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


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THE WORKS OF PLATO,

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Plato

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THE
WORKS OF PLATO.

A NEW AND LITERAL VERSION,

CHIEFLY FROM THE TEXT OF STALLBAUM

VOL. I.

CONTAINING

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES,
CRITO,
PHÆDO,

GORGIAS,
PROTAGORAS,
PHÆDRUS,

THEÆTETUS,
EUTHYPHRON
LYSIS.

BY HENRY CARY, M.A.,

WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE only version of the entire works of Plato, which has appeared in the English language, is that published by Taylor; in which nine of the Dialogues previously translated by Floyer Sydenham are introduced. Taylor's portion of the work is far from correct, and betrays an imperfect knowledge of Greek: that by Sydenham is much better, and evidently the work of a scholar, but in many instances, and those chiefly where difficulties present themselves, he obscures his author's meaning by too great amplification. Translations of several detached Dialogues have appeared at various times, but of those which have fallen into my hands none appear to me deserving of notice, with the exception of a little volume containing the *Phædrus*, *Lysis*, and *Protagoras*, by Mr. J. Wright, of Trinity College, Cambridge, the production of a promising scholar.

In the volume now offered to the public, I have endeavoured to keep as closely to the original as the idioms of the two languages would allow.

In the introduction to each Dialogue I have contented myself with giving a brief outline of the arguments; sufficient, I trust, to enable a reader not familiar with the rigid dialectics of Plato to follow the chain of his reasoning, and catch the points at which he so frequently diverges from, and again returns to, the main subject of each Dialogue.

The editions which have been made use of are those of Bekker, Ast, and Stallbaum, though with very few exceptions the readings of the latter have been adopted. The division into sections, according to the London edition of Bekker, has been retained, because the arrangement is convenient, and it is believed that that edition is more generally to be met with in this country than any other.

II. C.

Oxford, Nov. 28, 1848.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

Two charges were brought against Socrates, one, that he did not believe in the gods received by the state, the other, that he corrupted the Athenian youth by teaching them not to believe.

Plato, who was present at the trial, probably gives us the very arguments employed by the accused on that occasion. Socrates disdained to have recourse to the usual methods adopted by the popular orators of the day to secure an acquittal; and, having devoted his whole life to the search after and the inculcation of religious, philosophical, and moral truth, resolved to bear himself in this extremity in a manner consistent with his established character, and to take his stand on his own integrity and innocence, utterly uninfluenced by that imaginary evil, death. From this cause it is that his defence is so little artificial. In his discussions with others, on whatever subject, it was his constant habit to keep his opponents to the question before them, and he would never suffer them to evade it, but by a connected series of the most subtle questions or arguments compelled them to retract any erroneous opinion they might have advanced: whereas, in defending himself, he never once fairly grapples with either of the charges brought against him. With regard to the first accusation, that he did not believe in the established religion, he neither confesses nor denies it, but shews that he had in some instances conformed to the religious customs of his country, and that he did believe

B

in God, so much so indeed that even if they would acquit him on condition of his abandoning his practice of teaching others, he could not consent to such terms, but must persevere in fulfilling the mission on which the Deity had sent him, for that he feared God rather than man. With reference to the second charge which he meets first, by his usual method of a brief but close cross-examination of his accuser Melitus, he brings him to this dilemma, that he must either charge him with corrupting the youth designedly, which would be absurd, or with doing so undesignedly, for which he could not be liable to punishment.

The Defence itself properly ends with the twenty-fourth section. The second division to the twenty-ninth section relates only to the sentence which ought to be passed on him. And in the third and concluding part, with a dignity and fulness of hope worthy even of a Christian, he expresses his belief that the death to which he is going is only a passage to a better and a happier life.

THE
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

I KNOW not, O Athenians, how far you have been influenced by my accusers: for my part, in listening to them I almost forgot myself, so plausible were their arguments: however, so to speak, they have said nothing true. But of the many falsehoods which they uttered I wondered at one of them especially, that in which they said that you ought to be on your guard lest you should be deceived by me, as being eloquent in speech. For that they are not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact, when I shall shew that I am not by any means eloquent, this seemed to me the most shameless thing in them, unless indeed they call him eloquent who speaks the truth. For, if they mean this, then I would allow that I am an orator, but not after their fashion: for they, as I affirm, have said nothing true; but from me you shall hear the whole truth. Not indeed, Athenians, arguments highly wrought, as theirs were, with choice phrases and expressions, nor adorned, but you shall hear a speech uttered without premeditation, in such words as first present themselves. For I am confident that what I say will be just, and let none of you expect otherwise: for surely it would not become my time of life to come before you like a youth with a got up speech. Above all things therefore I beg and implore this of you, O Athenians, if you hear me defending myself in the same language as that in which I am accustomed to speak both in the forum at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised or disturbed on this account. For the case is this: I now for the first time come before a court of justice, though more than seventy years old; I am therefore utterly a stranger to the language here. As, then, if I were really a stranger, you would have pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which I had been educated, so now I ask this of you as an act of justice, as it appears to me, to

disregard the manner of my speech, for perhaps it may be somewhat worse, and perhaps better, and to consider this only, and to give your attention to this, whether I speak what is just or not; for this is the virtue of a judge, but of an orator to speak the truth.

2. First then, O Athenians, I am right in defending myself against the first false accusations alleged against me, and my first accusers, and then against the latest accusations, and the latest accusers. For many have been accusers of me to you, and for many years, who have asserted nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party, although they too are formidable; but those are still more formidable, Athenians, who laying hold of many of you from childhood, have persuaded you, and accused me of what is not true:—"that there is one Socrates, a wise man, who occupies himself about celestial matters, and has explored every thing under the earth, and makes the worse appear the better reason." Those, O Athenians, who have spread abroad this report are my formidable accusers: for they who hear them think that such a search into these things do not believe that there are gods. In the next place, these accusers are numerous, and have accused me now for a long time; moreover they said these things to you at that time of life in which you were most credulous, when you were boys and some of you youths, and they accused me altogether in my absence, when there was no one to defend me. But the most unreasonable thing of all is, that it is not possible to learn and mention their names, except that one of them happens to be a comic poet^a. Such, however, as influenced by envy and calumny have persuaded you, and those who, being themselves persuaded, have persuaded others, all these are most difficult to deal with; for it is not possible to bring any of them forward here, nor to confute any; but it is altogether necessary, to fight as it were with a shadow, in making my defence, and to convict when there is no one to answer. Consider, therefore, as I have said, that my accusers are twofold, some who have lately accused me, and others long since, whom I have made mention of; and believe that I ought to defend myself against these first; for you heard them accusing me first, and much more than these last.

Well. I must make my defence then, O Athenians, and

^a Aristophanes.

endeavour in this so short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny which you have long entertained. I wish, indeed, it might be so, if it were at all better both for you and me, and that in making my defence I could effect something more advantageous still: I think however that it will be difficult, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is. Nevertheless let this turn out as may be pleasing to God, I must obey the law, and make my defence.

3. Let us then repeat from the beginning what the accusation is from which the calumny against me has arisen, and relying on which Melitus has preferred this indictment against me. Well. What then do they who charge me say in their charge? For it is necessary to read their deposition as of public accusers. "Socrates acts wickedly, and is criminally curious in searching into things under the earth, and in the heavens, and in making the worse appear the better cause, and in teaching these same things to others." Such is the accusation: for such things you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, one Socrates there carried about, saying that he walks in the air, and acting many other buffooneries, of which I understand nothing whatever. Nor do I say this as disparaging such a science, if there be any one skilled in such things, only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a charge of this kind; but I say it, O Athenians, because I have nothing to do with such matters. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of this, and require you to inform and tell each other, as many of you as have ever heard me conversing; and there are many such among you. Therefore tell each other, if any one of you has ever heard me conversing little or much on such subjects. And from this you will know that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are of a similar nature.

4. However not one of these things is true; nor, if you have heard from any one that I attempt to teach men, and require payment, is this true. Though this indeed appears to me to be an honourable thing, if one should be able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, O Athenians, is able, by going through the several cities, to persuade the young men, who can attach themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow citizens as they please, to abandon their fellow citizens and associate with them, giving them money and thanks besides. There is also another

wise man here, a Parian, who I hear is staying in the city. For I happened to visit a person who spends more money on the sophists than all others together, I mean Callias, son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for he has two sons, "Callias," I said, "if your two sons were colts or calves, we should have had to choose a master for them and hire a person who would make them excel in such qualities as belong to their nature : and he would have been a groom or an agricultural labourer. But now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to choose for them? Who is there skilled in the qualities that become a man and a citizen? For I suppose you must have considered this, since you have sons. Is there any one," I said, "or not?" "Certainly," he answered. "Who is he?" said I, "and whence does he come? and on what terms does he teach?" He replied, "Evenus the Parian, Socrates, for five minæ." And I deemed Evenus happy, if he really possesses this art, and teaches so admirably. And I too should think highly of myself and be very proud, if I possessed this knowledge ; but I possess it not, O Athenians.

5. Perhaps, one of you may now object : "But, Socrates, what have you done then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For surely if you had not busied yourself more than others, such a report and story would never have got abroad, unless you had done something different from what most men do. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not pass a hasty judgment on you." He who speaks thus appears to me to speak justly, and I will endeavour to shew you what it is that has occasioned me this character and imputation. Listen then : to some of you perhaps I shall appear to jest, yet be assured that I shall tell you the whole truth. For I, O Athenians, have acquired this character through nothing else than a certain wisdom. Of what kind, then, is this wisdom? Perhaps it is merely human wisdom. For in this, in truth I appear to be wise. They probably, whom I just now mentioned, possessed a wisdom more than human, otherwise I know not what to say about it; for I am not acquainted with it, and whosoever says I am, speaks falsely and for the purpose of calumniating me. But, O Athenians, do not cry out against me, even though I should seem to you to speak somewhat arrogantly. For the account which I am going to give you, is not my own, but I shall refer to an authority whom

you will deem worthy of credit. For I shall adduce to you the god at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom, if I have any, and of what it is. You doubtless know Chærepho: he was my associate from youth, and the associate of most of you; he accompanied you in your late exile and returned with you. You know, then, what kind of a man Chærepho was, how earnest in whatever he undertook. Having once gone to Delphi, he ventured to make the following inquiry of the oracle, (and, as I said, O Athenians, do not cry out,) for he asked if there was any one wiser than me. The Pythian thereupon answered that there was not one wiser: and of this, his brother here will give you proofs, since he himself is dead.

6. Consider then why I mention these things: it is because I am going to shew you whence the calumny against me arose. For when I heard this, I reasoned thus with myself, What does the god mean? What enigma is this? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise, either much or little. What then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For assuredly he does not speak falsely: that he cannot do. And for a long time, I was in doubt what he meant; afterwards with considerable difficulty I had recourse to the following method of searching out his meaning. I went to one of those who have the character of being wise, thinking that there, if any where, I should confute the oracle, and shew in answer to the response that This man is wiser than I, though you affirmed that I was the wisest. Having then examined this man, (for there is no occasion to mention his name, he was however one of our great politicians, in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe, O Athenians,) having fallen into conversation with him, this man appeared to me to be wise in the opinion of most other men, and especially in his own opinion, though in fact he was not so. I thereupon endeavoured to shew him that he fancied himself to be wise, but really was not. Hence I became odious both to him, and to many others who were present. When I left him, I reasoned thus with myself, I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appear to know any thing great and good: but he fancies he knows something, although he knows nothing, whereas I, as I do not know any thing, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to be wiser than him, because I do not fancy I know what I do not know. After that I went to another who was thought to

be wiser than the former, and formed the very same opinion. Hence I became odious to him and to many others.

7. After this I went to others in turn, perceiving indeed and grieving and alarmed that I was making myself odious; however it appeared necessary to regard the oracle of the god as of the greatest moment, and that in order to discover its meaning, I must go to all who had the reputation of possessing any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians, for I must tell you the truth, I came to some such conclusion as this: those who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most deficient, in my researches in obedience to the god, and others who were considered inferior, more nearly approaching to the possession of understanding. But I must relate to you my wandering, and the labours which I underwent, in order that the oracle might prove incontrovertible. For after the politicians I went to the poets as well the tragic as the dithyrambic and others, expecting that here I should in very fact find myself more ignorant than them. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems, which appeared to me most elaborately finished, I questioned them as to their meaning, that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed, O Athenians, to tell you the truth; however it must be told. For, in a word, almost all who were present could have given a better account of them than those by whom they had been composed. I soon discovered this, therefore, with regard to the poets, that they do not effect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural inspiration and under the influence of enthusiasm like prophets and seers; for these also say many fine things, but they understand nothing that they say. The poets appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner: and at the same time I perceived that they considered themselves, on account of their poetry, to be the wisest of men in other things, in which they were not. I left them, therefore, under the persuasion that I was superior to them, in the same way that I was to the politicians.

8. At last, therefore, I went to the artizans. For I was conscious to myself that I knew scarcely any thing, but I was sure that I should find them possessed of much beautiful knowledge. And in this I was not deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this respect they were wiser than me. But, O Athenians, even the best workmen appeared to me to

have fallen into the same error as the poets: for each, because he excelled in the practice of his art, thought that he was very wise in other most important matters, and this mistake of theirs obscured the wisdom that they really possessed. I therefore asked myself in behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, possessing none either of their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both as they have. I answered, therefore, to myself and to the oracle, that it was better for me to continue as I am.

9. From this investigation, then, O Athenians, many enmities have arisen against me, and those the most grievous and severe, so that many calumnies have sprung from them and amongst them this appellation of being wise. For those who are from time to time present think that I am wise in those things, with respect to which I expose the ignorance of others. The god however, O Athenians, appears to be really wise, and to mean this by his oracle, that human wisdom is worth little or nothing; and it is clear that he did not say this of Socrates, but made use of my name, putting me forward as an example, as if he had said, that man is the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, knows that he is in reality worth nothing with respect to wisdom. Still therefore I go about and search and inquire into these things, in obedience to the god, both among citizens and strangers, if I think any one of them is wise; and when he appears to me not to be so, I take the part of the god, and shew that he is not wise. And in consequence of this occupation I have no leisure to attend in any considerable degree to the affairs of the state or my own; but I am in the greatest poverty through my devotion to the service of the god.

10. In addition to this, young men, who have much leisure and belong to the wealthiest families, following me of their own accord, take great delight in hearing men put to the test, and often imitate me, and themselves attempt to put others to the test: and then, I think, they find a great abundance of men who fancy they know something, although they know little or nothing. Hence those who are put to the test by them are angry with me, and not with them, and say that "there is one Socrates, a most pestilent fellow, who corrupts the youth." And when any one asks them by doing or teaching what, they have nothing to say, for they do not know: but that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say such things as are ready at

hand against all philosophers ; “ that he searches into things in heaven and things under the earth, that he does not believe there are gods, and that he makes the worse appear the better reason.” For they would not, I think, be willing to tell the truth, that they have been detected in pretending to possess knowledge, whereas they know nothing. Therefore, I think, being ambitious and vehement and numerous, and speaking systematically and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears, for a long time and diligently calumniating me. From amongst these, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon, have attacked me ; Melitus being angry on account of the poets, Anytus on account of the artizans and politicians, and Lycon on account of the rhetoricians. So that as I said in the beginning, I should wonder if I were able in so short a time to remove from your minds a calumny that has prevailed so long. This, O Athenians, is the truth ; and I speak it without concealing or disguising any thing from you, much or little ; though I very well know that by so doing I shall expose myself to odium. This however is a proof that I speak the truth, and that this is the nature of the calumny against me, and that these are its causes. And if you will investigate the matter, either now or hereafter, you will find it to be so.

11. With respect then to the charges which my first accusers have alleged against me, let this be a sufficient apology to you. To Melitus, that good and patriotic man, as he says, and to my later accusers, I will next endeavour to give an answer ; and here again, as there are different accusers let us take up their deposition. It is pretty much as follows : “ Socrates,” it says, “ acts unjustly in corrupting the youth, and in not believing in those gods in whom the city believes, but in other strange divinities.” Such is the accusation ; let us examine each particular of it. It says that I act unjustly in corrupting the youth. But I, O Athenians, say that Melitus acts unjustly, because he jests on serious subjects, rashly putting men upon trial, under pretence of being zealous and solicitous about things in which he never at any time took any concern. But that this is the case I will endeavour to prove to you.

12. Come then, Melitus, tell me ; do you not consider it of the greatest importance that the youth should be made as virtuous as possible ?

Mel. I do.

Socr. Well now, tell the judges who it is that makes them better, for it is evident that you know, since it concerns you so much: for, having detected me in corrupting them, as you say, you have cited me here and accused me; come then, say, and inform the judges who it is that makes them better. Do you see, Melitus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say? But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you never took any concern about the matter? But tell me, friend, who makes them better?

Mel. The laws.

Socr. I do not ask this, most excellent sir, but what man, who surely must first know this very thing, the laws?

Mel. These, Socrates, the judges.

Socr. How say you, Melitus? Are these able to instruct the youth, and make them better?

Mel. Certainly.

Socr. Whether all, or some of them, and others not?

Mel. All.

Socr. You say well, by Juno, and have found a great abundance of those that confer benefit. But what further? Can these hearers make them better, or not?

Mel. They too can.

Socr. And what of the senators?

Mel. The senators also.

Socr. But, Melitus, do those who attend the public assemblies corrupt the younger men? or do they all make them better?

Mel. They too.

Socr. All the Athenians therefore, as it seems, make them honourable and good, except me, but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so?

Mel. I do assert this very thing.

Socr. You charge me with great ill-fortune. But answer me: does it appear to you to be the same with respect to horses? do all men make them better, and is there only some one that spoils them? or does quite the contrary of this take place? is there some one person who can make them better, or very few, that is the trainers? but if the generality of men should meddle with and make use of horses, do they spoil them? Is not this the case, Melitus, both with respect to horses and all other animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. For it would be a great good-fortune

for the youth if only one person corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However, Melitus, you have sufficiently shewn that you never bestowed any care upon youth; and you clearly evince your own negligence, in that you have never paid any attention to the things with respect to which you accuse me.

13. Tell us further, Melitus, in the name of Jupiter, whether is it better to dwell with good or bad citizens? Answer, my friend: for I ask you nothing difficult. Do not the bad work some evil to those that are continually near them, but the good some good?

Mel. Certainly.

Socr. Is there any one that wishes to be injured rather than benefited by his associates? Answer, good man: for the law requires you to answer. Is there any one who wishes to be injured?

Mel. No, surely.

Socr. Come then, whether do you accuse me here, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them more depraved, designedly or undesignedly?

Mel. Designedly, I say.

Socr. What then, Melitus, are you at your time of life so much wiser than me at my time of life, as to know that the evil are always working some evil to those that are most near to them, and the good some good; but I have arrived at such a pitch of ignorance as not to know, that if I make any one of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of receiving some evil from him, and yet I designedly bring about this so great evil, as you say? In this I cannot believe you, Melitus, nor do I think would any other man in the world: but either I do not corrupt the youth, or if I do corrupt them, I do it undesignedly: so that in both cases you speak falsely. But if I corrupt them undesignedly, for such involuntary offences it is not usual to accuse one here, but to take one apart and teach and admonish one. For it is evident that if I am taught, I shall cease doing what I do undesignedly. But you shunned me, and were not willing to associate with and instruct me, but you accuse me here, where it is usual to accuse those who need punishment, and not instruction.

14. Thus, then, O Athenians, this now is clear that I have said, that Melitus never paid any attention to these matters, much or little. However tell us, Melitus, how you say I cor-

rupt the youth? Is it not evidently, according to the indictment which you have preferred, by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other strange deities? Do you not say that by teaching these things, I corrupt the youth?

Mel. Certainly I do say so.

Socr. By those very gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom the discussion now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these men. For I cannot understand whether you say that I teach them to believe that there are certain gods, (and in that case I do believe that there are gods, and am not altogether an atheist, nor in this respect to blame,) not however those which the city believes in, but others, and this it is that you accuse me of, that I introduce others; or do you say outright that I do not myself believe that there are gods, and that I teach others the same?

Mel. I say this, that you do not believe in any gods at all.

Socr. O wonderful Melitus, how come you to say this? Do I not then like the rest of mankind, believe that the sun and moon are gods?

Mel. No, by Jupiter, O judges: for he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon an earth.

Socr. You fancy that you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Melitus, and thus you put a slight on these men, and suppose them to be so illiterate, as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are full of such assertions. And the young, moreover, learn these things from me, which they might purchase for a drachma, at most, in the orchestra, and so ridicule Socrates, if he pretended they were his own, especially since they are so absurd? I ask then, by Jupiter, do I appear to you to believe that there is no god?

Mel. No, by Jupiter, none whatever.

Socr. You say what is incredible, Melitus, and that, as appears to me, even to yourself. For this man, O Athenians, appears to me to be very insolent and intemperate, and to have preferred this indictment through downright insolence, intemperance and wantonness. For he seems, as it were, to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an experiment. Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? For in my opinion he clearly contradicts himself in the

indictment, as if he should say, Socrates is guilty of wrong in not believing that there are gods, and in believing that there are gods. And this, surely, is the act of one who is trifling.

5. Consider with me now, Athenians, in what respect he appears to me to say so. And do you, Melitus, answer me; and do ye, as I besought you at the outset, remember not to make an uproar if I speak after my usual manner.

Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human affairs, but does not believe that there are men? Let him answer, judges, and not make so much noise. Is there any one who does not believe that there are horses, but that there are things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that there are pipers, but that there are things pertaining to pipes? There is not, O best of men: for since you are not willing to answer, I say it to you and to all here present. But answer to this at least: is there any one who believes that there are things relating to demons, but does not believe that there are demons?

Mel. There is not.

Socr. How obliging you are in having hardly answered, though compelled by these judges. You assert then that I do believe and teach things relating to demons, whether they be new or old; therefore, according to your admission, I do believe in things relating to demons, and this you have sworn in the bill of indictment. If then I believe in things relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I should believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. For I suppose you to assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to demons, do we not allow that they are gods, or the children of gods? Do you admit this or not?

Mel. Certainly.

Socr. Since then I allow that there are demons as you admit, if demons are a kind of gods, this is the point in which I say you speak enigmatically and divert yourself in saying that I do not allow there are gods, and again that I do allow there are, since I allow that there are demons? But if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones, either from nymphs or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what man can think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not gods? For it would be just as absurd, as if any one should think that there are mules the offspring of horses and asses, but should not think there are horses and asses. However, Melitus, it

cannot be otherwise than that you have preferred this indictment for the purpose of trying me, or because you were at a loss what real crime to allege against me: for that you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of sense, that the same person can think that there are things relating to demons and to gods, and yet that there are neither demons, nor gods, nor heroes, is utterly impossible.

16. That I am not guilty then, O Athenians, according to the indictment of Melitus, appears to me not to require a lengthened defence; but what I have said is sufficient. And as to what I said at the beginning, that there is a great enmity towards me among the multitude, be assured it is true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I am condemned, not Melitus, nor Anytus, but the calumny and envy of the multitude, which have already condemned many others, and those good men, and will I think condemn others also; for there is no danger that it will stop with me.

Perhaps, however, some one may say, "Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have pursued a study, from which you are now in danger of dying?" To such a person I should answer with good reason, You do not say well, friend, if you think that a man, who is even of the least value, ought to take into the account the risk of life or death, and ought not to consider that alone when he performs any action, whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and the part of a good man or bad man. For according to your reasoning, all those demi-gods that died at Troy would be vile characters, as well all the rest as the son of Thetis, who so far despised danger in comparison of submitting to disgrace, that when his mother, who was a goddess, spoke to him, in his impatience to kill Hector, something to this effect, as I think^b, "My son, if you revenge the death of your friend Patroclus, and slay Hector, you will yourself die, for," she said, "death awaits you immediately after Hector." But he, on hearing this, despised death and danger, and dreading much more to live as a coward, and not avenge his friends said; "May I die immediately, when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty, that I may not stay here an object of ridicule, by the curved ships, a burden to the ground?" Do you think that he cared for death and danger? For thus it is, O Athenians, in truth; wherever any one has posted himself,

^b *Iliad*. lib. xviii. ver 94, &c.

either thinking it to be better, or has been posted by his chief, there, as it appears to me, he ought to remain and meet danger taking no account either of death or any thing else in comparison with disgrace.

17. I then should be acting strangely, O Athenians, if, when the generals whom you chose to command me assigned me my post at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I then remained where they posted me, like any other person, and encountered the danger of death, but when the deity as I thought and believed, assigned it as my duty to pass my life in the study of philosophy, and in examining myself and others, I should on that occasion, through fear of death or any thing else whatsoever, desert my post. Strange indeed would it be, and then in truth any one might justly bring me to trial, and accuse me of not believing in the gods, from disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself to be wise when I am not. For to fear death, O Athenians, is nothing else than to appear to be wise, without being so; for it is to appear to know what one does not know. For no one knows but that death is the greatest of all goods to man; but men fear it, as if they well knew that it is the greatest of evils. And how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance, to think that one knows what one does not know? But I, O Athenians, in this perhaps differ from most men; and if I should say that I am in any thing wiser than another, it would be in this, that not having a competent knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I have not such knowledge. But to act unjustly, and to disobey my superior, whether God or man, I know is evil and base. I shall never, therefore, fear or shun things which, for aught I know, may be good, before evils which I know to be evils. So that even if you should now dismiss me, not yielding to the instances of Anytus, who said that either I should not^c appear here at all, or that, if I did appear, it was impossible not to put me to death, telling you that if I escaped, your sons, studying what Socrates teaches, would all be utterly corrupted; if you should address me thus, "Socrates, we shall not now yield to Anytus, but dismiss you, on this condition however, that you no longer persevere in your researches nor study philosophy, and if hereafter you are detected in so doing, you shall die,"—if, as I said, you should dismiss me on these terms, I should say to you:

• See the Crito. s. 5.

"O Athenians, I honour and love you : but I shall obey God rather than you ; and as long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease studying philosophy, and exhorting you and warning any one of you I may happen to meet, saying as I have been accustomed to do : ' O best of men, seeing you are an Athenian, of a city the most powerful and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed of being careful for riches, how you may acquire them in greatest abundance, and for glory and honour, but care not nor take any thought for wisdom and truth, and for your soul, how it may be made most perfect ? ' " And if any one of you should question my assertion, and affirm that he does care for these things, I shall not at once let him go, nor depart, but I shall question him, sift and prove him. And if he should appear to me not to possess virtue, but to pretend that he does, I shall reproach him for that he sets the least value on things of the greatest worth, but the highest on things that are worthless. Thus I shall act to all whom I meet, both young and old, stranger and citizen, but rather to you my fellow citizens, because ye are more nearly allied to me. For be well assured, this the deity commands. And I think that no greater good has ever befallen you in the city, than my zeal for the service of the god. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading you, both young and old, to take no care either for the body, or for riches, prior to or so much as for the soul, how it may be made most perfect, telling you that virtue does not spring from riches, but riches and all other human blessings, both private and public, from virtue. If, then, by saying these things, I corrupt the youth, these things must be mischievous ; but if any one says that I speak other things than these, he misleads you^d. Therefore I must say, O Athenians, either yield to An'ytus or do not, either dismiss me or not, since I shall not act otherwise, even though I must die many deaths.

18. Murmur not, O Athenians, but continue to attend to my request, not to murmur at what I say, but to listen, for as I think, you will derive benefit from listening. For I am going to say other things to you, at which perhaps you will raise a clamour ; but on no account do so. Be well assured, then, if you put me to death, being such a man as I say I am, you will

Οὐδὲν λέγει, literally " he says nothing : " on se trompe, ou l'on vous impose, *Cousin*.

not injure me more than yourselves. For neither will Melitus nor Anytus harm me; nor have they the power: for I do not think that it is possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may perhaps have me condemned to death, or banished or deprived of civil rights; and he or others may perhaps consider these as mighty evils: I however do not consider them so, but that it is much more so to do what he is now doing, to endeavour to put a man to death unjustly. Now, therefore, O Athenians, I am far from making a defence on my own behalf, as any one might think, but I do so on your behalf, lest by condemning me you should offend at all with respect to the gift of the deity to you. For, if you should put me to death, you will not easily find such another, though it may be ridiculous to say so, altogether attached by the deity to this city as to a powerful and generous horse, somewhat sluggish from his size, and requiring to be roused by a gad-fly; so the deity appears to have united me, being such a person as I am, to the city, that I may rouse you, and persuade and reprove every one of you, nor ever cease besetting you throughout the whole day. Such another man, O Athenians, will not easily be found, therefore, if you will take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, being irritated, like drowsy persons who are roused from sleep, will strike me, and, yielding to Anytus, will unthinkingly condemn me to death; and then you will pass the rest of your life in sleep, unless the deity, caring for you, should send some one else to you. But that I am a person who has been given by the deity to this city, you may discern from hence; for it is not like the ordinary conduct of men, that I should have neglected all my own affairs and suffered my private interest to be neglected for so many years, and that I should constantly attend to your concerns, addressing myself to each of you separately, like a father, or elder brother, persuading you to the pursuit of virtue. And if I had derived any profit from this course, and had received pay for my exhortations, there would have been some reason for my conduct; but now you see yourselves, that my accusers, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in every thing else, have not had the impudence to charge me with this, and to bring witnesses to prove that I ever either exacted or demanded any reward. And I think I produce a sufficient proof that I speak the truth, *namely*, my poverty.

19. Perhaps, however, it may appear absurd, that I, going

about, thus advise you in private and make myself busy, but never venture to present myself in public before your assemblies and give advice to the city. The cause of this is that which you have often and in many places heard me mention: because I am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence, which also Melitus, through mockery, has set out in the indictment. This began with me from childhood, being a kind of voice which, when present, always diverts me from what I am about to do, but never urges me on. This it is which opposed my meddling in public politics; and it appears to me to have opposed me very properly. For be well assured, O Athenians, if I had long since attempted to intermeddle with politics, I should have perished long ago, and should not have at all benefited you or myself. And be not angry with me for speaking the truth. For it is not possible that any man should be safe, who sincerely opposes either you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjust and illegal actions from being committed in a city; but it is necessary that he who in earnest contends for justice, if he will be safe for but a short time, should live privately, and take no part in public affairs.

20. I will give you strong proofs of this, not words, but, what you value, facts. Hear then what has happened to me, that you may know that I would not yield to any one contrary to what is just, through fear of death, at the same time that, by not yielding, I must perish. I shall tell you what will be displeasing and wearisome*, yet true. For I, O Athenians, never bore any other magisterial office in the city, but have been a senator: and our Antiochean tribe happened to supply the Prytanes when you chose to condemn in a body the ten generals, who had not taken off those that perished in the sea-fight, in violation of the law, as you afterwards all thought. At that time I alone of the Prytanes opposed your doing any thing contrary to the laws, and I voted against you; and when the orators were ready to denounce me, and to carry me before a magistrate, and you urged and cheered them on, I thought I ought rather to meet the danger with law and justice on my side, than through fear of imprisonment or death to take part with you in your unjust designs. And this happened while the city was

* But for the authority of Stallbaum, I should have translated *δικανικά* "forensic," that is, such arguments as an advocate would use in a court of justice.

governed by a democracy. But when it became an oligarchy the Thirty, having sent for me with four others to the Tholus, ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, that he might be put to death; and they gave many similar orders to many others, wishing to involve as many as they could in guilt. Then however I shewed, not in word but in deed, that I did not care for death, if the expression be not too rude, in the smallest degree, but that all my care was to do nothing unjust or unholy. For that government, strong as it was, did not so overawe me as to make me commit an unjust action; but when we came out from the Tholus, the four went to Salamis, and brought back Leon; but I went away home. And perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that government had not been speedily broken up. And of this you can have many witnesses.

21. Do you think, then, that I should have survived so many years, if I had engaged in public affairs, and, acting as becomes a good man, had aided the cause of justice, and, as I ought, had deemed this of the highest importance? Far from it, O Athenians: nor would any other man have done so. But I, through the whole of my life, if I have done any thing in public, shall be found to be a man, and the very same in private, who has never made a concession to any one contrary to justice, neither to any other, nor to any one of these whom my calumniators say are my disciples. I however was never the preceptor of any one; but if any one desired to hear me speaking and to see me busied about my own mission, whether he were young or old, I never refused him. Nor do I discourse when I receive money, and not when I do not receive any, but I allow both rich and poor alike to question me, and, if any one wishes it, to answer me and hear what I have to say. And for these, whether any one proves to be a good man or not, I cannot justly be responsible, because I never either promised them any instruction or taught them at all. But if any one says that he has ever learnt or heard any thing from me in private, which all others have not, be well assured that he does not speak the truth.

22. But why do some delight to spend so long a time with me? Ye have heard, O Athenians. I have told you the whole truth, that they delight to hear those closely questioned who think that they are wise but are not: for this is by no means

disagreeable. But this duty, as I say, has been enjoined me by the deity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode by which any other divine decree has ever enjoined any thing to man to do. These things, O Athenians, are both true, and easily confuted if not true. For if I am now corrupting some of the youths, and have already corrupted others, it were fitting, surely, that if any of them, having become advanced in life, had discovered that I gave them bad advice when they were young, they should now rise up against me, accuse me, and have me punished; or if they were themselves unwilling to do this, some of their kindred, their fathers, or brothers, or other relatives, if their kinsmen have ever sustained any damage from me, should now call it to mind. Many of them however are here present, whom I see: first, Crito, my contemporary and fellow-burgher, father of this Critobulus; then, Lysanias of Sphettus, father of this Æschines; again, Antiphon of Cephissus, father of Epigenes; there are those others too, whose brothers maintained the same intimacy with me, namely, Nicostratus, son of Theodotus, brother of Theodotus—Theodotus indeed is dead, so that he could not deprecate his brother's proceedings, and Paralus here, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; and Adimantus son of Ariston, whose brother is this Plato; and Æantodorus, whose brother is this Apollodorus. I could also mention many others to you, some one of whom certainly Melitus ought to have adduced in his speech as a witness. If however he then forgot to do so, let him now adduce them, I give him leave to do so, and let him say it, if he has any thing of the kind to allege. But quite contrary to this, you will find, O Athenians, all ready to assist me, who have corrupted and injured their relatives, as Melitus and Anytus say. For those who have been themselves corrupted might perhaps have some reason for assisting me; but those who have not been corrupted, men now advanced in life, their relatives, what other reason can they have for assisting me, except that right and just one, that they know that Melitus speaks falsely, and that I speak the truth.

23. Well then, Athenians; these are pretty much the things I have to say in my defence, and others perhaps of the same kind. Perhaps, however, some among you will be indignant on recollecting his own case, if he, when engaged in a cause far less than this, implored and besought the judges with many

tears, bringing forward his children in order that he might excite their utmost compassion, and many others of his relatives and friends, whereas I do none of these things, although I may appear to be incurring the extremity of danger. Perhaps, therefore, some one, taking notice of this, may become more determined against me, and, being enraged at this very conduct of mine, may give his vote under the influence of anger. If then any one of you is thus affected,—I do not however suppose that there is,—but if there should be, I think I may reasonably say to him; “I too, O best of men, have relatives; for to make use of that saying of Homer, I am not sprung from an oak, nor from a rock, but from men, so that I too, O Athenians, have relatives, and three sons, one now grown up, and two boys: I shall not however bring any one of them forward and implore you to acquit me. Why then shall I not do this? Not from contumacy, O Athenians, nor disrespect towards you. Whether or not I am undaunted at the prospect of death, is another question, but out of regard to my own character, and yours, and that of the whole city, it does not appear to me to be honourable that I should do any thing of this kind at my age, and with the reputation I have, whether true or false. For it is commonly agreed that Socrates in some respects excels the generality of men. If, then, those among you who appear to excel either in wisdom, or fortitude, or any other virtue whatsoever, should act in such a manner as I have often seen some when they have been brought to trial, it would be shameful, who appearing indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a surprising manner, as thinking they should suffer something dreadful by dying, and as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. Such men appear to me to bring disgrace on the city, so that any stranger might suppose that such of the Athenians as excel in virtue, and whom they themselves choose in preference to themselves for magistracies and other honours, are in no respect superior to women. For these things, O Athenians, neither ought we to do who have attained to any height of reputation, nor, should we do them, ought you to suffer us; but you should make this manifest, that you will much rather condemn him who introduces these piteous dramas, and makes the city ridiculous, than him who quietly awaits your decision.

24. But reputation apart, O Athenians, it does not appear

to me to be right to entreat a judge, or to escape by entreaty, but one ought to inform and persuade him. For a judge does not sit for the purpose of administering justice out of favour, but that he may judge rightly, and he is sworn not to shew favour to whom he pleases, but that he will decide according to the laws. It is therefore right that neither should we accustom you, nor should you accustom yourselves to violate your oaths; for in so doing neither of us would act righteously. Think not then, O Athenians, that I ought to adopt such a course towards you as I neither consider honourable, nor just, nor holy, as well, by Jupiter, on any other occasion, and now especially when I am accused of impiety by this Melitus. For clearly, if I should persuade you, and by my entreaties should put a constraint on you who are bound by an oath, I should teach you to think that there are no gods, and in reality, while making my defence, should accuse myself of not believing in the gods. This, however, is far from being the case: for I believe, O Athenians, as none of my accusers do, and I leave it to you and to the deity to judge concerning me in such way as will be best both for me and for you.

[Socrates here concludes his defence, and the votes being taken, he is declared guilty by a majority of voices. He thereupon resumes his address.]

25. That I should not be grieved, O Athenians, at what has happened, namely, that you have condemned me, as well many other circumstances concur in bringing to pass, and moreover this, that what has happened has not happened contrary to my expectation; but I much rather wonder at the number of votes on either side. For I did not expect that I should be condemned by so small a number, but by a large majority; but now, as it seems, if only three more votes had changed sides, I should have been acquitted. As far as Melitus is concerned, as it appears to me, I have been already acquitted, and not only have I been acquitted, but it is clear to every one that had not Anytus and Lycon come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas, for not having obtained a fifth part of the votes.

26. The man then awards me the penalty of death. Well. But what shall I, on my part, O Athenians, award myself? Is it not clear that it will be such as I deserve? What then is that? do I deserve to suffer or to pay a fine, for that I have

purposely during my life not remained quiet, but neglecting what most men seek after, money-making, domestic concerns, military command, popular oratory, and moreover all the magistracies, conspiracies and cabals that are met with in the city, thinking that I was in reality too upright a man to be safe if I took part in such things, I therefore did not apply myself to those pursuits, by attending to which I should have been of no service either to you or to myself; but in order to confer the greatest benefit on each of you privately, as I affirm, I thereupon applied myself to that object, endeavouring to persuade every one of you, not to take any care of his own affairs, before he had taken care of himself, in what way he may become the best and wisest, nor of the affairs of the city before ~~he took~~ care of the city itself; and ~~that~~ he should attend to other things in the same manner. What treatment then do I deserve, seeing I am such a man? Some reward, O Athenians, if at least I am to be estimated according to my real deserts; and moreover such a reward as would be suitable to me. What then is suitable to a poor man, a benefactor, and who has need of leisure in order to give you good advice? There is nothing so suitable, O Athenians, as that such a man should be maintained in the Prytaneum, and this much more than if one of you had been victorious at the Olympic games in a horse race, or in the two or four-horsed chariot race: for such a one makes you appear to be happy, but I, to be so: and he does not need support, but I do. If, therefore, I must award a sentence according to my just deserts, I award this, maintenance in the Prytaneum.

27. Perhaps, however, in speaking to you thus, I appear to you to speak in the same presumptuous manner as I did respecting commiseration and entreaties: but such is not the case, O Athenians, it is rather this. I am persuaded that I never designedly injured any man, though I cannot persuade you of this, for we have conversed with each other but for a short time. For if there was the same law with you as with other men, that in capital cases the trial should last not only one day but many, I think you would be persuaded; but it is not easy in a short time to do away with great calumnies. Being persuaded then that I have injured no one, I am far from intending to injure myself, and of pronouncing against myself that I am deserving of punishment, and from awarding

myself any thing of the kind. Through fear of what? lest I should suffer that which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not whether it be good or evil? instead of this, shall I choose what I well know to be evil, and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, a slave to the established magistracy, the Eleven? Shall I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned until I have paid it? But this is the same as that which I just now mentioned, for I have not money to pay it. Shall I then award myself exile? For perhaps you would consent to this award. I should indeed be very fond of life, O Athenians, if I were so devoid of reason as not to be able to reflect that you, who are my fellow citizens, have been unable to endure my manner of life and discourses, but they have become so burdensome and odious to you, that you now seek to be rid of them: others however will easily bear them: far from it, O Athenians. A fine life it would be for me at my age to go out wandering and driven from city to city, and so to live. For I well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will listen to me when I speak, as they do here. And if I repulse them, they will themselves drive me out, persuading the elders; and if I do not repulse them, their fathers and kindred will banish me on their account.

28. Perhaps however some one will say, Can you not, Socrates, when you have gone from us, live a silent and quiet life? This is the most difficult thing of all to persuade some of you. For if I say that that would be to disobey the deity, and that therefore it is impossible for me to live quietly, you would not believe me, thinking I spoke ironically. If, on the other hand, I say that this is the greatest good to man, to discourse daily on virtue, and other things which you have heard me discussing, examining both myself and others, but that a life without investigation is not worth living for, still less would you believe me if I said this. Such however is the case, as I affirm, O Athenians, though it is not easy to persuade you. And at the same time I am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. If indeed I were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I should be able to pay; for then I should have suffered no harm, but now—for I cannot, unless you are willing to amerce me in such a sum as I am able to pay. But perhaps I could pay you a mina of silver: in that sum then I amerce myself. But Plato here, O Athenians, and Crito Crito-

bulus, and Apollodorus bid me amerce myself in thirty minæ, and they offer to be sureties. I amerce myself then to you in that sum; and they will be sufficient sureties for the money.

[The judges now proceeded to pass the sentence, and condemned Socrates to death; whereupon he continued:]

29. For the sake of no long space of time, O Athenians, you will incur the character and reproach at the hands of those who wish to defame the city, of having put that wise man, Socrates, to death. For those who wish to defame you will assert that I am wise, though I am not. If, then, you had waited for a short time, this would have happened of its own accord; for observe my age, that it is far advanced in life, and near death. But I say this not to you all, but to those only who have condemned me to die. And I say this too to the same persons. Perhaps you think, O Athenians, that I have been convicted through the want of arguments, by which I might have persuaded you, had I thought it right to do and say any thing, so that I might escape punishment. Far otherwise: I have been convicted through want indeed, yet not of arguments, but of audacity and impudence, and of the inclination to say such things to you as would have been most agreeable for you to hear, had I lamented and bewailed and done and said many other things unworthy of me, as I affirm, but such as you are accustomed to hear from others. But neither did I then think that I ought, for the sake of avoiding danger, to do any thing unworthy of a freeman, nor do I now repent of having so defended myself; but I should much rather choose to die, having so defended myself, than to live in that way. For neither in a trial nor in battle, is it right that I or any one else should employ every possible means whereby he may avoid death; for in battle it is frequently evident that a man might escape death by laying down his arms, and throwing himself on the mercy of his pursuers. And there are many other devices in every danger, by which to avoid death, if a man dares to do and say every thing. But this is not difficult, O Athenians, to escape death, but it is much more difficult to avoid depravity, for it runs swifter than death. And now I, being slow and aged, am overtaken by the slower of the two; but my accusers, being strong and active, have been overtaken by the swifter, wickedness. And now I depart, condemned by you to death; but they condemned by truth, as guilty of iniquity and injustice:

and I abide my sentence and so do they. These things, perhaps, ought so to be, and I think that they are for the best.

30. In the next place, I desire to predict to you who have condemned me, what will be your fate : for I am now in that condition in which men most frequently prophecy, namely, when they are about to die. I say then to you, O Athenians, who have condemned me to death, that immediately after my death a punishment will overtake you, far more severe, by Jupiter, than that which you have inflicted on me. For you have done this, thinking you should be freed from the necessity of giving an account of your life. The very contrary however, as I affirm, will happen to you. Your accusers will be more numerous, whom I have now restrained, though you did not perceive it ; and they will be more severe, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more indignant. For, if you think that by putting men to death you will restrain any one from upbraiding you because you do not live well, you are much mistaken ; for this method of escape is neither possible nor honourable, but that other is most honourable and most easy, not to put a check upon others, but for a man to take heed to himself, how he may be most perfect. Having predicted thus much to those of you who have condemned me, I take my leave of you.

31. But with you who have voted for my acquittal, I would gladly hold converse on what has now taken place, while the magistrates are busy and I am not yet carried to the place where I must die. Stay with me then, so long, O Athenians, for nothing hinders our conversing with each other, whilst we are permitted to do so ; for I wish to make known to you, as being my friends, the meaning of that which has just now befallen me. To me then, O my judges,—and in calling you judges I call you rightly,—a strange thing has happened. For the wonted prophetic voice of my guardian deity, on every former occasion even in the most trifling affairs opposed me, if I was about to do any thing wrong ; but now, that has befallen me which ye yourselves behold, and which any one would think and which is supposed to be the extremity of evil, yet neither when I departed from home in the morning did the warning of the god oppose me, nor when I came up here to the place of trial, nor in my address when I was about to say any thing ; yet on other occasions it has frequently restrained me in the midst of speaking. But now, it has never through-

out this proceeding opposed me, either in what I did or said. What then do I suppose to be the cause of this? I will tell you: what has befallen me appears to be a blessing; and it is impossible that we think rightly who suppose that death is an evil. A great proof of this to me is the fact that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal should have opposed me, unless I had been about to meet with some good.

32. Moreover we may hence conclude that there is great hope that death is a blessing. For to die is one of two things: for either the dead may be annihilated and have no sensation of any thing whatever; or, as it is said, there is a certain change and passage of the soul from one place to another. And if it is a privation of all sensation, as it were a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think that if any one, having selected a night, in which he slept so soundly as not to have had a dream, and having compared this night with all the other nights and days of his life, should be required on consideration to say how many days and nights he had passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout his life, I think that not only a private person, but even the great king himself would find them easy to number in comparison with other days and nights. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I say it is a gain; for thus all futurity appears to be nothing more than one night. But if, on the other hand, death is a removal from hence to another place, and what is said be true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing can there be than this, my judges? For if, on arriving at Hades, released from these who pretend to be judges, one shall find those who are true judges, and who are said to judge there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demigods as were just during their own life, would this be a sad removal? At what price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and Musæus, Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if this be true. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable, when I should meet with Palamedes, and Ajax son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients who has died by an unjust sentence. The comparing my sufferings with theirs would, I think, be no unpleasing occupation. But the greatest pleasure would be to spend my time in questioning and examining the people there

as I have done those here, and discovering who among them is wise, and who fancies himself to be so but is not. At what price, my judges, would not any one estimate the opportunity of questioning him who led that mighty army against Troy, or Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten thousand others, whom one might mention, both men and women? with whom to converse and associate, and to question them, would be an inconceivable happiness. Surely for that the judges there do not condemn to death; for in other respects those who live there are more happy than those that are here, and are henceforth immortal, if at least what is said be true.

33. You, therefore, O my judges, ought to entertain good hopes with respect to death, and to meditate on this one truth, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, nor are his concerns neglected by the gods. And what has befallen me is not the effect of chance; but this is clear to me, that now to die, and be freed from my cares, is better for me. On this account the warning in no way turned me aside; and I bear no resentment towards those who condemned me, or against my accusers, although they did not condemn and accuse me with this intention, but thinking to injure me: in this they deserve to be blamed.

Thus much however I beg of them. Punish my sons, when they grow up, O judges, paining them as I have pained you, if they appear to you to care for riches or any thing else before virtue, and if they think themselves to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as I have done you, for not attending to what they ought, and for conceiving themselves to be something when they are worth nothing. If ye do this, both I and my sons shall have met with just treatment at your hands.

But it is now time to depart,—for me to die, for you to live. But which of us is going to a better state is unknown to every one but God.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO.

It has been remarked by Stallbaum that Plato had a **two-fold** design in this Dialogue; one, and that the primary **one**, to free Socrates from the imputation of having attempted to corrupt the Athenian youth; the other, to establish the principle that under all circumstances it is the duty of a good citizen to obey the laws of his country. These two points, however, are so closely interwoven with each other, that the general principle appears only to be illustrated by the example of Socrates.

Crito was one of those friends of Socrates who had been present at his trial and had offered to assist in paying a fine, had a fine been imposed instead of the sentence of death. He appears to have frequently visited his friend in prison after his condemnation, and now, having obtained access to his cell very early in the morning, finds him composed in a quiet sleep. He brings intelligence that the ship, the arrival of which would be the signal for his death on the following day, is expected to arrive forthwith, and takes occasion to entreat Socrates to make his escape, the means of which were already prepared. Socrates thereupon, having promised to follow the advice of Crito, if after the matter had been fully discussed it should appear to be right to do so, proposes to consider the duty of a citizen towards his country, and having established the divine principle, that it is wrong to return evil for evil, goes on to shew that the obligations of a citizen to his country are even more binding than those of a child to its parent or a slave to his master, and that therefore it is his duty to obey the established laws, at whatever cost to himself.

At length Crito admits that he has no answer to make, and Socrates resolves to submit himself to the will of Providence.

CRITO;

OR

THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN.

SOCRATES, CRITO

Socr. WHY have you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not very early?

Cri. It is.

Socr. About what time?

Cri. Scarce day-break.

Socr. I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you.

Cri. He is familiar with me, Socrates, from my having frequently come hither; and he is under some obligations to me.

Socr. Have you just now come, or some time since?

Cri. A considerable time since.

Socr. Why then did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting down by me in silence?

Cri. By Jupiter, Socrates, I should not myself like to be so long awake and in such affliction. But I have been for some time wondering at you, perceiving how sweetly you slept; and I purposely did not awake you, that you might pass your time as pleasantly as possible. And indeed I have often before throughout your whole life considered you happy in your disposition, but far more so in the present calamity, seeing how easily and meekly you bear it.

Socr. However, Crito, it would be disconsonant for a man at my time of life to repine because he must needs die.

Cri. But others, Socrates, at your age have been involved in similar calamities, yet their age has not hindered their repining at their present fortune.

Socr. So it is. But why did you come so early?

Cri. Bringing sad tidings, Socrates; not sad to you, as it appears, but to me and all your friends sad and heavy; and which I, I think, shall bear worst of all.

Socr. What tidings? Has the ship^a arrived from Delos, on the arrival of which I must die?

Cri. It has not yet arrived; but it appears to me that it **wil**. come to-day, from what certain persons report who have come from Sunium^b, and left it there. It is clear, therefore, from these messengers, that it will come to-day, and consequently it will be necessary, Socrates, for you to die to-morrow.

2. *Socr.* But with good fortune, Crito: and if so it please the gods, so be it. I do not think, however, that it will come to-day.

Cri. Whence do you form this conjecture?

Socr. I will tell you. I must die on the day after that on which the ship arrives.

Cri. So they say^c who have the control of these things.

Socr. I do not think, then, that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I conjecture this from a dream which I had this very night, not long ago; and you seem very opportunely to have refrained from waking me.

Cri. But what was this dream?

Socr. A beautiful and majestic woman, clad in white garments, seemed to approach me, and to call to me and say "Socrates, three days hence you will reach fertile Phthia^d."

Cri. What a strange dream, Socrates!

Socr. Very clear, however, as it appears to me, Crito.

3. *Cri.* Very much so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be persuaded by me, and save yourself. For, if you die, not only a single calamity will befall me, but besides being deprived of such a friend as I shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not know you and me well, when I might have saved you, had I been willing to spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what character can be more disgraceful than this to appear to value one's riches more than one's friends? For the generality of men will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence, when we urged you to it.

Socr. But why, my dear Crito, should we care so much for the opinion of the many? For the most worthy men, whom

^a See the Phædo, s. 1.

^b A promontory at the southern extremity of Attica.

^c The Eleven.

^d See Homer's Iliad l. ix. v. 363.

we ought rather to regard, will think that matters have transpired as they really have.

Cri. Yet you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to attend to the opinion of the many. For the very circumstances of the present case shew that the multitude are able to affect not only the smallest evils, but even the greatest, if any one is calumniated to them.

Socr. Would, O Crito, that the multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also affect the greatest good, for then it would be well. But now they can do neither; for they can neither make a wise man, nor foolish; but they do whatever chances.

4. *Cri.* So let it be then. But answer me this, Socrates; are you not anxious for me and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence, informers should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off, and so we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very large sum, or to suffer something else beside this? For, if you fear any thing of the kind, dismiss your fears. For we are justified in running this risk to save you, and, if need be, even a greater than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not refuse.

Socr. I am anxious about this, Crito, and about many other things.

Cri. Do not fear this, however; for the sum is not large on receipt of which certain persons are willing to save you, and take you hence. In the next place, do you not see how cheap these informers are, so that there would be no need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your service, sufficient, I think, for the purpose: then if, out of regard to me, you do not think right to spend my money, these strangers here are ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. Cebes, too, is ready, and very many others. So that, as I said, do not through fears of this kind hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in court give you any trouble, that if you went from hence you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many places, and wherever you go, men will love you: and if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will esteem you very highly, and will ensure your safety, so that no one in Thessaly will molest you.

5. Moreover, Socrates, you do not appear to me to pur-

just course in giving yourself up when you might be saved ; and you press on the very results with respect to yourself which your enemies would press and have pressed in their anxiety to destroy you. Besides this, too, you appear to me to betray your own sons, whom, when it is in your power to rear and educate them, you will abandon, and, as far as you are concerned, they will meet with such a fate as chance brings them, and, as is probable, they will meet with such things as orphans are wont to experience in a state of orphanage. Surely one ought not to have children, or one should go through the toil of rearing and instructing them. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent course ; though you ought to have chosen such a course as a good and brave man would have done, since you profess to have made virtue your study through the whole of your life ; so that I am ashamed both for you and for us who are your friends, lest this whole affair of yours should seem to be the effect of cowardice on our part ; your appearing to stand your trial in the court, since you appeared when it was in your power not to have done so, the very manner in which the trial was conducted, and this last circumstance, as it were a ridiculous consummation of the whole business, your appearing to have escaped from us through our indolence and cowardice, who did not save you, nor did you save yourself, when it was practicable and possible, had we but exerted ourselves a little. Think of these things, therefore, Socrates, and beware, lest, besides the evil *that will result*, they be disgraceful both to you and to us ; advise then with yourself, though indeed there is no longer time for advising, your resolve should be already made. And there is but one plan ; for in the following night the whole must be accomplished. If we delay, it will be impossible and no longer practicable. By all means, therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and on no account refuse.

6. *Socr.* My dear Crito, your zeal would be very commendable were it united with right principle ; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it is, by so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always, am a person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according as it appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the reasons, which I formerly professed, I cannot now reject, because this misfor

tune has befallen me ; but they appear to me in much the same light, and I respect and honour them as before ; so that if we are unable to adduce any better at the present time, be assured that I shall not give in to you, even though the power of the multitude should endeavour to terrify us like children, by threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the matter most conveniently ? First of all, if we recur to the argument which you used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was rightly resolved or not, that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and to others not ; or whether, before it was necessary that I should die, it was rightly resolved, but now it has become clear that it was said idly for argument's sake, though in reality it was merely jest and trifling. I desire then, Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether it will appear to me in a different light now that I am in this condition, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I think, on former occasions, by those who were thought to speak seriously, as I just now observed, that of the opinions which men entertain some should be very highly esteemed and others not. By the gods, Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said ? For you, in all human probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider then : does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled, that we ought not to respect all the opinions of men, but some we should and others not ? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of some we should and of others not ? What say you ? Is not this rightly resolved ?

Cri. It is.

Socr. Therefore, we should respect the good but not the bad ?

Cri. Yes.

Socr. And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the foolish ?

Cri. How can it be otherwise ?

7. *Socr.* Come then, how again were the following points settled ? Does a man who practises gymnastic exercises, and applies himself to them, pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one, or of that one man only who happens to be a physician or teacher of the exercises ?

Cri. Of that one only.

Socr. He ought, therefore, to fear the censures and covet the praises of that one, but not those of the multitude.

Cri. Clearly.

Socr. He ought, therefore, so to practise and exercise himself, and to eat and drink, as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows, rather than to all others together.

Cri. It is so.

Socr. Well, then, if he disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion and praise, but respects that of the multitude and of those who know nothing, will he not suffer some evil?

Cri. How should he not?

Socr. But what is this evil? whither does it tend, and on what part of him that disobeys will it fall?

Cri. Clearly on his body, for this it ruins.

Socr. You say well. The case is the same too, Crito, with all other things, not to go through them all. With respect, then, to things just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, about which we are now consulting, ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to respect it, or that of one, if there is any one who understands, whom we ought to reverence and respect rather than all others together? and if we do not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by injustice? Or is this nothing?

Cri. I agree with you, Socrates.

8. *Socr.* Come then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what is wholesome, but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being persuaded by those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not?

Cri. Yes.

Socr. Can we then enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body?

Cri. By no means.

Socr. But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice ruins, but justice benefits? Or do we think that to be of less value than the body, whatever part of us it may be, about which injustice and justice are concerned?

Cri. By no means.

Socr. But of more value?

Cri. Much more.

Socr. We must not, then, my excellent friend, so much regard what the multitude will say of us, but what he will say who understands the just and unjust; the one, even truth itself. So that at first you did not set out with a right principle, when you laid it down that we ought to regard the opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and honourable and good, and their contraries. However, some one may say, are not the multitude able to put us to death?

Cri. This, too, is clear, Socrates; any one might say so.

Socr. You say truly. But, my admirable friend, this principle which we have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before*. And consider this moreover, whether it still holds good with us or not, that we are not to be anxious about living, but about living well.

Cri. It does hold good.

Socr. And does this hold good or not, that to live well and honourably and justly, are the same thing?

Cri. It does.

9. *Socr.* From what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises, whether it is just or not, that I should endeavour to leave this place without the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be just, we will make the attempt; but if not, we will give it up; but as to the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money, reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they could do so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so requires, must consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned, whether we shall act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who will lead me hence, as well they who lead me as we who are led hence, or whether in truth we shall not act unjustly in doing all these things. And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we must needs die, or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall be acting unjustly.

* That is to say, the principle which we had laid down in former discussions, that no regard is to be had to popular opinion, is still found to hold good.

Cri. You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates; but see what we are to do.

Socr. Let us consider the matter together, my friend; and if you have any thing to object to what I say make good your objection, and I will yield to you; but if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me the same thing so often, that I ought to depart hence, against the will of the Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavours to persuade me thus to act, so long as it is not against my will. Consider, then, the beginning of our enquiry, whether it is stated to your entire satisfaction, and endeavour to answer the question put to you exactly as you think right.

Cri. I will endeavour to do so.

10. *Socr.* Say we, then, that we should on no account deliberately commit injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain circumstances, under others not? Or is it on no account either good or honourable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former occasions, and as we just now said? Or have all those our former admissions been dissipated in these few days; and have we, Crito, old men as we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other, without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? whether the multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more severe or a milder punishment than this, still is injustice on every account both evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?

Cri. We do admit it.

Socr. On no account, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.

Cri. Surely not.

Socr. Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly.

Cri. It appears not.

Socr. What then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not?

Cri. Surely it is not right, Socrates.

Socr. But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated, is that right or not?

Cri. By no means.

Socr. For to do evil to men, differs in no respect from committing injustice.

Cri. You say truly.

Socr. It is not right, therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil to any man, however one may have suffered from him. But take care Crito, that in allowing these things, you do not allow them contrary to your opinion. For I know that to some few only these things both do appear and will appear to be true. They then to whom these things appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common, and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other's opinions. Consider well then, whether you coincide and think with me; and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point, that it is never right either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when one has been evil-entreated to revenge one's-self by doing evil in return; or, do you dissent from and not coincide in this principle? For so it appears to me both long since and now; but if you in any respect think otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former opinions, hear what follows.

Cri. I do persist in them and think with you. Speak on then.

Socr. I say next then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has promised to do things that are just, he ought to do them, or evade his promise?

Cri. He ought to do them.

11. *Socr.* Observe then what follows. By departing hence without the leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by what we agreed on as being just, or do we not?

Cri. I am unable to answer your question, Socrates: for I do not understand it.

Socr. Then consider it thus. If while we were preparing to run away, or by whatever name we should call it, the laws and commonwealth should come and, presenting themselves before us, should say: "Tell me, Socrates, what do you purpose doing? Do you design any thing else by this proceeding in which you are engaged, than to destroy us, the laws, and the whole city as far as you are able? Or do you think it possible for that city any longer to subsist and not be subverted, in which judgments that are passed have no force, but are set aside and destroyed by private persons?" What should we say, Crito, to these and similar remonstrances? For any

one, especially an orator, would have much to say on the violation of the law, which enjoins that judgments passed shall be enforced. Shall we say to them that the city has done us an injustice and not passed a right sentence? Shall we say this, or what else?

Cri. This, by Jupiter, Socrates.

12. *Socr.* What then if the laws should say: "Socrates, was it not agreed between us that you should abide by the judgments which the city should pronounce?" And if we should wonder at their speaking thus, perhaps they would say, "Wonder not, Socrates, at what we say, but answer, since you are accustomed to make use of questions and answers. For come, what charge have you against us and the city, that you attempt to destroy us? Did we not first give you being? and did not your father through us take your mother to wife and beget you? Say then, do you find fault with those laws amongst us that relate to marriage as being bad?" I should say, "I do not find fault with them." "Do you with those that relate to your nurture when born, and the education with which you were instructed? Or did not the laws, ordained on this point, enjoin rightly, in requiring your father to instruct you in music and gymnastic exercises?" I should say, rightly. Well then: since you were born, nurtured, and educated through our means, can you say, first of all, that you are not both our offspring and our slave, as well you as your ancestors? And if this be so, do you think that there are equal rights between us, and whatever we attempt to do to you, do you think you may justly do to us in turn? Or had you not equal rights with your father, or master, if you happened to have one, so as to return what you suffered, neither to retort when found fault with, nor when stricken to strike again, nor many other things of the kind; but that with your country and the laws you may do so; so that if we attempt to destroy you, thinking it to be just, you also should endeavour as far as you are able, in return to destroy us, the laws, and your country, and in doing this will you say that you act justly, you who, in reality, make virtue your chief object? Or are you so wise as not to know that one's country is more honourable, venerable and sacred, and more highly prized both by gods and men possessed of understanding, than mother and father, and all other progenitors,

and that one ought to reverence, submit to, and appease one's country, when angry, rather than one's father, and either persuade it or do what it orders, and to suffer quietly if it bids one suffer, whether to be beaten, or put in bonds; or if it sends one out to battle there to be wounded or slain, this must be done, for justice so requires, and one must not give way, or retreat, or leave one's post; but that both in war, and in a court of justice, and every where, one must do what one's city and country enjoins, or persuade it in such manner as justice allows: but that to offer violence either to one's mother or father is not holy, much less to one's country? What shall we say to these things, Crito? That the laws speak the truth or not?

Cri. It seems so to me.

13. *Socr.* "Consider, then, Socrates," the laws perhaps might say, "whether we say truly that in what you are now attempting you are attempting to do what is not just towards us. For we, having given you birth, nurtured, instructed you, and having imparted to you and all other citizens all the good in our power, still proclaim, by giving the power to every Athenian who pleases, when he has arrived at years of discretion and become acquainted with the business of the state, and us, the laws, that any one, who is not satisfied with us, may take his property and go wherever he pleases. And if any one of you wishes to go to a colony, if he is not satisfied with us and the city, or to migrate and settle in another country, none of us, the laws, hinder or forbid him going whithersoever he pleases, taking with him all his property. But whoever continues with us after he has seen the manner in which we administer justice, and in other respects govern the city, we now say, that he has in fact entered into a compact with us, to do what we order, and we affirm that he who does not obey is in three respects guilty of injustice, because he does not obey us who gave him being, and because he does not obey us who nurtured him, and because, having made a compact that he would obey us, he neither does so nor does he persuade us if we do any thing wrongly, though we propose for his consideration, and do not rigidly command him to do what we order, but leave him the choice of one of two things, either to persuade us, or to do what we require, and yet he does neither of these.

14. "And we say that you, O Socrates, will be subject to these charges if you accomplish your design, and that not least of the Athenians, but most so of all." And if I should ask, for what reason? They would probably justly retort on me by saying, that among all the Athenians I especially made this compact with them. For they would say, "Socrates, we have strong proof of this, that you were satisfied both with us and the city; for of all the Athenians you especially would never have dwelt in it, if it had not been especially agreeable to you. For you never went out of the city to any of the public spectacles, except once to the Isthmian games, nor any where else, except on military service, nor have you ever gone abroad as other men do, nor had you ever had any desire to become acquainted with any other city or other laws, but we and our city were sufficient for you; so strongly were you attached to us, and so far did you consent to submit to our government, both in other respects and in begetting children in this city, in consequence of your being satisfied with it. Moreover in your very trial, it was in your power to have imposed on yourself a sentence of exile, if you pleased, and might then have done, with the consent of the city, what you now attempt against its consent. Then indeed you boasted yourself as not being grieved if you must needs die; but you preferred, as you said, death to exile. Now, however, you are neither ashamed of those professions, nor do you revere us, the laws, since you endeavour to destroy us; and you act as the vilest slave would act, by endeavouring to make your escape contrary to the conventions and the compacts by which you engaged to submit to our government. First then, therefore, answer us this, whether we speak the truth or not in affirming that you agreed to be governed by us in deed though not in word?" What shall we say to this, Crito? Can we do otherwise than assent?

Cri. We must needs do so, Socrates?

Socr. "What else, then," they will say, "are you doing out violating the conventions and compacts which you made with us, though you did not enter into them from compulsion or through deception, or from being compelled to determine in a short time, but during the space of seventy years, in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied with us, and the compacts had not appeared to you to be just? You, how-

ever, neither preferred Lacedæmon nor Crete, which you several times said are governed by good laws, nor any other of the Grecian or barbarian cities; but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind, and other maimed persons. So much, it is evident, were you satisfied with the city and us, the laws, beyond the rest of the Athenians: for who can be satisfied with a city without laws? But now will you not abide by your compacts? You will, if you are persuaded by us, Socrates, and will not make yourself ridiculous by leaving the city.

15. "For consider, by violating these compacts and offending against any of them, what good you will do to yourself or your friends. For that your friends will run the risk of being themselves banished, and deprived of the rights of citizenship, or of forfeiting their property, is pretty clear. And as for yourself, if you should go to one of the neighbouring cities, either Thebes or Megara, for both are governed by good laws, you will go there, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity, and such as have any regard for their country will look upon you with suspicion, regarding you as a corrupter of the laws, and you will confirm the opinion of the judges, so that they will appear to have condemned you rightly, for whoso is a corrupter of the laws will appear in all likelihood to be a corrupter of youths and weak-minded men. Will you then avoid these well-governed cities, and the best-ordered men? And should you do so, will it be worth your while to live? Or will you approach them, and have the effrontery to converse with them, Socrates, on subjects the same as you did here, that virtue and justice, legal institutions and laws, should be most highly valued by men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You must think so. But you will keep clear of these places, and go to Thessaly, to Crito's friends, for there is the greatest disorder and licentiousness, and perhaps they will gladly hear you relating how drolly you escaped from prison, clad in some dress or covered with a skin, or in some other disguise such as fugitives are wont to dress themselves in, having so changed your usual appearance. And will no one say that you, though an old man, with but a short time to live, in all probability, have dared to have such a base desire of life as to violate the most sacred laws? Perhaps not, should you not offend any one. But if you should, you will hear,

Socrates, many things utterly unworthy of you. You will live, too, in a state of abject dependence on all men, and as their slave. But what will you do in Thessaly besides feasting, as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? And what will become of those discourses about justice and all other virtues?—But do you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may rear and educate them? What then? Will you take them to Thessaly, and there rear and educate them, making them aliens to their country, that they may owe you this obligation too? Or if not so, being reared here, will they be better reared and educated while you are living, though not with them? for your friends will take care of them. Whether, if you go to Thessaly, will they take care of them, but if you go to Hades will they not take care of them? If, however, any advantage is to be derived from those that say they are your friends, we must think they will.

16. "Then, O Socrates, be persuaded by us who have nurtured you, and do not set a higher value on your children, or on life, or on any thing else than justice, that, when you arrive in Hades, you may have all this to say in your defence before those who have dominion there. For neither here in this life, if you do what is proposed, does it appear to be better, or more just, or more holy to yourself, or any of your friends; nor will it be better for you when you arrive there. But now you depart, if you do depart, unjustly treated, not by us, the laws, but by men; but should you escape, having thus disgracefully returned injury for injury, and evil for evil, having violated your own compacts and conventions which you made with us, and having done evil to those to whom you least of all should have done it, namely, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, both we shall be indignant with you as long as you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades, will not receive you favourably, knowing that you attempted, as far as you were able, to destroy us. Let not Crito, then, persuade you to do what he advises, rather than we."

17. These things, my dear friend Crito, be assured I seem to hear, as the votaries of Cybele^f seem to hear the flutes. And the sound of these words booms in my ear, and makes me incapable of hearing any thing else. Be sure, then, so long as I

^f The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, who in their solemn festivals made such a noise with flutes that the hearers could hear no other sound.

retain my present opinions, if you should say anything contrary to these, you will speak in vain. If, however, you think that you can prevail at all, say on.

Cri. But, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

Socr. Desist, then, Crito, and let us pursue this course, since this way the deity leads us.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHÆDO.

THIS dialogue presents us with an account of the manner in which Socrates spent the last day of his life, and how he met his death. The main subject is that of the soul's immortality, which Socrates takes upon himself to prove with as much certainty as it is possible for the human mind to arrive at. The question itself, though none could be better suited to the occasion, arises simply and naturally from the general conversation that precedes it.

When his friends visit him in the morning for the purpose of spending this his last day with him, they find him sitting up in bed and rubbing his leg, which had just been freed from bonds. He remarks on the unaccountable alternation and connexion between pleasure and pain, and adds that *Æsop*, had he observed it, would have made a fable from it. This remark reminds *Cebes* of Socrates' having put some of *Æsop's* fables into metre since his imprisonment, and he asks, for the satisfaction of the poet *Evenus*, what had induced him to do so. Socrates explains his reason, and concludes by bidding him tell *Evenus* to follow him as soon as he can. *Simmias* expresses his surprise at this message, on which Socrates asks, "Is not *Evenus* a philosopher?" and on the question being answered in the affirmative, he says, that he or any philosopher would be willing to die, though perhaps he would not commit violence on himself. This, again, seems a contradiction to *Simmias*, but Socrates explains it by shewing that our souls are placed in the body by God, and may not leave it without His permission. Whereupon *Cebes* objects, that in that case foolish men only would wish to die and quit the service of the best of masters, to which *Simmias* agrees. Socra-

tes, therefore, proposes to plead his cause before them, and to shew that there is a great probability that after this life he shall go into the presence of God and good men, and be happy in proportion to the purity of his own mind.

He begins^a by stating that philosophy itself is nothing else than a preparation for and meditation on death. Death and philosophy have this in common: death separates the soul from the body, philosophy draws off the mind from bodily things to the contemplation of truth and virtue: for he is not a true philosopher who is led away by bodily pleasures, since the senses are the source of ignorance and all evil; the mind, therefore, is entirely occupied in meditating on death, and freeing itself as much as possible from the body. How, then, can such a man be afraid of death? He who grieves at the approach of death cannot be a true lover of wisdom, but is a lover of his body. And, indeed, most men are temperate through intemperance, that is to say, they abstain from some pleasures that they may the more easily and permanently enjoy others. They embrace only a shadow of virtue, not virtue itself, since they estimate the value of all things by the pleasures they afford. Whereas the philosopher purifies his mind from all such things, and pursues virtue and wisdom for their own sakes. This course Socrates himself had pursued to the utmost of his ability, with what success he should shortly know; and on these grounds he did not repine at leaving his friends in this world, being persuaded that in another he should meet with good masters and good friends.

Upon this Cebes^b says that he agrees with all else that had been said, but cannot help entertaining doubts of what will become of the soul when separated from the body, for the common opinion is that it is dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke, and no longer exists any where. Socrates, therefore, proposes to enquire into the probability of the case, a fit employment for him under his present circumstances.

§ 21—30.

^b § 39, 40.

His first argument^c is drawn from the ancient belief prevalent amongst men, that souls departing hence exist in Hades, and are produced again from the dead. If this be true, it must follow that our souls are there, for they could not be produced again if they did not exist: and its truth is confirmed by this, that it is a general law of nature that contraries are produced from contraries, the greater from the less, strong from weak, slow from swift, heat from cold, and in like manner life from death, and *vice versa*. To explain this more clearly, he proceeds to shew that what is changed passes from one state to another, and so undergoes three different states, first the actual state, then the transition, and thirdly the new state, as from a state of sleep, by awaking to being awake: in like manner birth is a transition from a state of death to life, and dying from life to death, so that the soul, by the act of dying, only passes to another state; if it were not so, all nature would in time become dead, just as if people did not awake out of sleep all would at last be buried in eternal sleep. Whence the conclusion is that the souls of men are not annihilated by death.

Cebes^d agrees to this reasoning, and adds that he is further convinced of its truth by calling to mind an argument used by Socrates on former occasions, that knowledge is nothing but reminiscence, and if this is so, the soul must have existed and had knowledge before it became united to the body.

But in case Simmias should not yet be satisfied, Socrates^e proceeds to enlarge on this, his second argument, drawn from reminiscence. We daily find that we are carried from the knowledge of one thing to another. Things perceived by the eyes, ears, and other senses, bring up the thought of other things: thus the sight of a lyre or a garment reminds us of a friend, and not only are we thus reminded of sensible objects, but of things which are comprehended by the mind alone, and have no sensitive existence. For we have formed in our minds

^c § 40—46.

^d § 47.

^e § 48—57.

an idea of abstract equality, of the beautiful, the just, the good, in short, of every thing which we say exists without the aid of the senses, for we use them only in the perception of individual things, whence it follows that the mind did not acquire this knowledge in this life, but must have had it before, and therefore the soul must have existed before.

Simmias and Cebes^f both agree in admitting that Socrates has proved the pre-existence of the soul, but insist that he has not shewn it to be immortal, for that nothing hinders but that, according to the popular opinion, it may be dispersed at the dissolution of the body. To which Socrates replies, that if their former admissions are joined to his last argument, the immortality, as well as the pre-existence of the soul, has been sufficiently proved. For if it is true that any thing living is produced from that which is dead, then the soul must exist after death, otherwise it could not be produced again.

However to remove the apprehension that the soul may be dispersed by a wind as it were, Socrates proceeds, in his third argument^g, to examine that doubt more thoroughly. What then is meant by being dispersed but being dissolved into its parts? In order therefore to a thing being capable of dispersion it must be compounded of parts. Now there are two kinds of things, one compounded, the other simple, the former kind is subject to change, the latter not, and can be comprehended by the mind alone. The one is visible, the other invisible; and the soul, which is invisible, when it employs the bodily senses wanders and is confused, but when it abstracts itself from the body it attains to the knowledge of that which is eternal, immortal, and unchangeable. The soul, therefore, being uncompounded and invisible must be indissoluble, that is to say immortal.

Still Simmias and Cebes^h are unconvinced. The former objects, that the soul, according to Socrates' own shewing, is nothing but a harmony resulting from a combination of the

^f § 55—59

§ 61—75

^h § 76—84.

parts of the body, and so may perish with the body as the harmony of a lyre does when the lyre itself is broken. And Cebes, though he admits that the soul is more durable than the body, yet objects that it is not therefore of necessity immortal but may in time wear out, and it is by no means clear that this is not its last period.

These objections produce a powerful effect on the rest of the company, but Socrates, undismayed, exhorts them not to suffer themselves to be deterred from seeking the truth by any difficulties they may meet with; and then proceeds¹ to shew, in a moment, the fallacy of Simmias' objection. It was before admitted, he says, that the soul existed before the body, but harmony is produced after the lyre is formed, so that the two cases are totally different. And further, there are various degrees of harmony, but every soul is as much a soul as any other. But then what will a person who holds this doctrine, that the soul is harmony, say of virtue and vice in the soul? Will he call them another kind of harmony and discord? If so, he will contradict himself, for it is admitted that one soul is not more or less a soul than another, and therefore one cannot be more or less harmonized than another, and one could not admit of a greater degree of virtue or vice than another; and indeed a soul, being harmony, could not partake of vice at all, which is discord.

Socrates, having thus satisfactorily answered the argument adduced by Simmias, goes on to rebut that of Cebes², who objected that the soul might in time wear out. In order to do this, he relates that when a young man he attempted to investigate the causes of every thing, why they exist and why they perish; and in the course of his researches finding the futility of attributing the existence of things to what are called natural causes, he resolved on endeavouring to find out the reasons of things. He therefore assumed that there is a certain abstract beauty, and goodness, and magnitude, and

¹ § 98—99.

² § 100—112.

so of all other things: the truth of which being granted he thinks he shall be able to prove that the soul is immortal.

This then being conceded by Cebes, Socrates¹ argues that every thing that is beautiful is so from partaking of abstract beauty, and great from partaking of magnitude, and little from partaking of littleness. Now it is impossible he argues that contraries can exist in the same thing at the same time, for instance the same thing cannot possess both magnitude and littleness, but one will withdraw at the approach of the other: and not only so, but things which, though not contrary to each other, yet always contain contraries within themselves cannot co-exist; for instance the number three has no contrary, yet it contains within itself the idea of odd, which is the contrary to even, and so three never can become even; in like manner heat while it is heat can never admit the idea of its contrary, cold. Now if this method of reasoning is applied to the soul it will be found to be immortal; for life and death are contraries, and never can co-exist, but wherever the soul is there is life, so that it contains within itself that which is contrary to death, and consequently can never admit of death; therefore it is immortal.

With this he closes his arguments in support of the soul's immortality. Cebes owns himself convinced, but Simmias, though he is unable to make any objection to the soundness of Socrates' reasoning, cannot help still entertaining doubts on the subject. If, however, the soul is immortal, Socrates proceeds^m, great need is there in this life to endeavour to become as wise and good as possible. For if death were a deliverance from every thing it would be a great gain for the wicked, but since the soul appears to be immortal, it must go to the place suited to its nature. For it is said that each person's demon conducts him to a place where he receives sentence according to his deserts.

He thenⁿ draws a fanciful picture of the various regions of

¹ § 112—128.

^m § 129—131.

ⁿ § 132—145

the earth, to which the good and the bad will respectively go after death, and exhorts his friends to use every endeavour to acquire virtue and wisdom in this life, "for," he adds, "the reward is noble and the hope great."

Having thus brought his subject to a conclusion, Socrates proposes to bathe himself, in order not to trouble others to wash his dead body. Crito thereupon asks if he has any commands to give, and especially how he would be buried, to which he, with his usual cheerfulness, makes answer, "Just as you please, if only you can catch me," and then, smiling, he reminds them that after death he shall be no longer with them, and begs the others of the party to be sureties to Crito for his absence from the body, as they had been before bound for his presence before his judges.

After he had bathed, and taken leave of his children and the women of his family, the officer of the Eleven comes in to intimate to him that it is now time to drink the poison. Crito urges a little delay, as the sun had not yet set, but Socrates refuses to make himself ridiculous by shewing such a fondness for life; the man who is to administer the poison is therefore sent for, and on his holding out the cup, Socrates, neither trembling nor changing colour or countenance at all, but, as he was wont, looking stedfastly at the man, asked if he might make a libation to any one, and being told that no more poison than enough had been mixed, he simply prayed that his departure from this to another world might be happy, and then drank off the poison readily and calmly. His friends, who had hitherto with difficulty restrained themselves, could no longer control the outward expressions of grief, to which Socrates said, "What are you doing, my friends? I, for this reason chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind. For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."

When he had walked about for a while his legs began to grow heavy, so he laid down on his back, and his body, from

the feet upwards, gradually grew cold and stiff. His last words were, "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius: pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."

"This," concludes Phædo, "was the end of our friend, a man, as we may say, the best of all his time that we have known, and moreover, the most wise and just."

PHÆDO,

OR

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

FIRST ECHECRATES, PHÆDO.

THEN SOCRATES, APOLLODORUS, CEBES, SIMMIAS, AND CRITO.

Ech. WERE you personally present, Phædo, with Socrates on that day when he drank the poison in prison? or did you hear an account of it from some one else?

Phæd. I was there myself, Echecrates.

Ech. What then did he say before his death? and how did he die? for I should be glad to hear: for scarcely any citizen of Phlius^a ever visits Athens now, nor has any stranger for a long time come from thence, who was able to give us a clear account of the particulars, except that he died from drinking poison; but he was unable to tell us any thing more.

2. *Phæd.* And did you not hear about the trial how it went off?

Ech. Yes; some one told me this; and I wondered, that as it took place so long ago, he appears to have died long afterwards. What was the reason of this, Phædo?

Phæd. An accidental circumstance happened in his favour, Echecrates: for the poop of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos, chanced to be crowned on the day before the trial.

Ech. But what is this ship?

Phæd. It is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly conveyed the fourteen boys and girls to Crete, and saved both them and himself. They, therefore, made a vow to Apollo on that occasion, as it is said, that if they were saved they would every year despatch a solemn embassy to

^a Phlius, to which Echecrates belonged, was a town of Sicyonia in Peloponnesus.

Delos ; which from that time to the present, they send yearly to the god. 3. When they begin the preparations for this solemn embassy, they have a law that the city shall be purified during this period, and that no public execution shall take place until the ship has reached Delos, and returned to Athens : and this occasionally takes a long time, when the winds happen to impede their passage. The commencement of the embassy is when the priest of Apollo has crowned the poop of the ship. And this was done, as I said, on the day before the trial : on this account Socrates had a long interval in prison between the trial and his death.

4. *Ech.* And what, Phædo, were the circumstances of his death ? what was said and done ? and who of his friends were with him ? or would not the magistrates allow them to be present, but did he die destitute of friends ?

Phæd. By no means ; but some, indeed several, were present.

Ech. Take the trouble, then, to relate to me all the particulars as clearly as you can, unless you have any pressing business.

Phæd. I am at leisure, and will endeavour to give you a full account : for to call Socrates to mind, whether speaking myself or listening to some one else, is always most delightful to me.

5. *Ech.* And indeed, Phædo, you have others to listen to you who are of the same mind. However, endeavour to relate every thing as accurately as you can.

Phæd. I was indeed wonderfully affected by being present, for I was not impressed with a feeling of pity, like one present at the death of a friend ; for the man appeared to me to be happy, Echecrates, both from his manner and discourse, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his death : so much so, that it occurred to me, that in going to Hades he was not going without a divine destiny, but that when he arrived there he would be happy, if any one ever was. For this reason I was entirely uninfluenced by any feeling of pity, as would seem likely to be the case with one present on so mournful an occasion ; nor was I affected by pleasure from being engaged in philosophical discussions, as was our custom ; for our conversation was of that kind. But an altogether unaccountable feeling possessed me, a kind of unusual mixture compounded

of pleasure and pain together, when I considered that he was immediately about to die. And all of us who were present were affected in much the same manner, at one time laughing, at another weeping, one of us especially, Apollodorus, for you know the man and his manner.

Ech. How should I not?

6. *Phæd.* He, then, was entirely overcome by these emotions; and I too was troubled, as well as the others.

Ech. But who were present, Phædo?

Phæd. Of his fellow-countrymen, this Apollodorus was present, and Critobulus, and his father Crito, moreover Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æschines, and Antisthenes; Ctesippus the Pæanian, Menexenus, and some other of his countrymen were also there: Plato I think was sick.

Ech. Were any strangers present?

Phæd. Yes: Simmias the Theban, Cebes, and Phædonides: and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.

7. *Ech.* But what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?

Phæd. No: for they were said to be at Ægina.

Ech. Was any one else there?

Phæd. I think that these were nearly all who were present.

Ech. Well now: what do you say was the subject of conversation?

Phæd. I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. On the preceding days I and the others were constantly in the habit of visiting Socrates, meeting early in the morning at the court-house where the trial took place, for it was near the prison. 8. Here then we waited every day till the prison was opened, conversing with each other; for it was not opened very early, but, as soon as it was opened we went in to Socrates, and usually spent the day with him. On that occasion however, we met earlier than usual; for on the preceding day, when we left the prison in the evening, we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. We therefore urged each other to come as early as possible to the accustomed place; accordingly we came, and the porter, who used to admit us, coming out, told us to wait, and not enter until he called us. "For," he said, "the Eleven are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that he must die to-day." But in no long time he returned, and bade us enter.

9. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his bonds, and Xantippe, you know her, holding his little boy and sitting by him. As soon as Xantippe saw us, she wept aloud and said such things as women usually do on such occasions, as "Socrates, your friends will now converse with you for the last time and you with them." But Socrates, looking towards Crito, said, "Crito, let some one take her home." Upon which some of Crito's attendants led her away, wailing and beating herself.

But Socrates sitting up in bed, drew up his leg, and rubbed it with his hand, and as he rubbed it, said; "What an unaccountable thing, my friends, that seems to be, which men call pleasure; and how wonderfully is it related towards that which appears to be its contrary, pain; in that they will not both be present to a man at the same time, yet, if any one pursues and attains the one, he is almost always compelled to receive the other, as if they were both united together from one head.

10. "And it seems to me," he said, "that if Æsop had observed this he would have made a fable from it, how the deity, wishing to reconcile these warring principles, when he could not do so, united their heads together, and from hence whomsoever the one visits the other attends immediately after; as appears to be the case with me, since I suffered pain in my leg before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have succeeded."

Hereupon Cebes, interrupting him, said, "By Jupiter, Socrates, you have done well in reminding me: with respect to the poems which you made, by putting into metre those Fables of Æsop and the hymn to Apollo, several other persons asked me, and especially Evenus recently, with what design you made them after you came here, whereas before you had never made any. 11. If, therefore, you care at all that I should be able to answer Evenus, when he asks me again, for I am sure he will do so, tell me what I must say to him."

"Tell him the truth then, Cebes," he replied, "that I did not make them from a wish to compete with him, or his poems, for I knew that this would be no easy matter; but that I might discover the meaning of certain dreams, and discharge my conscience, if this should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to apply myself to. For they were to the following purport: often in my past life the same dream

visited me, appearing at different times in different forms, yet always saying the same thing, 'Socrates,' it said, 'apply yourself to and practise music.' 12. And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, as those who cheer on racers, so that the dream encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, namely, to apply myself to music, since philosophy is the highest music, and I was devoted to it. But now since my trial took place, and the festival of the god retarded my death, it appeared to me that, if by chance the dream so frequently enjoined me to apply myself to popular music, I ought not to disobey it but do so, for that it would be safer for me not to depart hence before I had discharged my conscience by making some poems in obedience to the dream. Thus, then, I first of all composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present, and after the god, considering that a poet, if he means to be a poet, ought to make fables and not discourses, and knowing that I was not skilled in making fables, I therefore put into verse those fables of Æsop, which were at hand, and were known to me, and which first occurred to me.

13. Tell this then to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and, if he is wise, to follow me as soon as he can. But I depart, as it seems, to-day; for so the Athenians order."

To this Simmias said; "What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus to do? for I often meet with him; and from what I know of him, I am pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with your advice."

"What then," said he, "is not Evenus a philosopher?"

"To me he seems to be so," said Simmias.

"Then he will be willing," rejoined Socrates, "and so will every one who worthily engages in this study; perhaps indeed he will not commit violence on himself, for that they say is not allowable." And as he said this he let down his leg from the bed on the ground, and in this posture continued during the remainder of the discussion.

Cebes then asked him, "What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is not lawful to commit violence on one's-self, but that a philosopher should be willing to follow one who is dying?"

14. "What, Cebes, have not you and Simmias, who have conversed familiarly with Philolaus^b on this subject, heard?"

^b A Pythagorean of Crotona.

"Nothing very clearly, Socrates."

"I, however speak only from hearsay; what then I have heard I have no scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one who is about to travel there, to enquire and speculate about the journey thither, what kind we think it is. What else can one do in the interval before sunset?"

"Why then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one's-self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both Philolaus, when he lived with us, and several others say that it was not right to do this; but I never heard any thing clear upon the subject from any one."

15. "Then you should consider it attentively," said Socrates, "for perhaps you may hear: probably however, it will appear wonderful to you, if this alone of all other things is an universal truth^c, and it never happens to a man, as is the case in all other things, that at sometimes and to some persons only it is better to die than to live; yet that these men for whom it is better to die—this probably will appear wonderful to you—may not without impiety do this good to themselves, but must await another benefactor."

16. Then Cebes, gently smiling, said, speaking in his own dialect^d, "Jove be witness."

"And indeed," said Socrates, "it would appear to be unreasonable, yet still perhaps it has some reason on its side. The maxim indeed given on this subject in the mystical doctrines^e, that we men are in a kind of prison, and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape, appears to me difficult to be understood, and not easy to penetrate. This however appears to me, Cebes, to be well said, that the gods take care of us, and that we men are one of their possessions. Does it not seem so to you?"

"It does," replied Cebes.

"Therefore," said he, "if one of your slaves were to kill himself, without your having intimated that you wished him to die, should you not be angry with him, and should you not punish him if you could?"

"Certainly," he replied.

^c Namely, "that it is better to die than live."

^d Ἰττω Bæotian for ἵττω.

^e Of Pythagoras.

"Perhaps then in this point of view, it is not unreasonable to assert, that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays him under a necessity of doing so, such as that now laid on me."

17. "This, indeed," said Cebes, "appears to be probable. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very willing to die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just now is agreeable to reason, that it is God who takes care of us, and that we are his property. For that the wisest men should not be grieved at leaving that service in which they govern them who are the best of all masters, namely the gods, is not consistent with reason. For surely he cannot think that he will take better care of himself when he has become free: but a foolish man might perhaps think thus, that he should fly from his master, and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from a good one, but should cling to him as much as possible, therefore he would fly against all reason: but a man of sense would desire to be constantly with one better than himself. Thus, Socrates, the contrary of what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to rejoice."

18. Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to be pleased with the pertinacity of Cebes, and looking towards us, said, "Cebes, you see, always searches out arguments, and is not at all willing to admit at once any thing one has said."

Whereupon Simmias replied; "But indeed, Socrates, Cebes appears to me, now, to say something to the purpose: for with what design should men really wise fly from masters who are better than themselves, and so readily leave them? And Cebes appears to me to direct his argument against you, because you so easily endure to abandon both us, and those good rulers, as you yourself confess, the gods."

"You speak justly," said Socrates, "for I think you mean that I ought to make my defence to this charge, as if I were in a court of justice."

"Certainly," replied Simmias.

19. "Come then," said he, "I will endeavour to defend myself more successfully before you than before the judges. For," he proceeded, "Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I should go first of all amongst other deities who are both wise and good, and, next, amongst men who have de-

parted this life, better than any here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death: but now be assured, I hope to go amongst good men, though I would not positively assert it; that, however, I shall go amongst gods who are perfectly good masters, be assured I can positively assert this, if I can any thing of the kind. So that, on this account, I am not so much troubled, but I entertain a good hope that something awaits those who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better for the good than the evil."

20. "What then, Socrates," said Simmias, "would you go away keeping this persuasion to yourself, or would you impart it to us? For this good appears to me to be also common to us; and at the same time it will be an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say."

"I will endeavour to do so," he said. "But first let us attend to Crito here, and see what it is he seems to have for some time wished to say."

"What else, Socrates," said Crito, "but what he who is to give you the poison told me some time ago, that I should tell you to speak as little as possible? For he says that men become too much heated by speaking, and that nothing of this kind ought to interfere with the poison, and that otherwise, those who did so were sometimes compelled to drink two or three times."

To which Socrates replied, "Let him alone, and let him attend to his own business, and prepare to give it me twice, or, if occasion requires, even thrice."

21. "I was almost certain what you would say," answered Crito, "but he has been some time pestering me."

"Never mind him," he rejoined.

"But now I wish to render an account to you, my judges, of the reason why a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy, when he is about to die, appears to me, on good grounds, to have confidence, and to entertain a firm hope that the greatest good will befall him in the other world, when he has departed this life. How then this comes to pass, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain.

"For as many as rightly apply themselves to philosophy seem to have left all others in ignorance, that they aim at nothing else than to die and be dead. If this then is true, it would surely be absurd to be anxious about nothing else than

this during their whole life, but, when it arrives, to be grieved at what they have been long anxious about and aimed at."

22. Upon this, Simmias, smiling, said, "By Jupiter, Socrates, though I am not now at all inclined to smile, you have made me do so; for I think that the multitude, if they heard this, would think it was very well said in reference to philosophers, and that our countrymen particularly would agree with you, that true philosophers do desire death, and that they are by no means ignorant that they deserve to suffer it."

"And indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in asserting that they are not ignorant; for they are ignorant of the sense in which true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense they deserve death, and what kind of death. But," he said, "let us take leave of them, and speak to one another. Do we think that death is any thing?"

"Certainly," replied Simmias.

23. "Is it any thing else than the separation of the soul from the body? and is not this to die, for the body to be apart by itself separated from the soul, and for the soul to subsist apart by itself separated from the body? Is death any thing else than this?"

"No, but this," he replied.

"Consider then, my good friend, whether you are of the same opinion as me; for thus I think we shall understand better the subject we are considering. Does it appear to you to be becoming in a philosopher to be anxious about pleasures, as they are called, such as meats and drinks?"

"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.

"But what? about the pleasures of love?"

"Not at all."

24. "What then? does such a man appear to you to think other bodily indulgences of value? for instance, does he seem to you to value or despise the possession of magnificent garments and sandals, and other ornaments of the body, except so far as necessity compels him to use them?"

"The true philosopher," he answered, "appears to me to despise them."

"Does not then," he continued, "the whole employment or such a man appear to you to be, not about the body, but to separate himself from it as much as possible, and be occupied about his soul?"

"It does."

"First of all then, in such matters, does not the philosopher, above all other men, evidently free his soul as much as he can from communion with the body?"

"It appears so."

25. "And it appears, Simmias, to the generality of men, that he who takes no pleasure in such things, and who does not use them, does not deserve to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who cares nothing for the pleasures that subsist through the body."

"You speak very truly."

"But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom, is the body an impediment or not, if any one takes it with him as a partner in the search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any truth to men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who say that we neither hear nor see any thing with accuracy? If however these bodily senses are neither accurate nor clear, much less can the others be so: for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?"

"Certainly," he replied.

26. "When then," said he, "does the soul light on the truth? for, when it attempts to consider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is plain that it is then led astray by it."

"You say truly."

"Must it not then be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the things that really are become known to it?"

"Yes."

"And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things disturb it, neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure of any kind, but it retires as much as possible within itself, taking leave of the body, and, as far as it can, not communicating or being in contact with it, it aims at the discovery of that which is."

"Such is the case."

"Does not then the soul of the philosopher, in these cases, despise the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within itself?"

"It appears so."

"But what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that justice itself is something or nothing?"

"We say it is something, by Jupiter."

"And that beauty and goodness are something?"

"How not?"

"Now then have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your eyes?"

"By no means," he replied.

"Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? but I speak generally, as of magnitude, health, strength, and, in a word, of the essence of every thing, that is to say, what each is. Is then the exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or is it thus, whoever amongst us habituates himself to reflect most deeply and accurately on each several thing about which he is considering, he will make the nearest approach to the knowledge of it?"

"Certainly."

28. "Would not he, then, do this with the utmost purity, who should in the highest degree approach each subject by means of the mere mental faculties, neither employing the sight in conjunction with the reflective faculty, nor introducing any other sense together with reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by itself, should attempt to search out each essence purely by itself, freed as much as possible from the eyes and ears, and, in a word, from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is in communion with it. Is not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who will arrive at the knowledge of that which is?"

29. "You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates," replied Simmias.

"Wherefore," he said, "it necessarily follows from all this, that some such opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so that they should speak among themselves as follows: 'A by-path, as it were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by reason,' because as long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully attain to what we desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body subjects us to innumerable hindrances on account of its necessary support, and moreover if any diseases befall us, they impede us in our search after that which is; and it fills us with longings, desires, fears, all kinds of fancies, and a multitude of absurdities, so that, as it is said in real truth, by reason of the body it is never possible for us to make any ad-

vances in wisdom. 30. "For nothing else but the body and its desires occasion wars, seditions, and contests; for all wars amongst us arise on account of our desire to acquire wealth; and we are compelled to acquire wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service; and consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit of philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any leisure, and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any subject, it constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our researches, and occasions trouble and disturbance, and confounds us so that we are not able by reason of it to discern the truth. It has then in reality been demonstrated to us, that if we are ever to know any thing purely, we must be separated from the body, and contemplate the things themselves by the mere soul. And then, as it seems, we shall obtain that which we desire, and which we profess ourselves to be lovers of, wisdom, when we are dead, as reason shews, but not while we are alive. 31. For if it is not possible to know any thing purely in conjunction with the body, one of these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire knowledge, or only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist apart by itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by its nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall release us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body, we shall in all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves know the whole real essence, and that probably is truth; for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the pure. Such things, I think, Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must both think and say to one another. Does it not seem so to you?"

"Most assuredly, Socrates."

32. "If this then," said Socrates, "is true, my friend, there is great hope for one who arrives where I am going, there, if any where, to acquire that in perfection for the sake of which we have taken so much pains during our past life; so that the journey now appointed me is set out upon with good hope, and will be so by any other man who thinks that his mind has been as it were purified."

"Certainly," said Simmias.

"But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a former part of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the soul from the body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself on all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, as far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered as it were from the shackles of the body?"

"Certainly," he replied.

33. "Is this then called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?"

"Assuredly," he answered.

"But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly, are especially and alone desirous to deliver it, and this is the very study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body, is it not?"

"It appears so."

"Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man who has endeavoured throughout his life to live as near as possible to death, then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be ridiculous?"

"How should it not?"

"In reality then, Simmias," he continued, "those who pursue philosophy rightly study to die; and to them of all men death is least formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the body and desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be irrational if, when this comes to pass, they should be afraid and grieve, and not be glad to go to that place, where on their arrival they may hope to obtain that which they longed for throughout life; but they longed for wisdom; and to be freed from association with that which they hated? 34. Have many of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of there seeing and being with those whom they have loved; and shall one who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very hope, that he shall no where else attain it in a manner worthy of the name, except in Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go there? We must think that he would gladly go, my friend, if he be in truth a philosopher; for he will be firmly persuaded of this, that he will no where else but there attain wisdom in its purity; and if this be so, would it not be

very irrational, as I just now said, if such a man were to be afraid of death?"

"Very much so, by Jupiter," he replied.

35. "Would not this then," he resumed, "be a sufficient proof to you, with respect to a man whom you should see grieved when about to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of his body? and this same person is probably a lover of riches and a lover of honour, one or both of these."

"It certainly is as you say," he replied.

"Does not then," he said, "that which is called fortitude, Simmias, eminently belong to philosophers?"

"By all means," he answered.

"And temperance also, which even the multitude call temperance, and which consists in not being carried away by the passions, but in holding them in contempt, and keeping them in subjection, does not this belong to those only who most despise the body, and live in the study of philosophy?"

"Necessarily so," he replied.

36. "For," he continued, "if you will consider the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurd."

"How so, Socrates?"

"Do you know," he said, "that all others consider death among the great evils?"

"They do indeed," he answered.

"Then do the brave amongst them endure death, when they do endure it, through dread of greater evils?"

"It is so."

"All men, therefore, except philosophers, are brave through being afraid and fear; though it is absurd that any one should be brave through fear and cowardice."

"Certainly."

"But what, are not those amongst them who keep their passions in subjection, affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through a kind of intemperance? and although we may say, perhaps, that this is impossible, nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with respect to this silly temperance resembles this; for, fearing to be deprived of other pleasures, and desiring them, they abstain from some, being mastered by others. And though they call intemperance

the being governed by pleasures, yet it happens to them that, by being mastered by some pleasures, they master others; and this is similar to what was just now said, that in a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance."

"So it seems."

37. "My dear Simmias, consider that this is not a right exchange for virtue, to barter pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money; but that that alone is the right coin, for which we ought to barter all these things, wisdom; and for this, and with this every thing is in reality bought and sold, fortitude, temperance, and justice, and, in a word, true virtue subsists with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears, and every thing else of the kind, are present or absent; but when separated from wisdom, and changed one for another, consider whether such virtue is not a mere outline, and in reality servile, possessing neither soundness nor truth; but the really true virtue is a purification from all such things, and temperance, justice, fortitude, and wisdom itself, are a kind of initiatory purification. 38. And those who instituted the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means contemptible, but in reality to have intimated long since that whoever shall arrive in Hades unexpiated and uninitiated shall lie in mud, but he that arrives there purified and initiated, shall dwell with the gods. 'For there are,' say those who preside at the mysteries, 'many wand-bearers, but few inspired.' These last, in my opinion, are no other than those who have pursued philosophy rightly: that I might be of their number, I have, to the utmost of my ability, left no means untried, but have endeavoured to the utmost of my power. But whether I have endeavoured rightly and have in any respect succeeded, on arriving there I shall know clearly, if it please God, very shortly, as it appears to me.

39. "Such then, Simmias and Cebes," he added, "is the defence I make, for that I, on good grounds, do not repine or grieve at leaving you and my masters here, being persuaded that there, no less than here, I shall meet with good masters and friends. But to the multitude this is incredible. If however I have succeeded better with you in my defence than I did with the Athenian judges, it is well."

When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, taking up the dis-

cussion said, "Socrates, all the rest appears to me to be said rightly, but what you have said respecting the soul will occasion much incredulity in many from the apprehension that, when it is separated from the body, it no longer exists any where, but is destroyed and perishes on the very day in which a man dies, and that immediately it is separated and goes out from the body, it is dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke, and is no longer any where; since, if it remained any where united in itself, and freed from those evils which you have just now enumerated, there would be an abundant and good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. 40. But this probably needs no little persuasion and proof, that the soul of a man who dies, exists, and possesses activity and intelligence."

"You say truly, Cebes," said Socrates, "but what shall we do? Are you willing that we should converse on these points, whether such is probably the case or not?"

"Indeed," replied Cebes, "I should gladly hear your opinion on these matters."

"I do not think," said Socrates, "that any one who should now hear us, even though he were a comic poet, would say that I am talking idly, or discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. If you please, then, we will examine into it. Let us consider it in this point of view, whether the souls of men who are dead exist in Hades, or not. This is an ancient saying, which we now call to mind, that souls departing hence exist there, and return hither again, and are produced from the dead. 41. And if this is so, that the living are produced again from the dead, can there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for surely they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and this would be a sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality be evident that the living are produced from no other source than the dead. But, if this is not the case, there will be need of other arguments."

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"You must not, then," he continued, "consider this only with respect to men, if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty, but also with respect to all animals and plants, and, in a word, with respect to every thing that is subject to generation, let us see whether they are not all so produced, no

otherwise than contraries from contraries, wherever they have any such quality, as for instance the honourable is contrary to the base, and the just to the unjust, and so with ten thousand other things. 42. Let us consider this, then, whether it is necessary that all things which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than their contrary. As for instance, when any thing becomes greater is it not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it afterwards became greater?"

"Yes."

"And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously greater, afterwards become smaller?"

"It is so," he replied.

"And from stronger, weaker? and from slower, swifter?"

"Certainly."

"What then? if any thing becomes worse, must it not become so from better? and if more just, from more unjust?"

"How should it not?"

"We have then," he said, "sufficiently determined this, that all things are thus produced, contraries from contraries?"

"Certainly."

"What next? is there also something of this kind in them, for instance, between all two contraries a mutual twofold production, from one to the other, and from that other back again? for between a greater thing and a smaller there is increase and decrease, and do we not accordingly call the one to increase, the other to decrease?"

"Yes," he replied.

43. "And must not to be separated and commingled, to grow cold and to grow warm, and every thing in the same manner, even though sometimes we have not names to designate them, yet in fact be every where thus circumstanced of necessity, as to be produced from each other, and be subject to a reciprocal generation?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"What then?" said Socrates, "has life any contrary, as waking has its contrary, sleeping?"

"Certainly," he answered.

"What?"

"Death," he replied.

"Are not these, then, produced from each other, since they

are contraries, and are not the modes by which they are produced twofold, intervening between these two?"

"How should it be otherwise?"

"I then," continued Socrates, "will describe to you one pair of the contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and its mode of production; and do you describe to me the other. I say that one is to sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking is produced, and from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their production are the one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. 44. Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?"

"Certainly."

"Do you then," he said, "describe to me, in the same manner, with respect to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to death?"

"I do."

"Yes."

"And that they are produced from each other?"

"What then, is produced from life?"

"Death," he replied.

"What, then," said he, "is produced from death?"

"I must needs confess," he replied, "that life is."

"From the dead, then, O Cebes, living things and living men, are produced."

"It appears so," he said.

"Our souls, therefore," said Socrates, "exist in Hades."

"So it seems."

"With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of them very clear? for to die surely is clear? is it not?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"What then shall we do?" he continued; "shall we not find a corresponding contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective in this? Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?"

"By all means," he said.

"What is this?"

"To revive."

"Therefore," he proceeded, "if there is such a thing as to revive, will not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?"

"Certainly."

"Thus, then, we have agreed, that the living are produced from the dead, no less than the dead from the living: but, this being the case, there appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are again produced."

45. "It appears to me, Socrates," he said, "that this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted."

"See now, O Cebes," he said, "that we have not agreed on these things improperly, as it appears to me: for if one class of things were not constantly given back in the place of another, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation were direct from one thing alone into its opposite, and did not turn round again to the other, or retrace its course, do you know that all things would at length have the same form, be in the same state, and cease to be produced?"

"How say you?" he asked.

"It is by no means difficult," he replied, "to understand what I mean; if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling asleep, but no reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep, you know that at length all things would shew the fable of Endymion to be a jest, and it would be thought nothing at all of, because every thing else would be in the same state as him, namely, asleep. And if all things were mingled together, but never separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified, 'all things would be together.' 46. Likewise, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing alive? for if living beings are produced from other things, and living beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?"

"Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates," replied Cebes, "but you appear to me to speak the exact truth."

"For, Cebes," he continued, "as it seems to me, such undoubtedly is the case, and we have not admitted these things under a delusion, but it is in reality true that there is a reviving again, that the living are produced from the dead, that the souls of the dead exist, and that the condition of the good is better, and of the evil, worse."

47. "And indeed," said Cebes, interrupting him, "according

to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing, if it is true, that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence, according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible, unless our soul existed somewhere before it came into this human form; so that from hence also the soul appears to be something immortal."

"But, Cebes," said Simmias, interrupting him, "what proofs are there of these things? remind me of them, for I do not very well remember them at present."

48. "It is proved," said Cebes, "by one argument, and that a most beautiful one, that men, when questioned, if one questions them properly, of themselves describe all things as they are: however, if they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to diagrams, or any thing else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the case."

"But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you will agree with us on considering the matter thus. For do you doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?"

"I do not doubt," said Simmias, "but I require this very thing of which we are speaking, to be reminded; and indeed, from what Cebes has begun to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however, I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it."

"I do it thus," he replied: "we admit surely that if any one be reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some time or other before."

"Certainly," he said.

49. "Do we then admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this; if any one, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same, but different, should we not justly say, that he remembered that of which he received the idea?"

"How mean you?"

"For instance; the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre."

"How not?"

"Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment, or any thing else which their favourite is accustomed to use, are thus affected; they both recognise the lyre, and receive in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an infinite number of similar instances."

"An infinite number indeed, by Jupiter," said Simmias.

"Is not then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of reminiscence? especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?"

"Certainly," he replied.

50. "But what?" he continued, "does it happen, that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre, one is reminded of a man, and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes?"

"Certainly."

"And does it not also happen, that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Simmias himself?"

"It does indeed," he replied.

"Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?"

"It does."

"But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been reminded?"

"It is necessary," he replied.

"Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we allow that there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of this kind, but something altogether different from all these, abstract equality; do we allow that there is any such thing or not?"

"By Jupiter, we most assuredly do allow it" replied Simmias.

51. "And do we know what it is itself?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of that which is different from these? for does it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at another not?"

"Certainly."

"But what? does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or equality inequality?"

"Never, Socrates, at any time."

"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are not the same?"

"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."

"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your knowledge of it?"

"You speak most truly," he replied.

"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"

"Certainly."

"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on seeing one thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily be reminiscence."

"Certainly."

52. "What, then, as to this?" he continued; "are we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of? and do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at all, of being such as equality itself is?"

"They fall far short," he replied.

"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and cannot become such as that is, but is inferior to it, do we admit that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though imperfectly?"

"It is necessary."

"What then? are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?"

"Assuredly."

"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality before the time when on first seeing equal things, we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."

"Such is the case."

53. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses: for I say the same of them all."

"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as our argument is concerned."

"However, we must perceive by means of the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall short of it: or how shall we say it is?"

"Even so."

"Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we must have had a knowledge of equality itself, what it is, if we were to refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it."

"This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said."

"But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our other senses?"

"Certainly."

"But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a knowledge of abstract equality?"

"Yes."

"We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born."

"It seems so."

54. "If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born possessing it, we knew both before we were born, and as soon as we were born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and in one word, respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence, both in

the questions we ask, and the answers we give. So that we must necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born."

"Such is the case."

"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through life: for to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"

"Assuredly, Socrates," he replied.

55. "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our birth, and afterwards, through exercising the senses about these things, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? and in saying that this is to remember should we not say rightly?"

"Certainly."

"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said, one of these two things must follow, either we are all born with this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn afterwards do nothing else but remember, and this learning will be reminiscence."

"Such certainly is the case, Socrates."

56. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with knowledge, or that we afterwards remember what we had formerly known?"

"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose?"

"But what? are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think about it? Can a man, who possesses knowledge, give a reason for the things that he knows, or not?"

"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.

"And do all men appear to you, to be able to give a reason for the things of which we have just now been speaking?"

"I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid, that at this time to-morrow, there will no longer be any one able to do this properly."

"Do not all men then, Simmias," he said, "seem to you to know these things?"

"By no means."

"Do they remember, then, what they once learned?"

"Necessarily so."

"When did our souls receive this knowledge? not surely, since we were born into the world."

"Assuredly not."

"Before then."

"Yes."

"Our souls therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence."

57. "Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge at our birth, for this period yet remains."

"Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for we are not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose it then at the very time in which we receive it? Or can you mention any other time?"

"By no means, Socrates: I was not aware that I was saying nothing to the purpose."

"Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias," he proceeded. "If those things which we are continually talking about really exist, the beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this we refer all things that come under the senses, as finding it to have a prior existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these things to it, it necessarily follows, that as these exist, so likewise our soul exists even before we are born; but if these do not exist this discussion will have been undertaken in vain. Is it not so? and is there not an equal necessity, both that these things should exist, and our souls also before we are born, and if not the former neither the latter?"

58. "Most assuredly, Socrates," said Simmias, "there appears to me to be the same necessity, and the argument admirably tends to prove that our souls exist before we are born, just as that essence does which you have now mentioned. For I hold nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things most certainly exist, as the beautiful, the good, and all the rest that you just now spoke of; and as far as I am concerned the case is sufficiently demonstrated."

"But how does it appear to Cebes," said Socrates; "for it is necessary to persuade Cebes too."

"He is sufficiently persuaded, I think," said Simmias, "although he is the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I think he is sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed before we were born. But whether when we are dead, it will still exist, does not appear to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates," he continued, "but that popular doubt, which Cebes just now mentioned, still stands in our way, whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dispersed, and this is the end of its existence. 59. For what hinders its being born, and formed from some other source, and existing before it came into a human body, and yet when it has come, and is separated from this body, its then also dying itself, and being destroyed?"

"You say well, Simmias," said Cebes; "for it appears that only one half of what is necessary has been demonstrated, namely, that our soul existed before we were born: but it is necessary to demonstrate further, that when we are dead, it will exist no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made complete."

"This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes," said Socrates, "if you will only connect this last argument with that which we before assented to, that every thing living is produced from that which is dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is necessary for it when it enters into life, and is born, to be produced from nothing else than death, and from being dead, how is it not necessary for it also to exist after death, since it must needs be produced again? 60. What you require then, has been already demonstrated. However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you wished to sift this argument more thoroughly, and to be afraid like children, lest on the soul's departure from the body the winds should blow it away and disperse it, especially if one should happen to die not in a calm, but in a violent storm."

Upon this Cebes smiling said, "Endeavour to teach us better, Socrates, as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid, though perhaps there is some boy^f within us, who has such a dread. Let us then endeavour to persuade him not to be afraid of death, as of hobgoblins."

^f Some boyish spirit.

"But you must charm him every day," said Socrates, "until you have quieted his fears."

"But whence, Socrates," he said, "can we procure a skilful charmer for such a case, now that you are about to leave us?"

61. "Greece is wide, Cebes," he replied, "and in it surely there are skilful men, there are also many barbarous nations, all of which you should search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, as there is nothing on which you can more seasonably spend your money. You should also seek for him among yourselves; for perhaps you could not easily find any more competent than yourselves to do this."

"This shall be done," said Cebes, "but, if it is agreeable to you, let us return to the point from whence we digressed."

"It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?"

"You say well," rejoined Cebes.

"We ought then," said Socrates, "to ask ourselves some such question as this, to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus affected, namely to be dispersed, and for what we ought to fear, lest it should be so affected, and for what not. And after this, we should consider which of the two the soul is; and in the result should either be confident or fearful for our soul."

"You speak truly," said he.

62. "Does it not, then, appertain to that which is formed by composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded; and if there is any thing not compounded, does it not appertain to this alone, if to any thing, not to be thus affected?"

"It appears to me to be so," said Cebes.

"Is it not most probable then that things which are always the same, and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things which are constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are compounded?"

"To me it appears so."

"Let us return then," he said, "to the subjects on which we before discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this account that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always the same, or does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the beautiful itself, and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small? Or does each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself, continue

always the same, and in the same state, and never undergo any variation at all under any circumstances?"

"They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state, Socrates," said Cebes.

63. "But what shall we say of the many beautiful things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of the kind, whether equal, or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they continue the same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never at any time, so to say, the same, either with respect to themselves or one another?"

"These on the other hand," replied Cebes, "never continue the same."

"These then you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other senses; but those that continue the same, you cannot apprehend in any other way than by the exercise of thought; for such things are invisible, and are not seen?"

"You say what is strictly true," replied Cebes.

64. "We may assume then, if you please," he continued, "that there are two species of things, the one visible, the other invisible?"

"We may," he said.

"And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible never the same?"

"This too," he said, "we may assume."

"Come then," he asked, "is there any thing else belonging to us, than on the one hand body, and on the other soul?"

"Nothing else," he replied.

"To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and more nearly allied?"

"It is clear to every one," he said, "that it is to the visible."

"But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"

"It is not visible to men, Socrates," he replied.

"But we speak of things which are visible or not so to the nature of men: or to some other nature, think you?"

"To that of men."

"What then shall we say of the soul, that it is visible, or not visible?"

"Not visible."

"Is it then invisible?"

"Yes."

"The soul then is more like the invisible than the body, and the body, the visible?"

"It must needs be so, Socrates."

65. "And did we not some time since say this too, that the soul, when it employs the body to examine any thing, either by means of the sight or hearing, or any other sense, (for to examine any thing by means of the body is to do so by the senses,) is then drawn by the body to things that never continue the same, and wanders and is confused, and reels as if intoxicated through coming into contact with things of this kind?"

"Certainly."

"But when it examines any thing by itself, does it approach that which is pure, eternal, immortal, and unchangeable, and, as being allied to it, continue constantly with it, so long as it subsists by itself, and has the power, and does it cease from its wandering, and constantly continue the same with respect to those things, through coming into contact with things of this kind? and is this affection of the soul called wisdom?"

"You speak," he said, "in every respect, well and truly, Socrates."

"To which species of the two, then, both from what was before, and now said, does the soul appear to you to be more like and more nearly allied?"

66. "Every one, I think, would allow, Socrates," he replied, "even the dullest person, from this method of reasoning that the soul is in every respect more like that which continues constantly the same, than that which does not so."

"But what as to the body?"

"It is more like the other."

"Consider it also thus, that, when soul and body are together, nature enjoins the latter to be subservient and obey, the former to rule and exercise dominion. And in this way, which of the two appears to you to be like the divine, and which the mortal? Does it not appear to you to be natural that the divine should rule and command, but the mortal obey and be subservient?"

"To me it does so."

"Which then, does the soul resemble?"

"It is clear, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine, but the body, the mortal."

"Consider then, Cebes," said he, "whether, from all that has

been said, these conclusions follow, that the soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, and which always continues in the same state, but that the body on the other hand is most like that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multiform, dissoluble, and which never continues in the same state. Can we say any thing against this, my dear Cebes, to shew that it is not so ?”

“ We cannot.”

67. “ What then ? Since these things are so, does it not appertain to the body to be quickly dissolved, but to the soul, on the contrary, to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so ?”

“ How not ?”

“ You perceive, however,” he said, “ that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which is exposed to sight, and which we call a corpse, to which it appertains to be dissolved, to fall asunder and be dispersed, does not immediately undergo any of these affections, but remains for a considerable time, and especially so if any one should die with his body in full vigour, and at a corresponding age^ε; for when the body has collapsed and been embalmed, as those that are embalmed in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incredible length of time ; and some parts of the body, even though it does decay, such as the bones and nerves, and every thing of that kind, are nevertheless, as one may say, immortal. Is it not so ?”

“ Yes.”

68. “ Can the soul, then, which is invisible, and which goes to another place like itself, excellent, pure, and invisible, and therefore truly called the invisible world^η, to the presence of a good and wise God, (whither if God will, my soul also must shortly go,) can this soul of ours, I ask, being such and of such a nature, when separated from the body be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as most men assert ? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But the case is much rather thus ; if it is separated in a pure state, taking nothing of the body with it, as not having willingly communicated with it in the present life, but having shunned it and gathered itself within itself, as constantly studying this ; but this is nothing else than to pursue

^ε That is, at a time of life when the body is in full vigour.

^η In the original there is a play on the words *Αἰδης* and *ἀεὶδης*, which I can only attempt to retain by departing from the usual rendering of the former word.

philosophy aright, and in reality to study how to die easily; would not this be to study how to die?"

"Most assuredly."

"Does not the soul, then, when in this state, depart to that which resembles itself, the invisible, the divine, immortal, and wise? and on its arrival there, is it not its lot to be happy, free from error, ignorance, fears, wild passions, and all the other evils to which human nature is subject, and, as is said of the initiated, does it not in truth pass the rest of its time with the gods? Must we affirm that it is so, Cebes, or otherwise?"

"So, by Jupiter," said Cebes.

69. "But, I think, if it departs from the body polluted and impure, as having constantly held communion with the body, and having served and loved it, and been bewitched by it, through desires and pleasures, so as to think that there is nothing real except what is corporeal, which one can touch and see, and drink and eat, and employ for sensual purposes; but what is dark and invisible to the eyes, which is intellectual and apprehended by philosophy, having been accustomed to hate, fear, and shun this, do you think that a soul thus affected can depart from the body by itself, and uncontaminated?"

"By no means whatever," he replied.

"But I think it will be impressed with that which is corporeal, which the intercourse and communion of the body, through constant association and great attention, have made natural to it."

"Certainly."

"We must think, my dear Cebes, that this is ponderous and heavy, earthly and visible, by possessing which such a soul is weighed down, and drawn again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of Hades, wandering, as it is said, amongst monuments and tombs, about which, indeed, certain shadowy phantoms of souls have been seen, being such images as those souls produced which have not departed pure from the body, but which partake of the visible, on which account also they are visible."

"That is probable, Socrates."

70. "Probable indeed, Cebes; and not that these are the souls of the good, but of the wicked, which are compelled to wander about such places, paying the penalty of their former conduct,

which was evil; and they wander about so long, until, through the desire of the corporeal nature that accompanies them, they are again united to a body; and they are united, as is probable, to animals having the same habits as those they have given themselves up to during life."

"But what do you say these are, Socrates?"

"For instance, those who have given themselves up to gluttony, wantonness, and drinking, and have put no restraint on themselves, will probably be clothed in the form of asses and brutes of that kind. Do you not think so?"

"You say what is very probable."

"And that such as have set great value on injustice, tyranny, and rapine, will be clothed in the species of wolves, hawks, and kites? Where else can we say such souls go?"

"Without doubt," said Cebes, "into such as these."

"Is it not then evident," he continued, "as to the rest, whither each will go, according to the resemblances of their several pursuits?"

71. "It is evident," he replied, "how not?"

"Of these, then," he said, "are not they the most happy, and do they not go to the best place, who have practised that social and civilized virtue, which they call temperance and justice, and which is produced from habit and exercise, without philosophy and reflection?"

"In what respect are these the most happy?"

"Because it is probable that these should again migrate into a corresponding civilized and peaceable kind of animals, such as bees perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even into the same human species again, and from these become moderate men."

"It is probable."

"But it is not lawful for any one, who has not studied philosophy and departed this life perfectly pure, to pass into the rank of gods, but only for the true lover of wisdom. And on this account, my friends Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophize rightly abstain from all bodily desires, and persevere in doing so, and do not give themselves up to them, not fearing the loss of property and poverty, as the generality of men and the lovers of wealth; nor again dreading disgrace and ignominy like those who are lovers of power and honour, do they then abstain from them."

"For it would not become them to do so, Socrates," says Cebes.

72. "It would not, by Jupiter," he rejoined. "Wherefore, Cebes, they who care at all for their soul, and do not spend their lives in the culture of their bodies, despising all these, proceed not in the same way with them, as being ignorant whether they are going, but being convinced that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy, but in accordance with the freedom and purification she affords, they give themselves up to her direction, following her wherever she leads."

"How, Socrates?"

"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of wisdom know, that philosophy receiving their soul plainly bound and glued to the body, and compelled to view things through this, as through a prison, and not directly by herself, and sunk in utter ignorance, and perceiving too the strength of the prison, that it arises from desire, so that he that is bound as much as possible assists in binding himself. 73. I say, then, the lovers of wisdom know that philosophy, receiving their soul in this state, gently exhorts it, and endeavours to free it, by shewing that the view of things by means of the eyes is full of deception, as also is that through the ears and the other senses, persuading an abandonment of these so far as it is not absolutely necessary to use them, and advising the soul to be collected and concentrated within itself, and to believe nothing else but herself, with respect to what she herself understands of things that have a real subsistence, and to consider nothing true which she views through the medium of others, and which differ under different aspects¹; for that a thing of this kind is sensible and visible, but that what she herself perceives is intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher, therefore, thinking that she ought not to oppose this deliverance, accordingly abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires, griefs and fears, considering that when any one is exceedingly delighted or alarmed, grieved or influenced by desire, he does not merely suffer such evil from these things as one might suppose, such as either being sick or wasting his

By this I understand him to mean that the soul alone can perceive the truth, but the senses, as they are different, receive and convey different impressions of the same thing; thus the eye receives one impression of an object, the ear a totally different one.

property, through indulging his desires; but that which is the greatest evil, and the worst of all, this he suffers and is not conscious of it."

"But what is this evil, Socrates?" said Cebes.

74. "That the soul of every man is compelled to be either vehemently delighted or grieved about some particular thing, and at the same time to consider that the thing about which it is thus strongly affected is most real and most true, though it is not so. But these are chiefly visible objects: are they not?"

"Certainly."

"In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially shackled by the body?"

"How so?"

"Because each pleasure and pain, having a nail as it were, nails the soul to the body, and fastens it to it, and causes it to become corporeal, deeming those things to be true whatever the body asserts to be so. For, in consequence of its forming the same opinions with the body, and delighting in the same things, it is compelled, I think, to possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished, so that it can never pass into Hades in a pure state, but must ever depart polluted by the body, and so quickly falls again into another body, and grows up as if it were sown, and consequently is deprived of all association with that which is divine, and pure, and uniform."

"You speak most truly, Socrates," said Cebes.

75. "For these reasons, therefore, Cebes, those who are truly lovers of wisdom are moderate and resolute, and not for the reasons that most people say. Do you think as they do?"

"Assuredly not."

"No, truly. But the soul of a philosopher would reason thus, and would not think that philosophy ought to set it free, and that when it is freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains, to bind it down again, and make her work void, weaving a kind of Penelope's web the reverse way. On the contrary, effecting a calm of the passions, and following the guidance of reason, and being always intent on this, contemplating that which is true and divine, and not subject to opinion, and being nourished by it, it thinks that it ought to live in this manner as long as it does live, and that when it dies it shall go to a kindred essence, and one like itself, and

shall be freed from human evils. From such a regimen as this the soul has no occasion to fear, Simmias and Cebes, while it strictly attends to these things, lest being torn to pieces at its departure from the body it should be blown about and dissipated by the winds, and no longer have an existence any where."

76. When Socrates had thus spoken, a long silence ensued ; and Socrates himself was pondering upon what had been said, as he appeared, and so did most of us : but Cebes and Simmias were conversing a little while with each other. At length Socrates perceiving them, said, "What think you of what has been said? does it appear to you to have been proved sufficiently? for many doubts and objections still remain if any one will examine them thoroughly. If, then, you are considering some other subject, I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about this, do not hesitate both yourselves to speak and express your opinion, if it appears to you in any respect that it might have been argued better, and to call me in again to your assistance, if you think you can be at all benefited by my help."

Upon this Simmias said, "Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth : for some time each of us, being in doubt, has been urging and exhorting the other to question you, from a desire to hear our doubts solved, but we were afraid of giving you trouble, lest it should be disagreeable to you in your present circumstances."

77. But he, upon hearing this, gently smiled, and said, "Bless me, Simmias ; with difficulty indeed, could I persuade other men that I do not consider my present condition a calamity, since I am not able to persuade even you ; but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now than during the former part of my life. And, as it seems, I appear to you to be inferior to swans with respect to divination, who, when they perceive that they must needs die, though they have been used to sing before, sing then more than ever, rejoicing that they are about to depart to that deity whose servants they are. But men, through their own fear of death, belie the swans too, and say that, they lamenting their death, sing their last song through grief, and they do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted with any other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or the hoopoes, which they say sing

lamenting through grief. But neither do these birds appear to me to sing through sorrow, nor yet do swans; but in my opinion, belonging to Apollo, they are prophetic, and foreseeing the blessings of Hades, they sing and rejoice on that day more excellently than at any preceding time. 78. But I too consider myself to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and sacred to the same god, and that I have received the power of divination from our common master no less than they, and that I do not depart from this life with less spirits than they. On this account, therefore, it is right that you should both speak and ask whatever you please, as long as the Athenian Eleven permit."

"You say well," said Simmias, "and both I will tell you what are my doubts, and he in turn how far he does not assent to what has been said. For it appears to me, Socrates, probably as it does to you with respect to these matters, that to know them clearly in the present life is either impossible, or very difficult: on the other hand, however, not to test what has been said of them in every possible way, so as not to desist until on examining them in every point of view, one has exhausted every effort, is the part of a very weak man. For we ought with respect to these things, either to learn from others how they stand, or to discover them for one's-self, or, if both these are impossible, then, taking the best of human reasonings and that which is the most difficult to be confuted, and embarking on this, as one who risks himself on a raft, so to sail through life, unless one could be carried more safely, and with less risk, on a surer conveyance or some divine reason. 79. I, therefore, shall not now be ashamed to question you, since you bid me do so, nor shall I blame myself hereafter, for not having now told you what I think; for to me, Socrates, when I consider the matter, both with myself and with Cebes, what has been said does not appear to have been sufficiently proved."

Then said Socrates, "Perhaps, my friend, you have the truth on your side; but tell me in what respect it was not sufficiently proved."

"In this," he answered, "because any one might use the same argument with respect to harmony, and a lyre, and its chords, that harmony is something invisible and incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, in a well-modulated lyre: but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of corporeal form, compounded and earthly, and akin to that which is mortal. When

any one, then, has either broken the lyre, or cut or burst the chords, he might maintain from the same reasoning as yours, that it is necessary the harmony should still exist and not be destroyed; for there could be no possibility that the lyre should subsist any longer when the chords are burst, and that the chords which are of a mortal nature should subsist, but that the harmony, which is of the same nature and akin to that which is divine and immortal, should become extinct, and perish before that which is mortal; but he might say that the harmony must needs subsist somewhere, and that the wood and chords must decay, before it can undergo any change. 80. For I think, Socrates, that you yourself have arrived at this conclusion, that we consider the soul to be pretty much of this kind, namely, that our body being compacted and held together by heat and cold, dryness and moisture, and other such qualities, our soul is the fusion and harmony of these, when they are well and duly combined with each other. If then, the soul is a kind of harmony, it is evident that when our body is unduly relaxed or strained through diseases and other maladies, the soul must of necessity immediately perish, although it is most divine, just as other harmonies which subsist in sounds or in the various works of artizans, but that the remains of the body of each person last for a long time, till they are either burnt or decayed. Consider then what we shall say to this reasoning, if any one should maintain that the soul being a fusion of the several qualities in the body, perishes first in that which is called death."

81. Socrates, therefore, looking stedfastly at us, as he was generally accustomed to do, and smiling, said, "Simmias indeed speaks justly. If then, any one of you is more prompt than I am, why does he not answer? for he seems to have handled my argument not badly. It appears to me, however, that before we make our reply we should first hear from Cebes, what he too objects to our argument, in order that, some time intervening, we may consider what we shall say, and then when we have heard them, we may give up to them, if they appear to speak agreeably to truth, or if not, we may then uphold our own argument. Come then, Cebes," he continued, "say what it is that disturbs you, so as to cause your unbelief."

"I will tell you," said Cebes; "the argument seems to me to rest where it was, and to be liable to the same objection that

we mentioned before. For, that our soul existed even before it came into this present form, I do not deny has been very elegantly, and, if it is not too much to say so, very fully demonstrated: but that it still exists any where when we are dead, does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I give in to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and more durable than the body, for it appears to me to excel very far all things of this kind. 82. 'Why then,' reason might say, 'do you still disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies his weaker part still exists, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the more durable part should still be preserved during this period?' Consider then, whether I say any thing to the purpose in reply to this. For I too, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of an illustration: for the argument appears to me to have been put thus, as if any one should advance this argument about an aged weaver who had died, that the man has not yet perished, but perhaps still exists somewhere; and as a proof, should exhibit the garment which he wore and had woven himself, that it is entire and has not perished; and if any one should disbelieve him he would ask, whether of the two is the more durable, the species of a man or of a garment, that is constantly in use and being worn; then should any one answer, that the species of man is much more durable, he would think it demonstrated, that beyond all question the man is preserved, since that which is less durable has not perished. 83. But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the case, and do you consider what I say, for every one must think that he who argues thus argues foolishly. For this weaver, having worn and woven many such garments, perished after almost all of them, but before the last I suppose, and yet it does not on this account follow any the more that a man is inferior to or weaker than a garment. And I think the soul might admit this same illustration with respect to the body, and he who should say the same things concerning them would appear to me to speak correctly, that the soul is more durable, but the body weaker and less durable; for he would say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if it lives many years; for, if the body wastes and is dissolved while the man still lives, but the soul continually weaves anew what is worn out, it must necessarily follow that when the soul is dissolved it must then have on its last garment, and perish before this

alone; but when the soul has perished the body would shew the weakness of its nature, and quickly rot and vanish. 84. So that it is not by any means right to place implicit reliance on this argument, and to believe that when we die our soul still exists somewhere. For, if any one should concede to him who admits even more than you do, and should grant to him that not only did our soul exist before we were born, but that even when we die nothing hinders the souls of some of us from still existing, and continuing to exist hereafter, and from being often born, and dying again; for so strong is it by nature, that it can hold out against repeated births; if he granted this, he would not yet concede that it does not exhaust itself in its many births, and at length perish altogether in some one of the deaths. But he would say that no one knows this death and dissolution of the body, which brings destruction to the soul; for it is impossible for any one of us to perceive it. If however, this be the case, it follows that every one who is confident at the approach of death is foolishly confident, unless he is able to prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and imperishable: otherwise it necessarily follows that he who is about to die must be alarmed for his soul, lest in its present disunion from the body it should entirely perish."

85. Upon this, all of us who had heard them speaking were disagreeably affected, as we afterwards mentioned to each other; because, after we had been fully persuaded by the former arguments, they seemed to disturb us anew, and to cast us into a distrust, not only of the arguments already adduced, but of such as might afterwards be urged, for fear lest we should not be fit judges of any thing, or lest the things themselves should be incredible.

Echec. By the gods, Phædo, I can readily excuse you: for, while I am now hearing you, it occurs to me to ask myself some such question as this, What arguments can we any longer believe? since the argument which Socrates advanced, and which was exceedingly credible, has now fallen into discredit. For this argument, that our soul is a kind of harmony, produces a wonderful impression on me, both now and always, and in being mentioned, it has reminded me, as it were, that I too was formerly of the same opinion: so that I stand in need again, as if from the very beginning, of some other argument which may persuade me that the soul of one who dies does not die with the body. Tell me therefore, by Jupi-

ter, how Socrates followed up the argument; and whether he too, as you confess was the case with yourselves, seemed disconcerted at all, or not, but calmly maintained his position; and maintained it sufficiently, or defectively. Relate every thing to me as accurately as you can.

Phæd. Indeed, Echecrates, though I have often admired Socrates, I was never more delighted than at being with him on that occasion. That he should be able to say something is perhaps not at all surprising; but I especially admired this in him, first of all that he listened to the argument of the young men so sweetly, affably, and approvingly; in the next place, that he so quickly perceived how we were affected by their arguments; and lastly, that he cured us so well and recalled us, when we were put to flight as it were and vanquished, and encouraged us to accompany him, and consider the argument with him.

Echec. How was that?

Phæd. I will tell you: I happened to be sitting at his right hand, near the bed, upon a low seat, but he himself sat much higher than I. Stroking my head, then, and laying hold of the hair that hung on my neck, for he used, often, to play with my hairs, "To-morrow," he said, "perhaps, Phædo, you will cut off these beautiful locks?"

"It seems likely, Socrates," said I.

87. "Not if you are persuaded by me."

"Why so?" I asked.

"To-day," he replied, "both I ought to cut off mine and you yours, if our argument must die, and we are unable to revive it. And I, if I were you, and the arguments were to escape me, would take an oath, as the Argives do, not to suffer my hair to grow until I had renewed the contest, and vanquished the arguments of Simmias and Cebes."

"But," I said, "even Hercules himself is said not to have been a match for two."

"Call upon me, then," he said, "as your Iolaus, while it is yet day."

"I do call on you, then," I said, "not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as Iolaus upon Hercules."

"It will make no difference," he replied. "But first of all we must beware lest we meet with some mischance."

"What?" I asked.

"That we do not become," he answered, "haters of reasoning as some become haters of men; for no greater evil can happen to any one than to hate reasoning. 88. But hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind both spring from the same source. For hatred of mankind is produced in us from having placed too great reliance on some one without sufficient knowledge of him, and from having considered him to be a man altogether true, sincere, and faithful, and then after a little while finding him depraved and unfaithful, and after him another. And when a man has often experienced this, and especially from those whom he considered his most intimate and best friends, at length, having frequently stumbled, he hates all men, and thinks that there is no soundness at all in any of them. Have you not perceived that this happens so?"

"Certainly," I replied.

"Is it not a shame?" he said, "and is it not evident that such a one attempts to deal with men, without sufficient knowledge of human affairs? For if he had dealt with them with competent knowledge, as the case really is, so he would have considered that the good and the bad are each very few in number, and that those between both are most numerous."

89. "How say you?" I asked.

"In the same manner," he replied, "as with things very little and very large. Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large or a very little man, or dog, or any thing else? and again swift or slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and few, but that the intermediate are abundant and numerous?"

"Certainly," I replied.

"Do you not think, then," he continued, "that if a contest in wickedness were proposed, even here very few would be found pre-eminent?"

"It is probable," I said.

"It is so," he said; "but in this respect reasonings do not resemble men, for I was just now following you as my leader, but in this they do resemble them, when any one believes in any argument as true without being skilled in the art of reasoning, and then shortly afterwards it appears to him to be false, at one time being so and at another time not, and so on

with one after another^k; and especially they who devote themselves to controversial arguments, you are aware at length think they have become very wise, and have alone discovered that there is nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings, but that all things that exist, as is the case with the Euripus, are in a constant state of flux and reflux, and never continue in any one condition for any length of time."

"You speak perfectly true," I said.

90. "Would it not then, Phædo," he said, "be a sad thing if, when there is a true and sound reasoning, and such as one can understand, one should then, through lighting upon such arguments as appear to be at one time true, and at another false, not blame one's-self and one's own want of skill, but at length through grief should anxiously transfer the blame from one's-self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of one's life in hating and reviling arguments, and so be deprived of the truth and knowledge of things that exist?"

"By Jupiter," I said, "it would be sad indeed."

"In the first place, then," he said, "let us beware of this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion, that there appears to be nothing sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in a sound condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavour to become sound, you and the others, on account of your whole future life, but I, on account of my death, since I am in danger at the present time, of not behaving as becomes a philosopher, with respect to this very subject, but as a wrangler like those who are utterly uninformed. 91. For they, when they dispute about any thing, care nothing at all for the subject about which the discussion is, but are anxious about this, that what they have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons present. And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from them only in this respect; for I shall not be anxious to make what I say appear true to those who are present, except that may happen

^k καὶ αὐθις ἕρεπος καὶ ἕρεπος, that is, "with one argument after another." Though Cousin translates it *et successivement tout différent de lui-même*, and Ast, *et rursus alia atque alia*, which may be taken in either sense, yet it appears to me to mean that, when a man repeatedly discovers the fallacy of arguments which he before believed to be true, he distrusts reasoning altogether, just as one who meets with friend after friend who proves unfaithful, becomes a misanthrope.

by the way, but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I thus reason, my dear friend, and observe how interestedly, if what I say be true, it is well to be persuaded of it: out if nothing remains to one that is dead, I shall at least during the interval before death, be less disagreeable to those present by my lamentations. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long, for that would be bad, but will shortly be put an end to. Thus prepared then, Simmias and Cebes," he continued, "I now proceed to my argument. Do you however, if you will be persuaded by me, pay little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if I appear to you to say any thing true, assent to it, but if not, oppose me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I do not deceive both myself and you, and like a bee depart leaving my sting behind."

92. "But let us proceed," he said; "first of all, remind me of what you said, if I should appear to have forgotten it. For Simmias, as I think, is in doubt and fears lest the soul, though more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish before it, as being a species of harmony. But Cebes appeared to me to grant me this, that the soul is more durable than the body, but he argued that it is uncertain to every one, whether when the soul has worn out many bodies, and that repeatedly, it does not, on leaving the last body, itself also perish, so that this very thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases decaying. Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to enquire into?"

They both agreed that they were.

"Whether, then," he continued, "do you reject all our former arguments, or some of them only, and not others?"

"Some we do," they replied, "and others not."

"What then," he proceeded, "do you say about that argument, in which we asserted that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this being the case, our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere before it was enclosed in the body?"

93. "I, indeed," replied Cebes, "was both then wonderfully persuaded by it, and now persist in it, as in no other argument."

"And I too," said Simmias, "am of the same mind, and should very much wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that point."

"Then," Socrates said, "you must needs think otherwise,

my Theban friend, if this opinion holds good, that harmony is something compounded, and that the soul is a kind of harmony that results from the parts compacted together in the body. For surely you will not allow yourself to say that harmony was composed prior to the things from which it required to be composed. Would you allow this?"

"By no means Socrates," he replied.

"Do you perceive then," he said, "that this results from what you say, when you assert that the soul existed before it came into a human form and body, but that it was composed from things that did not yet exist? For harmony is not such as that to which you compare it; but first the lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, exist, and last of all harmony is produced, and first perishes. How then will this argument accord with that?"

"Not at all," said Simmias.

94. "And yet," he said, "if in any argument, there ought to be an accordance in one respecting harmony."

"There ought," said Simmias.

"This of yours however," he said, "is not in accordance. Consider then, which of these two statements do you prefer, that knowledge is reminiscence, or the soul harmony?"

"The former, by far, Socrates," he replied, "for the latter occurred to me without demonstration, through a certain probability and speciousness whence most men derive their opinions. But I am well aware that arguments which draw their demonstrations from probabilities are idle; and unless one is on one's guard against them, they are very deceptive, both in geometry and all other subjects. But the argument respecting reminiscence and knowledge may be said to have been demonstrated by a satisfactory hypothesis. For in this way it was said that our soul existed before it came into the body, because the essence that bears the appellation of 'that which is,' belongs to it. But of this, as I persuade myself, I am fully and rightly convinced. It is therefore necessary, as it seems, that I should neither allow myself nor any one else to maintain that the soul is harmony."

95. "But what, Simmias," said he, "if you consider it thus? Does it appear to you to appertain to harmony, or to any other composition, to subsist in any other way than the very things do of which it is composed?"

"By no means."

"And indeed, as I think, neither to do any thing, nor suffer any thing else, besides what they do or suffer."

He agreed.

"It does not, therefore, appertain to harmony to take the lead of the things of which it is composed, but to follow them."

He assented.

"It is then far from being the case that harmony is moved or sends forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed to its parts?"

"Far indeed," he said.

"What then? is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as it has been made to accord?"

"I do not understand you," he replied.

"Whether," he said, "if it should be in a greater degree and more fully made to accord, supposing that were possible, would the harmony be greater and more full, but if in a less degree and less fully, then would it be inferior and less full?"

"Certainly."

"Is this then the case with the soul, that, even in the smallest extent, one soul is more fully and in a greater degree, or less fully and in a less degree this very thing, a soul, than another?"

"In no respect whatever," he replied.

96. "Well then," he said, "by Jupiter, is one soul said to possess intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another folly and vice, and to be bad? and is this said with truth?"

"With truth, certainly."

"Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what will any one say that these things are in the soul, virtue and vice? Will he call them another kind of harmony and discord? and say that the one, the good soul, is harmonized, and, being harmony, contains within itself another harmony, but that the other is discordant, and does not contain within itself another harmony?"

"I am unable to say," replied Simmias, "but it is clear that he who maintains that opinion would say something of the kind."

"But it has been already granted," said he, "that one soul is not more or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that one harmony is not to a greater degree or more

fully, or to a less degree or less fully, a harmony, than another : is it not so?"

"Certainly."

"And that that which is neither more nor less harmony, is neither more nor less harmonized : is it so?"

"It is."

"But does that which is neither more nor less harmonized partake of more or less harmony, or an equal amount?"

"An equal amount."

97. "A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized?"

"Even so."

"Such then being its condition, it cannot partake of a greater degree of discord or harmony?"

"Certainly not."

"And again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a greater degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue harmony?"

"It cannot."

"Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will partake of vice, if it is harmony : for doubtless harmony, which is perfectly such, can never partake of discord?"

"Certainly not."

"Neither, therefore, can a soul, which is perfectly a soul, partake of vice."

"How can it, from what has been already said?"

"From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally good, if at least they are by nature equally this very thing, souls?"

"It appears so to me, Socrates," he said.

"And does it appear to you," he said, "to have been thus rightly argued, and that the argument would lead to this result, if the hypothesis were correct, that the soul is harmony?"

98. "On no account whatever," he replied.

"But what," said he, "of all the things that are in man, is there any thing else that you say bears rule except the soul, especially if it be wise?"

"I should say not."

"Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing them? My meaning is this, for instance, when heat and thirst are present, by drawing it the contrary way, so as

to hinder it from drinking, and when hunger is present, by hindering it from eating; and in ten thousand other instances we see the soul opposing the desires of the body. Do we not?" "Certainly."

"But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony, it would never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation, vibration, or any other affection to which its component parts are subject, but would follow, and never govern them?"

"We did allow it," he replied, "for how could we do otherwise?"

"What, then, does not the soul now appear to act quite the contrary, ruling over all the parts, from which any one might say it subsists, and resisting almost all of them through the whole of life, and exercising dominion over them in all manner of ways, punishing some more severely even with pain, both by gymnastics and medicine, and others more mildly, partly threatening, and partly admonishing the desires, angers, and fears, as if, being itself of a different nature, it were conversing with something quite different? 99. Just as Homer has done in the *Odyssey*¹, where he speaks of Ulysses: 'Having struck his breast, he chid his heart in the following words, Bear up, my heart; ere this thou hast borne far worse.' Do you think that he composed this in the belief that the soul was harmony, and capable of being led by the passions of the body, and not rather that it was able to lead and govern them, as being something much more divine than to be compared with harmony?"

"By Jupiter, Socrates, it appears so to me."

"Therefore, my excellent friend, it is on no account correct for us to say that the soul is a kind of harmony; for as it appears, we should neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor with ourselves."

"Such is the case," he replied.

"Be it so, then," said Socrates, "we have already, as it seems, sufficiently appeased this Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what arguments shall we appease this Cadmus^m?"

¹ Lib. xx. v. 7.

^m Harmony was the wife of Cadmus, the founder of Thebes; Socrates, therefore, compares his two Theban friends, Simmias and Cebes, with them, and says that having overcome Simmias, the advocate of Harmony, he must now deal with Cebes, who is represented by Cadmus.

100. "You appear to me," replied Cebes, "to be likely to find out; for you have made out this argument against harmony wonderfully beyond my expectation. For when Simmias was saying what his doubts were, I wondered very much whether any one would be able to answer his reasoning. It therefore appeared to me unaccountable that he did not withstand the very first onset of your argument. I should not, therefore, be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same fate."

"My good friend," said Socrates, "do not speak so boastfully, lest some envious power should overthrow the argument that is about to be urged. These things, however, will be cared for by the deity, but let us, meeting hand to hand, in the manner of Homer, try whether you say any thing to the purpose. This, then, is the sum of what you enquire: you require it to be proved that our soul is imperishable and immortal; if a philosopher that is about to die, full of confidence and hope that after death he shall be far happier than if he had died after leading a different kind of life, shall not entertain this confidence foolishly and vainly. 101. But to shew that the soul is something strong and divine, and that it existed before we were born, you say not at all hinders, but that all these things may evince, not its immortality, but that the soul is durable, and existed an immense space of time before, and knew and did many things. But that, for all this, it was not at all the more immortal, but that its very entrance into the body of a man was the beginning of its destruction, as if it were a disease, so that it passes through this life in wretchedness, and at last perishes in that which is called death. But you say that it is of no consequence whether it comes into a body once or often, with respect to our occasion of fear: for it is right he should be afraid, unless he is foolish, who does not know, and cannot give a reason to prove, that the soul is immortal. Such, I think, Cebes, is the sum of what you say; and I purposely repeat it often, that nothing may escape us, and, if you please, you may add to or take from it."

Cebes replied, "I do not wish at present either to take from or add to it; that is what I mean."

102. Socrates, then, having paused for some time, and considered something within himself, said, "You enquire into no easy matter, Cebes; for it is absolutely necessary to discuss

the whole question of generation and corruption. If you please, then, I will relate to you what happened to me with reference to them; and afterwards, if any thing that I shall say shall appear to you ~~useful~~, towards producing conviction on the subject you are now treating of, make use of it."

"I do indeed wish it," replied Cebes.

"Hear my relation then. When I was a young man, Cebes, I was wonderfully desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of nature: for it appeared to me to be a very sublime thing to know the causes of every thing, why each thing is generated, why it perishes, and why it exists. And I often tossed myself upwards and downwards, considering first such things as these, whether when heat and cold have undergone a certain corruption, as some say, then animals are formed; and whether the blood is that by means of which we think, or air; or fire, or none of these, but that it is the brain that produces the perceptions of hearing, seeing, and smelling, and that from these come memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion, when in a state of rest, in the same way knowledge is produced? 103. And again considering the corruptions of these, and the affections incidental to the heavens and the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskilful in these speculations, that nothing could be more so. But I will give you a sufficient proof of this: for I then became, by these very speculations, so very blind with respect to things which I knew clearly before, as it appeared to myself and others, that I unlearned even the things which I thought I knew before, both on many other subjects and also this, why a man grows. For before I thought this was evident to every one, that it proceeds from eating and drinking; for that, when, from the food, flesh is added to flesh, bone to bone, and so on in the same proportion, what is proper to them is added to the several other parts, then the bulk which was small becomes afterwards large, and thus that a little man becomes a big one. Such was my opinion at that time: does it appear to you correct?"

"To me it does," said Cebes.

104. "Consider this further. I thought that I had formed a right opinion, when on seeing a tall man standing by a short one, I judged that he was taller by the head, and in like manner one horse than another: and still more clearly than

this, ten appeared to me to be more than eight, by two being added to them, and that two cubits are greater than one cubit, by exceeding it a half."

"But now," said Cebes, "what think you of these matters?"

"By Jupiter," said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of these, for that I cannot even persuade myself of this, when a person has added one to one, whether the one to which the addition has been made has become two, or whether that which has been added, and that to which the addition has been made, have become two by the addition of the one to the other. For I wonder, if when each of these was separate from the other, each was one, and they were not yet two, but when they have approached nearer each other, this should be the cause of their becoming two, namely, the union by which they have been placed nearer one another. 105. Nor yet, if any person should divide one, am I able to persuade myself that this, their division, is the cause of its becoming two. For this cause is the contrary to the former one of their becoming two; for then it was because they were brought ~~nearer to~~ each other, and the one was added to the other; it is, because one is removed and separated from the other. Nor do I yet persuade myself, that I know why one is produced, nor, in a word, why any thing else is produced or perishes, or exists, according to my method of proceeding; but I mix up another method of my own at random, for this I can on no account give in to.

"But having once heard a person reading from a book, written, as he said, by Anaxagoras, and which said that it is intelligence that sets in order and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause, and it appeared to me in a manner to be well that intelligence should be the cause of all things, and I considered with myself, if this is so, that the regulating intelligence orders all things, and disposes each in such way as will be best for it. 106. If any one, then, should desire to discover the cause of every thing, in what way it is produced, or perishes, or exists, he must discover this respecting it, in what way it is best for it either to exist, or to suffer, or do any thing else; from this mode of reasoning, then, it is proper that a man should consider nothing else, both with respect to himself and others, than what is most excellent and best: and it necessarily follows that this same

person must also know that which is worst, for that the knowledge of both of them is the same. Thus reasoning with myself, I was delighted to think I had found in Anaxagoras a preceptor who would instruct me in the causes of things, agreeably to my own mind, and that he would inform me, first, whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had informed me, would moreover explain the cause and necessity of its being so, arguing on the principle of the better, and shewing that it is better for it to be such as it is, and if he should say that it is in the middle, that he would moreover explain how it is better for it to be in the middle; and if he should make all this clear to me, I was prepared no longer to require any other species of cause. 107. I was in like manner prepared to enquire respecting the sun, and moon, and the other stars, with respect to their velocities in reference to each other and their revolutions, and other conditions, in what way it is better for both to act and be affected as it does and is. For I never thought that after he had said that these things were set in order by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for them than that it is best for them to be as they are: hence, I thought, that in assigning the cause to each of them, and to all in common, he would explain that which is best for each, and the common good of all. And I would not have given up my hopes for a good deal, but having taken up his books with great eagerness, I read through them as quickly as I could, that I might as soon as possible know the best, and the worst.

108. "From this wonderful hope, however, my friend, I was speedily thrown down, when, as I advance and read over his works, I meet with a man who makes no use of intelligence, nor assigns any causes for the ordering of all things, but makes the causes to consist of air, ether, and water, and many other things equally absurd. And he appeared to me to be very like one who should say, that whatever Socrates does he does by intelligence, and then, attempting to describe the causes of each particular action, should say, first of all, that for this reason I am now sitting here, because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard, and have joints separate from each other, but that the sinews, being capable of tension and contraction, cover the bones, together with the flesh and skin which contains them. The

bones, therefore, being suspended in their sockets, the nerves relaxing and tightening enable me to bend my limbs as I now do, and from this cause I sit here bent up. 109. And if again, he should assign other similar causes for my conversing with you, assigning as causes voice, and air, and hearing, and ten thousand other things of the kind, omitting to mention the real causes, that since it appeared better to the Athenians to condemn me, I therefore thought it better to sit here, and more just to remain and submit to the punishment which they have ordered; for, by the dog, I think these sinews and bones would have been long ago either in Megara or Bœotia, borne thither by an opinion of that which is best, if I had not thought it more just and honourable to submit to whatever sentence the city might order, than to flee and run stealthily away. But to call such things causes is too absurd. But if any one should say that without possessing such things as bones and sinews, and whatever else I have, I could not do what I pleased, he would speak the truth; but to say that I do as I do through them, and that I act thus by intelligence, and not from the choice of what is best, would be a great and extreme disregard of reason. 110. For this would be not to be able to distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that another without which a cause could not be a cause: which indeed the generality of men appear to me to do, fumbling as it were in the dark, and making use of strange names, so as to denominate them as the very cause. Wherefore one encompassing the earth with a vortex from heaven, makes the earth remain fixed; but another, as if it were a broad trough, rests it upon the air as its base: but the power by which these things are now so disposed that they may be placed in the best manner possible, this they neither enquire into, nor do they think that it requires any superhuman strength; but they think they will some time or other find out an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this, and more capable of containing all things, and in reality, the good, and that which ought to hold them together and contain them, they take no account of at all. I then should most gladly have become the disciple of any one who would teach me of such a cause, in what way it is. But when I was disappointed of this, and was neither able to discover it myself, nor to learn it from another, do you wish, Cebes, that I should shew you in

what way I set out upon a second voyage in search of the cause?"

111. "I wish it exceedingly," he replied.

"It appeared to me then," said he, "after this, when I was wearied with considering things that exist, that I ought to beware lest I should suffer in the same way as they do who look at and examine an eclipse of the sun, for some lose the sight of their eyes, unless they behold its image in water, or some similar medium. And I was affected with a similar feeling, and was afraid lest I should be utterly blinded in my soul through beholding things with the eyes, and endeavouring to grasp them by means of the several senses. It seemed to me, therefore, that I ought to have recourse to reasons, and to consider in them the truth of things. Perhaps, however, this similitude of mine may in some respect be incorrect; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons considers them in their images, more than he does who views them in their effects. However, I proceeded thus, and on each occasion laying down the reason, which I deem to be the strongest, whatever things appear to me to accord with this I regard as true, both with respect to the cause and every thing else. but such as do not accord I regard as not true. 112. But I wish to explain my meaning to you in a clearer manner; for I think that you do not yet understand me."

"No, by Jupiter," said Cebes, "not well."

"However," continued he, "I am now saying nothing new, but what I have always at other times, and in a former part of this discussion, never ceased to say. I proceed then to attempt to explain to you that species of cause which I have busied myself about, and return again to those well-known subjects, and set out from them, laying down as an hypothesis, that there is a certain abstract beauty, and goodness, and magnitude, and so of all other things; which if you grant me, and allow that they do exist, I hope that I shall be able from these to explain the cause to you, and to discover that the soul is immortal."

"But," said Cebes, "since I grant you this, you may draw your conclusion at once."

"But consider," he said, "what follows from thence, and see if you can agree with me. For it appears to me, that if there be any thing else beautiful, besides beauty itself, it is

not beautiful for any other reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty; and I say the same of every thing. Do you admit such a cause?"

"I do admit it," he replied.

113. "I do not yet understand," he continued, "nor am I able to conceive, those other wise causes; but if any one should tell me why any thing is beautiful, either because it has a blooming florid colour, or figure, or any thing else of the kind, I dismiss all other reasons, for I am confounded by them all; but I simply, wholly, and perhaps foolishly, confine myself to this, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, except either the presence or communication of that abstract beauty, by whatever means and in whatever way communicated: for I cannot yet affirm this with certainty, but only that by means of beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. For this appears to me the safest answer to give both to myself and others, and adhering to this, I think that I shall never fall, but that it is a safe answer both for me and any one else to give, that by means of beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Does it not also seem so to you?"

"It does."

"And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater things, greater; and by littleness less things become less?"

"Yes."

114. "You would not then approve of it, if any one said that one person is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by the very same thing, but you would maintain that you mean nothing else than that every thing that is greater than another is greater by nothing else than magnitude, and that it is greater on this account, that is on account of magnitude, and that the less is less by nothing else than littleness, and on this account less, that is, on account of littleness, being afraid, I think, lest some opposite argument should meet you if you should say that any one is greater and less by the head; as first, that the greater is greater, and the less less, by the very same thing; and next, that the greater is greater by the head, which is small; and that it is monstrous to suppose that any one is great through something small. Should you not be afraid of this?"

To which said Cebes, smilingly, "Indeed I should."

"Should you not, then," he continued, "be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two, and for this cause exceeds it, and not by number, and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one cubit by half, and not by magnitude? for the fear is surely the same."

"Certainly," he replied.

115. "What then? when one has been added to one, would you not beware of saying that the addition is the cause of its being two, or division when it has been divided; and would you not loudly assert that you know no other way in which each thing subsists, than by partaking of the peculiar essence of each of which it partakes, and that in these cases you can assign no other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of duality; and that such things as are to become two must needs partake of this, and what is to become one, of unity; but these divisions and additions, and other such subtleties, you would dismiss, leaving them to be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself: whereas you, fearing, as it is said, your own shadow and inexperience, would adhere to this safe hypothesis, and answer accordingly? But if any one should assail this hypothesis of yours, would you not dismiss him and refrain from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting from it, whether in your opinion they agree with or differ from each other? But when it should be necessary for you to give a reason for it, would you give one in a similar way, by again laying down another hypothesis, which should appear the best of higher principles, until you arrived at something satisfactory, but at the same time you would avoid making confusion, as disputants do, in treating of the first principle and the results arising from it, if you really desire to arrive at the truth of things. 116. For they, perhaps, make no account at all of this, nor pay any attention to it, for they are able, through their wisdom, to mingle all things together, and at the same time please themselves. But you, if you are a philosopher, would act, I think, as I now describe."

"You speak most truly," said Simmias and Cebes together.

Echec. By Jupiter, Phædo, they said so with good reason: for he appears to me to have explained these things with wonderful clearness, even to one endued with a small degree of intelligence.

Phæd. Certainly, Echecrates, and so it appeared to all who were present.

Echec. And so it appears to me, who was absent, and now hear it related. But what was said after this?

As well as I remember, when these things had been granted him, and it was allowed that each several idea exists of itself^a, and that other things partaking of them receive their denomination from them, he next asked: "If then," he said, "you admit that these things are so, whether, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than Phædo, do you not then say that magnitude and littleness are both in Simmias?"

"I do."

117. "And yet," he said, "you must confess that Simmias's exceeding Socrates is not actually true in the manner in which the words express it; for Simmias does not naturally exceed Socrates, in that he is Simmias, but in consequence of the magnitude which he happens to have; nor, again, does he exceed Socrates, because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates possesses littleness in comparison with his magnitude?"

"True."

"Nor, again, is Simmias exceeded by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but because Phædo possesses magnitude in comparison with Simmias's littleness?"

"It is so."

"Thus, then, Simmias has the appellation of being both little and great, being between both, by exceeding the littleness of one through his own magnitude, and to the other yielding a magnitude that exceeds his own littleness." And at the same time, smiling, he said, "I seem to speak with the precision of a short-hand writer; however, it is as I say."

He allowed it.

118. "But I say it for this reason, wishing you to be of the same opinion as myself. For it appears to me, not only that magnitude itself is never disposed to be at the same time great and little, but that magnitude in us never admits the little, nor is disposed to be exceeded, but one of two things, either to flee and withdraw when its contrary, the little, approaches it, or when it has actually come, to perish; but that it is not disposed, by sustaining and receiving littleness, to be different from what

^a *ἐλαί τι*, literally, "is something."

it was. Just as I, having received and sustained littleness, and still continuing the same person that I am, am this same little person: but that, while it is great, never endures to be little. And in like manner the little that is in us is not disposed at any time to become or to be great, nor is any thing else among contraries, while it continues what it was, at the same time disposed to become and to be its contrary; but in this contingency it either departs or perishes."

119. "It appears so to me," said Cebes, "in every respect."

But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly remember who he was, said, "By the gods, was not the very contrary of what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our discussion, that the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater, and in a word, that the very production of contraries is from contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that this can never be the case."

Upon this Socrates, having leant his head forward and listened, said, "You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however, perceive the difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it was said, that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary to itself, neither that which is in us, nor that which is in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of things that have contraries, calling them by the appellation of those things; but now we are speaking of those very things, from the presence of which things so called receive their appellation, and of these very things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production from each other." 120. And, at the same time looking at Cebes, "Has any thing that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?"

"Indeed," said Cebes, "I am not at all so disposed; however, I by no means say that there are not many things that disturb me."

"Then," he continued, "we have quite agreed to this, that a contrary can never be contrary to itself."

"Most certainly," he replied.

"But further," he said, "consider whether you will agree with me in this also. Do you call heat and cold any thing?"

"I do."

"The same as snow and fire?"

"By Jupiter, I do not."

“But heat is something different from fire, and cold something different from snow?”

“Yes.”

“But this, I think, is apparent to you, that snow, while it is snow, can never, when it has admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what it was, snow and hot, but, on the approach of heat, it must either withdraw or perish?”

“Certainly.”

“And again, that fire, when cold approaches it, must either depart or perish; but that it will never endure, when it has admitted coldness, to continue what it was, fire and cold?”

121. “You speak truly,” he said.

“It happens then,” he continued, “with respect to some of such things, that not only is the idea itself always thought worthy of the same appellation, but likewise something else which is not indeed that idea itself but constantly retains its form so long as it exists. What I mean will perhaps be clearer in the following examples. The odd in number must always possess the name by which we now call it; must it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Must it alone of all things, for this I ask, or is there any thing else, which is not the same as the odd, but yet which we must always call odd, together with its own name, because it is so constituted by nature, that it can never be without the odd? But this I say is the case with the number three, and many others. For consider with respect to the number three; does it not appear to you that it must always be called by its own name, as well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as the number three? Yet such is the nature of the number three, five, and the entire half of number, that though they are not the same as the odd, yet each of them is always odd. And again, two and four, and the whole other series of number, though not the same as the even, are nevertheless each of them always even: do you admit this or not?”

122. “How should I not?” he replied.

“Observe then,” said he, “what I wish to prove. It is this, that it appears, not only that these contraries do not admit each other, but that even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always possess contraries, do not appear to admit that idea which is contrary to the idea that exists in themselves, but, when it approaches, perish or depart. Shall

we not allow that the number three would first perish, and suffer any thing whatever, rather than endure, while it is still three, to become even?"

"Most certainly," said Cebes.

"And yet," said he, "the number two is not contrary to three."

"Surely not."

"Not only, then, do ideas that are contrary never allow the approach of each other, but some other things also do not allow the approach of contraries."

"You say very truly," he replied.

"Do you wish, then," he said, "that, if we are able, we should define what these things are?"

"Certainly."

"Would they not then, Cebes," he said, "be such things as whatever they occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own idea, but also that of something which is always a contrary?"

"How do you mean?"

123. "As we just now said. For you know surely, that whatever things the idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three, but also odd?"

"Certainly."

"To such a thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form which constitutes this can never come."

"It cannot."

"But did the odd make it so?"

"Yes."

"And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?"

"Yes."

"The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?"

"No surely."

"Three, then, has no part in the even?"

"None whatever."

"The number three is uneven?"

"Yes."

"What therefore I said should be defined, namely, what things they are which, though not contrary to some particular thing, yet do not admit of the contrary itself, as in the present instance, the number three though not contrary to the even, does not any the more admit it, for it always brings the con-

trary with it, just as the number two does to the odd, fire to cold, and many other particulars, consider then, whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it. 124. But call it to mind again, for it will not be useless to hear it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea of the even, nor ten, its double, that of the odd. This double then, though it is itself contrary to something else^o, yet will not admit the idea of the odd; nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind, such as the half and the third part admit the idea of the whole, if you follow me and agree with me that it is so."

"I entirely agree with you," he said, "and follow you."

"Tell me again, then," he said, "from the beginning; and do not answer me in the terms in which I put the question, but in different ones, imitating my example. For I say this because, besides that safe mode of answering, which I mentioned at first^p, from what has now been said, I see another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is, which if it be in the body will cause it to be hot, I should not give you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one more elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire: nor, if you should ask me what that is, which if it be in the body, will cause it to be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but fever; nor, if you should ask what that is, which if it be in number, will cause it to be odd, should I say that it is unevenness, but unity, and so with other things. But consider whether you sufficiently understand what I mean."

125. "Perfectly so," he replied.

"Answer me then," he said, "what that is, which when it is in the body, the body will be alive?"

"Soul," he replied.

"Is not this, then, always the case?"

"How should it not be?" said he.

"Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies?"

"It does indeed," he replied.

"Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not?"

"There is," he replied.

• That is, to single.

^p See § 113.

"What?"

"Death."

"The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it, as has been already allowed?"

"Most assuredly," replied Cebes.

"What then? how do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of the even?"

"Uneven," he replied.

"And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?"

"Unmusical," he said, "and unjust."

"Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit death?"

"Immortal," he replied.

"Therefore does not the soul admit death?"

"No."

"Is the soul, then, immortal?"

"Immortal."

"Be it so," he said. "Shall we say then, that this has been now demonstrated? or how think you?"

"Most completely, Socrates."

"What then," said he, "Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?"

"How should it not?"

"If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat should be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would not perish; nor yet would it stay and admit the heat."

"You say truly," he replied.

"In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold were imperishable, that when any thing cold approached the fire, it would neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite safe."

"Of necessity," he said.

"Must we not then of necessity," he continued, "speak thus of that which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it. For, from what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor will ever be dead, just as we said that three will never be even, nor again will the odd, nor will fire

be cold, nor yet the heat that is in fire. 127. But some one may say, what hinders, though the odd can never become even by the approach of the even, as we have allowed, yet, when the odd is destroyed, that the even should succeed in its place? We could not contend with him who should make this objection, that it is not destroyed; for the uneven is not imperishable; since, if this were granted us, we might easily have contended, that on the approach of the even the odd and the three depart; and we might have contended in the same way with respect to fire, heat, and the rest; might we not?"

"Certainly."

"Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed that it is imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must also be imperishable; if not, there will be need of other arguments."

"But there is no need," he said, "as far as that is concerned; for scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is liable to it."

128. "The deity, indeed, I think," said Socrates, "and the idea itself of life, and if any thing else is immortal, must be allowed by all beings to be incapable of dissolution."

"By Jupiter," he replied, "by all men indeed, and still more, as I think, by the gods."

"Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the soul, since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable?"

"It must of necessity be so."

"When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted, having withdrawn itself from death?"

"It appears so."

"The soul, therefore," he said, "Cebes, is most certainly immortal and imperishable, and our souls will really exist in Hades."

"Therefore, Socrates," he said, "I have nothing further to say against this, nor any reason for doubting your arguments. But if Simmias here or any one else has any thing to say, it were well for him not to be silent: for I know not to what other opportunity beyond the present any one can defer it, who wishes either to speak or hear about these things."

129. "But indeed," said Simmias, "neither have I any reason to doubt what has been urged; yet from the magni-

tude of the subject discussed, and from my low opinion of human weakness, I am compelled still to retain a doubt within myself with respect to what has been said."

"Not only so, Simmias," said Socrates, "but you say this well, and moreover the first hypotheses, even though they are credible to you, should nevertheless be examined more carefully; and if you should investigate them sufficiently, I think you will follow my reasoning as far as it is possible for man to do so; and if this very point becomes clear, you will enquire no further."

"You speak truly," he said.

"But it is right, my friends," he said, "that we should consider this, that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the danger would now appear to be dreadful, if one should neglect it. 130. For if death were a deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the wicked, when they die, to be delivered at the same time from the body, and from their vices together with the soul: but now, since it appears to be immortal, it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety, except by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes to Hades, possessing nothing else but its discipline and education, which are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, on the very beginning of his journey thither. For thus it is said; that each person's demon who was assigned to him while living, when he dies conducts him to some place, where they that are assembled together must receive sentence and then proceed to Hades with that guide, who has been ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there having received their deserts, and having remained the appointed time, another guide brings them back hither again, after many and long revolutions of time. The journey, then, is not such as the Telephus of Æschylus describes it. For he says that a simple path leads to Hades; but it appears to me to be neither simple nor one: for there would be no need of guides, nor could any one ever miss the way, if there were but one. But now it appears to have many divisions and windings; and this I conjecture from our religious and funeral rites⁹. 131. The well-ordered and wise soul, then,

⁹ It is difficult to express the distinction between *ψῆμα* and *νόημα*, the former word seems to have reference to the souls of the dead, the latter to their bodies.

both follows, and is not ignorant of its present condition; but that which through passion clings to the body, as I said before, having longingly fluttered about it for a long time, and about its visible place^r, after vehement resistance and great suffering, is forcibly and with great difficulty led away by its appointed demon. And when it arrives at the place where the others are, impure and having done any such thing as the committal of unrighteous murders or other similar actions, which are kindred to these, and are the deeds of kindred souls, every one shuns it and turns away from it, and will neither be its fellow-traveller or guide, but it wanders about, oppressed with every kind of helplessness until certain periods have elapsed: and when these are completed, it is carried of necessity to an abode suitable to it; but the soul which has passed through life with purity and moderation, having obtained the gods for its fellow-travellers and guides, settles each in the place suited to it. 132. There are indeed many and wonderful places in the earth, and it is itself neither of such a kind, nor of such a magnitude, as is supposed by those who are accustomed to speak of the earth, as I have been persuaded by a certain person."

Whereupon Simmias said, "How mean you, Socrates? For I too have heard many things about the earth, not however those things which have obtained your belief: I would therefore gladly hear them."

"Indeed, Simmias, the art of Glaucus* does not seem to me to be required to relate what these things are; that they are true however, appears to me more than the art of Glaucus can prove, and besides, I should probably not be able to do it, and even if I did know how, what remains to me of life, Simmias, seems insufficient for the length of the subject. However, the form of the earth, such as I am persuaded it is, and the different places in it, nothing hinders me from telling."

"But that will be enough," said Simmias.

"I am persuaded, then," said he, "in the first place, that, if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical form, it has no need of air, nor of any other similar force, to prevent it from falling, but that the similarity of the heavens

^r Its place of interment.

* A proverb meaning "a matter of great difficulty."

to themselves on every side, and the equilibrium of the earth itself, are sufficient to support it; for a thing in a state of equilibrium when placed in the middle of something that presses it equally on all sides cannot incline more or less on any side, but being equally affected all around remains unmoved. 133. In the first place then," he said, "I am persuaded of this."

"And very properly so," said Simmias.

"Yet further," said he, "that it is very large, and that we who inhabit some small portion of it, from the river Phasis to the pillars of Hercules, dwell about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and that many others elsewhere dwell in many similar places, for that there are every where about the earth many hollows of various forms and sizes into which there is a confluence of water, mist, and air; but that the earth itself, being pure, is situated in the pure heavens, in which are the stars, and which most persons who are accustomed to speak about such things call ether; of which these things are the sediment and are continually flowing into the hollow parts of the earth. 134. That we are ignorant, then, that we are dwelling in its hollows, and imagine that we inhabit the upper parts of the earth, just as if any one dwelling in the bottom of the sea, should think that he dwelt on the sea, and, beholding the sun and the other stars through the water, should imagine that the sea was the heavens, but through sloth and weakness should never have reached the surface of the sea, nor, having emerged and risen up from the sea to this region, have seen how much more pure and more beautiful it is than the place where he is, nor has heard of it from any one else who has seen it. This then is the very condition in which we are; for, dwelling in some hollow of the earth, we think that we dwell on the surface of it, and call the air heaven, as if the stars moved through this, being heaven itself. But this is because by reason of our weakness and sloth, we are unable to reach to the summit of the air. Since, if any one could arrive at its summit, or, becoming winged, could fly up thither, or emerging from hence, he would see,—just as with us, fishes emerging from the sea, behold what is here,—so any one would behold the things there, and if his nature were able to endure the contemplation, he would know that that is the true heaven, and the true light, and the true earth. 135. For this earth and these stones, and

the whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things in the sea by the saltness; for nothing of any value grows in the sea, nor, in a word, does it contain any thing perfect, but there are caverns and sand, and mud in abundance, and filth, in whatever parts of the sea there is earth, nor are they at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things with us. But on the other hand, those things in the upper regions of the earth would appear far more to excel the things with us. For, if we may tell a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind the things are on the earth beneath the heavens."

"Indeed, Socrates," said Simmias, "we should be very glad to hear that fable."

136. "First of all then, my friend," he continued, "this earth, if any one should survey it from above, is said to have the appearance of balls covered with twelve different pieces of leather, variegated and distinguished with colours, of which the colours found here, and which painters use, are as it were copies. But there the whole earth is composed of such, and far more brilliant and pure than these; for one part of it is purple, and of wonderful beauty, part of a golden colour, and part of white, more white than chalk or snow, and in like manner composed of other colours, and those more in number and more beautiful than any we have ever beheld. And those very hollow parts of the earth, though filled with water and air, exhibit a certain species of colour, shining among the variety of other colours, so that one continually variegated aspect presents itself to the view. In this earth, being such, all things that grow, grow in a manner proportioned to its nature, trees, flowers, and fruits; and again, in like manner, its mountains and stones possess, in the same proportion, smoothness and transparency, and more beautiful colours; of which the well-known stones here that are so highly prized are but fragments, such as sardin-stones, jaspers, and emeralds, and all of that kind. But there, there is nothing subsists that is not of this character, and even more beautiful than these. 137. But the reason of this is, because the stones there are pure, and not eaten up and decayed, like those here, by rottenness and saltiness, which flow down hither together, and which produce deformity and disease in the stones and the earth, and in other things, even animals and plants. But that earth is adorned

with all these, and moreover with gold and silver, and other things of the kind: for they are naturally conspicuous, being numerous and large, and in all parts of the earth; so that to behold it is a sight for the blessed. There are also many other animals and men upon it, some dwelling in mid-earth, others about the air, as we do about the sea, and others in islands which the air flows round, and which are near the continent: and in one word, what water and the sea are to us, for our necessities, the air is to them; and what air is to us, that ether is to them. 138. But their seasons are of such a temperament that they are free from disease, and live for a much longer time than those here, and surpass us in sight, hearing, and smelling, and every thing of this kind, as much as air excels water, and ether air, in purity. Moreover, they have abodes and temples of the gods, in which gods really dwell, and voices and oracles, and sensible visions of the gods, and such-like intercourse with them; the sun too, and moon, and stars, are seen by them such as they really are, and their felicity in other respects is correspondent with these things.

“And such indeed is the nature of the whole earth, and the parts about the earth; but there are many places all round it throughout its cavities, some deeper and more open than that in which we dwell: but others that are deeper, have a less chasm than our region, and others are shallower in depth than it is here and broader. 139. But all these are in many places perforated one into another under the earth, some with narrower and some with wider channels, and have passages through, by which a great quantity of water flows from one into another, as into basins, and there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, both of hot and cold water, and a great quantity of fire, and mighty rivers of fire, and many of liquid mire, some purer, and some more miry, as in Sicily there are rivers of mud that flow before the lava, and the lava itself, and from these the several places are filled, according as the overflow from time to time happens to come to each of them. But all these move up and down as it were by a certain oscillation existing in the earth. And this oscillation proceeds from such natural cause as this: one of the chasms of the earth is exceedingly large, and perforated through the entire earth, and is that which Homer¹ speaks of, ‘very far

¹ *Iliad*, lib. viii. v. 14.

off, where is the most profound abyss beneath the earth, which elsewhere both he and many other poets have called Tartarus. For into this chasm all rivers flow together, and from it flow out again : but they severally derive their character from the earth through which they flow. 140. And the reason why all streams flow out from thence, and flow into it, is because this liquid has neither bottom nor base. Therefore it oscillates and fluctuates up and down, and the air and the wind around it do the same ; for they accompany it both when it rushes to those parts of the earth, and when to these. And as in respiration the flowing breath is continually breathed out and drawn in, so there the wind oscillating with the liquid, causes certain vehement and irresistible winds both as it enters and goes out. When, therefore, the water rushing in descends to the place which we call the lower region, it flows through the earth into the streams there and fills them, just as men pump up water. But when again it leaves those regions and rushes hither, it again fills the rivers here, and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth, and having severally reached the several places to which they are journeying, they make seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. 141. Then sinking again from thence beneath the earth, some of them having gone round longer and more numerous places, and others round fewer and shorter, they again discharge themselves into Tartarus, some much lower than they were drawn up, others only a little so, but all of them flow in again beneath the point at which they flowed out. And some issue out directly opposite the place by which they flow in, others on the same side : there are also some which having gone round altogether in a circle, folding themselves once or several times round the earth, like serpents, when they had descended as low as possible, discharge themselves again : and it is possible for them to descend on either side as far as the middle, but not beyond ; for in each direction there is an acclivity to the streams both ways.

“ Now there are many other large and various streams, but among this great number there are four certain streams, of which the largest, and that which flows most outwardly round the earth, is called Ocean, but directly opposite this, and flowing in a contrary direction, is Acheron, which flows through other desert places, and moreover passing under the earth,

reaches the Acherusian lake, where the souls of most who die arrive, and having remained there for certain destined periods, some longer and some shorter, are again sent forth into the generations of animals. 142. A third river issues midway between these, and near its source falls into a vast region, burning with abundance of fire, and forms a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud; from hence it proceeds in a circle, turbulent and muddy, and folding itself round it reaches both other places and the extremity of the Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water; but folding itself oftentimes beneath the earth, it discharges itself into the lower parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon, whose burning streams emit dissevered fragments in whatever part of the earth they happen to be. Opposite to this again the fourth river first falls into a place dreadful and savage, as it is said, having its whole colour like cyanus^u: this they call Stygian, and the lake, which the river forms by its discharge, Styx. This river having fallen in here, and received awful power in the water, sinking beneath the earth, proceeds, folding itself round, in an opposite course to Pyriphlegethon, and meets it in the Acherusian lake from a contrary direction. Neither does the water of this river mingle with any other, but it too, having gone round in a circle, discharges itself into Tartarus, opposite to Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

143. "These things being thus constituted, when the dead arrive at the place to which their demon leads them severally, first of all they are judged, as well those who have lived well and piously, as those who have not. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in the vessels they have, on these arrive at the lake, and there dwell, and when they are purified, and have suffered punishment for the iniquities they may have committed, they are set free, and each receives the reward of his good deeds, according to his deserts: but those who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences, either from having committed many and great sacrileges, or many unjust and lawless murders, or other similar crimes, these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth.

^u A metallic substance of a deep blue colour, frequently mentioned by the earliest Grecian writers, but of which the nature is unknown.

144. But those who appear to have been guilty of curable, yet great offences, such as those who through anger have committed any violence against father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their life in a state of penitence, or they who have become homicides in a similar manner, these must of necessity fall into Tartarus, but after they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave casts them forth, the homicides into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides into Pyriphlegethon: but when, being borne along, they arrive at the Acherusian lake, there they cry out to and invoke, some those whom they slew, others those whom they injured, and invoking them, they entreat and implore them to suffer them to go out into the lake, and to receive them, and if they persuade them, they go out, and are freed from their sufferings, but if not, they are borne back to Tartarus, and thence again to the rivers, and they do not cease from suffering this until they have persuaded those whom they have injured, for this sentence was imposed on them by the judges. 145. But those who are found to have lived an eminently holy life, these are they, who, being freed and set at large from these regions in the earth, as from a prison, arrive at the pure abode above, and dwell on the upper parts of the earth. And among these, they who have sufficiently purified themselves by philosophy shall live without bodies, throughout all future time, and shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor at present is there sufficient time for the purpose.

“But for the sake of these things which we have described, we should use every endeavour, Simmias, so as to acquire virtue and wisdom in this life; for the reward is noble, and the hope great.

“To affirm positively, indeed, that these things are exactly as I have described them, does not become a man of sense; that however either this, or something of the kind, takes place with respect to our souls and their habitations—since our soul is certainly immortal—this appears to me most fitting to be believed, and worthy the hazard for one who trusts in its reality; for the hazard is noble, and it is right to allure ourselves with such things, as with enchantments; for which reason I have prolonged my story to such a length. 146. On account of these things, then, a man ought to be confident

about his soul, who during this life has disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the body as foreign from his nature, and who, having thought that they do more harm than good, has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of knowledge, and who having adorned his soul not with a foreign but its own proper ornament, temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and truth, thus waits for his passage to Hades, as one who is ready to depart whenever destiny shall summon him. You then," he continued, "Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, will each of you depart at some future time; but now destiny summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it is nearly time for me to betake myself to the bath; for it appears to me to be better to drink the poison after I have bathed myself, and not to trouble the women with washing my dead body."

147. When he had thus spoken, Crito said, "So be it, Socrates, but what commands have you to give to these or to me, either respecting your children, or any other matter, in attending to which we can most oblige you?"

"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new; that by taking care of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and yourselves, whatever you do, though you should not now promise it; but if you neglect yourselves, and will not live as it were in the footsteps of what has been now and formerly said, even though you should promise much at present, and that earnestly, you will do no good at all."

"We will endeavour then so to do," he said; "but how shall we bury you?"

"Just as you please," he said, "if only you can catch me, and I do not escape from you." 148. And at the same time smiling gently, and looking round on us, he said; "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who methodizes each part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how he should bury me. But that which I some time since argued at length, that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer remain with you, but shall depart to some happy state of the blessed, this I seem to have urged to him in vain, though I meant at the same time to console both you and myself. Be ye then my sureties to Crito," he said, "in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the

judges; for he undertook that I should remain; but do you be sureties that, when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may more easily bear it, and when he sees my body either burnt or buried, may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered some dreadful thing, nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. 149. For be well assured," he said, "most excellent Crito, that to speak improperly is not only culpable as to the thing itself, but likewise occasions some injury to our souls. You must have a good courage then, and say that you bury my body, and bury it in such a manner as is pleasing to you, and as you think is most agreeable to our laws."

When he had said thus he rose, and went into a chamber to bathe, and Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him. We waited, therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had been said, and considering it again, and sometimes speaking about our calamity, how severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking that, like those who are deprived of a father, we should pass the rest of our life as orphans. When he had bathed, and his children were brought to him, for he had two little sons and one grown up, and the women belonging to his family were come, having conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and given them such injunctions as he wished, he directed the women and children to go away, and then returned to us. And it was now near sun-set; for he spent a considerable time within. 150. But when he came from bathing he sat down, and did not speak much afterwards; then the officer of the Eleven came in, and standing near him, said, "Socrates, I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do with others, that they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by order of the archons, I bid them drink the poison. But you, on all other occasions during the time you have been here, I have found to be the most noble, meek, and excellent man of all that ever came into this place: and, therefore, I am now well convinced that you will not be angry with me, for you know who are to blame, but with them. Now, then, for you know what I came to announce to you, farewell, and endeavour to bear what is inevitable as easily as possible." And at the same time, bursting into tears, he turned away and withdrew.

151. And Socrates, looking after him, said, "And thou, too, farewell, we will do as you direct." At the same time turning

to us, he said, "How courteous the man is; during the whole time I have been here he has visited me, and conversed with me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of men; and now how generously he weeps for me. But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let some one bring the poison, if it is ready pounded, but if not, let the man pound it."

Then Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still on the mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others have drunk the poison very late, after it had been announced to them, and have supped and drunk freely, and some even have enjoyed the objects of their love. Do not hasten then, for there is yet time."

Upon this Socrates replied, "These men whom you mention, Crito, do these things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by so doing, and I too with good reason shall not do so; for I think I shall gain nothing by drinking a little later, except to become ridiculous to myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing of it when none any longer remains. Go then," he said, "obey, and do not resist."

152. Crito having heard this, nodded to the boy that stood near. And the boy having gone out, and staid for some time, came, bringing with him the man that was to administer the poison, who brought it ready pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on seeing the man, said, "Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?"

"Nothing else," he replied, "than when you have drunk it walk about, until there is a heaviness in your legs, then lie down; thus it will do its purpose." And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. And he having received it very cheerfully, Echecrates, neither trembling, nor changing at all in colour or countenance, but, as he was wont, looking stedfastly at the man, said, "What say you of this potion, with respect to making a libation to any one, is it lawful or not?"

"We only pound so much, Socrates," he said, "as we think sufficient to drink."

"I understand you," he said, "but it is certainly both lawful and right to pray to the gods, that my departure hence thither may be happy; which therefore I pray, and so may it be." And as he said this he drank it off readily and calmly. Thus far, most of us were with difficulty able to restrain our-

selves from weeping, but when we saw him drinking, and having finished the draught, we could do so no longer; but in spite of myself the tears came in full torrent, so that, covering my face, I wept for myself, for I did not weep for him, but for my own fortune, in being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even before me, when he could not restrain his tears, had risen up. 154. But Apollodorus even before this had not ceased weeping, and then bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he pierced the heart of every one present, except Socrates himself. But he said, "What are you doing, my admirable friends? I indeed, for this reason chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind. For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."

When we heard this we were ashamed, and restrained our tears. But he, having walked about, when he said that his legs were growing heavy, laid down on his back; for the man so directed him. And at the same time he who gave him the poison, taking hold of him, after a short interval examined his feet and legs; and then having pressed his foot hard, he asked if he felt it: he said that he did not. And after this he pressed his thighs; and thus going higher, he shewed us that he was growing cold and stiff. Then Socrates touched himself, and said, that when the poison reached his heart he should then depart. 155. But now the parts around the lower belly were almost cold; when uncovering himself, for he had been covered over, he said, and they were his last words, "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."

"It shall be done," said Crito, "but consider whether you have any thing else to say."

To this question he gave no reply; but shortly after he gave a convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were fixed; and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.

This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend, a man, as we may say, the best of all of his time that we have known, and moreover, the most wise and just.

INTRODUCTION TO THE GORGIAS.

CALLICLES and **Polus**, two friends of **Gorgias**, the famous orator of **Leontium** in **Sicily**, happening to meet with **Socrates** and **Chærephon**, tell the former that he has sustained a great loss in not having been just now present when **Gorgias** was exhibiting his art. **Chærephon** admits that the fault is his, but adds that as **Gorgias** is his friend he can easily persuade him to exhibit to them either then, or at a future time. They accordingly, all four, adjourn to the house of **Callicles**, where **Gorgias** is staying. When arrived there, **Chærephon**, at the suggestion of **Socrates**, proposes to question **Gorgias** as to the art he professes ; but **Polus**, his pupil, somewhat impertinently offers to answer for him, on the ground that **Gorgias** is fatigued. **Chærephon** therefore asks, what is the art in which **Gorgias** is skilled, and what he ought to be called ? To which **Polus** answers, " the finest of the arts." **Socrates**, not satisfied with this, as being no answer at all, begs **Gorgias** himself to answer. He says, that rhetoric is the art he professes, and that he is a rhetorician, and able to make others rhetoricians^a.

Socrates, having got **Gorgias** to promise that he would answer briefly, proceeds to ask him about what rhetoric is employed, and of what it is the science. **Gorgias** says, " of words," but **Socrates** shews, that other arts, in various degrees, make use of words, and that some, such as arithmetic and geometry, are altogether conversant with words ; he therefore requests him to distinguish between these arts and rhetoric, and to explain about what particular thing these words are employed. **Gorgias** confidently answers, about " the greatest of all human concerns and the best." But the physician, the teacher of gymnastics, the money-getter, in short all men, would say that the end which their own art aims at is the best ; what then is

this good which you say is the greatest good to men? Gorgias answers, that it is the power of persuading by words. But Socrates objects that other arts do the same, for that every one who teaches any thing persuades what he teaches; you must therefore say of what kind of persuasion, and on what subject rhetoric is the art. It is that which is produced in courts or justice, and other public assemblies, and relates to matters that are just and unjust. But here again Socrates makes Gorgias admit, that there are two kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, the other that produces knowledge; which of these two then does rhetoric produce? doubtless the former. But supposing the question is about the choice of physicians or shipwrights, or the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, will a rhetorician be consulted, or a person skilled in these several matters? Here Gorgias answers that on these and all other subjects a rhetorician will speak more persuasively than any other artist whatever: but it is his duty to use his art justly; though if he uses it unjustly, he and not his teacher is to blame^b.

Socrates, here, perceiving an inconsistency in Gorgias' statement, after deprecating his being offended at the course the discussion might take, asks whether by saying that a rhetorician can speak more persuasively to the multitude on any art, than a person skilled in that art, he does not mean the ignorant by the multitude; and, that being admitted, whether it does not follow that one who is ignorant will be more capable of persuading the ignorant, than one who possesses knowledge? Gorgias allows this to be the case. Is the case, then, the same with respect to what is just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil? Can a rhetorician persuade the multitude on these subjects, himself being ignorant of them, or must he know them before he learns rhetoric, or will the teacher of rhetoric instruct him in these? Gorgias professes that if a pupil does not know these things he would learn them from

^b § 8—28.

him. But surely he who has learnt carpentering is a carpenter, music a musician, medicine a physician; does it not follow then, that he who has learnt justice, must be just, and wish to do just actions? Gorgias admits this too: and yet he had just now allowed that a rhetorician might make an unjust use of his art, and said, that in that case, the teacher ought not to be blamed, but the person who acts unjustly ought to be punished^c.

At this point Polus takes up the discussion, and having elected to ask questions, instead of answering them, begins by asking Socrates what kind of art he considers rhetoric to be. Socrates answers that he does not think it is any art at all, but a kind of skill, employed for procuring gratification and pleasure: in other words, a species of flattery, of which there are many divisions. Polus asks what division it is. "Rhetoric, in my opinion," says Socrates, "is a semblance of a division of the political art," and as such is base. This answer, however, is not intelligible either to Gorgias or Polus; at the request of the former, therefore, Socrates explains himself more clearly^d.

As there are two kinds of subject matter, he says, namely, soul and body, so there are two arts, that which relates to the soul is political; the other, relating to the body, he is not able to describe by one name, but there are two divisions of it, gymnastics and medicine. In the political art legislation corresponds to gymnastics, and the judicial art to medicine. But flattery, perceiving that these four take the best possible care of the soul and body respectively, has divided itself fourfold, and feigns itself to be what it pretends, not really caring for what is best, but seducing ignorance by means of pleasure. Thus cookery puts on the garb of medicine, and pretends that it knows the aliment best for the body; and again, personal decoration feigns itself to be gymnastics. Then, he adds, what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is sophistry to legislation, and what cookery is to medicine, that is rhetoric to jus-

^c § 29—37.

^d § 38—43.

tice; and so being proximate to each other, sophists and rhetoricians are confounded with legislators and judges^e.

Are good rhetoricians, then, asks Polus, to be esteemed as vile flatterers in cities? Socrates replies that they appear to him to be of no estimation at all. But have they not the greatest power in cities? Not, if to have power is a good to him who possesses it. For what is it to have power? is it to do what one wishes, or what appears to one to be best? Polus admits that it is not good for a person devoid of understanding to do what appears to him to be best. He must therefore prove that rhetoricians possess understanding, otherwise, since to have power is a good, they cannot do what they wish. Polus, however, is unable to distinguish between doing what one wishes and doing what appears to be best, and therefore agrees to change positions with Socrates, and to answer instead of asking questions^f.

Socrates, then, asks, do men wish what they do for the sake of the thing itself, or for some other end? for instance, do men take medicine because they wish to take it, or in order to health? Again, do men incur the perils of the sea because they wish to be in peril, or for the sake of riches? Clearly the latter, in both and all similar cases. Now some things, such as wisdom, health, and riches, are good, but their contraries evil; but whatever we do, we do for the sake of that which is good. So that if we kill or banish a person, if it is good to do so, we wish it, and do what we wish; but if it is really evil, though it appears to us to be good, we do not what we wish. Polus sees the force of Socrates' argument, and can only object to it that Socrates himself would like to do what he pleased, and would envy another whom he saw slaying, or spoiling, or imprisoning whom he pleased. But Socrates resolutely denies this, and insists that if he must necessarily either act unjustly or suffer unjustly, he should choose the latter; for that it is better to suffer than to commit injustice^g.

^e § 44—47.

§ 48—50.

^f § 51—57

Polus imagines that even a child could confute such a position as this; and in order to do so mentions instances of men whom all have accounted happy, though they were unjust, especially that of Archelaus, king of Macedonia. But Socrates denies that any one who acts unjustly can be happy; and further than this, he contends that a person who acts unjustly, and does not suffer punishment, is more miserable than one who meets with punishment for his injustice. To prove this he argues that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it, and if more base it must also be worse; Polus admits the premise, but denies the conclusion. Socrates, therefore, endeavours to make his opponent admit this also by the following arguments. Beautiful things are esteemed beautiful, either on account of their usefulness, or the pleasure they occasion, or both; and in like manner base things are deemed base on account of the pain or evil they occasion, or both; so that when of two things one is more beautiful than the other, it is so because it excels in pleasure or utility, or both; and when of two things one is more base, it must be because it exceeds in pain or evil. But Polus has already admitted that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; it must therefore be so because it exceeds in pain or evil, or both. But to commit injustice does not exceed the suffering it, in pain; it remains, therefore, that it must exceed it in evil: consequently it must be worse, for whatever exceeds another thing in evil must necessarily be worse^h.

Having established his point thus far he now goes on to prove that it is the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice not to be punished. To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, are one and the same thing. But all just things are beautiful. Moreover wherever there is an agent there must also be a patient; and the patient suffers what the agent does; so that if the agent punishes justly the patient also suffers justly. But it has been just admitted that

^h § 58—69.

all just things are beautiful; and it was proved before that all beautiful things are good, either because they are pleasant or useful; whence it follows that he who is punished suffers that which is good, and is benefited in being freed from the greatest evil, which is depravity in the soul. From all this it is evident that rhetoric can be of no use whatever: for it is generally employed for the purpose of excusing injustice, and screening men from the punishment they deserve, which on the contrary they ought rather to court than to shun¹.

Polus having been thus completely silenced, Callicles takes up the argument and begins by asking whether Socrates is really in earnest. Finding that he is so, he blames Polus for having granted that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; for that there is a difference between nature and law, which Socrates perceiving, confounded that which is more base by nature with that which is so by law, and so made that which is more base by law appear to be more so by nature: whereas by nature it is more base to suffer injustice than to commit it. For the weak and the many make laws with a view to their own advantage, but nature herself avows that it is just that the better should have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the weaker. Callicles then proceeds to inveigh against philosophy and philosophers, and when he has done, Socrates, after having indulged in a vein of pleasant irony at his expense, returns to the subject, and asks what he means by the superior, the better, and the stronger, whether they are the same or different. Callicles says they are the same. Socrates objects, that if that is the case the many being stronger are also the better, and so, inasmuch as they make the laws, law and nature are not contrary to each other. Callicles therefore is compelled to change his ground, and next says that by the better and superior he means the more wise: and at last he says that they are those who are skilled and courageous in administering the affairs of

¹ § 70—80.

a city. He adds that it is just that the governors should have more than the governed. Socrates, hereupon, asks whether they ought not to govern themselves also and be temperate, which elicits from Callicles the shameless avowal that a man should have as large desires as he can, and indulge them without restraint^k.

Socrates having in vain endeavoured to persuade Callicles to change his opinion by two similitudes of a perforated cask, and a full and an empty one, to which he compares the soul, proceeds to combat his assertion that a happy life consists in having and indulging as large desires as possible. If happiness consists in being hungry and eating, thirsty and drinking, it must follow that to be scabby and itch and scratch one's self is to live happily. Callicles is forced to admit that this is to live pleasantly, and then if pleasantly, happily; and at length is driven to assert that the pleasant and the good are the same. In order to confute this opinion, Socrates leads him to maintain that science and courage differ from each other and from the good; and then by a series of most subtle questions, too minute to be abbreviated, forces him to this absurd conclusion, that if the pleasant and the good are the same, a bad man, inasmuch as he oftentimes receives more pleasure than a good man, must be accounted better than a good one^l.

Callicles to evade this absurdity is compelled to admit that some pleasures are better than others. From this concession Socrates shews that the end of all human actions is the good and not the pleasant; for that so far is it from being the case that we do any thing merely for the sake of pleasure, that we pursue pleasure itself for the sake of the good^m.

Having established this point, Socrates brings back the discussion to the original subject, and proposes to enquire whether it is better to live in such a manner as Callicles advises, namely to devote one's self to public business and to study rhetoric, or in such a manner as philosophy persuades. He recurs there-

^k § 81—103.

§ 104—117.

^m § 118—119.

fore to his own former arguments, in which he stated that as there are certain skills, not arts, employed for the gratification of the body, so there are other corresponding ones made use of to please the soul, such as flute-playing, harp-playing, dithyrambic and even tragic poetry ; now take from these last melody, rhythm and measure, and what else remains but words, that is to say a kind of flattery addressed to the multitude ? And is not popular rhetoric similar ? Callicles answers that there is a difference to be observed in this respect, for that some do, as Socrates has observed, speak only in order to please, but that others look to the interest of the citizens. "That is enough," says Socrates. At all events one part of rhetoric is flattery, and when has an instance of that which is honourable, which strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers, ever been seen ? Callicles instances Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles, but Socrates will by no means admit that any of these really endeavoured to make the people better. But before this, Callicles, being hard pressed in argument, breaks off the discussion, and Socrates, at the request of Gorgias, carries it on by himself, and shews at length and with great force and perspicuity the advantages of a virtuous and well regulated life ; and in conclusion he describes the future judgment when each man will give account of himself in another world, and be rewarded or punished according as he has lived a good or a bad life.

GORGIAS,

OR,

ON RHETORIC.

CALLICLES, SOCRATES, CHÆREPHON, GORGIAS, AND POLUS.

Cal. THEY say, Socrates, that we should thus take part in war and battle^a.

Socr. Have we then, as the saying is, come after the feast, and are we too late?

Cal. And a very elegant feast. For Gorgias has just now exhibited many fine things to us.

Socr. Chærephon here, Callicles, is the cause of this, by having compelled us to waste our time in the forum.

Chær. It's of no consequence, Socrates; for I will also find a remedy; for Gorgias is my friend, so that he will exhibit to us now, if you please, or, if you prefer it, at some future time.

2. *Cal.* What, Chærephon? is Socrates desirous of hearing Gorgias?

Chær. We are come for this very purpose.

Cal. Whenever you please, then, come to my house; Gorgias lodges with me, and will exhibit to you.

Socr. You say well^b, Callicles. But would he be inclined to converse with us? For I wish to learn from him what is the power of his art, and what it is that he professes and teaches: the rest of the exhibition, as you say, he may make at some other time.

Cal. There is nothing like asking him, Socrates: for this is one part of his exhibition: he just now bade all that were in the house ask what question they pleased, and promised to answer every thing.

^a That is, come too late, and so take no part at all.

^b Or, "you are very obliging."

3. *Socr.* You say well in truth. Ask him, Chærephon.

Chær. What shall I ask him?

Socr. What he is.

Chær. How mean you?

Socr. Just as, if he happened to be a maker of shoes, he would surely answer you, that he is a shoemaker. Do you not understand what I mean?

Chær. I understand, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, does Callicles here say truly that you promised to answer whatever any one should ask you?

Gorg. Truly, Chærephon: for I just now made that very promise: and I affirm that for many years no one has asked me any thing new.

Chær. Without doubt, then, you will answer easily, Gorgias.

Gorg. You may make trial of that, Chærephon.

Pol. By Jupiter, Chærephon, if you please, *make trial* of me: for Gorgias appears to me to be fatigued; as he has just now been speaking a great deal.

4. *Chær.* What, Polus, do you think you can answer better than Gorgias?

Pol. What matters that, if I answer well enough for you?

Chær. Not at all: since you wish it then, answer.

Pol. Ask.

Chær. I ask then, If Gorgias happened to be skilled in the same art as his brother Herodicus is skilled, what name should we rightly give him? Would it not be the same as his brother's?

Pol. Certainly.

Chær. In calling him a physician, then, we should speak correctly?

Pol. Yes.

Chær. But if he were skilled in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother, what should we properly call him?

Pol. Evidently, a painter.

Chær. But now, since he is skilled in a certain art, what can we properly call him?

5. *Pol.* Chærephon, there are many arts among men by experience experimentally discovered: for experience causes our life to proceed according to art, but inexperience according to chance. Of each of these different persons partake of

different arts, in different manners; but the best of the best; in the number of whom is Gorgias here, who possesses the finest of the arts.

Socr. Polus appears, Gorgias, to be very well prepared for speaking: but he does not do what he promised Chærephon.

Gorg. How so, Socrates?

Socr. He does not appear to me to answer the question that was asked.

6. *Gorg.* Do you then, if you please, ask him.

Socr. No, but if yourself would be willing to answer me, I would much rather ask you. For it is evident to me that Polus, from what he has said, has studied more what is called rhetoric, than conversation.

Pol. Why so, Socrates?

Socr. Because, Polus, when Chærephon asked you in what art Gorgias was skilled, you praised his art, as if some one had blamed it, but you did not say what the art itself is.

Pol. Did I not answer, that it was the finest of all arts?

Socr. Certainly. But no one asked you what was the quality of the art of Gorgias, but what it was, and by what name we ought to call Gorgias; just as Chærephon proposed the former questions to you, and you answered him well and in few words. Now, therefore, tell me in the same manner, what art Gorgias professes, and what we ought to call him. Or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself what we ought to call you as skilled in what art.

Gorg. In rhetoric, Socrates.

7. *Socr.* Ought we, then, to call you a rhetorician?

Gorg. And a good one, Socrates, if you wish to call me, as Homer says, what "I boast myself to be."

Socr. But I do wish.

Gorg. Call me so, then.

Socr. Shall we say too that you are able to make others rhetoricians?

Gorg. I profess this not only here but elsewhere.

Socr. Are you willing then, Gorgias, to continue, as we are now doing, partly to ask questions and partly to answer, and to defer to some other occasion that prolixity of speech, such as Polus just now began with? But do not belie what you promised, but be willing to answer each question briefly.

Gorg. There are some answers, Socrates, which must necessarily be made at length: however, I will endeavour to make them as short as possible. For this is one of the things which I profess, that no one can say the same things in fewer words than me.

8. *Socr.* There is need of this now, Gorgias; give me therefore a specimen of this very thing, conciseness of speech, and of prolixity at some other time.

Gorg. I will do so; and you will admit that you never heard any one speak more concisely.

Socr. Well then, since you say that you are skilled in the art of rhetoric, and that you can teach another this art, tell me about what is rhetoric employed? just as the art of weaving is employed in the making of garments, is it not so?

Gorg. It is.

Socr. And is not music also employed in the composing of melodies?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. By Juno, Gorgias, I admire your answers, for you answer as briefly as possible.

Gorg. I think, Socrates, that I do this well enough.

9. *Socr.* You say well. Come then, answer me thus respecting rhetoric, of what is it the science?

Gorg. Of words.

Socr. What kind of words, Gorgias? Are they such as inform the sick by what kind of diet they may become well?

Gorg. No.

Socr. Rhetoric, then, is not concerned with all kinds of words?

Gorg. Certainly not.

Socr. Yet it makes men able to speak?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. And does it not enable men to think on the same things on which it enables them to speak?

Gorg. Without doubt.

Socr. Does not, then, the medicinal art, of which we just now spoke, make men able to think and speak about the sick?

Gorg. Necessarily so.

Socr. The medicinal art, then, as it appears, is conversant with words?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. And those that concern diseases?

Gorg. Just so.

Socr. And is not the gymnastic art also conversant with words that relate to the good and bad habit of bodies?

Gorg. Certainly.

10. *Socr.* And it is the same with other arts, Gorgias: each of them is conversant with those words that are employed about that particular thing of which each is the art.

Gorg. It appears so.

Socr. Why, then, do you not call other arts rhetorical, as being conversant with words, since you call that rhetoric which is employed about words?

Gorg. Because, Socrates, almost the [whole^c science of other arts is conversant with manual operations and such-like actions;] in rhetoric, however, there is no such manual operation, but all its activity and efficiency is by means of words.] For this reason, I consider that the art of rhetoric is conversant with words, herein speaking correctly, as I affirm.

Socr. Do I understand what kind of art you wish to call it? but I shall soon comprehend it more clearly. However, answer me. We have arts, have we not?

Gorg. Yes.

11. *Socr.* Of all the [arts,] some, I think, [consist principally in workmanship,] and stand in need of [but few words,] and [others of none at all,] but their work may be accomplished in silence, as painting, statuary, and many others. With such arts, you appear to me to say rhetoric has nothing to do? is it not so?

Gorg. You apprehend my meaning perfectly, Socrates.

Socr. On the other hand, there are [other arts which accomplish all by means of words, and require no work at all, or very little, such as theoretical^d and practical arithmetic, geometry, the game of dice, and many other arts; some of which require almost as many words as actions, and most of them more, so that altogether their whole activity and efficiency is by means of words. You appear to me to say that rhetoric is among arts of this kind.]

12. *Gorg.* You say truly.

^c The expression *ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν* qualifies the word *πᾶσα*, "almost the whole," or "the whole, so to speak."

^d *ἀριθμητική* means the theory, *λογιστική* the practice of arithmetic.

Socr. However, [I do not think you mean to call any one of these rhetoric, although in the expression you used you so said, that rhetoric has its efficiency by means of words;] and any who wished to catch at your words might reply, Do you say then, Gorgias, that arithmetic is rhetoric? But I do not think that you call either arithmetic or geometry rhetoric.

Gorg. You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend my meaning correctly.

Socr. Come then, complete the answer to my question. Since [rhetoric] is one of those arts which make great use of words, and there are others of the same kind, endeavour to tell me in reference to what rhetoric has its efficiency in words. 13. Just as if any one should ask me respecting any of the arts which I but now mentioned: Socrates, what is the arithmetical art? I should say to him, as you did just now, That it is one of the arts that have their efficiency in words. And if he should further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, In reference to the knowledge of even and odd, how many there may be of each. But if again he should ask me, What do you mean by the art of computation? I should answer, that this also is one of those arts whose whole efficiency consists in words. And if he should further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, as they do who draw up motions in the assemblies of the people, That in other respects computation is the same as arithmetic, for it has reference to the same object, that is to say, the even and the odd; but it differs in this respect, that computation considers what relation even and odd have to themselves and to each other in regard to quantity. 14. And if any one should ask me about astronomy, and after I had said that its whole efficiency consists in words, should say, But Socrates, to what do words employed about astronomy refer? I should answer, That they are employed about the course of the stars, and of the sun and the moon, how they are related to each other with respect to velocity.

Gorg. And you would answer rightly, Socrates.

Socr. Now then do you answer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of those arts which accomplish and effect every thing by means of words: is it not so?

Gorg. It is so.

Socr. Tell me then in reference to what? what is the par-

ticular thing about which these words are, which rhetoric uses?

Gorg. The greatest of all human concerns, Socrates, and the best.

Socr. But, Gorgias, what you say is questionable, and by no means clear. For I think you must have heard at banquets men singing that song in which the singers enumerate that the best thing is health, the second beauty, and the third, as the author of the song says, riches gained without fraud.

Gorg. I have heard it; but with what object do you mention this?

15. *Socr.* Because the artificers of those things which the author of the song has commended, namely, the physician, the master of gymnastics, and the money-getter, will forthwith present themselves, and the physician will say: Socrates, Gorgias deceives you. For his art is not employed about the greatest good to men, but mine is. If, then, I should ask him, Who are you that say this? he would probably answer, I am a physician. What then do you say? that the object of your art is the greatest good? How can it be otherwise, Socrates, he would probably say, since its object is health? and what greater good can men have than health? And if after him again the master of gymnastics should say, I too should wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could shew you any greater good from his art than I can from mine, I should again say to him, And who are you, Sir, and what is your employment? A master of gymnastics, he would say, and my employment is to make men beautiful and strong in their bodies. 16. After the master of gymnastics, the money-getter would say, as I imagine, despising all others, Consider, I beg, Socrates, whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or any one else? I should thereupon say to him, What, then, are you the artificer of this good? He would say, I am. Who are you then? A money-getter. What then? Do you consider riches to be the greatest good to men? I shall say. Assuredly, he will answer. However, Gorgias here contends that his art is the cause of greater good than yours. It is clear then that after this he would ask, And what is this good? let Gorgias answer. Come then, Gorgias, suppose that you are asked by them and by me, and answer, What is this, which you say is the greatest good to men, and of which you are the artificer?

Gorg. That which is in reality, Socrates, the greatest good, and is at the same time the cause of liberty to men, and of their being able to rule over others in their several cities.

Socr. What then do you say it is?

Gorg. I say it is the power of persuading by words judges in a court of justice, senators in the senate-house, and the hearers in a public assembly, and in every other convention of a political nature. Moreover, by this power you will make the physician your slave, and the master of gymnastics your slave, and the money-getter will be found to have gained money, not for himself, but for another, for you who are able to speak, and persuade the multitude.

Socr. At length you appear to me, Gorgias, to have shewn as nearly as possible what kind of art you consider rhetoric to be; and if I understand you rightly, you say that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, and that its whole employment and the sum of it terminates in this. Can you say that rhetoric has any further power than that of producing persuasion in the minds of the hearers?

Gorg. By no means, Socrates; but you appear to me to have defined it sufficiently. For that is the sum of it.

18. *Socr.* Listen then, Gorgias. Be assured that I, as I persuade myself, if there is any one, who in conversing with another, wishes to know the very thing about which the conversation is, be assured, I say, that I am such a person; and I think that you are too.

Gorg. What then, Socrates?

Socr. I will now tell you. The persuasion which you speak of as resulting from rhetoric, what it is, and with what particulars it is conversant, be assured I do not clearly understand, not but that I have a suspicion of what I suppose you mean, and about what it is employed: yet I will not the less ask you what persuasion you mean results from rhetoric, and with what particulars it is conversant. Why then do I who have a suspicion ask you, and not rather myself speak? Not on your account, but on account of the discussion, that it may proceed in such a manner as to make the subject of the discussion most clear to us. 19. For consider whether I seem to you right in putting the question to you: just as if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis? if you were to tell me

that he paints animals, might I not justly enquire of you, what kind of animals he paints? is it not so*?

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. And would it not be for this reason, because there are also other painters who paint many other animals?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. But if no one else but Zeuxis painted them, you would have answered properly.

Gorg. Assuredly.

Socr. Come then, with respect to rhetoric, tell me, whether it appears to you that [rhetoric alone produces persuasion, or do other arts produce it likewise?] My meaning is this: Does he who teaches any thing persuade what he teaches, or not?

Gorg. He does certainly persuade, Socrates.

Socr. Again, if we speak of the same arts of which we just now made mention, does not arithmetic teach us such things as relate to number? and does not an arithmetician the same?

Gorg. Certainly.

20. *Socr.* Does it not also persuade?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. Arithmetic, then, is an artificer of persuasion.

Gorg. It appears so.

Socr. If, then, any one should ask us, What persuasion it produces, and with respect to what? we should answer, That which teaches about the quantity of even and odd. In like manner we may shew, that all the other arts of which we spoke just now, produce persuasion, and what kind of persuasion, and with respect to what: is it not so?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. Rhetoric then, is not alone an artificer of persuasion.

Gorg. You say truly.

Socr. Since then, it does not alone produce this effect, but other arts do the same, we may justly, as in the case of the painter, next enquire of the speaker; of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion on what subject rhetoric is the art? Does it not appear to you that this question may fairly be asked?

* I have ventured to read η $\sigma\upsilon$ for $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, for which my only excuse is that the usual reading cannot be rendered intelligibly, and that the alteration I have ventured to import is an expression very commonly used by Socrates on similar occasions.

Gorg. It does.

Socr. Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case.

21. *Gorg.* I speak then, Socrates, of that persuasion which is produced in courts of justice, and in other public assemblies, as I just now mentioned, and with respect to matters that are just and unjust.

Socr. I suspected, Gorgias, that you meant that persuasion, and on such matters. But do not be surprised if I shortly ask you a question that may appear to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat, for, as I before observed, I ask it for the sake of carrying on the discussion in an orderly manner, and not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of catching up each other's words on suspicion; but do you finish what you have to say according to your own plan, just as you please.

Gorg. You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.

Socr. Come then, let us examine this too. Do you admit that to learn is any thing?

Gorg. I do admit it.

Socr. Again? to believe?

Gorg. I do.

Socr. Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe, and learning and belief are the same, or different?

Gorg. I think, Socrates, that they are different.

22. *Socr.* You think rightly; and you may know from this; if any one should ask you, Is there, Gorgias, a false and true belief? I think you would say there is.

Gorg. I should.

Socr. Well then, is there a false and true science?

Gorg. Certainly not.

Socr. It is clear, therefore, that they (belief and science) are not the same.

Gorg. You say truly.

Socr. Yet both those who learn are persuaded, and those who believe.

Gorg. Such is the case.

Socr. Are you willing, therefore, that we lay down two kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, but the other science?

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. Which kind of persuasion, then, does rhetoric produce in courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting what is just and unjust? Is it that from which belief springs without knowledge, or that from which knowledge arises?

Gorg. It is evident, Socrates, that it is 'that from which belief springs.

Socr. (Rhetoric) then, as it seems, Gorgias, is the artificer of a persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches respecting the just and unjust.)

Gorg. It is so.

Socr. A rhetorician, therefore, does not profess to teach courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting things just and unjust, but only to produce belief. For surely he could not teach so great a multitude in a short time things of such great importance.

Gorg. Certainly not.

23. *Socr.* Come then, let us see now what we ought to say of rhetoric. For I, indeed, am not yet able to understand what I should say. When an assembly is held in a city, for the choice of physicians, or shipwrights, or any other kind of artificer, is it not the case that the rhetorician will refrain from giving his advice? for it is evident that, in each election, the most skilful artist ought to be chosen. Nor *will he be consulted* when the question is respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, but architects only. Nor, again, when a deliberation occurs respecting the choice of generals, or the marshalling an army against enemies, or the occupation of posts,—but on such occasions those who are skilled in military affairs will give advice, and not rhetoricians. What do you say, Gorgias, on such points? For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is proper to enquire of you what are the things about which your art is concerned. And consider that I am labouring for your benefit. For, perhaps, some one who is now within the house may wish to become your disciple; for I perceive some, nay several, who probably are ashamed to question you. 24. In being questioned, therefore, by me, consider yourself to be questioned by them. What would be the consequence to us, Gorgias, if we should put ourselves under

your instructions? On what subjects shall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the just only and the unjust; or on those subjects of which Socrates just now made mention? Endeavour to answer them.

Gorg. I will endeavour, Socrates, to develop clearly the whole power of rhetoric: for you have admirably led the way. You doubtless know that these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports, were made partly on the advice of Themistocles, and partly on that of Pericles, but not of artificers.

Socr. This is told of Themistocles, Gorgias: and I myself heard Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall^f.

Gorg. And when there is an election of any such persons as you mentioned, Socrates, you see that the rhetoricians are the persons who give advice, and whose opinion prevails in such matters.

25. *Socr.* It is because I wonder at this, Gorgias, that I have been for some time asking you, what is the power of rhetoric. For when I consider it in this manner, it appears to me almost divine in its magnitude.

Gorg. If you knew all, Socrates, that it comprehends under itself almost all powers! And I will give you a strong proof of this. For I have often, ere now, gone with my brother and other physicians to various sick persons, who would neither drink their medicine, nor suffer themselves to be cut or cauterized by the physician, and when the physician was unable to persuade them, I have done so by no other art than rhetoric. I say too, that if a rhetorician and a physician should go to any city you please, and it were necessary to contend by argument in a general assembly, or any other convention, which should be chosen, a rhetorician or a physician, the physician would be held in no account, but he that has the power of speaking would be chosen, if he pleased. 26. And if he should contend with any other artist whatever, the rhetorician would persuade that he himself should be chosen in preference to any one else. For there is no subject on which a rhetorician will not speak to the multitude more persuasively than any other artist whatever. Such, then, and so great is the power

^f The wall which connected the southern extremities of the long walls and the Phaleric wall.

of this art. It is right however, Socrates, to use rhetoric in the same way as any other exercise employed in contests: for it is not right to use other exercises against all men alike; nor, because any one has learnt pugilism, and the pancratium, and to fight with arms, so as to be superior both to friends and enemies, is it therefore proper to strike, or pierce, or slay one's friends. 27. Nor, by Jupiter, if some one who, by having frequented the palæstra, has made his body robust, and become a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father or mother, or any other of his relatives or friends, would it on that account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the training masters and those who teach how to fight with arms. For they instructed their pupils in these exercises, in order that they might make a proper use of them against enemies, and those that do wrong, for self-defence, and not for attack; but they contrariwise, use their strength and skill improperly. The teachers, therefore, are not wicked, nor is their art either to be blamed, or for this reason wicked, but they, I think, who do not use it properly. 28. The same may be said of rhetoric. For a rhetorician is able to speak against all men, and on every subject; so that he can best persuade the multitude, in a word, on whatever subject he pleases: but he ought not any the more on this account to detract from the reputation of physicians, because he is able to do it, nor of other artificers; but he should use rhetoric justly, as well as other exercises. In my opinion, however, if any one having become a rhetorician abuses this power and art, it is not proper to hate the teacher and expel him from cities, for he imparted the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other makes a contrary use of it. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him who does not make a right use of it, but not the teacher.

29. *Socr.* I think, Gorgias, that you as well as I, have been present at many discussions, and that you have observed this in them, that it is not easy for men, on whatever subject they undertake to converse, having propounded their ideas to each other, both learning themselves and teaching one another, then to put an end to the conference; but if they have a controversy about any thing, and one says that the other does not speak correctly or clearly, they are indignant, and each thinks that the other is speaking out of envy, from a love of contention, and not seeking what was proposed in the discussion:

and some, at length^g, depart in a most disgraceful manner, having^h reviled each other, and spoken and heard such things that even the bystanders are vexed at themselves for having deigned to listen to such men. 30. But why do I say this? Because you now appear to me to say what does not follow from, or accord with, what you first said respecting rhetoric. I am afraid, therefore, to proceed with my refutation, lest you should suppose that I do not speak with zeal for the subject, that it may be made clear, but out of opposition to you. If, then, you are of that class of men to which I belong, I should gladly question you: but if not, I would forbear to do so. But to what class of men do I belong? To those who are willingly refuted, if they say any thing that is not true, and who willingly refute if any one says any thing that is not true; and who are not less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I consider the former to be the greater good, inasmuch as it is a greater good one's-self to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver another. For I think no evil so great to man as false opinion on the subjects we are now discussing. If, then, you say that you are such a man, let us continue our discussion; [31.] but if you think we ought to desist, let us give it up, and put an end to the argument.

Gorg. But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you describe. Perhaps, however, it is right to attend to the wishes of the company who are present. For, some time since, before you came, I explained many things to the present company: and now, perhaps, we shall protract it too far if we continue the discussion. We must, therefore, respect their wishes lest we detain any of them, who have something else to do.

Chær. You yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, hear the noise these men make, from their anxiety to hear, if you say any thing. For my part, may I never have so much business, as to be obliged to leave such a discussion and so conducted, from having any thing else more important to do.

32. *Cal.* By the gods, Chærephon, and I too, though I have been present at many conferences, know not whether I have ever been so delighted as now; so that you will gratify me much, should you even be willing to continue the discussion throughout the whole day.

^g Ficinus, I think, correctly translates *τελευτώντες*, *tandem*.

^h Literally "being reviled."

Socr. There is no obstacle on my side, Callicles, if only Gorgias is willing.

Gorg. After this, Socrates, it would be shameful in me not to be willing, especially as I myself announced that any one might ask what he pleased. But, if it is agreeable to the company, continue the discussion, and ask any question you please.

Socr. Hear then, Gorgias, what I wonder at in what you said. For, perhaps, you spoke correctly, and I did not rightly apprehend you. You say that you can make any one a rhetorician, who is willing to be instructed by you?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. So that he can speak persuasively on any subject to the multitude, not teaching, but persuading?

Gorg. Exactly so.

Socr. You said too, that a rhetorician is able to speak more persuasively than a physician, on the subject of health.

Gorg. I did say so, at least to a multitude.

Socr. Does not, then, this expression "to a multitude" mean to the ignorant? for, surely, among the well-informed he will not be better able to persuade than the physician.

Gorg. You say truly.

33. *Socr.* If then he shall be better able to persuade than the physician, he is better able to persuade than one who possesses knowledge?

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. Although he is not a physician? is it not so?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. But he who is not a physician must, surely, be unskilled in those things in which a physician is skilled.

Gorg. Clearly so.

Socr. He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable than one who possesses knowledge of persuading the ignorant, since a rhetorician is better able to persuade than a physician. Is this the result, or something else?

Gorg. That is the result in this instance.

Socr. The case therefore is the same as concerns a rhetorician and rhetoric with respect to all other arts: I mean, there is no need for it to know the subjects themselves, how they are circumstanced, but only to discover some means of persuasion, so as to appear to the ignorant to know more than those who possess knowledge.

Gorg. Is it not a great advantage, Socrates, without having other arts, but this one only, to be in no respect inferior to artificers?

34. *Socr.* Whether from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior, or not inferior to others, we will presently consider, if our argument requires it. But first let us consider this: Whether a rhetorician is in the same condition with reference to the just and the unjust, the base and the honourable, the good and the evil, as he is with reference to health, and other things with which other arts are concerned; I mean, that he does not know them, what is good, or what is evil, what is honourable or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust, but is able to devise some means of persuasion respecting them, so that, [though he is ignorant,] he [appears to the ignorant to know more than one who possesses knowledge;] or is it necessary that he should know these, and is it requisite that he who is about to learn rhetoric should have acquired these things before he comes to you; if not, will you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, [teach him who comes to you none of these things (for it is not your province), but make him appear to the multitude to know these things, though he does not know them, and to seem to be a good man when he is not so? or shall you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows beforehand the truth respecting these things?]] What is the case in this respect, Gorgias? And, by Jupiter, as you just now promised, unfold the whole power of rhetoric.

35. *Gorg.* I think, Socrates, that any one, if he did not know, would learn these things from me.

Socr. Stay; for you say well. [If then you make any one a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know what is just and unjust, either before, or afterwards from your instructions.

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. What then? Is he who has learnt carpentering, a carpenter, or not?

Gorg. He is.

Socr. And is not he who has learnt music, a musician?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. And he who has learnt medicine, a physician? And so, in the same way, with regard to other things, is not he who has learnt any particular art such a person as each science respectively makes its proficient?

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. By the same reason, then, [does it not follow, that he who has learnt just things is just?]

Gorg. Assuredly.

Socr. And he who is just surely performs just actions.

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. [Is it not, therefore, necessary¹ that the just man should wish to do just actions?]

Gorg. It appears so.

Socr. The just man, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly.

Gorg. Necessarily.

Socr. And it follows from the argument that the rhetorician should be just?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. [A rhetorician, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly?]

Gorg. It appears not.

36. *Socr.* Do you remember that you said a little before that we ought not to accuse the trainers of youth, nor expel them from cities, if a pugilist does not make a good use of the pugilistic art, and acts unjustly? And so, likewise, [if a rhetorician make an unjust use of rhetoric, that we should not accuse the teacher, nor expel him from the city, but the person who acts unjustly, and does not make a proper use of rhetoric?] Were these things said, or not?

Gorg. They were said.

Socr. But now this very same rhetorician appears incapable of ever acting unjustly. Is it not so?

Gorg. It appears so.

Socr. And it was said, Gorgias, at the commencement of our discussion, that [rhetoric is conversant with words, not those respecting the even and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was it not so?

37. *Gorg.* It was.

Socr. When, therefore, you spoke thus, I supposed that [rhe-

¹ Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι] τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν. I concur with Ast and others in thinking that the words inserted in brackets have been interpolated, and have therefore omitted them in the translation. Their insertion would break the chain of the argument.

toric could never be an unjust thing, since it always discourses concerning justice.] But when you said shortly afterwards that a rhetorician might use rhetoric unjustly, then, wondering, and thinking that the two statements did not accord, I made that remark, that if you should think it a gain to be confuted, as I do, it was worth while to continue the discussion, but if not, to give it up. Afterwards, however, when we were investigating the matter, you see yourself that it is again allowed to be impossible for a rhetorician to make an unjust use of rhetoric, and to be willing to act unjustly. How the case really stands, by the dog, Gorgias, requires no little discussion to examine it thoroughly.

38. *Pol.* What then, Socrates? Have you really such an opinion of rhetoric as you now say? or do you not think that Gorgias was ashamed not to acknowledge that the rhetorician knows what is just, beautiful, and good, and that, if any one should come to him ignorant of these things, he himself would teach them? Then perhaps from this admission some inconsistency in his arguments followed; the very thing which you love, yourself leading the way to such questions. [For who do you think will deny that he knows what is just, and can teach it to others? [To lead the discussion to such matters is a piece of great rusticity.]

Socr. Most excellent Polus! [we get ourselves friends and sons, for this express purpose, that when we, through being advanced in years, fall into error, you that are younger, being with us, may correct our life both in deeds and words. If, then, Gorgias and I have fallen into any error in our arguments, do you who are present correct us you ought to do so. And I wish that if any of the things that have been granted appear to you to have been improperly granted, you would retract whatever you please, only I beg you beware of one thing.]

Pol. What is that?

39. *Socr.* That you would restrain that prolixity of speech which at first you attempted to employ.

Pol. What? shall I not be allowed to speak as much as I please?

Socr. You would indeed be very badly treated, my excellent friend, if, having come to Athens, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech, you alone should here be ar-

prived of this liberty. But set this against it: if you speak in a prolix manner, and will not answer a question put to you, should not I be badly treated, if I am not allowed to go away and not listen to you? But if you feel any interest in the discussion that has taken place, and wish to correct it, as I just now said, retract whatever you please, and questioning and being questioned in turn, as Gorgias and I did, confute and be confuted. For you profess, surely, to know the same things as Gorgias; is it not so?

Pol. I do.

Socr. Will not you, then, also bid any one ask you what question he pleases, as knowing how to answer him.

Pol. Assuredly.

Socr. Then do whichever of these you please, ask or answer.

40. *Pol.* I will do so; and do you answer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias appears to you to be in doubt respecting rhetoric, what do you say it is?

Socr. Do you ask me what kind of art I say it is?

Pol. I do.

Socr. To tell you the truth, Polus, it does not appear to me to be an art at all.

Pol. What, then, does rhetoric appear to you to be?

Socr. A thing which you say produced art, in the treatise which I lately read.

Pol. What do you say this is?

Socr. A certain skill.

Pol. Does rhetoric, then, appear to you to be skill?

Socr. To me it does, unless you say otherwise.

Pol. Of what is it the skill?

Socr. Of procuring a certain gratification and pleasure.

Pol. Does not rhetoric, then, appear to you to be a beautiful thing, since it is able to gratify mankind?

Socr. What, Polus? Have you already heard from me what I say it is, that you afterwards ask me, if it does not appear to me to be beautiful?

Pol. Did I not hear you say that it is a certain skill?

Socr. Since, then, you prize giving pleasure, are you willing to give me a little pleasure?

Pol. I am.

41. *Socr.* Ask me, then, what kind of art cookery appears to me to be.

Pol. I do ask you; [what kind of an art is cookery?]

Socr. [None at all, Polus.]

Pol. What is it? say.

Socr. I say, then, it is a certain skill.

Pol. Of what? say.

Socr. I say, of procuring gratification and pleasure, Polus. *Long*

Pol. Are cookery and rhetoric the same thing?

Socr. By no means, but a part of the same study. *7*

Pol. Of what study are you speaking?

Socr. I fear it would be too rude to speak the truth, for I hesitate to speak on account of Gorgias, lest he should think that I ridicule his profession. But I know not whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias studies: for it was not at all clear from our late discussion what his opinion is. But what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain thing which does not rank among things beautiful.

Gorg. Of what thing, Socrates? say, without fear of offending me.

Socr. It appears to me, then, Gorgias, to be a certain study, that does not belong to art, but to a soul that is sagacious and manly, and naturally powerful in its intercourse with men. The sum of it I call flattery. 42. Of this study there appears to me to be many other divisions, and one of them is that of cookery, which, indeed, appears to be an art, but, as I maintain, is not an art, but skill and practice. I also call rhetoric a division of this, and personal decoration, and sophistry, these four divisions relating to four particulars. If, therefore, Polus wishes to enquire, let him enquire, for he has not yet heard what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be: but he did not observe that I had not yet finished my answer, nevertheless he asks me, if I do not think that it is beautiful. But I shall not answer him, whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or base, till I have first answered what it is. For that would not be right, Polus. If then you wish to enquire, ask me what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be.

Pol. I ask, then, and do you answer, what division it is.

Socr. Will you understand me when I answer? [For rhetoric, in my opinion, is a semblance of a division of the political art.]

Pol. What then? Do you say that it is beautiful, or base?

Socr. Base, I say; for I call evil things base: since I must answer you, as now knowing what I mean.

43. *Gorg.* By Jupiter, Socrates, but I do not myself understand what you mean.

Socr. Very likely, Gorgias : for I have not yet spoken clearly. But Polus here is young and hasty.

Gorg. But leave him alone ; and tell me in what way you say that rhetoric is a semblance of a division of the political art.

Socr. I will endeavour to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be. And if it is not such as I describe it, Polus here will confute me. [Do you not call body something, and soul something ?]

Gorg. How not ?

Socr. Do you not, then, think that there is a certain good habit of each of these ?

Gorg. I do.

Socr. What then ? an apparent good habit, which is not really so ? for instance, to explain my meaning, many appear to have a good constitution of body, whom no one but a physician, and a teacher in gymnastics, could easily perceive not to have a good constitution.

Gorg. You say truly.

Socr. I say that there is something of this kind both in the body and in the soul, which causes the body and the soul to appear to be in a good condition, when they are any thing but so.

44. *Gorg.* Such is the case.

Socr. Come now, if I can, I will explain to you more clearly what I mean. As there are two subject matters, I say there are two arts : and that which relates to the soul I call political, but that which relates to the body I am not able to describe to you off-hand by one name ; but of the culture of the body, which is one, I say there are two divisions, one gymnastics, the other medicine. But in the political art I lay down legislation, as corresponding to gymnastics, and the judicial to medicine. Now these respectively communicate with each other, as being concerned about the same subject, medicine with gymnastics, and the judicial art with legislation ; yet they in some respect differ from each other. These then being four, and always taking the best possible care, the former of the body, and the latter of the soul, flattery perceiving this, I do not say knowing, but sagaciously guessing it, and having

divided itself fourfold, and having stealthily put on the garb of each of these divisions, feigns itself to be that which it has put on; and it is not in the least concerned for what is best; but by means of that which is most pleasant, captivates and seduces ignorance, so as to appear to be of great value. 45. [Cookery, therefore, puts on the garb of medicine, and pretends that it knows the aliment best for the body. So that if a cook and a physician had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, which of the two was acquainted with good and bad aliments, the physician or the cook, the physician would die of hunger. This, then, I call flattery; and I say that a thing of this kind is base, Polus, (for I say this to you,) because it looks to what is agreeable without regard to what is best; and I affirm that it is not an art, but skill, because it has no knowledge of the things which it employs, what they severally are in their nature, so that it is unable to tell the use of each. But I do not call that an art which is a thing without reason. If you are doubtful about these things, I am willing to give you a reason for them. The flattery, then, pertaining to cookery, as I have said, is concealed under medicine; and in the same manner, under gymnastics, personal decoration, which is mischievous, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal, deceiving by means of gestures and colours, by smoothness and outward appearance; so as to make men put on an adventitious beauty, and neglect that which is their own, and is acquired by gymnastics. 46. That I may not, then, be prolix, I wish to tell you, after the manner of geometers, (for perhaps you can now follow me,) that what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is cookery to medicine: or rather thus, that what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is sophistry to legislation, and that what cookery is to medicine, that is rhetoric to justice. As I have said, they are thus different in their nature: but as they are proximate to each other^k, sophists and rhetoricians are confounded with *legislators and judges*, and are employed about the same things, and know not what to make of themselves, nor other men of them. For, if the soul did not preside over the body, but the body over itself, and cookery and medicine were not examined into and distinguished by

^k Bekker omits the words σοφισται και ῥήτορες, and Ast suggests δικασ-
ται for σοφισται, in either of which cases the addition of the words in
italics would be unnecessary.

the soul, but the body itself decided, estimating things by its own gratifications, that tenet of Anaxagoras would prevail extensively, friend Polus, (for you surely are acquainted with it,) that is, all things would be confounded together, things medicinal, and healthy, and pertaining to cookery, being undistinguished from each other. 47. You have heard, therefore, what I consider rhetoric to be, corresponding to cookery in the soul, as that in the body. Perhaps, however, I have acted absurdly, in that, though I do not allow you to make a long speech, I myself have extended mine to a great length. But I deserve to be pardoned: for when I spoke briefly you did not understand me, nor were you able to make use of the answer that I gave you, but required an explanation. If, therefore, when you answer, I in my turn shall not know what to make of it, do you also prolong your discourse: but, if I do know, suffer me to do so; for that is fair. And now, if you can make any use of this answer, do so.

Pol. What do you say, then? Does rhetoric appear to you to be flattery?

Socr. I said, indeed, that it was a [division of flattery] But do not you remember, Polus, though so young? What will you do by and by?

Pol. Does it seem to you, then, that good rhetoricians are to be esteemed as vile flatterers in cities?

Socr. Do you ask this as a question, or are you beginning an argument?

Pol. I ask a question.

48. *Socr.* They appear to me to be of no estimation at all.

Pol. How to be of no estimation? Have they not the greatest power in cities?

Socr. Not, if you mean that to have power is a good to him who possesses it.

Pol. But I do say so.

Socr. In that case, rhetoricians appear to me to possess the least power of all men in cities.

Pol. But what? do they not, like tyrants, slay whomever they please, and deprive of their property, and banish from cities whomever they think fit?

Socr. By the dog, Polus, I am doubtful with respect to each of the things you say, whether you assert these things yourself, and declare your own opinion, or ask me.

Pol. I ask you.

Socr. Be it so, my friend. Then you ask me two questions at once.

Pol. How two?

Socr. Did you not just now say, that rhetoricians, like tyrants, slay whomever they please, and deprive them of their property, and banish from cities whomever they think fit?

Pol. I did.

49. *Socr.* I say, then, that these are two questions, and I will give you an answer to both. For I affirm, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have very little power in cities, as I just now said: for they do scarcely any thing that they wish, though they do what to them appears to be best.

Pol. Is not this, then, to possess great power?

Socr. It is not, at least as Polus says.

Pol. I say not? On the contrary, I say it is.

Socr. By Jupiter, not you. For you said that to have great power is a good to him who possesses it.

Pol. And I repeat it.

Socr. Do you think, then, it is a good for any one to do what appears to him to be best, when he is void of understanding? And do you call this to possess great power?

50. *Pol.* Not I.

Socr. Prove, therefore, that rhetoricians are possessed of understanding, and that rhetoric is an art, and not flattery, if you mean to confute me. But, if you will leave me unconfuted, rhetoricians and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they please, will derive no good from thence. Power is, as you say, good; but to do, without understanding, whatever one pleases, you yourself admit is an evil. Is it not so?

Pol. I do.

Socr. How then can rhetoricians or tyrants have great power in cities, unless Socrates is persuaded by Polus to admit that they do what they wish?

Pol. What a strange man!

Socr. I deny that they do what they wish: but confute me.

Pol. Did you not just now admit that they do what appears to them to be best?

Socr. And I now admit it.

Pol. They do, therefore, what they wish.

Socr. I deny it.

Pol. But they do what appears best to them?

Socr. I grant it.

Pol. You speak absurdly and monstrously, Socrates.

Socr. Do not accuse me, most excellent Polus, that I may address you in your own style; but, if you have any other question to ask me, shew that I am deceived; if not, do you answer me.

Pol. I am willing to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.

Socr. Whether, then, do men appear to you to wish the thing that they do from time to time, or that for the sake of which they do the thing that they do? As for instance, do those who drink medicine from physicians appear to you to wish the thing that they do, viz., to drink the medicine, and suffer pain, or do they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine?

Pol. It is clear they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine.

Socr. In like manner those who sail on the sea, and those who carry on any other commercial business, do not wish the thing that they do from time to time: for who wishes to sail and to encounter danger, and to be harassed with business; but the object for which they sail is to acquire riches; for they sail for the sake of riches.

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. Is it not so then in all cases? whosoever does any thing for the sake of some thing else, does not wish the thing that he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

Pol. Yes.

52. *Socr.* Is there any thing in the world, then, that is not either good or evil, or between these, neither good nor evil?

Pol. It must needs be so, Socrates.

Socr. Do you not admit then, that wisdom, and health, and riches, and other things of the same kind, are good, but their contraries evil?

Pol. I do.

Socr. By the things that are neither good nor evil do you not mean such as sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of neither, as to sit, to walk, to run, and to sail, and again, stones, wood, and other things of the same kind? Are not these the things that you mean? Or do you call certain other things neither good nor evil?

Pol. No, but these.

Socr. Whether, therefore, do men, when they do these intermediate things, do them for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the intermediate.

Pol. The intermediate, surely, for the sake of the good.

Socr. Pursuing the good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it better, and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, viz., the good. Is it not so?

Pol. Yes.

53. *Socr.* Do we not, therefore, if we slay any one, slay, or banish, or deprive him of his possessions, thinking that it is better for us to do so than not?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. They, therefore, who do these things do them all for the sake of good.

Pol. I allow it.

Socr. Are we not agreed, then, that we do not wish those things which we do for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which we do them?

Pol. By all means.

Socr. We do not, then, wish simply to slay, or banish from cities, or deprive any one of his possessions; but if these things are useful we wish to do them, but if they are hurtful we do not wish to do them. For we wish, as you admit, things that are good, but we do not wish such as are neither good nor evil, nor such as are evil. Is it not so? Do I seem to you, Polus, to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer?

Pol. You speak the truth.

Socr. Since then we are agreed on these things, if any one slays, banishes from a city, or deprives another of his possessions, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to do, though it is really worse, he surely does what seems fit to him: is it not so?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. Does he, then, do what he wishes, if these things are really evil? Why do you not answer?

Pol. He does not appear to me to do what he wishes.

54. *Socr.* Is it possible, then, that such a man can have great power in the supposed city, if, according to your admission, to have great power is a good?

Pol. It is not possible.

Socr. I spoke truly, then, when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he pleases in a city, and yet not have great power, nor do what he wishes.

Pol. As if, Socrates, you yourself would not like to be allowed to do what you please in a city, rather than not, and would not be envious when you saw any one either slaying whom he pleased, or taking away his possessions, or putting him in bonds.

Socr. Do you mean justly or unjustly?

Pol. Whichever he should do, is he not in either case to be envied?

Socr. Good words, I pray you, Polus.

Pol. But why?

Socr. Because it is not right, either to envy those that are not to be envied, or the wretched; but to pity them.

Pol. What say you? Does such appear to you to be the case with the men of whom I am speaking?

55. *Socr.* How can it be otherwise?

Pol. Does he, then, who slays whom he pleases, slaying him justly, appear to you to be wretched, and an object of pity?

Socr. Not at all; nor indeed is he to be envied.

Pol. Did you not say just now that he was wretched?

Socr. I said, my friend, that he is wretched who slays another unjustly, and more than that, to be pitied; but that he who slays another justly is not to be envied.

Pol. He surely who dies unjustly is to be pitied, and is wretched.

Socr. Less so, Polus, than he who slays him; and less than he who dies justly?

Pol. How so, Socrates?

Socr. Thus; because to act unjustly is the greatest of evils.

Pol. But is this really the greatest of evils? Is it not a greater evil to suffer unjustly?

Socr. By no means.

Pol. Had you, then, rather suffer unjustly than act unjustly?

Socr. I should wish neither of these: but if I must necessarily either act unjustly or suffer unjustly, I should choose rather to suffer unjustly than to act unjustly.

Pol. Would you not, then, consent to be a tyrant?

Socr. I would not, if by being a tyrant you mean the same that I do.

Pol. I mean by it what I just now said, to have the power to do in a city whatever one pleases; to slay and banish, and do every thing according to one's own pleasure.

56. *Socr.* My excellent friend, attend to what I say, and confute me if you can. If, when the forum is full, I should take a dagger under my arm, and say to you, Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has just now fallen to my lot: for, if it seems fit to me that any one of these men whom you see ought immediately to die, he shall die; and if it seems fit to me that any one of them ought to have his head broken, he shall immediately have it broken; or if that his garment should be torn to pieces, it shall be torn to pieces: so great is the power I possess in the city. And if, on your disbelieving me, I should shew you the dagger, perhaps, on seeing it, you would say: According to this, Socrates, all men may have great power, since any house that you please might be burnt in this way, and even the dock-yards of the Athenians, and the triremes, and all the shipping, as well public as private. But surely this is not to possess great power, to do whatever one pleases: do you think so?

Pol. Certainly not in this way.

Socr. Can you tell me, then, why you blame a power of this kind?

Pol. I can.

Socr. Why then? tell me.

Pol. Because it must needs be that one who acts thus should be punished.

Socr. But is not the being punished an evil?

Pol. Certainly.

57. *Socr.* Therefore, my excellent friend, to have great power appears to you to be, when advantage attends one's doing what one pleases, and then it is a good; and this, as it seems, is to have great power; but if not, it is an evil, and to have little power. Let us consider this too. Are we not agreed that it is sometimes better to do the things which we just now spoke of, to slay, to banish men, and deprive them of their property, and sometimes not?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. This, then, as it seems, is agreed on both by you and me?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me what limit you establish?

Pol. Do you, Socrates, answer this question.

Socr. I say, then, Polus, since it is more agreeable to you to hear it from me, when any one does these things justly, it is better, but when unjustly, it is worse.

Pol. Forsooth, it is difficult to confute you, Socrates! but could not even a child convince you that you do not speak the truth?

Socr. I should be very much obliged to the child, and equally so to you, if you can confute me, and free me from my extravagances. But be not weary in obliging a man who is your friend, but confute me.

58. *Pol.* However, Socrates, there is no need to confute you by ancient examples. For things that have recently happened are sufficient to confute you, and to prove that many men who have acted unjustly are happy.

Socr. What are these?

Pol. Do you not see, for instance, this Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, ruler of Macedonia?

Socr. If not, at all events I hear of him.

Pol. Does he appear to you to be happy or miserable?

Socr. I do not know, Polus: for I have never yet had any intercourse with him.

Pol. What then? if you had intercourse with him, should you know? And do you not know otherwise, from the circumstances of the case, that he is happy?

Socr. By Jupiter, certainly not.

Pol. It is evident then, Socrates, you will say, that you do not even know whether the great king is happy?

Socr. And I should say the truth. For I do not know what his state is with regard to enlightenment and justice.

Pol. What? Does all happiness consist in this?

Socr. In my opinion, Polus. For I say that an honest and good man or woman is happy; but an unjust and wicked one is miserable.

Pol. This Archelaus, then, is miserable, according to your account?

Socr. At least, my friend, if he is unjust.

59. *Pol.* But how can he be otherwise than unjust, who had no right to the empire which he now possesses, as he was born of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas, and according to justice was the slave of Alcetas, and, if he had wished to do what is just, would have served Alcetas as a slave, and would have been happy, according to your account? whereas now he has become wonderfully miserable, since he has committed the greatest injustice. For, first of all, having sent for this his master and uncle, as if he would restore the government which Perdiccas had taken from him, and having entertained and intoxicated both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, and nearly his equal in age, he forced them into a carriage, and having carried them off by night, had their throats cut and made away with them both. And after he had committed these wrongs, he was not aware that he had become most miserable, and did not repent, but shortly afterwards, he did not wish to become happy by nurturing his legitimate brother, the son of Perdiccas, a child about seven years of age, to whom the government of right belonged, and by restoring it to him; but having thrown him into a well, and suffocated him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in pursuing a goose, and so met with his death. 60. Wherefore since he has committed the greatest wrongs of all in Macedonia, he is the most miserable of all the Macedonians, and not the most happy. And perhaps there are some among the Athenians, beginning with you, who would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.

Socr. At the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you, because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, though you had neglected the art of dialectics. And now, what else is this reasoning, by which even a child could confute me, and I, as you suppose, am now confuted by this reasoning of yours, when I said that a man who acts unjustly is not happy? How so, my friend? For I do not grant you any one of the things you assert.

Pol. Because you are not willing to do so; though it appears to you as I say.

Socr. My excellent friend, you attempt to confute me rhetorically, like those who think they confute their adversaries in courts of justice. For there some fancy they confute others when they produce many reputable witnesses in favour of what

they say, whereas the adverse party produces some one only, or none at all. 61. But this mode of confutation is worth nothing with reference to truth. For sometimes a man may be borne down by the false testimony of many witnesses who seem to be somewhat. And now, with respect to what you say, almost all the Athenians and strangers will agree with you, and if you wish to produce witnesses against me to prove that I do not speak the truth, there will testify for you, if you wish it, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and his brothers with him, who gave the tripods that stand in a row in the temple of Bacchus; or again, if you wish it, Aristocrates, son of Scellius, who gave that beautiful offering in the temple of Pythian Apollo; or if you wish it, the whole house of Pericles, or any other family, that you may think proper to choose out of this city. But I, who am but one, do not agree with you. For you do not convince me by arguments, but producing many false witnesses against me, you endeavour to eject me from my substance and the truth. But I, unless I shall be able to adduce you, who are one, as a witness agreeing with what I say, shall think that I have accomplished nothing worthy of mention with respect to the subject of our discussion; nor shall I think that you have done so, unless I, being one, alone testify for you, and you dismiss all those others. 62. This, then, is one mode of refutation, as you and many others think: but there is also another mode, which, on the contrary, I adopt. Let us, therefore, compare them with each other, and consider whether they differ at all from one another. For the matters about which we differ are by no means trifling; but they are indeed such as to know which is most honourable, and not to know most disgraceful, for the sum of them is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who is not. For instance, in the first place, with respect to the subject of our present discussion, you think it possible that a man may be happy who acts unjustly and is unjust; since you think that Archelaus, though unjust, is happy. Must we not suppose that such is your opinion?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. But I say it is impossible. On this one point, then, we differ. Be it so. But will he who acts unjustly be happy if he meet with justice and is punished?

Pol. By no means, for in that case he would be most miserable.

Socr. If, therefore, he who acts unjustly does not meet with the punishment he deserves, according to your account he will be happy.

Pol. So I say.

63. *Socr.* But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is in every way miserable; though more miserable if he does not suffer punishment, and does not meet with chastisement for his unjust actions; but less miserable if he suffers punishment, and meets with his just deserts both from gods and men.

Pol. You attempt, Socrates, to advance strange paradoxes.

Socr. Yet I shall endeavour, my friend, to make you say the same things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now then, the things about which we differ are these: and do you also consider. I said in a former part of our discussion, that to commit an injustice is worse than to suffer one.

Pol. Just so.

Socr. But you say it is worse to suffer an injustice.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. And I said that they who act unjustly are miserable, and was confuted by you.

Pol. You were so, by Jupiter.

Socr. At least as you think, Polus.

Pol. And I probably thought the truth.

Socr. But you, on the contrary, said that they who act unjustly are happy, if they do not suffer punishment.

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. But I say that they are most miserable; and that they who suffer punishment are less so. Do you wish to refute this also?

64. But this is more difficult to refute than the former, Socrates.

Socr. By no means, Polus, but it is impossible; for truth can never be refuted.

Pol. How say you? If a man should be detected acting unjustly, as in attempting to compass absolute power, and being detected should be put to the torture, be mutilated, and have his eyes burnt out, and after having himself suffered many other great and various torments, and having moreover seen his children and wife suffer the same, should at last be

crucified, or covered with pitch and burnt, will he be more happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he should become a tyrant, and ruling in the city, should pass through life doing whatever he pleases, being envied, and accounted happy, both by citizens and strangers? Do you say that it is impossible to refute these things?

Socr. You are now trying to terrify me, noble Polus, and do not refute me; but just now you adduced witnesses. However, remind me of a trifling circumstance; did you say, if a person should attempt unjustly to compass absolute power?

Pol. I did.

Socr. In that case, neither of them will ever be happier than the other, neither he who has unjustly acquired absolute power, nor he who has been punished. For, of two miserable persons, one cannot be happier than the other; but he is more miserable who escapes punishment and acquires absolute power. 65. What is this, Polus? do you laugh? Is this another species of refutation, when any one asserts any thing, to laugh at him, and not refute him?

Pol. Do you not think you are already refuted. Socrates, when you say such things as no man in the world would assert? for ask any one of these.

Socr. Polus, I am not among the number of politicians: and last year, happening to be chosen a senator, since my tribe held the presidency and it was necessary for me to collect the votes, I occasioned laughter, because I did not know how to collect them. Do not, then, require me to collect the votes of those who are present. But if you have no better mode of refutation than this, as I just now said, give the question up to me in my turn, and make trial of that mode of refutation which I think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witness of what I say, that is, the person with whom I am discoursing, but I let alone the multitude; and I know how to take the vote of one person, but I do not even discourse with the multitude. Consider, then, whether you are willing in your turn to give me an opportunity of refuting by answering the questions I shall put to you. For I think, that you and I, and other men, are of opinion, that to commit injustice is worse than to suffer it; and not to be punished, than to be punished.

66. *Pol.* But I, on the contrary, think that neither myself

nor any other man is of this opinion. For would you rather suffer injustice than commit it?

Socr. Yes, and you, and all other men.

Pol. Far from it; neither would you, nor I, nor any other man.

Socr. Will you not answer, then?

Pol. By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will say.

Socr. Tell me then, that you may know, as if I asked you from the beginning: whether does it appear to you, Polus, worse to commit an injustice or to suffer one?

Pol. To suffer one, in my opinion.

Socr. What then? whether is it more base to commit an injustice or to suffer one? Answer me.

Pol. To commit an injustice.

Socr. Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?

Pol. By no means.

Socr. I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful and the good, and the evil and the base, are the same?

Pol. Certainly not.

Socr. But what do you say to this? Beautiful things in general, such as bodies, colours, forms, sounds, and pursuits, do you call them severally beautiful, without reference to any thing else? As, for instance, first of all, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say that they are beautiful, on account of their usefulness, in reference to the particular thing for which each is useful, or on account of some pleasure, if in being seen they give delight to the beholders? Have you any thing else besides this to say respecting beauty of body?

Pol. I have not.

67. *Socr.* Do you not, then, denominate all other things in the same manner beautiful, such as forms and colours, either on account of some pleasure, or utility, or both?

Pol. I do.

Socr. And is not the case the same as to sounds, and every thing that relates to music?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. And moreover, with respect to laws and pursuits, they surely are beautiful, for no other reason except that they are either useful, or pleasant, or both?

Pol. So it appears to me.

Socr. And is it not the same with the beauty of the sciences?

Pol. Certainly. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, in defining the beautiful by pleasure and good.

Socr. Must not, therefore, the base be defined by the contrary, by pain and evil?

Pol. Necessarily so.

Socr. When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful than the other, it is more beautiful because it excels in one or both of these, either in pleasure, or utility, or both.

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. And when of two things one is more base than the other, it must be more base because it exceeds in pain or evil: is not this necessarily so?

Pol. Yes.

68. *Socr.* Come then; what did we say just now respecting committing injustice and suffering it? Did you not say that to suffer injustice is more evil, but to commit it, more base?

Pol. I did say so.

Socr. Therefore, since it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it, it must be more base because it is more painful and exceeds in pain, or evil, or both. Is not this also necessary?

Pol. How can it be otherwise?

Socr. First, then, let us consider whether to commit injustice exceeds in pain the suffering it; and whether they who commit injustice feel greater pain than they who suffer it.

Pol. This is by no means the case, Socrates.

Socr. It does not, then, exceed in pain?

Pol. By no means.

Socr. Therefore, if it does not exceed in pain, it will no longer exceed in both.

Pol. It appears not.

Socr. It remains, therefore, that it exceeds in the other.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. In the evil.

Pol. So it seems.

Socr. Since, therefore, to commit injustice exceeds in evil, it must be more evil than to suffer injustice.

Pol. Evidently so.

69. *Socr.* Was it not admitted by men in general, and by

you to me formerly, that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. Now, however, it appears to be worse.

Pol. So it seems.

Socr. Would you, then, rather choose that which is worse and more base, than that which is less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus, (for you will not be injured by so doing,) but answer, giving yourself up generously to the discussion as to a physician; and either admit or deny the question I ask.

Pol. Then I should not rather choose it, Socrates.

Socr. Would any other man in the world?

Pol. To me it appears not, according to what has been said.

Socr. I therefore said truly, that neither you, nor I, nor any other man in the world, would rather choose to commit injustice than to suffer it; for it is worse to do so.

Pol. So it appears.

Socr. You see then, Polus, that my mode of proof when compared with your mode of proof, does not at all resemble it; but all others agree with you, except myself. For my part you alone are sufficient for my purpose, agreeing with me and testifying for me; and I, having asked your opinion only, disregard that of others. Let this then be settled between us. And next, let us proceed to consider that which we doubted about in the second place, viz. whether it is the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice to be punished, as you thought, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished, as I thought. And let us consider it thus: To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, when one has committed injustice, do you not call the same thing?

Pol. I do.

Socr. Can you say, then, that all just things are not beautiful, so far as they are just? When you have well considered, answer me.

Pol. It appears to me that they are, Socrates.

Socr. Consider this also: When a man does any thing, must there not necessarily be something which is passive to him as an agent?

Pol. It appears so to me.

Socr. And does not the patient suffer what the agent does,

and just such a thing as the agent does? I mean in this way: If any one strikes, is it not necessary that something should be struck?

Pol. It is necessary.

Socr. And if the striker strikes hard or swiftly, must not the thing struck be stricken accordingly?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. That which is struck, then, undergoes a passion corresponding to that which the striker does.

Pol. Certainly.

71. *Socr.* In like manner, if any one burns, is it not necessary that something should be burnt?

Pol. How can it be otherwise?

Socr. And if he burns vehemently or painfully, that which is burnt must be burnt according as the burner burns?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. So, if any one cuts any thing, is not the reasoning the same? for something is cut.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. And if the cut is large or deep, or painful, that which is cut is cut with such a cut as the cutter cuts.

Pol. It appears so.

Socr. In a word, then, see if you grant what I just now said respecting every thing, viz., that according as the agent does, so the patient suffers.

Pol. I do grant it.

Socr. These things, then, being agreed on, whether is the being punished, to suffer, or to do something?

Pol. Necessarily, Socrates, it is to suffer.

Socr. Must it not, therefore, be by some agent?

Pol. Undoubtedly: by him who chastises.

Socr. But does not he who chastises rightly, chastise justly?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. Doing what is just, or not?

Pol. What is just.

Socr. Then, does not he who is chastised, when he is deservedly punished, suffer justly?

Pol. It appears so.

Socr. But what is just has been acknowledged to be beautiful.

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. Of these, then, the one does, and the other, he that is chastised, suffers that which is beautiful.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. And if beautiful, then good; for *that which is beautiful* is either pleasant or useful.

Pol. Necessarily so.

Socr. He therefore who is punished suffers that which is good.

Pol. So it seems.

72. *Socr.* He is therefore benefited.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. Is it with such a benefit as I suppose? Does he become better as to his soul, since he is chastised justly?

Pol. That is probable.

Socr. He, therefore, who is punished is freed from a vice of the soul.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. Is he not freed, then, from the greatest evil? Consider the matter thus: in the condition of a man's property do you perceive any other evil than poverty?

Pol. No other than poverty.

Socr. Well, in the constitution of the body? would you say that weakness, disease, deformity, and the like, are evils?

Pol. I should.

Socr. Do you not think, too, that there is a certain depravity in the soul?

Pol. How otherwise?

Socr. Do you not then call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and the like?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. Have you not said, then, that of these three, property, body, and soul, there are three corresponding evils, poverty, disease, injustice?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. Then which of these evils is the most base? Is it not injustice, and, in a word, the depravity of the soul?

Pol. By far.

Socr. But, if it is most base, then is it not also the worst?

Pol. How mean you, Socrates?

73. *Socr.* Thus. In every case, that which is most base is so because, from what has been before admitted, it occasions the greatest pain, or harm, or both.

Pol. By all means.

Socr. But injustice and the whole depravity of the soul, have been just now admitted by us to be most base.

Pol. They have been so admitted.

Socr. Is it not, therefore, the most troublesome and most base of these *depravities*, because it exceeds either in troublesomeness or hurtfulness, or both?

Pol. Necessarily so.

Socr. Is then the being unjust, intemperate, cowardly, and ignorant, more painful than to be poor and diseased?

Pol. It does not appear so to me, Socrates, from what has been said.

Socr. The depravity of the soul, then, is the most base of all, because it exceeds the others by some extraordinarily great harm and wonderful evil, since, according to your argument, it is not exceeded in painfulness.

Pol. So it appears.

Socr. But, surely, that which exceeds in the greatest harmfulness must be the greatest evil of all?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. Then injustice, intemperance, and the other depravities of the soul, are the greatest evils of all.

Pol. So it appears.

74. *Socr.* What art, then, frees from poverty? Is it not that of money-making?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. What, from disease? Is it not the medicinal?

Pol. Necessarily so.

Socr. What, from depravity and injustice? If in this way you cannot readily answer, consider it thus: whither, and to whom, do we take those that are diseased in body?

Pol. To physicians, Socrates.

Socr. Whether those who act unjustly, and are intemperate?

Pol. Do you mean, to the judges?

Socr. Is it not, then, that they may be punished?

Pol. I grant it.

Socr. Do not then those who chastise rightly chastise by employing a certain justice?

Pol. Clearly.

Socr. The art of money-making, therefore, frees from poverty, medicine from disease, and justice from intemperance and injustice.

Pol. So it appears.

Socr. Which of these, therefore, is the most beautiful?

Pol. Of what are you speaking?

Socr. The art of money-making, medicine, and justice.

Pol. Justice, Socrates, is far superior.

Socr. Does it not, then, produce the greatest pleasure, or utility, or both, since it is the most beautiful?

Pol. Yes.

75. *Socr.* Is it, then, pleasant to be under the care of a physician? and do they who are under such charge rejoice?

Pol. It does not appear so to me.

Socr. But it is useful. Is it not?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. For they are freed from a great evil; so that it is advantageous to endure pain and be restored to health.

Pol. How can it be otherwise?

Socr. Would the man then, thus be most happy with respect to his body who is under the care of a physician, or who is not diseased at all?

Pol. Clearly he that is not diseased.

Socr. For this is not happiness, as it seems, the being freed from evil; but the never possessing it at all.

Pol. It is so.

Socr. But what? Of two men that have evil, either in body or soul, which is the more miserable, he that is under the care of a physician, and is freed from the evil, or he that is not under the care of a physician, and retains the evil?

Pol. It appears to me, he that is not under the care of a physician.

Socr. And is not punishment the being freed from the greatest evil, depravity?

Pol. It is.

Socr. For justice produces a sound mind, makes men more just, and becomes the medicine of depravity?

Pol. Yes.

76. *Socr.* He, then, is most happy who has no vice in his soul, since this is proved to be the greatest of evils.

Pol. It is evident.

Socr. The second, surely, is he who is freed from it.

Pol. So it seems.

Socr. But this is he who is admonished, reprovèd, and punished.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. He, therefore, lives worst, who is afflicted with injustice, and is not freed from it.

Pol. It appears so.

Socr. Is not, then, he one who, having committed the greatest injustice, and employing the greatest injustice, contrives that he may be neither admonished, nor chastised, nor punished, as you said was the case with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful men?

Pol. So it seems.

Socr. For these, my excellent friend, have managed much the same as one who being afflicted with the worst diseases should contrive not to have his bodily maladies corrected or subjected to medical treatment, fearing, as if he were a child, to be burnt and cut, because these operations are painful. Does it not appear so to you?

Pol. It does.

Socr. Being ignorant, as it seems, of what health is, and a good habit of the body. 77. Now from what we have just agreed on, Polus, those who flee from punishment appear to do something of this kind; they look to the pain attending it, but are blind to its utility, and are ignorant how much more miserable than an unhealthy body it is to dwell with an unhealthy soul, that is corrupt, unjust, and impious. Whence they do every thing that they may not be punished, nor freed from the greatest evil, procuring for themselves riches and friends, and the power of speaking as persuasively as possible. But if we have agreed on what is true, Polus, do you perceive what consequences result from our discourse? do you wish that we should draw the conclusions from them?

Pol. I do, unless you think otherwise.

Socr. Does it not follow that injustice and to act unjustly is the greatest evil?

Pol. It appears so.

Socr. And to suffer punishment was proved to be a means of freedom from this evil.

Pol. It appears to be so.

Socr. But not to suffer punishment is a continuance of the evil.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. To act unjustly, therefore, is the second of evils in magnitude; but to act unjustly and not to suffer punishment is the greatest and chief of all evils.

Pol. So it seems.

78. *Socr.* Was not this the point, my friend, with respect to which we differed, you considering Archelaus happy, for that having committed the greatest injustice he suffers no punishment; but I on the contrary thinking, that whether Archelaus, or any other man whatever, is not punished when he commits injustice, he must needs be far more wretched than all other men, and that he who commits injustice is ever more wretched than he who suffers it, and he that is not punished than he that is. Are not these the things that I said?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. And has it not been demonstrated that they were said truly?

Pol. It appears so.

Socr. Well then, if these things are true, Polus, what is the great utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now agreed on, every one ought especially to beware of acting unjustly, for that, *if he does so act*, he will sustain great evil. Is it not so?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. And if a man has committed injustice, either himself, or any one else for whom he has regard, he ought of his own accord to betake himself thither, where as soon as possible he will be punished, to a judge as to a physician, taking every pains lest the disease of injustice becoming inveterate should render the soul corrupt and incurable; or what must we say, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand? Do not these things necessarily harmonize with the former in this, but in no other way?

79. *Pol.* For what else can we say, Socrates?

Socr. For the purpose, then, of excusing injustice, our own, or that of our parents, or friends, or children, or country, when it acts unjustly, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus, unless on the contrary, any one supposes that he ought especially to

accuse himself, and afterwards his relatives, and any other of his friends, who may have acted unjustly, and not conceal the crime, but bring it to light, in order that he may be punished, and restored to health; moreover, that he should compel both himself and the others to lay aside fear, and with his eyes shut, and in a manly way, deliver himself up, as to a physician, to be cut and cauterised, pursuing the good and the beautiful, without paying any regard to what is painful; if he has committed a wrong worthy of stripes, delivering himself up to be beaten, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to pay it, if of exile, to be banished, if of death, to die, being himself the first accuser of himself, and others his relatives, not sparing either himself or them, but employing rhetoric for this very purpose, that, the crimes being exposed, they may be freed from the greatest of evils, injustice. Shall we say thus, Polus, or not?

80. *Pol.* These things appear to me, Socrates, to be absurd; but it must be admitted, they accord with what was before said.

Socr. Must not, therefore, either our former conclusions be done away with, or these results necessarily follow?

Pol. Yes; such is the case.

Socr. Contrariwise, if it is requisite to do ill to any one, whether to an enemy, or any other person, provided only that he is not himself injured by his enemy; for this is to be guarded against; but if an enemy injures another, we should endeavour by all possible means, both by actions and words, that he may not be punished, nor brought before a judge: but, if he is brought before him, we should contrive so that our enemy may escape, and not suffer punishment: and if he has robbed us of a great quantity of gold, that he should not restore it, but should retain it and spend it on himself and his associates unjustly and impiously; and if he has committed an injustice worthy of death, we should contrive that he may not die, if possible never, but that he may be immortal in depravity, or if this cannot be, that he may live in this state for as long a period as possible. 81. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric appears to me to be useful, since to him who does not intend to act unjustly, its utility does not appear to me to be great, if indeed it is of any utility at all, as in the former part of our discussion it appeared in no respect to be.

Cal. Tell me, Chærephon, does Socrates say these things seriously, or is he jesting?

Char. He appears to me, Callicles, to speak most seriously; but there is nothing like asking him himself.

Cal. You are right, by the gods, and I desire to do it. Tell me, Socrates, whether we must say that you are now speaking seriously, or jesting? For, if you are speaking seriously, and if what you say is true, is not our human life altogether subverted, and are not all our actions, as it seems, contrary to what they ought to be?

Socr. If there were not a certain passion, Callicles, common to men, to some, one, to others, another, but each of us had a peculiar passion different from others, it would not be easy for one to make known one's own affection to another. 82. I speak thus because I perceive that you and I are now affected in the same manner; for, being two, we each of us love two things: I, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, and philosophy, you, the Demus^k of the Athenians, and the son of Pyrilampes. Now I continually perceive that you, eloquent as you are, are unable to contradict the objects of your love, in whatever they may say, and in whatever manner they may assert a thing takes place, but you are changed by them upwards and downwards. For, in the assembly, if, when you say any thing, the Athenian people say that it is not so, you, changing your opinion, say what they wish; and you are affected in the same manner towards that beautiful youth, the son of Pyrilampes; for you cannot bring yourself to oppose the wishes and discourses of the objects of your love: so that, if any one, when from time to time you say what you do to please them, should wonder at its absurdity, perhaps you would say to him, if you wished to speak the truth, that unless some one shall cause the objects of your love to desist from such discourses, neither can you desist from saying what you do. Think, therefore, that you need to hear the like from me; and do not wonder that I speak thus, but cause philosophy, my favourite, to desist from speaking so. For, my dear friend, she always says what you now hear from me, and is much less fickle than my other loves. 83. For the son of

^k That is, "the people of Athens." It is necessary to retain the original word because of the play on the word *Demus*, which was the name of the son of Pyrilampes, a person distinguished for his personal beauty. Socrates means to insinuate that while he loves the inward beauty of Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles loves the external beauty of the people and Demus son of Pyrilampes.

Clinias, here, says different things at different times ; but philosophy always the same. And she says the things that you now wonder at ; and you have just heard what she said. Either, therefore, confute her, as to what I just now said, and prove that to act unjustly, and when one has acted unjustly not to suffer punishment, is not the worst of all evils ; or, if you suffer this to remain unconfuted, then, by the dog, the deity of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you, but will differ from you, Callicles, through the whole of his life. However, I think, my excellent friend, that it would be better for me that my lyre should be out of tune and discordant, and the choir of which I might be the leader, and that most men should not agree with me, but oppose what I say, rather than that I, being one, should be discordant with and contradict myself.

Cal. You seem to me, Socrates, to act the boaster in your discourses, as being in truth a mob-orator : and now you thus declaim, since Polus has met with the same treatment as he objected Gorgias met with from you. 84. For he said that Gorgias, when asked by you, whether if one should come to him, wishing to learn rhetoric without being acquainted with justice, Gorgias would teach him, was ashamed, and said that he would teach him, on account of the custom among men, because they would be displeased if any one were to refuse : and that from this admission Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, and you were delighted with this very circumstance ; for which he then ridiculed you, as it appeared to me, very properly. And now he himself has in turn been treated the very same way ; I, however, in this particular, do not commend Polus, because he has conceded to you, that to commit injustice is more base than to suffer it. For, from this admission, he being entangled by you in the discussion, has been brought to a check, because he was ashamed to say what he thought. For you in reality, Socrates, while you profess to be in search of truth, lead to such vulgar and popular things as these which are not beautiful by nature, but by law. For these are, for the most part, contrary to each other, nature and law. 85. If any one, therefore, is ashamed, and dares not say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself. And you, having perceived this subtle distinction, deal unfairly in the discussion ; for, if any one speaks of any thing according to law, you cunningly ask him about it according to na-

ture, and if he speaks of things according to nature, you ask him about them according to law; as just now in the present discussion, respecting committing injustice and suffering it, when Polus spoke of that which is more base according to nature, you followed up the law *as if it were* according to nature. For, by nature, every thing is more base which is also worse, as to suffer injustice, but by law to commit it. For to submit to injustice is not the condition of a man, but of a slave, to whom it is better to die than to live, since, being injured and disgraced, he is unable to defend himself or any one else for whom he has regard. But I think, those who make the laws are the weak and the many: they, therefore, make laws with a view to themselves and their own advantage, and with the same view they bestow praise and impute blame; and to terrify such men as are stronger, and who are able to acquire more, that they may not acquire more than themselves, they say that it is base and unjust to obtain a superiority, and that to endeavour to acquire more than others is to commit injustice. 86. For they are content, I think, if they, being weaker, have an equal portion. For this reason, therefore, by law it is said to be unjust and base to endeavour to possess more than the many, and they call this committing an injustice. But nature herself, I think, evinces, on the contrary, that it is just that the better should have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the weaker. And it is evident in many instances that it is so, both in other animals, and in whole cities and races of men, that the just is so settled that the superior should rule over the inferior, and possess more than they. For, with what justice did Xerxes make war upon Greece, or his father on the Scythians? or ten thousand other instances which one might adduce? But I think they do these things according to natural justice, and, by Jupiter, according to the law of nature; not, perhaps, according to that law which we have framed, taking the best and strongest amongst us from their youth, like lions, we tame them by incantations and juggleries, telling them that it is right to preserve equality, and that this is the beautiful and the just. 87. But, I think, if there should be a man found with sufficient natural power, having shaken off all these trammels, and broken through, and abandoned, and trampled under foot our written ordinances, and quackeries, and incantations, and laws contrary to nature,

he, from being our slave, would rise up and prove himself our master; and then natural justice would shine forth. Pindar, too, appears to me to have declared what I now assert, in the ode in which he says that "law is the king of all, both mortals and immortals; and," he adds, "he with most powerful hand makes use of might, calling it right; and this I infer from the deeds of Hercules, since *he drove away the oxen of Geryon* unbought." He speaks pretty much in this manner; for I do not remember the ode by heart. He says, then, that Hercules drove away the oxen of Geryon, without having either bought them, or received them as a gift, as if this were naturally just, that both oxen, and all other possessions, when the property of the worse and inferior, belong to the better and superior. Such, then, is the truth; and you will know that it is so, if, dismissing philosophy, you betake yourself to greater things. 88. For philosophy, Socrates, is an elegant thing, if one handles it moderately in youth; but if one dwells upon it longer than is becoming, it is the ruin of men. For if a man should have excellent abilities, and should study philosophy beyond the period of youth, he must necessarily become unskilled in all things in which he ought to be skilled, who desires to be a worthy, good, and distinguished man. For such men are unskilled in the laws of the city, and in those arguments which any one must use, who is conversant with the business transactions of men, both privately and publicly: they are likewise altogether unskilled in human pleasures and desires, and, in short, in the manners of men. When, therefore, they engage in any private or public business, they make themselves ridiculous, just as, I think, politicians are ridiculous when they meddle with your disputations and arguments. For that saying of Euripides¹ is verified: "Every one shines in this, and to this applies himself, consuming the greater part of the day in whatever he most excels." But that wherein a man is weak he avoids, and abuses it, and praises the other through self-love, thinking thereby to praise himself: but I think the most correct way is to partake of both. 89. Of philosophy, indeed, so far as is requisite for education, it is well to partake, nor is it any disgrace for one who is young to study philosophy: but when a man who has reached an advanced age, still studies

¹ From the *Antiope* of Euripides. See Valckenaer *Diatrib. in Eurip. Reliquias*, p. 76.

philosophy, Socrates, the thing becomes ridiculous; and I have very much the same feeling towards those who study philosophy, as to those who stammer and sport. For when I see a child whom it still becomes to talk thus stammering and sporting, I am delighted, and his conduct appears to me to be graceful and liberal, and suited to the age of a child. But when I hear a little boy talking with precision, it seems a disagreeable thing to me, and offends my ears, and appears to be somewhat servile. When, however, one hears a man stammering, or sees him sporting, it appears to be ridiculous, unmanly, and worthy of stripes. Now I have this same feeling towards those who study philosophy. For, when I see philosophy in a young man, I am delighted, and it appears to me becoming, and I consider such a man to be of a liberal mind, but if he does not study philosophy, I consider him illiberal, and one who will never think himself worthy of any noble or generous action. When, however, I see a man advanced in years still studying philosophy, and not having abandoned it, such a man, Socrates, appears to me to be deserving of stripes. 90. For, as I just now said, such a man, even though he has excellent abilities, must needs become unmanly, by avoiding the public places of the city, and the forum, in which, as the poet^m says, men acquire celebrity, and by concealing himself from the public view, he passes the remainder of his life with three or four boys, whispering in a corner, but never utters any thing liberal, great, and becoming. But I, Socrates, am very friendly disposed towards you; and I seem to have the same feeling as Zethus towards Amphion in Euripides, whom I just now mentioned; for it occurs to me to say to you the same that he said to his brother: that you neglect, Socrates, what you ought to attend to, and strive to adorn the nature of a soul thus generous by a certain juvenile form; nor in deliberations of justice are you able to advance an argument correctly, nor lay hold of what is probable and persuasive, nor can you suggest vigorous advice for others. 91. However, my dear Socrates, (and do not be angry with me, for I speak out of good-will to you,) does it not appear to you to be base to be in the state in which I think you are, and others who continually make too great advances in philosophy? For now, if any one should arrest you, or any other of the

^m Homer, *Iliad*, ix. 441.

same character, and should take you to prison, asserting that you had acted unjustly, when you had not, you are aware you would not know what to do for yourself; but you would lose your head and gape, and not have any thing to say; and when you went into a court of justice, having met with a very vile and despicable accuser, you would die, if he chose to charge you capitally. And indeed, Socrates, how can this be wise, if any art meeting with a man of good natural ability renders him worse, and neither able to assist himself, nor preserve either himself or any one else from the greatest dangers, but suffers him to be plundered of all his substance by enemies, and to live in the city utterly without honour? Such a man, (if I may speak somewhat rudely,) one may slap on the face with impunity. 92. But, my friend, be persuaded by me, and give up confuting, cultivate harmony of conduct, and employ yourself in what will give you a reputation for wisdom, leaving to others these graceful subtleties, whether it is proper to call them frivolities, or fooleries, "by which you will come to dwell in an empty house:" and emulate, not men who are able to confute these trifling things, but those who have wealth, renown, and many other goods.

Socr. If I happened to have a golden soul, Callicles, do you not think I should gladly find one of the best of those stones by which they test gold, to which applying it, if it should allow that my soul was well cultivated, I should then know for a certainty that I was in a good state, and that I had no further need of any other test?

Cal. Why do you ask this, Socrates?

Socr. I will now tell you. I think that in meeting with you, I have met with this good fortune.

Cal. Why so?

Socr. I well know, that if you agree with me in those things which my soul entertains, such things are the very truth. For I perceive that he who intends to examine sufficiently respecting his soul whether it lives uprightly or not, ought to possess three qualities, all which you do possess, viz., science, benevolence, and freedom of speech. 93. For I meet with many who are not able to test me, through not being wise as you are; but others are wise, indeed, but are not willing to speak the truth to me, because they are not concerned about me as you are. Thus these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are indeed

wise, and my friends, but they are deficient in freedom of speech, and are more bashful than is proper. For how should it be otherwise? since they have reached such a pitch of bashfulness that through shamefacedness each of them dares to contradict himself before many persons, and this on the most important subjects. You however possess all these qualities, which the others have not. For you are both well instructed, as many of the Athenians will affirm, and are well-disposed towards me. What proof do I use? I know, Callicles, that you four have studied wisdom together, you, Tisander the Aphidnæan, Andron son of Androtion, and Nausicydes the Cholargean; and I once heard you deliberating how far wisdom ought to be cultivated, and I know that this opinion prevailed among you, that you should not endeavour to study philosophy with great accuracy; but you advised each other to be cautious, lest, by becoming more wise than is proper, you should destroy yourselves without perceiving it. 94. Since, then, I hear you giving me the very same advice that you gave to your most intimate friends, it is to me a sufficient proof that you are really well-disposed towards me. Moreover, that you are able to speak boldly and not be ashamed, both yourself say, and the speech which you just now made, evinces. The case is evidently this, with reference to our present discussion; if you shall agree with me in any thing, in our argument, that point will have been sufficiently examined by you and me, and it will be no longer necessary to put it to another test. For you would never have assented to it, either through deficiency of wisdom, or excess of bashfulness. Nor, again, would you have assented in order to deceive me: for you are my friend, as you have yourself said. In reality, therefore, your and my assent will have reached the perfect truth. But the most beautiful consideration of all, Callicles, with respect to the things about which you have reproved me, is that, viz., what kind of person a man ought to be, what he ought to study, and how far, both when he is advanced in life and when he is young. For, with respect to myself, if I do any thing in my life not rightly, be assured that I do not err willingly, but through my own ignorance. 95. Do you, therefore, as you have begun to advise me, not desist, but shew me clearly what it is that I ought to study, and in what way I may accomplish it. And if you find me now assenting to you, but in time to come not doing the

things to which I have assented, then consider me as utterly stupid, and thenceforth give me no more advice, as being a man altogether worthless. But repeat it to me again from the beginning, how say you and Pindar is the case with natural justice? is it that the superior should take by force from the inferior, and that the better should rule over the worse, and that the more excellent should have more than the depraved? Do you say that the just is any thing else than this? or do I remember rightly?

Cal. These things I said then, and I say now.

Socr. But do you call the same person better and superior? For I was not able at the time to understand you, what you meant: whether do you call the stronger superior, and must the weaker submit to the stronger; as you seemed to me to intimate when you said, that great cities attack little ones by natural justice, because they are superior and stronger; as if the superior, the stronger, and the better, were the same; or is it possible to be better, and at the same time inferior and weaker, and to be superior, but more depraved? or is there the same definition of the better and the superior? Define this clearly for me, are the superior, the better, and the stronger, the same, or different?

Cal. Then I tell you clearly, that they are the same.

96. *Socr.* Are not, then, the many by nature superior to one? since they establish laws for the one, as you just now said?

Cal. How can it be otherwise?

Socr. The laws, then, of the many are those of such as are superior?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Therefore, of the better? For, according to your account, the superior are far better.

Cal. Yes.

Socr. Are not, then, their laws by nature beautiful, since they are superior?

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. Now do not the many think thus, as you just now said, that it is just to possess the equal, and that it is more base to injure than to be injured? Is this so, or not? And take care that you are not detected here in being shamefaced. Do the many think or not that to possess the equal, but not

more, is just? and that it is more base to injure than to be injured? Do not refuse me an answer to this, Callicles, in order that, if you agree with me, I may be confirmed in my opinion by you, seeing that a man competent to decide has agreed with me.

97. *Cal.* The many, then, do think thus.

Socr. Not therefore by law only, but by nature also, it is more base to injure than to be injured, and just to possess the equal. So that you appear not to have spoken the truth before, nor to accuse me rightly, in saying that law and nature are contrary to each other, and that I, knowing this, deal unfairly in the discussion, if any one speaks according to nature, by leading him to law, and if any one speaks according to law, by leading him to nature.

Cal. This man will not cease trifling. Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed, at your age, to catch at words, and, if any one makes a mistake in an expression to consider it an unexpected gain? For, do you think that by the superior I mean any thing else than the better? Did I not tell you long since, that I consider the better and the superior to be the same? Do you suppose I mean, that if a crowd of slaves, and all sorts of men of no worth, except perhaps for bodily strength, should meet together, that what they should say^a would be legal institutions?

Socr. Be it so, most wise Callicles: is that your meaning?

Cal. Certainly.

98. *Socr.* But I, Sir, long since suspected that you meant some such thing by the superior; and therefore I repeat the question, desiring to understand clearly what you do mean; for you surely do not think that two are better than one, nor that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger than you. Tell me then from the beginning whom you mean by the better, since you do not mean the stronger. And, my admirable friend, teach me in the outset in a milder manner, that I may not leave you.

Cal. You are bantering, Socrates.

Socr. By Zethus, no, Callicles, in whose name you just now bantered me a good deal. But come, tell me who do you mean are the better?

^a οἱ τοὶ φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα; as if αὐτὰ ταῦτα preceded ἀ ἂν φῶσιν. See Stallbaum.

Cal. I mean the more excellent.

Socr. You see, then, that you yourself speak words, but explain nothing. Will you not tell me whether by the better and superior you mean the more wise, or some others?

Cal. But, by Jupiter, I mean these, certainly.

99. *Socr.* Often, therefore, according to your account, one wise man is superior to ten thousand that are not wise; and it is right that he should govern, and they be governed, and that the governor should have more than the governed. For you appear to me to wish to say this (and I do not catch at expressions), if one man is superior to ten thousand.

Cal. That is what I mean. For I think this is just by nature, that the better and the more wise should both govern and have more than the worthless.

Socr. Stop there. What then do you now say? If we were in the same place, as we now are, many men together, and had, in common, abundance of meat and drink, and were men of various descriptions, some strong, others weak, and one of us being a physician should happen to be more wise respecting these things, and should be (as is likely) stronger than some, and weaker than others, will it not follow that this man who is wiser than we are, will be better and superior with respect to these things?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Should he, therefore, have more of these meats than we, because he is better? Or, because he is chief, ought he not to distribute the whole, but, in consuming and using them for his own body, not take more than others, under pain of injury to himself, but should have more than some, and less than others; and if he should happen to be the weakest of all, though the best, he must have least of all, Callicles? Is it not so, my friend?

100. *Cal.* You speak of meats and drinks, and physicians, and such trifles; but I do not speak of these.

Socr. Whether, then, do you say that the more wise is better? Grant or deny.

Cal. I do.

Socr. And do you not say that the better ought to have more?

Cal. Not of meats and drinks.

Socr. I understand. But perhaps of clothes, and the most

skilful weaver should have the largest garment, and go about most abundantly and beautifully clad.

Cal. What garments do you mean?

Socr. And with respect to shoes, it is clear that he who is more skilled and best, should have more than others; the shoemaker, perhaps, ought to walk about with the largest and greatest number of shoes.

Cal. What shoes? Are you still trifling?

Socr. But if you do not mean such things, perhaps you do the following: for instance, that a husbandman, wise and skilled in the cultivation of land, should perhaps have more seeds than others, and use as much as possible on his own land.

101. *Cal.* How constantly you repeat the same things, Socrates.

Socr. Not only so, Callicles, but on the same subject.

Cal. By the gods, you never cease talking about shoemakers, fullers, cooks, and physicians, as if our discourse were about them.

Socr. Will you not tell me, then, with respect to what things a person should be superior and more wise, who having more than others, justly has more? Will you neither permit me to suggest, nor say yourself?

Cal. But I have said some time since. First, by the superior I do not mean shoemakers, or cooks, but those who are skilled in the affairs of a city, in what way they can be well administered, and not only skilled, but also brave, able to accomplish what they have conceived, and who do not fail through effeminacy of soul.

Socr. Do you see, most excellent Callicles, that you do not make the same objection to me that I do to you? For you allege that I always say the same things, and blame me for it; and I, on the contrary, complain of you, that you never say the same things on the same subjects; but at one time you defined the better and the superior to be the stronger, and at another time the more wise: and now again you come with something else; and certain persons that are braver are said by you to be the superior and better. But, my friend, tell me once for all, whom you call the better and superior, and in reference to what.

102. *Cal.* I have already said that they are such as are

wise and brave, with respect to the affairs of a city. For it belongs to them to govern cities, and it is just that they should have more than others, the governors than the governed.

Socr. But what? my friend, as governing themselves, or being governed?

Cal. What mean you?

Socr. I mean that each person governs himself. Is there no occasion for this, that a man should govern himself, but only others?

Cal. What do you mean by governing himself?

Socr. Nothing uncommon; but as men frequently say, that a man is temperate, and master of himself, controlling the pleasures and desires that are within himself.

Cal. How ridiculous you are! By the temperate you mean the foolish.

Socr. How otherwise? There is no one but would know that that is my meaning^o.

Cal. Most assuredly, Socrates; since how can a man be happy who is a slave to any one? But this it is which is beautiful, and just according to nature, and which I now freely tell you, *namely*, that a man who lives rightly should suffer his desires to be as great as possible, and should not restrain them; but should be able, when they are at their height, to minister to them by his courage and prudence, and satisfy each desire as it springs up. 103. This, however, I think, is not possible for the generality of men; wherefore they blame such persons through shame, to conceal their own impotency, and say that intemperance is base; as I said before, enslaving men of a better nature, and themselves not being able to satisfy their own pleasures, they praise temperance and justice, on account of their own effeminacy. For to those whom it has befallen from the first either to be the sons of kings, or who are able by nature to procure for themselves a government, or tyranny, or dynasty, what can be more disgraceful and base than temperance? who, when it is in their power to enjoy the good things of this life, and no one hinders them, impose a master on themselves, the law, discourse, and censure of the multitude? Or how should they be otherwise than miserable

^o I have followed Stallbaum's reading, οὐδὲς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνολή, ὅτι εἴτω λέγω. Socrates grants his opponent's erroneous inference that so he may be led on to a still greater absurdity.

through the beauty of justice and temperance, while they impart no more to their friends than to their enemies, and this though they have supreme power in their own city? Thus, then, it stands with the truth, Socrates, which you say you are in search of: luxury, intemperance, and liberty, if they have the proper aids, these are virtue and felicity; but all those other fine things, those compacts contrary to nature, are extravagancies of men, and of no value.

104. *Socr.* Not at all ignobly, Callicles, have you expressed your opinions, speaking freely; for you now plainly say what others think, indeed, but are unwilling to say. I beg of you, therefore, on no account to relax, in order that it may really become evident how we ought to live. Come tell me: do you say that our desires ought not to be checked, if one intends to be such as one ought, and that, suffering them to be as great as possible, one ought to provide for their satisfaction from every possible source, and that this constitutes virtue?

Cal. I do say so.

Socr. They, therefore, who need nothing, are not rightly said to be happy.

Cal. For thus stones and the dead would be most happy.

Socr. But, indeed, even as you say, life is grievous. For in truth I should not wonder if Euripides speaks the truth when he says: "Who knows whether to live is not death, and to die, life?" And we, perhaps, are really dead; as I have heard from one of the wise, that we are now dead, and that the body is our sepulchre, and that the part of the soul in which the desires are is of such a nature that it can be persuaded different ways, and change upwards and downwards; and this, some skilful man, perhaps a Sicilian, or Italian, turning into a fable, by a slight change of the word^p, called a cask, from its being credulous and easily persuaded, but the foolish he called uninitiated. He further compared that part of the soul of the uninitiated in which the desires are, namely, its intemperate and unclosed part, to a pierced cask, on account of its insatiable greediness. 105. This man, too, quite contrary to you, Callicles, shews that of those in Hades (meaning thereby the invisible world) the most miserable must be the unin-

^p The English language does not enable a translator to preserve the play on the words *πιθανόν* and *πίθον*, nor the equivoque in *ἀμύητους*, which means "leaky," as well as "uninitiated."

itiated, and that they carry water to a perforated cask by a similarly perforated sieve. The sieve, as he who spoke to me said, is the soul. But he likened the soul of the foolish to a sieve, as being perforated and not able to retain any thing, through incredulity and forgetfulness. This probably is somewhat absurd, nevertheless it shews that by proof of which I wish, if by any means I can, to persuade you to change your opinion, and to prefer to an insatiable and intemperate life one that is well regulated, and that is satisfied and contented with the things that are from time to time present. But do I persuade you at all, and do you change your opinion, and admit that the moderate are more happy than the intemperate? or have I produced no impression, and though I tell you many such fables, will you not be any the more disposed to change your opinion?

Cal. In this you have spoken more truly, Socrates.

106. *Socr.* Come, then, I will mention to you another similitude from the same school as the preceding. For consider whether you would speak thus of each kind of life, the temperate and the intemperate, as if two men had each many casks; and that those of one were sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and many others of other things; that the fountains of each were rare and difficult to be obtained, and could only be procured by many and severe toils; the one, then, having filled his casks, pours no more into them, nor is at all concerned about them, but on this score is at ease; that the fountains of the other, as of the former one, are possible to be procured, though with difficulty, that his vessels are perforated and defective, and he compelled, both night and day, to fill them, or suffer the most extreme pain. When such is the life of each, do you say that of the intemperate is more happy than that of the moderate man? Do I persuade you at all, by relating these things, to grant that a moderate life is better than an intemperate one, or do I not persuade you?

Cal. You do not persuade me, Socrates. For he that has filled his casks has no longer any pleasure: but this is, what I just now mentioned, to live like a stone, when he has filled them, neither rejoicing any more nor grieving: but a pleasant life consists in as much flowing in as possible.

107. *Socr.* Is it not, therefore, necessary, if much flows in,

that much also should go out, and that there should be certain large holes for its flowing out?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. You speak now of the life of a sea-lark¹, and not of a corpse, or a stone. But tell me, do you mean such a thing as being hungry, and, when hungry, eating?

Cal. I do.

Socr. And of being thirsty, and, when thirsty, drinking?

Cal. I do mean that, and that he who has all other desires, and, having the power to do so, satisfies them, lives a joyful and happy life.

Socr. Well done, my excellent friend! Proceed as you have begun, and take care not to be ashamed. But it is right, too, as it seems, that neither should I be ashamed. And first of all, tell me if, when a man, who is scabby and itches, is able to scratch himself without stint, and passes his life in scratching himself, this is to live happily?

Cal. How absurd you are, Socrates, and a mere babbler.

Socr. Hence it is, Callicles, that I have astonished Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed. You, however, will not be astonished nor ashamed, for you are courageous: but only answer me.

108. *Cal.* I say, then, that he who scratches himself lives pleasantly.

Socr. Therefore, if pleasantly, also happily?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Will this be the case if he only itches in his head, or must I ask you still further? Consider, Callicles, what answer you would give, if any one asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession. And to take that which is the chief of all, is not the life of catamites dreadful, base, and wretched? Will you dare to call them happy, if they have what they desire, without stint?

Cal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion to such subjects?

Socr. Do I lead it hither, noble Sir, or does he who asserts thus broadly, that such as rejoice, in whatever way they rejoice, are happy, and does not distinguish between pleasures,

¹ *Χυραδρίς*, a bird which Aristotle tells us (*Hist. Anim.*, l. ix. c. 11) "appears in the night and runs off in the day." See note to Cary's *Birds of Aristophanes*, act i. sc. 4.

what are good and what are bad? But tell me further still, whether do you say that the pleasant and the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not good?

Cal. In order that my argument may not contradict itself, if I should say they are different, I say that they are the same.

109. *Socr.* You subvert your former statements, Callicles, and no longer search for the truth with me properly, if you speak contrary to your real opinion.

Cal. And you do the same, Socrates.

Socr. Neither, then, do I act rightly, if I do so, nor do you. But, good Sir, consider whether to rejoice in any way be not good. For it is clear that many base consequences, which were just now hinted at, will follow, if this should be the case, and many others besides.

Cal. As you think, at least, Socrates.

Socr. Do you in reality, Callicles, persist in your assertion?

Cal. I do.

Socr. Shall we then enter on the discussion, as if you were in earnest?

Cal. Most certainly.

Socr. Come, then, since you are of that opinion, explain this to me. Do you call science any thing?

Cal. I do.

Socr. And did you not just now say, that there is a certain courage joined with science?

Cal. I did say so.

Socr. Did you speak of these two, as if courage was different from science?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different?

Cal. Different, surely, most wise friend.

Socr. Is courage also different from pleasure?

Cal. Undoubtedly.

110. *Socr.* Come, then, let us retain these things in our memory; that Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same; but that science and courage are different both from each other and the good.

Cal. But Socrates of Alopecia does not agree to this; does he agree?

Socr. He does not agree: and I think neither will Callicles

when he has rightly examined himself. For tell me, do you not think that those who fare well are affected in a manner quite contrary to those who fare ill?

Cal. I do.

Socr. If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, is it not necessary that the case should be the same with them as it is with health and disease? For, surely, a man is not at the same time well and diseased, nor at the same time separated from health and disease.

Cal. How say you?

Socr. For instance, take any part of the body you please, and consider. Has not a man sometimes a disease in the eyes, which is called ophthalmia?

Cal. Undoubtedly.

Socr. And his eyes, surely, are not at the same time well?

Cal. Certainly not.

Socr. But what? When he is freed from the ophthalmia, does he then also lose the health of his eyes, and, in a word, is he at the same time freed from both?

Cal. By no means.

Socr. For that, I think, would be wonderful and absurd. Would it not?

Cal. Assuredly.

111. *Socr.* But I think he, alternately, receives one, and loses the other.

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. And will it not be the same with regard to strength and weakness?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. And swiftness and slowness?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And with respect to things good and happiness, and their contraries, things evil and wretchedness, does he receive and part from each of these alternately?

Cal. Most assuredly.

Socr. If, therefore, we should find certain things which a man at the same time parts from and possesses, it is clear that these would not be both good and evil. Do we agree to this? Consider well and answer me.

Cal. I agree entirely.

Socr. Let us then recur to what was before agreed on.

Did you say that to be hungry is pleasant, or painful? I mean the very fact of being hungry.

Cal. I said it was painful: though to eat when hungry is pleasant.

Socr. I understand you: but to be hungry of itself is painful; is it not so?

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. And also to be thirsty?

Cal. Assuredly.

112. *Socr.* Whether, then, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you allow that all want and desire is painful?

Cal. I allow it; so do not ask.

Socr. Be it so. And do you not say that for a man to drink when he is thirsty is pleasant?

Cal. I do.

Socr. In the instance then of which you are speaking, to be thirsty is, doubtless, painful?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. But to drink is the satisfying of a want, and a pleasure?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. Therefore as to drinking you say that the man rejoices?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. But as to being thirsty?

Cal. I say—

Socr. That he suffers pain?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. Do you perceive then what follows? that you say he who is in pain at the same time rejoices, when you say that he who is thirsty drinks. And does not this happen at the same place and time, with respect either to the soul or body, whichever you please? For I think there is no difference. Is this so, or not?

Cal. It is.

Socr. You admitted, however, that it was impossible for one who fares well at the same time to fare ill.

Cal. I allow it.

Socr. But you have granted that it is possible for one who is in pain to rejoice.

Cal. It appears so.

Socr. To rejoice, therefore, is not to fare well, nor to be in pain, ill: so that the pleasant is different from the good?

Cal. I know not what subtleties you are using, Socrates.

113. *Socr.* You know, though you pretend not, Callicles.

Cal. Proceed still further, trifling as you are, that you may know how wise you are who take upon yourself to admonish me.

Socr. Does not each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive pleasure from drinking?

Cal. I do not know what you mean.

Gorg. Say not so, Callicles; but answer for our sakes, that the discussion may be brought to a conclusion.

Cal. But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, he asks trifling questions, and things that are of no consequence, and then refutes them.

Gorg. But what difference does that make to you? That is no concern at all of yours: but suffer Socrates to argue in whatever way he pleases.

Cal. Ask, then, these trifling and petty questions, since Gorgias thinks proper.

Socr. You are happy, Callicles, in that you have been initiated in the great mysteries before you were in the small: but I thought that was not allowed. Answer me, then, from the point where you left off, does not each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive pleasure?

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. And does not one cease to be hungry and to feel other desires and pleasures at the same time?

Cal. Such is the case.

Socr. Does one not, then, at the same time cease to feel both pains and pleasures?

Cal. Yes.

114. *Socr.* However one does not at the same time cease to experience good and evil, as you admitted; but now do you not admit it?

Cal. I do. But what then?

Socr. It follows, my friend, that good things are not the same with such as are pleasant, nor evil things with such as are painful. For, from these one ceases at the same time, but not from those, because they are different. How, therefore, can pleasant things be the same with such as are good, or painful

things with such as are evil? But, if you please, consider it in this way: for I think that you are not even thus agreed with yourself. Consider then. Do you not call the good good, from the presence of good things, just as you call those beautiful to whom beauty is present?

Cal. I do.

Socr. But what? Do you call foolish men and cowards good men? For you did not just now; but you said the brave and prudent were so. Do you not call these good?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. But what? Have you ever seen a boy without understanding, rejoicing?

Cal. I have.

Socr. And have you not also seen a man without understanding, rejoicing?

Cal. I think I have. But to what purpose is this?

Socr. Nothing: answer however.

Cal. I have seen it.

Socr. But what? have you seen a man endued with intellect grieving and rejoicing?

Cal. I have.

115. *Socr.* But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wise, or the foolish?

Cal. I think there is not much difference.

Socr. That is enough. In war have you ever seen a coward?

Cal. Most assuredly.

Socr. What then? On the departure of the enemy which appeared to you to rejoice the more, the cowards or the brave?

Cal. Both appeared to me to rejoice more: or, if not, in nearly the same degree.

Socr. It is of no consequence. Cowards, then, also rejoice?

Cal. Very much so.

Socr. And the foolish, as it seems?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. But, when the enemy approaches, do cowards only grieve? or do the brave also?

Cal. Both.

Socr. In an equal degree?

Cal. Cowards perhaps more.

Socr. But, when the enemy departs, do they not rejoice more?

Cal. Perhaps so.

Socr. Do not, therefore, as you say, the foolish and the wise, cowards and the brave, similarly grieve and rejoice, much in the same degree, but cowards more than the brave?

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. The wise however and the brave are good, but cowards and the foolish bad?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. The good and the bad, therefore, rejoice and grieve equally?

Cal. I admit it.

116. *Socr.* Are, then, the good and the bad, good and bad in an equal degree? or are the bad yet more good and bad?

Cal. By Jupiter, I do not know what you mean.

Socr. Do you not know that you said the good are good, through the presence of good things, and the bad through the presence of evil things? And that pleasures are good things, and pains evil?

Cal. I did.

Socr. Are not, therefore, good things, viz., pleasures, present with those that rejoice, if they do rejoice?

Cal. Undoubtedly.

Socr. And since good things are present are not they who rejoice good?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. But what? Are not evil things, viz., pains, present with those that suffer pain?

Cal. They are present.

Socr. But do you not say that the bad are bad, through the presence of evil things? Or do you say so no longer?

Cal. I do.

Socr. Those, therefore, that rejoice, are good; but those that suffer pain are bad?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And those that are more so, more, but those that are less so, less? and those that are equally so, equally?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. Do you not say, then, that the wise and the foolish

cowards and the brave, rejoice and grieve in an equal degree, or cowards even more?

Cal. I do.

117. *Socr.* Now in common with me, draw the inferences that result from these admissions. For, they say, it is beautiful to repeat and consider beautiful things twice, and even thrice. We say, that the prudent and brave man is good; do we not?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. But that the foolish man and a coward is bad?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Again, that he who rejoices is good?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. And that he who suffers pain is bad?

Cal. Necessarily so.

Socr. And that the good and the bad suffer pain and rejoice equally, but perhaps the bad more?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. Therefore, the bad man becomes equally bad and good, with the good man, or even more good? Do not these results follow, as well as the former ones, if one says that the pleasant and the good are the same? Are not these consequences necessary, Callicles?

Cal. I have been long listening to you, Socrates, and making concessions, considering with myself that if any one grants you any thing, even in jest, you seize it eagerly as boys do. And can you suppose that I or any other person in the world does not believe that some pleasures are better, and others worse?

118. *Socr.* Ho, Ho! Callicles, how cunning you are! You treat me as a child, now asserting that these things are in this manner, and now in another manner; trying to deceive me. Though, at the outset, I did not think that I should be purposely deceived by you, because you are my friend. But now I have been mistaken, and as it seems, must needs, according to the old proverb, make good use of what I have, and receive what you give me. What you now say, as it appears, is this, that some pleasures are good, others bad; is it not so?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. And are not the profitable good, and the noxious bad?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And those which effect a certain good, are profitable, but those which effect a certain evil, bad?

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. Do you not speak then of such as the following; as for instance, with respect to the body, those pleasures which we just now mentioned of eating and drinking; and if some of these produce in the body health or strength, or some other bodily excellences, are they not good, but those that produce the contraries of these, evil?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And are not pains, in like manner, some beneficial, others injurious?

Cal. Undoubtedly.

Socr. Ought we not, therefore, both to choose and to exercise ourselves in such pleasures and pains as are beneficial?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. But not such as are injurious?

Cal. That is evident.

119. *Socr.* For, if you remember, it was agreed between us, Polus and me, that all things should be done for the sake of what is good. And do you agree with us in thinking, that the good is the end of all actions, and that all other things ought to be done for its sake, but not it for the sake of other things? Do you accord with us and make up the third?

Cal. I do.

Socr. We ought, then, to do both all other things and such as are pleasant, for the sake of things good, but not good things for the sake of such as are pleasant?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Is every man, therefore, able to choose among pleasant things such as are good, and such as are evil? or is there need of a person skilled in each case?

Cal. Of a person skilled.

Socr. Let us then again call to mind what I said to Polus and Gorgias. I said, if you remember, that there are certain occupations which regard pleasure, and are occupied in this alone, but are ignorant of the better and the worse; but that there are others that know both what is good and what is evil. And I have placed among those which have pleasure for their object, cookery, as a skill relating to the body, but not an art; and among those that have the good for their object I placed the medicinal art. 120. And by the god of friendship, Callicles, think not that you ought to jest with me, nor give

any answer that may occur to you contrary to your opinion, nor receive what I say as if I were in jest. For you see that our discourse is on a subject, than which there is none that a man endued even with the smallest understanding would take more pains about, namely in what way we ought to live, whether in such a way as that to which you exhort me, engaging in such employments of a man, as speaking among the people, cultivating rhetoric, and applying oneself to political affairs, in the manner which you now do; or whether we should devote ourselves to a philosophic life, and in what the latter differs from the former. Perhaps, then, it is best, as I just now attempted, to make a distinction; and when we have distinguished and agreed with each other, that these are two kinds of life, then to consider in what they differ from each other, and which of them ought to be pursued. Perhaps, however, you do not yet understand what I mean.

121. *Cal.* I do not, indeed.

Socr. I will explain it to you more clearly. Since we have agreed, you and I, that there is something good, and something pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there is a certain study and preparation for the acquirement of each of them, one being a search after the pleasant, and the other after the good—however, first of all, grant me this, or not; do you grant it?

Cal. I do.

Socr. Come then, concede to me also what I said to these men, if at the time I appeared to you to speak the truth. I said that cookery does not appear to me to be an art, but a skill; and that medicine is an art; for I said that medicine considers the nature of that which it cures, and the cause of the things that it does, and is able to give an account of each of these: but that the other, being concerned about pleasure, to which its whole attention is directed, proceeds to it without any art at all, neither considering the nature nor the cause of pleasure, altogether without reason, and in a word incapable of giving any account of itself, a mere practice and skill, only preserving the memory of that which usually takes place, by which also it supplies pleasures. 122. First of all, then, consider whether these things appear to you to have been sufficiently established, and that there are also certain other corresponding studies relating to the soul, of which some follow rules of art, and re-

gard what is best for the soul; but others that neglect this, and consider only, as in the former case, the pleasure of the soul, in what way it may be procured; but paying no attention to which pleasure is better or worse, nor caring for any thing else than gratification only, whether it be better or worse. For my part, Callicles, there appear to me to be such studies; and I say that such a thing is flattery, as well in relation to the body as the soul, and to any thing else the pleasure of which one sedulously attends to, without paying any regard to the better and the worse. But do you entertain the same opinion as we do respecting these things, or do you gainsay it?

Cal. No, but I yield this point in order that our discussion may be brought to a close, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.

Socr. Does this take place with respect to one soul, but not with respect to two and several?

Cal. No; but it takes place with respect to two and several

Socr. Is it not, then, possible to gratify a number of souls collected together, without considering at all what is best?

123. *Cal.* I think so.

Socr. Can you tell me, then, what those studies are which produce this effect? Or rather, if you please, on my asking, whichever appears to you to be one of these, say so, and which not, deny it. And first of all, let us consider flute-playing. Does it not appear to you to be such a thing, Callicles, as pursues only our pleasure, but regards nothing else?

Cal. It appears so.

Socr. And is it not the case with all such studies, as for instance, harp-playing in the public games?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. And what as to the representation of choruses and dithyrambic poetry? does it not appear to you to be of the same kind? Do you think that Cinesias son of Meles cares at all to express himself in such a way that his hearers may become better? or rather what will gratify the crowd of spectators?

Cal. The latter is clearly the case, Socrates, with respect to Cinesias.

Socr. But what as to his father Meles? Did he appear to you to play on the harp, looking to that which is best? or did not he look to what was most pleasant? For in singing he offended the audience. Consider, however; does not all

harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry appear to you to have been invented for the sake of pleasure?

Cal. It does.

124. *Socr.* But what of that venerable and wonderful art, tragic poetry, at what does it aim? Do its endeavour and aim appear to you to be only to gratify the spectators? or does it strive, if any thing should be pleasing and grateful to them, but mischievous, to avoid saying this, but if it happens to be unpleasant and beneficial, to say and sing this, whether it gratifies the spectators or not? In which of these two ways do you think tragic poetry is framed?

Cal. This is clear, Socrates, that it rather aims at pleasure, and the gratification of the spectators.

Socr. Did we not just now say, Callicles, that a thing of this kind is flattery?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Come then, if any one should take from all poetry, melody, rhythm, and measure, would any thing else than words remain?

Cal. Necessarily so.

Socr. Are not these words, then, addressed to a great multitude, and to the people?

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. Poetry, therefore, is a kind of popular speaking.

Cal. It appears so.

Socr. Therefore it must be a rhetorical method of popular speaking: for do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?

Cal. They do.

125. *Socr.* Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among the people, consisting at the same time of boys and women and men, slaves and free-men, of which we do not altogether approve; for we have called it flattery.

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Well then. But as to the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people, and the people in other cities consisting of free-men, what shall we say as to that? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to what is best, aiming at this, that the citizens may be made as good as possible by their discourses? or do they, too, endeavour to gratify the citizens, and neglecting the public interest for the sake of

their own private advantage, do they treat the people as children, trying only to gratify them, without being in the least concerned whether they shall become better or worse by these means?

Cal. This is not a simple question that you ask me. For there are some who, looking to the interest of the citizens, say what they do; but others are such as you describe.

126. *Socr.* That is enough. For, if this also is twofold, one part of it will be flattery, and a base popular speaking, but the other will be honourable, namely, that which endeavours to make the souls of the citizens as good as possible, and strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers. But you have never yet seen this kind of rhetoric. Or, if you can mention any one of the rhetoricians who is of this stamp, why do you not tell me who he is?

Cal. But, by Jupiter, I cannot instance to you any of the rhetoricians of the present day.

Socr. But what? Can you instance any one of the ancients through whose means the Athenians have become better, after he had begun to harangue them, when previously they had been worse? For I know not who such a one is.

Cal. What? Have you not heard that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles, who died lately, whom you have also heard?

Socr. If that is true virtue, Callicles, which you before mentioned as such, namely, for a man to gratify both his own desires and those of others. But if this is not the case, but, as we were afterwards compelled to confess, those desires which, when satisfied, make a man better, ought to be indulged, but those which make him worse, not so, and if there is a certain art in this, can you say that any one of these was a man of this kind?

Cal. I know not what to say.

127. *Socr.* But if you seek well, you will find out. Let us however, consider, and see quietly if any one of these was such. For come, is it not true that a good man, who says what he says with a view to the best, does not speak at random, but looking to some end? just as all other artists, looking each to his own work, does not take at random and employ what he employs in his work, but so that the subject he is at work upon may have a certain form: for instance, if you

will look at painters, architects, shipwrights, and any other artists you please, you will see that each places whatever he employs in a certain order, and compels one thing to adapt itself to and harmonize with another, until the whole workmanship is compacted together with order and regularity. And moreover, those other artificers, whom we just now mentioned, who are employed about the body, teachers of gymnastics, and physicians, adorn the body in a way, and dispose it in an orderly manner. Do we allow that this is so or not?

Cal. Let it be so.

128. *Socr.* A house, then, that has acquired order and regularity will be a good house, but when disorder, a bad one.

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. And a ship in like manner?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. And do we not say the same with respect to our bodies?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. But what as to the soul? when in a state of disorder will it be in a good condition, or when it is in a state of order and regularity?

Cal. From what has been said, it is necessary to grant that the latter must be the case.

Socr. What, then, in the body, is the name of that which results from order and regularity?

Cal. You probably mean health and strength.

Socr. I do. But what, again, is the name of that which subsists in the soul from order and regularity? Endeavour to discover and mention it, as you did the name of the former.

Cal. Why do not you say what it is yourself, Socrates?

Socr. If it pleases you better, I will. But do you, if I seem to you to speak well, assent, if not, confute, and do not spare me. To me, then, it appears that the name belonging to the orderly disposition of the body is the healthful, from which health springs, and every other excellence of the body. Is it so, or not?

Cal. It is.

Socr. But the name belonging to the orderly and regular disposition of the soul is the legitimate and law; whence men become obedient to law and orderly; but these are justice and temperance. Do you admit this or not?

Cal. Be it so.

129. *Socr.* Will not, then, that good rhetorician who follows the rules of art, looking to these things, address the arguments he uses and all his actions to souls, and if he should bestow a gift, will he not bestow it, and, if he should take any thing away, will he not take it away *with the same end*, always directing his attention to this, that justice may be produced in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and injustice banished; that temperance may be produced in them, and intemperance banished; and, in short, that every virtue may be planted in them, but vice driven out. Do you grant this, or not?

Cal. I do grant it.

Socr. For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diseased, and ill-disposed, abundance of the most agreeable food or drink, or any thing else, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary, but, according to right reason, even less? Is this so?

Cal. Be it so.

Socr. For I think it is of no advantage for a man to live with a miserable state of body; for thus it would be necessary for him to live miserably: is it not so?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. And do not physicians generally allow a man in health to satisfy his desires, as, for instance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleases, or when thirsty to drink, but when ill, they scarcely ever allow him to satisfy himself with what he desires? Do you grant this too?

Cal. I do.

130. *Socr.* And should not the same method, my excellent friend, be adopted with respect to the soul? So long as it is depraved, as being without understanding, intemperate, unjust and unholy, one ought to restrain it from the indulgence of its desires, and not permit it to do any thing except what will render it better? Do you admit this or not?

Cal. I do.

Socr. For this surely is better for the soul itself.

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And is not to restrain any one from what he desires to punish him?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. To be punished, therefore, is better for the soul than intemperance, as you just now thought.

Cal. I don't know what you mean, Socrates: ask some one else.

Socr. This man will not submit to be benefited and to suffer the very thing of which we are speaking, viz., punishment.

Cal. I don't at all heed what you say; I only answered you thus far for the sake of Gorgias.

131. *Socr.* Be it so. What shall we do then? Shall we break off the discussion in the midst?

Cal. You shall determine.

Socr. But they say it is not right to leave even fables in the midst, but a head should be placed on them, that they may not wander without a head. Answer, therefore, to what remains, that our discussion may have a head to it.

Cal. How importunate you are, Socrates! But, if you will be persuaded by me, you will give up this discussion, or carry it on with some one else.

Socr. Who else is willing? for we must not leave the discussion unfinished.

Cal. Cannot you go through with it yourself, either speaking by yourself or answering yourself?

Socr. That the saying of Epicharmus may be verified in me, "what two men said before, I alone am able to say." But it appears to be very necessary. If, however, we shall do so, I think we ought all of us to strive heartily that we may understand what is true and what false with respect to the subject we are treating of: for it is for the common interest of all that this should become clear. 132. I will, therefore, go through the matter under discussion, as it appears to me to be: but, if I shall seem to any of you to grant myself what is not true, he must take me up and confute me. For I do not say what I say as knowing it, but I am enquiring in common with you, so that, if he who disputes with me should appear to say any thing to the purpose, I shall be the first to give in to him. I say this, however, in case you think the discussion ought to be finished; but if you do not wish it, let us give it up and depart.

Gorg. But it appears to me, Socrates, that we should not depart yet, but that you should pursue the argument: and it is evident that the others think so. And I, for my part, wish to hear you go through the remainder of the subject.

Socr. But indeed, Gorgias, I would gladly have continued

to carry on the discussion with Callicles here, until I had given him back the saying of Amphion for that of Zethus^r: but since you are not willing, Callicles, to finish the discussion with me, yet listen to me at least, and take me up if I appear to you to say any thing incorrectly. And if you shall confute me, I shall not be angry with you, as you are with me, but you shall be recorded by me as my greatest benefactor.

Cal. Speak then yourself, my good friend, and finish the argument.

133. *Socr.* Hear me then repeating the argument from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same? They are not the same, as I and Callicles have agreed. But whether is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant for the sake of the good. But is the pleasant that, with which when present we are pleased? and the good that, by which when present we are good? Certainly. Now we are good, both ourselves and all other things that are good, when a certain virtue is present? To me this appears to be necessary, Callicles. But the virtue of each thing, whether instrument, or body, or soul, and moreover of every animal, does not reach a high pitch of perfection by chance, but by order, and rectitude, and the art that is attributed to each of them. Is this so? I admit it. The virtue, then, of every thing is regulated and adorned by order? I should say so. A certain order, then, proper to each, becoming inherent in each, makes each thing good? It appears so to me. The soul, therefore, that has its own order, is better than that which is without order? Necessarily so. That, however, which has order is orderly? How should it not? And that which is orderly is temperate? Most necessarily. 134. A temperate soul, then, is good? I am not able to say any thing against this, my dear Callicles; but do you, if you can do so, inform me.

Cal. Proceed, my good friend.

Socr. I say, then, that if a temperate soul is good, that which is affected contrariwise to the temperate is base: and this surely is the foolish and intemperate? Certainly. Moreover, a temperate man would act becomingly both towards gods and towards men? for he would not be temperate if he acted unbecomingly? It must needs be so. Moreover, by acting

^r See before, § 90.

becomingly towards men he would act justly, and towards the gods piously; but it is necessary that he who acts justly and piously should be just and pious? It must be so. It is moreover necessary that he should be brave? for it is not the part of a temperate man either to pursue or avoid what is not becoming, but to pursue and avoid those things and men, pleasures and pains, which he ought, and to endure patiently wherever he ought. 135. So that it is absolutely necessary, Callicles, that the temperate man, as we have described him, being just, brave, and pious, should be a perfectly good man, and that a good man should do whatever he does well and honourably, and that he who does well should be blessed and happy, but that the wicked, who does ill, should be wretched: but this latter would be directly contrary to the temperate man, namely, the intemperate, whom you praised. I, therefore, thus lay down these things, and affirm that they are true. But if they are true, as it seems, he who wishes to be happy must pursue and practise temperance, and must avoid intemperance, every one of us with all his might, and must endeavour never to stand in need of punishment, but if he does need it, either he or any of his family, whether it be the case of a private person, or a city, justice must be administered, and punishment inflicted, if he is to be happy. This appears to me to be the mark to which we ought to look for the guidance of our life, and referring all private and public actions to this point, that justice and temperance may be ever present with him who will be blessed, and to act accordingly, not suffering his desires to be intemperate, nor endeavouring to satisfy them, which is an irremediable evil, causing a man to live like a robber. For such an one could neither be dear to any other man, nor to God; for it is impossible there can be any communion between them; and where there is no communion there can be no friendship. 136. The sages^a too, say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men, are held together by communion, friendship, order, temperance, and justice, and for this reason, my friend, they call this universe, order^t, and not disorder or intemperance. You, however, appear to me not to attend to these things, and this though you are wise; but it has escaped your observation that geometrical equality has

^a The Pythagoreans, especially Empedocles.

^t *Κόσμος*, "order," signifying also "the world."

great power both among gods and among men ; on the contrary you think that every one should strive to get more than others ; for you neglect geometry. Well then ; either this argument of mine must be confuted, *and it must be shewn* that the happy are not happy from the possession of justice and temperance, and the wretched, wretched from vice ; or, if the argument is true, we must consider what are its results. Now, Callicles, all those things before mentioned, with respect to which you asked me if I was speaking in earnest, result from it, to the effect that a man should accuse himself, his son, and his friend, if he committed any injustice, and should employ rhetoric for this purpose. And what you thought Polus granted through shame was therefore true, that by how much it is more base to do an injury than to be injured, by so much is it worse : and that he who would be a good orator ought to be just and skilled in the knowledge of things just ; which, again, Polus said Gorgias acknowledged through shame.

137. This then being the case, let us consider what it is that you find fault with in me, and whether you are right or not in saying that I can neither assist myself, nor any of my friends or domestics, nor save myself from the greatest dangers, but that I am in the power of any one who chooses, like men marked with infamy, if he pleases, according to that petulant expression of yours, to strike me on the face, or to take away my property, or expel me from the city, or, worst of all, to kill me, and that to be thus circumstanced, is the most disgraceful of all things, according to your opinion. But mine is this, it has indeed been often mentioned, yet nothing prevents its being again repeated ; I deny, Callicles, that to be struck in the face unjustly is most disgraceful, or for my body or purse to be cut, but that to strike unjustly and to cut me and mine, is both more disgraceful and worse, and that to rob, enslave, break open a house, and, in short, to injure in any respect me and mine, is both more disgraceful and worse for him who does the injury than for me who am injured. 138. These things, that were proved to be thus in the former part of our discussion, as I affirm, are held and bound (though it is somewhat rude to say so) in reasons of iron and adamant, as would really appear to be the case, so that unless you or some one stronger than you can break them, it is not possible that any one who says otherwise than as I now

say can speak correctly ; for my statement is always the same, that I know not how these things are, but that of all the persons with whom I have ever conversed, as now with you, no one, who says otherwise, can avoid being ridiculous. I therefore again assert that these things are so. But if this is the case, and injustice is the greatest of evils to him that commits it, and if, great as this evil is, it is still a greater, if possible, for one who acts unjustly not to be punished, what kind of help will that be, which, if a man cannot procure for himself, he would be really ridiculous ? will it not be that which would avert from us the greatest harm ? But there is an absolute necessity that this should be most disgraceful, for a man not to be able to assist either himself, or his friends and domestics, next to that, an inability to avoid the second evil, and the third, an inability to avoid the third evil, and so on with the rest ; in proportion to the magnitude of each evil, so is it beautiful to be able to avoid each of them, and disgraceful not to be able. Is the case thus or otherwise, Callicles ?

Cal. No otherwise.

139. *Socr.* Of these two things then, the doing injustice and receiving an injury, we say that to do injustice is a greater evil, but to receive an injury a less one. By recourse to what means, then, could a man so assist himself as to have both these advantages, that of not doing injustice, and that of not receiving an injury ? Is it by power, or will ? I mean thus : whether, if a man wishes not to be injured, will he not be injured, or, if he has acquired the power of not being injured, will he not be injured ?

Cal. It is clear that he will not, if he has acquired the power.

Socr. But what with respect to doing injustice ? Whether, if any one wishes not to do injustice, is this sufficient, (for in that case he will not do it,) or, besides this, is it requisite to acquire a certain power and art, so that, unless he has learned and practised them, he will do injustice ? Come then, answer me this question, Callicles ; whether do Polus and I appear to you to have been compelled, rightly or not, to make that admission in the former part of our discussion, when we admitted that no one willingly commits injustice, but that all who do commit it do so unwillingly ?

Cal. Let that point be granted, Socrates, in order that you may bring the argument to a conclusion.

Socr. For this purpose, then, as it appears, we must acquire a certain power and art, in order that we may not commit injustice.

Cal. Certainly.

140. *Socr.* What then is the art by means of which a man will receive no injury at all, or scarcely any? Consider, if it appears to you the same as it does to me. For to me it appears thus; either that he ought to govern in a city or even have absolute power, or be a friend of the existing government.

Cal. Do you observe, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you, if you say any thing well? This you appear to me to have said remarkably well.

Socr. Consider also, whether I appear to you to say this well. Each person seems to me for the most part to be a friend to each, according as the ancient sages say "like to like:" does it not seem so to you?

Cal. It does.

Socr. Wherever, therefore, a savage and uneducated tyrant governs, if there should be any one in the city much better than him, would not the tyrant fear him, and never be able to be cordially his friend?

Cal. Such is the case.

Socr. Nor yet, if any one should be much worse than the tyrant, would he become his friend; for the tyrant would despise him, nor ever feel any affection for him as a friend.

Cal. This also is true.

141. *Socr.* It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend, worthy of notice, to such a man, who, having a similar disposition, should blame and praise the same things, and be willing to be governed by and submit to his sway. Such a person will have great influence in this city, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not so?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. If, therefore, any young man in this city should consider within himself, "How could I obtain influence, and be injured by no one?" this, as it seems, must be his method, he must from his very youth accustom himself to rejoice and grieve at the same things as the despot, and contrive to make himself as like him as possible. Is it not so?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. Will not he, then, have managed so as not to be injured, and to have great power in that city, according to your argument?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Will he also manage not to commit injustice? or far from it, since he will be like the governor, who is unjust, and will have great influence with him? I think, for my part, that quite contrariwise he will contrive so as to be able to commit the greatest injustice and not to be punished for it. Will he not?

Cal. It appears so.

Socr. Will not, then, the greatest evil befall him, in consequence of being depraved in his soul, and tainted through imitation of the despot and his influence with him?

142. *Cal.* I know not, Socrates, how you always turn the arguments upside down. Do you not know, that he who imitates can kill him who does not imitate *the despot* if he pleases, and deprive him of his property?

Socr. I do know it, good Callicles, unless I am deaf, since I have just now heard it often both from you and Polus, and from almost every one else in the city. But do you in your turn listen to me: he will kill him if he pleases, but a depraved man, one who is upright and good.

Cal. And is not this a thing to be indignant at?

Socr. Not to a man of sense, as our argument proves. Do you think that a man should aim at this; to live as long as possible, and should study those arts which always preserve us from dangers, as rhetoric which you bid me study, and which saves us in courts of justice?

Cal. I do, by Jupiter, and therein I advise you well.

143. *Socr.* What then, my excellent friend, does the science of swimming too appear to you to be very fine?

Cal. No, by Jupiter.

Socr. And yet this too saves men from death, when they fall into such a danger as requires this science. But if this appears to you to be mean, I will mention to you one more important than this, namely that of piloting a ship, which not only saves lives, but also bodies and property from extreme danger, just as rhetoric does. And this art is moderate and modest, and does not brag and strut as if it accomplished something wonderful, but when it has accomplished the same thing as the

forensic art, if it has brought us safe here from Ægina, it demands, I think, two oboli, and if from Egypt or the Pontus, for so great a benefit in having brought safe what I now mention, ourselves and children, our property and wives, and in having landed them in port, it usually demands two drachms, and the man who possesses this art, and accomplishes these things, when he has disembarked, walks by the sea and his ship, with a modest gait. 144. For he knows, I think, how to reason with himself, that it is uncertain whom of his passengers he has benefited by not allowing them to be drowned, and whom he has injured, knowing that he has not put them ashore in any respect better than they were when they went on board, either as to their souls or bodies. He therefore reasons with himself, that if one who is afflicted in his body with severe and incurable diseases should happen not to be drowned, such a man is indeed miserable for having escaped death, and has received no benefit from him; but if any one labours under many and incurable diseases in that which is more precious than the body, his soul, such a one ought^u not to live, nor would he benefit him, if he saved him from the sea, or from a court of justice, or from any other danger, for he knows that it is not better for a depraved man to live, because he must needs live badly. For this reason, it is not usual for a pilot to boast, although he saves our lives; nor, my admirable friend, is it usual for an engineer who is sometimes able to save, no less than a general of an army, not to mention a pilot or any other person; for sometimes he saves whole cities. Does it not appear to you that he is fit to be compared with a forensic orator? though, if he chose to speak, Callicles, as you do, extolling his own art, he would overwhelm you with words, urging and exhorting you to the fitness of your becoming an engineer, for that other things are of no consequence; and he would have enough to say. 145. You, however, would nevertheless despise him and his art, and, by way of reproach would call him an engineer, and would neither give your daughter to his son, nor accept his daughter for your son. Though, if from the reasons for which you praise your own art, on what just pretext do you despise the engineer, and the others whom I have just now mentioned? I know that you would say you

^u The negative particle here expressed, is in the original at the beginning of the paragraph, *λογίζεσθαι οὐκ, ὅτι οὐκ*. See Stallbaum's lucid note.

are better, and of a better family. But if that which is better is not what I say it is, but if excellence consists in this, for a man to save himself and his property, whatever kind of man he may be, then your contempt for the engineer and the physician, and for whatever other arts are pursued for the purpose of preservation, is ridiculous.

But, my good friend, consider whether that which is noble and good is not something else than to save and be saved; and whether that principle, that one should live as long as one can, is not to be given up by one who is truly a man, and life not too fondly loved, but that leaving these things to the care of the deity, and believing the women, *who say* that no man can avoid his fate, one should consider this, by what means one may pass the remainder of one's life in the best possible manner, whether by conforming one's-self to the government under which one dwells. 146. And in that case whether it is right that you should resemble as much as possible the Athenian people, if you wish to be dear to them, and to have great influence in their city? Consider whether this is advantageous to you and to me, lest, my admirable friend, we should suffer what they say the Thessalian * witches did, who drew down the moon, and our choice of this power in the city should be attended with the loss of what is dearest to us. If, however, you think that any man in the world can teach you any such art, as will cause you to have great power in this city, while you are unlike the character of the people, whether for the better or the worse, as appears to me, Callicles, you are not rightly advised. For you must not only be an imitator of, but like them in your natural disposition, if you mean to do any thing effectual towards gaining the friendship of the Athenian people, and, by Jupiter, you must towards that of the son of Pyrilampes. Whoever, therefore, shall make you most like them, will make you a politician and an orator, such as you desire to be. For all men are delighted with arguments suited to their own dispositions, but are angry with such as are strange to them; unless you, my dear friend, have any thing to say to the contrary. 147. Have we any objection to make to this, Callicles?

Cal. I do not know how it is, Socrates, you appear to me to

* They are said to have lost the use of their eyes and feet.

speak well. Yet that which happens to most happens to me; I am not quite persuaded by you.

Socr. For the love of the people, Callicles, dwelling in your soul, resists me; but perhaps, if we should often and more fully examine into these same matters, you would be persuaded. Remember, then, that we said there were two methods for the cultivation of each, both the body and the soul, and that one had reference to pleasure, but the other to that which is best, not by gratifying, but opposing the inclinations. Is not this what we before settled?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. The one, then, that looks to pleasure is ignoble, and nothing else than flattery; is it not?

Cal. Be it so, if you please.

Socr. But the other endeavours that that which we cultivate may be made as excellent as possible, whether it be the body or the soul?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Must we then so endeavour to cultivate the city and the citizens, that we may make the citizens themselves as good as possible? For without this, as we discovered before, it is of no advantage to confer any other benefit upon them, unless the mind of those who are about to receive either great riches, or dominion or any other power, be upright and good. Shall we lay this down, as being so?

Cal. Certainly, if it is more agreeable to you.

148. *Socr.* If, therefore, Callicles, when setting about some public works, we were to exhort one another to works of architecture, as to very large buildings of walls, or docks or temples, would it be necessary that we should consider and examine ourselves, first, whether we are skilled or not in the art of architecture, and from whom we learnt it? Would this be necessary or not?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Then, secondly, we should consider this, whether we have ever constructed any private building, either for any one of our friends, or for ourselves, and whether this building is beautiful or ugly. And if on examination we found that our masters had been good and famous, and that we have constructed, in conjunction with our masters, many and beautiful buildings, and many privately by ourselves, after we had left

our masters, in that case it would become men of sense to undertake public works: but if we were not able to shew that we had a master, nor any building at all, or many and those of no account, it would surely in that case be foolish to attempt public works, and to exhort one another to undertake them. Shall we admit that this is well said, or not?

Cal. Certainly.

149. *Socr.* And is not this the case with all other things, and if, attempting to serve the public in the capacity of physicians, we should exhort each other, as if we were skilful physicians, should not you and I examine each other thus: By the gods, in what state is Socrates with respect to bodily health? Has any other person, whether slave or freeman, been cured by Socrates of any disease? And I too, I think, should make similar enquiries about you. And if we did not find that any one, whether stranger or citizen, man or woman, had been improved in health by our means, by Jupiter, Callicles, would it not be truly ridiculous, that men should come to such a pitch of folly, as before they had practised much in private, as best they could, and had succeeded in many cases, and thoroughly exercised the art, to attempt to learn the potter's art in making a pitcher, as the proverb goes, and attempt to serve the public in the capacity of physician, and exhort others to do the same? Does it not appear to you that it would be foolish to act thus?

Cal. It does.

150. *Socr.* But now, O best of men, since you have yourself just now begun to busy yourself in affairs of state, and you exhort and reprove me because I do not busy myself about them, should we not examine each other; Come then, whom of the citizens has Callicles yet made better? Is there any one who, being before depraved, unjust, intemperate, and foolish, has become upright and good through Callicles, whether stranger or citizen, slave or free-man? Tell me, Callicles, if any one should ask you these questions, what will you say? Who will you say has been made better by associating with you? Are you ashamed to answer, whether you have done any such work while you were in a private capacity, before you attempted to interfere in public affairs?

Cal. You are cavilling, Socrates.

Socr. I do not ask you from a desire to cavil, but really wish-

ing to know in what way you think public affairs ought to be conducted by us ; whether on undertaking the management of affairs of state we ought to attend to any thing else than how we may become as good citizens as possible. Have we not already often admitted that a politician ought to do this ? Have we admitted it or not ? Answer. We have admitted it ; I will answer for you. 151. If, then, a good man ought to endeavour to procure this for his city, now call to mind and say with respect to those men whom you a little before mentioned, whether they still appear to you to have been good citizens, Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles.

Cal. To me they do.

Socr. If, therefore, they were good citizens, it is evident that each of them made their fellow-citizens better instead of worse. Did they so, or not ?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. When Pericles, therefore, began to speak in public, were the Athenians worse than when he addressed them for the last time ?

Cal. Perhaps so.

Socr. There is no 'perhaps' in the case, my good friend, but this is a necessary consequence from what has been admitted, if he really was a good citizen.

Cal. But what then ?

Socr. Nothing. But tell me this moreover, whether the Athenians are supposed to have become better through Pericles, or quite the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. For so I hear, that Pericles made the Athenians idle, cowardly, talkative and avaricious, having been the first to give them pay.

Cal. You hear this, Socrates, from those whose ears have been bruised^y.

152. *Socr.* However, I no longer hear this, but I know well and so do you, that Pericles at first bore a high character, and that the Athenians passed no ignominious sentence upon him, when they were worse, but when by his means they had become upright and good, towards the close of the life of Pericles, they condemned him for peculation, and were on the point of sentencing him to death, clearly as being a bad citizen.

Cal. What then ? Was Pericles on this account a bad man ?

Socr. Such an one, indeed, would be thought a bad manager of asses, horses, and oxen, if having received them, neither kicking, nor butting, nor biting, he should make them do all these things through vice. Does not every trainer of any animal whatever appear to you to be a bad one, who, having received it gentle, has made it more vicious than he received it? Does he appear so, or not?

Cal. Certainly, that I may gratify you.

Socr. Gratify me, then, by answering this too, whether man is of the class of animals, or not?

Cal. How should he not be?

Socr. Had not Pericles, then, the care of men?

Cal. Yes.

153. *Socr.* What then? Ought they not, as we just now admitted, to have become more just, instead of more unjust, under his management, if he who took charge of them was a good politician?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And are not the just gentle, as Homer² says? What say you? Is it not so?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. However, he made them more savage than he received them, and this against himself, which he would least of all have wished.

Cal. Do you wish that I should agree with you?

Socr. If I seem to you to speak the truth.

Cal. Be it so, then.

Socr. If, then, he made them more savage, he must have made them more unjust, and worse?

Cal. Be it so.

Socr. According to this reasoning, then, Pericles was not a good politician?

Cal. Not, as you say.

Socr. By Jupiter, nor as you say either, from what you have admitted. But, again, tell me with respect to Cimon. Did not they whom he took care of pass a sentence of ostracism upon him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And did they not do the very same to Themistocles, and beside punish him with exile? And did they not sentence Miltiades, the conqueror at Marathon, to be thrown

* *Odyss.* vii. 120.

into the Barathrum, and but for the Prytanis, would he not have been thrown into it? These, however, if they had been good men, as you say, would never have suffered these things. 154. Good drivers, surely, do not at first keep themselves from falling from their cars, but, when they have trained their horses, and have themselves become better drivers, then fall off. This is never the case, either in driving, or in any other employment. Does it appear so to you?

Cal. To me it does not.

Socr. Our former statements, then, as it appears, are true, that we do not know any man who has been a good politician in this city. You admit that you know of none at present, but you say that formerly there were some, and you have selected these men: but these have appeared to be much the same as those of the present day, so that, if they were orators, they did not make use of the true rhetoric, for in that case they would not have fallen, nor yet did they employ flattery.

Cal. However, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of the present day will ever do such deeds as were done by any one of those.

Socr. Neither, my excellent friend, do I blame these men, as servants of the city, but they appear to me to have been more efficient than those of the present day, and better able to procure for the city what it desired. But in changing and repressing their desires, by persuading and compelling them to such a course as would make the citizens become better, they scarcely differed at all from those of the present day; yet that is the only duty of a good citizen. But, with respect to providing ships, walls, and docks, and many other such things, I agree with you, that they were more able than the men of our day. 155. You and I, however, act ridiculously in our discussion. For during the whole time that we have been conversing we have not ceased to go round and round the same subject, and to misunderstand each what the other says. I think that you have often admitted and acknowledged that there is a twofold method of treatment, both with respect to the body and with respect to the soul: and that the one is ministerial, by which we are enabled to procure food, if our bodies are hungry, drink, if they are thirsty, and if they are cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and all other things which the body stands in need of. And I purposely speak to you

through these images, in order that you may understand me more easily. For when any one supplies these things, being either a retail tradesman or a merchant, or a manufacturer of any of them, a baker, a cook, a weaver, a shoemaker, or tanner, it is not at all surprising that such a person should appear, both to himself and others, to be concerned in the care of the body, that is, to all who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body really belongs, and whose duty it is to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective productions, through knowing what meats or drinks are good and bad for the health of the body, whereas all those others are ignorant of this ; for which reason all those other arts are servile, ministerial, and base, as regards the management of the body, but the gymnastic art and medicine are justly the mistresses of these. 156. That the case is the same with respect to the soul, you, at one time, appeared to me to have understood, and admitted it as if you knew what I meant ; but shortly afterwards you went on to say that there have been good and upright men in this city, and when I asked you who they were, you appeared to me to adduce men very similar with respect to politics, as if, on my asking with respect to gymnastics, who have been or are good managers of the body, you had very seriously said to me, Thearion the baker, Mithæcus, who wrote on Sicilian cookery, and Sarambus the tavern-keeper, and that they take wonderful care of the body, the first making admirable bread, the second, made-dishes, and the third, wine. Perhaps, then, you would be angry if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing about gymnastics ; you tell me of men who are ministers and purveyors to desires, but who do not understand any thing great and good respecting them, and who, it may so happen, having filled men's bodies, and made them gross, and having been praised by them, end by ruining their old flesh. These men, on the other hand, through their ignorance, will not blame those who have pampered their appetites, as being the causes of their diseases, and of the loss of their old flesh, but they who may happen to have been with them, and to have given them some advice, when, after a long time, repletion, having been indulged in without any regard to health, comes bringing disease with it, these they will accuse and blame, and do them some mischief if they can, but those others, who are

the causes of their maladies, they will extol. 157. And now you, Callicles, act in very much the same way; you extol men who have pampered the Athenians by satiating their desires, and who they say have made the city great; and they do not perceive that it is swollen, and unsound through means of those ancient politicians: for, without considering temperance and justice, they have filled the city with harbours and docks, and walls and tributes, and such trifles. When, therefore, the crisis of their weakness comes, they will blame the advisers who are then present, but will extol Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, who were the causes of the mischief: and you perhaps, unless you are on your guard, and my friend Alcibiades, they will seize, when they have lost what they had before in addition to what they have acquired, although you are not the causes of the mischief, but perhaps accomplices. 158. Moreover, I both now see a very foolish thing happening, and I hear of it with respect to men of former times. For I perceive that when a city punishes any of its politicians as guilty of wrong, they are angry, and complain bitterly that they are treated shamefully; and having done the city many good services they are then unjustly ruined by it, as they allege. But the whole is a falsehood. For no president of a city can ever be unjustly ruined by the very city over which he presides. For the case seems to be the same with such as profess themselves to be politicians, as it is with the sophists. For the sophists, though wise in other things, commit this absurdity; whereas they affirm that they are teachers of virtue, they often accuse their disciples of acting unjustly towards them, by defrauding them of their wages, and not making other requitals for the benefits they have received from them. But what can be more unreasonable than such language as this, that men who have become good and just, who have been freed from injustice by their teacher, and have acquired justice, should yet act unjustly from that very quality which they have not? Does not this, my friend, appear to you to be absurd? Of a truth, Callicles, you have compelled me to make a speech by your unwillingness to answer me.

159. *Cal.* But should you not be able to speak unless some one answered you?

Socr. It seems as if I could: for now I have carried my discourse to a great length, seeing that you will not answer me.

But my good friend, tell me, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendship, does it not appear to you unreasonable, that a man who says he has made another person good, should blame that person, because having been made good through his means, and being so, he has afterwards become bad?

Cal. To me it appears so.

Socr. Do you not, then, hear those speak in this manner who profess to instruct men in virtue?

Cal. I do. But what can you say of men of no worth?

Socr. What then can you say of those, who, while they profess to preside over the city, and to take care that it shall be as good as possible, then accuse it, when it so happens, as being very bad? Do you think that these differ at all from the former? My good man, a sophist and an orator are the same thing, or nearly so, and very like, as I said to Polus^a. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is something exceedingly beautiful, and despise the other. But, in truth, the sophist's art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the legislative is than the judicial, and the gymnastic art than medicine. 160. But I for my part think that public speakers and sophists alone ought not to complain of the very thing that they teach, as being mischievous to themselves, or that in the very same charge they should at the same time accuse themselves for not having at all benefited those whom they profess to have benefited. Is it not so?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And surely to impart a benefit without a stipulated reward, as is probable, is proper for these men only, if they assert what is true. For one who has received any other kind of benefit, as, for instance, who has acquired swiftness of foot through the instructions of a teacher of gymnastics, perhaps might deprive him of his gratuity, if the teacher of gymnastics had left it to him, without having made an agreement for a fixed price, that he should be paid the money as nearly as possible at the same time that he imparted his skill to him. For men, I think, do not act unjustly through slowness, but through injustice. Do they not?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. If, therefore, any one should take away this, I mean injustice, there would be no danger of his ever being treated

^a See § 46.

unjustly, but he alone might safely impart this benefit, if in truth he is able to make men good. Is it not so?

Cal. I admit it.

161. *Socr.* For this reason then, as it appears, it is not at all disgraceful to take money for giving advice about other things, as, for instance, about architecture, or other arts.

Cal. So it appears.

Socr. But with respect to this study, by what means a man may become as good as possible, and may best govern his own family or a city, it is reckoned disgraceful to withhold advice, except one should give him money. Is it not so?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. For it is evident that this is the reason that this alone of all benefits makes the person who has received it desirous of requiting it; so that it appears to be a good sign, if he who has imparted this benefit shall be recompensed in return; but otherwise not. Is this so?

Cal. It is.

Socr. To which method, then, of taking care of the city do you advise me? explain to me; whether to that of thwarting the Athenians, in order that they may become as good as possible, as if I were a physician, or to that by which I should serve them, and curry favour with them. Tell me the truth, Calicles. For, as you begun to speak freely to me, it is right you should continue to say what you think. And now speak well and nobly.

Cal. I say, then, that I advise you to serve them.

162. *Socr.* You advise me, therefore, most noble Sir, to employ flattery.

Cal. Unless you prefer calling him a Mysian^b, Socrates; for if you will do so—

Socr. Do not repeat what you have often said, that any one who pleases will kill me, lest I too should say again, that a bad man would slay a good one; nor that he will take away my property, if I have any, lest I too should say again, that after he has taken it away he will not be able to make any use of it, but as he has unjustly taken it from me, so having got it, he will make an unjust use of it; and if unjustly, basely; and if basely, wickedly.

Cal. How confident you seem to me to be, Socrates, that you

^b A name of the utmost contempt.

will never suffer any of these things, as being one who lives out of harm's way, and who can never be brought before a court of justice by a man, perhaps, utterly depraved and vile!

Socr. I should indeed be foolish, Callicles, if I did not think that any one in this city might suffer any thing that might happen. This however I well know, that if I should go before a court of justice, and be exposed to any of the dangers you mention, he who takes me thither will be a bad man. For no good man would accuse one who has not committed injustice. And it would not be at all wonderful, if I should be condemned to death. Do you wish I should tell you why I expect this?

Cal. By all means.

163. *Socr.* I think that I, in conjunction with a few Athenians, (that I may not say alone,) apply myself to the true political art, and alone of those of the present day perform the duties of a citizen. Since, then, in the conversations which I enter into from time to time, I do not speak for the purpose of conciliating popular favour, but with a view to that which is best, and not to that which is most agreeable, and as I am not willing to do those fine things that you advise, I shall not have any thing to say in a court of justice. And the same illustration occurs to me that I mentioned to Polus. For I should be judged as a physician would be judged by children, with a cook for his accuser. For consider what defence such a man would make when taken before them, if one should accuse him as follows: 'O boys, this man has done you a great deal of mischief, and destroys both you and even the youngest of you, for, by cutting, cauterizing, weakening and choking you, he reduces you to great straits, giving you the bitterest draughts, and compelling you to hunger and thirst; not as I do who feed you with many sweet and various dainties.' What do you think a physician when brought to such an extremity would have to say? If he should say the truth, 'I did all these things, boys, for your health,' what a clamour do you think such judges would raise against him? Would it not be loud?

Cal. Probably; one must think so, at least.

164. *Socr.* Do you not think, then, that he would be altogether at a loss what to say?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And I know that I should be treated just in the same

way, if I came before a court of justice. For I should not be able to mention any pleasures which I had procured for them, which they consider as benefits and advantages; but I neither envy those who procure them, nor those for whom they are procured. And if any one should say that I corrupt younger men, by causing them to doubt, or that I revile the elder men, by speaking bitter words, either privately or publicly, I should not be able to say the truth, that "I say and do all these things justly, and for your advantage, judges, and nothing else." So that I should probably suffer whatever might happen.

Cal. Does a man, then, appear to you, Socrates, to be well off in a city who is thus circumstanced, and is unable to help himself?

165. *Socr.* If there is that in him, Callicles, which you have often allowed, namely, if he can assist himself, by neither having said or done any thing unjust towards men or towards gods. For this aid has often been acknowledged by us to be the best that a man can have for himself. If, therefore, any one could convict me of being unable to afford this assistance either to myself or another, I should be ashamed, whether convicted before many or few, or alone by myself, and if I should be put to death for this inability I should be deeply grieved: but if I should die through want of flattering rhetoric, I well know that you would behold me meeting death cheerfully. For death itself no one fears, who is not altogether irrational and cowardly, but he does fear to commit injustice; for to go to Hades with a soul full of crimes is the worst of all evils. But, if you please, I will tell you a story to shew that such is the case.

Cal. Since you have brought the rest to a conclusion, bring this to a conclusion also.

166. *Socr.* Hear then, as they say, a very beautiful tale, which you will consider a fable, as I think, but I a tale; for what I am about to tell you, I tell you as being true. As Homer says^c, then, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, divided the government among themselves, after they had received it from their father. This law, then, respecting men was in existence in the time of Saturn, and always was, and still is, established among the gods, that a man who has passed through life justly and piously when he dies should go to the isles of the blessed,

^c Iliad, xv. 187.

and dwell in all perfect happiness free from evil, but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously should go to a prison of punishment and justice, which they call Tartarus. During the reign of Saturn, and even recently when Jupiter held the government, there were living judges of the living, who passed sentence on the very day on which any one was about to die. In consequence of this sentences were awarded badly. Pluto, therefore, and the guardians of the blessed isles, went to Jupiter, and informed him that men came to them who did not deserve either sentence. 167. Jupiter, therefore, said, I will prevent this in future. For now sentences are badly awarded, because those that are judged are judged clothed, for they are judged while living. Many, therefore, he continued, whose souls are depraved are invested with beautiful bodies, nobility of birth, and riches, and when the judgment takes place, many witnesses come in their behalf, to testify that they have lived justly. Hence the judges are awed by these things, and moreover, they too pass sentence when clothed, for their minds are veiled with eyes and ears, and the whole body. All these things, then, are obstacles to them, as well their own clothing as that of those that are judged. First of all, then, they must no longer be allowed to know beforehand the time of their death: for at present they do know it beforehand. Prometheus, therefore, has orders to deprive them of this power: next they must be judged divested of all these things; for they must be judged after they are dead: the judge too must be naked and dead, and examine with his soul the soul of each immediately after death, destitute of all his kindred, and leaving all that ornament on the earth, in order that the judgment may be just. 168. Now I had observed these things before you, and accordingly have appointed my sons as judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Æacus. These, then, when they are dead, shall judge in the meadow, at the three roads, of which two lead one to the isles of the blessed, the other to Tartarus. And Rhadamanthus shall judge those from Asia, and Æacus those from Europe. But to Minos I will give the prerogative of deciding in case any doubt occurs to the two others, in order that the judgment respecting the path men are to take may be as just as possible.

These are the things, Callicles, which I have heard, and be-

lieve to be true : and from these statements I infer the following results. Death, as it appears to me, is nothing else than the separation of two things, the soul and the body, from each other. But when they are separated from each other, each of them possesses pretty much the same habit that the man had when alive, the body its own nature, culture and affections, all distinct. 169. So that if any one's body, while living, was large by nature, or food, or both, his corpse when he is dead is also large ; and if corpulent, his corpse is corpulent when he is dead ; and so with respect to other things. And if again he took pains to make his hair grow long, his corpse also has long hair. Again, if any one has been well whipped, and while living had scars in his body, the vestiges of blows, either from scourges or other wounds, his dead body also is seen to retain the same marks. And if the limbs of any one were broken or distorted while he lived, these same defects are distinct when he is dead. In a word, of whatever character any one has made his body to be while living, such will it distinctly be, entirely or for the most part, for a certain time after he is dead. The same thing too, Callicles, appears to me to happen with respect to the soul ; all things are distinctly manifest in the soul after it is divested of body, as well its natural disposition, as the affections which the man has acquired in his soul, from his various pursuits. 170. When, therefore, they come to the judge, those from Asia to Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus, having made them stand before him, examines the soul of each, not knowing whose it is, but often meeting with the soul of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, he sees nothing sound in the soul, but finds it thoroughly marked with scourges and full of scars, through perjuries and injustice, which the actions of each has imprinted on his soul, and *he finds* all things distorted through falsehood and arrogance, and nothing upright, in consequence of its having been nurtured without truth ; he also sees the soul full of disproportion and baseness through power, luxury, wantonness and intemperate conduct. On seeing it he forthwith sends it ignominiously to prison, where on its arrival it will undergo the punishment it deserves. But it is proper that every one who is punished, if he is rightly punished by another, should either become better, and be benefited by it, or should be an example to others, that they, beholding his sufferings, may be made better through

fear. 171. But those that are benefited, at the same time that they suffer punishment both from gods and men, are such as have been guilty of curable offences ; their benefit however, both here and in Hades, accrues to them through means of pain and torments ; for it is not possible to be freed from injustice in any other way. But those who have committed the most extreme injustice, and have become incurable through such crimes, serve as examples to others, and these are not benefited at all, as being incurable, but others are benefited by beholding them suffering for ever the greatest, most bitter, and most dreadful punishments for their sins, being suspended in the prison of Hades altogether as examples, a spectacle and warning to the unjust men who are constantly arriving. Of these, I say, Archelaus will be one, if Polus says true, and every other tyrant that resembles him. I think too, that the most of these examples will consist of tyrants, kings, and potentates, and such as have governed the affairs of cities ; for these through their power commit the greatest and most impious crimes. 172. Homer^d also bears witness to this ; for he makes those to be kings and potentates, who are punished for ever in Hades, Tantalus, Sisyphus and Tityus ; but Thersites, or any other private man who was depraved, no one has represented as suffering great punishments as if incurable ; for I think it was not in his power to commit them ; on which account he was more happy than those who had the power. But, Callicles, the most wicked men are amongst the powerful ; nothing however hinders but that good men may be found amongst them ; and when they are found they deserve the highest admiration : for it is a difficult thing, Callicles, and deserves high praise, when one who has great power of acting unjustly, passes through life justly. There are however a few men of this kind ; for they have existed both here and elsewhere, and I think there will be hereafter good and upright men, endued with the virtue of administering justly whatever is committed to their charge. There has been one who is very celebrated among all the Greeks, Aristides, son of Lysimachus. But, my excellent friend, the generality of potentates prove wicked. 173. As I said, then, when Rhadamanthus has got any such person in his power, he knows nothing else about him, neither who he is, nor who are his parents, but only that he is wicked ; and on

^d Odyss. xi. 675, &c.

discerning this, he sends him away to Tartarus, signifying at the same time whether he appears to be curable or incurable; but he arriving thither suffers according to his deserts. Sometimes, Rhadamanthus beholding another soul that has passed through life piously and with truth, whether it be of some private man, or any other, but I say, Callicles, especially of a philosopher, who has attended to his own affairs, and has not made himself very busy during life, he is delighted, and sends it to the isles of the blessed. Æacus too, does the very same things. And each of them passes sentence, holding a rod in his hand. But Minos sits apart looking on, and is the only one that has a golden sceptre, as the Ulysses of Homer^e says he saw him; "bearing a golden sceptre, and administering justice to the dead." I therefore, Callicles, am persuaded by these accounts, and consider how I may exhibit my soul before the judge in the most healthy condition. Wherefore, disregarding the honours that most men value, and looking to the truth, I shall endeavour in reality to live as virtuously as I can, and when I die, to die so. 174. And I invite all other men, to the utmost of my power, and you too I in turn invite to this life and this contest, which I affirm surpasses all contests here, and I upbraid you because you will not be able to assist yourself, when you will have to undergo the sentence and judgment which I have just now mentioned; but when you shall come before the judge, the son of Ægina, and when he shall seize you and bring you before his tribunal, you will there gape and become dizzy, no less than I should here, and perhaps some one will strike you ignominiously on the face, and treat you with every species of contumely.

Perhaps, however, these things appear to you to be like an old woman's fable, and you accordingly despise them. And it would not be at all wonderful that we should despise them, if on investigation we could find any thing better and more true than them. But now you see that you three, who are the wisest of the Greeks of this day, you, Polus, and Gorgias, are unable to prove that we ought to live any other life than such as appears to be advantageous hereafter, but among so many arguments, while others have been refuted, this alone remains unshaken, that we ought to beware of committing injustice rather than of being injured, and that above all a man ought to

^e *Odys.* xi. 568.

study not to appear good, but to be so, both privately and publicly : and that if any one is in any respect wicked, he should be punished, and that this is the next good to the being just, to become so¹, and to submit to the punishment one deserves ; and that all flattery, whether of one's-self or others, whether of few or many, must be avoided ; and that rhetoric, and every other action, is always to be employed with a view to what is just.

175. Be persuaded by me then, and follow me to that place, by going to which you will be happy, both living and after you are dead, as your own argument proves. And suffer any one to despise you as senseless, and to treat you with contumely, if he pleases, and by Jupiter, do you cheerfully let him strike that ignominious blow ; for you will suffer nothing dreadful, if you are in reality upright and good, and devoted to the practice of virtue. And when we have thus exercised ourselves in common, we will then, if it should appear desirable, apply ourselves to politics, or we will deliberate on whatever we shall think desirable, being better qualified to deliberate than we now are. For it is disgraceful, being in the condition in which we appear to be at present, to pride ourselves, like youths, as if we were something, who yet never retain the same opinion on the same subjects, and these of the greatest moment ; to such a pitch of ignorance have we reached ! Let us use as our guide, then, the reasoning that has now been made clear to us, which teaches us, that this is the best mode of life, to live and to die in the exercise of justice and the other virtues. This, then, let us follow, and invite others to do the same, not that, to which you confidently invited me : for it is of no value, Callicles.

¹ Τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον δίδόναι δίκην, Stallbaum translates "to become just by undergoing the punishment one deserves ;" I cannot extract this meaning from the passage.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTAGORAS.

IN this dialogue Socrates relates to a friend, whose name is not given, a discussion which he had just had with Protagoras the sophist, of Abdera.

Hippocrates, a young Athenian, had roused Socrates very early in the morning and entreated him to accompany him on a visit to Protagoras, who was then at Athens staying at the house of Callias, and whose pupil he was anxious to become. On arriving there, they find the sophist attended by a crowd of admirers, and moreover Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos, surrounded by their respective followers^a.

After Socrates had made known the object of his visit to Protagoras, Callias proposes that the whole party should sit down and listen to the conversation. When all are seated, Socrates repeats to Protagoras, that Hippocrates is desirous of becoming his pupil, and wishes to know what advantage he may expect to derive from associating with him. Protagoras tells him that from the very first day of their intercourse he will become a better man than he was before, and will daily make further progress. But, asks Socrates, in what will he become better, and in what make further progress? In the management of his domestic and public affairs, that is to say, in the political art. To this Socrates objects that the general opinion is that political virtue cannot be taught, and that, whereas with respect to arts and sciences it was usual only to consult persons who had made them their study and were skilled in them, in affairs of state every one, of whatever condition, was at liberty to give his opinion; he therefore begs Protagoras to prove that virtue can be taught^b. To this end Protagoras relates a fable in which he explains how the capacity of becoming virtuous was imparted by Jupiter to

^a § 1—18.

^b § 19—29.

mankind; and then argues that as men are punished for injustice, impiety, and the like, it follows that they must think that these virtues ought to be possessed and may be acquired by all men, for that they would not punish them for a mere defect of mind any more than of body, if it were natural and not attributable to the fault of the individual^c.

Socrates having complimented him on his eloquence, according to his usual method, begs that he will answer his questions briefly; and then expresses his surprise at having heard Protagoras speak of justice, temperance, holiness, and the like, as if they were collectively virtue. He therefore wishes to know whether virtue is one thing, and justice, temperance and holiness, parts of it, or whether they are all names of one and the same thing. Protagoras answers that virtue is one thing, and these several qualities parts of it. Are they then parts like the parts of a face, the mouth, nose, eyes, and ears, or like the parts of gold, which do not differ from each other? Like the former. In that case holiness and justice must be different from each other, which, as Protagoras is at length compelled, though unwillingly, to admit, is absurd^d.

Again, each several thing has only one contrary; for instance, strength is contrary to weakness, swiftness to slowness, ugliness to beauty, evil to good; in the same way each virtue must have its contrary. This being granted, Protagoras is led to admit that folly is contrary to temperance, and also to wisdom; but in that case wisdom and temperance cannot be different from each other, as was before stated, but must be one and the same thing. A similar course of enquiry is instituted by Socrates, in order to shew that justice and prudence likewise are one and the same, but the impatience of Protagoras at finding himself driven to repeated admissions which contradict the theory with which he set out, interrupts the discussion; at length, however, the breach is repaired by the interference of the company, and it is agreed that each shall question the

^c § 30—39.

^d 40—56.

other in turn. Protagoras begins by getting Socrates to allow that an ode of Simonides is beautiful, but that it cannot be beautiful if the poet contradicts himself. He then shews that in one part of the ode it is said "that to become a good man is difficult," and in another part, "that he is not pleased with the saying of Pittacus, where he says that it is difficult to continue to be good." Socrates, however, justifies the opinion he had expressed by a minute and subtle examination of the object the poet had in view in composing the ode*.

Having concluded his criticism of the ode, Socrates is anxious to bring back the discussion to the original subject, and having with difficulty prevailed on Protagoras to consent to this, repeats the question with which they set out, which was to this effect: whether wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and holiness are five parts of virtue, differing from each other as the parts of the face do? Protagoras answers that they all are parts of virtue, four of them very like each other, but the fifth, courage, very different from all the rest. But this distinction Socrates overthrows as follows: you admit that the courageous are daring; but they who, like divers, are bold in a matter in which they are skilled are commended as courageous, whereas they who are unskilled and yet bold are not courageous but mad; so that according to this reasoning wisdom and courage are the same. Protagoras, however, tries to avoid this conclusion by saying that Socrates has mis-stated his former admission, for that he allowed only that the courageous are bold, not that the bold are courageous. But Socrates, with a view more certainly to convict his opponent of error, changes his ground, and asks whether all pleasant things are good, and all painful things evil? Protagoras is in doubt what answer to give; Socrates, therefore, shews that pleasure is in itself a good, but that men mistake as to what things are pleasant; for knowledge alone ought to govern man, and if a man knows good and evil he will never be overcome by any thing

* § 57—90.

so as to do any thing else but what knowledge bids him. Yet there are some who say that they are overcome by pleasure or pain; but what is it to be overcome by pleasure? nothing else than to choose present pleasure which will result in greater evil; in other words, to embrace a greater evil rather than a greater good; they, therefore, who are overcome by pleasure are so from ignorance^f.

Having established this, Socrates recurs to the statement of Protagoras, that courage differs from the other parts of virtue, because the most unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most ignorant men, are sometimes most courageous. It is admitted that no one willingly exposes himself to things that he believes to be evil; a brave man, therefore, incurs dangers which he knows to be honourable and good, and therefore pleasant, and is influenced by no base fear, nor inspired with base confidence; but the coward, on the contrary, is influenced by base fear and inspired by base confidence; he errs, therefore, through ignorance and want of knowledge, whence it follows that courage is contained in knowledge. The result of the whole is that virtue, since it consists in knowledge, can be taught, and so it turns out that Socrates, who began by maintaining that it could not be taught, has been arguing all along that it can, and Protagoras, who asserted that it could be taught, has been arguing that it cannot.

^f § 92—118.

PROTAGORAS,

OR

THE SOPHISTS.

A FRIEND, SOCRATES, HIPPOCRATES, PROTAGORAS, ALCIBIADES,
CALLIAS, CRITIAS, PRODICUS, AND HIPPIAS.

Fr. WHENCE come you, Socrates? can there be any doubt but that it is from a chase after the beauty of Alcibiades? and to me, indeed, when I saw him lately, the man appeared still beautiful, though between ourselves, Socrates, he is a man and is now getting a pretty thick beard.

Socr. But what of that? Do you not approve of Homer^a, then, who says, that the most graceful age is that of a youth with his first beard, which is now the age of Alcibiades?

Fr. What have we to do with that now? Do you come from him? And how is the youth disposed towards you?

Socr. Very well, I think, and not least so to-day; for he has said many things in my favour, assisting me, and indeed I have just now come from him. However, I have something strange to tell you: for though he was present I paid no attention to him, and even frequently forgot him.

2. *Fr.* But what great affair can have happened between you and him? for surely you have not met with any one else more beautiful, in this city at least?

Socr. By far.

Fr. What say you? A citizen, or a stranger?

Socr. A stranger.

Fr. From whence?

Socr. From Abdera.

Fr. And did this stranger appear to you so beautiful that you thought him more beautiful than the son of Clinias?

Socr. But how, my dear friend, can the wisest be thought otherwise than more beautiful?

^a Odyss. x. 279.

Fr. Have you come then, Socrates, from meeting one of our wise men?

Socr. Yes, and from the wisest of the present day, if you think Protagoras is the wisest.

Fr. Ha! What say you? Is Protagoras here?

Socr. And has been, these three days.

Fr. And are you just now come from his company?

Socr. I have, and from a very long conversation with him.

3. *Fr.* Why then should you not relate this conversation to us, unless something hinders you, having made this boy rise up, and seating yourself in his place?

Socr. Certainly; and I shall be obliged to you if you will listen to me.

Fr. And we to you, if you will tell us.

Socr. The obligation will be mutual. Listen then. This morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus and brother of Phason, knocked very hard at my gate with his stick, and as soon as it was opened to him he came in, in great haste, and calling out with a loud voice, said, "Socrates, are you awake or asleep?" And I, knowing his voice, said, "Hippocrates is here: do you bring any news?"

"None," he replied, "but what is good."

"You say well," said I, "but what is it? and why have you come so early?"

"Protagoras is come," said he, standing by my side.

4. "He came the day before yesterday," said I, "and have you only just heard of it?"

"By the gods," he replied, "only yesterday evening," and at the same time feeling about my bed, he sat down at my feet, and said, "Yesterday evening, very late, on my return from the village of Cœnoë, for my slave Satyrus ran away, and I was purposing to tell you that I was going in pursuit of him, but something else put it out of my head; but when I had returned, and we had supped, and were going to bed, then my brother told me that Protagoras was arrived, and my first thought was to come immediately to you, but afterwards it appeared to me too late at night. As soon, however, as sleep had refreshed me after my fatigue, I immediately arose and came here."

5. And I, knowing his earnestness and excitability, said, "What is this to you? Does Protagoras do you any harm?"

And he, laughing, said, "By the gods, Socrates, he does, because he alone is wise, and does not make me so."

"But, by Jupiter," said I, "if you give him money and persuade him, he will make you wise too."

"Would that, O Jupiter and ye gods," he said, "it depended on that, for I would spare nothing of my own or of my friend's property either, and I have now come to you for this very purpose, that you may speak to him in my behalf. For besides that I am too young, I have never yet seen Protagoras or heard him speak, for I was but a boy when he came here before. However, Socrates, all men praise him, and say that he is the wisest man to speak. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within? He is staying, as I have heard, with Callias son of Hipponicus. Let us go then."

6. I said to him: "We will not go there yet my friend, it is too early; but let us rise up and go into our court, and spend the time there walking about, until it is light; then we will go. For Protagoras stays mostly within; therefore cheer up, we shall probably find him at home."

After this we rose and walked about the court, and I in order to try the strength of Hippocrates, examined and questioned him; "Tell me," said I, "Hippocrates, you are now purposing to go to Protagoras, and to pay him money as a fee for teaching you something; to what kind of person do you think you are going, and what do you expect to become? Just as if you thought of going to your own namesake, Hippocrates of Cos, one of the Asclepiads, and were to pay him money as a fee for teaching you, if any one asked you, 'Tell me, Hippocrates, you are about to pay a fee to Hippocrates, in what capacity?' what should you answer?"

"I should say," he replied, "in that of a physician."

"And what do you expect to become?" "A physician." said he.

"But if you thought of going to Polycletus the Argive, or Phidias the Athenian, and were to pay them a fee for teaching you, if any one asked you, 'In what capacity do you intend to pay this money to Polycletus and Phidias?' what should you answer?"

"I should say, in that of statuaries."

"And what do you expect to become yourself?"

"Clearly, a statuary."

"Be it so," said I. "But we are now going, you and I, to Protagoras, and we are prepared to pay him money as a fee for teaching you, if our money is sufficient for the purpose, and we can persuade him by it; but if not, we mean to borrow from our friends. If, then, some one seeing us thus earnestly bent on this, should ask; 'Tell me, Socrates and Hippocrates, in what capacity do you intend to pay money to Protagoras?' what answer should we give him? What other name do we hear given to Protagoras, as that of statuary is given to Phidias, and that of poet to Homer? What name of this kind do we hear given to Protagoras?"

"They call him a sophist, Socrates," he replied.

"As to a sophist, then, we are going to pay him money?"

"Assuredly."

8. "If, then, any one should ask you this further question. 'What do you expect to become yourself by going to Protagoras?'"

Upon which he said, blushing, (for the day was now beginning to dawn, so that I could see him,) "If this case is at all like the former, it is evident that I expect to become a sophist."

"But, by the gods," said I, "should you not be ashamed to shew yourself as a sophist before the Greeks?"

"By Jupiter, I should, Socrates, if I must say what I think."

"Do you suppose, then, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras will not be of this kind, but such as you received from a grammarian, a musician, or a teacher of gymnastics? for you were not instructed in each of these for the sake of the art, meaning to become a professor yourself, but by way of accomplishment, as is proper for a private person and a free-man."

"Just so," he said, "such rather appears to me to be the instruction given by Protagoras?"

"Do you know, then," said I, "what you are about to do, or does it escape you?"

"About what?"

"That you are about to entrust your soul to the care of a man, who, as you admit, is a sophist; and yet I should wonder if you know what a sophist is. Though, if you are ignorant of this, neither do you know to what you are confiding your soul, whether to a good or a bad thing."

"But I think I know," he said.

"Tell me, then, what you think a sophist is."

"I think," said he, "as the name imports, that he is one learned in wisdom."

"This, however," I replied, "may be said of painters and architects, that they too are learned in wisdom. And if any one should ask us in what wisdom painters are learned, we should surely say to him, in that which relates to the production of pictures, and so on with respect to the rest. But if any one should ask this question, 'In what wisdom is a sophist learned?' what answer should we give him? of what production is he a master?"

"What else should we say he is, Socrates, but a master of the art that makes men able speakers?"

10. "Perhaps," said I, "we should say truly, yet not sufficiently. For this answer requires from us another question, about what a sophist makes men able speakers; just as the musician, surely, makes a man speak ably on the subject in which he is learned, on music. Is it not so?"

"Yes."

"Well; on what subject, then, does a sophist make a man an able speaker? clearly on that in which he is learned?"

"Apparently."

"What then is that in which the sophist is both learned himself and makes his pupil learned?"

"By Jupiter," he replied, "I am unable to tell you."

11. After this I said, "What then? are you aware to what danger you are going to expose your soul? if you had occasion to entrust your body to some one, on the risk of its becoming healthy or diseased, should you not consider very carefully whether you ought to entrust it or not, and would you not summon your friends and relations to a consultation, and deliberate many days? But that which you esteem far more than the body, your soul, and on which your all depends, either to fare well or ill, according as it becomes healthy or diseased, concerning this do you neither communicate with your father nor your brother, nor with any of us your friends, whether or not you should commit your soul to this stranger who has arrived here, but having heard of his arrival yesterday evening, as you say, do you come before day-break, and take no thought or advice on the matter, whether it is proper or not to entrust yourself to him, but are ready to

spend both your own and your friends' property, as having already resolved that you must in any event associate with Protagoras, whom you neither know, as you admit, nor have ever spoken to; but you call him a sophist, though what a sophist is, to whom you are about to entrust yourself, you are evidently ignorant?"

12. And he having heard me, replied, "It seems so, Socrates, from what you say."

"Is not a sophist, then, Hippocrates, a kind of merchant or retailer of commodities by which the soul is nourished? To me, at least, he appears to be so."

"But by what is the soul nourished, Socrates?"

"By learning," I replied. "But we must take care, my friend, that the sophist does not deceive us by praising what he sells, as those others do with respect to nutriment for the body, the merchant and the retailer. For neither do they themselves know which of the commodities in which they traffic are good or bad for the body, though they praise all that they sell, nor do those who buy from them, unless one happens to be a professor of gymnastics or a physician. In like manner, those who hawk about learning through cities, and who sell and retail it to every one that desires it, praise all that they sell, though perhaps some of these too, my excellent friend, may be ignorant which of the things they sell is good or bad for the soul; and this also may be the case with those that buy from them, unless some one happen to be skilled in the medicine of the soul. 13. If then you happen to know which of these is good or bad, you may safely buy learning from Protagoras or any one else; but if not, beware my good friend, that you do not hazard and imperil that which is most precious. For there is much greater danger in the purchase of learning than in that of food. For when one has purchased meat and drink from a retailer or merchant one may take them away in different vessels, and, before receiving them into one's body by eating or drinking, one may set them down at home, and calling in some person who understands the matter, consult him as to what may be eaten and drunk, and what not, and how much and when; so that in this purchase there is no great danger. But it is not possible to carry away learning in a different vessel; but it is necessary, when one has paid the price, having received instruction in the soul itself

and learnt it, to depart either injured or benefited. 14. Let us therefore consider these things with persons older than we are: for we are too young to decide on a matter of such importance. Now however, since we have made up our minds, let us go and hear the man, and after we have heard him, let us communicate with others. For not only is Protagoras there, but Hippias of Elis, and I think also Prodicus of Ceos, and many other wise men."

This resolution taken, we set out. When we arrived at the front door, we stopped and discussed a question that had fallen out between us on the way; in order therefore that it might not be left unfinished, but that we might bring it to a conclusion and then enter the house, we stood at the front door talking together until we had agreed with each other. 15. Now it appears to me that the porter, who was a eunuch, overheard us, and he seems from the number of sophists to be out of humour with all who come to the house. For when we had knocked at the door, he having opened it and seeing us, said, "Ha, more sophists: he is not at leisure." And at the same time with both his hands, he slammed to the door with all his might. Thereupon we knocked again, and he answering with the door shut, said, "Sirs, did not you hear me say that he is not at leisure?" "But, my good friend," said I, "we are not come to Callias, nor are we sophists; cheer up then: for we are come wanting to see Protagoras: so announce us." At length, with difficulty the fellow opened the door to us. 16. When we entered, we found Protagoras walking up and down in the portico, and in a line with him, there walked on one side Callias son of Hipponicus, and his brother by the mother's side, Paralus son of Pericles, and Charmides son of Glaucon, and on the other side Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, and Philippides son of Philomelus, and Antimærus of Mende, who is the most famous of all the pupils of Protagoras, and who is learning professionally, meaning to become a sophist himself. Behind these there followed others who listened to what was said, the greater part appeared to be strangers, whom Protagoras brings with him from the several cities through which he passes, bewitching them by his voice like Orpheus, and they follow his voice, bewitched. Some of our countrymen also were in the band. 17. I was particularly pleased in observing this band, how well they took care never

to be in the way of Protagoras by getting before him, but whenever he and those with him turned round, these listeners, in a good and regular manner, opened to the right and left, and wheeling round, always ranged themselves behind him in admirable order.

"After him I perceived," as Homer^b says, Hippias of Elis sitting on a high seat in the opposite side of the portico, and round him on benches sat Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phædrus of Myrrhine, Andron son of Androtion, and some strangers partly his fellow citizens and others. They appeared to be asking Hippias questions on physics and astronomy; but he, sitting on a high seat, gave answers to each of them and resolved their questions. 18. "Moreover I saw Tantalus^c;" for Prodicus of Ceos had lately arrived; but he was in a building which Hipponicus had before used as a store-room, but now, owing to the multitude of guests, Callias had emptied it and turned it into a lodging for strangers. Now Prodicus was still in bed wrapt up in a great number of skins and bed-clothes, as it appeared; and there were seated near him on sofas Pausanias of Ceramis, and with Pausanias a youth, quite a lad, as I thought of an excellent disposition, and of a very beautiful form. I thought I heard them call him Agathon, and I should not wonder if he was Pausanias's favourite. This lad then was there, and the two Adimantuses, the one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and some others. But I was not able to learn from the outside what they were talking about, although I was exceedingly anxious to hear Prodicus; for he appears to me to be a very wise, nay a divine man, but owing to the harshness of his voice a kind of humming in the room made what he said indistinct.

19. We had just entered, and immediately after us there came in Alcibiades, the beautiful as you say, and as I am persuaded he is, and Critias, son of Callæschrus.

After we had entered, then, and waited a little while and observed what was going on, we went up to Protagoras, and I said, "Protagoras, I and Hippocrates here have come to see you."

"Do you wish to speak with me alone," he said, "or in the presence of the rest?"

"To us," I replied, "it makes no difference, but when you

^a Odyss. xi. 601.

^b Homer Odyss. xi. 582.

have heard on what account we have come, you can determine yourself."

"What is it then," said he, "that you are come for?"

"Hippocrates here is a native of this country, son of Apollodorus, of a great and wealthy family; in natural ability he seems to be a match for the youth of his age; and he appears to me to be desirous of becoming a person of note in the city; and he thinks that he shall most readily become so, if he associates with you. Do you then determine, whether we ought to converse apart with you on this subject, or in the presence of others."

20. "You very properly take precautions on my behalf, Socrates," he replied. "For a stranger who visits powerful cities, and persuades the most distinguished of the youth in them to quit the society of others, both kindred and not kindred, both old and young, and associate with him, in the expectation of being improved by his society, ought in doing this to be very cautious, for things of this kind are attended with no slight jealousies and enmities, and even plots. For my part, I say that the art of a sophist is ancient, but the men who professed it in ancient times, fearing the odium attached to it, sought to conceal it, and veiled it over, some under the garb of poetry, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, and others under that of the mysteries and prophecies, such as Orpheus and Musæus, and their followers, and some I perceive have veiled it under the gymnastic art, as Iccus of Tarentum, and one of the present day who is a sophist, inferior to none, Herodicus of Selymbria, who was originally of Megara. But your own Agathocles, who was a great sophist, concealed it under the garb of music, as did Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others. 21. All these, as I say, through fear of jealousies, employed these arts as veils. I, however, in this respect, do not agree with any of them; for I think that they did not by any means effect the object they wished; for they did not escape the observation of men of authority in the cities, on whose account they had recourse to these disguises, for the multitude perceive scarcely any thing at all, but whatever the former give out, that they sing. Now to try to escape and not to be able to do so, but to be detected, both shews great folly in the attempt, and necessarily makes men much more hostile: for they think that such a man is moreover an impostor. 22. I

therefore have taken a path quite contrary to them, and I acknowledge that I am a sophist and teach men, and I think that this precaution is better than the other, to confess rather than to deny: I have also planned other precautions besides this; so that by God's help I have suffered no harm through confessing that I am a sophist; though I have exercised this art now many years; for my age is very great, and there is not one amongst you all whose father I am not old enough to be. So that it will be by far the most agreeable to me, if you are willing, to discuss this matter in the presence of all who are in the house."

I then, for I suspected that he wished to shew and make a display of himself before Prodicus and Hippias, that we had come as his admirers—23. "Why then," said I, "do we not summon Prodicus and Hippias, and their party, to listen to us?"

"By all means," said Protagoras.

Callias therefore said, "Would you wish us to prepare seats, that you may sit down and converse?" It was agreed that this should be done. And we all of us, in great delight, as being about to listen to wise men, laid hold of the stools, and benches, and couches, and placed them in order near Hippias, for the stools were there already; meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades brought Prodicus and his party with them, having made him get out of bed.

When, therefore, we were all seated, "Now Socrates," said Protagoras, "since they are all here, you may repeat what you just now mentioned to me respecting this youth."

24. And I said, "My commencement, Protagoras, is the same as it was just now, namely, with what design we came to you. Hippocrates here is very desirous of your society, and says he shall be glad to hear what advantage he may expect to derive from associating with you. Such is our errand."

Thereupon Protagoras said in reply, "Young man, the advantage which you will derive from associating with me is this, that on the very day of your being with me you will go home a better man than you were before, and the same on the second day, and on each succeeding day you will make some further progress."

25. And I, on hearing this, said, "Protagoras, this is nothing wonderful that you say, but very natural, since you too, old

and wise as you are, would become better, if any one should teach you what you do not happen to know. But that is not what we require, but just as if Hippocrates here should on the instant change his mind, and desire to associate with the youth who has lately arrived, Zeuxippus of Heraclea, and coming to him as he now does to you, should be told by him the very same things that he has been by you, that by associating with him he would every day become better, and make further progress; if he should further ask him, 'In what do you mean I shall become better, and in what make further progress?' Zeuxippus would answer him, 'In the art of painting.' And if he were to attach himself to Orthagoras of Thebes, and being told by him the very same things that he has been by you, should further ask him in what he would daily become better by associating with him, he would reply, 'In flute-playing.' In like manner do you also reply to the youth, and to me who ask for him: Hippocrates here, by associating with Protagoras, on the very day in which he associates will go home a better man, and on each succeeding day will in like manner make further progress; in what Protagoras, and with respect to what?"

26. Protagoras, on hearing me thus speak, said, "You put the question fairly, Socrates, and I delight in answering those who put their questions well. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not be treated as he would be treated if he were to attach himself to any other of the sophists. For others injure youth; for when they have shewn an aversion to the arts they drag them back again and force them to study the arts by teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music; and at the same time he looked aside at Hippias: but if he comes to me, he will not learn anything else than that for which he came. The instruction that he will receive is this, the method of consulting well about his domestic affairs, in what way he may best govern his own house, and with respect to public affairs, how he may be best able to act and speak on affairs of state."

27. "Do I follow your meaning?" I replied, "for you appear to me to mean the political art, and to promise to make men good citizens."

"That," said he, "Socrates, is the very profession that I do make."

"What an admirable skill you possess," said I, "if you really

do possess it ; for I will say nothing else to you but what I think. For I imagined, Protagoras, that this could not be taught, yet since you say so, I know not how to disbelieve you. It is right, however, that I should tell you why I think it cannot be taught, nor acquired by men from men. For I, as well as the other Greeks, say that the Athenians are wise. I see, then, when we are met in the assembly, and when it is necessary for the city to settle any thing respecting architecture, that the architects are sent for and consulted about the buildings, and when respecting ship-building, ship-builders ; and so with all other things which they think can be taught and learnt. But should any one else, whom they think is not an artist, attempt to give them advice, even though he may be very honourable, and rich and noble, they pay no more attention to him on this account, but laugh at him and make an uproar, until either he of his own accord desists from speaking, through being hooted down, or the archers drag him away or remove him by order of the prytanes. 28. Thus they proceed with respect to matters which they think pertain to art. But when it is necessary to consult on any matter which relates to the government of the city, any one rises up and gives his advice on such subjects, whether he be a builder, a brazier, a shoemaker, a merchant, a ship's captain, rich, poor, noble or ignoble, and no one objects to them, as to the others, that without having received any instruction, or had any preceptor, they yet attempt to give advice ; for it is clear that they think this cannot be taught. And not only are the public in general of this opinion, but privately, the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to impart to others the excellence which they possess : for Pericles, the father of these youths, as far as depended on masters, had them educated liberally and well ; but in those things in which he is wise, he neither instructs them himself, nor entrusts them to any one else to be instructed ; but they, roaming about, feed as it were without restraint, if by chance they may of themselves light on virtue. 29. If you will too, this very same Pericles, being guardian to Clinias the younger brother of this Alcibiades, and fearing lest he might be corrupted by Alcibiades, separated him from him and sent him to be educated by Ariphron ; however, before six months had elapsed, Ariphron, being unable to do any thing with him, returned him to Pericles. I could also mention very many

others to you, who being good themselves, have never made any one else better, either of their own kindred or others. I therefore, Protagoras, looking to these things, think that virtue cannot be taught. When, however, I hear you saying what you do, I waver, and am of opinion that there is something in what you say, because I think that you are a man of great experience, and that you have learnt many things and discovered some yourself. If, therefore, you can prove to us, more clearly, that virtue can be taught, do not grudge doing so, but prove it."

"Indeed, Socrates," he said, "I shall not grudge it. But whether shall I prove it by relating a fable to you, as an older to younger men, or shall I discuss it by way of argument?"

Thereupon many of those who sat with him, answered, that he might explain it in any way he pleased. "It appears to me, then," said he, "more agreeable to relate a fable to you.

30. "There was once a time, when gods were, but mortal races were not. But when also their destined time of creation came, the gods fashioned them within the earth, composing them of earth and fire, and such things as are mingled with fire and earth. And when they were about to bring them into light, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus to adorn them and to distribute to each such faculties as were proper for them. But Epimetheus besought Prometheus that he might make this distribution. 'And,' he said, 'when I have made it, do you examine it.' Having thus persuaded him, he made the distribution. But in his distribution, to some he assigned strength without swiftness, and the weaker he adorned with swiftness; some he armed, but giving to others an un-armed nature, he devised some other faculty for their security: for to such of them as he clad with littleness, he assigned wings to fly with, or a subterranean abode; but such as he increased in magnitude he preserved by this very means; and thus he made the distribution, equalizing all things; he adapted these contrivances taking care that no race should be destroyed.

31. "When he had supplied them with the means of avoiding mutual destruction, he contrived means to defend them against the seasons, by clothing them with thick hairs and solid skins, sufficient to keep off cold and capable of averting heat, and so that, when they went to rest, these very things might serve

each of them as his proper and natural bed ; and under their feet he furnished some with hoofs, and some with hairs and solid and bloodless skins. After that he provided different food for different animals, for some, herbs from the earth, for others, the fruit of trees, for others, roots ; and to some he gave the flesh of other animals as food : and to these he attached the property of producing few offspring, but to those that are consumed by them, fecundity, providing for the preservation of the race. However, as Epimetheus was not very wise, he ignorantly exhausted all the faculties at his disposal on irrational animals. 32. The human race, therefore, still remained to him unadorned, and he was in doubt what to do. While he is doubting, Prometheus comes to examine the distribution, and sees other animals provided with every thing suitable for them, but man naked and unshod, unbedded and unarmed. But now the destined day was at hand, on which it was necessary that man should go forth from earth to light. Prometheus, therefore, being in doubt what safety he can find for man, steals the artificial wisdom of Vulcan and Minerva, together with fire, for it was impossible that it could be acquired or used by any one without fire, and accordingly he presents it to man. 33. Thus, then, man became possessed of the wisdom pertaining to life, he had not, however, political wisdom ; for that was with Jupiter ; and Prometheus was no longer permitted to enter the citadel, the habitation of Jupiter ; moreover the guards of Jupiter were terrible ; but he secretly enters the common abode of Minerva and Vulcan, in which they practised their arts, and having stolen the fiery art of Vulcan, and the other that belonged to Minerva, he gives them to man, and from this man derives the means of sustenance, but afterwards, as it is said, through Epimetheus, punishment for the theft overtook Prometheus.

34. " When, therefore, man had become partaker of a divine condition, first of all through this relationship to deity, he alone of all animals acknowledged gods, and set about building altars and statues of gods : next, by art, he soon articulated sounds and words, and devised houses and garments, and shoes and beds, and food from the earth. Thus provided however, at first men lived dispersed ; for cities were not : wherefore they were destroyed by wild beasts, through being every where weaker than them ; and the mechanical art was indeed suffi-

cient aid for their support, but was inadequate to the war with wild beasts; for they did not yet possess the political art, of which the military is a part. They sought therefore to collect themselves together, and to preserve themselves by building cities. When, however, they were thus collected, they injured one another, from not possessing the political art; so that, being again dispersed, they were destroyed. 35. Jupiter, therefore, fearing for our race, lest it should entirely perish, sends Hermes to carry shame and justice to men, that they might be ornaments of cities, and bonds to cement friendship. Hermes, therefore, asked Jupiter in what manner he was to give shame and justice to men. 'Whether, as the arts have been distributed, so shall I distribute these also? for they have been distributed thus: one man who possesses the medicinal art is sufficient for many not skilled in it, and so with other craftsmen. Shall I thus dispense shame and justice among men, or distribute them to all?' 'To all,' said Jupiter, 'and let all partake of them: for there would be no cities, if a few only were to partake of them, as of other arts. Moreover enact a law in my name, that whosoever is unable to partake of shame and justice shall be put to death as a pest of a city.'

36. "Thus, then, Socrates, and for these reasons, as well others as the Athenians, when a question arises about excellence in building, or any other mechanical art, think that few only should give their advice; and if any one, who is not of the number of the few, should offer to give advice, they do not allow him, as you say; and properly, as I say: but when they proceed to a consultation respecting political excellence, which ought to depend entirely on justice and temperance, they very properly allow every man to speak, because it is the duty of every one to partake of this excellence, otherwise there can be no cities. This, Socrates, is the cause of this fact.

37. "And that you may not think that you are deceived, *when you are told* that in reality all men are of opinion that every one partakes of justice, and of the other political excellences, take this additional proof. For in other kinds of excellence, as you say, if any one asserts that he is a good flute-player, or skilled in any other art, of which he is ignorant, they either ridicule him, or are indignant, and his friends go to him and admonish him as a madman; but in justice and other political virtues, even though they know of any man that

he is unjust, yet if he himself tells the truth of himself in the presence of many persons, what in the other case they considered prudence, to speak the truth, in this case *they consider* madness; and they say that all men ought to say they are just, whether they are so or not, or that he is mad who does not lay claim to justice, because it is necessary that every one should, in some respect, partake of it, or no longer be a man.

38. "I say these things to shew that they very properly permit every man to give advice concerning this virtue, because they think that every one partakes of it. But that men think that it exists not naturally or spontaneously, but that it is taught and acquired by study, by whomsoever it is acquired, this I will in the next place endeavour to shew. For whatever evils men think others respectively have by nature or fortune no one is angry with, nor admonishes, or teaches, or punishes the possessors of them, in order to make them otherwise than they are, but pity them. For instance, who would be so foolish as to attempt to do any of these things to the deformed, or the little, or the weak? For they know, I think, that these things, such as are beautiful and the contraries, happen to men by nature and fortune: but such advantages as they think result to men from study, practice, and instruction, if any one does not possess them but their contrary evils, for these things anger, and punishment, and admonition, are had recourse to: of these one is injustice, and so is impiety, and in short, every thing that is contrary to political virtue. Here, then, every man is angry with and admonishes every other, clearly because he thinks it may be acquired by study and instruction. 39. For if you will consider, Socrates, of what avail it is to punish those who act unjustly, this very thing will teach you that men think virtue is to be acquired. For no one punishes those who act unjustly, merely attending to this and for this reason, that any one has so acted, unless it be one who like a brute avenges himself irrationally; but he who endeavours to punish with reason, does not exact vengeance for the sake of past offence, (for what has been done he cannot make undone,) but for the sake of the future, that neither this man himself, nor any other who sees him punished, may again act unjustly. And he who entertains such a thought must think that virtue may be taught; he punishes certainly for the sake of deterring from wicked-

ness. 40 All, therefore, have this opinion who inflict punishment, either privately or publicly. Now all other men, and especially the Athenians, your fellow-citizens, inflict punishment on and correct those who they think act unjustly ; so that, according to this reasoning, the Athenians also are among the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. That your fellow-citizens, therefore, very properly allow a brazier and a shoemaker to give advice in political affairs, and that they think that virtue may be taught and acquired, has been sufficiently demonstrated to you, Socrates, at least as it appears to me.

41. " There still, however, remains a doubt which you entertain respecting those good men, why, in the world they have their sons instructed in such things as depend on masters, and make them wise, but in the virtue which they themselves possess do not make them better than others. With respect to this, then, Socrates, I shall no longer speak to you in fable, but argument. For consider the matter thus. Whether is there some one thing or not, of which it is necessary all the citizens should partake, if a city is to be ? for in this or in no other way, the doubt which you entertain is solved. For if there is, and if this one thing is neither the art of a builder, nor of a brazier, nor of a potter, but is justice, and temperance, and holiness, and in a word I call it by one name, the virtue of a man ; if this be the thing, of which all must partake, and with which every man if he wishes to learn or do any thing else, must *learn* or do it, but not without this, or if one who does not partake of it must be taught and punished, whether boy, or man, or woman, till through being punished he becomes better, and he who is not obedient, when punished or taught, is to be banished from cities, or put to death as incurable ; if this is the case, and if, notwithstanding this, good men teach their children other things, but not this, consider what strange people those good men are : 42. for we have shewn that they think it may be taught, both privately and publicly. But since it may be taught, and acquired by study, do they teach their children other things, for which death is not imposed as a penalty, if they do not know them ; but where the penalty of death or exile is imposed on their children, if they are not instructed or exercised in virtue, and besides death, the confiscation of their property, and in short the ruin of their families, *do you*

think that they do not teach them these things nor bestow their whole care upon them? We must think they do, Socrates.

“Beginning from childhood they both teach and admonish them as long as they live. For as soon as any one understands what is said, nurse, mother, pedagogue, and the father himself, vie with each other in this, how the boy may become as good as possible; in every word and deed teaching and pointing out to him that this is just, and that unjust, this is honourable and that base, this is holy and that unholy, and this you must do and that you must not do. And if the boy obeys willingly, it is well; but if not, like a tree twisted and bent they make him straight by threats and blows. 43. After this they send him to masters, and give them much more strict injunctions to attend to the children's morals than to their reading and music: and the masters do attend to this, and when the boys have learnt their letters, and are able to understand what is written, as before words spoken, they place before them on their benches to read, and compel them to learn by heart the compositions of good poets, in which there are many admonitions, and many details, and praises, and encomiums, of good men of former times, in order that the boy may imitate them through emulation, and strive to become such himself. Again, the music-masters, in the same way, pay attention to sobriety of behaviour, and take care that the boys commit no evil: besides this, when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach them the compositions of other good poets, and those lyric, setting them to music, and they compel rhythm and harmony to become familiar to the boys' souls, in order that they may become more gentle, and being themselves more rhythmical and harmonious, they may be able both to speak and act; for the whole life of man requires rhythm and harmony. 44. Moreover, besides this, they send them to a teacher of gymnastics, that having their bodies in a better state, they may be subservient to their well-regulated mind, and not be compelled to cowardice, through bodily infirmity, either in war or other actions. And these things they do who are most able; but the richest are the most able, and their sons beginning to frequent masters at the earliest time of life leave them the latest. And when they are set free from masters, the state still further compels them to learn the laws, and to live by them as a pattern, that they may not act at random

after their own inclinations, but exactly as writing masters having ruled lines with a pen for those boys who have not yet learnt to write well, so give them the copy-book, and compel them to write according to the direction of the lines, so the state having prescribed laws which were the inventions of good and ancient legislators, compels them both to govern and be governed according to these, but whoso transgresses them, it punishes; and the name given to this chastisement, both among you, and in many other places, is correction, since punishment corrects. 45. So great therefore being the attention paid to virtue, privately and publicly, do you wonder and doubt, Socrates, whether virtue may be taught? There is no need, however, to wonder, but much more if it could not be taught.

“Why then are there many bad sons of good fathers? Learn again the reason of this; for it is not at all wonderful, if what I have before said is true, that, if a state is to subsist, no one must be unskilled in this thing, virtue. For if what I say is the case, (and it assuredly is), consider the matter by selecting any other study and subject of instruction whatever. 46. For instance, suppose that a city could not subsist unless we were all of us flute-players, each according to his capacity, and suppose every one should teach his neighbour, both privately and publicly, and should chide any one who did not play well, and should not grudge doing this, as now no one grudges *a knowledge of* what is just and legal, or conceals it, as is the case in other arts, for mutual justice and virtue are, I think, advantageous to us; and for this reason every one most willingly tells and teaches others what is just and legal. If then in the same way, in flute-playing, we had a perfectly willing and ungrudging disposition to teach each other, do you think, Socrates,” said he, “that the sons of good flute-players would become good players, rather than the sons of bad ones? I indeed think not, but the man’s son who happened to have the best natural talent for flute-playing, would rise to distinction; and the man’s son who had no such natural talent, would be undistinguished; and the son of a good flute-player would often turn out a bad one, and the son of a bad one would often turn out a good one. However, all would be sufficiently good flute-players, compared with those who are untaught, and who know nothing of flute-playing. 47. In like manner think that the man who appears to you to be the most unjust of those who

are trained in the laws, and among civilized men, is just and a proficient in justice, when compared with men, who have neither instruction nor courts of justice, nor laws, nor any necessity that constantly compels them to attend to virtue, but may be considered as savages, such as those whom the poet Pherecrates represented last year, at the Lenæan festival. Assuredly, if you should chance to be thrown among such men as the misanthropes in that play, you would rejoice if you met with a Eurybates and a Phryndonas^d, and you would deplore with regret the depravity of the men here. But now you are fastidious, Socrates, because all are teachers of virtue as far as they are severally able, though no one appears to you to be so. Again, if you were to enquire for a teacher of the Greek language, not one would be found: nor, I think, if you were to enquire for one who could instruct the sons of our artificers in the very art which they have learnt from their father, so far as the father and the father's friends who follow the same art are able to teach it, *if, I say, you were to enquire* for one who could instruct them, I think, Socrates, that a teacher would not easily be found for them, but for those who are utterly unskilled, a teacher would easily be found, and so with respect to virtue and every thing else. 48. But if there is any one who excels us even but a little in advancing others in the road to virtue, we ought to be content. Of these, then, I think I am one, and that far above other men I know certain things by which a man will be made upright and good, and that worth the remuneration which I demand, and even more, as also my pupils think. Therefore I adopt the following method in my demand for remuneration; when any one has learnt from me, if he is willing, he pays the sum that I demand; but if not, having gone to a temple and sworn how much my instructions are worth, he pays that sum.

"Thus much, Socrates," he continued, "I have said by way of fable and argument, to prove that virtue may be taught, and that the Athenians are of that opinion, and that it is not at all wonderful that the sons of good fathers should turn out bad, or of bad fathers, good, since even the sons of Polycletus, who are of the same age with Paralus and Xanthippus here, are nothing compared with their father, and so with respect to the sons of other artists; these youths, however, do not yet deserve to be

^d Two men whose profligacy made their names proverbial.

blamed in this respect; for we have still hopes in them, as they are young."

49. Protagoras having made such and so long a display, ceased speaking; and I, having continued for a long time enchanted, still looked at him, expecting that he would say something more, and desiring to hear him. But when I perceived that he had in reality ceased, I with difficulty collected myself, and looking towards Hippocrates, said, "O son of Apollodorus, how thankful I am to you for having urged me to come hither; for I esteem it a great privilege to have heard what I have heard from Protagoras; for before this, I thought it was no human care by which good men become good, but now I am persuaded that it is. However, I feel a slight difficulty, which, doubtless, Protagoras will easily explain, since he has explained so much. For if any one should converse with any one of the popular orators on these subjects, he would perhaps hear similar arguments, as from Pericles, for instance, or some other able speaker; but if he should ask them any further questions, like books they are unable either to give an answer or to ask any question themselves. And if one should put any trifling question to them respecting what has been said, as brass when struck sounds for a long time, and prolongs its sound, unless some one lays hold of it, so these orators, when asked some trifling question, answer in a speech drawn out to a great length. 50. But Protagoras here is able to make long and beautiful speeches, as the fact proves, and is also able, when asked a question, to answer briefly, and when questioning, to wait and receive the answer, which are qualities possessed but by a few. Now then, Protagoras, I need a trifle only, so that I shall have all I want if you will answer me this. You say that virtue may be taught; and I, if I could be persuaded by any man, should be persuaded by you. But, what I wondered at your saying, satisfy my mind as to that. For you said that Jupiter sent justice and shame to men; and afterwards, in many parts of your discourse, justice, temperance, holiness, and all qualities of that kind, were spoken of by you, as if they were collectively one thing, virtue. Therefore explain this accurately to me, whether virtue is one thing, and justice, temperance, and holiness, parts of it; or whether these that I have now mentioned are all names of one and the same thing. This is what I still want to know."

51. "But it is easy," said he, "Socrates, to answer this question, that the qualities about which you ask are parts of virtue, which is one thing."

"Whether," said I, "are they parts like the parts of a face, the mouth, nose, eyes, and ears; or like the parts of gold, which in no respect differ from each other and from the whole, except in magnitude and littleness?"

"Like the former, it appears to me Socrates, as the parts of the face are to the whole face."

"Whether, then," said I, "do men possess these parts of virtue, some one and others another part? or is it necessary that he who has received one should have all?"

"By no means," he replied, "since many men are brave, but unjust, and again just, but not wise."

"Are these, then, parts of virtue," said I, "wisdom and courage?"

"Most assuredly," he replied, "and wisdom is chief of all the parts."

"And is every one of them," said I, "different from every other?"

"Yes."

"And has each of them its proper function, like the parts of the face? For instance, an eye is not like the ears, nor is its function the same; nor is any one of the others like any other, either as to its function, or in any other respect. Thus, then, with the parts of virtue, is not any one like any other, either in itself, or in its function? Is it not clear that such is the case, since it resembles our example?"

"Such is the case, Socrates," he replied.

52. Then I said, "Therefore none of the other parts of virtue are like science, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness."

"No," he said.

"Come then," said I, "let us examine together what the character of each of them is. And first of all, thus; is justice a thing, or not a thing? to me it appears to be a thing; but what does it appear to you to be?"

"To me also it appears to be a thing," he replied.

"What then? If some one were to ask you and me, 'Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with respect to this very thing which you have just now named, justice, whether is it in itself

just or unjust?" I should answer him that it is just: but what decision would you give? the same as mine, or different?"

"The same," he replied.

"Justice, then, is precisely similar to being just," I should say in answer to one who asked the question. And would not you, too?"

"Yes," he said.

"If, then, after this, he should ask us, 'Do you not also say that holiness is something?' we should reply, I think that we do?"

"Yes," he said.

"Do you not say that this too is a thing?" should we say it is, or not?"

He allowed that we should say it is.

"But whether do you say that this very thing is of such a nature as to be unholy, or holy?" I for my part," I said, "should be indignant at the question, and should say, 'Speak properly, my good sir, for scarcely could any thing else be holy, if holiness itself be not holy.' But what should you say? should not you give the same answer?"

"Certainly," he said.

"If, then, after this, he should ask us, and say, 'What then did you mean a little while ago? Or did I not hear you aright? For you appeared to me to say that the parts of virtue are so disposed to each other, that no one of them resembles any other;' I, for my part should reply, 'In other respects you heard aright, but in thinking that I too said this, you were mistaken; for Protagoras gave this answer, and I put the question.' If then he should say, 'Does he speak the truth, Protagoras; do you say that no one part of virtue is like any other of its parts? Is this your assertion?' what answer would you give him?"

"I must needs admit it, Socrates," he replied.

"After admitting this, Protagoras, what answer should we give him, if he further asked us, 'Is not holiness then of such a nature as to be a just thing, nor justice such as to be a holy thing, but such as to be not holy; and holiness such as to be not just, but unjust, and the former unholy?' What answer should we give him? I, for myself, should say both that justice is holy, and holiness just. And for you, if you would permit me, I should make the very same answer, that justice is the same with holiness, or very like it, and that justice bears the nearest possible resemblance to holiness, and holiness to justice

But consider whether you would forbid me to give this answer, or does it seem so to you also?"

"It does not altogether appear to me, Socrates," he said, "to be so absolutely true, that I can grant that justice is holy, and holiness just; but there appears to me to be a difference between them. However what matters that?" he continued: "if you wish it, let it be admitted between us that justice is holy, and holiness just."

55. "Not so," I replied, "for I do not require to examine into an 'If you wish it,' and 'If you think so,' but into what I think and what you think; but in saying 'what I think and what you think,' I mean this, I am of opinion that our argument will be best discussed if we put it out of the question altogether."

"Well then," he said, "justice has some resemblance to holiness, for every thing resembles every other thing in some respect, for white in some sort resembles black, and hard, soft, and so with respect to other things which appear to be most contrary to each other; and the things which we just now said have different functions, and are not the one like the other, as the parts of the face do in a certain respect resemble each other; so that in this way you could prove this, if you pleased, that all things are similar to each other; yet it is not right to call things that have a certain similarity, similar, nor things that have a certain dissimilarity, dissimilar, though the similarity is very trifling."

56. And I, wondering, said to him, "Do you think then that the just and the holy are so related to each other, that they have but a trifling similarity to one another?"

"Not quite so," he said, "nor on the other hand do I consider them in the same way as you appear to me to do."

"However," said I, "since you appear to me to be vexed at this, we will dismiss it, and consider this of the other things that you said. Do you call folly any thing?"

He admitted he did.

"And is not wisdom the direct contrary to this thing?"

"It appears so to me," he replied.

"But when men act rightly and profitably, do they then appear to you to act temperately*, in so acting, or the contrary?"

* Cousin has well remarked that σωφροσύνη, which Socrates opposes to ἀφροσύνη, means both *temperance* and *prudence*. We, as well as the

"To act temperately," he replied.

"And are they not temperate by temperance?"

"Necessarily so."

"Do not they, then, who act wrongly, act foolishly, and are they not intemperate in so acting?"

"I agree with you," he said.

"Acting foolishly, then, is the contrary to acting temperately."

He said it was.

"Are not, therefore, things which are done foolishly, done through folly, and things done temperately through temperance?"

He agreed.

"If then any thing is done through strength, is it not done strongly, and if through weakness, weakly?"

"It appears so."

"And if any thing is done with swiftness, swiftly, and if with slowness, slowly?"

He said it was.

"And if any thing is done in the same manner, is it not done by the same means, and if in a contrary manner by the contrary means?"

He granted it.

57. "Come then," I said, "is there any thing beautiful?"

He admitted there was.

"Is any thing contrary to this except the ugly?"

"There is not."

"But what? Is there any thing good?"

"There is."

"And is any thing contrary to this except evil?"

"There is not."

French, have no single word that expresses both ideas at once. I have therefore, in imitation of Cousin, adopted the word *temperance* throughout this part of the dialogue, for otherwise the dilemma to which Socrates brings his antagonist would be lost sight of, for he now compels him to admit that *temperance* and *wisdom* which he before distinguished from each other, are identical. Mr. Wright, in his scholar-like version of this dialogue, has used the word *discretion* throughout, but it appears to me scarce worthy to be exalted into a virtue that is the twin-sister of wisdom. Further on, as will be noticed, I have also followed Cousin in translating *σωφροσύνη* prudence.

I have followed Stallbaum's reading, who omits *εἰ* and *ἐπαινον*.

"What? is there any thing high in voice?"

He said there is.

"And is any thing contrary to this except the low?"

"There is not," he said.

"Therefore," said I, "to each several contrary there is only one contrary, and not many."

He granted it.

"Come then," said I, "let us reckon up our admissions. We have admitted that one thing only is contrary to one, but not more?"

"We have."

"And that what is done contrariwise, is done by contraries?"

He assented.

"We admitted also that what is done foolishly is done contrariwise to that which is done temperately?"

He assented.

"And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what foolishly, by folly?"

He agreed.

"If therefore it is done contrariwise, must it not be done by a contrary?"

"Yes."

"And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly?"

"Yes."

"Contrariwise?"

"Certainly."

"Through contraries therefore?"

"It appears so."

"Folly therefore is contrary to temperance?"

"So it appears."

"Do you remember, however, that we before admitted that folly is contrary to wisdom?"

He allowed it.

"And that one thing only is contrary to one?"

"I grant it."

58. "Which, then, of these positions must we retract, Protagoras? That which says, that one thing only is contrary to one, or that in which it was asserted, that wisdom is different from temperance, but that each is a part of virtue, and that

besides being different, both they and their functions are dissimilar, in the same manner as the parts of the face? Which of these, then, must we retract? for these two positions taken together are not set down in a very musical manner; for they neither accord, nor harmonize with each other. For how can they accord, since it is necessary that one thing only should be contrary to one, but not to more, but wisdom and temperance are found to be contrary to folly, which is one. Is it so, Protagoras," I asked, "or otherwise?"

He admitted that it was so, though very unwillingly.

"Must not, then, temperance and wisdom be one and the same thing? Before, moreover, justice and holiness were found to be nearly the same. 59. Come, however," said I, "Protagoras, let us not be disheartened, but examine the rest. Does a man who acts unjustly, appear to you to be prudent^s, because he acts unjustly?"

"I should be ashamed, Socrates," he said, "to acknowledge this, though many men do say so."

"Whether, then, shall I address my argument to them," I asked, "or to you?"

"If you please," said he, "discuss this statement first, the statement of the many."

"But it makes no difference to me, if only you will answer, whether these things appear so to you or not: for I am most anxious to sift the statement itself, though it may possibly happen, that both I who question, and you who answer, may ourselves be sifted."

At first, then, Protagoras began to give himself airs, for he objected that the subject was difficult; afterwards however, he agreed to answer.

60. "Come then," said I, "answer me from the beginning. Do persons who act unjustly, appear to you to be prudent?"

"Be it so," he replied.

"And by being prudent, do you mean thinking rightly?"

He assented.

"And by thinking rightly that they are well advised when they act unjustly?"

^s As was before observed, it is now necessary for the thread of the argument to use the word *prudent* instead of *temperate*, but the reader must bear in mind that in the original the two ideas are expressed by one word.

"Be it so," said he.

"Is this the case," I asked, "if they fare well in acting unjustly, or if they fare ill?"

"If they fare well."

"Do you say then that certain things are good?"

"I do."

"Are those things good, then," I asked, "which are advantageous to men?"

"By Jupiter," said he, "and some things though they are not advantageous to men I call good."

61. Protagoras now appeared to me to be ruffled and annoyed, and to be set against answering any more: when, therefore, I saw him in this state, I was cautious, and asked him gently: "Whether," said I, "Protagoras, do you mean things that are advantageous to no man, or things that are advantageous in no respect whatever? and do you call such things good?"

"By no means," said he; "but I know many things which are useless to men, meats and drinks, and drugs, and ten thousand other things, and some things that are advantageous; and some things that are neither the one nor the other to men, but are to horses, and some to oxen only, and others to dogs, others again to neither of these, but to trees, and others that are good for the roots of trees, but pernicious to their buds, for instance, dung is good when applied to the roots of all plants, but if you were to put it on their branches and young shoots, it destroys the whole. Oil too is very injurious to all plants, and is most destructive to the hairs of all animals except man, but it is of service to the hairs of man, and to the rest of his body. 62. So various and diversified a thing is good, that this very thing is good for the external parts of the human body, but most pernicious to the inward parts. And on this account all physicians forbid the sick to use oil, except only a very small quantity in what they are going to eat, just sufficient to overcome the disagreeable smell of the food and seasoning."

Protagoras having said this, those that were present loudly applauded him, for that he spoke well. And I said, "Protagoras, I happen to be a forgetful sort of man, and if any one makes me a long speech, I forget what the discussion is about. As, therefore, if I happened to be deaf, you would have thought

It necessary, if you were about to converse with me, to speak louder than you do to others, so now, since you have met with a forgetful person, curtail your answers for me, and make them briefer, if I am to follow you."

"How do you bid me answer briefly? Must I answer you," said he, "more briefly than is requisite?"

"By no means," I replied.

"But at such length as is requisite?" he asked.

"Yes," said I.

"Whether, then, must I answer at such length as I think requisite, or as you?"

63. "I have heard," I replied, "that you are both yourself able, and can teach others to make a long speech on the same subject if you please, so as never to be in want of words, and again to speak so briefly, that no one can express himself in fewer words than you. If, therefore, you mean to converse with me, use the other method with me, that of brevity."

"Socrates," said he, "I have ere this entered into discussion with many men, and if I had done what you bid me, that is, had conversed as my antagonist bade me converse, I should not have appeared to excel any one, nor would the name of Protagoras have been celebrated in Greece."

64. Then I (for I perceived that he was not pleased with his former answers, and that he would not willingly carry on the conversation by answering my questions) thinking that I had no longer any business to be present at the conference, said, "Protagoras, I am not anxious to continue our conference contrary to your wish; but whenever you are willing to converse in such a manner that I can follow you, I will then converse with you. For you, as is reported of you, and as you admit yourself, are able to carry on a conference both with prolixity and brevity; for you are wise; but I am unable to follow these long speeches; though I wish that I could. But it was fitting, that you, who are capable of doing both, should yield to me, in order that the conference might continue: now however, since you are not willing and I have business to attend to, and am unable to stay while you are extending your speeches to a great length (for I have somewhere to go to), I will take my departure; though otherwise perhaps I might have listened to these things with pleasure."

65. And as I spoke thus, I rose to depart. And as I was

rising, Callias takes hold of me with his right hand, and with his left seized my cloak, and said, "We shall not let you go, Socrates; for if you go away, our conversation will no longer be the same. I beseech you, therefore, stay with us; for there is no one I would more gladly hear than you and Protagoras conversing together; therefore oblige us all."

To this I said—I already stood up ready to go—"Son of Hipponicus, I always admire your love of wisdom; but I now both praise and love it; so that I should wish to gratify you, if you asked me what was possible. But now it is as if you should ask me to keep up with Crison of Himera, a runner in his prime, or to run a race and keep up with one of the long-distance runners or day-couriers; I should say to you, that I wish much more than you do that I could keep pace with these runners, but I cannot, but if you wish to see me and Crison running together, you must request him to slacken his pace; for I am not able to run swiftly, but he is able to run slowly. So if you desire to hear me and Protagoras, you must request him to continue to answer as he did at first, briefly and to the question. But if not, what kind of conversation will arise? I for my part thought that it is one thing to converse together, and another to harangue."

66. "But you see, Socrates," said he, "Protagoras appears to ask what is just, in requiring that he may be allowed to converse as he pleases, and you as you please."

Alcibiades, thereupon, taking up the discourse, said, "You do not speak fairly, Callias; for Socrates here admits that he has not the faculty of making long speeches, and yields to Protagoras, but in the power of conversing, and knowing how to give and receive a reason, I should wonder if he yielded to any man. If then, Protagoras confesses that he is inferior to Socrates in conversing, that is enough for Socrates; but if he pretends to rival him, let him carry on the conversation by question and answer, not making a long speech in answer to each question, evading the argument and not choosing to give a reason, but prolonging his speech until most of the hearers forget what the question was about. For as for Socrates, I will be his surety that he will not forget, notwithstanding he jests and says he is forgetful. To me, therefore, Socrates appears to make the fairer proposition; for it is right that every one should declare his own opinion."

67. After Alcibiades, it was Critias, I think, who said, "Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be very much on the side of Protagoras; but Alcibiades is always fond of contention, to whatever he applies himself. We, however, ought not to contend with each other, either for Socrates or Protagoras, but we should join in requesting them both not to break up the conference in the middle."

When he had spoken thus, Prodicus^h said, "You seem to me to say well, Critias: for it is right that those who are present at discussions of this kind should be common, but not equal hearers of both speakers. For it is not the same thing: for it is requisite to hear both in common, but not to give equal attention to each of them, but to the wiser more, and to the less learned less. 68. I too, Protagoras and Socrates, beg of you to make concessions to each other, and to argue with one another, but not to wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good will, but adversaries and enemies wrangle with one another. And thus the conference will be most admirably conducted. For you, the speakers, will thus be highly approved, not praised, by us the hearers; for approbation is felt in the mind of the hearers, and is without deception; but praise is bestowed in words, by persons often who speak untruly, contrary to their real opinion; again, we, the hearers, shall thus be highly delighted, not pleased, for delight takes place when one learns something and acquires wisdom in one's mind, but pleasure when one eats something, or experiences some other agreeable sensation in one's body."

69. When Prodicus had thus spoken, many of those that were present approved of what he said. But after Prodicus, Hippias the wise spoke: "My friends who are here present," said he, "I regard you all as kinsmen, relatives, and fellow-citizens by nature, though not by law; for like is by nature akin to like, but law being a tyrant over men, compels many things to be done contrary to nature. It were disgraceful, then, for us to know the nature of things, to be the wisest of the Greeks, and in this very character to have met together in the city of Greece, which is the very prytaneum of wisdom, and in the noblest and wealthiest house in this city, and then to exhibit

^h It will be observed that Prodicus's method, of drawing nice distinctions between words nearly resembling each other in meaning, is here ridiculed.

nothing worthy of this high rank, but like the lowest of men to disagree with each other. 70. I therefore both entreat and advise you, Protagoras and Socrates, to come to terms under our authority, who as arbitrators will bring you to an agreement; and neither do you, Socrates, require that exact form of dialogue, which is so very concise, unless it is agreeable to Protagoras, but relax somewhat and give the reins to your discourse, that it may appear to us with more majesty and grace; nor on the other hand, do you, Protagoras, stretching every rope, and carrying all sail, scud to an ocean of words out of sight of land, but both of you keep a middle course. Do thus then, and be persuaded by me to choose a moderator, president, and prytanis, who will oblige you to keep within moderate bounds on either side."

This pleased those that were present, and all approved, and Callias said that he would not let me go, and they urged me to choose a president. 71. I said therefore, "that it would be a shame to choose an umpire for our arguments; for if the person chosen should be our inferior, it would not be right that the inferior should preside over his superiors, nor if he should be equal, would this be right; for one that is equal will act the same as we do, so that the choice will be superfluous. But you will choose some one better than we are; in reality I think it impossible for you to choose any one wiser than Protagoras here: but if you should choose one in no respect superior, though you shall affirm that he is, this also will be a disgrace to him, to have a president chosen for him, as if he were a common person: for as to myself it makes no difference. I am willing, then, to act as follows, that our conference and conversation may continue, which you so earnestly desire: if Protagoras is not willing to answer, let him ask questions, and I will answer; and at the same time I will endeavour to shew him, how I say one who answers ought to answer. But when I have answered all the questions that he chooses to ask, let him in his turn, in like manner, reply to me. If, however, he should not appear disposed to answer the exact question put to him, both you and I will join in intreating of him, as you now do of me, not to destroy the conversation. And for this purpose there is no occasion for one president to be appointed, but you will all be presidents in common."

72. It appeared to all that this was what ought to be done.

And though Protagoras was not very willing to comply, yet he was compelled to consent to ask questions, and when he had asked enough in his turn to reply to my questions with brevity. He began therefore pretty nearly as follows :

"I think," said he, "Socrates, that the most important part of a man's education consists in being skilled in poetical composition ; that is, to be able to understand what has been said by the poets, both what has been correctly composed and what incorrectly, and to know how to distinguish and to give a reason when asked about them. And now the question shall be on the very subject about which you and I have been conversing, virtue, but it shall be transferred to poetry. For Simonides somewhere says to Scopas, son of Creon the Thes-salian, 'That to become a good man is truly difficult, square as to his hands and feet and mind, fashioned without fault.' Do you know the ode, or shall I repeat the whole to you?"

73. I said, "There is no necessity, for I know it, and have studied the ode with great attention."

"You say well," he then observed, "Whether, does it appear to you to have been composed beautifully and correctly or not?"

"Certainly," said I, "both beautifully and correctly."

"But does it appear to you to have been composed beautifully if the poet contradicts himself?"

"Not beautifully," I replied.

"Consider it, then, more attentively," said he.

"But my good friend, I have examined it sufficiently."

"You know, then," said he, "that in the course of the ode he says somewhere, 'That saying of Pittacus does not please me, though uttered by a wise man, wherein he says, it is difficult to continue to be good.' Do you observe, that the same person makes both this and the former remark?"

"I know it," I replied.

"Does it appear to you then," said he, "that the one agrees with the other?"

"It appears so to me." And at the same time I was afraid lest there should be something in what he said. "But," said I, "does not it appear so to you?"

"How can he who made both these assertions agree with himself, who first of all laid it down in his own person, that it is truly difficult to become a good man, and a little further

on this person forgets himself and blames Pittacus for saying the same thing that he had said himself, 'that it is difficult to be good,' and asserts that he cannot approve of his saying the very same thing as himself. Surely in blaming a man who says the same things as himself, it is clear that he blames himself, so that in the former or the latter place he does not speak correctly."

74. In saying this he elicited applause and praise from many of the hearers. And I, at first, as if I had been hit by a skilful boxer, was blinded, and made giddy, by his saying this, and by the applause of the others; but afterwards, to tell you the truth, that I might have time to consider what the poet meant, I turned to Prodicus, and calling out to him, said, "Prodicus, Simonides was your fellow-citizen; you are bound to assist the man. I seem then, to call upon you, in the same manner as Homerⁱ says Scamander, when assailed by Achilles, called upon Simois, saying, 'Dear brother, let us unite to repel the prowess of this man.' So I call upon you, let not Protagoras overthrow Simonides. For the defence of Simonides requires that exquisite skill of yours, by which you distinguish between to will and to desire, as not being the same, and by which you just now established many and beautiful distinctions. And now consider, whether your opinion agrees with mine: for Simonides does not appear to me to contradict himself. But do you, Prodicus, first declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that to become and to be are the same or different?"

"Different by Jupiter," said Prodicus.

75. "Has not Simonides himself then," said I, "in the first passage, declared his own opinion, that it is in truth difficult to become a good man?"

"You say truly," replied Prodicus.

"But he blames Pittacus," I continued, "not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing that he had said, but something different. For Pittacus does not say that this is the difficulty, to become a good man, as Simonides does, but this, to be so; but Protagoras, as Prodicus here says, to be and to become are not the same; and if to be and to become are not the same, Simonides does not contradict himself. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may say with Hesiod^k, 'that it is difficult to become good; for that the gods have placed

ⁱ Iliad xxi. 308.

^k Opp. et Dier. v. 287 &c.

sweat before virtue ; but when any one has reached its summit, it is then easy to acquire, though before it was difficult."

76. Prodicus, on hearing this, commended me ; but Protagoras said, " Your defence, Socrates, is more erroneous than the passage which you defend."

And I said, " Then I have done ill, as it seems, Protagoras, and I am an absurd physician ; in attempting to cure, I make the disease worse."

" So it is however," he said.

" But how?" I asked.

" Great must have been the poet's ignorance," he replied, " if he asserts that virtue is so easy a thing to be acquired, whereas it is the most difficult of all, as all men think."

77. And I said, " By Jupiter, Prodicus here is very opportunely present at our discussion. For the wisdom of Prodicus appears, O Protagoras, to have been of old divine, whether it began with Simonides, or is even still more ancient. But you, who are skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and not skilled in it as I am, from being the disciple of this Prodicus. And now you appear to me not to be aware that Simonides probably did not understand this word ' difficult,' in the same sense as you understand it ; but as with the word *δεινός*, (terrible and clever,) Prodicus here is continually taking me to task, when in praising you, or any one else, I say, that Protagoras is a wise and terrible man, he asks if I am not ashamed of calling good things terrible, for what is terrible, he says, is evil ; hence no one ever speaks of terrible riches, or terrible peace, or terrible health, but every one says terrible disease, and terrible war, and terrible poverty, since whatever is terrible is evil. Perhaps, therefore, the Cean and Simonides understand by the word difficult either that which is bad, or something else that you are not aware of. 78. Let us then ask Prodicus ; for it is right to enquire of him the meaning of words used by Simonides ; what, Prodicus, does Simonides mean by the word difficult?"

" Evil," he replied.

" For this reason, then," I continued, " Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying that it is difficult to be good, as if he had heard him say that it is evil to be good."

" But what else but this, Socrates," he asked, " do you think Simonides meant and found fault with in Pittacus, that he did

not know how to distinguish terms rightly, as being a Lesbian, and educated in a barbarous dialect?"

"Do you hear Prodicus," said I, "Protagoras? And have you any objection to make to this?"

Thereupon Protagoras said, 79. "This is far from being the case, Prodicus; for I am very sure that Simonides meant by the word difficult the same that we all do, not what is evil, but that which is not easy but is accomplished by much toil."

"And I too think, Protagoras," I said, "that Simonides meant this, and that Prodicus here knows he did, but he is jesting, and is willing to try whether you are able to maintain your own assertion. For that Simonides does not by the word difficult mean evil, is strongly confirmed by the expression immediately after this; for he says, that 'God alone possesses this privilege,' not surely meaning that it is evil to be good; then he adds that God alone possesses this, and he attributes this privilege to God alone; for in that case Prodicus would call Simonides a profligate, and by no means a Cean. But I am willing to tell you what appears to me to have been the design of Simonides in this ode, if you think proper to make trial of my poetical skill, as you call it; or if you prefer it, I will listen to you."

80. Protagoras, therefore, hearing me speak thus, said, "If you please, Socrates;" but Prodicus, Hippias, and the rest, urged me very much.

"I will endeavour, then," said I, "to explain to you what I think of this ode. Philosophy is most ancient and most prevalent in Crete and Lacedæmon of all Greece, and sophists are more numerous there than any where else. They deny it, however, and pretend to be ignorant, in order that they may not be discovered to surpass the rest of the Greeks in wisdom, like those sophists whom Protagoras mentioned, but that they may appear to excel in fighting and courage, thinking that, if it were known in what they excel, all men would engage in the same pursuit. But now, concealing this, they deceive those who affect Spartan manners in other cities, for some, in imitation of them, have their ears bruised, and bind their arms with the thongs of the cestus, and devote themselves to gymnastic exercises, and wear short garments, as if in these things the Lacedæmonians excelled the other Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, now that they wish to converse without restraint with

the sophists among them, and are wearied with conversing with them in secret, expelling these imitators of Spartan manners, and any other stranger that is living in their country converse with the sophists unknown to all strangers; and they do not suffer any of their young men to go out to other cities, as neither do the Cretans, lest they should unlearn what they have taught them. 81. And in these cities there are not only men that pride themselves on their learning, but women also. And you may know, that in this I speak truly, and that the Lacedæmonians are admirably instructed in philosophy and the art of speaking, from the following circumstance: for if any one wishes to converse with the meanest of the Lacedæmonians, he will find him, for the most part, apparently an ordinary person in conversation, but afterwards, when a proper opportunity presents itself, he sends forth, like a skilful lancer, a notable saying, brief and pointed, so that he who converses with him will appear to be nothing better than a boy. Accordingly some persons, both of the present day and of former times, have observed this very thing, that to imitate Spartan manners consists much more in studying philosophy, than devoting one's-self to gymnastic exercises, since they know that to be able to utter such sayings is a proof of a highly educated man. 82. Among these were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, our own Solon, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chene, and the seventh among them was reckoned the Lacedæmonian Chilo. These all were emulators, lovers, and disciples of the Lacedæmonian education, and any one may discover that their wisdom was of this kind, brief and memorable sayings uttered by each of them. These men also, having met together, consecrated the first-fruits of their wisdom to Apollo in the temple at Delphi, inscribing those sentences which all men have in their mouths: 'Know thyself,' and 'Nothing in extremes.'

"But why do I mention these things? To shew that this was the mode of philosophy among the ancients, a certain laconic brevity of diction. Amongst the rest this particular saying of Pittacus was noised abroad, being extolled by the wise men: 'It is difficult to be good.' Simonides, therefore, as being ambitious of a reputation for wisdom, knew that if he could overthrow this saying, as if it were a famous wrestler, and could master it, he himself would become famous amongst the men of

his own time. In opposition to this sentence, therefore, and with this object, designing to put it down, he composed the whole of this ode, as it appears to me.

83. "Let all of us, however, examine it together, to see whether what I say is true. For the very commencement of the ode would appear to be insane, if, wishing to say that it is difficult to become a good man, he had afterwards inserted the particle 'indeed.' For this appears to have been inserted for no purpose whatever, unless we suppose that Simonides is speaking as if he were quarrelling with the saying of Pittacus; and that when Pittacus says, that 'it is difficult to be good,' he, disputing this, says, 'Not so,' but it is indeed difficult, Pittacus, to become good in very truth; not 'truly good.' For he does not use the word truly in this way, as if some men were truly good, and others good indeed, but not truly so, for this would have been silly, and not worthy of Simonides; but it is necessary to transpose the word 'truly' in the ode, understanding the saying of Pittacus somewhat as follows, as if we were to make Pittacus himself speak, and Simonides answer, saying, 'O men, it is difficult to be good,' but the latter answers, 'Pittacus, your assertion is not true: for not to be, but to become indeed a good man, square as to one's hands and feet, and mind, fashioned without blame, is truly difficult.' Thus it appears that the particle 'indeed' is inserted with good reason, and that the word 'truly' is rightly placed at the end. And all that follows bears witness to this, that such is the meaning.

84. Many things might be said to prove with respect to each several passage in this ode, that it is well composed; for it is very elegant and elaborate; but it would be too long to go through the whole of it in this way. Let us then consider its whole outline and design, which is nothing else than a refutation of the saying of Pittacus throughout the ode. For he says shortly after this, proceeding as if he would say, to become a good man is truly difficult, it is possible however for a certain time: but having become to continue in this condition, and to be a good man, as you say, Pittacus, is impossible and more than human, but God alone possesses this privilege; 'but it cannot be that a man should be otherwise than evil, whomsoever irresistible calamity prostrates.' 85. Whom, then, does irresistible calamity prostrate in the command of a ship? Clearly not a private person, for the private person is always

prostrate ; as therefore no one can throw down a man who is lying on the ground, but sometimes one may throw down one who is standing upright, so as to make him lie on the ground, but not one already lying there, so an irresistible calamity may sometimes prostrate a skilful man, but never one who is always unskilful ; and a violent storm bursting on a pilot may make his skill of no avail, and a bad season befalling a farmer may make his skill of no avail, and the same with a physician : for it befalls a good man to become evil, as is also testified by another poet, who says, ' A good man is sometimes evil, and sometimes good : ' but it does not befall the evil to become so, but he must needs always be so. So that when an irresistible calamity prostrates a skilful, wise, and good man, it is not possible for him not to be evil ; but you say, Pittacus, that it is difficult to be good ; but the difficulty is to become good, though it is possible, but impossible to be so. 86. ' For every man who fares well is good, but evil if he fares ill.' What then is faring well with respect to literature ? and what makes a man good in literature ? Clearly the being instructed in it. What faring well makes a good physician ? Clearly the being instructed in the art of curing the sick. ' And evil if he fares ill.' Who then would become an evil physician ? Clearly he to whom it happens first to be a physician, and then a good physician ; for he may become an evil physician. But we who are ignorant of the medical art, can never by faring ill become either physicians, or builders, or any thing else of the kind ; but whoever cannot become a physician by faring ill, clearly cannot become an evil physician. Thus also a good man may sometime or other become evil, either from length of time, or labour, or disease, or some other accident, for this alone is a faring ill, to be deprived of knowledge, but the evil man can never become evil, for he is always so ; but if he is to become evil, it is necessary for him first to become good. So that this part of the ode tends to this, that it is not possible to be a good man, so as to continue good ; but that it is possible to become good, and for the same person to become evil : ' and they are for the longest time best whom the gods love.'

87. " All these things therefore are said against Pittacus, and the following parts of the ode shew this still more clearly. For he says, ' Wherefore I shall never, searching for that which cannot be, throw away a portion of my life on an empty im-

practicable hope, searching for an all-blameless man among us who feed on the fruits of the wide earth. When I have found one, I will inform you ;' he adds. So vehemently, and through the whole of the ode, does he attack the saying of Pittacus. ' But I praise and willingly love all who do nothing base ; but with necessity not even gods contend.' And this is spoken against that same saying. For Simonides was not so ill informed as to say that he praised those who did no evil willingly, as if there were some who did evil willingly. For I am pretty much of this opinion, that no wise man thinks that any man errs willingly, nor willingly commits base and evil actions, but they well know that all those who do base and evil things, do them unwillingly. 88. Moreover Simonides does not say, that he praises those who do not willingly do evil, but he uses this word ' willingly ' of himself. For he thought that a good and upright man is frequently compelled to love and praise a certain person ; for instance, it often happens to a man to have a perverse mother or father, or country, or something else of the kind. Now depraved men, when any such thing happens to them, are as it were glad to see it, and blaming make known and divulge the depravity of their parents or country. that when they neglect them, men may not accuse or reproach them for their neglect, so that they blame them still more *than they deserve*, and add voluntary to necessary enmity. But the good conceal the faults and compel themselves to praise, and if they are angry with their parents or country from having been injured by them, they pacify themselves and become reconciled, compelling themselves to love and praise their own connections. And I think Simonides also himself frequently considered it right to praise and extol a tyrant, or some one else of the kind, not willingly, but by compulsion. 89. This, too, he says to Pittacus ; I, Pittacus, do not blame you on this account, because I am fond of blaming ; for ' it is enough for me if a man is not evil or too helpless, a sane man, acquainted with justice that benefits the state ; I will not censure him, for I am not a lover of censure ; for the race of fools is infinite ;' so that he who delights in blaming may satiate himself in censuring them. ' All things are beautiful with which base things are not mingled.' His meaning in this, is not as if he had said, all things are white with which black is not mingled, for this would be in many ways ridiculous, but that he himself admits

of a mean, so as not to blame it. 'And I do not seek,' he adds, 'an all-blameless man, among us who feed on the fruits of the wide earth; when I have found him, I will inform you.' For this reason, therefore, I shall praise no one, but it is enough for me if a man be moderate, and does no evil, for I 'love and praise all.' Here too he uses the language of the Mitylenæans, as speaking to Pittacus, 'I praise and love all willingly,' (here it is necessary after 'willingly' to distinguish in the pronunciation,) 'who do nothing base,' but there are some whom I praise and love unwillingly. Thee therefore, Pittacus, if thou hadst spoken with moderate reason and truth, I should never have blamed, but now, since you lie excessively and in matters of the greatest moment, while you think you are speaking the truth, for this reason I blame you. 90. Such appears to me, Prodicus and Protagoras," said I, "to have been the design of Simonides in the composition of this ode."

Upon this Hippias said, "You seem to me, Socrates, to have given a good explanation of this ode, and I too," he added, "have some pretty good remarks to make on it, which I will communicate to you, if you please."

"Do so, Hippias," said Alcibiades, "but at another time; but now it is right to carry out the agreement which Protagoras and Socrates made with each other, and, if Protagoras wishes to ask any more questions, for Socrates to answer, but if he wishes to answer Socrates, then for the latter to ask questions."

91. Then I said, "I leave it to Protagoras to choose whichever is more agreeable to him; but if he is willing, let us have done with odes and poems, but I would gladly, Protagoras, examine with you and come to a conclusion on the subject about which I first questioned you. For a discussion about poetry appears to me very like the festivities of mean and uneducated men; for they, through not being able to converse with one another over their cups, with their own voices and their own words, in consequence of deficiency of education, enhance the pay of female flute-players, and hiring at a great price the foreign voices of flutes, converse with each other through their voices. But when worthy, good, and well-educated men meet together at a banquet you will see neither flute-playing women, nor dancing-girls, nor harpists, but you will find that they are able to converse with themselves, with-

out these trifles and pastimes, by means of their own voices, both speaking and listening to each other in turn, in good order, even though they have drunk a great deal of wine. 92. In like manner, such meetings as the present, when they are composed of such men as most of us profess ourselves to be, have no need of foreign voices, or of poets, of whom it is not possible to ask the meaning of what they say, and most of those who introduce them in their arguments say that the poet means some one thing and some another, disputing about a matter which they can never determine. But they dismiss such topics of conversation as these, and converse with each other through their own resources, and in their discussions receive and give proof of each other's capacity. It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate such persons as these, and setting aside the poets should discourse with each other, from our own resources, and receive proof of the truth and of ourselves. And if you still wish to question me, I am ready to offer myself to answer you; but if you do not wish it, do you offer yourself to me, so that we may bring to a conclusion the subject that we broke off in the middle."

93. On my saying these and other things of the same kind, Protagoras did not distinctly declare which of the two he would do. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, said, "Callias, does Protagoras appear to you to act rightly now, in not being willing to declare whether he will answer or not? For to me he does not. But let him either continue the conversation, or say that he is not willing to continue it, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converse with some one else, or whoever else wishes to do so with some other."

And Protagoras, being ashamed, as it seemed to me, when Alcibiades spoke thus and Callias and nearly all who were present entreated him, was with great difficulty prevailed on to renew the conversation and bade me question him, for that he would answer.

94. I then said to him, "Protagoras, think not that I converse with you with any other design, than to examine thoroughly into things about which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer¹ speaks very much to the purpose, when he says, 'When two come together, one apprehends

¹ *Iliad* x. 224.

before the other.' For all of us men are thus more prompt in every deed, and word, and thought, but when any one apprehends alone ^m, he immediately goes about and searches for some one to whom he may communicate it, and with whom he may establish it, until he finds him. So I too, for this reason, am better pleased to converse with you than with any one else, thinking that you are best able to investigate both other subjects which a good man is likely to examine into, and especially virtue. For who else can do it but you? Since you not only think yourself to be a good and worthy man, as some others also are virtuous, but are not able to make others so; you however are both good yourself, and are able to make others good, and you have such confidence in yourself, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourself to all the Greeks designating yourself a sophist, publishing yourself as a professor of erudition and virtue, and you are the first that has thought fit to receive pay for this. 95. How then, is it not right to call upon you to the examination of these matters, and to question and communicate with you respecting them? It cannot be otherwise. Now therefore I am desirous that the questions which I first asked you on these subjects, should, from the commencement, be partly called to mind by you, and partly to consider them with you. The question, I think, was this; whether these, wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and holiness, which are five names, belong to one thing, or whether a certain peculiar essence is attached to each of these names, and each thing has its own function, and no one of them is the same as any other? You said, then, that these were not names belonging to one thing, but that each of these names was applied to a distinct thing, and that all these are parts of virtue, not in the same manner as the parts of gold are similar to each other, and to the whole of which they are parts, but just as the parts of the face are dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts, and to each other, each possessing its peculiar function. If these things still appear to you as they did then, say so; if otherwise, explain the difference, since I shall not think you in any way accountable, if you happen to speak differently; for I should not wonder if you said these things before for the purpose of trying me."

96. "But I," he said, "tell you, Socrates, that all these are

^m Iliad x. 225.

parts of virtue, and four of them are very like each other, but courage is very different from all these. And thus you will know that I speak the truth; for you will find many men who are most unjust, most unholy, most intemperate, and most ignorant, yet eminently courageous."

"Hold," said I, "for what you say is worth examining. Do you mean that courageous men are daring, or some thing else?"

"I do," he replied, "and bold to rush headlong on dangers which most men are afraid to encounter."

"Come then; do you say, that virtue is something beautiful? and as being a beautiful thing do you offer to teach it?"

"Most beautiful," he replied, "unless I am out of my senses."

97. "Whether then," said I, "is one part of it base, and another beautiful, or, is it all beautiful?"

"All beautiful, surely, in the highest degree."

"Do you know, then, who boldly dive into wells?"

"I do, divers."

"Whether because they know how to do it, or for some other reason?"

"Because they know how to do it."

"But who are they that fight boldly on horseback? whether good riders or bad?"

"Good riders."

"And who with targets? those that are targeteers, or those that are not?"

"Those that are targeteers. And in every thing else," said he, "if this is what you are enquiring about, you will find that those who are skilled, are bolder than the unskilled, and the same men, after they have learnt are bolder than they were before they learnt."

98. "But did you ever see any," said I, "who, though unskilled in all these things, were yet bold with respect to each of them?"

"I have," he replied, "and very bold."

"Are those bold persons, then, courageous also?"

"If they were," he replied, "courage would be a base thing; for these men are mad."

"How then," I asked, "do you describe the courageous? did you not say that they are the bold?"

"And I say so now," he replied.

"Do not those then," I said, "who are thus bold appear to be not courageous, but mad? And again, in the former instances, the wise are the boldest, and being the boldest, are most courageous? And according to this reasoning, will not wisdom be courage?"

99. "You do not rightly remember, Socrates," said he, "what I said, and what answer I gave you? For when asked by you if the courageous were bold, I admitted that they were; but I was not asked, whether the bold also were courageous; for if you had asked me this, I should have said not all. But that the courageous are bold, which was my admission, you have no where shewn that I made that admission improperly. In the next place, you shew that men, who have skill, surpass themselves in boldness, and others who are unskilled, and from this, you conclude that courage and wisdom are the same. By proceeding in this way, you might also come to the conclusion that strength is wisdom. For, first of all, if proceeding thus you should ask me, whether the strong are powerful, I should say they are; and in the next place, whether those who are skilled in wrestling are more powerful than those who are unskilled, and they than themselves, after they have learnt, than before they learnt, I should say they are; 100. and on my admitting this, by using the same argument, you might allege, that according to my own admission, wisdom is strength; I however, do not here or any where admit that the powerful are strong, but I do that the strong are powerful, for power and strength are not the same; but the one arises from skill, and from madness too, and passion, but strength from nature, and good nurture of the body. In like manner, boldness and courage are not the same; so that it happens that the courageous are bold, but the bold are not all courageous. For boldness, like power, arises in men from skill, and from passion too and madness, but courage arises from nature, and the good culture of the soul."

101. "Do you allow, Protagoras," said I, "that some men live well, and others ill?"

He said he did.

"Does a man, then, appear to you to live well, if he lives in grief and pain?"

He said not

"But what, if he should die after having passed his life pleasantly, would he not in that case appear to you to have lived well?"

"To me he would," said he.

"To live pleasantly, then, is a good, but unpleasantly an evil thing."

"Yes," he said, "if he has lived taking pleasure in honest things."

"What then, Protagoras, do you, like the multitude, call some pleasant things evil, and some painful things good? I mean, as far as they are pleasant are they not so far good, unless something else results from them? And again, in the same way with regard to things painful; are they not evil so far as they are painful?"

"I know not, Socrates," he replied, "whether I should answer you as absolutely as you ask me, that pleasant things are all good, and painful things all evil; but it appears to me, not only with reference to the present answer, but also with reference to all the rest of my life, to be more safe to answer, that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and again, that there are some painful things which are not evil, and there are some which are a third sort, and which are neither the one nor the other, neither good or evil."

102. "But do you not call those things pleasant," I said, "which partake of pleasure, or occasion pleasure?"

"Certainly," said he.

"I ask this, then, whether they are not good, so far as they are pleasant, meaning to ask whether pleasure itself is not a good thing."

"As you frequently say, Socrates," he replied, "we must examine this, and if the examination shall appear to be connected with our subject, and the same thing shall appear to be both pleasant and good, we must grant it; but if not, we must controvert it."

"Whether, then," said I, "do you wish to take the lead in the examination, or shall I?"

"You ought to take the lead," he replied, "for you began the discussion."

103. "Do you think, then," said I, "that it will become clear to us in the following manner? just as if any one, examining a man from his form either with reference to his health, or any other

operations of his body, on beholding his face and hands, should say, Come, strip, and shew me your breast and back, that I may examine you more closely ; so I require something of the kind in reference to the present enquiry ; perceiving that you are so affected as you say you are, with reference to the good and the pleasant, I have need to say some such thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me on this point, how are you affected with respect to knowledge ? Does it appear to you as it does to most men, or otherwise ? Most men think of knowledge in some such way as this ; that it is not a strong, nor a guiding, nor a governing thing ; nor do they conceive of it as being any thing of the kind ; but though knowledge is often found in a man, they do not think that knowledge governs him, but something else, at one time passion, at another pleasure, at another pain, sometimes love, and frequently fear, absolutely forming their conceptions of knowledge, as of a slave dragged about by all the rest. Is such your opinion of it, or do you think that knowledge is a noble thing, and able to govern man, and that if a man knows good and evil he can never be overcome by any thing, so as to do any thing else than what knowledge bids him, and that wisdom is sufficient to protect mankind ?”

104. “It appears to me,” he replied, “as you say, Socrates : and moreover, if for any man, it would be disgraceful for me not to assert that wisdom and knowledge are the most powerful of all human things.”

“You say well and with truth,” I replied. “You are aware, however, that most men do not believe you and me, but say that many who know what is best are unwilling to do it, when it is in their power, but do other things. And all of whom I have asked what is the cause of this, have replied, that being overcome by pleasure, or mastered by pain, or some one of the things which I have just now mentioned, those who do these things are led to do them.”

“I think, Socrates,” he remarked, “that men say many other things incorrectly.”

“Come then, join me in endeavouring to persuade men, and to teach them what that affection of theirs is which they call being overcome by pleasures, and on that account not doing what is best, though they know it. For, perhaps, on our saying, ‘You do not speak correctly, my friends, but are deceived,’

they would ask us, 'Protagoras and Socrates, if this affection is not the being overcome by pleasure, what is it then, and what do you say it is, tell us?'"

"But why, Socrates, need we consider the opinion of the generality of men, who say any thing that occurs to them?"

105. "I think," said I, "that this will be of some service to us towards discovering with respect to courage how it is related to the other parts of virtue. If, therefore, you are willing to abide by what we just now agreed on, that I should take the lead, follow me where I think the matter will become exceedingly clear; but if you had rather not, I will dismiss it, if you please."

"You say rightly," he replied; "finish then, as you have begun."

"Again, then," said I, "if they were to ask us, 'What do you say this is, which we call being overcome by pleasures?' I, for my part, should answer them as follows: 'Hear then, for Protagoras and I will endeavour to tell you. Do you not say, friends, that this happens to you under the following circumstances? for instance, being often mastered by meats and drinks, and the delights of love, which are pleasant things, though you know that they are baneful, yet do you not indulge in them?' They would say that such is the case. 106. You and I should then ask them again, 'In what respect do you say that they are baneful? Is it because they afford pleasure, and each of them is pleasant, for the moment? or because they occasion diseases for the future, and make way for poverty, and many other things of the kind? or if they make way for none of these things for the future, but only occasion a man to rejoice, are they nevertheless evil, because they make a man rejoice in any way whatever?' Can we suppose, Protagoras, that they will give any other answer than that they are not evil from the momentary pleasure which they produce, but on account of the after results, diseases and other things?"

"I think," said Protagoras, "that the many would answer thus."

"Do they not, then, by occasioning diseases, occasion pain, and by occasioning poverty, occasion pain?" They would admit this, I think."

Protagoras assented.

107. "'Does it not appear to you then, my friends, as Protagoras and I say, that these things are evil, for no other rea-

son than because they end in pain, and deprive you of other pleasures?" Would they admit this?"

We both assented.

"If, again, we should reverse the question, 'In saying, friends, that good things are painful, do you not mean such things as gymnastic exercises, military service, and treatment of diseases by physicians, by cautery, the knife, physic, and starving, that these things are good, but painful?' They would say they did."

He assented.

"Whether, then, do you call them good, because, at the moment, they give extreme pain and torture; or because afterwards health results from them, and a good habit of body, and the safety of cities, and dominion over others, and wealth?" They would say, I think, because of the latter."

He assented.

108. "But are these things good for any other reason than because they end in pleasures, and deliverance from and prevention of pains? or can you mention any other end, to which you look when you call them good, except pleasures and pains?" They would say not, I think."

"I think so too," said Protagoras.

"Do you not, then, pursue pleasure as being good, and avoid pain as evil?"

He assented.

"This, then, you esteem to be evil, pain, and pleasure, good, since you say that enjoyment itself is then evil when it deprives of greater pleasures than those it brings with it, or when it makes way for pains greater than the pleasures contained in it: for if you call enjoyment itself evil on any other account, and looking to any other end, you would be able to tell us; but you cannot."

"Nor do I think they can," said Protagoras.

109. "Again, is not the case precisely the same with respect to pain itself? do you not then call pain itself a good, when it delivers from greater pains than those contained in it, or makes way for pleasures greater than the pains? for if you look to any other end than to that which I mention, when you call pain itself a good, you can tell us; but you cannot."

"You speak truly," said Protagoras.

"Again, therefore," said I, "if you should ask me, my

friends, 'Why in the world do you speak so much and so frequently about this,' 'Pardon me,' I should say. For, in the first place, it is not easy to prove what this is which you call being overcome by pleasures; and, in the next place, the whole proof depends on this. But even now you are at liberty to retract, if you are able to say that good is any thing else than pleasure, or evil any thing else than pain; or is it enough for you to pass your life pleasantly without pain? If it is enough, and you cannot mention any thing else that is good or evil, which does not end in these, hear what follows: 110. for I say to you, that if this be the case, the assertion is ridiculous, when you say that frequently, a man who knows that evil things are evil, nevertheless does them, when it is in his power not to do them, in consequence of being led away and overpowered by pleasures; and again, when you say that a man who knows what is good, is not willing to do it in consequence of immediate pleasures, by which he is overcome. For it will be manifest that these things are ridiculous, if we do not make use of many names, such as pleasant and painful, good and evil, but, since these things appear to be two, call them also by two names, first, good and evil, next, pleasant and painful. Having settled this, let us say, that a man knowing evil to be evil, nevertheless does it. If, then, any one should ask us, 'why?' we shall answer, 'because he is overcome.' 'By what?' he will ask us. But we are no longer at liberty to say, 'by pleasure;' for it has assumed another name instead of pleasure, namely, good. We must, however, answer him, and say, 'because he is overcome.' 'By what?' he will ask. 'By good,' we shall answer, by Jupiter. 111. Now if he who questions should happen to be somewhat insolent, he will laugh at us and say, 'A ridiculous thing is this you mention, if a man does evil, knowing that it is evil, when he ought not to do it, because he is overcome by good.' 'Is it,' he will ask, 'because the good is not worthy to overcome the evil in you, or because it is worthy?' We shall clearly say in answer, that it is because it is not worthy; for otherwise he would not err whom we say is overcome by pleasures. But perhaps he will ask, 'in what respect are good things unworthy to overcome the evil, or evil to overcome the good? Is it in any other respect than that the one is greater and the other less? or that the one is more, and the other fewer in number?' We shall

not be able to say any thing else than this. 'It is clear then,' he will say, 'that by being overcome you mean to receive greater evil instead of less good.' And thus much for this part of the question.

"Let us now change the names, and again apply the words pleasant and painful to these same things, and let us say, that a man does things, we before called them evil, but let us now call them painful, knowing that they are painful, being overcome by pleasant things, clearly such as are unworthy to prevail. And what other value is there of pleasure in comparison with pain, except that of excess or defect in one or the other? that is, of their being greater or less, more or fewer in number, stronger or weaker than one another. 112. For if any one should say, 'But Socrates, immediate pleasure is very different from future pleasure or pain,' 'Is it,' I should ask, 'in any thing else than in pleasure and pain?' for it cannot differ in any thing else. But like a man expert at weighing, having put together the pleasant things, and having put together the painful, and having placed those which are near, and those which are remote, in the scales, say which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleasures with pleasures, the greater and more numerous are always to be chosen, and if pains with pains, the less and the fewer in number. But if you weigh pleasures with pains, if the pains are exceeded by the pleasures, whether those that are near by those that are remote, or those that are remote by those that are near, the same course must be pursued, in whichever the excess is; but if the pleasures are exceeded by the pains, it must not be pursued. 'Can these things be settled in any other way, my friends,' I should ask? 113. I know that they could not mention any other."

It seemed so to him likewise.

"Since then, this is the case, I shall say 'Answer me this, do the same magnitudes appear to your sight greater when near, and less when at a distance, or not?' They will say they do. 'And things bulky, and things numerous, in like manner? and are not equal sounds greater when near, but less when at a distance?' They would say they are. If then, our well-being consisted in this, in making and choosing great masses, but in avoiding and not making little ones, what means of safety should we seem to have in life? Would it be the art of mensuration, or the faculty of judging by appearances? or

would the latter lead us into error, and often cause us to vary in our choice of the same thing, now choosing one and now another, and to repent both in our actions and our selections of things great and little, but would the art of mensuration do away with this outward show, and making manifest the truth, cause the soul to be at ease, abiding in the truth, and preserve our life? Would the men upon this admit that the art of mensuration preserves us, or some other art?"

114. "The art of mensuration," he admitted.

"But what, if the safety of our life consisted in the choice of even and odd, when more ought properly to be chosen, and when less, each with reference to itself, or one with reference to the other, whether they might be near or distant, what, in this case, would preserve our life? Would it not be a science? and would it not be one of mensuration, since it is an art of excess and defect? But since it has relation to even and odd, can it be any other than arithmetic?" Would the men grant us this, or not?"

It appeared also to Protagoras that they would.

"Be it so, my friends; but since the safety of our life has appeared to consist in the right choice of pleasure and pain, and of more and fewer, greater and smaller, more distant and nearer; does it not first of all appear to be an art of mensuration, since it is a consideration of excess and defect and equality of these with respect to each other?" "Necessarily so." "But since it has to do with mensuration, it must of necessity be an art and a science." 115. They will assent to this. What then this art and science may be, we will consider hereafter; but that it is a science is sufficient for the proof of that which Protagoras and I had to make good in answer to the question you asked us. You asked, if you remember, when we agreed with each other that nothing is more powerful than knowledge, but that it always gets the mastery, wherever it may be, both of pleasure and every thing else; but you said that pleasure often gets the mastery, even of a man possessed of knowledge, and when we did not agree with you, you thereupon asked us,

Protagoras and Socrates, if this affection is not the being overcome by pleasure, what is it then, and what do you say it is? tell us." 116. If, then, we had immediately said to you, that it is ignorance, you would have laughed at us. But now if you laugh at us, you will also laugh at yourselves. For you have ad-

mitted that they err through want of knowledge, who err in the choice of pleasures and pains; but these are things good and evil; and not only through want of knowledge, but as you afterwards further admitted, a knowledge of mensuration. Now an erroneous action done without knowledge, as you must yourselves know, is done through ignorance: so that to be overcome by pleasure is the greatest ignorance; of which Protagoras here says he is a physician, and so do Prodicus and Hippias. But you, because you think it is something else than ignorance, neither go yourselves, nor send your children to the teachers of these things, the sophists, as if this knowledge could not be taught, but by saving your money, and not giving it to these men, you fare badly, both in private and public. 117. Such is the answer we should give to the many. But I ask you, Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, for let the conversation be common to you all, whether I appear to you to speak the truth, or to speak falsely?"

What had been said appeared to all to be eminently true.

"You admit, then," said I, "that the pleasant is good, but the painful evil. But I deprecate Prodicus's verbal distinctions: for whether you call it pleasant, or delightful, or enjoyable, or from whatever derivation or in whatever way you please to denominate such things, most excellent Prodicus, use your own word and answer what I wish."

118. Prodicus, therefore, laughing, agreed with me, as did the others.

"But what, my friends," I continued, "do you say to this? All actions that tend to this, that we may live without pain and pleasantly, are they not beautiful? and is not a beautiful action good and profitable?"

They agreed.

"If then," I said, "the pleasant is good, no one who either knows or thinks that other things are better than what he is doing, and that they are possible, still continues to do the same, when it is in his power to do the better; nor is to be overcome by one's-self any thing else than ignorance, nor to be master of one's-self any thing else than wisdom."

All agreed to this.

"What then? Do you say that ignorance is a thing of this kind, to have a false opinion, and to be deceived about matters of great importance?"

To this, likewise, all agreed.

"Is it not the case then," I said, "that no one willingly sets about things evil, or things which he thinks are evil, nor is this, as it seems, in the nature of man willingly to engage in things which he thinks are evil, instead of such as are good; and when of two evils he is compelled to choose one, no one will choose the greater, when it is in his power to choose the less."

119. All these things were assented to by us all.

"What then," said I, "do you call dread and fear something? and the same that I do, (I address myself to you, Prodicus,) I mean by it a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread."

It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear were of this nature, but to Prodicus that dread was, but fear not.

"But," said I, "it is of no consequence, Prodicus; but this is; if what we before said is true, will any man deliberately engage in things which he dreads, when it is in his power to engage in things which he does not dread? or is not this impossible from our former admissions? for it has been admitted that what he dreads he considers to be evil; and what he considers to be evil, no one either engages in or willingly receives."

These things, likewise, were agreed to by all.

120. "These points, then, being established," I said, "Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras here defend himself and shew us how his first answer is correct, no, not quite the first, for he then said, that there being five parts of virtue, no one of them was like any other, but that each had a peculiar function of its own. I do not however mean this, but what he said afterwards. For afterwards he said, that four of them very much resembled each other, but that one was altogether different from the rest, namely courage. And he said I should know it by the following proof. 'You will find men, Socrates, who are most unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most ignorant, who are yet most courageous; by which you will know that courage differs much from the other parts of virtue.' And I indeed, at the moment, was very much astonished at the answer, and I have been still more so since I have discussed these things with you. I therefore asked him if he meant that courageous men are bold? He said he did, and ready to rush headlong. 121. Do you remember, Protagoras," said I, "that you gave this answer?"

He admitted it.

"Come then," said I, "tell us on what you say the courageous are ready to rush headlong? Is it on the same things as cowards?"

He said not.

"On different things, therefore."

"Yes," he replied.

"But whether do cowards attempt things which they can venture on with confidence, but the courageous on such as are dreadful?"

"It is said so, Socrates, by the generality of men."

"You say truly," I replied. "I do not, however, ask this: but on what do you say courageous men are ready to rush headlong, on dreadful things, thinking that they are dreadful, or on such as are not dreadful?"

"But this," he said, "in the arguments which you just now used, was shewn to be impossible."

"And in this," I replied, "you say truly. So that if this point was proved correctly, no one attempts things which he considers to be dreadful, since to be overcome by one's-self was found to be ignorance."

He admitted it.

"All men, however, attempt things in which they have confidence, both the cowardly and the courageous, and thus both the cowardly and the courageous attempt the same things."

122. "But indeed, Socrates," said he, "the things which the cowardly and the courageous attempt are quite contrary to each other; for instance, the latter are willing to engage in war, but the former are unwilling."

"Whether," said I, "is it honourable to engage in it, or base?"

"Honourable," he replied.

"If, therefore, it is honourable, have we not already admitted that it is good, for we have admitted that all honourable actions are good."

"You say truly, and I am always of this opinion."

"Right," said I. "But which of the two do you say are unwilling to engage in war, though it is honourable and good?"

"Cowards," he replied.

"If therefore," said I, "it be honourable and good, is it not also pleasant?"

"That has been granted," he said.

"Are the cowardly, then, unwilling to attempt what they know to be more honourable and better, and more pleasant?"

"But," said he, "if we admitted this, we should destroy our former admissions."

123. "But what with respect to the brave man? Does he not engage in what is more honourable, better, and more pleasant?"

"It is necessary," said he, "to admit that he does."

"On the whole, then, is it not the case, that the courageous, when they are afraid, have no base fear, nor are they inspired with base confidence?"

"True," said he.

"But if not base, are they not honourable?"

He assented.

"And if honourable, also good?"

"Yes."

"And are not the cowardly, and the bold, and the mad, on the contrary, influenced by base fears, and inspired with base confidence?"

He admitted that they are.

"And are they bold in what is base and evil, through any thing else than ignorance and want of knowledge?"

"So it is," he replied.

"What then? Do you call this, through which cowards are cowardly, cowardice or courage?"

"Cowardice," said he.

"But have not cowards appeared to be what they are, through not knowing what is dreadful?"

"Certainly," said he.

"They are cowardly then, through this want of knowledge?"

He admitted it.

"But that through which they are cowardly, you have admitted is cowardice?"

He assented.

"Must not, then, the not knowing what is dreadful, and not dreadful, be cowardice?"

He nodded assent.

"However," said I, "courage is contrary to cowardice."

He said it was.

"Is not then the knowledge of what is dreadful, and no dreadful, contrary to a want of knowledge of these things?"

And here he still nodded assent.

"But is not the want of knowing these things cowardice?"

He, here, with great difficulty, nodded assent.

"Is not the knowledge therefore, of what is dreadful, and not dreadful, courage, being contrary to a want of knowledge of these things?"

124. Here he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.

So I said, "Why, Protagoras, do you neither admit nor deny what I ask?"

"Do you conclude the subject," he said.

"I have only one more question to ask you," said I, "whether some men still appear to you as at first, to be most ignorant, and yet most courageous."

"You seem to be very anxious, Socrates, that I should be the person to answer. I will therefore indulge you, and I say, that from what has been granted, it appears to me to be impossible."

"I ask all these questions," said I, "on no other account, than because I wish to examine how the case stands with respect to things pertaining to virtue, and what virtue itself is. For I know that when this is discovered, that other will be clearly ascertained, about which you and I have both of us held so long a discussion, I maintaining that virtue cannot be taught, but you that it can. 125. And the present issue of our discussion appears to me, as if it were a man, to accuse and laugh at us, and if it had a voice, it would say, Absurd men ye are, Socrates and Protagoras; you, who at the outset maintained that virtue cannot be taught, are now contending in opposition to yourself, and endeavouring to shew that all things are knowledge, as justice, temperance, and courage, according to which method of proceeding it will certainly appear that virtue may be taught. For if virtue were any thing else than knowledge, as Protagoras endeavours to maintain, it clearly could not be taught; but now, if it shall appear to be altogether knowledge, as you contend, Socrates, it will be wonderful if it cannot be taught. Protagoras on the other hand, who at first insisted that it could be taught, now seems to contend for the contrary, that it may appear to be almost any thing else rather than knowledge; and so can on no account be taught. 126. I

therefore, Protagoras, seeing all these things terribly confused, this way and that, am exceedingly anxious that they should be made clear, and should wish, now we have discussed these things, to proceed to enquire what virtue is, and to examine again respecting it, whether it can be taught, or not, lest by chance that Epimetheus of yours should treacherously deceive us in our enquiry, just as he neglected us in the distribution which he made, as you say. Now in the fable, Prometheus pleased me more than Epimetheus, and making use of him, and looking forward with forethought to my whole life, I diligently attend to all these matters; and if you are willing, as I said at the beginning, I would most gladly join with you in examining them thoroughly."

To this Protagoras said, "I, Socrates, praise your zeal, and your method of unfolding arguments. For I am not in other respects, I think, a bad man, and least of all men envious: indeed I have often said of you to many, that I admire you more than all whom I am in the habit of meeting, and far above those of your own age: and I add, that I should not wonder if you were to rank among men renowned for wisdom. And these matters we will further discuss hereafter, when you please; but it is now time for me to attend to other business."

"It is right so to do," I replied, "if you think fit. For I too ought long since to have gone where I had to go, but I staid to oblige the beautiful Callias."

Having said and heard these things, we departed.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHÆDRUS.

PHÆDRUS, whom we have already^a met with among the followers of the sophist Hippias, happening to meet with Socrates, tells him that he has just left the orator Lysias, who had written and recited a speech on the subject of love, in which he argued that a youth ought rather to shew favour to one who is not in love than to one who is. Socrates, who pretends to be very anxious to hear the speech, begs Phædrus to repeat it from memory as well as he is able, for he cannot doubt but that he has learnt it by heart, so great is his admiration for its author. Phædrus affects shyness, though in reality desirous of practising himself on Socrates: at length, however, Socrates discovers that he has a copy of it under his cloak, so they proceed on their walk, talking by the way, till they reach a plane-tree on the banks of the Ilissus, outside the walls of Athens, under whose ample shade they lie down^b.

Phædrus reads the speech, which in addition to the faults of obscurity, inconclusiveness, and tautology, takes a very low and sensual view of the passion of love^c. When it is ended, Phædrus asks Socrates what he thinks of it, and whether it is not a wonderful composition, especially as to the language. Socrates at first praises it ironically, but on being pressed by Phædrus points out some of its faults, and says that even Lysias himself could not be satisfied with it, and that many others have both spoken and written finer things on the same subject, with which at that very instant his breast is full. Phædrus catches at this, and insists on Socrates repeating these fine things, promising that if he says any thing that excels the speech of Lysias he will erect his statue in gold in Olympia^d.

As it is the present design of Socrates to take the same low view of love that Lysias had done, he determines to speak with

^a See the Protagoras, § 17.

^c § 11—21.

^b § 1—10.

^d § 22—27.

his face covered, that he may not falter through shame. He begins by a definition of love, which he represents to be desire hurried on to the pleasure derived from personal beauty; and then he goes on to shew, with great perspicuity, how a person under the influence of such a passion must needs be anxious that the beloved object should not excel himself or be admired by others. Then with regard to the body, he will wish to make it effeminate, and be anxious that his beloved should be as much as possible dependent on him; and at length he will become unfaithful, forget all his former vows and promises, and leave his favourite despised and destitute, who will suffer most of all in this, that he has been debarred from cultivating his soul, than which, he adds, there neither is nor ever will be any thing more precious in the sight of gods and men^e.

Phædrus expects that Socrates will not only shew the disadvantages of granting favours to a lover, but also go on to point out the advantages of granting them to one who is not in love. This, however, he refuses to do; and then, conscience-stricken for that he has been guilty of an offence against the deity of Love in speaking of him in so impious a manner, he determines on making his recantation, by uttering a speech which shall describe that deity in his true character. He begins by condemning his former assertion that favour ought rather to be shewn to one who is not in love than to a lover, because the latter is mad and the former in his sober senses. For, he argues, it is not universally true that madness is an evil, so far from it, that the greatest blessings spring from madness, for even prophetic inspiration is a species of madness and derives its very name from it. And love is one of many kinds of madness, and as such the source of the greatest happiness to man. To prove this, he says, it is necessary to examine into the nature of the soul, both human and divine. The soul, then, is immortal, because it contains the principle of motion within itself (a subtle argument which it may be observed was

not adduced in the *Phædo*, where the soul's immortality was the immediate point under discussion.) Still, to explain what the soul is would require a divine and lengthened exposition; he must therefore content himself with saying what it is like. He therefore compares the soul to a pair of winged steeds and a charioteer. The horses and charioteers of the gods are all good, but all others are mixed. While the soul is perfect and winged it soars aloft, but when it loses its wings it is borne downward and becomes united with a body in which it takes up its abode, and the two united are called mortal. He then describes how Jupiter goes first, driving a winged chariot, and is followed by a host of gods and demons distributed into eleven divisions: in their flight they reach the external regions of heaven, and behold truth, justice, temperance, science, in their essences. Other inferior souls endeavour to follow and imitate them; few, however, can do so: those that get a glimpse of any of the true essences are free from harm till the next revolution, but those that are unable to do so are weighed down and lose their wings, and become implanted in earthly natures of various orders, and then, according to their conduct in this condition, are either restored to their former state or still further degraded. The mind of the philosopher, however, is alone furnished with wings, because his memory dwells on that which is divine¹.

This then is the madness above spoken of, when one, beholding beauty in this lower world, is reminded of the true, and looking upwards to it despises things below and is deemed to be affected with madness. But he who has become corrupted is not easily carried hence to beauty itself, nor does he reverence it when he beholds it, but looks upon it with carnal sensuality; whereas he, who has not been so far corrupted, when he beholds the imitation of beauty here, reverences it as a god, and, but for the imputation of madness, would sacrifice to it. Then his wings begin to swell again and en-

deavour to burst forth anew; but when separated from the beautiful object the soul becomes parched and the passages through which the wings shoot forth become closed. Thus alternately tormented with agony and joy, it becomes frantic and runs about trying to see the possessor of the beauty. This affection men call love. Now when a follower of Jupiter is thus seized, he is better able to bear the burden of the winged god: for such a one seeks one who resembles Jupiter to be the object of his love; and when he has found him, he endeavours to make him like his own gods.

As each soul was before divided into three parts, two having the form of horses, and the third that of a charioteer, so that division must still be maintained. When therefore the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring sight, the obedient horse is easily restrained, but the other compels them to hurry to the favourite, and longs to indulge in the delights of love. But the charioteer, on approaching him, is carried back to absolute beauty, and being awe-struck falls backward and throws the horses on their haunches. When by being repeatedly checked in this way the vicious horse has laid aside his insolence, he becomes humbled and the soul of the lover follows his favourite with reverence and awe. And the beloved being worshipped by one who does not feign the passion but who really feels it, requites the affection of his worshipper, and in turn longs for the lover in the same manner that he is longed for, possessing love's image, love returned. If then the better parts of their mind prevail so as to lead to a well-regulated life and philosophy, they pass their life in bliss and concord, and when they depart this life, they become winged and win one of the three truly Olympic contests, a greater good than which neither human prudence nor divine madness can bestow on man. If however, they have adopted a coarser and less philosophic mode of life, but still honourable, in the end they find the body without wings indeed, yet making an effort to become

winged and so carry off no trifling prize of impassioned madness^h.

When Socrates had ended his recantation to Love, Phædrus expresses great admiration of his speech; and adds that he doubts whether Lysias will ever venture to write speeches again. But Socrates shews him that such an expectation is altogether groundless; and after a charming little episode on the origin of grasshoppers, proposes to consider in what a correct mode of speaking and writing consistsⁱ.

The first essential is that the speaker should know the truth of the subject on which he is about to speak. And though it is commonly said that an orator need not know what is really just, but only what will appear so to the multitude, yet Socrates with great force destroys this fallacy, and shews that such rhetoric is not an art but an inartistic trick; for a genuine art of speaking neither does nor can exist without laying hold of truth. Rhetoric must be an art that leads the soul by means of argument. Now in courts of justice and popular assemblies men succeed by making things appear similar to each other so far as they are capable of being made appear so; and deception will more frequently occur in things that nearly resemble each other, so that a person who means to persuade or deceive another must be able to distinguish accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things, and so lead his hearer by means of resemblances. Taking this as his principle, Socrates proceeds to shew that the speech of Lysias is altogether inartistic, for that he ought first of all to have defined Love and divided it into its different species and shewn of which class he was going to speak, whereas he begins where he should have ended, and throughout speaks at random without any definite design. He then proceeds to comment on his own two speeches. In one he argued that favour ought to be shewn to one that is in love, in the other to a person that is not in love. In one he said that love was a kind of divine

^h § 73—84.

§ 85—91.

madness, and then dividing this madness into four parts he shewed that the madness of Love is the best. In these speeches, then, are seen the two methods of arguing correctly, definition and division, the former of which contemplates many things under one aspect and brings them together under one general idea, the latter separates that general idea into species^k.

Socrates then ridicules the rules of rhetoric laid down by many of the sophists, and having passed a high eulogium on Pericles, shews that a perfect orator must know the real nature of the things to which he will have to apply his speeches, and that is the soul; for as the power of speech consists in leading the soul, he must know how many kinds of soul there are, and by what arguments each kind is most easily persuaded^l.

From speaking he proceeds to writing, and tells a pleasant story of the invention of letters, and remarks that the evil of writing is, that, like painting, if you ask it a question it cannot answer; and when once written it is tossed from hand to hand, as well among those who understand it as those who do not. But there is another kind of discourse far more excellent, which is written in the learner's mind, and knows when to speak and when to be silent. The conclusion of the whole is that a speaker should be acquainted with the true nature of each subject on which he speaks or writes, be able to define, and divide things into their species until he reaches the indivisible, and to investigate the nature of the soul and apply his discourses to each soul according to its capacity.

Then, with a message, in accordance with these principles, to Lysias, and a high encomium on Isocrates, who promised to be led by a diviner impulse to holier and higher things, he concludes by praying that Pan would grant him to be beautiful in the inner man, and that all outward things might be at peace with those within. That he may deem the wise man rich: and may have such a portion of gold as none but a prudent man can bear or employ.

^k § 92—111.

^l § 112—132.

PHÆDRUS.

SOCRATES. PHÆDRUS.

Socr. My dear Phædrus, whither are you going, and from whence come you?

Phæ. From Lysias, son of Cephalus, Socrates; but I am going for a walk outside the walls; for I have spent a long time there, sitting from very early in the morning; but in obedience to your and my friend Acumenus, I take my walks in the open roads; for he says that they are more refreshing than those in the course.

Socr. He says rightly, my friend: Lysias then, as it seems, was in the city?

Phæ. Yes, with Epicrates in the Morychian house here, near the Olympium.

Socr. What was your employment there? Without doubt Lysias feasted you with speeches?

Phæ. You shall hear, if you have leisure to go on with me and listen.

Socr. What then? do you not think that, according to Pindar^a, I should consider it a matter above all want and leisure, to listen to the conversation between you and Lysias?

Phæ. Proceed then.

Socr. Do you begin your story.

2. *Phæ.* And indeed, Socrates, the subject is suited to you. For the question, in which we spent our time, I know not how, was amatory. For Lysias had written a speech in which he described a beautiful youth as being courted, but not by a lover; and on this very point he argued with great subtilty; for he maintains that favour ought to be shewn to one who is not in love, rather than to one who is in love.

Socr. Generous man! I wish he had written that favour should be shewn to a poor man rather than a rich one, and to an old than

^a Isthm. i. 2.

a young, and so on with respect to such things as happen to me and the most of us; for then his discourses would be charming and of general usefulness. I, for my part, am so very desirous to hear his speech, that even if you prolong your walk to Megara, and, after Herodicus, when you have reached the wall, turn back again, I shall on no account lag behind you.

3. *Phæ.* How say you, most excellent Socrates? Do you think, that what Lysias, the most able writer of the day, composed at his leisure in a long space of time, I who am but a novice could repeat from memory in a manner worthy of him? Far from it; though I would rather be able to do so than be the possessor of a large sum of gold.

Socr. Phædrus, if I know not Phædrus, I have also forgotten myself; but neither of these is the case; for I know well that on hearing Lysias's speech he not only heard it once, but urged him to read it repeatedly, and he readily complied; neither was this sufficient for Phædrus, but at length having got hold of the book, he examined the parts he liked best; and having done this, sitting from very early in the morning, he was fatigued and went out for a walk, as I believe, by the dog, having learnt the whole speech by heart, if it is not a very long one. And he was going outside the walls, that he might con it over, and, meeting with one who has a desire for hearing speeches, was delighted at seeing him approach, because he would have one to share his enthusiasm, and bade him accompany him in his walk. But when that lover of speeches begged him to recite it, he affected shyness, as if he did not wish to repeat it, though at length he would have compelled one to listen to it even though one was not willing to do so. Do you then, Phædrus, entreat him to do now what he will soon do at all events.

Phæ. It is, in truth, far best for me to repeat it as well as I can; for I see you are determined not to let me go, until I have delivered it some how or another.

Socr. You think perfectly right.

Phæ. I will do it then; but in truth, Socrates, I have by no means learnt the words of this oration by heart, though the general outline of all the several parts, in which he said the claims of one who is in love and one who is not differ from each other, I can go through summarily and in order, beginning from the first.

5. *Socr.* But shew me first, my dear friend, what you have got there in your left hand, under your cloak ; for I suspect that you have got the speech itself : and if this is the case, think thus of me, that I love you very much, but that, when Lysias is present, I have by no means made up my mind to lend myself to you to practise upon. Come then, shew it me.

Phæ. Stop, you have dashed down the hope I had, Socrates, of practising upon you. But where do you wish we should sit down and read ?

Socr. Let us turn down here, and go near the Ilissus, then we will sit down quietly, wherever you please.

Phæ. Very seasonably, as it appears, I happen to be without shoes, for you are always so. It will be easiest for us then to walk by the shallow stream, wetting our feet, and it will not be unpleasant, especially at this season of the year, and this time of the day.

Socr. Lead on then, and at the same time look out for a place where we may sit down.

6. *Phæ.* Do you see that lofty plane-tree ?

Socr. How should I not.

Phæ. There, there is both shade and a gentle breeze, and grass to sit down upon, or, if we prefer it, to lie down on.

Socr. Lead on, then.

Phæ. But tell me, Socrates, is not Boreas reported to have carried off Orithya from somewhere about this part of the Ilissus ?

Socr. So it is said.

Phæ. Must it not have been from this spot ? for the water hereabouts appears beautiful, clear and transparent, and well suited for damsels to sport about.

Socr. No, but lower down, as much as two or three stadia, where we cross over to the temple of the Huntress, and where there is, on the very spot, a kind of altar sacred to Boreas.

Phæ. I never noticed it. But tell me, by Jupiter, Socrates, do you believe that this fabulous account is true ?

7. *Socr.* If I disbelieved it, as the wise do, I should not be guilty of any absurdity : then having recourse to subtleties, I should say that a blast of Boreas threw her down from the neighbouring cliffs, as she was sporting with Pharmacea, and that having thus met her death she was said to have been carried off by Boreas, or from Mars' hill ; for there is also another

report that she was carried off from thence and not from this spot. But I, for my part, Phædrus, consider such things as pretty enough, but as the province of a very curious, pains-taking, and not very happy man, and for no other reason than this, that after this he must set us right as to the form of the Hippocentaurs, and then as to that of the Chimæra; besides there pours in upon him a crowd of similar monsters, Gorgons and Pegasuses, and other monstrous creatures, incredible in number and absurdity, which if any one were to disbelieve and endeavour to reconcile each with probability, employing for this purpose a kind of vulgar cleverness, he will stand in need of abundant leisure. 8. But I have not leisure at all for such matters; and the cause of it, my friend, is this; I am not yet able, according to the Delphic precept, to know myself. But it appears to me to be ridiculous, while I am still ignorant of this to busy myself about matters that do not concern me. Wherefore dismissing these matters, and receiving the popular opinion respecting them, as I just now said, I do not enquire about them, but about myself, whether I happen to be a beast, with more folds and more furious than Typhon, or whether I am a more mild and simple animal, naturally partaking of a certain divine and modest condition. But, my friend, to interrupt our conversation, is not this the tree to which you were leading me?

Phæ. This is the very one.

9. *Socr.* By Juno, a beautiful retreat. For this plane-tree is very wide-spreading and lofty, and the height and shadiness of this agnus castus are very beautiful, and as it is now at the perfection of its flowering, it makes the spot as fragrant as possible. Moreover, a most agreeable fountain flows under the plane-tree, of very cold water, to judge from its effect on the foot. It appears from these images and statues to be sacred to certain nymphs, and to Achelous. Observe again the freshness of the spot how charming and very delightful it is, and how summer-like and shrill it sounds from the choir of grasshoppers. But the most delightful of all is the grass, which with its gentle slope is naturally adapted to give an easy support to the head, as one reclines. So that, my dear Phædrus, you make an admirable stranger's guide.

10. *Phæ.* And you, my wonderful friend, appear to be a most surprising being: for as you say, you are just like a stranger

who is being shewn the sights, and not a native or the place. This comes from your never quitting the city, or going beyond the boundaries, nor do you seem to me ever to go outside the walls.

Socr. Pardon me, my excellent friend ; for I am a lover of learning : now the fields and trees will not teach me any thing, but men in the city do. You, however, appear to me to have discovered a charm to entice me out. For as those, who, by shaking leaves or some fruit before them, lead their hungry flocks, so do you, by holding out written speeches before me, seem as if you could lead me about all Attica, and wherever else you please. But now, for the present, since I am come here, I am resolved to lay me down, and do you in whatever posture you think you can read most conveniently, take this and read.

Phæ. Listen then. 11. " You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I think you have heard that it would be for our advantage if this took place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I do not happen to be one of your lovers : for they repent of the benefits they have conferred, as soon as their desires cease ; but the others have no time at which it is convenient for them to repent ; since not from necessity, but voluntarily, they confer benefits according to their ability, so as but to consult their own interests. Besides, lovers consider what of their affairs they have managed badly by reason of their love, and what benefits they have conferred, and adding thereto what labour they have undergone, they think that they have long since conferred sufficient favours on the objects of their love. But those who do not love have no pretence to make of the neglect of their own affairs on this score, nor can they take into account the labours they have undergone, nor make differences with their friends a pretext : so that, all such evils being removed, nothing remains for them but to do cheerfully whatever they think they will gratify them by doing. 12. Besides, if for this reason it is right to make much of those who love, because they say they are most devotedly attached to those whom they love, and are always ready, both in words and deeds, to incur the enmity of others, so that they can but gratify the objects of their love, it is easy to discover whether they speak the truth, because those whom they afterwards fall in love with they will prize more

highly than the former, and it is evident that if the latter require it, they will behave ill to the former. And how is it reasonable to lavish such a treasure^b on one afflicted with such a calamity, as no experienced person would ever attempt to avert? for they themselves confess that they are rather diseased than in their right minds, and that they know that they are out of their senses, but are unable to control themselves. How therefore, when they recover their senses, can they think that those things were right about which they were so anxious when in that state of mind? 13. Moreover, if you should choose the best from among your lovers, your choice must be made from a few; but if from among all others the one most suited to you, from many: so that there is much more hope that among the many there is one worthy of your affection. If, therefore, you respect the established usages of mankind, and are afraid lest, when men discover it, it should be a disgrace to you, it is probable that lovers, thinking that they are envied by others in the same way that they envy each other, should be so elated as to talk, and, out of ambition, publish to the world that they have not bestowed their labour in vain; but that such as are not in love, having a control over themselves, should prefer what is best to celebrity amongst men. 14. Besides, it must needs happen that many should hear of and see lovers following the objects of their affection, and doing this sedulously, so that when they are seen conversing with one another men think that they are together on account of desire already indulged or about to be so: but they do not attempt to blame those who do not love, on account of their familiarity, being aware that it is necessary to converse with some one, either on account of friendship or some other pleasure. 15. Moreover, if you have experienced uneasiness from the consideration that it is difficult for friendship to last, but that when a difference takes place under other circumstances a common calamity happens to both; but that when you have lavished what you prize most highly great injury would befall you, you would with good reason be more afraid of those who love. For there are many things that grieve them, and they think that every thing is done to their detriment. Wherefore they prohibit the objects of their love from associating with others, fearing those who possess wealth, lest they should get the

^b Youth.

better of them by means of their riches, and the well-educated, lest they should surpass them in intelligence; and they are apprehensive of the influence of every one who possesses any other advantage. By persuading you, then, to keep aloof from such as these, they cause you to be destitute of friends. If, therefore, regarding your own interest, you pursue a wiser course than they recommend, you are sure to quarrel with them. 16. But such as are not in love, but have obtained the accomplishment of their wishes through merit, will not envy your associating with others, but will rather hate those who will not associate with you, thinking that you are despised by them, and are benefited by those who associate with you. So that there is much more reason to hope that friendship will be produced between these by this means, than enmity. Moreover, most lovers conceive a desire for the person before they know their habits or are acquainted with their own qualities, so that it is uncertain whether they will still wish to be their friends when their desire has ceased; but with those who are not in love, and who have done this, having been friends with each other before, it is not probable that acts of kindness will make their friendship less, but that they will be left as monuments of future services. 17. Besides, it will tend to your improvement if you are persuaded by me rather than by a lover. For they, contrary to your best interests, praise all that you say and do, partly fearing lest they should offend you, partly being themselves depraved in their judgment, through desire, for love shews itself in such things: it makes the unsuccessful consider as distressing things which occasion no pain to others, and compels the successful to praise things which are not worthy the name of pleasures; so that it is much more proper to pity than envy those that are loved. 18. But if you will be persuaded by me, first of all I will associate with you, not attending to present pleasure, but future advantage, not overcome by love, but controlling myself, not conceiving violent enmities for trifling offences, but slowly indulging slight anger for great offences, pardoning involuntary faults, and endeavouring to divert you from such as are voluntary; for these are the marks of a friendship that will endure for a long time. If, however, it has occurred to you that it is not possible for affection to be strong unless one is in love, you should consider that in that case we should not be very

fond of our children or our fathers and mothers, nor acquire faithful friends, who have become such not from desire of this kind, but from other useful qualities. 19. Moreover, if it is right to gratify those most who most need it, it is right also with respect to others to benefit, not the best men, but the most needy; for, being delivered from the greatest evils, they will feel the deepest gratitude towards us. And besides this, in private entertainments it will not be proper to invite our friends, but mendicants and those who are in need of a hearty meal; for these will greet and follow us, and will come to our doors, and be highly delighted, and feel the utmost gratitude, and pray for many blessings upon us. 20. But surely it is right to gratify those not who are exceedingly needy, but who are best able to repay a kindness, nor those who love only, but those who deserve this favour; nor such as will enjoy the bloom of your youth, but who, when you are old, will share their own fortune with you; nor those who, when they have effected their object, will boast of it to others, but who, out of modesty, will be silent towards all men; nor those who are devoted to you for a short time, but who will be greatly attached to you throughout life; nor who, when their desire has ceased, will seek a pretext for quarrelling, but who, when your bloom is gone, will then exhibit their own excellence. 21. Do you, then, remember what I have said, and consider this, that friends admonish lovers that their course of life is a bad one, but no one ever yet found fault with those who are not in love, as if, on that account, they consulted ill for their own interests. Perhaps, however, you may ask me whether I advise you to gratify all who are not in love. But I think that not even a lover would exhort you to be thus affected towards all your lovers: for neither if one considers the matter reasonably is such a course deserving of equal gratitude, nor if you wished it, is it equally possible to keep it secret from others; but it is requisite that no harm should result from the business; on the contrary, advantage to both. I, for my part, think that enough has been said, but if you require any thing more, under the impression that it has been omitted, question me."

22. What do you think of the speech, Socrates? Does it not appear to you to be wonderfully composed in other respects, and especially as to the language?

Socr. Divinely indeed, my friend, so much so that I am

amazed. And I had this feeling through you, Phædrus, by looking at you, for you appeared to me to be enraptured with the speech while you were reading it. For supposing you to understand such matters better than I do, I followed you, and, in following you, I felt the same enthusiasm with you, my inspired friend.

Phæ. Well; do you think proper to jest in this manner?

Socr. Do I appear to you to jest, and not to be in earnest?

Phæ. Don't, Socrates! But tell me truly, by Jupiter the god of friendship, do you think that any other man in Greece could speak more ably and fully than this on the same subject?

23. *Socr.* But what? ought the speech to be praised by you and me for this reason, that its composer has said what he ought, and not only because every word is clear, and rounded, and accurately polished off? For, if it ought, it may be granted for your sake, since it escaped me by reason of my nothingness: for I attended only to its rhetoric, but this I did not think that even Lysias himself would think sufficient. And to me, indeed, it seemed, Phædrus, unless you say otherwise, that he has repeated the same things twice and thrice, as if he had not the faculty of saying much on the same subject, or perhaps he did not care about this. Moreover he appeared to me to make a wanton display of his ability to express these things in different ways, and both ways most elegantly.

24. *Phæ.* You say nothing to the purpose, Socrates: for the speech has this very merit in the highest degree. For he has omitted nothing belonging to his subject, which was worthy to be mentioned: so that, beyond what has been said by him, no one could ever say more things or of greater weight.

Socr. On this point I am no longer able to agree with you; for the ancient and wise, both men and women, who have spoken and written on this subject, would confute me, if I were to admit this out of compliment to you.

Phæ. Who are they? and where have you heard better things than these?

Socr. I am unable to say on the moment; but I am sure that I have heard them from some one or other, either from the beautiful Sappho, or the wise Anacreon, or some other writer. Whence do I form this conjecture? some how or other, my divine friend, my breast is full, and I feel that I could say other things in addition to those and not inferior to them. That I

understand none of them of myself, I am well aware, being conscious of my ignorance. It remains then, I think, that I must have filled myself, like a vessel, by means of hearing, from some foreign source; but owing to my stupidity I have forgotten even this, both how and from whom I heard it.

25. *Phæ.* You have told me excellent news, my noble friend. For though you cannot tell me from whom and how you heard it, even if I bid you, yet do the very thing that you say; promise that you will say other things better and not less in quality than those contained in the book, without making use of any thing in it. And I promise you, after the manner of the nine Archons, that I will dedicate at Delphi, a golden statue as large as life, not only of myself, but also of you.

Socr. You are very kind, Phædrus, and really worth your weight in gold, if you suppose I mean that Lysias was entirely wrong, and that it is possible to say something altogether different from what he has said; for I do not think that this could happen even to the poorest writer. 26. For instance with respect to the subject in hand; do you think that any one who was maintaining that favours ought to be shewn to one who is not in love rather than to one who is, if he neglected to extol the prudence of the former and to blame the folly of the latter, these being obvious points, could have any thing else to say? But I think that such points are to be allowed and granted to a speaker, and that of such things not the invention but the method of handling is to be praised, but of things which are obvious, and which are not difficult to discover, the invention as well as the method of handling.

Phæ. I grant what you say; for you appear to me to have spoken fairly. I will therefore do thus; I will allow you to suppose that one who is in love is more diseased than one who is not, but for the rest if you say other things more fully and of greater weight than Lysias, you shall stand in Olympia, of solid gold, near the offering of the Cypselidæ.

27. *Socr.* You are quite serious, Phædrus, because in teasing you I have attacked your favourite, and you think that I shall really attempt to say something more skilfully wrought than his wisdom has produced.

Phæ. For that matter, my friend, you have given me as good a hold on you; for you must speak, at all events, as well as you are able. And take care that we are not compelled to

have recourse to that troublesome method of comedians, of retorting upon one another, and do not compel me to say^c, "If I, Socrates! know not Socrates, I have also forgotten myself," and, "he longed to speak, but affected shyness." But make up your mind that we shall not leave this spot before you have given utterance to what you said you have in your breast. For we two are by ourselves, in a lonely place, and I am both stronger and younger; from all this understand what I mean, and on no account prefer speaking by compulsion rather than willingly.

28. *Socr.* But, my excellent Phædrus, it would be ridiculous in me, who am but a novice in comparison with an experienced author, to attempt to speak extempore on the same subject.

Phæ. Do you know how the case stands? Let me have no more of your airs; for I have that to say which will force you to speak.

Socr. On no account say it then.

Phæ. Nay, but I will say it. And what I have to say is an oath. For I swear to you, by whom, by what god? shall it be by this plane-tree? that unless you make a speech to me before this very tree, I will never again either shew or repeat to you another speech by any one whomsoever.

Socr. Ah, wicked one! how well have you found out how to compel a lover of speeches to do whatever you bid him.

Phæ. Why then do you hesitate?

Socr. I shall not any longer, since you have sworn this oath. For how should I ever be able to debar myself of such a feast?

Phæ. Begin then.

Socr. Do you know then, what I mean to do?

Phæ. About what?

Socr. I shall speak with my face covered, that I may run through my speech as quickly as possible, and that I may not, by looking at you, be put out through shame.

Phæ. Do but speak; and as to the rest, do as you please.

29. *Socr.* Come then, ye Muses, whether from the character of your song, ye are called tuneful^d, or whether ye derive this appellation from the musical race of the Ligians, assist me in the tale which this best of men compels me to relate,

^c See before, § 3 and 4.

^d There is here a play on the words *Ἀγλαίαι* "tuneful," and *Λιγύων* Ligians," which cannot be retained in an English version.

that so his friend, who heretofore appeared to him to be wise, may now appear still more so.

There was once a boy, or rather a youth, of exceeding beauty; and he had very many lovers. One of them was a cunning fellow; who though he was no less in love than the rest, persuaded the boy that he was not in love. And once, as he was courting him, he endeavoured to persuade him that favour ought to be shewn to one who was not in love, in preference to one who was. And he spoke as follows.

On every subject, my boy, there is one method of beginning. for those who mean to deliberate well; they must know what the thing is about which the deliberation is to be, or else of necessity go altogether astray. But it has escaped the notice of most men that they do not know the essence of each several thing. As if they did know, then, they do not agree with each other at the outset of the enquiry, and as they proceed they pay the probable penalty, for they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. Let not you and I, then, fall into the error which we condemn in others, but since the question proposed to us is, whether we ought rather to enter into a friendship with one who is in love or not, having by mutual agreement settled on a definition of love, what it is, and what power it has, and looking back and referring to this, let us prosecute our enquiry whether it occasions advantage or detriment. 30. That love, then, is a kind of desire, is clear to every one; and we know that they who are not in love, desire beautiful things. How then shall we distinguish a lover from one who is not in love? Here it is necessary to observe, that in each of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow wherever they lead, one being an innate desire of pleasures, the other an acquired opinion, which aims at what is most excellent. These sometimes agree in us, and sometimes are at variance; and sometimes one gets the upper hand, at other times the other. When opinion therefore with the aid of reason leads to that which is best, and gets the upper hand, we give the name of temperance to this power; but when desire drags us irrationally to pleasures and rules within us, this ruling power takes the name of excess. But excess has many names; for it has many limbs and many forms. 31. And of these principles whichever happens to get the predominance gives its own designation to the person who

possesses it, and that neither honourable nor worth acquiring. For instance with respect to food, desire that gets the better of the highest reason, and of the other desires, will be called gluttony, and will cause the person who possesses it to be called by the same name; again with respect to drinking, when it has usurped dominion, by leading its possessor in this direction, it is clear what designation it will acquire: and with respect to other things akin to these, and the names of kindred desires, it is manifest how they ought to be called, according as each for the time being happens to be dominant. Why all this has been said is already pretty evident, but every thing becomes in a manner more clear by being mentioned than if not mentioned. 32. For desire without reason having got the upper hand of opinion that tends to what is right, and being driven towards the pleasure derived from beauty, and being strongly impelled by its kindred desires to corporeal beauty, receives its name from this very strength and is called love^e. But, my dear Phædrus, do I appear to you, as I do to myself, to be moved by some divine influence?

Phæ. Assuredly, Socrates, an unusual fluency has got possession of you.

Socr. Listen to me then in silence. For in truth the place appears to be divine. If, therefore, in the progress of my speech I should be frequently entranced by the genius of the spot, you must not be surprized. For what I utter now is not very far removed from dithyrambics.

Phæ. You say most truly.

33. *Socr.* Of this, however, you are the cause. But hear the rest; for perhaps the attack of the trance may be averted: though this will be the care of the deity, but let us again direct our discourse to the boy.

Well then, my excellent boy, what that is, about which we are to deliberate, has been declared and defined. Keeping this in view, then, let us proceed to consider what advantage or detriment will probably accrue from one who is in love and one who is not, to him that shews favour to them.

He that is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure, must necessarily, I think, endeavour to make the object of his love

^e I have followed Stallbaum in omitting the words ἐρρωμένως and νική-σασα, but still fear that I have failed to convey the full meaning of this difficult and corrupt passage.

as agreeable to himself as possible. But to one diseased every thing is pleasant that does not oppose his wishes; but that which is superior and equal is hateful to him. A lover therefore will never willingly allow his favourite to be either superior to or on an equality with himself, but is always endeavouring to make him inferior and more deficient. An ignorant person is inferior to a wise one, a coward to a brave one, one who is unable to speak to a rhetorician, a dull to a clever one. 34. Since so many evils, and even more than these, are engendered or naturally exist in the mind of the beloved object, the lover must of necessity rejoice at the existence of the one sort and endeavour to introduce the others, or be deprived of immediate pleasure. He must therefore needs be envious, and by debarring his favourite from much other and that profitable society, whence he might become most manly, he is the occasion of great harm, and of the greatest by debarring him of that by means of which he would become most wise; and this is divine philosophy, from which a lover must needs keep his favourite at a distance, through the fear of being despised; and must so manage every thing else, that he may be ignorant of every thing, and look to the lover for every thing, thus being most agreeable to him, but most detrimental to himself. As concerns the mind, then, a man that is in love is in no respect a profitable guardian and companion.

But as to the habit and care of the body, what it will be and how he will attend to it, of which a man has become the lord, who is compelled to pursue the pleasant in preference to the good, is next to be considered. 35. He will be seen pursuing some delicate and not hardy youth, not reared in the open air but under the shade of mingled trees, a stranger to manly toil, and dry sweats, but no stranger to a delicate and effeminate mode of life, adorned with foreign colours and ornaments, through want of such as are natural, and studious of all such other things as accompany these: what they are, is clear, and it is not worth while to enter into further detail; but having summed them up under one head, we will proceed to another part of our subject. Such a body both in battle and other great emergencies, enemies will look upon with confidence, but friends and lovers themselves will fear for. This, however, as sufficiently evident, may be dismissed. 36. In the next place we must declare what advantage or what detriment, with

respect to our possessions, the society and guardianship of one in love will occasion. But this indeed is manifest to every one, and especially to a lover, that he would desire above all things that the object of his love should be bereft of his dearest, fondest, and holiest treasures: for he would have him gladly deprived of father and mother, kindred and friends, thinking that they are an hindrance to, and blamers of the sweetest intercourse with him. Moreover if he has abundance of gold, or any other property, he will think that he cannot be so easily caught, nor when caught easily managed. Wherefore it must of necessity happen that a lover should grudge his favourite possession of abundance, and should rejoice at its loss. Further still, a lover will wish his favourite to continue as long as possible without a wife, without child, and without home, from a desire to enjoy his own delights for as long a time as possible. 37. There are, indeed, other evils besides these, but some deity has mingled present pleasure with most of them: with a flatterer, for instance, a dreadful beast and great bane, nature has nevertheless mingled a kind of pleasure that is by no means inelegant. And some one perhaps may blame a mistress as detrimental, and many other similar creatures and pursuits, which for the day, however, afford the greatest enjoyment; but to a favourite, a lover besides being detrimental, is the most disagreeable of all for daily intercourse. For the ancient proverb says, that equal delights in equal; I suppose, because an equality of age leading to equal pleasures produces friendship by similarity of tastes. But still the intercourse even of these brings satiety: and moreover, necessity is said to be irksome to every one in every thing; and this in addition to their dissimilarity is especially the case with a lover towards his favourite. 38. For an old man who associates with a young one, does not willingly leave him, either by day or night, but is driven on by necessity and frenzy, which leads him on by constantly giving him pleasure, through seeing, hearing, touching, and by every sense feeling the presence of the beloved object, so that he would with pleasure cling constantly to him: but by giving what solace or what pleasures to the object of his love, can he prevent him during an intercourse of equal duration, from feeling the utmost disgust, while he sees a face old and no longer in its bloom, with the other things that accompany it, which are unpleasant even to hear spoken

of, much more so to have actually to do with from an ever-pressing necessity ; when he has too to keep a suspicious watch over himself at all times and in all company, and has to listen to unreasonable and extravagant praises, and reproaches as well, which when the lover is sober are intolerable, and when he is drunk, are not only intolerable but disgraceful from the loathsome and undisguised freedom of his language. 39. Thus he that is in love is detrimental and disgusting, but when he ceases to love, he is thenceforth unfaithful towards him who by many promises and with many oaths and entreaties he could hardly prevail on at that time to endure his troublesome familiarity in the hope of advantage. But now, when payment ought to be made, having received within himself another ruler and master, reason and prudence, instead of love and madness, he has become another man unknown to his favourite. He then demands a return for former favours, reminding him of what was done and said, as if he was talking to the same person ; but the other through shame, dares neither say that he has become another man, nor is he able to adhere to the oaths and promises of the former insensate reign, now that he has got possession of his senses and has become prudent, fearing lest, by doing the same things as before, he should become like what he was, and the same thing again. 40. Hence he becomes a runaway, and of necessity a defrauder, who was before a lover, and the shell being turned^f, he changes from pursuit to flight ; but the other is forced to pursue him with indignation and curses, having been ignorant from the very beginning that he ought never to have granted favours to one that is in love and of necessity out of his senses, but much rather to one who is not in love, and in his right mind ; otherwise he must necessarily give himself up to one that is unfaithful, morose, envious, disgusting, detrimental to his property, detrimental to his bodily habit, but far more detrimental to the cultivation of his soul, than which in truth there neither is nor ever will be any thing more precious in the sight of gods and men. It is right, therefore, my boy, to reflect on these things, and to know that the attachment of a lover is not united with

^f In allusion to a game among children, in which a shell, white on one side and black on the other, was thrown up into the air, and according as either side fell uppermost, one set of playmates ran off and the other pursued, or vice versa.

good will, but like food for the sake of repletion, "as wolves love a lamb, so lovers love a boy."

This is it, Phædrus; you must not expect to hear me say another word, but must let my speech end here.

41. *Phæ.* But I thought it was only in the middle, and that it would say as much about one who is not in love, that he ought rather to be favoured, mentioning in turn what advantages he has. Why then, Socrates, do you stop short now?

Socr. Did you not observe, my excellent friend, that I was now uttering epics, and no longer dithyrambics, and this while giving expression to blame? If then I should begin to praise the other, what do you think would become of me? Do you not know that I shall be thrown into an extacy by the Nymphs, to whom you have purposely exposed me? I say then, in one word, that whatever vices I have attributed to the one, to the other the contrary advantages belong. What need then is there for a long speech? for enough has been said about both. Thus the story will be treated as it ought to be treated: I will, therefore, cross over the river and go home, before I am compelled by you to do something more difficult.

42. *Phæ.* Not yet, Socrates, before the heat has passed away. Do you not see that it is now nearly high-noon, as it is called? Let us, then, remain here, and converse together about what has been said, and as soon as it grows cool, we will go home.

Socr. You are a strange man for speeches, Phædrus, and really wonderful. For I think that of all the speeches made during your life-time no one has been the occasion of more being made than yourself, whether by speaking them yourself, or in some way or other compelling others. I except Simmias of Thebes; but you far surpass all the rest. And now again you appear to me to be the occasion of another speech being made.

Phæ. You do not announce war indeed. But how and what speech is this?

43. *Socr.* When I was about to cross the river, my good friend, the divine and wonted signal was given me, (it always deters me from what I am about to do,) and I seemed to hear a voice from this very spot, which would not suffer me to depart before I had purified myself, as if I had committed some offence against the deity. Now I am a prophet, though

not a very good one, but like bad writers, am good enough for my own purposes. Accordingly, I clearly perceive my offence: for, my friend, the soul is in some measure prophetic; and mine troubled me some time since as I was delivering the speech, and some how I was cast down, as Ibycus says, for fear I should offend the gods, and gain honour from men in exchange. But now I perceive my offence.

Phæ. What do you say it is?

Socr. A dreadful, dreadful speech, Phædrus, you both brought here yourself, and compelled me to utter.

Phæ. How so?

Socr. Foolish, and in some sort impious: and can any thing be more dreadful than this?

44. *Phæ.* Nothing, if you say truly.

Socr. What then? Do you not think that Love is son of Venus, and a god?

Phæ. So it is said.

Socr. Yet not by Lysias, nor by that speech of yours which was uttered through my mouth when bewitched by you. But if Love be, as indeed he is, a god, or something divine, he cannot be in any respect evil; yet both our late speeches spoke of him as such. In this therefore they committed an offence against Love, besides their silliness was very amusing, in that they said nothing sound or true, yet they prided themselves as if they were something, because they might perhaps impose on some simpletons and gain their approbation. It is necessary, therefore, my friend, that I should purify myself. But there is an ancient purification for those who offend in matters relating to mythology, which Homer was not acquainted with, but Stesichorus was. For, being deprived of sight for defaming Helen, he was not ignorant like Homer, but as a friend of the Muses, knew the cause, and immediately composed the following lines: "This tale is not true, thou didst not go on board the well-benched ships, nor reach the towers of Troy." Thus having composed this entire recantation as it is called, he immediately recovered his sight. I however, will be wiser than them in this respect; for before I suffer any harm for defaming Love, I will endeavour to present him my recantation, with my head bare, and not, as before, covered through shame.

45. *Phæ.* There is nothing, Socrates, that you could say to me more agreeable than this.

Socr. For, my good Phædrus, you must be sensible how shamelessly both our speeches were composed, as well mine as that which was read from the book. For, if any generous man, and of mild disposition, who is either now in love with, or has formerly been enamoured of another like himself, had happened to hear us say that lovers contract violent enmities for trifling causes, and are envious of, and detrimental to, their favourites, can you suppose that he would do otherwise than think he was listening to men brought up among sailors, and who had never witnessed an ingenuous love, and would be far from assenting to the censures we cast upon Love?

Phæ. Probably he would, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Socr. Out of respect to him, then, and fear of Love himself, I am anxious to wash out as it were the brackish taste by a sweet speech. And I advise Lysias, too, to write as soon as possible, that it is proper, under similar circumstances, to favour a lover rather than one who is not in love.

46. *Phæ.* You may be well assured that this will be done; for, when you have spoken in praise of the lover, Lysias must needs be compelled by me to write another speech on the same subject.

Socr. This I believe, while you continue the man you are.

Phæ. Speak then with confidence.

Socr. But where is my boy, to whom I spoke? that he may hear this too, and may not, from not hearing it, hastily grant favours to one who is not in love.

Phæ. Here he is always very near to you, whenever you want him.

Socr. Understand then, my beautiful boy, that the former speech was that of Phædrus, son of Pythocles, a man of Myrrhinus; but that which I am now about to deliver is the speech of Stesichorus, son of Euphemus, of Himera. It must begin thus:

“The assertion is not true which declares that when a lover is present favour ought rather to be shewn to one who is not in love, because the one is mad and the other in his sober senses. 47. For if it were universally true that madness is evil, the assertion would be correct. But now the greatest blessings we have spring from madness, when granted by divine bounty. For the prophetess at Delphi, and the priestesses at Dodona, have, when mad, done many and noble ser-

vices for Greece, both privately and publicly, but in their sober senses, little or nothing. And if we were to speak of the Sybil and others, who, employing prophetic inspiration, have correctly predicted many things to many persons respecting the future, we should be too prolix in relating what is known to every one. 48. This, however, deserves to be adduced by way of testimony, that such of the ancients as gave names to things did not consider madness as disgraceful or a cause of reproach : for they would not have attached this very name to that most noble art by which the future is discerned, and have called it a mad art ; but considering it noble when it happens by the divine decree, they gave it this name ; but the men of the present day, by ignorantly inserting the letter τ , have called it the prophetic art^ε. Since also with respect to the investigation of the future by people in their senses, which is made by means of birds and other signs, inasmuch as men by means of reflection, furnished themselves by human thought with intelligence and information, they gave it the name of prognostication^η, which the moderns, by using the emphatic long \omicron , now call augury. But how much more perfect and valuable, then, prophecy is than augury, one name than the other, and one effect than the other, by so much did the ancients testify that madness is more noble than sound sense, that which comes from God than that which proceeds from men. 49. Moreover, for those dire diseases and afflictions, which continued in some families in consequence of ancient crimes committed by some or other of them, madness springing up and prophesying to those to whom it was proper, discovered a remedy, fleeing for refuge to prayers and services of the gods, whence obtaining purifications and atoning rites, it made him who possessed it sound, both for the present and the future, by discovering to him, who was rightly mad and possessed, a release from present evils. There is a third possession and madness proceeding from the Muses, which seizing upon a tender and chaste soul, and rousing and inspiring it to the composition of odes and

^ε It is impossible, in an English version, to retain Plato's explanation of the progressive application of kindred words ; if the unlearned reader can decypher the following Greek letters he may possibly understand our author's meaning ; *μανία* is *madness*, *μανική*, the *mad art*, *μαντική*, the *prophetic art*.

^η *οἰωνιστική*, *prognostication*, *οἰωνιστική*, *augury*.

other species of poetry, by adorning the countless deeds of antiquity, instructs posterity. But he who without the madness of the Muses approaches the gates of poesy under the persuasion that by means of art he can become an efficient poet, both himself fails in his purpose, and his poetry, being that of a sane man, is thrown into the shade by the poetry of such as are mad.

50. So great and even more noble effects of madness proceeding from the gods I am able to mention to you. Let us not, therefore, be afraid of this, nor let any argument disturb and frighten us so as to persuade us that we ought to prefer a sane man as our friend in preference to one who is under the influence of a divine impulse; but let him carry all the victory when he was shewn this in addition, that love is sent by the gods for no benefit to the lover and the beloved. But we, on the other hand, must prove that such madness is given by the gods, for the purpose of producing the highest happiness. Now the proof will be incredible to the subtle, but credible to the wise. It is necessary, therefore, first of all to understand the truth with respect to the nature of the soul both divine and human, by observing its affections and operations. 51. This then is the beginning of the demonstration.

Every soul is immortal: for whatever is continually moved is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Therefore that only which moves itself, since it does not quit itself, never ceases to be moved, but is also the source and beginning of motion to all other things that are moved. But a beginning is uncreate: for every thing that is created must necessarily be created from a beginning, but a beginning itself from nothing whatever; for if a beginning were created from any thing, it would not be a beginning. 52. Since then it is uncreate it must also of necessity be indestructible; for should a beginning perish, it could neither itself be ever created from any thing, nor any thing else from it, since all things must be created from a beginning. Thus then the beginning of motion is that which moves itself: and this can neither perish nor be created, or all heaven and all creation must collapse and come to a stand-still, and never again have any means whereby it may be moved and created. 53. Since then it appears that that which is moved by itself is immortal, no one will be ashamed to say that this is the very essence and true notion of soul. For every body which is

moved from without, is soulless, but that which is moved from within of itself, possesses a soul, since this is the very nature of soul. But if this be the case, that there is nothing else which moves itself except soul, soul must necessarily be both uncreate and immortal. This then may suffice for its immortality.

But respecting its idea we must speak as follows: what it is, would in every way require a divine and lengthened exposition to tell, but what it is like, a human and a shorter one: in this way then we will describe it. 54. Let it then be likened to the combined power of a pair of winged steeds and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all both good themselves and of good extraction, but all others are mixed. In the first place, then, our ruling power drives a pair of steeds, in the next place, of these horses it has one that is beautiful and noble, and of similar extraction, but the other is of opposite extraction, and opposite character; our driving therefore is necessarily difficult and troublesome. But we must endeavour to explain in what respect an animal is called mortal or immortal. All soul takes care of all that is without soul, and goes about all heaven, appearing at different times in different forms. 55. While it is perfect, then, and winged, it soars aloft and governs the universe: but when it has lost its wings it is borne downward, until it meets with something solid, in which having taken up its abode, by assuming an earthly body, which appears to move itself by means of its own power, the whole together is called an animal, soul and body compounded, and takes the appellation of mortal. But the immortal derives its name from no deduction of reasoning, but as we neither see, nor sufficiently understand God, we represent him as an immortal animal possessed of soul, and possessed of body, and these united together throughout all time. Let these things, however, so be and be described as God pleases. But let us now discover the cause of the loss of the wings, why they fall off from the soul. It is something of the following kind:

56. The natural power of a wing, is to carry up heavy substances by raising them aloft to the regions where the race of the gods dwells; and of the parts connected with the body, it probably partakes most largely of that which is divine. But that which is divine is beautiful, wise, good, and every thing of that kind. By these then the wings of the soul are chiefly,

nourished and increased, but by what is base and vile, and other similar contraries, it falls to decay and perishes. Now the mighty chief in heaven, Jupiter, goes first, driving a winged chariot, ordering and taking care of all things; and there follows him a host of gods and demons, distributed into eleven divisions, for Vesta remains alone in the dwelling of the gods: but of the others all that have been assigned a station as chief gods in the number of the twelve, lead in the order to which they have been severally appointed. 57. But there are many delightful sights and paths within heaven among which the race of the blessed gods move, each performing his own proper work; and whoso has both will and power accompanies them; for envy stands aloof from the heavenly choir. But when they proceed to a banquet and feast, they now ascend by an up-hill path to the highest arch of heaven: and the chariots of the gods, which from being equally poised are obedient to the rein, move easily, but all others with difficulty; for the horse that partakes of vice weighs them down, leaning and pressing heavily towards the earth, if he happens not to have been well trained by his charioteer. Here then the severest toil and trial is laid upon the soul. For those that are called immortal, when they reach the summit, proceeding outside, stand on the back of heaven, and while they are stationed here, its revolution carries them round, and they behold the external regions of heaven. 58. But the region above heaven no poet here has ever yet sung of, nor ever will sing of, as it deserves. It is, however, as follows: for surely I may venture to speak the truth, especially as my subject is truth. For essence, that really exists, colourless, formless and intangible, is visible only to intelligence that guides the soul, and around it the family of true science have this for their abode. As then the mind of deity is nourished by intelligence and pure science, so the mind of every soul that is about to receive what properly belongs to it, when it sees after a long time that which is, is delighted, and by contemplating the truth, is nourished and thrives, until the revolution of heaven brings it round again to the same point. And during this circuit it beholds justice herself, it beholds temperance, it beholds science, not that to which creation is annexed, nor that which is different in different things of those which we call real, but that which is science in what really is. And in like manner, having beheld all other

things that really are, and having feasted on them, it again enters into the interior of heaven, and returns home. 59. And on its return, the charioteer having taken his horses to the manger, sets ambrosia before them, and afterwards gives them nectar to drink. And this is the life of the gods.

But, with respect to other souls, that which best follows and imitates a god, raises the head of its charioteer to the outer region, and is carried round with the rest in the revolution, yet is confused by its horses, and scarcely able to behold real existences; but another at one time rises, at another sinks, and owing to the violence of the horses, partly sees, and partly not. The rest follow, all eager for the upper region, but being unable to reach it they are carried round sunk beneath the surface, trampling on and striking against each other, in endeavouring to get one before another. Hence the tumult, and struggling, and sweating is extreme; and here through the fault of the charioteers many are maimed, and many break many of their feathers; and all of them having undergone much toil depart without having succeeded in getting a view of that which is, and after their departure they make use of the food of mere opinion. 60. And this is the reason for the great anxiety to behold the field of truth, where it is; the proper pasture for the best part of the soul happens to be in the meadow there, and it is the nature of the wing by which the soul is borne aloft, to be nourished by it; and this is a law of Adrastia¹, that whatever soul, in accompanying a deity, has beheld any of the true essences, it shall be free from harm until the next revolution, and if it can always accomplish this, it shall be always free from harm: but whenever from inability to keep up it has not seen any of them, and from meeting with some misfortune, has been filled with oblivion and vice, and so weighed down, and from being weighed down has lost its wings, and fallen to the earth, then there is a law that this soul should not be implanted in any brutal nature in its first generation, but that the soul which has seen most, should enter into the germ of a man who will become a philosopher or a lover of the beautiful, or a votary of the Muses and Love; but that the second should enter into the form of a constitutional king, or a warrior and commander, the third into that of a statesman, or economist, or merchant, the fourth into one

¹ That is, "an inevitable law."

who loves the toil of gymnastic exercises, or who will be employed in healing the body, the fifth will have a prophetic life or one connected with the mysteries, to the sixth the poetic life or some other of those employed in imitation will be best adapted, to the seventh a mechanical or agricultural life, to the eighth the life of a sophist or mob-courtier, to the ninth that of a tyrant. 61. But among all these, whosoever passes his life justly afterwards obtains a better lot, but who unjustly, a worse one. For to the same place, whence each soul comes, it does not return till the expiration of ten thousand years ; for it does not recover its wings for so long a period, except it is the soul of a sincere lover of wisdom, or of one who has made philosophy his favourite^k. But these in the third period of a thousand years, if they have chosen this life thrice in succession, thereupon depart, with their wings restored in the three thousandth year. But the others, when they have ended their first life, are brought to trial ; and being sentenced, some go to places of punishment beneath the earth and there suffer for their sins, but others, being borne upwards by their sentence to some region in heaven, pass their time in a manner worthy of the life they have lived in human form. But in the thousandth year, both kinds coming back again for the allotment and choice of their second life, choose that which they severally please. And here a human soul passes into the life of a beast, and from a beast he who was once a man passes again into a man. 62. For the soul which has never seen the truth, cannot come into this form : for it is necessary that a man should understand according to a generic form, as it is called, which proceeding from many perceptions is by reasoning combined into one. And this is a recollection of those things which our soul formerly saw when journeying with deity, despising the things which we now say are, and looking up to that which really is. Wherefore, with justice, the mind of the philosopher is alone furnished with wings ; for, to the best of his power, his memory dwells on those things, by the contemplation of which even deity is divine. But a man who makes a right use of such memorials as these, by constantly perfecting himself in perfect mysteries, alone becomes truly perfect. And by keeping aloof from human pursuits, and dwelling on that which is divine, he is found fault

^k παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας. So in the Gorgias (§ 82) Socrates calls "philosophy his favourite," τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά.

with by the multitude as out of his senses, but it escapes the notice of the multitude that he is inspired.

63. To this then comes our whole argument respecting the fourth kind of madness, on account of which any one, who, on seeing beauty in this lower world, being reminded of the true, begins to recover his wings, and, having recovered them, longs to soar aloft, but being unable to do it, looks upwards like a bird, and despising things below, is deemed to be affected with madness. Our argument comes to this then, that this is the best of all enthusiasms, and of the best origin, both for him who possesses and for him who partakes of it, and that he who loves beautiful objects, by having a share of this madness, is called a lover. For, as we have mentioned, every soul of man has, from its very nature, beheld real existences, or it would not have entered into this human form; for it is not easy for every one to call to mind former things from the present, neither for those who then had but a brief view of the things there, nor for those who after their fall hither, were so unfortunate as to be turned aside by evil associations to injustice, and so to have forgotten the sacred things they formerly beheld. Few therefore are left who have sufficient memory. But these, when they see any resemblance of the things there, are amazed and no longer masters of themselves, and they know not what this affection is, because they do not thoroughly perceive it.

64. Now of justice and temperance and whatever else souls deem precious, there is no brightness in the resemblances here, but by means of dull instruments with difficulty a few only, on approaching the images, are able to discern the character of that which is represented. But beauty was then splendid to look on, when with that happy choir, we in company with Jupiter, and others with some other of the gods, beheld that blissful sight and spectacle, and were initiated into that which may be rightly called the most blessed of all mysteries, which we celebrated when we were whole and unaffected by the evils that awaited us in time to come, and moreover when we were initiated in, and beheld in the pure light, perfect, simple, calm, and blessed visions, being ourselves pure, and as yet unmasked with this which we now carry about with us and call the body, fettered to it like an oyster to its shell.

65. Let this much be said out of regard to memory, on account of which, from a longing for former things, I have now

spoken at greater length than I ought. But with respect to beauty, as we observed, she both shone among things there, and on our coming hither we found her, through the clearest of our senses, shining most clearly. For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though wisdom is not seen by it. For vehement would be the love she would inspire, if she came before our sight and shewed us any such clear image of herself, and so would all other loveable things; but now beauty only has this privilege of being most manifest and most lovely.

66. He, then, who has not been recently initiated, or who has become corrupted, is not speedily carried hence thither to beauty itself, by beholding here that which takes its name from it. So that he does not reverence it when he beholds it, but, giving himself up to pleasure, like a beast he attempts to mount it and to have intercourse with it, and in his wanton advances he is neither afraid nor ashamed of this unnatural pursuit of pleasure. But he who has been recently initiated, and who formerly beheld many things, when he sees a god-like countenance, or some bodily form that presents a good imitation of beauty, at first shudders and some of the former terrors come over him, then as he looks stedfastly at it, he reverences it as a god, and if he did not dread the imputation of excessive madness, he would sacrifice to his favourite, as to a statue or a god.

67. But after he has beheld it, as commonly happens, after shuddering, a change, a sweating and unusual heat comes over him. For having received the emanation of beauty through his eyes, he has become heated, so that the wings that are natural to him are refreshed; and by his being heated, the parts where they grow are softened, which having been long closed up through hardness prevented them from shooting out. But when this nutriment flows in, the quill of the wing begins to swell, and makes an effort to burst from the root, beneath the whole form of the soul; for of old it was all winged. In this state, then, the whole boils and throbs violently, and as is the case with infants cutting their teeth, when they are just growing out there is a pricking and soreness of the gums, in the same way the soul is affected of one who is beginning to put forth his wings, it boils and is sore, and itches as it puts them forth.

68. When, therefore, by beholding the beauty of a boy, and receiving particles that proceed and flow from thence, which are for that reason called

desire, it becomes refreshed and heated; it is relieved from pain and filled with joy: but when it is separated and becomes parched, the orifices of the passages through which the wing shoots forth, become closed through drought and shut up the germ of the wing. But it being shut in together with desire, leaping like throbbing veins, strikes against each passage that is shut against it, so that the whole soul, being pricked all round, is frantic and in agony; but again retaining the memory of the beautiful one, it is filled with joy. 69. And from both these mingled together, it is tormented by the strangeness of the affection, and not knowing what to do becomes frenzied, and being in this frantic state it can neither sleep at night, nor remain quiet by day, but runs about with longing wherever it may hope to see the possessor of the beauty. And on beholding him and drawing in fresh supplies of desire, it loosens the parts that were closed up, and recovering breath has a respite from stings and throes, and again for the present enjoys this most exquisite pleasure. Wherefore, it never willingly leaves him, nor values any one more than the beautiful one, but forgets mothers and brothers and friends all alike, and if its substance is wasting through neglect, it reckons that as of no consequence, and despising all customs and decorums in which it formerly prided itself, it is ready to be a slave and to lie down wherever any one will allow it as near as possible to the object of its longing. For in addition to its reverence for the possessor of beauty, it has found that he is the only physician for its severest troubles.

70. Now this affection, my beautiful boy, you I mean to whom I am speaking, men call love, but when you hear what the gods designate it, you will probably laugh, on account of your youth. Some Homeric, I think, adduce out of their secret poems two verses on love, of which the second is very insolent, and not altogether delicate: they sing as follows: "Him mortals indeed call winged Eros, but immortals Pteros (Flyer) for his flighty nature¹."

These verses then, you are at liberty to believe, or not; however, this assuredly is the cause and the condition of lovers. 71. Now when one of the attendants upon Jupiter is seized, he is able to bear with greater firmness the burden of the wing-

¹ I must own myself indebted to Mr. Wright's version of this dialogue for this happy translation of these two lines.

named god ; but such as are in the service of Mars and went round heaven with him, when they are caught by Love, and think that they are at all injured by the object of their love, are blood-thirsty, and ready to immolate both themselves and their favourite. And so with respect to each several god, whose choir each followed, he spends his life in honouring and imitating him to the best of his power, so long as he remains free from corruption, and is living here his first generation ; and in this way he associates with and behaves to his beloved and all others. 72. Every one, therefore, chooses his love out of the objects of beauty according to his own taste, and, as if he were a god to him, he fashions and adorns him like a statue, as if for the purpose of reverencing him and celebrating orgies in his honour. They then that are followers of Jupiter seek for some one who resembles Jupiter in his soul, to be the object of his love. They therefore consider whether he is by nature a lover of wisdom, and fitted to command ; and when, on finding one, they have become enamoured of him, they do every thing in their power to make him such. If, then, they have not already entered upon this study, they now set about it, and learn it from whatever source they can, and themselves pursue it ; and by endeavouring to discover of themselves the nature of their own deity, they succeed by being compelled to look stedfastly on their god, and when they grasp him with their memory, being inspired by him, they receive from him their manners and pursuits, as far it is possible for man to participate of deity. 73. And considering the object of their love as the cause of all this, they love him still more, and if they have drawn their inspiration from Jupiter, like the Bacchanals, they pour it into the soul of their beloved, and make him as much as possible resemble their own god. But such as attended Juno seek after a royal favourite, and when they have found one, they act towards him in precisely the same manner. And such as attended Apollo, and each of the other gods, following the example of their several deities, desire that their favourite may have a corresponding character, and when they have gained such an one, both by imitation on their own part, and by persuading and alluring their favourite, they lead him to the peculiar pursuit and character of that god ; not, indeed, by employing envy or illiberal severity towards their favourite, but endeavouring by every means in their power to lead him to a perfect resem-

blance of themselves and their god, they act accordingly. 74. A zeal, then, on the part of those who truly love, and an initiation, as I call it, if they succeed in what they desire, so beautiful and blessed, falls to the lot of the beloved one at the hands of him that is maddened by love, if only he be won. But he that is won, is won in the following manner.

As in the beginning of this account I divided each soul into three parts, two of them having the form of horses, and the third that of a charioteer, so let us still maintain that division: but of the horses, one, we said, was good and the other not: what however is the virtue of the good one, or the vice of the bad one, we have not yet explained, but must now declare. That one of them, then, which is in the nobler condition, is in form erect, finely-moulded, high-necked, hook-nosed, white-coloured, black-eyed, a lover of honour, with temperance and modesty, and a companion of true glory, without the whip is driven by word of command and voice only: the other, on the other hand, is crooked, thick set, clumsily put together, strong-necked, short-throated, flat-faced, black-coloured, gray-eyed, hot-blooded, a companion of insolence and swaggering, shaggy about the ears, deaf, scarcely obedient to whip and spur together. 75. When, therefore, the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring sight, his whole soul becoming heated by sensation, he is filled with irritation and the stings of desire, the horse that is obedient to the charioteer, then as ever, overpowered by shame restrains himself from leaping on the beloved object: but the other, no longer heeds either the whip or the spurs of the charioteer, but bounding forward is carried violently along, and giving every kind of trouble to his yoke-fellow and the charioteer, compels them to hurry to the favourite, and to indulge in the delights of love. They at first resist from indignation at being compelled to such a dreadful and lawless course: but at length, when there is no end to the evil, they go on as they are led, having submitted and consented to do what they are ordered; and now they come up to him and behold the gleaming countenance of the favourite. 76. But the memory of the charioteer when he beholds him is carried back to the nature of absolute beauty, and again sees her together with temperance standing on a chaste pedestal. And, on beholding, it^m shudders, and awe-struck falls down backward, and at the

^m "It," memory

same time is compelled to draw back the reins so violently, as to throw both the horses on their haunches, the one indeed willingly, from his not resisting, but the insolent one very much against his will. When they have withdrawn to some distance, the former through shame and amazement drenches the whole soul with sweat, but the other, having got rid of the pain which he suffered from the bit and the fall, when he has scarcely recovered his breath, bursts out into passionate revilings, vehemently reproaches the charioteer and his yoke-fellow, for having abandoned their station and compact from cowardice and effeminacy. And again compelling them against their wills to approach, he with difficulty yields to their entreaties to defer it to a future time. 77. But when the time agreed on comes, reminding them who pretend to forget it, plunging, neighing, and dragging forward, he compels them again to approach the favourite for the same purpose. And when they are near, bending down his head and extending his spear, he champs the bit and drags them on with wantonness. But the charioteer being affected as before, though more strongly, as if he were falling back from the starting rope, pulls back the bit with still greater violence from the teeth of the insolent horse, and covers his railing tongue and jaws with blood, and forcing his legs and haunches to the ground, tortures him with pain. 78. But when by being often treated in the same way, the vicious horse has laid aside his insolence, being humbled he henceforth follows the directions of the charioteer, and when he beholds the beautiful object, he swoons through fear. So that it comes to pass, that thenceforth the soul of the lover follows its favourite with reverence and awe. Since then he is worshipped with all observance as if he were a god, not by a lover who feigns the passion, but who really feels it, and since he is by nature inclined to friendship, he directs his affection to accord with that of his worshipper, even though in past times he may have been misled by his associates or some others, who told him that it was disgraceful to allow a lover to approach him, and he may for this reason have rejected his lover, yet in process of time his age and destiny induce him to admit his lover to familiarity. 79. For surely it was never decreed by fate, that the evil should be a friend to the evil, or the good not a friend to the good. When, therefore, he has admitted him and accepted his conversation and society, the

benevolence of the lover being brought into close contact astonishes the beloved, when he perceives that all his other friends and relatives together exhibited no friendship at all towards him in comparison with his inspired friend. But when he has spent some time in doing this, and has approached so near as to come in contact in the gymnastic schools and other places of social intercourse, then the fountain of that stream to which Jupiter, when in love with Ganymede, gave the name of desire, streaming in great abundance upon the lover, partly sinks into him, and partly flows out from him when he is full. And as a wind or any sound rebounding from smooth and hard substances, is borne back again to the place from whence it proceeded, so this stream of beauty, flowing back again to the beautiful one through the eyes, by which way it naturally enters the soul, and having returned thither and fledged itself anew, refreshes the outlets of the feathers, and moves him to put forth wings, and in turn fills the soul of the beloved one with love. 80. Accordingly he is in love, but with whom he knows not; neither is he aware nor is he able to tell what has happened to him, but like a person who has caught a disease in the eyes from another, he is unable to assign the cause, and is not aware that he beholds himself in his lover, as in a mirror. And when the lover is present, he is freed from pain in the same way as the lover is; but, when he is absent, he in turn longs for him in the same manner that he is longed for, possessing love's image, love returned; but he calls it and considers it to be not love but friendship. And he desires, in the same way as the lover, though more feebly, to see, to touch, to kiss, to lie down with him; and, as is probable, he soon afterwards does all this. 81. In this lying down together, then, the unbridled horse of the lover has something to say to its charioteer, and begs to be allowed some small enjoyment in recompence for his many toils, but the same horse of the favourite has nothing to say, but swelling with love and in doubt, embraces the lover, and kisses him as he would kiss a very dear friend, and when they are laid down together, he is unable to refuse, as far as in his power, to gratify his lover in whatever he requires. But his yoke-fellow, together with the charioteer, resists this familiarity with shame and reason. If, then, the better parts of their mind have prevailed so as to lead them to a well-regulated mode of living and phi-

losophy, they pass their life here in bliss and concord, having obtained the mastery over themselves, and being orderly, through having brought into subjection that part of the soul in which vice was engendered, and having set free that in which was virtue: and when they depart this life, becoming winged and light, they have been victorious in one of the three truly Olympic contests, a greater good than which neither human prudence nor divine madness can possibly bestow on man. 82. If, however, they have adopted a coarser and less philosophic mode of living, yet still honourable, but perhaps in a fit of drunkenness or some other thoughtless moment, their two unbridled beasts finding their souls ungarded, and bringing them together to one place, have made and consummated that choice which most men deem blissful; and having once consummated it they continue to practise it for the future, though rarely, in that they are doing what is not approved by their whole mind. These too, then, pass their life dear to each other, but less so than the others, both during the period of love and after it, thinking that they have both given to and received from each other the strongest pledges, which it were impious to violate, and so at any time become alienated. 83. But in the end, without wings indeed, yet making an effort to become winged, they quit the body, so as to carry off no trifling prize of impassioned madness: for there is a law that those who have already set out in the heavenward path should never again enter on darkness and the paths beneath the earth, but that, passing a splendid life, they should be happy walking with each other, and that, for their love's sake, whenever they become winged, they should be winged together.

These so great and divine things, my boy, will the affection of a lover confer on you. But the familiarity of one who is not in love, being mingled with mortal prudence, and dispensing mortal and niggardly gifts, generating in the beloved soul an illiberality which is praised by the multitude as virtue, will cause it to be tossed about the earth and beneath the earth for nine thousand years, devoid of intelligence. 84. To thee, beloved Love, this recantation, the most beautiful and the best, according to my ability, is presented and duly paid, both in other respects and by certain poetical phrases, of necessity, adorned for the sake of Phædrus. But do thou, pardoning my former speech, and graciously accepting this, propitiously and

benignly, neither take from me the art of love which thou hast given me, nor maim it in thy wrath, but grant that even more than now I may be honoured by the beautiful. And if, in our former speech, Phædrus and I have said any thing offensive to thee, blaming Lysias as the author of the speech, make him desist from such speeches in future, and convert him to philosophy, as his brother Poiemarchus has been converted, so that this lover of his may no longer remain neutral as now, but may wholly devote his life to love, in conjunction with philosophic discourses.

Phæ. I join with you in praying, Socrates, that if this is better for us, so it may be. 85. But I have been long wondering at your speech, how much more beautiful you have made it than the former one ; so that I am afraid that Lysias will appear to me but poor, even if he should be willing to produce another in opposition to it. For only the other day, my admirable friend, one of our public men, as he was attacking him, upbraided him with this very thing, and throughout the whole of his attack called him a writer of speeches. Perhaps, therefore, for ambition's sake he will refrain from writing any more.

Socr. The opinion you express, my youth, is ridiculous ; and you very much mistake your friend, if you imagine him to be so easily frightened. Perhaps, too, you think that his assailant really meant what he said.

86. *Phæ.* He seemed to do so, Socrates ; and you are doubtless yourself aware, that the most powerful and considerable men in a city are ashamed to write speeches, and to leave their own compositions behind them, through fear of the opinion of posterity, lest they should be called sophists.

Socr. It has escaped your notice, Phædrus, that the proverb "a sweet bend" is derived from that long bend in the Nile : and as well as the bend, it escapes your notice, that these public men who think most highly of themselves are most fond of writing speeches, and of leaving their compositions behind them ; and moreover, whenever they write a speech, they so love its supporters, that they prefix their names who on each occasion commend them.

87. *Phæ.* How do you mean ? for I don't understand you.

Socr. Don't you understand, that at the beginning of a statesman's writing, the name of its supporter is written first.

Phæ. How ?

Socr. "Approved," I think the writing itself says, "by the council, or the people, or both," and he who proposed it, speaking very pompously of and extolling himself, namely the composer, after this makes a speech so as to display his own wisdom to his supporters, sometimes making a very long composition. Does this appear to you to be any thing else than a written speech?

Phæ. It does not to me.

88. *Socr.* If, then, it happens to be approved, the composer goes home from the theatre delighted. But if it should be rubbed out, and he debarred from writing speeches, and from the dignity of an author, both he and his friends take it greatly to heart.

Phæ. Just so.

Socr. It is clear, then, that they do not despise this practice, but admire it exceedingly.

Phæ. Certainly.

Socr. What then, when an orator or a king has proved himself competent to assume the power of a Lycurgus, or a Solon, or a Darius, and to become immortal as a speech-writer in a state, does he not deem himself godlike, while he is yet alive, and do not posterity think the very same of his writings?

Phæ. Just so.

89. *Socr.* Do you think then that any person of this sort, however ill-disposed he may be towards Lysias, would upbraid him merely because he is a writer?

Phæ. It does not seem probable from what you say; for in that case, as it appears, he would upbraid his own passion.

Socr. This, then, must be clear to every one, that the mere writing of speeches is not disgraceful.

Phæ. Why should it be?

Socr. But this I think now is disgraceful, not to express and write them well, but shamefully and ill.

Phæ. Clearly so.

Socr. What then is the method of writing well or ill? Have we not occasion, Phædrus, to enquire about this from Lysias or some one else, who has at some time or other written or means to write, either a political or private composition, in metre as a poet, or without metre as a prose-writer?

Phæ. Do you ask, if we have occasion? For what purpose in the world should any one live, but for the sake of pleasures

of this kind? Not, surely, for those which cannot even be enjoyed unless they are preceded by pain, which is the case with nearly all the pleasures connected with the body; on which account they are justly called servile.

90. *Socr.* We have leisure, however, as it seems: and moreover the grasshoppers, while, as is their wont in the heat of the day, they are singing over our heads and talking with one another, appear to me to be looking down upon us. If, then, they should see us too, like most men, not conversing at mid-day, but falling asleep and lulled by them, through indolence of mind, they would justly laugh us to scorn, thinking that some slaves or other had come to them in this retreat, in order like sheep to take a mid-day sleep by the side of the fountain. But if they see us conversing, and sailing by them, as if they were Syrens unenchanted, the boon which they have from the gods to confer upon men, they will perhaps out of admiration bestow upon us.

Phæ. But what is this that they have? For I happen not to have heard of it, as it seems.

Socr. Yet it is not proper that a lover of the Muses should not have heard of things of this kind. It is said, then, that these grasshoppers were men before the Muses were born; but that when the Muses were born, and song appeared, some of the men of that time were so overcome by pleasure, that through singing they neglected to eat and drink, until they died unawares. 91. From these the race of grasshoppers afterwards sprung, having received this boon from the Muses, that they should need no nourishment from the time of their birth, but should continue singing without food and without drink till they died, and that after that they should go to the Muses and inform them who of those here honoured each of them. Therefore by informing Terpsichore of those who honour her in the dance they make them dearer to her; and Erato they inform of her votaries in love; and so all the rest in a similar manner, according to the kind of honour belonging to each. But the eldest, Calliope, and next to her Urania, they tell of those who pass their lives in philosophy, and honour their music; and these most of all the Muses, being conversant with heaven, and discourse both divine and human, pour forth the most beautiful strains. For many reasons, therefore, we should converse and not sleep at mid-day.

Phæ. We should converse, indeed.

Socr. Therefore, as we lately proposed to consider, we should enquire in what consists a correct method of speaking and writing, and in what not.

Phæ. Evidently.

92. *Socr.* Is it not, then, essential, in order to a good and beautiful speech being made, that the mind of the speaker should know the truth of the subject on which he is about to speak?

Phæ. I have heard say on this subject, my dear Socrates, that it is not necessary for one who purposes to be an orator to learn what is really just, but what would appear so to the multitude, who will have to judge; nor what is really good or beautiful, but what will appear so: for that persuasion proceeds from these, and not from truth.

Socr. We ought not to reject a saying^a, which wise men utter, but should consider whether they say any thing worth attending to. Wherefore we must not pass by what you have now said.

93. *Phæ.* You are right.

Socr. Let us then consider it as follows.

Phæ. How?

Socr. Suppose I should persuade you to purchase a horse for the purpose of repelling enemies, but both of us should be ignorant what a horse is, suppose, however, I did happen to know this much, that Phædrus believes a horse to be that tame animal which has the longest ears.

Phæ. That would be ridiculous indeed, Socrates.

Socr. Wait a moment: if I should earnestly persuade you, by composing a speech in praise of the ass, calling him a horse, and asserting that it is well worth while to purchase this beast both for domestic purposes and for military service, that he is useful to fight from, and able to carry baggage, and serviceable in many other respects.

Phæ. This, now, would be perfectly ridiculous.

Socr. But is it not better that a friend should be ridiculous, than dangerous and mischievous?

Phæ. Clearly so.

94. *Socr.* When an orator, therefore, who is ignorant of good and evil, having found a city that is likewise so, en-

^a An expression taken from Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 65

deavours to persuade it, not by celebrating the praises of an æs's shadow^o, as if it were a horse, but of evil, as if it were good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude should persuade them to do evil instead of good, what kind of fruit do you suppose rhetoric will afterwards reap from such a sowing?

Phæ. By no means a good one.

Socr. But have we not, my good friend, reviled the art of speaking more roughly than is proper? for she may, perhaps, say: "Why, sirs, do you talk so foolishly? For I compel no one who is ignorant of the truth to learn how to speak: but if my advice is worth any thing, when he has acquired that, he then has recourse to me. This, then, I insist on, that without me one who knows the truth will not for all that be able to persuade by art."

Phæ. Will she not speak justly, in asserting this?

95. *Socr.* I admit it, at least if the arguments that assail her testify that she is an art. For I think I have heard some arguments coming up and insisting that she lies and is not an art, but an inartistic trick. But a genuine art of speaking, says the Spartan, without laying hold of truth, neither exists, nor ever can exist hereafter.

Phæ. We must have these arguments, Socrates; so bring them forward and examine what they say, and in what manner.

Socr. Come hither then, ye noble creatures, and persuade Phædrus with the beautiful children, that, unless he has sufficiently studied philosophy, he will never be competent to speak on any subject whatever. Let Phædrus answer then.

Phæ. Put your questions.

Socr. Must not then rhetoric in general be an art that leads the soul by means of argument, not only in courts of justice, and other public assemblies, but also in private, equally with respect to trivial and important matters? and is its right use at all more valued when employed about grave than about trifling things? What have you heard said about this?

96. *Phæ.* By Jupiter, nothing at all of this kind; but it is for the most part spoken and written according to art in judicial trials, and it is spoken also in popular assemblies; but I have never heard any thing further.

Socr. What, have you heard only of the rhetorical arts of

* A proverb meaning "a thing of no value." See Suidas *ἔννυ σκιδ*.

Nestor and Ulysses, which they composed during their leisure in Ilium, and have you never heard of those by Palamedes?

Phæ. And, by Jupiter, I have not even heard of those by Nestor, unless you make Gorgias a Nestor, or Thrasy machus and Theodorus a Ulysses.

Socr. Perhaps I do. But let us pass over these; do you say however; in courts of justice what do adversaries do? do they not contradict each other? or what shall we say?

Phæ. That very thing.

Socr. And respecting the just and unjust?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. Will not he, then, who accomplishes this by art, make the same thing appear to the same persons, at one time just, and, when he pleases, unjust?

Phæ. How not?

Socr. And in a popular assembly the same things seem to the state at one time good, and at another the contrary?

Phæ. Just so.

97. *Socr.* And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes[†] spoke by art in such a manner that the same things appeared to his hearers similar and dissimilar, one and many, at rest and in motion?

Phæ. Assuredly.

Socr. The art, then, of arguing on both sides has not only to do with courts of justice and popular assemblies, but as it seems, it must be one and the same art, if it is an art, with respect to all subjects of discourse, by which a man is able to make all things appear similar to each other so far as they are capable of being made appear so, and to drag them to light, when another attempts to make them appear similar and conceals his attempt.

Phæ. What mean you by this?

Socr. I think it will be evident if we enquire as follows: Does deception more frequently occur in things that differ much or little?

Phæ. In things that differ little.

Socr. But by changing your position gradually, you will more easily escape detection in going to the opposite side, than by doing so rapidly.

[†] By Palamedes, as the Scholiast observes, he means Zeno of Elea, the friend of Parmenides

98. *Phæ.* How not?

Socr. It is necessary, then, that he who means to deceive another, but not be deceived himself, should be able to distinguish with accuracy the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

Phæ. It is indeed necessary.

Socr. Will he be able, then, if ignorant of the truth of each particular thing, to discern the smaller or greater similarity of the thing of which he is ignorant, in other things?

Phæ. Impossible.

Socr. It is clear, therefore, that in the case of those who have formed opinions contrary to the truth and are deceived, this error has found its way in by means of certain resemblances.

99. *Phæ.* It doubtlessly does happen so.

Socr. Is it possible, then, that one, who is ignorant of what is the nature of each particular thing, should have sufficient art to bring over any one by degrees by leading him through means of resemblances, from each several truth to its opposite, or himself to escape from being so led?

Phæ. Never.

Socr. He therefore, my friend, who does not know the truth, but hunts after opinions, will, as it appears, produce but a ridiculous and inartistic art of speaking.

Phæ. It seems so.

Socr. Are you willing, then, in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in those which I delivered, to look for instances of what I assert is inartistic and artistic?

Phæ. I should like it of all things; for now we are speaking in a bald sort of way, for want of sufficient examples.

100. *Socr.* And, indeed, by some lucky chance, as it seems, two speeches have been made which furnish examples, of how one who is acquainted with the truth, while he is jesting in his arguments, can lead his hearers astray. And for my part, Phædrus, I attribute that to the deities of the spot. Perhaps, also, the interpreters of the Muses, the songsters over head, have inspired us with this gift; for I at least have no part in any art of speaking.

Phæ. Be it as you say, only make your meaning clear.

Socr. Come then, read out to me the beginning of Lysias's speech.

100. *Phæ.* "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I think you have heard that it would be for our

advantage if this took place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I do not happen to be one of your lovers : for they repent" —

Socr. Stop. We are to say, then, in what he errs, and acts inartistically : are we not ?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. Now is it not plain to every one, that in some things of this kind we are agreed, on others at variance ?

Phæ. I think I understand what you mean ; but explain yourself still more clearly.

Socr. When any one pronounces the word iron or silver, do we not all understand the same thing ?

Phæ. Assuredly.

Socr. But what when any one pronounces the word just, or good ? are we not carried different ways, and do we not differ both with one another and with ourselves ?

Phæ. Certainly.

Socr. In some things, therefore, we agree, in others not.

Phæ. Just so.

Socr. In which class of things, then, are we more easily deceived ? and in which of the two has rhetoric greater power ?

Phæ. Clearly in that in which we are easily led astray.

102. *Socr.* He, therefore, who means to pursue the art of rhetoric, ought first of all to have distinguished these methodically, and to have discovered a certain character of each species, both of that in which the generality of men must necessarily be led astray, and of that in which that is not the case.

Phæ. He who has attained to this, Socrates, will have devised a noble classification of species.

Socr. Then, I think, when he comes to each particular case, he ought not to be at a loss, but should perceive quickly to which of the two classes the subject, on which he is going to speak, belongs.

Phæ. How not ?

Socr. What then with respect to Love ? shall we say that he belongs to things doubtful, or to such as are not so ?

Phæ. To things doubtful, surely ; otherwise do you think he would have allowed you to say what you just now said about him, that he is both a mischief to the beloved and the lover, and again, that he is the greatest of blessings ?

Socr. You speak admirably. But tell me this too, for from

being carried away by enthusiasm, I do not quite remember whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech.

Phæ. By Jupiter you did, and with wonderful accuracy.

103. *Socr.* Alas; how much more artistic in speech-making do you say the nymphs of Acheloüs and Pan son of Mercury are than Lysias son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias too, in the beginning of his love-speech, compel us to conceive of Love, as some one particular thing, which he wished it to be, and then complete all the rest of his speech in accordance with this? Are you willing that we should read over again the beginning of his speech?

Phæ. If you wish it; though what you seek is not there.

Socr. Read, however, that I may hear him in person.

104. *Phæ.* "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I think you have heard, that it would be for our advantage if this took place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I do not happen to be one of your lovers: for they repent of the benefits they have conferred, as soon as their desires cease."

Socr. He seems to be far indeed from doing what we are seeking for, since in making his speech he attempts to swim backwards, with his face uppermost, not setting out from the beginning, but from the end, and he begins with what the lover would say to his favourite at the close of his speech. Have I said nothing to the purpose, Phædrus, my dear friend?

Phæ. It is indeed, Socrates, the end of the subject about which he is speaking,

105. *Socr.* But what as to the rest? do not the other parts of the speech appear to have been put together at random? or does it appear that what is said in the second place ought from any necessity to have been placed second, or any thing else that he said? For it seems to me, who however know nothing about the matter, that the writer has without any scruple said whatever came uppermost. But do you know of any rule in speech-writing, in conformity to which he disposed his sentences in the order he has done one after another?

Phæ. You are pleasant, in supposing that I am able to see through his compositions so accurately.

Socr. But this at least I think you will allow, that every speech ought to be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own, so as to be neither without head, nor without

feet, but to have both a middle and extremities, described proportionately to each other and to the whole.

106. *Phæ.* How not?

Socr. Consider, then, your friend's speech, whether it is so or otherwise; and you will find that it is in no respect different from the epigram which some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

Phæ. What is it, and what is there remarkable in it?

Socr. It is as follows;

"I am a maiden of brass and I lie on Midas's sepulchre,
So long as water flows and tall trees flourish,
Remaining here on the tomb of Midas,
I will tell all passers by, that Midas is buried here."

That it makes no difference which line is put first or last, you must perceive, I think.

Phæ. You are jesting at our speech, Socrates.

107. *Socr.* That you may not be angry, then, we will have done with this; (though it appears to me to contain very many examples, which any one might examine with advantage, so long as he does not at all attempt to imitate them;) and let us proceed to the two other speeches; for there was something in them, I think, fit to be looked into by those who wish to examine into the subject of speeches.

Phæ. What do you mean?

Socr. They were in a manner opposed to each other. For one said that favour ought to be shewn to a person that is in love, the other to a person that is not in love.

Phæ. And this, most strenuously.

Socr. I thought you were going to say, with truth, madly. However, this is the very thing I was seeking for. For we said that love was a kind of madness, did we not?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. But there are two kinds of madness, one arising from human diseases, the other from an inspired deviation from established customs.

Phæ. Certainly.

108. *Socr.* But dividing the divine mania of the four deities into four parts, and assigning prophetic inspiration to Apollo, mystic to Bacchus, poetic to the Muses, and the fourth to Venus and Love, we said that the madness of Love is the best,

and I know not how representing the passion of love, probably lighting on some truth and perhaps carried off elsewhere, we compounded a speech not altogether improbable, and sang a kind of mythical hymn, in a seemly and devotional manner, in honour of my lord and thine, Phædrus, Love, the guardian of beautiful boys.

Phæ. And one by no means unpleasant to me to hear.

Socr. Let us endeavour to find out, then, from the speech itself, how it was able to pass from censure to praise.

Phæ. What mean you by this?

109. *Socr.* To me it appears that in all other respects we have really been jesting; but as regards the two methods¹ that are seen in these casually uttered speeches, if any one could apprehend their power by art, it would be by no means an unwelcome circumstance.

Phæ. What methods are these?

Socr. The one is to see under one aspect and to bring together under one general idea, many things scattered in various places, that, by defining each, a person may make it clear what the subject is that he wishes to discuss, as just now with respect to love, its nature being defined, whether it was well or ill described; at all events for that reason my speech was able to attain perspicuity and consistency.

Phæ. And what is the other method you speak of, Socrates?

110. *Socr.* The being able, on the other hand, to separate that general idea into species, by joints, as nature points out, and not to attempt to break any part, after the manner of an unskilful cook; but as, just now, my two speeches comprehended mental derangement under one common class. But as from one body there spring two sets of members bearing the same name, one called the left the other the right, so my speeches having considered mental derangement as naturally one class in us, then the speech that had to divide the left part, did not leave off dividing this again until having found in its members a kind of left-handed love, it reviled it deservedly: but the other taking us to the right hand side of madness, and having found a kind of love bearing the same name as the former, but divine, brought it to light and commended it as the cause of the greatest blessings to us.

¹ The two methods are "definition" and "division," afterwards explained.

111. *Phæ.* You speak most truly.

Socr. For my part, Phædrus, I am not only myself a lover of these divisions and generalisations, in order that I may be able both to speak and think; but if I perceive any one else able to comprehend the one and the many, as they are in nature, him "I follow behind as in the footsteps of a god." But whether I designate those who are able to do this, rightly or not, God knows, however I have hitherto called them dialecticians. But now, tell me by what name ought we to call those who take lessons from you and Lysias? is this that art of speaking, by the use of which Thrasymachus and others have become able speakers themselves, and make others so who are willing to bring presents to them, as to kings?

Phæ. They are indeed royal men, yet not skilled in the particulars about which you enquire. However you appear to me to call this method rightly, in calling it dialectical; but the rhetorical appears to me still to escape us.

112. *Socr.* How say you? A fine thing indeed that must be, which is destitute of this and yet can be apprehended by art. It must on no account be neglected by you and me; but we must consider what is the remaining part of rhetoric.

Phæ. There are indeed very many things, Socrates, which you will find in the books written on the art of speaking.

Socr. You have reminded me very opportunely. The exordium, I think, must first be spoken at the beginning of the speech. You mean these, do you not? the refinements of the art?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. And secondly a kind of narration, and evidence to support it; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities; and I think that a famous Byzantian tricker-out of speeches mentions confirmation and after-confirmation.

Phæ. Do you mean the excellent Theodorus?

Socr. I do. He says, too, that refutation and after-refutation must be employed both in accusation and defence. And must we not adduce the most illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first discovered subordinate intimations and bye-praises? and some say that he put into metre bye-censures, to assist the memory: for he is a wise man. 113. But shall we suffer Tisias and Gorgias to sleep, who found out that probabilities

* See Homer's *Odyssey*, v. 193.

were more to be valued than truths, and who by force of words make small things appear great, and great things small, and new things old, and the contrary new, and who discovered a concise method of speaking and an infinite prolixity on all subjects? When Prodicus once heard me tell this, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered what speeches are required by art; that we require them neither long nor short, but of a moderate length.

Phæ. Most wisely, Prodicus.

Socr. But do we not mention Hippias? for I think our Elean friend was of the same opinion with him.

Phæ. Why not?

114. *Socr.* But how shall we describe Polus's new-fangled method of speaking, as his reduplication of words, his sentences, his similitudes, and the words which Licymnius made him a present of, in order to produce a graceful diction.

Phæ. But was not the system of Protagoras, Socrates, something of this kind?

Socr. His was a correctness of diction, my boy, and many other fine things besides, but in the art of dragging in speeches to excite commiseration for old age and poverty, the Chalcedonian hero appears to me to have carried off the palm. He was moreover a powerful man to rouse the anger of the multitude, and again, when enraged, to soothe them by enchantment, as he used to say; he was most skilful in raising and removing calumnies, on any ground whatever. But all seem to agree in the same opinion with respect to the conclusion of speeches, to which some have given the name of recapitulation, others a different name.

Phæ. You mean the summarily reminding the hearers, at the conclusion, of the several things that have been said.

115. *Socr.* I mean that, and now consider if you have any thing else to say about the art of speaking.

Phæ. Only some trifling things, and not worth mentioning.

Socr. Let us pass over trifles; and rather examine these things in the clear light, and see what influence they have in art, and on what occasion.

Phæ. A very powerful influence, Socrates, at least in assemblies of the people.

Socr. They have indeed. But, my admirable friend, do you also observe whether their web does not appear to you to be very wide as it does to me.

Phæ. Explain what you mean.

Socr. Tell me then: If any one should go to your friend Eryximachus, or his father Acumenus, and should say, "I know how to apply such things to the body, as will make it warm or cold, as I please, and if I think proper, I can produce vomitings, and again purgings, and many other things of the kind, and as I know these things I consider myself a physician, and that I can make any one else so, to whom I impart the knowledge of these particulars:" what do you think they would say on hearing this?

Phæ. What else, but ask him if he knew besides to what persons, and when, and how far, he ought to do each of these things?

116. *Socr.* If then, he should say, "Not in the least; but I expect that he who should learn these things from me, would be able to do what you ask?"

Phæ. He would say, I think, that the man is mad; and that, having heard from some book or other, or having met with certain drugs, he fancies that he has become a physician, though he knows nothing at all about the art.

Socr. But what if any one were to go to Sophocles and Euripides, and tell them, that he knew how to make very long speeches on a trifling subject, and very short ones on a great subject, and whenever he pleased, piteous and contrariwise, terrible and threatening speeches, and other things of the kind, and that by teaching these he thought he could impart the power of writing tragedy?

117. *Phæ.* They too, I think, Socrates, would laugh, if any one should suppose that tragedy was any thing else than the composition of all these, so disposed as to be consistent with each other and the whole.

Socr. But, I think, they would not upbraid him rudely, but as a musician, who happened to meet with a man who believes himself to be skilled in harmony, because he knows how to make the highest and lowest note, would not harshly say to him, "Miserable fellow, you are stark mad;" but, being a musician, he would speak more mildly; "My excellent man, it is indeed necessary for one who means to be skilled in harmony, to know these things, but at the same time there is nothing to hinder a person from possessing the knowledge you have without his understanding harmony in the least; for you know what is necessary to be learnt before harmony, but not harmony itself."

Phæ. Most correctly.

118. *Socr.* In like manner, Sophocles might reply to the person who displayed his learning to them, that he knew the things before tragedy, but not tragedy itself; and Acumenus, that the medical pretender knew things before medicine, but not medicine itself.

Phæ. Most assuredly.

Socr. But what must we think the sweet-voiced Adrastus, or even Pericles would do, if they were to hear of the beautiful contrivances which we have just now enumerated, the short sentences and similitudes, and all the rest, which when we went through them, we said must be examined by the clear light, whether they, as you and I did, would rudely make some ill-mannered remark against those who had written and who teach such things as if they constituted the art of rhetoric, or, as being wiser than we are, would they not reprove us, saying, 119. "Phædrus and Socrates, you ought not to be angry with, but rather to excuse those who, through being ignorant of dialectics, are unable to define what rhetoric is, and who, in consequence of this ignorance, possessing the things necessary to be learnt preparatory to the art, think that they have discovered rhetoric itself, and, suppose that by teaching these things to others, they can teach them rhetoric in perfection; but how each of them is to be used persuasively, and the whole combined together, this, as being of no consequence in the world, they think their pupils ought to acquire for themselves in composing their speeches."

Phæ. Such indeed, Socrates, appears to be the case with the art which these men teach and write about as rhetoric; and you seem to me to have spoken the truth: but how and from whence can one acquire the art of true rhetoric and persuasion?

120. *Socr.* The ability, Phædrus, to become a perfect proficient, probably, or rather necessarily, depends on the same things as in other cases: for, if you naturally possess rhetorical abilities, you will be a distinguished orator by adding science and practice; but in whichever of these you are deficient, in that respect you will be imperfect. But so far as it is an art, its method, I think, will not be found in the way that Lysias and Thrasymachus are proceeding.

Phæ. In what way then?

Socr. Pericles, my excellent friend, appears, with good reason, to have been the most perfect of all men in rhetoric.

Phæ. How so?

Socr. All the great arts require a subtle and speculative research into the law of nature: for that loftiness of thought and perfect mastery over every subject seems to be derived from some such source as this; which Pericles possessed in addition to a great natural genius. For meeting, I think, with Anaxagoras, who was a person of this kind, and being filled with speculative research, and having arrived at the nature of intelligence and want of intelligence, about which Anaxagoras made that long discourse, he drew from thence to the art of speaking whatever could contribute to its advantage.

121. *Phæ.* What mean you by this?

Socr. The method of the art of rhetoric is, in a manner, the same as that of medicine.

Phæ. How so?

Socr. In both it is requisite that nature should be thoroughly investigated, the nature of the body in the one, and the soul in the other, if you mean not only by practice and experience, but by art, to give health and strength to the former by applying medicine and diet, and to impart such persuasion as you please and virtue to the latter, by means of speeches and legitimate employments.

Phæ. This indeed seems probable, Socrates.

Socr. But do you think it possible rightly to understand the nature of the soul, without understanding the nature of the universe?

Phæ. If we are to believe Hippocrates, of the family of Æsculapius, we cannot understand even the nature of body without this method.

Socr. For he says well, my friend. But it is necessary, in addition to the authority of Hippocrates, to examine our argument, and consider whether it is consistent.

Phæ. I agree.

122. *Socr.* Consider, then with respect to nature, what Hippocrates and true reason say. Is it not thus necessary to examine into the nature of any thing? In the first place, whether that is simple or manifold about which we are desirous, both ourselves to be skilled, and to be able to make others so; and, in the next place, if it be simple, to examine the power it

naturally possesses of acting on each particular thing, or of being acted upon by each particular thing? And if it possesses several species, having enumerated these, as in the case of the one, ought we not to consider this in each of them, what active and passive power they naturally have?

Phæ. It seems so, Socrates.

123. *Socr.* The method, then, that neglected these, would resemble the walk of a blind man. He however who proceeds by art, ought on no account to be compared either to a blind or a deaf man; but it is clear that whosoever teaches another speaking by art, should accurately shew the real nature of the things to which he will have to apply his speeches; and this surely is the soul.

Phæ. How not?

Socr. His whole endeavour, therefore, must be directed to this; for in this he attempts to produce persuasion. Is it not so?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. It is clear, therefore, that Thrasyarchus, and any one else who seriously endeavours to teach the art of rhetoric, will in the first place describe with all possible accuracy, and make it be seen whether the soul is naturally one and similar, or, like the form of the body, composed of different elements; for this we say is to make known nature.

Phæ. Most assuredly.

Socr. And, in the second place, in what respect it naturally acts or is acted upon by any thing.

124. *Phæ.* How not?

Socr. In the third place, having set in order the different kinds of speech and of soul, and the different manners in which these are affected, he will go through the several causes, adapting each to each, and teaching what kind of soul is necessarily persuaded, and what not persuaded, by particular kinds of speech, and for what reason.

Phæ. It will assuredly be best done in this way, as it seems.

Socr. Never then, my dear friend, will any thing that is otherwise explained or spoken, be spoken or written by art, either in any other case or in this. But the modern writers on the art of speech-making, whom you yourself have heard, are dissemblers, and conceal the very admirable knowledge they have of the soul. Until, then, they both speak and write ac-

according to this method, let us never be persuaded that they write artistically.

Phæ. What method is this?

Socr. It is not easy to mention the very words themselves; but how it is proper to write, if a man means to be as artistic as he possibly can, I am willing to tell you.

Phæ. Tell me then.

125. *Socr.* Since the power of speech is that of leading the soul, it is necessary that he who means to be an orator should know how many kinds of soul there are: but they are so many, and of such and such kinds; whence some men are of this character and some of that character. These then being thus divided, there are again so many kinds of speech, each of a certain character. Now men of such a character are for this particular reason easily persuaded by certain speeches, and persons of a different character are for these reasons with difficulty persuaded. It is necessary, therefore, that he, after having sufficiently understood all this, when he afterwards perceives these very things taking place in actions, and being done, should be able to follow them rapidly by perception, otherwise he will know nothing more than the very things which he formerly heard from his preceptor. 126. But when he is sufficiently competent to say, what kind of person is persuaded by what kind of speeches, and is able, when he sees him before him, to point out to himself that this is the person and this the nature for which those speeches were formerly made now actually present before me, and to which these particular speeches are to be addressed, in order to persuade him to these particular things,—when he has acquired all this, and has learnt moreover the proper seasons for speaking and being silent, and again has made himself master of the seasonable and unseasonable occasions for brevity, plaintiveness, and vehemence, and all the other several kinds of speech which he has learnt, then his art will be beautifully and perfectly accomplished, but not before. But whoever is deficient in any of these particulars, either in speaking, or teaching, or writing, and yet asserts that he speaks by art, is overcome by the person who will not be persuaded. 127. “What then,” perhaps the writer on rhetoric will say, “does it appear to you, Phædrus and Socrates, that the art of speaking, as it is called, must be obtained in this or some other way?”

Phæ. It is impossible, Socrates, that it should be obtained in any other way; though it seems to be a work of no small labour.

Socr. You say truly. And on this account we ought to turn over all speeches again and again, and consider whether any easier and shorter way to it can be found, in order that we may not in vain go by a long and rough one, when we might have taken a short and smooth one. If, therefore, you have heard of any thing that will assist us, from Lysias or any one else, endeavour to call it to mind, and tell it me.

Phæ. If the endeavour were enough I should be able to do so, but just at present I cannot.

128. *Socr.* Are you willing, then, that I should repeat to you a statement which I heard from persons who take an interest in such matters.

Phæ. How not?

Socr. It is said, however, Phædrus, to be right to state even the wolf's case.

Phæ. And do you do so.

Socr. They say, then, that there is no occasion to treat these matters so solemnly, nor to carry them back so far, by such long windings. For as we said in the beginning of our discussion, there is no need at all for one who wishes to become a competent orator to have any thing to do with the truth respecting actions just or good, or men who are such, either by nature or education. For that in courts of justice no attention whatever is paid to the truth of these things, but only to what is plausible, and that it is probability to which one who wishes to speak by art ought to apply himself. And that sometimes even facts that have actually happened must not be stated, unless they are probable, but probabilities both in accusation and defence: and, in short, that a speaker should pursue the probable, and pay no regard at all to truth. For that when this method is observed throughout the whole speech, it constitutes the perfection of the art.

129. *Phæ.* You have described the very things, Socrates, which they say who profess to be skilled in speech-making; and I remember that we touched briefly upon this in a former part of our discussion; but this appears to be matter of the utmost consequence to those who study these things.

Socr. However you have thoroughly fumbled Tisias himself.

Let Tisias then tell us this, whether he means any thing else by the probable than that which accords with the opinion of the multitude.

Phæ. What else can it be?

Socr. Having made, then, as it seems, this wise and artistic discovery, he has written, that if a weak but brave man should be brought to trial for having knocked down a strong and cowardly one, and for having robbed him of his clothes or any thing else, then that neither of them ought to speak the truth, but the coward should say that he was not knocked down by the brave man alone, and the latter should prove this, that they were alone, and then urge this; "How could a man like me ever attack a man like him?" But the other will not admit his own cowardice, but, in attempting to tell some other falsehood, will perhaps supply his adversary with the means of refuting him. And in other cases, such things as these are said according to art. Is it not so, Phædrus?

130. *Phæ.* How not?

Socr. Wonderfully clever seems to have been the inventor of this abstruse art, whether Tisias or whoever else he was, and by whatever name he delights to be called. But, my friend, shall we say to him or not?

Phæ. What?

Socr. Tisias, long since before your arrival, we happened to say, that this probability of yours derives its influence with the multitude from its resemblance to truth; and we just now concluded that in all cases he knows best how to discover resemblances who is best acquainted with the truth. So that, if you have any thing else to say about the art of speaking, we will listen to you; but if not, we shall hold to the conclusions we have lately come to, that unless a man has reckoned up the different natures of those who will have to hear him, and is able to divide things themselves into species, and to comprehend the several particulars under one general idea, he will never be skilled in the art of speaking so far as it is possible for a man to be so. 131. But this he can never acquire without great labour, which a wise man ought not to bestow for the purpose of speaking and acting amongst men, but that he may be able to speak such things as are acceptable to the gods, and act acceptably to them, to the utmost of his power. For, as wiser men than we say, Tisias, a man of understanding ought.

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not to make it his principal study to gratify his fellow-servants, except by the way, but good masters and of good extraction. If therefore the circuit be long, wonder not; 132. for it is to be undertaken for the sake of great ends, not such as you think. And even these, as our argument proves, if any one is willing, will be best attained by those means.

Phæ. This appears to me, Socrates, to be very finely said, if only a man could attain to it.

Socr. But when one is attempting noble things, it is surely noble also to suffer whatever it may befall us to suffer.

Phæ. Assuredly.

Socr. As regards, then, the art and want of art in speaking, let this suffice.

133. *Phæ.* How should it not?

Socr. But as regards elegance and inelegance in writing, in what way it may be done well, and in what way inelegantly, remains to be considered. Does it not?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. Do you know, then, how you may best please God with regard to speeches, both acting and speaking?

Phæ. Not at all. Do you?

Socr. I can tell a story I have heard of the ancients, its truth they know. But if we ourselves could discover this, do you think we should any longer pay any regard to the opinions of men?

Phæ. Your question is ridiculous; but relate what you say you have heard.

134. *Socr.* I have heard then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of the ancient gods of that country, to whom was consecrated the bird, which they call Ibis; but the name of the deity himself was Theuth. That he was the first to invent numbers and arithmetic, and geometry and astronomy, and moreover draughts and dice, and especially letters, at the time when Thamus was king of all Egypt, and dwelt in the great city of the upper region which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes, but the god they call Ammon; to him Theuth went and shewed him his arts, and told him that they ought to be distributed amongst the rest of the Egyptians. Thamus asked him what was the use of each, and as he explained it, according as he appeared to say well or ill, he either blamed or praised them. 135. Now Thamus is reported to have said many things to

Theuth respecting each art, both for and against it, which it would be tedious to relate. But when they came to the letters, "This knowledge, O king," said Theuth, "will make the Egyptians wiser, and better able to remember; for it has been invented as a medicine for memory and wisdom." But he replied, "Most ingenious Theuth, one person is able to give birth to art, another to judge of what amount of detriment or advantage it will be to those who are to use it, and now you, as being the father of letters, out of fondness have attributed to them just the contrary effect to that which they will have. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn it through the neglect of memory, for that through trusting to writing, they will remember outwardly by means of foreign marks, and not inwardly by means of their own faculties. So that you have not discovered a medicine for memory, but for recollection. And you are providing for your disciples the appearance and not the reality of wisdom. For hearing many things through your means without instruction, they will appear to know a great deal, although they are for the most part ignorant, and will become troublesome associates, through thinking themselves wise instead of being so."

136. *Phæ.* Socrates, you easily make Egyptian and any other country's tales you please.

Socr. But, my friend, those who dwell in the temple of Dodonæan Jupiter said that the first prophetic words issued from an oak. It was sufficient for the men of those days, seeing they were not wise like you moderns, in their simplicity, to listen to an oak and a stone, if only they spoke the truth: and does it make any difference to you, forsooth, who the speaker is, and to what country he belongs? For you do not consider that only, whether the case is so or otherwise.

Phæ. You have very properly reproved me; and the case with regard to letters appears to me just as the Theban says.

137. *Socr.* He therefore, who thinks to leave an art in writing, and again, he who receives it, as if something clear and solid would result from the writing, must be full of simplicity, and in reality ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, since he thinks that written words are of further value than to remind one who already knows the subject of which the writings treat.

Phæ. Most correct.

Socr. For writing, indeed, Phædrus, has this inconvenience,

and truly resembles painting. For its productions stand out as if they were alive, but, if you ask them any question, they observe a solemn silence. And so it is with written discourses; you would think that they spoke as though they possessed some wisdom, but if you ask them about any thing they say, from a desire to understand it, they give only one and the self-same answer. And when it is once written, every discourse is tossed about every where, equally among those who understand it, and among those whom it in no wise concerns, and it knows not to whom it ought to speak, and to whom not. And when it is ill-treated and unjustly reviled, it always needs its father to help it; for, of itself, it can neither defend nor help itself.

138. *Phæ.* This, too, you have said most correctly.

Socr. But what? shall we consider another discourse, this one's legitimate brother, in what manner it is produced, and how far better and more powerful it naturally is than this?

Phæ. What is that, and how do you say it is produced?

Socr. That which is written with science in the learner's soul, which is able to defend itself, and knows before whom it ought to speak and be silent.

Phæ. You mean the discourse of a man endued with knowledge that has life and soul, of which the written may be justly called an image.

Socr. Assuredly. But tell me this. Would an intelligent husbandman, who has seeds that he cares for and which he wishes to be fruitful, seriously sow them in summer-time in the gardens of Adonis, and rejoice at seeing them growing up beautifully within eight days, or would he do this, if he did it at all, for the sake of sport or pastime; but the seed which he treats seriously, availing himself of the husbandman's skill and sowing it in its proper soil, would he be content that what he has sown shall come to maturity in the eighth month?

139. *Phæ.* Just so, Socrates, he would do the one seriously, and the other, as you say, for amusement.

Socr. But shall we say that he who possesses a knowledge of what is just, beautiful and good, shews less intelligence than a husbandman in the management of his own seeds?

Phæ. By no means.

Socr. He will not, then, seriously write them in water, sowing them with ink by means of a pen, with words that are

unable to defend themselves by speech, and unable adequately to teach the truth.

Phæ. In all probability he will not.

Socr. Surely not. But, as it seems, he will sow and write, when he does write, in the gardens of letters for the sake of diversion, treasuring up memoranda for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for all who are going on the same track, and he will be delighted at seeing them in their tender growth, and while other men pursue other diversions, refreshing themselves with banquets, and other pleasures akin to these, he, as it appears, instead of these, will pass his time in the diversions I have mentioned.

140. *Phæ.* You speak of a very noble in comparison of a mean diversion, Socrates, when a man is able to divert himself with discourses, telling stories about justice and the other things you mention.

Socr. It is so indeed, my dear Phædrus. But, in my opinion, a far more noble employment results from this, when a man availing himself of dialectic art, on meeting with a congenial soul, plants and sows scientific discourses which are able to aid both themselves and him that planted them, and are not unfruitful but contain seed within themselves, from whence others springing up in other minds are able to make this seed immortal, and make their possessor happy as far as it is possible for man to be so.

Phæ. This that you mention is far more noble.

Socr. Now then, Phædrus, since this is agreed on, we are able to determine our former questions.

Phæ. What are they?

Socr. Those which, in our desire to consider them, led us to the present point: namely, that we might examine into the reproach cast on Lysias for writing speeches, and then speeches themselves, which are written by art or without art. Now that which is artistic and that which is not appears to me to have been tolerably well explained.

141. *Phæ.* It appears so. But remind me of it again, in what way.

Socr. Before a man knows the truth of each subject on which he speaks or writes, and is able to define the whole of a thing, and when he has defined it again knows how to divide it into species until he comes to the indivisible; and in like

manner, having distinguished the nature of the soul, and having found out what kind of speech is adapted to the nature of each, he so disposes and adorns his speech, applying to a soul of varied powers speeches that are various and all-harmonious, and simple ones to a simple soul, before this is done, he will not be able to manage speech with art, as far as it might be done, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading, as the whole of our former argument has proved.

Phæ. This is exactly how it appeared.

142. *Socr.* But what as to its being honourable or disgraceful to speak and write speeches, and under what circumstances it may be called a reproach or not, has not what we have said a little before sufficed to prove?

Phæ. What was that?

Socr. That if either Lysias, or any one else, has ever written, or shall hereafter write, privately or publicly, writing a state document in proposing a law, and thinks that there is in it great stability and clearness, this is a reproach to the writer, whether any one says so or not. For to be utterly ignorant of what is just and unjust, evil and good, cannot be otherwise than truly disgraceful, though the whole mass of mankind should unite in its praise.

143. *Phæ.* Certainly not.

Socr. But he who thinks that in a written discourse, on whatever subject, there must necessarily be much that is sportive, and that no discourse, in prose or verse, deserving of much study, has ever been written or spoken, as those declamations used to be spoken without discrimination and instructive method, for the sake of persuasion, but that in truth the best of them were for the purpose of reminding those who already know, but that only in discourses taught and spoken for the sake of instruction, and really written in the soul about things just, and beautiful, and good, there is found what is clear and perfect and worthy of study; and that such discourses ought to be called as it were their author's legitimate offspring; first of all that which is in himself, if it is there by his own invention, then any children or brothers of the former that have at the same time worthily sprung up in the souls of others; whoever thinks thus and dismisses all others, that man, Phædrus, appears to be such a one as you and I should pray that we might become.

144. *Phæ.* I, for my part, entirely wish and pray for what you mention.

Socr. Be we then content with having thus far amused ourselves with the subject of speeches; and do you go and tell Lysias that we, having descended to the fountain of the nymphs, have heard words which charged us to tell Lysias and any one else who composes speeches, and Homer and any one else who is in the habit of composing poety, epic or lyric^a, and thirdly, Solon and whosoever commits political discourses to writing under the name of laws, if they composed their works knowing how the truth stands, and able to defend them when brought to account for what they have written, and being themselves capable by speaking to shew that their writings are poor, then they ought not to be named from these works, but from those to which they have seriously applied themselves.

145. *Phæ.* What name, then, do you assign them?

Socr. To call them wise, Phædrus, appears to me to be a great matter, and proper for God alone; but lovers of wisdom, or some such name, would suit them better, and be in better taste.

Phæ. And it would be nothing out of the way.

Socr. Him, therefore, who has nothing more valuable than what he has written, by turning it upwards and downwards for a long time, patching and clipping it bit by bit, may you not justly designate a poet, or a compiler of speeches, or a writer of laws?

Phæ. How not?

Socr. Tell this, then, to your friend.

Phæ. But you? what will you do? For we must not pass over your friend.

Socr. Whom do you mean?

146. *Phæ.* The beautiful Isocrates. What news will you take him, Socrates? what shall we say he is?

Socr. Isocrates is still young, Phædrus; but what I prophesy of him I am willing to say.

Phæ. What?

Socr. He appears to me to have better natural endowments than to be compared with the speeches of Lysias, and moreover to be endued with a nobler disposition, so that it would not be at all wonderful if, as he advances in age, he should in

^a Ψαλόν η εν φῶνῃ, without music or with.

this very pursuit of speech-making, to which he is now applying himself, surpass all who have ever attempted speeches, as if they were boys, and besides, if he should not be content with this, that a more divine impulse may lead him to greater things; for, my friend, there is a natural love of wisdom in the mind of the man. This message, then, I will take from the gods of this spot to Isocrates my favourite, and do you take the other to Lysias as yours.

147. *Phæ.* This shall be done. But let us depart, since the heat has become less oppressive.

Socr. Ought we not to go after we have prayed to these gods?

Phæ. How not?

Socr. O beloved Pan, and all ye other gods of this place, grant me to become beautiful in the inner man, and that whatever outward things I have may be at peace with those within. May I deem the wise man rich, and may I have such a portion of gold as none but a prudent man can either bear or employ.

Do we need any thing else, Phædrus? for myself I have prayed enough.

Phæ. Make the same prayer for me, too; for the possessions of friends are common.

Socr. Let us depart.

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEÆTETUS.

THEODORUS, a famous geometrician of Cyrene and a follower of Protagoras, is represented to have met Socrates at Athens, and to have been asked by him whether among his pupils there were any who promised to become eminent. Theodorus particularizes one above all the rest, who, while he is speaking, is seen approaching. His name is Theætetus. Socrates, having heard him so highly spoken of by Theodorus, at once opens upon the subject which he wishes to discuss, and asks What science is. Theætetus, in answer, enumerates several particular sciences, but is soon led to understand that the question is not, how many sciences there are, but what science itself is; and by an instance in point shews that he does so. Still he doubts his own ability to answer the question proposed, but is at length induced to make the attempt by Socrates pleasantly describing himself as inheriting his own mother's skill in midwifery, by which he is able to bring to the birth and deliver the mental conceptions of those whose souls are pregnant with ideas*.

Theætetus, then, first of all says that science is nothing else than perception. This, Socrates observes, is the opinion of Protagoras, differently expressed; for he said, that man is the measure of all things, in other words that all things are such as they appear to each person. In order to examine the truth of this doctrine Socrates begins by stating it more fully. Protagoras asserts that nothing exists of itself, nor can any thing be designated by any quality, for what we call great will, in reference to something else, be also small, and what we call heavy, light, and so on, so that nothing ever exists but is always becoming. Consequently all things spring from motion, and the relation that they bear to each other. Thus, with respect to colour, it does not actually exist, it is neither in the

object seen nor in the eye itself, but results from the application of the eye to the object, and so is the intermediate production of both. Again if you compare six with four they appear to be half as many again, but if with twelve, only the half, whence it appears that the same number is at one time great, at another small, which would not be the case if numbers had a fixed and determined magnitude. The principle then on which all things depend is this, That the universe is nothing but motion, of which there are two species, the one active, the other passive, by the union of which that which is perceivable and perception itself consist. Thus when the eye and a corresponding object, meeting together, produce whiteness and its connate perception, the eye sees, and becomes not vision, but a seeing eye, and the object itself becomes not whiteness but white: so that nothing is essentially one, but is always being produced by something else, and therefore the word "being" must be entirely done away with. But here it may be objected that the perceptions produced in persons who dream, or are diseased or mad, are utterly false, and so far are the things that appear to them from existing, that none of them have any real existence at all; how then can it be said that perception is science, and that things which appear to every one are to that person what they appear to be? The answer is, that the things which appear are most certainly true to the percipient; just as if wine appears bitter to a sick person, to him it is certainly bitter; and again with regard to dreams, there is no certain way of distinguishing a state of being awake from dreaming; and as the object perceived and the percipient exist or are produced by relation to each other, neither exists or is produced of itself, but the object perceived does exist in relation to the percipient and to him is true, so that he has a scientific knowledge of what he perceives^b.

Socrates then proposes to examine the correctness of Prota-

^b § 23—46.

goras's theory. If what he says is true, a pig or any other creature that possesses perception will be the measure of all things, as well as a man, and man himself will be equal in wisdom to the gods. To which Protagoras is supposed to answer, that the gods are not to be brought into the question at all, for that it does not appear whether they exist or not; and as to brute creatures, it would be strange if every man did not excel them in wisdom, and besides no argument deduced from them can be conclusive but rests only on probability, which cannot be allowed in a discussion respecting science. Well then, when we hear barbarians speak, whose language we have not learnt, are we to say that we both hear and know what they say? to which the answer is, that we both hear and know the sounds, but not the meaning of the words. Again it is objected, if perception is science, a person may remember a thing and not know it, for instance he may obtain a knowledge of a thing by seeing it, and then shut his eyes, in that case he remembers it, but does not see it, but inasmuch as sight is perception and perception knowledge, he cannot know it, because he does not see it, and yet he remembers it; which is absurd. But Protagoras will not admit this conclusion, but will say that memory is very different from perception, and that the things which we appear to remember are not the same as those that we formerly perceived. Still, though all things are as they appear to each person, it must be admitted that there is such a thing as wisdom and a wise man, and he is wise who changes the aspect of objects to another, and causes things that appear and are evil to any one, to appear and be good; just as a physician by means of medicine changes the habit of the body from bad to good.

Thus far Socrates had carried on the discussion with Theætetus, adducing the answers which Protagoras himself would have given to the objections brought against his theory, but expressing no opinion of his own. He now persuades Theodo-

rus to advocate the cause of Protagoras, and himself undertakes to refute it. Protagoras, then, maintains that what appears to each person exists to him to whom it appears; now all men think themselves in some respects wiser than others, and others wiser than themselves, so that all admit that there is wisdom and ignorance among themselves. Now is not wisdom true opinion, and ignorance false opinion? If so, some men form false opinions, and yet that could not be if man is the measure of all things. Again, according to his doctrine, the same thing will be both true and false; for instance, Protagoras's own theory will be true to himself, but false to all who do not agree with him, and by how many more they are to whom it does not appear to be true than those to whom it does so appear, by so much the more it is not than it is: and so in admitting that the opinion of those who differ from him is true he admits that his own opinion is false. Moreover, in political matters Protagoras will admit that things honourable and base, just and unjust, are such to each city as each city considers them; but he will allow that one counsellor excels another, and that all laws are not equally expedient, though the city that enacts them thinks them so^d.

The mention of political matters leads Socrates to interrupt the course of the argument, and to contrast the life of a politician with that of a philosopher, in which he shews how far more exalted are the views of the latter than of the former. The digression, however, has this connexion with the subject in hand, that it exposes the utter worthlessness of political expediency, which depends on appearances only, and vindicates the aspirations of philosophers, who devote themselves to the contemplation of wisdom and true virtue^e.

To return, then, to the original subject. Those who maintain that whatever appears to each person exists to him to whom it appears, persist that what a city enacts as appearing just to itself is just to that city as long as it continues in force;

^d § 66—75.

• § 76—87.

but in enacting laws the real object is to make them as advantageous to itself as possible, but what is advantageous regards also the future, for laws are enacted that they may be advantageous for the future. But if man is the measure of all things, he must also contain within himself the criterion of things about to happen; yet it will be admitted, in a variety of instances that are adduced, that a person who is skilled is better able to judge of the future than one who is unskilled: and Protagoras himself can judge beforehand better than any private person what arguments are likely to be available in a court of justice, so that not every man, but the wise man only, is the true measure of things^f.

This part of the argument being brought to a close, Socrates next proposes to consider the essence that is said to consist in motion, a doctrine which the followers of Heraclitus were then advocating very strenuously. Now there are two species of motion, removal and change; the former is when a thing passes from one place to another, the latter a change of quality, as when a thing becomes black from white, or hard from soft; and all things must undergo both kinds of motion, otherwise the same thing would be both in motion and at rest at the same time, and in that case it would not be more correct to say that all things are in motion than that they are at rest. Since then every thing must be continually undergoing a process of change at the same time that it is in motion, there can be nothing fixed and certain, so that perception cannot be science, for, as all things are in motion, perception itself, which results from the relation between the object and the percipient, must be in a constant state of motion and change^g.

Theætetus now resumes the argument, and though it would seem that Protagoras's doctrine had been already sufficiently refuted, yet Socrates resolves to try it by one more test. Each sense has its peculiar perception, and such things as are perceived by one faculty cannot be perceived by another; for instance, what is perceived by hearing cannot be perceived by

^f § 87—91.

§ 91—100

sight, and what is perceived by sight cannot be perceived by hearing; yet we can form a notion of them both together, and observe what properties they have in common, and how they differ: this, however, is not done by the senses, but by the soul itself, for children as soon as they are born are able to perceive by the bodily organs, but only arrive, with much labour and difficulty, at the power of comparing things with each other, and so obtain a knowledge of them, whence again it follows that perception and science are not the same^b.

The first definition of science attempted by Theætetus being thus overthrown, Socrates again asks him, What science is. To which he answers that it appears to be true judgment. Socrates however thinks proper first to enquire whether there is such a thing as false judgment. People, he says, must either know or not know things about which they form judgments. Now false judgments are formed, when a person thinks that things which he does not know are certain other things that he does not know, or when he thinks that things which he does know are other things that he does know, or that things which he does not know are things that he does know. But none of these things can happen, therefore it is not possible to form false judgments. Again if existence is put for knowledge a similar train of reasoning leads to the same conclusion. A third method of forming false judgments may be when any one says that any real object is another real object, changing one for the other in his thoughts. But in that case he must think of both of them or one only; if the former he would contradict himself; if the latter he cannot judge that the one is the other, for he thinks of one only, so that neither in this way can false judgment be formed. There still remains another mode in which false judgments may be formed. Suppose that we have in our souls a waxen tablet of various qualities in different persons: on this tablet are impressed the images of our perceptions and thoughts, and whatever is so impressed we remember and know so long as the image remains. But by ex-

amining every possible mode by which perception in the senses and impressions in the mind can be varied and inter-changed, it will be found that false judgment takes place where either the perception or the impression is imperfect and indistinct¹.

Socrates, however, is not satisfied with this conclusion, that false judgment proceeds from the conjunction of perception with thought, and shews that the mind alone by itself may err, for instance a man may think that seven and five make eleven, though he knows they make twelve; so that there must be either no false judgment at all, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows. Theætetus is unable to choose between these alternatives. Socrates therefore proposes to abandon their present course of argument and at once to enquire what it is to know. Some people say it is to have science, Socrates prefers saying it is to possess science; for having differs from possessing in that what we have, we use, but what we possess, we use or not as we please. Suppose the soul then to be a kind of aviary containing all sorts of birds, and let the birds stand for sciences; now all the sciences that are shut up in this aviary a man may be said to possess, but when he has occasion to use any particular science, he may by mistake take one instead of another, thus when he thinks that eleven is twelve he takes the science of eleven instead of that of twelve, and so judges falsely; but when he takes that which he endeavours to take, he judges truly. Still another even worse inconvenience appears to Socrates to follow from this; for it is absurd to suppose that a person who has the science of any thing should at the same time be ignorant of that thing; and if that can be, nothing hinders but that ignorance when present should make us know something. So that after all they have only come round again to the point from whence they started and have still to enquire what science is. Theætetus persists in answering that it is true judgment. But Socrates shews that this cannot be the case, for that judges, who listen to the arguments of lawyers, form true judgments without science,

whence it follows that true judgment and science are not the same ^k.

Theætetus, pressed by this objection, attempts a third definition of science, and says it is true judgment in conjunction with reason. But then, observes Socrates, how are we to distinguish the things that can be known from those that cannot? For instance, elements cannot be defined, but things composed of them can be defined. Again, elements can be perceived but not known, for he who cannot give an explanation of a thing cannot know it, but things compounded of them, because they can be defined, can also be known. Theætetus agrees to this; but Socrates is not satisfied with the statement, that the elements are unknown, but the nature of things compounded of them known. He illustrates his objection by an examination of the component parts of a syllable, and shews that if a whole is known its parts must also be known; if, then, letters are the elements of a syllable, being also the parts of it, they must also be known as well as the syllable^l.

But in order to ascertain the accuracy of Theætetus's last definition of science, it is necessary to determine the meaning of the word *logos*. First of all, then, it may mean the expressing one's thoughts by means of words, but in that case there will be no difference between true judgment and science. Secondly, it may mean the being able to describe a thing by its elements; but this has been already answered in considering the elements of syllables. Lastly, it may mean definition; but it is absurd to say that science is true judgment joined to definition, for definition can only be of that which a person already knows, so that this would be to say that science is true judgment joined to science^m.

At this point the argument is broken off, without having been brought to any satisfactory conclusion. But Socrates requests that they may meet again the following day and continue the discussion.

^k § 126—138

^l § 139—149

^m § 149—157.

THEÆTETUS,

OR

ON SCIENCE.

FIRST EUCLIDES, AND TERPSION,
THEN SOCRATES, THEODORUS, AND THEÆTETUS.

Euc. ARE you just now, Terpsion, or long since come from the country?

Ter. A considerable time since, and I have been seeking for you in the forum, and wondered that I could not find you.

Euc. I was not in the city.

Ter. Where then?

Euc. As I was going down to the port, I met with Theætetus, who was being carried from the camp at Corinth to Athens.

Ter. Alive or dead?

Euc. Alive, though scarcely so; for he is in a bad state from several wounds, though he suffers more from the disease that is prevalent in the army.

Ter. Is it dysentery?

Euc. Yes.

Ter. What a man you speak of as being in danger!

Euc. An honourable and good man, Terpsion, and I just now heard some persons highly extolling his conduct in the battle.

Ter. Nor is that surprising, but it would be much more wonderful if he had not behaved so. But why did he not stop here at Megara?

Euc. He was hastening home; although I begged and advised him, yet he would not. And after I had attended him on his journey, on my return hither I recollected, and was filled with admiration of Socrates, who often spoke pro-

B b

phetically about other things, and especially about him. 2. For if I remember rightly, a little before his death, he met with Theætetus who was then a youth, and being in company and discoursing with him, he very much admired his natural disposition. And when I went to Athens, he related to me the conversation he had had with him, which was very well worth hearing, and he said that he must necessarily distinguish himself, if he lived to a mature age.

Ter. And he spoke truly as it seems. But what was the conversation? are you able to relate it?

Euc. No, by Jupiter, not by heart; but as soon as I returned home, I made notes of it, and afterwards at my leisure calling it to mind I wrote it down, and as often as I came to Athens, I asked Socrates to repeat what I did not remember, and, on my return hither, corrected it; so that I have nearly the whole conversation written out.

3. *Ter.* True: I have heard you say so before, and though I always meant to beg you to shew it me, I have hitherto delayed doing so. But what should hinder us from now going through it? For I am in great need of rest, having just come from the country.

Euc. I too accompanied Theætetus as far as Erinion, so that I should not be at all sorry to rest myself. Let us go, then, and while we rest the boy shall read to us.

Ter. You say well.

Euc. This then is the book, Terpsion. But I wrote the conversation thus, not as if Socrates related it to me, as he did, but as if he was conversing with the persons with whom he said he did converse. But these, he said, were Theodorus the geometrician, and Theætetus. 4. In order, then, that phrases interposed in the discourse might not give us trouble in the writing, when Socrates spoke of himself, as "I said," or "Thereupon I replied," and again when he spoke of the person who gave the answer, "He assented," or "He denied," for this reason I have introduced Socrates himself as conversing with them, and have done away with all such expressions.

Ter. And that is not at all improper, Euclides.

Euc. Here then, boy, take the book and read.

Socr. If I took more interest in the people at Cyrene, Theodorus, I should enquire of you what is going on there, and of

the people, whether there are any young men there who devote their attention to geometry, or any other liberal study. But now, for I love them less than these, I am more anxious to know who of our young men promise to become eminent. For I myself examine into this as far as I am able, and enquire of others, with whom I see the young men willingly associating. But no small number attach themselves to you, and justly; for you deserve it, both in other respects, and on account of your geometry. If, therefore, you have met with any one worth mentioning, I should be glad to be informed of it.

5. *Theo.* And indeed, Socrates, it is very well worth while both for me to tell and you to hear, what a youth I have met with among your fellow-citizens. And if he were beautiful, I should be very much afraid to mention him, lest I should appear to any one to be enamoured with him; but now, and don't be angry with me, he is not handsome, for he resembles you in the flatness of his nose and the prominence of his eyes: but he has these in a less degree than you. You see I speak without reserve. Be assured then, that of all I ever met with, and I have been in company with very many, I never yet knew one of such an admirable disposition. For a man to be apt to learn, as it is at all times difficult, and at the same time remarkably mild, and added to this brave beyond compare, I, for my part, thought could never happen, nor do I see any who are so. But those who are acute, as this one, sagacious, and of a good memory, are for the most part easily roused to anger, and are hurried violently along like ships without ballast, and are naturally rather furious than brave; on the other hand those who are more sedate commonly set about their studies more sluggishly and are forgetful. 6. But he so calmly, steadily, and effectually applies himself to his studies and investigations, with so much gentleness, like oil flowing noiselessly, that one wonders how one at his age can manage to do this.

Socr. You bring good news. But whose son is he of our citizens?

Theo. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However he is the middle one of those who are now approaching. For both he and these who are some of his companions were just now anointing themselves in the outer course; and

now they appear to me to be coming here after having anointed themselves. Observe, however, if you know him.

Socr. I do know him. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who, my friend, was just such a man as you describe the son to be, and who was otherwise a person of consideration, and besides left behind him a very large fortune.

7. *Theo.* Theætetus is his name, Socrates. But I think his guardians have squandered his fortune. However notwithstanding this, he is wonderfully liberal with his money, Socrates.

Socr. You describe a noble man. Bid him come here, and sit down by us.

Theo. I will. Theætetus, come hither to Socrates.

Socr. By all means come, Theætetus, that I may look at myself, and see what sort of a face I have. For Theodorus says I am like you. But if we had each of us a lyre, and he should say that they were modulated alike, should we believe him at once, or consider first whether he speaks as a musician?

Theæ. We should consider that first.

Socr. Should we not, then, on finding that he was so, believe him, but, if he was ignorant of music, disbelieve him?

Theæ. True.

Socr. Now, then, I think, if we care at all about the resemblance of our faces, we should consider whether he speaks as a painter, or not.

Theæ. It appears so to me.

Socr. Is Theodorus a painter then?

Theæ. Not that I know of.

Socr. And is he not a geometrician either?

Theæ. Most assuredly he is, Socrates.

8. *Socr.* Is he also an astronomer, a reasoner, and a musician, and acquainted with all such things as are requisite for a good education?

Theæ. He appears so to me.

Socr. If, then, he says that we resemble each other in some part of our body, praising or blaming it, it is not very well worth while to pay any attention to him.

Theæ. Perhaps not.

Socr. But what if he should praise the soul of either of us for virtue or wisdom? would it not be worth while for the one

who heard him to take pains to examine him that was praised, and for the latter to discover himself willingly ?

Theæ. Certainly, Socrates.

Socr. It is time then, my dear Theætetus, for you to discover yourself, and for me to examine you ; for be assured that Theodorus, though he has ere now praised many both strangers and citizens to me, has never praised any one so much as he praised you just now.

Theæ. May it be well, Socrates ; but beware that he did not speak in jest.

Socr. That is not Theodorus's habit. But do not retract what you have granted, under the pretence that he spoke in jest, lest he should be compelled to bear witness. For no one assuredly will accuse him of giving false evidence. Therefore adhere firmly to your agreement.

Theæ. It is proper to do so, if you think fit.

9. *Socr.* Tell me, then ; Do you learn geometry from Theodorus ?

Theæ. I do.

Socr. And, likewise, astronomy, and harmony, and reasoning.

Theæ. I endeavour to do so.

Socr. I too, my boy, endeavour to learn both from him and from others who I think understand any thing of these matters. However, though I am tolerably well informed in other subjects, yet I am in doubt about a trifle which I wish to consider with you, and these here present. Tell me, then, is not to learn to become wiser in that which one learns ?

Theæ. How otherwise ?

Socr. And by wisdom, I think, the wise are wise.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But does this differ at all from science ?

Theæ. What ?

Socr. Wisdom. Are not men wise in things of which they have a scientific knowledge ?

Theæ. How not ?

Socr. Then are wisdom and science the same ?

Theæ. Yes.

10. *Socr.* This, then, is the thing that I doubt about, and I am not able to determine satisfactorily by myself what science is. Can we then explain it ? What do you say ? Which of us

shall speak first? But he that mistakes, and as often as any one mistakes, shall sit as an ass, as the boys say when they play at ball; but whoever shall get the better without making a mistake shall be our king, and shall order any question he pleases to be answered. Why are you silent? Am I rude at all, Theodorus, from my love of talking, and in my anxiety to bring about a conversation amongst us, and of making us all friends, and sociable with one another?

Theo. Such a thing, Socrates, cannot by any means be rude, but bid one of these young men answer you. For I am unaccustomed to this kind of conversation, and am not of an age to accustom myself to it; whereas it is suitable to them, and they will benefit by it much more; for, in truth, youth can derive benefit from every thing. As you begun, therefore, do not let Theætetus off, but question him.

11. *Socr.* You hear, Theætetus, what Theodorus says, whom, I think, you will neither be willing to disobey, nor is it right for a young man not to submit to a wise man, when he commands him in matters of this kind. Tell me, therefore, frankly and ingenuously, what does science appear to you to be?

Theæ. I must then, Socrates, since you bid me. And if I make any mistake you will assuredly correct me.

Socr. Certainly, if we are able.

Theæ. It appears to me, then, that sciences are such things as one may learn from Theodorus, geometry, and the others which you just now enumerated; and again, the shoemaker's art, and those of other artizans, all and each of these are nothing else but science.

Socr. Nobly and munificently, my friend, when asked for one thing you give many, and various things instead of the single one.

Theæ. What mean you by this, Socrates?

Socr. Perhaps nothing: but I will tell you what I think. When you speak of the shoemaker's art, do you mean any thing else than the science of making shoes?

Theæ. Nothing.

12. *Socr.* But what of the carpenter's art? Do you mean any thing else than the science of making implements in wood?

Theæ. Still nothing else.

Socr. In both, then, do you not define that of which each is the science?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But the question asked, Theætetus, was not this, of what things there is science, nor how many sciences there are; for we did not enquire, with a view to enumerate them, but to know what science itself is. Do I say nothing to the purpose?

Theæ. You speak very correctly.

Socr. Consider this too. If any one should ask us about any mean and obvious thing, as, for instance, clay, what it is, if we were to answer him, there is the potters' clay, the oven-builders' clay, and the brick-makers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?

Theæ. Probably.

Socr. In the first place, *we should be ridiculous* for thinking that he who asks the question can understand from our answer, when we say Clay, adding, image-makers, or any other artisans whatever. Do you think that any one can understand the name of a thing when he does not know what that thing is?

Theæ. By no means.

13. *Socr.* Neither does he understand the science of shoes who does not know what science is?

Theæ. He does not.

Socr. He then does not understand what is the art of shoe-making, or any other art, who is ignorant of what science is?

Theæ. It is so.

Socr. It is, therefore, a ridiculous answer for one to give who is asked what science is, when he answers the name of some art. For he answers, of what there is a science, though this is not what he was asked.

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. In the next place, when he might have answered plainly and briefly he goes round an endless way. As for instance to the question about clay, it is a plain and simple answer to give, that clay is earth mixed with moisture, without mentioning what use is made of it.

Theæ. It appears easy now, in this way, Socrates; for you appear to ask just such a question as lately occurred to me when we were conversing together, I and your namesake here, Socrates.

Socr. What was that, Theætetus?

14. *Theæ.* Theodorus here was describing to us something

about powers, with respect to magnitudes of three and five feet, shewing that they are not commensurate in length to a magnitude of one foot, and thus proceeding through every number as far as to a magnitude of seventeen feet; at this he stopped. Since then powers appeared to be infinite in multitude, something of the following kind occurred to us, to endeavour to comprehend them in one name, by which we might denominate all these powers.

Socr. And did you discover any thing of the kind?

Theæ. I think we did. But do you also consider.

Socr. Say on.

Theæ. We divided all number into two classes; then comparing that in which the factors^a are the same to a square figure, we called it square and equilateral.

Socr. Very well.

Theæ. But the intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every one in which the factors are not the same, but a greater number is multiplied by a less, or a less by a greater, so that a greater and a lesser side always enclose them, we compared to an oblong figure, and called them oblong numbers.

Socr. Admirable. But what next?

Theæ. Such lines as square an equilateral and plane number, we defined to be length, and such as square an oblong number, powers, as not being commensurate with them in length, but with the planes which they produce. And the case is the same with solids.

15. *Socr.* Excellently done, my boys; so that Theodorus appears to me not liable to the charge of having given false testimony.

Theæ. However, Socrates, I shall not be able to answer your question about science, as I did that about length and power; though you appear to me to seek something of the same kind. So that Theodorus again appears to be a false witness.

Socr. How so? If, praising you for running, he should say that he never met with any youth who ran so swift, and afterwards you should be defeated in running by a man who is full grown and very swift, do you think he would have praised you with less truth?

^a The literal translation instead of "in which the factors are the same," is "which is able to become equally equal," by which is meant a number multiplied by itself.

Theæ. I do not.

Socr. But with respect to science, as I just now spoke of it, do you think it is a trifling matter to find out what it is, and not in every way difficult?

Theæ. By Jupiter, I think it difficult in the extreme.

16. *Socr.* Have confidence, then, in yourself, and think that Theodorus spoke to the purpose, and endeavour by all possible means to comprehend the notion both of other things, and also of science, what it is.

Theæ. As far as endeavour goes, Socrates, it shall be found out.

Socr. Come then: for you began very well just now; endeavour, in imitation of your answer about powers, as you comprised those, which are many, under one general idea, so likewise to designate many sciences by one notion.

Theæ. Be assured, Socrates, I have often attempted to examine this, on hearing the questions that are propounded by you; but I can neither persuade myself that I can say any thing satisfactory, nor can I hear any one else answering in the manner you require, though still I do not desist from the attempt.

17. *Socr.* You are in labour, my dear Theætetus, not because you are empty, but pregnant.

Theæ. I know not, Socrates; however I tell you how the case stands with me.

Socr. What, absurd youth, have you not heard that I am son of the very noble and awful midwife Phænarete?

Theæ. I have heard so.

Socr. And have you also heard that I study the same art?

Theæ. By no means.

Socr. Be assured, however, that it is so: but do not betray me to others. For they are not aware, my friend, that I possess this art? but they, since they are ignorant of it, do not say this of me, but that I am a most absurd man, and make me doubt. Have you not heard this?

Theæ. I have.

Socr. Shall I tell you the reason of it?

Theæ. By all means.

Socr. Consider, then, every thing that relates to midwives, and you will more easily understand what I mean. For you doubtless know, that not one of them delivers others, while she

herself can conceive and bring forth, but those who can no longer bring forth.

Theæ. Certainly.

18. *Socr.* But they say that Diana is the cause of this, because being herself a virgin she has the charge of child-births. Now to barren women she has not given the power of becoming midwives, because human nature is too weak to undertake an art in things of which it has had no experience, but she has imposed that office on those who from their age are incapable of bearing children, doing honour to the resemblance of herself.

Theæ. That is reasonable.

Socr. And is not this also reasonable and necessary, that who are pregnant and who are not should be better known by midwives than by others?

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Moreover, midwives by applying drugs and using enchantments, are able both to excite and, if they please, to alleviate the pangs, and to deliver those that bring forth with difficulty, and if the child appears to be abortive, they produce a miscarriage.

Theæ. It is so.

Socr. Have you not also heard this of them, that they are most skilful match-makers, as being perfectly competent to distinguish what kind of woman ought to be united to what kind of man, in order to produce the finest children?

Theæ. I did not altogether know that.

19. *Socr.* Be assured, then, that they pride themselves more in this than in cutting the navel-string. For consider; do you think it belongs to the same or a different art to cultivate and gather in the fruits of the earth, and again to know in what soil what plant or seed ought to be sown?

Theæ. No, but to the same art.

Socr. But with respect to women, my friend, do you think that there is one art of that kind^b, and another of gathering in the fruit?

Theæ. It is not reasonable to suppose so.

Socr. It is not. But by reason of the illegitimate and ill-assorted unions of men and women, to which the name of pandering has been given, midwives out of regard to their own

^b That is, of choosing the soil.

dignity avoid match-making also, fearing lest by this they should incur the other imputation, since it doubtless belongs to real midwives only to make marriages properly.

Theæ. It appears so.

Socr. Such then is the office of midwives, but less important than my task. For it does not happen to women, sometimes to bring forth images, and sometimes realities, which cannot be easily discriminated; for, if it did happen, it would be the greatest and noblest work for midwives to distinguish that which is true and that which is not; do you not think so?

Theæ. I do.

20. *Socr.* But in my art of midwifery all other things are the same as in theirs; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women, and that it attends to their souls bringing forth and not their bodies. But the most important thing in my art is, that it is able to test in every possible way whether the mind of a young man is bringing forth an image and a cheat, or what is genuine and true: for the case is the same with me as with midwives; I am barren of wisdom, and as to what many have reproached me with, that I question others, but give no answer myself on any subject, because I have no wisdom, they reproach me truly. But the cause of this is as follows: the deity compels me to act the part of a midwife, but forbids me to bring forth myself. I am not, therefore, myself at all wise, and I have no such discovery as is the offspring of my own mind; but those who associate with me at first appear, some of them, exceedingly ignorant, but all, as our intimacy continues, to whom the deity grants that privilege, make a wonderful proficiency, as is evident both to themselves and others; and this is clear, that they make this proficiency without ever learning any thing from me, but from their own resources finding and becoming possessed of many beautiful things; of the midwife's office, however, the deity and I are the cause. 21. But it is evident from this: many, from not knowing this, and deeming themselves to be the cause, but despising me, either of themselves or through the persuasion of others, have left me sooner than was proper, and after they have left me have miscarried for the future, in consequence of their depraved associations, and badly nurturing what they have been delivered of through me, they have destroyed it, setting a higher value on cheats and images than on

that which is true, they have at last appeared to be ignorant both to themselves and others. One of these was Aristides son of Lysimachus, and many others, with some of whom, when they again come to me, begging to renew their intercourse with me, and doing every thing in their power to obtain it, the demon that attends me prevents me from associating, but with others it allows me, and these again make considerable proficiency. And they that associate with me are in this respect affected in the same way as women who bring forth; they suffer pangs, and are filled with anxieties, to a far greater degree than the women are. But their pangs my art is able both to excite and appease. And these are affected in this way. 22. But sometimes, Theætetus, there are some who do not appear to me to be at all pregnant, and I, knowing that they do not need my assistance, very kindly sue others for them, and with the aid of the deity, conjecture well enough, from associating with whom they will derive benefit. Of these I have handed many over to Prodicus, and many to other wise and divine men. I have dwelt long on this, my excellent friend, for this reason, because I suspect, as you also think yourself, that you are in pain from being pregnant with something inwardly. Deal with me, then, as son of a midwife, and as myself skilled in midwifery, and endeavour to answer the questions I put to you to the best of your ability. And if, on examining any thing that you say, I shall consider it to be an image and not true, and should thereupon remove it and throw it away, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered for the first time are for their children: for many, my admirable friend, have ere this been so affected towards me as to be actually ready to bite me, when I take away any trifle from them, and they do not think that I do this with a good design, in that they are very far from knowing that no deity designs ill to men, and that neither do I do any thing of this kind through ill-will, but because it is by no means allowable for me to give way to falsehood and conceal the truth. 23. Again, therefore, from the beginning, Theætetus, endeavour to tell me what science is; but never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills and you strive manfully you will be able.

Theæ. Indeed, Socrates, when you are thus urgent, it would be disgraceful for one not to endeavour to the utmost of one's

power to say what one is able. He, then, that knows any thing appears to me to perceive what he knows, and, as it now seems, science is nothing else than perception.

Socr. Well and nobly said, my boy; for it is right thus to declare one's opinion. But come, let us consider this together, whether it is solid or empty. Science, you say, is perception?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. You appear, indeed, to have given no mean definition of science, but that which Protagoras has given; but he said the same thing in a different manner. For he says that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of those that exist, and of the non-existence of those that do not exist. You have doubtless read this?

Theæ. I have read it, and that often.

24. *Socr.* Does he not say pretty much, that such as every thing appears to me, such it is to me, and as it appears to you, such it is to you, but you and I are men?

Theæ. He does indeed say so.

Socr. It is probable however that a wise man does not trifle; let us, therefore, follow him. Does it not sometimes happen that when the same wind blows, one of us is cold, and another not, and one slightly, but another exceedingly?

Theæ. Assuredly.

Socr. Whether, then, shall we say, that the wind at that time is in itself cold or not cold? or shall we believe Protagoras, that it is cold to him that is cold, but not to him that is not?

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. Does it not, then, appear so to both of them?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But to appear is the same as to be perceived?

Theæ. It is.

Socr. Appearance then and perception are the same in things hot, and every thing of that kind; for such as every one perceives things to be, such also they seem to be to every one.

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. Perception, therefore, has always reference to that which really is, and is free from falsehood, as being science.

Theæ. It appears so.

25. *Socr.* By the graces, then, was not Protagoras a very wise man, and did he express himself thus enigmatically to us, the general rabble, but speak the truth to his disciples in secret?

Theæ. What mean you by this, Socrates?

Socr. I will tell you, and that no mean account; he asserts, that no one thing exists of itself, nor can you correctly designate any thing by any quality, but if you call it great, it will appear small, and if heavy, light, and so with every thing else; as if nothing was one thing, or any thing, or possessed of any quality: but as if all things which we say exist, become so from impulse, motion, and admixture with each other, thereby designating them incorrectly; for nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And in this all the wise men in succession, except Parmenides, agreed, namely, Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, and of the poets, those who rank highest in each kind of poetry, in comedy Epicharmus, and in tragedy Homer; for in saying that "Oceanus is father of the gods, and Tethys mother," he asserts that all things are produced by flux and motion. Does he not seem to say so?

Theæ. To me he does.

26. *Socr.* Who then can contend with such an army, with Homer for its leader, and not be ridiculous?

Theæ. It is not easy, Socrates.

Socr. It is not, indeed, Theætetus. For this is a strong proof in favour of their argument, that motion gives the appearance of existence and of generation, but repose of non-existence and decay; for heat and fire, which engenders and supports other things, is itself engendered by impulse and friction, but this is motion. Are not these the origin of fire?

Theæ. Surely they are.

Socr. And moreover the race of animals springs from the same causes.

Theæ. How not?

Socr. But what? Does not the habit of the body perish by rest and inaction, but is it not for the most part preserved by exercise and motion?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But does not the habit of the soul acquire and retain learning and become better by study and practice, which are

c Iliad, xiv. 201.

motions, but by rest, which is want of practice and ignorance, it neither learns any thing, and forgets what it has learnt?

Theæ. Assuredly.

27. *Socr.* Motion, therefore, is good both for the soul and the body; but rest, the contrary.

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. Shall I add further, with respect to stillness of the air, and calms and things of that kind, that rest corrupts and destroys, but the contrary preserves. And besides this shall I put the finishing stroke to my argument by compelling you to admit, that by the golden chain Homer meant nothing else than the sun, and intimated that as long as the universe and the sun are moved, all things exist, and are preserved, both amongst gods and amongst men; but if they were to stand still, as it were bound, all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down.

Theæ. He appears to me too, Socrates, to intimate what you say.

Socr. Then put the argument thus, my excellent friend: first with respect to the eyes, suppose that what you call white colour is not any thing different, external to your eyes, nor in your eyes; nor can you assign it any place; for then it would have a fixed position, and would continue, and not be liable to production.

28. *Theæ.* But how?

Socr. Let us follow our late principle, and lay it down that there is nothing which is of itself one thing; and thus black and white, and every other colour, will appear to us to be produced by the application of the eyes to a corresponding movement, and each thing that we say is colour, will neither be that which is applied, nor that to which it is applied, but some intermediate production peculiar to each. Would you positively maintain, that what each colour appears to you, such it also appears to a dog, and every other animal?

Theæ. Not I, by Jupiter.

Socr. But what? Does any thing appear similar to another man and to you? are you positive about this, or rather that it does not appear the same even to you, because you are never identical with yourself?

Theæ. The latter seems to me to be the case rather than the former.

Socr. If, therefore, that which we measure by comparison, or which we touch, were great, or white, or warm, it would never, by coming in contact with anything else, become different, for it would not be in any respect changed. But if that which measures or touches were some one of these things, it could not, in consequence of something else approaching it or being affected in any way, become any thing else, because it would not itself be in any respect affected. 29. For now, my friend, we are in a manner compelled to assert things altogether wonderful and ridiculous, as Protagoras would acknowledge, and every one who supports his opinions.

Theæ. How and what do you mean?

Socr. Take a trifling example, and you will understand all that I wish. Six dice for instance, if you should put four by them, we say are more than the four and half as many again, but if twelve we say they are fewer, and the half; nor would it be allowable to say otherwise. Would you allow it?

Theæ. Not I, indeed.

Socr. What then? If Protagoras or any one else should ask, "Theætetus, is it possible for any thing to become greater or more otherwise than by being increased? What would you answer?"

Theæ. If, Socrates, I should answer what appears to me to be the case with reference to the present question, I should say that it is not possible; but if with reference to the former question, to avoid contradicting myself, I should say that it is possible.

Socr. By Juno, well and divinely said, my friend. But, as it seems, if you should answer that it is possible, something like that saying of Euripides will happen; for the tongue will be blameless, but the mind not blameless^d.

Theæ. True.

30. *Socr.* If, therefore, you and I were skilful and wise, after we had thoroughly examined our minds, we should then, out of mere wantonness, make trial of each other's strength, and engaging in such a contest after the manner of the sophists, should mutually parry argument with argument: but now, as being novices, we shall desire first of all, to examine what the things themselves are which we have in our minds, whether they accord with each other, or not at all.

^d See Eurip. Hippol. l. 612.

Theæ. I should certainly desire this.

Socr. And so do I. But since this is the case, shall we not quietly, seeing we have abundance of leisure, again consider, not feeling any annoyance, but really examining ourselves, in order to see what those appearances in us are. And on considering them, we shall say in the first place, I think, that nothing ever becomes greater or less, either in bulk, or number, as long as it continues equal to itself. Is it not so?

Theæ. Yes.

31. *Socr.* And, in the second place, that a thing to which nothing is either added and from which nothing is taken away, will neither be ever increased or diminished, but always be equal.

Theæ. Just so.

Socr. And shall we not say, in the third place, that it is impossible for a thing which did not before exist, to exist afterwards, without it has been produced and is produced.

Theæ. It seems so, indeed.

Socr. These three admissions, I think, contend with each other in our soul, when we speak about dice, or when we say that I, being of the size I am, having neither increased, nor suffered diminution in the space of a year, am now larger than you, who are a young man, but afterwards less, though my bulk has not been diminished, but yours has been increased. For I am afterwards, what I was not before, without having been made so. 32. For it is impossible for a thing to have been made, without being made, and having lost nothing of my bulk, I cannot have been made less. And the case is the same with ten thousand other things with reference to ten thousand others, if we admit this. You doubtless follow me, Theætetus; for you appear to me not to be a novice in things of this kind.

Theæ. By the gods, Socrates, I wonder extremely what these things can be, and, truly, sometimes when I look at them, I become dizzy.

Socr. Theodorus, my friend, appears not to have formed an erroneous estimate of your disposition; for wonder is very much the affection of a philosopher; for there is no other beginning of philosophy than this, and he who said that Iris was the daughter of Thaumas^e, seems not to have described her genealogy badly. But do you understand now, why these

* Hesiod, Theog. l. 780. Thaum signifies "wonder."

things are so, from what we say Protagoras maintains, or not yet?

Theæ. I don't think I do yet.

33. *Socr.* Shall you not, then, be obliged to me, if I assist you in searching out the true, but concealed opinion of a man, or rather of men of celebrity?

Theæ. How should I not be, and indeed exceedingly obliged to you?

Socr. Look round, then, and see that no profane person hears us. But they are so who think that nothing else exists except what they can grasp with their hands, but do not admit that actions, and productions, and whatever is invisible, are to be reckoned in the number of things that exist.

Theæ. Indeed, Socrates, you speak of hard and obstinate men.

Socr. For they are very ignorant^f, my boy. But there are others far more refined than these, whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their principle, on which all the things, that we have just now mentioned, depend, is this: That the universe is motion, and nothing else besides, but that there are two species of motion, each infinite in amount, and that one has an active, the other a passive power. 34. That from the intercourse and friction of these with one another are formed productions infinite in number, but of two kinds, one that is perceivable, the other perception, which always coincides and is engendered together with that which is perceivable. Now to the perceptions we give the following names, seeing, hearing, smelling, cold and heat, and moreover pleasures, pains, desires, and fears are so called, and there are innumerable others which have no name, and vast multitudes that have been named: again there is a class of perceivable things akin to each of these, all kinds of colours to all kinds of vision, and in like manner voices to hearing, and other perceivable things are produced corresponding to the other perceptions. What then is the meaning of this discourse, Theætetus, in reference to the former? Do you understand what it is?

Theæ. Not very well, Socrates.

Socr. But observe if by any means it can be brought to a conclusion. For it means to say that all these things are, as we said, moved, and that there is swiftness and slowness in

^f Literally "unmusical."

their motion. 35. Whatever then is slow is moved in the same place and towards things near it, and so produces, and the things which are produced are accordingly slower; and on the contrary, whatever is swift moves towards things at a distance, and so produces, and the things which are produced are accordingly swifter, for they are impelled, and their motion consists in impulse. When, therefore, the eye and any of the things that correspond to it meet together and produce whiteness, and the perception connate to this, which would never have been produced had each of them approached something else, then they being in the meanwhile impelled, *that is to say*, sight from the eyes, and whiteness from that which together with it generates colour, the eye becomes filled with vision, and then sees, and becomes not vision, but a seeing eye; but that which together with it generates colour is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness, but white, whether it is wood or stone, or whatever may happen to be tinted with a colour of this kind. 36. And so with the rest, hard and warm, and every thing, we must in the same manner conceive that none of these is any thing of itself, as we have observed before that all things and of all kinds are produced by their intercourse with each other, from motion, for, as they say, we cannot determine positively with regard to any one thing, that that which is active really exists, nor again that which is passive; for neither is the active any thing before it meets with the passive, nor the passive before it meets with the active; and that which, meeting with any thing, is active, when it falls upon something else, is found to be passive. 37. So that it results from all this, as we said at the beginning, that nothing is essentially one, but is always being produced by something, and the word "being" must be entirely done away with, although we have already been compelled by custom and ignorance to use it frequently; but, as the sages say, we ought not to allow any thing, either of any other, or of me, or this, or that, or any other name which designates permanency, but that according to nature, things ought to be said to be produced and made, to perish and be changed: so, if any one asserts permanency of any thing, he who does so may easily be confuted. Thus then we ought to speak of things individually, and of many collectively, to which collection are given the names of man, stone, animal, and each several species. Do not these

things, Theætetus, appear pleasant to you, and have you not found them agreeable to your taste?

Theæ. I don't know, Socrates; for I can't make you out; whether you are giving your own opinions or are trying me.

38. *Socr.* You do not remember, my friend, that I neither know nor claim as my own any of these things, but that I am barren of them, but I act the midwife towards you, and for this purpose I enchant you, and put before you the opinions of the several wise men, that you may taste them, until I bring your own opinion to light: but when it is brought forth, I will then examine whether it shall prove to be empty or productive. Be therefore confident and bold, and answer in an honest and manly way, what you think of the questions I put to you.

Theæ. Ask then.

Socr. Tell me then again, whether it is your opinion that the good, and the beautiful, and every thing that we just now mentioned, have an actual existence or are constantly being produced?

Theæ. To me indeed, when I hear you thus explaining the matter, it is wonderful how far you appear to have reason on your side, and I think that your statements must be admitted.

39. *Socr.* Let us not, then, omit what remains of it. But it remains that we should speak of dreams, diseases, and, besides other things, of madness; and whatever else is called error of hearing or seeing, or of any other perception. For you know, without doubt, that in all these cases the doctrine which we have just now described, is considered to be completely confuted, since the sensations produced in these instances are utterly false, and so far are the things that appear to each person from existing, that quite contrariwise none of the things that appear have any real existence.

Theæ. You speak most truly, Socrates.

Socr. What argument, then, remains for him, who asserts that perception is science, and that things which appear to every one are to that person what they appear to be?

Theæ. I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have no answer to give because you just now blamed me for having said so: but in truth I cannot controvert the fact, that those who are mad or dreaming, form false opinions, since some of the former think they are gods, and the latter that they are winged and dancy that they are flying in their sleep.

40. *Socr.* Do you not know, then, the controversy that is

raised on these points, especially about dreaming and being awake?

Theæ. What is that?

Socr. That which I think you have often heard, when people ask, what proof one could give, if any one should ask us now at the present moment, whether we are asleep, and all our thoughts are dreams, or whether we are awake, and really conversing with each other.

Theæ. And indeed, Socrates, it is difficult to say what proof one ought to give: for in both states all things in a manner correspond with each other. For, with respect to our present conversation, nothing hinders our fancying that we converse with each other in a dream: and when in sleep we fancy we are telling our dreams, the similarity of one with the other is surprising^g.

Socr. You see, then, that it is not difficult to raise a controversy, since it is even controverted whether a state is that of being awake or dreaming; moreover since the time during which we sleep is equal to that when we are awake, in each of these states our soul persists that the opinions that are present for the time are most certainly true, so that for an equal space of time we say that these are real, and for an equal space that those are, and we are equally positive for each of them.

Theæ. Most assuredly.

41. *Socr.* May not, then, the same argument be used with respect to diseases and madness, except with regard to time, that it is not equal.

Theæ. Right.

Socr. What then? Shall truth be defined by length and brevity of time?

Theæ. That, indeed, would be ridiculous in many ways.

Socr. Have you, then, any other clear mark by which you can shew which of these opinions is true?

Theæ. I think not.

Socr. Hear, therefore, from me, what will be said about these things by those who maintain that appearances are always real to the person to whom they appear. They will question you thus, I think: "Theætetus, can a thing which is totally different from another, have the same power as that

^g Of conversations when awake, and of fancied conversations in dreams.

other?" And we are not to suppose that the thing we ask about is partly the same, and partly different, but altogether different.

Theæ. It is impossible that it should possess any thing the same, either in power, or in any other respect, since it is entirely different.

42. *Socr.* Must we not, then, necessarily confess, that a thing of this kind is dissimilar?

Theæ. It seems so to me.

Socr. If, therefore, any thing happens to become similar or dissimilar to any thing, whether to itself or to another, so far as it becomes similar we shall say it is the same, but, so far as dissimilar, different.

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. Have we not said before, that there are many, and indeed innumerable things, which are active, and likewise passive?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. And moreover, that one thing commingled first with one thing and then with another, will produce not the same, but different things.

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Let us speak, then, of you and me and other things in the same manner, of Socrates in health, and again of Socrates ill. Whether shall we say that the latter is similar to the former or dissimilar?

Theæ. By Socrates ill, do you mean the whole of the latter opposed to the whole of the former, Socrates in health?

Socr. You understand me perfectly; that is the very thing I mean.

Theæ. Dissimilar, surely.

43. *Socr.* And is it not different inasmuch as it is dissimilar?

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. And should you not speak in the same way of Socrates asleep, and in the several states we just now described?

Theæ. I should.

Socr. But will not each of those things whose nature it is to make any thing something else, when it lights upon Socrates in health, treat me as one thing, and when ill, as a different thing?

Theæ. How should it not?

Socr. And shall we not produce different things in each case, both I the patient, and that the agent?

Theæ. How not?

Socr. Now when I drink wine, being in health, it appears to me pleasant and sweet.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. For, from what has been already granted, the agent and the patient produce sweetness and perception, both being put in motion together; and the perception proceeding from the patient causes the tongue to perceive, but the sweetness proceeding from the wine and set in motion about it, causes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to a healthy tongue.

44. *Theæ.* Certainly, what was granted before comes to this.

Socr. But when it lights on me, being ill, first of all does not a different thing in reality light on one who is not the same person? for it approaches one who is dissimilar.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But Socrates in this state, and the wine drunk, again generate different things, with regard to the tongue a perception of bitterness, and with regard to the wine bitterness produced and set in motion, and that, indeed, not bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but perceiving.

Theæ. Exactly so.

Socr. Therefore I shall never become any thing else while I perceive thus; for a different perception of a different thing causes the percipient to be changed and different: nor will that, which thus affects me, by coming in contact with another, though it produces the same effect, ever become such as it was to me; for by generating a different thing from a different thing it will become changed.

Theæ. Such is the case.

Socr. Neither, then, shall I become such by myself, nor will it become such by itself^a.

Theæ. Certainly not.

Socr. But it is necessary that I, when I become percipient, should become so in relation to something: for it is impossible to become percipient, and yet percipient of nothing: and it is likewise necessary, when any thing becomes sweet or bitter, or

^a That is to say, the relation between agent and patient is so close that neither can be what it is, under that particular aspect, without the other.

any thing of the kind, that it should become so in relation to some one; for it is impossible for a thing to become sweet, and yet sweet to no one.

Theæ. Assuredly.

45. *Socr.* It remains, I think, that we¹, if we are, should be, or if we are produced, should be produced, by relation to each other; since necessity unites our existence together, and unites it to no other thing, nor even to ourselves. It remains, therefore, that we are united to each other. So that, if any one says that any thing exists, he must say that it exists for something, or of something, or in relation to something, and in like manner of any thing said to be produced: but he must not say, nor must he allow any one else to say, that any thing exists or is produced of itself, as the argument we have deduced clearly proves.

Theæ. Assuredly, Socrates.

Socr. Since, then, that which affects me is relative to me and not to another, do not I perceive it, and another not perceive it?

Theæ. How not?

Socr. My perception, therefore, is true to me; for it always belongs to my existence. And I, according to Protagoras, am a judge of things that exist in relation to me, that they do exist, and of things that do not so exist, that they do not exist.

Theæ. It seems so.

46. *Socr.* How then, since I am not deceived and do not falter in my mind about things that exist or are produced, can I fail to have a scientific knowledge of things which I perceive?

Theæ. It cannot fail to be so.

Socr. It was, therefore, very finely said by you, that science is nothing else than perception; and all come to the same result, the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all that tribe, that all things are in motion like streams, and that of the very wise Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things, and that of Theætetus, that, if this is the case, perception must be science. Is it not so, Theætetus? Shall we say that this is your new-born infant as it were, delivered by my midwifery? How say you?

Theæ. It is necessary to say so, Socrates.

¹ "We," that is, the agent and patient.

47. *Socr.* This, then, as it appears, we have with much difficulty produced, whatever it may turn out to be. But after the birth, we must, in truth, perform the ceremony of running¹ round in argument, and consider whether, without our perceiving it, that which is produced is not unworthy of being reared, but empty and false. Do you think that we ought by all means to rear your offspring, and not expose it? and will you endure to see it refuted, and not be very much offended if any one should take it away from you, as having been delivered for the first time?

Theo. Theætetus will endure this, Socrates, for he is not at all morose. But, by the gods, say whether it is not so.

Socr. You are really very fond of discussion, Theodorus, and pleasant, in thinking that I am a sack full of arguments, and that I can easily pick one out and prove that these things are not so. But you do not observe how the case stands, that no argument proceeds from me, but always from the person who is conversing with me, and that I know nothing but a very little, just enough to apprehend and examine moderately well an argument advanced by another who is wise. And now I will endeavour to do this from him, without saying any thing of myself.

48. *Theo.* You say well, Socrates; then do so.

Socr. Do you know, Theodorus, what I wonder at in your friend Protagoras?

Theo. What?

Socr. In other respects I thought what he said was very acceptable, that what appears to each person, really exists, but I wondered at the beginning of his essay, that he did not say at the commencement of his book on Truth that a pig or a cynocephalus or some other more monstrous creature that possesses perception, is the measure of all things, in order that he might begin by speaking grandly and very contemptuously to us, shewing that we indeed admire him as if he were a god, for his wisdom, whereas with respect to understanding, he is no better than a tadpole, let alone any other man. What are we to say, Theodorus? 49. For if that opinion which is formed from perception will be true to each person, and no one will be

¹ On the fifth day after the birth of a child the midwives, having purified their hands, ran with it round the hearth, so Socrates proposes that the bantling of Theætetus should run the gauntlet of discussion.

able to decide better on the way in which another is affected, nor one more competent to examine the opinion of another, whether it is true or false, but, as we have often said, each person by himself alone will form opinions for himself, and all these are right and true, why in the world, my friend, should Protagoras be so wise as to be thought justly worthy to teach others for high pay, while we are more ignorant and must have recourse to him, though each person is to himself the measure of his own wisdom? How can we avoid saying that Protagoras speaks thus out of joke? As to myself and my art of midwifery, I say nothing of the ridicule we should be exposed to, and I think, so would the whole study of reasoning; for will it not be great and signal vanity to examine and endeavour to confute the fancies and opinions of others, each person's being true, if the Truth of Protagoras is true, and he has not uttered his oracles in sport from the sanctuary of his book?

50. *Theo.* Socrates, he is my friend, as you just now said; I cannot, therefore, allow Protagoras to be confuted by my concessions, nor yet can I oppose you contrary to my own opinion. Again, therefore, take Theætetus; for he certainly appears to have listened to you just now very attentively.

Socr. If you went to Lacedæmon, Theodorus, to the wrestling grounds, and were to see others naked, some of them mean, should you hesitate to strip yourself and shew your own form in turn?

Theo. Why do you think I should not, at least if they would permit me and be persuaded by me? as I think I shall now persuade you to allow me to be a spectator, and not drag me to the gymnasium, now that my limbs are stiff, but for you to wrestle with one who is younger and more supple.

51. *Socr.* But if this is agreeable to you, Theodorus, it is not disagreeable to me, as the vulgar saying goes. I must have recourse again, therefore, to the wise Theætetus. Tell me, then, Theætetus, first of all as to what we just now discussed, do you not wonder with me, that you have so suddenly discovered yourself to be not inferior in wisdom to any man or god? or do you think that the measure of Protagoras has less to do with gods than men?

Theæ. Not I, by Jupiter: and I very much wonder at your question. For when we discussed in what manner they said, that what appears to each person is true to him to whom it

appears, it seemed to me to be well said, but now the very contrary has speedily occurred to me.

Socr. For you are young, my dear boy, and quickly give ear to and are persuaded by plausible speeches. For to these things Protagoras or some one on his behalf would say: "Noble boys and old men, you here sit and converse together, dragging gods into the question, of whom, whether they exist or not, I do not think proper either to speak or write, and what the multitude hear and admit, this you assert, as if it were strange if every man did not excel any beast whatever in wisdom, but you do not adduce any proof, or conclusive argument, but have recourse to likelihood, which if Theodorus or any other geometrician were to employ in geometry, he would be deemed unworthy of notice." 52. Do you, therefore, and Theodorus, consider, whether on such matters you will admit of arguments deduced from probability and likelihood.

Theæ. But, Socrates, neither would you nor we say that this is right.

Socr. We must therefore consider it in another way, as it appears, according to what you and Theodorus says.

Theæ. In another way, certainly.

Socr. Let us, then, consider it thus, whether science and perception are the same or different: for to this surely our whole discourse tends, and for the sake of this we have mooted these many absurd points; have we not?

Theæ. Assuredly.

Socr. Shall we allow then that whatever we perceive by sight or hearing, this we at the same time know? for instance, before we have learnt the language of barbarians, whether shall we deny that we hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, when unacquainted with letters, on looking at them, whether shall we insist that we do not see, or know them, though we do see them?

53. *Theæ.* Whichever of them, Socrates, we see and hear, we shall say that we know, for that of the latter we see and know the form and colour, and of the former, that we both hear and know the sharpness and flatness of the sounds; but that what grammarians and interpreters teach about them, we neither perceive by sight or hearing, nor know.

Socr. Admirable, Theætetus, and it is not worth while to dispute with you about these things, in order that you may make

a greater proficiency. But observe also this other difficulty that stands in our way, and consider how we can repel it.

Theæ. What is that?

Socr. This: if any one should ask, whether it is possible for a person who still possesses and retains the memory of a thing which he once knew, at the very time when he remembers it, not to know the very thing that he remembers. But I am becoming prolix, as it seems, through a wish to ask whether a person who has learnt any thing and remembers it, does not know it.

Theæ. How should he not, Socrates? for, otherwise, what you say would be a prodigy.

Socr. Am I then trifling? Consider. 54. Do you not then say that to see is to perceive, and that sight is perception?

Theæ. I do.

Socr. Has not he, then, who sees any thing, obtained a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, according to our late argument?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. What then? do you not say that memory is something?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. Whether of nothing or something?

Theæ. Of something, surely.

Socr. Is it not, then, of the things which he learns and perceives, of some such things as these?

Theæ. What else?

Socr. And what a person sees, does he not sometimes remember?

Theæ. He does remember.

Socr. When he shuts his eyes too? or, when he does this, does he forget?

Theæ. It would be strange to say that, Socrates.

Socr. We must say it though, if we would keep to our former argument, otherwise it is gone.

Theæ. And I suspect so, by Jupiter, though I do not clearly understand it; but tell me how.

55. *Socr.* Thus. We say that a person who sees has obtained a scientific knowledge of that which he sees; for sight and perception and science are allowed to be the same.

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. But he who sees, and has obtained a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it indeed, but does not see it. Is it not so?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But to say that he does not see is as much as to say he does not know, since to see is the same thing as to know.

Theæ. True.

Socr. It follows, therefore, that a person who still remembers a thing of which he had a scientific knowledge, does not know it, because he does not see it; which we have said would be a prodigy, if it happened.

Theæ. You say most truly.

Socr. An impossibility, then, appears to result, if any one should say that science and perception are the same.

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. Each, then, must be confessed to be different.

Theæ. So it seems.

56. *Socr.* What then is science? must again, as it appears, be enquired from the beginning. What however shall we do, Theætetus?

Theæ. About what?

Socr. We appear to me, like a dunghill cock, to have jumped from our argument and begun to crow, before we have gained the victory.

Theæ. How so?

Socr. Like disputants we seem to have come to an agreement about the allowed meaning of words, and, having got the better thus far in the discussion, to be content, and though we say we are not wranglers but lovers of wisdom, we do the same as those shrewd men.

Theæ. I do not yet understand what you mean.

Socr. But I will endeavour to explain what I mean on this point. We enquired whether a person who has learnt and remembers any thing, does not know it, and having shewn that a person who has seen a thing and then shut his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it, we proved that he does not know it and remembers it at the same time; but that this is impossible. And so the Protagorean fable is destroyed, and yours at the same time of science and perception, that they are the same.

57. *Theæ.* It appears so.

Socr. It would not be so, my friend, I think, if the father of

the other fable were alive, but he would defend it stoutly : but now, as it is an orphan, we have insulted it. For not even the guardians, whom Protagoras left, are willing to assist it, in the number of whom is Theodorus here. We ourselves, however, for justice sake, will venture to assist it.

Theo. It is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias son of Hipponicus who is guardian of his doctrine ; for I very quickly turn aside from mere disputations to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be obliged to you if you will assist him.

Socr. You say well, Theodorus. Observe, then, what assistance I give. For any one would make more strange admissions than those just now, if he did not attend carefully to the meaning of words, in what way we are generally accustomed to employ them in affirming and denying. Shall I tell you or Theætetus, in what way ?

Theo. Tell us both together, but let the younger answer. For if he makes a mistake, it will be less disgraceful.

58. *Socr.* I am going to propose then a very strange question ; it is, I think, something of this kind : Is it possible that he who knows any thing should not know the thing that he knows ?

Theo. What shall we answer, Theætetus ?

Theæ. Impossible without doubt, I think.

Socr. Not so, if you maintain that to see is to know. For how will you deal with this inexplicable question, as the saying is, you will be caught in a well, if an imperturbable opponent should ask you, closing one of your eyes with his hand, whether you see his dress with the closed eye ?

Theæ. I should say, I think, Not with this, but I do with the other.

Socr. Would you not, therefore, see, and not see the same thing at the same time ?

Theæ. In some respects.

Socr. I do not require this, he will say, nor did I ask in what respect, but whether, what you know, this you also do not know. But now what you do not see, you are found to see : and you have already admitted, that to see is to know, and not to see, not to know. Infer then, what conclusion follows from this.

Theæ. I infer the very contrary to what I supposed.

59. *Socr.* But perhaps, my admirable youth, many things of

this kind would happen to you, if any one should further ask you whether it is possible to know sharply and dully, and near, but not at a distance, intensely and slightly as well, and ten thousand other questions, which a cunning mercenary light-armed combatant would put to you in discussion, when you asserted science and perception to be the same, attacking the hearing, smelling, and such other channels of perception, and he would confute you, keeping you to it and not letting you off, until through admiration of his exquisite wisdom you are completely caught in his toils, from whence, after he had conquered and bound you, he would at length set you free on payment of such a ransom as you and he could agree on. What argument, should you probably say, would Protagoras adduce in support of his own opinions? Shall we endeavour to say?

Theæ. By all means.

60. *Socr.* He will, then, both say all that we have said in his defence, and besides, I think, he will come to the encounter, despising us and saying; "This fine fellow Socrates, because a boy, when asked by him, whether it were possible for the same person to remember the same thing, and at the same time not to know it, was frightened, and being frightened, answered in the negative, through being unable to look on to results, has made me appear ridiculous by his arguments. But, most stupid Socrates, the case is thus, when you examine any of my opinions by questioning, if he to whom the questions are put gives the same answers that I should give and is proved wrong, I am confuted, but if he gives different answers, then he that is questioned *is confuted*. For, to the point, do you think that any one would grant you, that memory is present to any one, of the things by which he has been affected, as if memory were such an affection as he then experienced, though now he experiences it no longer? Far from it. Do you think, again, that he would hesitate to allow, that it is possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing? or if he should be afraid to say this, do you think he would ever grant that a person who has become changed is the same as he was before he was changed? but rather that he is one person, and not several, and those infinite in number, since change is constantly going on, for we must beware of catching at one another's words. 61. But my good sir," he will say, "attack my system in a more generous spirit, confute what I say, if you

can, and shew that we have not perceptions peculiar to each of us, or that, if they are peculiar, it does not follow that what appears to any one becomes, or if we must use the word existence, exists to him alone to whom it appears. But when you speak of pigs and cynocephali, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you persuade those that hear you to treat my writings in the same way, herein not doing well. For I affirm that the truth is, as I have written; for that each of us is the measure both of things that do and do not exist; though there is an infinite difference between one man and another, in this very circumstance, that they are and appear different to one person from what they are and do to another. And I am far from denying that there is such a thing as wisdom and a wise man, but I call that man wise, who, changing the aspect of objects to any of us, to whom they appear and are evil, causes them to appear and to be good. 62. But do not, again, follow out my arguments, attending to the words only, but thus in a still clearer manner understand what I mean. For call to mind what was said in a former part of the discussion, that to a sick man what he eats appears and is bitter, but to a man in health it is and appears the contrary. But there is no need to make either of them wiser than the other; for that is not possible; nor must we allege that the sick man is ignorant, because he is of a different opinion, and that he who is in health is wise, because he thinks differently; but we must endeavour to make him change over to the other side; for the other habit is better. In like manner, in education, we should endeavour to make a man change from one habit to a better. But the physician effects a change by medicines, and the sophist by arguments. 63. For no one ever makes one who entertains false opinions, afterwards entertain true ones; for it is not possible for a man to have an opinion on things that do not exist, or on any others than those by which he is affected, and these are always true. And I think that a man, who from a depraved habit of soul forms opinions corresponding to it, a good habit causes to form different opinions of the same character, but these appearances some people, through ignorance, call true, but I say that some things are better than others, but not at all more true. Moreover, my dear Socrates, I am far from calling the wise, frogs, but as regards bodies, I call them physicians, and as regards plants, husbandmen. For I say that these last

produce in plants, when they are at all diseased, instead of depraved perceptions, good and wholesome perceptions and truths, and that wise and good orators cause good instead of depraved things to appear to be just to states. For whatever things appear just and honourable to each city, these are so to that city, so long as it thinks them so; but a wise man, instead of the several depraved things that they have, makes good things to be and to appear. 64. By the same reason a sophist, who is thus able to instruct his pupils, is wise, and deserves large pay from those whom he instructs. And thus some are wiser than others, and yet no one entertains false opinions, and you must admit, whether you will or not, that you are the measure of things; for this principle is maintained throughout, if then you are able to controvert this from the beginning, do so, by answering it in a consecutive speech, or if you had rather by questioning, do it by questioning; for neither is this to be avoided, but most of all pursued by a man of sense. However do it thus; don't act unfairly in your questions. For it is a great inconsistency for one who pretends to be a lover of virtue, to persevere in doing nothing else but act unfairly in argument. But it is to act unfairly in a matter of this kind, when a man does not make a difference between disputation and discussion, and in the former jests and leads into error as far as he can, but in the latter speaks seriously, and sets the person with whom he is conversing right, pointing out to him those errors only into which he has been led by himself and his former conversations. 65. If, then, you act thus, those who converse with you will have to blame themselves for their own confusion and perplexity, but not you, and they will follow and love you, but hate themselves, and fly from themselves to philosophy, that, becoming different, they may be changed from what they formerly were: but if you act the contrary to this, as most men do, the very contrary will befall you, and you will make those who associate with you, instead of being philosophers, hate this pursuit, when they are more advanced in life. If, then, you will be persuaded by me, as I said before, applying yourself to it not hostilely or pugnaciously, but in a favourable spirit, you will truly consider what I have said, in maintaining that all things are moved, and that whatever appears to every one, also exists, both to an individual and a city; and from hence you will further consider, whether science and perception

are the same or different, and you will not, as just now, depart from the usual meaning of words and names, which most men forcing wherever it suits them, occasion one another all kinds of perplexity." 66. These things, Theodorus, I have advanced by way of assistance to your friend, according to my ability, trifling from trifling means; but, if he were alive, he would defend his own opinions in a more noble manner.

Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have defended the man very vigorously.

Socr. You say well, my friend. But tell me: did you observe that Protagoras said just now and reproached us, that in arguing with a boy, we took advantage of the boy's fear to oppose his principles, and giving it the contemptuous name of cavilling, and vaunting his measure of all things, he exhorted us to be serious in examining his doctrine?

Theo. How should I not have observed it, Socrates?

Socr. What then? Do you require us to obey him?

Theo. By all means.

Socr. Do you see, then, that all these, except you, are boys? If then we are to obey him, it is requisite that you and I, questioning and answering each other, should be serious in examining his doctrine, that he may not have this to object to us that we have discussed this question again jesting with youths.

67. *Theo.* But what? Would not Theætetus follow this investigation much better than many who have long beards?

Socr. But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not, therefore, think that I ought in every way to defend your deceased friend, but you not at all. But come, my good sir, follow me a little, just so far as to enable us to see whether it is right that you should be the measure of diagrams, or whether all men equally with you are sufficient for themselves in astronomy, and the other things in which you have the reputation of excelling.

Theo. It is not easy, Socrates, for one who is sitting by you, to refuse to answer you. But I was just now trifling when I said that you would permit me not to strip myself, and that you would not compel me like the Lacedæmonians. But you appear to me to resemble Sciron^k rather. For the Lacedæ-

^k A noted robber between Megara and Corinth, who used to throw all travellers whom he fell in with into the sea. He was slain by Theseus.

monians bid us either depart or strip; but you seem to me to act rather like Antæus¹, for you do not let any one go who approaches you until you have compelled him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

68. *Socr.* You have found out an admirable comparison for my disease, Theodorus, though I am stronger than they were; for an innumerable multitude of Herculeses and Theseuses, who were powerful in argument, have met with me and beaten me heartily, but I do not desist any the more, such a strange passion for this kind of exercise has got possession of me. Do not you, therefore, refuse to have a fall with me, and to benefit yourself and me at the same time.

Theo. I hold out no longer, but lead me wherever you please: I must needs submit to the destiny that you weave for me, and be confuted. However I shall not be able to give myself up to you further than you proposed.

Socr. So far will be sufficient. And I beg of you observe this very closely, that we do not, unawares, get into a puerile mode of talking, and so let any one reproach us again for that.

Theo. I will endeavour, as far as I can.

69. *Socr.* First of all, then, let us impugn the argument which we did before, and see whether we correctly or incorrectly find fault with and reprobate the assertion, that every one is sufficient to himself with respect to wisdom. Now Protagoras has conceded to us that some men excel others with respect to better or worse, and those too who are wise: has he not?

Theo. Yes.

Socr. If he then being present in person had agreed to this, and we in assisting him had not made this concession in his behalf, there would be no need to recur to it in order to confirm it; but now, perhaps, some one may consider us incompetent to assent on his behalf, wherefore it will be better to come to a more clear understanding on this point; for it makes no small difference whether it is so or otherwise.

Theo. You say truly.

Socr. Not from others, then, but from his own statements we may in very few words get his assent.

¹ Antæus dwelt in a cave in Lybia, and compelled all strangers who came by to wrestle with him. He met with his match in Hercules, and was slain.

70. *Theo.* How so?

Socr. Thus. Does he not say that what appears to each person exists to him to whom it appears?

Theo. He does say so.

Socr. Now, Protagoras, we speak the opinions of a man, or rather of all men, and say that there is no one who does not think himself in some respects wiser than others, and in other respects others wiser than himself, and in the greatest dangers, when men are in peril, in wars, or diseases, or storms at sea, they behave towards those who have power in each several case as towards gods, looking up to them as their saviours, though they excel them in nothing else than in knowledge; and the whole world is almost full of men seeking for masters and governors of themselves and other animals and works, and again of men who think themselves competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all these cases what else shall we say, than that men themselves think that there is wisdom and ignorance among themselves?

Theo. Nothing else.

Socr. Do they not, then, think that wisdom is true opinion, and ignorance false opinion?

Theo. How should they not?

71. *Socr.* How then, Protagoras, shall we deal with the assertion? Whether shall we say that men always form true opinions, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For in either way the result is that they do not always form true opinions, but both true and false. For consider, Theodorus, whether any one of the followers of Protagoras, or you yourself, would contend that no one thinks that there is another who is ignorant, and forms false opinions.

Theo. That is incredible, Socrates.

Socr. Yet the assertion, that man is the measure of all things, of necessity comes to this?

Theo. How so?

Socr. When you have determined any thing within yourself, and make known your opinion to me on any point, then, according to his statement, your opinion must be true to you; but may not the rest become judges of your judgment, or must we determine that you always form true opinions? Will not myriads, who form contrary opinions to yours, continually oppose you, deeming that you judge and think falsely?

Theo. By Jupiter, Socrates, there are myriads, as Homer says, who give me a vast deal of trouble.

72. *Socr.* What then? Will you allow us to say that you then form opinions that are true to yourself, but false to innumerable others?

Theo. This seems to me necessary, from the assertion.

Socr. But what with respect to Protagoras himself? If neither he thought that man is the measure of all things, nor the multitude, as indeed they do not, does it not necessarily follow that this truth which he has described exists to no one? But if he himself thought so, but the multitude do not agree with him, you must be aware that, in the first place, by how many more they are to whom it does not appear so, than those to whom it does so appear, by so much the more it is not than it is?

Theo. Necessarily so, since, according to each several opinion, it will be or will not be.

Socr. In the next place, this is very pleasant; for he, with respect to his own opinion, admits, that the opinion of those who differ from him, in that they think he is in error, is true, since he allows that all men form opinions of things that exist.

Theo. Certainly.

Socr. Must he not, therefore, admit that his own opinion is false, if he allows that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?

Theo. Necessarily so.

Socr. The others however do not admit that they are in error?

Theo. Surely not.

73. *Socr.* He however, from what he has written, allows that this opinion also is true.

Theo. It appears so.

Socr. It will therefore be controverted by all men, Protagoras not excepted, or rather will be allowed by him, that when he admits to one who differs from him, that he forms a true opinion, then even Protagoras himself will admit that neither a dog, nor any man whatever, is the measure of a thing that he has not learnt. Is it not so?

Theo. It is.

Socr. Therefore, since this is controverted by all men, Pro-

tagoras's truth will not be true to any one, neither to any one else, nor to himself.

Theo. We run down my friend too severely, Socrates.

Socr. But, moreover, my friend, it is uncertain whether we have not also exceeded the bounds of propriety. For it is probable that he being older is wiser than we are : and if he should suddenly rise up as far as his neck, having reproved me much for trifling, as is probable, and you for assenting, he would sink down again and hurry away. 74. But it is necessary for us, I think, to make use of our own abilities such as they are, and to say whatever appears to us to be true. Well then, shall we now say that any one will grant this, that one man is wiser than another, and another also more ignorant ?

Theo. It appears so to me.

Socr. Shall we say too that our argument holds good as we have laid it down in our endeavours to assist Protagoras, that most things are as they appear to every one, warm, dry, sweet, and all other things of this kind ; but that if in some things he shall admit that one man excels another, he would say with regard to things wholesome and unwholesome, that not every silly woman, boy and brute, is competent to cure itself by knowing what is wholesome for itself, but that here, if any where, one excels another ?

Theo. So it appears to me.

75. *Socr.* And with respect to political matters, he will admit that things honourable and base, just and unjust, holy and unholy, as each city thinks right to enact laws for itself, are in truth such to each city, and yet that in these things one individual is not at all wiser than another, nor one city than another ; but in enacting what is expedient for itself or not expedient, here again, if any where, he will allow that one counsellor excels another, and the opinion of one city that of another with regard to truth ; nor will he by any means venture to affirm, that the laws which a city enacts, thinking them to be expedient for itself, must certainly be so. But here in the matter I am speaking about, with respect to what is just and unjust, holy and unholy, men will persist that none of these have by nature an essence of their own, but that what appears to the community to be true, that becomes true at the time when it so appears, and so long as it appears. And those who do not altogether hold the doctrine of Protagoras, deal with

philosophy in some such manner as this. But one topic of conversation, Theodorus, springs from another. a greater from a less.

76. *Theo.* Have we not leisure, Socrates?

Socr. We appear to have. And I have often at other times observed, my excellent friend, and especially now, with what good reason those who have spent much time in philosophical studies, are found to be ridiculous orators when they enter courts of justice.

Theo. What mean you by this?

Socr. They that have been from their youth in courts of justice, and places of that kind, when compared with those who have been nurtured in philosophy and such-like studies, appear to have been educated like slaves compared with free-men.

Theo. In what respect?

Socr. In this, that these, as you said, have always leisure, and converse in peace at their leisure, just as we now are taking up our third topic in succession, so they too, if any question occurs to them that pleases them better than the one in hand, as is the case with us, are not at all concerned whether they speak at length or briefly, if they can but arrive at the truth. But the others always speak in a hurry, for the running water presses them on, nor are they allowed to speak on whatever subject they wish, but their opponent stands by them with this instrument of compulsion^m, and the record (which they call the pleadings) read aloud, out of which they must not travel; and their speeches are always about a fellow slave before the master who is seated holding the scales of justice in his hand, their contests too, are never unrestrained, but are always to the point before them, and oftentimes it is a race for life. 77. So that, from all these causes they become vehement and keen, knowing how to flatter the master by words, and to conciliate him by actions, being mean and not upright in soul. For slavery from childhood has taken away their growth, and rectitude, and freedom,

^m I have followed Stallbaum in giving this meaning to ἀνδραγῆ. See his note on this passage. I have perhaps taken a liberty in translating ἀνθρωπίαν in the next line "pleadings," but I know of no other word that will convey our author's meaning to an English reader, and in the passage before us technicality is unnecessary.

compelling them to do crooked actions, by exposing their yet tender souls to great dangers and fears, which not being able to bear up against with justice and truth, they immediately have recourse to lying and injuring one another, and become so bent and distorted, that they pass from youth to manhood without having any solidity in their minds, but have become clever and wise, as they think. Such then are these, Theodorus. But are you willing that I should describe the men of our band, or that, passing them by, we should return again to our subject, lest we abuse too much our liberty and powers of digression, which we just now spoke of.

78. *Theo.* By no means, Socrates, but describe them. For you observed very well, that we who are members of this band, are not the servants of topics of discussion, but they are our servants as it were, and each of them must wait for its completion until we think proper. For neither does a judge nor a spectator preside over us, to rebuke and keep us in order, as is the case with the poets.

Socr. Let us speak then, as we ought, since it is agreeable to you, about the chiefs; for why should any one speak of those who spend their time in philosophy to but little purpose? These then from early youth do not know the way to the forum, nor where the law-court, or senate house, or any other public place of assemblage in the city is situated; and they neither see nor hear laws or decrees, proclaimed or written. And canvassing of partisans for magistracies, and meetings, and banquets, and revelry with flute-players, they never think of even in a dream. Whether any one in a city is well or ill born, or what evil has befallen any one from his ancestors, whether men or women, is as little known to him as how many measures of water there are in the sea, as the saying is. 79. And he does not know that he is ignorant of all this; for he does not keep aloof from them for vanity's sake, but in reality his body only is situated and dwells in the city, but his mind, considering all these things as trifling and of no consequence, holds them in contempt, and is borne every where, according to the expression of Pindar, measuring things beneath the earth and upon its surface, contemplating the stars in heaven above, and searching thoroughly into the entire nature of every thing in the universe, and not stooping to any thing that is near.

Theo. What mean you by this, Socrates?

Socr. Just, Theodorus, as a smart and witty Thracian servant-girl is related to have joked Thales, when, contemplating the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a well, that he was anxious to know what was going on in heaven, but forgot to notice what was before him, and at his feet. 80. The same joke is applicable to all who devote themselves to philosophy; for, in reality, such a one is ignorant about his near neighbour, not only what he is doing but almost whether he is a man or some other animal. But what man is, and what such a nature ought to do or suffer beyond others, he enquires and takes pains to investigate. You understand me surely, Theodorus; do you not?

Theo. I do: and you say truly.

Socr. Therefore, my friend, a man of this kind dealing privately with each person, or publicly, as I said at the outset, when he is compelled, in a court of justice or any where else, to speak about things at his feet and before his view, affords laughter not only to Thracian damsels, but to the rest of the crowd, by falling into wells and all kinds of perplexities through inexperience, and his strange awkwardness gives him a character of stupidity. 81. For when he is reviled he has nothing personal to retort against any one, as he does not know any evil of any one from not having troubled himself about such matters; therefore, not having any thing to say, he appears to be ridiculous: and when he hears others praise and boast of themselves, being seen to laugh not feignedly but really he is considered to be a simpleton. For when encomiums are passed on a tyrant or king, he thinks that he hears a herdsman, a swineherd for instance, or a shepherd, or a cowkeeper pronounced happy for milking abundantly: but he thinks that they feed and milk an animal that is more hard to manage and more cunning than the others do; and that such a one must necessarily, from their occupations, be not at all less rustic and uneducated than herdsmen, being shut up within walls as in a mountain pen. But when he hears that any one who possesses ten thousand acres of land or even more, is possessed of vast property, it appears to him very trifling, as he has been accustomed to survey the whole earth. 82. And when they extol nobility of birth, accounting any one noble from being able to shew seven rich ancestors. he thinks that this praise proceeds from

men of dull minds, and who look at trifles, being unable through want of education to look at the succession of ages and compute that every man has had innumerable myriads of grandsires and ancestors, amongst whom there must have been an innumerable multitude of rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks; but when they pride themselves in a catalogue of five-and-twenty ancestors, and refer their origin to Hercules son of Amphitryon, it appears to him absurd from its littleness; and he laughs at their being unable to compute and so rid themselves of the vaunting of a silly mind, that the five-and-twentieth ancestor from Amphitryon and the fiftieth from him was such as fortune happened to make him. In all these things, therefore, such a man is ridiculed by the multitude, partly from bearing himself haughtily, as it seems, and partly from not knowing what is at his feet, and being on all occasions embarrassed.

Theo. You say exactly what takes place, Socrates.

83. *Socr.* But when he is able, my friend, to draw any one upwards, and any one is willing to leave those questions, of "What injury do I do you?" or "What injury do you do me?" for the consideration of justice and injustice themselves, what each of them is, and in what respect they differ from all other things, or from each other, or the inquiry, Whether a king is happy, and again, he who possesses abundance of gold, for the consideration of royalty and human happiness and misery in general; what they both are, and in what way it is proper for the nature of man to seek the one and shun the other,—when, therefore, it is requisite for that little-minded, sharp, and pettifogging fellow to give an account of all these things, he then shews the opposite side of the picture; becoming dizzy through being suspended aloft and looking so high up, from want of use, and becoming stupified, and perplexed, and stammering, he does not, indeed, afford laughter to the Thracian damsels or any other uneducated person, (for they do not perceive any thing,) but to all who have been brought up otherwise than as slaves. 84. This, then, is the character of each of them, Theodorus, the one, that of him who is truly brought up in liberty and leisure, whom you call a philosopher, to whom it is no disgrace to be thought simple and to be good for nothing, when he has to attend to servile offices, for instance, that he does not know how to pack and tie up luggage, or

season viands or make flattering speeches; the other, that of him who is able to perform all such offices dexterously and quickly, but knows not how to gather up his cloak with his right hand like a well-bred person, nor perceiving harmony of language to celebrate the life of gods and happy men such as it really is.

Theo. If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of what you say, as you have me, there would be more peace and less evil among men.

Socr. But it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be destroyed; for it is necessary that there should be always something contrary to good; nor can it be seated among the gods, but of necessity moves round this mortal nature and this region. Wherefore we ought to endeavour to fly hence thither as quickly as possible. But this flight consists in resembling God as much as possible, and this resemblance is the becoming just and holy with wisdom. 85. But, my excellent friend, it is not very easy to persuade men, that not for the reasons for which most men say we ought to flee from vice and pursue virtue, ought we to study the one and not the other, namely, that a man may not seem to be vicious, but may seem to be good; for these are, as the saying is, the drivellings of old women, as it appears to me. But let us describe the truth as follows. God is never in any respect unjust, but as just as possible, and there is not any thing that resembles him more than the man amongst us who has likewise become as just as possible. And on this depends the true excellence of a man, and his nothingness and worthlessness. For the knowledge of this is wisdom and true virtue, but the not knowing it is manifest ignorance and vice, but all other seeming excellencies and wisdoms, when they are found in political government, are abject, but in arts sordid. It is therefore by far the best not to allow him who acts unjustly, and who speaks or acts impiously, to excel by reason of his wickedness; for they delight in this reproach, and think they hear that they are not valueless, mere burdens on the earth, but men such as they ought to be who will be safe in a city. The truth, therefore, must be spoken, that they are so much the more what they think they are not, from not thinking that they are such. For they are ignorant of the punishment of injustice, of which they ought to be least of all ignorant: for it does not consist in what they

imagine, stripes and death, which they sometimes suffer who do not commit injustice, but in that which it is impossible to avoid.

86. *Theo.* What do you mean?

Socr. Since, my friend, there are two models in the nature of things, one divine and most happy, the other ungodly and most miserable, they, not perceiving that this is the case, through stupidity and extreme folly, unknown to themselves become similar to the one by unjust actions, and dissimilar to the other. Wherefore they are punished, by leading a life suited to that to which they are assimilated. But if we should tell them, that unless they abandon this excellence, that place which is free from all evil will not receive them when dead, but here they will always lead a life resembling themselves, and there will associate with evil, these things, as being altogether shrewd and crafty, they will listen to as the extravagances of foolish men.

87. *Theo.* Assuredly, Socrates.

Socr. I know it, my friend. One thing, however, happens to them; it is, that if they have to give and listen to reasons privately respecting the things that they blame, and if they are willing to persevere manfully for a length of time, and not fly like cowards, then at length, my excellent friend, they are very absurdly displeased with themselves for what they have said, and that rhetoric of theirs becomes somehow so weak that they appear to be no better than boys. However, let us quit this subject, since what we have been saying was only a digression; if we do not, more topics constantly flowing in will shut out the subject with which we began. Let us, then, return to our former subject, if it is agreeable to you.

Theo. Such things, Socrates, are not at all displeasing to me to hear; for it is easier for one of my age to follow them; if you please, however, let us return to our subject.

Socr. If I mistake not, then, we were at that part of our discussion in which we said that those who maintain motion to be essence, and that whatever appears to each person exists also to him to whom it appears, would in other things persist, and especially with regard to justice, that on every account what a city enacts as appearing just to itself, this also is just to the city that enacts it, so long as it continues in force: but that with respect to what is good, no one is so hardy as to venture to contend that whatever things a city has enacted,

thinking that they are advantageous to itself, are also advantageous so long as they continue in force, except one should speak only of the name: but this would be a mere mockery on such a subject as we are speaking on; would it not?

Theo. Certainly.

88. *Socr.* Let him not, then, speak of the name, but of the thing designated by it.

Theo. Just so.

Socr. But the thing that the name designates is doubtless that which the city aims at in enacting laws, and enacts all laws, as far as it thinks and is able, to be as advantageous to itself as possible. Does it look to any thing else in enacting laws?

Theo. By no means.

Socr. Does it, then, always accomplish its purpose, or is every city often mistaken?

Theo. I think it is often mistaken.

Socr. Still more then would every one allow this very thing, if the question should be asked with reference to the whole genus, to which the advantageous belongs: but surely it regards also the future; for, when we enact laws, we enact them that they may be advantageous for the time to come; and this we should correctly call the future.

Theo. Certainly.

89. *Socr.* Come then, let us thus question Protagoras, or some one else who holds the same opinions with him, Man, as you say, Protagoras, is the measure of all things, white, heavy, light, and every thing of that kind: for, as he contains the criterion of them within himself, in thinking they are such as he feels them to be, he thinks what is true to himself, and really is? Is it not so?

Theo. It is.

Socr. Shall we also say, Protagoras, that he contains within himself the criterion of things about to happen, and that such things as he thinks will happen, do become such to him who thinks so? For instance, with regard to heat, when any particular person thinks that he shall catch a fever, and that this kind of heat will happen to him, and another, a physician, thinks differently, according to the opinion of which of the two shall we say will the result prove? or will it be according to the opinion of both of them, and to the physician will he be neither hot nor feverish, but to himself both?

Theo. That, indeed, would be ridiculous.

Socr. And I think the opinion of the husbandman, and not that of the harper, respecting the future sweetness or roughness of wine, would prevail.

Theo. How not?

Socr. Nor again would a teacher of gymnastics form a better opinion than a musician respecting what will be inharmonious and harmonious, and what will afterwards appear to the teacher of gymnastics himself to be harmonious.

Theo. By no means.

90. *Socr.* Therefore also, when a banquet is prepared, the judgment of one who, not being skilled in cookery is about to feast on it, is less sound than that of the cook, respecting the pleasure that will ensue. For we are not arguing at all about that which now is or has been pleasant to each person, but about that which will hereafter both appear and be so, whether every one is the best judge for himself? Could not you, Protagoras, judge beforehand better than any private person what arguments are likely to be available for us in a court of justice?

Theo. Indeed, Socrates, in this he himself professes to excel all men by far.

Socr. By Jupiter, he does, my friend; otherwise no one would pay him large sums for his instructions, if he had not persuaded his pupils that no prophet or other person would be able to judge better than he could for himself, as to what in future would both be and appear to be.

Theo. Most true.

Socr. But do not legislation and the useful regard the future, and would not every one acknowledge, that a city, in enacting laws, of necessity often misses that which is most useful?

Theo. Assuredly.

91. *Socr.* We have, therefore, rightly urged against your master, that he must needs confess, that one man is wiser than another, and that such a one is the true measure, but that there is no necessity at all for me who am ignorant, to become a measure, as the argument advanced on his behalf just now compelled me to be, whether I would or not.

Theo. In that way, Socrates, his argument appears to me to be effectually refuted, and it was also refuted by this, that he makes the opinions of others sound; and these were found to consider his arguments as by no means to be true.

Socr. In many other ways, too, Theodorus, this may be demonstrated, that not every opinion of every man is true. But, with respect to the manner in which each person is affected, whence perceptions and corresponding opinions are produced, it is more difficult to demonstrate that they are not true. But perhaps I should say, it is quite impossible: for probably they cannot be refuted, and those who say that they are certain and sciences, may possibly say the truth, and in that case Theætetus here did not speak amiss in asserting that perception and science are the same. 92. Let us, then, approach nearer to it, as the argument advanced in behalf of Protagoras enjoined us, and examine this essence, that is said to consist in motionⁿ, by knocking it, and see whether it sounds whole or cracked. For the contest about it is neither mean nor among a few.

Theo. It is very far from being mean, but is spreading very much throughout Ionia. For the partisans of Heraclitus advocate this doctrine very strenuously.

Socr. Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we should the rather examine it from the beginning, as they propound it.

Theo. Assuredly. For, Socrates, with respect to these Heraclitian, or, as you say, Homeric, and even older doctrines, it is no more possible to converse about them with the people of Ephesus who pretend to be acquainted with them, than with persons who are raving mad. For, just as their written doctrines, they are truly in constant motion, but to keep to an argument and a question, and quietly to answer and ask in turn, is less in their power than any thing; or rather the power of rest in these men is infinitely less than nothing. But if you ask any one of them a question, they draw out, as from a quiver, certain dark enigmatical words, and shoot them off, and if you wish to get from him a reason for what he has said, you will be forthwith stricken with another newly coined word, but will never come to any conclusion with any one of them; nor do they with one another, but they take very good care not to allow any thing to be fixed, either in their discourse, or in their souls, thinking, as it appears to me, that this very thing is stationary^o; and they make constant war upon it, and as far as they are able, expel it from every where.

93. *Socr.* Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these men

ⁿ See § 87.

^o And so opposed to their doctrine of constant motion.

contending, but have never been in their company when peaceable, for they are no friends of yours. But I think they say such things when at leisure, to their disciples, whom they wish to render like themselves.

Theo. What disciples, my good friend? Amongst such men, one is not the disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, from whatever place each of them happens to be seized with a frenzy, and each thinks that the other knows nothing. From these, therefore, as I was just now saying, you will never get a reason either willingly or unwillingly: but we must take the matter up as if it were a problem and examine it ourselves.

Socr. You say right. But have we not received this problem from the ancients, who by the aid of poetry concealed it from the multitude, that Ocean and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest, and from the moderns, as being wise, who have declared openly, so that even cobblers on hearing them learn wisdom, and give up their foolish opinion, that some things are at rest and others in motion, and learning that all things are in motion, they pay great respect to their teachers. 94. But I had almost forgotten, Theodorus, that others have declared the very contrary to this, that "that which is called the universe is immovable," and every thing else that the followers of Melissus and Parmenides maintain in opposition to all this, as, that all things are one, and that this is at rest in itself, and has no place in which it can be moved. What then shall we do with all these people, my friend? For advancing by little and little, we have unawares fallen between both of them, and if we do not defend ourselves and escape, we shall be punished like those who in the wrestling grounds play on the line, who, when they are caught by both parties, are dragged in contrary directions. It appears therefore to me, that we should first of all consider those with whom we set out, the advocates of perpetual motion, and, if they shall prove to speak to the purpose, we will join with them, and endeavour to escape from the others; but if those who say that the universe is at rest appear to speak more truly, we will on the other hand fly to them from those who move even things immovable. 95. And if both shall be found to speak nothing right, we shall be ridiculous for thinking that we, mean as we are, can say any thing to the purpose, after we have condemned men of great

antiquity and wisdom. Consider therefore, Theodorus, whether it is for our interest to venture on so great a danger.

Theo. It would be unpardonable, Socrates, not thoroughly to examine what each of these men say.

Socr. We must examine it, since you are so anxious to do so. It appears to me then, that the first thing to be done in an enquiry about motion, is to find out what they mean by saying that all things are in motion. I mean this: whether they say that there is one species of motion, or, as it appears to me, two. Nor should it appear to me only, but do you also join with me, that we may both fall into the same error, if we must err. Tell me, therefore, do you call it being in motion, when a thing passes from one place to another, or is turned round in the same place?

Theo. I do.

96. *Socr.* Let this, therefore, be one species. But when it remains in the same place, and grows old, and either becomes black from white or hard from soft, or undergoes any other change, is it not right to say that this is another species of motion?

Theo. It appears so to me.

Socr. It must be so: I say, then, that there are these two species of motion, change and removal.

Theo. You say right.

Socr. Having, therefore, made this distinction, let us now address ourselves to those who say that all things are in motion, and ask them: Whether do you say that every thing undergoes both kinds of motion, and is both removed and changed, or that one thing is moved both ways, and another only in one way?

Theo. By Jupiter, I know not what to answer; but I think they would say, both ways.

Socr. Otherwise, my friend, the same things would appear to them to be both in motion and at rest, and it would not be at all more correct to say that all things are in motion, than that they are at rest.

Theo. You speak most truly.

Socr. Since, therefore, it is necessary that every thing should be in motion, and that the absence of motion should be in nothing, all things must always be moved with every kind of motion.

97. *Theo.* Necessarily so.

Socr. Consider this, then, I beg : did we not say that they explain the generation of heat, or whiteness, or any thing else pretty much in this manner, that each of them is impelled, together with perception, between the agent and the patient, and that the patient becomes affected by perception, but is not yet perception itself, and that the agent becomes affected by a certain quality, but is not quality itself? Perhaps, however, quality may appear to you to be a strange word, and you may not understand it when used in this collective sense. Hear me, then, explain it in detail. For the agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and so with respect to other things. For you surely remember that we said before^p, that no one thing exists of itself, neither that which is an agent nor that which is a patient, but that, from the meeting together of each with the other, perceptions and objects of perception being produced cause the one to be of a certain quality, and the other percipient.

98. *Theo.* I recollect. How should I not.

Socr. Let us then dismiss the rest of their system, whether they speak this way or that way; and let us keep to that point alone which concerns our discussion and ask, Are all things in motion and in a state of flux, as you say? Is it not so?

Theo. Yes.

Socr. And by both those kinds of motion which we have distinguished, removal and change?

Theo. Undoubtedly; if they are to be perfectly moved.

Socr. If, therefore, they were only removed, but not changed, we should surely be able to say what kind of things are removed. Must we not say so?

Theo. Just so.

Socr. But since not even this continues in the same state, namely that that which flows continues to flow white, but it changes so that there is also a flux of this very thing, whiteness, and a transition into another colour, in order that it may not be found continuing in the same state, will it ever be possible to call any thing a colour, so as to designate it correctly?

Theo. How is it possible, Socrates? or any thing else of the kind, since, while we are speaking about it, it is constantly escaping, as being in a state of flux?

Socr. But what shall we say of any kind of perception, for instance of seeing or hearing? Does it ever continue in the state of seeing or hearing?

Theo. It ought not, since all things are in motion.

99. *Socr.* We must not affirm then, that any one sees rather than not sees, or has any other perception rather than not, since all things are in constant motion.

Theo. Surely not.

Socr. Yet perception is science, as Theætetus and I said.

Theo. That is the case.

Socr. On being asked, therefore, what science is, we answered, that it is not at all science rather than not science.

Theo. You appear to have done so.

Socr. A fine correction of our answer it would be, if we endeavour to prove that all things are in motion, in order that our former answer may appear correct. But this, as it seems, is the result, if all things are in motion, every answer on whatever subject it may be given, will be equally correct, whether we say that a thing is so or is not so, or, if you will, becomes so, that we may not fix them by a definite expression.

Theo. You say rightly.

Socr. Except, Theodorus, that I said "so and not so." But we ought not to use this word "so," for in this way it will no longer be in motion; nor again must we use the expression "not so," for neither does this express motion; but they who maintain this doctrine must find out some other term, since at present they have not words suited to their hypothesis, except perhaps, this, "not in any manner." This would suit them best, as having an indefinite meaning.

Theo. This manner of speaking would indeed be most proper for them.

100. *Socr.* We have done then with your friend, Theodorus, nor can we by any means concede to him, that any man is the measure of all things, except he is wise: nor can we concede to him that science is perception, at least according to the doctrine that all things are in motion; unless Theætetus here says otherwise.

Theo. You say admirably well, Socrates; for since these things are brought to a conclusion, it is right that I too should have done with answering according to our agreement, now that our discussion about the doctrine of Protagoras has come to end.

Theæ. Not so, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that the universe is at rest, as you just now proposed to do.

Theo. Do you who are so young, Theætetus, teach old men to act unjustly, by violating their compacts. But prepare to give account to Socrates of what remains to be discussed.

Theæ. If he wishes it, though I should be very glad to hear you on the subject I mentioned.

Theo. You are challenging riders to a race in challenging Socrates to a discussion. Ask therefore and you will hear.

Socr. But I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of Theætetus.

Theo. Why not comply ?

101. *Socr.* Though I am ashamed of examining with too much freedom Melissus and others, who say that the universe is one and immoveable, yet I am less ashamed to do so with respect to them than Parmenides alone. For Parmenides appears to me, that I may use the words of Homer ⁹, "both venerable and formidable." For I was acquainted with him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess a depth of wisdom altogether extraordinary. I am afraid, therefore, that we should not understand his words, and that we should be much less able to discover the meaning of what he said, and above all, I fear lest with respect to the main subject of our discussion, science, what it is, should be left unconsidered by reason of the digressions that will rush across us, if we listen to them. Besides, the question which we have now raised is of immense extent, and if one should consider it only by the way, it would be treated unworthily, but if as it deserves, the discussion, being extended to too great length, will put out of sight the subject of science. But neither of these things ought to happen; but we ought to endeavour, by the mid-wife's art, to deliver Theætetus of his conceptions respecting science.

Theæ. It is proper to do so, if you think well.

102. *Socr.* Again, therefore, Theætetus, consider this with respect to what has been said. You answered that perception is science; did you not ?

Theæ. Yes.

⁹ Iliad, iii. 172.

Socr. If then any one should ask you, with what a man sees things white and black, and with what he hears sounds sharp and flat, you would say, I think, with the eyes and ears.

Theæ. I should.

Socr. The free use of names and words and without excessive precision, is for the most part not unbecoming a person of education, but rather the contrary to this is illiberal, though sometimes it is necessary; as in the present case it is necessary to find fault with your answer, so far as it is not correct. For consider, which answer is more correct, that it is the eyes with which we see or by which we see, and the ears with which we hear, or by which we hear?

Theæ. By which we receive each perception, it seems to me, Socrates, rather than with which.

Socr. For surely it would be strange, my boy, if many senses were seated in us, as in wooden horses, and they did not all tend to one certain form, whether it is soul, or whatever it is proper to call it, with which, by means of these as instruments, we perceive all objects of perception.

Theæ. The case appears to me to be rather in this way than in that.

103. *Socr.* But why do I require so much accuracy from you on this point? For this reason, that we may discover whether by some one and the same part in us we, by means of the eyes, attain to things white and black, and again other things by means of the other senses, and whether, when questioned, you will be able to refer all such things to the bodily organs. But perhaps it will be better that you should say this by answering my questions, than that I should take all this trouble for you. Tell me, then; the things by which you perceive things hot and dry, and light and sweet, do you refer each of them to the body, or to any thing else?

Theæ. To nothing else.

Socr. Are you also willing to allow, that such things as you perceive by means of one faculty it is impossible for you to perceive by means of another, for instance, that what you perceive by means of hearing you cannot perceive by means of sight, and what you perceive by means of sight, you cannot perceive by means of hearing?

Theæ. How should I not be willing to allow it?

Socr. If, then, you form a notion of them both together, you

cannot receive this perception of both together by means of one organ or the other.

Theæ. Surely not.

104. *Socr.* Now with respect to sound and colour, is not this the very first notion that you have of them both, that they both exist.

Theæ. It is.

Socr. Is it not also, that each is different from the other, and the same with itself?

Theæ. How not?

Socr. And that both are two, but each one?

Theæ. And this also.

Socr. Are you not also able to consider whether they are like or unlike each other?

Theæ. Probably.

Socr. By means of what, then, do you acquire all these notions about them? For it is not possible by means either of hearing or sight to apprehend that which is common between them. Moreover, this too is a proof of what we say. For, if it were possible to examine respecting them both, whether they are salt or not, you know you would be able to say with what you would make this examination, and this proves to be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

Theæ. How not, and that the faculty of taste by means of the tongue?

Socr. You say well. But in what does the faculty consist which shews you that which is common to all things, and to these two, to which you give the name of existence and non-existence, and those other names about which we were just now asking? what organs will you attribute to all these, by means of which our perceptive faculty perceives these several things?

105. *Theæ.* You speak of existence and non-existence, similitude and dissimilitude, identity and difference, and moreover of unity and other numbers: and it is evident that you ask about the even and odd and whatever else depends on them, by which of the organs of the body we perceive these things in our soul.

Socr. You follow me exceedingly well, and these, Theætetus, are the very things about which I ask.

Theæ. But by Jupiter, Socrates, I know not what to say,

except that it seems to me that there is no organ at all peculiar to these things as there is to the others, but the soul of itself appears to me to examine that which is common in all things.

Socr. You are beautiful, Theætetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus said; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But, besides being beautiful, you have done well in having released me from a very long discussion, if it appears to you that the soul beholds some things by itself, and others by the faculties of the body. For this was the very thing that seemed to me, and I wished it might likewise seem so to you.

Theæ. And indeed it does appear so to me.

106. *Socr.* To which of the two classes, then, do you refer existence? For this especially attaches to all things.

Theæ. I refer it to those things which the soul of itself reaches after.

Socr. Is it the same with similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. What then? with the beautiful and the ugly, good and evil?

Theæ. It appears to me that the soul especially considers the essence of these in reference to each other, comparing within itself things past and present with the future.

Socr. Stay: will it not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft in like manner?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But their essence, both what they are, and their opposition to each other, and the nature of this opposition, the soul itself, examining them repeatedly and comparing them with each other, endeavours to determine for us.

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Are not, then, both men and beasts by nature able to perceive as soon as they are born those things that pass by means of the bodily organs to the soul, but comparisons of these with reference to their essence and use they arrive at with difficulty, and after a long time, by means of much labour and study, if ever they do arrive at it?

Theæ. Most assuredly.

Socr. For is it possible to apprehend the truth of that of which we cannot apprehend the existence?

Theæ. Impossible.

107. *Socr.* But can any one possess a scientific knowledge of a thing, of which he cannot apprehend the truth?

Theæ. How can he, Socrates?

Socr. There is, therefore, no science in sensations, but in reasoning on them; for in this way, as it seems, it is possible to touch upon essence and truth, but in that way impossible.

Theæ. It appears so.

Socr. Can you, therefore, call that and this the same, when there is so great a difference between them?

Theæ. It would not be right to do so.

Socr. What name, then, do you give to that, to sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, being hot, and being cold?

Theæ. Perceiving; for what other name can be given?

Socr. Do you, therefore, call the whole of this perception?

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. To which, as we said, it does not appertain to touch upon truth, for it does not ever touch upon essence.

Theæ. Certainly not.

Socr. Nor, therefore, upon science?

Theæ. No.

Socr. Perception, therefore, and science, Theætetus, can never be the same?

Theæ. It appears not, Socrates.

108. *Socr.* And now it has been made perfectly clear that science is something different from perception. But we did not commence this conversation with this view, that we might find out what science is not, but what it is. However, we have advanced so far as not to seek it at all in perception, but in that name, whatever it is, which the soul possesses when it employs itself about things that exist.

Theæ. But this, I think, Socrates, is called, to judge.

Socr. You think rightly, my friend. And now consider again from the beginning, having obliterated all that has been said before, if you see at all more clearly, now that you have come to this point. And tell me again what science is.

Theæ. It is impossible, Socrates, to say that it is every judgment, because there is also false judgment. But it appears that true judgment is science, and let this be my answer. For if, as we proceed, it shall not appear to be so, as it does at present, we will endeavour to say something else.

109. *Socr.* Thus, then, Theætetus, you must speak more promptly, and not, as at first, hesitate to answer. For if we do so, one of two things will happen; we shall either find that which we are in search of, or we shall in a less degree think that we know what we do not know at all; though this would be no despicable reward. Now, then, what do you say? Since there are two species of judgment, one true, and the other false, do you define science to be true judgment?

Theæ. I do; for this at present appears to me to be the case.

Socr. Is it, then, worth while again to resume the discussion respecting judgment?

Theæ. What do you mean?

Socr. Somehow this matter troubles me just now, and has often done so at other times, so that I have had great doubt with respect to myself and others, from not being able to say what this affection in us is, and in what way it is produced.

Theæ. What affection?

Socr. This, that any one forms false judgments; and I even now still consider and am in doubt whether we shall let this alone, or examine it in a different manner than we did just now.

Theæ. How not, Socrates? at least if it appears necessary to be done in some way or other? For you and Theodorus just now remarked, not badly, respecting leisure, that there is no urgency in matters of this kind.

110. *Socr.* You have reminded me very properly. For perhaps it will not be foreign to our purpose in a manner to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little well than much insufficiently.

Theæ. Why not?

Socr. How then? what do we say? do we not affirm that sometimes judgments are false? or that one of us forms false judgments and another true ones, as if this was naturally the case?

Theæ. We doubtless do affirm this.

Socr. Does not this happen to us with regard to things in general and each particular, that we either know it or do not know it? For learning and forgetting, as being between these, I pass by for the present, for now they have nothing to do with our discussion.

Theæ. However, Socrates, there is no other alternative with respect to each particular, except knowing or not knowing it.

Socr. Then, is it not necessary, that he who judges should judge either what he does know, or does not know?

Theæ. It is necessary.

Socr. But that a person who knows should not know the same thing, or that he who does not know it should know it, is impossible.

Theæ. How not?

Socr. Does not he, then, who forms a false judgment about what he knows, think that these are not the same, but different from what he knows, and thus while he knows both, he is at the same time ignorant of both?

Theæ. But this is impossible, Socrates.

111. *Socr.* Does he, then, think that things which he does not know are certain other things that he does not know, and is it possible for one who knows neither Theætetus nor Socrates, to imagine that Socrates is Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates?

Theæ. How could that be?

Socr. Neither, surely, does any one think that the things which he knows are the same as those that he does not know, nor again that the things which he does not know, are the same as those that he does know.

Theæ. For that would be monstrous.

Socr. How then can any one form false judgments? For it is impossible to form judgments in any other way than this, since we either know or do not know all things, and in these it appears to be by no means possible to form false judgments.

Theæ. Most true.

Socr. Ought we, then, to consider the object of our enquiry, not by proceeding according to knowing and not knowing, but according to being and not being?

Theæ. How do you mean?

Socr. Whether it is not universally true, that he who thinks things that are not, with respect to any thing whatever, must unavoidably form a false judgment, however intelligent he may be in other respects.

Theæ. That is reasonable, Socrates.

Socr. How then? what shall we say, Theætetus, if any one should ask us, "Is it possible for any one to do what you say,

and can any man think that which is not, whether respecting any real object or abstract essence?" And we, it seems, shall say to this, "When he who thinks does not think what is true." What else can we say?

Theæ. Nothing else.

112. *Socr.* Does a thing of this kind happen also in other cases?

Theæ. Of what kind?

Socr. If a person sees something, and yet sees nothing.

Theæ. But how can that be?

Socr. But if he sees some one thing, he sees something that exists; and do you think that one thing is ever among things that do not exist?

Theæ. I do not.

Socr. He, therefore, who sees some one thing sees that which exists.

Theæ. It appears so.

Socr. And, therefore, he who hears something, both hears some one thing, and hears that which exists.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. And doubtless he who touches both touches some one thing, and that which exists, since it is one thing?

Theæ. And this too.

Socr. Does not he then who judges, judge some one thing?

Theæ. Of necessity.

Socr. And does not he who judges some one thing, judge something that exists?

Theæ. I grant it.

Socr. He therefore who judges what does not exist, judges nothing.

Theæ. It appears not.

Socr. But he who judges nothing, does not judge at all.

Theæ. That is evident, as it seems.

Socr. It is impossible, therefore, to judge that which is not, either with respect to real objects or abstract essences.

Theæ. It appears not.

Socr. To form false judgments, therefore, is different from judging things that do not exist.

Theæ. It seems to be different.

Socr. Neither then in this way nor in the way we considered a little before, is false judgment formed in us.

Theæ. On no account.

113. *Socr.* Do we then give that name to what takes place as follows.

Theæ. How?

Socr. We say that a mistaken judgment is a false judgment, when any one says that any real object is another real object, changing one for the other in his thoughts. For thus he always judges that which exists, but one thing instead of another, and erring in that which he was considering, he may be justly said to form a false judgment.

Theæ. You now appear to me to have spoken most correctly: for, when any one forms a judgment that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he truly forms a false judgment.

Socr. It is evident, Theætetus, that you esteem me lightly and have no fear of me.

Theæ. How so?

Socr. I do not seem to you, I imagine, likely to lay hold of your "truly false," by asking whether it is possible for swift to take place slowly or light heavily, or any other contrary, not according to its own nature, but according to the nature of its contrary, contrariwise to itself. This, however, I dismiss, that your confidence may not be in vain. But are you satisfied, as you say, that to form false judgments is to form mistaken judgments?

Theæ. I am.

114. *Socr.* It is possible, then, according to your opinion, for one thing to be comprehended in the mind as another, and not as it is.

Theæ. It is possible.

Socr. When, therefore, any one's mind does this, is it not necessary that it should think about both objects, or one of them?

Theæ. Quite necessary.

Socr. Either together or in turns?

Theæ. Very well.

Socr. But by thinking do you mean the same that I do?

Theæ. What do you mean by it?

Socr. The discourse which the soul holds with itself about the objects that it considers. I explain this to you as a person who does not know what he says. For the soul, when it thinks,

appears to me to do nothing else than discourse with itself, asking itself questions and answering them, affirming and denying; but when it has decided, whether it has come to its decision more slowly or more rapidly, and now asserts and does not doubt, this we call judgment. So that to form a judgment I call to speak, and judgment a sentence spoken, not indeed to another person nor with the voice but in silence to itself. But what do you call it?

Theæ. The same.

Socr. When any one, therefore, forms a judgment that one thing is another, he says to himself, as it seems, that one thing is another.

115. *Theæ.* How not?

Socr. Recollect, then, whether you have ever said to yourself, that the beautiful is certainly ugly, or the unjust, just, or even, chief of all, consider whether you have ever attempted to persuade yourself, that one thing is certainly another, or, quite contrariwise, whether you have ever ventured even in sleep to say to yourself, that undoubtedly odd is even, or any thing else of the kind.

Theæ. You say truly.

Socr. But do you think that any one else in his senses or even mad would venture to say seriously to himself, being himself persuaded, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two one?

Theæ. Not I, by Jupiter.

Socr. If, therefore, to speak to one's-self is to form judgments, no one, who speaks and forms judgments of both objects, and touches upon both with his soul, would say and judge that one is another. You must therefore give up what you said about the other. For I assert this, that no one thinks that the ugly is beautiful, or any thing else of the kind.

Theæ. I give it up then, Socrates, and it appears to me as you say.

Socr. It is impossible, then, for one who forms judgments about both, to think that the one is the other.

Theæ. It seems so.

116. *Socr.* He, however, who judges one thing only, but the other in no respect, will never judge that the one is the other.

Theæ. You say truly: for he would be compelled to touch upon that also of which he does not judge.

Socr. It is not possible then for a person who judges upon

both or one of the two, to judge that one is the other: so that if any one should define false judgment to be the judgment of one thing instead of another, he would say nothing to the purpose; for neither in this way, nor in those before mentioned, does it appear that false judgment pertains to us.

Theæ. It seems not.

Socr. However, Theætetus, if this should appear not to be so, we shall be compelled to admit many absurdities.

Theæ. What are they?

Socr. I will not tell you, until I have endeavoured to consider the matter in every point of view; for I should be ashamed for both of us, if, while we are in the difficulty we are, we should be compelled to admit what I now say. But if we discover the object of our search and become free, then we will speak of others, as subject to this, being ourselves placed beyond the reach of ridicule: but if we shall continue still involved in difficulties, we must humble ourselves, I imagine, and give ourselves up to discussion, like those who are sea-sick, to be trampled on and treated as it pleases. Hear, then, how I still find a way out of our enquiry.

117. *Theæ.* Only speak.

Socr. I shall deny that we made a correct admission, when we admitted that it is impossible for a person to judge that what he knows is what he does not know and be thus deceived; but in some respect it is possible.

Theæ. Do you mean that which I suspected at the time when we said this, might be the case, that sometimes I knowing Socrates, and seeing another person at a distance whom I do not know, have thought it was Socrates, whom I do know? For what you mention happens in a case of this kind.

Socr. Are we not, then, driven from that position, because it made us, while we know, not know the things that we do know?

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Let us not, then, make our assumption in this way but as follows; and perhaps it will in some respect succeed for us, and perhaps it will oppose us. For we are in a condition in which it is necessary to examine our whole argument in every point of view. Consider, therefore, whether I say any thing to the purpose. Is it possible for a person who did not know something before, afterwards to learn it?

Theæ. It is indeed.

Socr. And can he not also learn another thing after another ?

118. *Theæ.* Why not ?

Socr. Suppose, then, I beg, for the sake of argument, that we have in our souls a waxen tablet, in one larger, in another smaller, in one of purer wax, in another of impurer, in some of harder, and in others again of softer, but in some of a moderate quality.

Theæ. I do suppose it.

Socr. Let us say, then, that this is a gift of Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses ; and that, whatever we wish to remember of things that we have seen, or heard, or have ourselves thought of, we impress in this, by placing it under our perceptions and thoughts, as if we were taking off the impressions from rings : and that whatever is imprinted, this we remember and know, as long as its image remains ; but when it is effaced, or can be no longer imprinted, we forget and do not know it.

Theæ. Be it so.

Socr. When, therefore, a person knows these things and considers any of the things that he sees or hears, consider whether in this way he can judge falsely ?

Theæ. In what way ?

Socr. By thinking with respect to what he knows, that they are at one time the things that he knows, and at another the things that he does not know. For in a former part of our discussion we made an improper admission in admitting that this was impossible.

119. *Theæ.* But how do you mean now ?

Socr. We must speak thus on this subject, defining it from the beginning : It is impossible that he who knows any thing, and has a remembrance of it in his soul, but does not actually perceive it, can think that it is some other thing that he knows, of which he has the impression, though he does not perceive it : and again, it is impossible that any one can think that what he knows is that which he does not know, and of which he has not the seal : or that what he does not know is that which he does not know : or that what he does not know is that which he does know : or think that what he perceives is some other thing that he perceives : or that what he perceives is something that he does not perceive : or that what he does not perceive is some other thing that he does not perceive : or that what he does not perceive is something that he does perceive.

And again it is still more impossible, if that can be, that a person should think that what he knows and perceives, and of which he has an impression by means of perception, is something else that he knows and perceives, and of which in like manner he has an impression by means of perception. And it is impossible that what he knows and perceives, and of which he has a correct remembrance, he can think is something else that he knows : or that what he knows and perceives, and in like manner retains in his remembrance, is something else that he perceives : or again, that what he neither knows nor perceives is something else that he neither knows nor perceives : or that what he neither knows nor perceives is something else that he does not know ; or that what he neither knows nor perceives is something else that he does not perceive. In all these cases it is utterly impossible for any one to judge falsely. It remains, therefore, that it must take place, if anywhere, in the following cases.

120. *Theæ.* In what cases? perhaps I shall understand you better from them ; for at present I do not follow you.

Socr. In things which a person knows, he may think that they are different from the things that he knows and perceives ; or from those which he does not know, but perceives ; or that the things which he knows and perceives are some of the things which he likewise knows and perceives.

Theæ. Now I am left much further behind than I was.

Socr. Listen again, then, as follows : I, knowing Theodorus, and remembering within myself what kind of a person he is, and in like manner, Theætetus, do I not sometimes see them, and sometimes not, and sometimes touch them, and sometimes not, and hear or perceive them by some other sense, but sometimes have I no perception of you at all, yet nevertheless do I remember you, and know you within myself?

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Understand this, then, the first of the things that I wish to prove, that it is possible for a man not to perceive what he knows, and that it is possible for him to perceive it.

Theæ. True.

Socr. And does it not often happen that a man does not perceive what he does not know, and often that he perceives it only?

Theæ. This also is true.

121. Consider then, whether you can now follow me better. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theætetus, but he sees neither of them, nor has he any other perception respecting them, now he can never form this judgment within himself, that Theætetus is Theodorus? Do I say any thing to the purpose or not?

Theæ. Yes, quite true.

Socr. This then was the first of the cases that I mentioned.

Theæ. It was.

Socr. But the second was this, that I knowing one of you, but not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, should never think that he whom I know is the person whom I do not know.

Theæ. Right.

Socr. The third was this, that I neither knowing nor perceiving either of them, should not think that he whom I do not know is some other person of those whom I do not know: and consider that you again hear in succession all the instances before put, in which I shall never form a false judgment respecting you and Theodorus, neither while knowing nor ignorant of you both, nor while knowing one, and not the other; and in the same way with regard to perceptions, if you follow me.

Theæ. I do follow you.

122. *Socr.* It remains, therefore, that I may form a false judgment in this case, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having the impression of both of you in that waxen tablet made by a seal ring as it were, seeing you both from a distance and not sufficiently distinguishing you, I endeavour, by attributing the peculiar impression of each to his peculiar aspect, applying it so as to adapt it to its own form in order that I may recognise it, then failing in this, and changing them like those that put their shoes on the wrong feet, I fit the aspect of each to the impression of the other, as happens in looking into mirrors, where the sight passes from the right to the left, so I fall into the same error; then mistaken opinion and false judgment take place.

Theæ. What happens with regard to judgment, Socrates, seems wonderfully like what you describe.

Socr. Still further, when, knowing both of you, in addition to knowing I perceive one, but not the other, I have a know-

ledge of the other not according to perception, which I thus described before, but you did not then understand me.

Theæ. I did not.

123. *Socr.* I said this however, that a person who knows and perceives one and has a knowledge of him according to perception, will never think that he is some other person whom he knows and perceives, and of whom he has a knowledge according to perception. Was not this what I said?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. There remained then the case that was just now mentioned, in which we said that false judgment takes place, when a person knowing you both and seeing you both, or having some other perception of you both, has not the impression of each according to the perception of each, but, like an unskilful archer, shoots beside the mark and misses, this then is called a falsehood.

Theæ. And very properly so.

Socr. When, therefore, perception is present to one of the impressions, and not to the other, and the one applies the impression of the absent perception to that which is present, in this case the mind is altogether deceived: and, in a word, with respect to things that a person has neither known nor ever perceived, it is not possible, as it seems, either to be deceived, or to form a false judgment, if there is any soundness in what we now say: but with respect to things that we know and perceive, in these very things judgment is conversant and turns round, becoming both false and true, by collecting together in a direct and straight line the copies and marks proper to each, it is true, but sideways and obliquely, false.

124. *Theæ.* Is it not well described, Socrates?

Socr. You will say so still more, when you hear what follows. For to judge truly is beautiful, but to be deceived is base.

Theæ. How not?

Socr. They say, then, that these things proceed from hence. When the wax in any one's soul is deep, abundant, smooth, and properly moulded, objects entering by means of the perceptions and impressing themselves on this heart^r of the soul, as

A play on the words *κέαρ* or *κῆρ* and *κήρος*, which cannot be retained in an English version.

Homer calls it, obscurely intimating its resemblance to wax, then pure and sufficiently deep impressions being made in these, become lasting, and such men are first of all easily taught, next have retentive memories, and lastly do not change the impressions of the perceptions, but form true judgments, for, as these impressions are clear, and in a wide space, they quickly distribute to their proper images each of the things that are called beings; and such men are called wise. Does it not appear so to you?

Theæ. Entirely so.

125. *Socr.* When, therefore, any one's heart is covered with hair, which the very wise poet has celebrated, or when it is muddy, and not of pure wax, or very soft, or hard, those in whom it is soft are easily taught, but are forgetful, and those in whom it is hard, the contrary; but those who have it hairy and rough, and stony or full of earth or mixed mud, have indistinct impressions; they are also indistinct in those that are hard, for there is no depth in them; they are likewise indistinct in those that are soft, for by being confused they soon become obscure; but if, in addition to all this, they fall one upon another by reason of narrowness of space, if any one's soul is little, they are still more indistinct than the others. All these, therefore, are such as form false judgments. For when they see, or hear, or think about any thing, not being able at once to attribute each object to its impression, they are slow, and attributing different objects to different impressions, they for the most part see wrongly, and hear wrongly, and think wrongly; and these are said to be deceived in objects and ignorant.

Theæ. You speak as correctly as man can do, Socrates.

126. *Socr.* Shall we say, then, that there are false judgments in us?

Theæ. By all means.

Socr. And true judgments also?

Theæ. And true.

Socr. Do we, then, consider it to have been sufficiently established that these two judgments do without doubt exist?

Theæ. Most assuredly.

Socr. A talkative man, Theætetus, appears to be really troublesome and disagreeable.

Theæ. How so? Why do you say this?

Socr. Because I am angry at my own ignorance, and, in truth, talkativeness. For what other name can any one give it when a man drags the conversation upwards and downwards, and cannot be persuaded through his dulness, and is with difficulty torn from each several topic?

Theæ. But why are you angry?

Socr. I am not only angry, but I am afraid that I should not know what to answer, if any one should ask me, "Socrates, have you found that false judgment is neither in the perceptions compared with each other, nor in the thoughts, but in the conjunction of perception with thought?" I think I shall say, I have, priding myself as if we had made a very fine discovery.

127. *Theæ.* What has just now been proved appears to me, Socrates, to be by no means despicable.

Socr. Do you therefore assert, he will say, that we can never suppose that a man whom we think of only, but do not see, is a horse, which we neither see nor touch, but think of only, and do not perceive in any other way? I believe I should say, that I do assert this.

Theæ. And rightly.

Socr. What then? he will say, according to this mode of reasoning, can the number eleven, which one thinks of only, ever be supposed to be twelve, which also one thinks of only? Come then, do you answer?

Theæ. I should answer, that a person seeing or touching might suppose that eleven are twelve, but that he would never think thus respecting numbers which he embraces only in thought.

Socr. What then? do you suppose that any one has ever proposed to consider within himself of five and seven, I do not mean seven and five men, or any thing else of the kind, but the numbers five and seven themselves, which we said were in his soul like impressions in wax, and that it is impossible to judge falsely respecting them,—has any man at any time considered these very things, speaking to himself and asking how many they are, and answered, one that he supposes they are eleven, and another that they are twelve, or do all men say and suppose that they are twelve?

128. *Theæ.* No, by Jupiter, but many suppose that they are

eleven. And if a person considers about a greater number, he is still more mistaken; for I suppose that you rather speak about every number.

Socr. You suppose rightly, but consider whether any thing else ever happens than this, that he supposes that the number twelve impressed in his soul is eleven?

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. Does it not then come back to our former statements? For he who is in this condition supposes that what he knows is something else that he also knows, which we said was impossible, and from which very circumstance we demonstrated that there is no such thing as false judgment, in order that the same person might not be compelled to know and not to know the same thing at the same time.

Theæ. Most true.

Socr. Therefore we must shew that false judgment is something else than an interchange of mind with perception. For, if this were so, we could never be deceived in the thoughts themselves: but now there is either no such thing as false judgment, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows: and which of these two do you choose?

Theæ. You offer me a difficult choice, Socrates.

Socr. Our argument however appears as if it would not allow both these to take place: though (for we must venture on every thing), what if we should determine to lay aside all shame?

Theæ. How?

Socr. By taking upon ourselves to declare what it is to know.

Theæ. But why would this be shameless?

129. *Socr.* You do not seem to consider that the whole of our discussion from the beginning has been an investigation respecting science, as if we did not know what it is.

Theæ. I do consider it.

Socr. Does it not, then, appear to be a shameless thing, to explain what it is to know, when we are ignorant of what science is? But, Theætetus, our conversation has been all along full of defects. For we have over and over again used the expressions, We know, and We do not know, We have a scientific knowledge, and We have not a scientific knowledge, as if we both of us understood something about it, whereas we are still ignorant of what science is. But if you please, we

will still at the present moment use the terms, to be ignorant, and to understand, as if we could properly use them, though we are destitute of science.

Theæ. But how will you converse, Socrates, if you abstain from the use of these expressions?

Socr. Not at all, while I am what I am. If however I were contentious, or if a person of that kind were now present, he would say that I must abstain from them, and would strongly object to what I say. But as we are poor creatures, do you wish I should venture to say what it is to know? For it appears to me that it would be worth while to do so.

Theæ. Venture then, by Jupiter; for you will be readily pardoned for not abstaining from these expressions.

130. *Socr.* Have you heard, then, what they now say it is to know?

Theæ. Perhaps so; but at present I do not remember.

Socr. They say, I believe, that it is to have science.

Theæ. True.

Socr. Let us, then, change it a little, and say that it is to possess science.

Theæ. But in what will you say this differs from that?

Socr. Perhaps in nothing: but whether it seems to differ or not, listen and examine with me.

Theæ. I will, if I am able.

Socr. To possess, therefore, does not appear to me to be the same as to have: for instance, if any one having bought a garment, and having it in his power, should not wear it, we should not say that he has it, but that he possesses it.

Theæ. And very properly.

Socr. See then whether it is possible thus to possess science without having it: just as if any one having caught some wild birds, as doves or any others, and having constructed a dove-cote at home, should feed them; we should probably say that in some respects he always has them, because he possesses them: should we not?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But in another respect we should say that he has none of them, but that he has acquired a power over them, since he has brought them under his control, in an enclosure of his own, so as to take and have them when he pleases, by catching whichever he wishes, and again of letting them go: and this he is at liberty to do as often as he thinks fit.

Theæ. Such is the case.

131. *Socr.* Again, therefore, as in a former part of our discussion we constructed I know not what kind of waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul a kind of aviary of all sorts of birds, some being in flocks, apart from others, and others few together, and others alone, flying amongst all the rest wherever it may chance.

Theæ. Suppose it to be made: but what next?

Socr. While we are children, we must say, that this receptacle is empty, and instead of birds we must understand sciences; whatever science, then, one has become possessed of and shut up in this enclosure, one must say that he has learnt or discovered the thing of which this is the science, and that this is to know.

Theæ. Be it so.

Socr. Again, therefore, when any one wishes to catch any one of these sciences, and, when he has taken it, to have it, and again to let it go, consider what words he requires, whether the same as before, when he possessed them, or different ones. But from what follows you will more clearly understand what I mean. Do you call arithmetic an art?

Theæ. Yes.

132. *Socr.* Suppose this to be a catching of the sciences of every even and odd number.

Theæ. I do suppose it.

Socr. By this art, then, I think, he has the sciences of numbers under his control, and, if he pleases, transfers them to others.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. And we say that he who transfers them teaches, and that he who receives them learns, but that having them, by possessing them in that aviary, he knows them.

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Attend now to what follows. Does not he who is a perfect arithmetician know all numbers? for the sciences of all numbers are in his soul.

Theæ. How not?

Socr. Does not then such a person sometimes calculate either something within himself, or something else that is external, that is capable of being calculated.

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Socr. But to calculate we shall say is nothing else than to examine what is the quantity of any number.

Theæ. Just so.

Socr. What therefore he knows, he appears to examine, as if he did not know, though we admitted that he knows all number. You surely hear such questions as these.

Theæ. I do.

133. *Socr.* We, therefore, carrying on our comparison with the possession and catching of doves, will say that this catching is of two kinds, one before possessing for the sake of possessing, the other when one has already obtained possession, for the purpose of taking and having in the hands what was already possessed. So with respect to the things of which a person has already acquired the science by learning, and which he knew, he may learn these same things again, and recover and retain the science of each, which he formerly possessed, but had not ready in his mind.

Theæ. True.

Socr. On this account, I just now asked, what words it is proper to use in speaking of these things, when an arithmetician sets about calculating, or a grammarian reading any thing. Shall we say that knowing such a subject he again applies himself to learn from himself what he knows?

Theæ. This would be absurd, Socrates.

Socr. Shall we say, then, that he is going to read or calculate what he does not know, though we have granted him that he knows all letters and all numbers?

Theæ. This too would be unreasonable.

134. *Socr.* Will you, then, that we say, that we care nothing at all about words, in what way any one chooses to employ the words knowing and learning, but, since we have settled that it is one thing to possess a science, and another to have it, we maintain that it is impossible for a person not to possess what he does possess, so that it never happens that any one does not know what he knows, though it is possible for him to form a false judgment respecting it? For it is possible for him not to have the science of this particular thing, but another instead of it, when hunting after some one of the sciences that he possesses as they are flying about, he may by mistake take one instead of another; accordingly when he thinks that eleven is twelve, he takes the science of eleven instead of that of twelve,

as it were taking a pigeon that he possessed instead of a dove.

Theæ. It is reasonable to suppose so.

Socr. But when he takes that which he endeavours to take, then he is not deceived, and judges truly : and thus we will say that false and true judgment subsist, and none of the things which occasioned difficulty before will any longer stand in our way. Perhaps you agree with me, or what will you do ?

Theæ. Agree with you.

135. *Socr.* We are freed then, from the dilemma of a man's not knowing what he knows : for it never happens that we do not possess what we do possess, whether we are deceived respecting any thing or not. However, another much worse inconvenience appears to me to present itself.

Theæ. What is that ?

Socr. If the interchange of sciences can ever become false judgment.

Theæ. But how ?

Socr. In the first place, that having the science of any thing one should be ignorant of that thing, not through ignorance, but through the science of the thing itself, and in the next place, that one should judge this thing to be another thing and another thing this, how is it not a great piece of absurdity, that when science is present the soul should know nothing, but be ignorant of all things ? For, from this mode of reasoning, nothing hinders but that ignorance when present should make us know something, and blindness should make us see, if science will ever make a man ignorant.

Theæ. Perhaps, Socrates, we have done wrong in making sciences only take the place of the birds, and we ought to have supposed that various kinds of ignorance were flying about in the soul with them, and that the sportsman at one time taking science, and at another time ignorance, with respect to the same thing, judges falsely through ignorance, but truly through science.

136. *Socr.* It is not by any means easy, Theætetus, to forbear praising you : however, examine again what you have just said. For suppose it to be as you say. He who takes ignorance, will judge falsely you say ; is it not so ?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. Yet surely he will not think that he judges falsely.

Theæ. How should he?

Socr. But truly, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he is deceived.

Theæ. Assuredly.

Socr. He will therefore judge that by sporting he has taken science, and not ignorance.

Theæ. Clearly.

Socr. Having therefore made a long circuit, we have come back again to our first doubt. For that critic will laugh at us and say, "Can any one, my excellent friends, who knows both, science as well as ignorance, think that what he knows is some other thing that he knows? or, knowing neither of them, can judge that what he does not know, is some other thing that he does not know? or, knowing one, and not the other, can he suppose that what he knows is what he does not know, or what he does not know is what he does know? Will you tell me again, that there are sciences of sciences and ignorances, which their possessor having enclosed in some other ridiculous aviaries, or waxen figments, knows as long as he possesses them, though he has them not ready in his soul? And will you be thus compelled to revolve perpetually round the same circle, without making any progress?" What answer shall we give to this, Theætetus?

137. *Theæ.* By Jupiter, Socrates, I have no notion what ought to be said.

Socr. Does not the argument, then, my boy, reprove us very properly, and shew that we did wrong in searching for false judgment before science, and neglecting that? But it is impossible to know this until we have sufficiently discovered what science is.

Theæ. It is necessary, Socrates, at present to think as you say.

Socr. Again therefore, what shall one say from the beginning about science? For we surely must not give it up yet.

Theæ. By no means, unless you refuse to persevere.

Socr. Tell me, then, how can we best speak concerning science so as not to contradict ourselves.

Theæ. As we attempted to do before, Socrates, for I know of no other plan.

Socr. What is that?

Theæ. That true judgment is science. For to judge truly is

surely free from error, and whatever results from it is beautiful and good.

Socr. He who acted as guide in fording a river, Theætetus, said that it would shew its own depth; so if we go on in our enquiries, perhaps the impediment that we meet with will shew us what we are in search of, but if we stop nothing will be clear.

Theæ. You say well; let us go on then and examine it.

138. *Socr.* This then requires but a brief examination, for one whole art shews that it is not science.

Theæ. How so? and what art is it?

Socr. That which belongs to those who are most renowned for wisdom, whom they call orators and lawyers. For they, in fact, persuade, not by teaching, but by making men form such judgments as they please. Do you think that there are any teachers so clever as, when persons have not been present while others were robbed of their money, or treated with some other violence, to be able, while a little water is running, to teach those persons sufficiently of the truth of what took place?

Theæ. I by no means think so, but that they can persuade.

Socr. But do you not say that to persuade is to make a person form a judgment?

Theæ. How otherwise?

Socr. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about things which can only be known by seeing and in no other way, then judging these things from hearsay, do they not, when they form a true opinion, judge without science, being persuaded properly, since they decide correctly?

Theæ. Assuredly.

139. *Socr.* But, my friend, if true judgment and science are the same, a perfect judge could never form a correct judgment without science; but now each appears to be different from the other.

Theæ. I had forgotten, Socrates, what I heard some one say, but now I remember it: he said that true judgment in conjunction with reason is science, but that without reason it is out of the pale of science, and that things for which a reason cannot be given cannot be known; these were his very words; and that things for which a reason can be given are known.

Socr. You speak admirably well. But how do you distinguish the things that can be known from those that cannot? tell me, for perhaps you and I have heard the same thing.

Theæ. I know not whether I can explain it; but I could follow another person describing it, I think.

Socr. Hear, then, a dream for a dream. For I too seem to myself to have heard some people say, that the first elements, as it were, from which we and all other things are composed, cannot be explained by reason; for that each several element by itself can only be named, but that nothing else can be predicated of it, neither that it exists nor does not exist; for that this would be to attribute to it existence or non-existence, whereas nothing ought to be added to it, if one means to speak of the thing itself only; neither must we add to it the term the, or that, or each, or only, or this, or many others of the same kind; for these are constantly varying and are applied to all things, and are different from the things to which they are added. 140. But we ought, if it were possible, to speak of the thing itself, and, if it has a definition peculiar to itself, to speak of it without the addition of any thing else. Now, however, it is impossible for any of the first elements to be explained by a definition, for it does not admit of any thing else than being named, for it has only a name; but the things that have been composed from these, as they are complex, so their names, when connected together, constitute a definition; for a connection of names is the essence of definition. Thus the elements themselves cannot be defined or known, but only perceived, but things compounded of them can be both known and defined, and apprehended by true judgment. When, therefore, any one forms a true judgment of any thing, without explanation, his soul indeed perceives the truth respecting it, but does not know it, for he who is not able to give and receive an explanation of a thing must be ignorant of that thing, but when he adds an explanation to it then he is capable of knowing all these things, and may be perfect in science. Is it thus that you have heard the dream, or in some other way?

Theæ. In this way precisely.

141. *Socr.* Are you willing then that we should settle it thus, that science is true judgment in conjunction with reason?

Theæ. Exactly so.

Socr. Have we, then, Theætetus, thus on this very day dis-

covered what of old so many sages sought for and grew old before they found it?

Theæ. For my part, Socrates, it appears to me that what has been now stated is well said.

Socr. And it is reasonable that this very thing should be the case; for what science could there be without reason and right judgment? However one of the things that were stated displeases me.

Theæ. Which is that?

Socr. That which seems to be very forcibly said, that the elements are unknown, but that the natures of things compounded of them are known.

Theæ. Is not that right?

Socr. We must see. For we have as sureties for this doctrine the examples which he used who said all these things.

Theæ. What are they?

Socr. The elements of letters and syllables: do you think that he who said what we have mentioned had any thing else in view when he said it?

Theæ. No, but these.

142. *Socr.* Let us, then, apply ourselves to these and examine them, or rather ourselves, whether we learnt letters in this way, or not. First of all then do syllables admit of a definition, but are the elements undefinable?

Theæ. Probably.

Socr. It certainly appears so to me, too. If, then, any one should ask thus respecting the first syllable of the word Socrates, "Theætetus, tell me, what is So?" what would you answer?

Theæ. That it is *S* and *o*.

Socr. Have you not, then, this definition of the syllable?

Theæ. I have.

Socr. Come then, in the same way give me the definition of the letter *S*.

Theæ. But how can any one speak of the elements of an element? For *S*, Socrates, is a consonant, only a sound, as of the tongue hissing; again the letter *B* has neither voice nor sound, nor have most of the elements. So that it is very right to say that they are undefinable, since the most distinct among them, to the number of seven, have only a sound, but do not admit of any definition.

Socr. Thus far, then, my friend, we have determined rightly with respect to science.

Theæ. We appear to have done so.

143. *Socr.* What then? have we shewn rightly that the element cannot be known, but that the syllable can?

Theæ. It is probable.

Socr. Come then, do we say that a syllable is both the elements, and, if there are more than two, all of them, or some one form resulting from their conjunction?

Theæ. All, we appear to me to say.

Socr. Observe, then, with respect to the two letters *S* and *o*; both of them together form the first syllable of my name, does not then he who knows this syllable know both of them?

Theæ. How should he not?

Socr. He knows, therefore, *S* and *o*.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But what? is he ignorant of each of them, and knowing neither, does he know both?

Theæ. That would be strange and absurd, Socrates.

Socr. However, if it is necessary to know each, in order that he may know both, it is quite necessary for a person who is ever to know a syllable to know the elements first, and thus our former statement will escape us and be off.

Theæ. And very suddenly too.

Socr. For we did not guard it well. For, perhaps, we ought to suppose that a syllable does not consist of the elements, but of some one species resulting from them, which has a form peculiar to itself, different from the elements.

Theæ. Certainly; and perhaps the case is rather in this way than in the other.

144. *Socr.* We must examine it, and not so unmanfully abandon a weighty and venerable statement.

Theæ. We ought not, indeed.

Socr. Let it be then as we just now said; let the syllable be one form resulting from the several elements, connected together, as well in letters as in all other things.

Theæ. Just so.

Socr. It must, therefore, have no parts.

Theæ. Why not?

Socr. Because where there are parts, the whole must necessarily be the same as all the parts: or do you say that a whole

resulting from parts is one certain species different from all the parts?

Theæ. I do.

Socr. Whether do you call all and the whole the same, or each different from the other?

Theæ. I cannot say any thing for certain, but since you bid me answer boldly, I venture to say that they are different.

Socr. Your boldness, Theætetus, is right; but whether your answer is so, must be considered.

Theæ. It must indeed.

Socr. Does not the whole, then, differ from all, according to your present statement?

Theæ. Yes.

145. *Socr.* But what, is there any difference between all the parts, and the all? for instance when we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, or five and one, whether in all these cases do we say the same thing, or that which is different?

Theæ. The same thing.

Socr. Do we say any thing else than six?

Theæ. Nothing.

Socr. And in each mode of speaking did we not mention all the parts of six?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. Again, therefore, when we say all the parts do we say nothing?

Theæ. We necessarily do say something.

Socr. Do we say any thing else than six?

Theæ. Nothing.

Socr. In all things, then, that consist of number, do we not call the all and all the parts the same thing?

Theæ. It appears so.

Socr. Thus then let us speak of them; the number of an acre and an acre are the same; is it not so?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. And the number of a stadium in like manner?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. And moreover the number of an army, and an army, and in like manner with respect to all other things of the kind? For all number is all that which each of them is.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But is the number of each of them any thing else than its parts?

Theæ. Nothing.

Socr. Such things, then, as have parts must consist of parts?

Theæ. It appears so.

Socr. But it is admitted that all the parts are the all, since all number is the all.

Theæ. Just so.

Socr. The whole, therefore, does not consist of parts; for it would be all, if it were all the parts.

Theæ. It seems not.

Socr. But is a part a part of any thing else than a whole?

Theæ. Yes, of the all.

146. *Socr.* You fight manfully, Theætetus. But is not this very all, the all when nothing is wanting to it?

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. And will not the whole be this very same thing when nothing is wanting to it? but when any thing is wanting, it is neither the whole, nor all, each becoming the same thing from the same cause?

Theæ. It appears to me now, that the whole and the all in no respect differ from each other.

Socr. Did we not say, that where there are parts, the whole and the all will be all the parts?

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Again, therefore, to return to what I just now attempted to prove, if a syllable is not the elements, does it not necessarily follow that it has not elements as parts of itself, or that, if it is the same with them, it must be equally known with them?

Theæ. Just so.

Socr. In order that this might not follow, did we not suppose it to be different from them?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. What then? if the elements are not parts of a syllable, can you mention any other things that are parts of a syllable, and yet not its elements?

147. *Theæ.* By no means; for if, Socrates, I should admit that it has parts, it would surely be ridiculous to reject the elements and search for other things.

Socr. From what you now say, therefore, Theætetus, a syllable must certainly be some one indivisible form.

Theæ. So it seems.

Socr. Do you remember then, my friend, that we admitted a little before, and thought it was well said, that there cannot be a definition of first elements, of which other things are composed, because each considered by itself is uncompounded, and neither can the term "being" be correctly attributed to it nor the term "this," because these things would be said as different and foreign to it, and indeed this very cause makes it undefinable and unknown.

Theæ. I do remember.

Socr. Is there any other cause, then, than this of its being simple and indivisible? I for my part see no other.

Theæ. There does not appear to be any.

Socr. Does not the syllable, then, fall under the same class as the elements, since it has not parts, and is one form?

Theæ. Assuredly.

148. *Socr.* If, therefore, a syllable is many elements, and a whole, and these are its parts, syllables and elements may be equally known and defined, since all the parts have been found to be the same as the whole.

Theæ. By all means.

Socr. But if it is one and indivisible, a syllable equally as an element must be undefinable and unknown; for the same cause will make them alike.

Theæ. I cannot say otherwise.

Socr. We must not, therefore, allow this, if any one should say, that a syllable is known and definable, but an element the contrary.

Theæ. We must not, if we admit this reasoning.

Socr. What then? should you pay any more attention to one who should assert the contrary of what you are conscious happened to yourself in learning your letters?

Theæ. What is that?

Socr. That in learning you did nothing else than endeavour to distinguish the elements both by sight and hearing, each separated by itself, in order that their position when pronounced or written, might not confuse you.

Theæ. You say most truly.

Socr. And at your music-master's was learning perfectly any thing else than the being able to follow each note, and

α γ

distinguish to what chord it belonged, which every one would allow is called the elements of music.

Theæ. Nothing else.

149. *Socr.* If, therefore, we may conjecture from the elements and syllables in which we are skilled, to others, we shall say that the class of elements are capable of a much more clear and distinct knowledge than that of syllables, in order to our acquiring each study in perfection; and if any one should say that a syllable is known, but that an element is by nature unknown, we shall think that he is jesting either intentionally or unintentionally.

Theæ. Most assuredly.

Socr. Moreover, other proofs of this might still be found, as it appears to me; but let us not lose sight of the question before us by considering them, that is to say, what is meant by the statement, that reason united to true judgment is the most perfect science.

Theæ. This, then, we must consider.

Socr. Come then, what is the signification of the word *logos**: for it appears to me to mean one of three things.

Theæ. What are they?

Socr. The first would be to make one's thought clear by the voice, through the means of verbs and nouns, impressing one's judgment on what flows from the mouth, as it were on a mirror, or water; does not *logos* appear to you to be something of this kind?

Theæ. It does: and we say that he who does this speaks.

150. *Socr.* Every one, therefore, is able to do this more quickly or slowly, that is, can shew what he thinks about every thing, unless he is altogether dumb or deaf, and thus all who form right judgments on any matter, will be found to do so in conjunction with *logos*, and right judgment will never subsist without science.

Theæ. True.

Socr. We must not, therefore, too readily condemn him as having spoken nothing to the purpose, who asserted that science is that which we are now examining. For perhaps he

* As no one English word will express the three different meanings contained in the word *λόγος*, I have thought it better to retain the original word throughout this part of the argument.

who said it did not mean that, but that a person, when asked what each thing is, should be able to give an answer to the questioner by means of each thing's element.

Theæ. For instance, how do you mean, Socrates?

Socr. As Hesiod for instance says of a chariot, that it is made of a hundred pieces of wood, which I, for my part, could not enumerate, neither do I think could you, but we should be contented, if when asked what a chariot is, we could say wheels, axle, frame, rails, and yoke.

151. *Theæ.* Certainly.

Socr. But he probably would think us ridiculous, just as if we, when asked concerning your name and having answered syllable by syllable, thereby judging and saying correctly what we do say, should think ourselves grammarians, and that we know and speak grammatically the definition of the name of Theætetus; whereas it is not possible to say any thing scientifically, before one has given a complete account of each thing by means of its elements, together with true judgment, as was observed before, if I mistake not.

Theæ. It was observed.

Socr. So, too, we have a correct judgment respecting a chariot, but he who is able to describe its nature by means of those hundred pieces, by adding this, both adds *logos* to true judgment, and instead of forming a mere judgment becomes an artist and knowing in the nature of a chariot, in that he gives a complete account of the whole, by means of its elements.

Theæ. Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well said?

Socr. If it appears to you, my friend, and you allow that the description of each thing by its element is *logos*, and that that made by syllables, or even larger parts is devoid of *logos*, tell me, that we may examine it.

Theæ. I certainly do allow it.

Socr. Whether do you think that any one has a scientific knowledge of any thing, when the same thing appears to him at one time to belong to the same thing and at another to a different thing, or when he forms at one time one judgment and at another a different judgment about the same thing?

Theæ. By Jupiter, not I.

152. *Socr.* Have you forgotten then, that in learning your letters at first both you and others did this?

Theæ. Do you mean that we thought that at one time one letter, and at another time another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we placed the same letter at one time to its proper syllable, and at another time to another?

Socr. I do mean that.

Theæ. By Jupiter, I do not forget, nor do I think that they have knowledge who are in this condition.

Socr. What then? when a person at that time of life writing the name Theætetus, thinks that he ought to write and does write *Th* and *e*, and again attempting to write Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write *T* and *e*, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

Theæ. We have just now admitted, that a person in this condition does not yet know.

Socr. Does any thing, then, hinder the same person from being in this condition with respect to the second, third, and fourth syllable?

Theæ. Nothing.

153. *Socr.* Will he not then have the description by means of the elements, and write Theætetus with correct judgment, when he writes it in its proper order?

Theæ. Clearly.

Socr. Will he not still be void of science, though he judges correctly, as we said?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. And yet he has *logos* together with correct judgment; for he wrote it knowing the order of the elements, which we allowed to be *logos*.

Theæ. True.

Socr. There is, therefore, my friend, correct judgment accompanied with *logos* which must not yet be called science.

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. We have been enriched then, as it appears, in a dream, in thinking that we possess the truest definition of science: or shall we not condemn it yet? For perhaps some one may not define *logos* in this manner, but may consider it to be the remaining species of the three, one of which we said would be adopted by him who defined science to be correct judgment accompanied with *logos*.

Theæ. You have rightly reminded me; for there is still one left. For the first was an image of the thought as it were ex-

pressed by the voice: and that just now mentioned was a proceeding to the whole by means of the elements: but what do you say the third is?

Socr. That which most men would say it is, the being able to mention some mark by which the object of enquiry differs from all other things.

Theæ. Can you give me a *logos* of any thing by way of example?

154. *Socr.* For instance, if you please, with respect to the sun, I think it would be sufficient for you to admit, that it is the most luminous of the heavenly bodies that move round the earth.

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Observe then why this was said. It is that which we just now mentioned, that when you find the difference of each thing, by which it differs from all others, you will find, as some say, the *logos*; but as long as you lay hold of some common quality, you will have the *logos* of those things to which this common quality belongs.

Theæ. I understand; and it appears to me very proper to call such a thing *logos*.

Socr. He, therefore, who together with correct judgment respecting any thing whatever can find out its difference from all other things, will have arrived at the knowledge of that of which he before only formed a judgment.

Theæ. We say it certainly is so.

Socr. Now, however, Theætetus, since I have come near what has been said, as if it were a picture in perspective, I find that I do not understand it in the least, but while I stood at a distance it appeared to me to have some meaning.

155. *Theæ.* How is this?

Socr. I will tell you, if I can. If, when I have a correct judgment respecting you, I likewise find your *logos*, then I know you, but if not, I only form a judgment.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But *logos* was the explanation of your difference.

Theæ. It was.

Socr. When, therefore, I formed a judgment only, is it not true that I reached by my thought none of those things by which you differ from others?

Theæ. It seems that you did not.

Socr. I, therefore, thought of some common qualities, none of which belong to you more than to any one else.

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. Come, then, by Jupiter, how in such a case did I form a judgment of you rather than of any one else? For suppose me to be thinking that this is Theætetus, who is a man, and has nose, eyes, a mouth, and so on with each several member. Will this thought cause me to think of Theætetus rather than of Theodorus, or, as the saying is, the last of the Mysians?

Theæ. How should it?

156. *Socr.* But if I not only think of one who has nose and eyes, but also of one who has a snub nose and prominent eyes, shall I in that case think of you rather than of myself, or any other persons of that description?

Theæ. Not at all.

Socr. But I think I shall not form the image of Theætetus in my mind, until his snubbiness shall have impressed on me and left with me some mark different from all other instances of snubbiness that I have seen, and so with respect to the other parts of which you are made up; which, if I should meet you to-morrow, would recal you to my mind, and make me form a correct judgment respecting you.

Theæ. Most true.

Socr. Right judgment, therefore, respecting each object has to do with difference.

Theæ. It appears so.

Socr. What then will become of adding *logos* to correct judgment? For if it means that we should moreover form a judgment of the manner in which any thing differs from others, the injunction will be very ridiculous.

Theæ. How so?

Socr. It bids us add a right judgment of the manner in which things differ from others, when we have a right judgment of the manner in which they differ from others. And thus the turning round of a scytala, or a pestle, or any other proverb of the kind, would be nothing compared with this injunction, though it might more properly be called the advice of a blind man; for to bid us add those things that we already have, in order that we may learn what we already have formed judgments about, seems remarkably suited to one who is utterly blind.

Theæ. Tell me, then, what did you mean by asking me just now?

157. *Socr.* If, O boy, in bidding us add *logos* it bids us know, but not form a judgment of the difference, this most beautiful of all the definitions of science would be a delightful thing: for to know, surely, is to acquire science. Is it not?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. When asked, therefore, as it appears, what science is, he will answer, that it is correct judgment with the science of difference. For, according to him, this will be the addition of *logos*.

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. But it is altogether foolish, when we are searching for science, to say that it is correct judgment with science, either of difference or any thing else. Neither perception, therefore, Theætetus, nor true judgment, nor *logos* united with true judgment, can be science.

Theæ. It seems not.

Socr. Are we, then, still pregnant and in labour, my friend, with reference to science, or have we brought forth every thing?

Theæ. And by Jupiter, with your help, I have said more than I had in myself.

Socr. Does not, then, our midwife's art pronounce that all these things are empty, and not worth rearing?

Theæ. Assuredly.

158. *Socr.* If, therefore, after this you should wish to become pregnant with other things, Theætetus, and if you do become so, you will be full of better things by means of the present discussion; but if you should be empty, you will be less troublesome to your companions, and more meek through modesty, in not thinking that you know what you do not know. For thus much only my art is able to accomplish, but nothing more, nor do I know any of the things which others do who are and have been great and wonderful men. But this midwife's art I and my mother received from the deity; she about women, and I for young and noble men and such as are beautiful. Now, however, I must go to the king's porch, to answer the indictment which Melitus has preferred against me: to-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRON.

EUTHYPHRON, a person who professes to be thoroughly conversant in the knowledge of divine things, is represented as meeting Socrates at the king's porch, that is, the entrance of the court in which trials for murder and impiety were carried on. He is surprised at seeing Socrates at such a spot, for he cannot believe that he has a cause pending there. Socrates tells him that he is indicted by one Melitus, a person of no note at Athens, but one who knows how to govern the city rightly, for that he charges Socrates with impiety in introducing new gods and corrupting the youth. Socrates then asks Euthyphron whether he too has a cause in the same court, and is informed that he has indicted his own father for murder, because he had occasioned the death of one of their hired servants, who had himself first slain a slave of Euthyphron's father, and then been cast bound into a ditch, where he died from hunger and cold. On hearing this, Socrates asks whether he has such a perfect knowledge of holiness and impiety that he is sure he is right in bringing his father to trial; and on Euthyphron's asserting that he has, Socrates begs that he will accept him for his disciple, in order that he may learn how to clear himself in his own approaching trial, and first of all desires to know what holiness and impiety are. Euthyphron confidently answers that what he is now doing is holy, namely, to prosecute any one who acts unjustly, whoever he may be, but that not to prosecute such an one is impious. Socrates, however, is not satisfied with this answer, for that he did not ask about particular actions, but about holiness in the abstract. "That, then, which is pleasing to the gods is holy," says Euthyphron. But Socrates shews that different things are pleasing to different gods, so that the same things are both loved

and hated by divers of them, whence it follows that the same things are both holy and unholy.

Euthyphron, feeling the force of this objection, next says that the holy is that which all the gods love, and the impious that which they all hate: but here again Socrates shews that this cannot be a correct definition of holiness, for that it is not holy because they love it, but they love it because it is holy. To help him out of his difficulty, Socrates suggests that holiness is a part of justice; to which Euthyphron assents, and adds that it is that part of it which is concerned about our care for the gods. But, asks Socrates, what care for the gods will holiness be? A kind of service paid to them, is the answer. But to what end do our services of the gods avail? Euthyphron evades the question by saying they are many and beautiful; but when further pressed, he says that holiness consists in sacrificing and praying to the gods, wherein, he is led to admit, men beg those things that they need, and sacrifice such things as the gods need, from whence Socrates concludes that holiness is a kind of traffic between gods and men. But it is clear that the gods cannot be benefited by men; therefore, as Euthyphron says, it must be that which is most dear. But this definition of holiness had been already rejected. Socrates, therefore, proposes to renew the enquiry, but Euthyphron, finding himself defeated at all points, suddenly breaks off the discussion, on pretence of business elsewhere.

EUTHYPHRON,

OR

ON HOLINESS.

EUTHYPHRON. SOCRATES.

Euth. WHAT new thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your haunts in the Lyceum, and are now waiting about the king's porch! You surely have not a trial before the king as I have.

Socr. The Athenians, Euthyphron, do not call it a trial, but an indictment.

Euth. What say you! Some one, it seems, has preferred an indictment against you, for I cannot believe that you have indicted any one else.

Socr. Surely not.

Euth. Has some one else, then, indicted you?

Socr. Certainly.

Euth. Who is he?

Socr. I do not myself very well know the man, Euthyphron, for he appears to me to be young and unknown; however they call him Melitus, I think; and he is of the borough of Pithos, if you know any Melitus of Pithos, who has lank hair, a thin beard, and a hook nose.

Euth. I don't know him, Socrates, but what indictment has he preferred against you?

Socr. What? One not unworthy of a high-minded man, as it appears to me; for it is no contemptible matter for one who is so young, to be versed in so weighty a business. For he knows, as he says, how the youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt them. And he appears to be a shrewd man, and, observing my ignorance, he comes before the city, as before a

mother, to accuse me of corrupting those of the same age with himself. And he appears to me to be the only one of our statesmen who knows how to govern rightly; for it is right first of all to pay attention to the young, that they may become as virtuous as possible, just as it is proper for a good husbandman first of all to pay attention to the young plants, and afterwards the others: so Melitus probably first purges us who corrupt the blossoms of youth, as he says; then after this it is clear that by paying attention to the older men, he will be the cause of very many and great blessings to the city, as may be expected to happen from one who makes such a beginning.

2. *Euth.* I wish it were so, Socrates; but I dread lest the contrary should happen. For, in reality, he appears to me, in attempting to injure you, to begin by assailing the city from the hearth. But tell me, by doing what does he say that you corrupt the youth?

Socr. Absurd even to hear mentioned, my admirable friend: for he says that I am a maker of gods, and, as if I made new gods and did not believe in the ancient ones, he has indicted me on their account, as he says.

Euth. I understand, Socrates, it is because you say that a demon constantly attends you. As if, then, you introduced innovations in religion he has preferred this indictment against you, and he comes to accuse you before the court, knowing that such charges are readily entertained by the multitude. And me too, when I say any thing in the public assembly concerning divine things, and predict to them what is going to happen, they ridicule as mad; and although nothing that I have predicted has not turned out to be true, yet they envy all such men as we are. However we ought not to heed them, but pursue our own course.

3. *Socr.* But, my dear Euthyphron, to be laughed at is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, as it appears to me, do not care very much whether they think a man is clever, so long as he does not communicate his wisdom; but when they think a man makes others so, they are angry, either through envy, as you say, or from some other cause.

Euth. With respect to that matter, how they are affected towards me I am not very anxious to say.

Socr. For perhaps you seem to shew yourself but rarely, and

to be unwilling to impart your wisdom ; but I am afraid that, from my love of mankind, I appear to them to tell every man too freely whatever I know, not only without pay, but even gladly offering myself, if any one is willing to listen to me. If then, as I just now said, they were going to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, there would be nothing unpleasant in passing some time in a court of justice, jesting and laughing ; but if they are in earnest, how this affair may terminate is unknown, except to you prophets.

Euth. Perhaps, however, it will be of no consequence, Socrates, but you will conduct your cause to your mind, as I think I shall mine.

4. *Socr.* Have you too a cause, Euthyphron ? Do you defend it, or prosecute ?

Euth. I prosecute.

Socr. Whom ?

Euth. One, in prosecuting whom, I seem to be mad.

Socr. What then ? do you prosecute some one that can fly ?

Euth. He is very far from being able to fly, for he happens to be very old.

Socr. Who is he ?

Euth. My father.

Socr. Your father, my excellent friend ?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. But what is the charge, and what is the trial about ?

Euth. Murder, Socrates.

Socr. By Hercules ! Surely, Euthyphron, the generality of men are ignorant how this can ever be right. For I do not think any common person could do this properly, but he must be very far advanced in wisdom.

Euth. Far indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Socr. Is it any one of your relations who has been killed by your father ? It must be so ; for surely you would not prosecute him for the murder of a stranger.

Euth. Ridiculous, Socrates, to think that it makes any difference whether the person killed is a stranger or a relation, and that we ought not to consider this only, whether he killed him justly or not, and, if justly, let him go, but if not, prosecute him, even though the murderer should live at the same hearth and the same table with you. For the pollution is equal, if you knowingly associate with such a one, and do not purify both

yourself and him by bringing him to justice. However, the deceased was a dependant of our's, and when we were farming at Naxos, he worked there for us, for hire. This man, then, having drunk too much wine and being in a passion with one of our slaves, slew him. My father, therefore, having bound his hands and feet, and thrown him into a pit, sends a man here to enquire of the interpreter of religious matters, what he ought to do with him ; and in the mean time he neglected the prisoner, and took no care of him as being a murderer, and as if it was of no consequence if he died ; which did happen. For he died from hunger, cold, and the chains, before the messenger returned from the interpreter. For this reason my father and all my relatives are angry with me, because I, for the sake of a murderer, accuse my father of murder, who, as they say, did not kill him, and even if he had killed him, as the deceased was a murderer, they say that I ought not to concern myself about such a man ; for that it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder ; little knowing, Socrates, what the divine rule is with respect to holiness and impiety.

Socr. But, by Jupiter, Euthyphron, do you think you have such an accurate knowledge of divine things, how they are circumstanced, with respect both to things holy and impious, that those things having been done as you say, you are not afraid, in bringing your father to trial, lest you should commit an impious action ?

Euth. I should be a sorry person, Socrates, nor would Euthyphron in any respect excel the generality of men, if I did not know all such things accurately.

5. *Socr.* Admirable Euthyphron, it will be a most excellent thing for me to become your disciple, and, before Melitus's indictment comes on for hearing, to object this very thing to him, saying, that I hitherto deemed it of the utmost consequence to be acquainted with divine things, and that now, since he says I am guilty of acting rashly, and introducing innovations with respect to divine things, I have become your disciple. If then, I should say, Melitus, you admit that Euthyphron is wise in such matters and thinks rightly, suppose that I do so too, and do not bring me to trial ; but if otherwise, call him, the teacher, to account before you do me, as one who corrupts the elders, both me and his father, me by teaching me, and him by admonishing and punishing him : and if he is

not persuaded by me and does not let me off the trial, or indict you instead of me, it will be necessary to say these very things in the court, which I have already objected to him.

Euth. By Jupiter, Socrates, if he should attempt to indict me, I should find, I think, his weak side, and we should much sooner have a discussion in the court about him than about me.

Socr. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am anxious to become your disciple, being persuaded that some others and this Melitus do not appear even to see you, though he has so very keenly and easily seen through me, as to indict me for impiety. 6. Now therefore, by Jupiter, tell me what you just now asserted you know so well; what do you say is piety and impiety, both with respect to murder and other things? Is not holiness itself the same with itself in every action, and again, is not impiety, which is contrary to all holiness, in every case similar to itself, and has not every thing that is impious some one character with respect to impiety?

Euth. Most assuredly, Socrates.

Socr. Tell me, then, what you say holiness is, and what impiety?

Euth. I say, then, that that is holy which I am now doing, to prosecute any one who acts unjustly either with respect to murder or sacrilege, or who commits any similar offence, whether he be one's father or mother, or whoever else he may be, but not to prosecute him is impious. For observe, Socrates, what a great proof I will give you that the law is so, as I have also said to others, shewing that it is rightly done, when one does not spare one who acts impiously, whoever he may be. For all men believe that Jupiter is the best and most just of the gods, and yet they admit that he put his own father in chains, because he unjustly swallowed his children, and again, that he mutilated his father for other similar reasons, but they are indignant with me, because I prosecute my father for having acted unjustly, and thus these men contradict themselves with respect to the gods and me.

Socr. Is this the reason then, Euthyphron, for which I am defendant in this indictment, because when any one says things of this kind respecting the gods, I admit them with difficulty? on which account, as it seems, some one will say that I am

guilty. Now, therefore, if these things appear so to you likewise, who are well versed in such matters, we must of necessity, as it seems, agree with you. For what else can we say, who acknowledge that we know nothing about these things? But tell me, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship, do you think that these things did really happen so?

Euth. And things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, which the multitude are unacquainted with.

Socr. Do you then think that there is in reality war among the gods one with another, and fierce enmities and battles, and many other things of the kind such as are related by the poets, and with representations of which by good painters both other sacred places have been decorated, and moreover in the great Panathenaic festival a veil full of such representations is carried into the Acropolis. Must we say that these things are true, Euthyphron?

Euth. Not these only, Socrates; but, as I just now said, I can, if you please, relate to you many other things respecting divine affairs, which I am sure you will be astonished to hear.

7. *Socr.* I should not wonder; but you shall relate these things to me hereafter, at our leisure. Now, however, endeavour to explain to me more clearly what I just now asked you. For you have not yet, my friend, sufficiently answered my question as to holiness what it is, but you have told me that what you are now doing is holy, prosecuting your father for murder.

Euth. And I said the truth, Socrates.

Socr. Perhaps so. But, Euthyphron, you may also say that many other things are holy.

Euth. For such is the case.

Socr. Do you remember, then, that I did not beg this of you, to teach me some one or two from among many holy things, but the particular character itself by which all holy things are holy? For you surely said that unholy things are unholy, and holy things holy, from one character: do you not remember?

Euth. I do.

Socr. Teach me, then, this very character, what it is, in order that looking to it, and using it as a model, I may say that such a thing of all that you or any one else does is holy, and that what is not such is not holy.

Euth. But if you wish it, Socrates, I will also tell you this.

Socr. I do indeed wish it.

Euth. That, then, which is pleasing to the gods is holy, and that which is not pleasing to them is impious?

Socr. Admirably, Euthyphron, you have answered just as I begged you to answer. Whether truly, however, I do not yet know, but you will doubtless convince me that what you say is true.

Euth. Certainly.

8. *Socr.* Come then, let us consider what we say. A thing that is pleasing to the gods, and a man who is pleasing to the gods, are holy; but a thing that is hateful to the gods, and a man that is hateful to the gods, are impious; but the holy is not the same with the unholy, but most contrary to it: is it not so?

Euth. Assuredly.

Socr. And this appears to have been well said.

Euth. I think so, Socrates; for it has been said.

Socr. And that the gods quarrel, Euthyphron, and are at variance with each other, and that there are enmities amongst them one towards another: has not this also been said?

Euth. It has.

Socr. But, my excellent friend, variance about what occasions enmity and anger? Let us consider it thus. If you and I differed about numbers, which of two was the greater, would a difference on this point make us enemies and angry with each other, or having recourse to computation, should we soon be freed from such dissension?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. And if we differed about the greater and the less, by having recourse to measuring should we not soon put an end to our difference?

Euth. Such is the case.

Socr. And by having recourse to weighing, as I think, we should be able to decide respecting the heavier and the lighter?

Euth. How not?

Socr. About what then disagreeing and in what being unable to come to a decision, do we become enemies to, and angry with, each other? Perhaps you cannot readily answer, but consider when I say whether they are these, the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the base, the good and the evil.

Are not these the things about which disagreeing, and not being able to arrive at a satisfactory decision respecting them, we become enemies to each other when we do become so, both you and I, and all other men?

Euth. This, indeed, is difference itself, Socrates, and it is about these things.

Socr. But what? If the gods, Euthyphron, differ at all, must they not differ about these very things?

Euth. Most necessarily.

Socr. According to your account, then, noble Euthyphron, different gods think different things just, and beautiful and base, and good and evil. For surely they could not quarrel with each other if they did not differ about these things; is it not so?

Euth. You say rightly.

Socr. Do they not severally, then, love the things which they consider beautiful and good and just, and hate their contraries?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. And these same things, as you admit, some consider to be just, and others unjust; disputing about which they quarrel and make war on each other; is it not so?

Euth. Just so.

Socr. The same things, therefore, as it seems, are both hated and loved by the gods, and these are both hateful to the gods and pleasing to the gods.

Euth. It seems so.

Socr. From this reasoning also the same things must be holy and unholy, Euthyphron?

Euth. It appears so.

9. *Socr.* You have not, therefore, answered my question, my admirable friend: for I did not ask you this, what is at the same time both holy and impious; but what is pleasing to the gods is also hateful to the gods, as it seems. So that, Euthyphron, in punishing your father, as you are now doing, it is not at all wonderful if in doing this you do what is pleasing to Jupiter, but odious to Saturn and Heaven, and what is pleasing to Vulcan, but odious to Juno; and if any other of the gods differs from another on this point, to them also in like manner.

Euth. But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will

differ from another about this, and say that he ought not to be punished who has slain any one unjustly.

Socr. But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, Euthyphron, whether he who has slain another unjustly, or has committed any other injustice, ought to be punished?

Euth. They never cease doubting about these things, both elsewhere and in courts of justice. For they who commit very many acts of injustice say and do every thing in their power to escape punishment.

Socr. Do they also confess, Euthyphron, that they have acted unjustly, and confessing, do they nevertheless say that they ought not to be punished?

Euth. They by no means say this.

Socr. They do not, therefore, do and say every thing in their power. For I think they dare not say nor doubt this, that if they act unjustly they ought to suffer punishment; but, I think, they deny that they have acted unjustly: is it not so?

Euth. You say truly.

Socr. They do not, therefore, doubt this, whether he who acts unjustly ought to be punished; but this, perhaps, they doubt, who has acted unjustly, and by doing what, and when.

Euth. You say truly.

Socr. Do not, then, the very same things happen to the gods if they quarrel about things just and unjust, according to your statement, and do not some say that they act unjustly towards each other, and others again deny it? For surely, my admirable friend, no one, either of gods or men, dare maintain this, that he who acts unjustly ought not to suffer punishment.

Euth. Yes, and what you say is true, Socrates, at least in general.

Socr. But they who doubt, Euthyphron, doubt, I think, about each particular that has been done, both men and gods, if the gods do doubt: and when they differ about any action, some say that it has been done justly, and others unjustly: is it not so?

Euth. Certainly.

10. *Socr.* Come then, my dear Euthyphron, teach me too, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think he died unjustly, who serving for wages and having committed homicide, and being put in chains by the master of the deceased, died in his fetters before he that put him in chains

received an answer respecting him from the interpreters, as to what he ought to do ; and that for such a cause it is right for a son to prosecute and demand judgment against his father. Come, endeavour to make it clear to me, with respect to this, that all the gods without exception consider this action to be right. And if you make this sufficiently clear, I will never cease extolling you for your wisdom.

Euth. But perhaps this is no trifling matter, Socrates ; though I could prove it to you very plainly.

Socr. I understand you ; I appear to you to be more dull of apprehension than the judges ; for it is evident that you will prove to them that it was unjust, and that all the gods hate such actions.

Euth. Very plainly, Socrates, if only they will hear what I have to say.

11. *Socr.* But they will hear you, if only you shall appear to speak well. However, while you were speaking, I made this reflexion, and considered within myself : if Euthyphron should certainly convince me that all the gods think such a death to be unjust, what more shall I have learnt from Euthyphron as to what is holy, and what impious ? For this action, as it seems, would be hateful to the gods. Yet what was lately defined has not appeared from this, namely what is holy, and what not : for that which is hateful to some gods appeared also to be pleasing to others. So that I grant you this, Euthyphron, and if you please let all the gods think it unjust, and let them all hate it. Shall we, then, make this correction in the definition, and say, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love is holy ; but that what some love, and others hate, is neither, or both ? Are you willing that we should give this definition of the holy and the impious ?

Euth. What hinders, Socrates ?

Socr. Nothing hinders me, Euthyphron ; but do you, for your part, consider whether, assuming this, you can thus easily teach me what you promised ?

Euth. But I should say that the holy is that which all the gods love, and the contrary, the impious, that which all the gods hate.

Socr. Shall we examine this, then, Euthyphron, whether it is well said ? or shall we let it pass, and thus concede both to ourselves and others, that if any one only says that any thing is

so, we shall allow that it is? or must we examine what the speaker says?

Euth. We must examine it: for my part, however, I think that this is now well said.

12. *Socr.* We shall soon, my good friend, know this more clearly. For consider it in this way: Is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy; or is it holy, because it is loved?

Euth. I don't understand what you mean, Socrates.

Socr. I will endeavour, then, to express myself more clearly. We say that a thing is carried, and carries; that it is led, and leads; that it is seen, and sees: and you understand that all things of this kind are different from each other, and in what they differ?

Euth. For my part, I seem to understand it.

Socr. Is not, then, that which is beloved one thing, and that which loves different from it?

Euth. How not?

Socr. Tell me, then, is that which is carried, carried because one carries it, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, but for this.

Socr. And that which is led, because one leads it, and that which is seen, because one sees it?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. One does not therefore see a thing because it is seen, but on the contrary it is seen because one sees it: nor does one lead a thing because it is led, but it is led because one leads it: nor does one carry a thing because it is carried, but it is carried because one carries it. Is my meaning clear, then, Euthyphron? I mean this, that if one does any thing, or suffers any thing, one does it not because it is done; but it is done because one does it; nor does one suffer any thing because it is suffered, but it is suffered because one suffers: do you not admit this to be the case?

Euth. I do.

Socr. Is not, then, the being loved, something either done or suffered by some one?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. And is not the case the same with this as with all the former instances; those who love it do not love it because it is loved, but it is loved, because they love it?

Euth. Necessarily so.

Socr. What then do we say respecting holiness, Euthyphron? Do not all the gods love it according to your statement?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. Is it for this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, but for this.

Socr. They love it then because it is holy, but it is not holy because they love it.

Euth. It seems so.

Socr. Therefore because the gods love it it is beloved, and that which is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them.

Euth. How not?

Socr. That which is pleasing to the gods, therefore, is not holy, Euthyphron, nor is that holy which is pleasing to the gods, as you say, but one is different from the other.

Euth. How so, Socrates?

Socr. Because we agree that what is holy is therefore loved because it is holy, and that it is not holy because they love it; is it not so?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. But that which is pleasing to the gods because the gods love it, is from the very circumstance of their loving it pleasing to them; but they do not love it because it is pleasing to them.

Euth. You say truly.

Socr. But, my dear Euthyphron, if the being pleasing to the gods and being holy were the same thing, since that which is holy is loved because it is holy, that which is pleasing to the gods would also be loved because it is pleasing to them; and if that which is pleasing to the gods were pleasing to them because they love it, that which is holy would also be holy because they love it. Now, however, you see that they are contrary, as being altogether different from each other. For the one is such as is loved because they love it, but the other is loved because it is of such a character that it ought to be loved. And you appear, Euthyphron, when asked what holiness is, not to have been willing to make known to me its essence, but to have mentioned an affection to which this same holiness is subject, namely the being loved by all the gods; but what it is, you have not yet told me. If therefore it is

agreeable to you, do not conceal it from me, but again say from the beginning what holiness is, whether it is loved by the gods, or is subject to any other affection: for we shall not differ about this. But tell me frankly what the holy is and what the impious.

Euth. But, Socrates, I know not how to tell you what I think. For whatever we put forward some how constantly moves from its position, and will not remain where we have placed it.

Socr. What you have advanced, Euthyphron, appears to resemble the statues of my ancestor Dædalus. And if I had said and laid down these things, you would probably have joked me, for that owing to my relationship to him, my works, by way of discussion, escape, and will not remain where one places them. But now, for the hypotheses are yours, there is need of some other raillery. For they will not remain with you, as you too perceive yourself.

Euth. But it appears to me, Socrates, that what has been said needs pretty much the same raillery. For I am not the person who causes them to shift about in this way and not remain in the same place, but you appear to me to be the Dædalus. For as far as I am concerned, they would have remained as they were.

Socr. I appear, then, my friend, to have become much more skilful than him in my art, in that he only made his own works moveable, but I besides my own, as it seems, make those of others so. And this, moreover, is the most wonderful thing in my art, that I am skilful against any will. For I should wish that my reasonings should remain and be immovably fixed, rather than have the riches of Tantalus, in addition to the skill of Dædalus. But enough of this. 13. Since, however, you appear to be too nice, I will assist you to shew how you may teach me respecting holiness, and not be tired before you have done. For see, whether it does not appear to you to be necessary that every thing that is holy should be just.

Euth. To me it does.

Socr. Is, then, every thing that is just also holy, or is every thing that is holy just, but not every thing that is just holy, but partly holy, and partly something else?

Euth. I do not follow your questions, Socrates.

Socr. And yet you are younger no less than wiser than I am ; but, as I said, you are too delicate through abundance of wisdom. However, my blessed friend, exert yourself ; for it is not difficult to understand what I mean. For I mean the contrary to what the poet said, who wrote, " You are unwilling to mention Jove the creator who made this universe : for where fear is there is also shame." I, however, differ from this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect ?

Euth. By all means.

Socr. It does not appear to me, that where fear is there is also shame. For there appear to me to be many who fearing diseases, poverty, and many other things of the kind, fear indeed but are by no means ashamed of what they fear. Does it not appear so to you ?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. But wherever shame is, there is also fear : for is there any one who is ashamed of and blushes at any thing, that is not afraid of and does not fear the reputation of baseness ?

Euth. Assuredly he does fear it.

Socr. It is not right, therefore, to say, that where fear is, there also is shame, but where shame is, there also is fear ; not however, wherever there is fear, there is also shame. For I think that fear is more extensive than shame ; for shame is a part of fear, as the odd is a part of number, so that it does not follow that wherever number is, there also is the odd, but wherever the odd is, there also is number. Do you follow me now ?

Euth. Perfectly.

Socr. I asked you, then, about a thing of this kind above, whether where the just is, there also is the holy, or where the holy is, there also is the just, but wherever the just is, there is not always the holy : for the holy is a part of the just. Shall we say thus, or does it seem to you otherwise ?

Euth. No, but thus. For you appear to me to speak correctly.

14. *Socr.* Observe then what follows. If the holy is a part of the just, it is necessary, as it seems, that we should find out what part of the just the holy is. If then you were to ask me about some of the things before mentioned, for instance, what part of number the even is, and what number it is, I should

say that it is not scalene, but isosceles^t. Does it not appear so to you?

Euth. It does.

Socr. Do you, then, also endeavour in like manner to teach me what part of the just the holy is, that I may tell Melitus no longer to treat me unjustly nor indict me for impiety, since I have now sufficiently learnt from you what things are pious and holy, and what not.

Euth. That part of justice then, Socrates, appears to me to be pious and holy, which is concerned about our care for the gods; but that which is concerned about our care for mankind is the remaining part of justice.

15. *Socr.* You appear to me, Euthyphron, to speak well; but I still require a trifle further. For I do not yet understand what care you mean. For you surely do not mean such care is to be had for the gods as is employed about other things. For we say, for instance, not every one knows how to take care of horses, but a groom; do we not?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. For surely the groom's business is the taking care of horses.

Euth. Yes.

Socr. Nor does every one know how to take care of dogs, but a huntsman.

Euth. Just so.

Socr. For the huntsman's business is the taking care of dogs.

Euth. Yes.

Socr. And the herdsman's of cattle.

Euth. Certainly,

Socr. But holiness and piety of the gods, Euthyphron; do you say so?

Euth. I do.

Socr. All care, therefore, aims at the same thing, that is to say, it is for some good and advantage of that which is taken care of, as you see that horses, taken care of by one skilled in the groom's business, are benefited and become better: do they not seem so to you?

Euth. They do.

Socr. Dogs also are benefited by one skilled in the huntsman's business, and oxen by that of the herdsman, and all

^t That is, it can be divided into equal parts, which the odd cannot.

other things in like manner: do you think that the care is employed for the injury of that which is taken care of?

Euth. Not I, by Jupiter.

Socr. But for its advantage?

Euth. How should it not?

Socr. Is holiness, therefore, since it is a care for the gods, an advantage to the gods, and does it make the gods better? And would you admit this, that when you do any thing holy, you make some one of the gods better?

Euth. Not I, by Jupiter.

Socr. Nor do I think, Euthyphron, that you mean this; I am far from doing so: but for this reason I asked you what care for the gods you mean, not thinking that you mean such as this.

Euth. And rightly, Socrates; for I do not mean such as this.

Socr. Be it so: but what care for the gods will holiness be?

Euth. That, Socrates, which slaves take of their masters.

Socr. I understand: it will be a kind of service, as it seems, paid to the gods.

Euth. Certainly.

16. *Socr.* Can you then tell me, to the performance of what the service of physicians is subservient? Do you not think it is to health?

Euth. I do.

Socr. But what? to the performance of what work is the service of shipwrights subservient?

Euth. Clearly, Socrates, to that of a ship.

Socr. And that of architects, to houses?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. Tell me, then, my excellent friend; to the performance of what work will the service of the gods be subservient? For it is clear that you know, since you say that you have a knowledge of divine things beyond that of other men.

Euth. And I say truly, Socrates.

Socr. Tell me then, by Jupiter, what is that very beautiful work which the gods effect, by employing us as servants.

Euth. They are many and beautiful, Socrates.

Socr. So do generals, my friend; though you could easily tell the principal of them, that they effect victory in war; is it not so?

Euth. How should I not?

Socr. Husbandmen too, I think; effect many and beautiful things; but the principal thing they effect is the production of food from the earth.

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. What then? of the many and beautiful things which the gods effect, what is the principal?

Euth. I told you just now, Socrates, that it is a difficult matter to learn all these things accurately; this however I tell you simply, that if any one knows how to speak and do things grateful to the gods, by praying and sacrificing, these things are holy, and such things preserve both private houses and the general weal of cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to them are impious, which also subvert and ruin all things.

17. *Socr.* You might, if you had pleased, Euthyphron, have told me the principal of what I asked in fewer words. But it is clear that you are not willing to teach me. For now when you were just upon the point of doing so, you turned aside; whereas if you had answered, I should by this time have sufficiently learnt from you what holiness is. But now (for it is necessary that he who asks questions should follow the person questioned wherever he may lead) what again do you say is the holy, and holiness? Do you not say it is a knowledge of sacrificing and praying?

Euth. I do.

Socr. Is not to sacrifice to offer gifts to the gods, and to pray to beg something of the gods?

Euth. Assuredly, Socrates.

Socr. From this statement it follows that holiness must be a knowledge of begging from and giving to the gods.

Euth. You quite understand what I mean, Socrates.

Socr. For I am very anxious, my friend, to obtain your wisdom, and I apply my mind to it: so that what you say will not fall to the ground. But tell me what this service of the gods is? Do you say it is to beg of them and to give to them?

Euth. I do.

18. *Socr.* Must we not then, therefore, to beg rightly, beg those things of them which we need from them?

Euth. What else?

Socr. And again to give rightly must we give them in return such things as they stand in need of from us? For surely

it would not be suitable to offer those gifts to any one which he does not need.

Euth. You say truly, Socrates.

Socr. Holiness, therefore, Euthyphron, will be a kind of traffic between gods and men.

Euth. A kind of traffic, if it pleases you to call it so.

Socr. But it is not at all pleasing to me, unless it happens to be true. Tell me therefore, what advantage the gods derive from the gifts which they receive from us? For the advantage arising from what they give is clear to every one; for we have no good at all which they do not impart? but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Do we get so much the advantage over them in this traffic, that we receive all good things from them, but they nothing from us?

Euth. But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

Socr. What is the use then, Euthyphron, of all our gifts to the gods?

Euth. What else do you think except honour and reverence, and, as I just now mentioned, gratitude?

Socr. Holiness then, Euthyphron, is that which is grateful, but not profitable or dear to the gods.

Euth. I for my part think it is of all things most dear to them.

Socr. This then again is, as it seems, holiness, that which is dear to the gods.

Euth. Most certainly.

19. *Socr.* Can you wonder then, when you say this, that your statements do not remain fixed, but move about, and can you accuse me as being the Dædalus that makes them move about, when you yourself are far more skilful than Dædalus, and make them go round in a circle? Do you not perceive that our discussion, turning round, comes to the same point? For you surely remember that in a former part of our discussion that which is holy and that which is acceptable to the gods appeared to us not to be the same, but different from each other: do you not remember?

Euth. I do.

Socr. Now, then, do you not perceive that you say that holiness is that which is dear to the gods? But is this any thing else than that which is acceptable to the gods? is it not so?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. Either, therefore, we did not then admit that properly, or, if we did, our present statement is not correct?

Euth. It seems so.

Socr. From the beginning, therefore, we must consider again what holiness is; for I shall not willingly run away like a coward, until I have learnt it. Do not then despise me, but by all means apply your mind earnestly to it and tell me the truth. For you know it, if any man does; and I cannot let you go like Proteus, until you have told me. For if you had not known clearly both what is holy and what is impious, it is not possible that you could ever have attempted, for the sake of a hireling, to prosecute your aged father for murder; but you would have feared both to incur the anger of the gods; in case you should not act rightly in this matter, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure that you think you clearly know both what is holy and what is not. Tell me, therefore, most excellent Euthyphron, and do not conceal from me what you believe it to be?

Euth. At some other opportunity then, Socrates: for now I am in haste to go somewhere, and it is time for me to depart.

Socr. What are you about, my friend? By going away you deprive me of the great hope I entertained that by learning from you what things are holy and what not, I might get rid of Melitus's indictment, by shewing him that I had now become skilled in divine things by the aid of Euthyphron, and that I no longer through ignorance speak rashly, or introduce innovations respecting them, and that therefore I should lead a better life for the future.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LYSIS.

As Socrates was one day going from the Academy to the Lyceum he met with Hippothales, Ctesippus, and other youths, who were on that day celebrating the Hermæan festival in a newly-erected palæstra hard by. They invite him to come in and join their conversation; he promises to do so on condition that they will first tell him who is the beauty among them. Hippothales, to whom he first puts the question, shews, by his embarrassment, that he is himself far gone in love; and on being taxed with it by Socrates blushes still more, whereupon Ctesippus says that he is constantly overwhelming them with his poems and speeches on his favourite Lysis. Socrates, on hearing this, begs Hippothales to inform him how a lover ought to speak of or address his favourite. Hippothales, though he does not deny his being in love, does deny that he makes verses or speeches; but Ctesippus shews that he is constantly giving utterance to the most extravagant praises of his favourite and his family; on which Socrates remarks that he should not celebrate his victory before it is won; for that it is not wise to praise the object of one's affection before a return of affection on his part is secured, and moreover such as are beautiful when highly praised are apt to become arrogant, and so are more difficult to be won. Hippothales takes these suggestions in good part, and begs Socrates to advise him how to address his favourite so as to win his affection, which Socrates readily promises to do if they will give him an opportunity of conversing with Lysis. To this end they all enter the palæstra, and almost as soon as Socrates, Ctesippus, Menexenus and others had seated themselves down in a quiet corner. Lysis, who is very fond of listening to conversations, comes and takes his seat next his friend Menexenus, while Hippothales is concealed in the back-ground out of sight of his favourite*.

Socrates begins by addressing a few words to the latter, but on Menexenus being called out by the master of the palaestra, he turns to Lysis, and asks him whether his parents do not love him very much. On Lysis replying that they certainly do, Socrates shews him that though, since they love him, they must needs wish to make him as happy as possible, yet they are so far from letting him do whatever he pleases, that they put him under the government of others, even of slaves, and this not on account of his youth, but because he has not yet acquired sufficient experience and knowledge to be entrusted with the government of himself; but that whenever he is wise enough, not only his father, but all others, will entrust him with the management of themselves and their affairs^b.

At this point of the conversation Menexenus returned and resumed his seat near Lysis, who begs of Socrates to say over again to Menexenus what he had been saying to him; but Socrates desires him to tell it himself on some future occasion, and for the present engages to converse on some other subject with Menexenus. Having observed, therefore, the friendship that subsisted between Lysis and Menexenus, he asks the latter, when any one loves another, which of the two becomes a friend of the other, the lover or the beloved? Menexenus replies that there is no difference. But Socrates shews that it frequently happens that a lover is not only not loved in turn, but is even hated. In that case, then, which is the friend? Menexenus is forced to admit that unless both love neither can be a friend to the other. But here Socrates interposes this difficulty; he remarks that men often love horses, dogs, and other things which cannot love in turn; and the poet, as Menexenus admits, speaks truly who says, "Happy the man who has boys for his friends and horses and dogs," so that the beloved now appears to be a friend of the lover, and not the lover of the beloved; and by the same reasoning he who is hated is an enemy, and not he who hates, whence the absurd

conclusion follows that people are beloved by their enemies and hated by their friends. This, however, is impossible; therefore the reverse must be the case, and the lover must be a friend of the beloved. "If, then, neither those who love are to be friends, nor those who are loved, nor yet those who both love and are loved," who are to be called friends? Lysis interposes with the remark that they do not appear to him to have conducted their enquiries aright; so Socrates avails himself of the opportunity thus offered him, and directs his discourse to Lysis^c.

"The poets say," he observes, that "God ever conducts like to like," and the wisest among men say the same, "that like must ever needs be friendly to like." Lysis agrees to this. But, objects Socrates, only half of this appears to be true, for the more wicked men are the more hostile are they to each other; so that it appears that the good man only is a friend to the good man only, but that the bad man never arrives at true friendship. But here again a new doubt is started.

The like can derive no benefit from the like; how, therefore, can they be held in regard by each other? and how can that which is not held in regard be a friend? In like manner, the good man is sufficient for himself; but he who is sufficient needs nothing, and so will not regard any thing, and therefore not love. So that from this it appears, that not even the good will be friends to each other^d.

Socrates then remarks, that he once heard some one say that like is most hostile to like, and the good to the good; and generally that things most like each other are most full of envy, strife and hatred, but such as are most unlike are most disposed to friendship, just as the dry desires the moist, the cold heat, and so on. Menexenus admits the truth of this, and of its consequence, that the contrary is most friendly to its contrary. But again Socrates drives him to this absurd conclusion, that since enmity is most contrary to friendship, therefore

an enemy must be a friend to a friend, or a friend a friend to an enemy*.

Since it appears, then, that neither is the like friendly to the like, nor the contrary to the contrary, Socrates next proposes to enquire whether that which is neither good nor evil can be the friend of the good. According to an ancient proverb, the beautiful is friendly, and the good is beautiful, whence he would conclude that that which is neither good nor evil is friendly to the beautiful and the good. There are three several classes of things, he says, the good, the evil, and that which is neither good nor evil. It has already been proved that the good is not friendly to the good, nor the evil to the evil, nor yet the good to the evil, nor the evil to the good; it remains, therefore, that that which is neither good nor evil must be friendly to the good. But a little further discussion leads to the more narrow conclusion, that that which is neither evil nor good is friendly to the good, on account of the presence of evil†.

Both Lysis and Menexenus agree to this conclusion; but Socrates soon raises new difficulties, and shews the fallaciousness of their former reasoning. A friend, he says, is a friend to some one, and for the sake of something, and on account of something; for a rich man is a friend to a physician on account of disease, which is an evil, and for the sake of health, which is a good, so that that which is friendly is a friend for the sake of a friend, on account of an enemy. By proceeding in this way, he argues, we shall at length arrive at some principle, which will not have to be referred to another friend, but will arrive at the first friend, for the sake of which all other things are friends, and which is friendly for its own sake. Now it has already appeared that we are friendly to that which is good, and that we love the good on account of evil; if, therefore, evil were to be done away with the good would be of no use to us, and we should not love it. In this, too, his

young friends are willing to acquiesce, but Socrates dispels this delusion also, and shews that evil cannot be the cause of love, since if evil were done away with the desires would still remain, which in reality are the causes of friendship; for that which desires desires what it stands in need of, and that which stands in need is friendly to that of which it stands in need: and so love, desire, and friendship respect that which, in a manner, belongs to a man; but then evil belongs to evil and good to good, consequently they will each severally be friendly to their fellow, and the evil will be no less a friend to the evil than the good to the good; but both these positions have already been shewn to be erroneous, and so no positive solution of the question proposed is arrived at.

• § 34—43.

LYSIS,

OR

ON FRIENDSHIP.

SOCRATES, HIPPOTHALES, CTESIPPUS, MENEXENUS, AND LYSIS.

I WAS going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum on the road outside the wall close to the wall itself, but when I reached the little gate, where is the fountain of the Panops, I there met with Hippothales son of Hieronymus, Ctesippus the Pæanian, and other young men with them standing together in a group. And Hippothales seeing me approach said, "Socrates, whither are you going, and whence come you?"

"From the Academy," I replied, "and am going straight to the Lyceum."

"Hither, then," said he, "straight to us. Won't you come here? it is worth while."

"Where do you mean," said I, "and whom do you mean by 'you'?"

"Hither," he replied, shewing me an enclosure opposite the wall and an open gate, "there we are passing away our time, we and a good many other fine fellows."

"And what is this, and what your occupation?"

"A palæstra," he said, "lately built; our occupation consists chiefly in conversation, which we would gladly share with you."

"You do well," said I. "But who teaches there?"

"Your friend and encomiast," said he, "Miccus."

"By Jupiter," said I, "he is no mean person, but an apt sophist."

"Will you follow us then," said he, "that you may see those that are there?"

2. "I should be glad to hear this first, and on that condition I enter, who is the beauty?"

"To some of us," said he, "Socrates, one appears so, to some, another."

"But who appears so to you, Hippothales? Tell me this."

Then he blushed at the question. And I said, "Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need no longer tell me this, whether you are in love with any one or not: for I know that you are not only in love, but are already pretty far gone in love. I, for my part, am in other matters poor and useless, but this somehow has been given me by the deity, to be able quickly to discern both a lover, and one that is beloved."

On hearing this, he blushed still more. Whereupon Ctesippus said, "It is a fine thing in you to blush, Hippothales, and hesitate to tell Socrates the name, though if he were to stay here with you even for a short time he would be tired to death with hearing you frequently telling it. 3. He has certainly deafened our ears, Socrates, and filled them with the name of Lysis: and if he is somewhat tipsy, it is easy for us, even when we awake out of sleep, to fancy that we hear the name of Lysis. And what he tells of him in his ordinary talk, though wearisome, is not so very much so; but when he attempts to overwhelm us with his poems and set-speeches! and what is still more wearisome than these, is that he sings about his favourite with a wonderful voice, which we must endure to listen to. But now when questioned by you, he blushes."

"This Lysis, then," said I, "is a youth, as it seems. I conjecture this, because on hearing the name I did not know it."

"They don't often call him by his own name," said he, "but he still goes by his father's name, because his father is so very well known. For I am very sure, that you are far from being unacquainted with the form of the youth; for he may be sufficiently known from this only."

4. "Tell me then," said I, "whose son he is."

"The eldest son of Democrates, of Æxone," he replied.

"Well done, Hippothales," said I, "what a noble and in every way admirable love is this you have met with! Come then, display to me what you display to these also, that I may discover whether you know what a lover ought to say about his favourite, either to himself or to others."

"Do you really put any weight, Socrates," said he, "on any thing that he says?"

"Do you deny," said I, "that you are in love with the person whom he speaks of?"

"I do not," said he, "but I do deny that I make verses on my favourite or compose speeches."

"He is not in his right senses," said Ctesippus, "but is delirious and mad."

Upon this I said, "Hippothales, I do not wish to hear your verses, nor any song that you may have made on the youth, but their meaning, that I may know in what way you behave towards your favourite."

"He doubtless will tell you," said he, "for he knows and remembers it well, since, as he says, he has been stunned by constantly hearing it from me."

5. "By the gods," said Ctesippus, "assuredly I do; and ridiculous it is too, Socrates. For that being a lover, and devoting himself to the youth beyond all others, he should have nothing of his own to say, that even a boy might not say, how can it be otherwise than ridiculous? For what the whole city resounds with about Democrates and Lysis the boy's grandfather, and all his ancestors, their wealth, their breed of horses, and their victories in the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, with four horses and with one, these things he puts into poems and speeches, and besides these, things still more absurd: for he lately described to us in a poem, the entertainment of Hercules, how an ancestor of theirs received Hercules on account of his relationship to him, being himself sprung from Jupiter and the daughter of the founder of his borough, such things as old women sing, and many others of the same kind, Socrates. 6. These are the things that he speaks of and sings and compels us to listen to."

Upon hearing this, I said, "O ridiculous Hippothales, before you have gained the victory do you compose and sing an encomium on yourself?"

"But I neither compose nor sing on myself, Socrates."

"You do not think so," I replied.

"How is that?" said he.

"These songs," said I, "most of all relate to you. For if you gain your favourite being such as you describe, what you have said and sung will be an honour to you, and in reality an encomium on yourself as victorious in having won such a favourite. But if he should escape you, by how much greater the encomiums are which you uttered on your favourite, by so much the more ridiculous will you appear in being deprived of greater blessings. Whoever therefore, my friend, is skilled in matters of love, does not praise his beloved before he has caught

him, fearing how the event will turn out. Moreover such as are beautiful when any one praises and extols them, are filled with pride and arrogance. Do you not think so?"

"I do," he replied.

7. "And by how much the more arrogant they are, are they not more difficult to be caught?"

"That is probable at least."

"What sort of huntsman, then, would he appear to you to be, who in hunting should scare away his prey, and make it more difficult to be caught?"

"Without doubt, a bad one."

"And by speeches and songs not to soothe but exasperate, shews a great want of skill; does it not?"

"It appears so to me."

"Consider then, Hippothales, whether you will not expose yourself to all these charges by your poetry. Though I think you would not be willing to allow that a man who harms himself by his poetry can be a good poet, in that he harms himself."

"No, by Jupiter," said he, "for that would be a great piece of folly. But on this very account, Socrates, I communicate the matter to you, and if you have any thing else to suggest, advise me, by saying what or by doing what one may win the affections of one's favourite."

"It is not easy to say," I replied: "but if you will make Lysis himself converse with me, I could perhaps shew you what you ought to say to him, instead of the things which your friends allege that you say and sing."

8. "There is no difficulty in that," he replied. "For if you will enter with Ctesippus here, and sit down and converse, I think that he will join you of his own accord, for he is exceedingly fond of listening, Socrates, and moreover, as they are celebrating the Hermæa, young men and boys are all mixed up together. He will therefore join you: but if not, he is intimate with Ctesippus, through his cousin Menexenus; for Menexenus is his most particular friend. Let him call him, therefore, if he does not join you of his own accord."

"This," said I, "we must do." And at the same time, laying hold of Ctesippus, I entered the palæstra, and the others came after us.

On entering there, we found that the boys had finished their

sacrifices, and, the ceremonies being now nearly ended, playing at dice, and all full dressed. 9. Many of them were playing in the court outside, but some in a corner of the dressing-room were playing at odd and even with a great number of dice which they drew out of certain little baskets. Others stood round these, looking on; and among them was Lysis, and he stood in the midst of the boys and youths, crowned, and surpassing them in form, so as not only to deserve to be called beautiful, but beautiful and noble. Then we withdrawing to the opposite side sat down, (for it was quiet there,) and entered into conversation with each other. Lysis, thereupon, turning round, frequently looked at us, and was evidently anxious to come to us; but for some time he hesitated, and was averse to approach alone. Then, Menexenus comes in, in the midst of his game from the court, and as soon as he saw me and Ctesippus, came and seated himself by us. 10. Lysis, therefore, seeing him, followed, and sat down by the side of Menexenus. Others likewise came up, and moreover Hippothales, when he saw a good many standing round, concealing himself behind them, took up a position where he thought Lysis could not see him, fearing lest he should give him offence, and in this position he listened to our discourse. And I, looking towards Menexenus, said, "Son of Demophon, which of you is the elder?"

"We are in doubt," he replied.

"Should you not also contend which of you is the more noble?" said I.

"Certainly," said he.

"And in like manner, which of you is the more beautiful?"

Hereupon they both laughed. "However," said I, "I will not ask which of you is the more rich, for you are friends; are you not?"

"Certainly," they replied.

"Now the property of friends is said to be common, so that in this respect there will be no difference between you if what you say about friendship is true."

They assented.

After this, I was purposing to ask, which of them was the more just and the more wise; but in the meanwhile some one came and made Menexenus get up, saying that the master of the palæstra called him; for he appeared to me to be one

concerned in the sacrifices. He therefore left us ; and I questioned Lysis : 11. "Doubtless," said I, "Lysis, your father and mother love you very much?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Would they not, then, wish you to be as happy as possible?"

"How not?"

"Does a man appear to you to be happy who is a slave, and who is not permitted to do any thing he desires?"

"By Jupiter, no," said he.

"If, therefore, your father and mother love you and wish that you may be happy, this is quite evident, that they endeavour to make you happy?"

"How should they not?" said he.

"Do they, therefore, permit you to do what you please, and in no respect find fault with you or hinder you from doing whatever you desire?"

"By Jupiter, Socrates," said he, "they do indeed hinder me in very many things."

"How say you?" I asked, "wishing you to be happy do they hinder you from doing whatever you please? Answer me thus ; If you should desire to mount on one of your father's chariots, and to take the reins when a race is to be run, would he not allow you, but hinder you?"

"By Jupiter," said he, "he would not allow me."

"Whom would he then?"

"There is a charioteer who receives pay from my father."

12. "How say you? Do they suffer a hired servant rather than you to do what he pleases with the horses, and moreover pay him money for so doing?"

"Why not?" said he.

"But I suppose they suffer you to drive the pair of mules, and, if you wish to take the whip and beat them, they would allow you."

"Why allow me?" said he.

"But what?" said I, "is no one allowed to beat them?"

"Certainly," said he, "the mule-driver."

"Is he a slave, or free?"

"A slave," he replied.

"They think more of a slave then, as it seems, than of you, their son, and commit their property to him rather than to you, and allow him to do what he pleases, but you they hinder.

Tell me this too. Do they allow you to govern yourself; or do they not even suffer this?"

"How should they suffer it?" he said.

"Who then governs you?"

"My pædagogus here," said he.

"Is he a slave?"

"How should he be otherwise? ours though," said he.

"It is shameful, surely," said I, "that a freeman should be governed by a slave. And by doing what does this pædagogus govern you?"

"Of course," said he, "he conducts me to my masters."

"And do they too govern you, the masters?"

"Assuredly."

13. "Your father, then, voluntarily sets over you many rulers and governors. But when you return home to your mother, does she allow you to do whatever you please, that you may be happy as far as she is concerned, either with her wool or her loom when she is spinning? She surely does not hinder you from touching the comb or the shuttle, or any other of her spinning instruments."

Whereupon, he laughing replied, "By Jupiter, Socrates, she not only hinders me, but I should be beaten too if I touched them."

"By Hercules," said I, "have you in any way injured your father or your mother?"

"By Jupiter, not I," he said.

"For what reason, then, do they so shamefully hinder you from being happy and doing what you please, and bring you up throughout the whole day in subjection to some one, and in a word let you do scarcely any thing that you wish? So that, as it seems, neither have you any advantage from such great riches, but any one manages them rather than you, nor from your person, which is so noble, but this too another tends and takes care of: but you, Lysis, neither govern any thing, nor do any thing that you wish."

14. "For I am not yet old enough, Socrates," said he.

"That should not hinder you, son of Democrates: since thus far, I think, both your father and mother permit you and do not wait till you are old enough: for when they wish any thing to be read to or written for them, they appoint you, I think, first of all in the house to this office; do they not?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Are you allowed then, in this case, to write whichever letter you please first, and which second, and are you allowed to read in like manner? And when you take the lyre, I think, neither your father nor your mother hinder you from tightening and loosening any string you please, and from twanging and striking them with the quill; do they hinder you?"

"By no means."

"What then can be the cause, Lysis, that in these cases they do not hinder you, but do hinder you in those that we just now mentioned?"

"Because, I think," said he, "I know the one, but not the other."

15. "Be it so," said I, "my excellent youth; your father, then, is not waiting for your being old enough to entrust every thing to you, but on the very day that he shall think you are wiser than he is, he will entrust to you both himself and his property?"

"I think he will," said he.

"Be it so," said I, "what then? Will not your neighbour follow the same rule as your father respecting you? Do you think he will entrust you with the management of his household when he thinks you are wiser than himself with respect to household-management, or will he preside over it himself?"

"I think he will entrust it to me."

"But what? do you think the Athenians will entrust their affairs to you, when they perceive that you are wise enough?"

"I do."

"By Jupiter," said I, "what then as to the great king? Would he suffer his eldest son, who will succeed to the government of Asia, when his meat is being cooked, to throw into the sauce whatever he pleases, rather than us, if we should go to him and shew that we are more skilled in the preparation of dishes than his son?"

"Us, clearly," he replied.

16. "And he would not allow him to throw any thing in, however trifling, but us he would allow, even if we wished to throw in salt by the handful."

"How not?"

"But what if his son should be diseased in his eyes would

he allow him to touch his own eyes, not considering him a physician, or would he hinder him?"

"He would hinder him."

"But if he supposed we were good physicians, even if we wished to open his eyes and sprinkle them with ashes, I think he would not hinder us, considering we judged rightly."

"You say true."

"Would he not entrust every thing else to us rather than to himself or his son, with respect to which we appeared to him to be wiser than either of them?"

"Necessarily so, Socrates," he replied.

"This, then, is the case," said I, "my dear Lysis, all persons, both Greeks and barbarians, men and women, will entrust us with those things with respect to which we are found to be wise, and we shall do in them whatever we please, nor will any one purposely hinder us, but we shall both be free ourselves in these matters, and governors over others, and these things will be our own, for we shall derive benefit from them. 17. But those things about which we have no knowledge no one will suffer us to do as we think proper, but all men will hinder us as much as they are able, not only strangers, but even our own father and mother, and any one else who is more nearly related to us than them, and in these matters we ourselves shall be subject to others, and they will be strange to us, for we shall derive no benefit from them. Do you admit that this is the case?"

"I do."

"Shall we, then, be friends to any one, and will any one love us in those things in which we are of no use?"

"No, surely," said he.

"Now, then, neither does your father love you, nor does any one else love another person, in so far as he is useless?"

"It appears not," he said.

"If, then, you become wise, my boy, all men will be your friends, and all men will be attached to you, for you will be useful and good. But if not, neither will any one else, nor your father be a friend to you, nor your mother, nor any of your kindred. Is it possible, then, Lysis, that any one can deem himself wise in those things of which as yet he has no knowledge at all?"

"How can he?" said he.

"If, then, you require a teacher, you are not yet wise?"

18. "True."

"Neither, then, are you very wise, if you are still unwise?"

"By Jupiter," said he, "Socrates, I do not think that I can be."

Then I, upon hearing this, looked at Hippothales, and almost committed a blunder, for it occurred to me to say, "Thus, Hippothales, we ought to converse with favourites, humbling and checking them, and not, as you do, puffing them up and filling them with vanity." However, perceiving him anxious and disturbed at what was said, I recollected that, although he was standing near, he wished to escape the observation of Lysis; I therefore recovered myself, and restrained my speech.

At this moment Menexenus came again, and sat down by Lysis, whence he had risen before. Lysis, then, in a very boyish and affectionate manner, unobserved by Menexenus, talking to me a little while, said, "Socrates, say over again to Menexenus what you have been saying to me."

And I replied, "Do you tell it him, Lysis, for you paid very great attention."

"I certainly did," he replied.

"Endeavour, then," said I, "to remember it as well as you can, that you may tell him all clearly; but if you forget any thing, ask me again the first time you meet me."

19. "I will most certainly do so, Socrates," said he, "be well assured. But say something else to him, that I too may hear, until it is time for me to go home."

"I must do so," said I, "since you bid me; but take care that you assist me, if Menexenus should attempt to confute me. Do you not know that he is fond of disputing?"

"By Jupiter," said he, "very much so; and for this reason I wish you to converse with him."

"That I may make myself ridiculous?" said I.

"No, by Jupiter," said he, "but that you may punish him."

"How so," said I, "that's not an easy matter, for the man is clever, a disciple of Ctesippus. And besides, he is here in person, do not you see Ctesippus?"

"Don't concern yourself about that, Socrates," said he, "but come, converse with him."

"We must converse, then," I replied.

While we were speaking thus to each other, Ctesippus said,

"What are you two feasting on by yourselves, without letting us share in the conversation?"

"But indeed," said I, "you shall have a share, for Lysis here does not understand something that I have said, but says he thinks Menexenus knows it, and bids me ask him."

20. "Why then," said he, "do you not ask him?"

"But I will ask him," I replied. "Answer me, then, Menexenus, what I shall ask you; for from my childhood I happen to have had a desire for a certain thing, as another person may have of something else: for one desires to possess horses, another dogs, another gold, and another honours; but I, for my part, am indifferent about these things, but have a fond desire for the possession of friends, and I had rather have a good friend than the best quail or cock in the world; and, by Jupiter, than the best horse or dog, and I think, by the dog, that I should much rather prefer the possession of an intimate, than the gold of Darius, or even than Darius himself, so fond am I of intimate friends. Seeing you, therefore, and Lysis, I was amazed, and pronounced you happy, because, young as you are, you have been able so quickly and easily to acquire this possession, and you have so quickly and sincerely acquired him for your friend, and again he you. But I am so far from making this acquisition, that I do not even know in what way one man becomes the friend of another; but I wish to ask this very thing of you, as being an experienced person. 21. Tell me, then, when any one loves another, which of the two becomes a friend, the lover of the beloved, or the beloved of the lover? or is there no difference?"

"It appears to me," said he, "that there is no difference."

"How say you?" I replied, "Do both then become friends of each other, if one alone loves the other?"

"To me it appears so," said he.

"But what? Is it not possible for one who loves not to be loved in turn by the object of his love?"

"It is."

"But what? is it not possible, then, for one who loves ever to be hated? as lovers surely sometimes seem to be treated by their favourites: for though they love most ardently, some of them think that they are not loved in turn, and some even that they are hated. Does not this appear to you to be true?"

"Quite true," said he.

"In such a case, then," said I, "does one love, and is the other loved?"

"Yes."

"Which then of these is the friend of the other? the lover of the beloved, whether he is loved in turn, or even if he is hated, or the beloved of the lover? or again, in such a case, is neither the friend of neither, unless both love each other?"

"It seems indeed to be so."

22. "Now, then, it appears to us otherwise than it appeared before. For then if one loved, both appeared to be friends; but now, unless both love neither is a friend."

"It appears so," said he.

"Nothing, therefore, is a friend to that which loves unless it loves in turn."

"It seems not."

"Neither, then, are they friends of horses, whom horses do not love in turn, nor friends of quails, nor again friends of dogs, and friends of wine, and friends of gymnastics, and of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in turn: or do they severally love these things although they are not friends, and does the poet speak falsely who says, 'Happy the man who has boys for his friends, and solid-hoofed horses, and hunting dogs, and a foreign guest?'"

"It does not seem so to me," he replied.

"But does he appear to you to speak the truth?"

"Yes."

"The beloved, then, is a friend to that which loves, as it seems, Menexenus, whether it loves or whether it hates; just as children newly born, who partly do not yet love, and partly even hate, when they are punished by their mother or their father, nevertheless, at the very time when they hate, are in the highest degree beloved by their parents.

"It appears to me," said he, "that this is the case."

23. "The lover, therefore, from this reasoning, is not the friend, but the beloved."

"It seems so."

"And he who is hated, therefore, is an enemy, but not he who hates."

"So it appears."

"Many, therefore, are beloved by their enemies and hated by their friends; and are friends to their enemies, but enemies

to their friends, if the beloved is a friend, and not the lover. Though it is very absurd, my dear friend, or rather, I think, impossible, to be an enemy to a friend, and a friend to an enemy."

"You seem to speak truly, Socrates," said he.

"If, therefore, this is impossible, the lover will be a friend of the beloved."

"So it appears."

"Again, therefore, that which hates must be the enemy of that which is hated."

"Necessarily so."

"Therefore, the result will be that we must of necessity admit the very things that we did before, that a man is often a friend of that which is not a friend, and often even of that which is an enemy, when either any one loves that which does not love, or even loves that which hates, and is often an enemy of that which is not an enemy, or is even a friend, when either any one loves that which does not hate, or even hates that which loves."

"It appears so," said he.

"What shall we do, then," said I, "if neither those who love are to be friends, nor those who are loved, nor yet those who both love and are loved? Shall we say that some others besides these become friends to each other?"

"By Jupiter, Socrates," said he, "I don't well know what answer to make."

24. "Have we not, then, Menexenus," said I, "conducted our enquiries altogether right?"

"To me it appears not, Socrates," said Lysis; and as he said this he blushed: for his remark appeared to me to escape from him involuntarily through his earnest attention to the conversation: and he was plainly most attentive while he was listening.

I then, wishing that Menexenus should cease speaking, and being delighted with the other's love of wisdom, accordingly turned round and directed my discourse to Lysis, and said, "Lysis, you seem to me to say truly, that if we had conducted our enquiries properly, we should never have wandered in this manner. But let us proceed no longer in this way, (for the investigation appears to me to be difficult as if it were a road,) but it seems to me that we should proceed by the road to which we turned aside, and conduct our enquiries after the

poets ; for they are to us, as it were, fathers of wisdom and guides. They speak however, I imagine, so as not to give a mean account of such as happen to be friends, but they say that God himself makes them friends, by conducting them to each other. They express themselves as I think somehow as follows : ‘ God ever conducts like to like,’ and makes them known ; have you not met with this verse ?”

“ I have,” said he.

25. “ Have you not met, too, with the writings of the wisest of men that say the very same things, that like must ever needs be friendly to like ? But these are they who discourse and write about nature and the universe.”

“ You say truly,” he replied.

“ Whether, then,” said I, “ do they say well ?”

“ Perhaps so,” said he.

“ Perhaps,” said I, “ the half is true, and perhaps the whole, but we do not understand it : for the wicked man, by how much nearer he approaches, and is more intimate with a wicked man, seems to us to become so much the more hostile to him ; for he injures him ; but, surely, it is impossible for those who injure and are injured to be friends : is it not so ?”

“ Yes,” he replied.

“ Thus, then, the half of this saying will not be true, since the wicked are like each other ?”

“ You say true.”

“ But they seem to me to say that the good are like each other and friends, but that the bad, as it is said of them, are never alike even to themselves, but are inconstant and unstable. But that which is unlike and at variance with itself, can scarcely be like or friendly to another ; does it not seem so to you too ?”

“ To me it does,” said he.

26. “ They intimate this, then, my friend, as it seems to me, when they say that like is friendly to like, that the good man only is a friend to the good man only, but that the bad man never arrives at true friendship, either with a good or a bad man : does it seem so to you also ?”

He nodded assent.

“ We have now discovered, then, who are friends, for our argument shews that it must be those who are good.”

• Homer, *Odyss.* xvii. 218.

"It certainly seems so," said he.

"And I think so too," said I. "Nevertheless, I find some difficulty in it. Come then, by Jupiter, let us see what it is I suspect. The like, in so far as he is like, is a friend to the like, and such an one is useful to such an one: or rather thus: can any thing that is like confer any benefit on or do any harm to any thing that is like, which it cannot also do to itself; or suffer any thing which it cannot also suffer from itself? But how can such things be held in regard by each other when they are unable to afford any assistance to each other? is it possible?"

"It is not possible."

"But how can that which is not held in regard be a friend?"

"In no way."

"The like, then, is not a friend to the like: but will the good be a friend to the good, so far as he is good, and not so far as he is like?"

"Perhaps so."

27. "But what? Will not the good man, so far as he is good, be sufficient for himself?"

"Yes."

"But he who is sufficient stands in need of nothing, so far as sufficiency is concerned?"

"How can it be otherwise?"

"And he who stands in need of nothing will not regard any thing?"

"He will not."

"But he who does not feel a regard cannot love?"

"Surely not."

"How, then, will the good be in any respect friends to the good, who neither when absent regret each other, for they are sufficient for themselves when apart, nor when present stand in need of each other? By what contrivance can such persons value each other very highly?"

"By none at all," said he.

"But they will not be friends who do not value each other very highly?"

"True."

"Observe then, Lysis, how we are deceived. Are we, then, deceived in the whole?"

"How so?" said he.

"I once heard a person say, and I just now call it to

mind, that like is most hostile to like, and the good to the good. And moreover, he adduced Hesiod^b as a witness, saying that 'potter is angry with potter, bard with bard, and beggar with beggar.' And so, he said, with regard to all other things, that as a matter of absolute necessity, things most like each other are most full of envy, strife, and hatred; but such as are most unlike, of friendship; 28. for that the poor man is compelled to be a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of assistance, and the sick man to the physician; and that every one who is ignorant must regard and love him that has knowledge. Moreover, he carried on the subject in a more lofty style, saying that the like is so far from being friendly to the like, that the very contrary to this takes place. For that the most contrary is in the highest degree friendly to the most contrary; for every thing desires its contrary, and not its like. Thus the dry desires the moist, the cold heat, the bitter sweet, the sharp blunt, the empty fulness, and the full emptiness; and all other things in the same way. For the contrary is food to the contrary, but the like can derive no enjoyment from the like. And indeed, my friend, he who said this seemed to be an accomplished man, for he spoke well. But how does he seem to you to speak?" I asked.

29. "Well," replied Menexenus, "as it seems on first hearing."

"Shall we say, then, that the contrary is most friendly to the contrary?"

"Certainly."

"Be it so," said I, "but is it not monstrous, Menexenus, and will not those perfectly wise men, the disputants, immediately spring upon us exultingly, and ask, if friendship is not most contrary to enmity? What answer shall we give them. Must we not of necessity admit that they say truly?"

"Of necessity."

"Well then," they will ask, 'is an enemy a friend to a friend, or is a friend a friend to an enemy?'"

"Neither the one nor the other," he replied.

"But is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the intemperate, or the good to the bad?"

"It does not appear to me to be so."

"However," said I, "if one thing is a friend to another by

^b Op. et Di., v. 25.

reason of contrariety, these things must also of necessity be friendly?"

"Of necessity."

"Neither, therefore, is the like friendly to the like, nor the contrary to the contrary?"

"It appears not."

"Further, let us consider this, whether it still more escapes our observation, that a friend is in reality none of these, but that what is neither good nor evil may sometimes become the friend of the good."

"How mean you?" said he.

"By Jupiter," said I, "I don't know; for I am in reality myself dizzy with the perplexity of the argument. It appears, however, according to the ancient proverb, that the beautiful is friendly. 30. It certainly resembles something soft, smooth, and plump; on which account perhaps it slips away from us and escapes us, because it is a thing of this kind. For I say that the good is beautiful: do you not think so?"

"I do."

"I say, therefore, prophetically, that that which is neither good nor evil is friendly to the beautiful and the good. But hear why I thus prophesy. There appear to me to be as it were three several classes, one good, a second evil, a third neither good nor evil. What think you?"

"It seems so to me also," said he.

"Now that the good is friendly to the good, or the evil to the evil, or the good to the evil, our former argument does not allow us to say. It remains therefore, if any thing is friendly to any thing, that that which is neither good nor evil, must be friendly either to the good, or to that which is such as itself; for nothing surely can become friendly to the evil."

"True."

"Neither is like friendly to like, we just now said; did we not?"

"Yes."

"Therefore to that which is neither good nor evil, that which resembles it will not be friendly?"

"It appears not."

"The result then is, that that which is neither good nor evil alone becomes friendly to the good alone?"

"Necessarily so, as it seems."

31. "Well then, my boys," said I, "does what is now said lead us in the right direction? Surely if we will consider, a healthy body has no need of the medicinal art, or of any assistance; for it is sufficient for itself; so that no healthy person is a friend to a physician on account of health; is it not so?"

"No one."

"But the sick man I think is, on account of disease?"

"How not?"

"But disease is an evil, and the medicinal art beneficial and good."

"Yes."

"But a body surely, so far as it is body, is neither good nor evil."

"Just so."

"But a body is compelled, on account of disease, to embrace and love the medicinal art."

"It seems so to me."

"That, therefore, which is neither evil nor good, becomes friendly to the good, on account of the presence of evil."

"So it seems."

"But it is evident that it becomes so, prior to its becoming evil through the evil which it contains; for when it has once become evil, it will no longer desire the good, and be friendly to it: for we have said that it is impossible for the evil to be friendly to the good."

"It is impossible."

"Consider, then, what I say. For I say that some things are themselves such as that which is present with them, and some not. Thus, if any one wishes to dye any thing with any colour, the colour that is dyed in is surely present in the thing that is dyed."

"Certainly."

32. "Is then, that which is dyed, afterwards, the same as to colour, as that which is on it?"

"I don't understand you," he replied.

"But thus," said I, "If any one should dye your hairs, which are yellow, with white lead, would they then be white, or appear so?"

"They would appear so," he replied.

"Though whiteness would be present with them."

"Yes."

"And yet your hairs would not be at all the more white, but though whiteness is present, they are neither white nor black."

"True."

"But when, my friend, old age has brought this colour on them, then they become such as that which is present with them, white by the presence of white."

"How can it be otherwise?"

"This then I now ask, if a thing be present in any thing, will that which contains it be such as that which is present with it, or if it be present after a certain manner, will it be such, but otherwise not?"

"Thus, rather," he replied.

"That then which is neither evil nor good, sometimes when evil is present, is not yet evil, but sometimes it has already become such."

"Certainly."

"When, therefore, it is not yet evil, though evil be present, this very presence of evil makes it desirous of good, but this presence which makes it evil, deprives it at the same time of the desire and friendship for the good. 33. For it is now no longer neither evil nor good, but evil; evil however we saw, is not friendly to good."

"It is not."

"On this account we must say, that those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether they are gods or men; nor again do they love wisdom who have so much ignorance, as to be evil: for no evil and foolish person loves wisdom. They therefore are left, who possess indeed this evil, ignorance, but are not yet thereby stupid or foolish, but still think that they do not know the things that they do not know. Wherefore they who are not yet either good or evil are lovers of wisdom; but such as are evil do not love wisdom, nor do the good: for we have seen in a former part of our discussion, that neither is the contrary friendly to the contrary, nor the like to the like: do you not remember this?"

"Certainly," they both replied.

"Now then," said I, "Lysis and Menexenus, we have certainly discovered what it is that is friendly and what not. For we say, that with respect to the soul, and with respect to the body, and every thing else, that which is neither evil nor good, is friendly to the good on account of the presence of evil."

34. They quite admitted and agreed that such was the case.

And I for my part was rejoicing exceedingly, like any hunter, in having just caught the prey that I was in chase of. And then, I know not from what quarter, a most strange suspicion came into my mind, that what we had assented to was not true. And immediately being distressed, I said, "Alas, Lysis and Menexenus, we seem to have grown rich in a dream."

"Why so?" said Menexenus.

"I am afraid," I replied, "that as if with braggart men, we have fallen in with some such false reasonings respecting a friend."

"How so?" he asked.

"Let us consider it thus," said I; "whether is he who is a friend, a friend to some one or not?"

"Necessarily so," said he.

"Whether, therefore, for the sake of nothing, and on account of nothing, or for the sake of something, and on account of something?"

"For the sake of something and on account of something."

"Whether is that thing friendly for the sake of which a friend is a friend to a friend, or is it neither friendly nor hostile?"

"I do not quite follow you," said he.

"Probably," said I. "But thus perhaps you will be able to follow me; and I think that I too shall better understand what I say. The sick man, we just now said, is a friend to the physician; is it not so?"

"Yes."

"Is he not, then, a friend to the physician on account of disease, for the sake of health?"

"Yes."

"But disease is an evil?"

"How not?"

"But what is health?" said I; "is it good or evil, or neither?"

"Good," said he.

35. "We stated, then, as it seems, that the body, which is neither good, nor evil, on account of disease, that is on account of evil, is friendly to the medicinal art: but the medicinal art is a good; and the medicinal art acquires the friendship for the sake of health; and health is good: is it not?"

"Yes."

"But is health a friend, or not a friend?"

"A friend."

"And is disease an enemy?"

"Certainly."

"That then which is neither evil nor good, on account of what is evil and an enemy, is a friend to the good, for the sake of what is good and a friend."

"It appears so."

"The friendly therefore is a friend for the sake of the friend, on account of that which is an enemy."

"So it seems."

"Well then," said I, "since we have reached this point, my boys, let us pay every attention that we be not deceived. For that a friend becomes a friend to a friend, and that like becomes a friend to like, which we said is impossible, I give up. However let us consider this, that what is now asserted may not deceive us. The medicinal art, we say, is a friend for the sake of health?"

"Yes."

"Is not, then, health also a friend?"

"Certainly."

36. "If, then, it is a friend, it must be so for the sake of something?"

"Yes."

"And indeed of something friendly, if we will keep to our former admission?"

"Certainly."

"Will not, therefore, that again be a friend, for the sake of something friendly?"

"Yes."

"Must we not, then, necessarily be tired out with going on thus, and arrive at some principle, which will not have to be referred to another friend, but will arrive at that which is the first friend, for the sake of which we say that all other things are friendly?"

"Necessarily so."

"This, then, is what I say, we must take care that all those other things which we said were friendly for the sake of that, do not, as being certain images of it, deceive us, but that that may be the first which is truly a friend. For let us consider it thus. If any one values any thing very highly, as, for in-

stance, sometimes a father prizes a son above all other things, will not such an one, because he esteems his son above every thing, also value something else very highly? For instance, if he were to hear that he had drunk hemlock, would he not value wine very highly, if he thought this would save his son?"

"How should he not?" said he.

37. "And the vessel too that contained the wine?"

"Certainly."

"Will he then set the same value on an earthenware cup as he does upon his son, or three measures of wine as on his son? or is the case thus? all such anxiety is employed not about those things that are procured for the sake of something else, but about that for the sake of which all such things are procured: for although we often say that we value gold and silver very highly, yet we may observe that the truth is not at all the more thus; but what we value so very highly is that, whatever it may prove to be, for the sake of which gold and all other provisions are procured. Shall we not say so?"

"Certainly."

"May not the same thing also be said of a friend? for whatever things we say are friendly to us, for the sake of some friendly thing, we appear to describe by a name that belongs to another, but that very thing seems in reality to be friendly in which all those so-called friendships terminate?"

"This seems to be the case," said he.

"That, then, which is in reality friendly is not friendly for the sake of any other friendly thing?"

"True."

"This, then, is settled, that what is friendly is not friendly for the sake of any other friendly thing. Is the good, then, friendly?"

"It seems so to me."

38. "Is the good, then, loved on account of evil, and is the case thus? If of the three things which we just now mentioned, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, two only were to be left, but evil were to depart altogether, and not come in contact with any thing, either with body, or soul, or any other of the things which we say in themselves are neither evil nor good, in that case would not good be of no use to us, but become useless? For if there were nothing to hurt

us any more, we should stand in need of no assistance whatever. And thus it would then become evident that we had a regard for and loved the good on account of evil, since good is a medicine for evil, but evil is a disease. But when there is no disease, there is no need of medicine. Is this, then, the nature of good, and is it loved on account of evil, by us who are placed between evil and good, and is it of no use itself, for the sake of itself?"

"Such seems to be the case," he replied.

"That which is friendly, therefore, to us, is that in which terminate all other things, which we said are friendly for the sake of some other friendly thing, but in no respect resembles them? 39. For these are called friendly for the sake of a friendly thing; but that which is in reality friendly appears to be of a nature quite contrary to this; for we have found it to be friendly for the sake of that which is hostile: but if that which is hostile should depart, it would no longer, as it seems, be friendly to us."

"It seems to me that it would not," said he, "according to what is now said."

"Whether, by Jupiter," said I, "if evil were to be destroyed, would there no longer be any hunger or thirst, or any thing else of the kind? or would there be hunger, if men and other animals existed, yet not so as to be hurtful? and thirst, and other desires, yet not be evil, since evil is destroyed? or is the question ridiculous, what would then be the case or not be the case? for who knows? This, however, we know, that at present it is possible to be harmed by being hungry, and it is also possible to be benefited; is it not so?"

"Certainly."

"Therefore it is possible that one who thirsts, or is affected by any other similar desire, may sometimes be affected by it beneficially, and sometimes harmfully, and sometimes neither?"

"Assuredly."

"If, therefore, evil were destroyed, must things that are not evil be destroyed together with the evil?"

"Not at all."

"There will be, then, such desires as are neither good nor evil, even if evils were destroyed?"

"It appears so."

40. "Is it, then, possible, that one who desires and is fond of any thing, should not love that which he desires and is fond of?"

"It does not appear so to me."

"When evils, then, are destroyed, there will remain, as it seems, certain friendly things?"

"Yes."

"Not so; at least if evil were the cause of any thing being friendly, for, when that is destroyed, one thing could not be friendly to another: for when the cause is destroyed, it is surely impossible that that of which it was the cause should any longer exist?"

"You say rightly."

"Did we not admit that the friendly loved something, and on account of something, and did we not then think that, on account of evil, that which is neither good nor evil loved the good?"

"True."

"But now, as it seems, there appears to be some other cause of loving and being loved?"

"So it seems."

"Whether, then, in reality, as we just now said, is desire the cause of friendship, and is that which desires friendly to that which it desires, and at the time when it desires, but is what we before said was friendly mere trifling, like a poem^c heedlessly composed?"

"It seems so," said he.

"However," I said, "that which desires desires that which it stands in need of; does it not?"

"Yes."

"And is that which stands in need friendly to that of which it stands in need?"

"It seems so to me."

"And it stands in need of that which is taken from it?"

41. "How should it not?"

"As it seems, then, love, friendship, and desire, respect that which belongs to a man; so it appears, Menexenus and Lysis?"

^c I have adopted Ast's suggestion of *μάτην* for *μακρόν*. Stallbaum would retain both, and read *μακρόν μάτην*.

They both assented.

"If, therefore, you two are friends to each other, you must in a manner, by nature belong to each other?"

"Assuredly," they both replied.

"If, then," said I, "any one desires or is fond of another, my boys, he could never desire, or be fond of, or be a friend, unless he, in a manner, belonged to the object of his love, either as to his soul, or as to some habit of the soul, or disposition, or form?"

"Certainly," said Menexenus, but Lysis was silent.

"Well, then," said I, "it has proved necessary for us to love that which by nature belongs to us?"

"It seems so," said he.

"It is necessary, then, for a genuine, and not a pretended lover, to be beloved by his favourite?"

To this Lysis and Menexenus scarcely nodded assent, but Hippothales, through delight, exhibited all sorts of colours. And I, being willing to examine the matter, said, "If there is any difference between that which belongs to us and that which is like, we shall be able to say, as it seems to me, Lysis and Menexenus, respecting a friend, what he is, but if the like and that which belongs are the same, it is not easy to get rid of our former conclusion, that the like is useless to the like, as regards similitude; but to admit that what is useless can be friendly is absurd. 42. Are you willing, then," I added, "since we are, as it were, intoxicated by the discussion, that we should grant and affirm that that which belongs is different from that which is like?"

"Certainly."

"Whether, then, shall we admit that good belongs to every thing, but that evil is foreign? or that evil belongs to evil, good to good, and that which is neither good nor evil, to that which is neither good nor evil?"

They both said, that so it appeared to them, that each belongs to each.

"Again, therefore," said I, "my boys, we have fallen upon those conclusions which we at first rejected respecting friendship. For the unjust will be no less a friend to the unjust and the evil to the evil, than the good to the good."

"So it seems," he said.

"But what? if we should say that the good and that which

belongs are the same, will not the good only be a friend to the good?"

"Certainly."

"But in this too we thought we had confuted ourselves; do you not remember?"

"We do remember."

"In what way, then, can we still deal with the subject; is it not clear, in no way at all? I require, then, like skilful pleaders in the law courts, to sum up all that has been said; for if neither those that are loved, nor those that love, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor those that belong to us, nor any others that we have described, (for I do not remember them any further, on account of their number,) but if no one of these is a friend, I have nothing more to say."

43. When I had said this, I purposed to stir up some one of the older men; but just then, like evil spirits, the pædagogues of Lysis and Menexenus approaching us, having hold of their brothers by their hand, called to them, and bade them go home, for it was already late. At first, then, both we and the bystanders drove them away; but when they paid no attention to us, but murmured in their barbarous dialect, and desisted not from calling them, and seemed to us, from having drunk too much at the Hermæan festival, to be difficult to manage, we yielded to them, and dissolved the conference. However, as they were just going away, I said, Lysis and Menexenus, we have made ourselves ridiculous, both I, an old man, and you; for those who are now leaving us will say, that we think ourselves to be each other's friends, (for I reckon myself among you,) but that we have not yet been able to discover what a friend is.

END OF VOL. I.

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
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Plato

THE
WORKS OF PLATO.

A NEW AND LITERAL VERSION,

CHIEFLY FROM THE TEXT OF STALLBAUM.

VOL. II

CONTAINING

THE REPUBLIC, TIMÆUS, AND CRITIAS.

BY HENRY DAVIS, M.A.

AUTHOR OF "PROGRESSIVE EXERCISES IN LATIN COMPOSITION FOR THE
USE OF KING'S COLLEGE."

LONDON :
BELL & DALDY, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
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PREFACE.

THE present volume comprises three connected dialogues, written no doubt towards the close of Plato's life (about 350 B. C.), subsequently to his travels in Italy, Sicily, and Egypt, and after his philosophic views had attained their full maturity and developement. Two of them, indeed,—the Republic and the Timæus,—are among the most important and most carefully elaborated in the entire series of the Platonic dialogues;—the former being the summary of Plato's whole ethical system, and combining the results of most of the other dialogues,—the latter comprising the full and almost sole developement of his speculations on the formation of the Universe and the organization of Man. The Critias can be considered only as an historical, or rather, mythical supplement to the Timæus;—and it appears to have been left unfinished at the author's death.

The translation has been formed, with some few exceptions, on the text of Stallbaum, now justly reputed as the most correct in existence;—and great pains have been taken throughout, not only to make it a literally correct exponent of the original, but also to transfuse into it that easy flow of language which constitutes the peculiar charm of Plato's writing. In both these respects, therefore, it will be found strikingly to differ from the uncouth, obscure, un-English, and often extremely erroneous version of Taylor,—the only English dress in which this great philoso-

PREFACE

pher has till now appeared. Abundant use has been made of the Latin interpretations dispersed through Stallbaum's notes;—and the translator has not scrupled to avail himself of the valuable aid derivable from the French versions of Leroy, Cousin, and Martin, and the German versions of Schleiermacher and Schneider, the latter of which, only recently published, deserves the highest praise for its extreme correctness and perspicuity.

Notes have been added, where the meaning seemed to require explanation or illustration, as well as to indicate any variation in the text;—and when any of the other dialogues have been referred to, the quotation is given from Serranus's edition, printed by Henry Stephens, 1578, in three volumes folio,—the last of which comprises the dialogues here translated. Separate introductions preface each dialogue;—and the volume opens with a brief account of the Platonic philosophy generally,—carefully compiled from the writings of Ritter, Van Heusde, Trendelenburg, and Bishop Hampden. On the whole, therefore, it is hoped that this volume will be found acceptable, not only to the classical student, but also to the general reader, as a correct and pleasing exposition of pure Platonism.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

ON THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY GENERALLY.

ALMOST contemporaneously among the learned of Europe, there has arisen a tendency to study the sublime, spiritual philosophy of Plato, in preference to the cold materialism of Aristotle, on which have been erected so many of the systems that have risen and had their day in our literary world. That this has not hitherto been the case, and that Platonism (which, in its spiritualising and purifying tendency, may be deemed to approach Christianity,) has not hitherto been exalted to its true dignity and station in metaphysical history, is chiefly attributable to the absurd mysticism and fanatical extravagances which the New Platonists introduced in their interpretations, and which have too frequently been regarded as true expositions of the great philosopher, by modern writers either too lazy or too ignorant to go and drink the clear waters at the fountain-head. Plato himself wrote wonderfully little that cannot be comprehended by a reflective mind;—and the more his works are studied in themselves, and apart from false interpretation, the more will his acute intelligence, practical good sense, and pure morality, become apparent, and the higher will he rise in the respect and admiration of the Christian philosopher.

Our present object is, to give a concise view of the philosophic doctrines of Plato, as a sort of general key to his Dialogues viewed as a whole;—and we propose to give, by way of introduction, a short account of the life of this man of mighty mind, this “*Maximus philosophorum*,” of whom Eusebius so beautifully observes, that “he alone, of all the Greeks, reached to the vestibule of truth, and stood upon its threshold.”

The true moral history of Plato is to be discovered wholly in his writings. As for the details of his external life, the records of antiquity furnish information so varying, contradictory, and uncertain, as to render it difficult to distinguish the true from the false—the authentic from the fabulous. The following statement, however, may be relied on, as generally correct.

Plato, the son of Ariston and Perictione or Potona, was born (probably in the island of Ægina, then occupied by Athenians) in the month Thargelion (May), *anno* 429 A. C., in the third year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad, about the time of Pericles’s death. By his mother’s side he was descended from Codrus and Solon;—and he was connected with the most distinguished families and most renowned political men of his day. His youth falls in the time of the Peloponnesian war; and his whole life is closely connected with that brilliant period when the literature of Attica, historical, dramatic, and rhetorical, was at the zenith of its glory,—at a time, however, (we must add,) when the seeds of Athenian decay were being rapidly brought to maturity by the substitution of a base and brutalizing ochlocracy for the rational government of good and patriotic men,—and by the elevation of a troop of superficial, seductive, truth-perverting, applause-loving sophists to the throne of true, noble, elevating, divine philosophy. He received the best education that Athens could furnish; being taught reading, writing, and literary knowledge (*γράμματα*), by Dionysius, gymnastics by Ariston an Argive wrestler, music by Metellus of Agrigentum and Draco of Athens, and the elements of the Heracleitean philosophy by Cratylus and Hermogenes. He had but little inclination for political life; for, besides being unfitted for it by a retiring habit and weak voice, he was utterly disgusted by the endless changes that occurred in

the governments of Greece, by the corruptions of the Athenian democracy, and by the depravity of Athenian manners. His studies were happily promoted by an early cultivation of poetry, in which many of his essays were far from unsuccessful; and his works betray a very considerable acquaintance with mathematical science. It was by Socrates, however, that his mind was imbued with that true philosophic spirit, which gave a right direction and exalted object to all his after-pursuits. His intercourse with this pure, simple-minded moralist began, when he was twenty years old (B. C. 410), and lasted nearly eleven years; during which time he carried on his studies and inquiries by means of books or oral instruction from others, but in all cases consulting his favourite master, as the interpreter, commentator, and critic of the various philosophical studies in which he was engaged. This, indeed, is the view which Plato has given us of Socrates throughout the Dialogues;—for the latter seldom or never appears in them as a didactic expounder of truth, but rather as the critic of opinions, doctrines, and systems,—the judge, in short, to whom everything is to be submitted for approval, or rejection, or modification, as the case may be.

After the persecution and death of his divine master (so beautifully and pathetically related in the *Phædo*), Plato went to Megara, where he is said to have attended the Lectures of Euclid; and he then spent several years in travel, far distant from the past and the future scene of his philosophical labours:—nor can there be any question, but that they were years of great importance to him for developing the peculiar character of his philosophy. He visited Megara, Cyrene, the Greek cities in Magna Græcia and Sicily, (where he became acquainted with Archytas, Philolaus, and others of the Pythagorean school;) and he travelled even as far as Egypt, where he stayed thirteen years in gaining an insight into the mysterious doctrines and priest-lore of the sacerdotal caste. At three different periods he visited the court of Dionysius, tyrant of Sicily, and made several attempts to subdue his haughty spirit. It was during the first of these residences (B. C. 389), that he was employed in the instruction of Dion, the king's brother-in-law; and in his efforts to rescue his

pupil from the general depravity of the court, he was not disappointed. Dion, inspired with the love of wisdom, was desirous of introducing his preceptor to Dionysius the tyrant; but Plato's discourse with him being levelled against the vices and cruelties of his reign, the tyrant conceived a violent prejudice against him and formed a design against his life, which, by the aid of Dion, Plato happily managed to escape. His captivity in Ægina, which was brought about by the agents of Dionysius the elder, happily ended in his manumission, through the kindness of his friend Anicerris; and he then returned to Athens, there to found his celebrated School in the Academy. Here he lectured during twenty-two years, and then undertook a second journey to Syracuse at the instigation of Dion, who hoped, by the philosophical lessons of Plato, to inform and improve the ill-educated mind of his nephew, the new ruler of Syracuse—Dionysius the younger. This prince, it is said, had been brought up by his father wholly destitute of an enlightened education; and Plato now attempted the improvement of his mind by philosophy. This second journey is placed B. C. 367; and he stayed four months in Sicily. It seems to have been a part also of the plan laid down by Dion and himself, to bring about a wholesome reform in the Sicilian constitution, and to give it a more aristocratic character. Whatever may have been their intentions, however, they were all frustrated by the weak and luxurious character of Dionysius, who, however he might relish for a time the sage and virtuous lessons of Plato, soon found it more conformable to his personal interests to follow the counsels of Philiston, his father's friend and adviser. Dion thereupon became the object of his nephew's jealousy, and was banished on the ground of his ambitious designs. In this juncture, Plato did not long stay in Syracuse, where his position would have been, at best, only ambiguous. He returned once more to Athens; but in consequence of some fresh disagreements between Dionysius and Dion with respect to the property of the latter, he was induced (B. C. 361) to take a third journey to Syracuse. So far, however, from effecting the expected reconciliation, he came himself to an open rupture with the tyrant, and was in great personal danger, till relieved by his philosophic

friends at Tarentum. From this time he appears to have passed his old age in tranquillity, engaged with the instruction of his numerous disciples and the prosecution of his literary labours. He died, while yet actively employed in teaching, *Olymp.* 108. *circ. anno* 348 B. C.

He was succeeded as Lecturer in the Academy, by his nephew Speusippus; and among his principal followers may be mentioned, Hippothales and Callippus of Athens, Xenocrates of Chalcedon, Aristotle of Stageira, Dion of Syracuse, Demosthenes the orator, and the philosopher Theophrastus.

The works of Plato, it scarcely need be mentioned, consist of a long series of Dialogues, in all of which, except the *Laws*, the principal interlocutor is Socrates. The form of dialogue he was certainly not the first to introduce into philosophy; and it seems probable, that his adoption of this form of composition flowed rather out of the subject than from any desire of direct imitation. The Eleatic dialectics, with which Platonism is strongly imbued, could only be explained in the form of question and answer; and besides, that Plato should write in the form of dialogue seems to be the natural consequence of his wish to investigate and analyse dialectically, and after the manner of Socrates, the various questions of philosophy then in vogue. And so Schleiermacher remarks:—"In every way, not accidentally only or from practice and tradition, but necessarily and naturally, Plato's was a Socratic method, and, indeed, as regards the uninterrupted and progressive reciprocation, and the deeper impression made upon the mind of the hearer, to be certainly as much preferred to that of his master, as the scholar excelled him, as well in constructive dialectics as in richness and compass of subjective intuition." And further,—“if we look only to the immediate purpose, that writing, as regarded by himself and his followers, was only to be a remembrance of thoughts already current among them (*ἀγράφα γράμματα*)—Plato considers all thought so much like spontaneous activity, that, with him, a remembrance of this kind of what has been already acquired, must necessarily be so of the first and original mode of acquisition. Hence, on that account alone, the dialogistic form, necessary as an imitation of that original and

reciprocal communication, would be as indispensable and natural to his writings as to his oral instruction." But, however essentially different the *form* of the dialogues adopted by Plato from that pursued by other writers, they were composed, as respects their matter, with constant reference to the labours of his predecessors. In fact, his whole system is rather critical and eclectic than dogmatical; and several of his dialogues assume the form of criticisms on the notions of former philosophers, rather than the formal developments of any doctrines of his own. He was thoroughly conversant not only with the leading principles and peculiar system of Socrates, but had no mean acquaintance, besides, with the notions of Pythagoras, Heracleitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Zeno, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras,—extracts from whose writings, with animadversions on their opinions, are abundantly scattered throughout his works. Yet, however much Plato may have learnt from the philosophic works of his predecessors, while he borrowed some of his leading ideas from his great master Socrates, we should nevertheless be treating him most unjustly, were we to regard him merely as a compiler and systematiser of what had been before promulgated, and so deny him all claim to the merit of being a great original thinker. His entire system is based, in fact, on some grand and novel ideas, perhaps faintly shadowed forth by others, but never clearly unfolded till the time of Plato. The opposition between the general law and the particular facts, between the objects of reflection and the objects of the senses, between the world of intelligence and the visible world, was never clearly proclaimed till Plato announced it. Socrates, indeed, awakened the germ of science, and laid the foundation of dialectics; but it was Plato who gave system and consistency to the whole. Socrates had not the mental capacity or education to arrange his thoughts on any definite plan;—whereas the kindred genius of Plato was happily fostered by every encouraging influence, and he stepped in to elaborate completely the plan of which his master had merely sketched the first rude outline.

We proceed next to consider the chronological arrangement of the Platonic Dialogues, and the natural division according to

which they should be classified.* The most obvious arrangement is according to their chronological order;—and viewing them in this light, we may divide them into three classes. In the *first* are those written by Plato before he set out on his travels,—namely, the *Lysis*, *Phædrus*, *Laches*, *Hippias major*, *Protagoras*, *Charmides*, *Ion*, *Menon*, *Alcibiades i.*, *Euthydemus*, *Euthyphron*, *Crito*, and the *Apology of Socrates*;—in the *second* are those which he drew up on his return from his travels, and before his second journey to Sicily,—namely, the *Gorgias*, *Theætetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Cratylus*, *Parmenides*, the *Symposium*, *Menexenus*, *Philebus*, and *Phædo*; and in the *third* we place those written in more advanced life, when his views had become matured, and his doctrines thoroughly digested into one harmonious system,—namely, that noble trilogy comprising the *Timæus*, *Critias*, and *Republic*,—to which may be added the long dialogue of the *Laws*, which, though perfectly genuine, is but loosely connected with the general system of Plato's philosophy, and seems to be quite an extraneous section of this part of his writings. Schleiermacher, however, has presented us with a classification of a different kind, based on their subject-matter, and on an acute and careful examination of the connexion of thought running through the Dialogues. He arranges them under three heads:—1. *Elementary Dialogues*, containing the germs of all that follows,—of Logic as the instrument of philosophy, and of Ideas as its proper object,—viz., the *Phædrus*, *Protagoras*, and *Parmenides*, the *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, and *Euthyphron*, to which he appends also, the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Io*, and *Hippias minor*;—2. *Progressive Dialogues*, which treat of the distinction between scientific and common knowledge in their united application to Moral and Physical science,—viz., the *Gorgias*, *Theætetus*, *Menon*, *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, the *Symposium*, *Phædo*, and *Philebus*, with an Appendix containing the *Erast*, first *Alcibiades*, *Menexenus*, and

* We have particularised here only those Dialogues which are usually regarded as genuine. The *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Alcibiades ii.*, *Clitophon*, *Theages*, *Eryxias*, *Demodocus*, *Epinomis*, and the *Letters*, are of disputable origin, and to be assigned, probably, to some of Plato's followers.

Hippias major ;—3. *Constructive Dialogues*, containing an objective scientific exposition, in which the practical and speculative are completely united,—viz., the *Timæus*, the *Critias*, and the *Republic*, with an Appendix comprising the *Laws*, *Epistles*, &c. It is clear also that the *Dialogues* will allow of yet another mode of arrangement, according to their contents,—as being either *Dialectical*, *Ethical*, or *Physical* :—this division, indeed, is clearly discernible in his works, though several may not be assignable to any one part in particular :—thus, the *Theætetus* and its two connected dialogues,—the *Gorgias* and *Protagoras*, with the *Cratylus* and the *Sophistes*, are clearly dialectical ; the *Phædrus*, *Philebus*, *Republic*, and *Laws* are ethical, and the *Timæus* is exclusively physical. If, however, we would view the *Dialogues* as a whole, with all its parts fully harmonising, we should inquire what was the philosopher's great object visible throughout those writings. Mr. Sewell answers this very satisfactorily ;—we shall give his own expressive, glowing words :—“ Plato's great object was man. He lived with man, felt as a man, held intercourse with kings, interested himself deeply in the political revolutions of Sicily, was the pupil of one, whose boast it was to have brought down philosophy from heaven to earth, that it might raise man up from earth to heaven ; and, above all, he was a witness and an actor in the midst of that ferment of humanity exhibited in the democracy of Athens. The object constantly before the eyes of Plato was the incorporated spirit, the μέγα θρέμμα of human lawlessness ; he saw it, indeed, in an exhausted state, its power passed away, its splendour torn off, and all the sores and ulcers which former demagogues had pampered and concealed, now laid bare and beyond cure.” Indeed, as the same writer well observes ;—“ the state of the Athenian democracy is the real clue to the philosophy of Plato. It would be proved, if by nothing else, by one little touch in the *Republic*. *The Republic is the summary of his whole system, and the key-stones of all the other Dialogues are uniformly let into it.* But the object of the *Republic* is to exhibit the misery of man let loose from law, and to throw out a general plan for making him subject to law, and thus to perfect his nature. This is exhibited on a large scale in the person of a State ; and in the

masterly historical sketch which, in the eighth and ninth Books, he draws of the changes of society, having painted in the minutest detail the form of a licentious democracy, he fixes it by the slightest allusion (it was perhaps all that he could hazard) on the existing state of Athens; and then passes on to a frightful prophecy of that tyranny which would inevitably follow. All the other dialogues bring us to the Republic, and the Republic brings us to this as its end and aim."

We may now proceed to take a general review of the Platonic philosophy, and his theory of Ideas in particular, an intelligent acquaintance with which is wholly indispensable to the student of Plato.

The Platonic philosophy, be it understood, begins and ends, as do the lessons of Socrates, with an acknowledgment of human ignorance,—the only true starting-place of sound scientific investigation. Imitating his master's example, Plato did not so much endeavour to *teach*, in the strict sense of the word, as to explore men's minds, and ascertain how far they really comprehended the doctrines and opinions which they professed. Taking for granted that all current opinions are true, *because* they are current, was the great fault of the Sophists, who taught entirely *προς δόξαν*, relative to opinion;—whereas, with Socrates and Plato, the preliminary investigation respecting their truth or falsehood was *ALL IN ALL*,—any prior assumption of their truth being positively inadmissible; because, without investigation, it was impossible to *know* and be sure of the truth of opinions. The method of Plato, accordingly, is the reverse of the didactic method employed by the Sophists, who assumed principles as true, and on these grounds proceeded to argue and persuade. The Socratic method, on the other hand, consisted in putting questions with the view of eliciting replies bearing on the point in debate,—in simply inquiring and *pronouncing* so far only as the answer is approved or rejected,—in a word, educing the truth by simply bringing the answerer to teach himself:—and hence it was, that the popular opponents of this method decried it, as one producing doubt, and therefore of dangerous tendency. With Plato, however, as with Socrates, the awakening of doubt was not

merely a vain display of logical skill and clever cavilling, but had for its object the removal of the unstable ground on which opinions may have been rested, and the formation of more settled convictions :—indeed, it was exalted by him into a regular discipline of the mind set in operation for the single purpose of investigating the truth. The method and discipline by which he accomplishes this object is, what he calls *DIALECTIC*, which, as opposed to the plans of the Sophists, may be termed the true art of Discussion ; and, as contrasted with the mere wisdom of opinion, (the *δοξασοφία* of the Sophists,) it was philosophy—real science—the knowledge of the truth. The ground of his whole proceeding was the Fallaciousness of Opinion ; and hence Plato had to seek some *criterion of Truth*, apart from mere opinion. Denying the sufficiency of *subjective* truth (i. e. the assumption that the mental perceptions are true simply because they take place), he set himself to search after *objective* truth—truth independent of the mind of man and not affected by the variations of human judgment—as a foundation of his system of knowledge. Involved with the notion of the Fallaciousness of Opinion, another is closely allied,—*the Fallaciousness of the Senses* ; and it is the joint application of these two fundamental principles, which unites his method and his philosophy in one master-science,—Dialectic. True knowledge, unlike that derived through the senses, is founded purely on the apprehensions of the intellect, without any intervention whatever of the senses ;—and so also Dialectic, as being philosophy, is occupied about that which exists (*τὸ ὄντως ὄν*), or has Being, in opposition to the presentations made to the senses, which are conversant only with those things that have the semblance of being (*τὰ φαινόμενα*) ;—while, as a method, it investigates the reason or account of the Being of everything,—of everything as it *IS*, and not as it *APPEARS*, not being satisfied with opinions, of which no account can be given, but bringing all to the test of exact argument and definition. Plato thought it his first business, therefore, to give his method a firm basis by establishing at the outset a sound Theory of Being, as a sure Criterion of Truth ;—and this is his celebrated Theory of *IDEAS*.

Plato conceived, that Opinion, in contradistinction from Knowledge, is grounded *on sensation and becoming* (τὸ γιγνόμενον). To man, indeed, such sensation is absolutely necessary; because the soul resides in the body, which is itself a compound thing, subject to continual decay and reproduction,—the connexion between the two consisting in the reciprocal communication either of action or passion by means of their respective faculties. Hence sensation is clearly regarded as an effect produced by the union of the soul with the body; and Plato did not fail to observe that although sensation, strictly speaking, has cognisance only of corporeal qualities, there are certain internal states of the soul which have no immediate reference to the corporeal. The soul, in short, receives sensations through the sensuous mechanism; but it has moreover, (in addition to the power which it exercises through the instrumentality of the bodily organs,) a distinct faculty of investigating by itself the abstract properties of all sensations; “appearing,” as it is said in the *Theætetus* (p. 185. b.) “to have the power of inspecting the common properties of all things.” In accordance with this view, Plato distinguishes what is apprehended by the senses (τὸ αἰσθητόν) from that of which we become cognisant by means of reflection (διάνοια) through the understanding or rational contemplation (λογισμός or νόησις);—the former being in a continual state of transition or becoming (τὰ γιγνόμενα), whereas the latter (τὰ ὄντα) are constant and permanent, unproduced, imperishable, and ever identical with themselves, belonging to οὐσία and capable of becoming the objects of science or certain knowledge. Such are the notions of genus and species, the laws and ends of nature, as also the principles of cognition and moral action, and the essences of individual, concrete, thinking souls;—respecting all of which may be predicted an εἶδος, which closely corresponds with what we now designate—a *general term*. (Comp. *Republ.* vii. p. 532. a., with *Phileb.* p. 15. a., and *Tim.* p. 51. c.) It is in this sense, then, that he says of science in general (which seeks in the ideas to seize the essence of things), that its object is to exhibit everything as it is, by itself, absolutely, (τὸ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, or τὸ αὐτὸ ἑασμένον, as in *Republ.* vi. p. 494. a.) and that the ideas themselves invariably maintain their proper nature, character,

and identity. All things else, therefore, besides ideas, have only so far a reality, as they participate therein;—all being formed out of ideas and numbers,*—sensible things merely resembling ideas and being, as copies do originals,—just as Plato himself observes in the tenth Book of the Republic,—speaking of a couch, *οὐ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτον ὅλον τὸ ὄν*. Inquiry, however, must necessarily lead men from one idea to others in connexion therewith; and on this account Plato regarded individual ideas as hypothetical notions, for which a true foundation can only be given by an idea not requiring explanation and confirmed also by some higher supposition or idea. He wished, indeed, through the realisation of the lower ideas to rise to a knowledge of the highest, which represents the principle of all things,—in short, the idea of God,—God, the measure of all things (not man, as Protagoras held),—God, the beginning, the middle, and the end of all,—the Supreme Idea, containing in itself all others, and the unity which in itself comprises the true essence of all things.

In conclusion, as Ritter succinctly and well observes, “Plato attempted to account for the existence of the sensible world, by the ideas alone, without recourse to any other nature, alien and foreign to them; and in this attempt to make the transition from the ideal to the sensible, there is much that is vague and indeterminate. The source of this vagueness lies principally in the insufficiency of the distinction which he makes between different ideas, as indicating either a substantial and absolute entity, or a mere relation or property. To this must be added the vague and indeterminate sense of the Platonic idea of the essence which is exhibited by the ideas severally. In this respect Aristotle does not seem to be to blame, when he asks how ideas or lifeless numbers can possibly have a desire, or longing, notwithstanding that we are constrained to admit that, according to Plato, some ideas, at least, that of the soul for instance,—must be supposed to be endued with life. Again, the distinction which is made between

* Θεὸς οὕτω δὴ τότε πεφυκότα ταῦτα πρῶτον διεσχηματίσατο εἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς. “God thus truly formed these things as they first arose according to ideas and numbers.”—Tim. p. 53. b.

ideas in their unity and totality, and ideas in their opposition to each other, is extremely vague ; although it is the basis on which the whole theory rests. If moreover, we admit that, according to man's true and real nature, the world of ideas is his proper home, and that he there contemplates the true essence of things, as is implied in the doctrine of reminiscence, it becomes difficult to account for his removal from so perfect a state of being, into the present imperfect existence. Finally, Plato was forced to have recourse to the notion, that there is an impelling necessity in the secondary causes, the ground of which was the supposition, that there must be a something opposite to good. In this there is undoubtedly contained a very ancient cast of thought, still the very indefinite nature of this necessity shows that, after all his attempts to reconcile the supra-sensible with the sensible, Plato still found in it something inexplicable. Thus much at least is certain, that on the one hand, the tendency of his views was to refer all real entity to the immutable ideas, and consequently to consider the sensible more as an unsubstantial shadow than a reality ; while, on the other, he seems never to have forgotten that the only point of view from which philosophical speculation is possible, lies on the sensible, and so again the reality of the sensible appears to be a necessary supposition of his system. In these two tendencies, we may recognise the well-balanced and measured character of his mind. To discover their true connection however, was granted neither to Plato nor his age ; nor can we wonder, then, that he should have had recourse to many vague and loose conceptions in order to explain it, none of which, however, eventually satisfied his own mind.

The dialectic of Plato, however great its defects may be estimated, presents, nevertheless, a worthy image of the pure philosophical feeling. This Plato assumed to be grounded in love and in a longing after the eternal ideas, by the contemplation of which the mortal soul sustains itself, and by perpetual renovation becomes participant in immortality. Stimulated by such a desire, the philosophical mind or soul strives to attain, as far as possible, to a perfect remembrance of ideas which are the eternal essence of things, the memory of them being awakened by sensible phenomena, which are resemblances of the ideas and real

entity, and thereby serve as means by which the cognition of real being becomes attainable. But while the sensible, by bringing to mind this resemblance to real entity, is subservient to the efforts of the reasonable soul, it also impedes and limits it in its pursuits of the true, since the sensuous representations contain as much of irresemblance as of resemblance. But the greatest impediment to philosophical investigation arises from the constant flux of sensation which allows it no stability. Flowing on in a continual series of production and decay, sensible things are constantly changing their state and never exhibit the full perfection of the subsistent. They comprise at once entity and non-entity, and it is not the true standard and the all-sufficient which they represent, but only the relative, which constantly varies by greater or less from the measure of the true and substantive entity. It was to this that Plato looked when he thought he had discovered in the ideas of the other and the relatively great and little, the grounds of the sensible matter of mutability. But contingent being is only for the absolute, a mean merely by which the resemblance to ideas is manifested in sensible things; and, viewed in this light, ideas must appear as the ends of sensible existence, and as the standard by which the true therein is to be measured. A multiplicity of ends having been admitted, it followed that there must also be a last end,—an ultimatum in the realm of ideas,—therefore a *supreme idea*. This result follows from the consideration of the mutual relation of ideas, for one idea must be explained by another, and thus we proceed through a series of subordinate ideas up to higher and higher, in order to reduce them by a legitimate synthesis into unity, until at last we arrive at the highest idea, and then again, by a converse method, to descend by analysis from the supreme unity to the multiplicity of subordinate ideas. In this higher and lower ordination, each subordinate idea requires merely as a supposition until it is shown by the latter to be legitimate. But from such hypotheses or suppositions the mind must at last arrive at that which implies nothing else, and is in itself sufficient; of this kind is the nature of good, which, exhausting all true entity, is itself in want of nothing, but is desired by all. This idea of good, or God, is consequently the key-stone of all

rational investigation. It embraces whatever subsists without difference, in time or space,—all truth and science, all substances and all reason, being neither reason nor essence, but being superior to, unites both within itself. It is the source of motion to all, for all has a desire towards it, and consequently it is the mistress of all generation, in which nought is true beyond its resemblance of the good. However, from some impelling necessity, evil, the opposite of good, is in generation mixed up with it. Man, therefore, as living in this scene of production and decay, cannot attain to a complete knowledge of the unity of good; for to him truth, and the science of truth, appear in opposition to each other, and it is not permitted to mortal nature to contemplate the eternal, in its absolute essence, but merely as shadowed forth in the temporal. God, then, is the good itself, of which this sensible world is only an image. But in the present world it ought to be man's endeavour to enlarge and cultivate his science, in order that, by attaining to as pure a knowledge as possible of the multiplicity of ideas, he may be able to discern therein, however imperfectly, the unity of truth and science which subsists in the good.

PART II.

PLATO'S VIEWS ON ETHICS AND POLITICS. GENERAL SKETCH OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE REPUBLIC.

THE notions entertained by Plato on Political Science will be best understood by viewing them in connexion with his ethical doctrines, from which, indeed, he considered them inseparable. The two leading principles on which his moral system reposes, are—first, that no one is willingly evil (*κακὸς μὲν ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς*), and, secondly, that *every one is endued with the power of producing moral changes in his own moral character*,—which, indeed, are only the counterpart ethical *changes in his moral character*;—and these are only the corresponding ethical expressions of the theory of *Immutable Being*, on the one hand, and, on the other, of *the world of sensible things* (*τὰ γινόμενα*),—everything that is born and perishes,—a principle which places in the strongest possible contrast the mutability and false appearances of this world with the true and immutable of the Deity, whom Plato conceived to be not only the measure of all things and the pattern of his own perfections, having the supreme good for the object of all his operations, but likewise as the only real Idea of Good, in comparison with which the best strivings and conceptions of man are but tendencies and approximations. So truly is it said in the *Phædo*, that “all things desire to be of the same quality as the *summum bonum*, but yet are ever inferior to it.” Philosophy and morals, in fact, perfectly coincide in their object, —the love of truth being the love of good, and the love of good the love of truth;—and morality, viewed *per se*, is the one motive of the love of truth and good predominating over, purifying,

and absorbing into itself every desire of human nature,—is, in fact, the purifying of the soul, the perfecting of virtue, the discipline of immortality, the resemblance and participation of the Deity.*

Of Plato's moral doctrines, the most important are the following:—that, independently of other ends, virtue is to be pursued as the true good of the soul,† the proper perfection of man's nature, the power by which the soul fitly accomplishes its existence,‡ whereas vice is a disease of the mind (Republ. iv. 444. c.), arising from delusion or imperfect apprehension of our proper interests;—that the real freedom of a rational being consists in an ability to regulate his conduct by reason, and that every one not guided by his reason, encourages insubordination in the mental faculties, and becomes the slave of caprice or passion; (πολλῆς μὲν δουλείας τε ἂν ἀνελευθερίας γέμει. ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτοῦ. Republ. ix. 577. d.)—that virtuous conduct, apart from its benefits to society, is advantageous to the individual practising it, inasmuch as it ensures that regularity of the imagination,—that tranquillity and internal harmony, which constitutes the mind's proper happiness.|| He, throughout, and with great power, contends for the earnestness of a virtuous mind in the attainment of truth, and inculcates the propriety of pursuing the ordinary pleasures of life,§ only

* "As the rational soul can only involuntarily be subject to ignorance, *it is only against its will that it can be evil*. Every volition, by its essential nature, pursues the good; no one is willing to be subject to evil or to become bad, inasmuch as the end of volition is not the immediate act, but the object for the sake of which the act is undertaken; and no man enters on any act or undertaking, except for the sake of ultimate good. Now a man, when engaging in any act apparently good, may err, and choose the evil instead of the good; but in that case he labours under an *involuntary error*, and does not what he really desires, but what, in spite of his wishes, seems to him either as an immediate good or a mean to ultimate good."—Ritter's History of Philos. (Morrison's Tr.) ii. 387.

† Gorg. p. 506. e.

‡ Republ. i. p. 353. d.

§ Republ. ix. p. 591. d

|| Democritus, Aristippus, and the Sophists had taught that *good consists in pleasure*;—and Plato, in his refutation of this vicious doctrine, does not deny that pleasure belongs to the good things of life, but only seeks to determine its relative value. Pleasures, too, are of two kinds,—some simple and pure, dependant on the bodily or intellectual organisation,—others mixed or impure, as being always combined with more or less of pain. The latter are only relatively pleasures, inasmuch as they are incapable of affording pleasure except by the gratification of some

so far as they are subservient to, or compatible with, man's higher and nobler duties. In the fourth Book of the Laws, there is a pretty complete summary of the salient features in Plato's theory of morals,—a condensed view of which will be found in the article "Plato" of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana:—the remarks with which it closes—on the coincidence of the precepts of morality with the conclusions of prudence and enlightened self-love,—are both happily conceived and well expressed.

Plato conceived that there were two great causes of human corruption, viz., *bad or ill-directed education*, and *the corrupt influence of the body on the soul*. His ethical discussions, therefore, have for their object, the limiting of the desires, and the cure of the diseases produced by them in the soul; while his political discussions have for their immediate object, the laying down of right principles of education, and enforcing them by the constitution of the laws and the power of the State. His two great works, in fact,—the Republic and the Laws,—may be considered as theories and plans of civic education, rather than schemes of legislation and details of laws. The former, it is true, inquires more particularly into the principles on which a right government may be formed, and the latter presents a systematic view of the principles of legislation:—but, comprising, as both works do, so much matter of a purely intellectual and ethical character, we are compelled to conclude that their primary object is, the improvement of human nature by social institutions expressly formed for that purpose. We are not to suppose, moreover, that Plato, in his Republic, had in view the actual foundation of a State, but that he presents rather an example of the most perfect life—public as well as private—free from those impediments which all existing governments and laws throw across the path of the virtuous. Thus, in the Laws (*lib. vii.*), he says—"Our whole government consists in the imitation of a most excellent and virtuous life;" and again, "these excellent things are rather as wishes stated in a fable than actual facts, though it

want; whereas true enjoyment consists in those pure delights which do not arise after pain, but which the soul experiences, when filled with the contemplation of true being. (Republ. ix. p. 585. d.)—Ritter's History of Philos. ii. p. 390.

would be best of all if they could exist in all States." He thought, in fact, that as Philosophy is the guide of private life, elevating it to the knowledge of the true and the good, so it was seated, likewise, on the throne of government, and exhibited the eternal ideas of social good and truth,—modifying society after their pattern ;—and hence is it, that (as Aristotle observes in the second Book of his Politics, ch. 2,) Plato overlooks impossibilities in his arrangements, and sacrifices all to the one great object of sketching *the idea of good as a social principle*, apart from the evil influences of society.

We shall now proceed to describe at some length the subject-matter of the Republic ; and we shall just remark, that if the work itself had been more studied, there would have been far less difference of opinion respecting the nature and object of this Dialogue. In fact, no exposition or theory can explain Plato, who is, above all others, a writer to be studied in his own works ; and his character as a writer and philosopher would have been far higher in general estimation at the present day, if there had been fewer to pronounce sentence on him without having read a single syllable of his writings.

The Republic of Plato is *a development of the analogy between the ideas of the perfect man and the perfect State*,—the two principles being elaborated throughout the Dialogue, in perfect harmony and mutual dependance on each other. He exhibits, indeed, the image of perfect and consummate virtue, such as ought to be seen in the whole life of man, whether in his private capacity simply, as a sentient and moral agent, or in his public position as the member of a State. As man, moreover, has certain special social relations and social functions, he considers him also collectively, as part of a State, and is hence led to inquire into the best or pattern form of a State,—a proceeding quite in unison with the custom of the Greeks, who treated Politics rather as a branch of Ethics than a separate science. This Dialogue, therefore,—one of that splendid group of which the *Timæus*, the *Critias*, and the *Laws* are the other members,—comprises two subjects constantly connected and cohering,—the contemplation of the perfectly good man, composed of body and

soul on the one hand, and on the other the perfectly good State, composed of many members in different classes, performing their respective functions. Justice, then,—the principle, cause, and uniting bond of all the other virtues,—one, too, that is essentially of a political character—forms a very suitable discussion by way of introduction to this Dialogue. The refutation of incorrect or inadequate definitions of this virtue, occupies a large portion of the first Book ;—and Socrates (the hero of this, as of most other of the Platonic Dialogues), then proceeds, with the view of educing some abstract definition of justice, to explain his notion of a perfect State, as one in which all ranks of its members accurately fulfil their respective functions, dwelling together in harmony. .

Commencing with the consideration of Virtue, (which consists in the harmonious cultivation of the different intellectual and moral faculties,) he opens the inquiry with a kind of analysis of the human mind, which he divides into three parts,—first, *the rational or reasoning principle*, (τὸ λογιστικόν),—secondly, *the spirit or will*, (τὸ θυμικόν or θυμοειδές),—and thirdly, *the appetite or passion* (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν),*—which last, however, indicates nothing beyond that vital impulse which leads from one sensation to another. Of these faculties the most excellent is Reason, whose proper province is to direct and controul the other faculties; and of the operations of this faculty Plato forms several divisions (at the close of the sixth Book), according as the ideas are abstract, mixed, or material,—the νόησις constituting the knowledge of pure ideas, the διάνοια that of mixed ideas, πίστις that of actually existing materials and their affections, and εἰκασία the knowledge of the images or shadows of bodies,†—these divisions including—first, ἐπιστήμη (true science), and secondly, opinion true or false, (δόξα).‡ So much for Reason (τὸ λογιστικόν).

* Ritter, ii. p. 363. † (Query—the science of forms?) Comp. Republ. vi. 509. e.

‡ Plato's system of Ideas (εἶδη) consists, strictly speaking, of what we now term generalization and abstraction,—the main part of the definition *real*; and he seems to have constructed his theory as a mean between the Heraclitean doctrine of a perpetual flux, modified into the notion of Protagoras, πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου, which set up γίνεσθαι instead of εἶναι,) and the Eleatic doctrine that all is one, without multiplicity, change, augmentation, or decay. He was convinced of the

Now,—intermediate between Reason and Passion (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) is the Will or Spirit, which should be an assistant to Reason (ἐπικουρον ὃν τῇ λογιστικῇ φύσει) in the pursuit of virtue, and should oppose the indulgence of base desires,—all desires being legitimately under the controul of the Reason and the Will.* Furthermore,—from the exercise and combination of these three faculties there are generated four principal or cardinal virtues:—1. Prudence or Wisdom (φρονήσις);—2. Courage or Fortitude (ἀνδρεία), by which Plato means the maintenance of right opinion as to what is and is not to be feared, (περὶ τῶν δεινῶν,) i. e. as to good and evil;†—3. Temperance or Self-controul (σωφροσύνη);‡—and 4. Justice (δικαιοσύνη), which, with Plato, does not simply mean the virtue of rendering to all their due, but stands for that harmonious and proportional development of the inner man, by means of which each faculty of his soul performs its own functions without interfering with the others|| (μὴ ἰάσαντα τὰλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ μῆδε πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα). Just or virtuous actions, then, says he, consist in the performance of actions agreeable to the nature of the soul,§ whereas the contrary comprise such as are discordant to a right nature, and productive of mental disturbance and agitation. In the realization of this Justice, in short, consists Virtue itself, which Plato defines to be “a certain health and beauty and good habit of the soul,” exercising the nobler parts of our nature in the contemplation of philosophy and more particularly the *summum bonum* (τὸ ἀγαθόν), the practical realization of which should be the chief aim of the State constituted in the soul.¶

reality both of the permanent being or genus (οὐσία) and of the mutable γένεσις of the phenomena:—the science that contemplates these general terms is called ἡ διαλεκτική—Dialectics. These ideas are recognized by the νόησις and διάνοις—not by the senses; and as they belong to οὐσία, they become the objects of true science or certain knowledge. Everything of this kind is an εἶδος, or general term, or quiddity. He thought, moreover, that there was a supreme standard Idea—God—in which were comprised all other subordinate Ideas, and which contained nothing whatever capable of being apprehended by the senses. This is not exactly but nearly the view taken by Ritter, li. 264—270.

* Republ. iv. p. 441. a. † Ib. iv. 429. b. c. ‡ Ib. iii. 389. d. and iv. 430. d. e.
 § Republ. iv. 443. e. ¶ Ib. iv. 444. e. ¶ Ib. ix. 591. e.

The man, then, who studies to produce this harmony in the mental faculties, is truly consistent with himself,—truly entitled to the appellation—*μουσικός* and *πολιτικός*,—by which he means far more than is conveyed by the modern terms, musician and politician. So great, indeed, is the power and influence of virtue that, without it, there can be neither true happiness nor mental tranquillity,—all else of the nature of pleasure being mere shadow and inanity (*ἰσχυρογραφημένη τις*).* Now, with respect to Pleasure, each mental faculty has its own peculiar species,—the highest as well as purest of all being exclusively enjoyed by the philosopher, through the exercise of wisdom;† and those who cultivate wisdom and virtue are to be deemed happy, even in the midst of misfortune, and when it has no probability of proper reward. It is to be cultivated, indeed, on its own intrinsic merits, without any regard for expediency—any hope of reward. At the same time, however, it is quite apparent that good men are praised, loved, and honoured, while the unjust are eventually exposed and punished;—nay, even by the Deity, good and just men are not neglected, for God loves and rewards those who practise virtue and seek to resemble Him. Independently of this, too, Plato derives another motive to virtue from the immortality of the soul,—viz., that, if we be not justly and adequately compensated in this life, we shall meet with perfect and unswerving justice, when arraigned before the judgment-seat of God.

Having thus far explained Plato's notions respecting Man's character individually, and respecting the dignity and excellence of Virtue—and of Justice in particular—that union and consummation of all the other virtues,—we now proceed to shew, how he applied these principles to the formation of his ideal and perfect Commonwealth (*πολιτεία*), which he thought to be analogous to,

* Republ. ix. 583. b.

† The relation which, according to Plato, subsists between knowledge and pure pleasure, seems to be in general of the following nature.—In the gradual growth of the human consciousness, pleasure is necessarily combined with cognition,—so however, as that, at one time pleasure, at another cognition, is the dominant and determining element. In the former case, the pleasure is impure and immoderate, while in the latter a pure pleasure arises, measured by the truth of Ideas. To avoid the former and pursue the latter, ought, therefore, to be the object of a truly intellectual life.—Ritter, ii. p. 393.

and a sort of exhibition (**παραδειγμα*) of, a good and virtuous man. Some few incidental remarks occur on the formation of society for mutual aid and support; and he then proceeds to classify the members or parts of his ideal Republics.

These he classes under three heads or divisions, corresponding with the faculties of the soul,—viz., 1. the *βουλευτικόν*, (counsellors) those who employ reason in the contemplation of what best suits the State,—2. the *ἐπικουρικόν*,—those who aid the *βουλευταί* with a ready will,—3. the *χρηματιστικόν*, who are bent on gain and selfish gratification.* Reason alone is, according to Plato, entitled to and capacitated for the supreme government (just as reason is the monarch of the properly energising mind), to the total exclusion of the commonalty (*χρηματισταί*), who are totally unacquainted with wisdom or philosophy. The military class or executive, however, (*τὸ ἐπικουρικόν*), who are to be the active guardians (*φύλακες*) of the State, he requires to be properly taught and disciplined, so that, while obeying the counsellors, they may protect the State from both internal and external danger. As these guardians, therefore, are necessarily to be chosen from the better class of the citizens, they should be of a philosophic turn, of an active will, and of a stern determination (*φιλόσοφοι καὶ θυμιοειδῆς καὶ ταχῆς ἔχοντες τὴν φύσιν*).†

As respects the training of the military class, that must be effected by a thorough discipline,—first, in *Gymnastics*, which includes every exercise and training of the body, whether patience under hardships, or endurance of hunger and thirst—cold or heat; and likewise dancing, all being practised not only to invigorate the body, but to strengthen the spirit and maintain the entire

* In other words,—“There should be one part to correspond with the reason, to whom the sovereignty is to be entrusted,—a second, answering to spirit, is to assist the sovereign,—and lastly, a third part is made parallel to the appetite, and intended to supply the bodily wants of the community. These are the three social classes—the ruler, the warrior, and the craftsman. Each contributes a peculiar virtue to the general body: by its ruling class it becomes sagacious, bold by its warriors, and temperate by the obedience of the artizan to the orders of his ruler. From the due combination of these virtues in the whole community, results civil justice.” This explanation, so happily expressed by Ritter, is fully authorised by the passages, lib. ii. 427. c.; 433. d.

† *Republ.* ii. 376. c.

man—the passions, in particular—in subjection to reason ;—and secondly, in Music,* which Plato held to comprise all imaginative art, the ordinary instruction in grammar, and also science itself, all of which contribute to elevate and enlarge the mind, protecting it, at the same time, from all that militates against virtue. More particularly, the φύλακες must be kept free from all ambition and avarice, which are unquestionable obstacles to the proper performance of their civic functions. From these φύλακες the chief rulers and counsellors of the State (βουλευταί) are to be chosen ; to be chosen, too, for their general fitness and estimation :—and those only should be placed in charge, who are endowed with high talent, and have all along maintained a life of virtue, superior to that of the other citizens. Furthermore, in the same way as human life can only attain to its highest happiness, under the guidance of reason conducting it to the highest good,—so also, a State can only attain to consummate virtue and prosperity, when its rulers apply themselves to the investigation of eternal truth and the contemplation of the highest good. Hence it is, that Plato says (v. 473. c.), the rulers must be philosophers,—not, indeed, necessarily occupied in subtle disputations on general subjects of investigation, but rather engaged in contemplating the eternal ideas of things—truth itself ; and they must not only admire the beauty of virtue, but earnestly seek the individual cultivation of it, and teach it to others also † by the exhibition of its development in their own persons.

Virtue, again, whether exercised by individuals or in com-

* These accomplishments, however, he wished to restrain within due bounds, lest their simplicity should become luxurious, and lest they should become incentives to passion and vice. Poetry, in particular, he desires to restrain, dreading its evil influence on the moral habits ;—and he almost wishes the expulsion of poets from his ideal State. He looks upon poetry, indeed, as a mere art of imitation, little better than mere illusion and childishness (x. 602. b. c.) ;—useful, perhaps, for education, but to be placed, for fear of abuse, under the strictest surveillance.

† Virtue, according to Plato, in the *Meno* and *Protagoras*, may be learnt, so far as it rests on science, in the same sense as science itself is teachable,—i. e., originally and naturally it dwells potentially in the soul ; and for the right attainment of virtue, nothing more is requisite than a fitting direction of the mind, leading man to contemplate the good through the medium of reflection and memory.

munities, is one and the same,* comprising, however, four parts :—first, *Wisdom*, the essential qualification of rulers ;—secondly, *Courage*, the property of the military class who defend the State ;—thirdly, *Temperance*, the distinctive quality of a well-ordered and obedient commonalty ; and, fourthly, *Justice*, by virtue of which each particular class or individual energises in his own sphere, without encroaching on that of his neighbours. The pure exercise of virtue, however, is exceedingly rare, either in States or individuals ; while, on the other hand, errors and defects are constantly observable and ever likely to interfere with correct action. Hence, applying this remark to Politics, our pattern State (*ἀριστοκρατία*) will insensibly become vitiated ; sinking first into *τιμαρχία*, and thence into *ὀλιγαρχία*, *δημοκρατία*, and lastly downright *τυραννίς*, the worst possible mode of social union. No wonder, for if we compare them with the state of the human soul when reason is on her throne, and also when she is dethroned by the passions, we discover between them a close analogy. From the dominance of the will over reason we realise the idea of *Ambition* ; and this seems nearly allied to the *τιμαρχία* of the Cretans and Spartans (which Plato greatly preferred to the democracy of Athens) ;—again, when rein is given to the appetite, still other and greater evils arise, and among others, *Avarice*, which bears a close analogy to *ὀλιγαρχία* ;—thirdly, when the passions are freely indulged, and in a base manner, without regard to order or decency, we have before us *δημοκρατία* or mob-rule ;—and lastly, when any one passion or violent emotion exercises sway to the

* The question, whether virtue is one or many (often raised without receiving any decisive solution), is connected with the more general one, whether *the one* (τὸ ἓν) can be manifold or the manifold *one*. From the Dialectic, it must be clear, that on this point Plato came to the conclusion that virtue must both be regarded as one, and in another respect also as many. In a moral point of view, however, this question of the unity of virtue must be taken in quite another sense ; for as all good is considered as a due measure and proportion, no single virtue, by itself and apart from the rest, can be truly virtuous. Hence Plato often describes some single virtue as comprising in itself the sum of all virtues. Thus, Justice is often used for virtue in general, because no action, which is not also just, can be virtuous ;—and similarly with wisdom, temperance, and valour. In the Protagoras, too, Plato adds a fifth virtue—*δεδιότης*, or piety, and in the Republic (iii. 402, b.) he mentions liberality and magnanimity.

exclusion of all the more generous feelings of our nature, we have an exact picture of *τυραννίς*, which is the worst species of government, and furthest of all removed from political perfection.

To return to our pattern State: it must have the principle of permanence in healthy operation; and this is best effected by harmony, or, as it were, unity of action in all the members, just as individual virtue results from the harmonious exercise of the collective mental faculties. The various establishments in a State, therefore, must so cohere and harmonise, as mutually to aid each other; and the most anxious pains must be taken to protect the State from all influences likely to deteriorate good morals and impair the authority of the government. To this end, then, care must be observed, that no innovations (*τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν*, Republ. iv. 424. c.) be introduced in the training of youth in Gymnastics and Music;—for such innovations, says this ancient Conservative, have an insidious and destructive tendency. The affairs of domestic life, also, must be so regulated, that no base desires shall invade and disturb the State; and to promote this object, as well as to show that the defenders of the State should consider not so much their own individual existence, or their own gratifications, as their inseparable connection and membership with the whole State, to the welfare of which the individual man is ever subordinate;—on this principle must be explained those strange views of the community of wives and children, that have always excited the astonishment of those not fully acquainted with the moral ends of the Republic. Individuals are, according to this philosopher, members of, and to be merged in, the State;—and hence he suggests also, that even the women should undergo the same kind of training with the young men, as they have their respective aptitudes. Thus is a State to be maintained in permanent health, free from the incursions of civil discord. With whatever ability, however, a State may be formed, it cannot be permanently prosperous without the constant and active exercise of virtue;—and just in proportion as sin entails misery and virtue happiness, so, likewise, Tyranny produces disorder and wretchedness; while Aristocracy, *i. e.*, Plato's best form of government, will not fail to exalt the

State and its several members to the pinnacle of civil happiness and prosperity.

We have thus briefly sketched the general and ethical system of Plato's Philosophy, as well as given a general survey of the subject-matter of the Republic ; and it is presumed that the student will now be enabled to take up the writings of Plato with improved facilities, and a far greater probability of getting thoroughly acquainted with the notions of that great philosopher.

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

THE *first Book* opens with a pleasant and highly dramatic dialogue, in the course of which the happy old Cephalus (a kind of Mæcenas on a small scale) sings the praises of an independent old age, free from anxiety and debt; and this leads Socrates to introduce the discussion of justice, which, by way of provoking inquiry, he first generally defines, as τὰ ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ, ὃ ἀν' λάβοι τις, ἀποδιδόναι. The more complete definition, however, he first attempts by the negative process, purposely selecting two species of (false or inadequate) justice to be refuted,—thus to make way for the basis of a full and true definition. He then proceeds to consider the constituents of a state—magistrates and subjects; the former of whom he cautions against tyranny—the latter against indecent insubordination; insomuch as neither the one party should have reference to his own private advantage only, nor should the others live without care for the general advantage of the state, nor without a due regard for honest, upright principle.

SOCRATES,
CEPHALUS,
GLAUCON,

ADIMANTUS,
POLEMARCHUS,
THRASYMACHUS.

[The whole is in the form of a narrative related by Socrates in the presence of Timæus, Critias, Hermocrates, and another of unknown name.*
—The scene is in the house of Cephalus at the Piræus.]

CHAP. I.—I went down yesterday to the Piræus, with Glaucon,† son of Ariston, to pay my devotion to the goddess,—and wishing, at the same time, to observe in what manner they would celebrate the festival, as they were now to do so for the first time.‡ The procession of the natives themselves, in-

* See the opening of the Timæus.

† Glaucon and Adimantus were the brothers of Plato. Comp. Xen. Mem. iii. 6.

‡ The festival here alluded to is the Βενδίδεια, in which Artemis or Bendis was worshipped agreeably to the custom of the Thracians.

deed, seemed beautiful; yet that which the Thracians conducted appeared not less elegant. After we had paid our devotions, and seen the solemnity, we were going back to the city, when Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, observing us from a distance, hurrying home, bid his boy run and tell us to wait for him; and the boy, taking hold of my robe behind, said:—Polemarchus desires you to wait. I turned then and asked, where he was. He is coming after you, answered he: but pray wait for him. Yes, we will wait, said Glaucon; and just afterwards came Polemarchus and Adimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, son of Nicias*, and some others, as from the procession. Then said Polemarchus, Socrates, you seem to me to be hurrying to the city, as on your return. Aye, you do not make a bad guess, said I. See you, then, said he, how many we are? Yes, of course. Well, then, said he, you must either prove yourselves stronger than these, or else remain here. One expedient, said I, is still left; namely, to persuade you that you should let us go. How can you possibly persuade such as will not hear? By no means, said Glaucon. Make up your mind then, that we will not hear. But know you not, said Adimantus, that in the evening there is to be a torch-race on horseback to the goddess?† On horseback, said I; surely, this is a novelty. Are they to have torches, and to hand them to one another, contending together on horseback;—or how do you mean? Just so, replied Polemarchus. And besides, they will perform a nocturnal solemnity well worth seeing;—for we shall rise after supper and see it [the night festival,]‡ and shall be there with many

* Nicias was one of the leading Athenian generals in the Peloponnesian war.

† In the Panathenæan, Hephæstian, and Promethean festivals, it was customary for young men to run with torches or lamps lighted from the sacrificial altar; and in this contest that person only was victorious, whose lamp remained unextinguished in the race. We are here forcibly reminded of the figure used by Plato in the Laws, vi. p. 776 b, and also of Lucretius, ii. verse 78:—

Inque brevi spatio mutantur sæcla animantium.
Et quasi cursores vitæ lampada tradunt.

‡ By this nocturnal solemnity are meant the lesser Panathenæa, which, as the name implies, were sacred to Athena. As in the greater Panathenæa they carried about the veil of Athena, on which were represented the giants vanquished by the Olympian gods, so in the lesser Panathenæa

of our young [friends,] and have a chat. Do you also stay and do the same. It is right, I think, said Glaucon, that we should stay. Well,—if you please, said I, we will so.

CHAP. II.—We went home therefore to Polemarchus's [house,] and there we found, both Lysias and Euthydemus, brothers of Polemarchus,—likewise Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Pæoneian, and Clitophon the son of Aristonymus. Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus, was likewise in the house; and he seemed to me to have become a good deal aged, for I had not seen him for a long time. He was sitting crowned on a cushioned seat; for he had been offering sacrifice in the inner court. So we sat down by him; for some seats stood there in a circle. Immediately, therefore, on seeing me, Cephalus saluted me, and said: Socrates, you do not often come down to us to the Piræus, though you ought; for, could I still easily go up to the city, there would have been no need for you to come hither, but we should have gone up to you. As it is, however, you should come hither more frequently; for be assured that with me, the more bodily pleasures decay, the more also do the desires and pleasures of conversation increase. Do not then fail us, but accompany these youths, and resort hither, as to friends, and very dear friends too. As for me, Cephalus, said I, I am delighted to converse with persons well advanced in years; for it appears to me a duty to learn from them, as from persons who have gone before us, on a road which we too must necessarily travel, what kind of road it is,—whether rough and difficult, or level and easy. Moreover, I would gladly learn from you (as you are now at that time of life which the poets call the threshold of old age), what your opinion of it is, whether it be a burdensome part of life, or how you describe it.

CHAP. III.—By Zeus!* said he, I will tell you, Socrates, what I, for my part, think of it; for several of us, who are of the same age, frequently meet together in the same place,

near another veil was exhibited, in which the Athenians, who were the pupils of Athena, were represented victorious in the battle against the inhabitants of the Atlantic island.

* The translator wishes it to be understood, that in compliance with a now pretty general custom, he has preserved the Greek mythological names; Zeus for Jupiter, Athena for Minerva, Poseidon for Neptune, Artemis for Diana, and so on.

observing the old proverb.* Most of us, therefore, when we are together, complain of missing the pleasures of youth, calling to remembrance the pleasures of love, those of drinking and feasting, and such like: and they are mightily in dudgeon, as being bereaved of some great things,—having once lived happily, but now scarce living at all. Some of them, too, bemoan the contempt which old age meets with from intimate friends: and, on this account, they whine about old age, as being the cause of so many of their ills. To me, however, Socrates, these men seem not to blame the [real] cause; for, if this were the cause, I myself likewise should have suffered these very same things through old age,—and all others, likewise, who have come to these years. Now I have met with several not thus affected; and particularly I was once in company with Sophocles the poet, when he was asked by some one: How, said he, do you feel, Sophocles, as to the pleasures of love; are you still able to enjoy them? Softly, friend, replied he;—most gladly, indeed, have I escaped from these pleasures, as from some furious and savage master.† To me, then, he, at that time, seemed to speak well, and now not less so: for, on the whole, as respects such things there is in old age great peace and freedom; because, when the appetites cease to be vehement and have let go their hold, what Sophocles said, most certainly happens; we are delivered from very many, and those too, furious masters. With relation to these things, however, and what concerns our intimates, there is one and the same cause; which is, not old age, Socrates, but the disposition or [different] men: for, if they be discreet and moderate, even old age is but moderately burdensome: but if not, Socrates,—to such an one, both old age and youth are grievous.

CHAP. IV.—Delighted to hear him say these things, and wishing him to discourse further, I urged him, and said: I fancy, Cephalus, the generality will not agree with you in

* This alludes to the well-known Greek adage—*ἡλικὴ ἡλικία τίρπεια*. Nearly the whole of this and the following chapter is quoted by Cicero, de Senect. ch. 3.

† This passage was evidently in the view of Cicero, when he wrote as follows:—*Quum ex eo quidam jam affecto ætate quæreret, uteretur rebus veneris:—Dii meliora, inquit, s. lubenter verò istinc tanquam à domino agresti ac furioso profugi.*—Cato Maj. ch. 47.

these opinions ; but will imagine that you bear old age easily, not owing to your natural bias, but from possessing much wealth ; for the rich, say they, have many consolations.* True, replied he ; they do not agree with me ; and there is something in what they say, yet not so much as they imagine. The saying of Themistocles, however, is just ; who, when the Seriphian† reviled him, and said, that he was honoured, not on his own account, but on account of his country, replied, that neither would himself have been renowned, had he been a Seriphian, nor would he, the [Seriphian,] had he been an Athenian. To those likewise, who are not rich and bear old age with impatience, the same saying fairly applies ;—that neither would the worthy man bear old age with poverty quite easily, nor would he who is unworthy, though enriched, ever be agreeable to himself. But, [tell me,] Cephalus, said I ; was the greater part of what you possess, left you, or did you acquire it [yourself?] Somewhat, Socrates, replied he, I have acquired : as to money-getting I am in a medium between my grandfather and my father : for my grandfather of the same name with myself, who was left almost as much property as I possess at present, increased it manifold ; while my father Lysanias made it yet less than it is now : I, on the other hand, am content, if I can leave my sons here not less, but some little more than I received. I asked you, said I, for this reason,—because you seem to me to have no excessive love for riches ; and this is generally the case with those who have not acquired them ; while those who have acquired them [themselves,] are doubly fond of them : ‡ for, as poets love their own poems, and as parents love their own children,—in the same manner, too, those who have enriched themselves, value their wealth, as their own production, as well as for its utility,—on which ground it is valued by others. True, replied he.

CHAP. V.—Aye, entirely so, said I. But further, tell me this ;—what do you conceive to be the greatest good realized through the possession of extensive property ? That, pro-

* This seems to allude to the very common Greek adage—*τοῖς πλουσίοις πόλλ' ἔστι τὰ παραμύθια*.

† From Seriphus, one of the Cyclades.

‡ Aristotle expresses nearly the same sentiments in the Nicom. Eth. iv. 1, and ix. 4.

bably, said he, of which I shall not persuade the generality, were I even to mention it. For, be assured, Socrates, continued he, that, after a man begins to think he is soon to die, he becomes inspired with a fear and concern about things, that had not entered his head before: for those stories concerning a future state, which tell us, that the man who has been unjust here must be punished hereafter, have a tendency, much as he formerly ridiculed them, to trouble his soul at such a time with apprehensions, that they may be true; and the man, either through the infirmity of old age, or being now, as it were, in closer proximity to them, views them more attentively, and consequently becomes full of suspicion and dread, and reflects and considers whether he has in any thing done any one a wrong. That man, then, who discovers in his own life much of iniquity, and, like children, constantly starting in his sleep, is full of terrors, and lives on with scarce a hope of the future. But with the man who is not conscious of any such iniquity,

Hope, the solace of old age,
Is ever present,

As Pindar says: for this, Socrates, he has beautifully expressed, that whoever lives a life of justice and holiness,

With him to cheer his heart, the nurse of age,
Sweet hope abides, companion blest, that sways
With power supreme the changeful mind of man.*

In this he speaks well, and with great elegance. In conformity with this thought, therefore, I deem the possession of riches to be chiefly valuable, not to every man indeed, but to the man of worth: for as respects liberating us from the temptation of cheating or deceiving against our will,—or again from departing thither in fear, because we owe either sacrifices to God, or money to man,—for this, indeed, the possession of money has great advantages. It has many other also;—but for my part, Socrates, that seems not the least, among all others, which proves its high advantage to a man of understanding.

You speak admirably, Cephalus, replied I:—but this very thing, *Justice*,—shall we call it Truth, simply, and the re-

* This passage will be found in Boeckh's *Fragm. Pind.* 243, vol. ii. p. 2, p. 682.

storing what one has received from another,—or shall we say, that it is possible to do the very same things at one time justly and at another unjustly? My meaning is somewhat as follows: Every one would probably be of opinion, that if a man received arms from a friend in sound mind, and that person should demand them back when mad, it would not be proper to restore such articles, nor would the restorer be just;* nor again, [would he] who, to a man so situated, should willingly tell the whole truth. Right, replied he. This, then, is not the definition of justice, [namely,] to speak the truth, and restore what one has received. Of course it is, Socrates, replied Polemarchus taking up the subject, if at least we are to believe Simonides. However that be, said Cephalus, I leave this conversation to you; for I must now go to attend to the sacred rites.† Well then, is not Polemarchus, said I, the heir of your [argument?] Certainly, replied he, smiling, and went off to the sacred rites.

CHAP. VI.—Tell me, then, said I, you who are heir in the conversation, what is it, that you affirm Simonides to have correctly alleged about justice? That to restore to each his due, is just, replied he: in saying this, he seems, to me at least, to speak correctly. Aye, indeed, said I, we cannot easily discredit Simonides; for he is a wise and divine man:—but as to his meaning in this passage, you, Polemarchus, are probably acquainted with it, but I am not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were saying just now,—that, when one has deposited any thing with us, we should return it to him, even if he demand it in his insanity: and yet the thing deposited is in some sense due, is it not? It is. At least, then, [you will grant] it must on no account whatever be restored, when a man asks for it in his insanity? True, replied he. Simonides then, it would seem, has some other meaning than this, in saying that to deliver up what is due, is just? Yes,—one quite different, replied he: for he is of opinion, that friends ought to do their friends good—not ill. I understand, said I;—that man does not give back what is due, who restores money deposited with him, if the repayment and receipt be really hurtful, and the receiver and restorer be

* Comp. Cicero de Off. iii. 25.

† Cicero very elegantly refers to this passage in his Epistles to Atticus, iv. 16.

friends:—is not this what you allege Simonides to say? Surely. What then?—are we to give our enemies, also, what may chance to be their due? By all means, said he, what is really due to them; and from an enemy to an enemy, there is due, I imagine, what is fitting too,—namely some evil.

CHAP. VII.—Simouides, then, it would seem, replied I, defined the nature of justice somewhat enigmatically, and after the manner of the poets; for it seems he had a notion, that justice consists in giving every one what was expedient for him; and this he called his due. But what is your opinion? said he. By Zeus, replied I, if any one then should ask him thus,—Simonides, what is the art, which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, is called medicine, what, think you, would he answer us? That art, surely, replied he, which dispenses drugs to the body, and also meats and drinks. And what is the art, which, dispensing to certain things something fitting and due, is called cookery? The art which gives seasonings to victuals. Granted. What then, is that art, which may be called justice, as dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due? If we ought to be at all directed, Socrates, by what has been said above, [it is] the art which dispenses good offices to friends, and injuries to enemies. To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls justice? It seems so. Who then can best serve his friends, when they are sick, and most ill to his enemies, as either in sickness or health? A physician. And who to those at sea, as respects danger on the sea? A pilot. But what as to the just man? In what business, and with respect to what action, can he most serve his friends and harm his foes? In fighting in alliance with the one, and against the other,—so far as I think. Just so; but at any rate, to those who are not sick, Polemarchus, the physician is useless? Aye. And the pilot, to those who do not sail? He is. And is the just man, in like manner, useless to those not engaged in war? This, at any rate, is not at all my opinion. Is justice, then, useful also in time of peace? Yes, useful, too. And so is agriculture, is it not? Yes. Towards the getting in of crops? Yes. And is not shoemaking useful too? Yes. Towards the possession of shoes, methinks you will say? Certainly. But what then? For the use or possession of what is it, that would you say

justice were useful in time of peace? For contracts, Socrates! By these contracts do you mean copartnerships, or what else? Copartnerships, certainly. Well then; is the just man or the dice-player, a good and useful copartner for playing at dice? The dice-player. But, in the laying of tiles or stones, is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the builder? By no means. In what copartnership then, is the just man a better copartner than the harper, as the harper is better than the just man for touching the strings of a harp? In one about money, as I imagine. And yet perhaps, with regard to the use of money, Polemarchus, when it is necessary jointly to buy or sell a horse, then, I should think, the jockey is the better copartner, is he not? He would appear so. And with respect to a ship, the shipwright or pilot? It seems so. When is it, then, with respect to the joint application of money, that the just man is more useful than others? When it is to be deposited and be safe, Socrates! Do you not mean when there is no need to use it, but to leave it in deposit? Certainly. When money then, is useless, justice is still useful with regard to it? It seems likely. When, therefore, one wants to put by a pruning-hook, justice is useful, both for a community and for a particular person: but when one wants to use it, then the art of vine-dressing [is useful.] It seems so. You will say, likewise, that when a shield or a lyre is to be kept and not used, then justice is useful; but when they are to be used, then the arts of warfare and music? Of course. And with reference to all other things, when they are to be used, justice is useless; but when they are not to be used, it is useful? It seems so.

CHAP. VIII.—Justice, then, my friend, can be no very important matter, if it is useful only in respect of things not to be used. But let us consider this matter:—is not he who is the cleverest at striking in a fight, whether with the fists or some other way, the cleverest likewise, in self-defence? Certainly. And as to the person who is clever in warding off and escaping from a distemper, is he not very clever also in bringing it on? So I suppose. And he too the best guardian of a camp, who can steal the counsels, and the other operations of the enemy? Certainly. Of whatever, then, any one is a good guardian, of that likewise he is a clever

thief. It seems so. If, therefore, the just man be clever in guarding money, he is clever likewise in stealing. So it would seem, said he, from this reasoning. The just man, then, has been shewn to be a sort of thief; and it is likely you have learned this from Homer; for he not only admires Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Ulysses, but says, that he was distinguished beyond all men for thievishness and swearing.* Justice, then, seems in your opinion as well as in that of Homer and Simonides, to be a sort of thieving carried on for the benefit of our friends on the one hand, and for the injury of our enemies on the other:—did not you say so? No, by Zeus, I did not; nor, indeed, do I any longer know what I was saying:—yet it is still my opinion, that justice benefits friends, but injures foes. But [tell me,] whether you pronounce such to be friends, as seem to be honest; or such merely as are so, though not seeming so;—and in the same way as to enemies? It is reasonable, said he, to love those whom one deems honest, and to hate those [one deems] wicked. But do not men fall into error on this point, so that many appear to them honest who are not so, and many the contrary? Yes, they do. To such as these, then, the good are enemies, and the bad friends? Certainly. But still is it, in that case, just for them to benefit the wicked, and hurt the good? So it seems. The good, moreover, are just, and incapable of doing any ill. True. According to your argument, then, is it just to do those harm, who do no harm [themselves?] By no means [think that,] Socrates, replied he; for that opinion seems to be vicious. With respect to the unjust, then, said I, is it right to injure these, but to do good to the just? This opinion seems fairer than the other. To many, then, it will occur [to think,] Polemarchus,—that is, to as many as have formed wrong opinions of men,—that they may justly hurt their friends (for they are wicked to them), and, on the other hand, benefit their enemies, inasmuch as they are good:—and thus we shall state the very reverse of what we alleged Simonides to say. That is precisely the case, said he:—but, let us change our definition;

* Μητρὸς ἑῆς πατὴρ' ἑσθλὸν, ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκίκαστο
Κλεπτοσύνη θ', ὄρκῳ τε.—*Odys.* xix. 395.

His mother's noble sire, who all mankind

In furtive arts and fraudulent oaths excelled.—*Cowper.*

for we seem not to have rightly defined a friend and a foe. How were they defined, Polemarchus? That he who seems honest, is a friend. How then are we now to alter our definition, said I? That the person, replied he, who seems, and also is honest, is a friend; but that he who is apparently honest, but not really so, seems to be, yet is not [really] a friend: the definition, too, respecting an enemy, exactly corresponds. The good man, according to this reasoning, will, it seems, be a friend; and the wicked man a foe? Yes. Do you bid us then make an addition to our former definition of justice, by saying that it is just to serve a friend and harm a foe:—and are we now to say, in addition to this, that it is just to serve a friend who is good, but to hurt an enemy who is bad? This last, said he, seems to me perfectly well expressed.

CHAP. IX.—Is it the just man's part, then, said I, to hurt any one mortal whatever? By all means, said he; the wicked at least, and his enemies, he ought certainly to injure. And horses, when hurt, do they become better or worse? Worse. Do they so, as regards the virtue of dogs or horses? That of horses. And, do not dogs, when hurt, become worse as regards the virtue of dogs, but not of horses? Necessarily so. As to men, then, friend, may we not likewise say, that when hurt, they become worse with reference to man's virtue? Certainly. But is not justice a human virtue? This too we must [allow.] It follows, then, friend, that those men who are hurt become more unjust? It seems so. Can musicians, then, by music, make men unmusical? Impossible.—Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unskilled in horsemanship? They cannot. Is it possible, either, that by justice the just [can make men] unjust; or in general that by virtue, the good can make men wicked? It is impossible. [Yes,] for it is not, methinks, the effect of heat to make cold, but [the effect] of its contrary? Yes. Nor of drought to make moist, but that of its contrary? Certainly. Neither is it the part of a good man to hurt, but that of his contrary? It appears so. But, at any rate, the just is good? Certainly. Neither, then, is it the part of a just man, Polemarchus, to hurt either friend or any other, but [that] of his contrary, the unjust man. In all respects, Socrates, said he, you seem to reason truly. If, then, any one affirms it just to give every one his due, and consequently thinks this within himself, that injury is due

from a just man to enemies, but service to friends,—he was not wise who said so, for he spoke not the truth:—for in no case has the justice been proved of injuring any one at all. I agree, said he. You and I then will jointly dispute the point, said I, if any one allege, that Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any other of those wise and happy men said so. I am ready, for my part, said he, to take part in this discussion. But know you, said I, whose saying I conceive it to be,—that it is just to serve friends, and hurt enemies? Whose, said he? I conceive it to be Periander's, or Perdiccas's, or Xerxes's, or Ismenius's, the Theban, or of some other rich man, who thought himself mightily important. You say most truly, said he. Be it so, said I:—but as this has not been shewn to be justice nor the just, what else may one say it is?

CHAP. X.—Now Thrasymachus had frequently during our discourse been on the point of breaking in upon the discussion with some objection,* but was hindered by the sitters-by, who wanted to hear out the conversation. When, however, we came to a pause, and after my making these last remarks, he could no longer keep quiet; but, taking his spring like a wild beast, attacked us, as if he would tear us in pieces. Both myself and Polemarchus were frightened and terror-struck. But he, raising his voice in the midst, cried out:—What is this, Socrates, which has so long possessed you; and why do you thus play the fool together, conceding mutually to one another? But if in particular you really want to know the nature of justice, do not only ask questions, and value yourself in refuting the answers you may get, well knowing that it is easier to ask than to answer; but answer yourself, and state your own view of the nature of justice. And [take care] that you do not tell me that it is what is fit, or what is due, or what is profitable, or what is gainful, or what is expedient; but, whatever you mean, express it plainly and accurately; for I will not allow you to utter such trifles as these. I was astounded on hearing this; and when I looked at him, I was frightened; and, methinks, had I not perceived him before he perceived me, I should have become speechless.† But just when he began to grow fierce under

* For this sense of ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, comp. book vi. p. 497 d, and p. 504; also Gorgias, 506 a.

† This alludes to the popular belief that men were rendered speechless

our discussion, I observed him first, so that I was now able to answer him, and said, somewhat in a flutter:—Be not hard on us, Thrasymachus; if I and he [Polemarchus] err in the working out of our arguments, be well assured we err unwittingly: for, think not, that if we were searching for gold, we would ever wittingly yield to one another in the search, thus frustrating all chance of discovering it, and yet searching for justice,—a matter far more valuable than gold, foolishly make concessions to each other, and not labour with the utmost ardour for its discovery:—think you so, friend? Nay, methinks, we could not. That we should be sympathized with by your clever * persons is far more to be expected than, than that we should be treated with contempt.

CHAP. XI.—On hearing this he [Thrasymachus] gave a disdainful sort of laugh, and said:—By Heracles, this is Socrates's wonted irony; and this I both knew, and foretold to these here,—that you never incline to answer, but use your irony, and do any thing rather than answer, if any one asks you any thing. Aye; you are a wise man, Thrasymachus, said I; for you knew well, that if you asked any one, how many make twelve; and, if asking, you should tell him, you must not tell me, man, that twelve are twice six,—or three times four,—or four times three; because I will not admit it, if you are such a trifler; it was plain to you, methinks, that no man would answer one so inquiring. But if he should say to you, What mean you, Thrasymachus, may I not answer in any of these ways you have told me,—not even though the real answer happen to be one of them; but am I rather to say something else than the truth? Or, how is it you mean? What would you say to him in reply to these things? If they were alike, I should give an answer; for the one, forsooth, is like the other. That is no real objection, said I†; but even if it be not like, but only appears so to him who has been asked, do you think he would the less readily express his opinion, whether we should forbid him or not? And, will you do so now? said he. Will you state, in reply, some of those things which I forbade you to say? I should not wonder, if I did, said I, by the fixed look of a wolf; but this, they thought, was not the case, if they saw the wolf first.

* *οἱ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν*, alluding of course to the Sophists, who deemed themselves emphatically *δεινοί*. Comp. Protagor. p. 341 a.

† Thrasymachus here alleges with a sneer, that the example adduced by Socrates had no connection with the subject treated in the last chapter.

if it appeared so to me on inquiry. What, then, said he, if I should shew you another answer, besides all these about justice, and better, too, than these,—what will you deserve to suffer? What else, said I, but what the ignorant ought to suffer?—and it is proper, perhaps, to learn from a wise man. I consequently deserve to suffer this. You are merry now, said he; but besides learning, you must pay money too. Aye, when I have it, said I. We have got some, said Glaucon; but, as for the money, Thrasymachus, say on, for all of us will club for Socrates. By all means, I think, said he, in order that Socrates may go on in his usual manner,—not answer himself, but when another answers, take up the discourse and confute. How, then, in the first place, my good fellow, said I, can a man answer, when he neither knows, nor pretends to know; and when, supposing him to have any opinion at all about these matters, he is forbidden to say what he thinks by no ordinary person? But it is more reasonable, then, that you speak, as you say you know, and can tell us. Do not refuse, then, but oblige me by answering, and do not begrudge instructing Glaucon here, and the rest of the company.

CHAP. XII.—On my saying this, both Glaucon and the rest of the company entreated him not to decline it:—and Thrasymachus in particular, was evidently most anxious to speak, in order to gain applause, reckoning he had a mighty clever answer to make, and pretending to be earnest that I should be the answerer; but at last he agreed. Now, this, forsooth, said he, is the wisdom of Socrates, that he himself is unwilling to teach, but goes about learning from others, and gives no thanks for it. That I learn from others, Thrasymachus, is quite true, said I; but in saying, that I do not thank persons for it, you are wrong. I pay as much as I am able, and I can only give them praise, for money I have none; but how readily I do this, when any one appears to me to speak well, you shall perfectly know directly, whenever you make your answer; for methinks you will speak well. Hear, then, said he, for I say that the just is nothing else but what is expedient for the strongest.* But why do not you com-

* The Sophists were used to recommend that the laws of a state should be made by the most powerful and influential, and that in making them it was quite right that they should consult their own advantage, there being

mend?—Ah! you do not like that. Let me learn first, said I, what it is you are talking about; for as yet I know not. That which is expedient for the strongest you say, is the just. And what, at all, is it that you are talking of now, Thrasymachus? for you certainly do not mean any thing like this. If Polydamas, the wrestler,* be stronger than we, and if beef be better for his body, this food is likewise both just and beneficial to us, who are weaker than himself. You are a saucy fellow, Socrates, and lay hold of my argument just on that side where you may damage it most. By no means, my good fellow, said I; but say more plainly what is your meaning. Know you not, then, said he, that with reference to States, some are tyrannical, others democratical, and others aristocratical? Of course. And is not the governing part of each State the more powerful? Certainly: and every government makes laws precisely to suit itself,—a democracy, democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic; and the rest in like manner:—and when they have made them, they declare that to be just for the governed, which is advantageous for themselves, and any one who transgresses it, they punish as one acting contrary both to law and justice. This, then, most excellent Socrates, is what I say, that in all States the same thing constitutes justice, viz., what is expedient for the established government. This, then, is the fact with him who reasons rightly, that in all cases whatever that same is just which is expedient for the more powerful. Now, said I, I understand what you mean. But as to its truth or otherwise, I will try to find out. As for the expedient, then, even you yourself, Thrasymachus, have affirmed it to be the just; and yet, though you forbade me to give the answer, still you are adding the expression of *the more powerful*. Quite a trifling addition, perhaps, said he. It is not clear yet, whether it is small or great; but it is clear that we must inquire whether you speak the truth, since I, too, acknowledge that the just is something that is expedient; but you say, in addition, that it is that also which belongs to the most powerful.

no fixed standard for virtue and justice, but only that of expediency. Comp. Gorgias, p. 483, b, c, d; and Protagor. p. 337.

* A celebrated wrestler of Scotussa in Thessaly, who won the prize in the Pancratiun, at the Olympic games, B.C. 408. He was of immense size; and it is related of him, that he killed without arms a huge and fierce lion on Mount Olympus, and could stop a chariot at full gallop.

This I am not sure of; but that is what we have to inquire. Inquire then, said he.

CHAP. XIII.—We will do so, said I:—and, tell me,—do you not say, that it is just to obey governors? Yes, I do. Are the governors in the several states infallible, or are they capable of erring? Certainly, said he, they are liable to err. When they set about making laws, then, do they not make some of them right, and some of them wrong? I think so. To make them right, then, is to make them expedient for themselves, and to make them not right, [is that] inexpedient;—or how mean you? Just so. And what they enact is to be observed by the governed; and this is what is just? Of course. According to your reasoning, then, it is just, to do what is expedient to the stronger, while the contrary is what is not expedient:—what say you, replied he? I am of the same opinion as yourself. But let us inquire better. Is it not granted, that governors in bidding the governed do certain things, may sometimes be in error as to what is best for themselves; and that what the governors enjoin, is just for the governed to do? Have not these [truths] been granted? I think so, said he. Consider also, therefore, said I, that you have allowed it to be just to do what is inexpedient for governors and the more powerful, whenever governors unwillingly enjoin what is ill for themselves; and yet you say, that it is just for the others to do what these enjoin. Must it not necessarily happen, then, most sage Thrasymachus, that, in this case, it may be just to do the contrary of what you say; for that which is the disadvantage of the more powerful, is sometimes enjoined on the inferiors? Yes, by Zeus, said Polemarchus, these things are quite clear, Socrates. Yes, if you bear him witness, said Clitiphon in rejoinder. What need, said I, of a witness?—for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that governors sometimes order what is ill for themselves, and that it is just for the governed to do these things. Aye, Polemarchus; for he laid it down, that it is just to do what is bidden by the governors, and he has also defined that as just, Clitiphon, which is expedient for the more powerful; and, having laid down both these propositions, he has granted that the more powerful sometimes bid the inferiors and governed to do what is inexpedient for themselves; and, from these concessions, what is expedient for the more powerful can

no more be just than what is not expedient. But he alleged, said Clitiphon, that what was expedient for the strongest was what the strongest judged expedient for himself; this, too, was to be done by the inferior, and this he defined as the just. Aye,—but that was not stated, said Polemarchus. There is no difference, Polemarchus, said I; but, if Thrasymachus says so now, so let us understand him.

CHAP. XIV.—Now tell me, Thrasymachus; was this what you meant by justice,—namely, the advantage of the more powerful, such as appeared so to the more powerful, whether it really were so, or not:—shall we say that you mean this? Not at all, said he:—for, think you, I call him who errs, the more powerful, at the time he errs? For my part, said I, I thought you meant this, when you acknowledged that governors were not infallible, but that in some things even they erred. You are a sycophant, said he, in reasoning, Socrates! * For, for instance do you call him a physician, who errs about the treatment of the sick, in respect of that very thing in which he errs; or him a reasoner, who errs in reasoning, at the very time he errs, and with reference to that very error? But, we say, in common language, I fancy, that the physician erred, the reasoner erred, and the grammarian likewise; but in fact I think, each of these, so far as he is what we designate him, never errs; so that, strictly speaking (especially as you are a strict reasoner), no artist errs;—for he who errs, errs through defect of science, in what he is not an artist; and hence no artist, or wise man, or governor, errs, in so far as he is a governor. Yet every one would say ‘the physician erred,’ and ‘the governor erred.’ You must understand, then, that it was in this way I just now answered you. But the most accurate answer is this:—that the governor, in as far as he is governor, errs not; and as he does not err, he enacts that which is best for himself, and this must be observed by the governed. So that as I said at the beginning, I call justice the doing that which is for the advantage of the strongest [*i. e.* the best].

* There was a prevalent corruption in the law-courts of Athens, which at length gave rise to a separate class,—the infamous sycophants, who lived by extortion and making criminal charges against the opulent citizens of timid natures and quiet habits, who were ordinarily led to purchase the silence of these informers, who hence rose to wealth and importance.

CHAP. XV.—Be it so, said I, Thrasymachus;—but do I seem to you to act the sycophant? Aye, surely, said he. Do you think that I insidiously mislead you in the argument, to put the question to you as I did? I know it well, said he, and you shall gain nothing by it; for neither shall you mislead me unawares, nor can you unawares get the better of me in argument. I shall not attempt it, said I, my excellent friend, but, that nothing of this kind may happen to us again,—define in which way you speak of a ruler, and superior, according only to common talk, or in the strict sense of the word, as you just now said, he, whose advantage, in that he is the more powerful, it is just for the inferior to observe. [I speak of him,] who is a ruler in the strictest sense of the word. For this now abuse and calumniate me, as you like. I do not deprecate your doing so; but you are quite unable. Do you think me so mad, said I, as to attempt to shave a lion,* and traduce Thrasymachus? You have just attempted it, said he, but with no effect. Enough of such matters, said I; but tell me he who is, strictly speaking, a physician, whom you just now mentioned, is he a gainer of money, or a tender of the sick?—and mind—tell us of him who is really a physician. A tender of the sick, said he. But what of the pilot? is he who is really a pilot, a master of sailors, or a sailor? A master of sailors. It matters not, I fancy, that he sails in a ship, and is not to be called a sailor; for he it is not called a pilot from his sailing, but from his art, and his mastery of the sailors. True, said he. Has not each of these, then, something that is advantageous for him? Certainly. Was not the art then acquired for this very purpose, said I, to seek out and supply to each what is advantageous for him? For that purpose, said he. To each of the arts, then, is any other advantage wanting, than to be as perfect as possible?—How mean you by this question? If you were to ask me, said I, whether it is sufficient for the body to be a body, or whether it needs something else, I should say, that it certainly does stand in need of something else. For this reason, indeed, has the medicinal art been already invented, because the body is infirm, and it is not sufficient for it to be such as it is:—in order then to supply what is advantageous for it, art

* A proverb, meaning—*To undertake any thing above one's power.* There is a similar one in Latin.

has been provided. Do you think then, said I, that I am right, or not, in thus speaking? Right, said he. But what then? Is this very art of medicine, or any other whatever, imperfect, as being deficient in a certain virtue; just as the eyes, when deficient as to sight, and the ears as to hearing; and for these reasons need they a certain additional art to seek out and furnish what is expedient for these very organs? Is there then in art itself some imperfection, and does every art need another art, to consider what is expedient for it, and does that which considers again need another, and so on to infinity; or will each art consider what is expedient for itself; or will each need neither itself, nor any other, to consider what is expedient for it with reference to its own imperfection?—For there is no imperfection nor error in any art whatever; nor is it the business of art to seek what is expedient for anything else, but that of which it is the art;—but as for itself, it is infallible and pure, because it is right, so long as each, whatever it is, be an accurate whole:—and consider now, in that same strict sense of the words, whether it be thus or otherwise. It seems so, said he. The art of medicine, then, said I, does not consider what is expedient for the art of medicine, but for the body? Yes, said he. Nor the art of managing horses, what is expedient for that art, but for horses. Nor any other art for itself (for that is needless), but only for that of which it is the art? So it appears, he said. However, Thrasymachus, the arts rule and govern that of which they are arts? He assented to this, though with great difficulty. No science whatever, then, either considers or dictates what is expedient for the superior, but only what is so for the inferior,—that, namely, which is governed by it? To this also he at length assented, though he attempted to contend about it. But when he had assented, What else is this, said I, but saying that no physician, so far as he is a physician, either considers or dictates what is expedient for the physician, but only what is expedient for the sick?—For the physician, strictly so called, has been acknowledged to be one who has charge of the body, and is not an amasser of wealth.—Has it not been acknowledged? He assented. And likewise that the pilot, so called, is the master of the sailors, and not a sailor? It has been acknowledged. Such a pilot and master then, will not consider

and dictate what is expedient for the pilot, but what is so to the sailor and the governed? He acquiesced, but unwillingly. Nor yet, Thrasymachus, said I, does any other in any government whatever, so far as he is a governor, consider or dictate what is expedient for himself, but only for the governed and those to whom he acts as steward; and, with an eye to this, and to what is expedient and suitable for this, he both says what he says, and does what he does.

CHAP. XVI.—When we were at this part of the discussion, and it was evident to all, that the definition of justice stood now quite contrary [to that of Thrasymachus,] Thrasymachus, instead of replying, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you a nurse? What now, said I;—ought you not rather to answer, than put such questions? Because, forsooth, said he, she neglects you when your nose is stuffed,* and does not wipe it when it needs it, you, who as well as she, understand neither about sheep nor shepherd. What is the meaning of all this? said I. Because you think that shepherds and herdsmen consider the good of the sheep or oxen, to fatten and tend them, having their eye on something else than their master's good and their own; moreover, that those who rule in cities, those, who rule truly, are somehow differently disposed towards the governed, than [a shepherd] would be towards sheep, and that they attend day and night to somewhat else than the question, how they shall be gainers themselves; and so far are you from the notion of the just and justice, and the unjust and injustice, that you seem ignorant that both justice and the just are, in reality, a foreign good, expedient for the stronger and ruling party, but positively injurious to the subject and servant,—while injustice, on the contrary, takes the rule of such as are truly simple and just, and the governed do what is expedient for him, since he possesses the most power, and promote his happiness, by serving him, but themselves not at all.—In this case, most simple Socrates, we should consider, that a just man gets less on all occasions than an unjust.—First, in mutual contracts with one another, where a certain party joins with another, you will never find on the dissolution of the partnership, that the just man gets more than the unjust, but less:—then, again, in civil affairs, when public imposts are to be paid,

* Gr. κορυζῶντα, *having a cold or rheum in the nose.*

the just man, from equal means, pays more, the other less; and when anything is to be gained, the one gains nothing, the other much; and when each of these holds any public office, if no other loss befalls the just man, at any rate his domestic affairs become deteriorated through neglect, and from the public he derives no benefit, because he is just;—besides which, he becomes hated by his domestics and acquaintance, since he will never serve them, beyond what is just.—But with the unjust man, all the contrary of this occurs; for I maintain, what I lately said, that such an one has a great power of becoming unfairly rich.—Consider the case of this man, therefore, if you would discern how much more it conduces to his private interest to be unjust, rather than just. This you will most easily of all understand if you come to the most finished injustice, such as renders the unjust man most happy, but the injured and those who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched.—This, now, is tyranny, which takes away the goods of others, as well by secret fraud as open violence, both things sacred and holy, private and public, and these in no small portions, but all at once.—In all particular cases of such crimes, when a man undisguisedly commits injustice, he is both punished and treated with the greatest ignominy: and as a proof of this, they are called sacrilegious, kidnappers, housebreakers, pilferers, and thieves, according to the several kinds of the wickedness committed. But when a man, in addition to the property of the citizens, takes prisoners and enslaves the citizens themselves, instead of these ugly names, he is called happy and blest, not only by the citizens, but likewise by all the rest, whoever may get informed that he has committed [such] enormous injustice;—for those who revile wickedness, revile it—not because they are afraid of doing, but because they are afraid of suffering what is unjust.—Thus, Socrates, is it, that injustice, when it attains a certain point, is both more powerful, more free, and more absolutely despotic than justice: and (as I said at the beginning) the advantage of the stronger happens to be just, while that is unjust which profits and benefits one's self.

CHAP. XVII.—Saying this, Thrasyarchus purposed going off, after pouring on our ears, as a bath-keeper, this impetuous and lengthened discourse.* Those present, how-

* Lucian must have had this passage in view, when writing *Encom.*

ever, would not suffer him, but forced him to stay and give account of what he had advanced; and I myself, also, strongly urged him, and said: Oh! wonderful Thrasymachus; do you purpose, after throwing on us such strange talk, to go away without rightly instructing us, or informing yourself whether the case be as you say, or otherwise? Do you think that you are trying to determine some small matter, and not the guide of life, by which each of us being conducted may pass his life most profitably? Can I think that the case is otherwise? said Thrasymachus. You seem, at any rate, said I, to care nothing at all about us, nor to be any way concerned whether we shall live well or ill, through our ignorance of what you say you know:—but, my good friend, be so obliging as to show it to us also; nor will the favour be ill-placed,* whatever you may bestow on so many of us as are here present. And I, for my part, can say that I am not persuaded, nor do I think, that injustice is more gainful than justice,—not even should we allow it play, and not prevent it doing what it likes. But, my good friend, even supposing him to be unjust and able to do unjustly, either secretly or by open force, yet I at least am not persuaded that injustice is more gainful than justice; and on this point probably some of us here are of the same mind, and not I alone. Persuade us, therefore, sufficiently, my admirable friend, that we are wrong in deeming justice of more value than injustice. But how, said he, am I to persuade you? for if you are not persuaded by what I have said already, what further can I do for you? Shall I take and implant my arguments in your very soul? By Zeus, no, said I;—but, first of all, whatever you have said, abide by it: or, if you do change, change openly, and do not deceive us. Now, you see, Thrasymachus—(for we will reconsider what has been above said),—that in first defining the true physician, you did not think it needful afterwards, that the true shepherd should strictly keep his flock, but fancy, that so far as he is a shepherd, he may feed his flock without regarding the best interests

Demosth. § 16:—*ἡ πού γε, ἔφη, διανοί καταχέιν μου τῶν ὧτων, ὥσπερ βαλανεύς καταντλήσας τὸν λοιπὸν λόγον.*

* Analogous phrases are common among the Greek Classics. Comp. Gorg. p. 506 c., and Thucyd. i. c. 129:—*Κείσεται σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν κῶ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ εἰσαὶ ἀνάγκη.*

of the sheep, but rather as some glutton going to feast on them at some entertainment, or to dispose of them as a merchant, and not [care for them] as a shepherd. The shepherd art, however, has certainly no other care but that for which it is appointed, namely, to afford it what is best, since its own affairs are already so sufficiently provided for, as to be in the very best state without needing any of the shepherd art. So likewise, I, for my part, conceived that there you must necessarily agree with us in this, that every government, in as far as it is government, considers what is best for nothing else but for that which is governed and tended, whether in political or private government. But with respect to rulers in cities, think you that such as are really rulers govern willingly? No, by Zeus, said he, [I do not think so;] but I am quite certain.

CHAP. XVIII.—Why now, Thrasymachus, said I, do you not perceive, as regards all other governments, that no one undertakes them willingly, but men ask for recompense, since the benefits likely to accrue from governing are not to come to themselves, but to the governed? Tell me this, then;—do we not always say that each several art is distinct in this, in having a distinct function? And my admirable friend, do not answer contrary to your opinion, that we may make some real progress. In this respect, at any rate, said he, it is distinct. And does not each of them afford us some certain peculiar advantage, and not a common one;—as, for instance, the medicinal, health; the pilot art, safety in sailing,—and the rest in like manner? Certainly. And has not the mercenary art mercenary reward? for this is its function. Do you call both the medicinal art and the pilot art one and the same? Or, if you mean to define them strictly, as you proposed, though one in piloting recover his health, on account of the expedience of his going to sea, you will not at all the more on this account call it the medicinal art? Not at all, said he. Nor [will you call] the mercenary art the medicinal, I fancy, though in earning a reward one may recover his health? No, indeed. What then? Will you call the medicinal the mercenary art, if, in performing a cure, one earn a reward? No, said he. Have we not acknowledged, then, that each art has its peculiar advantage? Granted, said he. Whatever, then, be that advantage, with which all artists in common are advantaged, it must plainly be by

using some same thing in common to all, that they are advantaged by it. It seems so, said he. Still, we say that the advantage accruing to artists from receiving a reward comes to them from the adoption of a mercenary art. He acquiesced unwillingly. This, then, is not the advantage which each receives from his own art, [namely,] the receiving a reward?—But if we strictly consider it, the art of medicine produces health, that of money-getting a reward, masonry a house, and the mercenary art accompanying it, a reward; and all the others in like manner.—every one performs its own work, and confers advantage on that for which it was designed; but if it meet not with a reward, is the artist benefited at all by his art? It appears not, said he. But confers he no service when he works gratuitously? I think he does. This, then, is now evident, Thrasyarchus, that no art or government provides what is advantageous for itself; but, as we said long ago, it both provides and prescribes for the governed what is advantageous to him, having in view the interest of the inferior and not that of the more powerful. For these reasons, then, friend Thrasyarchus, I even just now said, that no one is willing to govern and undertake the setting right of others' troubles without asking a reward; because, whoever intends to practise his art well, never himself does nor enjoins [on others] what is best for himself, if he enjoins according to his art, but rather what is best for the governed; for which reason, therefore, as it seems, a recompense must be given to those who are likely to be willing governors,—either money, or honour,—or punishment, on the other hand, if a man will not govern.

CHAP. XIX.—How say you this, Socrates? said Glaucon:—the two rewards, indeed, I understand; but the punishment, that you mention, and how you can speak of it under the head of reward, I know not. As for the reward, then, of the best of men, said I, do you not understand why the most worthy govern, when they are willing to govern:—or, do you not know, that to be ambitious and covetous, is both deemed a reproach, and is so? I do, said he. For these reasons, then, said I, good men are not willing to govern, either for money or for honour; inasmuch as they neither wish to be called mercenary, for openly making gain by governing,—nor thieves, for taking clandestinely

from what belongs to their office:—nor again [are they willing to govern] for honour, since they are not ambitious. Hence if they are to be induced to govern willingly, there must be laid on them both compulsion and punishment; and hence it seems likely, that a willing undertaking of government, without waiting for compulsion, has been reckoned dishonourable. The greatest part of the punishment, however, in case he is not willing to govern himself, is the being governed by one who is inferior. It is chiefly through fear of this, methinks, that the good govern, when they do govern: and in that case they enter on the government, not as on anything good, or as about to derive any advantage therefrom, but as on a necessary task, and finding none better than, or even like, themselves, to intrust with the government. It seems likely, indeed, that if there were a state of good men, the contest would be, not to govern, as now it is to govern; and, hence, it would be manifest, that the really true governor does not naturally aim at his own advantage, but at that of the governed; so that any one who has sense would rather choose to be benefited by another, than have trouble in benefiting another. This, therefore, I, for my part, by no means grant to Thrasymachus; that justice is what is expedient for the stronger:—but this, indeed, we shall consider again hereafter.—What Thrasymachus says now, however, seems to me of much more importance,—when he says, that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. You, then, Glaucon, said I, which opinion do you choose; and which of the two seems to you most consistent with truth? The life of the just, said he, is in my opinion the more profitable. Have you heard, said I, how many good things Thrasymachus just now enumerated in the life of the unjust? I heard, said he; but I am not persuaded. Do you wish, then, that we should persuade him (if we can find any means of doing so), that there is no truth in what he says? How should I not wish it? said he. If then, by way of opposition, said I, we advance, as argument against argument, how many good things are involved in being just,—and again, he on the other side, and we again rejoin, it will be requisite to compute and estimate what either of us says on either side; and we shall want also some judges to decide thereon. But if, as just now, we inves-

tigate these matters, by agreeing with each other, we shall ourselves be both judges and counsel? Certainly, said he. Which of these plans, then, said I, do you choose? The latter, said he.

CHAP. XX.—Come then, said I, Thrasymachus ;—answer us from the beginning. Say you, that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice? Assuredly, I do say so, replied he ;—and why, too, I have already told you. Come, now, how can you affirm anything like the following concerning them?—Do you call one of them virtue; and the other vice? How not? Is not justice, then, a virtue,—and injustice a vice? Likely, indeed, that I should say so, factious man ; since I say that injustice is profitable, but justice not so! What then? Quite the contrary, said he. Do you call justice a vice? No; but a very generous folly. Do you, then, call injustice a want of principle? No, said he, but sagacity. Do the unjust, Thrasymachus, seem to you both wise and good? Such, at least, said he, as are able to do injustice in perfection, and can subject states and nations to themselves; but you think, perhaps, that I speak of cut-purses. Even such employment as this, said he, is profitable, if concealed; but yet is of no value in comparison with what I just mentioned. I am not ignorant, said I, of what you mean to say: but at this I am surprised,—that you should reckon injustice as a part of virtue and wisdom, and justice among their contraries. But, I certainly do reckon it so. This, my good friend, said I, is somewhat too hard, and it is no longer easy to know what one can say: for if you had alleged that injustice is profitable, and had still allowed it to be a vice, or base, as some others do,—we should have had something to say, speaking according to received opinions. But now it is evident that you will say it is beautiful and strong, and will attribute to it all other properties which we ascribe to the just man, because, forsooth, you have ventured to class it with virtue and wisdom. You augur very truly, said he. I must not grudge, however, said I, to pursue our inquiry, so long as I conceive you speak what you really think; for you appear to me, Thrasymachus, without doubt, not to be jesting, but only to speak what you conceive to be the truth. What difference is it to you, said he, whether I think

so, or not;—and why do you not refute my reasoning? No difference at all, said I:—but try further to reply to this likewise: does one just man appear to you to wish to have more than another just man? By no means, said he; for otherwise he would not have been accommodating and silly, as we just conceived him. What; not even in a just action? No,—not even in one that is just, said he. But, would he deem it right to overreach the unjust man, and reckon it just; or would he not think it just? He would both count it just, said he, and deem it right; but yet he would not be able [to do it]. That, said I, I do not ask,—but, whether the just man would neither deem it right, nor feel a wish to overreach a just man, but yet would do so to the unjust? Such is the case, said he. What, then, would the unjust man [do?]-Would he deem it right to overreach the just man, even in a just action? How not, said he, since he deems it right to overreach all men? With respect, then, to the unjust man and unjust action, will not the unjust man desire to overreach both; and eagerly strive himself to receive most of all? Such is the fact.

CHAP. XXI.—This, then, is what we mean, said I:—the just man does not try to overreach one like himself, but one that is unlike, while the unjust man does so both to one like, and one unlike himself. You have expressed yourself admirably, said he. Well, then, said I, the unjust man is both wise and good; but the just man is neither. Well, again, said he. In that case, said I, is not the unjust man like the wise and the good, and the just man unlike. Of course, said he, a person of a certain character is likely to resemble one of like character; and he who is otherwise, not. Well said:—such an one then, of course, is either of those whom he resembles? Why doubt it? said he. Granted, Thrasy-machus;—now do you call one man musical, and another unmusical? I do. Which of the two do you call wise, and which unwise? The musical, surely, wise, and the unmusical unwise. As being wise, then, is he not good; but as unwise, bad? Yes. And what as to the physician, is it not the same? The same. Do you think, then, my excellent friend, that any musician, when he is tuning a harp, wants to overreach, or deems it right to have more skill than a man who is a musician, in straining and slackening the strings?

Not I. But what with respect to one unmusical? He could not help it, said he. And what as to the physician? In prescribing meats or drinks, would he try to overreach either another physician, or the art he professes? No, indeed. But one who is no physician [would?]. Yes. Just consider then, as respects all science and ignorance, whether any skilful man, be he who he may, appears to you to have a desire to grasp at, or do, or say more than another skilful man,—and not rather to do the same things, in the same business as one equally skilful with himself? Aye, it seems, it must be so, said he. But what, as to him who is unskilled, will not he like to overreach both alike the skilful and the unskilled? Probably. But the skilful man [is] wise? I admit it.—And the wise, good?—I admit it. Both the good and the wise, then, will not want to overreach his like, but rather one unlike, and contrary to himself? It seems so, said he. But the bad and the ignorant man [will want to overreach] both his like and his contrary? It appears so. In that case, Thrasy-machus, said I;—the unjust man desires to overreach both one unlike and one like himself:—did not you say so? I did, said he. The just man, however, on his side, will not overreach his like, but one unlike? Yes. The just man then, said I, resembles the wise and the good, but the unjust, the evil and the ignorant? It seems so. But we agreed, that each of them was such as what he resembled? We did agree so. The just man, then, has been clearly shown to be good and wise, but the unjust, ignorant and evil.

CHAP. XXII.—Thrasy-machus at last agreed to all these things. —not easily, as I now narrate them, but dragged to it, and with difficulty, and with a wondrous deal of sweating, just as if it was summer. Then, indeed, did I behold—I never did before—Thrasy-machus blushing. And after we had agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice, vice and ignorance,—well, said I, let this be so settled;—but we said also, that injustice is powerful:—do not you remember, Thrasy-machus? I do remember, said he;—but, to me at least, what you now say is not pleasing, and I have somewhat to say about it; but should I mention it, I well know you would say I am declaiming.*

* A sly hit at the Sophists, of which dogmatic set Thrasy-machus is throughout a very apt representative.

Either, then, let me say what I please, or, if you wish to question me, do so, and I will say to you, as to gossiping old women,* "Be it so," and will assent and dissent. Not by any means, said I, if against your own opinion. Just to please you, said he, since you will not let me speak: though what else do you wish? Nothing, by Zeus, said I: but if you will do this, do it, and I will ask questions. Ask, then. This, then, I ask, as just now (that we may regularly examine our argument), of what quality is justice, compared with injustice? for I think it has been said that injustice was more powerful and stronger than justice.—But now, at any rate, said I, if justice be both virtue and wisdom, it will easily, methinks, be seen to be more powerful also than injustice, since injustice is ignorance; no one can any longer be ignorant of this.—For my part, however, Thrasymachus, I am not desirous of getting rid of the question at once, but to consider it somehow thus.—Would you say that a state may be unjust, and attempt to enslave other states unjustly, and have enslaved them, and besides that actually hold many in slavery under herself? How not? said he: and this for the most part the best state will do, and one that is most completely unjust. I am aware, said I, that this was your assertion:—but this is what I wish to inquire; whether the state, which becomes more powerful than another state, is to hold this power without justice, or must necessarily do so with justice? If indeed, as you now alleged, said he, justice is wisdom—with justice; but if, as I said,—with injustice. I am quite delighted, Thrasymachus, said I, that you not merely assent and dissent; but also that you answer quite capitally. For I oblige you, he said. Therein doing well: oblige me, then, in this too, and tell me,—think you that a city, or camp, or robbers, or thieves, or any other company of men, such as jointly undertake anything unjustly, can meet with any success, if they injure one another? No, indeed, said he. But what, if they do no wrong?—will they not [get on] better? Certainly. For, somehow or other, Thrasymachus, injustice induces seditions, and hatreds, and contentions among men,—while justice

* The term γρᾶν ὑβλος or μῦθος was quite proverbial among the Greeks. Comp. Gorg. p. 527 a. Τάχα ἔ' οὐν ταῦτα μῦθος σοι δοκεῖ λίσσθαι ὥσπερ γρᾶός.

[brings] harmony and friendship. Does it not? Granted, said he, that I may not differ from you.

CHAP. XXIII.—You are very kind, my excellent friend, then tell me this too;—if this be the work of injustice to engender hatred wherever it exists, will it not, when exercised both among freemen and slaves, make them hate one another, and become seditious, and incapable of doing anything in concert for the common advantage? Certainly. But what if it happen in the case of two only; will they not differ, and hate, and become enemies both to one another and to the just also? They will, said he. If then, my admirable friend, injustice reside in a person,—will it lose its power, or still retain it? It will still retain it, he replied. Seems it not, then, to have some such power as this;—that, in whatever it exists, whether in a city, or race, or camp, or anywhere else, it first of all renders it unable to act of itself, owing to seditions and differences; besides which, it becomes an enemy not only to itself, but to every opponent; especially to the just—is it not so? Certainly. And, methinks, when injustice residing in one man will have all these effects, which it is natural for it to produce, it will, in the first place, render him unable to act, while at variance and discord with himself;—and, secondly, as being an enemy both to himself and the just:—is it not so? Yes. But, at any rate, friend, the gods are just? Granted, said he. As respects the gods, then, Thrasymachus, the unjust man will be a foe, but the just man a friend? Feast yourself boldly on this reasoning, said he; for I will not oppose you, that I may not render myself odious to those who think so.* Come then, said I, and satiate me with the rest of the feast, by answering as you were doing just now: for as respects the just appearing wiser and better and more able to act, but the unjust being capable of doing nothing in concert; and besides that, as to what we said with reference to the unjust, that they are ever at any time able strenuously to act in mutual concert,—this we advanced not quite correctly, for being thoroughly unjust, they would not spare one another: but yet it was evident that there was a justice in them, which made

* A clever way of extricating himself from the dilemma in which his general scepticism has involved him!

them refrain at any rate from injuring one another and those of their party,—owing to which they performed what they did; and they rushed into unjust actions, through injustice, in a kind of half-wicked feeling; for the completely wicked are both perfectly unjust, and also quite incapable of action:—that this is really so, I understand, but not in the way that you first defined it. Besides, whether the just live better than the unjust, and are more happy (which we proposed to consider afterwards), is now to be considered:—and, methinks, they appear to do so even at present, from what we have said:—but let us consider the matter still better; for the discussion is not about a casual matter, but about the manner in which we ought to live.

Consider, then, said he. I am considering, said I;—and tell me, does there seem to you to be any work peculiar to a horse? Yes. Would you not call that the [peculiar] work both of a horse, and indeed of any being whatever, which he can do, or best do, with him alone? I do not understand, said he. But thus;—see you with anything else than the eyes? Surely not. What then? Could you hear with anything else than the ears? By no means. Should we not, then, justly call these the works peculiar to them? Certainly. And what—could you not with a sword, a knife, and many other things, lop off a vine-branch? How not? But with nothing, at any rate, methinks, so well as with a pruning-knife made for that purpose. True. Shall we not then define this to be its [peculiar] work? We will so define it then.

CHAP. XXIV.—Now, methinks, you may understand better what I was asking, when I inquired whether the work of each be not that which, of all others, one performs either alone or in the best manner. I understand you, said he; and this seems to me to be each one's peculiar work. Granted, said I:—and does there not likewise appear to you to be a virtue belonging to everything, to which a certain work is assigned? But let us run over the same ground once more:—We say that the eyes have a certain work? Yes. Is there not then a virtue belonging to the eyes? A virtue also. Well, then, have the ears a certain work? Yes. And of course a virtue also? A virtue also. And, about all the rest;—is it not thus? It is. But, hold:—could the eyes ever cleverly perform their work, when not possessed of their own proper virtue, but

vice instead of virtue? How could they? said he; for perhaps you mean blindness instead of sight. Whatever, said I, be their virtue, that I mean,—for I do not yet enter on this question; but, whether by their own proper virtue they will perform their own proper work well, whatever they undertake; and by vice, badly? In this, at least, said he, you speak the truth. And will not the ears also, when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill? Certainly. And, are we to settle all other things by the same reasoning? So I suppose. Come then, after this, consider what follows: has the soul a certain work, which you can perform by no other living thing,—such as this, to take care, to govern, to consult, and all such [acts?]. Is there any other than the soul, to which we can justly ascribe them, and say they are its proper functions? No other. But what of this?—To live; shall we say it is the work of the soul? Most assuredly, said he. Do not we say, then, that there is some virtue, also, peculiar to the soul? We do. And can the soul, then, Thrasymachus, ever perform its own works cleverly, whilst deprived of its proper virtue;—or, is this impossible? Impossible. Of necessity, then, a bad soul must govern and take care of things badly, and a good soul perform all these things well? Necessarily so. Did we not then agree, that justice was the virtue of the soul, and injustice its vice? We did so agree. The just soul, then, and the just man, will live well, and the unjust ill? It appears so, said he, according to your reasoning. Surely, then, he who lives well is both blessed and happy; and he who does not, the opposite? How not? The just, then, is happy, and the unjust miserable? Granted, said he. But at any rate, it is not advantageous to be miserable, but happy? How not? In that case, excellent Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice. Well, now, Socrates, said he, you have been capitally well feasted at these Bendideia. Aye, by you, Thrasymachus, I certainly have; for you are grown quite mild, and have ceased to be troublesome:—and if I have not feasted handsomely, it is owing to myself, not you.—But just as greedy guests, ever gloating on what is fresh brought before them, taste thereof, without having properly enjoyed what went before,—so I, methinks, without having first ascertained what we were before investigating,—namely the nature of justice, have omit

ted this, and rushed eagerly forward to inquire concerning it, whether it be vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue ;—and when an assertion was afterwards introduced, that injustice is more profitable than justice, I could not refrain from coming to this, from the other ; so that now, from this conversation, I have learnt nothing at all ;—for since I do not know what justice is, I can scarcely know whether it be a virtue or not, —and whether he who possesses it be unhappy or happy.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

D

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

In the *second book* he illustrates justice by a pretty long discourse about injustice, its contrary, and the social evils thence arising. From such a comprehensive view of society itself he is not unnaturally led into his main argument, the subject of civil government; carefully distinguishing between the head and the members—the governors and the governed; but also bearing in mind that society is the stage on which alone the virtues of the just man can be seen in perfection. The governors, says he, should be spirited and shrewd, so as to be able both to repel the violence of the state's enemies, and severely to punish wicked citizens, as well as peaceably to maintain their own subjects or dependants under the law's protection, and to appoint proper rewards for virtuous and deserving actions. The principal study then should, as respects a state, be devoted jointly to *music* and *gymnastics*—the former referring to mental, the other to bodily training; but above all these he places *religion*, which though he does not statedly define it, yet he proves to be wholly distinct from the superstition of his own time.

CHAP. I.—Having said these things, I thought to have been relieved from the debate; but this it seems was only the introduction; for Glaucon is on all occasions most courageous, and then especially did not approve of Thrasymachus's withdrawal from the debate, but said;—Socrates, have you any desire of seeming to have persuaded us, or to succeed in really persuading us that it is in every respect better to be just than unjust? I, for my part, said I, would prefer to do so in reality, if it depended on me. You are not doing then, said he, what you desire: for, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would accept as a possession, without regard to its results, but embracing it [simply] for its own sake; such as joy and all kinds of harmless pleasures,* though for the future no other advantage springs from them

* ἀβλαβεῖς means not only *harmless* pleasures, but those which are pure and unalloyed with pain. We may remark here, that he divides goods (τὰ ἀγαθὰ) into three classes,—one, to be pursued for its own sake only, without reference to advantage.—another, which is to be loved both

than the delight arising from their possession. To me, indeed, said I, there does seem to be something of this kind. But what ;—is there not some species of good which we both love for its own sake, and also for what springs from it,—as wisdom, sight, and health ?—for such goods we surely embrace on both accounts. Yes, said I. But do you see, said he, a third species of good,—among which are bodily exercise, being healed when sick, the practice of medicine, or any other lucrative employment ?—for these things, we should say, are laborious, yet beneficial to us, and we should not choose them for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and other advantages that spring from them. There is, indeed, said I, this third species also : but what then ? In which of these species, said he, do you place justice ? I think, indeed, said I, in the most beautiful,—as being a good, which, both on its own account and for what springs from it, is desired by a man bent on being happy. It does not seem so, however, said he, to the multitude, but rather to be of that laborious kind which is pursued on account of rewards and honours [gained] through high repute, but on its own account to be shunned, as fraught with trouble.

CHAP. II.—I am aware, said I, that it seems so ; and it was in this view, that it was some time since condemned by Thrasymachus, but injustice praised :—it seems, however, that I am one of those who are dull in learning. Come now, said he, listen to me too, if you please ; for Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you just like a snake,* more quickly than he ought ; while, with respect to myself, the proof has not yet been made to my satisfaction in either case, for I desire to hear what each is, and what intrinsic power it has by itself, when residing in the soul,—letting alone the rewards and what springs from them.

for its own sake, and for the advantages thence accruing,—and a third, which of itself perhaps is not worthy to be pursued, but only on account of the advantages thence accruing. In the second or mixed class Socrates places justice.

* Thrasymachus is here, on account of his passionate violence and uncouth manners, aptly compared to a snake, which, as the ancients believed, could be softened and subdued by music :—and we note particularly the elegant use of the verb *κηλεῖν*, which primarily signifies to *charm*, *sooth*, *subdue*, and then generally, *to soften by persuasion* or *argument*.

I will proceed, in this manner, therefore, if it be your pleasure. I will take up Thrasymachus's argument in another shape; and, first of all, I will tell you what they say justice is, and whence it arises,—and, secondly, that all who cultivate it, cultivate it unwillingly, as necessary, but not as good,—and thirdly, that they do this with reason, inasmuch as, according to their notion, the life of an unjust man is much better than that of one that is just. Though, for my own part, Socrates, it by no means appears so to me, still I am thrown into a state of doubt, from having my ears stunned by hearing Thrasymachus and innumerable others.—But as for the statement respecting justice, that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard it explained as I wish. I wish, therefore, to hear it eulogized on its own account, and am quite of opinion that I shall hear it from you: wherefore, by way of opposition,* I shall speak in praise of an unjust life, and in so speaking will show you in what manner I want to hear you in turn condemn injustice and commend justice. But see if my proposal be agreeable to you. Quite so, said I; for about what would any man of intellect delight more frequently to speak and hear? You speak excellently well, said he:—and now, as to what I said I would first speak about, listen, both what justice is and whence it springs.

They say, forsooth, that to do injustice is naturally good, and to suffer injustice bad,—but that suffering injustice is attended with greater evil than doing injustice with good; so that, when men do each other injustice, and likewise suffer it, and have a taste of both, it seems advantageous for those, who are not able to avoid the one and choose the other, to agree among themselves neither to act unjustly nor yet to be treated so; and also, that hence they began to form for themselves laws and compacts, and to call what is enjoined by law lawful and just.—This, then, is the origin and essence of justice,—a medium between what is best, namely, when a man acts unjustly with impunity, and what is worst, that is, when one injured is unable to obtain redress;—and this justice being half-way between both these, is desired, not as

* Respecting this use of the verb *κατατείνειν*, comp. ch. ix. p. 367 b. p. 47 of this translation:—ὥς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λίγω. See also, Xen. Anab. ii. 5, s. 30, and Eurip. Hec. v. 132.

good, but as being held in honour, owing to an incapacity for doing injustice; because the man who had ability to do so would never, if really a man, agree with any one neither to injure nor be injured; for he would be mad to do so. This, then, Socrates, and such like, is the nature of justice; and such, as they say, is the source whence it arises.

CHAP. III.—Again,—that those who cultivate it through an incapability of doing injustice, cultivate it unwillingly, we shall best be made aware, if we should mentally conceive such a case as follows:—Let us give full liberty to each of them, both the just and the unjust, to do whatever they please,—and then follow them, observing whither inclination will lead each.—We should then detect* the just man going the same way with the unjust, through a desire of having more than others,—which every nature naturally pursues as good, but by law and compulsion is led to respect equality.† And the liberty of which I speak may be chiefly of such a kind, as if they possessed such a power, as they say once belonged to Gyges (the progenitor of the Lydian king ‡); and of him, forsooth, they say, that he was a hired shepherd with the then governor of Lydia, but when a portion of

* *ἐκ' αὐτοφώρῳ λαβεῖν*, lit. *to catch in the fact*.

† Euripides in his *Phoen.* v. 545, &c., elegantly expresses a similar notion:—

————— κείνο κάλλιον, τέκνον,
*ἰσότητα τ' ἡμῶν, ἣ φίλους ἀεὶ φίλοις
 πόλεις τε πόλεσι, συμμάχους τε συμμάχοις
 ξυνδοεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἴσον νόμιμον ἀνθρώποις ἔφν.
 τῷ πλείονι δ' αἰὲν πολέμιον καθίσταται
 τοῦλασσαν.*

To honour justice, and to love the right,
 Which friends to friends and state to state unite,
 Be ours. We honour equal aims and ends;
 But still the greater with the less contends,
 And evil times begin.

‡ The words between brackets are considered spurious by Stallbaum, but admitted as genuine by Bekker and Schneider. The pretty generally received opinion now is, that ὁ Λυδός alludes to Croesus, who was highly celebrated throughout Greece, and hence was emphatically termed "The Lydian." Comp., however, Herod. i. 8 (pp. 4, 5. Cary's Transl.), who tells a somewhat different story.

ground was torn up by a prodigious rain and earthquake, and an opening made in the place where he was grazing [his flocks.]—that, in astonishment at the sight, he descended and saw other wonders besides, which men hand down in fables, especially a brazen horse, hollow, provided with doors, leaning against which, he beheld inside a dead body, apparently larger than that of a man, and that it had nothing else except that it wore a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and came out. And when there was a meeting of the shepherds, as usual, for making their monthly report to the king about their flocks, he also came with the ring; and while sitting with the rest, he happened to turn the stone of the ring towards himself into the inner part of his hand; and when this was done, he became invisible to those who sat beside him, and they talked of him as absent: and astonished at this, he again handled his ring, turned the stone outward, and on turning it became visible. On observing this, then, he made trial of the ring, whether it had this power; and it always happened so, that, when he turned the stone inward, he became invisible,—when outward, visible. Perceiving this, he instantly contrived to be made one of the embassy to the king; and on his arrival he debauched his wife, and, with her, assaulted and killed the king,* and took possession of the kingdom. If now, there were two such rings, and the just man had one, and the unjust the other, no one, we should think, would be so case-hardened as to persevere in justice, and dare to refrain from others' property and not touch it, when it was in his power both to take fearlessly, even from the market-place, whatever he pleased, and to enter houses, and embrace any one he pleased,—both to kill and loose from chains whomever he pleased,—and to do anything else likewise, as a god among men:—acting in this manner, he would in no respect differ from the other, but both would go the same road. This, in truth, one may say, is a strong proof, that no one is willingly just, but only by constraint, as if it were not an intrinsic good, because every one, where he thinks he can, does injustice. Every man, then, thinks that injustice is intrinsically much more profitable than justice, thinking truly, as he says, who argues on such a subject as this: inasmuch as, if any

* Gyges slew Candaules in the second year of the sixteenth Olympiad, B.C. 614. See Cic. de Offic. iii. 9, where the story is given in nearly the same form.

one possessed of such a liberty were never to act unjustly, nor touch others' property, he would be deemed by men of sense to be most wretched, and most void of understanding; yet would they praise him in each others' presence, mutually deceiving one another through fear of being injured. Thus much, then, concerning these things.

CHAP. IV.—With respect, again, to the decision on the life of those of whom we are speaking,—if we distinguish the supremely just and the supremely unjust, we shall be able to come to a right judgment,—but not otherwise; and what, then, is this distinction? It is this;—let us, from the unjust man, take nothing of injustice, nor from the just man, of justice; but let us make each of them perfect in his own pursuit. First, then, let the unjust man act as clever artists [do]. For instance, a skilful pilot or physician comprehends both the possible and impossible in his art, the former of which he attempts, but relinquishes the latter;—and again, if he meet with any failure, he is able to rectify it:—so, in like manner, let the unjust man when he attempts clever acts of injustice, remain concealed, if he intends to be exceedingly unjust; but, as for him that is caught, he must be deemed worthless: for the most complete injustice is—to seem just, when not so.* To the completely unjust, then, we must ascribe the most complete injustice, and not take it from him, but allow him, while doing the greatest injustice, to win the highest reputation for justice; and, if he should fail at all, he should be able to rectify it, and be capable of speaking persuasively, if any report of his unjust deeds get abroad, and be able also to effect by force what requires force, owing to his courage and strength, and through the instrumentality of his friends and his wealth; supposing him, then, to be such as this, let us for argument place in contrast with him a just, simple-minded, and generous-hearted man, who, according to Æschylus, desires less the seeming than the reality of goodness:† let us

* Comp. here Cicero de Off. i. c. 13. Totius autem injustitiæ nulla capitalior est, quàm eorum, qui, quum maximè fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse videantur.

† The entire passage here alluded to is from the Septem cont. Thebes, v. 577:—

Οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θείων,
Βαθείαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,
'Εξ ἧς τὰ κεινὰ βλαστάνει βουλευματα.

take from him, then, the mere seeming of goodness; for, should he seem just, honours and rewards will be his lot, because he merely seems so:—and thus [it may be] uncertain whether he be such for the sake of justice, or rewards and honours. Let him be stripped, then, of everything but justice, and be placed in direct contrast to the other;—without doing injustice too, let him have the reputation of doing the greatest,—in order that he may be put to the test for justice, and not be moved to reproach and its consequences, but rather be unchangeable till death, seeming, indeed, to be unjust through life, though really just; and that thus both arriving at the extreme,—one of justice, the other of injustice, we may judge which of the two is the happier.

CHAP. V.—Bah, bah, said I, dear Glaucon, how exceedingly anxious you are to cleanse each of these men for trial, just as [you would] a statue! As much, said he, as I can: but, as they are such, there will be no difficulty, I suppose, in ascertaining what life will be the lot of either. It shall be told, then:—and, even if it should be told with more than usual bluntness, think not, that it is I who tell it, Socrates, but those who praise injustice before justice.—This then will they say, that the just man, thus situated, will be scourged, tortured, fettered, have his eyes burnt out, and lastly, suffer all manner of evils, and be crucified;* and he will know too, that a man should desire not to be, but to appear just. As for that saying of Æschylus, too, it applied far better against the unjust man: for in reality men will say, that the unjust man, as being in pursuit of an object connected with truth, and not living according to opinion, has no desire to appear, but to be unjust,—

Reaping the hollow furrow of his mind,
Whence all his cherished councils blossom forth.

In the first place, he holds the magistracy in the state, because he is thought just,—next, he marries out of whatever

* A similar passage occurs in Cicero de Republ. iii. 17:—*Proque hac opinione bonus ille vir vexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique offerantur, effodiantur oculi, damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, cæcat, postremo jure etiam optimo omnibus miserrimus esse videatur.*

family he pleases, and gives his children in marriage to whom he pleases, forms agreements and joins in partnership with whom he likes,—and, besides all this, succeeds in all his projects for gain, because he scruples not to commit injustice. When he engages, therefore, in competitions, he both in private and public surpasses and overreaches his adversaries ; and by this overreaching gets rich, serves his friends, hurts his foes ; and to the gods, as respects sacrifices and offerings, he not only sufficiently but even magnificently both sacrifices and makes offerings, serving far better than the just man, not only the gods, but of men also whomsoever he pleases ; so that it is very likely that he should be a greater favourite of the gods than the just man. Thus, they say, Socrates, that with gods and men a better life awaits the unjust than the just.

CHAP. VI.—Glaucón having said this, I was thinking of saying something in reply ; but his brother Adimantus said—Do you not think, Socrates, that enough has been already said on the matter ? What then ? said I. The very point has not been mooted, said he, which ought most especially to have been discussed. Why then, said I, as the saying is, let a brother help a brother,—so that, if he fails at all, do you help him out :—yet, as far as I am concerned, what he has alleged is quite sufficient to defeat me, and disable me from defending justice.

And he in reply said : Oh, it is a mere nothing you allege ;—but still hear this in addition ;—for we must go through all the arguments in opposition to what he has said, [those, namely,] which praise justice and condemn injustice,—in order that it may be more clearly seen, what, I think, Glaucon means : and perhaps parents tell and exhort their sons, as all those do who care for them, that they ought to be just,—not commending justice for itself, but for the reputation arising therefrom ;—and hence to a man reputed to be just, there may accrue from that very repute both state-offices and marriage-connections, and whatever Glaucon just now enumerated as the consequences of being reputed just : these, however, carry this notion of repute too far ;—for, throwing in the approbation of the gods, they can speak of abundant blessings, which, they say, the gods bestow on

the holy. Just as noble Hesiod and Homer say;—the former, that the gods make oaks produce for just men

Acorns at top, and in the middle bees;
Their woolly sheep are laden thick with fleece.*

and a great many other good things of the same nature—
~~similarly~~, also, the latter:—

[Unrivalled, like the praise] of some great king,
Who o'er a numerous people and renown'd
Presiding like a deity, maintains
Justice and truth. The earth under his sway
Her produce yields abundantly; the trees
Fruit-laden bend; the lusty flocks bring forth;
The ocean teems with finny swarms beneath
His joint control, and all the land is blest.†

Musæus, too, and his son [Eumolpus] tell us, that the gods give just men far more splendid blessings than these;‡ for carrying them in his poem into Hades, and placing them at table in company with holy men, at a feast prepared for them, they crown them, and make them pass the whole of their time drunken,—deeming eternal inebriation to be the best reward of virtue.—Some, however, extend down still further than these the rewards from the gods; for they say, that children's children, and a future generation of the holy and faithful, are left on earth. These, then, and such as these, are their eulogies of justice. As for the unholy and unjust, however, they bury them in Hades, in mud, and compel them to carry water in a sieve;—and as for those that are yet living, if they lead them into wrong notions, as Glaucon did in enumerating the punishments of just persons, but reputed unjust,—this they can allege about the unjust, but nothing else. The praise then or blame belongs to either party [as they please].

* Hesiod. Op. et Di. i. 231. Comp. Virg. Eclog. iv. 30, and Hor. Epod. xvi. 47.

† Hom. Odys. xix. 109—113.

‡ Eumolpus, the son of Musæus, was a Thracian, who emigrated into Attica, and founded the Eleusinian mysteries,—from whom also the Athenians in charge of the rites were called Eumolpidæ. See Smith's Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology,—articles *Musæus* and *Eumolpus*;—also Kreuzer's Symbolik. vol. iv. p. 342, &c.

CHAP. VII.—In addition to this, however, consider, Socrates, another species of argument about justice and injustice, referred to both privately and by poets; for all with one mouth celebrate temperance and justice* as beautiful, but still difficult and laborious, but intemperance and injustice as sweet and easy of attainment, though by repute only and law disgraceful: and they mostly say, that unjust are more profitable than just actions; and wicked rich men, and such as have power of any kind, either public or private, they are quite willing to pronounce happy and to honour both publicly and privately, but to despise and overlook those who may be at all weak and poor, even though they acknowledge them to be better than the others.—But of all these arguments, the most marvellous are those concerning the gods and virtue,—as if it were a matter of course, that the gods allot misfortunes and an evil life to many good men, and to the opposite, an opposite fate. Pedlar-priests† also, and prophets, frequenting the gates of the rich, persuade them, that they possess a power granted them by the gods, of expiating by sacrifices and incantations in the midst of pleasures and feastings, whatever injustice has been committed by any one, or his forefathers: and if he wishes to blast a foe, he can at small expense injure the just, as well as the unjust, by certain blandishments and magic ties, persuading the gods, as they say, to succour them: and to all these discourses they bring the poets as witnesses; who, mentioning man's predisposition to vice, say,—

How vice at once and easily we choose;
The way so smooth, its dwelling too so nigh;
Toil before virtue, thus forewill'd the gods—‡

and a certain road, both long and steep;—while others make

* Comp. Hesiod. Op. et D. v. 287, &c., and Epicharmus, cited by Xenophon, Mem. II. i. § 20.

† The *ἀγυραί* were a species of itinerant sacrificers, who went about collecting money for the expense of sacrifices to certain gods or goddesses. and contrived to eke out a subsistence by imposing on the vulgar, whom they supplied also with nostrums, and cheated with lying prophecies.

‡ Hes. Op. et D. v. 285—288;—and they are cited also in the Laws, iv. p. 718, e.

Homer witness as to the persuasive power of men over the gods, inasmuch as that poet says,—

. the gods
In virtue thy superiors, are themselves
Yet placable; and if a mortal man
Offend by transgression of their laws,
Libation, incense, sacrifice, and prayers
In meekness offer'd turn their wrath away.*

They bring forward, too, a crowd of books of Musæus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, in accordance with which they perform their sacred rites, persuading not only private individuals, but states likewise, that both absolutions and purgations from iniquities are effected by sacrifices, and sportive pleasures,—and this, too, for the benefit of the living as well as the dead;—which purgations they call *mysteries*,† which absolve us from the evils of another life,—whereas a dreadful fate awaits those who perform no sacrifice.

CHAP. VIII.—As respects all such and so much as has been said, dear Socrates, about virtue and vice, and what reward both men and gods attach thereto,—what do we suppose the souls of our youth do when they hear them, such at least as are of good natural parts, and able to rush, as it were, to all that is said, and thence infer in what sort of character, and by what procedure one may best pass through life? He might probably say to himself, according to Pindar,—

Shall I yon rampart, loftier far
Than justice, dare ascend,—or crooked fraud
Invite, to cheat the world, and thus
Myself live cased in guilt's base panoply.‡

For what is said happens to me, if I am just, though I am not reputed so, they say it is no profit, but clearly, mere trouble and punishment,—whereas the unjust man, who has procured for himself the reputation of justice, is said to have a divine life. Since then, as the sages tell me,§ appearance both does violence to reality, and is the arbiter

* Il. ix. 493.

† Gr. *τελεάς*.

‡ See Boeckh, *Pindari Fragm.* ccxxxii. p. 671.

§ *Simonidis Fragm.* cxxiii. ed. Gaisford, l. p. 394

of happiness, I ought surely to turn wholly thereto, drawing round myself, as a covering and picture, an image of virtue, but still dragging after me the cunning and versatile fox of that very clever Archilochus.* Perhaps, however, some one will say, —it is not easy for a bad man always to practise his wickedness in secret.—Neither is anything else easy (will we say) of important matters: but still, would we be happy, thither we must go where the tracks of reasoning lead us: for, with a view to concealment, we shall form conspiracies and associations; and there are masters of persuasion, who teach a popular and forensic wisdom,—by which, partly though persuasion and partly by force, we may escape punishment after all our over-reaching. However, it is not possible either to escape the notice of the gods, or to overpower them.

Wherefore, if they have no existence, and have no care about human affairs, neither need we care about concealment; and as respects their existence and care for us, we neither know nor have heard of them otherwise than from traditions, and from the poets who write their genealogies;† and these very persons tell us, that they are to be moved and persuaded by sacrifices and propitiatory vows, and offerings,—both of which we are to believe, or neither. If, however, we are to believe both, we may do injustice, and offer sacrifice from the fruits of unjust deeds. For if we be just, we shall escape punishment from the gods, and then deprive ourselves of the gains of injustice: but if, on the other hand, we be unjust, we shall make gain, and after transgressing and offending, shall appease them by prayers, and so escape punishment. Nevertheless, we shall suffer in Hades the punishment of our misdeeds here, either ourselves, or our children's children. But the reasoner

* That is, apparently, *virtue*; but, in reality, mere *cunning*. Archilochus has written more than one piece, in which the fox plays the part of a cunning and deceitful personage. See *Archil. Fragm.* ed. Gaisf. i. pp. 307, 308.

† That the gods exercise no care over human affairs was a favourite doctrine of the sophists, and especially of Protagoras. Comp. Theæt. p. 162, d. with Cicero de Nat. Deor. i. ch. 23. See also De Legg. p. 885, d. e.—*ἡμῶν μὲν γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὸ παράπαν θεοὺς οὐδαμῶς νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῶν φροντίζειν, οἱ δὲ εὐχαῖς παράγεσθαι. . . . νῦν μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα αἰοῦντες τε καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα τῶν λεγομένων ἀρίστων εἶναι ποιητῶν τε καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ μαντιῶν καὶ ἱερέων καὶ ἄλλων πολλακισμυρίων, ὅτε ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν τὰ ἄδικοα τρεπόμεθα οἱ πλείστοι, δρᾶσαντες δὲ ἐξακείσθαι τιρώμεθα*

may say, Friend, the mysteries again can do much, and the gods who expiate,—as say the mightiest states, and those children of the gods,—the poets and prophets, who declare that these things are so.

CHAP. IX.—For what reason, then, should we prefer justice before the greatest injustice?—Should we acquire it by any unfair pretences, we shall, both with reference to gods and men, fare according to our wishes both in life and death, as we are told by the sayings both of the multitude and the learned too.—From all that has been said, then, Socrates, how shall a man contrive to acquire a will for honouring justice, who has any power of mind, or wealth, or body, or birth, and not rather laugh at hearing its praises? Although, therefore, a man be able even to show what we have said to be false, and fully knows that justice is best, he will, perhaps, greatly excuse and not be angry with the unjust, because he knows, that unless a man through a divine instinct abhor injustice, or from knowledge abstain from it,—of all the rest not one is willingly just, but either through cowardice, old age, or some other weakness, condemns injustice, when unable to do it. That it is so, is plain;—for the first of such persons, who arrives at the power, is the first to commit injustice, as far as he is able.

The reason of all this, again, is no other than that, from whence all this discussion set out between my brother and me and you, Socrates, because, among all of you, my wonderful man, who call yourselves the eulogists of justice, from these ancient heroes downwards, of all whose arguments are left to the men of the present time, no one has ever yet condemned injustice, nor praised justice, otherwise than as respects the repute, honours, and emoluments arising therefrom; while, as respects either of them in itself, and subsisting by its own power in the soul of the possessor, and concealed both from gods and men, no one has yet sufficiently investigated, either in poetry or prose-writing,—how, namely, that the one is the greatest of all the evils that the soul has within it, and justice the greatest good: for had it from the beginning been thus stated by you all, and you had so persuaded us from our youth, we should not need to guard against injustice from our fellows, but every man would be the best guardian over himself, through fear, lest by doing injustice he should dwell with tho

greatest evil. These things, Socrates, and, perhaps also, yet more than these, Thrasymachus, and others too, might say respecting justice and injustice, perverting their power, disagreeably as I conceive: *—but, I, for I wish to conceal nothing from you, am very anxious to hear your refutation, and so say the most I can by way of opposition.—Do not, therefore, merely show us in your reasoning, that justice is better than injustice, but in what way each by itself affects the mind, the one as in itself evil, and the other as good; and put out of the question mere opinion, as Glaucon recommended; for if you do not set aside the true opinions on both sides, and add those that are false, we will say you do not praise justice, but its appearance, and do not condemn injustice, but its appearance,—advising the unjust man to hide himself, and agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is a foreign good expedient for the more powerful, while injustice is what is expedient and profitable for one's self, but inexpedient for the inferior. Since, then, you have granted that justice is one of those greatest goods, which on account of their results are worthy to be possessed, but yet far more in themselves for their own sake,—such as sight, hearing, wisdom, health, and all other genuine goods, such as are so in their own nature, and not merely in opinion; for this very reason we may praise justice, as intrinsically, in itself, profitable to its owner, and injustice harmful; but as for rewards and repute, let others sing their praises.—I could endure, perhaps, that the rest of the world should thus praise justice and condemn injustice, complimenting and reviling the opinions and rewards that concern them; but certainly [I could not endure] it in you (except you absolutely require it), because you have passed the whole of life, engaged in no other inquiry but this.—Show us, then, in course of the discussion, not only that justice is better than injustice, but also what either intrinsically by itself makes its owner, whether concealed or not from gods and men, the one being good, and the other evil.

CHAP. X.—On hearing this, pleased, as I always am, with the disposition of Glaucon and Adimantus, I was then, in particular, perfectly delighted, and replied: O sons of

* φορτικῶς, ὥς γ' ἔμοι δορεῖ.

that worthy sire [the Sophist, *] with good reason does the lover of Glaucon thus begin his elegies [which he made] on you, when you distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara.†

Ariston's sons ! of sire renown'd afar,
That race divine

This, friends, seems well observed; for you must be under some influence quite divine, if you are not persuaded that injustice is better than justice, when you can thus speak in its defence. Still methinks, you are not really persuaded; and I reason from the rest of your behaviour; because, according to your mode of talking, I should certainly have disbelieved you:—but the more I trust you, the more I am at a loss, as to the kind of argument I should use. I know not, indeed, how I am to defend it,—as I seem unable;—and the proof of it is, that, as respects what I thought I had clearly shown in arguing with Thrasymachus, that justice is better than injustice, you did not admit my proofs;—nor, on the other hand, have I any excuse for not defending it; because I fear it may be impious to abandon justice, and see it accused when I am present, without defending it, so long as I have breath and am able to speak. It is best then to assist it in such a manner as I can. Hereupon Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means to defend it, and not relinquish the discussion, but rather investigate thoroughly the nature of each, and what the truth is, as to their respective advantages. I then stated what I thought,—that the inquiry we were attempting was no trifling one, but one, as appears to me, suited for sharp-sighted persons. Since then, said I, we are not very expert, it seems proper to make such an investigation of it, as if a person should order persons not very sharp-sighted to read small letters at a distance, and then find out that the same letters are rather larger elsewhere, and in a larger field;—it would then appear desirable, methinks, first to read these, and then examine the lesser, whether they happen to be the same. By all means,

* The phrase *ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός* does not refer to their father Cephalus, but to some sophist of whom they were the disciples, and whose dogmas they defended. The words are similarly used in the Philebus. Comp. also *παῖδες ζωγράφων* in Legg. vi. p. 769, b.

† A battle fought near Megara between the Athenians and Corinthians, in which the former were victors; OL 80, 4 (B.C. 453). Comp. Thuc. i. 105; Diod. Sic. xi. 79.

said Adimantus. But what analogy do you perceive, Socrates, in the inquiry about justice? I will tell you, said I:—do we not say that justice affects an individual man and an entire state also? Certainly, replied he. Is not a state a greater object than an individual? Greater, said he. Perhaps, then, justice will be more fully developed in what is greater, and also more easily intelligible:—we will first, then, if you please, inquire what it is in states; and then, we will in like manner examine it in the individual, searching for the similitude of the greater in the idea of the less. Yes,—you seem to me, said he, to speak rightly. If then, said I, we contemplate in argument the rise of a state, shall we not also perceive the rise of justice and injustice? Perhaps so, said he. Well then, if this be the case, is there no ground for hoping that we shall more easily find the object of our inquiry? Just so. Does it not seem, then, that we ought to try after success? for I imagine this is a work of no small importance. Consider then. We have considered, said Adimantus, and do you the same.

CHAP. XI.—A state then, said I, takes its rise, methinks, —because none of us individually happens to be self-sufficient, but stands in need of many things; do you think that there is any other origin of the settlement of a state? * None, said he. Thus, then, one assisting one person for the want of one thing, and another another for the want of another, as we stand in need of many things, we collect into one dwelling many companions and assistants, and to this joint dwelling we give the name of city; do we not? Certainly. One then imparts to another, if he does impart anything, or receives in exchange, thinking it will be for his advantage? Certainly. Come then, said I, let us, for argument's sake, form a city from the beginning;—our necessity, as it seems, will form it? Of course. But the first and the greatest of wants is the provision of food, in order that we may subsist and live? Assuredly. The second is of lodging, the third of clothing, and the like? Just so. But come, said I, how will the city be able to make so great a provision?—Shall not one be a husbandman, another a builder, a third a weaver;—

* Aristotle has made some unnecessarily severe strictures on this notion in his *Polit.* iv. ch. 4, which are ingeniously refuted by Morgenstern, *Comment. de Plat. Rep.* on this passage.

and must we not add to them a shoemaker, or some one else of those that minister to our bodily wants? Certainly. The state then, that is most in need, will consist of only four or five men? * It appears so. What then? must each of these contribute his work for the whole in common?—as, for instance, must the husbandman, though only one, provide food for four, and spend fourfold time and labour in providing food and sharing it with others; or is he, without any care for them, to prepare for himself alone the fourth part of this food in the fourth part of the time, while of the other three parts of his time, he employs one in the providing a house, another clothing, the other shoes,—and not trouble himself to share with others, but give his whole attention to his own affairs? And Adimantus said—Aye, but perhaps the former way, Socrates, is easier than the latter. By Zeus, that is not amiss, said I:—for, while you are speaking, I am thinking that first of all we are born not each perfectly alike to each, but differing in disposition,—one fitted for doing one thing, and another for another;—does it not seem so to you? It does. What then?—Will a man do better, when, as a single individual, he works in many arts, or only in one? When one works in one, said he. This, moreover, is also plain, methinks;—that if one miss the seasonable time for any work, it is ruined? Clearly. Aye, —for the work, methinks, will not wait on the leisure of the workman, but the workman must necessarily attend closely on his work, not in the way of a by-job? He must. And hence more will be done, and better, and with greater ease, when every one does but one thing, according to his genius, at the proper time, and when at leisure from all other pursuits. Quite so, said he. Surely, Adimantus, we need more citizens than four for the provisions that we mentioned: for the husbandman, it seems, will not himself make his own plough, if it is to be good, nor yet a spade or any other instruments of agriculture:—neither, again, will the builder,—for he, likewise, needs many things; and in the same way, the weaver also and the shoemaker:—is it not so? True. Carpenters, then, and smiths, and many other such workmen, by becoming members of our little city, make it throng? Certainly. Yet

* Comp. here the strictures in Aristotle's *Polit.* iv. 3 and 4.

't would be no very great matter, either, if we added to them herdsmen also, and shepherds, and all other sorts of graziers, —in order that both the husbandmen may have oxen for ploughing, and the builders by aid of the husbandmen may have cattle for their carriages, and the weavers also, and shoemakers, hides and wool. Yet it would be no very small city, said he, that had all these. Moreover, said I, it is all but impossible to settle the city itself in such a place that it will not require imported goods. Impossible. Surely, then, it will require others in addition, to bring to it what it needs from other cities. It will require them. And, moreover, if the servant were to go empty, taking with him nothing that they need from whom what they themselves require is imported, he will return empty; will he not? I think so. It is necessary for them, then, not only to produce what is sufficient for themselves, but such and as many things also, as are required by those whose services they require. It ought. Our city, then, certainly wants many more husbandmen and other kinds of workmen. Aye, many more. And all other servants besides, to import and export the several articles; and these are merchants, are they not? Yes. We shall want merchants then, as well? Certainly. And if the traffic is carried on by sea, it will want many others besides, skilled in navigation. Many others, truly.

CHAP. XII.—What then;—in the city itself, how will they exchange with one another what each has produced, for the sake of which, we have formed a city and established a community? It is plain, said he, that by selling and buying [they will do so]. A market-place, therefore, and an established coinage, as a symbol for the purposes of exchange, must spring up from hence. Certainly. If then the husbandman, or any other workman, bring any of his work to the market, but does not come at the same time as those who want to make exchanges with him, will he not, while sitting in the market, be unoccupied at his trade? By no means, said he; for there are some, who, observing this, devote themselves to this service; and, in well-regulated cities, they are chiefly such, as are weakest in body and unfit for any other work;—these then should attend about the market, to give money in exchange for what people wish to sell, and goods in exchange for money to such as want to buy. It

is this want, said I, that provides our city with a race of shopkeepers; for do we not call those shopkeepers, who sit in the market, and serve both in selling and buying; whereas such as travel to other cities we call merchants? Certainly. There are certain other servants still, I conceive, who, though as regards intellectual power unworthy to be taken into society, yet possess bodily strength adequate for labour; and these selling the use of their strength, and calling the reward of it hire, are called, I think, hired labourers;—are they not? Just so. Hired labourers then, as it seems, form the complement of a city. Aye, it seems so. Has our city then, Adimantus, so increased on us already, as to be complete? Perhaps. Where, then, will justice and injustice be placed in it; and, in which of the matters that we have considered is it engendered? I do not know, said he, Socrates, unless it be somehow in a certain use of these very things with one another. Perhaps, said I, you are right:—but yet we must consider the point, and not avoid it. First, then, let us consider how the persons thus procured are to be supported.—In making bread and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and building houses, will they not work in summer, chiefly without clothes and shoes, but in winter, sufficiently clad and shod? and will they be supported partly on barley made into meal, and partly on wheat made into loaves, partly boiled and partly toasted, with fine loaves and cakes placed over a fire of stubble or dried leaves, and will they feast, they and their children, resting on couches strewed with smilax and myrtle-leaves,—drinking wine, crowned, and singing to the gods, pleasantly living together, begetting children not beyond their means, and cautiously guarding against poverty or war?

CHAP. XIII.—Glaucón then, in answer, said: You make the men feast, it seems, without esculents.* You say true, said I: I forgot that they were to have esculents too;—and they will clearly have salt, and olives, and cheese, and will boil bulbous roots, and potherbs, such as are cooked in the fields: and we will set before them desserts of figs, peas, and beans; and they will toast at the fire myrtle-berries and beech-nuts, drinking in moderation; and thus

* The Greek *βλῶν* is not to be translated, except by a periphrasis. It strictly means *boiled meat*, as opposed to bread,—but more generally, as here, anything eaten with bread or other food to give it flavour and relish.

passing their life in peace healthily, they will die in old age, probably, and leave a similar mode of life to their children. Socrates, said he, if you had been making a city of hogs, on what else but these would you have fed them? But what ought we to do then, Glaucon? said I. What is usual, said he: let them lie down on beds, I think, unless they are to live miserably, and take their meals from tables, and have esculents, as the present men have, and desserts. Be it so, said I:—I understand. We are considering, it seems, not only how a city, but how a luxurious city may exist; and perhaps it is not amiss: for, in considering one of this character, we may probably see how justice and injustice arise in cities. But the true city, which we have lately described, seems to me just like a person that is in health; but if you are desirous that we should inspect, also, a city that is inflated, there can be no objection to it: for these things [that concern a merely simple mode of life] will not of course suffice for some, nor will this sort of life satisfy them; but there must be beds, tables, and all other articles of furniture,—seasonings, unguents, and perfumes, mistresses, confections, and many miscellaneous articles of this description. And especially as to what we before mentioned, we must no longer consider these as alone necessary,—namely, houses, and clothes, and shoes; but we must set in operation painting too, and all the refined arts, and must possess gold, and ivory, and all things of that kind; must we not? Yes, said he.

CHAP. XIV.—Must we not, then, increase the size of our city?—For that healthy one is no longer sufficient, but already full of repletion and abundance of such things as are in nowise requisite for cities,—such as all kinds of sportsmen, and imitative artists, many of whom imitate in figures and colours, and many in music: poets too, and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, contractors,* and manufacturers of all sorts of trinkets, especially of those belonging to female attire; and in that case, too, we shall require many more servants; and think you not they will require teachers, nurses, tutors, hair-dressers, barbers, confectioners, too, and cooks? Aye, and further still, we shall want swine-herds. Of these, indeed, there were none

* Gr. ἱπολάδοι, i. e. persons undertaking for a certain sum to complete a house or any other given task.

in the other state (for there needed none); but in this we shall need these also; and shall require, too, many other sorts of cattle, if any one eats them; shall we not? Of course. Shall we not, then, in this mode of life, require physicians far more than in the former one? Much more.

And the land, perhaps, which at first sufficed to support the inhabitants, will, instead of being sufficient, become too little; or how shall we say? Just so, said he. Must we not then cut off a part from the neighbouring country, if we would have enough for arable and pasture, and they in turn from ours, if they on their part devote themselves to the accumulation of boundless wealth, going beyond the limits of mere necessity?

We must, Socrates, said he. Shall we go to war afterwards, Glaucon, or how shall we do? Certainly, said he. But let us not yet, said I, consider the question, whether war produces harm or good,—but thus much only, that we have found the origin of war, and whence especially arise mischiefs to cities, both privately and publicly. Aye, indeed. We shall require, then, friend, a still larger city,—not for a small, but for a large army, which may go out and fight with those who assail it, for their whole substance and everything that we have now mentioned. What, said he, are not these sufficient to fight? No, said I;—not if you and all of us were rightly agreed, when we formed our state: and we agreed, if you remember, that it was impossible for a single person to practise many arts well. True, said he. What then, said I, do not struggles in war seem to require art? Very much so, said he. Ought we then to take more care of the shoemaking art than of that of warfare? By no means. But we charged the shoemaker not to attempt to be at the same time a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder, in order that the work of shoemaking might be well done; and in like manner we allotted to each of the others a single calling, to which each was adapted by nature, and at which, each by abstaining from the rest, and applying to it the whole of his life, and not neglecting the proper opportunities, he would be likely to work well; but is it not of the greatest importance that what concerns war should be well performed? or is it so easy that one who is a husbandman may also be a soldier, and a shoemaker, and one who practises any other art,—while no one could become a skilful chess or dice

player, who does not study it from childhood, but makes it a mere by-work? and can a person who takes a spear or other warlike arms and instruments, instantly become an expert combatant in an armed encounter or aught else relating to war; while, as respects the tools of any other art whatever, one cannot become a good artist, or even a wrestler to any useful extent, without having correct knowledge and bestowing sufficient attention? In that case, such tools, said he, would truly be very valuable.

CHAP. XV.—Therefore, said I, by how much more important is the work of the state-guardians, by so much will it require the greatest leisure from other pursuits, and likewise the greatest art and study! I really think so, replied he. And will it not also require natural talents suited to this particular profession? Of course. I think, then, we should make it our special business, if possible, to choose what men and what talents are suited for the guardianship of a state. Aye, our special business. By Zeus, said I, in that case we have undertaken no trifling business; but, still we must not despair, as long, at least, as we have any ability. Of course not, said he. Think you, then, said I, that the genius of a high-bred whelp at all differs as respects guardianship, from that of a high-bred youth? What do you mean? For instance, must not each of them be acute in perception, swift in pursuing what he perceives, and strong likewise, if he wants, when he has taken, to overcome it? Of all these there is great need, said he. And surely he must be brave also, if he is to fight well. Of course. But is he likely to be brave, who has not a high spirit;* whether horse, or dog, or any other animal? Have you not observed, how irresistible and invincible is anger, and, when it is present, that every soul is fearless of everything and indomitable? I have. It is plain, then, what species of guardian we ought to have, as respects the body? Yes. And with reference to his soul moreover, that he should be spirited. That is clear, also. How then, said I, Glaucon, can they be otherwise than savage towards each other and the other citizens, when of such a temper? By Zeus, said he, not easily. Still it is necessary, that towards their friends they should be mild, but towards their enemies fierce:—for otherwise they would not wait for others to destroy them, but rather be beforehand with them in doing it.

* Gr. *θελήσει*, in the sense of *μίλλει* or *δύναται*.

True, said he. What shall we do, then, said I :—whence shall we find a disposition at the same time mild and magnanimous?—for the mild nature is surely opposed to the high-spirited? It appears so. Nevertheless, if he be deprived of either of these, he cannot be a good guardian ; but this seems to be impossible :—and thus it turns out that it is impossible there should be a good guardian. It seems so, said he. Then I, being at a loss, and considering what had passed, said :—We very justly hesitate, my friend, for we have departed from the image that we first established. How say you? Did we not observe that there are such kinds of tempers as we imagined did not exist, having these opposite qualities? Where? One may see it also in other animals, and not a little in that, to which we compared our guardian ; for you know it is the natural temper of generous dogs to be as gentle as possible towards their intimates and their acquaintances, but the reverse to those whom they know not. Aye,—I know it. This then, said I, is quite possible ; and we do not unnaturally require our guardian to be so. It seems not.

CHAP. XVI.—Are you, further, of opinion, that he who is to be our guardian should, besides being spirited, have a philosophic nature also? How? said he :—for I do not understand. This too, said I, you will observe in dogs, what is also well worthy of admiration in the brute. What? He is angry at every unknown person that he sees, though he has never suffered ill from him before ; but one that is known he fawns upon, even though he may never have received any good from him. Did you never wonder at this? I never, said he, thought of it before ; but he does so, it is clear. Moreover, this affection of his nature appears elegant at least, and truly philosophic. In what respect? Because, said I, it distinguishes a friendly and unfriendly aspect by nothing else but this,—that it knows the one, but not the other :—and how can we refuse to consider that as the love of learning, which defines the friendly and the foreign by intelligence and ignorance? By no means, said he :—it cannot be otherwise. Nevertheless, said I, to be a lover of learning and a philosopher, are the same. The same, said he. May we not then boldly lay down [the principle,] that in man too, if any one be mild towards his intimates and acquaintances, he must by nature be a philosopher and a lover of learning? Let us so lay it down, said he.

He, then, who intends to be a good and worthy state-guardian, should be by nature a philosopher, spirited, swift, and strong. By all means, said he. Let him, then, be just such as this, said I. In what manner, then, shall they be trained and instructed? and will the consideration of this at all aid us in perceiving the object, for the sake of which we are considering all these things; that is to say, how justice and injustice arise in a state? that we may not omit any necessary part of our argument, or wade through what is superfluous? Then, said Glaucon's brother: I, for my part, quite expect, that this inquiry will conduce to this end. By Zeus, said I, friend Adimantus, we must not dismiss it; even though it be somewhat too long. No, truly. Come then, let us, as if we were talking in the way of fable, and at our leisure, give some ideal training to these men.* It is right to do so.

CHAP. XVII.—What then is the education?—Is it difficult to discover a better than has been discovered for a long time? that is, surely, gymnastics for the body, and music for the mind? It is. Must we not first, then, begin by teaching music, rather than gymnastics? Of course. When you say music, you mean arguments, do you not? I do. But of arguments there are two kinds,—the one true, the other false. Yes. And they must be instructed in both,—but first in the false. I do not understand, said he, what you mean. Know you not, said I, that first of all we tell children fables;—and this, [surely,] to speak generally, is falsehood; though there is some truth in it; but we employ fables with children before gymnastic exercises. We do. This was what I meant, then, by saying that we must begin music before gymnastics. Right, said he. And know you not, that the beginning of every work is most important, especially to any one young and tender;—because then that particular impression is most easily instilled and formed, which any one may wish to imprint on each individual. Entirely so. Shall we then let children hear any kind of fables composed by any kind of persons, and receive into their minds opinions in a great measure contrary to those which we think they should have

* Gr. λόγῳ παιδεύωμεν. Comp. ch. iv. 361 b, and De Legg. iv. p. 712 a:—πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ νόμους.

when they are grown up? We should by no means allow it. First of all, then, as it seems, we must exercise control over the fable-makers; and whatever beautiful fable they may invent, we should select, and what is not so, we should reject:—and we are to prevail on nurses and mothers to repeat to the children such fables as are selected, and fashion their minds by fables, much more than their bodies by their hands. But very many of those that they now tell them ~~must~~ be cast aside. What, for instance? said he. In the more important fables, said I, we shall see the lesser likewise:—for the fashion of them must be the same; and both the greater and the less must have the same kind of influence:—do not you think so? I do, said he: but I do not at all understand, which of them you call the greater. Those, said I, which both Hesiod and Homer told us, and the other poets also:—for they composed and related false fables for mankind, and do still relate them. What class, said he, do you mean;—and what do you blame in them? That, said I, which ought first and most of all to be blamed,—especially when one does not falsify well. What is that? When a poet, in his composition, exhibits bad representations of the nature of gods and heroes,—just as a painter draws a picture not at all resembling what he was intending to paint. Yes, it is quite right, said he, that such as these should be blamed:—but how do we say, and in what respect? First of all, said I, with reference to that greatest falsehood, in matters of grave importance too, in saying which he did not falsify well, that Uranus made what Hesiod says he did; and then again how Kronos punished him, and what Kronos did, and suffered from his son:* for though these things were true, yet I think they should not be so readily told to the unwise and the young, but rather concealed from them;—and were there need to tell them, they should be heard in secrecy, by as few as possible, after sacrificing not a [valueless] hog,† but some great and wonderful sacrifice, in order that it may fall to the lot of the fewest possible to hear them. These fables, said he, are indeed

* Comp. Hesiod. Theogon. v. 154—6, and 178—80.

† Allusion is here made to the mysteries of Eleusis, in which all about to be initiated sacrificed a hog,—a circumstance referred to by Aristophanes, Pax, v. 373—5; Acharn. vv. 747 and 764. The verb ἀκούσαι refers to the cabalistic oaths and secrets that were listened to during the process of initiation.

injurious. Neither are they to be told, Adimantus, said I, in our state:—nor should it be said in the hearing of a youth, that he who commits the most extreme injustice, or that he who punishes in every possible way a father who commits injustice, does nothing strange, but only does the same as the first and the greatest of the gods. No truly, said he, nor do such things as these seem to me proper to be said. Neither, generally, said I, must it be told, how gods war with gods, and plot and fight against one another (for such assertions are not true),—if, at least, it be the duty of those who are to guard the state to esteem it most shameful to hate each other on slight grounds. As little ought we to describe in fables, and with ornamental aids, the battles of the giants, and other many and various feuds, both of gods and heroes, with their own kindred and relations:—but if we would persuade them that never at all should one citizen hate another, and that it is not holy, such things as these are rather to be told them in early childhood, by the old men and women and those well advanced in life; and the poets should be obliged to compose consistently with these views. And [the fables of] Hera fettered by her son,* and Hephæstus hurled from heaven by his father for going to assist his mother when beaten,† and all those battles of the gods which Homer has composed, we must not admit into our state;—either in allegory or without allegory; for young persons are not able to judge what is allegory and what is not, but whatever opinions they receive at such an age are wont to be obliterated with difficulty, and immovable. Hence, one would think, we should of all things endeavour, that what they first hear be composed in the best manner for exciting them to virtue.

CHAP. XVIII.—There is reason for it, said he:—but, if any one should ask us about these, what they are, and what kind of fables, which should we name? Adimantus, I replied, you and I are not poets at present, but founders of a city, and it is the founder's business to know the models on which the poets are to compose their fables, contrary to which they are not to be tolerated; but it is not

* Suidas tells us, under the word *Ἡρα*, that the myth here alluded to was mentioned in a passage of Pindar, and that it was to be found also in a comedy of Epicharmus, both now lost.

† Comp. Hom. Il. i. v. 588.

our province to make fables for them. Right, said he. But as to this very thing,—namely, the models to be taken in speaking about the gods, what must they be? Some such as these, said I:—God is always to be represented such as he is, whether we represent him in epic, in song, or in tragedy. Necessarily so. Is not God essentially good, and is he not to be described as such? Without doubt. But nothing that is good is hurtful, is it? I do not think so. Does then what is not hurtful ever hurt? By no means. Does that, which hurts not, do any evil? Nor this either. And what does no evil cannot be the cause of any evil? Of course not. But what?—good is beneficial. Yes. It is, therefore, the cause of prosperity? Yes. Good, therefore, is not the cause of all things, but the cause of those things only which are in a right state,—not the cause of those things which are in a wrong state. Entirely so, said he. Neither, then, can God, said I, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as the many say, but only the cause of a few things to men, but of many things not the cause; for our blessings are much fewer than our troubles: and no other must be assigned as the cause of our blessings; whereas of our troubles we must seek some other causes, and not God. You seem to me, said he, to speak most truly. We must not admit, then, said I, that error of Homer or any other poet who foolishly errs with respect to the gods, and says how—

Fast by the threshold of Jove's courts are placed
Two casks; one stored with evil, one with good,
From which the God dispenses as he wills.
For whom the glorious Thund'rer mingles both,
He leads a life chequer'd with good and ill
Alternate; but to whom he gives unmix'd
The bitter cup, he makes that man a curse,
His name becomes a by-word of reproach,
His strength is hunger-bitten, and he walks
The blessed earth unblest, go where he may,—*

Nor, that Zeus—

Grants mortal man both happiness and woe.

CHAP. XIX.—As regards the violation of oaths and treaties which Pandarus effected, if any should say it was done by the agency of Athena and Zeus, we cannot approve;—neither [if he were to relate] the dissension

* Hom. Il. xxiv. v. 527—31.

among the gods, and the judgment by Themis and Zeus; nor yet must we suffer the youth to hear what Æschylus says; how,

Forthwith to mortals God invents a cause,

Whene'er he wills their dwellings to destroy ;—

and, besides, if any one is making poetical compositions, in which are these iambics, the sufferings of Niobe, of the Pelopides, or the Trojans, or others of a like nature, we must either not suffer him to say, that they are the works of God,—or, if of God, we must discover that principle of action which we now require, and say, that God did what was just and good, and that they were benefited by being chastised: and we must not let a poet say, that those are miserable who are punished, and that it is God who does these things. If they say, however, that the wicked, as being miserable, need correction, and that, in being punished, they are benefited by God, we may suffer the assertion.—To say, however, that God, who is good, is the cause of ill to any one, this we must by all means oppose, and suffer no one to say so in our state; if at any rate we wish it well governed;—neither must we allow any one, young or old, to hear such things told in fable, either in verse or prose,—as their relation is neither consistent with holiness, nor profitable to us, nor consistent with themselves.

I vote along with you, said he, as respects this law,—for it quite pleases me. This, then, said I, is probably one of the laws and models as respects the gods, by which it will be necessary for those who speak to speak and for those who compose to compose, that God is not the cause of all things, but of good. Yes, said he, of course. But what as to this second law?—Think you that God is a sorcerer, and appears designedly, at different times, in different shapes,—sometimes like himself,—and, at other times, changing his form into many shapes,—sometimes deceiving us and making us conceive false opinions of him;—or, that he is simple, and that he by no means quits his proper form? I cannot, now, at least, say so, replied he. But what as to this;—if anything be changed from its proper form, must it not be necessarily changed by itself, or by another? Undoubtedly. Are not those things which are in the best state, changed and moved least of all other by another;—as the body, by meats and drinks, and labours, and all kinds of plants by droughts and winds, and

such like accidents? Is not the most healthy and vigorous least of all changed? Surely. And as to the soul itself, will not external accidents least of all disorder and change the bravest and wisest? Yes. And surely all manufactured vessels, and buildings, and vestments, such as are properly made and in a right state, are according to the same reasoning least of all changed by time, or other accidents? Such is the case. Everything then, which is in a good state, either by nature or art, or both, receives the smallest change from another. It seems so. But God, and all that belongs to divinity, are in the best state? Of course. In this way, then, God should least of all have many shapes? Least of all, truly.

CHAP. XX.—Again.—should he change and alter himself? Clearly so, said he, if he be changed at all. Does he then change himself to what is better, and fairer, or to the worse, and more deformed? To the worse, surely, replied he,—if he be changed at all; for we can never say, that God is at all deficient in beauty or excellence. You speak most correctly, said I. And this being so, think you, Adimantus, that any one, either of gods or men, would willingly make himself any way worse? Impossible, said he. It is impossible, then, said I, for a god to desire to change himself; but, as it seems, each being most beautiful and excellent, continues always to the utmost of his power invariably in his own form. This seems a necessary conclusion, said he. Well then, said I, most excellent Adimantus, let not any of the poets tell us, how

. in similitude of strangers oft
The gods, who can with ease all shapes assume,
Repair to populous cities*

Neither let any one belie Proteus and Thetis, nor introduce Hera in tragedies or other poems, as having transformed herself into a priestess, collecting for

Those life-sustaining sons
Of Inachus, the Argive streams;—

nor let them tell us many other such falsehoods:—nor again, let mothers, persuaded by them, terrify their children, telling the stories wrong,—as, that certain gods wander by night,

Resembling various guests, in various forms,—

* *Odyss.* xvii. v. 485, 6.

lest they should, at one and the same time, blaspheme against the gods, and make their children cowards. Surely not, said he. But do the gods, said I, who in themselves never change, still make us imagine that they appear in various forms, deceiving us, and playing the sorcerer? Perhaps they do, said he. What, said I;—can a god wish to deceive,—holding up a mere phantom, either in word or deed? I know not, said he. Know you not, said I, that a real falsehood (if we be allowed to say so), both all the gods and men abhor? How mean you? replied he. Thus, said I: that to be deceived in the most excellent part of oneself, and that about one's highest interests, is what no one wishes of his own accord; but, of all things, every one is most afraid of this happening to him. Even yet, said he, I do not understand you. Because, said I, you think I am saying something awful:—but I am saying, that for the soul to be deceived with respect to realities, and to be so deceived and ignorant, and in that to have obtained and to maintain a falsehood, is what every one would least of all choose; and would most hate it in the soul. Most especially, said he. But this, as I was now saying, might very correctly be termed a real falsehood—ignorance in the soul of the deceived person; for imitation in words is a kind of image of the affection the soul feels, and springs up afterwards, and is not altogether a pure falsehood:—is it not so? Assuredly.

CHAP. XXI.—But a real falsehood is not only hated by the gods, but also by men. It appears so to me. But what as to a falsehood in words? when is it of such service, so as not to deserve hatred?—Is it not when employed towards enemies, and some even of those called friends,—when during madness, or other folly, they attempt to do some mischief;—in that case, is it not useful for dissuasion as a drug;—and in the fables we just mentioned, because we know not how the truth stands about ancient things, do we not forge a falsehood resembling the truth as much as possible, and so make it useful? It certainly is so, said he. In which of these cases, then, is a falsehood useful to God?—Does he invent a falsehood resembling the truth, because he is ignorant of ancient things? That were ridiculous, said he. In God, then, there is not a lying poet? I think not. But would he invent a falsehood through fear of his enemies? Far from it

Or on account of the folly or madness of his friends? No, said he, none of the foolish and mad are beloved of God. There is no occasion at all, then, for a god to invent a falsehood? None. The divine and godlike nature, then, is altogether free from falsehood? Entirely so, said he. God, then, is quite simple and true, both in word and deed; neither is he changed himself, nor does he deceive others,—neither by visions, nor discourse, nor the pomp of signs, neither when we are awake nor when we sleep? So it appears to me, said he, just as you say. You agree then, said I, that this shall be the second principle which we are to lay down both in speaking and composing concerning the gods,*—namely, that they are neither sorcerers and change themselves, nor mislead us by falsehoods, either in word or deed? I agree. While, then, we commend many other things in Homer, this we shall not commend,—namely, the dream sent by Jupiter to Agamemnon; nor that in Æschylus, when he makes Thetis say that Apollo had sung at her marriage, that

..... her happy lot should be
 To bear an offspring fair, from ailment free,
 And blest with lengthen'd days; and then the God,
 Unfolding all, with pæans high proclaim'd
 Thy heaven-blest fortunes, welcome to my soul
 I hoped that all was true that Phœbus sang
 So sweetly tuned with high prophetic art;—
 But he who at my nuptials joy foretold,
 The same is he, who now hath slain my child.

When any one alleges such things as these about the gods, we must show disapproval, and not grant them the privilege of a chorus; neither should we suffer teachers to employ them in the training of youth,—if at least our guardians are to be pious and divine men, as far as man can be. As to all these models, I entirely agree with you, said he, and I should adopt them as laws.

* Gr. τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι ἐν ᾧ δὲ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν.

BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

In the *third book* he continues to dilate on music and gymnastics, and then proceeds to treat of the talents, habits, and education suitable for the inferior magistrates of a state. Lastly, from the interpretation of a certain Phœnician fable, he demonstrates the need of a community and general harmony between citizens, as being truly brethren and members of the same family. It is quite necessary, however, that there should be a distinct and well-ordered *εὐραξία*, because some are capable of being *χρῦσος*, others only *ἀργυρεος*, and so on, according to caste, talent, and conduct, all together composing the state ;—and lastly, he expresses disapprobation at the great weight given to the sayings of poets, whom accordingly he wishes to be excluded from his ideal republic, though he willingly accords them honour on account of their great learning.

CHAP. I.—Concerning the gods, then, said I, such things as these are, it seems, to be both heard, and not heard, from childhood upwards, by those who will honour the gods and parents, and not lightly esteem mutual friendship. Aye,—and methinks, said he, these things are rightly so understood. But what then?—If men are to be brave, must not these things be told them, and such others likewise, as may make them least of all afraid of death ; or, think you, that any one can ever be brave, who has this fear within him ? Not I, truly, said he. But what ? think you any one can be free from the fear of death, while he conceives that there is Hades—and a dreadful place, too,—and that in battles he will choose death in preference to defeat and slavery ? Surely not.

We ought then, it seems, to take the command, also, of those who undertake to discourse about these fables, and entreat them not so sweepingly to abuse what is in Hades, but rather to praise it ;—since they neither speak what is true nor what is expedient for those who mean to be soldiers. We

ought indeed, said he. Beginning then, said I, at this verse, we will omit all such as these :—

I had rather live
The servile hind for hire, and eat the bread
Of some man scantily, himself sustained,
Than sovereign empire hold o'er all the shades ;*—

And this—

Lest Neptune o'er his head
Shattering the vaulted earth, should wide disclose
To mortal and immortal eyes his realm
Terrible, squalid, to the gods themselves
A dreaded spectacle ;—

And—

Oh, then, ye gods ! there doubtless are below,
The soul and semblance both, but empty forms ;†—

And—

He's wise alone, the rest are flutt'ring shades ;‡ —

And—

Down into Hades from his limbs dismiss'd
His spirit fled sorrowful, of youth's prime
And vigorous manhood suddenly bereft ;§—

And—

..... His soul, like smoke, down to the shades
Fled howling..... ||

And—

As when the bats within some hallow'd cave
Flit screaming all around ; for if but one
Fall from the rock, the rest all follow him ;
In such connexion mutual they adhere ;
So..... the ghosts
Troop'd downward, gibbering all the dreary way.¶

As to these and all such like passages, we must request Homer and the other poets not to be offended at our erasing them,—not as unpoetical and displeasing to the ears of the multitude ;—for the more poetical they are, the less should they be listened to by children, or men either, who would be free, and fear slavery more than death. Aye, by all means.

* Odyss. xi. v. 488—91.

† Il. xxiii. v. 103.

‡ Il. xxii. v. 265.

§ Il. xvi. v. 856.

|| Il. xxii. v. 100.

¶ Odyss. xxiv. v. 6.

CHAP. II.—Further, are not all dreadful and frightful titles also, about these things, to be rejected ;—Cocytus and Styx, the infernals, the life-lorn, and many other appellations of this character, such as make all hearers shudder ?—and perhaps they may well serve some other purpose ; but we fear for our guardians, lest by such terror they be made more effeminate and soft than is fitting. We are in the right too, to be afraid of that, said he. Are these then to be suppressed ? Yes. And must they speak, then, and compose on a contrary model to these ? Plainly so. And are we likewise to suppress the wailings and lamentations of illustrious men ? We must, said he, if we do the former. Consider then, said I, whether we shall suppress them rightly or not,—and do we say, that the virtuous man to another virtuous man—whose friend he is—deems death dreadful ? We do. He would not then, at any rate, lament over him, as if he had suffered something dreadful ? No, indeed. And we say this likewise, that such an one is most of all self-sustained as regards living happily, and distinctively above all others, least in need of foreign aid. True, said he. To him, then, it is least dreadful to be deprived of a son, a brother, or property, or other like things ? Aye, least of all so. Least of all then will he lament, but rather endure with the utmost meekness whatever trouble may befall him ? Certainly. We should be right then in suppressing the lamentations of famous men, and should assign them to women, (and among these even not to the better sort), and to such men as are cowards ; in order that, as regards those whom we propose to educate for the guardianship of the country, they may disdain to act thus. Right, said he. Again, then, we will entreat Homer and the rest of the poets not to say in their compositions about Achilles, the son of a goddess, that

Now on his side he lay, now lay supine,
Now prone ; then starting from his couch he roam'd
Forlorn the beach.....*

Nor how—

..... grasping with both hands the ashes,
Down he pour'd them burning on his head....†

Nor the rest of his lamentation and wailing,—of whatever

* II. xxiv. v. 10.

† II. xviii. v. 23, 24.

kind and quantity he made them;—nor Priam, near as he was to the gods, who—

..... to all—kneel'd
In turn, then roll'd himself in dust, and each
By name solicited to give him way.*

Still much more must we entreat them not to represent the gods as bewailing, and saying,

Ah me, forlorn ! ah me, parent in vain
Of an illustrious birth.†

And if they are not thus to introduce the gods, far less should they dare thus unbecomingly to represent the greatest of those gods :

Ah ! I behold a warrior dear to me,
Around the walls of Ilium driven, and grieve
For Hector,—

And again,—

Alas, he falls ! my most beloved of men,
Sarpedon, vanquished by Patroclus, falls :
So will the Fates !‡

CHAP. III.—Supposing then, friend Adimantus, our youths should seriously hear such things as these, and not ridicule them as spoken unworthily,—hardly any one would think it unworthy of himself as a man, or reprove himself [for it,] if he should chance either to say or do anything of the kind,—but would rather, without shame or endurance, sing many lamentations and moanings over trifling sufferings. You speak most truly, replied he. But they must not,—as our argument has just evinced ; which we must believe, till some one persuades us by some better. They must not, of course. Neither ought we, moreover, to be over fond of laughing :—for commonly where a man gives himself to violent laughter, such a disposition requires a violent change. I think so, said he. Neither, if any one should represent worthy men as overcome by laughter, should we allow it, much less if [he thus represent] the gods. Much, indeed, said he. Neither, then, ought we to receive such statements as these of Homer concerning the gods :—

Heaven rang with laughter inextinguishable—
Peal after peal, such pleasure all conceived
At sight of Vulcan in his new employ.§

* Il. xxii. v. 414. † Il. xviii. v. 54. ‡ Il. xxii. v. 168.

§ Namely as cupbearer to the gods.—Il. i. v. 599.

This cannot be admitted, according to your reasoning. If you please to call it my reasoning, said he,—this, indeed, cannot be admitted. Besides this, however, the truth must be held of great importance :—for if we just now argued rightly,* and falsehood be really of no service to the gods, but useful to men, in the form of a drug, it is plain that such a thing should be trusted only to physicians, but not meddled with by private persons. Quite plain, said he. To the governors of the state, then, if to any, it especially belongs to speak falsely either about enemies or citizens, for the good of the state ; whereas, for all the rest, they must venture on no such a thing. For a private person, moreover, to speak falsely against such governors, we shall deem the same and even a greater offence, than for a patient not to speak the truth to his physician, or for one who is learning his exercises to his gymnastic master about the ailments of his body,—or for one not to tell the pilot the real state of what concerns the ship and sailors, how himself and the other sailors are performing their duty. Most true, said he. If, however, he should detect any other citizen in a falsehood—

..... of those, who by profession serve

The public, prophet, healer of disease,

Or him who makes the shafts of spears,†

he will punish him, as introducing a practice subversive and destructive of the city, as well as of a ship. If, at least, it is on speech that actions are completed.‡ But what ;—will our youths have no need of temperance ? Certainly. And are not such as these in general the principal parts of temperance ; namely, obedience to governors,—and also, that the governors themselves be temperate in drinking, feasting, and pleasures of love ? I am quite of that opinion. And we shall say, I believe, that such views are just,—just as in Homer Diomedes says :

Sit thou in silence, and obey my speech,§—

and what is in connexion therewith,—thus :

So moved the Greeks successive, ev'ry chief
His loud command proclaiming, while the rest,
As voice in all those thousands none had been,
Heard mute..... ||

* Comp. B. ii. ch. 21.

† Hom. Od. xvii. v. 383.

‡ Gr. *ἀνὰ πῆρ ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελέηται*.

§ Il. iv. v. 412.

|| Il. iv. v. 431.

and so on. Well spoken. But what of such as these?—

Oh! charged with wine, in steadfastness of face
Dog unabash'd, and yet at heart a deer,*—

and as respects what follows, and whatever other childish effusions are uttered in prose or verse by private individuals, are they well [pronounced]? No, not well:—for, methinks, even as respects temperance, such [discourses] are not fit for the young to hear; and supposing they do afford some other sort of pleasure, it is no wonder:—but what is your notion of the matter? The same as your own, said he.

CHAP. IV.—What?—To make the wisest man say, that it appears to him supremely beautiful, when

..... the steaming table's spread
With plenteous viands, while the cups, with wine
From brimming beakers fill'd, pass brisk around,†—

does it seem proper to you that a youth should hear, in order to obtain a command over himself;—or yet this:—

..... most miserable it is,
To die of famine and have adverse fate;‡—

or that Zeus, through desire for the pleasures of love, could easily forget all that in solitary watching he had revolved in his mind, while other gods and men were asleep, and could be so struck on seeing Hera, as not even to care to enter his chamber, but to desire connexion with her on the very spot, to embrace her on the ground, and at the same time to declare that he was possessed with a desire, exceeding even what he felt on their first acquaintance,

..... Hidden from their parents dear;§—

nor yet how Ares and Aphrodite were bound by Hephæstus,|| and other such things? No, by Zeus, said he; these seem quite unfit. But if, said I, any instances of self-denial in all matters are both to be spoken of and practised by men of eminence, these should be held up for a spectacle and celebrated in verse,—such as this:¶—

..... Smiting on his breast, thus he reprov'd
The mutinous inhabitant within.**

* Il. i. v. 225.

† Od. ix. v. 8.

‡ Od. xi. v. 342.

§ Il. xiv. v. 291.

|| Od. viii. v. 266.

¶ *Θεαρίον τε καὶ ἀκουστέον*, which we have somewhat paraphrastically rendered. in order to give the full meaning of the words.

** Od. xx. v. 17.

Just so, by all means, said he. Of course, then, we cannot by any means allow men to receive bribes, or be covetous. By no means. Neither must we sing to them, that

Gifts gain the gods and venerable kings ;*—

neither can we commend Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, as if he spoke correctly, when counselling him to accept of presents and assist the Greeks, but, without presents, not to desist from his wrath : †—nor again, should we commend Achilles himself, or approve of his being so covetous as to receive presents from Agamemnon, and, likewise for giving up the dead body of Hector, on receiving a ransom, when otherwise he would not do so. Of course it is not right, said he, to commend such conduct as this. I am loath, said I, for Homer's sake, to say, that it is not allowable to allege these things against Achilles, or to believe them, when said by others ; nor, again, that he spoke thus to Apollo :—

Oh ! of all the powers above,
To me most adverse, archer of the skies !
Thou hast beguiled me, leading me away...
And hast defrauded me of great renown.
Ah ! had I power, I would requite thee well, ‡—

and how he disobeyed the river [Xanthus,] though a divinity, and was ready to fight ; and again, how he says to that other river, Spercheius, with his sacred locks,

Thy lock to great Patroclus I could give,
Who now is dead... §

Now, that he actually did this, we cannot believe. And again, the dragging of Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and the murder of the captives at his funeral pile,—we shall deny that all this is spoken truly ; nor shall we suffer our people to believe, that Achilles, the son of a goddess, and of Peleus, the most wise of men, and the third from Jupiter, educated also by that sage Chiron, could be of so disordered a constitution as to have within him two positively opposite moral ailments,—illiberality and covetousness, and moreover a

* This verse is not to be found in any of Homer's writings ; and Suidas ascribes it to Hesiod. Euripides has a similar sentiment, *Med.* v. 934.

† *Comp. Il. xix. v. 278, &c. with Il. xxiv. v. 175, &c.*

‡ *Il. xxii. v. 15, 16.*

§ *Il. xxiii. v. 151.*

contempt both of gods and men. You say right, replied he.

CHAP. V.—Let us not then believe these things, said I, nor yet suffer any to say, that Theseus, son of Poseidon, and Pirithous, son of Zeus, were impelled to such dire abductions; nor that any other son of a deity, or hero either, would dare to commit horrible and impious deeds, such as now they falsely ascribe to them; but let us compel the poets to say, either that the actions do not belong to these persons, or that these persons are not the children of gods,—but not to say both, nor yet try to persuade our youth that the gods are the origin of evil, and heroes no better than men:—for just as we said before, these [statements] are neither holy nor true; inasmuch as we have somewhere or other shown, that evils cannot possibly proceed from the gods. Of course not. But, besides this, they are hurtful to the hearers also; for every one will pardon his own depravity, through the persuasion that even the near relatives of the gods, near to Zeus himself, do, and have done, things of a similar nature, of whom it has been written,—

They, on the top of Ida, have uprear'd
To parent Jupiter an altar;—

And,

Whose blood derived from gods is not extinct.

Wherefore, we should suppress all such fables, lest they create in our youth a great readiness for committing wickedness. We should so, of course, replied he. What other species of argument, then, said I,—since we are speaking about arguments,—have we still remaining, which ought, or ought not, to be maintained?—For in what manner we ought to speak of the gods we have already mentioned, and likewise of demons and heroes, and those too in Hades. Certainly. Does it not remain, then, to speak concerning men? Clearly so. Still it is impossible for us, my friend, to regulate this at present. How? Because we shall say, I think, that the poets and orators speak amiss in most important respects concerning mankind, as [for instance,] that many are unjust, and yet happy, while the just are miserable; and that injustice is profitable, if it escape observation, while justice is another's gain indeed, but injury to one's self; such things, as these, we must forbid them to say, but yet bid them sing and compose in fable

the very contrary. Do you not think so? I know it well, said he. If then you acknowledge that I am right, shall I conclude that you have admitted what all along we were seeking for? You judge right, said he. Shall we not allow, then, that such arguments may be stated about men, whenever we shall have discovered the nature of justice,—and how it is naturally profitable for the just man to be such, whether he seem so or not? Most true, replied he.

CHAP. VI.—Concerning the arguments, then, let what we have said suffice, and now we should consider, methinks, the manner of stating them; and then we shall have completely considered, both what is to be spoken, and the manner how. Adimantus here said;—What you now say, I do not understand. Nevertheless, replied I, it needs you should.—Perhaps then you will understand it better in this way:—is not everything told by the mythologists or poets, a narrative of the past, present, or future?* Of course, replied he. And do not they execute it, either in simple narrative, or through the medium of imitation, or both? This too, replied he, I yet require to understand more plainly. I appear, said I, to be a ridiculous and dull instructor:—like those, then, who are unable to speak, I will endeavour to explain my meaning,—not the whole generally, but by a particular case. And tell me,—are you acquainted with the opening of the *Iliad*, where the poet says, Chryses entreated Agamemnon to ransom his daughter; but that he was angry, whereupon the former, since he did not obtain his request, besought the god, against the Greeks? I know it. You know, then, that down to these verses,—

His supplication was at large to all

The host of Greece; but most of all to two,

The sons of Atreus, highest in command,—

the poet himself speaks, and does not attempt to divert our attention elsewhere, as if any other person were speaking except himself; but as to what he says after this, he speaks as though he himself were Chryses, and tries all he can to make us think that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest, an old man:—and thus he has composed nearly all the rest of the narrative of what happened at Troy, and in Ithaca, and the adventures

* This threefold distinction of poetry is mentioned likewise by Aristotle; *Poet. ch. iii. § 2.*

throughout the *Odyssey*. Yes, certainly, replied he. Is it not narrative, then, when he recites the several speeches, and also when [he recites] what intervenes between the speeches? Of course. But when he speaks in the person of another, do we not say, that then he assimilates his speech as much as possible to each person whom he introduces as speaking? We will grant it;—why not? And is not [a poet's] assimilation of himself to another, either in voice or figure, an imitation of that person to whom he assimilates himself? Of course. In such a case as this, then, it seems, both he and the other poets execute their narrative by means of imitation? Certainly. But if the poet were not to conceal himself at all, his whole action and narrative would be without imitation.—That you may not say, however, that you do not again understand how this can be, I will tell you.—If, for instance, in relating how Chryses came with his daughter's ransom, beseeching the Greeks, but chiefly the kings, Homer had subsequently spoken, not in the character of Chryses, but still as Homer, you know it would not be imitation, but only simple narrative:—and it would have been somehow thus (I shall speak without metre, for I am no poet):—"The priest came and prayed, that the gods would allow them to take Troy, and return in safety; and begged them also to restore him his daughter, and accept the presents, out of respect to the god. When he had said this, all the rest showed respect, and consented; but Agamemnon became enraged, and charged him to depart instantly, and not return, lest his sceptre and the garlands of the god should not avail him, and added also, that, before his daughter should be ransomed she should grow old with him in Argos; and he ordered him to be gone, and not irritate him, if he would get home in safety. The old man on hearing this was terrified and went away in silence. And after his retiring from the camp he offered numerous prayers to Apollo, calling on the god by his various names, and reminding as well as imploring him, that, if ever, either in the building of temples, or the offering of sacrifices, he had made any acceptable presents,—for the sake of these then, he besought him, to avenge with his shafts on the Greeks the tears [that had been shed] by himself."*—Thus far, said I, friend, the narrative is simple, without imitation. I understand, said he.

* The Greek form—*τὰ δ δάκρυα* is unquestionably archaic; but,

CHAP. VII.—Understand, then, said I, that the opposite of this happens, when one takes out the poet's words between the speeches, and leaves only the dialogue. This too, said he, I understand, that something like this takes place with tragedies. You have apprehended my meaning quite correctly, said I. And methinks, I can now make plain to you what before I could not,—that in poetry, and all fabulous writing, one species of it is wholly imitative, as, for instance (just as you say), tragedy and comedy; another species employs the narration of the poet himself, (you will find this chiefly in dithyrambs;) and another again by both, as in epic poetry, and many other kinds besides:—if you understand me. Aye,—I now understand, replied he, what you meant before. Remember, too, that we were before saying, that it had already been settled what were to be the subjects of speech, but it yet remained to be considered how they should be spoken. I do remember. This then, is the very thing that I was saying,—namely, that we ought to have agreed, whether we will allow the poets to make us narratives wholly through the medium of imitation, or partly through imitation, partly not so,—and, of what kind in each,—or lastly whether they are not to employ imitation at all. I guess, said he, you are inquiring, whether we are to receive tragedy and comedy into our state, or not. Perhaps so, said I, and something more too,—for I as yet know not; but wherever our reason, wind-like, carries us, there must we go. You say well, said he. Let us then consider, Adimantus, whether our guardians ought to be practised imitators or not:—does not this follow, from what has been above stated, that each may exercise one business well, but many, not,—and should he attempt it, that, in grasping at many things, he will fail in all, and excel, perhaps, in none? Of course he will. Well then, does not the same reasoning apply to imitation, that the same man cannot so well imitate many things as one? Of course he cannot. In that case he can perform scarcely any of the more eminent employments, and at the same time imitate many things, and be an apt imitator,—since the same persons cannot well execute two different sorts of imitations, apparently similar to each other; as, for instance, comedy

as Stallbaum well observes, was still extant among the Athenians in colloquial language.

* Gr. ὥστ' εἶναι ἑλλόγιμος.

and tragedy:—and as for that, did you not, just now, call both of these imitations? I did; and you are right in saying, that the same persons cannot succeed [in both]. Nor can they, at the same time, be rhapsodists and actors? True. Nor can the same persons be actors in comedies and in tragedies:—and all these are imitations, are they not? Aye,—surely. The genius of man, Adimantus, seems to have been cut up even into a still greater number of minute particles,—so much so, indeed,* that it cannot properly imitate many things, or perform [in earnest] those very things, of which even the imitations are the resemblances. Most true, said he.

CHAP. VIII.—If we are to hold to our first reasoning, therefore, that our guardians, though unoccupied in any productive art whatever, ought to be the most skilful labourers for the liberty of the state, and to mind nothing but what refers thereto, it were surely proper that they should neither perform nor imitate anything else,—but, should they imitate at all, to imitate from their childhood upwards just what correspond with these,—brave, temperate, pious, generous-hearted men, and the like;—but neither to perform, nor desire to imitate what is illiberal or base, lest from the very imitation they come to experience the positive reality.† Have you not also observed, that imitations, if from earliest youth onwards they be long continued, become established in the manners and natural temper, both as to body and voice, and intellect too? Very much so, replied he. Surely we are not to allow those, said I, for whom we profess to be anxious, and who ought to be good men, to imitate a woman either young or old, whether reviling her husband, or contending against the gods, and speaking boastingly from the idea of her own happiness;—neither should we imitate her in her misfortunes, sorrows, and lamentations, when sick, or in love, or in the throes of child-birth; we shall be far from allowing this. By all means, replied he. Nor to imitate male or female servants in doing servants' duties? Nor this either. Nor yet, it seems, depraved men, dastards, and those who do the contrary of what has been just mentioned, who revile and rail at one another; and speak abominable things,

* Gr. εἰς ἀμικρότερα κατακεκερματίζθαι.

† Gr. ἵνα ἢ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν.

whether drunk or sober, or [do] any other misdeeds, such as this class of persons are guilty of, either in words or actions, either as respects themselves or others?—I think too, that they should not even accustom themselves to resemble madmen, in words or actions, for one may know both the mad and wicked, whether men or women;—yet we must not either do or imitate any one of their actions. Most true, said he. But what, said I;—are braziers or other craftsmen, or such as row vessels, or pilot the sailors, or any others connected therewith to be imitated? How can it be so, said he, by those at least who are not allowed to give their mind up to those pursuits? But what,—are they to imitate horses neighing, or bulls lowing, or rivers murmuring, or the sea roaring, or thunder, and all such like things? No surely, said he:—we have forbidden them either to get mad, or resemble madmen. If then I understand what you mean, replied I, there is a sort of speech and narrative in which the truly good and worthy man expresses himself, when required to say anything,—and another again quite dissimilar, to which a person quite oppositely born and bred always adheres, and in which [he always] expresses himself. But what sorts are they? asked he. That man, said I, seems a worthy man, who on coming in his narrative to any speech or action of a good man, will willingly tell it, as if he were himself the man, and not be ashamed of such an imitation,—the more especially, if he be imitating a good man acting cautiously and sensibly, one who is seldom and but little led astray through ailments, or love, or drink, or any other mishap. But when there arises [in his narrative] anything unworthy of himself, he will not be in any hurry to assimilate himself to one that is worse, except it be for a short time when he is doing some good; and besides, he will be ashamed of it, both as being unpractised in the imitation of such characters, and also, as unwilling to mould himself, and stand among the models of baser men, whom all the while he despises in his heart, [bearing with them] only for mere amusement. Probably, said he.

CHAP. IX.—Will he employ a narrative such as that we not long since described in the case of Homer's poems; and will his language partake both of imitation and simple narrative, but have only a small portion of imitation inserted in a great quantity [of plain narrative?]
—Do you think I speak to the pur-

pose or not? Yes, certainly, replied he; that must needs be the type of such an orator. In that case, said I, will not such a man, the more he is depraved, the more readily narrate any matter *whatever*, thinking nothing unworthy of him,—so much so, indeed, that he will undertake to imitate everything zealously and in public, and such especially as we just mentioned, *thunderings* and noises of winds and tempests, and of axles and wheels, and of trumpets, pipes, whistles, and sounds of all kinds of instruments, and the cries of dogs likewise, and sheep, and birds?—and of course the whole expression of this is to be by imitation, both in voice and gestures, partaking but slightly of narrative. This too, said he, is a matter of course. These, said I, are what I termed the two kinds of diction. Yes, they are, replied he. Has not one of the two, then, very trifling variations; and to give the diction a becoming harmony and rhythm, he who would speak correctly must always speak in the same style, in one harmony,—for the variations are but trifling,—and of course in a rhythm closely corresponding? It is so, clearly, replied he. But as to the other kind, does it not require the contrary,—all kinds of harmonies, and all kinds of rhythms, if, indeed, it is to be naturally expressed, on account of its having all sorts and shades of variation? That is precisely the case. Do not, then, all the poets, and writers of narrative generally,† use one or other of these models of diction, or a blending of the other two? They must, replied he. What are we to do then, said I:—shall we admit into our state all of these [models,] or only one of the unmixed, or the one compounded? If my opinion, replied he, is to prevail, [you should employ] that uncompounded one, which imitates only what is worthy. But surely, Adimantus, the mixed is at least pleasant:—the most pleasant of all, both to children and pedagogues, is the opposite or what you choose, and it is so to the crowd likewise. Yes, it is the most pleasant. But probably, said I, you will not deem it suited to our civil establishment, because with us no man can be engaged in two or more occupations, but each individual is employed in one only? Of course, it is not fit. Shall we not find then, that in such a state alone, a shoemaker is only a shoemaker, and not a pilot as well as a shoe-

* Gr. *καὶ δὴ ἐν ῥυθμῷ ὡσαύτως παραπλησίῳ τινί.*

† Gr. *καὶ οἱ τι λέγοντες.*

maker; and that the husbandman is only a husbandman, and not a judge as well as a husbandman; and that the soldier is a soldier, and not a money-maker as well; and so with the rest? True, replied he. With respect to the man then, who is enabled by his talents to become everything and imitate everything, if that person were to come into our state and wish to show us his poems, we should respect him as a pious, wonderful, and pleasant person, but would say that we have no such person in our state, nor could such be allowed; and then we should send him to some other state, pouring oil on his head, and crowning him with a woollen chaplet,* while we ourselves would call in, to our advantage, a more austere and less pleasing poet and mythologist, to imitate for us the diction of what is becoming, and say whatever he says, in accordance with those models which we regularly set forth on first undertaking the education of our soldiers. So we should do, replied he, if it depended on us. Now then, friend, it seems that we have thoroughly discussed that part of music which concerns oratory and fable; for what is to be spoken, and how spoken, we have already considered. I think so too, observed he.

CHAP. X.—Are we not next to speak, said I, about the style of song and melody?† Clearly so. Cannot one already find out, then, what we ought to say about these things, and of what kind they should be, if we would be consistent with what we have above said? Here Glaucon, smiling, said,—I seem, indeed, Socrates, to be a stranger to the whole business, for I cannot at present conceive what we ought to say,

* Gr. ἀποπέμπομέν τε ἂν εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχάντες καὶ ἱρίῳ στέφαντες. This passage with all its beauty is somewhat obscure. It plainly refers to that kind of poet, who was used to treat all kinds of characters and subjects;—and yet the ancient writers evidently understood it, as referring to Homer. Comp. Dicn. Halic. Epist. de Plat. vol. vi. d. 756:—*ἦν τῇ Πλάτωνος φύσει πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχουσα τὸ φιλότιμον* ἔδῃλωσε δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα διὰ τῆς πρὸς Ὅμηρον ζήλοτυπίας, ὃν ἐκ τῆς κατασκευαζομένης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πολιτείας ἐκβάλλει, στεφανώσας καὶ μύρῳ χρίσας. So also Aristides, Orat. Plat. 111; vol. ii. p. 326:—Ὅμηρον μύρῳ χρίσας ἐκπέμπει χελιδόνος τιμὴν καταθεῖς. Josephus, Minucius Felix, Theodoret, and Chrysostom bear similar testimony to its meaning.

† It has been rightly stated by Ger. Voss. in his Institut. Poet. ii. ch. ix. § 2, that the word μέλος is equivalent to λόγος αἰδόμενος. Comp. also Plato de Legg. ii. p. 655 a.

though I have some inkling. You can, surely, said I, at any rate, fully state this much,—that melody has three constituents,—sentiment, harmony, and rhythm? * Yes, replied he, this much, at any rate. And as concerns the sentiment,—that differs in nothing from the sentiment which is not sung, inasmuch as it ought to be performed on the same models, as we just said, and after the same fashion. True, said he. Surely, then, the harmony and rhythm should correspond with the sentiment? Of course. But yet we said there was no need for wailings and lamentations in written compositions? None, certainly. Which then are the querulous harmonies? † Tell me,—for you are a musician. The mixed Lydian, ‡ replied he, and the sharp Lydian, and some others of this kind. Are not these, then, said I, to be rejected, as being useless even to well-conducted women, not to speak of men? Certainly. Drunkenness, moreover, is highly unbecoming in our guardians, as well as effeminacy and idleness? Of course. Which then are the effeminate and convivial harmonies? The Ionic, replied he, and the Lydian, which are called relaxing. Can you use these, my friend, for military men? By no means, replied he; but it seems you have yet the Doric remaining, and the Phrygian. I am not learned, said I, in harmonies; but let us put out of the question that harmony, which would fitly imitate the voice and accents of a brave man, engaged in military action, and every sort of rough adventure, and, should he fail of success, rushing on wounds or death, or any other distress, all the while regularly and resolutely battling with fortune:—let us put out of the question, also, that kind of harmony which suits what is peaceable, where there is no violence, but everything is voluntary, where a man either persuades or beseeches any one, about anything,—either God by prayer, or man by

* The distinction between harmony and rhythm is well explained in the Laws, ii. p. 655 a:—*τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα· τῇ δ' αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε δέξιός ἕμα καὶ βαρείος συκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονίας ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο.*

† On the power and character of the several kinds of melody, comp. Heraclides Ponticus in Athenæus, xiv. p. 624 d, and Aristotle's Polit. viii. ch. 5—7. Boeckh also in his work on the metres of Pindar (vol. i. pt. 2), has learnedly discussed the variety of ancient Greek melodies.

‡ Aristoxenus quoted by Plutarch (de Musicâ, p. 1136 d), thus explains the word *μειζολυδιστί*:—*καὶ ἡ μειζολυδίας δὲ παθητικὴ τις ἔστι, τραγῳδίας ἀρμόζουσα.* 'Αριστόξενος δὲ φησι Σαπφὴν πρῶτην εὗρασθαι *τὴν μειζολυδιστί, παρ'* ἧς τοὺς τραγῳδοποιούς μαθεῖν.

instruction and admonition ; or, on the other hand, where one submits to another's entreaties, instructions, or persuasion, and in all these points acts in accordance with intellect, and does not behave haughtily, but demeans himself soberly and moderately, gladly embracing whatever may happen :—put out of the question, too, these two harmonies, the vehement and the voluntary,* which so capitally imitate the voice both of the unfortunate and fortunate,—the moderate and brave. Aye, you are anxious, replied he, to leave no others but those I now mentioned. We shall have no need, then, said I, in our songs and melodies, for many strings or instruments expressive of all the harmonies. We shall not, it seems, replied he. We are not to maintain, then, such craftsmen, as make harps and spinets, and instruments of many strings that produce a variety of harmony. We are not, it seems. But what,—will you admit into your city flute-makers or flute-players? for, are not those instruments which consist of the greatest number of strings,† and those that produce all kinds of harmony, imitations of the flute? Plainly so, replied he. There are still left you, then, said I, the lyre and the harp, as useful for your city; and, as respects the fields again, a reed or so for the shepherds? This is quite reasonable, said he. We are doing nothing new then, replied I, in preferring Apollo and Apollo's instruments, to Marsyas‡ and his instruments. Truly not, it seems, replied he. By the dog, too, said I, we have been once more unconsciously cleansing our city, which, we just now said, had become luxurious. Aye; we were wise to do so, replied he.

* A harmony is here termed *βίαιος*, which (to use the words in the Laws, viii. 814 e):—*ἐν βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ κερπόντως ἂν μῆσαιτο φθόγγος τε καὶ προσψιδίας, &c.* ;—and that is called *ἐκούσιος*, which becomes a man who is engaged *ἐν ἐκούσιῳ πράξει*.

† All musical instruments are here rejected, which, from having many chords, have the power of soothing the ear with a variety of harmonies, and yet do not improve the mind, but rather render it effeminate and fill it with sensual desires. Among these is classed the lyre,—which is rejected also by Pythagoras, who (according to Iamblichus) *τοὺς αὐλοῦ, ὑπελάμβανεν ὑβριστικὸν τε καὶ πανηγυρικὸν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἐλευθέριον τὸν ἦχον ἔχειν*. See also Plato's Gorgias, p. 501 e, where he conceives the art of flute-playing—*τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον ζῶειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν*.

‡ On the contest of Marsyas with Apollo, comp. Herodot. vii. 26, and Diodor. Sic. iii. p. 192.

CHAP. XI.—Come then, said I, and let us cleanse the remainder; for what concerns rhythm will follow after harmonies,—namely, that our citizens pursue not ever-varying rhythms having a variety of cadences, but observe what are the rhythms of an orderly and manly life; and observing these, should compel the time and the melody to subserve the sentiment, and not the sentiment to subserve the time and melody.—Now, what these rhythms are, it is your business to tell, as you did with the harmonies. Nay, by Zeus, replied he, I cannot tell:—so far, indeed, as that there are three forms from which all measures are composed, just as there are four primitive sounds, from which all harmony is derived, this I can say from observation; but what kind of imitations they are, and of what kind of life, I am not able to tell. These things, however, said I, with Damon's* aid we will consider,—what measures suit illiberality and insolence, or madness and any other ill disposition,—and what rhythms also must be left for their opposites. And I have a confused recollection of having heard him call a certain [measure] enoplion, which was compound, another a dactyl, and a third an heroic measure,—embellishing them I know not how,—making them equal above and below, in breadth and length: and methinks he called one an iambus, and another a trochee, and regulated also the long and short measures. In some of these, too, I fancy, he both blamed and praised the measure of the foot, no less than the numbers themselves, or something compounded of both. As for these matters, however, as I said, let them be thrown on Damon: for to define them distinctly, indeed, would require no small discourse: do not you think so? No small one, truly. But as for this point,—whether the propriety or impropriety is dependent on the good or ill rhythm,—can you at all discern that? Of course. Moreover, with respect to good or ill rhythm, the one depends on elegant expression, and conforms to it, while the other is the reverse; and, in the same way, as to the harmonious and discordant, the rhythm and harmony being subservient to the sentiment, as we just said, and not the sentiment to the former. These, indeed, said he, should subserve the sentiment. And what, said I, as to the manner

* A celebrated musician who instructed Pericles in that art. Comp. Rep. iv. ch. 3, p. 424 c. See also Plutarch, Life of Pericles, ch. 4.

of expression, and as to the sentiment itself, must it not be suited to the temper of the soul? Of course. And all the rest to the expression? Yes. Well then, fine expression, fine harmony, perfect propriety, and perfect rhythm, are dependent on good disposition,—not that dulness which in flattering language we call good temper, but the intellect itself, adorned with excellent and amiable moral feelings? Surely, altogether so, replied he. Must not all these then be always pursued by the youth, if they would perform their duties? They should, indeed, be so pursued. Painting, indeed, is, somehow, full of these things, and so is every other such kind of craftsmanship; and weaving, too, is full thereof, and embroidery and architecture, and all craftship of all kinds of implements; and yet further, the nature of animal bodies and of all plants,—for in all these is found either propriety or impropriety: and moreover, impropriety, want of rhythm, and want of harmony, are close akin to bad language and depraved manners,—their opposites being likewise related, and imitations of discretion and good morals. Entirely so, replied he.

CHAP. XII.—Must we, then, merely superintend the poets, and oblige them to present in their poems the idea of good morals, or else not write at all with us;—or should we superintend all other craftsmen also, and restrain this immoral, undisciplined, illiberal, indecent style, so as not to exhibit it either in the representation of animals, or in buildings, or in any other craftsmanship,—so that he who cannot do this may not be suffered to work with us?—[This we must do,] for fear that our guardians, being trained by images of evil, as in bad pasture-land, by every day plucking and eating many different things, should establish imperceptibly, by little and little, some mighty evil in their soul;—but rather should we seek for such craftsmen, as, by the help of a good natural genius, can investigate the nature of the beautiful and becoming,—in order that our youths, dwelling, as it were, in a healthful place, may receive advantage on all sides, and so receive some service, either by sight or hearing, from fine productions, just as a breeze brings health from healthy places, and imperceptibly lead them from childhood onwards to resemblance, friendship, and harmony with right reason. Thus indeed, said he, they would be brought up

in the best possible manner. In this case, then, Glaucon, said I;—is not musical training of the utmost importance, inasmuch as rhythm and harmony enter largely into the inward part of the soul, and most powerfully affect it, at the same time introducing decorum, and rendering every one becoming, if properly trained, and, if not so, the reverse?—Moreover, the man, who has thus been brought up as he ought, very soon perceives whatever workmanship is defective and badly executed, or what productions are of such description,—and through a right feeling of disgust will praise and rejoice in the beautiful, and receiving it in his soul will be fostered thereby, and thus become a worthy, good man,—while, as to all that is base, he will rightly despise and hate it, even from early youth, and before he can partake of reason; and again, when reason comes, having been thus trained, he will heartily embrace it, because he clearly recognises it from its intimate familiarity with himself. This appears to me, replied he, the very reason, why there should be musical training. Just as in learning our letters, said I, we are only then sufficiently instructed, when we are acquainted, on meeting them, with the few elementary letters through their various combinations, and do not more or less despise them as unnecessary to be learnt, but take all pains to understand them thoroughly,—as we cannot be good grammarians till we do so. True. And supposing the images of letters were seen anywhere, either in water or in mirrors, should we not recognise them before the letters themselves?—or is this a part of the same art and study? Surely. Is it then true, what I say, by the gods, that in this case we shall never become musicians, neither ourselves nor the guardians we talk of training, unless we understand the ideas of temperance, fortitude, liberality, and magnificence, and whatever are akin to these, are acquainted also with their contraries, so familiar to all, and unless, wheresoever they are, we observe both the virtues themselves and the images thereof, and despise them neither in small nor great instances, but conceive them to be rather a part of the same art and study. It must be so, said he. Must not that person, then, said I, whose lot it is to have virtuous habits in his soul, and what is proportioned and corresponding thereto in his appearance, partake of the same impression and be a fine spectacle to any one who is able to behold him? Quite so. Yet, what is most beau.

tiful is most lovely? Of course. He, then, who is most musical should surely love those men, who are most eminent in this way; but if a man be unmusical, he will not love them? He will not, replied he, if he be at all defective in his soul: still, if it were in his body, he would bear with it, and be willing to associate with him. I understand, said I, that your favourites are or have been of this kind: and I too agree to that; but tell me this,—is there any communion between temperance and excessive pleasure? How can there? said he, for such pleasure causes a privation of intellect, not less than grief. But has it communion with any other virtue? Not at all. What then,—has it communion with insolence and intemperance? Most certainly. Can you mention a greater and more acute pleasure than what respects the matters of love? I cannot, said he, nor yet one that is more insane. But right love is of a nature to love the beautiful and the good temperately and harmoniously? Certainly. Nothing, then, which is mad, or allied to intemperance, may approach real and right love. It may not approach it. Nor may pleasure approach it; neither may the lover and the person he loves have communion with it, if they are rightly to love and be beloved? No, truly, said he; they may not, Socrates. Thus, then, it seems, you will lay down a law in the city you are establishing, that the lover shall love, converse, and associate with the objects of his love, as with a son,—from a virtuous motive and with his consent; and as to everything else, every one will so converse with him whose love he solicits, as never to wish to associate for any other purpose but what we have said;—for otherwise he would undergo the reproach of being unmusical and unacquainted with the beautiful. It must be so, replied he. Do not you think then, said I, that our discourse concerning music is now concluded?—For it has now terminated where it ought,—as what is concerned with the art of music somehow ought to terminate in the love of the beautiful. I agree, said he.

CHAP. XIII.—After music, then, our youths must be trained in gymnastics. What then? In this likewise they must needs be accurately trained, from infancy upwards through their whole life:—For the matter, methinks, stands somehow thus;—and do you also consider.—I do not think that any sound body can, by its own virtue, render the soul good; and contrariwise, that a good soul can, by its own

virtue, render the body the best possible : what think you ? I think so too, replied he. If then, after having sufficiently trained the intellect, we commit to it the careful management of what concerns the body, shall we not, as we are only laying down patterns, (that we may not be tedious,) act in a right manner ? Entirely so. We say then, that they must abstain from drunkenness ; for any one, rather than a guardian, might be allowed to get drunk, and not know where he is. It were ridiculous, said he, for a guardian to need a guardian himself. But what as respects meats ;—for these men are wrestlers in most important combats ;—are they not ? Yes. Would not then the bodily state of the wrestlers suit such as these ? Perhaps so. But, said I, they are a sluggish set, and of dubious health :—do you not observe, that they sleep out their life ; and, that if they only ever so little depart from their regular diet, such wrestlers become extensively and deeply diseased ? I do observe it. But a more elegant kind of exercise, said I, is required for our military wrestlers,—who, as dogs, ought to be wakeful, and see and hear most acutely, and endure, in their expeditions, many changes of water and food, of heat and cold, that so they may not fail in their health ? I think so. Is not then the best kind of gymnastic exercise very like the simple music which we just before described ? How mean you ? That the gymnastics should be simple and moderate, and of that kind most especially which concern war. Of what kind ? Even from Homer, said I, one may learn such things as these : for you know, that in their military expeditions, at their heroes' banquets, he never feasts them with fish, not even while they were by the sea at the Hellespont, nor yet with boiled flesh, but only with roast meat, as what soldiers can most easily procure : for, in short, one can everywhere more easily use fire, than carry vessels about ? Yes. Neither does Homer, I think, make any mention of seasonings : and this is what every wrestler knows,—that the body, to be in good condition, must abstain from these. They are right, said he, and do abstain. You do not then approve, friend, it would seem, of the Syracusan table, and the various Sicilian made-dishes, since you think the other right ? It seems I do not. You will disapprove also of a Corinthian girl, as a mistress, for such as would be in good bodily condition ? By

all means. And likewise of those celebrated delicacies of Attic confections? Surely. As respects all such feeding and dieting, if we compare it to the melody and song produced in full harmony and universal rhythm, will not the comparison hold good? Of course. And does not that diversity cause insubordination in this case—disease in the other? But simplicity in music, engenders temperance in the soul,—and in gymnastics, bodily health. True, said he. And when insubordination and diseases multiply in a city, must not many law-courts and medicine-halls be opened; and will not the forensic and medicinal arts be in request, when many, even of the free, will earnestly apply to them? Of course.

CHAP. XIV.—Can you then adduce any greater proof of bad and shameful training in a city, than the fact of their needing physicians and supreme magistrates, and these too, not only for base and low craftsmen, but for those also, who boast of having been liberally educated;—and again, does it not seem base, and a great proof of defective education, to be obliged to see justice pronounced on us by others, as our masters and judges, and yet to have no sense of it in ourselves? This, replied he, is of all things the most base. And deem you not this far more base, said I; when a person not only spends a great part of his life in courts of justice, as defendant or plaintiff,—but, from ignorance of the beautiful, thinks he is renowned for his very dexterity in doing injustice, and his cleverness at turning through all sorts of windings, and using every kind of subterfuge, with the idea of evading justice,—and all this for the sake of small and contemptible things,—ignorant how much better and more noble it were so to regulate life as not to need a sleepy judge? This, replied he, is still baser than the other. And to need the medicinal art, said I, not on account of wounds, or some incidental epidemic complaint, but through sloth, and such diet as we mentioned, being filled with rheums and wind, like lakes, and obliging the skilful sons of Æsculapius to invent new names for diseases,—such as dropsies and catarrhs:—do not you think this abominable? Truly, replied he, those are very new and strange names of diseases. Such, said I, as I think, existed not in the days of Æsculapius: and I guess so from this, that when Eurypylus was wounded at Troy, and was getting Pramnian wine to drink with much flour sprinkled in it, and cheese grated (all which

seem to be of inflammatory tendency), the sons of Æsculapius neither blamed the woman who presented it, nor reproved Patroclus, for presenting the cure. Surely such a potion, said he, is absurdly improper for one in such a case. Not so, said I, if you consider, that the descendants of Æsculapius, as they tell us, did not, before the time of Herodicus, practise the method of cure now in use, which puts the patient on a regimen;—whereas Herodicus, being a teacher of youth, and in weak health too, confounded gymnastics and medicine, and made himself first very uncomfortable, and afterwards many others besides. How was that? said he. By procuring himself a lingering death, said I; for while he was constantly attending to his disease, which was mortal, he was not able, as I imagine, to cure himself; though, to the neglect of everything else, he was constantly using medicines, and thus passed his life, always most uneasy, if he departed in the least from his usual diet; and through this wisdom of his, struggling long with death, he arrived at old age. A mighty reward, said he, he reaped for his cleverness! Such as became one, said I, who was unconscious that it was not from ignorance or inexperience of this method of cure, that Æsculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but simply because he was aware, that in all well-regulated states there every one had a certain work enjoined him, necessary to be done, and no one could be permitted to have time or leisure to get sick throughout life, or busy himself with taking medicine;—a fact that we amusingly discover in the case of labouring people, but do not see it in that of the rich, and those reputed happy. How? said he.

CHAP. XV.—A builder, replied I, when he falls sick, gets from the physician some potion for throwing up his disease, or purging it downwards, or else, by means of caustic or amputation, for getting freed from trouble; but if any one prescribe him a system of regimen, putting caps on his head and so on, he quickly tells him that he has no leisure to lie sick, and it does not suit him to live in that manner, attending to his troubles, and neglecting his duty; and so, bidding the physician farewell, he returns to his ordinary diet, and, should he recover, he goes on managing his affairs, but should his body be unable to bear up against the disease, he dies, and gets rid of his troubles. Such an one, said he, ought to use the art of medicine just in this manner. Is it

not, said I, because he has a certain business,—and which, if he does not do it, it is no profit for him to live? Plainly, replied he. But the rich man, as we say, has no such work allotted him, from which, when compelled to refrain, life is not worth the having? It is said so of him, at least. You do not mind, said I, what Phocylides says,—that one ought, throughout life, to practise virtue. I think, replied he, we attended to that formerly. We shall not differ on this point, said I. But let us learn, whether excessive attention to one's disease is to be the business of the rich, and life is not worth keeping, if he does not give this attention; inasmuch, as such a life hinders the mind from attending to building and other arts,—but, as respects the exhortation of Phocylides, it is no hindrance. Yes, by Zeus, said he, it is, and that in the greatest degree, when this unusual care of the body goes beyond gymnastica. It agrees neither with attention to private economy, or military expeditions, or sedentary magistracies in the city. But what is of most importance is, that such application to health ill suits any sort of learning and inquiry and solitary study, because one is then perpetually dreading certain pains and swimings of the head, and blaming philosophy as the cause thereof,—so that, where there is this attention to health, it greatly hinders the practice of virtue and improvement therein, as it makes us always imagine that we are ill and ailing. Very probably, said he. And shall we not say, that Æsculapius too understood these things, when to persons in health, and such as used a wholesome diet, but were afflicted by some particular disease, to these and such kind of constitution he prescribed medicine, resisting their ailments by drugs and incisions, but still ordering them their usual diet, that the public might not be injured; but he did not attempt, either by low or nourishing diet, to cure thoroughly diseased systems; and so to afford a long and miserable life to the man himself, and his descendants too, who would probably be of the same kind: for he did not think that a man ought to be cured, who could not live in the ordinary course, as in that case he would be of no service either to himself or the state. You make Æsculapius, a politician, observed he. Plainly so, said I; and his sons may evince that he was so.* See you not again, that at Troy they proved their bravery in war, and, as I say, practised medicine

* Viz. Machaon and Podalirius.

likewise? And do not you remember, that when Menelaus was wounded by Pandarus,—

.... they sucked the wound, then spread it o'er
With drugs of balmy power ;*—

but as for what he wanted to eat or drink afterwards, they prescribed for him no more than for Eurypylus, because they deemed external applications sufficient to heal men, who, before they were wounded, had been healthy and moderate in their diet, whatever potion they might have drunk at the time, but conceived, that a diseased constitution and an intemperate life were beneficial neither to the men themselves nor to others, and that their art ought not to be employed on, nor minister to them, even were they richer than Midas.† How vastly clever, said he, you are making the sons of Æsculapius!

CHAP. XVI.—It is quite right, replied I ;—though in opposition to us, the tragedy-writers, and Pindar also, say that Æsculapius was the son of Apollo,‡ and was induced by gold to undertake the cure of a rich man, already in a dying state,—for which indeed he was struck with a thunderbolt :—but we, in accordance with what has been before said, will not believe them as to both these statements, but assert, that were he really a god's son, he would not have been given to filthy lucre,—or else, if he were given to filthy lucre, he was not a god's son. This at least, said he, is quite correct. But what say you to this, Socrates?—Must we not provide good physicians for the state ; and must not these probably be such as have been conversant with great numbers both of healthy and sick people ; and judges also, who have had experience of all varieties of dispositions ? I am speaking particularly, said I, of those who are good : but [tell me,]—are you aware who they are, that I deem such ? [I shall be,] if you will tell me, replied he. I will try to do so, said I ; but you are inquiring in one and the same question about two different

* Hom. II. iv. 218, though somewhat modified by Plato.

† Plato is here alluding to Tyrtæus, Eleg. iii. v. 6 :—

Οὐδ' εἰ Τιθωνοῖο φύην χαριέστερος εἶη
Πλουτοῖη δε Μίδεω καὶ κινύρῳ βάθιον.

‡ Respecting this power of Æsculapius to raise the dead, comp. Pind. Pyth. iii. v. 96, &c. Euripides, also, in the opening lines of the *Alcestis*, remarks, that Æsculapius was struck with lightning, but without assigning any reason.

things. As how? said he. Physicians, replied I, would become extremely skilled, if, from childhood upwards, they would, in course of learning their art, gain experience from a large number of bodies, and these too of a very sickly character,—especially if they should be themselves afflicted with all kinds of maladies, and not be altogether of a healthy constitution,—for it is not by the body, methinks, that they cure the body (else their own bodies would never be allowed to be diseased, or become so), but they cure the body by the soul, which, while in a diseased state, or becoming so, is incapable of properly performing any cure whatever. Right, said he. But as for the judge, friend, said I, he governs the soul by the soul; and if it has been bred up from childhood with depraved souls, has constantly associated with them, and has itself committed all sorts of crime, it cannot so far emancipate itself, as of itself to judge correctly about others' ill deeds, just as happens with respect to bodily ailments:—no, it must even in youth be unacquainted with and unpolluted by bad habits, if it would be fair and honourable itself and judge correctly of what is just. Hence, therefore, the virtuous, even in youth, appear simple, and easily deceived by the unjust, because they have within them, forsooth, no dispositions corresponding in sentiment with those of the wicked. Aye, indeed, said he, this very often happens to them. For this reason, said I, the good judge must not be a youth, but old,—one who has been late in learning the nature of wickedness, which he apprehends not as a peculiar quality resident in his own soul, but from having, as a foreign one, long studied it in the souls of others, and from having ascertained the nature of its evil by positive science, rather than personal experience. Such an one as this, said he, is likely to be a very noble judge. And a good one too, said I; the very thing you required: for the man with a good soul is good;—while on the other hand, the clever, slyly suspicious man,—he, namely, who has himself committed much sin, and is deemed subtle and wise when in the society of his equals, has the repute of being a clever, wary kind of person, because he has constantly in his eye those models that reside within himself:—but whenever he approaches the good, who are his seniors, he appears mightily inferior, unseasonably suspicious, and wholly ignorant of moral integrity, having within him no models of any such

quality ; but, on the other hand, as he has more frequent intercourse with the wicked than with the wise, he appears, both to himself and others, unusually wise, rather than ignorant. Quite true, said he.

CHAP. XVII.—We must not then, said I, in such a man as this, look for a wise and good judge, but in the former one. Vice, indeed, can never know both itself and virtue ; but virtue, where the moral temper is gradually instructed, will attain to a scientific knowledge both of itself and depravity also :—this man, then, and not the wicked one, is, as I think, wise. I, too, said he, am of the same opinion. You will establish, then, in your state a science of medicine such as we have described, and along with it a corresponding system of judicature, both of which together may carefully provide for such of your citizens as are naturally well disposed both in body and in mind ; while, as regards the opposite, such as are diseased in their bodies, they should let die ; but as for those who are thoroughly evil and incurable as to the soul, these they are themselves to put to death ? It seems, at any rate, the best, said he, that can happen, both for those who are thus afflicted and for the state itself. As respects your youths, however, it is quite plain, said I, that they will be cautious in calling in the aid of judicial science, so long as they are employed on that simple music, which, we said, generates temperance. Of course, said he. Will not then, the musician who pursues gymnastics, on the very same principles as his own art, prefer doing so in such a way as not to want medicine except when absolutely necessary ? I think so. His exercises too, and his labours, he will perform with reference more to the spirited portion* of his nature thus stirred into action, than to mere physical strength,—differently, indeed, from all other wrestlers, who take food and undergo toil with a view to the promotion of bodily strength ? Most true, said he. In that case, said I, Glaucon, they who propose to teach music and gymnastics, propose them, not for

* Τὸ θυμοειδές. This refers to Plato's division of the mental faculties into τὸ λογιστικόν and τὸ ἄλογον, the latter of which is again divided into τὸ θυμικόν and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. The art of gymnastics, he conceives then, has for its object—not so much the promotion of the bodily strength, as the excitement of the spirited part of our nature,—τὸ θυμοειδές.

what some imagine, namely, to cure the body by the one, and the soul by the other. If not, what is their motive? asked he. They seem to propose them both, said I, chiefly on the soul's account. As how? Perceive you not, said I, how those persons have regulated their intellect itself, who have all their life been conversant with gymnastics, yet never studied music,—or how those are affected who have lived in a manner quite the reverse of this? What are you speaking about? said he, Of savageness and fierceness, said I, and again of effeminacy and mildness. Yes, I understand, said he;—that is, persons who apply themselves to unmixed gymnastics become more savage than they ought; and those again [who attend] to music alone, are softer than becomes them. And moreover, said I, this very savageness imparts probably a certain spirit to the disposition, and, if rightly disciplined, will become fortitude; but when stretched too far, it will probably become indecently fierce and troublesome. So I think, said he. But what;—will not the philosophic nature partake of the mild also; and when this disposition is carried to excess, may it not prove softer than it ought, and if rightly disciplined, both mild and modest? Just so. We say also, that our guardians ought naturally to be possessed of both. They ought. Ought they not, then, to be made to suit one another? Of course. And the soul of the person thus suited is temperate and brave? Certainly. But the soul of a person not so suited is cowardly and savage? Especially so.

CHAP. XVIII.—As a matter of course, then, when one consents to be soothed with the charms of music, and to have poured into his soul through his ears (as through a pipe) those lately called the sweet, effeminate, and doleful harmonies, and spends the whole of his life humming ditties and charmed with melody,*—such an one, first of all,—should he possess any spirit,—softens it like iron, and makes it serviceable, instead of useless and harsh. When, however, he

* Gr. *ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικῇ παρεχῇ καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν διὰ τῶν ὠτων, ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης, ἃς νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ μαλακὰς καὶ ὀρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας καὶ μινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένους ὑπὸ τῆς ψόῃς διατελῇ τὸν βίον ὅλον, &c.* The verb *μινυρίζειν* signifies *to sing in a high and plaintive key*,—sometimes, also, *to whine*; *γαυοῦν* is derived from *γάμος*, *splendour*, *joy*, and hence means *to be radiant with pleasure, to be of joyful countenance*.

positively declines desisting, and becomes the victim of a kind of fascination,—after this, he is melted and dissolved, till his spirit is quite spent, and the nerves are, as it were, cut out from his soul, making him an effeminate warrior.* Quite so indeed, said he. Aye,—said I; if he had originally possessed a nature devoid of spirit, he would quickly have done thus; but, if [he possesses] one of high spirit, it makes the mind weak, and causes it to be quickly overbalanced, speedily either excited and overcome; and hence men become outrageous and ill-tempered, rather than high-spirited. Quite so, indeed. But what;—if a man labour much in gymnastics and live on extremely good diet, but pay no attention to music and philosophy; is he not first of all, from having his body in good condition, abundantly filled with prudence and spirit, and does he not become braver than he was before? Surely. But what;—supposing he does nothing else, and has no commerce with the Muses, not even if he had any love of learning in his soul, as neither having a taste for investigation, nor sharing in any inquiry or reasoning, or other musical pursuit whatever, does it not become feeble, deaf, and blind, as being neither awakened, nor nurtured, nor his perceptions purified? Just so. Such an one then becomes, I suppose, a hater of argument, and indisposed to music,—one who cannot at all be reasoned into anything, but conducts himself in all matters with violence and ferocity, like a wild beast; and thus he lives in ignorance and barbarity, out of measure, and unpolished? Quite so, said he. Corresponding then to these two tempers, it seems, I would say, that some deity has furnished men with two arts,—music and gymnastics,—relating respectively to the high-spirited and the philosophic nature,—not indeed, for the soul and body, otherwise than as a by-work and accessory, but with a view to those two tempers, that they may be mutually suitable to each other by being tightened and loosened at

* Allusion is here made to Hom. Il. xvii. v. 586 :—

Ἕκτορ, τίς κέ σ' ἔτ' ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν τερβήσειεν;
Οἶον δὲ Μενέλαον ὑπέτρεσας, ὃς τὸ πάρος περ
Μαλθακὺς αἰχμητὴς

What chiefs of all the Grecians shall henceforth
Fear Hector, who from Menelaus shrinks
Once deemed effeminate. Cowper.

pleasure. Aye,—it seems so. Whoever then can most cleverly mingle gymnastics with music, and introduce them in justest measure into the soul, this person we may most properly call completely musical, and most harmoniously disposed,—far more, indeed, than the man who puts in tune the strings of an instrument. Very likely, Socrates, said he. Shall we not then, always need, Glaucon, such a president in our city, if its government is to be kept entire? It will indeed be quite needful, as far at least as we can.

CHAP. XIX.—The above then are probably the true models both of education and discipline:—for why should one go through the dances, the hunts of wild beasts with dogs and nets, the wrestlings and the horse-races expedient for such persons?—for it is almost manifest that they follow as a matter of course, nor are they at all hard to discover. Well, said he, perhaps they are not difficult. Granted, said I:—but after this, what had we next to determine?—Is it not, which of these shall govern, and be governed? What else? Is it not plain that the governors should be the elder, and the governed the younger? Plain. And also, that the best of them [should govern?]. Aye,—that too. And the best husbandmen;—are they not the cleverest in tillage? Yes. Now, if it be fit that our guardians be the best, will they not be most strictly watchful over the city? Yes. With this view should we not make them prudent, and able, and careful also of the city? It is the fact. At any rate a man would be most careful of what he happens to love? Necessarily so. And this at least one must especially love,—namely, what he deems to have a community of interest with himself, especially when he conceives, that in another's good fortune he may find good fortune too,—but if otherwise, the reverse? Just so, said he. We must choose then, from the rest of the guardians such men, as on inquiry most of all seem to perform with all cheerfulness through an entire life whatever they deem expedient for the state,—while, as to the inexpedient, they will not do it by any means at all. These are just the proper persons, said he. I really think that they ought to be observed at all stages of life, whether they act consistently with this opinion, without either being reduced or forcibly compelled inconsiderately to throw up the opinion, of its being a duty to do what is best for the state. What

throwing up do you mean? said he. I will tell you, said I. Opinion seems to me to come from the intellect either voluntarily or involuntarily,—voluntarily indeed as regards false opinion, [when it comes] from him who unlearns it,—but involuntarily, as regards every true one. The case of the voluntary one, replied he, I understand; but that of the involuntary I want to learn. What;—are not even you of opinion, said I, that men are deprived of good things involuntarily, but of evil things voluntarily? Is being deceived respecting the truth no evil, and the attainment of truth no good? and think you not, that to form opinions respecting things as they really exist is attaining the truth? Aye, said he, you speak correctly:—they do indeed seem to me to be deprived unwillingly of true opinion. Are they then thus affected by being robbed, or enchanted, or forced? Now, at any rate, said he, I do not understand you. I am probably expressing myself, said I, just like the tragedians: * for, I say, that those [have their opinions] stolen, who change them through persuasion, or else forget them; because, in the one case, they are imperceptibly removed by time, and in the other by reasoning:—now perhaps you understand? Yes. And those, I say, are forced out of their opinions, whom grief or agony obliges to change them? This too, said he, I understand, and you are right in saying so. Those, moreover, methinks, you will say, are enchanted out of their opinions, who change them, either bewitched by pleasure or appalled by fear. For whatever deceives, said he, seems to exercise a kind of magical enchantment.

CHAP. XX.—We must now then inquire,—as I was saying before,—who are the best guardians of their own particular maxim, that they should do whatever they deem to be best for the state; and they should observe them too quite from childhood, setting before them such work, as may lead them most readily to forget such a matter and delude themselves; and we should choose one who is mindful and hard to be deluded, while one who is not so we should reject:—is that it? Yes.

* Plato here alludes to the obscure style sometimes adopted by them to mystify the hearers. Comp. viii. ch. 3, where they are spoken of as *πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχελοῦσας ὑψηλολογουμένας*. Aristophanes all through "the Frogs" caricatures this mystifying, bombastic tendency.

And we must appoint them labour* and pains and contests, in which we must observe these very same things. Right, said he. Should we not, also, said I, appoint a third contest, that of the mountebank kind; and look to see, just as persons lead young colts amidst noises and tumults, to find out whether they are frightened?—and thus, while yet young, they must be led into various fearful situations, and again be thrown back into pleasures, trying them far more than gold in the fire, whether a person appears hard to be beguiled by mountebank tricks, and is of composed demeanour amidst all, because he is a good guardian of himself, and of that music in which he had been instructed, proving himself in all these respects to be in just rhythm and harmony. Being of such character, he would truly be most useful both to himself and the state. And he who in childhood, youth, and manhood, has been thus tried, and come out pure, may be appointed governor and guardian of the state; honours are to be paid him while he lives, and at his death he should receive the highest rewards of public burial and other memorials:—while one that is not such we must reject. Somewhat like this, methinks, Glaucon, said I,—for we have only drawn it in outline, not defined it accurately,*—should be the mode of choosing and establishing our governors and guardians. I think so too, rejoined he. Is it not then really most correct to call these the perfect guardians, both as to what relates to enemies abroad and friends at home, for taking from one party the will, and from the other the power of doing mischief, while the youth (whom we just now called guardians) will be allies and auxiliaries to the decrees of the governors? Yes, I think so, replied he.

CHAP. XXI.—What then, said I, should be our plan, when we are falsifying by one of the well-intentioned and necessary untruths, such as we just mentioned, with a view to persuade chiefly the governors themselves;—but, if not these, the rest of the state? What kind of untruth do you mean? Nothing new, said I, but something like the Phœnician fable,† which has often taken place heretofore, as the

* Gr. ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δὲ ἀκριβείας, εἰρησθαί. Comp. vi. ch 6—*ἵκεν γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὃν λέγω*, where *τύπον*, as here means *a general notion or sketch*, like *ὕπογραφὴν* in ch. 16 of the same book.

† The scholiast tells us that the Phœnician fable had reference to the

poets say and have persuaded us, but which has not happened in our times, nor do I know whether it is likely to happen,—to persuade one of which indeed requires great suasive power. You seem to me, said he, to hesitate to tell it! I shall appear to you, said I, to hesitate with very good reason, whenever I shall tell it. Speak, said he, and be not afraid. I will tell you then, though I know not with what courage, or what words I am to use in telling you;—and I will attempt, first of all to persuade the governors themselves, and the soldiers, and then also the rest of the state, that, whatever training or education we gave them, all these particulars seemed to affect and befall them like dreams, while really they were in course of formation and development beneath the earth, where are fabricated not only themselves, but also their armour and other equipments:—but after they were completely fashioned, the earth, who is their mother, brought them forth; and now they ought to consult the interests of the country in which they reside as for a mother and nurse, and to defend her in case of invasion, and to look upon the rest of the citizens as their brethren, and sprung from the same soil. It is not without reason, said he, that some time back, you were ashamed to tell this falsehood. Quite so, said I:—but still hear the remainder of the fable. All of you in the state truly are brethren (as we shall tell them by way of fable); but the God, in forming you, mixed gold in the formation of such of you as are able to govern;—on which account they are the most honourable;—in such as are auxiliaries, silver;—and in the husbandmen and other craftsmen, iron and brass. Since then you are all of the same kindred, you would for the most part beget children resembling yourselves; and sometimes perhaps silver will be generated out of gold, and out of silver there might be a golden offspring; and thus in all other ways [are they generated] out of one another.* Governors then, first and chiefly, the God charges, that over nothing are they to be such good guardians, or to keep such vigilant watch, as

myths related about the dragon and the sown men that arose at the bidding of Cadmus, the son of Agenor, and grandson of Poseidon and Libya, whose native country was Phœnicia.

* Aristotle makes some rather strong remarks on these views in his Polit. ch. 2, § 15. ed. Schneid.

over their children;—[to know] with which of these principles their souls are imbued;—and should their descendants be of brass or iron, they will show them no indulgence whatever, but assigning them honour just proportioned to their natural temper, will thrust them down to the rank of craftsmen or husbandmen. And if again any from among these latter shall exhibit a golden or silver sort of nature, they are to pay them honour and elevate them;—some to the guardianship, others to the rank of auxiliaries,—the oracle having declared that the state shall perish whenever iron or brass shall hold its guardianship. With respect to this fable then, have you any means of persuading them of its truth? None, said he, of persuading these men themselves; but I have as respects their sons and posterity, and the rest of mankind afterwards. Even this, said I, would act well in making them more anxious about the state's welfare, and for one another; for I almost understand what you mean;—and this truly will lead the same way as the oracle.

CHAP. XXII.—As for ourselves, having armed these earth-born sons, let us lead them forward under the conduct of their leaders; and when they are come into the city, let them consider where they may best pitch their camp, so as best to keep in order those within it, should any one be unwilling to obey the laws; and likewise how they may defend it against those without, should any enemy come, like a wolf, on the fold. And when they have pitched their camp, and sacrificed to the proper divinities, let them erect their tents: is that the way? Just so, said he. They should be such then as may suffice to defend them, both from winter's cold and summer-heat? Of course; for I think, said he, you are alluding to houses. Yes, said I, those of the military class, not those of the money-makers. How, replied he, do you say that the latter differs from the former? I will try to tell you, said I; for, of all things, it is the most dreadful, and disgraceful to shepherds, to breed, as guardians of the flocks, such kind of dogs, and in such a manner, as that, either through want of discipline, or hunger, or some other ill habit, the dogs should themselves attempt to hurt the sheep, and so resemble wolves rather than dogs. It is dreadful, of course, said he. Must we not then take all care, lest our allies act thus towards our citizens, as being the more powerful, and,

instead of generous allies, resemble savage masters? We must take care, said he. Would they not be prepared to exercise the greatest caution, if they were really well educated? They are so, moreover, replied he. I then, for my part, observed: that you cannot properly insist on, friend Glaucon; but what we were just now saying is proper; namely, that they should have a good education, whatever its nature, if they are to possess what is most important towards rendering them mild, both among themselves and towards those under their guardianship. Right, said he. In addition then to this training, any intelligent person would say, that their houses and all other effects ought to be so contrived, as neither to impede their guardians in becoming the very best possible, nor to excite them to the injury of the other citizens. Aye, and he will say true. If then they intend to be such, consider, said I, whether they ought to live and arrange their household in some such manner, as follows: First, let none possess any private property unless it be absolutely necessary: next, let none have any dwelling, or store-house, into which any one that pleases may not enter: then, as for necessaries, let them be such as both temperate and brave champions in war may require; making for themselves this law, not to receive such a reward of their guardianship from the other citizens, as to have either surplus or deficiency at the year's end. Let them also frequent public meals, as in camps, and live in common; and we must tell them, that they have ever in their souls from the gods a divine gold and silver, and therefore have no need of that which is human; and that it were profane to pollute the possession of the divine ore, by mixing it with the alloy of the mortal metal; because the money of the vulgar has produced many impious deeds, while that which they have is pure; and that of all men in the city, they alone should not be allowed to handle or touch gold or silver, or harbour it under their roof, or carry it about, nor to drink out of silver or gold. By such means they will be likely to preserve both themselves and the state; but whenever they shall possess private lands and houses, and money, they will become stewards and farmers instead of guardians, and hateful masters instead of allies to the other citizens; in hating indeed, and being hated, in plotting, and being plotted against, they will pass the whole of their life; much more frequently and more

really terrified by the enemies from within than by those from without, as they and the rest of the state are hastening very near to destruction. For all these reasons, said I, we must say, that our guardians should be thus regulated, both as to their houses and all other matters. And let us consider these things as law; shall we not? By all means, said Glaucon.

BOOK IV.

ARGUMENT.

In the *fourth book*, after defining the true position and functions of the $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\alpha\varsigma$ and the arrangement of a model state,—which he further conceives to comprise, as essentials, wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice, the necessary union and coherence of which he demonstrates by analogy with the numerous mental faculties, which, like the members of a state, exist by mutual connexion and dependence. This concord of faculties is at the bottom of Plato's notion of a state; and this constitutes justice, the benefits of which are negatively proved by the exposure of injustice. This justice, however, he proves to have numerous ramifications, just in the same way as both himself and Aristotle conceive that under the term politics is included everything that concerns civil administration when placed in the hands of the people themselves, both generically and in its specific departments.

CHAP. I.—ADIMANTUS hereupon rejoining said: What answer will you make, Socrates, if one were to say that you do not make these men very happy,—and that owing to themselves, whose property the state really is,—yet they enjoy no advantage in the state, such as others do who possess lands, build beautiful and large houses, purchase suitable furniture, offer sacrifices to the gods at their own expense, entertain strangers, and, as you were just now saying, possess gold and silver, and everything generally supposed to contribute towards making men happy. Aye, doubtless, he may say, they seem, like hired auxiliaries, to be settled in the state for no other purpose than keeping guard. Yes, said I; and that too only for their maintenance, without receiving, like the rest, pay as well as rations;—so that they are not to be allowed so much as to travel abroad privately, though they wish it, nor bestow money on mistresses, nor spend it in such other ways as those do who are reputed to be happy. These and many such like things you leave out of the accusation. Well, let these charges too, said he, be made against them. What answer then, are we to make, you ask? I do. While travelling on the same

road, we shall find, methinks, what is to be said : for we shall state, that it would be nothing strange, were these men, under these circumstances, to be the happiest possible :—yet it was not with an eye to this, that we are establishing our state,—to have any one tribe in it remarkably happy, but that the whole state might be so to the fullest extent ; for we judged, that in such an one more particularly we should meet with justice, and again in that the worst established injustice ; and that, on thoroughly examining these, we might determine what we have long been seeking. Now then, as we suppose, we are forming a happy state, not by selection, making some few only so in it, but the whole : and we will next consider one its reverse. Just as if, when we were painting human figures, a person should come and blame us, saying, that we do not place the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the creature,—inasmuch as the eyes, the most beautiful part, were not painted with purple, but black ; we should seem perhaps to make a sufficient answer to him, by saying, Clever fellow, do not suppose that we ought to paint the eyes so beautifully, as that they should not appear to be eyes, and so with the other parts ;—but consider, rather, whether, in giving each particular part its due, we make the whole beautiful. And especially now, do not oblige us to confer such happiness on our guardians as shall make them anything rather than guardians : for we know too, how to dress out the husbandmen in fine robes and gird them with gold, and bid them till the ground with a view to pleasure only,—and in like manner, those who make earthenware, to lie at their ease by the fire, drinking and feasting, and placing the wheel near them to work just so much as they like ;—and so also how to confer happiness on every one in such a manner as to render the whole state happy. But do not advise us in this way ; because, if we obey you, neither will the husbandman be really a husbandman, nor the potter a potter ; nor will any one else be really of any of those professions of which the state is composed. As to all the rest, it is of less consequence :—for, when shoemakers become bad and corrupt, and profess to be shoemakers when they are not so, no great mischief befalls the state ; but when guardians of the laws and of the state are not so really, but only in appearance, you see how entirely they destroy

the whole state, and, on the other hand, that they alone have the opportunity of managing it well and effecting its happiness. If then we would appoint men who shall be really guardians of the city, [let us choose] those who will be least hurtful to it ; but he who says that they should be a kind of farmers, and as in a festival meeting, not in a state, jolly entertainers, must speak of something else rather than a city. We must consider, then, whether we establish guardians with this view, that they may enjoy the greatest happiness,—or, looking to the entire state, we regard whether it is to be found therein ; and we must compel these allies and guardians to do this, and persuade them to become the best performers of their own particular work, and act also towards all others in the same manner ; and thus, as the whole city becomes prosperous, and well constituted, we must permit its several classes to share in that degree of happiness which their nature admits.

CHAP. II.—I think you say well, said he. Well then, said I, what is near akin to this, shall I be thought to say rightly. In what particularly ? With respect to all other artificers again, consider whether these things corrupt them, so as to make them bad workmen. To what do you allude ? Riches, said I, and poverty. As how ? Thus :—Would the potter, think you, after he has become rich, have any desire still to mind his art ? By no means, said he. But will he not become more idle and careless than he was before ? Much more so. Will he not then become a worse potter ? This too, much more so, said he. And, moreover, being unable through poverty to supply himself with tools, or other requisites of his art, his workmanship will be more imperfectly executed, and his sons, or others whom he instructs, will be inferior artists. Of course they will. Owing to both these causes, then, [namely] poverty and riches, the workmanship in the arts becomes inferior, and [the artists] themselves inferior too. It appears so. We have then, it seems, found out other things for our guardians, against which they must by all means watch, that they may not steal into the state without their knowledge. Of what sort are these ? Riches, said I, and poverty ;—the one engendering luxury, idleness, and a love of innovation ;—the other, illiberality and mischief, as well as a love of innovation.

Quite so, said he. But, Socrates, pray consider this;—how is our state to have the power of engaging in war, when she is possessed of no money, especially if compelled to wage war against a great and opulent one? It is plain, said I, that to fight against one is somewhat difficult; but against two such is more easy. How say you? replied he. First of all, now, said I, if there is any occasion for fighting, will they not, being practised warriors, fight against rich men? Yes, surely, said he. What then, said I, Adimantus, would not a single boxer, trained as highly as possible to this exercise, seem to you easily able to fight against two who are not boxers, but on the other hand, are rich and fat? Not perhaps with both at once, said he. Not even, said I, if he should be enabled to retire a little, and then turn back and give a blow to the furthest in advance, and repeat this frequently in the sun and heat?—would not a person of this kind easily defeat many such as these? Clearly so, and no wonder, said he. But think you not, that the rich have more science and experience in boxing than in the military art? I do, said he. In that case, according to appearances, our wrestlers will easily combat with double and threefold their number. I will agree with you, said he; for I believe you say right. But what,—supposing they were to send an embassy to another state, informing them of their true situation, telling them, We make no use either of gold or silver, neither is it lawful for us to use them, while for you it is so:—if then you become our allies in war, you shall receive the enemy's spoils;—think you that any, on hearing this, would choose to fight against stanch and resolute dogs, rather than in alliance with the dogs to fight against fat and tender sheep? I think not; but, if the wealth of all the rest be accumulated in one single state, take care that it [the wealthy state] does not endanger that which is poor. How good you are, said I, to think that any other deserves to be called a state except such as we have established. Why not? said he. To those others, said I, we must give a more magnificent appellation; for each of them comprises very many states, and is not one, as was said in the game;* for there are always in them, however small

* The scholiast tells us, that "to play at cities" (*πόλεις παίζειν*) is a kind of game at dice, in which the players cried,—*"One city,"* or *"Many*

they be, two parties hostile to each other,—the poor and the rich; and in each of these again there are very many;—to which, if you apply as to one, you would be entirely mistaken;—but if, as to many, giving one party the goods and power, or even persons, of the other, you will always have the many for your allies, and the few for enemies; and, so long as your state be managed temperately, as lately established, it will be the greatest,—not I mean in mere repute, but really the greatest, though its defenders were no more than one thousand; for a single state of such size you will not easily find, either among Greeks or barbarians, but many which have the repute of being many times larger than one such as this.* Are you of a different opinion? No, by Zeus, said he.

CHAP. III.—This, then, said I, will probably be the best boundary-mark for our rulers as to the size that a state should attain, and what extent of ground should be marked off for it in proportion to its bulk, without reference to anything further?† What boundary? said he. I suppose, said I, [it should be] this: So long as the city, as it increases, continues to be one, so far it may increase, but no further. Very right, said he. We will impose, then, this further injunction on our guardians, to take care by all means that the city be neither small nor great, but of moderate extent, and one only. This probably, said he, will be a trifling injunction. A more trifling one still, said I, is what we previously mentioned, when we observed, that if any descendant of the guardians be depraved, he should be dismissed to the other classes; and if one from the other classes be worthy, he should be promoted to that of the guardians;—by all which it was intended to show that all the other citizens should apply themselves each to that particular art for which he has a natural genius, that so, each minding his own proper work,

cities;” and he informs us, moreover, that the expression was proverbial.

* These notions are severely commented on by Aristotle in his *Pol.* ii. 4.

† From the previous discussion respecting the unity and harmony of a state, Socrates conceives that it may be inferred *also* what decision should be formed respecting its size and boundaries; and he wishes it to be increased only in such way as may be consistent with moderate bulk, and not endanger its unity and the harmony of its several parts.

should not become many, but one ; and thus, consequently, the whole state would have the nature of unity ;—not plurality. Well,—this, indeed, said he, is a still more trifling injunction than the other. We do not here, said I, good Adimantus, as any one might suppose, impose on them many and grave injunctions, but all of them rather trifling, if they take care of one grand point that we speak about, or rather not so much great as sufficient. What is that ? said he. The education, said I, and nurture of children ; for if, by being well educated, they become temperate men, they will easily see through all these things, and such other things as we pass by at present,—women, marriages, and the propagation of the species,—inasmuch as these things ought all, according to the proverb,* to be made entirely common among friends. Yes,—for that, said he, would be most right. And moreover, said I, if once a republic is set a-going, it proceeds as a circle, constantly on the increase. For nurture and good education, when maintained, engender good dispositions, and good dispositions, partaking of such education, turn out still better than the former, especially with reference to propagation, just as with all other animals. Probably, said he. To speak then in brief, this, particularly, the guardians of the state must guard against, that it may not be corrupted unawares,—nay, above all things, must they guard against this, not to make innovations in gymnastics and music, contrary to the established order of the state, but as far as possible maintain it, through fear that while a man adopts that poetical expression,

..... Men most admire that song
Which most partakes of novelty,†

one might often think that the poet means not new songs, but some new style of song, and so commends it : but such as this

* Allusion is here made to the well-known Pythagorean adage,—*τῶν φίλων κοινά*, all the property of friends should be held in common.

† Hom. *Odyss.* i. v. 353 ; but with slight variation,—the original having *ἀκούοντες*, not *ἀειδόντες*. Great stress is here laid on the necessity of keeping up the severe old style of music, inasmuch as the introduction of a new and more luxurious style would infallibly produce a general corruption of national morals. The importance attached to this point will be more truly seen from considering the close relation which, in the opinion of the Greeks, subsisted between all the liberal arts. Plato alludes to the subject at length in the *Laws*, ii. pp. 656 c, 659 c, and iii. pp. 700 a, &c., and vii. throughout.

one ought neither to commend nor admit; for as to receiving a new kind of music one should be specially cautious, as endangering the whole: for never, as Damon says, and I quite agree with him, are the measures of music altered without affecting the most important laws of the state. And me too, you may place, said Adimantus, among those who are of that opinion.

CHAP. IV.—We must erect then, said I, in music, as it seems, a kind of citadel for our guardians. Nevertheless, neglect of the laws even here, said he, easily and imperceptibly steals in. Yes, said I, in the way of diversion, and as if it were doing no mischief. No, for it does nothing else, said he, but by gradually insinuating itself into it, insensibly flow into their manners and pursuits; and afterwards in a greater degree it finds its way into their contracts with each other; and from contracts it enters with much boldness into the laws and political establishments, Socrates, till at last it overturns everything, privately as well as publicly. Well, then, said I, is this the case? It appears so to me, he replied. Ought not our children then, as I said at the beginning, even from infancy, to be allowed diversions more conformable to the laws? because, if their diversions are inconsistent with the laws, and the children such themselves, it is impossible that they should grow up men obedient to the laws and virtuous. How can it be otherwise? said he. When, therefore, children beginning well set about their diversions conformably to the laws, with music, quite the contrary to what happens in the former case attends them in everything, and grows up with them, and corrects in the state whatever was before neglected. True, indeed, said he. And regulations, even, said I, that seem but of little importance, these persons discover anew, which the others had allowed altogether to perish. What regulations? Such as these:—That the younger should keep silence before the elder, as is proper, and give them place, and rise up before them, * and show reverence to parents; likewise what shaving, what clothes and shoes are proper, with the whole bodily dress, and all similar matters. Do not you think so? I do. But to make laws about these things, would, I think, be silly; neither is it done anywhere; nor would it

* Comp. here Aristot. Eth. ix. ch. 2:—παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν ἀποδοτέον ὑπαναστάσεισι καὶ καταλείψει.

stand, though established both by word and writing. For how can it? It seems then, said I, Adimantus, that in whatever way a man sets out in his education, such accordingly will be its consequences; for does not the like always attract the like? Of course. And we may say, I suppose, that it results at last in something complete and vigorous, whether it be good or the contrary? Of course, said he. I would not then, said I, for these reasons, undertake as yet, to make laws about such matters as these. Very properly, said he. But what, by the gods, said I, as to those laws relative to matters of contract, and to the traffic which they severally transact with each other in the market, and, if you please, their traffic likewise among their handicrafts, their abusiveness and bodily assaults, their entering of actions at law, their institution of judges, and likewise such imposts and payments of taxes as might be expedient either in the markets or at the ports,—or generally as to laws commercial, municipal, or marine, or any other the like,—shall we venture to establish any of these? It is improper, said he, to prescribe them to good and worthy men; for the greater part of them, such as ought to be established by law, they will easily find out for themselves. Yes, said I, my friend, if at least God grant them security for those laws which we have above described. But if not so, said he, they will spend the whole of their life making and amending many such [regulations,] imagining that they will thus attain to what is best. You say that such as these, said I, will lead a life like that of sick persons, and such as are unwilling, through intemperance, to relinquish a bad mode of living? Quite so. And truly, these at least pass their time very pleasantly; for though they undergo remedial treatment, they do nothing but make their ailments greater and more complex; and they are ever in hopes, when any one recommends any medicine to them, that by these means they shall soon get well. Aye, that is just the case with diseased persons like these. But what, said I, is not this pleasant of them, to reckon that man the most hateful of all, who tells them the truth, namely, that, till one abandons drunkenness, gluttony, unchaste pleasures, and laziness, neither drugs nor caustics, nor the use of the knife, nor charms, nor amulets, nor any other such things as these, will be of any avail? That, said he, is not very pleasant; for

to be angry with one who tells us what is right, has nothing in it that is pleasant. You seem to be no admirer, said I, of such men as these. No, truly.

CHAP. V.—You cannot then surely approve of it, even though the entire city (as we were lately saying) should act so; or rather, do they not seem to be doing the same that is done by all those cities, which, however ill-governed, command their citizens not to alter any part of the constitution, for that death will be inflicted on all who do any such things; while, on the other hand, whoever most cheerfully serves those who thus govern, gratifying them with insinuating flattery, and exhibits great dexterity in anticipating and satisfying their desires, will be deemed both good and wise in matters of highest importance, and will be held by them also in the greatest honour? They seem to me at least, said he, to do the very same thing, and I cannot by any means commend them. But what again as to those who desire to manage such states, and are even fond of it, do you not admire their courage and dexterity? I do, said he; excepting, indeed, such as are imposed on by them, and fancy that they are really politicians, because they are praised by the multitude. How do you mean? Do you not pardon those men? said I. Do you think it even possible that a man ignorant of the art of measuring, supposing he should hear many other such men tell him that he is four cubits high, would not believe this of himself? Impossible, said he. Be not angry then; for such as these are of all the most ridiculous; because, as they are ever making laws about such things as we have just mentioned, and ever mending them, they conceive they shall find some end to the frauds respecting commerce, and what else I just now spoke about, through ignorance of the fact that they are in fact, as it were, trying to destroy a hydra. Nevertheless, it is nothing else, said he, that they are now attempting. I think, then, said I, that a true lawgiver ought not to give himself much trouble about such sorts of laws and police, either in an ill or well ordered state; in the one, because it is unprofitable and of no avail; in the other, because, as for some of the laws, any one whatever can find them out, while others flow quite of their own accord out of their former habits and pursuits.

What then, in the enactment of laws, said he, yet re-

mains for us to consider? And I said: We have nothing, indeed, remaining: to the Delphian Apollo, however, there remains the greatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions. Of what kind? said he. The erection of temples, sacrifices, and other services to the gods, demons, and heroes; likewise the rites of the dead, and what other ceremonies should be gone through, with a view to their propitiation. Such things as these, indeed, we neither know ourselves, nor, in founding the state, would we intrust them to any other, if we be wise; nor would we employ any other interpreter than that of the country: for surely this god, being the natural interpreter to all men about such matters, interprets to them sitting in the middle, and, as it were, navel of the earth. Aye, you say well, said he; and we must act accordingly.

CHAP. VI.—Thus then, son of Ariston, said I, is our state established. And, in the next place, having provided from some source or other sufficient light for it, do you yourself observe, and call on your brother and Polemarchus and these others also to do so also, whether we can at all perceive where justice lies, and where injustice, and in what respect they differ from each other; and likewise which of the two that man ought to possess, who proposes to be happy, whether with or without the knowledge of gods and men. You say nothing to the purpose, replied Glaucon; for you yourself promised to inquire into this, as it was unholy for you not to assist by all possible means the cause of justice. What you remind me of, said I, is true; and I must act accordingly; still it is proper, that you too should assist in the inquiry. Aye, that we will, said he. I hope then, said I, to be able to find what I want in the following manner:—I think that our city, if at least it has been rightly established, should be perfectly good. Necessarily so, said he. It is evident then, that it is wise, and brave, and temperate, and just. Manifestly so. Whatever then of these [virtues] we shall find in it, the remainder will be that which is not found? Of course. Supposing of any four things whatever, if we were in quest of one, were we to discover this one at first, we should be satisfied; and were we first to discover the other three, we should discover from this itself what we were inquiring after; for it would be manifestly no other than what was left behind. You say

right, said he. Well then, since of the virtues above mentioned there happened to be four [in our state,] shall we not inquire about them in a similar manner? Plainly so.

CHAP. VII.—First of all, indeed, to my mind at least, wisdom appears to hold in it a very conspicuous place; and there appears to be something very peculiar about it. What is that? said he. The state which we have described appears to me to be really wise, for it is well advised; is it not? It is. And surely this very thing, the ability of advising well, is evidently a kind of science; for in no case do men advise well through ignorance, but only by means of science. Plainly so. But there are many and various kinds of science in the state? Of course there are. Is it then owing to the science of builders, that the state is to be termed wise and well-advised? By no means through this, said he; for it would only be clever in building. A state, then, is not to be called wise on account of its skill in advising the best methods of building? Surely not. And what, as respects skill in brass-work or anything else of a similar nature? For none of these, said he. Nor yet for its knowledge of the productions of the earth [is it said to be wise,] but only skilled in agriculture. I think so. But what, said I; is there any science among any of the citizens in the state which we have just founded, which deliberates, not about any particular thing in the city, but about the whole, how it may best be conducted, both as regards itself and its intercourse with other cities? Yes, there is. What is it, said I, and among whom to be found? This very guardianship, said he; and [it may be found] among those very governors, whom we lately termed perfect guardians. On account then of this skill, what do you term the state? Well-advised, said he, and really wise. Whether then, said I, do you imagine that the braziers, or these true guardians, will be the more numerous in the state? The braziers, said he, far more so. And of all, said I, who owing to their skill are to be held in account, will not these guardians be the fewest in number? By far. By this smallest class and portion of the state then, and by the science that presides over and governs it, is the whole city wisely established on natural principles; and this class, as it seems, is by nature the smallest, whose business it is to have a

share in that science, which of all others ought alone to be denominated wisdom. Your remark, replied he, is perfectly true. We have found then, I know not how, one of the four, both as respects its nature and the part of the state in which it resides. And for my part, said he, I think it has been sufficiently described.

CHAP. VIII.—But as to fortitude, both as respects itself, and the particular part of the state in which it resides, on account of which the state is termed brave, that can be no difficult matter to discover. How so? Who, said I, would call a state brave or cowardly, with relation to any other than that particular portion which makes war and fights in its defence? No one would, said he, with relation to any other. No, said I, for I do not think that the other classes therein, whether cowardly or brave, can have any influence to make it either the one or the other. No, indeed. The state then is brave in a certain part of itself, because it contains such a power as will constantly maintain its opinion about things dreadful, as to their being these very things, and such like, just as the lawgiver inculcated during training:—Do you not call this fortitude? I have not thoroughly comprehended, said he, what you say; so tell it over again. Fortitude, said I, I term a kind of preservative. What sort of preservative? A preservative of opinion formed by law in a course of education about things dreadful, as to their nature and quality; and I called it a constant preservative, because one retains it both in pains and pleasures, desires and fears, and never casts it off; and, if you please, I will liken it to what I think it closely resembles. Pray do. Do not you know then, said I, that dyers, when they want to dye their wool, that it may be purple, choose out of ever so many colours only the white, and then prepare and manage it with no trifling pains, so that it may best take a bright hue, and then they dye it? And whatever is dyed in this manner is of an indelible dye; nor can any washing, either without or with soap, take away its hue; but as for wool not thus managed, you know of what sort it proves, whether one dye either this or other colours, without previous preparation. I know, said he, that they are easily washed out, and get shabby.* Suppose then, that we, too, were to per-

* The original is *αλολία*—a word not very easy to render.

form according to our ability a similar operation, when selecting our soldiers, and instructing them in music and gymnastics; and that we should attend to no other object, than that they should obediently and in the best manner receive the laws, as they would a colour, and so acquire indelible opinions about the dreadful, and other things as well, through having had a suitable temper and education; these leys then, however strongly detersive, could not wash away their dye, whether they be pleasure (which is more powerful in effecting this than any alkali* or ley whatever), or pain, fear, and desire, which exceed in power all other solvents.—Such a power then, and constant maintenance of right and legitimate opinion about what is dreadful or not so, I term and define to be fortitude, unless you offer some other meaning. No; I can offer none, said he; for you seem to me to hold, that when a right opinion about these matters arises without education, it is both savage and slavish, and not at all according to law; and you give it some other name besides fortitude. Your remark is quite true, said I. I admit, then, that this is fortitude. Admit further, said I, that it is political fortitude, and you will admit rightly; but we will inquire about it, if you please, more perfectly some other time; for, at present, it is not this, but justice, that we are seeking; and with regard to the inquiry about the other, that has, in my opinion, been carried far enough. You say well, he rejoined.

CHAP. IX.—There yet remain, said I, two [virtues] in the state which we must consider,—namely, temperance, and that, for the sake of which we have been searching after all the rest,—that is justice. Certainly. How then can we find out justice, so as to trouble ourselves no further about temperance? I truly neither know, said he, nor do I wish it to be developed before the other, if at least we are on that account to dismiss altogether the consideration of temperance; but, pray oblige me, and consider this before the other. I for my part am quite willing, said I; for I should be acting wrongly

* The word *χαλασπράϊον*, lit. nitre (nitrate of potash), is derived from *Χαλάσπρα*, a town and lake of Macedonia, where this mineral was found in great abundance.—Comp. Plin. Nat. Hist. xxxi. 10, 5, 46. The rendering, *alkali*, may perhaps be thought an anachronism; but it expresses the author's meaning better than any one word in our language.

not to do so.* Consider then, said he. We must consider, I replied; and as it appears from this point of view, it seems to resemble a sort of symphony and harmony more than the virtues formerly mentioned. How? Temperance, said I, is somehow a certain decorum, and a restraint, as one may say, exercised over certain pleasures and desires; and when one boasts of being superior to oneself, and many other such-like expressions, these are mentioned as indications of it; are they not? Yes,—they are its leading indications, said he. But is not the expression, “superior to oneself,” ridiculous?—for he who is superior to himself must somehow also be inferior to himself; and the inferior be the superior,—for the same person is spoken of in all these cases. How otherwise? To me, however, said I, the expression seems to denote, that in the same man, as regards his soul, there is one part better, and another worse; and that when the better part of his nature governs the inferior, this is what is termed being superior to himself, and expresses a commendation; but when, owing to bad education or associations, that better and smaller part is swayed by the superior power of the worse part,—then one says, by way of reproach and blame, that the person thus affected is inferior to himself and altogether in disorder. Aye,—it would seem so, said he. Look then, said I, at our new state, and you will find one of these in it: for you will agree, that it may justly be addressed as superior to itself, if that state, in which the better part governs the worse, is called temperate and superior to itself. I do see it, said he;—and you say true. And moreover one may find very many and various desires, and pleasures, and pains, especially among children, and women, and domestics, and likewise among the greatest and most depraved portion of those who are called free. Certainly. But as for the simple and moderate desires, which are led by the intellect, with judgment and right opinion, you will meet with them only in the few, those, namely, of the best temper and best educated. True, said he. And do not you see that these things are contained in our state, and that there too the desires of the many and the baser part are restrained by the

* The original is very elliptical:—*Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, βοίλομαι γε, εἰ μὴ δδίκω*. The form *εἰ μὴ ἀδίκω* occurs again, x. ch. 9, p. 608 d. and ch. 12, p. 612 d.

desires and prudence of the smaller and more moderate part? I do, said he.

CHAP. X.—If then, we are to call any state superior to pleasures and desires, and to itself also, this may be so called. Yes, by all means, said he. And is it not on all these accounts temperate? Quite so, said he. And if, again, in any other state, the governors and the governed agree in opinion on the point, as to the fit governing party, it is to be found in this:—do you not think so? I am strongly of that opinion. In whom then of the citizens will you say that temperance resides, when they are thus situated;—in the governors, or the governed? In both of them, probably, said he. Do you see then, said I, that we just now rightly guessed, that temperance resembles a kind of harmony? How so? Because—not as fortitude and wisdom (each of which resides in a certain part, the latter making the state wise, and the former courageous), not after this manner does temperance render the state temperate; but it is naturally diffused through the whole, making the weakest and the strongest and the intermediate all to agree, either in prudence, if you will, or if you will, in strength, magnitude, or in substance, or anything else of the same kind; so that most justly may we say, that this concord is temperance, a natural consent between the worse and the better part, [with reference to the question] which of them ought to govern, either in the state or in each individual. I am quite of the same opinion, said he. Well then, said I, three qualities in our state, it would seem, have been clearly discovered: but with respect to the remaining species, owing to which the state has the quality of virtue; what can it be? It is plain that it is justice. It is plain. Ought we not then, Glaucon, like huntsmen, closely surrounding a thicket, to take great care that justice does not somehow or other escape, and vanish from our sight?—for it is clear that it is somewhere here. Look earnestly, therefore, to spy it out, if you can any how see it sooner than me, and then point it out to me. Would that I could, said he; but if you will use me rather as an attendant, and one able only to perceive what is pointed out to him, you will then be treating me just as you ought. Call on the gods with me, said I, and follow. I will do so, said he; do you only lead the way. To me, said I, this seems a place somehow hard of access,

and overcast with shadow :—it is indeed dark, and hard to penetrate ;—but still we must go on. We must, said he. And I perceiving, said, Ho ! Ho ! Glaucon, we seem to have some track ; and I think that it will not altogether escape us. You tell good news, said he. Verily, said I, our senses are somewhat blunted. As how ? Long since, even from the first, my fine fellow, has it been rolling at our feet ; and we perceived it not, but made the most ridiculous figure, like those who sometimes seek for what they already have in their hands :—so we did not perceive it, but were looking out to a distance ; and thus perhaps it escaped us. How mean you ? said he. Thus, said I ;—that I think, although we have been long talking and hearing of it, we do not understand ourselves, as to the manner in which we expressed it. A long preamble, said he, to one who is eager to hear.

CHAP. XI.—Well now, said I, listen whether I say anything to the point :—for what we at first settled, when regulating the state, as what ought always to be done,—that, I think, or a species thereof, is justice :—this surely we settled, and frequently mentioned, if you remember ;—that every one ought to apply himself to one thing, with reference to the state,—to that, namely, to which his genius most naturally inclines him ? Yes, we did say so. And also, that attending to one's own affairs, and not busying oneself about many things, is justice, and this we have not only heard from many others, but have frequently said ourselves. We have said so. This then, my friend, said I, somehow seems to be justice, to attend to one's own business.—Do you know whence I infer this ? No ; pray tell me, said he. Besides what we have already considered in the state,—namely, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom,—this, said I, seems to remain, which enables all these both to have a being in the state and to afford safety to its indwellers as long as it continues therein ; and we said likewise, that justice would be that remaining part, if we found the other three. It must be so, said he. But if, said I, you want to judge, which of these, by its presence in the state, will do it the greatest proportionate good ; it would be difficult to determine whether the coincidence of opinion between the governors and the governed, or the maintenance of legitimate opinion among the soldiers about what is

dreadful, and what is not so,—or what is wisdom and guardianship in the rulers,—or whether this, by its existence in the state, makes it proportionably best,—namely, when child and woman, bond and free, artificer, magistrate, and subject, every one in short attends to his own business, and does not meddle. Yes, it is hard to decide, said he, of course. With reference, then, to the virtue of a state, that power which makes each person in it attend to his own business, rivals, as it seems, its wisdom, temperance, and courage. Undoubtedly so, said he. Will you not then constitute justice as a co-rival with these, with reference to the virtue of a state? By all means. Consider, then, whether you agree with me in this: will you enjoin the rulers to give just decisions in judgment? Of course. And in giving judgment, what else are they to aim at in preference to this,—namely, that no one shall have what belongs to others, or be deprived of his own? No; they [must aim] at this. And [do they not aim at it,] when acting justly? Yes. And thus justice is acknowledged to be the habitual practice of one's own proper and special work? It is so. See then, if you agree with me:—suppose a carpenter to take in hand the work of a shoemaker, or a shoemaker the work of a carpenter, exchanging either their tools or wages; or if the same man undertake both, and make all the other exchanges; think you that the state would be much injured? Not very much, said he. But methinks, if a craftsman, or one born to a money-getting employment, should afterwards, through being elated by wealth, popularity, strength, or any thing else of the kind, try to advance into the military class, or out of the military class into that of counsellor and guardian, when unworthy of it,—and these should exchange tools and rewards; or if the same man should undertake to do all these things at once; then, I suppose, you will be of opinion, that this interchange of things and this multiplicity of employments by a single person is the destruction of the state. By all means. A meddling spirit, then, in these three classes, and the change from one to another, is the greatest injury to the state, and may be most correctly called its depravity. Aye, truly so. But will not you say that injustice is the greatest ill a state can do itself? Of course. This then is injustice.

CHAP. XII.—Again we say, as follows: The peculiar

occupation of the money-getting, the auxiliary, and the guardian class, when each of them does his own work in a state, will be the contrary of the other, that is justice, and will make the state just. The case appears to me, said he, to be no otherwise than thus. Let us not as yet, said I, affirm this for certain : but if it shall be conceded by us, that this kind enters into each individual, and that there is justice, we will then agree ; for what shall we say ? but if not, then we must push our inquiries further.—But now let us finish the inquiry on which we were engaged,—namely, whether, in judging, we should be better able, by first contemplating justice in some of the greater objects that possess it, to distinguish its nature in a single man, and that as a state appeared to us this very object ; we thus therefore formed it as well as we possibly could, in the assurance that justice would be found in one that is good. As to what we have discovered in the state, then, let us now transfer and apply it to a single person ; and if the two correspond, it will be well ; but if there be any difference in the individual, we will go back again to the state, and put it to the test ; and, perhaps, in considering them side by side, and by striking them, we shall make justice shine forth, like fire from flints ; and when once clearly apparent, we can then firmly establish it among ourselves. Aye, you are speaking quite in the right way, said he ; and thus, too, we must act.

With respect then, said I, to what may be termed the same, whether greater or less, does it happen to be dissimilar in that respect in which we call it the same, or is it similar ? Similar, said he. The just man then, said I, will not at all differ from the just state, as respects the idea of justice, but will be similar to it. Aye, similar, said he. However a state appeared to be just, because three kinds of dispositions being in it, each performed its own work ; but it appeared to be temperate, brave, and wise, on account of certain other affections and habits of these very same kinds. True, said he. And in that case, my friend, we shall deem it proper, that the individual, who has these very same principles in his soul (namely, temperance, fortitude, wisdom), should have a good right, from having the same affections with the state, to be called by the same names ?

He needs must, said he. Here again, my clever fellow, we have fallen into a trifling discussion* about the soul, whether it does or does not contain within itself these three principles. I do not think it is a trifling one, said he: for probably, Socrates, the common saying is true, that things excellent are difficult. They seem so, said I. And be assured of this at least, Glaucon, that, in my opinion, we shall never comprehend this matter accurately by such methods as we are now using in our conversation, because the road which really leads to it is longer and of greater extent: still we will consider it in a manner consistent with our former disquisitions and inquiries. Ought we not to acquiesce in this? said he: for to me at least, and for the present, it would be satisfactory enough. Aye, and for me too, said I, it will be quite sufficient. Do not get tired then, said he; but pursue the inquiry. Is it then necessary, said I, that we should acknowledge the very same characters and manners to exist in every individual that are found in the state? because there is no other source whence they arrived thither. It were ridiculous, indeed, to imagine that the high spirit for which the Thracians, Scythians, and nearly all the northern nations are reputed, does not arise from individual personages; and the same may be said respecting the love of learning, which one may especially deem natural to the people of this country,—or, with reference to the love of riches, which we may say prevailed especially among the Phœnicians and the people of Egypt. Quite so, said he. It is so, of course, said I; and it is not hard of recognition. No, indeed.

CHAP. XIII.—This, however, is truly hard [to decide,] whether we perform our separate acts by one and the same power, or whether, as they are three, we perform one by one, and another by another; that is, learn by one, get angry by another, and by a third covet the pleasures of nutrition and propagation, and others akin to these; or whether, when we devote ourselves to them, we act on each with the whole soul: these matters

* Stallbaum reads—*εἰς φαῦλόν γε σκῆμμα*, which is the reading of the best MSS., though the old editions read—*οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε*. The words are spoken ironically.

are difficult adequately to determine. I think so too, said he. Let us try to define these things, whether they are the same with one another, or different. How can we? It is plain that the same thing evidently cannot at the same time produce or experience contrary effects in the same respect, and relatively to the same object; so that, if we ever find anything thus occurring, we shall know that it was not one and the same thing, but several. Granted. Attend now to what I am saying. Proceed, replied he. Is it possible for the same thing, considered in the same relation, to be both at rest and in motion? By no means. Let us define this more accurately still, lest, as we proceed, we be inclined to waver:—for, if one were to say that, when a man stands, though yet moving his hands and head, the same person is at once still and in motion; we should not, I conceive, reckon this a correct mode of speaking, but that one part of him is at rest, and another part in motion:—is it not so? Just so. But if a person arguing thus were to proceed jestingly and facetiously allege that tops are wholly at rest, but yet are at the same time in motion, when, fixed on the same point, they are whirled about their centre,—or that anything else going round in a circle in the same position does the same,—we should not admit it, as it is not in the same respect that they both stand still and are in motion; but we should say that they have in them the straight line [*i. e.* the axis] and the circumference; and that, with relation to the axis they are at rest (because it inclines to neither side); but with relation to the circumference, they move in a circle:—and again, if, while it is whirling round, its perpendicularity inclines either to the right or the left, forwards or backwards, then it is by no means at rest. Very right, said he. No assertion then of this kind will frighten us; nor shall any one persuade us, that anything, being one and the same, can do and suffer contraries at one and the same time, in the same respect, and relatively to the same object. Me, at any rate, he shall not, said he. But once more, said I, not to be tedious in going over and refuting all these quibbles, let us proceed on the supposition, that this is really the case, acknowledging, also, that if at any time these things are found to be different

from what they now are, all that we have gained will be lost. This then, said he, is what we must do.

CHAP. XIV.—Well then,—nodding an assent, said I, and making a sign of dissent, desiring to take a thing and refusing it, attracting or repelling—will you reckon all such things contraries respectively, whether actions or passions;—for it matters not which? Contraries, certainly, said he. What then, said I,—thirst, hunger, and the desires generally,—and further, to wish and to will, may not all these be considered as of the same kind with the species just mentioned?—As for instance, will you not always say of a man who desires, that his soul aims after what it desires, or attracts to itself what it wishes to have?—Or again, so far as the soul wishes something to be given to it, does it not make a sign for it, as if a person were asking for it, through desire of acquiring its possession? I should say so. But what?—to be unwilling, not to wish, and not to desire,—shall we not deem them synonymous with repelling and driving off from the soul, and so all things else that are contrary of the former? Of course. This being the case, shall we say that there is a certain species of desires, and that the most conspicuous are those which we call thirst and hunger? We shall say so, he replied. Is not one the desire of drinking, the other of eating? Yes. In the case of thirst then, is it, so far as it is thirst, a desire in the soul of anything more than what we were saying; and as far as thirst goes,—is there a thirst for hot drink, or cold, for much or little, or in short for some particular kind of drink?—or again, if heat be added to the thirst, will it not readily occasion a desire for cold drink; but if cold [be added to it,] then [a desire] for warm drink: and if the thirst be great, owing to numerous causes, will it not occasion a desire for much drink, but if small, [a desire] for little; while as for the desire of thirst itself, it never becomes the desire of anything else, but of that only to which it naturally belongs,—and so, also, of hunger with reference to meat? Just so, said he, every desire belongs in itself to that alone of which it is the desire; but whether they be desires of such or such a particular kind, are adventitious circumstances. Let no one then, said I, trouble us, as if we were inadvertent, [by objecting to us] that no one desires drink, but good drink,—nor meat, but good meat;—inasmuch as all men desire what is good.

If then thirst be a desire, it is one of something good ; whether it be of drink, or anything else whatever,—and in the same way with all the other desires. Aye, perhaps, replied he, the man who says this may be deemed to say something to the purpose. But in truth, said I, things naturally relative, refer in each particular, as I think, to this or that object, to which they belong, while in their individual character they refer only to themselves individually. I do not understand, said he. Do not you understand, said I, that greater is relatively greater than something? Certainly. Is it not greater than the lesser? Yes. And that which is much greater than that which is much less; is it not? Yes. And that which was formerly greater than that which was formerly less, and that which is to be greater than that which is to be less? Of course, said he. And in like manner, the more numerous has reference to the less numerous, and the double to the half, and so in all such-like cases;—and further, the heavier to the lighter, and the swifter to the slower; and further still, the hot to the cold; and all such like, are they not thus related? Entirely so. But what as to the sciences;—is not the case the same?—for, science itself is the science of pure learning, or of whatever else one sees fit to make it the science; while, on the other hand, a certain particular science, of a particular kind, refers to a certain particular kind, and also to a particular object. My meaning is as follows:—when the science of building houses arose, was it not so far separated from the other sciences, as to acquire the name of architecture? Of course. Was it not so, because it was of a kind like none else? Yes. Was it not then from its being the art of such a particular thing, that it became itself such a particular art;—and are not all other arts and sciences in like manner? They are so.

CHAP. XV.—Consider then, said I, that this is what I wanted to express, if you now understand me; namely, that things which are relative, taken by themselves alone, relate to themselves alone, but considered as of such a quality, relate to particular objects. I do not say, however, that a science altogether resembles that of which it is the science; (as if, for example, the science of healthy and sickly were itself healthy and sickly, or the science of good and evil itself good and evil;) but as

science is not constituted the science of that generally of which it is the science, but only of a certain quality of it (that is, of its healthy and sickly state), so it comes to be itself a particular science; and hence it is no longer called simply a science, but the medicinal science, the particular class to which it belongs being superadded. I understand you, said he; and I think it is so. As for thirst then, said I, will you not class it among those things which have relation to something else, so far as it is what it is? and is not thirst a thirst for something? I should, certainly, said he, for drink. And does not a particular thirst desire a particular drink?—whereas thirst in general is neither of much nor of little, nor of good nor bad, nor, in one word, of any particular kind; but abstractly and in general, the natural desire of drink. Assuredly. The soul of the man then who thirsts, so far as he thirsts, wishes nothing further than to drink; and this he covets, and to this he hurries? Clearly so. If therefore, when the soul is athirst, anything draws it back, must it not be some different principle from that which excites thirst, and leads it as a wild beast to drink;—since it is impossible, we say, for the same thing, by itself, and at the same time, to produce contrary results from the same cause? It is indeed impossible. Just as it is not proper, methinks, to say of an archer, that his hands at once propel and draw in the bow, but that one of his hands propels it, and the other draws it in? Assuredly, said he. Can we say, then, that there are some, who when athirst are not willing to drink? Certainly, said he, many, and often. What then, said I, is one to say of these persons?—Might it not be said, that there is something in their soul that prompts them to drink, and likewise something that restrains them, quite different, and that prevails over the prompting principle? I think so, said he. Does not the restraining principle then, whenever it arises, arise from reason; while those that lead and urge men onwards, proceed from affections and ailments? It appears so. We shall not then, said I, be unreasonable in defining these as distinctly two, and separate from one another, if we call that with which one reasons, the rational part of the soul, but that part with which it loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and is carried away by desires, the

irrational and concupiscent part, as associated with certain gratifications and pleasures. We shall not, said he; but we may reasonably regard them in this light. Let these two then, said I, be defined as distinct principles in the soul. But as to that of anger, and by which we are angry, is it a third principle, or is it of like nature with one or other of these two? Perhaps, said he, with one of them, the concupiscent. But I believe, said I, what I have somewhere heard:—Leontius, son of Aglaion, as he was returning from the Piræus, along the outside of the northern wall, perceiving some dead bodies lying close to the place of public punishment,* had a desire to look at them, but yet at the same time revolted therefrom and turned away; and for a while he resisted, and covered his eyes, but, at last, overcome by his desire, ran with eyes wide open towards the dead bodies, and said: “Here now, ye wretched eyes of mine! glut yourselves with this fine spectacle.” I too have heard it, said he. This story now shows, said I, that anger sometimes opposes the desires, as being distinct from each other. Yes, said he, it does show it.

CHAP. XVI.—Do we not then in other cases, and very frequently, perceive, said I, when the appetites compel any one against his reason, that he reproaches himself, and is angry at the compelling principle within him; and that like two persons at variance, the anger of such a person becomes an ally to reason; but that it sides with the desires when reason decides that no opposition is to be offered, you will say, I think, that you have never perceived anything of this kind either in yourself, nor yet in any other? No, by Zeus, replied he. What then, said I, is it not the case, when a man imagines he is doing a wrong, that the more generous he is, the less is he apt to be angry, however he may suffer hunger or cold, or other like privations, from one, who, as he thinks, inflicts them with justice?—And, as I have said, his anger will not incline him to rise up against such an one. True, said he. But what;—when a man thinks himself injured, does he not in this case boil with rage and become indignant and ally himself on the side of what seems just; and under all the sufferings of hunger, cold, and the like, does he not bear up and strive to conquer:

* Gr. *παρὰ τῷ ἐημίῳ*, which admits of no concise rendering

nor does he cease from his generous toils, until he has either accomplished them, or dies, or, like a dog by the shepherd, is called off and pacified by the rational principle within him? Certainly, said he, it is precisely like what you say; for, in our state, we appointed the auxiliaries to be obedient, like dogs, to the state rulers, as being shepherds of the state. You quite understand, said I, what I mean to say:—but have you considered this also? What? That here apparently, as regards the irascible, the reverse takes place from what took place in the former instance,—for then we reckoned it the same as the concupiscent; but now we say it is far from it, or rather that, in the sedition of the soul, it more willingly arrays itself on the side of the rational part. Entirely so, said he. Is it then as something entirely distinct, or as a species of the rational;—so as that there are not three species, but only two in the soul, the rational and concupiscent?—or, as there were three species which completed the city, the money-getting, the auxiliary, the deliberative; so, in the soul, is this irascible a third natural principle, auxiliary to the rational, when not corrupted by bad education? Of course, it must, said he, be a third. Yes, said I, if at least it seem at all different from the rational, just as it seemed to be distinct from the concupiscent. Aye, that is not hard to see, said he;—and as a proof of this, one may see, even in little children, that quite from their infancy they are full of anger, while some of them, at least in my opinion, never have any share in reason, the majority indeed only arriving at it but late in life. Aye, truly, said I, you are right. And in the brute beasts, too, one may observe yet further, that what you say is really the case; and besides this, it is attested also by what we formerly cited from Homer*—

His breast he struck, and thus his heart reproved;—

for, in this passage, Homer has plainly made one part reprove the other; that part, namely, which reasons about good and evil, to reprove the part which is unreasonably angry. You are quite right, said he.

CHAP. XVII.—These things, said I, we have agreed to after some difficulty; and it is now sufficiently acknowledged, that the same sort of principles that are in a state reside also

* Hom. Odyss. lib. xx. v. 17.

in the soul of every individual, and equal in number. Must it not, then, necessarily follow, that in whatever manner the state is wise, and in whatever respect, after the same manner and in the same respect, the individual is so also? Of course. And in whatever respects, and after whatever manner, the individual is brave, in the same respect, and after the same manner, a state is brave also? and so in all other respects, both are the same as regards virtue? Necessarily so. And I think, Glaucon, it may be said that a man is so just in the same way as a state is so. This also must needs be the case. Aye; but have we not somehow or other forgotten this, that the state is just, when every one of the three species in it does its own particular work? No, said he, I do not think we have forgotten that point. We must remember then likewise, that each of us will be just, and do his own work, each part of whose soul does its own proper duty. Aye, said he, we must be sure to recollect that. Is it not proper, then, that the rational part should govern, as being wise, and charged with the care of the whole soul; and that the spirited part should obey and ally itself to the other? Certainly. Will not the mixture then, as we said, of music and gymnastics, make the two to harmonize by exalting and nurturing the one with excellent arguments and good discipline, while it unbends the other by soothing and rendering it mild through harmony and rhythm? Assuredly, said he. And when these two are thus nurtured and have been truly taught and practised in their own affairs, they will preside over the concupiscent part, which in every one occupies the largest part of the soul, and by its nature is insatiable of wealth; and they will take care, lest, having acquired growth and strength by being filled with bodily pleasures, as they are termed, it become discontented with its own work, and so attempt to enslave and rule over those it ought not, and thus wholly upset the entire system of life. Certainly, said he. And by this principle, said I, will not the two maintain a good guard against enemies from without, owing to their joint influence over both soul and body, the one laying down the plans, and the other fighting in obedience to its leader, and executing with fortitude the plans laid down? Such is the case. And I think we call a man brave, when, through all the pains and pleasures of life, the spirit maintains the opinion dictated by

reason about what is terrible, and what is not so. Right, said he. And we call a man wise, from that small part which governs him, and dictates this, inasmuch as it possesses the knowledge of what is expedient for each separately, and for the whole of the three together. Certainly. And, do we not moreover term a man temperate, from the association and harmony of these very principles, when the governing and governed agree in one,—namely, when reason governs, and when the others are not at variance therewith? Temperance, said he, is no other than this, either as respects the state or the individual. But he will be just, owing to those causes and in the manner which we have often before mentioned? He must. What then, said I; has anything blunted us, that we should regard justice as anything else than what it is seen to be in a state? Not in my opinion at least, said he. In this manner then (if there yet remain any doubt in the soul), let us, by all means, satisfy ourselves by bringing the man into difficult circumstances. As what? For instance, if we be compelled to declare, concerning such a state and a man born and educated conformably thereto, whether such a man, if intrusted with gold or silver, is likely to embezzle it,—who do you think would imagine, that such an one would do it sooner than those of a different character? No one would, said he. Will not such an one then be free from sacrileges, thefts, and treacheries, either privately against his friends, or publicly against the state? He will. Nor will he ever, in any shape, be faithless, either as to his oaths, or other compacts? How should he. Adulteries, neglect of parents, and impiety against the gods, will be found then in any one rather than such a man as this? Aye, in any one else, truly, said he. And is not this the cause of all these things,—that, of all the parts within him each separate one does its own work, as to governing and being governed? This is it, and nothing else. What else do you wish justice to be, except such a power as produces men and states like these? Not I, truly, said he, for my part.

CHAP. XVIII.—Our dream then, which we conjectured, is at last accomplished; that on our very first attempt to found our state we have apparently arrived by divine assistance at a principle and pattern of justice? Quite so. And that, Glaucon, was a certain image of justice, that the man na-

turally fitted for the office of a shoemaker, should make shoes properly, and do nothing else; and that he also, who is a carpenter, should do that work,—and so also, of the rest. It appears so. In truth, then, of such a kind was justice, as it seems; nor does it regard merely a man's external action, but what is really internal, relating to the man himself, and what is properly his own; not allowing any principle in him to attempt what is another's province, or to meddle and interfere with what does not belong to it; but really well establishing his own proper affairs, and maintaining proper self-government, keeping due order, becoming his own friend, and most naturally attuning these three principles, as three musical strings, base, tenor, and treble, or whatever others may intervene:—thus will he be led to combine all these together, and out of many to form one whole, temperate, attuned, and able to perform whatever is to be done, either in acquiring wealth, or managing the body, or any public affair or private bargain, and in all these cases reckoning that action to be just and good, which always sustains and promotes this habit; and so also calling the knowledge which presides over this action wisdom,—and on the contrary, calling that an unjust action, which destroys this habit,—and the opinion which presides over this, folly. Perfectly true, Socrates, said he. Be it so, said I:—if then we should say, that we have found out a just man and state, and the nature of justice in both, I think we should not be considered altogether in error. No, by Zeus, said he. May we assume it, then? We may.

CHAP. XIX.—Be it so, said I. But we were next, I think, to consider injustice? Clearly so. Is it not then necessarily a kind of variance between the three principles, a kind of meddling and interfering spirit in things foreign to their proper business, and an insurrection of some one principle against the whole soul, to govern where it is not its province, though it be really of such a nature, that it ought to be in subjection to the governing principle? I imagine then we are to call this tumult and error by some such names as these,—injustice, intemperance, cowardice, folly, and in a word, all vices? Just so, said he. To commit injustice then, said I, and to be injurious, and likewise to act justly, all these must be very manifest, if indeed injustice

and justice are so. How? Because, said I, they do not differ from what is salutary or noxious;—as the latter are in the body, so are the former in the soul. In what way? said he. Such things as are healthy produce health, and such as are noxious, disease. Yes. And does not acting justly produce justice, — and acting unjustly, injustice? Necessarily so. To produce health, however, is to establish everything in the body, so that they shall mutually govern and be governed, conformably to nature,—while the production of disease, on the other hand, consists in one part governing and being governed by another, contrary to nature. It is indeed. Then again, said I, to produce justice, is it not to establish all in the soul, so that its parts shall mutually govern and be governed according to nature;—and does not injustice consist in governing and being governed by one another contrary to nature? Plainly so, said he. Virtue then, as it seems, is a kind of health, beauty, and good habit of the soul; and vice its disease, deformity, and infirmity? It is so. Do not honourable pursuits then lead to the attainment of virtue, but dishonourable to that of vice? They must. What remains for us to consider then is,—whether it be profitable to act justly, and pursue what is honourable, and to be just, and whether a man can be of such a character unconsciously or not;—or to act unjustly, and to be unjust, though one be never punished, or reformed by correction? But, said he, Socrates, this inquiry seems, to me at least, quite ridiculous;—that if in a corrupt state of the body life be deemed not worth possession, not even though accompanied by all kinds of meats and drinks, and all wealth and power, yet when the nature of the vital principle is disordered and thoroughly corrupted, life will then be worth having, though a man were to do everything else that he likes, except ascertaining how he shall get released from vice and injustice, and cultivate justice and virtue,—since both these things have been proved such as we have represented them. Aye, it would be truly ridiculous, said I. However, since we have arrived at such a point as enables us most distinctly to perceive that these things are so, we must not get weary. On no account, by Zeus, said he, must we be weary. Come then, said I, and let us see also how many principles vice possesses,—principles

indeed that are worthy of attention. I am all attention, said he ;—only tell me. And truly now, said I ;—since we have reached this part of our discourse, it appears to me, as to one looking from a height, that there is but one principle of virtue, while those of vice are infinite :—and of these there are four, particularly deserving of mention. How say you ? replied he. There seem to be as many classes of the soul as there are forms of government. How many then ? Five, said I, of governments, and five of the soul. Name them, said he. What we have just described, replied I, is one species of government ; and it may have a twofold appellation ; for, if among the rulers one prevails over the rest, it may be termed a Monarchy,—but if there be several, an Aristocracy. True, said he. I call this then, said I, one species ; for, whether there be several, or whether it be but one who governs, they will never alter the principal laws of the state, —because they will observe the nature and education we have described. It is not likely, said he.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

BOOK V.

ARGUMENT.

In the *fifth* book he shows how the magistracy is to be constituted, so as to establish a prosperous state. True philosophy, says he, is its basis; and this, so far from being superficial and affecting only the outward bearing and life of the citizens, turns the mind away from all these fleeting subjects to that which is real, positive, and consistent with the knowledge of God. Carrying the subject somewhat back, therefore, he considers in detail the subject-matter of philosophy, proving that it is the knowledge both of virtue and of God, both of which are indispensable to a well-ordered state, in which either philosophers must be rulers or *vice versâ*. As however he had said in the third book, that a state's welfare depended on the community of ideas and of property, he now shows in detail, how the duties of men and women are common in a state, and how consequently themselves and their property too should be common,—a notion which Aristotle rather severely handles in the second book of the *Politics* (ch. 3), where he says, that, though the state be one, but with this restriction, that we must bear in mind that to different men belong different dispositions, and if *εὐραξία* is gently to be maintained, we must specially guard against confusion and unnecessary interference, the certain means of downfall to a state.

CHAP. I.—Such a state and government then, and such a man as we have described, I term good and upright: and if this government be an upright one, I reckon the others bad and erroneous, both as to the regulations in states, and the establishment of the moral nature in individuals, inasmuch as there are four species of depravity.* Of what kind are these? said he. I was about to mention them in order, as they each appeared to me to rise one out of another; but Polemarchus stretching out his hand—(for he sat a little further off than Adimantus,)—caught him by the robe at his shoulder, and drew him near; and, bending towards him, he spoke something in a whisper, of which we heard nothing but this: Shall we let that pass, then? said he, or what shall we do? By no means, said Adimantus, now speaking aloud. And I replied, What will not you let pass? You, indeed, said he:—for it

* The argument here interrupted respecting the four kinds of depravity, individually or in states, is resumed at the commencement of the eighth book.

was to you I alluded. You seem to us to be getting careless and to be stealing through a whole branch of the discourse, and that not the least important, that you may not have the trouble of going through it; and you think you escaped our notice, when you made this speech so simply, viz., that it is clear to every one both as to wives and children, that whatever belongs to friends will be common. Did not I say right, Adimantus? Yes, said he: but this, which was rightly said, like the rest of your discourse, requires explanation;—namely, to show what is the mode of that community; for there must be many:—do not omit saying then which mode you mean; for we have been expecting it for some time past, thinking you would, some time or other, speak of the propagation of children, how they are to be propagated;—and when born, how they should be brought up, and everything relating to this community that you were mentioning both of wives and children; for we suppose it to be of great, nay—paramount importance to the state, whether this be rightly performed or not. Now then, since you are taking in hand another kind of state-government before you have sufficiently discussed this, we have determined, as you just heard, not to let you pass, without going over all these things, as you did the others. And me too you may reckon, said Glaucon, as joining in this vote. Be quite sure, Socrates, said Thrasymachus, that this is the opinion of us all.

CHAP. II.—What have you done, said I, in seizing me thus? What a mighty talk is this you are again raising, as you did at the beginning, about your republic, which I was so glad at having completely described, pleased [to think] that any one would let these things pass, and admit what was then said!—And as to what you now challenge me to, you know not what a swarm of disputes you are stirring up: I foresaw them, and let them pass at that time, for fear of making a great disturbance. What then, said Thrasymachus, think you that these are now come hither to melt gold, and not to hear reasonings? Aye, said I, but in moderation. As for moderation, Socrates, said Glaucon, the whole of life serves for hearing such reasonings as these:—but let pass what relates to us; and as to what we

* The verb *χουσοχοῖν* is used proverbially to indicate the entertaining of great hopes that are afterwards unfulfilled.

are inquiring, do not begrudge explaining what you think about it,—what sort of community of wives and children is to be observed by our guardians, and how the latter ought to be reared while very young, in the period between their birth and their education, which seems to be the most troublesome of all. Try and tell us now, how that is to be accomplished. It is not easy, my good fellow, said I, to describe them; for many of them are very hard to be believed, even more than those we have before described; for even their possibility we might well disbelieve; and even were they possible, one might still doubt, whether they would best be done in this particular way:—on this account, my dear friend, I somewhat hesitate to touch on these topics, lest our reasoning appear to be a mere wish, rather than absolute reality. Do not hesitate now, said he; for your hearers are neither unreasonable, nor incredulous, nor ill-disposed. Now, my very good Glaucon, said I, is it with the desire of reassuring me, that you say this? I do, said he. Then you have produced quite a contrary effect, said I; for could I trust to myself, that I thoroughly know what I am to say, your encouragement would have been quite right; for among intelligent and friendly persons, one who understands the truth, may speak with safety and confidence about the most important matters; but when one speaks, as of course I do, with diffidence and a sort of searching spirit, there is both fear and danger, not only of being exposed to ridicule (for that is but a trifling thing), but lest, mistaking the truth, I not only fall myself, but draw my friends along with me into an error about matters, in which we ought least of all to be mistaken. I conjure Adrasteia,* therefore, Glaucon, with respect to what I am going to say:—For I hope it is a smaller offence to be unintentionally a murderer, than an impostor about what is good and excellent, just and lawful: and as for this risk, it were better to risk it among enemies than friends; so that you are not giving me proper encouragement. Then said Glaucon, laughing: Aye, but Socrates, even if we should suffer aught amiss from your discourse, we acquit you as clear of homicide, and as no impostor: so proceed boldly. But the man, said I, who is

* Adrasteia or Nemesis was a daughter of Zeus, and regarded as the punisher of murderers and homicides,—even those involuntarily so. See Blomfield's note to *Æschyl.* *Prom.* v. 972.

acquitted in a court of justice is, at any rate, deemed clear of the crime, as the law says ; and if it be so in that case, it should be so in this. As respects this then, said he, pray proceed. We must now, said I, once more return to what perhaps in strict order should have been considered before ; and thus perhaps it would be correct, after having entirely completed the men's part, to complete also the women's ; especially since you challenge me to do so.

CHAP. III.—Men who have been born and educated as we have described, cannot, in my opinion, otherwise rightly acquire and employ their wives and children than by following the same track, in which we have proceeded from the beginning : for we surely undertook, in our argument, to represent men as the guardians of a flock. Yes. Let us proceed then, to give the children a corresponding birth and education ; and let us consider, whether it be proper for us or not. How ? replied he. Thus : Are we to reckon it proper for the females among our guardian dogs to watch and hunt, and do everything else in common with the males ; or rather to manage domestic affairs within doors, as being disabled from other exercises on account of bearing and nursing the whelps, while the males are to labour and take the entire charge of the flocks ? All in common, said he ; except that we employ the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger. Is it possible then, said I, to employ an animal for the same purposes [with another,] without giving it the same nurture and education ? It is not possible. If, therefore, we are to employ the women for the same purposes as the men, must we not give them also the same kind of instruction ? Yes. Were both music and gymnastics bestowed on the males ? Yes. To the women too, then, we must impart these two arts, and those likewise that refer to war ; and we must employ them in the same manner. It is probable from what you say, said he. Perhaps, however, said I, many things, concerning what we are now speaking, may appear ridiculous, because contrary to custom,—if they shall be practised in the way now mentioned. Quite so, replied he. But which of them, said I, do you conceive to be the most ridiculous ? Would it not clearly be to behold the women naked in the palæstra wrestling with the men, and not only the young women, but even those more advanced in years, just like the old men in the wrestling-schools, who are still fond of the

exercises, though wrinkled, and not at all comely to the eye? Aye, by Zeus, said he; it would appear truly ridiculous, as present fashions go. Ought we not then, said I, since we have entered on this discourse, to fear the raillery of wits, which they would probably bestow pretty abundantly on such innovations [as respects exercising the women] in gymnastics, music, and more especially in the use of arms, and the management of horses? You say right, he replied. But since we have entered on this discourse, let us go to the rigour of the law, and beg these men not to be the slaves of prejudice, but to think seriously, and remember, that not long since the sight of naked men appeared base and disgusting to the Greeks, just as now indeed it does to most of the barbarians: and when first the Cretans, and afterwards the Lacedæmonians, began their exercises, the wits of that day might have made a jest of all this: do not you think so? I do. But methinks, when those experienced in the art thought it better to strip themselves, than to cover up such parts, the merely apparent ridiculousness of the thing is set aside by the advantage stated in our reasoning; and this, too, manifestly shows that the man is a fool who deems anything ridiculous except what is bad, and tries to run down as ridiculous any other idea but that of the foolish and the vicious, or employs himself seriously with any other end in view but that of the good. Assuredly, said he.

CHAP. IV.—Must we not then, first of all, agree on this,—whether these things be possible or not;—and set forth a question, whether any one, either in jest or earnest, can doubt, if the human nature in the female can in all cases share with the male, or in no case share at all; or in some cases, but not in others; and this too with reference to what concerns war? Would not the man who thus sets out so also probably conclude? Certainly, said he. Do you wish then, said I, that we should argue against ourselves about these things, in order that the opposite side may not, if attacked, be destitute of defence? Nothing hinders, said he. Let us then say this for them: There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, for others to dispute with you about this matter; for yourselves, in first establishing your state, agreed that each individual ought to practise one business, according to his particular talent. We did so agree, I think; for how could we do otherwise? Does not then the nature of a woman differ widely

from that of a man? Of course it differs. And is it not right to allot to each a different work, according to the nature of each? Of course. Are not you in the wrong then, and do you not contradict yourselves, in saying that men and women ought to do the same things, with natures so widely different? Have you any answer to make against this, my clever Glaucon? To do so on the moment is no such easy matter, said he; but I will entreat you, and I do so now, to unravel the arguments on our side, whatever they may be. These, Glaucon, replied I, and many other such things, are what I long ago foresaw; and I was both afraid and unwilling to touch on the law concerning the possession of wives and the education of children. No, by Zeus, replied he, it seems no easy matter. Certainly not, said I. The case, however, is thus: If a man fall into a small fish-pond, or quite into the ocean itself, still he has to swim no less. Certainly. Let us too, then, swim, and try to escape from this argument, expecting that either some dolphin* will rescue us, or that we shall have some other remarkable deliverance? It seems we ought, replied he. Come then, said I;—let us see, if we can anywhere find an outlet; for we acknowledged that different natures ought to study different things, and that the natures of a woman and a man are different; yet now we say, that different natures ought to study the same things:—do you accuse us of this? Just so. How admirable, Glaucon, said I, is the power of the art of disputing! How? Because, replied I, many seem to fall into it unwillingly, supposing that they are not cavilling, but reasoning truly, owing to their inability to divide a subject rightly and investigate it according to its species; but following the literal sense, they pursue what is quite contradictory to their subject, making use of cavilling instead of argument. This is indeed the case with many, said he; but does that extend likewise to us in the present instance? Quite so, said I; for I think, that without meaning it, we have fallen into a contradiction. How? Because we have very boldly and disputatiously asserted, that unless persons' natures are the same, they ought not to have the same employments; though we have not at all inquired the sort of difference and identity of the nature [here referred to,]

* Allusion is here made to the fable of Arion,—or if not to that, to the vulgar notion that the dolphin was particularly friendly to man. See Plin. Hist. Nat. ix. 8.

and with reference to which we defined them, when we ascribed different pursuits to different natures, and to the same natures the same pursuits. No certainly, said he, we did not consider that. It would seem then, replied I, that we may still ask ourselves the question, whether the nature of the bald and those who wear hair be the same and not different;—and if we agree that it be different, whether, if the bald made shoes, we should let those who wear hair make them;—or if again, those who wear hair [made them, whether we should allow] the others [to do so likewise]? That were ridiculous, replied he. Is it then ridiculous, said I, for any other reason than that we did not then in general define the sameness and diversity of natures, but observed only that species of diversity and sameness, which respects their peculiar functions, just as we say that a physician, and a man who has a genius for being a physician, have one and the same nature? Do not you think so? I do. But have the physician and the carpenter a different [nature]? Most assuredly.

CHAP. V.—In that case, said I, as regards the natures of men and women, if they appear different, with respect to any art, or other employment, we are supposed to assign to each separately his proper employment:—but if it appear to differ only in this,—namely, that the female bears children, and the male begets them,—we must not say that it has at all as yet been proved that a man differs from a woman in the sense of which we are speaking, and we must still think, that both our guardians and their wives may pursue the same employments. And with reason, said he. After this, then, should we not require any one who says the contrary, to inform us on this point,—what is that art or function in the arrangements of a state, where the nature of a man and woman is not the same, but different? A reasonable demand, too. Perhaps then some one may reply, as you said some time since, that it is not easy all at once to explain this sufficiently, but yet no hard matter for one who has considered it? Yes,—one might well say so. Do you wish then, that we should request such an opponent to follow us, while we try to show him, that there is no function peculiar to a woman in the management of a state? By all means. Come then (we will say to him), answer us:—did you not mean that one man has a natural talent for

anything, and another not, in this respect,—namely, that one learns a thing easily, and another with difficulty; and one with a little instruction discovers much in what he learns, while another, after much instruction and care, does not retain even what he has learned; and that with the one, the body is duly subservient to the mind; while in the other it is opposed to it?—Well, and what other marks are there besides these, by which you would distinguish a man that has particular talents from him that has none at all? One cannot mention any other, said he. Know you then of any function performed by mankind, in which the males have not all these characteristics in a superior degree to the females;—and would it not be tedious to specify particularly the weaving art, and the making of pastry and spice-meats, for which female talents seem to have some repute, and cannot be surpassed without the greatest disgrace? You are right, said he, in saying that in all things universally the talent of the one is superior to that of the other;—yet many women are superior in many respects to many men; though, on the whole, it is as you say. There is no function, my friend, then, among the entire members of our state that is peculiar to woman, considered as such, nor to man, considered as such; but natural talents are indiscriminately diffused through both, and the woman naturally shares in all offices, the same as the man, though in all cases the woman is weaker than the man. Certainly. Are we then to commit all [state concerns] to the men, and none to the women? How should we? It is true then, I think (as we say), that one woman too is fitted for being a physician, and another not so,—one is musical, another by nature unmusical. How otherwise? And is one fitted for gymnastics and warlike,—another not fitted either for war or gymnastics? That is my opinion too. And what;—is not one a lover of philosophy; and another averse to it; and one high-spirited, and another timid? This is true, too. And is not one woman naturally suited for being a guardian, and another not so;—and have we not made choice of such a talent as this for our guardian men? Yes—just of such as this. The nature then of the woman and of the man, as respects the guardianship of the state, is the same,—only that the one is weaker, the other stronger. So it seems.

CHAP. VI.—Women such as these then are to be chosen to dwell with such men, and to be their fellow-guardians,—inasmuch as they are naturally suited for them, and of kindred talents. Certainly. And must not the same employments be assigned to the same natures? The same. We have now got round then, to our former point; and, we allow that it is not contrary to nature, to allot to the wives of our guardians the study both of music and gymnastics? Assuredly. We did not establish then what is impossible, or to be only vainly wished for, when we established the law according to nature:—and it would seem rather, that what is at present contrary to these things is contrary to nature? It seems so. Was not then our inquiry, whether our establishment was possible and best? It was. And we have agreed, that it is possible? Yes. And we must next be convinced, that it is best? Clearly so. In order, therefore, that a woman may become a suitable guardian, there will not be one mode of education for making men [guardians,] and another for women, especially as the latter have received the same natural genius? No,—it will not be different. What think you then of such an opinion as this? Of what? That of imagining in your own mind, that one man is better and another worse;—or do you deem them to be all alike? By no means. In the state then which we were just establishing,—which of the two do you think to make the better men,—the guardians provided with this education we have described, or shoemakers that are taught shoemaking? That question, replied he, is ridiculous. I understand you, said I:—but, tell me; of all the other citizens, are not they the best? By far. But what;—will not these women too be the best of women? They will, replied he, by far. Is there anything better in a state, than that both women and men be rendered the very best? There is not. And this is to be effected by music and gymnastics being imparted to them, as we have described? Of course. We have been establishing then a law, which is not only possible, but best also for the state? Just so. We must unclothe, then, the wives of our guardians, since they are to put on virtue for clothes;* and they must bear a part:

* The expression of Herodotus, Clio, ch. 8, is not dissimilar:—*ἅμα δὲ χιτῶν ἐκδυνέψι συνεκδέεται καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ γυνή.*

in war, and all other guardianship of the state, and do nothing else :—but of these special services the lightest part is to be allotted to the women rather than the men, on account of the weakness of their sex :—and the man who laughs at naked women while going through their exercises with a view to the best object, reaps the unripe fruit of a ridiculous wisdom, and seems not rightly to know at what he laughs, or why he does it :*—for that ever was and will be deemed a noble saying, that the profitable is beautiful, and the hurtful base. Assuredly.

CHAP. VII.—We may say then, that we have escaped one wave, as it were, by thus settling the law with respect to women, and have not been quite overwhelmed, through determining that our male and female guardians are to manage all things in common :† and besides that, our reasoning has been consistent with itself, as respects both what is possible and advantageous also. Truly, it is no small wave you have escaped, said he. You will not call it a great one, replied I, when you see what follows. Tell me, said he ; and let me see. After this enactment, replied I, and the others formerly mentioned, the following, I think, comes naturally. Which is that ? That these women be all common to all these men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately, and that their children likewise be common ;—so that neither shall the parents know their own children, nor the children their parents.‡ This, in comparison with the other, is far more difficult to persuade, both as to its possibility and utility. I do not think, replied I, as to its utility at least, that any one would doubt about it being a very great good to have the women

* The cited words—ἀρετῇ σοφίας δρίπων καρπὸν are from Pindar. See Stobæus, Serm. ccxi. p. 711, and Boeck's Pindar, vol. ii. part 2, p. 669.

† The figure here used bears some resemblance to that used in ch. iv. of this book, p. 453 d :—ἀντε τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἱμπίσῃ, ἀντε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πῖλαγος μέσον, &c.

‡ This peculiar notion on the community of wives and children is severely handled by Aristotle, Polit. ii. ch. 2, and Hist. Anim. ix. 1. It seems probable, however, that Plato did not intend here entirely to destroy all domestic ties whatever, but to inculcate a general community of goods as far as possible,—as most conducive to civil concord and national prosperity. Compare, however, the opening of the ninth chapter of this book. The fact is, that the question is here viewed simply in its physical, not in its moral relations.

and children in common, if it were but possible:—but the greatest question, methinks, will be, whether it be possible or not? One might very well, said he, raise a discussion on both points. You are mentioning, replied I, a combination of discussions; but I thought, at least, that I should escape from one of them, if its utility had been agreed on, and that in that case it would only have remained to consider its possibility. But you have not slunk off, said he, quite unobserved; and so, give us an account of both. I must submit to a trial, said I:—indulge me thus far, however: let me feast myself, as the slow in intellect are wont to feast themselves, when they walk alone:—for men of this sort, I imagine, ere finding out how to attain what they desire, waive that inquiry, in order that they may not tire themselves in deliberating about its possibility or impossibility, supposing they have obtained what they desire, and then they go through what remains,—rejoicing, also, to recount what they will do, when it has happened, and rendering their soul, otherwise indolent, more indolent still. Now I too am become languid, and would, therefore, defer such debates, and inquire afterwards into the possibility of these [arrangements]. At present, however, supposing them possible, I will, if you please, consider how our rulers are to regulate matters thence arising, in order that the doing of these things may be most advantageous both to the state and the guardians:—this, first, I will try to examine with your assistance, and the other question afterwards, if you allow me. Oh, I will give you leave, said he;—so pray proceed with your inquiry.

I imagine then, said I, if our rulers will be worthy of that name, and those also who are their auxiliaries, that the latter will cheerfully do whatever they are bidden, while the former will take the command, giving their directions in some matters conformably to the laws, and imitating their spirit in whatever matters we leave to their sole guidance. Very likely, said he. Do you then, their lawgiver, said I, as you have chosen out the men, so choose out also the women, making them, as far as possible, of similar dispositions:—and these, as they dwell and eat together in common, and none possesses anything whatever in private, will be always together;—and as they mingle in the gymnastic yards and in all their other training exercises, they will, I think,

be led by innate necessity, to mutual intimacies:—do not you think I am speaking of what must necessarily happen? Not, replied he, by any geometrical necessity, but by one founded on love, which seems to be more cogent than the other, in persuading and winning over the bulk of mankind.

CHAP. VIII.—Quite so, said I; but in the next place, Glaucon, to form irregular intimacies, or to do anything else of the same character, is not at all right in a city of happy persons, nor ought the rulers to allow it. No, it were not just, said he. It is evident, by right, in the next place, to make marriages as far as possible sacred; and those most advantageous would be sacred. Altogether so. How then are they to be most advantageous? Tell me this, Glaucon;—for in your house I see both sporting dogs, and a great number of well-bred birds; have you, by Zeus, ever attended to their pairing, and bringing forth young? How? said he. First of all, among these, though all be well-bred, are not some of them far better than all the rest? They are. Do you breed then from all alike; or are you anxious to do so, as far as possible, from the best breeds? From the best. But how; from the youngest or the oldest, or those quite in their prime? From those in their prime. And if they are not thus bred, you consider that the breed both of birds and dogs greatly degenerates? I do, replied he. And what think you as to horses, said I, and other animals;—is the case otherwise with respect to these? It were absurd [to think so,] said he. How strange, my dear fellow, said I; what extremely perfect governors must we have,—if the same applies to the human race! Nevertheless, it is so, replied he; but what then? Because, said I, they must necessarily use many medicines; but as for a physician, where the body does not want medicines, but men willingly subject themselves to a regimen of diet, we think that an inferior and less skilful one may suffice; but when there is need for taking medicines, we know that we want a more able physician. True; but with reference to what do you say this? With reference to this, replied I: it seems likely that our rulers must use an abundance of lying and deceit for the advantage of the governed; and we said somewhere, that all these things were useful in the way of a remedy. Rightly too, said he. This apparent right now seems by no means inconsiderable in marriages and the propa-

gation of children. How so? It necessarily follows, said I, from what has been acknowledged, that the best men should as often as possible form alliances with the best women, and the most depraved men, on the contrary, with the most depraved women; and the offspring of the former is to be educated, but not of the latter, if the flock is to be of the most perfect kind:—and this must be so done, as to escape the notice of all but the governors themselves, if at any rate the whole band of the guardians is to be as free as possible from sedition. Quite right, said he. Are there not to be festivals legally established, in which we shall draw together the brides and bridegrooms;—and must not there be sacrifices, and hymns composed by our poets suitable to the marriages in course of celebration?—But as to the number of the marriages, this we will leave to the rulers, that they may as much as possible keep up the same number of men, having a regard both to wars and diseases, and all other such matters, so that as far as possible our state may be neither great nor small. Right, said he. And chances too, I conceive, should be so well managed, that the depraved man may, on every turn of them, accuse his fortune, and not the governors. Of course, said he.

CHAP. IX.—As for those youths, who distinguish themselves, either in war or other pursuits, they ought to have rewards and prizes given them, and the most ample liberty of lying with women, that so, under this pretext, the greatest number of children may spring from such parentage. Right. And as for the offspring born from time to time, are the authorities presiding over these matters to receive them, whether they be men or women, or both?—for somehow these offices belong in common both to men and women. Yes, they do. As respects, then, the children of worthy persons, I think, they should carry them to some retirement, to certain nurses dwelling apart in a certain quarter of the city; but as for the children of the more depraved, and such of the rest as may be maimed or lame, they will hide them, as is right, in some secret and obscure place. Yes, indeed, said he, if the race of guardians is to be pure. Will they not then take care also of their children's nurture, bringing to the nursery mothers with full breasts, taking every precaution that no woman should recognise her own child, and, where the mothers cannot suckle them, providing others who would be able

to do so? And they will be careful also of this most particularly, that the nurses suckle only during a proper time; and they will enjoin, both on the nurses and keepers, their watching duties, and every other necessary toil. You speak, said he, of a time of great ease to the wives of our guardians, in the breeding of children. Yes, for it should be so, replied I. But let us next discuss what we were so anxious to do, when we said that the procreation of children should take place among persons in the prime of life. True. Do you agree with me then, that this prime season is at twenty in a woman, and at thirty in a man? How do you reckon this time for each sex? said he.* The woman, replied I, is to bear children to the state from the age of twenty to that of forty; and the man, after having passed the most excitable period of his course, is from that period to beget children to the state up to the age of fifty-five. This indeed, is the prime, replied he, in both sexes, both as respects body and mind. If then any one, either older or younger than these, should employ himself in begetting children for the commonwealth, we should say that the trespass is neither right nor just, since he is begetting to the state a child, which (if concealed) is born and grows up, ushered in neither by sacrifices nor prayers—(which, on every marriage, the priestesses and priests, and the whole state offer, that the descendants of the good may be still better, and that from useful descendants others still more useful may arise),—but is born in darkness, and the result of dreadful incontinence. Right, said he. And the law, said I, must be the same, if any of those men, who are yet of the age for procreation, have intercourse with women of a proper age, without the magistrate's leave; for we may consider him as having raised to the state a bastard, born in adultery and unhonoured by religious auspices. Most right, said he. And I presume, whenever either the women or the men are past the age of procreation, we are to let the men cohabit with any woman they like, except their daughter and mother, and the children of their daughters, or those upwards from their mother; and so likewise the women are to embrace any, except a son, a father, and the children of these, in either direction: all this liberty we are to

* The Greek (*τὰ ποῖα αὐτῶν*) is very elliptical; but we agree with Cousin in considering this to be its real meaning.

grant them, after we have enjoined them to be careful, first, if a child be conceived, not to bring it to the light, but if, by accident, it should be brought forth, so to expose it as if there were no provision for it. All these things, said he, are reasonably said :—but how are the fathers and daughters, and the other relations you just mentioned, to be known to one another? They are not to be known at all, said I ; but from the day on which any one is married, whatever children are born between the seventh or tenth month after it, all these he is to call, the males his sons, and the females his daughters, and they are to call him father ; and in the same way again, he is to call the children of these—grandchildren ; and they in turn are to call them grandfathers and grandmothers ; and those who were born during the period in which their fathers and mothers were begetting children, they shall call sisters and brothers, as I just observed,—so that they may have no sexual intercourse.—But as for brothers and sisters, the law will allow them to live together,—if their lot so fall, and the Pythian oracle give consent. Quite right, said he.

CHAP. X.—This, and such as this, Glaucon, is the community of women and children, among the guardians of the state : and that this is consistent both with the rest of our polity, and is by far the best, we must next establish from reason ;—or how shall we do? By Zeus, just so, said he. Is not this, then, the beginning of our agreement, to ask ourselves what we can allege to be the greatest good for the establishment of a state, with a view to which the lawgiver is to enact the laws, and what the greatest evil,—and next to examine, whether what we have hitherto described tends to or conforms with the track of the good, and is opposed to that of the evil? Most certainly, said he. Is there, then, any greater evil for a state than that which tears it in pieces, and makes it many instead of one ;—or, any greater good than that which binds it together, and makes it one? There is not. Does not then the communion both of pleasure and pain bind men together, when the whole of the citizens as much as possible rejoice and mourn in fellowship, for the same matters, whether gainful or the contrary?* Assuredly, he replied. And again, any mere private perception

* Gr. τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων, &c

of such things dissolves [that union,] when some grieve exceedingly, and others rejoice exceedingly at the same events, either in the state or those composing it? Of course. Does not this then arise from the following circumstance,—when such words as these are not pronounced at the same time in a state, as *mine*, and *not mine*; and with regard to what concerns another, in the same way? Aye, surely. And the state, in which the greatest number unite in saying of the same things, that *this concerns me*, and *that does not concern me*,—that is best regulated? By far. And it is that also, which most closely resembles the individual man;—just as, when a person's finger is wounded, the entire fellowship of feeling, extending through the body towards the soul, and producing that harmony which is the work of the governing principle within it, [viz. the soul,]* experiences a sensation, and at the same time wholly sympathizes with the ailing part; and thus we say that the man has a finger-ache:—and so also, with respect to any part whatever of the human frame, the same reasoning applies either with respect to grief, when a part is in pain, or with respect to pleasure, when it is at ease. Aye, the very same, said he: and as to what you are asking, the state that nearest approaches this is the best governed. When, therefore, any individual citizen receives good or ill, such a state, methinks, will most especially maintain that she herself is the party affected, and will unite as a whole in joy or mourning. That must be the case, said he, in a state, governed, at least, by good laws.

CHAP. XI.—It will be time perhaps for us to return to our state, and consider as to the points on which we have agreed in our discussion, whether they belong more particularly to our state than any other. Yes,—we must, he replied. What then? there are surely in other states, both governors and people?—and so also in this? There are. And will not all these address one another as citizens? Of course. But besides calling them citizens, what do the people call their governors under the other forms of government? In most states, masters, but in democracies, this very name gover-

* Gr. ὅταν του ἡμῶν δάκτυλός που πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἢ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ, &c.

nors. But what as to the people in our state? besides citizens, what do they say their governors are? Saviours, said he, and helpers. And what do they call the people? Paymasters, replied he, and supporters. And in the other states, what do the governors call their people? Slaves, he replied. And what do the governors call one another? Fellow-governors, said he. And ours, what? Fellow-guardians. Can you then tell about the governors in other states, whether any one of them can address one of his fellow-governors as an intimate, and another as a stranger? Aye, very many can. Does he not then esteem and speak of his intimate as his own, and the stranger as not his own? Just so. But how is it with your guardians? Is there any one of them, who can esteem or address any of his fellow-guardians as a stranger? By no means, he replied;—for with whomever a person falls in, he will conceive that he falls in with a brother or sister, or a father or mother, or a son or daughter, or their descendants or ancestry. You speak exceedingly well, replied I:—and further, tell me this also, whether you will give them only a legal right to these familiar names,—or rather bid them perform all their actions in accordance with these names, especially as respects parents, whatever the law enjoins as the parents' due,—such as reverence, and care, and obedience,—it being otherwise not for his advantage, either in the sight of God or of men, inasmuch as he would do what is neither holy nor just, if he acted otherwise than thus?—Will these, or other maxims coming from the whole body of our citizens, echo close round the ears of our children, both about their parents, when pointed out to them, and about other relations likewise? These [maxims must so,] replied he; for it were ridiculous, if, without actions, their proper names were uttered by the mouth alone. Of all states then, in this especially, when any one individual fares either well or ill, the citizens will mostly agree in exclaiming, according to our late expression,—namely, "Mine fares well, or mine ill?" Quite true, said he. Did we not say too, that agreeably to this opinion and expression, their common pleasures and pains should agree? Aye,—and we said rightly. Will not then our citizens most especially hold in common that same thing, which they call "*my own*,"—and, holding this in common, thus

have a special fellowship in pleasure and pain? Very much so. And the cause of all this, independently of other regulations of the state,—is it not the community of women and children among the guardians? Most especially so, he replied.

CHAP. XII.—We had agreed, moreover, as to the greatest good of a state, by comparing a well-managed state to a body, which feels pleasure or pain affecting any part of it. Aye, we were right, said he, in agreeing about this. The cause then of all this high degree of good to our state was found to be the community of women and children among our defenders? Surely, replied he. And in that case, we agree at least with what was before alleged; for we said, I believe, that they ought to have neither houses of their own, nor land, nor any possession, but to receive their subsistence from others, as a reward for their guardianship, and all to consume it in common, if they mean really to be guardians? Right, said he. Do not then, as I say, the circumstances formerly mentioned, and still more those now mentioned, cause them to be true guardians, and prevent those divisions in the state [which arise] from not calling one and the same thing their own,—but one one thing, and another another;—one drawing to his own dwelling whatever he can acquire separately from the rest, and another, to his likewise that which is separate; and also different wives and children, occasioning both pleasures and pains, individually private, though holding one and the same opinion concerning what is domestic,—all, as far as possible, pointing towards the same thing,—namely, a community of feeling respecting pleasure and pain? Of course, we grant that, replied he. But what?—will not lawsuits and criminal charges in the courts be banished from among them (so to speak), from the fact of their possessing nothing in private but their body, but all the rest in common,—owing to which, they will be kept free from all the dissensions which men raise about money, or children and relatives? It is quite clear, they will be thus relieved. And, moreover, in these there could not fairly be any suits, as regards personal violence or improper treatment:—for conceiving personal preservation to be an absolute necessity, we will own it to be handsome and just for compeers in age to help their compeers. Right, said he. And this privilege, said I, at any rate this law possesses:—

if a man be in a passion with any one, he will in such a case be less apt to venture on still greater seditions. Certainly. The elder, moreover, will be ordered both to govern and chastise all the younger. Clearly so. And moreover, as to the younger, with regard to the elder, unless the magistrates order it, he will never attempt to beat the elder, or otherwise offer him violence,—nor, methinks, will he by any other means dishonour him:—for there are two sufficient guardians to hinder it, fear and respect,—respect on the one hand restraining him from laying hands on a parent, and fear on the other, that others might come to the defence of the sufferer;—some as sons, others as brothers, and others as fathers. Yes,—such is the case, said he. In every respect then, in consequence of the laws, these men, [i.e. the warriors,] will enjoy peace with one another? Yes, much. And so long as these do not quarrel among themselves, there is no danger of the rest of the state rising or mutually splitting into factions. No, of course not. As for the least important evils, I am unwilling for propriety's sake even to mention from how many they will have been relieved,—the poor, [for instance,] as regards the work of flattering the rich,—and the difficulties and anxieties, which people have in bringing up their children and procuring money for the support of servants,—sometimes borrowing, sometimes denying debts, and at other times using all manner of shifts in procuring [money,] and then giving it to the management of their wives and domestics;—about these matters, friend, how many slavish and ignoble troubles they suffer are not even worthy to be mentioned. Yes, they are manifest, said he, even to one blind.

CHAP. XIII.—From all these troubles, therefore, they will be relieved, and will live more blessedly than that most blessed life which those live who gain the Olympic prizes. How? On one small account only are those esteemed happy, compared with what these enjoy;—for the victory of these is more noble, and their maintenance at the public expense more complete: inasmuch as the victory that they gain brings safety to the entire state,—and by way of crown and reward, both they and their children receive their maintenance and all other necessities of life, thus winning honours from their own state while living, and at their death

an honourable funeral. Noble rewards! indeed, said he. Do you remember, then, said I, that in a former part of our discussion, some one,—I know not who,—objected to us, that we were not making our guardians happy, by decreeing that those who had the whole wealth of the citizens at their command should nevertheless have nothing at all?—and we said, I believe, that we would consider this afterwards, if it fell in our way; but that at present we were making our guardians real guardians, and the state itself as happy as possible, without exclusively regarding any single class in it, with a view to make it happy? I remember, said he. What think you now of the life of our auxiliaries, which appears far more noble and happy than that of those of the Olympic prizemen;—do you think it can be compared to the life of the leather-cutter, or any other kind of craftsman, or even the farmer? I do not think so, said he. Still even, what I said before, it is proper that I mention here also,—if the guardian should try to become happy in such a way as to lose his character as a guardian, and not be content with a life thus moderate and steady, and as we say, of the best quality, but on the other hand be impelled by a silly boyish notion about happiness, to appropriate to himself all the property in the state, because he has the power, he will know that Hesiod was really wise, in saying that “the half is considerably more than the whole.”* If he take me for his counsellor, said he, he will remain in such a life. You agree then, said I, as to the fellowship of the women with the men, which we have explained, in matters referring to education and children, and the guardianship of the other citizens;—that whether they remain in the state, or go forth to war, they ought to keep guard with them, and hunt with them like hounds, and in every case take a share in all things, as far as they can; and that doing these things they will do what is best, and not contrary to the nature of the female, as regards the male,—by which nature, indeed, they act jointly with one another? I agree, said he.

CHAP. XIV.—Does not this then, said I, still remain to be discussed, whether it be possible that this community of

* Comp. Hes. Op. et Di. v. 40—νήπιοι οὐδ’ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἡμῖν ἠγνός.

habits can take place among men, even as among other animals? and how it is possible? You have forestalled me, said he, by mentioning what I was just going to ask. Aye;—for as to war, said I, it is plain, methinks, how they will fight. How? said he. They will go out jointly on their military expeditions, and will carry along with them to battle also such of their children as are robust, in order that those of the craftsmen may see what they ought to practise when arrived at full age, and, apart from mere observation, may serve and minister in all such matters subserviently both to their fathers and mothers. Have you not observed also what happens in the common arts, as, for instance, among the children of the potters,—how long a time they help and look on, before they apply themselves to the making of pottery? Yes, indeed. Should these then, or our guardians, be more careful in instructing their children by their own experience, and by observation of what is suitable for them? [To suppose that the craftsman would,] replied he, were truly ridiculous. Yet every creature whatever will fight more valiantly in the presence of its offspring? It is so: but there is no small danger, Socrates, should they be defeated, as is often the case in war, that when their children, as well as themselves, are cut off, it will be impossible to restore the rest of the state. You speak truly, replied I: but think you, that our first duty should be never to expose them to risk? No, by no means. What then: if they are to hazard themselves in any case, is it not—where they will become better men, if they succeed? Clearly so. But do you think it a small matter, and unworthy of the risk, that children destined for military life should or should not be observers of the transactions of war? No;—for it is highly important with reference to what you now mention. This then, we must first contrive,—to make our children spectators of war, yet providing for their safety:—and then all will go well, will it not? Yes. And surely their fathers, said I, in the first place, as far as men can, will not be ignorant, but well informed as to the kinds of expeditions which are dangerous or not so. Probably so, said he. Into the one then, they will take them; but will be cautious of exposing them to the other. Right. And they will probably, said I, set governors over them, not such as are

the most depraved, but such as by experience and years are able leaders and trainers of the young. Yes, quite proper. Yet many things, we may say, happen to many contrary to expectation. Quite so. With reference, therefore, to such events as these, it is fit that we should provide the children with things while quite young, in order, if need be, that they may escape by flight. How do you mean? said he. We must mount them on horseback, said I, when extremely young; and when they have learnt to ride, they must be taken to see battles, not on high-mettled war-horses, but on the fleetest and most obedient to the rein; for thus they will best observe their proper work, and in case of need, escape with the greatest safety, following the aged leaders. I think, said he, your remark is correct. What then, said I, as to the affairs of war; how are you to manage our soldiers, both as respects each other and their enemies? Is my opinion correct or not? Tell me what it is, replied he. As for that man among them, said I, who has left his rank, thrown away his arms, or done any such like act from mere cowardice, ought we not to make him a craftsman, or field labourer? Certainly. And the man who is taken alive by the enemy, should he not be given away as a present to those inclined to use their booty just as they please? Yes, surely. And as to him who has signalized himself and attained to high renown, think you not, that he ought, first of all in the field itself, to be crowned successively by each of the youths and boys who are his fellow-soldiers?—is it not so? Yes, I think so. And will they give him the right hand likewise? And that too. But what I am going to tell you, said I, will not, methinks, be quite so pleasing. What? That they should kiss and be kissed by each individually? This is by far the best of all, said he: and for myself, I would add this regulation,—that, so long as they are on this expedition, no one shall be allowed to refuse the man, whoever it be that he pleases to kiss,—so that if a warrior happen to be in love with any one, male or female, he may be the more animated to win the noblest prize of valour.* Very well, said I:—for it has been already said, that more opportunities for marriage should be provided for the brave citizen than for others, and

* Comp. here Aristot. Pol. ii. 2.

more frequent choice in such matters should be allowed to them than to all others, in order that such a man's descendants may be as numerous as possible. Yes, we did say so, replied he.

CHAPTER V.—Moreover, even according to Homer, it is just that really brave youths should be honoured in this way; inasmuch as Homer said, that Ajax, who on account of the renown he had gained in battle, was rewarded with a large share at the entertainments,—fit reward, too, for a brave and youthful man, from which he at once acquired both honour and strength. Most right, said he. In this matter, at least, then, said I, we are to obey the authority of Homer; and as a proof of this, we will so honour the brave, both at our sacrifices, and on such like occasions, in as far as they appear deserving, both with hymns, and the honours just mentioned; and besides this, with seats and viands, and brimming cups, so as at once both to honour and exercise the virtue of worthy men and women. You speak capitally well, replied he. Well, of those then that die in the campaign, shall we not, in the first place, say, of the man that closes his life with glory, that he is of the golden race? Quite so, indeed. And are we not to believe Hesiod, when he tells us, that if any of this race die, then—

Chaste, holy, earthly spirits they become,
Expelling evil, guardians of mankind?*

Yes, we will believe him. We will ask the oracle then, how we ought to bury noble and divine men, and with what marks of distinction; and then we will bury them in the very manner that [the God] directs. Of course. And in all after-time we will reverence and worship their tombs as those of demigods, and enact that the same ceremonies shall be observed with regard to persons dying of old age, or from any other cause, after having been deemed remarkably good during their lifetime? Aye, it is only just, said he. But what?—how are our soldiers to behave towards enemies? In what respect? First, as respects enslavement, think you it just, that Greeks should enslave Greek cities?—nay, ought they not, as far as they can, to prevent

* Hesiod. Op. et Di. v. 121, 2.

others from doing it, and act on the principle of sparing the Grecian tribe, cautiously looking to the possibility of being themselves enslaved by barbarians? Aye, said he; both generally, and in every particular case, it is the best plan to be sparing. Are they then not to keep any Greek slave themselves, and to counsel the rest of the Greeks to agree to the same plan? Surely, said he: because they will thus at least, turn themselves the more against the barbarians, and abstain from one war against another. But what? Stripping the dead, said I, of anything but their arms after conquering them, is that right;—or does it not rather furnish cowards with an excuse not to go against a foe, as if they were doing some duty when bending over a mere corpse; and have not many armies been destroyed by this kind of plunder? Very many. Do not you think it also illiberal and forbidden to plunder a corpse, and the mark of a feminine and little mind to deem the body of the deceased an enemy, after the enemy has fled away, and nought remains behind, but the instrument with which he fought? Do you think that they who act thus do any otherwise than dogs do, who snap at the stones with which they are pelted and do not touch the man who throws them? Not at all, he replied. We must have done then with this stripping of the dead, and these hinderances arising from the carrying off of booty. Aye, by Zeus, said he, we must have done with them.

CHAP. XVI.—Moreover, we shall not at any time bring arms into the temples, for the purpose of dedicating them, at least not the arms of Greeks,—if we at all care for the kind feeling of the rest of the Greeks; but we shall rather fear its being a kind of profanation, to bring into the temple such things as these from our close connexions, unless the oracle direct us otherwise. Quite right, replied he. And as regards the laying waste of Grecian lands and the burning of houses, how would your soldiers treat their enemies? Aye,—I should be glad, said he, to hear you state your opinion on that point. Truly then, said I, my opinion is, that we should do neither of these things, but only carry off the year's crop:—and would you have me tell you the reason, why this should be done? By all means. It appears to me, that as these two words, war and discord, are different, so two different things are signified

by them ; and I call them different—the latter between members of the same community, and the former between foreigners and strangers.—When hatred is among one's own people, it is called discord ; when it respects foreigners, war. What you say, replied he, is not at all unreasonable. But consider, whether what I now state is also to the purpose ; for I assert that the Greek nation itself is friendly and in alliance with itself, though foreign and strange to the barbarian. Well observed, said he. When therefore Greeks fight with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, we may then say, that they are at war, and naturally enemies ; and this hatred we may call war : but when Greeks act thus towards Greeks, we may say that they are naturally friends, and that Greece in such a case is distempered, and at discord ; and such a hatred is to be called discord. I agree, said he, that we must view it thus. Consider then, said I, that in the discord just mentioned, whenever such a thing happens, how the state is split in factions, and when they sequester each other's lands and burn each other's houses, how destructive the discord seems, and neither of them seem to be lovers of their country ; for otherwise they would never have dared to pillage their nurse and mother, but it would have been sufficient for the victors to carry off the crops of the vanquished, and to conceive that they would one day be reconciled, and not perpetually be at war. This indeed is by far a milder sentiment than the other. But what then ? said I ; this state that you are founding, is it to be a Greek one ? It ought, he replied. Are they not then to be good and mild ? By all means. And will they not be lovers of Greece ; and will they not account Greece as related to them ; and will they not observe the same religious rites as the rest of the Greeks ? Most decidedly. Any difference then, that they have with Greeks, as kinsmen, will they not consider that as discord,—not war ? Yes, for it is not war. And they will behave then, as those capable of being reconciled ? Quite so, of course. They will be mild then and moderate, not punishing so far as to enslave or destroy,—as advocates for correction, and not as enemies. Just so, said he. Neither then, as they are Greeks, will they pillage the lands, or burn the houses of Greeks ; nor will they allow, that in every state, individually, all are their enemies, men, women, and children, but that in all cases a few only are enemies,—the originators

of the quarrel : and on all these accounts they will not choose to lay waste their lands, since the majority of the occupants are their friends; nor will they overturn the houses:—and so far only will they carry on the war, until the real originators be obliged by the innocent to make reparation to those whom they have grieved. I agree, said he, that we ought so to behave towards opponents among our own citizens,—but towards the barbarians, as the Greeks now act towards each other. This law, then, also, let us enact for our guardians, that they shall neither lay waste the lands, nor burn the houses. Aye, let us enact it, said he ; and this further, that these things are right, and those also, that you before mentioned.

CHAP. XVII.—It appears to me, however, Socrates, that if one allow you to go on speaking in this fashion, you will never remember what you formerly put aside, when you entered on all that you have now said ;—namely, how far such a government is possible, and in what way it is at all possible ? For, if it be at all possible, I will allow that all these high advantages will belong to that state in which it exists, and the following also, which you omitted ; and I now tell you, that they will, with all possible courage, fight against their enemies, and least of all abandon each other, recognising, and calling one another by these names,—fathers, sons, and brothers ; and if the females encamp along with them, whether in the same rank, or drawn up behind them, they will strike terror into the enemies, and at the same time, in case of need, give all assistance :—in this way, I know, they will be utterly unconquerable ; and as for the advantages they have at home, which we have omitted, those at any rate I plainly see.—But as I allow, that all these, and ten thousand other things, will belong to this form of government, if it actually does exist, let us talk no more about it, but try to persuade each other of this itself, how far it is possible, and in what way :—and let us omit the other points. You have suddenly, said I, made an attack on my argument, and make no allowance for one who is but a bungler ;* because, perhaps, you do not know with what difficulty I have got over two breakers, and now you are driving me on the greatest and

* Gr. *σπαργενομένην*, which is Bekker's emendation, the old reading being *σπαρτενομένην*. The verb means—to be wearied, to delay, trifle, play the coward.

most dangerous of all the three. After having seen and heard this, you will, I am sure, forgive me; allowing, that I had reason for hesitation, and was frightened by the mention of so great a paradox from undertaking its examination. The more, said he, you mention such things, the less will you be excused from explaining in what respect this government is possible. Proceed then without delay. Must we not then, said I, first remember this, that we are come hither to inquire into the nature of justice and injustice? We must, said he. But what is this to the purpose? Nothing. But supposing we find out the nature of justice, are we to judge then, that the just man ought nowise to differ therefrom, but in every respect to resemble justice; or are we to be satisfied, if he approach to it, as nearly as possible, and, of all others, partake of it the most? This will satisfy us, said he. For example's sake, then, said I, we were inquiring into this,—what is the nature of justice; and we were in quest also of the perfectly just man, how he became so, and what was his nature, if he really existed,—and so also with respect to injustice, and the supremely unjust man, in order that, looking to them as regards their apparent qualities in relation to happiness and its opposite, we might be obliged to acknowledge concerning ourselves, that whoever most resembles them in character will have a fortune most resembling theirs; and not for the purpose of showing that these things are possible or not. It is quite true, said he. Think you, then, that he is in any degree an inferior painter, who having painted the portrait of a very handsome man, and having expressed everything fully in his picture, is yet unable to show that such a man really exists? By Zeus, said he, I do not. Well, have we not now then logically defined, [shall we say,] the model of a good state? Yes, indeed. Have we, indeed, less ably stated the case, think you, for this reason, because we are unable to show the possibility of a state being established as we have described? No, indeed, said he. This then, said I, is the truth of the case:—but if indeed, I must now, on your account, be anxious on this point,—that is, to show how and in what respects it is most possible, with a view to this discovery,

* Plato's object here is to show, that painters in the high departments of art copy *ideal*, not *actual* nature,—nature in its perfection,—not in its imperfect and actual nature.

you must again allow what you did before. What? Can anything possibly be executed as perfectly as it is described; or, is it the nature of practice, that it does not approach so near to truth as theory, though some may think otherwise:—will you allow this or not? I allow it, said he. Do not oblige me then to show you, that all these things in every respect positively exist in as great perfection as we have described in our reasoning:—if, however, we can find out how a state may be established as closely as possible to what has been mentioned, you will agree that we have discovered the possibility of what you require; or will you not even be satisfied, if this be proved? For my own part I should be satisfied. Yes, and I too, said he.

CHAP. XVIII.—Next then, it seems, we must endeavour to find out and show what is the evil now existing in states, owing to which they are not established in the manner we have described,—and what is that smallest change, by making which we could bring the state to this model of government;—and let us chiefly see, if this can be effected by the change of one thing,—if not, by the change of two,—if not that, by the change of the fewest things in number, and the smallest in power. By all means, said he. By changing one thing only then, said I, methinks, I can show that the state may be moulded into this form of government:—that change, however, is neither small nor easy, though possible. What is it? said he. I am now come, said I, to what I compared to the greatest wave: and it shall now be mentioned, even though, as with a wave, I should be overwhelmed with ridicule and infamy. Consider, however, what I am now going to say. Proceed, replied he. Unless either philosophers, said I, govern in states, or those who are at present called kings and governors philosophize genuinely and sufficiently, and both political power and philosophy unite in one,—and until the bulk of those now pursuing each of these separately are of necessity excluded, there will be no end, Glaucon, to the miseries of states; nor yet, as I think, to those of the human race; nor till then will that government, which we have described in our reasonings, ever spring up to a positive existence, and behold the light of the sun.—And this is what all along made me dislike mentioning it, that I saw what a paradox I was about to advance: for

one can scarcely be convinced that no other government but this can enjoy happiness, either public or private. You have thrown out such an expression and argument, Socrates, said he, as you think may bring on you a great many, and these too so specially bold as to put off their clothes, and snatch naked whatever weapon each happens to have ready (as if about performing prodigies) for rushing forward in battle-array:—and if you do not mow them down with argument, and so make your escape, you will pay for it by suffering the severest ridicule. And are not you the cause of all this? said I. Aye, through acting well at least, replied he:—yet in this affair, I will not betray but defend you, as far as I can; and I am enabled to do so both by my own good-will and your encouragement; and your questions probably I shall answer more carefully than any other:—only do you try, by help of such assistance, to show those who are loath to believe these things, that they really are what you represent them. I must try, said I; especially, as you afford me so much assistance. And here it seems necessary, if we can at all escape from those you mention, that we should at any rate define clearly what kind of men those are whom we call philosophers,—those, who, we are bold enough to say, ought alone to govern;—so that, when they are clearly pointed out, an able defence may be set up, by asserting that it is their natural province both to study philosophy, and also assume to themselves the government of the state,—while the other members of the state study neither philosophy nor politics, but only obey their leader. It is quite fit, said he, that we should define them. Come then, follow me this way, [and see] if we can in some way or other sufficiently explain this matter. Lead on then, said he. Will it be necessary then, to remind you, said I,—or do you recollect, that when we say of any one, that he loves a thing, he would not appear, if we speak strictly, to love one part of it, and not another, but to have an affection for the whole?

CHAP. XIX. —I need, it seems, to be reminded of that, replied he; for I do not understand it perfectly. Some one else, indeed, Glaucon, replied I, might say what you say; out it does not become a man who is a lover, to forget that all things in their bloom somehow excite, and agitate an amorous person and lover, as seeming worthy

both of respect and of proper salutes:—do you not behave in this manner towards the beautiful? One, because flat-nosed, will be called agreeable, and be an object of praise; and the hooked nose of another, you call princely; and that between these, formed with exact symmetry: the dark are said to have a manly look, and the fair to be the children of the gods: but this name of delicate white, think you it is the invention of any other than a flattering lover, who easily bears with the paleness, if it be in the season of youth?—in one word, do you not make all kinds of pretences, and say everything that you can, so as not to reject any one who is in the prime of life? If you are disposed, said he, to judge by me of other lovers, that they act in this manner, I agree to it for argument's sake. And what, said I, as to lovers of wine:—do not you find they act in the same manner, cheerfully drinking every kind of wine on every pretext? Yes, indeed. And you perceive, I suppose, that the ambitious likewise, if they cannot obtain the command of an army, will take the command of a *τριπύς*;* and if they cannot get honour from greater and nobler men, are content to be honoured by the lesser and the meaner sort, because they are desirous of honour at any rate? Perfectly true. Will you allow this or not: if we say, one desires a thing, are we to say that he desires the whole species, or that he desires one part of it, but not another? The whole, replied he. May we not then likewise say, that the philosopher desires wisdom, and that too, not one part only, but the whole? True. He then, who is averse to a course of discipline, especially if he be young, and has not understanding to discern what is good and what is otherwise, should not be called a lover of learning, nor a philosopher;—just as we say of a person disgusted with meats, that he neither hungers after nor desires meats, and is not a lover but a hater of them. Aye,—and we shall say right. But the man who has a ready inclination to taste of every branch of learning, and enters with pleasure on its study, and is insatiable thereof,

* The Scholiast states by way of explanation, that the Athenian people were divided into ten *φυλαί* or wards, which were again subdivided into *τριπύες*, *ἔθνη* and *φρατρίαι*. The commander of a *τριπύς*, then was called a *τριπύραρχος*,—whence the verb *τριπύραρχεῖν*.

this man we may with justice call a philosopher, may we not? Whereon Glaucon said, Many such philosophers as those will go into great absurdities; for all your lovers of shows appear to me to be of this kind, from taking a pleasure in learning; and your story-lovers are of all persons to be reckoned the most stupid,—among philosophers at least. These indeed would not willingly attend to such reasoning, or to such a disquisition as this. But yet, as if they had hired out their ears to listen to every public ditty, they run about to the Dionysia, omitting neither the civic nor village festivals.* Are all these then, and others who run after such matters, and those likewise who devote themselves to the inferior arts, to be called by us philosophers? By no means, said I, but only fake philosophers.

CHAP. XX.—Who are they, however, said he, whom you call the true ones? Those, said I, who are desirous of discerning the truth.† That too, said he, is correct:—but how do you mean? It is not easy, said I, to tell another this; but you, I think, should agree with me in this. In what? That since the beautiful is contrary to the deformed, these are two things. Of course, they are. And if they are two, then each of them is one. Granted also. And as regards justice and injustice,—good and evil,—and also respecting all ideas whatever, the argument is the same—that each of them is one in itself, though, as to their relation with actions and bodies, and each other mutually, they take an all-varying number of forms, so as to make the one appear many. Right, said he. In this

* There were three festivals at Athens, commonly termed Bacchic,—the great or city festival (the most important of all, at which the dramatic poets contended with their new plays), celebrated in the month Elaphebolion,—the Lensea, in the month Maimacterion,—and the rural Dionysia, in the month Poseideon.

† The portrait of the true philosopher, whom Plato conceives to be the only true president and ruler of his state, is described from this chapter onwards to the end of the third chapter of the sixth book, with further illustration in the thirteenth chapter of that book. Should the reader conceive, that too little regard is paid to worldly affairs and too little stress laid on the doctrine of ideas, he must recollect that this philosopher conceived that all knowledge of truth (—without which not even civil business could be conducted, according to his notions—) is to be gained only from the contemplation of things considered *per se*,—and that there can be no real human felicity unconnected with wisdom and virtue, which can only be attained by true philosophers engaged in inquiring into the eternal nature of things around or in themselves.

manner then, said I, do I distinguish and set apart those that you just mentioned, the lovers of public shows, from craftsmen and mechanics; and then quite apart from these I place those of whom we are now discoursing, whom alone we may properly call philosophers. How say you? replied he. The lovers of common stories and spectacles, delight in fine sounds, colours, and figures, and everything made up of these; but the nature of beauty itself their intellect is unable to discern and admire. That is the case, indeed, said he. As to those, however, who are able to approach this beauty itself and behold it in its real essence, surely they must be few in number? Extremely so. He then who deems some things beautiful, but neither knows beauty itself nor is able to follow, should any one lead to the knowledge of it, do you think he lives in a dream, or is awake? consider: is not this to dream, when a man, either asleep or awake, imagines the likeness of a thing not to be its likeness, but the real thing itself which it resembles? I for my part would assert, replied he, that such a person is really in a dream. But what now as to him who comes to an exactly opposite conclusion, who understands the real nature of beauty, and is able to discern both it and its accessories, and deems neither the accessories to be beauty, nor beauty the accessories;—does such a man, think you, live in a waking or dreaming state? Wide awake, said he. May we not then properly call this man's intellectual power, so far as he really knows, knowledge, but that of the other, opinion,—as he only opines? Surely so. But what,—if the person, who, we say, only opines things, but does not really know them, becomes indignant, and raises a dispute, alleging that our position is not true, shall we have any method of soothing and gently persuading him, and yet at the same time concealing that he is not in a sound state? We surely ought, replied he. Come then, bethink you what we are to say to him.—are you disposed that we should question him thus,—saying, that if he knows anything, no one envies him, and we should gladly see him possessed of more knowledge;—and tell us this too, does the man who has so much knowledge, know something or nothing? Do you answer me in his behalf. I will answer, said he, that he knows something. Is it something then, that does or does not exist? What

does exist: for how can that, which does not exist, be known? This, then, we have sufficiently considered;—though we might have considered it more fully,—that what really is, may be really known, but what does not at all exist, cannot be known at all? Yes,—this we have examined quite sufficiently. Be it so: but if there be anything of such character, as both to be and not to be, must it not lie between what has a perfect existence, and what has none at all? Between them. If then there is knowledge as to what really exists, and necessarily ignorance as to what does not exist,—as to what lies between these, must we not seek for something between ignorance and science, if there be any such thing? By all means. Are we to allege, then, that opinion is anything? Of course. Is it a different faculty from science, or the same? Different. Opinion then is conversant about one thing, and science about another, each according to its own peculiar faculty? Just so. Is not then the nature of science as regards that which exists, to know what existence is? It seems to me, however, far more necessary to lay down the distinction thus. How?

CHAP. XXI.—We will say, that faculties are a certain kind of real existences, by which both we can do whatever we are able, and every being else also whatever it is able: for instance, I say, that seeing and hearing are faculties, if you understand what I mean to call ‘the species’ [or idea].* I understand, said he. Hear then what is my opinion about them: for I do not see any colour nor figure, nor any of such qualities of a faculty, as of many other things, with reference to which I form a mental internal perception of their differences: but in a faculty, I regard that alone, about which it is employed, and what it accomplishes; and on this account I call each of these a faculty; and that which is employed about and accomplishes one and the same purpose, this I call the same faculty; but what is employed about and accomplishes a different purpose, that I call a different faculty:—what say you? In what manner do you call it? Just the

* Plato makes use of two terms in his system,—*τὸ εἶδος* and *ἡ ἰδέα*;—and some commentators are disposed to think, that the former corresponds with the dialectical term, *species*,—the higher intellectual, abstract notion being expressed only by the latter. It must be confessed, however, that they are often used with scarcely any distinction of meaning.

same, he replied. Here again, excellent Glaucon, said I,—do you allege, that science is itself a certain faculty, or to what class do you refer it? To this, he said, the strongest of all the faculties. But what then;—are we to refer opinion to faculty, or to some other species? By no means, said he; for that by which we have the power of forming opinions is nothing else but opinion. But some time since, you allowed that science and opinion were not the same. How, said he, can any one with common sense reduce under one, what is infallible, and what is not infallible? Right, said I;—and it is plain, that we have allowed opinion to be a different thing from science. Yes,—different. Each of them then has naturally a different faculty in reference to a different object? Of course. Science surely as regards that which exists, so as to know the nature of real existence? Yes. But we say that opinion opines? Yes. Is it cognizant of the same thing that science is;—and will that which is known, and that which is matter of opinion, be the same;—or is this impossible? Impossible, said he, from what has been granted: since they are naturally faculties of different things, and both of them are faculties,—opinion and science,—and each of them different from the other, as we have said; hence it cannot be, that what is opined is the same with that which is known. If then that which exists is known, must it not differ from what is perceived by opinion? It does differ. Does opinion then entertain what has no existence;—or is it impossible to opine what does not exist at all?—Consider now, does not the man who opines, refer his opinion to some standard;—or is it possible to opine, and yet opine nothing at all? Impossible. But whoever opines, opines some one thing? Yes. But surely that which does not exist, cannot be called any one thing, but most properly nothing at all? Certainly. But we necessarily referred ignorance to that which has no true being, and knowledge to real existence? Right, said he. He does not, therefore, opine true being, nor yet that which has no being? He does not. Opinion then is neither knowledge, nor is it ignorance? It seems not. Does it then exceed these, either knowledge in perspicuity, or ignorance in obscurity? Neither. Think you then, said I, that opinion is more obscure than knowledge, but clearer than ignorance? Far, said he. Does

it lie then between them both? Yes. Opinion then is between the two? Entirely so. And have we not already said, that if anything appeared of such a nature, as at once to exist and yet not exist, such a thing would lie between what really exists, and that which has no existence at all, and neither science nor ignorance would take cognizance of it, but that only which appeared to be between ignorance and science? Right. And now, what we call opinion has been shown to lie between them. It has been so shown.

CHAP. XXII.—This then yet remains for us, as it seems, to discover,—what participates in both—that is, being, and non-being, and what can properly be called neither of them perfectly,—so that if it seems to be what it is reputed, we may with justice term it so, assigning to the extremes what are extreme, and to the middle what are between the two:—must we not? Just so. These things being determined, I will say, let this worthy man tell and answer me,—he who reckons that there is neither beauty, nor idea of beauty, always the same; but that lover of beautiful objects* reckons that there are many beautiful objects, not enduring to be told that there is only one beautiful, and one just, and so of the rest. Of all these many things, excellent man! shall we say, whether there be any which will not appear deformed, and of those just which will not appear unjust, and of those holy which will not appear profane? No; but said he, the objects themselves must in some respects necessarily appear both beautiful and deformed, and whatever else you ask. But what?—Do double quantities generally seem to have less capacity for being halves than the doubles [of others?]? Not at all. And things great and small, light and heavy, are they to be termed what we call them, any more than the opposite? No; said he.—each of them, always participates of both. Is then, or is not, each of these many things just what it is said to be? It resembles their equivocal jokes at feasts, said he, and the riddle of children about the eunuch's striking the bat, with

* The words *ἐκείνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων* (which Ast. considers superfluous) convey a sly hit at those sophists who set up for admiration various different objects of beauty, sensual and physical, instead of the eternal and immutable beauty of truth and virtue.

what and on what part they guess he strikes it:* for all these things have a double meaning, and it is impossible to know accurately whether they are, or are not,—or are both, or neither of the two. How can you act with them then, said I, or what better position have you for them than a medium between being and non-being?—For nothing seems more obscure than non-being as compared with having no being at all, nor more clear than being in respect of real being.† Most true, said he. We have discovered then, it seems, that most of the maxims of the people about the beautiful, and those other things, fluctuate somehow between being and non-being. Yes, we have discovered it. But it was formerly agreed at least, that if such a thing were apparent, it ought to be called that which is opined, and not what is known; and that which fluctuates between the two is to be perceived by the intermediate faculty. We agreed. Those then, who contemplate many beautiful things, but yet never perceive beauty itself, and cannot follow another who would lead them to it,—and many just things, though not justice itself, and all other things in like manner, these persons, we will say, hold opinions on all things, yet have no accurate knowledge of what they opine. It must be so, said he. But what then, as regards those who perceive each of the objects themselves, always existing in the same manner, and in the

* The Scholiast cites the following lines, which he ascribes to Clearchus :—

αἶνος τίς ἐστιν ὡς ἀνὴρ τε κοῦκ ἀνὴρ
 ὄρνιθα κοῦκ ὄρνιθ' ἰδὼν τε κοῦκ ἰδῶν
 ἐπὶ ξύλου τε κοῦ ξύλου καθημένην ,
 λίθῳ τε κοῦ λίθῳ βάλοι τε κοῦ βάλοι — ἄλλως
 — ἀνθρωπος οὐκ ἀνθρωπος ἀνθρωπος δ' ὅμως,
 ὄρνιθα, κοῦκ ὄρνιθα, ὄρνιθα δ' ὅμως
 ἐπὶ ξύλου τε κοῦ ξύλου καθημένην
 λίθῳ βάλων με κοῦ λίθῳ διώλεσεν —
 νυκτερίδα ὁ εὐνοῦχος νάρθηκε κισήρει.

† This is rather an obscure passage, which, however, receives some illustration from the Parmenides (pp. 137 c—155 e), in which the philosopher teaches, among other things, that τὸ ἐν (i. e. *the one by itself and infinite*) is nothing, destitute of all reason and form, void of truth and in no way falling within the cognizance of the mental faculties;—whereas τὸ ἐν ὄν (*the one finite*—inasmuch as it has form, mode, and reason of existence, — is everything, that is, receives within itself a variety of certain forms, and is capable therefore of being perceived and recognised by opinion, perception, and real knowledge.

same relations,—shall we not say that they know, and do not opine? This must be the case also. And shall we not say, that these embrace and love the things of which they have knowledge, and the others the things of which they entertain only opinions;—and remember we not, that we alleged them to behold and love fine sounds and colours, and such things; though beauty itself they do not admit to have any real being? Yes,—we remember. Shall we be wrong then in calling them lovers of opinion, rather than philosophers?—And yet they will be greatly enraged at us, if we call them so. Not, if they be persuaded by me, said he; for it is not right to be enraged at the truth. Those then who embrace and love what has real being, we must call philosophers, and not lovers of opinion? Most assuredly.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

BOOK VI.

ARGUMENT.

In the *sixth book*,—continuing the argument respecting the indispensability of true philosophy to a well-ordered state, and the absolute need of distinguishing true from false philosophy (*i. e.* that of the sophists which throws discredit on the whole pursuit), and likewise from what is warped by prejudice, he goes on to show that a state will be blessed with philosophers for rulers, and shows what is the true subject of true philosophy, as well as the means and manner of learning it,—the sum of which is, that a good *φύλαξ* must be provided with all the defences of true science, not with a view to unprofitable speculations, but that all science and all virtue, his moral clothing, may be considered with reference to its real bearing on the common good of human society. Philosophy, says Plato, has for its proper subject the idea of good (the true end of being), and this being the subject, he next goes on to show the mode of becoming acquainted therewith.

CHAP. I.—Philosophers then, Glaucon, said I, and those who are not so, have, at length, after a long parade of talk and with some difficulty, been respectively defined. Aye, said he,—for perhaps, it was not easy to do it briefly. It appears not, said I. —I still think, however, that their qualities would have been better exhibited, had we deemed it right to speak about this alone, and not discussed a multitude of other matters while considering the difference between a just and an unjust life. What then, said he, are we to consider next? What else, said I, but that which is next in order?—Since those are philosophers who are able to concern themselves with what always maintains a constant relation, whereas those who cannot effect this, but ruminate among a host of [material objects] that are every way shifting,* are not philosophers;—which of these ought to be the rulers of the state? Which way, said he, shall we define the matter, and

* Gr. *ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἰσχυσι πλανώμενα*, &c.

define correctly? Such of them, said I, as seem capable of preserving the laws and institutions of states, these are to be made guardians. Right, said he. This then, said I, is of course evident,—whether we ought to seek for a guardian one that is blind or one that is sharp-sighted. Of course, that is quite evident, said he. What difference then is there between blind persons and those who are in fact deprived of the knowledge of each individual essence, and have no clear demonstration of it in the soul, and cannot (like painters who look at what is positively true, and refer everything thereto, examining it with all possible accuracy), if need be, form settled notions, of the beautiful, just, and good, and so maintain them, as if sanctioned by law? No, by Zeus, said he;—they do not differ much. Shall we then rather appoint these as our guardians, or those rather who know each individual being, and in experience are not at all inferior to those others, nor behind them in any other department of virtue? It were absurd, said he, to choose any others, if at least they be not deficient in all other matters; since they excel in this, which is the most important. Must we not inquire this then,—in what manner the same persons will be able to have both the one and the other? Certainly. As we observed then, at the opening of this discussion, we must first of all thoroughly understand their disposition; and I think, if we are pretty well agreed about that, we shall agree also, that the same persons are able to possess both these qualities; and none else but these ought to be the governors of states. How so?

CHAP. II.—Let us then so far agree about philosophic dispositions, that as respects learning they always covet that which discovers to them that ever-existing essence which does not vary through generation or corruption. Let it be agreed. And likewise, said I, that they desire the whole of such learning, and do not willingly omit any part of it, either small or great, more honourable or more dishonourable, as we formerly observed concerning the ambitious and those engaged in love. You say right, said he.

* Gr. *κατεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα εἶχειν*,—that is, both a practical acquaintance and experience of things, and a more subtle and scientific knowledge of truth.

Consider then, in the next place, whether, besides, what we have mentioned, it be necessary for those who would be such as we have described, to have this also in their natures. What? Freedom from falsehood, and never willingly to admit a lie, but rather to hate it through love of truth. It probably would, replied he. It is not only probable, my friend, but quite necessary, that one who naturally loves a thing should love everything that is allied and belongs to the object of his affection. Right, said he. Is there anything that you can find more nearly allied to wisdom than truth? I cannot, said he. Is it possible, then, for the same disposition to be both philosophic, and fond of falsehood? By no means. He then who is really a lover of learning, ought from early infancy wholly to desire all truth? By all means. But we know somehow, that whoever has his desires vehemently set on one object, for this very reason has them weaker as regards other things,—just as a current diverted from its channel. Certainly. Whoever then has his desires running out after learning and such like matters, would be engaged, methinks, with the pleasure of the soul itself, and forsake the pleasures arising from the body,—if indeed, he be not a pretender, but a real philosopher. This of course must necessarily follow. Such an one moreover is prudent, and by no means fond of money;—for the reasons why money is so anxiously sought at so great a sacrifice are likely to make any one anxious rather than a man like this. Certainly. And surely you should consider this too, when deciding about a philosophic disposition, and one that is not so. What? That it shall not unconsciously take an illiberal turn,—since narrow-mindedness is most revolting to a soul that is ever earnestly pursuing all that is divine and human. Most true, said he. Think you then, that he who possesses magnificent intellectual conceptions and can contemplate all time and all being, can possibly consider human life as a thing of great consequence? It is impossible, said he. Such an one then will not regard death as anything terrible. Least of all, surely. It seems then, that a cowardly and illiberal disposition will not readily connect itself with true philosophy. I do not think it will. What then;—can the well-disposed man, who has moderate desires,

and is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor arrogant, nor cowardly, ever possibly be unjust, or a breaker of engagements? It is impossible. And this also you will likewise consider, when viewing from its very source what is and is not a philosophic soul, whether it be just and gentle, or unsocial and savage. By all means. Neither, as I think, will you omit this. What? Whether it learn easily or with difficulty:—in fact, do you expect that a person will ever love a thing sufficiently, while he is uneasy in its performance, and makes but small progress? It cannot be. But what if he be oblivious and retains nothing of what he learns, can he then possibly acquire science? * How is it possible? And when he thus vainly labours, think you not that he will be forced at last to hate both himself and such employment? Of course he must. We can never reckon then among philosophic souls, that which is forgetful; but we shall on the other hand require it to have a good memory? By all means. And we can never say this at any rate, that an un-musical and ill-regulated disposition leads anywhere but to-wards irregularity. Where else should it? But as regards truth, think you it is allied to irregularity or regularity? To regularity. Let us require then, in addition to all other qualities, an intellect naturally well-regulated and gracious, as a willing and naturally well-disposed guide in realizing the idea of individual being. Of course. What then;—do you not think, that we have in some measure discussed the necessary qualifications, and such as are mutually connected in a soul that would attain a fitting and perfect apprehension of being?—Aye, the most necessary, said he. Can you then any how blame such a study as this, which a man can never sufficiently pursue, unless he has a naturally good memory, learns with facility, and is generous, kind-hearted, the friend and ally of truth, justice, manliness, and temperance? Not even Momus himself, said he, could find fault with such a study.† Aye, said I, and will it not be to such as these alone, when perfected by education and age, that you will intrust the state?

* *ἀρ' ἂν οἷός τ' εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι*;—lit. *can he be otherwise than void of science?*

† This proverbial expression is well illustrated by Erasmus, *Chiliad*. i. 5, § 75.

CHAP. III.—Then said Adimantus: No one, indeed, Socrates, can contradict you on these points; but all who from time to time hear you advancing what you do at present, feel somehow thus;—being led a little astray by your reasoning on each question, through inexperience in this mode of question and answer, when all these little are collected together, they reckon at the close of the discussion that the mistake appears considerable, and the contrary of their first concessions; and just as those who play at talus with such as are dexterous, themselves being unskilful, are in the end driven into a corner and cannot move a piece, so your hearers have nothing to say, being driven into a corner, at this different kind of play, not with the dice, but your reasonings;—though the truth at least is not thus at all advanced.*—I say this with reference to the present inquiry; for a person may tell you, that he has nothing to allege as an argument against your questions individually, but sees in fact that all those who plunge into philosophy do not pursue it with the view of being taught in it during childhood, and liberated from it when they arrive at mature age, but rather in order that they may continue in it much longer, becoming most of them quite perverse,—not to say, altogether depraved; while even such of them as appear most worthy, are still so far affected by this pursuit that you so much commend, as to become useless to the public. When I had heard this, I said,—Think you then, that such as say these things are telling a falsehood? I know not, said he; but I should like to hear what is your opinion.

You will hear then, that in my opinion they speak the truth. How, replied he, can it be right to say that the miseries of states are never to come to a close, till they be governed by philosophers, whom we now acknowledge as useless thereto? You ask a question, said I, which needs a figurative reply. And yet said I, I do not think you usually speak by figures.

CHAP. IV.—Granted, said I:—and are you not jesting me, after having involved me in a subject so hard of ex-

* This elegant comparison of Socrates to the clever *παιτεύτης* is more lightly touched in a passage in the *Laws*, vii. p. 820 c:—*προβάλλοντά τε ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ διατριβὴν τῆς παιτείας πολὺ χαρίστερον πρεσβυτέρων διατρίβοντα φιλονεικῆν ἐν τοῖς τοῦτων ἀξίαισι σχολαῖς.*

planation?—Yet attend to the comparison, in order that you may the better see how nicely I make it:—for the sufferings of the best philosophers in the management of public affairs are so grievous, that there is not one other suffering so severe: but in making our simile, and putting in a defence for them, we must collect from many particulars, in the same way as painters mingle together different figures, and paint a creature both goat and stag in one,* and others of the same kind. Conceive now such a person as this to be the pilot of a fleet or a single ship, one who surpasses all in the ship both in bulk and strength, but is somewhat deaf, and short-sighted as well, and whose skill in nautical affairs is much of the same kind;—and also that the sailors are all quarrelling among each other about the pilotage, each thinking he ought to be pilot, though he never learned the art, and cannot show who was his master, nor at what time he got his learning;—that besides this, they all say that the art itself cannot be taught, and are ready to cut in pieces any one who says that it can.—Imagine further, that they are constantly crowding round the pilot himself, begging, and forming all schemes to induce him to commit the helm into their hands, and that sometimes even, when they do not so well succeed in persuading him as others may, they either kill these others, or throw them overboard, and after having, by mandragora or wine or something else, rendered the noble pilot incapable, they manage the ship by aid of the crew, and sail on, thus drinking and feasting, as may be expected of such people;—and besides this, if any one be clever at assisting them in getting the management into their own hands, and either by persuasion or force, setting aside the pilot, they praise such an one, calling him sailor and pilot, and versed in navigation, but despise as useless every one not of this character,—not in the least considering that the true pilot must necessarily study the year, the seasons, the heavens, and stars, and winds, and everything belonging to his art, if he would be a real commander of a ship; but at the same time as respects the art and practice of governing men, whether some be willing or not, they think it impossible for a man to attain it in connexion with the art of navigation.—Whilst affairs are thus situated as regards

* The *τραγέλαφος* was a mere fictitious or fabled animal, like the griffin.

ships, do you not think that the true pilot will be called by the sailors on board of ships thus regulated, a mere star-gazer,* trifler, and of no use to them whatever? Undoubtedly, said Adimantus. I think then, said I, that you do not want this comparison explained, in order to see that it represents how people feel in states towards true philosophers, but that you quite understand what I mean. Perfectly, said he. First of all then, as regards this,—namely, a person's wondering that philosophers are not honoured in states,—you must acquaint him with our comparison, and try to persuade him, that it would be much more wonderful if they were honoured. I will so, replied he. And further, that it is quite true, as you were just observing, that the best of those who study philosophy are useless to the bulk of mankind:—but nevertheless, for all this, they intend to lay the blame not on the philosophers, but on such as make no use of them,—for it is not natural that the pilot should beg of the sailors to allow him to govern them, nor that the wise should hold attendance at the gates of the rich:†—and whoever wittily said this was mistaken; for this indeed is the natural method, that whoever is sick, whether rich or poor, must necessarily go to the gates of the physician, and whoever wants to be governed must wait on a person able to govern; for it is not natural that a really worthy governor should beg of the governed to subject themselves to his government.—You will not be far wrong, however, in comparing our present political governors to those sailors we now mentioned, and those whom they call insignificant and star-gazers to those who are truly pilots. Quite right, said he. Hence, then, it would seem, that the best pursuit is not likely to be held in much honour by persons engaged in those of an opposite nature,—but by far the greatest and most violent outcry against philosophy is caused by those who profess its study;—the very persons, whom most of all, you say, your reviler of philosophy calls

* *μετεωροσκοπόν*, the usual term of reproach with which the Sophists visited Socrates. Compare Apolog. Socr. p. 18 b; and see throughout Aristophanes's caricature in his comedy of the Clouds.

† *τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἵεναι*. The Scholiast has a long note on this bon-mot, which he ascribes to Eubulus in a dialogue with Socrates. Schleiermacher, however, following Diogenes Laertius (ii. 69), attributes it to Aristippus, and Schneider to Simonides, on the authority of Aristotle, Rhetor. ii. 16.

downright wicked, and the very best useless; and I agreed that you spoke correctly,—did I not? Yes.

CHAP. V.—Have we not now fully explained the cause, why the best of them are useless? We have. Do you wish, then, that we should next explain the reason, why most of them must necessarily be depraved, and try also to show, that philosophy is not the cause of this. Certainly. Let us open our argument then, by carefully calling to mind what we before observed about the natural disposition necessarily belonging to the good and worthy [philosopher;]—and if you remember, the leading part therein was truth, which he must by all means wholly pursue, or else be a vain boaster, having no fellowship with true philosophy. Aye,—so it was said. Is not this single part of his character wholly the reverse of what is at present held respecting him? Quite so, replied he. We shall be urging, therefore, no trifling argument in his defence, if we can show that the true lover of learning is naturally inclined to aspire after the knowledge of real being, and, so far from being arrested by the numerous individual things which are the objects of opinion, that he proceeds undauntedly forward and desists not from his love of truth* till he becomes acquainted with the nature of all existing things through the agency of that part of the soul whose business it is to take cognizance of such matters:—but it is the office of that part of the soul which is allied [to real being;] and when this true lover of learning approaches thus far, and mingles therewith, thus giving rise to intellect and truth, he will attain to true knowledge, and truly live and be maintained, and at length become liberated from the pains of production,†—but not before. As good a defence, said he, as there possibly can be. What then;—will it be a part of such a person's business to love falsehood, or quite the contrary, to hate it? To hate it, said he. While truth, however, leads the way, we can never say, I think, that any band of evils follows in her train? No, we cannot. But on the contrary, sound and just morals accompanied with temperance? Right, said he. Well then;—is it necessary

* Comp. here Book v., ch. 20 (p. 476, c, d).

† Gr. οὐτω λόγοι ωδίνος. Allusion is here made to the pangs attending the birth of the idea and love of beauty—τὸ καλόν.—as more largely treated in the Sympos. p. 206, b, c.

that we again examine and re-arrange all the qualities of a philosophic nature?—for, no doubt, you remember that men of this character possess fortitude, magnanimity, aptitude for learning, and a good memory; and when you said by way of rejoinder, that every one would be compelled to agree to our statement, we quitted that subject, and turned to the subject of our present discourse—your assertion of having found some of the philosophers useless, and the majority also completely depraved.—And in investigating the cause of that calumny, we are at length come to inquire, how it is, that the greater part of them are bad; and on this account we have again analyzed the nature of true philosophers, and necessarily defined it. It is so, said he.

CHAP. VI.—We must therefore, consider, said I, the corruptions of this nature, how it becomes ruined in many, so that only some few escape, whom men call not depraved, but useless; and next we must consider those dispositions that counterfeit this nature, and only pretend to pursue it, and what is the nature also of those souls, which aspire to a pursuit not belonging to them, and above their reach: for these persons, by their multiplied errors, have everywhere and among all men, attached this opinion to philosophy which you are now mentioning. To what kind of corruptions, said he, do you allude? I will try to recount them, said I, if I can.—And this now, methinks, every one will allow us, that such a nature, with all the qualifications that we just now enjoined to a person aspiring to be a perfect philosopher, is rarely to be found among men, and of these there are but very few: do you not think so? Quite so. And among those few, just consider how many and how great are the causes of corruption. What are they? The most surprising of all to hear,—namely, that of those qualities which we commended in the nature of a philosopher, each corrupts the soul possessing them, and withdraws it from philosophy—from fortitude, I mean, and temperance, and all those other qualities which we enumerated. That is a strange saying, said he. And further still, said I;—besides these things, all that are commonly called good,—such as beauty, riches, bodily strength, a powerful family connexion in the state,* and all

* Gr. *εὐγένεια ἡρώμενη ἐν πόλει*. Plato similarly speaks of political

that relates to these, corrupt and withdraw it from philosophy:—there, you now have the outline of what I mean. I have, he replied, and would be glad more clearly to understand what you say. Apprehend, therefore, the whole of it aright, said I; and it will become perfectly clear, and what we before said will not be thought absurd. How then, said he, do you bid me act? With respect to every kind of seed, or plant, said I, whether of vegetables or animals, we know, that what is not properly nurtured and has not its proper nourishment, or season, or place, the stronger it is, so many more kindly influences does it require,—for evil is more contrary to good, than to that which is not good. Of course. It is reasonable then, I suppose, that the very best nature, if supported on diet unsuited to it, should become worse than one which is inferior? It is. Well then, Adimantus, said I, are we to say, that souls naturally the best, if badly trained, become more than commonly depraved;—or think you that gross iniquity and extreme wickedness arise from an inferior rather than from a good disposition ruined in its education; whereas a weak disposition will never produce either great good or great evil? No,—I think not, said he;—and the case is as you say. If then this philosophic nature, that we have here defined, meet with suitable training, it will of necessity grow up, I suppose, and attain to every virtue; but if it be sown in an improper soil, and grow up and be nurtured accordingly, it will become quite the reverse, unless one of the gods should by chance come to its assistance;—think you then, as most do, that some youths are corrupted by sophists, and that these sophists are men in private life who corrupt them in any matter soever that is worthy of their attention;—or rather, that the very persons who say these things are themselves the greatest sophists, conveying their instruction with most perfect skill, and rendering young and old, men and women, such as they wish them to be? When is that? said he. When many of them, said I, are seated and crowded together in an assembly, in their law-courts, theatres, camps, or other public

connexions in the *Sympos.* p. 178 c:—*ἃ γὰρ χρὴ ἀνθρώποις ἡγεῖσθαι παντός τοῦ βίου τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βιώσεσθαι, τοῦτο οὔτε ἐυγένεια οἷα τε ἐμποιεῖν οὕτω καλῶς, οὔτε τιμαὶ οὔτε πλοῦτος οὐτ' ἄλλο οὐδέν.*

meetings of the people, and when they blame with much tumult some speeches and acts, and commend others, shouting and stamping, [to see] which shall outvie the other;—and besides this, the echo from the rocks and the place where they are sitting, redoubles the tumult of their disapprobation and applause;—in such a situation as this, what kind of heart, as the saying is, do you think the youth has; or what private instruction can so restrain him, as to prevent him from being quite overwhelmed by such blame or applause, and from yielding and being carried along the stream wherever it bears him;—and will he not call things beautiful and base, according as these people call them, and just as they pursue them, thus becoming of the very same character? This, said he, must of course be the case, Socrates.

CHAP. VII.—And yet, said I, we have not yet mentioned what is the greatest necessity of all. What is that? said he. What these, your teachers and sophists, add, by way of acts to their talk, when they cannot persuade:—know you not that they punish with disgraces and fines and deaths, the man whom they cannot persuade? I know that, said he, extremely well. What other sophist then, or what private reasonings, do you think, will counteract and overpower these? I know none, said he. Is it not besides, said I, great folly also even to attempt it?—For there neither is, nor was, nor can ever possibly be, any other system as regards virtue, to be compared with this education by the sophists,—I mean a human method, my friend; for a divine one, according to the proverb, we keep out of the question.*—Indeed, you must well know, with respect to whatever is preserved, and becomes what it ought in such a constitution of government, that you will not be far wrong in deeming it preserved by divine destiny.† Nor am I, said he, of a different opinion. But further now, besides this, said I, you must also be of this opinion. Of what? That each of these hired private teachers, whom these men call sophists and

* Ast conjectures that there was a well-known adage;—*τὸ θεῖον ἔξαιρῶ λόγον*.

† Similarly in the Menon (p. 97 b, 100 b), Plato, in ridiculing the statesmen of his own day, declares that they acquired virtue,—not from human instruction, but by a certain gift from heaven.

consider as rival artists, teach nothing else but those dogmas of the vulgar, which they approve in their assemblies, and term wisdom;—just as if a man were to learn the tempers and desires of a great and strong animal that he is training,—how it must be approached, how touched, and when it is most fierce or most mild,—and from what sorts it springs, and the sounds also which it is used occasionally to utter, and by what sounds when uttered by another, this beast is rendered either gentle or savage; and if, after learning all these things by long associating with this animal, he should call this wisdom and, apply himself to the teaching thereof, as to an established art,—while yet, as regards these dogmas and desires, he has no real knowledge of what is beautiful or base, good or ill, just or unjust, but defines them all by the opinions of that great animal, calling those things good by which it is pleased, and those evil with which it is vexed, having no other measure respecting them, but calling things necessary both just and beautiful, though he has never himself seen, nor can show to another, the nature of the necessary and the good, and how far they really differ from each other. Being such as this, then, do you not, by Zeus, think him a ridiculous teacher? I do, he replied. And, think you, he in any way differs from the man, who deems it wisdom to have understood the tempers and pleasures of the multitude, and of mixed assemblies, either in painting, music, or politics?—For if any one converse with these, and show them either a poem, or other work of art, or piece of service connected with the state, and make the multitude the judges thereof, he is, beyond all other necessities, under what is called a “Diomedean”* necessity,—that of doing whatever they commend.—But as respects these things being really good and beautiful, did you ever hear any of

* A Diomedean necessity is a proverbial expression applied to those, who do anything from necessity: its origin is as follows. Diomedes and Ulysses, having stolen the Palladium from Ilium, returned by night to their ships. Ulysses, however, most anxious that the glory of the deed should be his alone, endeavoured to slay Diomedes, who walked before him with the Palladium. Diomedes, however, on seeing by moonlight the shadow of the sword raised over him, seized Ulysses, bound his hands, bid him walk before him, and, after striking him on the back with the flat part of his sword, proceeded onward, and at length reached the Argive camp.

them advance a reason that was not quite ridiculous? No;—and I think, said he, I never shall.

CHAP. VIII.—Considering all these things, then, bear this in mind, that the multitude never will admit or reckon that there is the one beautiful itself, and not many beautiful,—one thing itself individually existing, and not many such individual things. They will be the last to do so, he replied. It is impossible, then, for the multitude to be philosophers. Impossible. And those who philosophize must necessarily be subject to their reproach? Necessarily so. And likewise to that of those private persons, who, in conversing with the multitude, desire to please them? Clearly. In consequence of this, then, what security do you see for the philosophic nature to continue its pursuit, and arrive at perfection?—And consider from what has gone before; for it has been admitted, that aptitude for learning, memory, fortitude, and magnanimity belong to this kind of disposition. Yes,—it has. Will not such an one as this, then, be the first of all men in all things whatever, especially if he have a body naturally suited to his soul? Of course he will, he replied. And when he is further advanced in years, his kindred and citizens, methinks, will be disposed to employ him in their affairs. Why not? As suppliants then they will pay him homage, and submit to him, anticipating and flattering beforehand his growing power. Aye, said he, such is usually the case. What then, said I, think you such an one will do under such circumstances, especially if he be a member of a great state, rich, and nobly born, handsome withal and of large stature?—Will he not be filled with extravagant hopes, deeming himself capable of managing the affairs both of Greeks and barbarians, and on this account demean himself loftily, being full of ostentation and vain conceit, but without judgment? Quite so, he replied. If one should gently approach a man of this disposition, and tell him the truth, that he has no judgment, but needs it;—as judgment is only to be acquired by one who devotes himself as a slave to its acquisition, think you, that, amidst all these

* It seems highly probable that Plato is here drawing a portrait of Alcibiades, with whose general character this description most closely tallies.

evils it would be easy for him to hearken? Far from it, he replied. But if, said I, through a good natural temper, and innate attachment to reasoning, he were to acquire penetration, and thus be bent and drawn towards philosophy,—what, think we, will those others do, when they reckon on losing his services and company:—will they not by every action, and every speech, say and do all to the man to prevent his being persuaded,—and as respects his adviser, take away all his influence, both by forming private plots and arraigning him at public trials? This, of course, must necessarily be the case, he replied. Is it likely then, that such an one as this will be a philosopher? Not at all.

CHAP. IX.—You see then, said I, that we were not wrong in saying, that even the very essentials of the philosophic disposition, are, when badly directed, in some measure the cause of a falling off from this pursuit, as well as from those vulgarly reputed goods,—riches, and all such-like matters. No, certainly, he replied;—that was correctly observed. Such then, said I, admirable friend! is the ruin, such and so great the corruption of the best nature for the best of all pursuits, and which, as we observe, is rarely elsewhere to be found;* and among these are the men who do the greatest harm both to states and private persons, and those also who do the greatest good, such as are drawn to one particular side, [viz. what is good:]—whereas small talents do nothing great for any one, either private person or state. Most true, said he. Since those, then, who thus fall off, whose chief business was to apply to philosophy, and who, leaving her deserted and imperfect, lead themselves a life neither becoming nor true,—while on this same philosophy other unworthy persons have intruded and disgraced her, loading her with reproaches, such as those with which you say her revilers reproach her:—of those who engage with her,—some are worth nothing, and most of them deserve great punishments. Aye surely, this, replied he, is commonly said. Aye,—and said too with reason, replied I;—for other contemptible men seeing the field unoccupied, and the possession of it followed by dignities and honourable names, just like persons who take refuge from their prisons in the temples, these likewise

* Gr. δλίγης και ἄλλως γινομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φημὶ

gladly leap from their trade-crafts to philosophy;—such of them I mean, as are most adept in their own little art.—Indeed, even in this position of philosophy, her remaining dignity, in comparison with all the other arts, is still of surpassing magnificence,—which dignity many eagerly covet, who yet are of an imperfect nature, and have bodies not only deformed by their arts and crafts, but souls likewise that are broken and crushed by their servile occupations:—must it not necessarily be so? Undoubtedly, said he. Think you, then, said I, that they at all differ in appearance from a bald and puny blacksmith, who having made a little money, has been newly liberated from chains, and washed in the bath,† with a new robe on him, just decked out as a bridegroom, presuming, on account of his master's poverty and forlorn situation, to propose for his daughter's hand? There is no great difference, replied he. What sort of a race must such as these produce;—must it not be bastardy and abject? Certainly,—it must. But what;—when persons unworthy of instruction study it, and meddle with it unworthily, what kind of sentiments and opinions must we say come from them?—Must they not be such as to be properly termed sophisms, and neither genuine, nor allied to true discretion? Wholly so, of course, he replied.

CHAP. X.—An extremely small number is left, said I, Adimantus, of those who engage worthily in philosophy,—men of that noble and well-cultivated nature, which somehow seeks retirement, and naturally persists in philosophic study, through the absence of corrupting tendencies; or it may be, in a small state, some mighty soul arises, who has despised and wholly neglected civil honours;—and there may be some small portion perhaps, who, having a naturally good disposition, hold other arts in just contempt, and then turn to philosophy.—These the bridle of our friend Theages will probably be able to restrain; for all other things are calculated to withdraw Theages from philosophy, while the care

* We give the Greek entire :—οὐ δὲ ἐφιέμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λεύβηται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς συγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυνμένοι τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν.

† The elegant play on the words λευμίνου and λελουμένου is wholly lost in the translation.

of his health occupies him to the exclusion of politics : * —and as to what concerns myself, namely the sign of my demon, it is not worth while to mention that ; for I think it has heretofore been met with only by one other, if any at all. —And even of these few [they are] such as taste, and have tasted, how sweet and blessed is the acquisition of philosophy, and have withal sufficiently observed the madness of the multitude, and that none of them, as I may say, does what is wholesome in state matters, and that a man can get none to aid him in securely succouring the just, but is like one falling among wild beasts, neither willing nor able to aid them in doing wrong, as one only against a host of wild creatures, and so without doing any good either to the state or his friends, perishes unprofitably to all the world. Quietly reasoning on all these things, and attending to his own affairs, like a man sheltered under a wall in a storm of dust and foam borne along on the wind, by which he sees all about him overwhelmed in disorder, such an one is content anyhow to pass his life pure from injustice and unholy deeds, and to effect his exit hence with good hopes cheerful and agreeable. Aye, —and he will make his exit, said he, without having done even the least of them. Nor the greatest either, said I ; —because he has not found a suitable form of government ; for in one that suits him, he will both make greater progress himself, and together with the affairs of private persons, will preserve those of the public also.

CHAP. XI.—As respects philosophy, then, for what reasons it has been traduced, and that it has been so unjustly, we have, I think, sufficiently stated, —unless you have anything else to allege. Nay, said he ; —I can say nothing further about this point : —but which of the present forms of government do you conceive to be suited to philosophy ? None whatever, said I ; and this particularly is what I complain of, that no existing constitution of a state

* Theages is stated in the Apology of Socrates (p. 33 c), to be the son of Demodocus and the brother of Paralus, and to have been most desirous of attaining to a knowledge of the Socratic philosophy ; —and we are here told that his delicate health hindered him from persevering in its pursuit : —so true is the saying of Plutarch (de Sanit. tuend. p. 126 b), φιλοσοφῶν ἀρρώστια πολλοὺς παρέχουσιν.

is worthy of the philosophic nature; and on this account therefore it is turned and altered, just as a foreign seed sown in an improper soil becomes worthless, and has a tendency to fall under the influence of the soil in which it is placed;—so this race likewise has not at present its proper power, but degenerates to some pattern foreign to it;—but in case that it does meet with the best form of government, being itself also best, it will then be evident that this is really divine, and all others only human, both as to their natures and pursuits:—but as a matter of course you are evidently about to ask what is this form of government? You are mistaken, said he,—for this I was not going to ask; but whether it be this, which we have described in establishing our state, or some other. As regards all other things, said I, it is this one:—and this very thing was then mentioned, that there must always be in our state something having the same regard for the government, which you the legislator had in establishing the laws. Aye,—that was mentioned, said he. Yes, but, said I, it was not made sufficiently clear, owing to the fear of what you objected, when you showed also, that the illustration of the thing would be both tedious and difficult;—for indeed it is not on the whole quite easy to discuss what remains. What is that? In what manner a state is to undertake the study of philosophy, so as not itself to be destroyed; for all great pursuits are dangerous; and,—as the saying is,—those noble even are truly difficult. But still, rejoined he, let our demonstration be completed by making this evident. Want of inclination, said I, will not hinder, though possibly want of power may:—and now you shall at once be assured of my readiness.—Consider indeed, how readily and adventurously I am about to assert, that a state ought to attempt this study in a way opposite to what it does at present. How? At present, said I, those who engage in it are striplings, who, quite from childhood, amidst their domestic affairs and lucrative employments, betake themselves to most abstruse inquiries, considering themselves consummate philosophers,—(and I call what respects reasoning, the most difficult of all;)—and should they in after-time be invited by others practising this art, they are pleased to become hearers, and think it a great condescension, reckoning they ought to do it as a by-work:—but

towards old age, with the exception indeed of some few, they are extinguished even more than the Heraclitean* sun, because they are never again rekindled. But how should they act? said he. Quite the reverse of what they do:—while they are lads and youths they should study youthful learning and philosophy,† and, take special care of the body; during its growth and strengthening by inviting its services to the aid of philosophy; and then, as that time of life progresses, during which the soul is attaining its perfection, they should vigorously apply to her exercises;—but when strength decays, and is no longer suited for civil and military employments, they should then be dismissed, and live at pleasure, with the exception of a by-work, [that is, studying philosophy,]—if indeed they propose to live happy, and, when they die, possess in the other world, a destiny suited to the life which they have led in this.

CHAP. XII.—How truly do I think, Socrates, said he, that you speak with ready zeal:—I think, however, that most of your hearers will still more zealously oppose you, and by no means be persuaded, and Thrasymachus even first. Do not divide Thrasymachus and me, said I, who are now become friends, though not enemies heretofore; for we will not at all relax our efforts, till we either persuade both him and the rest, or make some advances towards that life, on attaining which they will again meet with such discourses as these. You have spoken, said he, only for a short time. No time at all, said I, as compared at least with the whole of time: but that the multitude are not persuaded by what is said, is no wonder; for they have never as yet seen that what was mentioned actually came to pass, but rather that they were certain mere words cleverly fitted to each other, and not as now coming out spontaneously:—and as regards the man, who is, as completely as possible, squared and made consistent with virtue both in word and deed, holding power in a state of such different

* Heraclitus the Ephesian said that the sun descended to the western sea, and at its setting was extinguished,—being again enkindled when it ascended above the earth in the east; and that this took place perpetually.

† The Scholiast suggests, that Plato here refers to mathematical science: but Stallbaum conceives with far greater probability, that allusion is made to all liberal or musical arts whatsoever, which are to be studied as disciplines for the mind, just as gymnastics are practised to promote the growth and strength of the body.

character; they have never at all seen either one or more of the kind:—do you think they have? By no means. And again, as respects arguments, my excellent friend, they have not sufficiently listened to what are fair and liberal, such as persevere in the search for truth, by every method, for the mere sake of knowledge, saluting at a distance* such intricate and contentious questions, as tend only to opinion and strife, either in their law-courts or private meetings. Not even as respects these, he replied. On these accounts then, said I, and foreseeing these things, we, although with fear, still asserted (compelled by truth), that neither state nor government, nor even a man in the same way, could ever become perfect, till some need of fortune should compel those few philosophers, who at present are termed not depraved but useless, to take the government of the state, whether they will or not, and oblige it to be obedient to them; or till the sons of those who are now in high offices and magistracies, or they themselves, be by some divine inspiration filled with a true love of sincere philosophy: and I am sure that no one can reasonably suppose either or both of these to be impossible; for thus might we justly be derided, as saying things which otherwise are only like wishes:—is it not so? It is. If then, in the infinite series of past ages, absolute necessity has compelled men who have reached the summit of philosophy to take the government of a state,—or even if such is now the case in some barbarous region, remote from our observation, or is likely to be the case hereafter, we are ready, in that case, to advance in argument, that this form of government just described has existed and now exists [in possibility,] and will actually arise, when this our muse shall obtain the government of the state: for this is neither impossible to happen, nor do we speak of impossibilities, though we ourselves confess that they are difficult. I too, said he, am of the same opinion. But you will say, replied I, that the multitude are not of that opinion? Very likely, said he. My excellent friend, said I, do not thus altogether

* Gr. *πρόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων*, an elegant phrase equivalent to *χαίρειν ἑώντων*, bidding farewell to. Perhaps Plato had in memory the line of Euripides, Hippolyt. v. 101, where Hippolytus accosts Aphrodite—

πρόσωθεν αὐτὴν ἀγνὸς ὢν ἀσπάζομαι.

condemn the multitude; and do not upbraid them for their opinion, but rather encourage them,—remove the reproach thrown on philosophy,—and point out to them the persons you call philosophers, defining distinctly, as at present, both their genius and pursuits, that they may not think that you speak of such as they themselves call philosophers.—Indeed, if they talk of the same men, will you not say that they have conceived a different opinion of the men from what you have, and give very different replies from yours; and think you that one man can be angered at another, who is not angry himself; or that a man will envy the envious, who is himself free from envy, and of a gentle temper? I will anticipate you by saying, that I think some few, though not the great mass of mankind, have naturally so bad a temper as you have described. I am quite of that opinion also, said he. Are you then of my opinion in this also,—namely, that, as regards the ill-feeling of the populace towards philosophy, those people from without, [*i. e.* the sophists,] are the real cause of it, by making an indecent and turbulent irruption thereinto, insulting and showing a downright hatred of philosophers, ever directing their discourses at particular men, and so doing what least of all becomes philosophy? Certainly, said he.

CHAP. XIII.—In fact, Adimantus, the man who really applies his intellect to reflect on true being, probably has no leisure to look down on the little affairs of mankind, and by fighting with them, become filled with envy and ill-nature; but on the other hand, beholding and contemplating objects that are orderly, always self-consistent and stable,* such as neither injure nor are injured by each other, but are in all respects beautiful and consonant with reason, these he imitates and resembles as far as possible:—what, think you it at all possible, that a man will not imitate what he admires as soon as he is conversant therewith? Impossible, he replied. The philosopher then, who is occupied with what is divine and orderly, becomes himself divine and orderly, as far as lies

* The reader will take in connexion with this what had been stated at the close of the first chapter of this book,—that the philosopher's studies were concerned with real and eternal being, and not allowed to wander to the changeable and destructible—οὐ πλανωμένην ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς.

in man's power:—yet in all there is great room for blame. Most assuredly. If then, said I, he should be any how compelled to try to introduce among men what he beholds there [in his world of contemplation,] with a view of forming their manners, both in private and public, and not merely to form himself alone,—would he prove, think you, a bad artist, in the matter of temperance and justice and every civil virtue? Not at all, said he. But, supposing that the multitude should perceive that we are speaking the truth about him, [i. e. the philosopher,] will they be angry at philosophers and discredit our assertion, that the state can never otherwise be happy, except as portrayed by painters who employ a divine pattern? They will not be angry, said he, if they do perceive it: but what method of painting do you mean? When they have got for their groundwork, said I, the state and manners of mankind, they would first make them pure, which is not altogether an easy matter; for you know, that in this they differ from others,—in being unwilling to meddle either with a private man or state, or to prescribe laws, till they have either received them as pure, or themselves have made them so. Rightly too, said he. And after this, think you not they will draw a sketch of their form of government? Of course. Afterwards, I think, as they proceed in their work, they will frequently look in two directions,—not only to what is naturally just and beautiful, and temperate and the like, but also, again, to that which they can establish among mankind, blending and compounding their human form out of different human characters and pursuits, drawing from what Homer calls the divine likeness, and the divine resemblance subsisting among men? Right, said he. They will, of course, I think, erase one thing, and put in another, till they have, as far as possible, made human morals pleasing to the gods? At that rate, said he, the picture will be most beautiful. In this case, said I, do we at all succeed in persuading these men, who, you said, were coming upon us

* Philosophers ideally contemplating the image of a perfect state are here elegantly compared to painters about to make an original design of a city, who of course require that their tablets be clean, ere they commence their drawing.

in battle-array, that a person who can thus depict governments is the man we then recommended to them,—and on whose account they were angry with us, for committing to him our states:—and will they now be more mild, when they hear our mention thereof? Certainly, said he, if they be wise:—for what is there now, that they can further question?—will they assert that philosophers are not lovers of real being and truth? That, said he, were absurd. Or that their disposition, as just described, is not allied to what is best? Nor this either. What then;—will not a disposition such as we have described, by finding suitable employments, become perfectly good and philosophic, if any other be so;—will men say that those more attain to it, whom we have selected? Not at all. Will they still then be indignant at us for saying, that until the philosophic race have the government of the state, the miseries neither of state nor citizens can have an end, nor can this government, which we ideally describe, be ever perfectly realized? Perhaps somewhat less indignant, rejoined he. Is it your wish, then, said I, that we say—not that they are somewhat less [indignant,] but that they have become altogether mild, and are persuaded; that they will at least consent, if no more, through very shame? By all means, said he.

CHAP. XIV.—Let them then, said I, be persuaded of this:—and is there any one who will dispute this,—that men of a philosophic disposition do not usually spring from kings and sovereigns? No one, said he, would assert that. And though they be born of such a character, one may say they are necessarily prone to be corrupted; for indeed, it is a hard matter for them to be preserved untainted, even we ourselves agree;—but will any one contend throughout all time, that not one of the whole human race, would be preserved pure and untainted? How can there be? But surely, said I, any individual born with adequate abilities, and who has his state in obedience to him, can accomplish everything now so much disbelieved? Yes, for he is adequate to his task, said he. And when the governor, said I, establishes the laws and customs here detailed, it is not at all impossible for him to make the citizens willingly obey him? In no way whatever. But is it wonderful or impossible, that what is our opinion should be the opinion of others also? I, at least, do

not think so, said he. And that these things are best, if they be possible, we have, I think, sufficiently explained in the former part of our discourse. Yes, quite sufficiently. Now then, it seems, we are agreed about our legislation; that the laws we mention are the best, if they could be realized,—and that if it be hard to establish them, yet it is not impossible? Yes,—we are agreed, said he.

CHAP. XV.—Since this then has been with difficulty brought to a conclusion, shall we not next consider what remains;—in what manner, and in consequence of what sciences and pursuits, they will become installed as the preservers of the government, and at what periods of life they will all apply to their several pursuits? Aye, we must talk of this, observed he. My cunning has done me no service, said I, in having left untouched, in the former part of our discourse, the difficulty attending the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the establishment of governors, knowing how invidious the business is, and full of difficulty, even though it be perfectly true and correct:—for we are now under no less a compulsion of entering into these details.—What relates to women and children has already been brought to a close; and as to what concerns the governors, we must now from the beginning reconsider that subject.—We have alleged, if you remember, that they should appear to be lovers of the state,—proved to be so both by pleasures and pains, and not seen to abandon this principle, either through toils or fears or any other change; and that he who cannot do this should be rejected; while as for him who comes forth altogether pure, as gold tried in the fire, we should appoint him ruler, and endow him with honours and rewards both during life and after death. Such was what we said, when our argument was wandering and assuming a veil, through fear of disturbing the present state of things. You speak quite truly, said he;—for I remember it. Yes,—for I was loath, to say, my friend, what I must now venture to assert:—but now this assertion must at any rate be ventured,—that the most perfect guardians must be established philosophers. Yes,—that has been stated, replied he. But consider, I pray, that you will probably have only a few of these; for such a disposition, as we declared that they must necessarily have, is but rarely used to centre in one single individual; though its different parts are commonly

found in many different persons. How say you? he replied. That such as learn with facility, have a good memory, are sagacious and acute, and endued with all qualifications thereto allied, are yet not at the same time of so vigorous and lofty an intellect, as to live orderly, with calmness and constancy, but are carried hapchance by mere buoyancy of spirits, and are deserted by everything like stability. Your remark is true, replied he. Well then, these firm habits of the mind, which are not easily changeable, and which one might specially employ as trusty, and which in time of war are hard to be excited to terror;—and similarly also as regards learning,—they move heavily, and learn with difficulty, as if benumbed, and oppressed with sleep and yawning, when compelled to labour at any work of this description? It is so, replied he. But we said, that he ought to have a good and fair share of both these, or else should have no share whatever either in the most perfect kind of education, or in magisterial dignities or state-honours? Right, said he. Do not you think then, that this will but rarely happen? Of course it will. They must be tried then both in what we before alluded to,—labours, fears, and pleasures;—and likewise in what we then passed over, and are now mentioning;—we must exercise them in various kinds of learning, with due regard for the power of their talents to go through the highest branches of study, or else their failure, as that of persons failing in all other things. It is fit now, said he, that we consider this question in this manner:—but what kind of studies are they, which you call the highest?

CHAP. XVI.—You remember, perhaps, said I, that when we divided the soul into three parts, we defined the nature respectively of justice, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom? If I did not remember, said he, I should have no right to hear what remains. [Do you remember likewise] what was said before that? What was it? We somewhere said, that it was possible to behold these in their most beautiful forms, but that the journey would be tedious, which a person must make, who would see them clearly; yet that it was possible, to approach them through our proofs before mentioned, and you said also, that these were sufficient; so, what was then asserted fell in my opinion far short of the truth; though if agreeable to you, you may say so. I at least thought, re-

plied he, that they had been discussed in fair measure; and the rest seemed to think so too. But my friend, said I, in speaking of things of this kind, such a measure as omits any part whatever of the truth is not wholly in measure;—for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything;—though people sometimes think that things are sufficiently well when thus circumstanced, and there is no need for further inquiry. Very many, said he, thus behave through indolence. But the guardian of the state and the laws, said I, should least of all be thus affected. So it seems, replied he. Such an one, then, my friend, said I, must make a more comprehensive circuit, and labour as much in learning as in exercising himself: otherwise, as we were just saying, he will never arrive at the summit of the greatest and most suitable learning. But are not these branches the highest:—or is there, said he, any one yet higher than justice, and those virtues which we have discussed? There is something greater, said I; and even of these we must not, as just now, only contemplate the mere rude sketch; but we must not omit even its complete elaboration: is it not ridiculous in other things of small moment to employ our whole labour, and strive to attain the utmost accuracy and perfection, and yet not deem the highest and most important affairs worthy of our highest attention, with a view to making them as perfect as possible? The sentiment, said he, is very just:—but with respect to the question,—what is this most important branch of study, and about what you say it is employed,—think you that any one will let you go without asking its nature? Not at all, said I:—but do you ask; although you have assuredly often heard it, but at present you do not bear it in mind, or else intend to embarrass me by raising objections:—and I think this the more, as you have often heard at least, that the idea of the good is the highest branch of study;—about which, when justice and the other virtues employ themselves, they then become useful and advantageous.—Now then, you know pretty well that I mean to say this, and besides, that we do not sufficiently know that idea; and without this knowledge, though we were to understand everything else as fully as possible, yet you know that it could be of no service whatever to us: in the same manner as no possession whatever would be of aught avail, without the possession of the good:—

and think you that it is more profitable to possess all things without the possession of the good than to know all things without the knowledge of the good, having no perception at all of the beautiful and good? Not I, by Zeus, he exclaimed.

CHAP. XVII.—Of this, moreover, you may be quite certain, that to the multitude pleasure seems to be the good, while the more refined think it to be virtue. How otherwise? And you know also, my friend, that those who hold this opinion, are unable to show what knowledge is, but are compelled at last to call it the knowledge of the good. Aye, and most absurdly too, said he. How indeed can it be otherwise, replied I, if when upbraiding us for not knowing the good, they yet speak as to persons knowing it,* and say that knowledge is good itself, as if we understood their meaning when pronouncing the word “the good?” Most true, said he. But what? those who define pleasure to be good, are they less in error than the others; or are not these too compelled to confess that pleasures are evil? Quite so. It happens then, I think, that they acknowledge the same things to be both good and evil,—do they not? Undoubtedly. Is it not clear, then, that on this point there are great and manifold varieties of opinion? Of course there are. But what;—is it not clear also, that with reference to things just and beautiful, the multitude choose what is apparent, even though it has no real existence, yet acting and possessing and appearing to possess it;—though the acquisition of only apparent goods, never yet satisfied any one:—for people on the other hand seek what is real, and all men despise what is only apparent? Just so, said he. This then is what every soul pursues, and for the sake of which it does everything, conjecturing it to be something, though still in doubt, and unable either fully to comprehend its nature, or employ belief alone respecting it as of other things; and hence is it, that they fail of success even in other matters however useful.—Are we to say then, that about a matter of this nature,

* The meaning is;—that as such persons are forced to allow that knowledge of itself is not the highest good, but should be referred to the highest good, as the arbiter thereof,—those persons run into an absurd error, who denying that we have any knowledge of “the good,” yet so act as if we had a sufficient knowledge thereof,—fixing their notion on some abstract theory of good.

and of such vast consequence, even the best men in the state, to whom we commit the management of all things, will be thus in the dark? By no means, said he. I am of opinion then, said I, that the just and the beautiful, so long as they are unknown in what particular way they are good, cannot be of any great importance to have a guardian who is ignorant of this; and I suspect that no one will before this attain a sufficient knowledge thereof. Yes,—you guess rightly, observed he. Will not our government, therefore, have been completely set in order, if a guardian be set over it that is scientifically acquainted with these things?

CHAP. XVIII.—It must of necessity, said he:—but yet with respect to yourself, Socrates, say you that the good is science, or pleasure, or something independent of these? Oh, you fine fellow, said I, you long ago clearly showed that you were not to be satisfied with other men's opinions about these matters. Nor does it seem to me just, Socrates, said he, that a man should keep talking of other men's opinions, and not his own, after having spent so much time in inquiring about these particulars. But what, said I;—do you think it just then, that a man should talk about matters of which he is ignorant, just as if he knew them? By no means as if he knew them, said he; yet, according to his thoughts, whatever he thinks he should willingly tell us. But what, said I;—have you not observed respecting unscientific opinions, how contemptible they all are, and the best of them blind;—and think you, that these persons, who without intellect form true opinions, are at all different from blind men walking on the right road? Not at all, said he. Do you wish, then, that we should contemplate things base, blind, and crooked, when it is in our power to hear from others what is clear and beautiful? By Zeus, Socrates, said Glaucon, do not stop here, as if you had come to a close; for we shall be satisfied, if, in the same way as you have spoken of justice, temperance, and the other virtues, you will in like manner discourse of the good. And I too shall be very well satisfied, my friend, said I; but [I am afraid] that I shall not be able, and so, by my readiness may incur the ridicule of unmannerly persons.—But, my excellent friends, let us at present dismiss* this inquiry about the

* Socrates says this in consequence of the inability of his auditors to

nature of the good, (for it seems to me more, as far as I now think, than we can attain, in our present attempt): but I am willing to tell you, if you please, what I conceive to be the offspring of the good, and its nearest representation; and if not, I shall dismiss it. Well then, tell us, said he; for you shall afterwards acquit yourself of your debt by telling us of its parent. I could wish, said I, both that I were able to oblige you by explaining that, and not as now the offspring only and interest of my debt.* This child and offspring of the good itself, pray receive;—but still take due care that I deceive you nowise unwillingly by paying my account of this offspring in base coin. We will take care of that, said he, as far as we can:—only do you tell us. I will then, said I, when we are once thoroughly agreed, and I have reminded you of what was before mentioned, and has been often said on other occasions. What is that? said he. That there are many things beautiful, said I, and many good also; and each of these we declare to be so, and so define them in our argument. Yes, so we say. But as to the beautiful itself and the good itself, and similarly as to all those things which we then considered as of various natures, we are now again establishing them according to the unity of the general idea, to which we conceive each related; and these indeed, we say, are observed by the eye, but are not objects of intellectual perception; whereas the ideas are perceived by the intellect, not seen by the eye. Assuredly. By what part then of ourselves do we see things visible? By the sight, said he. And is it not, said I, by hearing, that we perceive what is heard; and by the other senses, all the other objects of sense? Of course. But have you not perceived, said I, as regards the artificer of the senses, with what perfect skill he has formed the power of seeing, and being seen? Not quite, he replied. But consider it thus:—is there understand the nature of the good: for the Greek Scholiast well observes on this part of the Republic, that it is through the inaptitude of subordinate natures that the more excellent are unable to energize. Παρά γὰρ τῶν καταδεστέρων ἀνεπιτηδείότητα τὰ κρείττονα ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐνεργεῖν.

* The *equivogue* of the word τόκος is difficult to translate; as it signifies equally *children*, *productions*, and *the interest of a debt*. The word πατήρ, if τόκος be taken in the latter sense, will refer to the *capital*. Comp. Aristotle, Polit. i. ch. 10—μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν, ὃ δε τόκος αὐτὸ ποιῇ πλεόν. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' εἰληφειν ὁμοία γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννώσιν αὐτὰ ἴσταιν, ὃ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίματος. Plato uses the same figure in the Politicus, p. 267 a.

a third kind of faculty required by the hearing and voice, in order that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which the one will not hear, and the other not be heard? There is not, said he. I conceive, said I, that many others also (not to say, none at all) require no such thing:—can you name any one that does? Not I, he replied. But with reference to the sense of seeing and the object of sight, do you not perceive that they require something? How? When there is sight in the eyes, and when he who has it attempts to use it, and when there is colour in the objects before him, unless there concur some third kind of medium naturally formed for the purpose,—the sight, you are aware, will see nothing, and colours will be invisible. What is this of which you are now speaking? inquired he. What you call light, said I. Your remark is true, replied he. This sense of seeing then, and power of being seen, are no unimportant ideas, and are connected by a bond more precious than all other bonds, if light be not valueless. But it is far, said he, from being valueless.

CHAP. XIX.—Whom then of the gods in heaven can you assign as the cause of this,—that light makes our sight to see, and visible objects to be seen, in the best manner? The same, he replied, as you and others do; for it is evident that you mean the sun. Does not sight then derive its nature through its relation to this god? How?—The sight is not the sun, nor is that the sun, in which sight is engendered,—which we call the eye. It is not. But yet, methinks, this at least of all the organs of sense is most sun-like? Very much so. And the power which it possesses, does it not possess, as dispensed and emanating hence? Certainly. Is not the sun then, though not sight itself, but the principle thereof, seen by sight itself? It is so, said he. This then, said I, be assured, is what I called the offspring of *the good*, which *the good* generates, analogous to itself; and what this is in the sphere of intelligence, with reference to intellect, and the objects of intellect, that the sun is in the visible [world] with reference to sight and visible things. How is that? said he: pray further explain it. You are aware, that the eyes, said I, when directed towards objects, whose colours are no longer visited by the light of day,* but by the glimmerings of the

* The words φῶς and φέγγος are here opposed,—the first referring to

night, grow dim and appear almost blind, as if they had in them no pure vision. Just so, said he. But when they turn to objects which the sun illuminates, then, methinks, they see clearly, and in those very eyes there now appears vision. There does. Understand the same, then, to be the case with reference to the soul.—When it firmly adheres to what is enlightened by truth and real being, then it understands and knows it, and appears to possess intellect; but when it adheres to what is blended with darkness, and is subject to generation and destruction, it then has to do with opinion, and is dull, wandering from one opinion to another, like one without intellect. So it seems. That therefore which imparts truth to what is known, and dispenses the faculty of knowledge to him who knows, you may call the idea of *the good* and the principle of science and truth, as being known through intellect. And as both these,—knowledge and truth, are so beautiful, you will be right in thinking that the good is something different, and still more beautiful than these. Science and truth here are as light and sight there, which we rightly judged to be sun-like, but yet did not think them to be the sun:—so here it is right to hold, that both of them partake of the form of *the good*,—but yet not right to suppose that either of them is *the good*, inasmuch as *the good itself* is worthy of still greater honour. You speak, said he, of some inestimable idea of “the beautiful,” which exhibits science and truth, and yet is itself their superior in beauty;—for you have nowhere said, that it was pleasure. Hope better things, said I; but thus rather consider its image still further. How? You will say, I think, that the sun imparts to things which are seen, not only their visibility, but likewise their generation, growth, and nourishment, though not itself generation? Of course. We may say, therefore, as to things the original and primary light of the sun, the latter to the inferior and borrowed light of the moon and stars.

* The generation of things illuminated by the sun, shows that it is perfectly unbegotten; for, according to the Platonic philosophy, the sun alone of all the bodies in the universe is without generation, neither receiving any accession nor diminution; whereas all that it illuminates receives light, through the motion of the sun about its proper centre, which also at different times sends different rays to the heavenly bodies belonging to its system. So far therefore as the sun illuminates, it is unbegotten; and, on this principle only, and not as respects its corporeal shape, is it assimilated to *the good*.

cognizable by the intellect, that they become cognizable not only from *the good*, by which they are known, but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, while *the good* itself is not essence, but beyond essence, and superior to both in dignity and power.

CHAP. XX.—Here Glaucon, heartily laughing, said, By Apollo, here is a marvellous transcendency! You yourself, replied I, are the cause of it, by compelling me to relate what I think about it. And by no means stop, said he, unless there be some cause; from again discussing the analogy about the sun, if you have omitted anything. Aye, I have omitted many things, replied I. Ah, but, replied he, pray do not omit the smallest particular. I think, said I, that much will be omitted: yet, as far as I can at present, I will not willingly omit anything. Do not, said he. Understand then, said I, that we allege these to be two; ruling—the one over the intelligible genus and place, and the other over the visible world,—not to say the heavens, lest I should seem to you to employ a sophistical expression: you understand then these two descriptions of being,—the visible and intelligible? I do. Supposing now you to take a line cut into two equal sections, then again cut each part according to the same ratio, both that of the visible and that of the intelligible species, you will then have them placed in contrast with each other, either in clearness or obscurity,—the second section in the visible species being images. Now images I call, in the first place, shadows,—in the next, appearances in water, and such as subsist in opaque, polished and bright bodies, and all such-like representations, if you understand me. Yes, I understand. Consider now the other section of the visible which this resembles,—the animals around us, and all kinds of plants, and everything of an artificial nature. I do consider it, said he. Do you wish to assert, then, that this section is divided by truth and its opposite;—and just as the objects of opinion are opposed to the objects of true knowledge, so also that which is compared [is opposed] to that with which it is compared? Aye, indeed: I am quite willing. Consider once more about this section of the intelligible, how it is to be effected. How? That with respect to one part thereof, the soul uses the former sections as images, and is compelled to investigate by means of hypo-

thesis, not going back to first principles, but advancing onward to conclusions; and the other part, again, is that where the soul proceeds from hypothesis to an unhypothetical principle, and makes its way even without those images by means of the ideas themselves. What you now say, rejoined he, I do not fully understand. Once more, said I,—for you will more easily understand me, from what has been previously stated,—you are not unaware, methinks, that persons versed in geometry, and computations, and such-like, after laying down hypotheses of the odd and even, and figures, and three kinds of angles, and other similar matters, according to each method, proceed on them as known, after establishing them as mere hypotheses, and give no further reason about them, either to themselves or others, as being things obvious to all;—but, beginning with these, then directly discuss the rest, and end by meeting at the point where the inquiry set out? I know this, said he, perfectly well. And [do you not likewise know] that they use the visible species, and reason about them, not employing their intellect about these species, but about those of which they are the resemblances, arguing about the square itself, and the diameter itself, and not about what they describe;—and, so also, with reference to other particulars, those very things which they form and describe, among which are shadows and images in water, these they use as images, trying to behold those very things, which a man can only perceive by his intellect? You say true, he replied.

CHAP. XXI.—This then was what I meant by the idea of the intelligible; but [I said also,] that the soul was obliged to use hypotheses in its investigation, not going back to the principle, as though unable to ascend higher than hypotheses, and employed comparisons formed from things below, to lead to those above, as to clearly-seen objects of thought, distinct from the things themselves. I understand, said he, that you are speaking of what concerns geometry and its sister arts. By that other section of the intelligible, then, you must understand me to mean what reason itself attains by its dialectic faculty, forming hypotheses, not as principles, but really hypotheses, just like steps and starting-points, in order that by proceeding up to the unhypothetical,—[that is,] the principle of the universe, coming in contact therewith,

and so again coming into union with what is united to it in principle, it may thus reach the end without making use of anything sensible, but only of ideas themselves, proceeding through some to others, and so ending in ideas. I understand, said he, but not fully :—(for I think you are talking of some difficult work :) but I understand it is your wish to prove that knowledge obtained by dialectic science respecting real and intelligible being is clearer than that acquired by means of what are called arts, which take hypotheses for their first principles, and which those who contemplate must view with the understanding and not the perceptive faculties ; whereas, through their inability to go back to first principles, and as they reason only from hypotheses, you think they do not exercise intellect [*νοῦν*] in these matters, much as they might become intelligible with some principle for a foundation :—and as for understanding [or reasoning,]—that which we acquire through geometry and its kindred arts, and not pure reason, this is something lying between opinion and pure intellect. You have fully understood me, said I :—and understand me now, that analogous to these four branches of knowledge are four affections [or faculties] of the soul,—pure reasoning answering to the highest,—understanding [or reasoning] to the second, faith to the third,—conjecture to the last :*—and so arrange them, as to assign to them respectively more or less of clearness, as they are more or less allied to truth. I understand, replied he, and quite agree ; and so let us adopt your proposed arrangement.

* Plato conceived that there was an ideal and a visible world,—the world of reason and the world of sense, and two essences in each ;—in the *former*, pure or abstract ideas and mixed ideas,—in the visible world (which comprises exclusively the objects of sense), material substances ; and secondly, the images, shadows, or representations of bodies. Analogous to these also are four faculties of the human mind, two only of which have any relation to the ideal world or form any part of true science ;—1. *νόησις*, the knowledge of pure ideas (reflection, the pure reason of Kant) ;—2. *διάνοια* (*understanding*), the knowledge of mixed ideas ;—3. *πίστις*, *faith*, the knowledge of bodies and their properties ;—4. *εἰκασία*, *conjecture*, the knowledge of the images or shadows of bodies. The two last belong to unstable, varying opinion (*δόξα*). This explanation is here given, as the words require a more accurate definition than can be furnished by the text. See article *Plato*, in the P. Cycl.

BOOK VII.

ARGUMENT.

IN the *seventh book*, which opens with a beautiful description of the nature of man confined in a dark cave, Plato proceeds to show the means and plan for learning true philosophy, and how we may attain to the serious and sober practice of social life and politics. That moral discipline, argues he, which I require in my guardian, is not mere vacant contemplation, but a profound and practical knowledge of all matters nearly or more remotely concerning the duties of life and the social relations of mankind,—that is, the state in its most broad and general sense : in fact, that he should be a philosophic ruler acquainted with divine and human things,—in other words, with true and primary philosophy. This he terms *dialectic*, the subordinates of which are *physics*, the science which considers the origin and formation of matter, and *mathematics*, which is halfway between the two others, engaged indeed in contemplating abstract and purely argumentative, but not on that higher eternal truth ; emphatically, *τὸ ὄν*, that primarily exists in the mind of God : of these matters he treats, particularly the first, at very considerable length : which, as Ritter says, is a regulating superintendent, which, from the knowledge of the eternally true, may indicate to each special science its proper object.

CHAP. I.—After this then, said I, compare our nature as respects education, or the want thereof, to a condition such as follows :—Behold men, as it were, in an underground cave-like dwelling, having its entrance open towards the light and extending through the whole cave,—and within it persons, who from childhood upwards have had chains on their legs and their necks, so as, while abiding there, to have the power of looking forward only, but not to turn round their heads by reason of their chains, their light coming from a fire that burns above and afar off, and behind them ; and between the fire and those in chains is a road above, along which one may see a little wall built along, just as the stages of conjurers are built before the people in whose presence they show their tricks. I see, said he. Behold then by the side of this little wall men carrying all sorts of machines rising above the wall, and statues of men and other animals wrought in stone, wood, and other materials, some of the bearers

probably speaking, others proceeding in silence.* You are proposing, said he, a most absurd comparison and absurd captives also. Such as resemble ourselves, said I;—for think you that such as these would have seen anything else of themselves or one another except the shadows that fall from the fire on the opposite side of the cave? How can they, said he, if indeed they be through life compelled to keep their heads unmoved? But what respecting the things carried by them:—is not this the same? Of course. If then they had been able to talk with each other, do you not suppose they would think it right to give names to what they saw before them? Of course they would. But if the prison had an echo on its opposite side, when any person present were to speak, think you they would imagine anything else addressed to them, except the shadow before them? No, by Zeus, not I, said he. At all events then, said I, such persons would deem truth to be nothing else but the shadows of exhibitions. Of course they would. Let us inquire then, said I, as to their liberation from captivity, and their cure from insanity, such as it may be, and whether such will naturally fall to their lot;—were a person let loose and obliged immediately to rise up, and turn round his neck and walk, and look upwards to the light, and doing all this still feel pained, and be disabled by the dazzling from seeing those things of which he formerly saw the shadows;—what would he say, think you, if any one were to tell him that he formerly saw mere empty visions, but now saw more correctly, as being nearer to the real thing, and turned towards what was more real, and then, specially pointing out to him every individual passing thing, should question him, and oblige him, to answer respecting its nature:—think you not he would be embarrassed, and consider that what he before saw was truer than what was just exhibited? Quite so, said he.

CHAP. II.—Therefore, even if a person should compel him to look to the light itself, would he not have pain in his eyes and shun it, and then, turning to what he really could behold, reckon these as really more clear than what had been previously pointed out? Just so, replied he. But if,

* Allusion is here made to puppets which are made to perform on a moveable stage by means of strings pulled from behind. See Ruhnken's Lexicon to the *Timæus*, on the word *θαύματα*, which he explains by the compound word *νευροσπάσματα*.

said I, a person should forcibly drag him thence through a rugged and steep ascent without stopping, till he dragged him to the light of the sun, would he not while thus drawn be in pain and indignation, and when he came to the light, having his eyes dazzled with the splendour, be unable to behold even any one thing of what he had just alleged as true? No, he could not, at the moment at least, said he. He would require, at least then, to get some degree of practice, if he would see things above him:—and first, indeed, he would most easily perceive the shadows, and then the images of men and other animals in the water, and after that the things themselves;—and after this he would more easily behold the things in heaven, and heaven itself, by night, looking to the light of the stars and the moon, than after daylight to the sun and the light of the sun. How else? Last of all, then, methinks, he might be able to perceive and contemplate the nature of the sun, not as respects its images in water or any other place, but itself by itself in its own proper station? Necessarily so, said he. And after this, he might reason with himself concerning the sun, that it is the body which gives us the seasons and years and administers everything in its stated place, being the cause also in a certain manner of all natural events. It is evident, said he, after what has been formerly stated, that one must arrive at this conclusion. What then,—when a man remembers his first habitation and the wisdom therein residing, and his fellow captives also,—think you not, that he would congratulate himself on the change and pity the rest? Quite so. And whatever honours and praises and rewards were assigned by mutual consent to him that had the most acute perception of the present, and the best recollection both of long past and recent events, and from such observations was best able to conjecture the future,—think you that he would desire such honours, or envy those honoured by these, or possessing influence, or would not he rather experience what Homer says, and ardently desire

As labourer, for some ignoble man
To work for hire,*—

and rather endure anything than entertain such opinions and live in such a manner? I think, said he, that he would choose to suffer anything rather than live in that

* Comp. Hom. Odyss. x. 428.

way. And consider this, said I, whether, in the case of such an one going down and again sitting in the same place, his eyes would not be blinded in consequence of coming so suddenly from the sun? Quite so, replied he. As for those shadows again, if he were compelled to split straws and dispute about them with those persons who had been in constant captivity, while yet he was in darkness before the establishment of his sight,—(and this time of getting habituated would not be short,)—would he not excite ridicule; and would it not be said of him, that after having once ascended he had come back with his eyesight destroyed, and should not even try to ascend again; and as for any one that attempted to liberate him and lead him up, they ought to put him to death, if they could get him into their hands? Especially so, said he.

CHAP. III.—As respects this image then, we must apply the whole of it to our preceding discourse; comparing the region that is seen by the eyes to the prison-habitation, and the light of the fire therein to the power of the sun;—and if you were to consider the ascent above, and the contemplation of things above as the soul's ascent into the region of intellect, you would not disappoint my expectations, since this it is which you desire to hear;—but God knows whether it be true. As respects appearances then, it thus seems, that in the subjects of human knowledge the idea of the good is the last object of vision, and hard to be seen; and when beheld it must be inferred from reason to be the cause of what is right and beautiful in all things, generating in what is visible, both light and its parent also, [viz. the sun,] while in that which is intelligible, it is itself the sovereign producing truth and intelligence; and it must be seen too by him that would act with judgment, either privately or in public. I too, said he, am quite of your opinion, as far indeed as I can be. Come then, said I, agree on this point also;—and be not surprised that those who come here are unwilling to act in human affairs, but have their souls ever urged to dwell on things above; for it is surely reasonable it should be so, since these things take place according to the above-mentioned image. Aye, quite reasonable, replied he. But what, said I;—think you it at all surprising, that a man coming from divine contemplations to mere human woes, should appear awkward and extremely ridiculous, while he is

yet dazzled,*—and when, ere being used to the present darkness, he is obliged to contend in courts of law or elsewhere about the shadows of justice, or the statues of which they are the shadows, and then to dispute how these matters are apprehended by those who have never contemplated justice itself? No wonder this, replied he. Nay, said I, if a man has intelligence, he will be conscious, that there are two disturbances of vision arising from two causes,—viz., when we turn from light into darkness and from darkness into light;—and when a man thinks that the same takes place with reference to the soul likewise, when it beholds him disturbed and unable to realize its perceptions, he will not laugh immoderately, but rather consider whether the soul has come out of a more brilliant existence and is now darkened by ignorance, or else emerging out of gross ignorance into a more luminous existence, be overpowered by dazzling splendour;—and thus he will congratulate the former on its life and destiny, while he pities the life and destiny of the other; and even if he wished to laugh at it, his laughter will be less ridiculous than if it were directed to the soul which comes from light into darkness. Your remark is perfectly reasonable, he replied.

CHAP. IV.—It is fit then, said I, if these things be true, that we form such an opinion as this respecting them,—that education is not of that character which some persons announce it to be, when they somehow assert that, there is no science in the soul, but that they can implant it just as if they implanted sight in the eyes of the blind. Aye, they say so, he replied.† Our present argument however, said I, shows this power to reside in the soul of every person, and to be the organ by which every one learns.—Just as the eye cannot turn otherwise than with the whole body from darkness to the light, so also one must turn with the whole soul from

* This refers to the reproach made to philosophers on the unpractical nature of their pursuits, and elsewhere alluded to in the preceding book, ch. 3, and likewise in the *Gorgias*, p. 484 c.

† Euripides alludes to the same false notion in the *Hippolytus*, v. 917.

ὦ πόλλ' ἀμαρτάνοντες ἄνθρωποι μάτην,
τί δὴ τέχνας μὲν μυρίας διδάσκετε
καὶ πάντα μηχανᾶσθε κάξευρίσκετε,
ἐν δ' οὐκ ἐπίστασθ' οὐδ' ἐθηράσασθ' ἢ
φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἷσιν οὐκ ἐνεστί νοῦς;

Pindar has a similar sentiment in *Olymp.* ix. 152—5.

sensible objects until it has become able to endure the contemplation of what is real, and what is most apparent of the real, and this we term *the good*: do we not? Yes. It will be the art then of this very person, said I, in turning about, to contrive this; namely, how he may turn with the greatest ease and advantage, not for the sake of implanting sight in him, but viewing him as already possessing it, though not rightly turned, and not looking in the right direction? It seems so, said he. The other virtues of the soul, as they are called, seem to me somewhat like those of the body; for in fact those not before contained therein are afterwards engendered by custom and practice:—but the faculty of intellect possesses, it seems, a nature somewhat more god-like than all the rest;—never losing its power, but by exertion becoming useful and profitable,—by the opposite, useless and hurtful. Have you never yet observed of those that are termed wicked yet clever,—how sharply the little soul looks, acutely distinguishing all to which it is turned, having indeed no contemptible power of vision, but compelled to be so far the servant of wickedness, that in proportion as its vision is more acute, the more crime it perpetrates? Quite so, of course, observed he. As regards this part of such a disposition, if from childhood upwards it should be stripped and cut off from what belongs to human production, as from leaden weights,—which have a relation to feastings, and pleasures, and lusts, that turn the sight of the soul to things downward;—if the soul can free itself and turn towards truth, the very same principle in the same individuals would as acutely see those things as the objects to which it is now turned. Certainly, he replied. What then, is not this probable, said I, and a necessary consequence of what has just been stated, that those who are untaught and inexperienced in truth can never exercise a sufficient superintendence over the state, nor yet those who are allowed to spend the whole of their time in philosophical pursuits,—the former, because they have no single object in life, towards which they should direct all their actions both private and public,—and the latter, because, as far as their will is concerned, they will not engage in public life, from the idea that even while yet living they have been transported to the islands of the

blessed? True, said he. It is our business then, said I, to compel those of the inhabitants, who possess the greatest talent, to devote themselves to that learning which we formerly considered most important, both to contemplate the good and go in search of it;—and when they have gained it, and taken a sufficient view thereof, yet they are not to be allowed what is now allowed them. What is that? To abide there, said I, and show an unwillingness to descend again to those captives of whom we were speaking, or share with them both their labours and honours, whether trifling or more important. In that case, said he, are we to do them injustice, and make them live a worse life, when they could have lived a better?

CHAP. V.—You have forgotten again, said I, that this is not the lawgiver's concern, how any one class in a state may be especially happy, but to contrive rather that happiness shall be generated throughout the state, uniting the citizens both by persuasion and compulsion, making them share each other's services, such as they can confer on the community at large; and when he introduces such men as these into the state, he does so, not that he may dismiss them and let them turn whichever way each likes, but that he may employ them as a bond of the state. True indeed, said he, for I had forgotten that. Anxiously consider then, Glaucon, that we must do no injustice to the philosophers born among us, but tell them what is just, when we compel them to take charge of and guard the remainder:—for we will assert, that those who in all other states become such [philosophers,] do not probably take a share in the labours going on therein, as they spring up of their own accord without the consent of the government in each; and it is just that what is voluntary, inasmuch as it owes its nurture to none, should willingly pay no one the price of its nurture;—but as for you, we brought into being both yourselves and the rest of the state, as leaders and kings in beehives, brought up better and more perfectly than the others, and better able to take a share in both [public life and philosophical pursuits]. Each must then in turn descend to the dwelling of the rest, and accustom himself to behold obscure objects; for, when once used to them, you will perceive the individual images of each, what they are and whence sprung, ten thousand times better from having already seen the truth concerning what is beautiful.

and just, and good :—and thus the state will be settled as a real vision, both by us and yourselves, and not as a dream, like most of those inhabited by persons fighting about shadows, and quarrelling about government, as if it were some great good.—The truth, however, is as follows : in whatever state those about to rule are least anxious to take the government, this must necessarily be the best and most peacefully governed, while one that has governors of an opposite character, must of course be the opposite. Certainly, said he. Think you then, that those under our charge, when they hear these things, will disobey us, and be unwilling to take their individual share in the labours of the state, and spend the greater part of their time with one another in a state of leisure ? Impossible, said he ;—for we will prescribe what is just to just men, and each of them will enter on his office from this consideration above all others, that he should act in a manner directly contrary from those who now govern individual states. Yes, for so it is, my friend ;—if you find the life of those appointed to official stations superior to the dignity of their office, then your state may possibly be well settled ; as in that alone will the really wealthy govern,—not those rich in gold, but as happy men should be rich, in a life of virtue and good sense ;—whereas, should they be poor, and destitute of property of their own, and then come into public life, thinking that they ought to plunder the public of its property, it is not possible [that such a state can be rightly settled] :—for as the contest is about the possession of the ruling power, such a war being domestic and intestine, is destructive to themselves as well as the rest of the state. Most true, he replied. Do you conceive then that any other kind of life despises political offices except that of true philosophy ? No, by Zeus, said he. But still it is fitting, at least, that those should enter upon it who are not fond of governing, otherwise the rivals will fight about it. Of course, it cannot be otherwise. Whom else, then, would you compel to enter on the guardianship of a state, except such as are most intelligent in what concerns the best establishment of a state, and possess other honours, and a mode of life superior to that of a mere politician ? None other, he replied.

CHAP. VI.—Do you wish, then, that we should now consider

this,—in what manner such persons will be produced and how any one can draw them upward into light, just as some are said to have ascended from Hades to the gods? Of course that is my wish, he replied. This then, as it seems, is not a mere turning of a die,* but a movement of the soul, which ascends from some half-night kind of day to the true light of existence, which we will term true philosophy. Certainly. Ought we not, then, to inquire what branch of learning possesses this influence? Of course. What then, Glaucon, may that training of the soul be, which draws it from what is generated and unstable towards that which has a positive existence? And talking of this, I am reminded:—did we not say that it is necessary for these persons even while young to engage in warlike exercises? We did say so. We should add this, then, to the training which we are now seeking. What is that? That of not being useless to military men. Aye, we must indeed, said he, if it be possible. Moreover, in our former discourse, we somewhere said we would have them taught gymnastics and music. We did so, said he. The art of gymnastics has to do, I think, with what is unstable and perishable; for it presides over corporeal growth and decrease. It appears so. This then cannot be the branch of study, of which we are in pursuit. It cannot. Is it music then, such as we have previously described? That, said he, if you remember, corresponded to gymnastics, as it trains the habits of the guardians, giving them a sort of concord founded on harmony—not science,—and good rhythm on the principles of rhythm, and other things in discourses which are akin to these both in such as are fabulous and such as more resemble truth; but as to its being a branch of science that refers to a good such as you are now investigating, music had no such character. Most correctly, said I, do you remind me; for it is in reality no such thing: but, excellent Glaucon, what branch of science is it, that possesses this character?—for all the arts somehow seem to be mechanical and illiberal. Of course;—and moreover what other branch of science is there, that is distinct from music, gymnastics, and the

* This alludes to a game of chance,—*ἡ δοσρακίνδα*, fully described in the Onomast. of Pollux, lib. ix. ch. 7 § 110—112.

arts? Come, said I, if we cannot conceive any except these, let us take one of those which extends over all. Of what kind is that? Such as this common idea which all arts, and intellects, and sciences employ, and which every person must learn at the outset. What is that? said he. This trifling matter, said I;—how to distinguish one, and two, and three, which I call in general terms arithmetic and computation:—is it not thus as regards these, that every art and science must necessarily have a share in these? Surely, he replied. Must not then the art of war? said I. Necessarily, he replied. What a ridiculous general then, said I, does Palamedes in his tragedies constantly represent Agamemnon to be.*—And have you not observed how he says, that after inventing numeration he adjusted the ranks at Ilium, and numbered the ships and the rest of the forces, as if they had never been numbered before, even when Agamemnon, as it seems, did not know how many feet he had, since he did not know how to count;—what kind of a general would you think him to be? I should think him a mighty absurd one, he replied, if this be true.

CHAP. VII.—Shall we not say, then, said I, that the power of computing and reckoning is a necessary attainment for a military man? Most certainly, he replied, if he intends to understand anything at all about marshalling troops,—or rather, if he means to be a man. Do you then understand, said I, about this branch of learning just what I do? What is that? It seems in its nature to be among the number of those things which lead to pure reason—of which indeed we are in search; but no one seems rightly to employ it, as evidently leading the mind to the consideration of true being. How say you? inquired he. I will at least, try, said I, to explain what is my opinion.—As to what I distinguish in my own mind as leading or not leading whither we are saying, [viz., to true being,] do you assist me in contemplating them, and either agree or dissent, so that we may more distinctly see whether they be such as I conjecture. Pray show me, said he. I will show you then, said I, if you will observe that some things relating to the perceptions do

* This passage refers, no doubt, to some one or more lost tragedies in which Palamedes is made to accuse Agamemnon of an utter ignorance of arithmetic.

not invite intellect to the inquiry, as being sufficiently determined by perception; while there are other things which by all means bid its interference, as perception alone does nothing correct. You are evidently speaking, said he, of objects seen at a distance, and things sketched in a picture. You have not quite comprehended my meaning, said I. What are you speaking of then? asked he. There are some things, replied I, which do not appeal [to the intellect], and yet do not issue at once into a contrary perception; while those that do so issue I consider as so appealing, when the perceptive faculty takes cognizance of one thing more than another, on meeting it either near or afar off.—And you will thus more clearly know what I mean: these we say are three fingers, the little finger, the next to it, and the middle finger. Just so, observed he. Consider me then to speak of them as seen only from a short distance, and consider this also, respecting them. What? Each of them appears equally to be a finger, and so far it makes no difference whether one looks at the middle one or the last, whether it be white or black, thick or slender, or anything of the kind; for in all these the soul of man is not compelled to ask the intellect what of many things a finger is,* for sight itself never at the same time indicates a finger to be a finger, and its contrary. Of course not, replied he. It is probable, then, said I, that such a case as this would neither appeal to nor rouse the intellect. Probably. But what then;—does the sight sufficiently distinguish their large or small size, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them be placed in the middle or at the end?—And so in like manner does the sense of touch take cognizance of thickness and slenderness, softness and hardness?—And as for the other perceptions, are they not defective in showing such things, or rather does not each of them so act; and first of all, is not the sense which is affected by hardness necessarily also affected by softness, and does it not, when it perceives this, announce to the soul, that hard and soft are one and the same thing? Just so, he replied. It must necessa-

* Gr. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἐπέρεσθαι τί ποτ' ἔστι δάκτυλος. The words τῶν πολλῶν are usually taken with τί ποτε, as above translated. Schleiermacher, however, takes it with ἡ ψυχῇ, the souls of people generally. Ast thinks the words an interpolation.

rily follow then, said I, that in such matters, the soul will be in doubt as to what the perception indicates as hard, since it calls the same thing soft also ;—and so also as regards the sense referring to light and heavy, the soul must be in doubt what is light and what is heavy, if the sense intimates heavy to be light, and light heavy? These at least, said he, are truly absurd reports made to the soul, and require investigation. Probably then, said I, in such cases as these the soul would first call in reason and intelligence to investigate the question whether the things reported be one or whether they be two. Of course. If then they appeared to be two, each of them will appear to be one and distinct from the other? Yes. If then each of them be one and both of them two, he will understand them to be two distinct; for, were they not distinct, he would not perceive two, but only one. Right. The sight, moreover, we say, could contemplate what is great and small, though not as distinct from each other, but as somewhat confused :—could it not? Yes. But for the sake of clearness in this matter, the intellect is once more obliged to consider great and small, not as confused, but as distinct in an opposite way from the other,—viz., the sense of sight. True. And is it not hence, somehow, that it first sets on questioning us, as to what is the great and what is the small? Assuredly. And thus then we call the one intelligible, and the other visible. Very right, he replied.

CHAP. VIII.—This then is what I just now attempted to express, that some things appeal to the intellect and others not; defining those that make such an appeal, as what affect the senses at the same time as their opposites, while such as do not, do not excite the intellect. I quite understand now, said he; and I am of the same opinion. What then;—to which of them, think you, do number and unity belong? I do not understand, replied he. But let us reason by analogy, said I, from what we have already said :—for if unity can be sufficiently seen of itself, or comprehended by any other sense, it still would not lead to true being, just as we remarked about the finger :—but if there be always seen at the same time an exact opposite thereto, so that it shall no more appear unity than it does the contrary, some one would then be wanted to judge respecting it; and in that very matter the soul would necessarily be in difficulty,

exciting reflection within itself, and would inquire into the nature of this same unity, and thus that branch of science which concerns unity would be among those which lead and turn the soul to the contemplation of real being. Ah, said he;—this is what the very sight of it does in no small degree; for we at once behold the same thing, both as one and as an infinite multitude. If then, said I, unity be thus affected, will not number generally be so likewise? Of course. Yet, again, all computation and arithmetic concern number? Quite so. But these at least seem to lead towards truth? Especially so, of course. They belong then, it seems, to the branches of learning which we are now investigating;—for a military man must necessarily learn them with a view to the marshalling of his troops, and so must a philosopher with the view of understanding real being, after having emerged from the unstable condition of becoming, or else he can never become an apt reasoner. That is the fact, he replied. But that guardian of ours happens to be both a military man and a philosopher? Unquestionably so. It would be proper then, Glaucon, to lay down laws for this branch of science and persuade those about to engage in the most important state-matters to apply themselves to computation, and study it, not in the common vulgar fashion, but with the view of arriving at the contemplation of the nature of numbers by the intellect itself,—not for the sake of buying and selling as anxious merchants and retailers, but for war also, and that the soul may acquire a facility of turning itself from what is in course of generation to truth and real being. A capital remark, he replied. And, moreover, I now observe, said I, respecting that branch of science which concerns computation, how refined it is, and in many ways useful to us as respects our wishes, if we will apply thereto for the sake of getting knowledge, and not with a view of traffic. In what way? inquired he. Just what we now said,—that it powerfully leads the soul upwards, and compels it to reason on abstract numbers, without in any way allowing a person in his reasoning to advance numbers which are visible and tangible bodies;*—for perhaps you know of some persons

* *Abstract*, ideal numbers, Plato terms αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί; and these only are the subject of scientific calculation. The *concrete* numbers (ἀριθμοὶ σώματα ἔχοντες) are the subjects only of every-day practical

skilled in these matters, who, if one were in argument to attempt dividing unity itself, would at once both ridicule him and not allow it; though, were *you* to divide it into parts, they would multiply them, lest unity should somehow seem not to be unity, but numerous parts. A very true remark, he replied. What think you then, Glaucon, if a person should ask them—You wonderfully clever men, about what kind of numbers are you reasoning;—in which unity, such as you deem it, is equal, each whole to the whole, without any difference whatever, and having no parts in itself?—what think you they would reply? This, as far as I think;—that they speak of such numbers only—as can be comprehended by the intellect alone, but in no other way. You see then, my friend, I observed, that our real need of this branch of science, is probably because it seems to compel the soul to use pure intelligence in the search after pure truth. Aye, remarked he, it does this to a remarkable extent. Have you yet considered this,—that persons naturally skilled in computation seem clever in all branches of science,—whereas those naturally slow, if instructed and exercised in this, will yet all of them, if they derive no other advantage, make such progress, as to become cleverer than they were before? Exactly so, he replied. And, moreover, I think you will not easily find that many things give the learner and student more trouble than this. Of course not. On all these accounts, then, we must not omit this branch of science, but those with the best of talents should be instructed therein? I agree with you, he replied.

CHAP. IX.—Let this one thing then, said I, [that has just been discussed,] be settled between us; and now let us consider, in the second place, with respect to what follows from it,—whether and how far it concerns ourselves. What is it, said he;—is it geometry you mean? That very thing, said I. So far, observed he, as it bears a relation to the concerns of war, it evidently does concern us;—for in pitching encampments, occupying positions, contracting and extending a line of troops, and as respects all the varied forms in which they draw up armies, either in battle itself or during a march, it would make a vast difference, whether a

enumeration and computation. The monad is the idea of unity, abstract, indivisible unity (*αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν*), the duad of abstract duality, &c.

general were a geometrician or not. Of course, rejoined I, for such purposes as these a very slender knowledge of geometry, and a small portion of arithmetic would suffice;—but as for any considerable amount thereof, and great progress in it, we must inquire how far they tend to this,—namely, to make us apprehend more easily the idea of the good:—and we say that all things contribute thereto, which compel the soul to turn itself to that region in which is the happiest portion of true being, which it must by all means perceive. Your remark is correct, said he. If then it compels the soul to contemplate true being, it is suitable,—but if only what is sensible and evanescent, it is not suitable. Aye, truly, we say so. This point then, at least, said I, those who have but little acquaintance with geometry, will not argue with us,—that this science has an entirely opposite nature to the words employed in it by those who practise it. How? said he. They speak somehow most absurdly, and necessarily so, since all the terms they use seem to be with a view to operation and practice,*—such as squaring, producing, adding, and such-like sounds; whereas on the other hand, the whole science should be studied for the sake of real knowledge. Assuredly, said he. Is this, then, further to be agreed on? What? That [it be studied] with a view to the knowledge of eternal being, and not of that which is subject to generation and destruction? We may well grant that, said he; for it is the business of geometry to concern itself with eternal being. It would have a tendency, therefore, gentle sir, to draw the soul to truth, and to cause a philosophic intelligence to direct upwards [the thoughts] which we now improperly cast downwards. As much as possible, he replied. As far as possible, then, said I, we must give special orders, that the inhabitants of that fine state† of yours should by no means omit the study of geometry, since even its by-works are not inconsiderable. What are they? inquired he. Those which you have just mentioned that concern war;—and indeed with reference to

* Gr. ὡς πράττοντες τε καὶ πραξέως ἔνεκα.

† The use of the ironical compound καλλίπολις gives a force and beauty to the passage which is wholly lost in translation. It is the reading, too, of all the best MSS., and altogether preferable to the old reading.—ἐν τῇ καλλίστῃ πόλει σου.

all branches of science, for the better understanding thereof, we are some how sure that it makes an entire difference every way, whether a man be acquainted with geometry or not. Every way, indeed, by Zeus, observed he. Let us fix on this then, as the second branch of learning for youth. Let us so fix it, he replied.

CHAP. X.—But what ; shall we fix upon astronomy, as the third, or think you otherwise ? I quite think we should, said he ; for to have unusually acute perceptions respecting the times of months and years, is suitable not only for agriculture and navigation, but not less so for the art of war. You are jesting, said I, when you seem to be afraid that the multitude will charge you with enjoining useless objects of study :—yet it is not altogether a trifle, but rather difficult to persuade that by these branches of study some organ of the soul in each individual, is purified and rekindled like fire, after having been destroyed and blinded by other kinds of study,—an organ, indeed, better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since by that alone can truth be seen. Among such, then, as join me in this opinion, you will have the reputation of reasoning admirably well ; though such as never had any perception of this will think perhaps that you say nothing to the purpose, as they see no advantage therefrom accruing that is worthy of notice. Consider, then, from this point, against which of the parties you are arguing,—or whether against neither, but chiefly for your own sake you are carrying on the discussion ; moreover, do not envy any other, if therefrom any one could derive any possible advantage. Thus, said he, do I choose, on my own account chiefly, to argue and ask questions, and make replies. Let us go a little back then, in our argument, for just now, indeed, we did not rightly take what is next in order after geometry. How then did we act ? asked he. After a plain surface, said I, we took a solid in a state of revolution, without first considering it by itself, in the abstract ; but the correct plan is to take the third in order, after the second dimension :—and this, probably, refers to the dimension of cubes, and what has to do with depth. Aye, it is so, said he : but these matters, Socrates, do not seem yet to have been investigated. Aye, there are two causes for this : because no state holds them in honour, they are only slightly investigated, as being difficult ; and those that do so

investigate them require a guide, without whom they cannot discover them,—one whom, first of all, it would be hard to get, and, when he is got, as things are at present, the investigators of these matters having lofty notions of themselves, would not obey him; whereas, if the whole state were to hold such pursuits in honour, and superintend them, these persons would be obedient, and the investigations being conducted with assiduity and vigour, would exhibit their true character; whereas now, despised and mutilated by the multitude, as well as by those who study them without being able to account for their usefulness, they still, in spite of all things, increase through their native grace; and it is no wonder that they should appear so to do. Aye, indeed, said he, this gracefulness is especially remarkable; but tell me more plainly what you were just now saying,—for you somehow defined geometry to be a study that concerns plane surfaces. I did, said I. Then next in order you mentioned astronomy; but afterwards you drew back. Yes, replied I, because when I am in a hurry to get quickly over the discussion, I get on the more slowly; for as regards the mode of measuring depth, which is next in order, that I passed over, as a hopeless investigation, and proceeded, after geometry, to speak about astronomy, which is the motion of solids. You say rightly, observed he. Let us fix on astronomy then, said he, as a fourth branch of science; as if that which we now omit, [*viz.* solid geometry,] may have an existence, whenever the state enters on that pursuit. Probably, said he: and as to what you just now urged on me, Socrates, about astronomy, as having needlessly praised it, I now praise it in accordance with your notions: for I think it is clear to every one, that it is this which compels the soul to look upwards, and from what is here conducts it thither. Perhaps, rejoined I, it may be clear to all except myself;—to me it does not seem so. Ah! how is that? said he. As those who introduce it into philosophy, nowadays pursue it, it makes the soul look altogether downwards. How say you? inquired he. I am of opinion, replied I, that you are not ungenerous in forming your mental estimate of the real nature of that branch of science which concerns things above; for you seem to be of opinion, that if a person were to look up and discover some of the heavenly bodies in an enclosed space, he would contemplate them with his in-

telleet and not his eyes. Perhaps, then, you judge rightly, and I am wrong; though I, on the other hand, cannot hold the opinion that any other branch of science can make the soul look upwards, except that which concerns real being and the invisible,—whether one were to gape upwards, or try by peering downwards to get acquainted with those matters:—and if any one were to gape upwards and so try to get acquainted with any perceptible object, I think that he never would get acquainted with it; as his soul has no scientific knowledge of such things,—nor would his soul look upwards, but downwards,—even though he were to try to learn, swimming on his back at sea or lying so on the ground.

CHAP. XI.—I am punished, rejoined he;—for you have rightly reproved me:—but in what manner did you say we ought to learn astronomy different from that in which they now teach it, if people are to be taught advantageously for the purposes of which we now speak? Thus, said I:—these various bright bodies in the heaven,—since indeed they are so variously placed in visible space,—ought to be deemed very beautiful and most perfect in their kind, though much inferior to the true magnificence of movement, with which real velocity and real retardation mutually bear along those bodies with all that belongs to them, in their true number and in all their true shapes; *—which things, indeed, can be apprehended only by reason and intelligence, not by sight:—do you think they can? By no means, said he. Must we not then, said I, use the various heavenly phenomena, as an exhibition for the purpose of instructing us in those [real] concerns,—just as one might meet with sketches, capitally well drawn and elaborated by Dædalus, or some other artist or painter?—For one skilled in geometry, on seeing such drawings, would, perhaps, think them to be exceedingly well wrought, and nevertheless deem it absurd to give them a serious consideration,—as if he were thence to get his conception of truth about equals, or doubles, or any other proportion,

* Gr. τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ὥς τὸ ὄν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὐσα βραδυτῆς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθεῖσι σχήμασι φορές τε πρὸς ἀλλήλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόητα φέρι. The passage is evidently corrupt,—and, as it now stands, is almost incapable of translation. That given above closely resembles that given by Victor Cousin, a far better one than Schleiermacher's.

Of course, it would be absurd, he replied. And think you not then, that the true astronomer will feel just the same, when he looks up to the orbits of the stars,—reckoning, indeed, that the heavens and all in them are established by the heavenly architect in the most beautiful manner possible for the formation of such works; and would not one deem it absurd of a man to conceive that this proportion of night with day, and of both these to a month, and of a month to a year, and of other stars to both of these, and towards each other has existed always in the same manner, and without experiencing any change, because they have a body, and are visible, and so to take all possible means to apprehend the truth of these things? So I think, he replied, whilst I listen to you. Let us then, said I, make use of problems, [or hypotheses,] in astronomy, as in geometry, and dismiss the heavenly bodies,—if we intend really to get acquainted with astronomy, and render useful instead of useless that portion of the soul which is naturally intelligent. You really impose, said he, a far harder task on astronomers than is enjoined them at present. I think, however, replied I, that we must enjoin other duties likewise, according to the same fashion, if we would be of any service as lawgivers.

CHAP. XII.—But have you anything to suggest about the fitting branches of study? I have not, he replied,—at present at least. Motion, moreover, said I, affords us, I think, not one indeed, but many species thereof;—all of which any wise man can probably tell; but those which occur to me are two. What are they? In addition to this, said I, there is its counterpart. Which? As the eyes, said I, seem formed for studying astronomy, so do the ears seem formed for harmonious motions; and these seem to be twin sciences to one another, as also the Pythagoreans* say; and we too, Glaucon, agree with them:—how shall we do? Just so, replied he. Shall we not, then, said I, since it is a matter of high importance, inquire of them how they speak concerning them, and whether they have anything else to say besides this; but we,

* It is here alleged that there are two species of motion (*φωδι*),—one affecting the eyes, and including the motion of the heavenly bodies, which are the subject-matter of astronomical science,—the other affecting the ears, and comprising that harmony of the heavenly motions which the Pythagoreans conceived to have given the first notion of music.

notwithstanding all this, shall defend our own conclusion? What is that? That those whom we educate should never attempt to learn these things imperfectly, nor without always aiming at the object, to which all ought to be directed,—as we just stated with reference to astronomy:—and do not you know that they do some such thing with regard to harmonics?—for, while they measure one with another the symphonies and sounds which are heard, they go through a fruitless toil, like the astronomers. Aye, by the gods, said he,—and absurdly too, when they make very frequent trials of the notes, lending their ears to catch the sound as from a neighbour's voice,—some indeed saying that they hear some middle note, with the smallest appreciable interval, and others again doubtfully saying that the notes are just what were sounded before,—both parties placing the ears above the intellect. But you are now speaking, said I, of those thrifty, money-making musicians, who are ever harassing and tormenting their strings, turning them on the pegs:—but, that the comparison may not be too tedious, I refrain from speaking of their complaints about the refusal and stubbornness of the strings, and at once give up the simile, saying that we do not mean to speak of these, but of those true musicians whom we before mentioned:—for these do here just what the others did in astronomy; for they search for numbers, in the symphonies which they hear, but do not go on to the inquiry proposed,—what numbers are symphonious, what not, and the reason why they are either the one or the other. You speak, said he, of a noble undertaking. It is serviceable, of course, said I, in the search for the beautiful and good,—but, if pursued in another manner, it is quite useless. Aye, probably so, said he. Still, methinks, said I, the plan of inquiry into all these matters that we have described, if it touches on their mutual communion and alliance, and proves how they are mutually related, will contribute something to what we require, and our labour will not be fruitless; but otherwise it will. I likewise, said he, guess the very same thing:—but you are speaking, Socrates, of a most laborious undertaking. Mean you the introduction, or what else? said I:—what,—know we not, that all these things are introductory to the strain itself;* which

* Glaucon is here complaining of the difficulty of the task proposed;

we ought to learn?—for even persons clever in these things you perhaps do not think skilled in dialectics. No, by Zeus, said he, only some very few of such as I have met. But supposing some of them not able, said I, to offer and admit reasoning, will they ever be able to get acquainted with what we say they ought to know? They will never be able to do this, he replied. Is not this then the very strain, Glaucon, said I, which dialectic science executes,—which also, being cognizable by the intellect, may be said to be imitated by the power of sight,—which faculty seeks, first, as we observed, to gaze at animals, then at the stars, and last of all at the sun himself:—so when a man attempts to discuss a subject without the aid of his perceptive faculties, he is impelled by reason to what is individual and real being; and if he stops not, till he apprehends by intelligence what is the good itself, then, indeed, he arrives at the end of the intelligible, as the other does at the end of the visible. Assuredly, he replied. What then;—do not you call this the dialectic process? What else?

CHAP. XIII.—And now, said I, [to revert to our former simile of the man in the cave,] there is his liberation from chains, his turning from shadows towards the images and the light, and his ascent from the underground cavern to the sun,—and when there, his looking at images in water, owing to a want of power at first of beholding animals and plants, and the sun itself;—so also here [in the intellectual world] you have the contemplation of divine phantasms, and the shadows of real beings, and not the shadows of images shadowed out by another similar light, as by the sun.*—All this exercise in the arts which we have discussed has this tendency, —namely, to lead back again the best part of the soul to the contemplation of what is best in existing beings; as in the former case, what is brightest in the body is led to what is most splendid in bodily and visible existence. I admit these things, said he; though it really seems to me extremely difficult to admit them, though in other respects difficult not to

and Socrates replies, that is a mere introduction or prelude to the main composition or piece of music (meaning dialectics) that is to follow. The word *νόμος* often means *a strain or piece of music*.

* This is a passage, the difficulties of which have caused much discussion. The above translation seems on the whole the best; but the reader can consult the conjectures of Ast and others in Stallbaum's long note on the passage.

admit them. However, granting what has been asserted (for we shall not only now hear these things, but often again discuss them), let us proceed to and discuss the strain itself, as we have finished the introduction. Say, then, of what kind is the power of dialectic,—into what species is it divided,—and what are the paths leading to it;—for these probably conduct us to that place, which we shall find a resting-place, and the end of our journey. You will not as yet, dear Glaucon, said I, be able to follow:—had you been so, no zeal would be wanting on my part; nor should you any longer only see the image of what we are now speaking about, but the truth itself, or what to me seems so. Whether it be so really or not, however, it is not proper positively to affirm; but that it is somewhat of this kind may be most strongly affirmed:—may it not? Of course. And further, that it is the power of dialectics alone, which can discover this to a person skilled in what we have discussed, and that it can be done by no other power. This also, said he, we may positively affirm. This statement at least no one, said I, will dispute with us,—that no other method can attempt to ascertain through a regular process the nature of each particular being; for all other arts respect either the opinions and desires of men, or generations and compositions, or are employed wholly in the study of what is generated and compounded:—but as for those others, which we alleged to have some relation to being, as geometry, and its dependent sciences, we behold them, as if dreaming indeed about real existence, it being impossible to have a true vision, so long as they employ hypotheses and keep them immovable, without the power of accounting for their existence:—for where the starting-point is the unknown, and the conclusion and intermediate steps are connected with that unknown principle, how can any such kind of assent ever possibly become science? By no means, replied he. Is it not then the dialectic method only, said I, that proceeds thus onwards,—removing all hypotheses back to the starting-point, that it may become firmly established, and so gradually draw and lead upward the eye of the soul, which was truly buried in a certain barbaric mire, by the aid and guidance of those arts we have mentioned, which through custom we frequently call sciences, but which require another name clearer indeed than opinion, but more obscure than science? We have somewhere

in the former part of our discourse termed it reflection, or reasoning. But the controversy is not, as it appears to me, about a mere name, when people are investigating things of such great importance as those now before us. It is not, said he.

CHAP. XIV.—You are pleased, then, said I, as formerly, to call the first part science, the second reflection, the third faith, the fourth conjecture,—both these last being opinion, and the two former intelligence;—and that opinion is employed also about generation, and intelligence about true being;—likewise, that true being bears to generation the same relation as intelligence to opinion, science to faith, and reflection to conjecture;—but as for the analogy of the things which these powers respect, and the twofold division of each,—viz., into the objects of opinion, and those of intellect, these we omit, Glaucon, that we may not be more prolix here than in our former discussions. As for me, said he, as regards those other things, so far as I can comprehend, I am of the same opinion. But do not you call that man skilled in dialectics, who apprehends the reason of the essence of each particular?—and as for the man who is unable to give a reason to himself, and to another, so far as regards this inability, will you not so far say he wants intelligence of the thing? Of course I shall, he replied. And is not the case the same with reference to *the good*?—whoever cannot logically define it, abstracting the idea of *the good* from all others, and taking as in a fight one opposing argument after another, and cannot proceed with unfailing proofs, eager to rest his case, not on the ground of opinion, but of true being,—such an one knows nothing of *the good itself*, nor of any good whatever: and should he have attained to any knowledge of *the good*, we must say he has attained it by opinion, not science; that he is sleeping, and dreaming away his present life; and before he is roused, will descend to Hades, and there be profoundly and perfectly laid asleep. By Zeus, said he, I will certainly affirm all these things. But surely, methinks, you will not allow those children of yours, whom you are ideally training and educating,—if ever in fact you should educate them,—to have the supreme government of the most important affairs in the state, while they are void of reason, as letters of the alphabet? By no means, he replied. You will lay this down then as a law:

that they shall most especially get that amount of education which may enable them to question and answer in the most scientific manner. I will make that a law, said he, by your assistance at least. Are you of opinion then, said I, that dialectic science is to be placed on high as a bulwark to moral training, and that no other training can with propriety be more elevated than this, but that this is the completion of scientific training? I am, said he.

CHAP. XV.—There now remains for you, said I, the regulation of the persons to whom we shall assign these studies, and after what manner. That is evident, said he. Do you remember then, in our former election of rulers, what kind we chose? Of course I do, said he. As to other things then, conceive, said I, that those dispositions should be selected, and that we should prefer the bravest, most resolute, and, as far as possible, the most handsome; and besides, we must not only seek for those whose manners are noble and grave,* but such as have dispositions adapted to this education. What dispositions do you enjoy? They must have, said I, my excellent friend, acuteness as respects instruction, that they may learn without difficulty; for souls are much more daunted by severe mental studies, than by strenuous bodily exercise; for the employment which is most familiar to them is of a peculiar nature, having no connexion with the body. True, said he. And we must seek for one of good memory, hardy, and in every way fond of toil:—or how think you any one would willingly endure bodily fatigue, and at the same time accomplish such learning and study? No one, said he, unless he be in all respects of a naturally good disposition. The mistake then about philosophy, and the dishonour done to it, have been occasioned by this, as I formerly said, that it is not studied in a way suitable to its dignity: for it ought not to have been attempted by bastards, but the well-born. How? said he. In the first place, he who is to apply to philosophy, said I, must not be lame in his love of labour, half-laborious, and half-averse to it; and this is the case, when a man is fond of wrestling and hunting, and all bodily exercises, but has no fondness for learning, or hearing instruction or

* Gr. γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἦθη. The word βλοσυρός usually means stern, scowling, fierce; but also grave, serious, as here.

making investigations, but in all these respects has an aversion to labour.—He too is lame, though in an opposite manner from the man who has wrongly employed his love of labour. You say most truly, replied he. And shall we not, said I, in like manner account that soul lame as to truth, which, though it hates a voluntary falsehood and is troubled by it, and is vastly indignant when others tell a lie, yet easily admits the involuntary lie, and if at any time it be found ignorant, is not displeased, but like a savage sow willingly wallows in ignorance? Assuredly, said he. And in like manner, said I, as to temperance and fortitude, and magnanimity, and all other branches of virtue, we must no less carefully attend to what is bastardly, and what is well-born; for when either private persons or a state understand not how to attend to all these things, they unwarily employ the lame and the bastardly for whatever they want,—private persons employing them as friends, and states as governors. Such is exactly the case, said he. But we must be on our guard, said I, about all such things; so that if we select for such extensive discipline such as are entire in body and mind, and take care to instruct them in suitable exercises, justice herself will not blame us, and we shall preserve both the state and constitution; but if we introduce persons of a different description into these affairs, we shall do everything the reverse, and pour still greater contempt on philosophy. That indeed were shameful, said he. Certainly, said I. But I myself seem at present to be somewhat ridiculous. How so? said he. I forgot, said I, that we were amusing ourselves, and I spoke with too great keenness; for, while speaking, I was referring to philosophy; and seeing her most unworthily abused, I seem to have been filled with indignation, and, through rage, as it were, with those who are the cause of it, to have said what I did somewhat too earnestly. No truly, said he, not for me as a listener at least. Aye, but for me, said I, who said it:—but let us not forget this, that in our former election we made choice of old men, which in this will not be allowed;—for we must not believe Solon, that a man in years can learn many things, far less even than running, but that all the most important and numerous kinds of toil are assigned to the young. Of necessity, said he.

CHAP. XVI.—Everything then relating to arithmetic and

geometry and all the previous instruction which they should receive before they learn dialectics, ought to be set before them while they are children, and on such a plan of teaching that they may learn without compulsion.* Why so? Because, said I, a free man ought to acquire no learning under slavery: for the labours of the body when endured through compulsion do not at all deteriorate the body: but as for the soul, it can endure no compulsory discipline. True, said he. Do not then, said I, my best of friends, force boys to their learning; but train them up by amusements, that you may be better able to discern the direction of each one's genius. What you say, replied he, is reasonable. Do not you remember our stating then, said I, that the boys should even be carried to war, as spectators, on horseback, and be brought as near as possible with safety, and allowed like young hounds, to taste the blood? I remember, said he. Whoever then, said I, shall appear the most forward in all these labours, studies, and dangers, such as these are to be selected to a certain number. At what age? said he. When they have finished their necessary exercises, said I; for this period of life, even should it last two or three years, cannot accomplish anything else; for fatigue and sleep are hostile to learning; and this too is none of the least of their trials, what each will prove himself in his exercises. Certainly, said he. And after this period, said I, such as have formerly been selected of the age of twenty are to receive greater honours than others; and those studies, which in their youth they have pursued promiscuously, must be brought before them in one view, that they may see the connexion of the whole with each other, and with the nature of real being. This indeed is the only kind of instruction that will abide permanently in those in whom it is engendered. And this, said I, is the best criterion for distinguishing talents naturally fitted for dialectics, from those which are not so. He who perceives this alliance is skilled in dialectics; he who does not, is not so. I am of the same opinion, said he. You will need then, said I, after observing these things, and seeing who are most distinguished herein, and who persevere both in learning and in

* So Quinctilian in his *Institutes*, lib. i. c. 1, 20:—*Nam id in primis cavere oportebit, ne studia qui amare nondum potest oderit, et amaritudinem semel perceptam etiam ultra rudes annos reformidat.*

war, and in other things established by law, to make choice of them after they exceed thirty years, selecting from those before chosen, and then advance them to greater honours. Observing them likewise by the test of dialectics, in order to ascertain which of them can without aid from the eyes, or any other sense, proceed with truth to being itself. And here, my companion, is a work of great caution. In what principally? said he. Do not you perceive, said I, how great is the evil which at present attends dialectics? What is it, said he, you mean? [Its followers,] observed I, are somehow or other full of disorder. Very much so, replied he. Think you then, said I, that their being so is at all extraordinary; and will you not forgive them? How do you mean? said he. Just as if, said I, a certain supposititious child were brought up in great opulence in a rich and noble family, and amidst many flatterers, and were to perceive, when grown up to manhood, that he is not descended from those alleged to be his parents, but yet cannot discover his real parents; can you guess how such an one would feel both towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, both at the time when he knew nothing of the cheat, and again at the time when he came to perceive it?—are you willing to hear me while I give a guess? I am willing, said he. I guess then, said I, that he will honour his father and mother, and other supposed relatives, more than the flatterers, and that he will neglect them less in case of their need, and be less apt to do or say anything amiss to them, and in matters of consequence will disobey them less than those flatterers, during that period in which he knows not the truth. It is likely, said he. But when he perceives the real state of the case, I again guess, he will relax in honour and respect for them, and attend to the flatterers, and be much more persuaded by them now than formerly, and live also according to their fashion,—while for the father, and the rest of his fictitious relations, if he be not of an entirely good natural disposition, he will have no regard. You mention everything, said he, just as it would happen. But in what manner does this comparison respect those conversant with dialectics? In this:—there are certain doctrines about justice and honour, in which we have been bred, as by parents, from childhood to render them respect and obedience.

There are, said he. Aye,—and there are other pursuits also, the opposite of these, attended by pleasures, that flatter and seduce the soul, but do not persuade those who are in any degree well-mannered; because these honour their relations, and obey them. Such is the case. What then, said I, if to a person thus affected the question be proposed, What is the beautiful? and, in reply to what he has heard from the lawgiver, he be refuted by reason; which frequently and in all ways convicts him and brings him round to the opinion, that objects are no more beautiful than they are deformed; and so also, as respects what is just and good, and whatever else he held in highest esteem, what do you think such an one will after this do, with regard to these things, as to honouring and obeying them? Of necessity, said he, he will no longer either honour or obey them, as he formerly had done. If then, said I, he no longer deems these things honourable, and allied to him as formerly, and cannot discover those which really are so, can he possibly with readiness join himself to any other life than that of flattery? It is not possible, said he. And from being an observer of the law, he will now, I think, appear to be a law-breaker. Of necessity.

CHAP. XVII.—Is it not likely then, said I, that the affections of persons who thus engage in reasoning, are deserving, as I was just now saying, of great consideration? Aye, and pity too, said he. While you take care then, that this pitiable case befall not those of the age of thirty, ought they not by every method to apply themselves to reasoning? Certainly, said he. And is not this one prudent caution,—that they meddle not with discussions while young: for you have not forgotten, I suppose, that youths, when they first join in discussions, abuse them by way of mere amusement, ever using them for the purpose of contradiction; and in imitation of those who are refuters, they themselves oppose others, ever delighting like whelps to drag and tear to pieces, by arguments, those who are their neighbours. Especially so, said he. And after they have confuted many, and been themselves confuted by many, then they vehemently and speedily fall into an indifference about their former opinions; and by these means they themselves, and the whole of philosophy, are calumniated by

the rest of the world. Most true, said he. But he who is of a riper age, said I, will not like to share in such madness, but will imitate him who is disposed to reason and inquire after truth, rather than one who, for the sake of diversion, amuses himself by contradiction; and he will himself be more modest, thus rendering the practice of disputing honourable instead of dishonourable. Right, said he. Have not then all our former remarks been rightly premised, by way of precaution on this point, that those who are to be taught dialectics should have gracious and steady dispositions, and not as now, when every chance person, even when quite unfit, is admitted thereto? Certainly, said he. Is twice the former period then sufficient for a man to be diligently and constantly engaged in acquiring dialectics without doing anything else but practising by way of contrast all bodily exercises? Do you mean six years, said he, or four? No matter, said I;—make it five:—for after this they must be made to descend to that cave again, and obliged to govern both in things relating to war, and in other youthful offices, so as not to fall short of others in experience; and among these they must be still further tested, that it may be seen whether they will continue firm, when drawn in all directions, or be somewhat drawn aside. And how long a time, said he, do you reckon for this? Fifteen years, said I. And when they are of the age of fifty, such of them as have been kept safely, and have in every way obtained all the prizes both in actions and sciences, are now to be led to the end, and are to be obliged to incline the eye of their soul to look at that which imparts light to all things, and, when they contemplate *the good itself*, to use it as a pattern, each in turn, either state or private persons, for adorning themselves, during the remainder of their life, for the most part, indeed, occupying themselves with philosophy, and when it is their turn, toiling in political affairs, and taking the government, each for the good of the state performing this office, not as something honourable, but as a thing necessary; and after bringing up others also from time to time to be of the same character, and leaving them to be state-guardians, they depart to inhabit the islands of the blest:—and the state, will erect monuments for them at the public cost, and if the Pythian goddess consent, will offer sacrifice, as to superior beings,—if not, as to happy and

divine men. Socrates, said he, you have made our governors all-beautiful, just as a sculptor would. And our governesses likewise, Glaucon, said I;—for suppose not that what I have said referred more to men than women,—such at least as have sufficient talent. Right, said he, if at least, as we said, they are to share in all things equally with the men. What then, said I;—do you agree, that with reference to a state and form of government, we have not altogether stated mere wishes,—but such things as though difficult, are yet in a certain respect possible, and not otherwise than has been mentioned,—[that is,] when true philosophers, whether one or more of them, on becoming governors in a state, despise present honours, and deem them illiberal and of no value; but esteem, above all things, rectitude and the honours therefrom derived; account justice as a thing of all others the greatest, and most absolutely necessary; and, by ministering to it and advancing it, thoroughly regulate the constitution of their own state? How? said he. Such, said I, of the more advanced in life, as have lived ten years in the state, let them send all into the country; and, removing their children away from the habits now contracted by domestics, let them bring them up according to their own manners and laws, as we formerly described them:—thus the state and government that we have described being most speedily and easily established, will both be happy itself, and of the greatest service to the people among whom it is established. Very much so indeed, said he;—and you seem to me, Socrates, to have very well described how this state will rise, if it rise at all. Well then, said I, have we not had sufficient talk, both about such a state as this, and the individual that corresponds thereto?—For it is now clear, perhaps, what kind of a man we shall say he ought to be. It is evident, replied he; and your inquiry, methinks, is now at an end.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

BOOK VIII.

ARGUMENT.

The mode of rightly governing a state having been duly set forth, Plato in the *eighth book* treats of the bad government which he had previously designated as *ádúxia*. Having mentioned then three principal forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, he shows in this and also the following book the excesses and defects peculiar to each. He considers these faults in two lights; first, as affecting the manners of *the citizens individually*; and, secondly, those of the state collectively. Aristocracy, says he, is apt to verge into oligarchy,—democracy into ochlarchy, and monarchy into *τυραννία* and tyranny. The two former classes only are treated in this book.

CHAP. I.—Well then, Glaucon, these things have been agreed on, that in a state that is to be perfectly administered the women are to be in common, the children in common, and their education also,—so likewise their employments both in war and peace in common, and their kings the best possible both in philosophy and warfare. It has been so agreed, he replied. And this, moreover, we agreed on, that when the commanders are appointed and leading their soldiers, they should dwell in habitations, such as we have described, containing nothing particularly belonging to any individual, but common to all; and besides these habitations, we agreed also, if you recollect, as to their possessions, to what sort they should be entitled. Aye, I recollect, said he, that we thought them entitled to no possessions whatever, like the other citizens, but that, like military wrestlers and guardians, they should receive the yearly pay of their service in maintenance provided by the rest, and should take care both of themselves and the rest of the state. You say rightly, said I:—but come,—since we have settled these matters, let us recollect from what point we made this digression, in order that we may again take up the same argument. No hard matter, said he;—for you were pursuing much about the same argument respecting the state, as you did just now, when saying that you considered

such a state to be good as you then described, and the individual man also analogous thereto,—and this, too, as it seems, when you were able to define both a better state and a better man. You said, moreover, that all the rest were wrong, if this were right;—and of the other kinds of states you said, I remember, that four were deserving of consideration, with the view of seeing the errors therein and the people thereto corresponding,—in order that by seeing all these and deciding on the best and worst man, we might inquire whether the best be the happiest, and the worst the most wretched or otherwise:—and when I inquired which were the four kinds of states to which you referred, on this Polemarchus and Adimantus interrupted us;* and so now resuming the subject you have arrived at this point. You have recollected it, said I, with great accuracy. Once more then, like a wrestler, furnish me with the same handle; and when I ask the same question, try to say just what you were then about to tell me. Aye, said I, if I can. Moreover, said he, I am anxious also myself to hear what those four kinds of states were. You shall hear that, and welcome, said I:—for, of those which I can mention and which have names,—that praised by the multitude is the Cretan and Lacedæmonian polity,—the second, and that which deserves the second praise, called oligarchy, a polity full of abundant evils,—that which differs from it, and follows next in order, democracy,—and then genuine tyranny, [or monarchy,] differing from all the others, the fourth and last ailment of the state:—surely you have no other form of polity, having a distinct and established species?—for small principalities and purchased kingdoms, and such-like politics as these, are of an intermediate class, and may be found no less among barbarians than Greeks. Aye, indeed, said he;—many are mentioned, and those, too, absurd enough.

CHAP. II.—Do you know, then, said I, that of men there are as many descriptions as of states?—or do you think that states, somehow or other, spring out of an oak or a rock, and not out of the habits of those in the state, whither.

* This refers to the interruption at the beginning of the fifth book, when, Socrates being about to describe the four kinds of wickedness in both individuals and states, was desired to develop his notions about the community of women and children.

indeed, everything else must verge and be attracted? I, for my part, think it is derived from no other source than that. In that case, if there be five kinds of states, the intellectual distinctions of the individuals will be five likewise. Of course. As for the person then, who resembles an aristocracy, we have already described him, and rightly pronounced him to be both good and just. Aye, we have described him. Are we then, in the next place, to argue about the inferior, —the contentious and ambitious man formed according to the Spartan model, and him again, who resembles an oligarchy, or a democracy, or a tyranny, in order that we may contemplate the most unjust, and contrast him with the most just, and thus our inquiry may be complete, how unmingled justice stands in opposition to unmingled injustice, as respects the happiness or misery of its possessor, —thus either pursuing injustice in compliance with Thrasymachus's suggestion, or else justice in compliance with our present argument? We must do so, by all means, said he. Are we then, just as we began, to consider moral habits in states primarily, or rather in private individuals, as being there more clearly developed; and now must we not thus first consider the ambitious republic (for I cannot call it by any other term, but only denominate it a timocracy or a timarchy), and in connexion with it an individual of the same character, —then again an oligarchy and a man of oligarchical character, —and so also, when considering a democracy, must we contemplate a democratic person, —and, fourthly, coming to a state governed by a tyrant, consider a person of tyrannical disposition; —thus trying to become competent judges about what we proposed? According to reason, indeed, such should be both our view and decision.

CHAP. III.—Come then, said I; —let us try to show in what way a timocracy arises out of an aristocracy: —is it not plain, at any rate, that every government changes through the agency of that portion which holds the public offices, whenever sedition arises in that particular part; whereas, if it only agree with itself, however small the state, it cannot possibly be disturbed? Such is the case. How then, Glaucon, said I, will our state be disturbed and how will our allies and rulers fall into quarrels with each other and amongst themselves: —do you wish, like Homer, that we implore the muses to tell us how first sedition rose, and address them in tragic fashion, as

if we were children, playing and jesting, so to speak, with seriousness uttering lofty language? How so? Somehow thus:—it is hard indeed for a state thus constituted to become disturbed;—but, as everything generated is liable to corruption, not even such a constitution as this can abide for ever, but must be dissolved:—and its dissolution is as follows.—Not only as regards terrestrial plants, but likewise terrestrial animals, a fertility and sterility both of soul and body take place, when the revolutions of the heavenly bodies complete the periphery of their respective orbits, which are shorter to the shorter-lived, and contrariwise to the contrary: and with reference to the fertility and sterility of your race, though those are wise whom you have trained as governors of the state, yet they will never, by intellect and sense united, observe the proper season for procreation, but let it slip by, and sometimes generate children when they ought not.—To that, however, which is divinely generated, there is a period which is comprehended by the perfect number; whereas, to that generated by man, there is one, in which the augmentations, both surpassing and surpassed, after having received three separations and four boundaries of things similar and dissimilar, increasing and decreasing, will render all things correspondent and rational;—of which the sesquitercian root, conjoined with the pentad and thrice increased, affords two harmonies,—one of these, the equally equal, just a hundred times as much;—while the other, of equal length indeed, but of oblong shape, is of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of the pentad, each wanting one, two of which are irrational and of a hundred cubes of the triad.—And the whole of this geometric number is, having such an influence, concerned with worse and better generations.* Now, if our governors be ignorant of this, and join our couples together unseasonably, the children will neither possess talent, nor be fortunate either; and though former governors should have placed the best of them in office, nevertheless as they are unworthy of it, and only come into the power which their fathers had, they will begin to neglect us in

* This passage, descriptive of the geometric or fatal number, has baffled the ingenuity of every commentator. Any literal translation is little better than nonsense, and any explanation would be too long for a mere note. The views of Baroccus, Schneider, &c. are given in a dissertation at the end of the volume;—but they are all far from satisfactory.

their guardianship, holding music first of all, and then gymnastics in less esteem than they ought, and hence our young men will become too little disposed to music;—in consequence of which the governors to be appointed from among them will not be very clever guardians, as respects proving, according to Hesiod and ourselves, what are the several species of talents, the golden, the silver, the brazen, and the iron. Where iron, however, mingles with silver, and brass with gold, then there arises a dissimilitude and unharmonious unevenness;—(and when this is the case, wherever it prevails, it perpetually generates war and hatred;)—we must say that sedition belongs to such a race as this, whenever it arises. Aye,—and we shall say that the answer was correctly given, replied he. Aye, and it must be so too, said I—as they are Muses. What then, said he, do the Muses say next? Sedition having once arisen, said I, two classes of genius,—the iron and the brazen, will be allured to gain, and the acquisition of land and houses, gold and silver,—while the golden and silver, not being in poverty but naturally rich, will lead souls to virtue and their original constitution; whereas, should they be violent and strive one against the other, they would agree to divide their lands and houses as individual possessions; and then, enslaving those formerly guarded by them as freemen, friends, and tutors, keep them as denizens and slaves, themselves providing for war and their own protection. This revolution, said he, seems to me to have just this origin. Will not then this government, said I, be a medium between aristocracy and oligarchy? Certainly.

CHAP. IV.—Thus then will the revolution be effected, and when it has taken place, what arrangement will then be made?—Is it not plain, that in some things they will follow the pattern of the former republic, and in others oligarchy, as halfway between the two, and having something also peculiar to itself? Just so, he replied. Will they, then, in honouring their rulers, in allowing their military to abstain from agriculture, as with us from mechanical and other money-making pursuits, in establishing common meals, and in studying both gymnastics and military contests,—in all these things will they not follow the pattern of the last form of government? Yes. But, through the fear of admit-

ting wise men into the magisterial office, inasmuch as the state no longer possesses men who are simple and resolute, but only such as are of a mixed character,—and through an inclination towards the high-spirited and even simple, naturally more suited for war than peace, and also towards those who are clever at tricks and schemes, spending their whole time in continual war;—in all these respects, will it not possess many such things as are peculiar to itself? Yes. And such as these, said I, will ever be lovers of wealth, just like those in oligarchies, and will have a wild though disguised love for gold and silver, as if they possessed treasuries of their own and domestic storehouses in which to hoard and hide them,—and circularly-enclosed houses also,—nests as it were wholly their own, in which they can lose and spend much, together with their own wives and such others as they fancy. Most true, said he. Well then,—will they not from their love of wealth be sparing of it also, though not openly acquiring it, but disposed to squander other people's property through lustful desire and secret indulgence in pleasure;—just as children escaping from parental law, who have been brought up not by persuasion but force, owing to their neglect of the true muse, which unites reasoning and philosophy and the preference also which they give to gymnastics over music? It is quite a mixed government, said he, of which you are now speaking,—compounded of good and ill. Aye, mixed indeed, said I:—but the most remarkable thing in it is what simply arises from the prevalence of high spirit,—contention and ambition. Aye, just so, said he. Such then is the origin and character of this form of government, if one may ideally sketch it without giving a complete description,—though enough for us to see from this sketch,—who is the just and the unjust man; and it were a work of tedious length to argue on all governments and all the various manners of men without any exception whatever. Quite right, said he.

CHAP. V.—What then will the individual be, who corresponds to this form of government;—how did he become so: and what is his nature? I think indeed, said Adimantus, he has a tendency to be like this Glaucon here, as far at least as concerns the love of contention. Perhaps so, said I, as to this particular;—but I think, that in these respects he cannot at

all resemble him. How? He must necessarily, said I, be more self-willed, and somewhat unapt to music, though fond of it; and fond of hearing, but by no means a rhetorician:—such an one will be rough towards the slaves, without despising them, as the man does who is fairly educated. He will be polite towards the free, submissive to governors, a lover of dominion and honour,—not thinking it proper to govern by eloquence or anything of the kind, but by political management and military achievements, being a lover of gymnastics and hunting. This indeed, said he, is the spirit of that form of government. And will not such an one, said I, despise money during his youth, but the older he grows, always value it the more, because he partakes of the covetous disposition, and is not sincerely affected towards virtue, because destitute of the best guardian? Of what guardian? said Adimantus. Reason, said I, accompanied with music, which being the only inbred preservative of virtue, dwells with the possessor through the whole of life. You say well, he replied. And surely the timocratic youth, said I, resembles such a state. Certainly. And such an one, said I, is somehow thus formed.—He may happen perhaps to be the youthful son of a worthy father, dwelling in an ill-governed state, and shunning public honours, magisterial offices, lawsuits, and all such public business, content to live neglected in obscurity, that he may have no trouble. In what manner then, said he, is he formed? First of all, said I, when he hears his mother complaining that her husband is not in magisterial office, and that she is on this account neglected among other women, and then sees that he is not over attentive to the acquisition of wealth, and does not wrangle and quarrel privately and publicly in the law courts, but on all these occasions acts indolently;—and when she perceives him always attentive to himself, and treating her neither with extreme respect nor contempt;—on all these accounts, she is filled with indignation, and tells her son that his father is unmanly, extremely careless, and whatever else wives are wont to chant about such matters. Aye,—many thiugs, truly, said Adimantus, and quite in accordance with their spirit.—And you know, said I, that the domestics likewise of such families, such of them as would be thought good-natured, sometimes say privately the very same to the sons; and if

they see either a debtor whom the father does not sue, or any one otherwise acting unjustly, they exhort him to punish all such persons when he comes to manhood, and to be more of a man than his father.—And when he goes abroad, he hears other such-like things, and sees also that such in the state as attend to their own affairs are called simple, and held in little esteem, while such as do not attend to their affairs are both honoured and commended.—The youth then who hears and sees all this, and then again hears his father's speeches, and closely observes his pursuits in contrast with those of others, is drawn in two opposite directions,—his father irrigating and promoting the growth of his rational part, and the others his passions and high spirit;—and so, being not naturally bad, but spoiled only by evil connexion with others, he is brought to a mean between both and delivers up the government within himself to a middle power,—the love of contention and high spirit:—and so he becomes a haughty and ambitious man. I think, said he, you have quite correctly explained the training of such a person.—We have here then, said I, the second form of government and the second individual. Aye,—we have, said he.

CHAP. VI.—Shall we not then after this say with Æschylus,—

Where state to state,—then each to each incline;—

or rather, shall we, according to our plan, establish the state first? Certainly, he replied. It would be an oligarchy then, methinks, that would succeed such a government as this. But what constitution is it, said he, that you call an oligarchy? That government, said I, which is founded on the estimate of men's property;—in which the rich rule, and the poor have no share in the government. Aye,—I understand, said he. Should we not, first of all explain, how the change is made from a timocracy to an oligarchy? We should. And surely the way, in which this change is made, said I, is manifest even to the blind! How? That treasury, said I, which each one fills with gold destroys such a state; for, first of all, they discover for themselves modes of expense, for which they set aside the laws,—both themselves and their wives disobeying them. Very likely,

said he, and afterwards, I think, when one observes another, and enters into rivalry, the people generally become of this character. It is likely. And thence then, said I, as they advance in the intensity of the desire for acquiring wealth, the more honourable they account this, the more dishonourable will they deem virtue;—for is not virtue so at variance with wealth, that, supposing each to be placed at the opposite end of a balance, they would always weigh the one against the other? Justly so, he replied. While wealth then and the wealthy are honoured in the state, both virtue and good men must necessarily be held in dishonour? It is plain. And what is honoured is always pursued, while what is dishonoured is neglected? Just so. Instead then of being contentious and ambitious men, they have at last become lovers of gain and wealth;—and the rich they praise and admire, elevating them to the magistracy, while the poor man they quite despise. Certainly. And do they not enact laws, marking out the boundary of the oligarchal constitution, and regulating the quantity of oligarchal power by the quantity of wealth,—allotting more to the more wealthy and less to those less so, intimating that he who has not the amount settled by law can have no share in the government;—and do they not settle these matters compulsorily, by force of arms, establishing such a state after previous intimidation?—Is it not thus? Aye, indeed. This then, so to speak, is its constitution? Yes, replied he. What then is the nature of the government, and what are the faults thereto ascribed? First of all, said I, of this very thing, the constitution itself, what think you?—for consider, if a person were thus to appoint pilots of ships, by the amount of their property, never intrusting one of them with a poor man, though better skilled in piloting,—what would then be the consequence? They would make a very bad voyage, he replied. And is it not the same about any other matter, or any presiding office whatever? I think so. Is it always so, except in a state, said I; or is it so as regards a state likewise? There, beyond all others, said he; inasmuch as it is the most difficult, and most important kind of government. Oligarchy then would seem to have this unquestionably very great fault. So it seems. But what;—is this no less a fault? What? That such a state is not integrally one, but

necessarily two; one containing the poor, and the other the rich, dwelling in one place and always plotting against one another. By Zena, said he, not a whit less;—and this besides is a fine thing,—the incapacity of waging war, through the necessity, either of employing the armed multitude, who are to be dreaded more than the enemy themselves, or else refusing to employ them at all, and so appearing quite oligarchical in battle,—being unwilling also to advance money for the public service, through a natural disposition to covetousness? This is not well. What then;—with reference to what we long ago condemned,—engaging in a variety of pursuits, the same persons in such a state giving their attendance all at once to agriculture, money-making, and military affairs; does this seem right? Not at all, of course.

CHAP. VII.—Let us see, then,—does this form of government above all others introduce this greatest of all evils? What is that? The permission to each person of selling the whole of his effects, and to another of purchasing them from him, and the privilege to the seller of dwelling in our state, though he belongs to no one class therein, and can be called neither a money-maker, nor mechanic, nor horseman, nor foot-soldier, but poor and destitute. Yes, above all others, he replied. Such a thing is not prevented in oligarchal governments; for, in that case some of them would not be over-rich, and others altogether poor. Right. But consider this likewise;—when such a rich man as this spends his property, would it do the state any more service, as regards the objects just mentioned; or did he only seem to be one of the magistrates, while in truth he was neither magistrate nor servant to the state, but only a consumer of its substance? Aye,—he did seem so, he replied;—he was nothing but a consumer. Do you desire, then, said I, that we should say of him, that, as a drone in a beehive brings ailment among the whole swarm, just so, such a person as this, like a drone in his house, is the ailment of a state? Quite so, Socrates, he replied. And has not God, Adimantus, made all the winged drones without any sting,—and those that have feet, some without stings, and some with dreadful stings?—And do not those that are without stings continue poor to old age:—whereas those that have stings, are those that we called mischievous? Most

true, said he. It is plain then, said I, that in a state where you would observe poor people, there are doubtless concealed thieves, cutpurses, sacrilegious persons, and workers of all such evils. Evidently so, said he. What then? Do not you find poor people in states that are placed under oligarchal government? Almost all are so, said he, except the governors themselves. And do we not think, said I, that they contain within them many mischievous persons with stings, whom the magistrates must restrain by vigilance and compulsory measures? We do indeed think so, said he. And must we not say, that it is through want of education, bad nurture, and a corrupt constitution of state, that persons of this character are here engendered? Yes we must. Well then, is not the state oligarchally governed when under an oligarchy of this character; and is it not affected by all these evils, and probably more too? It is nearly so, said he. Let us distinguish then this form of government likewise, said I, which they call oligarchy, as one having its governors [elected] according to the valuation of their property.

CHAP. VIII.—Next let us consider the man who is analogous to this [form of government,] how he is formed and what is his character. By all means, said he. Is it not thus then chiefly that the individual man changes from the timocratic to the oligarchic form? How? When such an one has a son, he, first of all, emulates his father, and follows his steps; afterwards, when he sees him suddenly dashed on the state [like a ship] on a rock, squandering his property and ruining himself, either at the head of the army, or in some other high magisterial office,—then falling into the law-courts, ruined by public informers, and either put to death, or exiled, and stripped of his honours and entire property. It is likely, said he. Aye, my friend, and after seeing and suffering this, and losing his property, he instantly, through fear, I think, pushes headlong from the throne within his soul, his ambitious, lofty temper, and at length, humbled by poverty, turns his attention to gain, lives meanly and sparingly, and by hard labour acquires wealth;—do you not think that such a man will seat on that throne in his soul a covetous and money-loving spirit, making it a mighty king within himself, and girding it, as it were, with tiaras, and

bracelets, and sceptres? I think so, said he. But, as for the principles of reason and high spirit, having laid them both at his feet on either side as mere slaves, he forbids the one to reason at all, or at any rate to inquire into aught else, except by what means a smaller amount of property can be made greater; and the other, again, to admire and honour anything but riches and the rich, and to receive honour with any other view than the acquisition of money, or whatever else may tend thereto. There is no change, said he, so sudden and powerful as that of an ambitious to an avaricious man. Is not this, then, said I, the oligarchic man? Aye—the change which he undergoes is from a person who resembles that government from which oligarchy arises. Shall we consider, now, if he does at all resemble it? Let us consider.

CHAP. IX.—Does he not, in the first place, resemble it in valuing money above all things? Of course he does. And he does so surely in being sparing and laborious, satisfying only his necessary desires, and not allowing himself any other expenses, but subduing the other desires as foolish. Certainly. And in being, said I, a sordid kind of man, making gain of everything, intent on hoarding,—one, such as the multitude extols, will not this be the man that resembles such a form of government? Aye, I think so, he replied: wealth at least must be highly valued by the state, as well as by the individual of such a character. Aye,—for I do not think, said I, that such a man has attended to education. I do not think he has, said he; for he would not then have chosen a blind guide for his chorus.* But further still, consider this attentively said I;—must we not say that, owing to his want of education, dronish desires springing in him, some of them beggarly, and some mischievous, forcibly kept under restraint by the rest of his pursuits? Just so, said he. Do you know, then, said I, where you will best observe their wickedness? Where? said he. [By looking] at their tutelage of orphans, or whatever else of this kind comes in their way, so as to give them much power to do injustice. True. Is not this then quite clear, that in all other kinds of contracts, wherever such an

* Allusion is here made to Plutus, the god of riches,—who is usually represented blind. The word χοροῦ, which is the reading of the best MSS., refers to the noisy crowd of desires that hurry a man through life.

one gains approbation, by the mere semblance of justice, he restrains the other wrong desires within him by exercising a certain moderation, not from any persuasion that it is not better to indulge them, nor from sober reason, but from necessity and fear, because he trembles for the remainder of his property? Certainly, said he. Aye, by Zeus, said I, my friend, most of them, when they want to spend the property of others, display passions much akin to those of drones. Yes, exceedingly so, observed he. Such a person as this, then, will not be free from internal discord; nor be integrally one, but a kind of double man; possessing desires, however, that are at variance with one another, the better, usually, governing the worse. It is so. On these accounts, then, such an one, methinks, will present a better appearance than many others; though the true virtue of a harmonized and consistent soul will wholly escape him. Aye, it seems so. And the sparing man, either privately or in the state, will be but a poor rival, as regards any victory or other struggle for honour; because either for reputation's sake, or any such contests, he is unwilling to spend his property, through fear of kindling expensive desires, and calling them into alliance or rivalry;—and warring, as he does, in oligarchic fashion, with only a few of his resources, he is in most cases defeated, though he still contrives to get rich. Quite so, replied he. Can we any longer hesitate, said I, to rank the niggard and the money-maker as resembling a state under an oligarchy? By no means, said he.

CHAP. X.—Democracy, as it seems, must next be considered,—how it arises, and when once arisen, what kind of man it produces;—in order that understanding the nature of such a man, we may at once bring him to trial. Yes, said he;—that would be our consistent course. Well then, said I, is not the change from oligarchy to democracy produced in some such way as this,—through the insatiable desire of the proposed good, viz. the desire of becoming as rich as possible? How? Inasmuch as its governors govern through the possession of great wealth, they will have no wish, methinks, to restrain by law the profligate portion of the young men from squandering and wasting their property at pleasure, because, by purchasing such persons' effects, and lending on usury, they will not only be still more enriched, but held in

higher repute. Far more so than any other. This, then, is already quite clear in our state, that to honour riches, and at the same time practise temperance, is impossible, since either the one or the other must necessarily be neglected. Of course, that is quite plain, said he. While, therefore, they are neglectful in oligarchies, and allow the youths to indulge in licentiousness, they must necessarily sometimes bring men to poverty, even those that are not ignoble. Quite so. And these, I suppose, stand in our state both spurred, and in armour; some in debt, others in disgrace, others in both, hating and conspiring against those who have got what belonged to them, and against others also, for mere love of change. Aye, such is the case. These usurers, however, bent on their own interests, and apparently unobservant of these, wound all that ever yield to them by advancing them money, and so, by getting multiplied interest for the parent principal,* fill the state with many a drone and pauper. Aye, with many a one, he replied. And even when such an evil is raging in the state, said I, they are not willing to extinguish it, not even by restraining people from spending their property at pleasure, nor yet in this way by making another law to destroy such disorders. What law? One that shall follow the other, compelling the citizens to cultivate virtue; for if they were bidden to engage in voluntary contracts chiefly at their own hazard, their usurers would create less scandal in the state, and fewer also of the evils now mentioned would arise therein. Far fewer, said he. At present, however, said I, it is by all these means that the governors in the state thus dispose of the governed; and both as to themselves and those belonging to them, do they not render the youths luxurious and idle as respects all bodily and mental exercises, effeminate in bearing pleasure and pains, and indolent likewise? What else? And as to themselves, they neglect everything but the acquisition of wealth, and pay no more regard to virtue than the poor? No, surely. Having then been thus trained up, when the governors and their subjects are thrown together, either on a journey along the road, or in other meetings, either at public

* The word *πατήρ* is here used to signify the principal sum (*τὸ κεφάλαιον*), from which the interest (*τόκοι* or *τὰ ἔκγονα*) are derived. Comp b. vi. ch. 18, p. 196.

spectacles, or on warlike expeditions, either as fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers, or when they see one another in real dangers, the poor in this case are by no means despised by the rich ;—but very often a robust fellow, poor and sunburnt, whose post in battle is by the side of a rich man bred up in the shade, and swoln with much unnecessary fat,* if he should see him panting for breath and in agony,—think you not, he will consider such persons to grow rich to their own injury, and will say to his fellow, when meeting in private, that our rich men are good for nothing? Of course, I well know, said he, that they do so. Well then, as a diseased body needs but the smallest shock from without to give it pain, and is sometimes thrown into disorder without any interference from without, so also the state that resembles it will, on the smallest occasion from without, either when one party forms an alliance with an oligarchal, or the other with a democratic state, become disordered, and fight with itself, and also rise in revolt without any external interference. Yes, certainly. A democracy then, I think, arises, when the poor prevailing over the rich, kill some, and banish others, and share the state-offices and magistracies equally among the remainder ; and for the most part the magistracies therein are disposed of by lot. Aye, said he, this is the establishment of a democracy, whether it be effected through force of arms, or from the withdrawal of the other party through fear.

CHAP. XI.—In what way then, said I, do these live,—and what will be the character of this government ;—for it is plain, that a man of this kind will appear democratic? It is plain, said he. First, then, are they not free, and is not the state full of freedom of action, and speech, and each one at liberty to do what he pleases? So it is said, he replied. And where there is liberty, every one will evidently regulate his own plan of life just as he pleases? Plainly so. Under such a government especially, methinks, men of all characters will spring up. Of course. This, said I, seems likely to be the best of all governments ;—just as a various-coloured robe, embroidered with flowers of all kinds,—so will this appear best, variegated as it is with all sorts of manners. Of course, said he. And perhaps too, said I, the

* Gr. *πολλάκις ἰσχνὺς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἡλιώμενος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ*
** λουσίῳ ἰστυατροφῇκοι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, &c.*

multitude will reckon this the best, just as children and women looking at embroidered dresses. Very likely, said he. Aye, my excellent friend, here is a state in which we may fitly look for a government. How so? Because it comprises all kinds of government on the score of its liberty; and it seems necessary for one that desires to establish a state, as we are now doing, to come to any democratic state, the form of which he likes, as to a general political fair, and establish that which he has chosen. Aye, said he, he would probably be in no want of models. Is not this, said I, a divine and pleasant kind of life for the present,—that there be no need of governing in this state, even though you be able to do so,—nor yet of being a subject, unless you please,—nor of engaging in war because others do,—nor of keeping peace when others keep it, unless you desire peace;—nor again, though there be a law that restrains you from governing or administering justice, yet you no less shall govern and administer justice, if so disposed? It is likely, said he;—in this particular at least. But what; is not their lenience towards some of those who are condemned very polite; and in such a government did you never yet see its lenity towards men condemned to death or banishment, who nevertheless remain there in open intercourse, the banished man, too, returning like a hero as if no one attended to or observed him? Aye, many, he replied. But this indulgence of the state,—not to mention the small regard, and even contempt which it shows for all that we deemed so important when settling our state, as that, unless a man had a most exalted nature,* he would never become a good man, except he had from childhood upwards delighted in noble actions, and diligently followed all such pursuits;—how magnanimously does it despise and think as naught all these things, evincing an utter disregard as to the kind of pursuits from which a man comes to engage in politics, though it honours him if he only declares himself well affected towards the multitude? How very generous, he rejoined. These then, said I, and others akin to these, are to be found in democracy; and it seems to be a pleasant sort of government, both anarchical and variegated, distributing a certain equality to all alike,

* Gr. *ὑπερβελημένην φύσιν*. Euripides uses a similar expression in the *Alcestis*, v. 155 :—*τί χρη γένεσθαι τὴν ὑπερβελημένην γυναῖκα*.

both equals and unequals. Aye, you say, he replied, what is perfectly well known.

CHAP. XII.—Consider then, said I, what kind of man such an one is in private; or shall we first consider, as we did with respect to the government, in what manner he is formed? Yes, said he. Is he not then formed in this manner,—namely, from the parsimonious man who was under the oligarchy,—as a son, trained up under his father according to his habits? Of course. Such an one forcibly governs his own pleasures,—such as are expensive, but not tending to the acquisition of wealth, which are hence called unnecessary. It is plain, said he. That we may not argue in the dark then, said I, let us first, if you please, determine what desires are necessary, and what are not. Willingly, said he. May not such be justly called necessary, which we cannot get rid of, and the gratification of which does us service? For both these kinds our nature must necessarily seek after; must it not? Quite so. This then, we may justly say, is a necessary part to these desires? Justly. But what now? Such desires as a man may relinquish, if he try to do so from his youth, and which while they remain, do no good, if we say of these that they are not necessary, shall we not say right? Right, indeed. Let us select a pattern of each, that we may understand from example what they are. Quite right. Is not the desire of eating necessary so far as is conducive to health and a good habit of body, and the desire of food and victuals? I think so. The desire of food, at least, is necessary on two accounts, as being advantageous in itself, and because the want of it must bring life to an end.* It is. And the desire of victuals is likewise necessary, as contributing towards a good habit of body. Certainly. But what?—even such desire as goes beyond these things, or any other sorts of meats, and yet can be curbed from youth, and trained to abstain from most things, and which is hurtful both to body and soul as regards the attainment of wisdom and temperance, may not that be rightly called unnecessary? Most rightly, indeed. May we not say then that these too are expensive, and the others frugal, as they conduce towards the

* Gr. ὃ τε ὠφέλιμος σίτος, ὃ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή,—i. e. if there be no sufficient supply,—the general meaning being, that the desire for food is not only useful. but indispensable to the maintenance of life.

actions of life? Of course. We may speak in the same manner, surely, of venereal, and the other desires? In the same manner. And did we not, by him whom we just now called the drone, indicate a person full of such desires and pleasures, and governed by those that are unnecessary; but one governed by those merely necessary, a parsimonious man, and disposed to an oligarchy? Without doubt.

CHAP. XIII.—Let us again mention, said I, how the democratic man arises out of the oligarchic; and to me he appears to arise chiefly thus. How? When a young man brought up, as we now mentioned, without proper instruction, and in niggard fashion, comes to taste the drones' honey, and associates with those fiery, terrible creatures who can procure all sorts and varieties of pleasures, and from every quarter;—then you may conceive, he somehow begins to change the oligarchic for the democratic character. It must be so, he observed. Well then, just as the state was changed by the aid of another party from without to which it was related, is not the youth so changed likewise, through the aid of one species of desires from without, to others within him, which resemble them and are allied thereto? By all means. And methinks, if any alliance should come to counteract the oligarchic principle within him, either through his father or other relatives, admonishing and upbraiding him, then truly will arise sedition, opposition, and an internal struggle against himself. Undoubtedly. And sometimes, indeed, I think the democratic yields to the oligarchic principle, and some of the desires are destroyed, while others retire, because a certain modesty is engendered in the youth's soul, and he is again restored to order. This is sometimes the case, said he. And again, I suppose, when some desires retire, others allied to them secretly grow up, which through neglect of parental instruction, become both many and powerful. This is usually the case, said he. They draw them then towards the same intimacies as before, and through their connexions secretly generate a multitude? What else? And in the end, I think, they seize the citadel of the youth's soul, because they find it empty, as regards virtuous pursuits and true reasoning,—the best guardians and preservers of the rational part of men dear to the gods. Just so, said he. And then, indeed false and arrogant reasonings

and opinions rush up in their stead, and take their place in such people. Assuredly, said he. And does he not then come once more, and dwell openly among those Lotophagi? * —And if any aid come from intimate friends to strengthen the parsimonious principle within him, these said arrogant reasonings, by shutting against it the gates of the royal wall, neither permit the alliance itself, nor allow the ambassadorial admonitions of individual old men, but struggle against them and maintain themselves in power;—and as for modesty, they call it stupidity, and thrust it out into disgraceful exile, while temperance they call unmanliness, load it with abuse, and then expel it;—and as for moderation and decent expense, they persuade themselves that they are nothing else but rusticity and illiberality, and banish them from their territories, with many other unprofitable desires. Assuredly, they do. Having emptied and purified from all these desires, the soul, thus held by them, and initiated in the great mysteries,† they next introduce with encomiums and false eulogies, indolence and anarchy, extravagance and shamelessness, shining with a great retinue, and wearing crowns,—calling insolence, good-breeding,—anarchy, liberty,—luxury, magnificence,—and impudence, manliness. Is it not, said I, somehow thus,—that a youth, after being bred up with necessary desires falls away into the license and dissoluteness induced by needless and unprofitable pleasures? Yes, plainly so, he replied. Such an one, then, methinks, thenceforth passes his life, spending his property, labour, and time as much on necessary as unnecessary pleasures, but if he be fortunate and not unusually excited by passion, he, as he advances in years, and the sovereignty of the passions is subdued, re-admits part of those expelled, and does not deliver himself wholly up to mere intruders, but regulates his pleasures on the principle of equality, and so lives, giving himself up to each incidental desire that happens to rule him, till he is sated,—and then another, undervaluing none, but indulging all alike. Quite so, of course. And yet

* These Lotophagi are described by Homer, Odyss. ix. 94, &c.

† Allusion is here made to the Eleusinian mysteries, which after certain lustrations and sacrifices, were successively communicated to those in course of initiation,—first, the lesser mysteries (μικρὰ τέλη), and six months subsequently, the greater (τὰ μεγάλα τέλη).

such an one, said I, will not listen to true reasoning, nor admit it into his stronghold,—should he be told that some pleasures are attached to honourable and virtuous desires, others to those that are depraved, and that he should pursue and honour the former, but chastise and hold captive the latter,—but in all these cases will dissent, and say that they are all alike, and to be held in equal honour. Assuredly, said he, one thus affected, does this. Well then, said I, thus does he daily live, gratifying every incidental desire, sometimes getting drunk to the sound of the flute, at others temperately drinking water,—at others, again exercising gymnastics; sometimes indolent and wholly careless; then again applying, as it were, to philosophy,—often too acting the politician, saying and doing by skips and jumps whatever comes first:—and if he would imitate any of the military tribe, thither he is carried; if the mercantile, then again thither; nor is his life regulated by any plan or law, but, deeming this particular life pleasant, and free, and blessed, he follows it throughout. You have most fully described, said he, the life of the man who places all laws on a level. I at least am of opinion, said I, that he is multiform, and filled with different habits; like the state, too, he is handsome and of varied complexion, a man whose life many men and women would emulate, because he contains within himself numerous patterns both of forms of government and moral habits. He does, said he. What then? Have we then so described and arranged such an one on the principles of democracy, as that he may be truly called one of democratic character. We will allow that it has, said he.

CHAP. XIV.*—It still remains, however, that we discuss, said I, that most excellent form of government and that most excellent man,—tyranny and the tyrant. Surely, said he. Come then, my dear fellow;—what is the manner in which tyranny arises?—for it is almost plain, that it is a change from democracy. Plain. Does not tyranny arise in the same manner from democracy, as democracy does from oligarchy? How—as respects the good then, which oligarchy proposed to itself, and according to which it was constituted; was it not with a view of becoming extremely rich? Yes. An insatiable

* A large portion of this and the following chapter will be found rendered into Latin in Cicero de Republ. i. ch. 43. 44.

desire then for riches, and a neglect of all besides, through attention to the acquisition of wealth, destroys it. True, said he. And with reference to what democracy denominates good, an insatiable thirst for it destroys it likewise? But what say you, it denominates as good? Liberty, said I:—for this, you are told, is best found in a state under democratic rule, and hence any one naturally free would choose to dwell in this alone. This word liberty, said he, is vastly much talked about. Well then, observed I, as I was just going to say, does not the insatiable desire for this, and the neglect of other things, change even the form of government, and prepare it to need a tyrant? How? said he. When a state, said I, is under democratic rule, thirsts after liberty, and happens to have bad cupbearers appointed it, and gets immoderately drunk with an unmixed draught thereof, it punishes even the governors, unless they be quite tame-spirited, and allow them excessive liberty, by accusing them of being corrupt and oligarchical. They do so, said he. But such as obey the magistrates, said I, it abuses as willing and good-for-nothing slaves; both publicly and in private they commending and honouring magistrates who resemble subjects, and subjects who resemble magistrates: must it not happen in such a state, that we must necessarily arrive at the acme of liberty? Of course. And must it not descend, too, my friend, said I, into private families, and at last reach even the brutes? How, said he, can we assert aught like this? For instance, said I, when a father gets used to become like his child, and fears his sons, and the son [in like manner] his father, and has neither respect nor fear of his parents, in order, forsooth, that he may be free;—and thus a mere resident is placed on a level with a citizen, and a resident with a stranger, and so likewise a foreigner. Just so, said he. Aye, these indeed happen, said I, and other similar little things also:—and in such cases a teacher fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their teachers, and so also their tutors; and on the whole the youths resemble those more advanced in years, and rival them both in speech and action: while the old men sit down with the young, and imitate them in their love of merriment and pleasantry, for fear of appearing morose and despotic. Quite so, of course, replied he. But as to this

extreme liberty of the multitude, said I, what a height it attains in a state like this, where purchased slaves, male or female, are no less free than their purchasers, and how much equality and liberty wives enjoy with their husbands, and husbands with their wives,—this we have almost forgotten to mention. Are we not then to say, according to Æschylus, he observed, whatever now comes into our mouth? By all means, said I; and accordingly I thus speak:—with reference even to brutes, such as are under the care of men, how much more free they are in such a state; he who has no experience thereof will not easily believe—for according to the proverb, even dogs resemble their mistresses;* and horses and asses are used to run about at large, surlily driving against whomsoever they meet, unless they get out of their way; and many other such-like things happen, that indicate an abundance of liberty. You are just telling me my dream, said he, for this has often happened to me when going into the country. But do you observe, said I, when all these things are collected together in a whole, that they make the soul of the citizens so sensitive, that if they were any how to be brought into slavery, they would be indignant and not endure it;—for in the end, you know, they regard laws neither written nor unwritten, and hence no one will by any means become their master? I know it well, said he.

CHAP. XV.—This then, said I, my friend, I suppose, is that government so beautiful and youthful, whence tyranny springs. Youthful, indeed, he replied; but what then? The same malady, said I, that existed in an oligarchy, destroys this form likewise; rising also to a higher pitch of power, and enslaving the democracy by its very licentiousness; for, in fact, the doing of anything to excess usually causes great change in an opposite direction: and so it is in the seasons, as in vegetable and animal bodies, and so also not least of all in forms of government. Probably so, said he. Aye, for excessive liberty seems only to degenerate into excessive slavery, either in private individuals or states. It is probable, indeed. Probably then, said I, tyranny is established out of no other form than democracy;—out of the highest degree

* The proverb here alluded to runs thus, according to the scholiast:—*οἰάπερ ἡ ἑσποῖνα, τοῖα καὶ κύων*. The adage from Æschylus, somewhat above, is of an origin equally unknown.

of liberty, methinks, the greatest and fiercest slavery. Yes, it is reasonable, said he. This, however, methinks, said I, was not what you asked:—but what is that same disease which arises in an oligarchy and a democracy, and reduces each to slavery? Your remark is true, replied he. I meant, said I, that there was a race of idle and profuse men, the bravest of whom were the leaders, and the more cowardly their followers, whom indeed we compared to drones; some to those with stings, others to those without stings. Rightly too, said he. These two now, said I, when they spring up in a government, disturb it, just like phlegm and bile in a natural body,—and against these it is the duty of a wise physician and lawgiver of a state, no less than of a wise bee-master, to take much fore-caution,—first, that they never gain admittance;—and if they should enter, that they be as soon as possible cut off, with their cells as well. Yes, by Zeus, said he; altogether so.

CHAP. XVI.—Let us thus then conceive the matter, said I, that we may more distinctly see what we want. How? Let us ideally divide a democratic state into three parts, as it in fact is; for some such classification is natural to it, owing to its liberty, no less than to an oligarchy. It is so. Yet it is much more fierce at least in this than in the former. How? In an oligarchy, from not being held in honour, but excluded from the magisterial office, it is unexercised and gains no strength;—but in a democracy it is, with a few exceptions, the presiding party, the fiercest of them ever talking and agitating, while the rest bustle about at the law-courts, and cannot endure any one else to speak differently from itself; and thus all things, with only a few exceptions, under such a government, are managed by a party. Very much the case, said he. Some other party, then, is always separated from the multitude. Which? While the general body are engaged in the pursuit of gain, such as are naturally the most temperate generally become the wealthiest. Very probably. And hence is it, methinks, that the greatest quantity of honey, and what comes with the greatest ease, is pressed out of these by the drones. Yes,—for how, said he, can any one press it from those who have but little? Such wealthy people, I think, are called the pasture of the drones. Nearly so, replied he. And the people will be a sort of third species,—such as mind their own affairs, without meddling with

others, who have little property, but are yet the most numerous, and most prevailing in a democracy, whenever it is densely populated. It is so; but this it will not often consent to do without getting some share of the honey. This class, of course, always obtains a share, said I, as far as their leaders are able, by robbing those that have property, and giving it to the people, in order that they may eat most themselves. Aye, said he, that is the way in which these become sharers. These, then, are obliged to defend themselves. Those thus despoiled are compelled to defend themselves, saying and doing all they can among the people. Of course. And though they have no inclination to introduce a change of government, they are charged with forming plots and plans against the common people, and being oligarchally disposed. What next? After seeing that the people, not willingly, but through ignorance and the impositions of these slanderers, attempt to injure them, do they not then, indeed, even against their wills, become truly oligarchic?—though not spontaneously, for this very mischief is generated by the drone that stings them. Quite so. And so they lay informations, make lawsuits, and have contests one with another. Very much so. And are not the people always used to place some one in special presidency over themselves, and to cherish him, and promote him to great power? They are. And this, said I, is plain, that whenever a tyrant rises, it is from the fact of thus presiding, and nothing else, that he flourishes. This is very clear. How, then, begins the change from a president into a tyrant?—is it not clearly when the president begins to do the same as is told in the fable, about the temple of the Lycean Zeus, to whom the wolf was dedicated in Arcadia? What is that? said he. That whoever tastes human entrails mixed with those of other offerings, must necessarily become a wolf:—have you not heard the story? I have. Well, then, supposing him to be thus the president of the people, and having to deal with an extremely compliant multitude, he should not refrain from shedding even kindred blood, but by unjust charges, as usual, should bring men into the law-courts and murder them, as if he set no value on human life, and, tasting with unholy mouth and tongue even the blood of relations, should banish men and slay them, proposing the abolition of debts and fresh division of lands,—must not

such an one of necessity, and by destiny, be either destroyed by his enemies, or else act the tyrant, and from a man, become a wolf? Of great necessity, said he. This then, is he, said I—the same who rises in sedition against those who have property. Yes. And when he has been banished and returns against the will of his adversaries, he comes back, of course, an accomplished tyrant. It is plain. And if they cannot expel him, or put him to death on a state accusation, then they conspire to cut him off privately by a violent death. It usually so happens, he observed. And besides this, all who have advanced to this station invent *this* much-vaunted tyrannical demand, asking the people for certain body-guards, that the people's aid may be secured them. Of this, said he, they take special care. And methinks they grant them this through fear of his safety, though secure as to their own. Quite so. And when a man observes this, who has property, and who, besides that, is further charged with hating the people,—he then, my friend, according to the answer of the oracle to Cræsus,

..... To pebble-bedded Hermus flies,
Nor waits the brand of cowardice ;*.....

because he would not, said he, be a second time in fear. But surely, said I, he at least, methinks, that is caught, is put to death. Of necessity so. It is plain, then, that this president of our state does not like a noble person, nobly lie,† but, after hurling down many others, sits in his chair of office, a consummate tyrant of the state,—and not a president. Of course, he is likely to be so, rejoined he.

CHAP. XVII.—Shall we then examine the happiness both of the man and the state, in which such a mortal as this is engendered? Let us do so by all means, said he. Does he not, then, said I, in the first days, and for a brief season, smile and salute every one he meets, and asserting himself to be no tyrant, and promise many things, both in public and private, and liberate men from debts, and distribute land both to the public and those about him, and affect to be mild and liberal towards all? He must, replied he. But, methinks, when he becomes reconciled to some of his foreign

* The same oracular legend occurs in Herodotus, Clio, ch. 58.

† Comp. Hom. Il. xvi. 776 ; Odyss. xxiv. 39.

enemies, and has destroyed others, and there is quiet respecting these, he first of all is ever exciting wars, that the people may be in need of a leader. Aye, that is likely. Is it not also then, that, being rendered poor by contributing to the public treasury, they may be compelled to be anxious for daily sustenance, and so less readily conspire against him? Plainly so. And methinks, if he suspects that any of a free spirit will not allow him to govern,—in order that he may have some pretext for destroying them, he exposes them to the enemy; for all these reasons a tyrant must necessarily be always raising war. Necessarily so. And, while he is doing these things, he will necessarily become more hateful to the citizens. Of course. And, therefore, some of those who have been promoted along with him and are in power, use great plainness of speech, towards him and among themselves, finding fault with what is done,—such at least, as are of a more manly spirit. Aye, probably so. The tyrant, therefore, if he means to govern, must cut off all these, till he leave no one, either friend or foe, worth anything. It is plain. He must carefully notice them,—who is courageous, who is magnanimous, who wise, who rich; and in this manner is he happy, that, willing or unwilling, he is under a necessity of being an enemy to all like these; and to form plots against them, till he has purged the state. A fine purging indeed! said he. Yes, said I, the reverse of what the physicians do with regard to animal bodies; for they take away the worst and leave the best; but he does the contrary. Because it seems, said he, if he is to govern, he must necessarily do so.

CHAP. XVIII.—By a blessed necessity, then truly, is he bound, said I; which compels him either to live with a depraved multitude,—hated by them too, or not live at all. In such necessity he is, he replied. And the more he is hated by the citizens whilst he does these things, will he not so much the more require a greater number of guards, and those more faithful? It is impossible he should not. Who then are the faithful, and whence shall he procure them? Many, said he, will come flying to him of their own accord, if he give them pay. By the dog, said I, you seem again to be talking of certain drones, both foreign and multiform. Aye, you think right, replied he. But those of the state itself,—would he not desire to have them also as guards?

How? After he has taken away the slaves from the citizens, would he not give them their liberty, and make of them guards about his person? By all means, said he; for these are the most faithful to him. What a blessed possession of the tyrants, said I, is this which you mention, if he employ such friends and faithful men, after having destroyed the former ones! But at any rate, said he, such he surely does employ. And then his companions, said I, admire him, and the young citizens flock around him: but those that are respectable men both hate and fly from him. Of course they would. It is not without reason, then, said I, that tragedy is generally thought a wise thing, and that Euripides is thought to excel in it. Why? Because he uttered this, the result of deep reflection, that tyrants are wise, by intercourse with the wise;—and he plainly said, those were wise with whom they hold converse. And he commends tyranny too, said he, as some divine thing, and says a great deal else about it, as do the other poets. Those composers then of tragedy, said I, as they are wise, will forgive both ourselves and others who establish governments analogous to our own, for not admitting them into our republic, as being panegyrists of tyranny. Methinks, said he, such of them, at least, as are well mannered, will forgive us. But they will go about through other states, methinks, drawing together the crowds, and put to sale their fine, magnificent, and persuasive words, and so draw over governments to tyrannies and democracies. Just so. And do they not further receive rewards and are specially honoured, first by tyrants, as is natural, and next by a democracy; but the higher they advance in the forms of government, the more does honour forsake them, disabled as it were by an asthma from pursuing its progress. Entirely so.

CHAP. XIX.—Thus far, said I, have we digressed: and now let us go back and talk about the army of the tyrant, beautiful as it is numerous, multiform, and ever the same,—how it is to be maintained. It is plain, said he, that whatever sacred things there be in the state, these they will despoil, and make the sale-proceeds therefrom to be such from time to time as to cause the commons to pay lighter taxes. But when these fail, what will they do? It is plain, said he, that he and his boon-companions, and associates, male and female, will be maintained out of his paternal inheritance.

I understand, said I:—the party that made the tyrant is to maintain him and his companions. Surely it must be so, replied he. How, say you? replied I:—if the people were to be enraged, and say, that it is not just for a son arrived at mature age to be maintained by the father, but on the contrary, the father by the son, and that he did not beget and bring him up for this purpose, to be himself a slave to his slaves after they have grown up, and to maintain him and his slaves with the rest of the riotous crew,*—but rather that under his auspices he might be liberated from the rich in the state, [who are also called the good and worthy]:—and now he orders him and his companions to leave the state as a father drives from home his son and his racketsy boon-fellows. By Zeus, then, the people, said he, such as they are, will know what sort of a creature they have begotten, embraced, and nurtured, and that being themselves the weaker party, they are still trying to drive out the stronger. How say you, replied I;—will the tyrant dare to offer violence to his father, and actually strike him if he will not yield? Yes, said he, for he has stripped him of his armour. The tyrant, said I, you call a parricide and a hard-hearted nourisher of old age; and this, as it seems, would be an acknowledged tyranny; and, as the saying is,—the common people, flying from the smoke of slavery among freemen, have fallen into the slavish fire of despotism, and instead of excessive and unreasonable liberty, they embrace the most rigorous and bitterest captivity of actual slaves. Aye,—this is very much the case, rejoined he. What then, said I, may it not be concluded with due consideration, that we have shown in sufficient detail how tyranny arises out of democracy, and its nature also, when it does arise? Quite sufficiently, of course, replied he.

* Gr. *ζυγκλύδων ἄλλων*. The word *ζυγκλυσ* means the vilest and most worthless scum of the people. Comp. Thucyd. vii. 5, where it is used in the same sense.

BOOK IX.

ARGUMENT.

In the *ninth book* the discussion of tyranny is concluded with a view of its origin and nature in the individual man, who, when thus affected, is given up to all kinds of disordered passions that effectually exclude him from all chance of happiness. Hence is it, that, as good and healthy monarchical government is pre-eminently conducive to the highest happiness of the citizens,—so also tyranny is unfailingly productive of the most intense and general misery. This is proved also from an analysis of the mental faculties, and a pretty full account is here given of the desires, pleasures, and indulgences by which they are affected, and which must be kept in constant subjection by the dominance of reason.

CHAP. I.—We have yet, said I, to consider the tyrannical man himself, how he arises out of the democratic,—and, when he does arise, what is his nature, and what kind of life he leads, whether wretched or happy. Yes, we have, said he. Know you, said I, what I still want? What? We do not seem to have sufficiently distinguished as regards the desires; what is their nature and amount; and how many; and while there is any defect in this, the inquiry we make will not be very clear. Is it not good time for that yet? I wish to know about them;—for it is this. Of pleasures and desires that are not necessary, some seem to me contrary to law,—which indeed seem engendered in all men:—though owing to the correction of the laws, and of improved desires aided by reason, they either forsake some men altogether, or are less numerous and feeble, while in others they are more powerful and more numerous. Will you inform me what these are? said he. Such, said I, as are excited in sleep, when the rest of the soul—which is rational, mild, and its governing principle, is asleep, and when that part which is savage and rude, being sated with food and drink, frisks about, drives away sleep, and seeks to go and accomplish its practices;—

in such an one, you know, it dares to do everything, because it is loosed and disengaged from all modesty and prudence: for, if it pleases, it scruples not at the embraces, even of a mother, or any one else, whether gods, men, or beasts; nor to commit murder, nor abstain from any sort of meat,—and in one word, it is wanting neither in folly nor shamelessness. You speak most truly, replied he. But when a man is in good health, methinks, and lives temperately, and goes to sleep, after exciting his reason, and feasting it with noble reasonings and investigations, having thus attained to an internal harmony, and given up the appetites neither to want nor repletion, that they may be at rest, and not disturb that part which is best, either by joy or grief, but suffer it by itself alone without interruption to inquire and long to apprehend what it knows not,—either something of what has existed, or now exists, or will exist hereafter; and so also, having soothed the spirited part of the soul, and not allowed it to be hurried into transports of anger, or to fall asleep with agitated passion;—but after having quieted these two parts of the soul, and roused to action that third part, in which wisdom dwells, he will thus take his rest;—you know, that by such an one the truth is best apprehended, and the visions of his dreams are then least of all portrayed contrary to the law. I am quite of this opinion, said he. We have digressed indeed a little too far in talking of these things;—but what we want to be known is this, that in every one resides a certain species of desires that are terrible, savage, and irregular, even in some that we deem ever so moderate:—and this indeed becomes manifest in sleep.—Now consider, if I seem to be speaking to the purpose, and whether you agree with me. Aye, indeed, I do.

CHAP. II.—As for the people's man then, recollect how we described him, as being brought up somehow from infancy under a parsimonious father, who valued avaricious desires only; and despised all such as were unnecessary, arising only out of a love of amusement and finery.* Was he not? Yes. But getting acquainted with the more refined, who are full of the desires just mentioned, running into all sorts of insolence, and imbibing their manners through detes-

* This refers to the description of the *δημοκρατικός* in book viii. ch. 12.

BOOK IX.

ARGUMENT.

In the *ninth book* the discussion of tyranny is resumed. It is its origin and nature in the individual man, who is given up to all kinds of disordered passions, and is shut from all chance of happiness. Hence is it, that a tyrannical government is pre-eminently *unhappy* to the citizens,—so also tyranny is the cause of the most intense and general misery, and a *prodigious* power, and a *prodigious* analysis of the mental faculties, and indulgence of the desires, pleasures, and which must be kept in constant *struggle* with reason.

CHAP. I.—We have yet, said I, to see, said he, I man himself, how he arises out of the *state of nature*; he does arise, what is his nature, of *which* nature he leads, whether wretched or happy? *He is wretched*, said I, Know you, said I, what I still *want* at last by their *misery* seem to have sufficiently distinguished *the nature* of desire, then what is their nature and amount *is a life-guard*, and this *prevents* there is any defect in this, the *ing*; and even should he *find* very clear. Is it not good time *to* *be* about them;—for it is this. *They* are not necessary, some seem to *be* indeed seem engendered in *all* the formation of a *tyranny* correction of the laws, and *as* this, said I, their reason, they either forsake *the* It seems so, replied numerous and feeble, while *the* a drunken man like and more numerous. *Will* He is indeed. *Al* said he. *Such* *is* *in* *his* *mind*, *u* rest of the *is* *not* *only* *men*, *but* principle *The* *tyrannical* rude, *is* *perhaps* *the* *best* away *is* *perhaps* *the* *best*

tation of his father's parsimony;—and yet having a better natural temper than his corrupters, and being drawn opposite ways, he at length settles down into a mode of life equidistant from either, and so in his opinion, participating moderately of each, leads a life neither illiberal nor lawless, after having thus become a democrat instead of an oligarchist. Yes,—this, said he, was and is our opinion of such an one. Suppose now again, that, when such an one has become old, he has a young son educated according to his own habits. I suppose it. And suppose, too, that the same happens to him as to his father;—that he is drawn into all lawlessness, which his seducers call all freedom; and that his father and his domestics are aiding those intermediate desires;—and that others also lend their assistance (when these clever conjurers and tyrant-makers have no hopes of otherwise keeping youth in their power), and so contrive to excite in him a certain love which is to preside over the passive desires, which distribute what may be at hand to all the rest,—a certain large-winged drone;*—or what else think you, is that kind of love? For my part, said he, I think, it is no other than this. Well,—when the rest of the desires buzz about him, full of their odours and perfumes, and crowns and wines, and the dissolute pleasures belonging to such associations,—and at last by their increase and nurture, add to the drone a sting of desire, then truly he is sentinelled by madness as a life-guard, and this president of the soul becomes frenzied; and even should he find in himself any opinions or desires which are deemed good and modest, he kills them and pushes them from him, till he has ridded himself of temperance and has become brimful of madness. You perfectly describe, said he, the formation of a tyrannical man. Is it not for some such reason as this, said I, that love has of old been said to be a tyrant? It seems so, replied he. Well, my friend, said I, and is not a drunken man likewise somewhat of a tyrannical spirit? He is indeed. And besides that, he that is mad and disturbed in his mind, undertakes and hopes to be able to govern not only men, but the gods as well. Entirely so, said he. The tyrannical character

* Gr. προστάτην τῶν ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτοιμα διανεμομένων ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὑπόπτερον καὶ μίγαν κηφῆνά τινα. This is perhaps the best rendering;—but the passage is somewhat obscure.

then, happy man! becomes so in full perfection, when either by temper or pursuits, or both, he becomes drunken and given up to love and melancholy. Perfectly so, indeed. *atrocious*

CHAP. III.—Such an one, it seems, then, is thus engendered, —but how does he pass his life?—Just as they say in their games, replied he;—"this you shall tell me too." I will tell you then, said I;—for I think, that in the next place, they have feastings and revellings and banquetings and mistresses, and all such things as may be expected among those with whom dwells the tyrant love, and governing all in the soul. Necessarily so, said he. Will there not then, each day and night, blossom forth numerous fierce desires, eagerly in want of many things? Many indeed. And if they get any supplies [of their wishes,] these are soon spent? Of course. And after this there are borrowings and forfeitures of property? Of course. And when everything fails them, must it not follow, that while the numerous and powerful desires nestled in the mind, will on the one hand raise a clamour, the men, on the other hand, who are driven and goaded by the rest of the passions, but especially by love itself, which commands all the others as its life-guards, will rage with phrensy, and seek after people's property, to see if they can plunder it either by fraud or violence? Quite so, said he. Of necessity, then, they must either plunder from all quarters, or else be hampered with great pain and anguish. Necessarily so. And as in such a man his new pleasures are greater than those he had before, and depreciate the value of the others, will he not similarly deem it right for himself, however young, to have more than his father and mother, and to take away from them, when he has spent his own portion, applying to his own use what belongs to his parents? Of course he will, replied he. And if they will not give it up to him, will he not at first try to pilfer or defraud his parents? By all means. And should he be unable to do this, he will next use rapine and violence? I think so, replied he. But supposing, my fine fellow, that the old man and woman fall out and fight, will he not be very cautious and wary of doing what is tyrannical? I, for my part, said he, am not quite sure about the safety of such a person's parents. But by Zeus,

* Gr. δανεισμοὶ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραπίεσις, lit. *the borrowing of money on usury, and the seizure of property for non-payment.*

Adimantus, think you, that for the sake of a newly beloved and unnecessary mistress, such a person would abandon his long loved and closely connected mother; or for the sake of a youth newly loved and with whom ~~he has no ties~~, give up to stripes his withered but time-honoured father, and the most ancient of all his friends, suffering them to be the slaves of these others, by bringing them into the same house? Yes, by Zeus, I do, said he. It seems indeed, said I, a vastly blessed thing to be the father of a tyrannical son! Not at all so, said he. But what, when the father and mother's riches are beginning to fail such an one, and when the great swarm of pleasures has been already collected within him, will he not be the first to scale the wall of some house, or strip some one of his coat late at night, and after that rifle some temple?—And in all these acts, as respects the opinions which he formerly held from boyhood, and which guided his decisions concerning good and evil, the passions, that are newly loosed from slavery and placed as the body-guards of Love, will prevail therewith;—and these indeed had only just been loosed from their dreamy sleep, when he was himself still under the law and governed by his father, as under a democracy:—yet afterwards, when tyrannized over by love, such as he rarely was when in his dreams, he will ever be when awake, nor will he abstain from slaughter, however horrid, or food, or any deed whatever:—but that tyrant love within him, living without restraint of law or government, as if it were sole monarch, will lead on the man it possesses, as it would a state, to every act of madness, whereby he can support himself and the mob of passions about him, which partly entering from without, through evil company, and partly through the manners of the man and his associates, have been unchained and set at liberty: now is not this the life of such an one? It is this truly, said he. And if, said I, there be, only a few such in the state, and the rest of the people are sober, they go out and serve as guards to other tyrants, or assist them for hire in case of war: but remain at home during peace and quiet, giving rise in the state to a great many minor evils. What mean you? Such as these: they steal, break open houses, cut purses, strip people of their clothes, rifle temples, make people slaves, and, where they can speak, sometimes turn false informers, give false testimony, and take

bribes.* These then you call minor mischiefs, said he,—if there be but a few such persons. What is small, said I, is small in comparison to the great; and all these things with regard to the tyrant, when compared with the wickedness and misery of the state, do not, as the saying is, come near the mark; for when the state has many such, and others for their companions, and when they perceive their own number, then these are the persons who, led by the people's folly, elevate to the tyranny the man among them who has within his soul most of the tyrant, and in the greatest strength. Probably so, indeed, said he; for he will be most suited for a tyrant. Of course, if they voluntarily submit to him:—but if the state will not allow him to use the violence towards them, with which he formerly treated his father and mother, so he will now again, if he can, chastise his country by bringing in his youthful associates, and enslaving under them, as the Cretans say, his once dear mother-land and father-land:—and this will of course be the issue of such a man's desire. Entirely so, said he. Do not these then behave thus in private life, said I;—even before becoming rulers; first with the company they keep, either associating with their own flatterers and those who are ready to supply their every want; or if they ask one for anything, falling down as suppliants, and deigning to assume the disguise of friends; but after they have gained their own purposes, acting as foes? Quite so. Throughout life then they live as real friends to no one whatever, but always either as masters or slaves to another;—because for liberty and true friendship the tyrant's nature has no relish whatever. Quite so. May we not rightly call these men faithless? Of course. And as unjust, moreover, as they possibly can be, if indeed we, in what we said before were rightly agreed as to the nature of justice? Aye, we were quite right, said he. Let us then give a summary account, said I, of this worst man of ours; he is the same kind of person, awake perhaps, whom we just described as asleep. Entirely so. And does not that man become such, who with a tyrannical nature holds the sovereign sway, and the longer he lives in tyrant-life become so more and more? Necessarily so, replied Glaucon, taking up the discourse.

* These grave crimes are almost similarly enumerated in the *Gorgias*, p. 508 c, and also by Xenophon, *Mem.* i. ch. 2, s. 62.

CHAP. IV.—And will not the man, said I, who appears the most wicked, appear likewise the most wretched ; and will not he who holds the tyranny longest and exercises it most, be really such in the greatest measure and for the longest time ? —but many as are men, so many are their minds. Of necessity, said he, these things must be so. And would not the tyrant man, said I, as closely resemble a state under tyranny, at the democratic man resembles the state under democracy, and so likewise as respects the others ? Of course. As state then is to state with regard to virtue and happiness, so surely will man be to man likewise ? Of course. What then is the state governed by a tyrant as compared with one under a kingly government,—such as we first described ? The exact contrary, said he ; for the one is best, and the other the worst. I will not ask, said I, which you mean, for that is plain ; but do you judge is it thus or otherwise, that you judge of their happiness and misery ?—and let us not be struck with admiration when considering the tyrant himself, or the few about him ; but let us, as we ought, enter into the whole state, and declare our opinion, after going through and viewing every part. You propose what is right, said he :—and it is clear to all that no state is more wretched than one under tyranny, and none more happy than that under regal power. Well then, said I, in proposing these same things with respect to individual men, should I rightly propose, if I accounted that man a suitable judge of them, who can by intellectual power penetrate into and inspect a man's disposition, and is not, as a child looking at exteriors, astounded by the pomp, which tyrants exhibit to those without, but has the power of looking properly through him ? If then I thought that we should all listen to the man, who from having dwelt with him in the same house, and been joined in his family transactions, is able to judge how he behaves to each of his domestics, [in which most especially a man appears stripped of his actor's finery,] and so also in public dangers ; and if when he has observed all this, I were to bid him declare how the tyrant stands, as regards happiness and misery, in comparison with others.* You would be quite right in

* Euripides, *Jon.* v. 621—4, has a similar sentiment beautifully expressed :—

τυραννίδος δὲ τῆς μάτην αἰνουμένης
τὸ μὲν πρόσωπον ἡδὺ τῶν δόμοισι δὲ

proposing this, observed he. Are you willing then, said I, that we should set up to be of the number of those who are able to judge, and who have already fallen in with such characters, so that we may have some one to answer our questions? By all means.

CHAP. V.—Come then, said I, thus consider it:—call to mind the mutual resemblance of the state and individual man; and thus, considering each by turns, describe to us the passions of each. What passions? said he. To begin first, said I, with the state;—do you call the one under tyranny, free or enslaved? Enslaved, said he, in the greatest degree possible. And moreover, you see in it some who are masters and freemen? I see some indeed, said he, but exceedingly few:—but the greatest and best part therein generally is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved. If then, said I, the individual man resembles the state, will he not necessarily be placed under like circumstances, and his soul be filled with slavery and illiberality, and those parts of it too be enslaved which were the most noble, and that small part of it too assume the mastery, which is the most wicked and insane of all? Quite so, said he. What then,—will you say, that such a soul is slavish or free? Slavish perhaps, I say. But is not the state that is slavish, and governed by tyranny, least of all able to do what it likes? Aye,—quite so. And speaking of a soul generally, will it not, when governed by tyranny, least of all do what it likes,—but being constantly hurried by some stinging passion, be full of tumult and inconstancy? Of course it must be so. But will the state governed by tyranny be necessarily rich or poor? Poor. And must a soul under a tyranny then be ever penurious and insatiable? Just so, said he. But what,—must not such a state and such an individual be necessarily full of fear? It must be so. As for lamentations, and groans, and weepings, and torments, think you that you would find more in any other kind of state? By no means. And in a man, think you that such things exist in any one to a greater extent than in this tyrannical one who is maddened by his desires and lusts? How can they? said he. It is with

λυπηράτις γὰρ μακάριος τις εὐτυχής.
ὅστις δεδοικώς καὶ περιβλέπων βίαν
αἰῶνα τείνει;

reference, I suppose, then to all these, and other such like things, that you have deemed this the most wretched of all states? Was I not right then in doing so? said he. Certainly, said I. But what say you again as respects the tyrannical man, with regard to these same things? That he is by far, said he, the most wretched of all in the world. This, replied I, you are not quite correct in saying. How? said he. He is not as yet, methinks, said I, as unhappy as he can be. But who is so? The following person probably you will deem even yet more miserable than the other. Which? That man, said I, who being naturally tyrannical, remains not in private life, but is unfortunate enough to be induced by his destiny to become a tyrant. From what has been formerly observed, said he, I presume that what you say is true. Yes, said I;—but we ought not merely to conjecture about matters so important as these, but to sift them to the bottom, in the way we are now about to do;* for most momentous is the inquiry about a good life and a bad one. Quite right, said he. Consider, then, whether there be anything in what I say; for, in considering this question, it is my opinion that we ought to perceive it from what follows. From what? From every individual private man, among such as are rich, and possess many slaves; for these have at least this resemblance to tyrants, that they rule over many,—the difference being in the multitude of the latter. Aye,—there is some difference. Are you sure then that these live securely, without dread of their domestics? Aye,—for what should they fear? Nothing, said I; but do you understand the reason? Yes;—because the whole state assists each particular individual. You say right, replied I:—but what,—if one of the gods were to take a man who had fifty slaves or upwards out of the state,—both himself, his wife, and children,—and set them down in a desert with the rest of his property, and his domestics, where no freemen would be likely to lend him aid,—what kind of fear, think you, he would entertain about himself, his children, and his wife, of being destroyed by the domestics? The greatest possible, methinks, replied he. Would he not be obliged to flatter some of his very slaves and make them many promises, and set them at liberty without need, and so appear to be

* Gr. οὐκ οἶσθαι χρή τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σπουδεῖν;

himself the flatterer of servants? He must of course be compelled to do so, said he, or else be destroyed. But what, said I;—if the god were to place round him many other neighbours who could not endure for any one to pretend to lord it over another,—and, wherever they find such an one, punished him with extreme rigour? Methinks, he would be still more distressed, said he, when thus beset by a whole host of foes. And is not the tyrant bound in such a prison-house, if he be of such disposition as we have described,—full of many and all kinds of aversions and desires; and whilst he is most eager in his soul, he alone of all in the state is not allowed to go abroad, or to see what others love to see, but huddles himself at home, and lives mostly as a woman, envying the other citizens, whenever they travel abroad, and see what is good? Wholly so, of course, replied he.

CHAP. VI.—Well, then, through such evils as these, does not the man reap still more, who, being ill-governed within himself, [a person whom you just now deemed to be the most of all wretched,] remains not in private station, but through some fortune or other is obliged to act the tyrant, and, though unable to control himself, attempts to govern others, as if with a body diseased, and unable to support itself, one were compelled to live not in a state of privacy, but in wrestling and fighting against other bodies? What you say, Socrates, replied he, is altogether most probable and true. Is not this condition, then, dear Glaucon, said I, altogether wretched; and does not the tyrant live more wretchedly even than the man that you conceive to live the most wretchedly of all? Quite so, replied he. True is it, then, though one may fancy otherwise, that the really tyrannical man is really a slave to the greatest flatteries and slaveries, and a flatterer of the most abandoned men; and without ever in the smallest degree satisfying his desires, he is of all men most in want of most things, and poor indeed, if one could but look into his whole soul, and full of fear throughout life, filled with terrors and griefs,—if, indeed, he resembles the constitution of the state he rules:—and he does resemble it; does he not? Extremely, said he.

And in addition to this, shall we not ascribe also to the tyrant-man what we formerly mentioned that he must ne-

cessarily be, and by governing become increasingly, envious, faithless, unjust, unfriendly, impious,—the entertainer and encourager of all vice; and from all these causes be specially happy himself, and render all about him happy likewise? No one of understanding will, said he, contradict you. Come, then, said I, as a judge who is examining the whole case; so tell me,—who, in your opinion, is first in happiness, and who second, and the rest in order, five in all; namely, the regal, the timocratic, the oligarchal, the democratic, and the tyrannic. Easy, indeed, is this decision, said he:—for as they came before us, I have judged of them as public actors, by their virtue and vice,—happiness and its contrary. Shall we then hire ourselves a herald? said I; or shall I myself declare, that the son of Ariston has judged the best and justest man to be the happiest, [and that this is the man who is fittest to be as king, and as king too over himself;] and that the worst and the most unjust is the most wretched; and that he is the most tyrannical, who in the greatest degree tyrannizes over himself and the state? So let it be pronounced by you, said he. Must I, then, state in addition, said I, whether they be unknown to be such or not, to all men, and the gods too? Pray do so, said he.

CHAP. VII.—Well then, said I;—this would seem to be one of our proofs; and this, if you please, must be the second. Which is this? Since the soul, said I, of every individual is divided into three parts, just as we divided our state, it will, in my opinion, admit of a second illustration. What is that? It is this:—of the parts of the soul there appear to me to be three pleasures, one peculiar to each, with desires and governments in like manner. How say you? replied he. One part we say, by which a man learns, another by which he is roused to spirit; but as for the third, it is so multiform, that we cannot express it by any one word peculiar to itself, but have named it from the greatest and most impetuous part thereof; calling it the desiderative, from the impetuosity of the desires for eating and drinking, and sexual pleasures, and such-like enjoyments, and calling it money-loving also, as it is through wealth most especially that such desires are accomplished. And we said rightly, replied he. Well, then, if we are to call it the pleasure and delight in gain, shall we not do best to reduce it under one head in our discourse, so that

we may have something quite clear to ourselves, when we are speaking of this part of the soul? And in calling it money-loving, and profit-loving, shall we not be giving it its proper term? Yes, I think so, said he. But what; do not we say, that the spirited principle ought to be wholly impelled to superiority, victory, and applause? Especially so. If, then, we term it the contentious and ambitious, shall we not accurately express it? Most accurately. But [as regards that part of the soul] by which we gain knowledge, it is clear to every one, that it is wholly intent on always knowing the truth, wherever it may be; and as to wealth and glory, least of all does it care for these. Just so. By terming it, then, the love of learning, and philosophy, we shall be defining it correctly? Of course. And in these people's souls, said I, one governs in some, and the other in others, as it happens? Just so, said he. This was why we said then, that of men also there were three original species; the philosophic, the ambitious, and the avaricious? Surely so. And likewise three species of pleasures,—corresponding to each of the others? Yes, certainly. You know, then, said I, that if you were to ask these three men, by turns, which of these lives is the pleasantest, each would most commend his own; and the money-maker would say, that, compared with the pleasures of acquiring wealth, those arising from honour, or learning, are of no value, unless they bring in money? True, said he. And what says the ambitious man? said I: does not he deem the pleasure arising from money-making a sort of burden;—and again, that which arises from learning, unless it bring him honour, mere smoke and trifling? So it is, said he. And as for the philosopher, said I, we may suppose that he deems all other pleasures in comparison with that of knowing the nature of truth as a mere nothing, and that, while constantly employed in learning something of this kind, he is not far off from pleasure,—and calls them really necessary, because he wanted none else, except when compelled by necessity.* This, said he, you should well know.

* The real *spiritual* nature of this truth is beautifully expressed in the *Phædo*, p. 67 a:—καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως—ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἶδέναι, ἴαν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὀμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλόμεθα τῆς τοῦτον φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς.

CHAP. VIII.—When these several lives then, said I, and the pleasures peculiar to each, are at variance with each other, not with reference to a mode of life, worthier or more base, worse or better,—but merely with reference to living more pleasantly or painfully;—how can we know which of the two speaks most in accordance with truth? I am not, said he, quite able to tell. But consider it thus:—by what criterion ought we to judge about matters rightly presented for our judgment;—is it not by experience, prudence, and reason,—or can we find any better criterion than these? How can we? said he. Consider now;—of the three men, who is the most experienced in all the pleasures?—Think you that the money-loving man, by learning the real nature of truth, gains more experience in the pleasure arising from knowledge, than the philosopher has in that resulting from the acquisition of wealth? There is a great difference, said he: for the philosopher must necessarily from early childhood taste the other pleasures; but what it is to know real beings, and how sweet is its pleasure, the money-getting man need not taste, or become experienced therein;—nay, indeed, it is no easy matter, even should he earnestly try to accomplish it. The philosopher then, said I, far surpasses the money-getting man, at least in experience of both the pleasures. Far indeed. But what as regards the ambitious man—has he any more experience in the pleasure arising from honour, than the philosopher in that which arises from the exercise of intellect? Honour, indeed, said he, attends them all, if each obtains his object: for the rich man is honoured by many, and so is the brave, and the wise; so all of them have experience, as to the kind of pleasure attending honour, but in the contemplation of being itself, as to the pleasure which it gives, it is impossible for any other than the philosopher to have tasted it. On the ground of experience then, said I, he of all men is the best judge. By far. And surely, including prudence also, he alone has experience. Of course. But the organ, by which these pleasures must be judged, is not the organ of the money-getter, nor of the ambitious man, but of the philosopher. Which is that? We said somewhere, that they must be judged of by reason,—did we not? Yes. But reasoning is chiefly the organ of the philosopher? Of course it is. If

then the things to be determined could be, best determined by riches and gain, what the money-getting man commended, or despised, would necessarily be most agreeable to truth? Quite so. And if by honour, victory, and courage,—must it not be as the ambitious and contentious man determined? It is evident. But since it is by experience, prudence, and reason, it follows of course, said he, that what is praised by the philosopher and the lover of reason must be the most true.—Of the three pleasures, then, that which belongs to that part of the soul by which we learn most is the most pleasant, and that man in whom this part of us holds the chief sway lives the pleasantest life. How can it be doubted? said he:—for the wise man, who has the supreme right to commend, commends his own life. But which life, said I, does our judge pronounce the second, and which the second pleasure? Plainly, that of the warlike and ambitious man; for this is nearer to his own than that of the money-getter. And that of the covetous, as it appears, is last of all? Of course, said he.

CHAP. IX.—These things then will succeed one another in order; and the just man will twice prevail over the unjust:—the third victory now, as at the Olympic games, is sacred to Olympian Zeus, the Saviour; for you must consider, that, with the exception of that of the wise man, the pleasure of the others is by no means genuine nor pure, but somehow shadowed over, as I think I have myself heard from one of the wise men:—and this truly would be the greatest and most complete downfall. Extremely so;—but how mean you? I will thus trace it out, said I, whilst in searching you answer my questions. Ask then, said he. Tell me then, said I, do we not say that pain is contrary to pleasure? Quite so. And do we not say likewise, that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is something? We say it is. And that the state between both of these is a certain tranquillity of the soul with reference to them;—do you not so understand it? Just so, he replied. Do you not remember, said I, the speeches of the diseased, which they utter when they are sick? What are they? That nothing is sweeter than health, but that it escaped their notice before they became sick, that it was the sweetest. I remember it, said he. And are you not wont to hear those who are under acute pain say, that there is nothing sweeter than a cessa-

tion from pain? I do hear them. And you may perceive the same thing in men, I think, when they are in other but similar circumstances, where, if in pain, they extol a freedom from pain and the tranquillity of such a state, as being most sweet, though they do not extol that of feeling joy. Because perhaps the latter, said he, becomes at that time sweet and desirable,—namely, tranquillity. And when any one ceases, said I, from feeling joy, the tranquillity of pleasure will be painful. Perhaps so, said he. This tranquillity, then, which we just now said was between the two, will at times become both pain and pleasure. It seems so. What,—is it possible, that what is neither of the two should become both? I do not think so. And moreover, when what is pleasant or painful is in the soul, both sensations are a certain excitement; are they not? Yes. But did not that which is neither painful nor pleasant appear just now to be tranquillity, and between these two? It did appear so. How is it right, then, to deem it sweet not to be in pain, or painful not to enjoy pleasure? It is by no means right. In these cases, then, tranquillity is not really so, said I; but it appears pleasant by comparison with the painful, and painful compared with the pleasant; and there is nothing genuine in these appearances as regards the truth of pleasure, but a certain magical delusion. Aye,—just as our argument proves, he replied. Consider the pleasures then, said I, which do not arise from the cessation of pain, so as not frequently during our discussion to hold the frequent notion that these two naturally thus subsist; viz., that pleasure is the cessation of pain, and pain the cessation of pleasure. How, said he, and to what pleasures do you allude? There are many others, said I, particularly if you wish to consider the pleasures that arise from smell; for these, without any preceding pain, are on a sudden immensely great, and, when they cease, they leave no pain behind them. Most true, said he. Let us not then be persuaded that pure pleasure is the removal of pain, or pain the removal of pleasure. No, we will not. But yet, said I, those which extend through the body to the soul, and which are called pleasures, the greatest part of them almost, and the most considerable, are of this species,—certain cessations from pain? They are so. And are not the preconceptions of pleasure and pain, which arise in

the mind from their expectation, of the same kind? Of the same.

CHAP. X.—Do you know then, said I, of what class they are, and what they chiefly resemble? What? said he. Do you conceive, said I, there is any such thing in nature as this, the above, the below, and the middle? I do. Do you think then that any one, when brought from the below to the middle, imagines anything else than that he is brought to the above; and when he stands in the middle, and looks down whence he was brought, will he imagine that he is anywhere else than above, whilst yet he has not seen the true above? By Zeus, said he, I do not think that such an one will imagine otherwise. But if he should again, said I, be carried to the below, he would conjecture he was carried to the below, and conjecture rightly? He would of course. Would he not be thus affected from his want of experience in what is really above, and in the middle, and below? Plainly so. Would you wonder then, that while men are inexperienced in the truth, they have unsound opinions about many other things,—and that as to pleasure and pain, and what is between these, they are likewise affected in the same manner; so that, even when they are brought to what is painful, they conceive truly, and are really pained; but when from pain they are brought to the middle, they strongly imagine that they have arrived at the highest pitch of pleasure, in the same manner as those, who along with the black colour look at the gray, through inexperience of the white, and so are deceived? and just so those who consider pain along with the freedom from pain, are deceived through inexperience of pleasure. By Zeus, said he, I should not wonder, but much rather if it were not so. Consider the matter thus, said I; are not hunger and thirst, and such-like things, certain emptinesses in the bodily habit? Of course. And are not ignorance and folly an emptiness in the habit of the soul? Quite so. And is not the one filled when it receives food, and the other when it acquires intelligence? Surely. But which is the more real repletion, that of the less, or the more truly real being? It is plain, that of the more real. Which species, then, do you think, participate most of a purer essence; those which partake of bread and drink, and meat, and all such sort of nourishment; or that species which partakes of true opinion and science, and intel-

ligence, and, in short, of all virtue?—And judge of it thus:—That which is connected with what is always similar, and immortal, and true, and is so of itself, and arises in what is of the same character, think you that it has more of the reality of being, than what is connected to what is never similar and mortal, and is such itself, and is generated in a thing of the same character? Aye, said he, this differs greatly from that which is always similar. Does then the essence of that which is always similar participate more of essence than of science? By no means. But what as regards truth? Nor of this neither. If it participate less of truth, does it not likewise do so of essence? Of necessity. In short, then, do not those species which relate to the care of the body partake less of truth and essence, than those relating to the care of the soul? By far. And the body likewise less than the soul; do you not think so? I do. Is not that which is filled with more real beings, and is itself a more real being, in reality more truly filled than that which is filled with less real beings, and is itself a less real being? Of course it is. If then it be pleasant to be filled with what is suitable to nature, that which is in reality filled, and with more real being, must be made both more really and more truly to enjoy true pleasure; but that which participates of less real being, must be less truly and solidly filled, and participates of a more uncertain and less genuine pleasure. Most necessarily, said he. Such then as are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and are always conversant in feastings and things of that kind, are carried, as it appears, to the below, and back again to the middle;—and there they wander during life:—but as they never pass beyond this, they do not look towards the true above, and are not carried to it; nor are they ever really filled with real being; nor have they ever tasted solid and pure pleasure; but, after the manner of brutes looking always downwards, bowed towards earth and their tables, they live feeding and coupling; and from a lust for such things, they kick and push at one another as with iron horns and hoofs, and perish through their own insatiety, just like those who are filling with unreal being that which is no real being, nor friendly to themselves. You are describing, Socrates, with quite oracular perfection, rejoined Glaucon, what is the life of the multitude. Must they not then, of necessity be conversant with pleasures mixed with

pains, images of the true pleasure, shadowed in outline, and coloured by their position beside each other; so that both their pleasures and pains will appear vehement, and engender their mad passions in the foolish? Hence also they must fight about these things, as Stesichorus says those at Troy fought about the image of Helen, through ignorance of the true one. Of necessity, said he, something of this kind must take place.

CHAP. XI.—But what? must not the same things necessarily happen to the irascible part of the soul, whenever any one gratifies it, either through envy from ambition, or violence from contentiousness, or anger from moroseness, pursuing a glut of honour, of conquest, and of anger, both without reason, and without intelligence? Such things as these, said he, must necessarily happen with relation to this part of the soul. What then, said I;—can we confidently say concerning all the pleasures, both as respects the avaricious and the ambitious part, that such of them as obey science and reason, and, in conjunction therewith, pursue and obtain the pleasures of which the prudent part of the soul is the leader, that these will obtain the truest pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to attain true pleasure, and in as much as they follow truth, pleasures properly their own; if indeed what is best for each be most properly his own? Aye, it surely is most properly his own, said he. When then the whole soul is obedient to the philosophic part, and there is no sedition in it, then every part in other respects performs its proper business, and is just, and also reaps its own pleasures, and such as are the best, and as far as is possible the most genuine. Certainly, indeed. But when any of the others governs, it happens that it neither attains its own pleasures, and it compels the other parts to pursue a pleasure foreign to them, and not at all genuine. It does so, said he. Will not then those parts, which are most remote from philosophy and reason most especially effect such things? Very much so. And is not that which is most remote from law and order, most remote likewise from reason? It plainly is. And have not the amorous and the tyrannical desires appeared to be most remote from law and order? Extremely so. And the royal and the moderate ones, the least remote? Yes. The tyrant then, I think, will be the most remote from true pleasure,

and such as is most properly his own, and the other will be the least. Of necessity. And the tyrant, said I, will lead a life the most unpleasant, and the king the most pleasant. Of great necessity. Do you know then, said I, how much more unpleasant a life the tyrant leads than the king? If you tell me, said he. As there are three pleasures, as it seems, one legitimate, and two illegitimate; the tyrant in carrying the illegitimate to extremity, and flying from law and reason, dwells with slavish pleasures as his life-guardians, and how far he is inferior cannot easily be told, unless it be done in this manner. How? said he. The tyrant is somehow in the third degree remote from the oligarchic character; for the democratic was halfway between them. Yes. Will he not then dwell in the third picture of pleasure, distant from him as regards truth, if our former reasonings be true? Just so. But the oligarchic is the third again from the royal, if we suppose the aristocratic and the royal the same? He is the third. The tyrant then, said I, is remote from true pleasure, the third from the third? So it seems. A plain surface then, said I, may be the image of tyrannical pleasure, as to the computation of length. Certainly. But as to power, and the third augment, it is manifest by how great a distance it is remote. It is manifest, said he, to the computer at least. If now, conversely, any one shall say the king is distant from the tyrant as to truth of pleasure, as much as is the distance 9, and 20, and 700, shall he not, on completing the multiplication, find him leading the more pleasant life, and the tyrant the more wretched one, by this same distance?*

* The following numbers are employed by Plato in this place. He considers the *Royal* character as analogous to unity, the *Oligarchic* to the number 3, and the *Tyrannic* to the number 9. As 3 therefore is triple of unity, the *Oligarchic* is the third from the *Royal* character; and in a similar manner the *Tyrant* is distant from the *Oligarchist* by the triple in number; for 9 is the triple of 3, just as 3 is the triple of 1. But 9 is a plane number, the length of which is 3, and also its breadth. And a *tyrannic*, says Plato, is the last image of a royal life. He also calls 3 a *power*, because unity being multiplied by it, and itself by itself, and 9 by it, there will be produced 3, 9, 27. But he calls the third augment 27, arising from the multiplication of the power 3, and producing depth or a solid number. Lastly, 27 multiplied into itself produces 729, which may be considered as a perfect multiplication, this number being the 6th power of 3; and 6 as is well known is a perfect number. Hence, as the *King* is analogous to 1, he is said, by Plato, to be 729 times distant from the *Tyrant*.

You have heaped up, said he, a prodigious account of the difference between these two men, the just and the unjust, with reference to pleasure and pain. Yet the numbers are true, said I, and corresponding to their lives, if indeed days, and nights, and months, and years, correspond to them. But they do correspond, said he. If then the good and just man surpasses so far the evil and unjust man in pleasure, in what a prodigious degree further shall he surpass him in decorum of life, in beauty, and in virtue! Prodigious, indeed, by Zeus, he replied.

CHAP. XII.—Well then, said I, since we have reached this part of our argument, let us recapitulate what we first said, on account of which we came hither: now it was said, if I mistake not, that it is advantageous to one who is thoroughly unjust, but who has the character of being just, to commit injustice. Was it not so said? It was indeed. Now then, said I, let us settle this point, since we have now settled the other, with reference to acting justly and unjustly, what power each of these possesses in itself. How? said he. Let us ideally fashion an image of the soul, that the man who said those things may know what he said. What kind of image? said he. One of those creatures, said I, which are fabled to have been of old, as that of Chimæra, of Scylla, of Cerberus; and many others are spoken of, where many particular natures existed together in one. They are spoken of indeed, said he. Let us form now the figure of a creature, various, and many-headed,* having all around heads of tame creatures, and of wild, and having power in itself of changing all these heads, and of breeding them out of itself. This is the work, said he, of a skilful modeller: however, as the formation is easier in reasoning, than in wax and such-like, let it be formed. Let there be now one other figure of a lion† and one of a man; but let the first be by far the greatest, and the second be the second in bulk. These are easy, said he, and they are formed. Unite now these three in one, so that they may somehow coexist. They are united, said he. Form now around them the external appearance of one of them, that of

* By this many-headed beast, *desire* is signified.

† The lion signifies *anger*, and the figure of a man *reason*: for the whole soul is divided into reason, anger, and desire.

the man; so that to one who is not able to see what is within, but who perceives only the external covering, the man may appear one creature. It is formed all round, said he. Let us now tell him who asserts that it is profitable to this man to do injustice, but to do justice unprofitable, that he asserts nothing else, than that it is profitable for him to feast the multiform creature, and to make it strong; and likewise the lion, and what respects the lion, whilst the man he kills with famine, and renders weak, so as to be dragged whichever way either of those drag him; and that he will also find it advantageous never to accustom the one to live in harmony with the other, nor to make them friends, but suffer them to bite one another, and to fight and devour each other. He, said he, who commends the doing injustice, undoubtedly asserts these things. And does not he again, who says it is advantageous to act justly, say that he ought to do and to say such things by which the inner man shall come to have the most entire command of the man, and, as a tiller of the ground, shall take care of the many-headed creature, cherishing the mild ones, and nourishing them, and hindering the wild ones from growing up, taking the nature of the lion as his ally, and, having a common care for all, make them friendly to one another, and to himself, and so nourish them? He who commends justice undoubtedly says such things as these. In all respects, then, he who commends justice would seem to speak the truth, but he who commends injustice, to speak what is false; for, as respects pleasure, applause, and profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, and he who discommends it speaks nothing genuine; nor does he discommend with understanding what he discommends. Not at all, said he, as appears to me at least. Let us then in a mild manner persuade him (for it is not willingly he errs), asking him, O blessed man! do not we say that the maxims of things beautiful and base become so upon such accounts as these? Those are good which make the brutal part of our nature most subject to the man, or rather perhaps to that which is divine; while those are evil which enslave the mild part of our nature to the brutal:—will he agree with us,—or how? He will, if he be advised by me, said he. Is there then any one, said I, whom it avails from this reasoning, to take gold unjustly, supposing some-

thing of this kind to happen, if, while taking the money, he at the same time subjects the best part of himself to the worst? Or, if, taking gold, he should enslave a son or daughter, and that even to savage and wicked men, shall we not say this would not avail him, not though he should receive for it a prodigious sum? But if he enslaves the most divine part of himself to the most impious and most polluted part, without any pity, is he not wretched? and does he not take a gift of gold to his far more dreadful ruin, than Eriphyle did when she received the necklace for her husband's life? By far, said Glaucon; for I will answer you for him.

CHAP. XIII.—Do you not, then, think that intemperance has of old been blamed on these accounts, because in such persons that terrible, great, and multiform beast was indulged more than was decent? Plainly so, said he. And are not arrogance and moroseness blamed, when the lion-like and serpentine disposition increases and stretches beyond measure? Certainly. And are not luxury and effeminacy blamed because of the remissness and looseness of this disposition, when it engenders cowardice in the man? What else? Are not flattery and illiberality blamed, when any one makes this irascible part itself subject to the brutal crew, and, for the sake of wealth and its insatiable lust, accustoms the irascible to be affronted from its youth, and instead of a lion to become an ape? Entirely so, said he. But why is it, do you think, that mechanical arts and handicrafts bring disgrace? Shall we say it is on any other account than this, that when a man has the form of that which is best in his soul naturally weak, so as not to be able to govern the creatures within himself, but ministers to them, he is able only to learn what flatters them? It is likely, said he. In order then that such an one may be governed in the same manner as the best man is, do we not say that he must be the servant of one who is the best, and who has within him the divine governing principle? not at all conceiving that he should be governed to the hurt of the subject (as Thrasymachus imagined), but, as it is best for every one to be governed, by one divine and wise, most especially possessing it as his own within him, if not subjecting himself to it externally; that as far as possible we may all resemble one another and be friends, governed by one and the same? Rightly, indeed, said he. And law at least, said I, plainly

shows it intends such a thing, being an ally to all in the city; as does likewise the government of children, in not allowing them to be free till we establish in them a proper government, as in a city; and having cultivated that in them which is best, by that which is best in ourselves, we establish a similar guardian and governor for youth, and then at length we set it free. It shows it indeed, said he. In what way then shall we say, Glaucon, and according to what reasoning, that it is profitable to do injustice, to be intemperate, or to do anything base, by which a man shall indeed become more wicked, but yet shall acquire more wealth, or any kind of power? In no way, said he. But how shall we say it is profitable for the unjust to be concealed, and not to suffer punishment? or does he not indeed, who is concealed, still become more wicked? but he who is not concealed, and is punished, has the brutal part quieted, and made mild, and the mild part set at liberty. And the whole soul being settled in the best temper, in possessing temperance and justice, with wisdom, acquires a more valuable habit than the body does, in acquiring vigour and beauty, with a sound constitution; in as far as the soul is more valuable than the body. Entirely so, said he. Will not everybody then, who possesses intellect, regulate his life, first by extending hither the whole of his powers, honouring those branches of science which will render his soul of this kind, and despising all other things? It is plain, said he. And next, said I, with regard to a good habit of body and its nourishment, he will spend his life in attention to these, not that he may indulge the brutal and irrational pleasure; nor yet with a view to health, nor principally with reference to becoming strong, healthy, and beautiful, unless by these means he is to become temperate likewise: but he always appears to adjust the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony which is in the soul. By all means, said he, if indeed he is to be truly musical. Will he not then, in acquiring wealth, maintain accord and symphony? nor moved by the congratulations of the multitude will he increase the bulk of his treasures to an infinite amount, occasioning thereby infinite evils? I think not, said he. But looking, said I, to the government of it himself, and taking care that nothing there be moved out of its place, through the greatness or smallness of his property, thus governing as far

as he is able, he will add to his property, and spend out of it. Entirely so, said he. He will regard honours, likewise, in the same manner; of some he will willingly take a share, and taste of those which he judges will render him a better man, but as for those which he thinks would dissolve that habit of soul which subsists within him, he will fly from both those privately and in public. He will not be willing, then, said he, to act the politician, if he takes care of this. Yes, truly, said I, in his own state, and greatly too; but not probably in his country, unless some divine fortune befall him. I understand, said he. You mean in the state we have now established, which exists only in our reasoning, but I think has no existence on earth. But in heaven, probably,—said I, there is a model of it, for any one who inclines to contemplate it, and on contemplating to regulate himself accordingly; and to him it matters not whether it does exist anywhere, or will ever exist here:—for he would perform the duties of this city alone, and of no other. It is reasonable, said he.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK.

BOOK X.

ARGUMENT.

The *concluding book* of the Republic comprises two main subjects of inquiry. First, he explains more fully than he had done in the third book, the reason for excluding from his pattern state the accomplishment of poetry, so highly prized by the Athenians, but nevertheless he allows the admission of that chaste and harmless kind of it; such as hymns to the gods and odes in honour of celebrated men;—and, lastly he treats of the rewards both precept and to come, resulting from the practice of justice,—and of the punishments on the other which attend on injustice, which is totally opposed to state-happiness.

CHAP. I.—Moreover, remarked I, both in many other respects, I observe that we have been rightly establishing our state, better indeed than all others; and not least so do I say, as regards our sentiments concerning poetry. What are they? said he. That no part of it which is imitative should by any means be admitted;—for that it must not be admitted appears now, methinks, exceedingly clear, since the several forms of the soul have been distinguished apart from one another. How do you mean? That I may tell it to you,—(for you will not denounce me to the composers of tragedy, and the rest of the imitative class),—all such things as these seem to be the ruin of the intellect of the hearers,—that is, of such of them as have not a test to enable them to discern their peculiar nature. What consideration, said he, leads you to say this? It must be stated, said I; although a certain friendship, at least, and reverence for Homer, which I have had from my childhood, almost restrains me from telling it; for he seems truly both to have been the first leader and teacher of all the good composers of tragedy; but still the man must not be honoured in preference to truth. But what I mean must be spoken. By all means, said he. Hear me then, or rather answer me. Put your question then. Can you tell me perfectly, what is the nature of imitation?—for I do not myself altogether understand its meaning. Is it possible then,

said he, that I shall any how understand it? That would be no way strange, said I; since those who are dim-sighted perceive many things sooner than those who see more clearly. The case is so, said he; but while you are present, I would not venture to tell, even though I had some inkling of it, but consider it yourself. Do you wish then, that we hence begin our inquiry in our usual method? for we used to suppose a certain idea relating to many individuals, to which we give the same name;—do you not understand? I do understand. Let us suppose now any one you please among the many, as for example, if you will, there are many beds and tables. Of course. But the ideas, at least respecting these pieces of furniture, are two, one of bed, and one of table. Yes. And do we not usually say, that the workman of each of these pieces of furniture, looking towards the idea, makes them thus—one of them the beds, and the other the tables which we use;—and all other things in like manner?—for surely not one of the artificers makes the idea itself; for how can he? By no means. See now then, what kind of an artificer do you call this? Which? He who makes all things which each several artificer makes. You are alluding to some skilful and wonderful person. Not yet, at least; but you will much more say so presently; for this same mechanic is not only able to make all sorts of utensils, but makes everything also which springs from the earth, and he makes all sorts of animals, himself as well as others; and besides these things, he makes the earth, the heaven and the gods, and all things in heaven, and in Hades under the earth. You are speaking, said he, of a perfectly wonderful sophist. Do you disbelieve me? said I; but tell me, do you not think that there is such an artificer; or that in one respect, he is the maker of all these things, and in another not so?—or do you not perceive, that even you yourself might be able to make all these things, in a certain manner at least? And what, said he, is this manner? It is not difficult, said I, but is done in many ways, and quickly too; but in the quickest way of all, if I mistake not, if you please to make a mirror, and carry it round everywhere; for then you will very quickly make the sun, and the heavenly bodies, the earth, yourself, and the other animals and utensils and plants, and all that we have just now mentioned. Yes, said he, the appearances, but not surely the realities. You come in.

said I, both well and seasonably, with your remark; for the painter too, methinks, is an artificer of this kind;—is he not? He cannot possibly be otherwise. You will say then, I suppose, that he does not make what he makes real and true, although the painter too, in a certain manner at least, makes a bed, does he not? Aye, said he; but he too makes only the appearance.

CHAP. II.—But what as to the bed-maker?—did you not just now say, that he does not make the idea which we say exists, and is a bed, but only a particular bed? I did say so. If then he does not make that which really exists, he does not make real being, but something resembling being, though not being itself: but if any one should say that the work of the bed-maker, or any other craftsman, were real being, it seems he would not say what is true. He would not, said he, as it should seem to those who are acquainted with such discussions. We must not then be surprised if this likewise should seem somewhat obscure compared with the truth. Certainly not. Are you willing then, said I, that as regards these very things we inquire concerning the real nature of their imitator? If you please, he replied. Are there not then these three sorts of beds:—one existing in nature, and which we may say, I suppose, God made, or who else? No one, I think. And another which the joiner makes? Yes, said he. And a third which the painter makes:—is it not so? Granted. Now the painter, the bed-maker, God, these three are the masters of three species of beds? They are three indeed. But God, whether it were that he was unwilling, or whether there was some necessity that he should only make one bed in nature, made this one only, which is really a bed; while two or more of such other species have never been produced, nor ever will be produced by God. How so? said he. Because, said I, if he had made but two, one again would have appeared, the idea of which both these two would have possessed, and that idea would be that of a bed, and not those two. Right, said he. God then, methinks, being aware of these things, and willing to be the maker of a bed really, and having real being, though of no one particular bed, and not to be any particular bed-maker, produced but one in nature? It seems so. Are you willing then that we should call him the producer of this, or of something of a similar nature? It is just, said he, since he has in their essential nature created this, as well as all other things. But what as to the joiner?—is not he

the maker of a bed? Yes. And is the painter, too, the workman and maker of something similar? By no means. But what will you say he has to do with a bed? This, as I think, we may most reasonably call him, said he, an imitator of what the others actually make and contrive. Be it so, said I; then him you call the imitator who makes what is generated the third from nature? Quite so, he replied. And this composer of tragedy will in like manner, as being an imitator, rise as a sort of third from the king and the truth; and so likewise all other imitators? Aye, so it seems. We have agreed, then, as to the imitator?—but tell me this concerning the painter, whether you think he undertakes to imitate each particular thing in nature, or the works of artificers? The works of artificers, said he. Whether, such as they really are, or such only as they appear? for this we must define more correctly. How say you? said he. Thus; does a bed differ at all in itself, whether a man view it obliquely or directly opposite, or in any particular position?—or, is it not at all different, but only apparently different, and so on as respects other things? Thus it appears, said he, yet it does not really differ. Consider this too, with reference to which of the two does painting work, in each particular work; whether with reference to real being, to imitate it as it really is, or with reference to what is apparent, as it appears; and whether is it the imitation of appearance, or of truth? Only of appearance, said he. The imitative art, then, is far from the truth: and on this account it seems, he is able to make these things, because he is able to attain only to some small part of each particular, and that but an image. Thus we say that a painter will paint us a shoemaker, a joiner, and other craftsmen, though having no acquaintance with any of these arts; yet he will be able to deceive children and ignorant people, if he be a good painter, when he paints a joiner, and shows him at a distance, so far as to make them imagine he is a real joiner. Of course. But this, I think, my friend, we must take into consideration in connexion with all these things; that when any one tells us of any one, that he has met with a man skilled in all kinds of workmanship, and everything else which each particular artist understands, and that he knows everything whatever more accurately than any one else, we ought to reply to such an one, that he is a simpleton, and that it seems, he has been deceived by falling

in with some conjurer, or imitator, so as to seem to himself, to know everything owing to his very incapacity of distinguishing between science and ignorance and imitation. Most true, said he.

CHAP. III.—Ought we not then next, said I, to consider tragedy and its leader, Homer?—Since from some we hear that these poets understand all arts, and all human affairs, respecting virtue and vice, and likewise all divine things; for a good poet must necessarily compose with knowledge, if he means what he composes to compose well,—else he is not able to compose. It is our business then to consider whether those who have fallen in with these imitators have been deceived, and on viewing their works have not perceived that they are the third distant from real being, and their works such as can easily be made by one not knowing the truth (for they make phantasms, and not real beings); or whether do they say something to the purpose, and do the good poets really know the things about which the multitude think they speak well. This, said he, is by all means to be inquired into. Think you then, that if any one could make both of these, that which is imitated, and likewise the original idea, he would allow himself seriously to apply to the workmanship of the images, and propose that to himself as the best thing in life? I do not. But if he were really intelligent in these things which he imitates, he would, I think, far more seriously study the things themselves than the imitations, and would try to leave behind him many and beautiful actions, as monuments of himself, and rather study to be himself the person commended than the mere eulogist. I think so, said he; for neither is the honour nor the profit equal. As to other things, then, let us not call them to account,—asking Homer or any other of the poets, whether they were skilled in medicine, and not mere imitators of medical discourses;—for which of the ancient or more recent poets is said to have restored any to health, as Æsculapius did? or what disciples of medical science has any of them left behind, such as he left his descendants?—Neither let us ask them about the other arts, but leave them out of the question; and with reference to those greatest and most beautiful things on which Homer tries to discourse,—about wars and armies, and civic consti-

tutions, and human education, it is just, perhaps, to question and inquire of him: Friend Homer, if you be not the third from the truth with regard to virtue, as being the artificer of an image (for thus we have defined an imitator), but rather the second, and can discern what pursuits render men better or worse, in private as well as public, tell us which of the states has been better constituted by you, as Lacedæmon was by Lycurgus, and great and small cities by many others;—but as respects yourself, what state is it that acknowledges you to have been a good lawgiver, and to have done them good service? Italy and Sicily acknowledge Charondas, and we Solon; but who acknowledges you? Will he be able to mention any one? I think not, said Glaucon. That is not pretended even by the Homeridæ themselves. But what war in Homer's days is recorded to have been conducted by him as general, or adviser? Not one. What then are his discoveries?—since among the works of a wise man there are many discoveries and inventions mentioned, that concern the arts, and other affairs; as of Thales the Milesian, and of Anacharsis the Scythian. There is not any one such to be found. But if not in a public manner, has Homer the repute of having lived as a private instructor to any who delighted in his conversation, and to have delivered down to posterity a certain Homeric manner of life,—just as Pythagoras was remarkably beloved on this account, and, as even to this day, such as denominate themselves Pythagoræans appear to be somehow eminent beyond others in their manner of life? Neither, said he, is there anything of this kind related about Homer:—for Creophilus,* Socrates, the friend of Homer, may probably appear even still more ridiculous in his education, than in his name, if what is said of Homer be true:—for it is said that he was greatly neglected by him when he lived.

CHAP. IV.—It is said so indeed, I replied:—but think you, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate men, and to make them better, as being capable not only of

* According to the Greek scholiast, Creophilus was an epic poet of Chios. Homer, it is said, married his daughter, and dwelling in his house, had from him the poem of the Iliad. His name, to which Socrates alludes, signifies a lover of flesh.

imitating in these matters, but of understanding them likewise, he would not then have won many intimate friends, and have been loved and honoured by them? Whereas on the other hand, Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and many others, have the power of persuading the men of their day, by private conversation, that they will neither be able to govern their family or the state, unless they themselves direct their education; and for this wisdom of theirs, they are so exceedingly beloved, that their friends almost carry them about on their heads. Would then the men of Homer's time have left either him or Hesiod to go about singing their songs, if he could have done men service in the way of virtue, and not rather have kept him with offers of gold, and so obliged him to stay with them; or,—had they been unable to prevail on him, would they not as disciples have followed him everywhere, till they had gained a sufficient education? Assuredly, Socrates, said he, you appear to me to say what is true. Shall we not then establish this point,—that all the poets, beginning from Homer, are imitators of the images of virtue, and of other things about which they compose, but yet do not attain to the real truth; but, as we just now said, a painter, who himself knows nothing about the making of shoes, will draw a shoemaker, apparently real only to such as are not intelligent, but look at him only as to colour and figures? Certainly. In the same manner, I think, we shall say that the poet colours over with his names and words certain colours of the several arts, without understanding anything himself, but merely imitating, so that to others such as himself who view things in his compositions, he has the appearance of possessing knowledge: and if he says anything about shoemaking in measure, rhythm, and harmony, he seems to speak perfectly well, whether it be respecting the art of a general or any other subject; so great is the enchantment which these things naturally have, because you know, I think, in what manner poetry appears when stript of the colour of music, and expressed apart,—for you have somewhere beheld it. I have, said he. Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of people who are in the prime of their life, but yet not beautiful, such as they appear when their bloom forsakes them? Quite so, said he. Come then, consider this:—the maker of the

image, whom we call the imitator, knows nothing of real being, but only of that which is apparent:—is it not so? Yes. Let us not then leave it expressed by halves, but let us examine it fully. Say on, replied he. A painter, we say, will paint reins and a bridle. Yes. And the leather-cutter, and the smith, will make them. Certainly. Does the painter then understand what kind of reins and bridle there ought to be;—or not even he who makes them, the smith, nor the leather-cutter, but he who knows how to use them, the horseman alone? Most true. Shall we not say that this is the case in everything else? How? That with reference to each particular thing there are these three arts:—that which is to use it, that which is to make it, and that which is to imitate it? Yes. Are then the virtue, and the beauty, and the rectitude of every utensil, and animal, and action, for nothing else but for the use for which each particular was made, or generated? Just so. Very necessarily, then, must he who uses each particular, be the most skilful, and most able to tell the maker what he makes good or bad, with regard to the use in which he employs it: thus, for example, a flute-player will tell the flute-maker concerning flutes, what things are expedient for playing on the flute, and will give orders how he ought to make them, but the latter will attend to his directions. Of course. Will not the one then, being intelligent, pronounce concerning good and bad flutes, and the other, believing him, make them accordingly? Yes. With reference then to one and the same instrument, the maker will form a correct opinion concerning its beauty or deformity, while he is conversant with one who is intelligent, and is obliged to hear from the intelligent; but he who uses it must have science. Certainly. But will the imitator have science from using the things he paints, whether handsome and correct, or otherwise? or will he form a correct opinion from being necessarily conversant with the intelligent, and from being ordered how he ought to paint? Neither of the two. The imitator then will neither know nor form a correct opinion about what he imitates with reference to beauty or deformity? It seems not. The imitator then will be very skilful in his imitation, with regard to wisdom, concerning what he paints? Not wholly so. Nevertheless he will at least imitate, without knowing about each particular in what respect

it is bad or good ; and he will probably imitate such as appears to be beautiful to the multitude, and those who know nothing? Of course. We have now, indeed, sufficiently, as it appears, at least, settled these things ;—that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning in those things which he imitates, but imitation is a sort of amusement, and no serious business :—and likewise, that those who apply to tragic poetry in iambs and epics, are all imitators in the highest degree? Certainly.

CHAP. V.—By Zeus, though, said I, this business of imitation is placed somehow in the third degree from the truth :—is it not? Yes. To what part then of man does it belong, having the power that it has? What part do you speak of? Of such as this :—the same magnitude perceived by sight, does not appear in the same manner, both near and at a distance. It does not. And the same things appear crooked and straight, when we look at them in water, and out of the water, and concave and convex, through error of the sight, as to colours. All this disturbance is manifest in the soul ; and it is this infirmity of our nature which painting attacks, leaving nothing of magical seduction unattempted, as well as the wonder-working art, and many other such-like devices. True. And have not the arts of measure, number, and weight been deemed in these matters most ingenious helps, that so the apparent greater or less, the apparent more or heavier, may not govern us, but that which numbers, measures, and weighs? It must be so. But this again is, at least, the work of the rational part in the soul. It is so, indeed. But while reason often measures and pronounces some things to be greater or less than other things, or equal, the contrary appears at the same time as regards these things? Yes. But did not we say that it was impossible for the same person to have contrary opinions about the same things at the same time? Thus far indeed we said rightly. That part of the soul, then, which judges contrary to the measure, would seem not to be the same with that which judges according to the measure. It would not. But surely that, at least, which trusts to measure and computation would seem to be the best part of the soul? Of course. That then which opposes itself to this will be one of our depraved parts. Necessarily so. It was this then I wished should be agreed

upon, when I said that painting, and imitation, in general, being far from the truth, delights in its own work, conversing with that part in us which is far from wisdom, and is its companion and friend, to no sound nor genuine purpose. Entirely so, said he. Imitation, then, being depraved in itself, and joining with that which is depraved, generates depraved things. It seems so. Whether, said I, is the case thus, with reference to the imitation which is by the sight only, or is it likewise so with reference to that by hearing, which we call poetry? Probably as to this also, said he. We shall not therefore, said I, trust to the appearance in painting, but we shall proceed to the consideration of the intellectual part with which the imitation through poetry is conversant, and see whether it is depraved or worthy. It must be done. Let us proceed then thus: Poetic imitation, we say, imitates men acting either voluntarily or involuntarily; and imagining that in their acting they have done either well or ill, and in all these cases receiving either pain or pleasure: is the case any otherwise than this? Not at all. In all these, now, does the man agree with himself? or, as he disagreed with reference to sight, and had contrary opinions in himself of the same things at one and the same time, does he, in the same manner, disagree likewise in his actions, and fight with himself? But I recollect that there is no occasion for us to settle this at least; for, in our previous discussion, we sufficiently determined all this,—that our soul is full of a thousand such internal contrarieties. Right, said he. Right indeed, said I, but it appears to me necessary to discuss now, what was then omitted. What is that? said he. We said somewhere formerly, said I, that a good man, when he meets with such a misfortune as the loss of a son, or of anything else which he values the most, will bear it of all men the easiest. Certainly. But let us now consider this further,—whether will he not grieve at all, or is this indeed impossible, but will he moderate his grief? The truth, said he, is rather this last. But tell me this now concerning him, whether do you think that he will struggle more with grief and oppose it, when he is observed by his equals, or when he is in solitude, alone by himself? Much more, said he, when he is observed. But when alone, he will venture, I think, to utter many things,

which, if any one heard him, he would be ashamed of, and he will do many things which he would not wish any one saw him doing. Aye, such is the case, said he.

CHAP. VI.—Do not then reason and law command him to restrain his grief,—while it is the passion itself that excites grief? True. As then there is a twofold inducement for man's conduct, with regard to the same thing, at one and the same time, we must necessarily say that he has two conductors. Of course. And shall we not say that one of them is ready to obey the law wherever law leads him? How? Law in a manner says that it is best to maintain the greatest possible tranquillity in misfortunes, and not to bear them ill; since the good or evil of such things as these is not manifest, and since no advantage follows the bearing these things ill; and as nothing of human affairs deserves great interest; and, besides this, their grief proves a hinderance to that within them which we ought to have most at hand. What is it, said he, you here mean? Deliberating on the event, said I; and, as on the throw of the dice, regulating our affairs according to what turns up, in whatever way reason shall dictate as best; and not as children, when they fall, to lie still, and waste the time in crying; but always to accustom the soul to apply in the speediest manner to heal and raise up what was fallen and sick, putting an end to lamentation by medicine. One would thus, said he, behave in the best manner in every condition. And did not we say that the best part is willing to follow this which is rational? Plainly so. And shall we not say that the part which leads to the remembrance of affliction and to wailings, and is insatiably given to these, is irrational, and idle, and a friend to cowardice? We shall, indeed, say so. Is not the grieving part then that which admits of much and various imitation? But the prudent and tranquil part, which is ever uniform with itself, is neither easily imitated, nor, when imitated, easily understood, especially by a popular assembly, where all sorts of men are assembled together in a theatre. For surely it is the imitation of a disposition which is foreign to them. Entirely so. It is plain, then, that the imitative poet is not made for such a part of the soul as this:—nor is his skill fitted to please it, if he means to gain the applause of the multitude; but he applies to the passionate and the

multiform part, as it is easily imitated. It is plain. May we not then, with justice, lay hold of the imitative poet, and place him in correspondence with the painter? for he resembles him, both because, as to truth, he effects but depraved things, and resembles him too in this being conversant with a different part of the soul from that which is best:—and thus we may, with justice, not admit him into our city which is to be well regulated, because he excites and nurtures this part of the soul, and, by strengthening this, destroys the rational:—and just as he, who in a state gives power to the wicked, betrays the state, and ruins the best men, we may in like manner say that the imitative poet establishes a bad republic in the soul of each individual, gratifying the foolish part of it, which neither discerns what is great, nor what is little, but deems the same things sometimes great, and sometimes small, forming little images in its own imagination, altogether remote from the truth? Certainly.

CHAP. VII.—Still we have not yet brought the greatest accusation against it: for that is, somehow, a very dreadful one, that it has the power of corrupting even the good, except only a very few. It must, if it acts in this manner. But hear now, and consider; for somehow, the best of us, when we hear Homer, or any of the tragic writers, imitating some of the heroes when in grief, pouring forth long speeches in their sorrow, bewailing and beating their breasts, you know are delighted; and, yielding ourselves, we follow along, and, sympathizing with them, seriously commend him as an able poet whoever most affects us in this manner. I know it, of course. But when any domestic grief befalls any of us, you perceive, on the other hand, that we value ourselves on the opposite behaviour, if we can be quiet and endure, this being the part of a man, but that of a woman, which in the other case we commended. I perceive it, said he. Is this commendation proper, then, said I, when we see such a man as one would not deign to be oneself, but would be ashamed of, not to abominate but to delight in and commend him? No, by Zeus, said he; it appears unreasonable. Certainly, said I, if you consider the matter thus. How? If you reflect that the part of us, which in our private misfortunes is forcibly restrained, and is kept from weeping and bewailing to the full, being by nature of such a kind as desires these, is the

very part which by the poets is filled and gratified; but that part in us, which is naturally the best, being not sufficiently instructed, either by reason or habit, grows remiss in its guardianship over the bewailing part, by attending to the sufferings of others, and deems it no way disgraceful to itself, to commend and pity one who grieves immoderately, whilst he professes to be a good man;—but this it thinks it gains, even pleasure, which it would not choose to be deprived of, by despising the whole of the poem:—for, methinks, it falls to the share of few to be able to consider, that what we feel for others' misfortunes must necessarily be felt with respect to our own,—because it is no easy matter for a man to bear up under his own troubles, who strongly cherishes the bewailing disposition over those of others. Most true, said he. And is not the reasoning the same with reference to the ridiculous?—For when you hear, by comic imitation, or in private conversation, what you would be ashamed to do yourself to excite laughter, and are delighted with it, and imitate it, you do the same thing here as in tragedy: for that part, which, when it wanted to excite laughter, was formerly restrained by reason from a fear of incurring the character of scurrility, by now letting loose, and allowing there to grow vigorous, you are often imperceptibly brought to be in your own conduct a buffoon. Extremely so, said he. And with respect to venereal pleasures, and anger, and the whole of the passions, as well the sorrowful as the joyful in the soul, which truly, we have said, attend us in every action; the poetical imitation of these has the same effect upon us; for it nurtures and irrigates them, whereas they ought to be dried up, and makes them govern us, whereas they ought to be governed, in order to our becoming better and happier, instead of being worse and more miserable. I can say no otherwise, said he. When therefore, Glaucon, said I, you find the eulogists of Homer saying that this poet instructed Greece, and that he deserves to be taken as a master to teach both the management and the knowledge of human affairs, and that a man should regulate the whole of his life by the rules of this poet, we should indeed love and embrace such people, as being as good as they can be; and agree with them that Homer is a fine poet,

and the first of tragic writers:—yet they must know, that hymns to the gods, and the praises of worthy actions, are alone to be admitted into our state:—for if you were to admit the pleasurable muse likewise, in songs, or verses, we should have pleasure and pain reigning in our state instead of law, and that reason which always appears best to the community. Most true, said he.

CHAP. VIII.—Let these things now, said I, be our apology, when we recollect what we have said with reference to poetry, that we then very properly dismissed it from our republic, since it is such as is now described: for reason obliged us. And let us address it further, that it may not accuse us of a certain roughness and rusticity, that there is an ancient variance between philosophy and poetry; for such verses as these,

That brawling whelp, which at her mistress barks,

And

He apes the great with empty eloquence,

And

On trifles still they plod, because they're poor;

and a thousand such-like, are marks of an ancient opposition between them. Notwithstanding, however, it may be said, that if any one can assign a reason why the poetry and the imitation which are calculated for pleasure ought to be in a well-regulated city, we, for our part, shall gladly admit them, as we are at least conscious to ourselves that we are charmed by them. But to betray what appears to be truth, were an unholy thing. For are not you yourself, my friend, charmed by this imitation, and most especially when you see it performed by Homer? Very much so. Is it not just, then, that we introduce it as speaking its own defence, either in song, or in any other measure? By all means. And we may at least grant, even to its defenders, such as are not poets, but lovers of poetry, to speak in its behalf, without verse, and show that it is not only pleasant, but profitable for states, and human life also; for surely we shall derive some benefit if it shall be found to be not only pleasant but profitable. How can we do otherwise than derive benefit from it? said

he. And if it happen otherwise, my friend, we shall do as those who have been in love, when they deem their love unprofitable,—they desist, though with violence; so we in like manner, through this innate love of such poetry that prevails in our best forms of government, shall be well pleased to see it appear to be the best and truest; and we shall hear it till it is able to make no further apology. But we shall take along with us this discourse which we have held, as a counter-charm, and incantation, being afraid to fall back again into a childish and vulgar love. We may perceive then that we are not to be much in earnest about such poetry as this, as if it were a serious affair, and approached to the truth; but the hearer is to beware of it, and to be afraid for the republic within himself, and to entertain those opinions of poetry which we mentioned. I entirely agree, said he. For great is the contest, friend Glaucon, said I, great not such as it appears, to become a good or a bad man: wherefore it is not right to be moved, either by honour, or riches, or any magistracy whatever, or poetry, so to neglect justice, and the other virtues. I agree with you, from what we have argued, and so I think will any one else.

CHAP. IX.—However, we have not yet, said I, discussed the greatest prize of virtue, and the rewards laid up for her. You speak of some prodigious greatness, said he, if there be other greater than those mentioned. But what is there, said I, can be great in a little time? for all this period from infancy to old age is but little in respect of the whole. Nothing at all indeed, said he. What then? Do you think an immortal being ought to be much concerned about such a period, and not about the whole of time? I think, said he, about the whole. But why do you mention this? Have you not perceived, said I, that our soul is immortal, and never perishes? On which he, looking at me, and wondering, said, By Jupiter, not I indeed. But are you able to show this? I should otherwise act unjustly, said I. And I think you yourself can show it, for it is not at all difficult. To me at least, said he, it is difficult; but I would willingly hear from you this which is not difficult. You shall hear then, said I. Only speak, he replied. Is there not something, said I, which you call good, and something which you call evil? I own it. Do you conceive of

them, then, just in the way that I do? How? That which destroys and corrupts everything is the evil, and what preserves and profits it is the good. I do, said he. But what? Do you say, that there is something which is good, and something which is bad, to each particular? as blindness to the eyes, and disease to every animal body, blasting to corn, rottenness to wood, rust to brass and iron, and, as I say almost every thing to its connate evil and disease? I do, he replied. And when anything of this kind befalls anything, does it not render that which it befalls base, and in the end dissolve and destroy it? How should it not? Its own connate evil then and baseness destroys each particular; or, if this does not destroy it, nothing else can ever destroy it:—because that which is good can never destroy anything, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil. How can they? said he. If then we shall be able to find among beings, any one which has indeed some evil which renders it base, but is not however able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not then know that a being thus constituted cannot be destroyed at all? So it seems, replied he. What then? said I:—is there not something which renders the soul evil? Certainly, he replied; all these things which we have now mentioned,—injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But does any of these then dissolve and destroy it?—And attend now, that we may not be imposed on, in thinking that an unjust and foolish man, when detected acting unjustly, is then destroyed through his injustice, which is the baseness of his soul: but consider it thus:—As disease, which is the baseness of animal body dissolves and destroys body, and reduces it to be no longer that body; so all those things we mentioned, being destroyed by their own proper evil adhering to them and possessing them, are reduced to non-existence. Is it not so? Yes. Consider now the soul in the same manner. Does injustice, and the rest of vice, possessing it, by possessing, and adhering to it, corrupt and deface it, till, bringing it to decay, it separates it from the body? By no means, said he.] It were absurd, said I, that anything should be destroyed by the baseness of another, but not by its own. Absurd. you must reflect, Glaucon, said I, that neither by the baseness of actuals, whether owing to mouldiness, or rottenness

whatever else, do we think our body can be destroyed ; but if this baseness in them create in the body a depravity of the body, we may allege, that through their means, the body is destroyed by its own evil, which is disease. But we will never allow that by the baseness of food, which is one thing, the body, which is another thing, can ever by this foreign evil, without creating in it its own peculiar evil, be at any time destroyed. You speak most correctly, he replied.

CHAP. X.—According to the same reasoning, then, said I, unless the baseness of the body create a baseness of the soul, let us never allow that the soul can be destroyed by an evil which is foreign, without its own peculiar evil, one thing by the evil of another. There is reason for it, said he. Let us, then, either refute these things as not good reasoning ; or, so long as they are unrefuted, let us at no time say, that the soul shall be ever in any degree the more destroyed, either by burning fever, or by any other disease, or by slaughter, not even though a man should cut the whole body into the smallest parts possible, till some one show that, through these sufferings of the body, the soul herself becomes more unjust and unholy. But we will never allow it to be said, that when a foreign evil befalls anything, whilst its own proper evil is not within it, either the soul or anything else is destroyed. But this, at least, said he, no one can ever show, that the souls of those who die are by death rendered more unjust. But if any one, replied I, shall dare to contend with us in reasoning ; and, in order that he may not be obliged to own that souls are immortal, should say, that when a man dies he becomes more wicked and unjust, we shall surely require if he who says this speaks truly, that injustice is deadly to the possessor, as a disease ; and that those who embrace it are destroyed by it as by a disease destructive in its own nature, —those most speedily who embrace it most, and those more slowly who embrace it less. And not as at present, where the unjust die having this punishment inflicted on them by others. By Jupiter, said he, injustice would not appear perfectly dreadful, if it were deadly to him who practises it (for that were a deliverance from evil) ; but I rather think it will appear to be altogether the reverse, destroying others as far as it can, but rendering the unjust extremely alive, and, in conjunction with being alive, wakeful likewise ; so far,

as it seems, does it dwell from being deadly. You say well, replied I; for, when a man's own wickedness and peculiar evil is not sufficient to kill and destroy the soul, that evil, which aims at the destruction of another, can scarcely destroy a soul, or anything else but that against which it is aimed. Hardly, indeed, said he, as I think at least. Since, therefore, it is destroyed by no one evil, neither peculiar nor foreign, is it not plain that, of necessity, it always is? and, if it always is, it is immortal? Necessarily so, he replied.

CHAP. XI.—Let this then, said I, be so settled:—and if it be, you will perceive that the same souls will always remain, for their number will never become less, none being destroyed, nor will it become greater; for if, anyhow, the number of immortals was made greater, you know it would take from the mortal, and in the end all would be immortal. You say true. But let us not, said I, think that this will be the case (for reason will not allow of it), nor yet that the soul in its truest nature is of such a kind as to be full of much variety, dissimilitude, and difference considered in itself. How mean you? said he. That cannot easily, said I, be eternal which is compounded of many things, and which has not the most beautiful composition, as hath now appeared to us to be the case with reference to the soul. It is not likely. That the soul then is something immortal, both our present reasonings, and others too, may oblige us to own: but in order to know what kind of being the soul is, in truth, one ought not to contemplate it as it is damaged both by its conjunction with the body and by other evils, as we now behold it, but such as it is when become pure, such it must by reasoning be fully contemplated; and he (who does this) will find it far more beautiful at least, and will more plainly see through justice, and injustice, and everything which we have now discussed. We are now telling the truth concerning it, such as it appears at present. We have seen it, indeed, in the same condition in which they see the marine Glaucus,* where they cannot easily

* According to the Greek Scholiast, Glaucus is said to have been the son of Sisyphus and Merope, and to have become a marine demon. For, meeting with an immortal fountain, and descending into it, he became immortal. Not being able, however, to point out this fountain to certain persons, he threw himself into the sea; and once every year coursed round all shores and islands in conjunction with whales.

perceive his ancient nature, because the ancient members of his body are partly broken off, and others are worn away; and he is altogether damaged by the waves: and, besides this, other things are grown to him, such as shellfish, seaweed, and stones: so that he in every respect resembles a beast, rather than what he naturally was. In such a condition do we behold the soul under a thousand evils. But we ought to behold it there, Glaucon. Where? said he. In its philosophy; and to observe to what it applies, and what intimacies it professes, as being allied to that which is divine, immortal, and eternal; and what it would become, if it wholly pursued a thing of this kind, and were by this pursuit brought out of that sea in which it now is, and had the stones and shellfish shaken off from it, which, at present, as it is fed on earth, render its nature, to a great extent, earthy, stony, and savage, through those aliments, which are said to procure felicity: and then one might behold its true nature, whether multiform, or uniform, and everything concerning it. But we have, I think, sufficiently discussed its passions, and forms in human life. Assuredly, he replied.

CHAP. XII.—Have we not now, said I, discussed everything else in our reasonings, though we have not produced those rewards and honours of justice (as you say Hesiod and Homer do)? but we find justice itself to be the best reward to the soul; and that it ought to do what is just, whether it have or have not Gyges' ring, and, together with such a ring, the helmet* likewise of Pluto. You say most true, said he. Will it not now, then, Glaucon, said I, be attended with no envy, if, besides these, we add those rewards to justice and the other virtues, which are bestowed on the soul by men and gods, both whilst the man is alive, and after he is dead? By all means, said he. Will you, then, restore me what you borrowed in the reasoning? What, chiefly? I granted you, that the just man should be deemed unjust, and the unjust be deemed to be just. For you were of opinion, that though it were not possible that these things should be concealed from

* The helmet of Pluto is said to be an immortal and invisible cloud, with which the gods are invested when they wish not to be known to each other. And it is applied as a proverb to those that do anything secretly. —Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 197.

gods and men, it should, however, be granted, for the sake of the argument, that justice in itself might be compared with injustice in itself; do you not remember it? I should, indeed, be unjust, said he, if I did not.

Now after the judgment is over, I demand again, in behalf of justice, that as you allow it to be indeed esteemed both by gods and men, you likewise allow it to have the same good reputation, that it may also receive those prizes of victory, which it acquires from the reputation of justice, and bestows on those who possess it; since it has already appeared to bestow those good things which arise from really being just, and that it does not deceive those who truly embrace it. You demand what is just, said he. Will you not, then, said I, in the first place, restore me this? That it is not concealed from the gods, what kind of man each of the two is. We will grant it, said he. And if they be not concealed, one of them will be beloved of the gods, and one of them hated,* as we agreed in the beginning. Such is the case. And shall we not agree, that as to the man who is beloved of the gods, whatever comes to him from the gods, will all be the best possible, unless he has some necessary ill from former miscarriage? Certainly. We are then to think thus of the just man. That if he happen to be in poverty, or in diseases, or in an other of those seeming evils, these things to him issue in something good, either whilst alive or dead. For never at any time is he neglected by the gods, who inclines earnestly to endeavour to become just, and practises virtue as far as it is possible for man to resemble God. It is reasonable, replied he, that such an one should not be neglected by him whom he resembles. And are we not to think the reverse of these things concerning the unjust man? Certainly. Such, then, would seem to be the prizes which the just man receives from the gods. Such they are, indeed, in my opinion, said he. But what, said I, do they receive from men? Is not the case thus (if we are to suppose the truth)? Do not cunning and unjust men do the same thing as those racers, who run well at the beginning, but not so at the end? for at the first they briskly leap forward, but in the end they become ridiculous, and, with their

* That is to say, one of these through aptitude will receive the illuminations of divinity, and the other through inaptitude will subject himself to the power of avenging demons.

ears on their neck, they run off without any reward. But such as are true racers, arriving at the end, both receive the prizes, and are crowned. Does it not happen thus, for the most part, as to just men; that at the end of every action and intercourse of life they are both held in esteem, and receive rewards from men? Entirely so. You will then suffer me to say of these what you yourself said of the unjust. For I will aver now, that the just, when they are grown up, shall arrive at power if they desire magistracies, they shall marry where they incline, and shall settle their children in marriage agreeably to their wishes; and everything else you mentioned concerning the others, I now say concerning these. And on the other hand, I will say of the unjust, that the most of them, though they may remain concealed while young, yet, being caught at the end of the race, are ridiculous; and, when they become old, are wretched and ridiculed, and shall be scourged both by foreigners and citizens, and afterwards tortured and burnt; which you said were terrible things;—and you spoke the truth. You may suppose that you hear from me that they suffer all these things. But see if you will admit what I say. Certainly, said he, for you say what is just.

CHAP. XIII.—These then, said I, are the prizes, the rewards and gifts, which a just man receives during life, both from gods and men; besides those good things which justice contains in itself. And they are extremely beautiful, said he, and permanent. But these now, said I, are nothing in number or magnitude, when compared with those which await each of the two at death. And these things must likewise be heard, that each of them may completely have what is their due in the reasoning. You may say on, he replied, as to one who would not listen to many other things with greater pleasure. But, however, I will not, said I, tell you the apologue of Alcinous; but that, indeed, of a brave man, Erus the son of Armenius, by descent a Pamphylian; who happening on a time to die in battle, when the dead were on the tenth day carried off, already corrupted, was taken up sound; and being carried home, as he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, when laid on the funeral pile, revived; and being revived, he told what he saw in the other state, and said, that after his soul left the body, it went with

many others, and that they came to a certain mysterious, hallowed place, where there were two chasms in the earth, near to each other, and two other openings in the heavens opposite on them, and that the judges sat between these;—that when they gave judgment, they commanded the just to go on the right hand, and upwards through the heaven, having fitted marks on the front of those that had been judged; but the unjust they commanded to the left, and downwards, and these likewise had behind them marks of all that they had done. But when he came before the judges, they said he ought to be a messenger to men concerning things there, and they commanded him to hear, and contemplate everything therein;—and that he saw there, through two openings, one of the heaven, and one of the earth, the souls departing, after they were there judged; and through the other two openings he saw, rising through the one out of the earth, souls full of squalidness and dust; and through the other, he saw other souls descending pure from heaven; and that on their arrival from time to time they seemed as if they came from a long journey, and that they gladly went to rest themselves in the meadow, as in a public assembly, and such as were acquainted saluted one another, and those who rose out of the earth asked the others concerning the things above, and those from heaven asked them concerning the things below, and that they told one another: those wailing and weeping whilst they called to mind, what and how many things they suffered and saw in their journey under the earth (for it was a journey of a thousand years); and that these again from heaven explained their enjoyments, and spectacles of amazing beauty. —To narrate many of them, Glaucon, would occupy much time; but this, he said, was the sum, that whatever unjust actions a man had committed, and whatever injuries a man had committed, they were punished for all these separately tenfold, and that it was in each, according to the rate of a hundred years (the life of man being considered as so long), that they might suffer tenfold punishment for the injustice they had done;—so that if any had been the cause of many deaths, either by betraying cities or armies, or bringing men into slavery, or being confederates in any other wickedness, for each of all these they reaped tenfold sufferings; and if, again, they had benefited any by good deeds, and had been just and

holy, they were rewarded according to their deserts. Of those who died very young, and lived but a little time, he related other things not worth mentioning;—but of impiety and piety towards the gods and parents, and of suicide, he told the more remarkable retributions; for he said he was present when one was asked by another, where the great Aridæus was? This Aridæus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia a thousand years before that time, and had killed his aged father and elder brother, and had done many other unhallowed deeds, as was reported: and he said, that the one who was asked, replied: He neither comes, nor ever will come hither.

CHAP. XIV.—Well then we saw this likewise, among other dreadful spectacles: When we were near the mouth of the opening, and were about to ascend after having suffered everything else, we on a sudden beheld both him, and others likewise, most of whom were tyrants, and there were some private persons who had committed great iniquity, whom, when they thought they were to ascend, the mouth of the opening did not admit, but bellowed when any of those who were so polluted with wickedness, or who had not been sufficiently punished, attempted to ascend. And then, said he, fierce men, and fiery to look on, standing by, and perceiving the bellowing, took some of them and led them apart, but Aridæus and the rest, having bound their hands and feet, and head, they thrust down and flayed, and then dragged them to an outer road, tearing them on thorns; declaring always to those who passed by, on what accounts they suffered these things, and that they were carrying them to be thrown into Tartarus. And hence, he said, that amidst all their various terrors, this terror surpassed, lest the mouth should bellow, and that when it was silent every one most gladly ascended; and that the punishments and torments were such as these, and their rewards were the reverse of these. He also added, that every one arising thence, after they had been seven days in the meadow, was required to depart on the eighth day, and arrive at another place on the fourth day after, whence they perceived from above through the whole heaven and earth, a light extended as a pillar mostly resembling the rainbow, but more splendid and pure; at which they arrived in one day's journey; and thence they

perceived, through the middle of the light from heaven, the extremities of its ligatures extended ; * as this light was the belt of heaven, like the transverse beams of ships keeping the whole circumference united ;—that from the extremities the distaff of Necessity is extended, by which all the revolutions were turned round, whose spindle and point were both of adamant, but its whirl commingled both with this and other things ; and that the nature of the whirl was of such a kind, as to its figure, as is any one we see here. But you must conceive it, from what he said, to be of such a kind as this : as if in some great hollow whirl, carved throughout, there was such another, but lesser, within it, adapted to it, like casks fitted one within another ; and in the same manner a third, and a fourth, and four others, for that the whirls were eight * in all, as circles one within another, having their lips appearing upwards, and forming round the spindle one united convexity of one whirl ; that the spindle was driven through the middle of the eight ; and that the first and outmost whirl had the widest circumference in the lip, that the sixth had the second wide, and that of the fourth the third wide, and the fourth that of the eighth, and the fifth that of the seventh, the sixth that of the fifth, and the seventh that of the third, and the eighth that of the second. Likewise that the circle of the largest is variegated, that of the seventh is the brightest, and that of the eighth has its colour from the shining of the seventh ; those of the second and fifth resemble each other, but are more yellow than the rest. But the third is bright white, the fourth reddish, the second in whiteness surpasses the sixth ; and the distaff must turn round in a circle with the whole that it carries ; and while the whole is turning round, the seven inner circles are gently turned round in a contrary motion to the whole ;—again, that of these, the eighth moves the swiftest ; and next to it, and equal to one another, the seventh, the sixth, and the fifth ; and that the third went in a motion which as appeared to them completed its circle in the same way as the fourth. The fourth in swiftness was the third, and the fifth was the second, and it was turned round on the knees of Necessity ;—and that on each of its circles there was seated a Siren on the upper

* By the eight whirls, we must understand the eight starry spheres, viz. the sphere of the fixed stars, and the spheres of the seven planets.

side, carried round, and uttering one voice variegated by diverse modulations ; but that the whole of them, being eight, composed one harmony ;—that there were other three sitting round at equal distance one from another, each on a throne, the daughters of Necessity, the Fates, clothed in white vestments, and having crowns on their heads ; Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, singing to the harmony of the Sirens ; Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future. And that Clotho, at certain intervals, with her right hand laid hold of the spindle, and along with her mother turned about the outer circle ;—and Atropos, in like manner, turned the inner ones with her left hand,—and that Lachesis touched both of these, severally, with either hand.

CHAP. XV.—After they arrive here, it is necessary for them to go directly to Lachesis. That then a certain prophet first of all ranges them in order, and afterwards taking the lots, and the models of lives, from the knees of Lachesis, and ascending a lofty tribunal, he says :—The speech of the virgin Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity : Souls of a day ! The beginning of another period of men of mortal race :—the demon shall not receive you as his lot, but you shall choose the demon : he who draws the first, let him first make choice of a life, to which he must of necessity adhere : Virtue is independent, of which every one shall partake, more or less, according as he honours or dishonours her : the cause is in him who makes the choice, and the Deity is blameless ;—that when he had said these things, he threw the lots on all of them, and that each took up the one which fell beside him, except himself, for he was not permitted ; and that when each had taken it, he knew what number he had drawn ;—that after this he placed on the ground before them the models of lives, many more than those we see at present ;—and that they were all various,—for there were lives of all sorts of animals, and human lives of every kind ;—and that among these there were tyrannies also, some of them perpetual, and others destroyed in the midst of their greatness, and ending in poverty, banishment, and want. That there were also lives of renowned men, some for their appearance as to beauty, strength, and agility ; and others for their descent, and the virtues of their ancestors. There were the lives of renowned women in the same manner. But that there was no disposi-

tion of soul among these models, because of necessity, on choosing a different life, it becomes different itself. As to other things, riches and poverty, sickness and health, they were mixed with one another, and some were in a middle station between these.

There then, as it seems, friend Glaucon, is the whole danger of man. And hence this of all things is most to be attended to, how each of us, omitting other studies, is to become an inquirer and learner in this study, in order to be able to learn and find out who will make him expert and intelligent to discern a good life, and a bad; and to choose everywhere, and at all times the best of what is possible, considering all that we have mentioned, both compounded and separated from one another, what they are with respect to the virtue of life; and to understand what good or evil beauty produces when mixed with poverty, or riches, and with this or the other habit of soul; and what is effected by noble and ignoble descent, by privacy, and by public station, by strength and weakness, docility and indocility, and everything else of the kind which naturally pertains to the soul, and likewise of what is acquired, when blended one with another, so as to be able from all these things to compute, and, having an eye to the nature of the soul, to comprehend both the worse and the better life, pronouncing that to be the worse which shall lead the soul to become more unjust, and that to be the better life which shall lead it to become more just, and to dismiss every other consideration:—for we have seen, that in life, and in death, this is the best choice. It is necessary, therefore, that a man should have this opinion firm as an adamant in him, when he departs to Hades, that there also he may be unmoved by riches, or any such evils, and may not, falling into tyrannies, and other such practices, do many and incurable mischiefs, and himself suffer still greater: but may know how to choose always the middle life, as to these things, and to shun the extremes on either hand, both in this life as far as is possible, and in the whole future. For thus man becomes happy.

CHAP. XVI.—At that time, therefore, the messenger from the other world further told how that the prophet spoke thus: Even to him who comes last, if he chooses with judgment,

and lives consistently, there is prepared a desirable life ; not bad. Let neither him who is first be negligent in his choice, not let him who is last despair. He said, that when the prophet had spoken these things, the first who drew a lot ran instantly and chose the greatest tyranny, but through folly and insatiableness had not sufficiently examined all things on making his choice, but was ignorant that in this life there was this destiny, the devouring of his own children, and other evils ; and that afterwards, when he had considered it at leisure, he wailed and lamented his choice, not having observed the admonitions of the prophet above mentioned ;—inasmuch as he did not accuse himself, as the author of his misfortunes, but fortune and the demons, and everything rather than himself. He added, that he was one of those who came from heaven, who had in his former life lived in a regulated republic, and had been virtuous by custom without philosophy ; and that, in short, among these there were not a few who came from heaven, as being unexercised in trials ; but most of those who came from earth, as they had endured hardships themselves, and had seen others in hardships, did not precipitately make their choice. And hence, and through the fortune of the lot, to most souls there was an exchange of good and evil things. Since, if one should always, whenever he comes into this life, soundly philosophize, and the lot of election should not fall on him the very last, it would seem, from what has been told us from thence, that he shall be happy not only here, but when he goes hence, and his journey hither back again shall not be earthy, and rugged, but smooth and heavenly. This spectacle, he said, was worthy to behold, in what manner the several souls made choice of their lives ; for it was pitiful and ridiculous and wonderful to behold, as each for the most part chose according to the habit of his former life ; for he alleged, that he saw the soul which was formerly the soul of Orpheus making choice of the life of a swan, through hatred of woman-kind, being unwilling to be born of woman on account of the death he suffered from them. He saw likewise the soul of Thamyras making choice of the life of a nightingale. And he saw also a swan turning to the choice of human life ; and other musical animals in a similar manner, as is likely ;—and he saw also one soul, while making its choice, choosing the life

of a lion; and it was the soul of Telamonian Ajax, unwilling to become a man, because it recollected the judgment given with reference to the armour;—that he then saw the soul of Agamemnon, which, in hatred also of the human kind, through his misfortunes, exchanged it for the life of an eagle: and that the soul of Atalante, choosing her lot amidst the rest, and, having attentively observed the great honours paid to an athletic man, was unable to pass by this lot, but took it. Next to this, he saw the soul of Epeus the Panopean going into the nature of a skilful workwoman; and that far off, among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites assuming the ape. And that by chance he saw the soul of Ulysses, who had drawn its lot last of all, going to make its choice: that in remembrance of its former toils, and tired of ambition, it went about a long time seeking the life of a private man of no business, and with difficulty found it lying somewhere, neglected by the rest. And that on seeing this life, it said, that it would have made the same choice even if it had obtained the first lot,—and joyfully chose it. That in like manner the souls of wild beasts went into men, and men again into beasts: the unjust changing into wild beasts, and the just into tame; and that they were blended by all sorts of mixtures. After, therefore, all the souls had chosen their lives according as they drew their lots, they all went in order to Lachesis, and that she gave to every one the demon he chose, and sent him along with him to be the guardian of his life, and the accomplisher of what he had chosen.—That, first of all, he conducts the soul to Clotho, to ratify under her hand, and by the whirl of the vortex of her spindle, the destiny it had chosen by lot: and, after being with her, he leads it back again to the spinning of Atropos, who makes the destinies irreversible. And that from hence they proceed directly under the throne of Necessity; and that, after he had passed by it, as all the others passed, they all of them marched into the plain of Lethe amidst dreadful heat and scorching, for he said that it is void of trees and everything that the earth produces;—that when night came on, they encamped beside the river Amelete, whose water no vessel contains.—Of this water all of them must necessarily drink a certain quantity, and such as are not kept by prudence drink more than they ought, and that he who from

time to time drinks forgets everything.—And, after they were laid asleep, and midnight was approaching, there was thunder, and an earthquake, and they were thence on a sudden carried upwards, some one way, and some another, approaching to generation like stars. And he himself was forbidden to drink of the water. Where, however, and in what manner, he came into his body, he was entirely ignorant ; but, suddenly looking up in the morning, he saw himself already laid on the funeral pile. And this fable, Glaucon, has been preserved, and is not lost, and it will preserve us, too, if we be persuaded thereby, for thus we shall happily pass over the river Lethe, and shall not pollute our souls.

But if the company will be persuaded by me ; considering the soul to be immortal, and able to bear all evil and good, we shall always persevere in the road which leads upwards, and shall by all means pursue justice in unison with prudence, that so we may be friends both to ourselves and the gods, both whilst we remain here, and when we afterwards receive its rewards, like victors assembled together ; and so, both here, and in that journey of a thousand years, which we have described, we shall be happy.

THE END OF THE TENTH AND LAST BOOK OF THE REPUBLIC.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TIMÆUS.

THE following Dialogue, *which comprises the detailed evolution of the physical or cosmological doctrines of Plato*, is supposed to have taken place on the day following that on which Socrates had been discussing with the same party the nature of an ideal or pattern Republic; and there is so far an internal connexion between the two dialogues, that both will be found to contain the same doctrines of the Ideas (εἰδη or ἰδέαι) and the *Summum bonum* (viz. τὸ εἶν in contradistinction to τὸ γινόμενον. Comp. Tim. ch. ix.), though presented under different aspects,—the former treating them in their relation to moral and political perfection, the latter physically and cosmologically, displaying the beauty, perfection, and benevolence of the Divine work in the formation of the Universe and the organization of Man. The dialogue opens with a lively conversation on the political notions set forth by Socrates (or rather elicited by him from the rest) on the preceding day, more especially with reference to their practicability in real life (ch. i.—iii.):—and Critias, to gratify Socrates, introduces the narrative of a long interview between Solon and some Egyptian priests, about the relative antiquity of the Grecian and Egyptian annals, the object of which is to prove, that the state of Athens, in very remote times, corresponded mainly with the picture of a perfect republic, as exhibited by Socrates (ch. iv.—vii.). The subject, however, is deemed worthy of still further investigation by the different parties present; and the first turn is unanimously conceded to Timæus, the Pythagorean, on account of his profound knowledge of physics and astronomy, who accordingly entertains them with a long and learned discourse on the origin of the Universe and the formation of Man,—Critias following him in the succeeding dialogue called by his name, wherein he tries to show that the men here ideally created (τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας) by Timæus, and brought into civil training by Socrates in the Republic, actually corresponded in character with the citizens of primitive Athens (ch. vii., viii.).

It is necessary to premise, however, before we enter into any analysis of Timæus's discourse, that Plato, regarded as a *physical theorist*, was not so much the propounder of new and

original views, as a critic and eclecticist, reviewing the various systems that had preceded him, opposing what he deemed false or vicious, and adopting what he thought good and solid in each. Now all the earlier philosophers, whether of Ionia or Magna Græcia, had made it their first business to start different theories, more or less visionary, on the origin of the Universe. Thales held the primary element to be *water*, Anaximenes and Diogenes *air*, Anaximander a vast *chaos*, and Heraclitus *fire*,—to whom at length succeeded Anaxagoras, the first to recognise a *Supreme Intelligence* (νοῦς) as the principle of life and arranger of the primitive chaotic atoms (and from whom Plato undoubtedly took some of his leading notions). Widely differing from the above, Xenophanes maintained *unity* (τὸ ἓν)—*the Universe, to be God*,—a notion, which elicited from Parmenides the atheistic dogma, that, as existence is conceivable, and non-existence is not so, *creation is impossible*, as it pre-supposes non-existence; and in this view he was followed by Empedocles, who regarded all things as alike uncreated and indestructible. When such notions were current, it can scarcely be matter for surprise that Heraclitus should have put forth the doctrine (equally atheistical) of a *perpetual flux*, and been followed by the sophist Protagoras, who stated that *all knowledge is sensation*, and that *man is the measure of all existing things whatever*. And lastly, it was the notion of Pythagoras (with whose views Plato was beyond all doubt deeply imbued), that *numbers and music* are the principles of the entire universe, and that the world is regulated by *numerical harmony*.* With all these conflicting views before him, and having at the same time a strong internal conviction of one grand, comprehensive, and intelligent Unity,—in other words, God,—Plato at once boldly impugned the doctrine of the Eleatics, that the world around was an eternal, immutable essence;—maintaining, on the other hand, that, as it was sensible, it must have been produced, and was in fact the necessary result of an effective cause,—*the work of a rational, intelligent, and benevolent Architect*.

Timæus, therefore, in this dialogue,—after stating *in limine* that there are two classes of things, the one eternal, *constant* (αἰώνιον), and not subject to change; the other *mutable* (θάρσπον), generated, and liable to decay: the former of which is comprehended by the intellect, the latter by the senses,—broadly sets forth the grand doctrine of Theism, that whatever is generated must proceed from some cause, namely God, who formed the sensible universe, the most perfect of things generated, according

* The reader is referred for further information on the pre-Socratic theories of nature, to Stallbaum's *Prolegomena to the Timæus*, pp. 48—54; as well as to Introductions to the Protagoras and Theætetus, in vol. i. of this translation.

to an eternal pattern existing in the Divine Mind (ch. ix.). The whole, indeed, was the work of the Creator's goodness; and the universe itself likewise was very good,—as it were, an ensouled, rational, living being,—perfect in unity, and composed of four elements indissolubly united,—earth and fire, air and water,—its shape being that of a perfect sphere moving in a circular orbit, and its soul emanating from its abode in the centre to all the other parts, including even the external surface,—in fine, it came forth from its Maker deficient in no single respect, “a blessed God” (ch. x.—xii.).

He next proceeds to unfold the nature and structure of the Universe in its several parts. And first, he assumes it to consist of two parts,—one eternal and fixed, because related to the world of intellect; the other corporeal, mutable, and capable of division,—both of which are so united on the principles of number and music, as to produce a happy and well-settled harmony both in structure and motion. This universal soul, moreover, pervades even the distant orbits of the fixed stars and planets, all of which depend for their life and circular motion on the eternal and constant principles of number and harmony,—the fixed stars moving *westward* on the eternal principle of sameness, the planets *eastward* on that of mutability and difference (ch. xii.). But in connexion with this soul, the universe possesses also a material body, whereby it becomes cognizant of material things,—the subjects of opinion and persuasion, as well as of the abstract truths that form the groundwork of reasoning and science (ch. xiii.).* Next came the creation of *time*, which was effected by the formation of the sun, moon, and five planets, whose motion, particularly that of the first, creates, determines, and watches over, the several divisions of days and nights, months and perfect years (ch. xiv.). The form and motions of the world thus once arranged, the Creator proceeds to people it with living beings,—first, the heavenly gods (*i. e.* the stars and other

* Plato, in ch. xxiii. designates *matter* as the receptacle, and, as it were, the nurse (*ὑποδοχήν, οἶον τιθήνην*) of all production; while God, on the other hand,—the sum of all ideas,—is the Father and fashioner of the Universe. In ch. xxvi. also, it is described as one and the same with space, which furnishes a place for all generated things. This principle of nature, therefore, is without form,—without an *idea*; and it is only in the productions of the creative energy and the all-susceptible nature,—that is, in the son of the father and mother,—that there is form and determinate *id-a*. This is clearly laid down in ch. xxiv.; and Ritter accordingly very rightly observes:—“Matter is nothing more than the condition of all human existence, which, however, is a necessary condition, and so causes the *natural* itself to appear as *necessary*; whereas the shape received from the good is that which under this condition comes into being and has its actual existence in nature.”—(Ritter, ii. p. 341, compared with ch. xliii. of this Dialogue.)

celestial bodies); secondly, airy and winged creatures; thirdly, those living in the water; and lastly, those moving on the earth. The stars, indeed, are termed a race of heavenly gods, yet generated and visible, endowed with fiery, spherical bodies, and called immortal, as not being subject to dissolution or decay (ch. xv.); but whether the earth itself is, like the other bodies, to be considered an ensouled, generated god, and whether at rest or in motion, is not exactly certain.

Next follows a narrative, almost purely mythical, of the formation of the mortal races of animals (ch. xvi.—xviii.), which the Supreme himself does not deign personally to create, but commits that task to the lower gods, reserving only the office of imparting to these new creatures whatever was to be immortal in their constitution. A like number of these perishable animals is assigned to each of the stars; and the first birth being the same in all,—that of the human male; nor was it till after a fixed period, that the female and all other animals,—beasts, fishes, and birds,—issued from this mortal form. Of this being, Man, consisting, like the universe, of body and soul mysteriously conjoined, Timæus next gives a detailed description, beginning with the head, which contains the leading organs of sense (ch. xix., xx.); and he then diverges into a long investigation of the elements of earthly bodies, particularly as respects their geometric forms, as well also, as of their various affections, viz. motion or rest, heat or cold, heaviness or lightness, smell, colour, &c., the discussion of which must necessarily precede any satisfactory account of the intellectual and physical man (ch. xxi.—xlii.). Man, he proceeds to observe, is composed of a corruptible body enshrining an immortal soul; but besides this, he possesses an inferior sort of soul, whereby he becomes cognizant of the various passions and emotions, viz., pleasure and pain, hope, fear, anger, desire, &c.; and all the parts of his body are composed with wonderful skill, and yet kept in constant subjection to the dominance of reason and intellect:—and he now parenthetically intimates the existence of two sets of causes,—the *divine* and *necessary*,—as constantly operating together; of the former of which we can gain only a very imperfect knowledge (though for our happiness' sake we should ever aspire thereto), while the latter we should investigate for the sake of getting at the former (ch. xliii.).

Next succeed separate and particular (though somewhat fanciful) descriptions of the heart, lungs, stomach, liver, spleen, intestines, spinal marrow and brain, skull and bones, ligaments and tendons, muscles and flesh, the nerves round the head, teeth, tongue, lips, hair, skin, pores, &c. &c., all of which are kept in healthy action by the united operation of the alimentary and respiratory systems (ch. xliv.—lxii.),—the

object of the whole of these speculations being to show the existence of design and the adaptation of means to ends throughout the work of creation. Now the regular, unimpeded, action of all these organs and component parts constitutes bodily health; whereas the disorders and decay of the component elements of life are either productive of disease or else slowly bring on old age and bodily decay (ch. lxii.). Then follow some curious details respecting the diseases of the body, which are ascribed to many various causes, mostly fanciful,—some few only real, formed on a knowledge of the human frame (ch. lxiii.—lxviii.). Far more important, however, and far more severe, are the diseases of the soul; and these are assigned to two causes,—first, bodily infirmity, and secondly, improper training, it being a vulgar error to suppose that any one is willingly evil. The great, and indeed only disease of the soul, is madness, which assumes two forms,—madness (*μανία*), and folly or idiocy (*ἀμαθία*), both caused by the unhealthy predominance of the animal passions over the reason and conscience. Great care must therefore be observed constantly to maintain the *mens sana in corpore sano*, to attend diligently to both, without neglecting either,—to form the body by constant and suitable exercise as well as strict temperance, and to cultivate the soul by engaging the intellect in the contemplation of divine things and eternal truth, including those heavenly revolutions with which the human soul also has a close relation and harmony (ch. lxix.—lxxi.).

The concluding chapters of the dialogue comprise some observations on the origin of the lower animals, from which it appears that Plato entertained the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls; for he thinks it probable that those who have lived unrighteously and effeminately will, at their second birth, be changed into women,—those of both sexes who have lived innocently but frivolously, foolishly believing that heavenly things could be seen by mortal eye, being changed into birds of the air; those, thirdly, who have been totally estranged from philosophy, into beasts of the earth; and those, fourthly, who are to the last degree foolish and ignorant, becoming mere fishes, creatures of the water, to whom the gods that formed them have denied even the privilege of breathing a thin and pure atmosphere (ch. lxxii., lxxiii., compared with ch. xvii., where he touches, though more briefly, on the same philosophic dogma). Lastly, the whole dialogue concludes with a brief, but elegant summary of the great doctrine, of which the philosopher has exhibited throughout it so many satisfactory proofs,—that “this world, which comprises and is filled with all kinds of living beings, both mortal and immortal, thus becomes a visible animal embracing visible natures,—an image

of the great Intelligence,—a sensible god,—the greatest and best, the fairest and most perfect,—this the one and only begotten Universe.”

Such is a succinct account of the leading arguments of the Timæus, which, both as respects language and deep philosophic matter, is by far the most difficult of any of Plato's dialogues,—there being many passages in it, which still in fact puzzle even the most ingenious of its commentators. The reader who would seek further information than can be afforded within the limits of a translation, is referred to Tiedemann's Introductions to the Platonic Dialogues, to Stallbaum's Prolegomena and notes to his edition of the Timæus, to Ritter's remarks on the physical doctrines of Plato (vol. ii. pp. 338—384), and, above all, to the valuable notes and dissertations in Martin's *Études sur le Timée de Platon*, 2 vols. 8vo. 1842.

THE TIMÆUS.

SOCRATES, TIMÆUS, CRITIAS, HERMOCRATES.

I.—Soc. One, two, three :—but where, dear Timæus, is that fourth of us who yesterday were your guests, but are entertainers now ?

TIM. Some illness has befallen him, Socrates ; for he would not willingly have missed such a meeting as the present.

Soc. It is your business, then, of yourself, and [that of] these present, to fill up the place of the absent guest.

TIM. Quite so, Socrates ; and, as far as we can, we will not fail to do so : for it would be unjust for the rest of us, whom you yesterday so handsomely entertained, not to treat you with readiness in return.

Soc. Do you recollect, then, the magnitude and nature of the things on which I charged you to speak ?

TIM. Some, indeed, we do recollect ; but what we do not, you, who were present, can recal to our memory : or rather, if it be not too much trouble, once more briefly run over the whole from the beginning, that it may be the more firmly established in our minds.

Soc. Be it so. The sum of yesterday's discussion respecting a republic was, what form I thought the best, and of what sort of men it should be composed.

TIM. And indeed, Socrates, all that you said was quite according to our mind.

Soc. Did we not in the first place separate the class of husbandmen, and ever so many other artificers, from that of those who fight in defence of the state ?

TIM. Yes.

Soc. And when we had assigned to every one that single employment which was suited to his own nature, and had prescribed to each his particular art, we bade the military caste confine themselves to the simple duty of protecting the state from the hostile incursions both of internal and external foes ;—mildly to administer justice to their subjects, as being naturally friends, but fiercely to combat with such foes as might fall in their way.

TIM. Quite so, of course.

Soc. We asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be naturally high-spirited, and at the same time remarkably philosophic, so as to enable them towards either friends or foes respectively to be gentle or severe.

TIM. You did so.

Soc. But what about their training? Did we not say that they ought to be instructed in gymnastic exercises, music, and other suitable branches of science?

TIM. Yes.

Soc. With respect at least to those thus trained, it was somehow said, that they should regard neither gold nor silver nor any such property, as their own private possession, but rather, like subordinates, should receive the wages of their guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve, their recompense being no more than sufficient for temperate men, and that they should spend their income in common, with a view only to mutual subsistence, bestowing their attention wholly on virtue, in preference to every other pursuit.

TIM. This too was so stated.

II.—Soc. Respecting women, too, we asserted that their nature should be aptly conformed to resemble that of men, and that they should all engage in common with them, both in the duties of war and the other employments of life.

TIM. This too you alleged.

Soc. But what about the procreation of children? This perhaps you easily remember, on account of the novelty of the proposal; for we ordered that marriage-unions and children should be in common to all persons whatsoever, special care being taken also that no one should be able to distinguish his own children individually, but all consider all as their kindred; regarding those of an equal age, and in the prime of life, as their brothers and sisters,—those prior to them,

and yet further back, as parents and grandsires,—and those below them, as their children and grandchildren.*

TIM. Aye,—these things too, in the way you describe them, are easily remembered.

SOC. That they might at once acquire then the best possible natural disposition, I recollect that we decreed that the rulers, male and female, whom we placed over the marriage contract, should secretly contrive, through certain lots, that the worthy should assort only with the worthy, the base with the base,—and that no discord might arise from this connexion, we should refer all the blame of the union to fortune alone.

TIM. This, too, we remember.

SOC. We ordered, moreover, that the children of the good should be properly trained, but those of the bad secretly sent to the other part of the state, while of those who are constantly arriving at manhood, such as are found to be of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile; those, among them, on the contrary, who have proved themselves unworthy, being in their turn banished to the place occupied by those just promoted.

TIM. Just so.

SOC. Have we, then, sufficiently summed up yesterday's discussion; or do we need anything further, friend Timæus, that has been omitted?

TIM. By no means, Socrates; for these were the very things discussed.

III.—SOC. You shall now hear some further details respecting the republic that we have described, and how I feel towards it. The feeling, then, seems to me somewhat similar to this,—as if some one, on beholding beautiful animals, either wrought by the graver's art, or really alive, but in a state of perfect rest, were to entertain a desire to behold them in motion, struggling, as it were, in those exercises which seem best suited to their bodies. Just the same do I feel towards that form of state which we have described; for I should gladly listen to any one who recited the story of the contests that one state engages in with others, when it ventures becomingly on war, and exhibits in the course of

* This subject is considered at some length in the third, fourth, and fifth books of the Republic, as well as in the Laws, v. 739, b.

it a conduct worthy of its nurture and training, as regards both active encounters and verbal negotiations with individual states. On these points, indeed, Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise the men and the state according to their desert; and that I should be so incapable is no wonder, as I have formed the same opinion respecting the poets both of the past and present age;—not that I despise the poet-tribe, but still every one must see, that being an imitative race, they most easily and in the best manner imitate those things in which they have been trained; while, on the contrary, whatever is unconnected with their training, is hard for them to imitate well even in actions, and in words even yet more difficult. And as for the tribe of Sophists, I deem them indeed mighty clever, both in multiplying words and many other fine accomplishments; yet I fear, as they have no settled abode, but wander through various cities, and dwell in no abode of their own, they will form false conjectures respecting both philosophers and politicians, as to the magnitude and nature both of the actions which they achieve in war, and of the words they employ in their mutual intercourse. The only people remaining, then, to whom I can apply, are those of your character and habit, versed both by nature and training in philosophy and political science. For Timæus here of Locris, in Italy, which is governed by the best of laws,* being withal not inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has in his own state attained to the highest official honours, and has likewise in my opinion reached the summit of all philosophy. Critias, too, as we all know, is not ignorant of the particulars that we are now mentioning;—and respecting Hermocrates also, we have ample testimony for the belief that he is both by nature and education well suited to all these pursuits.† Hence, when I perceived yesterday your great

* Its code was formed by Zaleucus, and it was said by the Syracusans to the best governed of all the Greek cities of Italy. Comp the Laws, i. 638.

† Critias was a man of a generous, vigorous-minded disposition, who was so fond of the company of philosophers, that he was said to be *ιδιώτης μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος δὲ ἐν ιδιώταις*. He was afterwards one of the thirty tyrants, and Socrates' most bitter enemy. Hermocrates was a celebrated Syracusan general, several times alluded to by Thucydides and Xenophon, and who made a vow to live by certain rules (*κατὰ νόμον* *ἔχειν βίαν*).

anxiety to discuss the formation of a republic, I was much pleased at it, being well aware, that if you pleased, none could better unfold the successive points for discussion;—inasmuch as, by properly adapting the state for warlike purposes, you would be the only person in the present age who could supply it with all things becoming its constitution. Having spoken, then, in compliance with your request, I now require you, in your turn, to comply with mine; and, as a matter of course, you have agreed to carry on the discussion among yourselves in common and so forthwith repay my hospitality with the feast of reasoning. Here, therefore, am I arrayed for the purpose, and readiest of all to partake of the promised banquet.

IV.—HERM. Aye, truly, Socrates, as Timæus here just observed, neither will we lack zeal in fulfilling your desire; nor will we offer any excuse for neglecting it; since only yesterday, just after leaving this, when we went to the lodging of Critias, where both there and before that on the way thither, we discussed this very subject. He here then unfolded to us a story from ancient tradition, which—prythee, Critias, even now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether or not it concerns his demand.

CRI. This we must surely do, if agreeable to Timæus, our third partner in this discussion.

TIM. I, for my part, fully consent.

CRI. Listen now then, Socrates, to a story very strange indeed, yet in every respect true, as it was once related by Solon, the wisest of the seven [sages of Greece]. He was the kinsman and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropides, as he himself often tells us in his poems; and he (Dropides) informed our grandfather Critias (as the old man himself in turn told us), that this state had formerly achieved great and admirable actions, the knowledge of which nevertheless had been lost through lapse of time and the decay of mankind,—one act in particular being more illustrious than the rest,—in remembrance of which it were fitting, that we should not only return you thanks, but also in full assembly hymn forth to the goddess our true and just acclaim of praise.

SOC. Well observed:—but what is this achievement, which Critias described as having been not only related

by Solon, but really accomplished by this state in days of yore?

CRI. I will acquaint you with that ancient story, which I indeed received from no mere youth; for at that time Critias, as he himself said, was almost ninety years old, and I myself about ten; and it chanced then to be the time of the *Cureotis Apaturiorum*.* The boys indeed were then going through the ceremonies customary with them at this festival;—for our parents proposed prizes for singing verses; and therefore a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sang the poems of Solon, as being at that time new. Then one of our tribe, whether it was his real opinion or he wished to gratify Critias, said he thought Solon not only the wisest of men in matters generally, but as regards poetry the most noble of all poets. On hearing this, the old man (for I well remember it) was exceedingly pleased, and said, laughing—‘If Solon, oh Amynander, had not considered poetry as a mere amusement, but made it, as others do, a serious employment, and so completed the history which he had brought from Egypt; and, had not been forced to relinquish it by the seditions and numerous other troubles in which he found his country involved, I do not think that either Hesiod, Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired more distinguished renown.’ ‘And what was that story, Critias?’ asked he. ‘One about an action,’ replied he, ‘the greatest and most celebrated, which this state ever achieved; although, through lapse of time and the death of those by whom it was undertaken, its fame has not descended to our own day.’ ‘Tell it,’ said he,

* The *Apaturia*, according to Proclus and Suidas, were festivals in honour of Dionysus, publicly celebrated for the space of three days; and they were assigned this name, δι’ ἀπάρην, that is, on account of the deception through which Poseidon is reported to have vanquished Xanthus. The first day of these festivals was called δόρπεια, in which, as the name indicates, those of the same tribe feasted together; and hence (says Proclus) on this day εὐωχίαι καὶ δεῖπνα πολλά, splendid banquets and much feasting took place:—the second day was called ἀνάρρυσις, a sacrifice, because many victims were sacrificed in it; the victims being called ἀναρρίματα:—the third day, of which Plato speaks in this place, was called κουριώτης, because on this day κοῦροι, that is, boys or girls, were collected to have their names registered in their tribes (φάργαι:):—to these some add a fourth day, which they call ἐπιέδα or the day after.

‘from the beginning; and say what that was, which Solon asserted as true, as well as how and from whom he heard it.’

V.—‘In Egypt,’ said he, ‘in the Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, is the district (*νομός*) surnamed Saitical; the chief city of which is Sais, whence also came the king Amasis; and it had a presiding divinity, whose name is in the Egyptian tongue *Neith*, which they say corresponds with the Greek *Athena*; and the people profess to be great friends of the Athenians, and united with them in a sort of close alliance. Solon said that on his arrival thither, he was very honourably received; and, especially, on his inquiring about ancient affairs of those priests who possessed superior knowledge in such matters, he perceived that neither himself nor any one of the Greeks (so to speak) had any antiquarian knowledge at all. And once on a time desirous of inducing them to narrate their ancient stories, he undertook to describe those events which had formerly happened among us in days of yore,—those about the first Phoroneus and Niobe, and again after the deluge of Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with their posterity, paying due attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have occurred:—on which one of their extremely ancient priests exclaimed, “Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, and aged Greek there is none.” Solon, on hearing this, replied, “How can you say this?” To whom the priest, “You are all youths in intelligence; for you hold no ancient opinions derived from remote tradition, nor any system of discipline that can boast of a hoary old age:—and the cause of this is the multitude and variety of destructions that have been and will be undergone by the human race, the greater indeed arising from fire and water, others of less importance from ten thousand other contingencies. The story, for instance, that is current among you, that Phaeton, the offspring of the Sun, once attempting to drive his father’s chariot, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the surface of the earth, and perished himself, blasted by lightning, is generally regarded as fabulous, but in point of fact it refers to a declination (or parallax) of the heavenly bodies revolving round the earth, and indicates that, at certain long intervals

of time, the earth's surface is destroyed by mighty fire.* When this occurs, then those who dwell either on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish in greater numbers than those dwelling near rivers, or on the sea-shore;—whereas to us the Nile is not only our safeguard from all other troubles, but liberates and preserves us also from this in particular;—and again when the gods, to purify the earth, deluge its surface with water, then the herdsmen and shepherds on the mountains are preserved in safety, while the inhabitants of your cities are hurried away to the sea, by the impetuosity of the rivers. In this our country, on the other hand, the waters neither then fell, nor ever have fallen from above upon the plains, but on the contrary are naturally driven upwards from the earth's interior:—and to these causes it is owing, that the most ancient things are said to be here preserved. The truth is, however, that in all places where there is neither intense cold nor immoderate heat, the race of man is always found to exist, sometimes in less, sometimes in greater number. And all the noble, great, or otherwise distinguished achievements, performed either by ourselves, or by you, or elsewhere, of which we have heard the report,—all these have been engraven in our temples in very remote times, and preserved to the present day; while, on the contrary, with you and all other nations, they are only just committed to writing, and all other modes of transmission which states require,—when again, at the usual period, a current from heaven rushes on them like a pestilence, and leaves the survivors among you both destitute of literary attainments and unacquainted with music;—and thus you become young again, as at first, knowing nothing of the events of ancient times, either in our country or yours. As for the transactions, indeed, Solon, which you have just related from your antiquities, they differ but little from puerile fables:—for in the first place you only mention one deluge of the earth, whereas there had been many before; and in the next place you are unacquainted with that most noble and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country, from whom you and your whole present state are descended, though only a small rem-

* It was the opinion of Heraclitus and many of the old philosophers, that the earth would be periodically destroyed by fire or water. The notion was borrowed, perhaps, from the Egyptians. (Comp. Herod. ii. ch. 142.)

nant of this admirable people is now remaining,—your ignorance in this matter resulting from the fact that their posterity for many generations died without the power of speech through the medium of letters;* for long before the chief deluge, a city of Athenians existed, regulated by the best laws both in military and all other matters, whose noble deeds and civil institutions are said to have been the most excellent of all that we have heard to exist under heaven."

VI.—'Solon, on hearing this, expressed his admiration, and exhibited the most ardent desire, entreating the priests to relate to him accurately and in order the whole history of his ancient fellow-citizens. And then one of the priests replied, "I have no objection, Solon; and for your sake, and that of your city, I will relate the whole, and more particularly on account of that goddess, to whom is assigned the guardianship both of your state and ours, and by whom both have been founded and fostered; yours indeed having a priority over ours of a thousand years, from having received its origin from Hephæstus and the Earth; and the annals even of our own city [Sais] have been preserved eight thousand years in our sacred writings. I will briefly describe, then, the laws and more illustrious actions of those states which have existed nine thousand years; and when we are more at leisure, we will take the sacred writings themselves, and recount an exact history of every particular.

"Now, consider the laws of these people, as compared with those prevailing here; for you will find here even at the present day many examples of institutions that formerly existed in your city. First of all, the priests passed their life separate from all the rest; and next, the artificers so exercised their crafts, that each followed his own employment without mingling with any other class of workmen. The same method was likewise adopted with shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen. The soldiers, too, you will find, were separated from other kinds of men, and were enjoined by the laws to engage in nothing but war. The armour, too, which each employed, such as shields and darts, resembled that which we used first of all the Asiatics,—the goddess in those places, as she did to you, first pointing out their use. Again,

* Gr. γράμμασι τελευτᾶν ἀφώνους, which can only be paraphrastically rendered.

with respect to wisdom, you may perceive what attention the law paid to it even from the first, as likewise to all that respects the universe, including even divination and medicine, that conduces to the preservation of health; and from these, which are divine things, the inquiry proceeds to human affairs and all other branches of learning therewith connected. Such then was the principle of distribution and arrangement on which the goddess first founded and established your state, choosing for that purpose the place in which you were born; because she foresaw that from its excellent temperature, the region would produce men of the most consummate wisdom; and, the goddess, of course, being a lover both of wisdom and war, selected a spot likely to produce men most resembling herself; and fixed on this first as their settled abode. You proceeded to settle, then, under the protection of such like laws, and what is more, under good government, surpassing all men likewise in every virtue, as becomes the descendants and disciples of the gods.

“Many and mighty deeds of your state, then, are here recorded in writing [in our sacred records,] and call forth our admiration; nevertheless there is one in particular, which in magnitude and valour surpasses them all;—for these writings relate what a prodigious force your city once overcame, when a mighty warlike power, rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia. That sea indeed was then navigable, and had an island fronting that mouth which you in your tongue call the Pillars of Hercules; and this island was larger than Libya and Asia put together; and there was a passage hence for travellers of that day to the rest of the islands, as well as from those islands to the whole opposite continent that surrounds that the real sea. For as respects what is within the mouth here mentioned, it appears to be a bay with a kind of narrow entrance; and that sea is indeed a true sea, and the land that entirely surrounds it may truly and most correctly be called a continent. In this Atlantic island, then, was formed a powerful league of kings, who subdued the entire island, together with many others, and parts also of the continent; besides which they subjected to their rule the inland parts of Libya, as far as Egypt, and Europe also, as far as Tyrrhenia. The whole of this force, then, being collected in

a powerful league, undertook at one blow to enslave both your country and ours, and all the land besides that lies within the mouth. This was the period, Solon, when the power of your state was universally celebrated for its virtue and strength ;—for, surpassing all others both in magnanimity and military skill, sometimes taking the lead of the Greek nation, at others left to itself by the defection of the rest, and brought into the most extreme danger, it still prevailed, raised the trophy over its assailants, kept from slavery those not as yet enslaved, insured likewise the most ample liberty for all of us without exception who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules. Subsequently, however, through violent earthquakes and deluges which brought desolation in a single day and night, the whole of your warlike race * was at once merged under the earth ; and the Atlantic island itself was plunged beneath the sea, and entirely disappeared ;—whence even now that sea is neither navigable nor to be traced out, being blocked up by the great depth of mud† which the subsiding island produced.” ‡

VII.—The above, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon :—and when yesterday you were discoursing about a republic and the citizens composing it, I was reminded to my surprise of what I have now mentioned ; for I perceived how divinely, as it were, by a kind of good luck, and without wandering from the mark, you in most respects coincided with Solon's statement. Still I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately ; since, from the long lapse of time since I first heard them, I did not remember them with sufficient accuracy [for repetition]. I considered, therefore, that I ought, before relating it, first of all to rehearse the whole diligently to myself. And this was why I yesterday speedily complied

* τὸ παρ' ὑμῖν μάλιστα. So reads Stallbaum, on the authority of several MSS., the old reading being παρ' ὑμῶν, which is retained by Bekker.

† Gr. πηλοῦ κάρτα βαθὺς ἱμποδὼν ὄντος. The old reading is καταβραχίος. We have here lowered Bekker's emendation.

‡ The whole of the story about the Atlantic isles, so much canvassed by the critics, is so improbable and so at variance with the geographical knowledge of the Greeks, even in Plato's time, that it can only be considered as a mere myth. See Martin's admirable remarks, *Études sur le Timée*.

with your demands, conceiving, as is most important in such matters, that we ought not to lack ability to present a discourse suited to the object in view. Hence was it, as Hermocrates here observed, that as soon as we left here yesterday, I brought up the subject before my friends here, in order to refresh my memory; and by afterwards meditating on it at night, I acquired nearly a complete recollection of the whole story. According to the proverb, indeed, what we learn in childhood takes a wonderful hold on the memory:—for with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recall the whole of yesterday's discourse, though I should be very much astonished if anything that I had heard a very long time ago were to escape my remembrance. What I then heard, indeed, was listened to with great pleasure and delight; and the old man very readily recounted it, even when I frequently asked for a repetition; and thus the story became like the brands of indelible writing fixed in my memory. Well then, as soon as it was day I repeated the narrative to my friends, that they might aid me in fairly recounting my story. Now, therefore, as respects the object of all that has been said, Socrates, I am prepared to relate, not only the general heads, but the particulars also of all that I heard. As for the citizens and state which you described to us yesterday as in a fable, we will now convert it into a reality, and consider the state established by you as no other than this [of Athens,] and the citizens which you described as no other than those real ancestors of ours, alluded to by the Egyptian priests. Indeed they will harmonize in every respect; and we shall not be far from the mark * in asserting that your citizens are the very people who existed at that time. Each taking our share then in this discussion, we will try our utmost to bestow suitable attention to the task that you have assigned us. It is requisite therefore to consider, O Socrates, whether this narrative answers our purpose,† or we should seek some other in its stead.

Soc. And what other, O Critias, can we receive in preference to this, which, from its affinity, is extremely suitable to the festival of the goddess, and has the all-important merit

* Gr. οὐκ ἀπασόμεθα, lit. we shall not sing out of tune. The old reading is ἀπασόμεθα, which is untranslatable.

† Gr. εἰ κατὰ νοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν οὗτος.

of being not a cunningly devised fable, but a true history? It is impossible, therefore, to say, how and whence, if we abandon your narrative, we should find another more suitable. We cannot; but must acknowledge that you have been happy in your narration; and, as for me, after my discourse of yesterday, I will now rest, and be in my turn a listener.

VIII.—CRI. Consider then, Socrates, the arrangement of this banquet of yours, how we settled it. For we think it right that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and has bestowed much pains in acquainting himself with the nature of the universe, should be the first to discourse to us, beginning from the creation of the world, and ending with the nature of men;—and also that I after him, receiving from him, as it were, the men which have been ideally produced—and some of them, too, excellently educated by you,—should introduce them among us here, according to the word and law of Solon, as to proper judges, and make them members of this city; as being really those very Athenians of bygone days, which were described as unknown to us in the report of the sacred writings;—and so, in future, we will treat them in our discourse as citizens and Athenians.

Soc. I am now, it seems, to be plentifully and splendidly entertained in my turn with a banquet of arguments:—it is for you, then, O Timæus, to begin the discourse, having first of all invoked the gods according to the usual custom.

TIM. Well, Socrates, this at any rate is true, — that those who have even the least share of wisdom, always invoke the deity on entering every undertaking, whether small or great; and so we likewise (unless we be in every respect unwise) who are now about to speak concerning the universe, whether it be generated or without generation, shall (if we be not very unwise) make it our first duty to invoke the gods and goddesses, and pray that what we speak may be first of all pleasing to them, and also in consistence with ourselves. And as respects the invocation of the gods, so have I acted for myself; while as respects ourselves, we must lead you by that way which you may most easily understand, and which will best enable me to explain my meaning about the proposed subjects of discussion.

IX.—I think we ought, in the first place, to define what

that is which is *ever-existent*, and has no generation; and what that is which is *in a state of generation* or becoming, but never really *is*. The former of these, indeed, which is apprehended by reflection united with reason, always subsists according to *sameness* ;*—while the latter is perceived by opinion united with irrational perception; since it subsists in a state of generation and corruption, and never really is. And, again, whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a certain cause; for it is wholly impossible that anything should be generated without a cause. An artificer, therefore, of anything, if he looks to that which always subsists according to sameness, and from this as a sort of pattern, works out the form and nature of his work, he must thus, necessarily, produce something wholly beautiful:—but where he employs for his pattern only what is generated, it cannot be beautiful.

Let this universe then be called *heaven*, or *the world*, or by any other name that it usually receives; and let us, in the first place, consider respecting it, what ought to be investigated at the very outset of our proposed inquiry about the universe,—whether it always existed, having no beginning, or was generated, beginning from some certain commencement. It is generated;—for this universe is palpable, and has a body; and all such things are perceptible (*i. e.* are to be apprehended by the senses); and things perceptible being apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with perception, appear to be in a state of becoming, and subject to generation. Again, with reference to what exists, it must necessarily have arisen from some cause.

To discover then the *Creator* and *Father* of this universe, as well as his work, is indeed difficult; and when discovered, it is impossible to reveal him to mankind at large. And this too, we must consider respecting him, according to which of two patterns he modelled the world; whether with reference to one subsisting ever in a state of sameness and similarly affected, or with reference to one that is only generated. If this world then is beautiful and its artificer good, he evi-

* The terms *ταῦρόν*—*θάτερον*, *ὁμοιον*—*ἀνόμοιον*, so constantly met with in this dialogue, express *eternal constancy*, as contrasted with *mutability*; and they are found among the ten pairs of opposites which, according to the Pythagoreans, constituted the *elements* of the universe.

dently looked to an eternal pattern; but if it be without beauty, and what it is not lawful to mention, he must have looked to one that is generated. It is evident, however, to every one that he looked to one that was eternal;—for the universe is the most beautiful of generated things, and its artificer the best of causes. Being thus generated, then, it has been framed according to principles that can be comprehended by reason and reflection, and ever abides in sameness of being. This, then, being the case, this world must necessarily be the resemblance of something;—although to describe its origin according to nature is the greatest of all undertakings. We should distinguish between an image and its pattern; just as words are connected with the things of which they are the interpreters:—and so when we speak of that which is stable and firm, and mentally intelligible, our language should be in like manner stable and immutable, and as far as possible unrefutable and immovable, having in this respect no deficiency; whereas, in speaking concerning its image only, and as compared to it, we should use probable arguments, that are in strict analogy thereto. Moreover, precisely as essence (or true being) is to generation, so is truth to faith (or mere conjecture). You must not wonder, then, O Socrates, since different people differ so much in opinion about the gods and the formation of the universe, if I should be unable to put forth generally approved and scrupulously exact statements on so difficult a subject; but even if we should only advance reasons not less probable than those of others, you should still be content, remembering that both I who am speaking, and you who are my judges, possess a common human nature; and you must be satisfied therefore, if my assertions are but probable statements, and should inquire no farther.

Soc. Capitally well said, Timæus; and we must proceed wholly as you recommend. As regards the prelude then of your discourse, we wonderfully approve of it: and now proceed to the strain (or main subject) itself.

X.—TIM. Let us declare then on what account the framing Artificer settled the formation of this universe.* He was good; and in the good, envy is never engendered about anything whatever. Hence, being free from this (envy), he

* Gr. γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε.

desired that all things should as much as possible resemble himself. Any one, therefore, who receives this as the leading principle of generation and the universe from intelligent men, will receive it most correctly. For as the deity desired, as far as possible, that all things should be good, and nothing evil,—he accordingly took everything that was visible and not in a state of rest, but in excessive agitation and disorder, and then reduced it from disorder into order, conceiving the latter to be far better than the former. It is not, indeed, and never was, lawful to do anything else but what is most honourable; and accordingly, he found by reasoning that of things naturally visible, nothing without intelligence could be more beautiful than what is wholly endowed with intellect, and besides this, that apart from the soul no one could possess intelligence.* In pursuance of this reasoning, placing intellect in soul and soul in body, he constructed the universe; that thus it might be a work naturally the most beautiful and the best. Hence, therefore, we have a reasonable motive for calling the world an animal with a soul, truly intellectual, and created through the providence of the deity.

XI.—This being the case, let us next consider, in the likeness of what animals the composing artificer framed the universe. We must by no means then think, that he would deign to fashion it like animals subsisting as a part of anything (*i. e.* in an incomplete form): for nothing resembling an imperfect animal can possibly be beautiful. But we may consider it on the other hand, as most nearly of all resembling what contains the other animals both separately and collectively as parts [of a whole:]—for it (the universe) comprises within itself all intelligible animals, just as this world contains us and all other visible creatures.† The deity, in-

* Plato seems, therefore, to regard the soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) as an intermediate agent and uniting bond between perishable bodies and the eternal and indestructible intellect, powerfully acting on matter; but yet, on the other hand, closely and necessarily connected with intellect; though not like the latter, naturally eternal and indestructible, but the best of things generated and constituted eternal by the divine decrees.

† Gr. οὐ δ' ἐστὶ τὰλλα ζῶα καθ' ἐν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, τοῦτων πάντων ὁμοίωτον αὐτὸν εἶναι τιθῶμεν. The meaning is somewhat obscure: the above is Stallbaum's interpretation. Compare also, ch. xv. at the beginning. It may be observed, as regards intelligible and sensible

deed, desirous of making it in all respects resemble the most beautiful and entirely perfect of intelligible objects, formed it into *one* visible animal, *containing within itself all the other* animals with which it is naturally allied. Are we not, then, right in concluding that there is but one heaven (or universe); or is it more correct to assert that there are many and infinite? One only, [I answer,] if it has been fabricated according to the original pattern. For that which comprehends all intelligible animals whatever, can never be second to any other:—for there would be need of another animal again to comprise these two, of which they would both be parts; and it would be more proper to assert that the universe resembles this comprehending third, rather than the other two. In order, therefore, that the world may in its substantive existence [κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν] resemble the all-perfect animal—on this account the framer of the worlds produced neither two nor an infinite number; but this, the solely-begotten heaven (or universe) having been generated, now exists and ever will exist.

Now, whatever has been generated, must necessarily have bodily shape, and be visible as well as tangible. But nothing can be visible without the aid of fire, and nothing tangible without something solid, and nothing solid without earth,—owing to which, the deity at the beginning of his constructive labour composed the body of the universe from fire and earth. But it is not possible for two things alone to cohere, without the intervention of a third; for a certain bond is necessary between the two. And the best of all bonds is that, which, as nearly as possible, unites into one both itself and the natures bound with it. But proportion will naturally best show this effect; *—for whenever, either in three numbers, or solids, or powers, the middle bears the same ratio to the last, as the first to the middle—and again also, as the last is to the middle, so is the middle to the first; then the middle (or mean) term becoming both first and last, and the last and first again each

objects, that Empedocles had laid down that the universe is *σὺν ἑνὶ τόκῳ*,—although the *παράδειγμα ἀρχέτυπον κόσμου αἰσθητοῦ*.

* So we have ventured to render,—*τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστα ἀποτελεῖν*. On the whole subject, see Stallbaum's long and satisfactory note.

become means, they must thus all necessarily become the same relatively to each other, and having become the same with each other, will all be one. If then, the body of the universe had been a superficies only without thickness, one medium alone would have sufficed, both for binding it and all that belongs to it;—but in the present case, as it was doomed to be a solid—and solids are never one only, but always jointed together by two media,—whence the deity placed water and air between fire and earth;—and by thus placing them as far as possible in proportion to each other, so that fire should be to air as air to water, and as air to water so water to earth,—he thus bound and framed together the world visible and tangible. On this account also, and from such elements, which are four in number, the body of the universe was confessedly generated by a certain proportion; and hence has resulted such an intimacy, that all its parts aptly cohere, and are indissoluble except by its uniting artificer.

Of these four elements, then, the composition of the world received one *whole* of each :*—for its composing artificer constituted it from entire elements of fire, water, air, and earth; leaving no part of any one of them, nor any extraneous power,—considering that it would thus be a whole animal, in the highest degree perfect and of perfect parts; and besides this, that it would be one, as nothing would be left, from which any other such element could be produced; and lastly, that it would be free from old age and disease,—and perceiving also that the principles composing bodies, as heat and cold, and all possess vigorous powers, when they surround bodies externally and interfere with them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and bring on diseases and old age, whereby they decay and perish. Owing to such causes and reasonings, then, he framed this universe, as one whole, an united series of perfect wholes, perfect, undecaying, and without disease. He gave it also a figure becoming and allied to its nature;—and to the animal destined to comprehend all others within itself, that figure as the most becoming, which includes within itself every sort of figure whatever. Hence he fashioned it in the shape of a sphere, perfectly round, having its centre

* Gr. ἐν ὅλον ἐκάστου,—one whole, without deficiency or superfluity, —the τὸ τέλειον, alluded to by Aristotle, *Metaph.* iv. § 16.

everywhere equally distant from the bounding extremities, as being the most perfect of all figures, and most resembling himself; — and he did this, considering the similar to be infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar.

Next, he most carefully polished the external circumference of this sphere, — and this for many reasons. It needed, indeed, neither eyes, nor ears, as there was nothing externally either visible or audible: — neither was it surrounded with air, as if it required respiration; — nor, again, did it require any organ, through which it might receive its nutriment, and discharge it again when digested: for nothing was either added to or taken from it, that being impossible. Indeed the universe is artfully made to provide itself with nutriment through its own decay, as well as to suffer and do all things in itself, and by its own operations; — because, indeed, its creator conceived that it would be much more excellent, if independent in action, than if it required extraneous aid. And he did not think fit to give it hands either, as it had nothing either to receive or reject; nor yet of feet, or any other members suited to locomotion: — for he assigned to it a motion peculiar to itself, being that of all the seven kinds of motion,* which chiefly belongs to intellect and reflection. Hence, making the world to turn constantly on itself and on the same point, he gave it a circular motion, and took from it all the other six, without giving it any power of progression: and as this revolution required no feet, he created the world without legs and feet.

XII.—Thus was it, that the intelligence of the eternal Deity, after due reflection, conceived the form of the god about to come into existence; and he made it smooth, equable, and even from its centre in every direction, — a body whole and perfect, wholly composed out of perfect bodies. As for the soul, he fixed it in the middle, extended it throughout the whole, and likewise surrounded with it its entire surface: — and so, causing a circle to revolve in a circle, he established the world as one substantive, solitary object, self-sufficient through its own excellence, requiring nothing external, but sufficiently known and friendly to itself. By this procedure, then, he produced the Universe, a blessed god. The Deity, however,

* On these seven kinds of motions, comp. ch. xviii. of this dialogue, p. 318.

did not, as we now undertake to say, form the soul posterior and junior to the body: for he who conjoined these, would never have allowed the more ancient nature to be governed by the younger:—and yet we, who are exposed to the blind chances of fortune, are apt to speak somehow in this silly fashion; whereas the Deity constituted the soul both in age and excellence prior to and older than the body, as being the proper mistress and ruler of its subject [the body;] and that, too, from the following sources, and in the following manner.

From one essence indivisible, and always the same, and from another again that is divisible and corporeal, he composed—by admixture from both—a third form of *essence* intermediate between the two; and again, between what is indivisible and divisible as respects bodies, he placed the nature of *same* and *different* (or mutable);—and taking these three, he mingled them all into one idea, joining them together by force, as the *different* would not freely mingle with the *same*. And after mingling them with *essence*, and producing one from the three, he again distributed this whole into suitable parts; each composed of a mixture of *same*, *different*, and *essence*. He next began to divide as follows:—In the first place, he took away one part from the whole; then he separated a second part, double of the first: and again, a third, one-and-a-half times as much as the second, but triple of the first; then a fourth, double of the second; in the next place a fifth, triple of the third: a sixth, octuple of the first: and lastly a seventh, twenty-seven times greater than the first. After this, he filled up the double and triple intervals, still taking off parts therefrom, and so placed them between the intervals, that there might be two media between every interval; one of which might, in the same degree, exceed one of the extremes, and be exceeded by the other, while the other part might in an equal degree exceed one of the extremes, and be exceeded by the other. But as by the intermediate links between the above-mentioned spaces the sesquialter, sesquitercian, and sesquiocave intervals were produced, he filled with a sesquiocave all the sesquitercian intervals,* leaving a part of each, the interval between which

* Gr. ἡμολίων διὰ διαστάσεων καὶ ἐπιτρίτων καὶ ἐπογδῶν γενομένων ἐκ τούτων τῶν δεσμῶν ἐν ταῖς πρόσθε διαστάσεσι, τῷ τοῦ ἐπογ-

and the following would have to each other the same ratio as the numbers 256 and 243; and in truth he thus exhausted the whole mixture—from which these were separated. He split the whole of this composition, then, along its entire length into two parts, joining them mutually across like the letter X, afterwards bending them into a circle, and connecting them both with themselves and each other, in such a way that their extremities might meet directly opposite the point of their mutual intersection, externally comprehending them in an uniform motion around the same centre; besides which, he made one of the circles external, the other internal.* The motion of the exterior circle he proclaimed to be that of sameness, and that of the interior the motion of difference. He caused also the circle of sameness to revolve laterally towards the right, and that of difference diagonally towards the left. And the superiority he gave to the circulation of same and similar; for this alone he suffered to remain undivided—while, as to that within, after dividing into six parts, and forming therefrom seven unequal circles, divided by double and triple intervals, three of each, he bade these circles travel in contrary directions to each other,—three of the seven to revolve at equal velocities, the remaining four with a velocity unequal as respects either of the former three, yet in a certain proportion as to their respective periods.

XIII. After, therefore, the whole composition of the [universal] soul had been completed according to the intention of God who framed it, he in the next place formed within it the whole of a corporeal nature; and he aptly jointed them, by uniting centre to centre. The former (the soul), being interwoven throughout from the middle to the very extremities of space, and covering it even all around exter-

δόον διαστήματι τὰ ἐπίγριτα πάντα συνεπληροῦντο, &c. The whole paragraph is very difficult, owing to the very scanty records left us respecting the nature of the ancient Harmonics.

* The whole of this Pythagorean-like speculation on Harmonics has been variously explained by Cousin, Stallbaum, and Martin (as well as Böckh, in many of his learned tracts). It may here simply be observed, that the two harmonic scales, thus split down their length and crossed, formed two circles or orbits, one (θάτερον) revolving within the other (ταυτόν), but in an opposite direction. These, according to many commentators, correspond with the equatorial and zodiacal circles (?).

ually, though at the same time herself revolving within herself, originated the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life throughout all time. And indeed the body of the universe was generated in visible shape; while the soul, though invisible, was made to partake of reason and harmony, and rendered the best of created things by Eim—the best of eternal intelligences. The soul, then, being composed from the admixture of the three parts, same, different, and essence, classified as well as bound together in certain proportions, and itself revolving inwardly on itself, whenever it comes in contact either with anything mutable or indivisible, at once declares by its intrinsic energy with what anything is identical, and from what it differs, and also with reference to what, where, how, and when it happens, both as regards its own separate essence and its external affections, either in things generated, or such as possess an eternal sameness.* When our talk, then, is about truth, and consistent with itself,—whether, on the one hand, it be about things mutable or things constant, and is silently and noiselessly borne onward by its own motion, or when it is concerned about things sensible, and the circle of difference reports on its onward passage to every part of the soul, then arise fixed and true opinions and persuasions:—but when, on the other hand, it is concerned about the merely rational, and the glibly-whirling circle of sameness makes its indications,—then intellect and science are thus necessarily brought to full perfection. And as respects the real essence in which these two qualities are engendered, if any one asserts that it is any other than the soul, he will assert everything rather than the truth.

XIV.—When the parent Creator perceived that this created image of the eternal gods had life and motion, he was delighted with his work, and by this very delight he was led to consider how he might make it still more to resemble its exemplar. Hence, as the *intelligible* universe was an eternal

* Gr. καὶ ὁπότε συμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γινόμενα τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα αἰεὶ. The whole sentence is difficult,—not so much from its obscurity, as its pregnancy of meaning, which all but defies translation. The same remark applies to the phrase—λόγος ὁ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὁ ἀληθὴς γινόμενος—in the succeeding sentence. See Stallbaum and Martin *ad locum*.

animal, he tried to make this [the *sensible* universe], as far as he could, similarly perfect. The nature indeed of the animal itself was eternal, and this nature could not be entirely adopted into any thing subject to generation;—hence God resolved to form a certain moveable image of eternity; and thus, while he was disposing the parts of the universe, he, out of that eternity which rests in unity, formed an eternal image on the principle of numbers;—and to this we give the appellation of *Time*. But besides this, he contrived the days and nights, months and years, which had no existence prior to the universe, but rose into being contemporaneously with its formation. All these are but the parts of time; and the terms *it was* and *it will be* are generated [*i. e.*, varying and evanescent] forms of time, which we have wrongly and unawares transferred to an eternal essence. For we say that a thing was, is, and will be; while according to truth, the term *it is*, is alone suitable,—*was* and *will be* being expressions only suitable to generation, which proceeds through time,—both of them being certain motions:—whereas, what exists eternally, the same and immoveable, neither becomes at any time older or younger; neither has it been generated in the past, nor will be in the future, nor is it subject to those accidents which generation imposes on sensible objects,—all of which are nothing more than forms of time imitating eternity, and moving in a circle measured by number. And besides this, in making such assertions as these,—that what has been generated is generated,—that what is becoming, is in generation,—that what will be is to be,—and that non-being is not;—in all this we state what is not accurately true. But this is perhaps not the place for a minute discussion of these matters.

Time, then, was generated with the universe, in order that, being produced together, they might together be dissolved, if their dissolution should ever happen:—and it was formed on the model of an eternal nature, that it might as far as possible resemble it; for this model exists through all eternity, while the world, on the other hand, has been generated, now exists, and will exist, throughout all time. With this design, then, and after such reflection on the generation of time, the Deity, in order that it might be produced in full operation, created the sun, moon, and the five other stars, which are denominated

planets, to distinguish and guard over the numbers of time. And as soon as he had produced the bodies of these stars, God placed them, seven in number, in the seven orbits whose revolutions are according to difference;*—the Moon, indeed, in the first orbit nearest about the earth; the Sun in the second beyond the earth; then Lucifer (*i. e.* Venus), and the star sacred to Hermes (*i. e.* Mercury), revolving in their orbits as swiftly as the sun, but on a different principle of motion, owing to which these stars, the Sun, Lucifer, and Mercury, mutually overtake and are overtaken by each other in their respective courses. As respects the other stars, however, the labour of investigating their revolutions, and the causes that gave them origin, would surpass that of the discourse itself which caused their mention. These subjects, then, may hereafter, perhaps, when we have leisure, meet with the investigation they deserve.

When, therefore, each of the stars necessary for the constitution of time had obtained a motion adapted to its condition, and their bodies, bound by living chains, had become vital beings and learned their prescribed duty, they pursued their course according to the movement of difference, passing obliquely through the orbit of sameness, to which the former is subordinate, one circle being larger and the other smaller, one moving quicker and the other more slowly; those that revolved the quickest on the principle of sameness appearing ever to overtake and be overtaken by those that travelled at slower velocities. And the revolutions of all these circles in their orbits with a spiral motion,† proceeding at one and the same time in two contrary directions, make it appear that the one moving at the slowest pace from that which was the most swift is the nearest of all. And in order that there might be a certain apparent measure of slowness and swiftness in the relative velocities of these spheres, and an evident uniformity in all the eight movements, the Deity enkindled a light, which we now denominate the sun, in the second of these orbits, in order that it might fully display all things in the universe, and that such animals as required it might have their share in number,‡ becoming acquainted therewith from

* Gr. ἔθηκεν εἰς τὰς περιφοράς, ἃς ἡ θατέρου περίοδος ἦεν, &c.

† Gr. πάντας γὰρ τοὺς κύκλους αὐτῶν στρέφουσα ἑλικά. On this construction, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 408.

‡ The sun, he means, was provided with light that those animals, that

the revolution of sameness and similarity. Thus, then, and on these accounts, arose night and day; being the period of the one and most skilfully-contrived movement.* The month, too, was generated, when the moon had run through her orbit, and passed into conjunction with the sun,—and the year, when the sun had completely travelled through his own orbit. As to the periods of the other stars, however, they are not understood, except by a very few; nor are they distinguished by any peculiar name or relatively measured on the principle of numbers:—and hence it may be said, they are ignorant that these movements really constitute time, infinite as they are in number and of wonderful variety. Still it is by no means impossible to conceive, how the perfect number of time completes a perfect year, when the courses of the eight orbits return at their completion to the same place of commencement, and have their revolution measured on the principle of sameness. In this manner, indeed, and for this purpose, were formed such of the stars as moved circularly through the universe,—that this (the visible animal, i. e. the universe) might resemble as nearly as possible the most perfect intelligible animal, in the imitation of an eternal nature.

XV.—The Creator constructed all the rest at the same time as the generation of time,† according to the similitude of that which has been portrayed; but still, as the universe did not yet comprise within it the entire animal race, in this respect there was a dissimilarity. This defect, therefore, [the Creator] supplied by impressing it with forms corresponding with the nature of its pattern. Wherever, therefore, the intellect beholds ideas of a certain quality, and quantity in that which possesses life, such and so many he conceived that this (the universe) should contain; and these are four:—One, the heavenly race of gods; another, winged and air-wandering race; a third, that which dwells in the water; and a fourth, that which has feet and walks on the ground. The chief idea, indeed, of deity, he formed from fire, that

required it, might gain a knowledge of number, i. e. of the principle on which the world is formed and now moves.

* In the *Timæus* Locrus it is said (p. 432 of Stallbaum, vol. vii.), that it is day, when the sun travels from east to west, and night when it travels from west to east;—and Plato must necessarily have thought this, as he held the earth to be immoveable, without any motion even round its own axis. Comp. *Aristot. de Cælo*, II. ch. 13.

† Gr. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἥδη μέγροι χρόνου γενέσθω. The old edd. read εἶδη.

it might be as far as possible splendid and fair to behold; and in adapting it to the universe, he rendered it circular; made it to consist in the knowledge of that good which it is to follow, and distributed it round the entire heavens, that it might be a true world, fully adorned with that race in its every part. To each of the divine bodies, also, he adapted two motions;—one of them taking place on the same spot and on the principle of sameness, corresponding with that intelligence which contemplates what is the same with itself; the other, a progressive motion subordinate to the motion that is constantly the same and similar: *—but as respects the other five motions, it was fixed immoveable, that each of them might become as far as possible the best. And for this reason also the fixed stars were formed, as being divine and eternal animals, ever abiding and revolving in the same place and on the principle of sameness; and the stars, which both revolve and have the kind of motion above described, were formed on those principles.† Next, he formed the earth our common nourisher, which, being confined round the axis that extends through the universe, is the guardian and artificer of night and day, as well as the first and most ancient of the gods that have been generated within the universe. With respect, however, to the dances [or rhythmical motions] of these divinities, and the mutual intersection of their circles, as well as their relative revolutions and progressive motions in their conjunctions and oppositions, whether in progressive or retrograde motion, at what times and in what manner they are in turn eclipsed, and afterwards reappear to our view, causing terror and presaging future events to such as are able to understand them;—to attempt an explanation of all this, without having a plan of them before us, would be a labour in vain. But of this enough; and this is all that we shall say concerning the nature of the visible and generated gods.

XVI.—Again, to speak concerning the other gods (or

* Plato is here describing two motions of the universe,—one on the principle of ταύτόν (which is that of intelligence) round its own axis, the other on that of θάρρερον (that which the soul of the world is formed), progressive, the latter of which—viz. sensible creation, is wholly subordinate to the former.

† Gr. τὰ δὲ τρεπόμενα καὶ πλάνην τοιαύτην ἴσχοντα—κατ' ἑκίνα γίγονε.

dæmons), and to know their generation, is more than we can perform; and we must trust to the reports of those ancient men, who being, as they said, the descendants of the gods, must have a clear knowledge of their parents. It is impossible, therefore, to discredit the children of the gods; and even though they should speak without probable and cogent proofs, yet as they declare that they are relating matters with which they are familiarly acquainted, we ought, in compliance with the law, to assent to their tradition. In this manner, then, according to them, the generation of these gods took place, and is described.

Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of Heaven and Earth; and from these sprang Phorcys, Kronos, and Rhea, and ever so many more with them;—and from Kronos and Rhea sprang Zeus, Hera (Jupiter, Juno), and all that we know are called their brethren, together with others still who were their progeny.* When therefore all such gods as visibly revolve, and show themselves when they please, were generated, the Artificer of the universe thus addressed them: "Gods of gods, of whom I am the creator and father, all things formed by me are by my will indissoluble. Indeed, what is bound is of course dissoluble; nevertheless, to desire to dissolve what is beautifully harmonized and well disposed, is the mark of an evil nature. Now, inasmuch as you have been generated, you are hence not immortal, nor wholly indissoluble; yet you shall never be dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; because you have got my will [that it shall be so,] which is a much greater and more powerful bond than those by which you were bound when first created. Learn, therefore, what I now say to you by way of information. Three classes of mortals yet remain uncreated. Unless these be created, then, the universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain within it every kind of animal, though it ought, in order to be quite perfect. Yet if these are generated, and partake of life through me, they will become equal to the gods. In order, then, that mortal natures may subsist, and the universe may be truly all, turn yourselves, according

* A comparison of this statement with Hesiod's will show that Plato was not much governed by the poet's authority. *Comp. Theog.* v. 132—156; 336—350; 453—460. Plato probably took his notion, as Proclus suggests, from the Orphic hymns.

to your nature, to the formation of animals, imitating the power which I employed in the creation of yourselves. And so far as any part of these is suited to have the same name as immortals to be called divine, and destined to take the lead among those who willingly pursue justice, and reverence you—of these I myself will deliver the seeds and beginnings; and for the rest do you weave together the mortal and immortal nature, constructing and generating animals, and promote their growth too by supplying them with food, and receive them back again [into your bosom] when fallen to decay.”*

XVII.—Thus spoke the Creator; and again into the same bowl, in which he had by mingling tempered the soul of the universe, he poured into it likewise what was left of the former mixture, somewhat indeed after the same manner, yet not equally pure as at first, but less so by two or three degrees. And after having thus framed the universe, he allotted to it souls equal in number to the stars, inserting each in each; and then, as it were, placing them on a vehicle [whereon to travel through the heavens,] he pointed out the nature of the universe, and announced to them the laws of fate; showing them that the first generation would be allotted in common to all, so that no particular soul should have less than its due portion, and that after they had been distributed through the several instruments of time adapted to each,† there would then be produced that animal which is of all the most suited for religious worship; and as human nature was of two kinds, [male and female,] he showed them that the more excellent was that which would afterwards be called *man*. As souls, therefore, are from necessity engrafted in bodies that are constantly gaining and losing their composing particles, he declared to them that in the first place all persons must necessarily have one connate [ξύμφυτον] sense produced by violent emotions,—secondly, love mingled with pleasure and pain; and besides these, fear and anger, together with all their consequences and natural opposites; and that such as subdued these would live justly, those overcome by them unjustly. And he declared also, that after living well for the time appointed to

* On this speech we must refer the reader to Stallbaum's long and valuable notes.

† Gr. εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις ἕκαστα ὄργανα χρόνων.

him, each one should once more return to the habitation of his associate star, and spend a blessed and suitable existence; but failing in these points, he should be changed in his second generation into the nature of a woman; and should he not cease from evil even under these circumstances, whatever the shape his wickedness had taken, so also the soul should be changed into the nature of some brute corresponding thereto, and when changed never cease from labour, until, following the revolution of sameness and difference peculiar to itself, and having overcome by reason its turbulent and irrational part, which is a mass, as it were, composed of fire, water, air, and earth, it should at length return to the first and best disposition of its nature.*

Having thus legislated for souls in all these particulars, in order that he might be in no respect the cause of the future wickedness of each, he planted some of them on the earth, others in the moon, and others in the remaining different instruments of time; and after this planting, he charged the junior gods with the duty of constructing mortal bodies, as well as everything additional that was required for the human soul, giving them dominion also over these and all things consequent thereon, and bidding them rule over the mortal creature as nobly and honourably as they could, that it might not become the cause of evil to itself.

XVIII.—The Creator, after arranging all these particulars, then retired to his accustomed repose; and while he thus abode, his children forthwith obeyed their father's order, and, taking the immortal principle of a mortal animal, they, in imitation of their own creator, borrowed† from the world portions of fire and earth, water and air, as things which they should one day restore; and firmly united them together, not with the same indissoluble bonds by which they themselves were held together, but fixing them with thickly-set nails, invisible through their smallness, constructing from these different

* This is a clear indication of the philosopher's belief in the transmigration of souls;—and the same notion is developed towards the close of the dialogue. Some, however, suppose that they are the opinions of Timæus, not Plato. How can we separate them?

† Gr. *δανειζόμενοι*, &c., borrowing certain particles, which were to be paid back as a debt at some future time, namely, at the dissolution of the mortal body.

elements each particular body, and placing the revolutions of the immortal soul in a body subject both to renewal and decay. These, however,—merged, as it were, in a deep river,—had no power of governing themselves, but violently hurried forward both themselves and others, so that the whole animal was moved—confusedly however, just as chance carried it forward, and without any reason, according to the whole six kinds of motion—backwards and forwards, to the right and left, upwards and downwards, and so on, according to the six differences of place. And great as was the advancing and retiring wave which furnished nutrition, yet it was still more agitated by the impulses which it received from without, when the body came into collision with external and foreign fire, or the solidity of earth, liquid waterfalls, or whirling blasts of air; from all which the various movements fell through the body on to the soul; which on this account were afterwards, and are still, called perceptions [*i. e.* general sensations]. And these, moreover, instantly giving rise to an exceedingly great and powerful motion, by moving with that constantly flowing stream, and vehemently disturbing the revolutions of the soul; wholly stopped the revolution according to sameness by their contrary current, hindering it either from commencing or continuing its course;*—and even the movement according to difference they so far disturbed, as to turn from their circular orbits and throw into all possible disorder the three intervals of double and triple, together with the mean terms and conjoining links of the sesquitercian, sesquialter, and sesquioctave ratios, which cannot be dissolved by any one but the artificer by whom they were bound;†—and thus, though scarcely connected with each other, they are borne along, though quite in disorder,—at one time straight forwards, at another obliquely, and then again upside down, just as if

* The general meaning of this rather involved sentence is,—that as well by the natural bodily change as by the perceptions of the senses, a disturbance is caused in the equable and constant agitation or operation both of the intelligent and sensuous part of the soul.

† This celebrated passage most plainly shows what Plato meant by the harmonic and arithmetic ratios concerned in forming the universe,—*viz.* that they indicated a certain harmony and equability of the intellectual powers, clearly perceptible in their agitation and movements, so long as the power of body and sense is not such as to destroy and impair them.—but this of course must be the result of an union of body and soul.

one were to fix his head on the earth and raise his feet on high, in which case, both to the inverted person and the spectators, the parts on the right would seem to be on the left, and the left on the right. These circles likewise greatly disturbed in these and similar ways, when they fall in externally with either sameness or difference, and call objects either same or different, contrary to truth, become false and unreasonable; nor is there any revolution among them which has a controlling and directing power;—and if, again, any of the external sensations are hurried forward and join in doing violence to the soul's whole receptacle, they then seem to prevail, though in reality they are still in subjection.

And it is owing to all these affections, that even now as in the beginning, the soul, when first united to a mortal body, is without intelligence; but when the stream of growth and nutrition flows along with diminished speed, the circles of the soul, restored to tranquillity, proceed in their proper path, gaining steadiness as time goes on, and then the orbits of the circles are regulated in their course agreeably to those that travel according to nature; and they call both same and different by their proper appellations, assigning wisdom to the person by whom they are possessed. If any one, therefore, receives both proper food and education, he must become perfectly sound and healthy, escaping every important disease; whereas he who neglects his soul will pass lamely through life's existence, and again pass into Hades aimless and unserviceable.* Of these matters, however, more hereafter. It is our business at present to treat more accurately of what we before proposed,—namely, the generation of body in connexion with soul, and owing to what causes and divine foresight it has taken place, resting for our proofs chiefly on the argument of analogy.

XIX.—First, then, the gods, in imitation of the spherical shape of the universe, bound the two divine circles of the soul in a spherical body,—that, namely, which we now call the head, which is man's most divine member, and the ruler of our whole composition. And to this the gods who framed it gave the whole body for its service, conceiving that it would thus partake of every possible motion; and moreover,

* Gr. ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀνόητος. Stephens proposed ἀνόητος on the authority of some MSS. :—but no change is needed.

lest the head, in rolling over the various elevations and depressions, should be unable to overcome the heights, or get out of the cavities, the gods gave it the body to be its locomotive vehicle. Hence the body was endued with length, and furnished by Divine contrivance with four members, naturally capable of extension and flexion, to enable it to seize objects, to give it a stable support, and to allow it to pass from place to place; and above this body was placed the head, the abode of our most divine and sacred portion. This was why we were furnished with legs and hands;—and as the gods considered that the fore parts are more honourable and fitter to rule than those behind, they gave us a motion chiefly progressive.* Beside this, it was requisite, that man's front should be distinct and dissimilarly formed from the other side; and on this account they first placed about the vessel of the head a face provided with organs to express all the energies of the soul, and assigned to this anterior part the natural government of man. And of these organs, the first that they constructed were the light-bearing eyes, fixing them in from some such cause as the following: The body of these eyes they formed to consist of fire, not enough indeed to burn, but to give a gentle light suitable to each day; for the pure fire contained within us and related to it, they caused to flow smoothly through the eyes, and in dense quantities throughout, but condensing it more especially in the middle of the eyes, so as to conceal all the grosser part within, and allow the pure only to filter through. When, therefore, the light of day surrounds the stream of vision, then, by the mutual falling of similar bodies on each other, one well-adapted body is constituted, according to the direction of the eyes, wherever the light proceeding from within resists that which falls on it from without. But the whole becoming similarly affected through similitude, when it either touches anything else or is itself touched by another, then the motion thus produced, diffusing itself through the whole body even as far as the soul, causes that sensation which we denominate sight. But when this kindred fire [within us] departs into night, the sight is cut off; for in this case, by proceeding into a dissimilar nature, it becomes estranged, and is extinguished: since it has no longer any relation to the

* ταύτη τὸ πολὺ τῆς πορείας ἡμῖν ἔδωκαν.

proximate surrounding air, which is naturally destitute of fire. Hence it ceases from seeing, and besides this, becomes the introducer of sleep; for the gods constructed the eyelids to be a preservative of the sight, and thus by their compression restrain the power of its inward fire, and besides that, scatter and smooth over its internal motions; and when they are thus calmed, rest ensues; which rest, when profound, produces a sleep attended with few dreams;—but on the other hand, if certain unusually vehement motions remain, then, according to their nature and the places in which they occur, they will engender corresponding phantasms within, which will come to our recollection as soon as we wake. With respect, also, to the formation of images on mirrors, and all lucid, smooth surfaces, there is nothing in these difficult of solution; for all such phenomena necessarily result from the mutual affinity of the external and internal fire, and again from one in particular that subsists about smooth bodies individually, and is many times reflected, because the fire around the face gradually becomes united on the smooth and shining surface with the fire coming from the eyes. The parts on the right, too, appear to be on the left, because there is a mutual contact of the contrary parts of the sight with the contrary parts of the object, different from their accustomed mode of approach. On the contrary, the parts on the right appear on the right, and the left on the left, when there is a reflexion of the light composed of the mingled fires, both exterior and interior; and secondly, the smoothness of the mirrors, which are convex, reflect that which is to the right on the left, and the left to the right. But if the mirror be concave, it presents an image wholly inverted, by sending the lower part of the image upwards, and again the upper part downwards.* All these phenomena, therefore, are only some of the concurring causes† which the divinity brings to his aid in rendering the idea of that which is best as far as possible complete,—whereas the multitude are of opinion that these

* This is a very obscure passage, but much light has been thrown upon it by Prof. T. H. Martin (*Etudes sur le Timée*, 2 vols. Paris. 1841), who conceives that Plato is here referring to convex and concave mirrors. Considerable light is thrown also on the meaning of the Greek words by a passage in Euclid's Optics, p. 393.

† Gr. τῶν ξυμμετρίων.

are not the concurring but the real causes of all things,—such, namely, as those producing cold and heat, freezing and thawing, and such like, but which are wholly incapable of exercising reason and intellect; for the soul may be said to be the only one of all beings that can acquire intellect; and this is invisible, whereas fire and water, air and earth, are all visible bodies. As for the lover of intellect and science, however, he should explore the first causes of intellectual nature, and consider, respecting second causes, how many arise from the motion of other bodies, and yet necessarily give motion again to others. This, then, is what we ought to do: we should speak concerning both kinds of causes, but separately of such as engage the intellect in forming things fair and good; and of such, also, as, abandoning wisdom, produce the things they form just as it may chance, and without any regard to order.

XX.—Respecting the second causes of the eyes,* therefore, so far as they possess the power which falls to their lot, let what has been already said suffice; and we will next speak of their greatest and most useful employment, for which, indeed, they were expressly bestowed on us by the Deity. The sight, indeed, is in my opinion the cause of the greatest benefit to man,—since even in our present discussion about the universe, not one argument could ever have been adduced without surveying the stars, the sun, and the heavens. Now, however, both day and night, months and periods of years, have been seen and arithmetically calculated; and they give us a conception of time, and means of investigating the nature of the universe; from all which we have gained that kind of learning termed philosophy, a better gift than which never was nor ever will be conferred by the gods on our mortal race. This, then, is what I call the greatest benefit of the eyes; and as for the others that are of less consequence, why should I celebrate them, to make those who are blind and unphilosophic mourn and regret them in vain? This, however, we may assert, that God invented and bestowed sight on us for this express purpose, that on surveying the circles of intelligence in the heavens, we might properly employ those of our own minds, which, though disturbed when compared with the others that are uniform, are still allied to their circula-

* Gr. τα μὲν οὖν τῶν ὀμμάτων συμμεταίτια.

tions; and that having thus learned and being naturally possessed of a correct reasoning faculty, we might by imitating the uniform revolutions of divinity set right our own silly wanderings and blunders.

As respects voice and hearing, we may say again, that they were bestowed on us by the gods for the same objects and on the same account; for speech was ordained for the very same purpose as the sight, which it greatly aids in its office;—and it is with a view also to harmony that the hearing has an aptitude for musical sounds. That harmony, moreover, which consists in motions analogous to the revolutions of our soul, does not seem advantageous to him who wisely devotes himself to the Muses* on the mere ground of its being pleasurable without reason, as it seems at present; but it was given us by the Muses to aid us in reducing the disturbed circulation of our soul to mutual order and accordance;—and again, they gave us rhythm for the same purpose, as the means of reforming the irregular and ungracious habits that prevail in the majority of our race.

XXI.—Thus far, with only a few exceptions, our past remarks have had reference to the creations of intellect; and we ought to speak likewise of things that come of necessity; for the generation of this world results wholly from the co-operation of intellect and necessity. Intellect, indeed, ruling over necessity, persuaded it to bring to the highest perfection the majority of created things; and in this way, by the persuasive power of wisdom over necessity, this universe was first created. Now, correctly to explain in what way it was created, we must refer in our explanation to the form of a variable cause,† as the nature of the case requires. Let us then recall our steps, and take up the subject afresh, going back to first principles, as we did before. Let us investigate then the nature and affections of fire and water, air and earth, prior to the generation of the heavens; for up to the present time no one has yet unfolded their generation:—and yet we speak of fire and other things as principles and elements of the universe, just as if the nature of each was known;—whereas at the same time any one with

* That is, philosophy, which likewise is signified by the term *ἡ μουσική*.

† Gr. τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας.

the least intelligence must be aware that they cannot be compared even to letters or parts of which syllables are formed. As respects ourselves, this is what we propose:—we will not speak of the principle or principles, or whatever other denomination they may receive, of all things;—and this for no other reason than the difficulty of stating what are my sentiments according to our present method of discussion.* Do not expect me then to speak thus, for I cannot persuade myself that I have the ability to undertake so difficult a subject. Keeping, therefore, to the line of argument laid down at the beginning, on the force of probability,† I will endeavour to make statements not less probable than those of others, and beginning the subject once more from its commencement‡ to discourse on the matter both in detail and as a whole. First, then, invoking the divinity who has now from the first been the guardian of our discourse, to defend us from an absurd and unusual exposition and lead us to a doctrine founded on probability—let us again begin to speak.

XXII. — This fresh commencement then, of our present discussion requires a more ample division than the former. For then we distinguished only two species; but we must now admit a third. In the former discussion two were sufficient;—one set forth as a species of model, apprehensible by the intellect, and always subsisting on the principle of sameness, —the second an imitation of the model, generated and visible; and we did not then distinguish a third, because we deemed these two sufficient. But now the subject of discourse seems to compel me to introduce and explain a new species which is both difficult and obscure.§ Of what natural power, then, are we to conceive it possessed? It is indeed in some sort the special receptacle, and, as it

* Gr. κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου. Stallbaum considers this phrase as equivalent to κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. We have preferred giving a literal interpretation of the words themselves.

† Gr. τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς ῥηθὲν διαφυλάττων, τὴν τῶν εἰκότων λόγῳ εἴναμιν, &c. He is here alluding to what he had said in his introduction of the subject, ch. ix.

‡ Gr. μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. Stallbaum suggests as an emendation, κατὰ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, according to the plan of our former discussion:—but this is scarcely needed.

§ On the nature of primitive matter and the distinction between matter finite and matter infinite, see Stallbaum's long and learned note *ad locum*.

were, the nurse of all generation. Such indeed is the truth :—but we must speak more clearly concerning it. And this will certainly be an arduous undertaking on many accounts, but principally on account of the questions that must previously be settled concerning fire and the rest of the elements,—why one should be called water rather than fire, or air rather than earth, or why any one of them should bear one name in particular rather than all the rest ; thus rendering it a difficult matter to use a language about it that is fixed and stable. How then, and by what means, are we to arrive at a probable conclusion in this dilemma ?

In the first place, then. what we now denominate water, on becoming condensed, seems to take the form of stones and earth,—and when melted and dispersed, that of vapour and air ;—air also, when burnt up, becomes fire, while the latter again, on becoming condensed and extinct, resumes the form of air ; and again air, when collected and condensed, produces mists and clouds, from which, when still more compressed, rain descends ; and from water again are formed earth and stones ;—[the whole of them,] as it seems, exchanging all round their mutual generation.*

XXIII.—As these, then, never maintain any constancy of existence, who will have the assurance to maintain that any one of them is *this* rather than *that* ? No one :—and it would be far the safest plan to speak about them as follows :—When we see anything constantly passing from one state of existence to another, as fire for instance, we should not say that it is fire absolutely, but something fiery,—and again, that what we call water is not absolutely so, but something watery ; without assigning to them any names that would give the idea of stability, as we think people do, when they express it by *this* and *that* (τόδε καὶ τούτο) ;—for not being of an abiding nature, it cannot endure to have applied to it such terms as, *this thing, of this nature, belonging to this* ; and any such others as would show it to have a substantive existence. Hence we should not give any one of them an individual name, but call it something such-like, but ever fluctuating ; and especially with respect to fire, [we should assert] that it is wholly such-like, and similarly likewise, every-

* Gr. κύκλον τε οὕτω διαδιδόντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ὥς ζαίνεται, τὴν γένεσιν.

thing endued with generation. [That receptacle,] however, in which each of these appears successively to grow up and decay, that alone is entitled to be termed *this* and *that*;—whereas anything of any kind soever, as hot, white, or their contraries, and all therefrom proceeding, cannot be so denominated. But let us again try more clearly to explain our meaning. If any one, in modelling all kinds of figures out of gold, were unceasingly to transform them one by one into all the others, and some one present were to point to one of them and inquire what it was, it would be by far the safest and most correct to say that is gold; but as for its being a triangle, or any other figure that might be given to it, not to speak of them as being so in reality, inasmuch as they are in process of change, even while we make such assertion; but to be content if it may safely be denominated such-like, [or of such a nature]. The same remark applies to that which receives all bodies;—and we should ever call it by the same name, as it never abandons its own proper power, but perpetually receives all things, and never anywhere or in any way assumes any of those shapes that enter into it,—being in fact a natural receptacle for everything,* receiving both motion and form from what enters therein; and this is why it exhibits a different aspect at different times. But as for the representations of the objects that enter and depart hence, they are modelled after them in a manner wonderful and difficult to describe, as we shall hereafter relate.

XXIV.—For the present, then, we must consider three things:—first, that which is produced,—the second, that in which it is produced,—and the third, that of which the thing produced is the natural resemblance. And especially is it proper to compare that which receives to the mother (*i. e.* which supplies the model), that from which it receives to the father, and the nature intermediate between these to the child;† and to consider, also, that as the image should

* Gr. ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει πάντι κεῖται. This unusual meaning of ἐκμαγεῖον is well explained by a passage in the opening of the *Timæus* Locrus, p. 94, a.—τὴν δ' ὕλην ἐκμαγεῖον καὶ ματέρα τιθάναν τε καὶ γεννατικὴν εἶμεν τὰς τρίτας οὐσίας. The words χώρα and ἔδρα are sometimes used in this dialogue to express a similar notion; viz. the primitive matter of things created, infinite in extent but capable of receiving shapes.

† This passage is alluded to by Aristotle, *Metaph.* I. ch. 6.

present every possible variety of forms, that in which the model is formed cannot well be prepared for the purpose, unless those forms have been erased from it which it used to receive from other quarters. Indeed, if it were like any of the objects that enter into it, if aught were to present itself of a nature contrary and wholly different, it would produce a bad likeness thereof. And hence from presenting at the same time its own image, that which is destined to receive within itself all the different species possible, should itself be destitute of all form whatever;—just as those preparing sweet-smelling unguents take all pains to render wholly inodorous the liquids that are to receive the perfume,—and as those also who wish to impress figures on a soft substance carefully remove from it any previous impression, and make it, as far as they can, exquisitely smooth and well-polished. In the same way, then, that which is intended properly to receive through its entire extent the resemblances of eternal beings, should be naturally without any form whatever of its own. Hence, as to this mother and receptacle of things created, which is visible and every way perceptible, we cannot term it either earth, air, fire, or water,—nor again, any one of their compounds, or any of the elements from which they were produced; but we should not be at all wrong in calling it a certain invisible and shapeless essence, which receives all things and has a certain share of intelligence,—though how it has it, is a matter very obscure and difficult of apprehension. So far, however, as it is possible to arrive at its nature from what has been previously said, we may very correctly say that fire appears to be something inflamed,* water something moist,—and so in like manner, earth and air, so far as it receives the images of these bodies.

XXV.—Let us, then, be somewhat more minute in resolving the following question,†—whether there is a certain

* Gr. *πῦρ μὲν ἐκάστοτε αὐτοῦ τὸ πεπυρωμένον μέρος φαίνεσθαι.*

† The question now proposed is, whether the elementary bodies have a separate existence and eternal ideas, or whether those only are certain that are cognizable by the senses. On this point he says, that just as *science* and *opinion* widely differ, so also do the *ideas* of things and the *things* submitted to the senses. Different, however, from both these is the *χώρα* or receptacle of that infinite matter, which can only be conceived by a bastard sort of reason; because the infinite is not the subject

fire subsisting in itself,—and so also, as respects other things which we always say have a separate existence in themselves, whether the objects alone that we see, and which are perceived through the bodily organs, possess reality of being, and nothing besides these has any existence at all,—or whether we are wrong in asserting that each of them has its corresponding idea, when after all it is nothing but idle talk. The present question, therefore, we must not decide without much judicious examination; neither should we add to our present discourse any great length of matter not strictly belonging to the subject:—but if there should appear to be any limit, by which it can be contained within a small compass, that would of all things be the most opportune to our present design.

Thus, then, will I state my opinion. If intellect and true opinion are two separate kinds of things, there must necessarily be self-existing ideas not perceptible by the senses, and to be apprehended only by the intellect; but if, as appears to some, true opinion differs in no respect from intellect, everything perceived through the body should be considered perfectly real. We must consider them, then, as two distinct things, because they both have a separate origin and character, one of them produced in us by learning, the other through persuasion,—one always based on true reason, the other irrational,—the one not to be moved by persuasion, the other subject to such mutation:—and lastly, of true opinion every man has a share; but of intellect only the gods, and some small portion of mankind.

XXVI.—Such being the case, we must acknowledge that there is an idea which subsists according to sameness, unproduced and not subject to decay; receiving nothing into itself from elsewhere, and itself never entering into any other nature, but invisible and imperceptible by senses, and to be apprehended only by pure intellect; while the second, on the other hand, which is like it, and bears the same name, is perceptible by the senses, the effect of production, ever in motion, coming into being in a certain spot, and then again hastening to decay, being apprehended by opinion united with perception. Again, there is a third of mental intelligence, but is, as it were hypothetically, considered by an inferior reasoning faculty.

class of being,—that of eternal place; which is never destroyed, but becomes a seat (or receptacle) for everything created, being perceptible of itself without the interference of the senses, by a sort of bastard reason, though scarcely to be relied on; and hence seeing it, as in a dream, we assert that every being must necessarily be somewhere, and in a certain place, and that nothing can exist which is neither on earth or in the heavens. With regard to all these, and such like opinions and the ideas which are entertained in a waking state and have a positive existence, we cannot, owing to this dreaminess, clearly distinguish the one from the other, and state what is the fact,—that the image, which cannot claim as its own that even for which it is formed, but is ever borne along as the spectre of something else, must consequently be formed in something else, and somehow vindicate to itself a separate essence, if it has any existence at all;—whereas, with regard to real being, true and accurate reason aids it by affirming, that as long as two things differ from each other, they cannot so exist one in another, as to be at the same time two things and one only.*

XXVII.—This, then, is a summary of my opinion,—that there are three distinct things which existed before the formation of the universe, *being*, *place*, and *generation*;—that the nurse of generation, moistened and inflamed, receiving the forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the other accidents thereon consequent, appeared under many various aspects; but as it was contained by powers neither similar nor equally balanced, it could not possibly be balanced itself, and through the want of such balance, became itself impelled by these forces, to which it again in turn gave impulse;† while the parts in motion were separately hurried along in different directions, like things shaken and winnowed

* This passage is somewhat difficult and involved; but Plato's meaning seems to be, that the things falling under the senses are conformed according to the example of the ideas, and are, as it were, representations thereof, though different from the ideas themselves:—and hence there must necessarily be some matter in which they have been moulded, or else they can have no permanent existence; though nevertheless sound reason shows us that there is a wide difference between them and the ideas properly so called.

† On the full meaning of this passage, see Stallbaum's long note *ad locum*.

by sieves (*πλοκάνων*) and machines used for the cleansing of corn, the dense and heavy particles in one direction, those that are light settling in another quite different. Thus when these four classes were agitated by their receptacle, which was itself moved as by the shaking of the [above-mentioned] instrument, there was a separation of the dissimilar parts, and a crowding together of those most alike; in consequence of which these other things also occupied a different position, before the universe was created and from such materials reduced to order. Before this, indeed, they all subsisted irrationally, and without measure;—but when the Creator undertook to arrange the universe, he first gave shapes with forms and numbers to fire and earth, water and air, which possessed indeed certain traces of their true essence, though, nevertheless, wholly so situated, as everything would probably be, in the absence of its god.* And let us above all things hold, and ever hold, that the Deity made them as far as possible the most beautiful and the best, when before they were in a totally different condition. Now, then, I will try to show you the distribution and generation of these things individually by a somewhat unusual mode of proof; but yet, as you have trodden the paths of mathematical learning, through which we must necessarily make our demonstration, you will not fail to follow me.

XXVIII.—First, then, that fire and earth, water and air, are bodies, is evident surely to every one. But every species of body possesses solidity; and every solid must necessarily be contained by planes. Again, a base formed of a perfectly plane surface is composed from triangles.† But all triangles are originally of two kinds, each of them having one angle a right angle, and the two others acute:—and one of these has

* What Plato here means is, that the elements before the creation, although infinite, shapeless, and soulless, contained within them certain traces of their true essence, and were afterwards made finite and of fixed shape by being clothed, as it were, with forms and numbers.

† Gr. *ἡ δὲ ὀρθὴ τῆς ἐπιπέδου βάσεως ἐκ τριγώνων ξυνίστηκε*. These notions about triangles were decidedly Pythagorean, as we are informed by Proclus in Euclid, II. 46. *οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ μὲν τρίγωνον ἀπλῶς ἀρχὴν γεννήσεως εἶναι φασιν καὶ τῆς τῶν γεννητῶν εἰδοποιίας*, &c. See also Martin's note, 67, *Etudes sur le Timée*, ii. p. 236—8. Plato, however, could have been no mean geometrician himself, having studied under Theodorus.

an equal part of a right angle divided by the equal sides; while in the other, two unequal parts of a right angle are divided by the unequal sides. This, then, we lay down, according both to probability and necessity, as the origin and principle of fire and all other bodies;—but as for the heavenly principles thereof, these indeed are known only to the Deity, and to those among men who enjoy God's favour.

We must relate, then, of what kind those four most beautiful bodies were that thus came into being, and which, however unlike each other, may yet be produced from each other by dissolution. By accomplishing this, indeed, we shall ascertain the truth about the generation of earth and fire, as well those elements (*i. e.* water and air) which in their just proportion hold an intermediate position; for then we shall allow no one to assert that there are visible bodies more beautiful than these, each of which belongs to a separate class. It must be our endeavour, therefore, to unite together these four kinds of bodies so excellent in beauty, and so prove to you that we have sufficiently apprehended their nature. Of the two triangles, indeed, the isosceles has but one form, while the oblong or scalene admits of infinite variety. We must select, therefore, the most beautiful among the infinites, if we would begin and proceed in due order:—still if any one can prove that he has found any form yet better and more suitable for the composition of these bodies, he shall be treated not as an enemy but a friend, and his opinion shall prevail. As for us, however, we fix on one only as the most beautiful of all the many triangles, passing over all the rest;—that out of which is formed a third, the equilateral triangle.* To explain the reason of this would indeed require a somewhat lengthened proof:—nevertheless we propose a handsome reward for him who by a diligent investigation finds this not to be the case. We select, therefore, two triangles out of many, from which the bodies of fire and the other elements have been constructed,—one being an isosceles, the other one always having the square of its longer side the triple of that of the shorter.

But what we formerly asserted rather obscurely, we must

* *ἐξ οὗ τὸ ἰσόπλευρον τρίγωνον ἐκ τρίτου συνίστηκε.* The sense of the whole passage is explained geometrically in Stallbaum's note. We here give only what seems the correct rendering of the Greek.

now more accurately define. For all the four kinds [of elements] seemed to be mutually generated among each other from not being correctly represented; for there are generated from the triangles which we have just chosen, four kinds [of solid figures]—three of them, indeed, from one having unequal sides, and the fourth alone constructed from the isosceles triangle.* All of them, therefore, cannot, by dissolution into each other, produce from many small things a few that are large,—this being effected only by three of them; for all things whatever naturally arise from one only, and when the greater parts are dissolved, many small parts will be formed out of them, receiving figures suitable to each; and again, when the numerous small parts are dispersed into triangles, a single number is formed, and the entire bulk constitutes one separate body of large size.† Thus much then may suffice concerning their mutual generation.

XXIX.—We must speak next in order concerning the quality of each class individually, and show from what composition of numbers each was formed. The first, then, indeed, is that composed from the smallest triangles, its element being that which has its subtending side twice the length of the shorter. Now, two of these triangles being mutually brought together to form a diagonal diameter, and this being thrice repeated, so that the diagonals and shorter sides shall meet in the same point, as in a centre, the result will be one equilateral triangle composed of six triangles. But four equilateral triangles form by the union of three plane angles one solid angle, the size of which exceeds that of the most obtuse plane angle; and thus by forming a figure that comprises four of these angles, we constitute that first species of solid, [the tetrahedron,] which divides into equal and similar parts the entire sphere in which it is inscribed. The second species of solid, [the octahedron,] is formed from the same triangles, which unite to form eight equilateral triangles, and form one solid angle from four plane angles, six solid

* Namely, the *tetrahedron* or pyramid, *octahedron*, and *icosahedron*, which are generated from six equal-sided triangles, and fourthly, the *cube*, generated from an equilateral triangle. See Stallbaum, *ad locum*.

† Gr. γενόμενος εἰς ἀριθμὸς ἐνὸς ὅγκου μέγα ἀποτελείσειεν ἂν ἄλλο εἶδος ἓν, lit. *one number being formed will complete one separate and large kind of single mass*.

angles being requisite to constitute this second class of solids. The third, [the icosahedron,] is formed from the union of one hundred and twenty elements, so united as to form twelve solid angles, each formed by five plane equilateral triangles, and it has for its bases (or faces) twenty equilateral triangles. These are the only solids that can be formed from this element, [viz. the scalene triangle]. It was the isosceles triangle, however, that produced the fourth elementary figure,—four of them being so united with their right angles at the centre, as to form one equilateral four-sided plane; and six of these again united forming eight solid angles, each of which is formed by the combination of three plane right angles;—the figure of the body thus composed being cubical, having six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There was yet a certain fifth combination, [the regular dodecahedron;] and this the Deity employed in tracing the plan of the universe.*

XXX.—Should any one then, after careful consideration of all these points, be at a loss to determine whether the number of worlds is infinite or finite,† let him consider that to admit an infinite number thereof, would be the notion only of one who is ignorant of all that he should best know. Still it may with much propriety be questioned whether there is in reality only one world, or whether there are five. According to our opinion, indeed, which is founded on probable reasoning, there is but one world; though others perhaps, regarding the question in another point of view, may be of a different opinion. Let us now leave alone further speculations of this kind, and returning to the elementary forms that have now been created in our discussion, let us assign them respectively to fire, earth, water, and air. To earth, indeed, let us assign a cubical form; for of all the four kinds earth is the most immoveable, and is of all bodies the most easy to model,—such being necessarily the case with that which has the most secure bases. Among the triangles, then, that we originally mentioned, that which has equal

* On these geometric forms or elementary particles, we must refer the reader to Martin's *Etudes sur le Timée*, notes 66—69, ii. pp. 234—250, where the whole subject is exceedingly well explained and illustrated.

† It was the opinion of Democritus that the worlds are infinite; and the same notion was afterwards entertained by Epicurus. Comp. Diog. Laert. ix. sect. 44, and Cic. Acad. Q. iv. 17.

sides possesses firmer bases than one having unequal sides, and of the two equilateral plane figures thus formed, the square has necessarily a firmer base than the triangle, whether considered with reference to its parts or the whole. On this account, in assigning this figure to the earth, we still preserve probability;—and we shall do this also by assigning to water that figure which is the least moveable of the whole, to fire that which is most so, and to air that which is intermediate between the two,—assigning also the smallest body to fire, the greatest to water, and to air one of a size intermediate between fire and water;—and again, the most subtile body to fire, the next in this respect to air, and the third to water. Among all these then, that body which possesses the fewest bases must necessarily be the most easily moveable, as well as most penetrating, and in every way most acute, being also exceedingly light, from being composed of the smallest possible number of elements:—and so also the second has these properties in a secondary degree, and the third in the third degree. Let it be agreed then, that, according both to strict and probable reasoning, the solid form of the pyramid is the element and germ of fire; that the second form described is air; and the third water. All these elements then, we must conceive to be so minutely small, that the individual parts of each kind may from their smallness escape notice, and yet when many of them are collected together, they become from their bulk the objects of our perception.* Moreover, as respects their relative proportions, numbers, motions, and other properties, the Deity, so far as the nature of necessity has willingly and obediently given way, has firmly established and united them together in just proportion.†

XXXI.—From all then that we have before said about the nature of these bodies, the following account seems to be the most probable:—Earth, when it meets with fire, and is dissolved by its subtilty, is borne along hither and thither in a dissolved state either in the fire itself, or in the air, or in the

* Gr. ξυνασθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ὅγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι.

† Gr. ταύτην πάντῃ ἐν' ἀκριβείας ἀποτελεσθεῖσων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ξυνηρμόσθαι ταῦτα ἀνὰ λόγον. Here is an awkward anacoluthon from the introduction of the passive perfect ξυνηρμόσθαι, for which Stephens suggested, as an emendation, ξυναρμόσασθαι.

water,—till its parts, meeting together, and again mutually harmonizing, once more become earth; for they can never take any other form. But water, when divided by fire or air, may, by the re-composition of its parts, become either one body of fire, or two bodies of air;—and as for the air, when it is decomposed, one only of its particles will produce two of fire. And again, likewise, when fire receives into itself either air or water or earth, though in small quantities relatively to the mass which contains it, if it be dragged along by the movements of these bodies and overcome in spite of all resistance, and at last be decomposed and broken in pieces, these two bodies of fire will coalesce into one of air; and if again the air is overcome and separated into parts, then from two wholes and a half there will be formed one whole body of water. Again, let us consider this matter as follows:—When any one of the other forms is enclosed by fire, and is cut by the acuteness of its angles and sides, it escapes further division by passing into the nature of fire:—for among bodies that are uniform and similar to each other, no one by itself can cause any change in one of the same class, or experience any itself, with respect to that which it resembles; whereas, when one class of bodies is contained within another, and the weak one contends with the stronger, it will not fail to be destroyed. And again, when the smaller, being comprehended in the greater, and the few by the many, are broken in pieces and extinguished, if they be disposed to adopt the form of the prevailing nature, they cease to be extinguished; and air becomes generated from fire,—water from air:—but if they attack and fall into contention with any of the rest that they may meet, the agitated parts continue to be dissolved, till being every way repulsed and dissolved, they fly to their kindred nature; or else, being overcome, and joined into one out of many similar to the prevailing power, they abide there in familiar union. And especially, as the result of these affections, all things whatever are mutually changing their positions;—for the numerous individuals of each class are distinguished according to their respective places through the motion of their receptacle, while those that are mutually dissimilar, but yet resemble others, are hurried on by the concussion [of other bodies] to the place occupied by the bodies they resemble.

All unmixed and primary bodies then are generated from such causes as these:—but that other classes of bodies are naturally inherent in these forms, is owing to the composition of each rudimental part (στοιχείον); which not only at first produces one triangle, possessed of a certain magnitude, but others also, both greater and smaller, equal in number to the various classes existing in the forms themselves;—and hence, these being mingled with themselves and each other, are infinite in their variety, — a fact which every one should consider, who means to argue with probability respecting the nature of things.

XXXII.—Concerning motion, then, and position, unless a person can clearly understand in what manner and in conjunction with what these two take place, he will meet with many hindrances in the subsequent part of this discourse. This matter indeed we have already partly discussed; but besides this, we must still inquire whether it be true, that motion never willingly resides in smoothness, inasmuch as it is difficult, or rather impossible, to conceive the existence of anything moving without a mover, or of a mover without something in motion;—motion being impossible while these are away, and it being equally impossible that these should be equable and smooth. Thus, then, we must assign a state of rest to smoothness, and motion to that which is unequal and rough; inequality indeed being the cause again of a rough uneven nature. Now, as regards the generation of inequality, that we have already discussed; but how the several bodies, when divided according to their classes, do not cease from their mutual courses and motions, this we did not explain:—and so we will once more make it the subject of inquiry. The revolution of the universe, since it comprehends the various classes of things, and is of circular shape and naturally desirous of uniting with itself, compresses all things together, and suffers no place to remain void. On this account is it, that fire most of all penetrates through everything, and air, in the next degree, being second to the former in subtilty and tenuity;—and the rest in the same way [according to their degree:]—for such as are composed of very large parts have a very large vacuity in their composition,—those, on the contrary, that are very small, a very small vacuity. The union, then, resulting from compression drives

together the small parts into the intervals of the larger ; and thus, the small parts being placed side by side with the large, the smaller dividing the greater, while the latter compress the smaller, they are all borne upwards and downwards to the places respectively suitable to each ;—for each, on changing its magnitude, changes its position likewise : and so, from these causes the production of diversity is constantly maintained, giving that perpetual motion to these bodies, which both now subsists and ever will continue.

XXXIII.—In the next place, we must understand that there are many kinds of fire;—as for instance, flame,—that which emanates from flame,* which without burning furnishes light to the eyes,—and that which abides in ignited bodies, even after the flame has been extinguished. In like manner, with respect to air, one kind is of the greatest purity, that denominated *æther*,—a second most turbulent, cloudy, and dark ; and besides these, there are other nameless kinds formed by the inequality of the triangles. As respects water, again, it admits of a twofold division, one kind being liquid, the other fusible. The liquid kind, therefore, being composed of very small and unequal parts of water, becomes moveable, both of itself and by other bodies, through the inequality of its composition and peculiar shape of its figure ; whereas the fusible kind, which is composed of large and smooth parts, is more stable than the former, as well as heavier and more compact, owing to its smoothness ;†—and when fire enters into and dissolves its substance, it becomes more moveable, from losing its uniformity ; and when it is thus rendered easily moveable, and is repelled by the surrounding air, and extended on the earth, it is said to be *liquefied*, by way of expressing the division of its masses, and is said to *flow* also, in order to show its extension over the earth :—and these two words express both the changes which it undergoes. Again, when fire escapes from this body, it does not retire into a vacuum, but the surrounding air repelled [by the fire] drives the easily moveable mass of moisture into the place before occupied by the fire,

* Gr. τό τε ἀπὸ τῆς φλογὸς ἀπὸν. The old editions read ἀπτόν.

† The distinction between τὸ ὑγρόν and τὸ χυρόν is not easily conveyed in translation. The former means an elastic fluid like water,—the latter, a mass of greater density and less elasticity, such as jelly, syrup, or oil. We have rendered it *fused*, because in the next page the term is used respecting metals.

with which at the same time it becomes mingled;—but when the mass by close compression once more becomes equable and smooth, it then resumes its smoothness and consistency, because fire, the artificer of inequality, has taken its departure;—and this departure of fire we denominate *cooling*, while the union that takes place without the presence of fire is termed a *condensation* [or hardening]. But among all those which we term fusible fluids, there is one that becomes most dense, though formed from the most subtile and equable parts, and is of an uniform character, and partaking of a lustrous yellow colour:—it is that most highly prized possession,—gold, which is produced by filtration through a rock. And a node (ὄζος) of gold, rendered by its density very hard and turned black, is called *adamant*. But that which consists of parts greatly resembling gold, and has more than one species, which surpasses gold in density, and that it may become the harder, contains but a small and insignificant portion of earth, though at the same time it is lighter, owing to the great intervals between its internal atoms;—this is a separate kind of lustrous and dense fluids, termed *brass*. But an earthy nature is therewith mingled, which, when through age the two parts become separated soon becomes visible of itself, and is denominated *rust*. All other such matters also, it would be no hard task further to discuss by pursuing the plan of probable arguments;—and any one, who by way of recreation interrupts for a while his reasonings on eternal being, and enters into probable speculations about the generation of material things, will by these means acquire a pleasure of which he need not repent, and establish for himself a moderate and wise recreation during life.

XXXIV.—Thus indulging ourselves, let us next recount certain probable reasons concerning what next follows of the same subject. Water that is mingled with fire, which being very thin and moist, takes its name* (ὕγρον) from its motion and the manner in which it rolls on the earth, and which is

* The Greek text is evidently corrupt. It stands as follows:—τὸ ὕδωρ, ὅσον λεπτὸν ὑγρὸν τε διὰ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἣν κυλινδούμενον ἐπὶ γῆς ὑγρὸν λέγεται, &c. Stallbaum suggests the removal of the last ὑγρὸν, and the insertion of ἰστί after κυλινδούμενον. This suggestion has been followed in our translation.

also called soft and yielding, because its bases are less stable than those of earth,—this, when separated from fire and bereft of air, acquires more uniformity, and through their departure (i. e. of air and fire) is compressed into itself;—and when it is thus condensed above the earth, it becomes hail, if on the earth, ice; but when there is less of it and only half the amount of freezing, [the water so condensed] above the earth becomes snow, and that on the earth, which is formed from dew, is called hoar-frost. When again the numerous kinds of water are mingled together, the entire liquid thus formed, which is filtered from the earth through plants, takes the name of juices or saps. Owing, however, to their mode of admixture, these individual fluids present through their dissimilarity many different undescribed varieties, although four of them, which are of a fiery character, and particularly transparent, have obtained appropriate appellations;—that which heats the soul as well as the body being called *wine*,—secondly, that which is smooth, and dazzling to the sight,* and hence bright, glittering, and apparently of an oily nature, such as pitch, the gum of the kiki-plant,† oil, and other things having similar properties;—again, that which possesses a power, as far as nature permits, of diffusing the substances of nutrition over the palate, and by this property presents the idea of sweetness, has obtained the general name of *honey*;—and lastly, that frothy fluid, which dissolves the flesh by burning, has been distinguished from all the other juices by the name of *opium* (ὀπός).

XXXV.—As respects the different kinds of earth, one of them, stone, is produced by the filtration of water in the manner following. The commingled water, when it loses its coherence, passes into the form of air, but, on becoming air, rises to its appropriate place. As, however, there is no vacuum, it presses on the surrounding air; and this, being weighty, and impelled against the mass of earth that it surrounds, violently compresses it, driving it into the vacant spaces whence the new air had before ascended. The earth, also, by the compression of the air into indissoluble union with water, is formed into stones; the more beautiful sorts of

* Gr. διακριτικὸν ὕψους, lit. *having the power of separating sight*.

† This is the same as the συλλικύπριον or *Palma Christi*. Comp. Herod. ii. 94, and D. Turner's note thereon.

which acquire a lustre from the equality and smoothness of their parts, the opposite being the case with those that are ugly and valueless. But when all the moisture is thrown off by the violence of fire, and the body is thus unusually dried up, then is formed the kind of earth that we call clay. Sometimes also, even without losing its moisture, the earth is fused by the fire, and on cooling becomes a stone of a black colour.* In the same manner, when this earth is deprived of the water it holds in mixture, but yet has small particles and is of a saline nature, it forms a half-solid body, still capable of solution in water,—either nitre, which purifies both oil and earth, or else salt, a substance so well adapted to give flavours pleasing to the palate, and deemed by the law as agreeable to the gods. The compounds of these two substances are not soluble by water, but yet can be melted by fire, for the following reasons. Neither fire nor air liquefies masses of earth; because, being naturally composed of elements smaller than the interstices (or pores) of earth, they easily penetrate through these capacious pores without subjecting it either to dissolution or liquefaction. The parts of water, on the other hand, as they are larger, strive to force a passage, and so dissolve and liquefy the earthy mass:—and hence, when the earth has no strong consistency, water alone will dissolve it, whereas if in a compact state, nothing will affect it but fire, which is the only body that can find an entrance. As for water, again, its strong cohesiveness of parts, [when frozen], can be overcome only by fire, whereas, when the cohesion is less strong, it can be equally decomposed by fire and air, the latter entering its interstices and the former separating even its constituent triangles. Nothing, however, can dissolve air strongly condensed, without attacking its composing elements; though when it coheres less strongly, it may be dissolved, though only by fire. Again, in bodies composed of water and earth, while the water occupies all the interstices in its state of compression, the particles of water from without, not finding egress, flow round the entire mass without suffering decomposition; whereas the particles

* Lindau conjectures this to be *basalt*. It is probably lava, or some similar volcanic product. The same commentator conceives the *λίπον* mentioned in the succeeding sentence to be *potash* or some alkali suitable for mingling with oil to form soap.

of fire that enter into the interstices of water, as water into those of earth, and have the same effect on water that fire has on air, alone possess the power of dissolving and liquefying the compound body. And among these, some contain less water than earth; such as all kinds of glass, and such stones as are termed fusible; while others, on the contrary, contain more water, such as wax and aromatic substances.

XXXVI.—Having thus then enumerated the several figures and classes of bodies variously formed by admixtures and mutual changes, we must now try to explain the causes of the feelings with which they impress us. First, then, the bodies here spoken of must be always perceptible. As yet, however, we have not discoursed on the generation of flesh, and what belongs to flesh, nor on that part of the soul which is mortal. This nevertheless cannot be suitably explained without at the same time explaining the sensations and impressions produced by external objects; and although one subject cannot be unfolded without a knowledge of the other, yet the two cannot be explained together. We must settle one first, and then proceed to the other. In order, then, in speaking of impressions, to observe the same order as in speaking of the bodies producing them, let our first inquiry be into those that concern the body and soul.

First, then, let us inquire why fire is called *hot*, the reason of which we shall perceive by considering its penetrating and cutting power about our bodies. Now, that this affection is a certain sharpness * is nearly evident to all; and as regards the tenuity of its sides, the sharpness of its angles, the smallness of its particles, and the velocity of its motion, through all which it becomes violent, penetrating and capable of instantly dividing whatever it meets; this we should carefully consider, recalling to mind the generation of its figure;—inasmuch as it is this, and no other nature, which separates and parcels out our bodies into small portions, and produces in us that affection which is very properly denominated *heat*. Now the contrary to this is sufficiently manifest; but still we must not pass it without explanation:—for in truth, among the humid particles surrounding the body, those that have the largest elementary parts enter and drive out the smaller;

* Gr. ὅτι τὸ πᾶθος,—meaning, that the affection resembles the impression formed by an acute angular body.

but being unable to occupy their places, they compress our bodily humours, and from being uneven and in a state of agitation, fix them and render them motionless through their evenness and density;—whereas things brought into contact against nature are naturally opposed and mutually repel each other. From this contest and agitation then there resulted a certain trembling and numbness; and the whole of this affection, as well as the cause that produces it, has the name of cold. Again we call those bodies *hard* to which our flesh yields; and those *soft*, which yield to the pressure of our flesh;—thus using the terms comparatively, with reference to each other. Bodies also yield to pressure when placed on a small base, while those resting on quadrangular bases are the least impressible, owing to their very firm position, and because from their own extreme density they strongly resist all opposing pressure.

XXXVII.—Again, the nature of heavy and light will become most evident, if investigated with that of *up* and *down*;—for it is by no means right to assert that there are naturally two distinct places opposite one to the other;—one termed *down*, to which all bodies tend that are endued with bulk, but the other *up*, to which bodies ascend contrary to their inclination. The whole universe, indeed, being spherical, all such things as are at the extremities (or circumference) and equally distant from the centre must all in like manner naturally belong to the extremities, while the centre, being in the same proportion distant from all these extremities, must be said to occupy quite an opposite position. Such then being the nature of the world, would not any one who reversed the position of the above-mentioned objects be fairly thought to apply names to them that are quite unsuitable? For the middle place in it cannot be fairly said to be either naturally down or up, but only the centre itself; and the circumference is neither the middle, nor does it contain within it any parts more distant than the rest either from the centre, or any of the opposite extremities. But when all the parts are naturally so similar, how can any one with propriety assign to them contrary names?—For supposing there were any regular solid body in the centre of the universe, it would never be carried to any of the extremities, owing to their entire uniformity;—but on the other hand, if any one were to move

in a circle round this solid, he would often stand with his feet opposite to where they before were, and so call the same part of himself both the upside and down. Since the universe, therefore, as we have just observed, is of a spherical figure, no prudent man should assert that it has any part which is [absolutely] either up or down;—yet, as regards the origin and usual application of these terms which we thus transfer to the universe, this we agree to be a proper subject of investigation. If, in that spot of the universe which specially belongs to fire, and where the principal mass is collected with which it has a tendency to unite, any one were to ascend thither and being possessed of the requisite power, were to take up the particles, place them in a balance, and raising the scale, were forcibly to draw the fire towards the air, with which it has no affinity, it is clear that in this case the smaller mass would be more easily impelled than the larger. Indeed, when two things are simultaneously raised by one and the same power, the smaller quantity must of course yield more readily than the greater to the impulsive force by which they are constrained; and hence, the one is called *heavy* and gravitating downwards, the other *light* and tending upwards. The same thing also is observable in what we ourselves do, who inhabit this place [the earth]. For when, in walking on the earth, we separate particles of an earthy nature, and sometimes even portions of the earth itself, forcibly and unnaturally drawing them towards the air which is dissimilar,—then that which is smaller yielding more readily to our impulse is sooner attracted towards the foreign element:—this then we call *light* and the place towards which it is drawn, *up* (or *above*), giving to their contraries the terms *heavy* and *down* (or *below*) respectively. Hence these must mutually differ from each other, owing to the contrary positions that the several elements occupy:—for that which is light in one place is contrary to one corresponding with it in an opposite position, and so also to a heavy body another that is heavy, and to bodies placed above or below others, opposed to them in their respective positions;—and they will all be found, whether in a state of becoming or actually existing, to be contrary, transverse, and every way differing from each other. This one thing, moreover, is to be understood concerning all these matters, that the tendency of

each towards a body of similar nature gives to the body so attracted the name *heavy*, and the place to which it tends, *down* (or *below*); and thus to contrary things are assigned contrary appellations. Such are the causes that we assign to these phenomena. And again, as to the cause of the impression of smoothness and roughness, every one who has investigated it will be able to disclose it to others; for roughness comes from hardness joined with unevenness, while smoothness is the united effect of uniformity and density.

XXXVIII.—It remains for us now to consider what is most important in those affections common to the whole body, which are the chief causes of pleasure and pain, and to inquire how it is that certain impressions excite through the parts of the body certain sensations invariably attended by pleasure and pain. Thus then let us examine all our impressions, whether sensible or not, calling to mind the distinctions that we before made between bodies moved with ease and those with difficulty;—for this is the way to arrive at the point that we wish to determine. When a body by nature easily moveable has received an impression ever so slight, the several parts communicate it to the parts placed around them, producing on these parts the same effect, until at length they reach the intellect itself, to which they announce the power of the agents producing such impression;—whereas a body, which on the contrary is firm and stable and has no circular motion, is simply affected by itself without moving any of the surrounding bodies; and hence, as their components do not mutually communicate the first received impression, the entire animal remains unmoved, and experiences no sensation. This is the case indeed as respects the bones and hair, and such other parts of the body as are chiefly of an earthy nature; whereas the phenomena above described principally refer to the organs of sight and hearing, which contain an abundance of fire and air. This is what we should hold then concerning pleasure and pain:—an impression produced in us contrary to nature, and with violence, causes pain,—one that is conformable to our nature, however strong, pleasure;—whereas an impression that is gentle and gradual is unperceived, while the contrary to these produces contrary effects. An impression, again, the whole of which is easily produced, is pre-eminently an object of sensation,

but is not affected by pleasure and pain:—and of this kind are the affections belonging to the sight; which indeed, as we have above asserted, is a body of a nature daily becoming allied to ourselves.* For in this way the impressions caused by cuttings and burnings, and other similar accidents, do not cause pain to the sight; nor again, does it experience pleasure, from returning to its previous condition:—whereas the sensations that are strongest and most clear do this, so far as any one is affected by any object; and this is the reason why there is no violence whatever either in its expansion or contraction. But bodies composed from larger parts, which yield with difficulty to impelling agents, and distribute their motion over the whole body, do experience pleasure and pain; pain indeed, when they are often alienated from their own nature, but pleasure when restored to their former condition. Again, all bodies that admit of very gradual withdrawals, and, as it were, emptyings of their own nature, and at the same time receive supplies on a large scale, have no perception of loss, though they have of what accrues to them; and hence, they do not give pain to the mortal part of the soul, but on the contrary the greatest delight:—and the truth of this is manifest from the sensation of pleasant odours. But such bodies, on the other hand, as suffer excessive variation, and can scarcely be restored even gradually to their pristine condition, are affected in a manner quite the reverse of those we have just described; the truth of which is manifest in the case of burnings and wounds inflicted on the body.

XXXIX.—Having thus then pretty fully discussed the common affections of the whole body, and the appellations assigned to their effective causes, we must now endeavour to explain, as far as we can, the affections that arise in particular parts of us, as well as the causes by which they are induced. In the first place then, let us if possible complete the explanation of what we before left unfinished about those of the juices,—namely, the particular affections subsisting about the tongue.† And these, as well as most others, appear

* Allusion is here made to ch. xix. p. 350 of this translation.

† Plato was not aware that the palate is the chief organ of taste, and that these sensations are transmitted to the sensorium by means of nerves (*i. e.* minute tubes filled with cerebral matter), all of which communicate either with the spinal marrow or the brain itself,—the centre of all sensa-

to be produced by certain expansions and contractions; the impressions formed thereby depending more on smoothness and roughness than all other circumstances; because, whenever anything falls on the small veins round the tongue (which are the arbiters, as it were, of the taste stretching to the heart), in such a way as to penetrate the moist and delicate texture of the flesh, which through its earthy nature is in a melting state, it contracts and dries up the veins:—and where these penetrating substances are rougher than usual, they have an acrid taste (*στυφρά*), if less so, only one of sourness (*αὐστηρά*). Those on the contrary which purge, and wash away whatever adheres to the tongue, if they do this to such an immoderate degree, as somewhat to liquefy its nature, as nitre does;—all such as these are termed *bitter*; while substances of inferior power to nitre, which purge only moderately, we conceive to be *salt*, without that rough bitterness, and to be more friendly to our nature. Again, things heated by the temperature of the mouth, and thereby softened—which reciprocally heat and are heated by it—and which through their lightness are elevated towards the senses of the head, dividing at the same time whatever comes in their way;—all these, owing to such properties, are termed *pungent* (*ἔριμεία*). But when these same particles, thinned by putrefaction, enter into the narrow veins, and there come into contact with earthy and airy particles of a suitable size, and by making them mutually revolve, so mix them together as to cause a confusion of their elements, and thus by entering other veins form interstices in which the liquid, sometimes earthy, sometimes quite pure, forms, as it were, certain air-cavities enclosed by water, some of which formed of pure liquid are transparent, and called *bubbles*, while those composed of earthy liquid and in a state of agitation have received the name of *seething* (or *boiling*), and *yeast* (or *leaven*);—the effective cause of all this being termed *acid* (*ὀξύ*). And an affection contrary to all that has been

tion, as Herophilus and Erasistratus held long prior to Galen. Plato, on the contrary, maintained that these sensations were carried by certain small veins (or arteries,—for he makes no distinction between them), to the liver—regarded by him as the seat (comp. ch. xlv.) of the lower mortal soul. The heart was regarded by Aristotle as the centre of the sensations.

asserted about these, proceeds from a contrary cause; for, when the liquid compounds that enter the mouth are naturally suited to the quality of the tongue, they lubricate its asperities, as well as contract or relax such parts as were before unnaturally dilated or compressed, and restore them, as far as possible, to their proper and natural habit. Hence all such substances are pleasant and friendly to every one, become the remedies of violent passions, and are denominated *sweet*. And thus much may suffice concerning particulars of this kind.

XL.—As respects the faculty of the nostrils, it admits of no classification: for all odours whatever are but half-begotten,—there being no substances so proportioned, as to give forth any particular smell. Besides, our veins surrounding the nose are too narrow to admit the various kinds of earth and water, and too broad for those of fire and air; and hence no one ever perceives an odour from any of these,—odours being produced from bodies that are damp, putrefying, liquid, or vaporous;—for odours are generated by the change of water into air, or air into water; and all these are either smoke or vapour. And of these, that which passes from air into water is *vapour*,—that which is changed from water into air, *smoke*;—whence it comes to pass that all odours are more subtile than water, and denser than air. And these facts are clearly shown, when any one, owing to any obstruction of the respiration, draws his breath inwards; for then no odour filters through, but breath only—unattended by any odours. This is why these two varieties of them are without a name, being formed neither from many nor from a simple species, the only two distinct terms respecting them, being *pleasant* or *unpleasant*; the latter of which irritate and violently disturb the whole cavity lying between the top of the head and the navel, while the former soothe the same part, and kindly restore it to its natural condition.

XLI.—Let us next speak of and investigate the third kind of sense,—the hearing, and the causes giving rise to the affections peculiar thereto. Now we may generally define *voice* as a certain pulsation of the air, penetrating through the ears, brain, and blood, as far as the soul; and the motion hence arising, which commences from the head and ends in the seat of the liver, *hearing*;—and that when this motion is

swift, it emits a sharp sound, when slow, a flat one,—the former being uniform and smooth, the latter quite the reverse and rough:—likewise, that when the motion is on a large scale it will produce a loud sound, and when on a small scale only a low one. But respecting the harmony of these sounds we must speak in the subsequent part of this discourse.

XLII.—The fourth kind of sense, which is still left for us to discuss, comprises a very large variety of what we generally term *colours*, which consist of a flame emanating from individual bodies, and having parts proportioned to the sight for producing sensation. But we have already considered the effective causes of sight.* Here then we ought to speak of colours, and what seems to us the most probable theory respecting them.

Among the particles that fall from other bodies on the sight, some are greater, others less than, and others equal to, those of the visual fire. Such as are equal, then, are imperceptible, and are termed transparent; while, as for those that are larger or smaller, the former contract, the latter dilate the sight, having a power resembling that of heat and cold on the flesh, or of things acrid, heating and pungent, on the tongue. Particles affecting the sight in this manner are called black and white;—having the property, indeed, of producing the same modifications in bodies, though, being produced in different parts of the organ, they still appear to produce different impressions. It is thus, then, that we ought to term them,—*white*, that which dilates the sight; and that which is opposite in its effect, *black*;—whereas, when a sharper motion, and that, too, from a foreign fire, falls on and divides the sight even as far as the eyes themselves, and both separates and moistens the openings of the eyes, so as to force from them that united flow of fire and water that we call tears, and which are of a fiery nature coming from without,—these two fires meeting together with a force like that of lightning, and then saturated and extinguished by moisture, produce a great variety of colours, the impressions from which we term *flashings* (*μαρμαρυγὰς*), and the objects producing them *bright* and *lustrous*. Another kind of fire, intermediate between those just mentioned, and which reaches the moisture of the eyes, and

* Comp. *ch* xix. p. 350—352 of this volume.

mingles with it, though by no means lustrous, and in which the rays of fire are mingled with moisture, and form a bloody colour; this we denominate *red*. A bright hue mingled with red and white forms the colour called *yellow*; but as regards the measure in which they mingle respectively, even a wise and thinking person could not explain it, were he ever so well informed on the matter, as he could not adduce concerning them any satisfactory reason, either necessary or probable. Again, red, when mingled with black and white, produces a *purple* colour; and a very deep colour is the result of their being mingled and burnt together, with a further addition of black. A *tawny red* is produced from the mixture of yellow and brown, and *brown* from the mixture of black and white; and a pale colour from the mingling of white and yellow. A brilliant white, falling on a large quantity of black, constitutes a *dark blue* (κβαρόν); a deep blue mingled with white, a *grey* colour; and a tawny red mingled with black forms a *green*. All the other tints it will be easy to conjecture from the above examples, if one only reasons fairly from analogy. Nevertheless, any one who would prove them by the test of experiment evinces great ignorance of the difference between a divine and human nature; for a god indeed may be able to mingle many things into one, and again dissolve the one into many, through his united power and intelligence; but no man living can accomplish either of these tasks, nor will any one in time to come.

XLIII.—All these things which thus naturally subsist from necessity, the artificer of what is most beautiful and best took for his elements of creation, in producing a self-sufficient and most perfect god; employing secondary causes indeed, but at the same time performing his work well on all created beings. For this reason we must distinguish two species of causes; the one necessary, the other divine. And in all things we should inquire after the divine cause, with the view of obtaining a blessed life in the highest degree of which our nature admits, for the sake of which also we should investigate the necessary cause as well,—convinced, that without these two classes of causes, we can neither understand nor apprehend, nor otherwise engage in the several objects of our anxious pursuit. Since, then, we have now before us the various classes of causes, laid out like materials for our labour,

and which will serve as the matter from which we are to interweave the remainder of our discourse, let us again briefly recur to our first observations, and thence pass rapidly on to the place at which we are now arrived; thus endeavouring to annex such an end and close to our discourse, as may harmonize with its beginning.

XLIV. Just as we stated in the opening of our discourse,—when all sensible things were in disorder, the Deity made each individually to harmonize with itself and mutually with all the rest, so far as things could possibly be brought into symmetry and proportion; because formerly, nothing had any order except by accident, nor did anything whatever deserve the names that things receive at present; such, for instance, as fire, water, and the rest of the elements. All these, however, the Creator put in order first of all, and then out of these constructed the universe, as a single animal, containing within itself different kinds of animals, mortal and immortal,*—he himself being the artificer of Divine natures, but committing to his offspring (the junior gods) the charge of producing those that are mortal. The latter, in imitation of their father, receiving the immortal principle of the soul, next fashioned† the mortal body, making it entirely to be a vehicle thereto, and forming within it a separate mortal kind of soul, possessed of certain dire and necessary passions: first, pleasure, the chief lure to evil; next, pain, the desertion of what is good;—after these again, temerity and fear, both mad advisers; anger, hard to be appeased; hope, which is easily misled both by irrational sense, and all-daring love. By mingling these together, they [the junior gods] necessarily composed the mortal race. And on this account, fearing to defile the Divine nature more than was absolutely necessary they lodged man's mortal portion separately from the Divine, in a different receptacle of the body; forming the head and breast, and placing the neck between, as an isthmus and limit to separate the two extremes.‡

* Comp. ch. xi. p. 335 of this translation, and also the concluding sentence of the dialogue, p. 409.

† Gr. περιτόρνουν, lit. *turned in a lathe*.

‡ The immortal soul Plato has already (ch. xix. xx.) placed in the head,—in which opinion Hippocrates and Galen both coincide;—and he composed it of two circles, and endowed it with three faculties—intelligence (νόησις), science (ἐπιστήμη), and true opinion (δόξα ἀληθής).

In the breast, indeed, and what is called the thorax [or trunk],* they seated the mortal part of the soul. And as one part of it was naturally better, and another worse, they formed the cavity of the thorax into two divisions (resembling the separate dwellings of our men and women), placing the midriff as a partition between them. That part of the soul, therefore, which partakes of fortitude and spirit, and loves contention, they seated nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck; as it is the business of the reason to unite with it in forcibly repressing the desires, whenever they will not obey the mandate and word issuing from the citadel above.

XLV.—The heart, which is the head and principlet of the veins, as well as the fountain of the blood that impetuously circulates through all the members, they placed in a kind of sentry-house, that, in case of any outburst of anger, being informed by the reason of any evil committed in its members, owing either to some foreign cause, or else internal passions, it (the heart) might transmit through all its channels the threatenings and exhortations of reason, so as once more to reduce the body to perfect obedience, and so permit what is the best within us to maintain supreme command.

Here, however, he speaks of the *mortal* or sensuous soul, which he divides into two distinct parts,—the *male* or spiritual portion (τὸ θυμικόν), and the *female* or appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). This seems to have been a notion of the Pythagoreans. Aristotle and Zeno placed the mortal soul in the heart only. On the three souls and their respective energies, comp. Martin's admirable note, vol. ii. pp. 296—302, *Etudes*, &c.

* Gr. *θώρακι*, a word used by Plato and Aristotle to mean not merely the upper part of the trunk, as by later writers, but the whole of it, from the collar-bone down to the pelvis. The word *κοιλία* in ch. xlv. has a similar latitude of signification.

† Gr. *ἀρχήν*. This reading is introduced by Stallbaum (and followed by Cousin) from three of the best MSS. The old editions have *ἄμα*, which Stephens altered into *ἄμμα* (*a knot* or ganglion), and Toup into *νᾶμα*, both on mere conjecture. Plato clearly thought that the heart was the source of the blood and the centre of union for the veins, which he regards as messengers transmitting to the whole body the orders coming from the male part of the mortal soul; but he runs into the error of attributing to them the function of nerves, as well of motion as sensation. We may remark further, that he considers the veins to have two centres—the heart and the liver, which are the two seats of the mortal soul, and makes no distinction whatever between veins and arteries. See Martin's note, 140; ii. 301—304.

But as the gods foreknew, with respect to the palpitation of the heart under the dread of danger and the excitements of passion, that all such swellings of the inflamed spirit would be produced by fire, they formed the lungs to be a sort of protection thereto; first, of all, soft and bloodless,* and next, internally provided with cavities perforated like a sponge, in order to cool the breath which they receive, and give the heart easy respiration and repose in its excessive heat. On this account then, they led the channels of the windpipe into the lungs, which they placed like a soft cushion round the heart, in order that when anger rises in it to an extreme height, it might fall on some yielding substance, and so getting cool, yield cheerfully and with less trouble to the authority of reason.

XLVI. That part of the soul next, which has a desire for meats, drinks, and all else that is necessary for the natural supplies of the body, they placed between the midriff and the region of the navel; forming, as it were, in all this place a sort of manger for the nutriment of the body; and then they bound it on to it, like some savage animal, annexed as necessary to nourish the mortal race afterwards to be brought into existence. This place of course the gods assigned it, in order that ever feeding at its manger, and dwelling as far off as possible from the deliberative part of the soul, it might make the least possible degree of tumult and noise, and permit the best portion of our nature to consult in quiet for the common benefit of the whole. Knowing also that this part would not acquiesce with the reason, and, even if it had any faculty of sense, yet would not regard the processes of reasoning, but be chiefly lured away, both day and night, by images and phantasms,—reflecting on this, the Deity formed the liver, assigning it the place it occupies. And he made it compact and smooth, shiny and sweet, and yet somewhat bitter,—in order that the multitude of thoughts falling on it from the intellect as on a mirror that receives and presents images to the view, might on the one side terrify it by employing a bitterness akin to its nature; and proceeding to dreadful

* Plato is quite wrong in stating this;—for all the blood passes through them, in order to be supplied with oxygen by the air contained in the cells. This, however, is not nearly so great an error as his statement in ch. lxxii. (speaking of generation), that the fluids we drink pass through the lungs into the bladder:

threats, gradually mingle this bitterness with the whole liver so as to present the dark hues of bile, and by contracting it, render it throughout rough and wrinkled;—or on the other, partly by removing the liver from its right place and contracting it, partly by obstructing and closing its ventricles and gates, cause impressions of pain and disgust:—whereas, on the contrary, when a gentle inspiration—the result of intelligence—depicts on it images of quite an opposite character, softens its bitterness by avoiding to agitate or touch anything contrary to its own nature,—it then gives it a softness peculiarly its own, and makes all its parts regular, polished, and free,—giving joy and peace to that part of the soul which resides near the liver, and making it enjoy a suitable repose at night, with the power of divination during sleep, to make up for its want both of reason and wisdom.*

XLVII. Those, forsooth, who created us, calling to mind their father's command, when he bid them make the mortal race as good as they possibly could, formed even the inferior part of us to have some connexion with truth, by establishing within it the faculty of divination. And a sufficiently clear proof, that the Deity assigned prophetic power† to human madness, is found in the fact that no one in his right senses has any concern with divinely inspired and true prophecy; which takes place only when the reasoning faculty is fettered by sleep, or alienated by disease or enthusiasm; while, on the other hand, it requires a person of considerable wisdom to understand the recorded sayings, whether sleeping or waking, of a prophetic and divinely-inspired nature, and so to distinguish all the phenomena it beholds as to be able to explain in what way and to whom they portend any future, past, or present good or evil; it being by no means the office

* Plato, in this purely fanciful description of the liver and spleen, seems to have been ignorant of the great use of the bile in promoting the digestion of the food during its passage through the duodenum; for in ch. lxiv. he considers it wholly in the light of a vicious secretion, though he acknowledges its presence in the healthy body as exercising a great influence over dreams and divination. Aristotle, while refuting Plato, is not a whit more correct as to this question in the animal economy. Hist. Anim. iv. 2.

† A distinction is to be observed between *μάντις* and *προφῆται*.—the former referring to the *interpreters*, the latter to the *utterers* only of the divine oracles; but the words, as Plato observes, have often been confounded.

of one who either has been, or is still mad, to judge respecting things seen or spoken by himself:—and it has been well observed by the ancients, that to transact and know one's own concerns and oneself is alone the province of a prudent man;—whence, indeed, the law directs that the race of prophets (or interpreters) should preside as judges over divine predictions, —whom some indeed call diviners, through entire ignorance that they are only the representers of enigmas and visions, and not at all entitled to be called diviners,—being, strictly speaking, interpreters of prophecies.

The liver then was constructed for this purpose, and seated where we have mentioned, for the sake of prediction. And besides, in every living individual, this organ gives forth unusually clear indications; but in those deprived of life, it becomes blind and delivers oracles too obscure for their meaning to be made intelligible. The nature and position of the intestines, again, which is next to it [the liver], is on the left side, for the purpose of always, like a sponge,* keeping it clean and bright, ready to reflect images; on which account, therefore, when certain impurities are produced in the liver by bodily disease, then the spleen, by its rarity, receives and purifies them all, from being of a hollow and bloodless texture;—and hence, is it, that when filled with unclean matter, it grows to a large size and becomes wholly unsound. And again, when the body is purified, it subsides into its natural condition, as before.

XLVIII. As respects the soul, then, including both its mortal and divine portion, in what way it existed, and in what way and why it was consigned to a separate habitation, the truth can be firmly established only by the consent of the Deity:—still, that we have stated what is near the truth, we will now, quite open to investigation, venture the assertion; and here accordingly it is made.† And what next follows we must treat in a similar manner; and this is no other, than how the rest of the body was produced. It is, therefore, in the most eminent degree becoming that they should be composed as fol-

* Gr. *ἐκμαγεῖον*,—very wrongly rendered by some, a *mirror*,—the error of which was first shown by Barker in No. xlv. of the *Class. Journal*, p. 201.

† Gr. *τό γε μὴν εἰκὸς ἡμῖν εἰρησθαὶ καὶ νῦν καὶ εἶτι μᾶλλον ἀναποροῦσι διακινδυνεύειν τὸ φάναι, καὶ πεφάσθω.*

lows:--Those who formed our race were aware, that we should be intemperate in eating and drinking, and that through madness we should use far more than is either necessary or moderate. For fear then of rapid destruction induced by disease, and lest our mortal race should perish without fulfilling its end,—to provide against this, the gods formed for the reception of the superfluous food a receptacle beneath, called a *belly*, and formed in it the convolutions of the intestines to prevent the food from passing so quickly as to require fresh and rapid supplies of nutriment for the body, and so by insatiable gluttony making our whole race unphilosophical and unmusical, insubordinate to the most godlike part of our composition.*

XLIX. The nature of the bones and flesh, and other parts of this kind, was constituted as follows:—The first principle of all these is the generation of the marrow; for the life-bonds of the soul that united it with the body being herein woven together, constitute the foundation of the mortal race. The marrow itself, however, has a different origin; for among the triangles, those of the first order, that are unbent and smooth, were specially adapted by their accuracy for producing fire and water, air and earth:†—these the Deity, separating each apart from its own class, and mingling them together in fixed proportions, composed by these means an all-varying mixture of seeds for the whole mortal race, and from these produced the marrow;—and he afterwards implanted this marrow, binding therein the various classes of souls; and as respects the number of figures and what individual forms the marrow was to receive, he divided it, both as regards the quality and quantity of the particles, at the original distribution,—giving to that part of it which was to be the field for containing the divine seed a completely globular shape; and this he called the *brain*, because in every

* The intestines are not, as Plato seems to think, solely destined to receive the excess of food. It is in the stomach that digestion commences, and it ends in the intestines, from which the chyle produced from the food is sent to the lungs to form blood. Aristotle's ideas on this point are more correct. Hist. Anim. iii. 14.

† Respecting these triangles, see ch. xxviii., and further on at ch. lxii. They are in fact the primary atoms, of which the body is composed, and are of different classes, according to the parts or organs of which they are the components.

animal that has arrived at its perfect form, the vessel containing this substance is called the *head*.* But as respects the part destined to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul, to this he gave both round and oblong shapes, giving to the whole the name of *marrow*; and from these, as from anchors, casting the bonds of the entire soul, he built around it our whole body, after first fixing round it a complete covering of bones.

L. The bones he composed as follows:—Having sifted pure and smooth earth, he mingled and moistened it with marrow; and after this he placed it in fire, then plunged it in water, once more placed it in fire, and after this dipped it in water: and thus by frequent transfers of each, he made it insoluble by either. With this bone, then, he fashioned a sphere, as on a lathe, placing it round the brain, and only leaving a narrow hole therein. At the same time also he formed of the same substance certain vertebræ about the marrow of the neck and back, extending them like hinges, from the head downwards through the whole trunk;—and thus he preserved all its seed, by fortifying it round with a stony covering,—forming in it joints also, for motion and flexion, employing the power of difference in their formation, as being possessed of a certain middle quality.† Then, considering that the bone would have a tendency to become dry and inflexible, and that when heated and again cooled, it would become carious, and quickly corrupt the seed it contained, he on this account formed the sinews and flesh; that the former, by binding all the parts of the body, and being stretched and loosened about the vertebræ, might give the body a facility for either flexion or extension, as occasion required; while the flesh would serve as a covering from the heat and defence from the cold;—as likewise for a protection against falls, in the same manner as cushions do it, by gently and easily yielding to external bodies:‡ and he implanted in it also a hot moisture, which perspires in sum-

* There is a play here on the words *κεφαλή* and *ἐγκέφαλον*, which cannot be translated.

† Gr. *τῇ θατέρου προσχρώμενος ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς μέσην ἰνισταμένην δυνάμει*. Comp. a similar passage in the succeeding chapter.

‡ Gr. *ἐπὶ δὲ πτωμάτων οἷον τὰ πηλητὰ ἔσεσθαι κτήματα*. A similar idea is nearly similarly expressed by Longinus, xxxii. sect. 5. *τὴν σάρκα οἷον πηλόμενα περιβέμενοι*.

mer, and gives forth an external dew, to impart a coolness to the whole body,—and again in winter, gently keeps out by its own fire the cold brought from without.

LI.—Our plastic Creator, reflecting on all this then, mingled and united water, fire, and earth, gradually mixing therewith a ferment of acid and salt;*—and thus he composed a pulpy, soft flesh:—And as for the tendons, he formed them of a mixture of bone and unfermented flesh, so as to have the properties of both, tinging them also with a yellow colour. And on this account is it, that the tendons are firmer and more viscous than the flesh, but softer and moister than the bones. With these God bound together the bones and marrow, afterwards enshrouding the whole of them with the covering of the flesh. Such of the bones, then, as were most ensouled, he covered with the smallest quantity of flesh,—such as were least so, with the most and the densest flesh. And besides this, except where reason evinced the need of the contrary, he placed only a small quantity of flesh on the joints of the bones; lest they should make the body uneasy by impeding its flexions and motion; or else, from being many and frequent, and strongly pressed together, cause by their solidity a dulness of perception, imperfection of memory, and a sort of intellectual blindness. On this account then, the bones of the groin, legs, loins, the shoulders and the arms from the elbow to the wrist, and such other parts of our bodies as have no joints, and such inward bones as have no thought, owing to the scarcity of soul in the marrow, are fully provided with flesh;—whereas those that have thought, he covered with less, except the flesh were for perception, as in the case of the tongue. In other respects, the case is as we have described. For a being born and nurtured under necessity,† does not receive a hard bone united with plenty of flesh, and with it also a quickness of sensa-

* Gr. ἐξ ὀξέος καὶ ἀλμυροῦ ξυνθεῖς ζήμωμα καὶ ὑπομίξας αὐτοῖς, σάρκα ἐγγχυμον καὶ μαλακὴν ξυνέστησε. Plato here alludes, however, not only to the σάρκες or muscular fibre, but to the whole cellular tissue and integument that form a general covering and defence for the entire body. The word νεῦρον in the succeeding sentence refers not to the pulpy, delicate fibres now called by that name, but to the tendons and ligaments that hold an intermediate position between flesh and bone.

† Plato here alludes to the soul of man, which is said to be generated and composed by necessity in consequence of its union with the body.

tion. And yet the head would have been thus constructed, if the two had exercised any will in thus coalescing; and the human race, having a fleshy, tendinous, and robust head, would enjoy healthy and unmolested a life twice as long as the present, or even yet longer than that: but the artificers of our race, after thoroughly considering whether they had better make it more lasting and of worse condition, or shorter but of a more excellent character, were agreed that a shorter but better life was wholly preferable to one longer, but inferior:—and this was why they covered the head with a thin bone, and not with flesh and fibre,—because it had no joints. On all these accounts, then, the body was provided with a head, which was the more perceptive and reflecting, in proportion as it was [physically] weaker than all the rest of man's structure. From these causes, then, and in this manner,* the Deity placing tendons round the lower extremity of the head, glued them, as it were, round the neck, and bound with them the lofty cheek-bones placed under the forehead;—and as for all the rest, he scattered them through all the members, connecting joint with joint.

LII.—We were next provided by those who formed us with the organs of the mouth, teeth, tongue, and lips,—arranged as they now are for purposes both necessary and the best; giving ingress for necessities, and egress to what is best,—everything, indeed, that enters to feed the body being necessary—while the stream of words flowing outwards, if guided by wisdom, is by far the fairest and best of all streams whatever.

LIIL.—Again, it was not possible that the head could bear a mere covering of thin bone, owing to the extremes of the different seasons; nor again, could it be allowed to become clouded, blind, and unperceptive, through the overcrowding of flesh. Hence a fleshy membrane, not dried, was left separate from the rest,—that now termed cuticle (or scalp). This, then, being brought into union with itself by the moisture about the brain, grows around and circularly invests the head. And it is the moisture flowing under the sutures that moistens this membrane, and causes it to close at the crown, connecting it as in a knot. But as for the ever-varying classes of

* Gr. ἐπ' ἐσχάτην τὴν κεφαλὴν περιστήσας κύκλῳ περὶ τὸν τράχηλον ἐκόλλησεν ὁμοιότητι, &c.

sutures, these are generated through the power of the periodic changes caused by nutriment in the flesh;* the variety becoming greater, when they struggle with each other more violently—less so, when less violently. All this membrane the Divine Being pierced all round with fire:—and hence, as it was wounded, and the moisture externally flowed through it, all that was pure of the moisture and heat was carried off, while that which was mixed, and of a nature allied to that of the membrane itself, being raised by the motion, was stretched outwards to a great size, having also a tenuity equal to the amount of puncture,—whereas, on the other hand, when continually thrust back through the slowness of its motion by the spirit surrounding it externally, it again revolves under the membrane and there becomes firmly rooted. And owing to these affections is it, that the hair springs up on the membrane of the head, being naturally allied, and serving as a rein to this membrane, but at the same time becoming harder and denser through the pressure of the cold, which hardens each hair, as it proceeds beyond the skin.† Thus, then, by the means above mentioned, did our Creator plant the head with hairs, reflecting at the same time that instead of flesh a light covering was needed to guard the brain, and give it shade and protection from the extremes of heat and cold without hindering its acuteness of sensation.

LIV.—But the mass of tendon, skin, and bone that is interwoven about the fingers, being a mixture of three substances, becomes, when dried, one common hard membrane composed of all in common—fashioned indeed with these as instrumental causes, but effectively produced by that reflection which ever has an eye to the future:—for those who formed us well knew, that women and other animals would some day

* So we have ventured (taking it as a case of *ἐν διὰ δυοῖν*) to render the words *διὰ τὴν περιόδων δύναμιν καὶ τῆς τροφῆς*. These *periods* are certain changes caused from time to time in the flesh by the motion of its particles, both solid and fluid,—and this owing to the constant supplies of food. A notion very much resembling it has been propounded by modern physiologists.

† The meaning of the sentence seems to be, that the whole *cutis* or scalp of the head was perforated by fire, and through the holes thus formed, there issued certain delicate streams of fluid which were hardened into fibre, as they rose above the skin and encountered the pressure of the external atmosphere.

be generated from men, and that nails would be of the greatest use in several respects to many of the animals:—and this was the reason, why they stamped in men the pattern of the nails at their first birth. It was from these causes, then, and with these intentions, that they implanted skin, hairs, and nails at the extremities of the limbs.

LV.—As the parts and members of the mortal animal however were all allied in nature, and their life necessarily resulted from fire and spirit, the decay and exhaustion of which would cause it to perish quickly, the gods provided for it the following remedy:—Intermingling a nature resembling that of man with other forms and senses, they planted as it were other animals,—such as kindly-disposed trees, plants, and seeds, which are made useful to us by the nurture and training of agriculture; though before there were only those of a rustic kind, which are more ancient than those that are cultivated.* Everything indeed that partakes of life we may justly and most correctly call an animal;—but that in particular, of which we are now speaking, is possessed of the third species of soul,† which we place between the midriff and the navel: and which has no share either in opinion, reason, or intellect, though possessing a sense of pleasure and pain, as well as desire. It effects all things indeed by passion (or appetite); and it does this by the evolution of its internal power and the employment of its own motion to the exclusion of every other, as it has not been formed with a nature capable of reasoning on its own concerns.‡ It thus lives in no way different from an animal, except in being firmly rooted in a fixed position and deprived of original motion.

* The question, whether plants are a distinct kind of animals, which was held by all the Platonic philosophers, is touched on by Plutarch, *De Plac. Philos.* v. 26, sect. 10, and by Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 26, where he remarks:—“*tam naturæ putarem hominis vitam sustentâri, quam vitis aut arboris* :—*hæc enim etiam dicimus vivere.*”

† *I. e.* τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

‡ What Plato here means, seems simply to be, that it is by turning in and about themselves; that is, by growth, without locomotion, that plants develop the perfection and beauty of their nature, without being in any way obliged for their origin or nature to the objects by which they are surrounded. The phrase *στροφέντι αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἑαυτό* is somewhat difficult, but is explained by a sentence in the *Theætetus* (p. 181, c.), where *ἀλλοίωσις* is also used to express the contrary notion.

LVI.—Now after the directing artificers of our structure had implanted all these organs for giving nutriment to our inferior nature, they directed various channels through our body, so as to water it like a garden, by the constant accession of flowing moisture.* And first, they cut two hidden channels beneath the juncture of the skin and flesh, viz. two veins going down the back to correspond with the double figure of the body, both on the right and left sides. These they placed close to the back-bone, so as to receive between them the marrow, the growth of which might be thus promoted, and that the flood supplied thence to other parts, might give an equable irrigation;—and then, dividing the veins about the head, and mutually interweaving them, they distributed them in opposite directions,—inclining some from the right to the left of the body, and some from the left to the right, that there might be a chain formed by the skin to unite the head to the body, there being no interlacing of tendons round the head,—and besides this, that the affection of sensation might from each of these parts pass round and through the body. It was in some such way as this, then, that they prepared the channel, of which we speak; and its truth we shall easily perceive by assenting to our previous position,—that all things composed of greater parts may envelop such as are less, while those consisting of less cannot envelop the greater. But fire is, of all classes of things, composed of the smallest parts; and hence it penetrates through water, earth, and air, and their several compounds,—and this to such an extent that nothing can retain it. The same remark is true of our belly, which is able to retain any food that has been introduced, but cannot hold spirit and fire, because they consist of smaller particles than those composing the belly.

LVII.—These channels therefore the Deity employed for the purpose of distributing moisture from the belly into the veins, by weaving with fire and air a network resembling

* This passage is well illustrated by Longinus, xxxii. sect. 5, where he is illustrating the power of metaphor:—*τῆς δὲ τροφῆς ἕνεκά, φησι, διωχέουσιν τὸ σῶμα, τέμνοντες ὥσπερ ἐν κήποις ὀχέτους, ὡς ἐκ τινος νάματος ἐκίοντος, ἀραιοῦ ὄντος αὐλῶνος τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τῶν φλεβῶν ῥίοι νάματα.* A very similar passage occurs in the *Timæus* Locrus, p. 101, c., p. 437 of vol. vii. in Stallbaum's edition of Plato's works.

basket-nets (or weeds), with two curved passages of entrance, —one of which he again twisted and divided into two branches, winding the continuations of these curved passages like coils of rope in every direction as far as the ends of the net. Now all the inner parts of the network he composed of fire, but the great flexures and the receptacle itself of air ;—and lastly, he took and placed them in the new-formed animal, as follows. One of the curved passages he placed in the mouth ; but, as this part has two flexures, he caused one (*i. e.* the trachea) to pass along the arteries into the lungs, the other (*i. e.* the œsophagus) by the side of the arteries into the belly. The other curved part he divided into two separate passages, making them pass in common to the channels of the nose, so that when the one does not reach the mouth, all the streams of the other might still be filled from this. But as for the remaining part of the hollow network, he made it extend all over the concavity of the body, and the whole of it flow gently together into the curved passages, as being of an airy texture, and at another time to flow through them backwards. But the net, which is of a thin structure, he so disposed as to make it penetrate through and again emerge.* Besides this, he ordered that the interior rays of fire should follow in constant succession, the air at the same time passing into each, and that this should never cease to be the case, as long as the mortal animal's life continued. And as respects the name of this kind of motion, we call it expiration and inspiration. Now this whole action and affection that it produces in our nature, is caused by certain bodily moistenings and coolings, alike conducive to our nutriment and life :—for as the breath passes in and out, an interior fire attends it in its course ; and when it is diffused through the belly and meets with solid and liquid food, it reduces them both to a

* The whole of this description refers to the œsophagus, which enters the upper part of the stomach, and runs side by side with the trachea, which divides to form the entrance to the two great cells of the lungs. This division is no doubt that of one of the *ἐγκύρτια*, which, it is said, God *διέπλεξε δίκρουν*, and then subdivided it into the numerous bronchial tubes that ramify in all directions over the surface of the lungs, *i. e.* *διὰ παντὸς πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ πλέγματος*. It may also be added that in the mouth are two passages leading up to the channels of the nose. The meaning is exceedingly obscure ; but the reader is referred to Stallbaum and Martin for several long explanatory notes on this curious account.

state of moisture, and by dividing them into very small parts, carries them along in its course; pouring them, as from a fountain, into the veins, and so cutting channels through the body as through an aqueduct.

LVIII.—But again let us consider the affection of breathing, and investigate the causes which gave it its present nature. We should reason on it, therefore, as follows:—As there is no such thing in nature as a vacuum into which a moving body can enter, and as breath passes from us outwards, every one is aware that it cannot escape into void space, but must thrust out whatever is nearest; again, that the body must always repel that ever nearest, and that from a necessity of this kind, everything impelled into the place vacated by the emitted breath must, after entering and filling up this space, attend on the breath as it travels. And all this must take place like the revolution of a wheel, through the impossibility of a vacuum. Hence, the breast and lungs, after dismissing the breath outwards, are again inflated by the entrance of the air surrounding the body into and around the cavities of the flesh. And when the air is again sent outwards and flows round the body, it drives the breath inwards through the mouth and nostrils.

LIX.—And as regards the cause from which they derive their origin, we may propose the following. In every animal in the universe those of its internal parts are the hottest which surround the veins and blood, just as if they contained a fountain of fire;* and this heat we compared to a bow-net, extending through the middle of the body, and woven wholly of fire; all outside of it being composed of air. Yet heat, it must be agreed, naturally proceeds outward into a region with which it is allied. But as there are two passages for the heat,—one through the body outwards, the other again through the mouth and nostrils; hence, when the breath is impelled towards the latter, it in turn repels that latter. But that which is drawn into the fire becomes heated by so falling, while what is exhaled becomes cooled;—and so, owing to the change of temperature, they pass again into their former condition, whether hot or cold, through the mutual repulsion of

* Gr. πᾶν ζῶον αὐτοῦ τάντος περὶ τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὰς φλεβὰς θερμότητας ἔχει, ὅλον ἐν αὐτῷ πηνήν τινα ἐνοῦσαν πυρός. The common reading has πάντως, instead of τάντος, and θερμότητα for θερμότητας.

each other ; and as the same influence is constant and mutually operating, its circular agitation gives birth to the expiration and inspiration of the breath.

LX. To the same causes may we ascribe the impressions produced by medical cupping-glasses, by swallowing drink, by the violent hurlings of bodies, whether upwards or on the ground, together with such sounds as appear swift or slow, sharp or flat,—and which at one time are discordant, owing to the dissimilitude of the motion which they cause within us, and at another harmonize, through the similitude of that motion. For the slower sounds catch up those antecedent and swifter, because the latter slacken their pace to one like their own ; and by so following the swifter, they still urge them onward,—though without disturbing the motion by introducing another, but making their slower rate to approach gradually to that of the swifter ;—and this mixed impression from the sharp and flat (*i. e.* the quick and slow) forms a single note ; whence results the pleasure felt even by the unwise, but really entertained by the wise, which is owing to the imitation of Divine harmony that exists in mortal motions.* And, indeed, with respect to all the motions of water, the fallings of thunder, and the wonderful circumstances observed in the attraction of amber, and the Herculean stone,†—in all these, no real attraction takes place at all ; but as a vacuum can nowhere be found, the particles are mutually impelled by each other ; hence, as they all individually, both in a separate and mingled state, have an attraction for their own proper seats, it is by the mutual intermingling of these affections, that such admirable effects present themselves to the view of the accurate investigator.

LXI.—It is specially owing to this cause, that respiration (whence our discourse originated) is generated ; and after the manner that we have before shown ;—namely, that as fire divides the food and rises internally to attend on the breath,

* Comp. ch. xviii. and xx. with Republ. vii. ch. 12, where the harmony of the soul is treated more at length. See also Martin, ii. p. 339.

† This is a very memorable passage, and clearly shows that Plato was not only well acquainted with the doctrine of attraction and repulsion, but was of opinion also that the law of repulsion depended on the congregation of similar elements throughout all nature. The whole matter, however, is largely treated by Plutarch in his sixth Platonic Dissertation, vol. ii. p. 1004, ed. Par.

the veins from the belly become filled by this joint elevation, in consequence of drawing thence the divided portions of the food; so that by these means, through every animal body the streams of nutriment are abundantly diffused. But the parts which are recently cut apart and separated from their kindred natures,—some of them fruits and others grasses, and produced by the Deity for bodily food, acquire varieties of colour through their mutual admixture; though for the most part the red predominates,* as its nature consists of fire combined with a lump of moist mud. Hence also the colour of that which flows about the body is just what it seems, and is also called *blood*, being the nurturing principle of the flesh and whole body; and so by everywhere diffusing its moisture, it copiously replenishes all the exhausted parts.

As for the manner of impletion and depletion, it is produced in the same way as the change of everything in the universe; viz. from the circumstance of all kindred natures having a common attraction:—for the natures with which we are clothed externally, are perpetually melting and being distributed, each form of matter departing to that with which it is allied. But the particles of blood which are contained in, and distributed throughout our bodies, as is the case with every animal created under heaven, necessarily imitate the motion of the universe. Each, therefore, of the divided parts within us, being borne along to its kindred nature, again replenishes what is void. But when the decretions exceed the accessions, the whole animal falls into decay; but in the contrary case, it acquires growth.

LXII.—The new composition therefore of every animal, as it has new triangles, [*i. e.* elementary principles,] formed as it were from fresh timbers, causes them to lock closely within each other,—the whole of its bulk being of a delicate structure, formed of fresh marrow and fed on milk. Those triangles, therefore, that compose the bodily aliment, having entered it from without and been received into the animal, from being older and weaker than the simple original triangles therewith agreeing, are overpowered and destroyed by the new triangles; and the animal grows to a large size, because it is

* Respecting the origin of the colour *red*, comp. ch. xlii. Galen thus speaks of this opinion about the blood (vii. ch. 159)—*τὴν ἐρυθρὰν χροῖαν γεννᾶσθαι φησι ἐν τῷ αἵματι διὰ τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐξόμορξιν.*

supplied from a multitude of similar parts. But when the root of these triangles is relaxed by fatigue and dulness, brought on by the repulsion of many particles during a long period of time, then the food received can no longer cut into its own similitude; but they are themselves easily separated by the bodies that enter from without. Overcome by this, the whole animal at length decays; and this state is what we call old age:—and at last, when the jointed chains of the triangles about the marrow can no longer hold, but through long employment get unfastened and set free the bonds of the soul,—the soul thus loosened naturally flies off with pleasure and delight; for everything contrary to nature is painful, while the natural is pleasant. Hence the death caused by wounds and disease is painful and violent,—while that which follows old age, as the end agreeable to nature, is of all deaths the least irksome, and attended rather by pleasure than pain.*

LXIII.—As to the origin of diseases, that must be obvious to every one:—for as there are four component elements of the body, viz. earth, fire, water, and air, the unnatural overabundance or defect of these, and their removal from their own to a different position,—those of fire, we mean, and the other classes, for there are more than one,—these are the causes why they do not each receive what suits their peculiar nature, and they necessarily produce disturbances and diseases: for as these are severally generated and transferred in a way contrary to nature, such things as were formerly heated become cold, what were once dry moist, the light heavy—all things, in short, undergo all possible mutations. For we assert that it is only when the same thing approaches to and departs from the same in the same manner and according to analogy, that it will allow what is the same with itself to abide in health and safety: and should any of them be in discordance, whether approaching or departing, it will cause all varieties of alienations, as well as unnumbered diseases and corruptions. But having now found the second set of conditions suitable to nature, the second mode of considering diseases also

* It is this kind of death of which he speaks in the *Georgics* (p. 524)—*ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὧν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτων διάλυσιν, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀπ' ἀλλήλων*. Comp. also Plutarch, *De Plac. Phil.* v. sect. 24, where he records also the opinions of many others on the same topic.

is now open to any one desirous of so doing.* For as the marrow, bone, flesh, and sinew are composed of those [elements,] as likewise the blood in another way, though from a similar origin, so also most other diseases owe their severity to the causes we have mentioned; though the greatest of them are to be traced to the following cause:—When the generation of these various [bodily substances] takes place inversely, then they become subject to corruption:—for the flesh and sinews are naturally formed from blood,—the sinews indeed from fibres, through the connexion between these, but the flesh from its union with that which when in a separate state becomes solid:—while the glutinous and fatty substance again which is formed from sinews and flesh, at once unites† the flesh to the bone, and itself feeds the growth of the bone itself, with which the marrow is surrounded. And again, that which filters through the solid part of the bones, being the purest kind of the triangles, as well as most smooth and unctuous, moistens the marrow by falling drop by drop from the bones.

LXIV.—When these several things are the case, health mostly ensues; but when the contrary happens—disease. For when the flesh becomes liquefied and sends back what it loses into the veins, then the blood mingled with spirit flows abundantly, and of all kinds, through the veins, with different degrees of colours and bitterness;‡ and yet further, from its acid and salt qualities, it generates all kinds of bile, lymph, and phlegm;—for as they are all generated and corrupted in an opposite way, they first of all destroy the blood itself;§ and the fluids that can no longer afford nutriment to the body, are borne along the veins without any natural order

* He now proceeds to consider the second cause of diseases—from the deprivation of the compound substances of the body,—blood, bile, flesh, marrow, &c., which can easily be comprehended, says he, by those who have followed him in his speculations on the first.

† The old reading was πολλά: but the best MSS. have κολλᾷ.

‡ Gr. πικρότητι. The old editions read πυκνότητι ποικιλούμενον.

§ What he here means is—that the health of the body mainly depends on the state of the blood; and on this principle chiefly he explains the causes of diseases, which arise from the corruption of the humours caused by the disturbed state of the body, bringing also a taint on the blood;—and hence it must follow that the general health becomes impaired, because the blood runs through the veins, diffusing through the body its vital nutriment.

of circulation ; at variance, indeed, with each other, because they derive no mutual advantages from the properties of each, but [positively] hostile to the constitution of the body, and its maintenance in health,—in short, destroying it and bringing it to putrefaction.

Such, therefore, of the flesh as becomes liquefied by its great age, being indisposed to putrefy, grows black from long burning ; and from having been entirely macerated it becomes bitter, and falls into discontent with the other parts of the body not yet infected with corruption. And then, indeed, instead of bitterness, the black part assumes an acidity, if the bitter becomes more attenuated : but when the bitterness is tinged with blood, it becomes still redder ; and when mixed with black, it assumes the nature of bile :—and yet further, to the bitterness is added a yellow colour through the melting of new flesh on the fire surrounding the flame. And this common name for all these some of the physicians assigned them,—or at any rate some who were able to consider many things dissimilar, and to detect in a single class a great number of particulars all deserving a special name. But all else that may be called kinds of bile, receive, according to colour, a name peculiar to each. As for *lymph* (ἰχρὸν), the whey of the blood, it is gentle and mild : while the sediment of black, acid bile, is fierce and wild ;—and when mingled by heat with anything of a saline quality, it is called *acid phlegm*. Again, the moisture running from new and tender flesh mingled with the air, which is afterwards inflated and enclosed by moisture, produces bubbles, which separately are invisible, owing to their small size, but when collected in a large bulk become visible, and acquire a white colour from the generation of froth. And all this liquefaction of delicate flesh, when woven together with spirit, we term *white phlegm*,—the sediment of recent phlegm, *tears* and *sweat* ; together with all such secretions that the body sends forth for its purification.

LXV.—All these indeed become the instruments of disease, when the blood is not supplied naturally from liquid and solid food, but gains bulk from contraries in violation of the laws of nature. When any part of the flesh therefore becomes separated by disease,* letting its first principles

* ὑπὸ νόσων, omitted in the old editions, has been restored on the authority of several of the best MSS.

remain, half the trouble is removed; for it admits of an easy recovery. But when that which binds the flesh to the bones becomes diseased, and the blood flowing from the fibres and sinews no longer serves as food to the bones and a bond to the flesh, but, instead of being fat, smooth and glutinous, becomes rough and salt from being parched by bad diet; then, in consequence of suffering all this and being separated from the bones, it is itself crumbled down* under the flesh and sinews;—while the flesh falling at the same time from its roots, leaves the sinews bare and saturated with salt; and thus, entering once more the circulation of the blood, it increases the number of the aforesaid maladies. And if these bodily ailments be severe, still more afflicting and troublesome are those that precede them; when the bone, owing to the density of the flesh, does not allow sufficient respiration, but becoming heated through rotteness, falls into decay, and will receive no nutriment, but on the contrary gradually crumble away,—bone falling on flesh, and flesh again on blood, diseases being by these means produced that are of a severer character than the former. By far the worst of all maladies however is,—when the marrow becomes diseased through some defect or excess;—because it is then productive of the most vehement and fatal diseases, the whole nature of the body being necessarily reversed and destroyed.

LXVI.—Again, as to the third species of diseases, we ought to consider them as divided into three classes,—one produced by spirit, a second by phlegm, and a third by bile. For when the lungs, the great guardian of the breath, through being obstructed by defluxions,† will not allow a free passage to the breath, which thus has no egress one way, and in another enters in larger supplies than it ought, those parts which are not cooled by it become putrid, while those that receive too much of it, passing violently through the veins, distort them and become liquefied, being shut out with the diaphragm in the middle of the body: and thus ten thousand severe ailments hence arise, together with an abundance of sweat. And frequently, when the flesh becomes separated within the body, breath is produced, which not finding

* Gr. *καταψήχεται*. The old editions have *καταλύχεται*. The same observation applies to *καταλνχόμενον*, a few lines lower down.

† Gr. *ὑπὸ πνευμάτων φράχθεις*, obstructed by discharges of phlegm.

escape externally, causes the same torments as the breath entering from without. The greatest pains that it produces, however, are, when it surrounds and swells out the sinews and neighbouring veins, stretching and distorting the tendons and sinews continued from the back. Now these diseases, from their disposition to extension, are termed tensions and contortions from behind,*—the cure of which it is difficult to find; because fevers supervene and generally bring them to a close. But the white phlegm, when it becomes troublesome through the formation of air-bubbles, being shut out by having breathing-vents outside the body, is of a milder kind, and variegate the body with white spots, generating other diseases also of a similar character. But when mingled with black bile, and dispersed about the most divine circulations of the head, it acts as a disturbing agent, though with less violence during sleep; but if it come to those who are awake, it cannot be expelled without difficulty; and as this is a disease of a sacred nature (or organ, i. e. the head), it is most justly called sacred.† An acid and salt phlegm again is the source of all those diseases which are produced by a defluxion of humours: and because the places into which this phlegm flows are of infinite variety, it produces all kinds of diseases. But whatever parts of the body are said to be inflamed, all become so from being burnt and inflamed by bile.

LXVII. Now this bile, whenever it makes an expiration, boils and sends up all kinds of tumours, and when inwardly restrained, generates many inflammatory diseases,—but the greatest of all, when mingled with pure blood it disturbs the order of the fibres, which are scattered in the blood for this purpose,—namely, of giving it certain measures of tenuity and

* Gr. ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τῆς ξυντρονίας τοῦ παθήματος τὰ νοσήματα τέταντοι τε καὶ ὀπισθοτόνοι προσεῖρήθησαν. Galen describes the *τέταντοι* as a distension or convulsion extending equally over a considerable part of the body;—but it appears to be a generic term also, of which *ὀπισθοτόνος* and *ἐμπροσθότονος* are species,—one extending over the hinder, and the other over the forepart of the body. Celsus explains it as *nerorum rigor*;—and it seems, in fact, to be an involuntary retraction, in a contrary direction to the muscles.

† *Epilepsy*, however, was what the ancients usually termed the *sacred disease*, because it was supposed to be sent by the anger of the gods, and could only be assuaged or removed by incantations and other sacred ceremonies.

density, and that it may neither through heat (as being moist) flow from the thin body, nor from its density become unadapted to motion, and so experience difficulty in flowing back in the veins. The just temperament, then, of these things is under the natural guardianship of the fibres; because if any one collects them together in the blood when dead and in a state of coldness, all the remaining blood becomes diffused; and when let out quickly, it coagulates in consequence of the cold surrounding it. The fibres possessing this influence over the blood, the bile, which is of the nature of ancient blood, and again changed into it from flesh by liquefaction, first gradually falls in a warm, moist state, and becomes coagulated through the power of the fibres; though when coagulated and violently extinguished, it causes a tempest and tremor within. When it flows with still greater force, it overcomes the fibres by its own proper heat, and by its ebullition drives them into disorder;* and if it retains its prevalence to the end, it penetrates into the marrow, and burning the bonds of the soul, as if they were the cables of a ship, dissolves their union, and sets it wholly free; but, on the other hand, when it flows less abundantly, and the body on becoming liquefied opposes its passage, it then, on finding itself overcome, either escapes through the whole body, or being driven through the veins into the upper or lower belly, escapes from the body like a fugitive from a seditious city, and introduces defluxions, dysenteries, or gripings of the intestines; and all diseases of a similar kind. When the body, therefore, is unusually diseased by an excess of fire, it then labours under *continued* burnings and fever; but when through excess of air, under *quotidian* fevers: under *tertian* through water, because water is less active than fire and air; and under *quartan*, through excess of earth;—for earth, being of all of them the least active, becomes purified in quadruple periods of time, and hence introduces quartan fevers, which are with difficulty dispelled.†

LXVIII. In the above manner are the diseases of the body

* Gr. εἰς ἀραξίαν ζέσασα διέσσειε. The old editions have διέσσειε, which makes against the context.

† Martin has taken great and successful pains to point out the surprising sagacity of Plato's conjectures on the causes of disease. His notes on the subject are well worthy of an attentive perusal.

produced ; but the diseases of the soul, resulting from the habit of the body, are as follows. We must admit that the disease of the soul is folly, or a privation of intellect ; and that there are two kinds of folly ; the one madness, the other ignorance. Whatever passion, therefore, a person experiences that induces either of them, must be called a disease. Excessive pleasures and pains, however, are what we should deem the greatest diseases of the soul :—for when a man is over-elevated with joy or unduly depressed with grief, and so hastens immoderately either to retain the one or fly from the other, he can neither perceive nor hear anything properly, but is agitated with fury, and very little capable of exercising the reasoning power. But he who possesses a great quantity of fluid-seed about the marrow, and is by nature like a tree over-laden with fruit, such a one having many throes,* and also many pleasures in his desires and their attendant offspring,—being maddened too during most of his life by the greatest pleasures and pains, having a soul also rendered morbid and unwise by the body, is wrongly deemed to be—not diseased, but voluntarily bad.† In truth, however, sexual intemperance generally becomes a disease of the soul, through a particular state of fluidity and moisture caused by the tenuity of the bones. And indeed it may almost be asserted, that all intemperance in any kind of pleasure, and all disgraceful conduct, is not properly blamed as the consequence of voluntary guilt. For *no one is voluntarily bad* : but he who is depraved becomes so through a certain bad habit of body and an ill-governed education ; and to every one these are inimical, as they result in a certain evil. And again, in the matter of pain, the soul suffers much depravity through the body. For where acid and salt phlegm, and likewise bitter and bilious humours, wandering through the body, get no external vent, but revolve inwardly, and mingle their exhalations with the circulation of the soul ; they in this case produce within it an infinite variety of diseases, greater or less in degree,—more or less in numbers. They are introduced, indeed, to three seats of the soul ; and according to the diversity of the place, each begets

* The old editions read *ὀδύνας*, not *ὠδύνας*.

† This is quite according to Plato's well-known doctrine—*οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός*, as he explains it below, and in the *Republ.* ix. p. 589, c. ; Protagoras, p. 345, e.

perpetually move it and assist its natural motions both within and without, by ever implanting in it certain agitations, and also by moderate agitation bring into order according to their mutual relations the wandering passions and parts of the body, he will not, as we said in our former discourse about the universe, place foe against foe, and suffer war and disease to be produced in the body,—but, on the other hand, combining friend with friend, will contrive to induce a state of sound health. Of all motions, again, that is the best which takes place in itself from itself: for this is particularly allied to intellect and the motion of the universe,—that produced by another being inferior:—whereas that is the worst of all motions, which, when the body is recumbent and at ease, moves it by means of others and only partially. Hence, therefore, of all modes of cleansing and giving consistence to the body, the best is that effected by gymnastics,—the second is that caused by easy conveyance, either in a ship or other suitable vehicle; but the third kind of motion, however useful perhaps to one in extreme need, must on no account be otherwise used by any one endued with intellect; and this is that medical kind of motion produced by pharmaceutical purgation:—for diseases, unless they are extremely dangerous, must not be irritated by medicines. Indeed, every form of disease in some respect resembles the nature of animals;—for the condition of the latter has allotted to it stated periods of life, both as respects individuals and entire races, and each animal separately of itself has its fated life apart from the affection arising from necessity:—because the triangles, which from the very first have power over each, are so composed, as to suffice only for a certain time: beyond which period no animal can extend its life. The same condition of things also takes place in the case of diseases; for if any one destroys them by medicine before the fated time, he will only produce great diseases out of small, and many out of few. On this account we must discipline all such maladies by proper diet, according as each has leisure, and not irritate by medicines an obstinate complaint.—And thus much may suffice to have been said concerning the common animal and its corporeal part,—how each governing himself and governed by himself, may pursue a life regulated by reason.

LXXI.—That part, however, which is to have the govern-

uent of the animal, should, as far as possible, be better provided, and earlier also, with the power of being the fairest and best in the art of ruling. To treat accurately indeed of these matters, would require a separate work of itself: but even pursuing it by way of mere by-work (*ἐν παρεργῇ*), in accordance with what has preceded, we shall not be inconsistent, nor fail in the end of our inquiries. We have often then before asserted that there are three kinds of soul within us, in three parts of the body, each having its peculiar motions; and so in the same way we must now briefly affirm, that when any one of them is in a torpid state and rests from its own proper motions, it must necessarily become extremely weak, and only by constant exercise attains the highest degree of strength:—we should be careful therefore that each may preserve its own motions in symmetry with all the rest.

But with respect to the highest and most leading part of our soul, [*i. e.* the human soul,] we should conceive as follows:—that the Deity assigned this to each as a *dæmon*;—that, namely, which we say, and say correctly too, resides at the summit of the body and raises us from earth to our cognate place in heaven:—for we are plants, not of earth, but heaven; and from the same source whence the soul first arose, a divine nature, raising aloft our head and root, directs our whole corporeal frame. In him, therefore, who has eagerly striven to satisfy the cravings of desire and ambition, all the conceptions engendered in his soul must necessarily be mortal; and he will necessarily, as much as possible, become entirely mortal, omitting no effort to improve such a nature. For one, however, who is sedulously employed in the acquisition of knowledge and true wisdom, and is chiefly practised in this one pursuit, it is altogether necessary, if he would touch on the truth, that he should be endued with wisdom about immortal and divine concerns; and as far as human nature is capable of immortality, he should leave no part neglected; and thus, as he ever cultivates that which is divine, and has a *dæmon* most excellently adorned residing within him, he will be exceedingly happy. But the culture of all the parts is one only,—that of assigning to each their proper nutriment and motion. But the motions allied to the divine part of our nature, are the reflective energies and circulations of the universe. These, then, each of us should pursue; restoring the revolutions in

our head that have been corrupted through being employed on generation, by a diligent investigation of the harmonies and circulations of the universe, with the view of assimilating the reflective power to the object of reflection according to its ancient nature ;* for, by this assimilation, we shall obtain the end of the best life proposed by the gods to men, both present and future.

LXXII.—And now the discussion which we announced at the beginning concerning the universe, as far at least as concerns the generation of man, is very nearly completed ; for as to the rest of the animals, how they were generated, we will only briefly describe them, except where necessity bids us enlarge : for a person may think that he is thus more in measure as concerns such an inquiry. On this subject, then, let us speak as follows :—Of the men that were born, such as are timid, and have passed through life unjustly, are, we suppose, changed into women in their second generation. At that time, then, and for that reason, the gods devised the love of copulation ; constructing an animated substance, and placing one in us men, another in the women,—forming each in the following manner :—That passage for the drink, by which these liquids run through the lungs under the reins into the bladder, and which sends them forth as it receives them, by the pressure of the breath,†—this [the gods] made to pass into the condensed marrow, from the head, along the neck, and through the back-bone ; and this we called seed in a former part of this discourse :—and this [the marrow], in consequence of being animated and endued with respiration, produces in the part where it respire a lively desire of emission,—thus perfecting in us the love of procreation. On this account, the nature of men, as respects their private parts, becoming insubordinate and imperious, like an animal not obedient to reason, tries through raging desire to gain absolute sway. The same is the case with the wombs, and

* Gr. τῇ κατανοουμένῃ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοῖωσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, &c. The meaning is, that where the reflective powers are employed in meditating on the universe, they are necessarily brought into harmony with the only true objects of intellect,—and which existed indeed from the first creation.

† This very erroneous view has been before alluded to in a note on ch. xlv. speaking of the lungs. Plato had evidently no knowledge of the action of the kidneys.

other connected parts of women,—so called, as forming an animal desirous of procreating children. This, when it remains without fruit long beyond its proper time, becomes discontented and indignant; and wandering every way through the body, it obstructs the passage of the breath, and throws women into extreme difficulties, causing all varieties of diseases, till at length the desire and love of both parties [i. e. the man and woman] cause the emission of seed, like fruit from a tree; by which emission, they sow in the womb, as in a field, animals invisible from their minute size, and yet unformed, which, as they become larger, they nourish within; and lastly, by bringing them to light, perfect the generation of animals.

LXXIII. Such is the process of generation in women and every female. Next succeeded the tribe of birds having feathers instead of hair, which were fashioned from men without vice indeed, but light-minded and curious about things on high, yet conceiving in their folly that the strongest proofs of these things are received through the sight [i. e. the senses]. Again, the race of wild animals with feet was generated from men, who made no use of philosophy, nor ever inquired into anything that concerned the nature of the universe,—and this, because they no longer employed the circulations in the head, but followed the guidance of those parts of the soul that reside about the breast. Owing to these pursuits, therefore, they fixed their fore-legs and head earthwards, as suited their nature,—having also long and variously-shaped heads, where the circulations of each were compressed by inactivity:—and hence their race became quadruped and multiped, the Deity giving a greater number of feet to those more than usually unwise, that they might be the more drawn towards the earth. But as regards the most unwise of these, which extend all their body along the ground, as if they had no longer any need for feet, the gods formed them without feet to creep on the earth. The fourth class is that living in the water, which was produced from such men as were to the last degree unthinking and ignorant, and whom those transformers of our nature did not think deserving of a pure medium of respiration, because they possessed a soul rendered impure by extreme transgression,—but drove them from the attenuated and pure atmosphere into the turbid and deep breathing-medium of

water:—and hence arose the tribe of fishes and oysters, and all other aquatic animals, which have received the most remote habitations, as a punishment of their extreme ignorance. After this manner then, both formerly and now, animals migrate into each other; experiencing their changes through either the loss or acquisition of intellect and folly. We are now at length to say, that our discourse about the universe has reached its conclusion;—for not only containing, but full of mortal and immortal animals, it has thus been formed *a visible animal embracing things visible, a sensible god of the intelligible, the greatest, best, and most perfect,—this one only-begotten UNIVERSE.*

THE END OF THE TIMÆUS.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITIAS.

THIS Dialogue may be considered as an appendix to that preceding, and the fulfilment of a promise which Critias had made in the opening of the *Timæus*, to give some account of the primæval history of the Athenians, whose early manners he supposed to correspond with those of the citizens in Socrates's ideal republic. The Athenians were a people so boastful of their antiquity, as to arrogate to themselves the name of *αἰρώχθονες*; and therefore any narrative or legend was likely to be agreeable to their feelings, which assigned to them even a higher antiquity than they really possessed. This may probably have been a leading motive with Plato for constructing this amusing dialogue; more than half of which, however, is taken up with the description of the Atlantic islands, its kings and its inhabitants, who all existed in the time of the primitive Athenians, though in Plato's time they were extinct, and their islands submerged in the sea. Many curious speculations have been put forth respecting the geography of the Atlantic isles, and some have gone so far as to conjecture them to have been a portion of the modern America. The whole story, however, has so much the appearance of a myth, that it seems useless to apply to it any of the laws of historical or geographical criticism. The Dialogue, moreover, is so short as scarcely to require any abbreviated account of its contents.

THE CRITIAS.

TIMÆUS, CRITIAS, SOCRATES, HERMOCRATES.

SECT. I.—TIM. I am just as pleased, Socrates, as one at rest after a long journey, that I have now at length been happily released from my protracted discourse!* And now I implore that God [the universe,] long, long ago created in fact, though only just recently in our discussion, to establish in security what we have properly stated, but as respects aught that we have even involuntarily stated that is not to the purpose, to inflict on us a suitable punishment:—and the right punishment for one out of tune is to make him play in tune.† In order then, that for the future we may speak correctly respecting the generation of the gods, we beseech him who is the best and most perfect to give us a scientific knowledge of medicine; and having thus prayed, we hand over to Critias, as we agreed, the succeeding discourse.

CRIT. Yes, Timæus, I receive it:—and as you acted at first, in requesting indulgence as one about to speak on momentous matters, the same also do I now entreat; and I think that I ought the more to obtain it for what I am about to say. Yet I know full well that I am making a very ambitious request, and of a more rustic kind than is proper; still we must proceed. That what you have now said has not been well said, who in his senses will pretend to say? I must try to show then, that what I am about to say needs greater indulgence on account of its greater difficulty:—for it is easier, Timæus, to speak and appear to speak rightly about the gods to men, than about mortals to us [men]; inasmuch as the

* Gr. ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λόγου διαπορείας.

† Gr. δίκη δὲ ὀρθή τὸν πλημμελοῦντα ἑμμελῇ ποιῆν.

inexperience and extraordinary ignorance of the hearers about things of this nature, both furnish great facilities to one intending to speak concerning them; but as respects the gods, we know how we are situated. In order, however, that I may clearly show my meaning, follow me in what I am about to say. What has been said by the whole of us was necessarily only imitation and resemblance; and now, as regards the representation by painters of divine and heavenly* objects, we see with what facility or difficulty they contrive that they shall seem to the spectators to be apt imitations; and we shall see also, that with respect to earth, mountains, rivers, woods, and the whole of heaven, and all therein, as well as what moves about it, we are satisfied if a person is able to produce even a slight resemblance of them;—but beyond this, as we have no accurate knowledge concerning such matters, we neither examine nor find fault with the paintings, but use a mere obscure and deceitful sketch of them. But when on the other hand any one attempts to represent our bodies, we quickly perceive any omissions, through our familiar apprehension of them, and become severe critics on any one who does not perfectly exhibit their resemblances. The same also we see, to be the case in arguments,—that we are content with even slightly resembling statements about heavenly and divine things, while we accurately examine things mortal and human. As regards then what we are now immediately saying, if we cannot fully exhibit what is desired, you ought to forgive us, because you must reflect that to form approved resemblances of mortal things is no easy task, but very difficult. Now I have said all this, Socrates, wishing to remind you of these things, and asking not for less, but more indulgence respecting what is about to be said. If then I seem to be fairly asking the favour, grant it with all cheerfulness.

SECT. II.—SOCR. Why should we hesitate to grant it, Critias?—And besides, we must grant this same indulgence to our third friend, Hermocrates:—for it is evident, as we shall see presently, that when he has to speak, he will make the same request as you. That he then may furnish with a different commencement and not be compelled to say the same, let him at once speak, as if this indulgence were

* Gr. *οὐράνια*, which Stallbaum has adopted on Cornarius's conjecture, instead of the *ἀνθρώπινα*, the readings both of the editions and MSS.

granted him. I must inform you, however, of the sense of the audience,* that the former poet [Timæus] has obtained a wonderful deal of applause;—so that you will need a vast quantity of indulgence if you intend to be an able successor to him.

HERM. You are making the same announcement to me, Socrates, as to him. Faint-hearted men, however, never yet erected a trophy, Critias:—so you must proceed manfully to your discourse, and, invoking Pæan and the Muses, exhibit and celebrate these primitive and best of citizens.

CRIT. Ah, friend Hermocrates, you are to speak afterwards† and have another before you;—and so you are vastly courageous. What the nature of the task is, however, the fact itself will speedily declare:—and we will therefore be persuaded by your encouragement and exhortation, and in addition to the gods that you have mentioned, will call on others besides, and most of all on Memory: for all the most important points of our discourse concern that goddess,—inasmuch as it is by suitably calling to mind and relating the narratives of the [Egyptian] priests brought hither by Solon, that I feel satisfied of our being thought by this auditory to have fairly accomplished our part. This therefore we must now do, and without further delay.

SECT. III.—First of all then let us recollect, that it is about nine thousand years, since war was proclaimed between those dwelling outside the Pillars of Hercules and all those within them,—which war we must now describe. Of the latter party, then, this city was the leader, and conducted the whole war; and of the former the kings of the Atlantic Island, which we said was once larger than Libya and Asia, but now, sunk by earthquakes, a mass of impervious mud,‡ which hinders all those sailing on the vast sea from effecting a passage hither;—and then our story will, as it were, unfold [to your view] the many barbarous tribes, and such of the

* Gr. τὴν τοῦ θεάτρον διανοίαν. The term *θέατρον* is frequently used to mean the audience only. This was no doubt unknown to those critics, who very unnecessarily conjectured from the use of this term, that Critias had brought out scenic representations.

† The old editions read *ὑπερταίας*; but Bekker and Stallbaum have *ὑστέρας*, which is adopted here, as agreeing with *τάξεως* understood.

‡ Gr. νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ σεισμῶν εὔσαν ἄπορον πηλόν. The old editions read *ὑσανάπορον*.

Greek nations as then existed, as each may happen to present itself:—but the wars of the then Athenians and their adversaries we must first describe, as well as the power and government of each. Of these [our own] people, however, we must be anxious first to speak.

SECT. IV.—To the gods was once locally allotted the whole earth, and that, too, without contention;—for it would not be reasonable to suppose that the gods are ignorant of what suits each of themselves, or that, fully aware of what is rather the property of others, they would try to get possession of it through strife. Obtaining then a country agreeable to them by just allotment, they chose these regions for their habitation; and, after settling, they like shepherds reared us, as their possessions, flocks and herds,—not however by forcing body against body, as shepherds in grazing drive their cattle with blows; but [they treated us] as an easily-governed animal, and piloting, as it were, with persuasions for a rudder, and working on the soul, they governed the entire mortal by leading him according to their own mind. Different gods, therefore, having received by lot different regions, proceeded to cultivate (or set in order) those [that they had received;]—but Hephæstus and Athéné having a common nature, not only related by brotherhood from having the same father, but united also in philosophy and love of art,* both received this one region as their common allotment, as being naturally familiar with and well adapted to virtue and wisdom; and after producing worthy men,—natives of the soil (*αὐτόχθονες*), arranged to their mind the order of their government:—of which men, indeed, the names are preserved; though their deeds have become extinct through the death of those that handed them down and the long lapse of time. The race, indeed, that survived, as it has been before observed, were a set of unlettered mountaineers, who had heard the names only of the ruling people in the land, and very little about their deeds. The names they out of affection gave to their children, though unacquainted with the virtues and laws of those before them, except through certain dark rumours concerning them; and being themselves and their children for many generations in want of necessities, with which, with all their wit, they were

* Gr. *φιλοτεχνία*. The old editions have *φιλοτεχνία*, which is an evident error.

unprovided, they bestowed their chief attention on this, to the neglect of events that had taken place in times long gone by :—for mythology and the inquiry into ancient affairs both visit states at a time of leisure, when they see that the necessities of life have been procured, but not before. In this way, then, the names of the ancients have been preserved without their deeds :—and I infer this to be the case, as Solon said, that the priests in describing the war then waged gave those engaged in them many names, such as Cecrops, Erechtheus, Erichthonius, Erysichthon, and most of the other names which are recorded prior to the time of Theseus ;—and they gave the names of women likewise. Besides, the figure and image of the goddess shows that at that time both men and women entered in common on the pursuits of war ; as in compliance with that custom an armed statue was dedicated to the goddess by the people of that day,—a proof that all animals that consort together, females as well as males, have a natural ability to pursue in common every suitable virtue.

SECT. V.—At that time, indeed, there dwelt in this country many other tribes of citizens engaged in crafts and the culture of the soil ; but the warrior-tribe, being set apart from the first by divine men, lived separately, having all the requisites for food and training, none of them possessing anything in private, but considering all their possessions as common, and not deigning to receive anything from the rest of the citizens beyond a sufficiency of food, occupying themselves moreover in all the pursuits that we yesterday described as those of appointed state-guardians. Moreover, as respects this country of ours, it was stated with probability and truth, that in early times it had boundaries fixed at the Isthmus and on the side of the other continent as far as the heights of Cithæron and Parnes, these boundaries coming down, with Oropia on the right, and with the Asopus as a seaward limit on the left :—and by the valour of this region it was said that the whole earth was vanquished, because it was then able to support the numerous army raised from the surrounding people. A great proof of their virtue also was this,—that what now remains of it may vie with any other whatever in the general productiveness of the soil, in the excellence of its fruits, and in pastures suited to every kind of animals. Then, however, it produced all these not only

excellent in quality, but in the greatest possible abundance. How then can we believe this;—and in what way can it [the present country] rightly be termed a remnant of the former land? The whole from the other continent [*i. e.* the western side] extends seaward like a long promontory, and is wholly surrounded by the steep-shored basin of the sea. As therefore many and extensive deluges happened in that period of nine thousand years,—for so many years have elapsed from that to the present time,—the earth, that was loosened and fell from the heights at these times and under these circumstances, did not, as elsewhere, aggregate to form any elevation worth mentioning, but ever eddying round, a length vanished in the deep; and the heights have been left, as is the case in small islands, like the bones of a diseased body, compared with those of former times, all the earth that was soft and fat being washed away, leaving only a thin body of soil. At that time, however, being undisturbed, it comprised mountains which are now only high hills; and the country, now termed the plains of Phelleus, was then full of fat earth. The mountains also abounded with woods, of which even now there are evident signs:—for there are some of the mountains, which now furnish food for bees only, though at no very distant period the houses were still standing, and in good preservation, that were constructed of the timber cut from the trees thereon, and suitable for the largest buildings. There were many lofty trees also, raised by cultivation (*ἡμερα*), and an incalculable amount of pasture for cattle. Prolific rain especially this land yearly enjoyed, not, as now, losing it by its quick passage over the bare earth down to the sea; but received an abundance of it, which it could keep within itself to dispense over the clayey soil which holds it:—and thus sending down the absorbed water from the heights into the hollows, it diffused over all these regions abundant streams of springs and rivers,—the truth of which is even now attested by the sacred remains observable in the ancient fountains.*

SECT. VI.—Such was once the natural state of this coun-

* This is an extremely involved and most probably a corrupt passage. We have nearly followed Stallbaum's interpretation; though it was absolutely necessary, in order to make it readable, to divide the sentence into two clauses.

try;—and it was cultivated, as it was likely it would be, by real husbandmen, actually practising their calling—lovers of honour and generous-minded, having a most excellent soil, great abundance of water, and an admirably attempered climate. It was at this time that the city was founded here as follows:—The form of the Acropolis was not then, as it is now;—for in later times [*lit. now*] a single rainy night softened it, and to a great degree bared it of soil,—there being earthquakes at the same time, and a fatal deluge—the third before that of Deucalion. Before this, in primitive times, it extended in size to the Eridanus* and Ilissus, and comprised the Pnyx, having the Lycabetus as its limit opposite the Pnyx,—the whole being well covered with soil, except some level spots in the higher part. Its outer parts down the flanks were inhabited by craftsmen and husbandmen who tilled the neighboring land,—the warrior-classes living separately by themselves in the more elevated parts around the temple of Athéné and Hephæstus, which they had formed, as it were, into the garden of a single dwelling by encircling it with one enclosure:—for on the northern side lived those, who erected public buildings and common banquets for the winter, and whatever else was suited to a common polity, buildings as well as temples being unadorned with gold or silver; (for they never at any time used these metals, but pursuing a middle course between extravagance and meanness, built neat dwellings, in which both they and their children's children grew old, and then left them to others like themselves,)—while as regards the south side, they removed thither their gardens, gymnasia, and common rooms of entertainment, which they fixed here during the summer. There was also one single fountain on the spot now occupied by the Acropolis, since the extinction of which by earthquakes only a few small streams have been left round it; although at that time it furnished to every part an abundant supply of water, well attempered both for winter and summer. Such was the way of life pursued by the guardians of their own state, who also were leaders of the rest of the Greeks—such at least as required them; and as to their number they paid special attention, that they should

* The Eridanus here mentioned was in Attica:—it is not the Eridanus known by geographers in Ætolia and Acarnania.

always have the same number of men and women that might both then and in future* be able to serve in war,—the whole being about twenty thousand. These men then, being personally such as I have described, and ever in some such way justly administering both their own affairs and those of Greece, were the most noted and renowned of all the people of that day over all Europe and Asia, both for the beauty of their bodies and the general virtue of their souls.

SECT. VII.—In the next place then, as respects the adversaries of these men, what was their character, and how they first arose, we will now impart this in common to you our friends, if at least we have not lost the recollection of what we heard in our childhood. Yet before we narrate this, we must briefly warn you not to be surprised at hearing Hellenic names given to barbarians :—and the cause of this you shall now hear. Solon, intending to make use of this story in his poetry, made an investigation into the power of names, and found that the early Egyptians who committed these facts to writing transferred these names into their own language ; and he again receiving the meaning of each name, introduced it by writing into our language. These very writings, indeed, were in the possession of my grandfather, and are now in mine, having been made the subject of much study during my boyhood. If therefore you hear such names as these in this narrative, be not surprised ;—for you know the reason. Of a long story, then, let such be the introduction.

SECT. VIII.—As we remarked at first concerning the allotment of the gods, that they distributed the whole earth here into larger and there into smaller portions,† procuring for themselves temples and public sacrifices,—so, Poseidon in particular, taking as his lot the Atlantic island, begot children by a mortal woman, and settled in some such spot of the island as we are about to describe. Towards the sea, but in the centre of the whole island, was a plain, which is said to have been the fairest of all plains, and distinguished for the excellence [of its soil]. Near this plain, and at its centre, about fifty stadia distant, was a mountain with short accli-

* Gr. ἡδὴ καὶ τὸ ἔτι. Cornarius here conjectured *κατὰ τὰ ἔρη* as the true reading ; but as the reading of the MSS. admits of translation, it seems unnecessary.

† Gr. λίγεις. The old editions and several MSS. have *μείζεις*.

vities on every side. On this dwelt one of those men who in primitive times sprang from the earth, by name Evenor, who lived with a wife, Leucippe; and they had an only daughter, Clito. Now when this girl arrived at marriageable age, and her mother and father were dead, Poseidon becoming enamoured, made her his mistress, and circularly enclosed the hill on which she dwelt, forming the sea and land into alternate zones, greater and less,—turning, as it were, two out of land and three out of sea, from the centre of the island, all equally distant, so as to be inaccessible to men:—for at that time ships and navigation were not known. And he himself, with his divine power, agreeably adorned the centre of the island, causing two fountains of water to shoot upwards from beneath the earth, one cold and the other hot, and making every variety of food to spring abundantly from the earth. He also begat and brought up five twin-male children; and after distributing all the Atlantic island into ten parts, he bestowed on the first-born of the eldest pair his mother's dwelling and the allotment about it,—this being the largest and best; and he appointed him king of all the rest, making the others governors, and giving to each the dominion over many people and an extensive territory. He likewise gave all of them names,—to the eldest, who was the king, the name of *Atlas*, from whom, as the first sovereign, both the island and sea were termed *Atlantic*;—and to the twin born after him, who had received for his share the extreme parts of the island towards the Pillars of Hercules, as far as the region which now in that country is called *Gadeirica*, he gave the titular name, which we Greeks call *Eumelus*, but which the people of that country term *Gadeirus*. Of the second-born twins he called the first *Ampheres*, the second, *Euzæmon*;—of the third, he called the first-born, *Musæus*, and the second, *Autochthon*;—of the fourth, the first, *Elasippus*, and the younger, *Mestor*;—and among the fifth, to the former was given the name *Azaes*, and to the latter, *Diaprepes*.

SECT. IX.—All these, then, and their descendants, dwelt for many generations, as rulers in the sea of islands, and as we before said, yet further extended their empire to all the country as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia. By far the most distinguished, however, was the race of *Atlas*; and among

these the oldest king in succession always handed down the power to his eldest son, all of them successively possessing wealth in such abundance as never was before found among regal dynasties, nor will easily be found hereafter; and all things were provided for them, which in a city, or elsewhere, are worth such provision. Many possessions, indeed, accrued to them through their power from foreign countries; but the greatest part of what they stood in need was provided for them by the island itself,—first, such ores as are dug out of mines in a solid [*i.e.* virgin] state, or require smelting;—and especially that metal *orichalcum*, which is now known only by name, but formerly of high celebrity, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island, being considered the most valuable of all the metals then known, except gold;—and it produced an abundance of wood for builders, and furnished food also for tame and wild animals. Moreover, there were comprised within it vast numbers of elephants:—for there were abundant means of support for all animals that feed in marshes and lakes, on mountains and plains, and so likewise for this animal, which by nature is the largest and most voracious of all. Besides these, whatever odorous plants the earth now bears, whether roots or grass, or woods or distilling gums, or flowers or fruits,—these it bore and produced them to perfection. And yet, further, it bore cultivated fruits, and dry edible fruits, such as we use for food;—all these kinds of food we call vegetables,—together with all that trees bear, as drinks, meats, and ointments; and those also, whose fruits, such as acorns, being used in sport and pleasure, are with difficulty hoarded up, together with certain dainty fruits for dessert that might provoke the satiated palate, or please the sick;—all these that once existing and warmly-acclimated island bore, sacred, beautiful, wonderful, and infinite in quantity. Receiving all these, then, from the earth, the inhabitants employed themselves also in erecting temples, royal habitations, ports and docks over the whole region, disposing them in the following manner:—

SECT. X.—First of all, those residing about that ancient metropolis bridged over those zones of the sea [before mentioned], making a passage both outwards and to the royal palace. And the palace they constructed immediately from the first in this habitation of the god and their ancestors;

and each in turn receiving it from his predecessor, and further embellishing the ornamental parts, continually surpassed the one before him, until they made the building quite admirable to the sight for the size and beauty of its works. They dug a trench indeed, beginning from the sea, three plethra broad, a hundred feet deep, and fifty stadia in length, as far as the outermost zone, and thus made a passage thither from the sea, as into a harbour, by enlarging its mouth sufficiently to admit the largest vessels. Besides this, they separated by bridges those zones of land which separated those of the sea, so that with one trireme a passage could be effected from one zone to another, covering the zones above, so as to allow a water-way beneath them;—for the banks of the zones of earth rose to a height considerably above the sea. And the greatest of these zones into which the sea penetrated was three stadia in breadth, and the zone of land next in order equal to the first;—of the second pair, the watery circle was two stadia in breadth, and that of earth again, equal to the preceding one of water; lastly, the zone running round the centre of the island had the breadth only of one stadium, and the island in which the king's palace stood had a diameter of five stadia. This island, as well as the zones, and the bridge (which was a plethrum in breadth), they enclosed on both sides with a stone wall, raising towers and gates at intervals on the bridges at the places where the sea passes through them [*i. e.* the zones]. The stone for it they quarried beneath the circuit of the island, both in the centre and also within and without the zones, one kind of it white, a second black, and a third red; and by thus quarrying they at the same time made cavities that served for two docks, having likewise a covering of rock. Of the buildings, some were of simple structure;—others they put together in a variegated style, by mixing the different kinds of stone by way of amusement, thus realizing a pleasure suitable to their natures:—and they surrounded with brass the whole circuit of the wall round the extreme outer zone, applying it like plaster; that of the next inside they covered with melted tin, and the wall round the citadel itself with orichalcum that has a fiery resplendence.

SECT. XI.—Next, the royal palace within the citadel was constructed as follows:—In its centre was planted a temple,

difficult of access, sacred to Clito and Poseidon, surrounded with an enclosure of gold;—and it was that, in which they first generated and produced the race of the ten kings; where also, making annual collections from all the ten allotments, they celebrated seasonable sacrifices to each. The temple of Poseidon himself was a stadium in length, three plethra in breadth, and of a height to correspond, having something of a barbaric appearance. All the outside of the temple, except the pinnacles, they lined with silver, but the pinnacles with gold:—and as to the interior, the roof was formed wholly of ivory variegated with gold and orichalcum; and as to all the parts—the walls, pillars, and pavements, they lined them with orichalcum. They also placed in it golden statues, the god himself [being represented] as standing on a chariot holding the reins of six winged horses, of such size as to touch the roof with his head, and round him a hundred nereids on dolphins;—for those of that day thought that such was their number; and it contained also many other statues dedicated to private individuals. Round the outside of the temple likewise golden images were placed of all the men and women that were descended from the ten kings, and many other large statues both of kings and private people, both from the city itself, and the foreign countries over which they had dominion. There was an altar, too, of corresponding size and workmanship with these ornaments; and the excellence of the palace was proportioned to the magnitude of the government and also to the order observed in the sacred ceremonies.

SECT. XII.—Next, they used fountains both from the cold and hot springs, of which there was a great abundance, either of which was wonderfully well adapted for use from its sweetness and excellence;* and round them they fixed their habitations and excellently-watered plantations, together with their water-tanks, some open to the heaven, but others for winter use roofed over for warm baths, the kings' baths and those of private persons being apart, with separate baths

* Gr. ταῖς δὲ δὴ κρήναις, τῇ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ νάματος, πλεῖθος μὲν ἀφθονον ἔχούσαις, ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ ἀριετῇ τῶν ὑδάτων πρὸς ἑατέρου τὴν χρῆσιν θαυμαστοῦ πεφυκότος, ἐχρῶντο, &c. This is a very difficult and involved sentence; but we have given its meaning as nearly as language will allow. Both Ast and Stallbaum consider the text imperfect from the dropping out of two or more words.

for women, and others for horses and other draught-cattle, providing each with the requisite means of cleanliness. The stream hence flowing they led to the grove of Poseidon, where there were all varieties of trees, reaching a wonderful height, owing to the excellence of the soil, and then conducted it by channels over the bridges to the external circles. And here, indeed, there had been constructed numerous temples dedicated to many different gods, and many gardens and gymnasia, one for men, and others separately for horses in either island of the zones;—and for the latter, in particular, there was a race-course plotted out in the centre of the largest island, a stadium in breadth, and extending in length through the whole circumference for a contest of speed between the horses. And around it on all sides were barracks for the household troops corresponding with their number;—to the more faithful of whom were assigned quarters in the smaller zone closer to the citadel, while those who excelled all in loyal faithfulness had dwellings given them inside the citadel near the kings themselves. The docks likewise were filled with triremes and the fittings requisite for triremes; and they were all satisfactorily provided. Such were the arrangements for the provision of the kings' dwelling;—but on crossing the three exterior harbours, one was met by a wall which went completely round, beginning from the sea, everywhere fifty stadia distant from the greatest [or outermost] zone and harbour, and enclosed in one the entrance to the canal and the entrance to the sea. The whole of this part indeed was covered with many and densely-crowded dwellings;—and the canal and largest harbour were full of vessels and merchants coming from all parts, causing from their multitude all kinds of shouting, tumult, and din all day long and the night through.

SECT. XIII. — We have now related from memory a description of the city and its ancient habitations; and now we must try to describe the nature of the rest of the country, and its mode of employment. First, then, the whole region was said to be exceedingly lofty and precipitous towards the sea, and the plain about the city, which encircles it, is itself surrounded by mountains sloping down to the sea, being level and smooth, all much extended, three thousand stadia in one direction, and the central part from the sea above two

thousand. And this district of the whole island was turned towards the south, in an opposite direction from the north. The mountains around it, too, were at that time celebrated, as exceeding in number, size, and beauty all those of the present time,—having in them many hamlets enriched with villages, as well as rivers, lakes, and marshes, furnishing ample supplies of food for all cattle both tame and wild, with timber of various descriptions, and in abundant quantity for every individual purpose. The plain then being thus by nature, was improved as follows by many kings in a long course of time. It was of square shape, mostly straight and oblong; and where it ended, they bounded it by a trench dug round it,—the depth, breadth, and length of which, for a work of man's making, besides the other connected undertakings, we can scarcely believe, though still we must report what we heard. It was excavated to the depth of a plethrum, and the breadth was a stadium in every part,—the whole excavation made round the plain being ten thousand stadia in length. This, receiving the streams coming down from the mountains, and conducted all round the plain, approached the city in some parts, and in this way was allowed to flow out to the sea. From above, likewise, straight canals were cut about a hundred feet broad along the plain, back into the ditch near the sea, distant from one another about one hundred stadia:—and it was by this that they brought down the timber from the mountains to the city, and carried on the rest of their shipping-traffic, cutting transverse canals of communication into each other, and towards the city. Their harvest, also, they gathered twice in the year; in winter availing themselves of the rains, and in summer introducing on the land the streams from the trenches.

SECT. XIV.—As to the quantity [of land,] it was ordered, that of the men on the plain fit for service, each individual leader should have his allotment, each allotment amounting in extent to a hundred stadia, and the total of the lots being sixty thousand;—and of those from the mountains and the rest of the country there was said to be an incalculable number of men, to all of whom, according to their dwellings and villages, were assigned certain lots by their respective leaders. To each leader, likewise, the task was appointed of furnishing for war the sixth portion of a war-chariot (to make up a total

of ten thousand), two riding horses, and a two-horse car without a driver's seat, having a mounted charioteer to direct the horses,* with another to dismount and fight at the side,—also two heavy-armed soldiers, two archers, two slingers, three each of light-armed men, stone-shooters and javelin-men, with four sailors to make up a complement of one thousand two hundred ships. Thus were the military affairs of this city arranged. And as respects the nine others, there were different other arrangements, which it would be tedious to narrate.

SECT. XV.—And as respects official situations and honours, the following were the arrangements made from the commencement:—Of the ten kings, each individually in his own district and over his own city ruled supreme over the people and the laws, constraining and punishing whomever he pleased:—and the government and commonwealth in each was regulated by the injunctions of Poseidon, as the law handed them down; and inscriptions were made by the first [kings] on a column of orichalcum, which was deposited in the centre of the island in the temple of Poseidon, where they assembled every fifth year, (which they afterwards changed to every sixth year), taking an equal part both for the entire state and its supernumeraries; and thus collected they consulted concerning the common weal, and inquired what transgressions each had committed, judging them accordingly. And when they were about to judge, they previously gave each other pledges, according to the following fashion:—As there were bulls grazing at liberty in the temple of Poseidon, ten men only of the whole number, after invoking the god to receive their sacrifice propitiously, went out to hunt swordless, with staves and chains, and whichever of the bulls they took, they brought it to the column and slaughtered it at its head under the inscriptions:—and on the column, besides the laws, there was an oath written, invoking curses on the disobedient. When, therefore, in compliance with their laws, they sacrificed and burnt all the limbs of the bull, they filled a goblet with clots of blood, and threw the rest into the fire, by way of purifying the column:—and after this, dipping out of the goblet with

* Gr. *ἐν δὲ ξυνωρίδα χωρὶς δίφρου καταβάτην τε σμικρασίδα καὶ τὸν ἀμφοῖν μετ' ἐπιβάτην τοῖν ἵπποιν ἡνίοχον ἐνοήσαν.* The old editions read *καταβάτας*.

golden cups, they poured libations down on the fire, and swore to do justice according to the laws on the column, to punish any one who had previously transgressed them, and besides that, never afterwards willingly to transgress the inscribed laws, nor ever to rule or obey any ruler governing otherwise than according to his father's laws. Then after invoking these curses on themselves and their descendants, and after drinking and depositing the cup in the temple of the God, and abiding a necessary time at supper, as soon as it was dark, and the fire round the sacrifice had been cooled, all of them dressed themselves in beautiful dark-blue robes, and sitting on the ground near the embers of the sacrifice on which they had sworn, extinguished during the night all the fire about the temple, and then mutually judged each other as respects any accusations of transgressing the laws;—and after their acts of judgment were over, when day came, they inscribed their decisions on a golden tablet and deposited them as memorials, together with their dresses. There were many other individual laws also respecting the privileges of the kings,—the chief being, that they should never wage war on each other, and that all should lend their aid, in case that any one in any of their cities should try to destroy the royal race,—consulting in common, as their ancestors did before them, as to the right course both in war and other concerns, and assigning the empire to the Atlantic race. They did not allow the king, however, any authority to put to death any of his kinsmen, unless approved of by more than half of the ten.

SECT. XVI.—Such then, and so great being the power at that time in those places, the Deity transferred it to these regions, as report goes, on the following pretexts:—For many generations, as long as the natural power of the god sufficed them, they remained obedient to the laws and kindly affected towards the divine nature to which they were allied:—for they possessed true and altogether lofty ideas, and practised mildness united with wisdom, in reference to the casual occurrences of life and towards each other. Hence, looking above everything except virtue, they considered things present as of small importance, and contentedly bore, as a burden, the mass of gold and other property; nor were they deceived by the intoxication of luxury, or rendered intem-

perate through wealth ;—but on the other hand being sober, they acutely perceived that all these things are increased through common friendship mingled with virtue, and that by too anxiously pursuing and honouring them, these goods themselves are corrupted, and with them [friendship] itself likewise perishes. To such a mode of reasoning then, and the abiding of such a nature, was it owing that they made all the progress that we before described. But when the divine portion within them became extinct through much and frequent admixture of the mortal nature, and the manners of men began to hold sway, then, through inability to bear present events, they began to exhibit unbecoming conduct and to the intelligent beholder appeared base, destroying the fairest among their most valuable possessions,—though all the while held by those who were unable to see a true life of happiness based on truth, to be in the highest degree worthy and blessed, though filled with avarice and unjust power. Zeus, however, the god of gods, who rules according to the laws, and is able to see into such things, perceiving an honourable race in a condition of wretchedness, and wishing to inflict punishment on them, that they might become more diligent in the practice of temperance, collected all the gods into their own most ancient habitation, which indeed, being situated in the centre of the whole world, beholds all things that have had a share in generation :—and having assembled them, he said,

* * * * *

THE END OF THE CRITIAS.

APPENDIX.

(See page 235.)

THE difficulty of the passage here alluded to, which has baffled the efforts of every critic, from Proclus and Iamblichus downwards, gave rise in ancient times to the trite proverb—*Numeris Platoniciis nihil obscurius*,—nor has the ingenuity of modern speculators thrown much light on its obscurity. Baroccius, however, a Venetian nobleman, in 1566, gave to the world with more pretence than merit, a wordy dissertation professing to solve this knotty problem. The words of Plato are—*ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος, ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπίῳ δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναι τε καὶ δυναστεύμεναι τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπίφηναν· ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται τρεῖς αὐξηθείς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκεις, ἑκατὸν τοσαντάκεις, τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν, τῇ προμήκει δὲ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος δεομένων ἐνδὸς ἐκάστων, ἀρρήτῶν δὲ δυεῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος· ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος, ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων, &c.* With reference to the former part, he says that Plato is alluding to *ratios of greater or less inequality*,—to which respectively belong multiples and submultiples, superparticulars and subsuperparticulars, &c., following the language of the schoolmen. Then again, as to the term *ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν* which had been variously rendered by the Latin *radix*, *propago*, *fundus*, and *solidum*, he conceives it to be a root or prime number, and fixes on the number *seven* as its representative ($4 + 3 = 7$). Further, by the two harmonics, he supposes Plato to mean the connexion between the *square* and the *cube* of TWELVE, which is itself made up of seven and five (*ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς*),—i. e. 144 and 1728,—*twelve* being a number often mentioned by Plato, as not only *perfect*, but the type of perfection,—the dodecahedron having given origin to the sphere, and being the type of the world,—as he has expressly stated in the *Timæus*. If this be granted, the

geometric or mathematical—perfect or fatal—number may be considered to be the cube of $12=1728$. This opinion, however, is strongly impugned by Schneider, who conceives it to be 216, i. e. $\sqrt[3]{6}$,—which is made up of three other cubes; 27, 64, and 125, i. e. $\sqrt[3]{3}$, $\sqrt[3]{4}$, and $\sqrt[3]{5}$. Others again have considered the root to be 9,—the cube-root of 729. So much for the *ἐκτίριτος πυθμήν*.

As to the elucidation, however, of the principal difficulties herein involved, we are still as far afield as ever;—nor has the united learning of Schneider, Trendelenburg, Böckh, Schleiermacher, or Cousin, removed any obstacle to their successful solution. To state their theories at length would take up much space without any adequate benefit;—and this must be our apology for substituting so short a notice for what we intended to be a lengthened statement. Many details however on this *vexata questio* may be gathered by the patient reader from Schneider's preface to vol. iii. of his edition of Plato,—Cousin's note in his translation *ad locum*,—and his translation of Proclus, with notes *ad locum*. It must be confessed, however, that the question still remains open and unsolved—still, *dignus vindice nodus*

THE END.

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


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1854 July 18.
Salisbury

PREFACE.

THE present portion of the works of Plato having been placed in my hands for translation, I undertook the task the more readily, as it enabled me to renew my acquaintance with an author to whose writings I formerly paid considerable attention.

It is now more than five and twenty years since I prepared for the press, for Mr. Priestley, his variorum edition of Plato, published in 1826; for which object I carefully examined whatever had been contributed by my predecessors, especially Routh, Fischer, Wyttensbach, Heusde, Heindorf, Buttman, Bekker, Ast, Schneider, and Stallbaum. Since then I have from time to time read or looked into the more recent publications illustrative of my author, and therefore feel myself competent to pronounce an opinion on their labours.

The seven Dialogues contained in the present volume are confessedly among the most difficult, and this chiefly because, with the exception of the Parmenides, they are the most corrupt. Hence I have found myself compelled to write longer and more frequent notes than would otherwise have been requisite; and sometimes, with the view of arriving at the probable meaning of the author, to suggest new readings.

G. B.

November, 1850

INTRODUCTION TO THE MENO.

OR

RESPECTING VIRTUE.

THE object of this dialogue is to inquire into the nature of Virtue in the abstract; to ascertain whether it can or cannot be taught; and to show that the knowledge we now possess is but the recollection of what the mind was conversant with at some former period.

On the first of these points Plato, as usual, arrives at no conclusion. For Socrates, who is merely Plato's mouth-piece, and not, as many imagine, the exponent of his own opinions, never pretended to know any thing in the abstract. He was therefore content to show, that for the development of Virtue a correct moral conduct, founded on prudence, temperance, and justice, is all that is requisite.

With regard to the question, whether Virtue can or cannot be taught, we are told that, as Virtue is not a science, it cannot, like a science, be made the subject of teaching; and that the virtuous person is such, rather by an act of the deity than by any efforts made by man.

Of the speakers, the principal is Meno, a Thessalian, who had been a pupil of Gorgias, and is supposed to be the person mentioned by Xenophon in the *Anabasis*, where his character is drawn in the darkest colours, and reflecting to the life the conduct of those, who had been taught by the Sophists of Greece:—

“*quærenda pecunia primum;
Virtus post nummos.*”

Seek money first; and virtue after coin.

Towards the latter part of the dialogue, Anytus, best known as one of the accusers of Socrates, is introduced, as taking accidentally a share in the conversation; partly because he was Meno's host;

but more, perhaps, with the view of enabling Plato to show, that the answers which Anytus gives to questions on political subjects, were less sensible than those, given by his own slave on geometrical problems; and this too, although the former had been under the cleverest masters, and the latter was merely self-taught.

MENO.

MENO, SOCRATES.

[1.] *Meno.* CAN¹ you tell me, Socrates, is virtue to be taught? or is it to be not taught, but acquired by (mental) exercise?² or does it come to man neither by (mental) exercise, nor teaching, but by nature, or some other means?

Socrates. The Thessalians, Meno, have been of old in great repute among the Grecians, and admired for their skill in horsemanship,³ and for their wealth; and now, I think, (they are) no less so for their wisdom.⁴ And not the least so, are the fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus of Larissa. Now of this Gorgias is the cause. For when he came to the city (of Larissa), he so captivated the chiefs of the Aleuadæ,⁵ one of whom is your friend Aristippus, and those of the other Thessalian families, that they fell in love with him for his wisdom.⁶ And in truth this custom has habituated you to answer fearlessly and with a high bearing, if any one asks a question; as indeed becomes those who know a subject

¹ From the very abrupt opening of the dialogue, some persons have supposed that the original commencement has been lost. But something similar occurs in the Cratylus and Philebus.

² The same question is touched upon in the Protagoras.

³ See Plato's Hipp. Maj. Suidas in 'Ἰωνεῖς λευκοθώρακες, and the Ζεύεις and the Ἐπῶρες of Lucian. S.

⁴ This is ironical. For Plutarch relates that, when Simonides was asked why he had not deceived the Thessalians, he replied, "They are too ignorant to be deceived by me." GEDIKE.

⁵ This was the noblest family in Larissa. They were descended from Aleuas, one of the kings of Thessaly, of the race of Hercules.

⁶ Hence Philostratus, in the Proeme to his Lives of the Sophists, says, ἦρξαι τῆς ἀρχαιοτέρης [sc. σοφιστικῆς] Γοργίας ὁ Αἰωντῖνος ἐν Θερπυλλοῖς.

thoroughly. Since he⁷ too offered himself for any of the Greeks to interrogate him on any matter he might think proper; and there was not one, to whom he did not give an answer. But here, friend Meno, the very reverse has occurred. There is, as it were, a dearth of wisdom; and there is a danger, that wisdom has departed from this country, and has fled to yours. Should you then be willing to put this question to any one here, there is not a man who would not laugh and say, "I run the risk, stranger, of seeming to you to be one of the blessed,⁸ in knowing whether virtue is to be taught, or comes by any other means whatever; since I am so far from knowing whether it is to be taught or not, that I happen not to know what virtue is at all." Now this, Meno, is my own case. [2.] I am in the same poverty of knowledge as my fellow-citizens in this affair; and I blame myself for being totally ignorant of virtue. How then can I know the quality of that, of which I know nothing? Or do you think it possible for a man, wholly ignorant, who Meno is, to know whether Meno is a handsome, or rich, or generous spirit, or the reverse of all these characters? [Do you think it possible?]⁹

Meno. I do not. But in good sooth, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? and shall I send home this report of you?

Soc. Not only that, my friend, but this further—that I never met any where with any person who, as I think, (did know).

Meno. Did you never then meet with Gorgias, when he was here?

Soc. I did.

Meno. And did he not seem to you to know?

Soc. I do not perfectly remember, Meno; so that I am not able to say at present what I then thought of him. But perhaps both he knew himself, and you too, what he said. Do you then bring to my recollection what he said; or, if you

⁷ On this boldness of Gorgias thus challenging persons to try his powers as a sophist, see Plato *Gorg.* p. 447, D., and Cicero *De Finib.*, from which it would appear that he was the admirable Creighton of his day.

⁸ By *μακάριος* is meant not simply blessed, but blessed as a god. So Cicero in *Tuscul.* i. 11, "Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, deus aliquis viderit." *ΓΕΔΙΚΕ*.

⁹ This clause, properly rejected as a needless repetition by *Gedike*, is vainly defended by *Heindorf* on *Charmid.* § 33.

would rather, tell it in your own words ; for surely you agree with him in opinion.

Meno. I do.

Soc. Let us then put him aside ; especially as he is absent. But, by the gods, do you, Meno, tell me yourself what you assert virtue to be ; and do not grudge me (the knowledge of it), in order that I may have uttered a most fortunate untruth, should both you and Gorgias appear (to know), what I said I had never met with a person (who did know).

[3.] *Meno.* Nay, Socrates, it is by no means difficult to tell. In the first place, if you wish (me to tell) the virtue of a man, it is easy (to say) that a man's virtue consists in his being competent to manage the affairs of the state, and, managing them, to do good to its friends, evil to its enemies, and to take care that he suffers himself nothing of that kind. Then, if you wish to know the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to go through (the particulars): that it is to manage well the affairs of her family, to keep safe the things in the house, and to hearken to her husband. Another kind of virtue is that of a child, either a girl or boy ; and of a man advanced in years ; and, if you choose (to go on), of a free-man and of a slave. Many more virtues are there, of all kinds ; so that there is no want of power to tell concerning virtue, what it is. For in every action, and in every age of life, and for every kind of business, there is (a peculiar) virtue to each person : and similarly, Socrates, I think, there is (a peculiar) vice.

Soc. I think myself greatly indeed favoured by fortune, Meno. For, when I was only in quest of one virtue, I have found, it seems, a whole swarm of virtues hiving with you. But with regard to this simile, taken from bees, had I, Meno, asked you respecting the nature of a bee, and you had told me that bees were many and various, what answer would you have given me, had I demanded of you further—Do you call them many and various, and differing one from another, in respect of their being bees ; or do they differ not in this respect, but with regard to something else, as beauty, or size, or any other thing of a like kind ? Tell me, what answer would you have made, had you been so questioned ?

Meno. I (would have answered) thus ; that so far as they are bees, they differ not at all one from another.

Soc. Had I then afterwards said—Tell me now, Meno, con-

cerning this very thing, in respect of which they do not differ, but are all the same; what say you is this? Would you have had any thing to say?

Meno. I should.

[4.] *Soc.* Just so it is with the virtues. Although they are many indeed, and of various kinds, yet they all agree in one and the same idea, through which they are virtues; and to which it is well for him to look, who by his answer would point out to the inquirer what virtue happens to be. Do you not comprehend what I am saying?

Meno. I think I do. But I do not grasp, as I could wish, the question.

Soc. Do you think only after this manner concerning virtue, that the virtue of a man is one thing, the virtue of a woman another thing, and so of the other virtues, (that they are all different)? or have you the same way (of thinking) as regards health, size, and strength? Do you consider the health of a man to be one thing, the health of a woman to be another? or is the same kind (of health) every where, wherever health is, whether it be in a man, or in any other subject whatever?

Meno. The health of a man and of a woman, I think, is the same thing.

Soc. (The same then applies to) size and strength. A woman, if she be strong, is strong according to the same idea, and with the same strength, (as applies to a strong man). By the same strength I mean this. That whether strength be in a man, or in a woman, as regards the existence of strength, there is no difference; or do you think there is a difference?

Meno. I think there is not.

Soc. Will there be any difference in virtue, with respect to its being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an aged person, in a woman or in a man?

Meno. This case, Socrates, seems to me somehow to be not quite similar to the other.

Soc. Why? Did you not tell me that the virtue of a man consisted in his well managing a state, and that of a woman, in well managing a household?

Meno. I did.

Soc. Is it, then, possible to manage well a state or household, or any thing else whatever, without justice and prudence.

Meno. By no means.

Soc. If then the management be just and prudent, will not the managers manage with justice and with prudence?

Meno. They will of necessity.

Soc. Both of them, therefore, the woman and the man, have need of the same things, (namely,) justice and prudence, if they are about to be good (managers).

Meno. It appears so.¹⁰

Soc. What then, can a child, or an old man, ever be good, if dissolute and dishonest?

Meno. By no means.

Soc. But only if sober and honest?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. All persons, surely, are good in the same way; for they are good by possessing the same qualities.

Meno. It seems so.

Soc. Now, if virtue were not the same in them (all), they surely would not be good in the same way.

Meno. They would not.

[5.] *Soc.* Since then the virtue is the same in them all, endeavour to recollect and tell¹¹ me, what says Gorgias of it, and you with him.

Meno. What else is it than to be able to govern men? If you are in search of one thing, applicable to all (persons).

Soc. It is the very thing I am in search of. But is this then the same virtue of a child, Meno, and of a slave, to be able¹² to govern their master? Do you think that he who rules would be still a slave?

Meno. I do not think he would, Socrates, at all.

Soc. For it is not reasonable, my very good (friend). Consider this again.¹³ You say (it is virtue) to be able to govern. Shall we not subjoin the (word) justly, but not, unjustly.

Meno. I think so. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.

Soc. Is it, Meno, virtue, or some virtue?

¹⁰ Instead of *φαίνονται*, one MS. has correctly *φαίμεναι*. The other reading would be at variance with the sense.

¹¹ Sydenham has thus tacitly corrected the collocation of the words *εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι*.

¹² The common text offers some difficulties, which no critic has successfully overcome.

¹³ Ficin. "rursus," from whence Stalb. and Buttm. would read *ὁ αὖ* for *γὰρ*.

Meno. How say you this ?

Soc. As respecting any thing else whatever. For instance, if you please, respecting roundness, I would say that it is a figure, and not thus absolutely that it is figure. And I should say so for this reason, because there are other figures.

Meno. You would thus speak rightly. Since I too myself not only say that justice is a virtue, but that there are other virtues.

Soc. Say what these other (virtues) are ; as I would, were you to bid me, tell you other figures beside the round. Do you then likewise mention to me other virtues beside justice.

Meno. Well then, courage, I think, is a virtue, and temperance, and wisdom, and a lofty bearing, and a great many other (qualities).

Soc. Again, Meno, we have met with the same thing as before. We have again found many virtues, while in search of only one, but in a different way from that just now : but the one virtue, which pervades all these, we are not able to find.

[6.] *Meno.* For I am not able as yet, Socrates, to lay hold of one such virtue as you are seeking, applicable to all, as in the other instances.

Soc. Probably so ; but I will show a readiness to urge ourselves onward, if I can. Already you apprehend, in some measure, that thus matters stand as regards every thing. For had any person asked you, what was figure, the thing I just now mentioned, and you had said it was roundness, had he then said to you, as I did, Is roundness figure, or a figure ? you would surely have said, It is a figure.

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And for this reason, because there are other figures ?

Meno. For that very reason.

Soc. And had he asked you further, of what sort those other figures were, you would have told them.

Meno. I should.

Soc. And had he asked you in the same manner concerning colour, what it is ? If you had answered, It is whiteness ; would not the interrogator have taken you immediately up with this question—Is whiteness colour, or a colour ? and you would have said, A colour ; because there happen to be other colours

Meno. I should.

Soc. And if he had bidden you to enumerate such other

colours, you would have mentioned those, which happen to be colours no less than white.

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. If then he had pursued the argument as I do, and said—We are always getting into a multitude. Do not (speak) thus to me. But since you call all this multitude by one name, and assert that there is none of them which is not figure; and this too, notwithstanding they are contrary to one another;¹⁴ what¹⁵ is this thing which comprehends the round as well as the straight, this to which you give the name of figure; and yet you say that the round is figure not more than the straight? or do you not say this?

Meno. I do.

Soc. When you speak thus, do you mean that the round is not more round than is the straight? and that the straight is not more straight than is the round?

Meno. I do not mean this, Socrates.

Soc. But you mean that the round is not more a figure than is the straight, nor is this than the other.

Meno. You say what is true.

[7.] *Soc.* Endeavour then to tell me—What is that thing which is called by the name of figure? Now if to an inquirer in this way concerning figure, or colour, you had said, I do not comprehend what it is you would have, man, nor do I know what it is you mean: he perhaps would have wondered, and said, Do you not comprehend that I am inquiring what is the same in all these? Would you have had nothing to say even after this, Meno, had one inquired—What is that applicable to the round, and to the straight, and to the other things which you call figures, being the same for all? Endeavour to tell me what it is, in order that you may be ready, by practice, to give a reply to the question respecting virtue.

Meno. Not so, Socrates; but do you yourself rather say what figure is.

Soc. Would you have me oblige you in this point?

Meno. By all means.

Soc. Shall you then be willing to tell me what virtue is?

Meno. I shall.

¹⁴ Since rectilinear figures are contrary to circles. S.

¹⁵ So Gedike; who reads *ri* for *δ*, *ri*. But the whole passage is scarcely intelligible; and so, I suspect, is Stalbaum's German version of it.

Soc. Let me then show my readiness; for the cause is worthy of it.

Meno. Without all doubt.

Soc. Come then; let us try if we can tell you what figure is. See if you can accept it, as being this. Let then figure be that which of all things is the only one, that always happens to accompany colour. Does this suffice you? or do you seek for any thing further? For I should be thus content, if you would tell me virtue.¹⁵

Meno. But, Socrates, this surely is silly.

Soc. How so?

Meno. According to your account, figure is that which always accompanies colour.

Soc. Be it so.¹⁶

[8.] *Meno.* But should any person assert, that he knew not what colour was, and was equally at a loss concerning colour and concerning figure, what answer do you think you would have given him?

Soc. That I had answered with truth. And if the questioner happened to be one of the wise men, fond of dispute and contention, I would tell him—"I had spoken; and that, if I had not spoken rightly, it was your business to take up the discourse, and to refute me." But if two parties, such as you and I here, were inclined to have a discourse together, as friends, they ought to answer each other in a milder and more conversational manner. Now it is perhaps more conversational to answer not only truthfully, but in terms which the party questioned confesses he understands.¹⁷ Accordingly, I shall now attempt to make you such a kind of answer. For tell me; do you call a certain thing by the name of end? I mean such a thing as bound or extreme? For by all these

¹⁵ From Sydenham's translation, "I should be well contented, if you would give me but as good an account of virtue," it is easy to see, that he wished to read, *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπήην, εἰ μοι ἀρετὴν οὕτως εἶποις*: which would make a far better sense than the received text, *ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπήην, εἰ μοι ἀρετὴν εἶποις*.

¹⁶ Heusde and Heindorf on Cratyl. p. 410, C., throw the Greek word *εἶεν*, commonly given to Socrates, into the speech of Meno. For *εἶεν* is similarly introduced in Alcib. i. p. 106, A., where see Buttmann.

¹⁷ Instead of *ἐρωτώμενος*, "questioned," Cornari suggested *ἐρῶμενος*, "questioning," which, though approved of by Schleiermacher and Buttmann, is rejected by Stalbaum.

words I mean the same thing. Prodicus, indeed, might possibly differ from us; but you at least would say, that a thing has been bounded, or, has had an end. This is what I mean to say; nothing many-coloured.

Meno. Well, I do call (something end): and I think I understand what you mean.

Soc. And do you not call something a superficies? and another thing a solid? such as are in geometry.

Meno. Yes, I do.

Soc. Now then, from these (premises) you can understand what I mean by figure. For in every figure, that which bounds the solid, I say, is figure; which (idea) I would concisely express by saying that figure is the bound of solid.

[9.] *Meno.* And what say you colour is?

Soc. You are a saucy fellow, Meno. You impose upon an old man the task of answering; yet are unwilling yourself to recollect and tell (me) what Gorgias said that virtue was.

Meno. But I will tell, after you have told me this, (what colour is).

Soc. A man with his eyes hoodwinked might perceive from your way of conversing, Meno, that you are handsome, and still have your admirers.

Meno. How so?

Soc. Because you do nothing but command in conversation; as foppish¹⁸ fellows do, as being lordlings, so long as they are in the prime of beauty; and at the same time you have perhaps convicted me, as being subdued by beauty. I will therefore gratify you and give an answer.

Meno. By all means do gratify me.

Soc. Do you wish me to answer like Gorgias,¹⁹ so that you may most easily follow me?

Meno. I do wish it. How not?

Soc. Do not you and Gorgias say, according to Empedocles,²⁰ that certain effluvia proceed from bodies?

¹⁸ The French "petit-maitres" is perhaps the best modern version of *τρυφῶντες* applied to young men.

¹⁹ Gorgias asserted that the qualities of things were perceived by the five outward senses, through small and invisible bodies, continually flowing from the larger and visible. Thus odours, whether fragrant or fœtid, were held to be the effluvia of bodies odoriferous, affecting agreeably or disagreeably the olfactory nerves. S.

²⁰ Empedocles, a Pythagorean philosopher of Agrigentum in Sicily,

Meno. We do so firmly.

Soc. And that there are certain pores, to which and through which those effluvia pass?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And that of those effluvia, some are fitted to some of these pores, but that others are less or greater?

Meno. It is so.

Soc. And do you not call something sight?

Meno. I do.

Soc. From these (premises) "Understand," as Pindar has said, "what I am saying." Colour then is the flowing off from figures, agreeing with the sight, and by it perceived.²¹

Meno. In this answer, Socrates, I think you have spoken as well as possible.

Soc. (You say so) perhaps because this has been said according to your habits; and because at the same time you perceive, I imagine, that you are able from thence to state what is sound,²² and smell, and many other things of the like kind.

Meno. It really is so.

Soc. The answer, Meno, was tragical;²³ and so it was more agreeable to you than that relating to figure.

wrote a poem in three books concerning nature, on the principles of Pythagoras. His theory was that the four elements of the universe, fire, water, earth, and air, were not irregular and infinite, as the Atomic and Atheistic philosophers imagined, but formed by rule in number and in measure, as being the work of mind. His poetry [the fragments of which have been collected by Sturz] was deemed by the ancients in point of versification equal to that of Homer. On the publication of his poem, the Pythagoreans expelled him from their society, and at the same time made a law, that from henceforth no poet should be admitted a member of their body. S.

²¹ Aristotle in his treatise *Περὶ Αἰσθήσεως καὶ Αἰσθητῶν*, says that Empedocles held the eye, that is, the sight of the eye, to be fire; and vision to be produced by the emission of light from the eye, as from a lantern. S. Plato in *Tim.* p. 67, B., describes colour, as *φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἐκάστων ἀπορρίουσιν, ὅψει σύμμετρα μέρη ἔχουσιν πρὸς αἰσθησιν*: from whence one would read here *σωμάτων* in lieu of *σχημάτων*.

²² Thus sound was said to be air, violently forced out of some body stricken, and propagating its motion by strokes continually repeated along the air, until it reached the ear; that odours were the subtle effluvia of bodies, conveyed along the air to the organ of smell; and that from bodies applied to the palate, juices were expressed, insinuating themselves into the pores of the organ of taste. S.

²³ The commentators explain *τραγικῇ* by saying that the language or

Meno. To me it was.

Soc. And yet, son of Alexidemus, I persuade myself, that not this,²⁴ but that, was the better answer. I conceive too, that you would not have thought thus, unless, as you said yesterday, there was necessity for you to go away before the mysteries. But if you could stay and be initiated, * * *

Meno. But if you would tell me many such things, I would certainly stay.

Soc. In my best endeavours to say such things I shall not be wanting, for my own sake as well as yours. But (I fear) I shall not be able to say much in that way. [10.] But come now, and try yourself to perform your promise, by speaking of virtue, what it is in general: and cease making many out of one; as persons say perpetually, when bantering those, who pound any thing to pieces; ²⁵ but leaving virtue whole and entire, tell me what it is. Patterns of such a definition you have had from me.

Meno. I think then, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says,

In what is fair, to feel a joy,
And (o'er it) to have power—

and this, I say, is virtue—for him who has a desire for beautiful things, to be able to obtain them.

Soc. Do you mean that the person, who desires beautiful things, has a desire for good things?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. Is it that there are some who have a desire for evil things, and others, who have a desire for good things? Do you not think, my good (friend), that all men desire good things?

Meno. I do not.

Soc. But that some desire evil things?

Meno. I do.

Empedocles was inflated like that of tragedy. But as there is nothing of that kind in the answer given by Socrates, the real meaning of *τραγικῇ* remains still to be discovered.

²⁴ There is nothing in the Greek to answer to "this." Hence Buttmann was led to read *Ὁὐχ αὖτῃ ἱστῶν, ὃ παῖ*—He should have suggested *Ὁὐχ ἱστῶν αὖτῃ, ὃ παῖ*—For thus *αὖτῃ* might easily have dropt out before *ὃ παῖ*.

²⁵ Here is a lacuna. The sense to be supplied is evidently "you would learn something perhaps not far from the truth;" as Gedike was the first to remark.

²⁶ On this saying Stalbaum refers to *Erasm. Adag.* p. 266, ed. Steph.

Soc. Say you that these men desire evil things, conceiving them to be good? or, knowing them to be evil, do they still desire them?

Meno. Both these events, I think, occur.

Soc. Is there any man, think you, who, knowing evil things to be evil, yet nevertheless desires them?

Meno. Without doubt.

Soc. What do you mean, by desiring them? Is it not that he may have them?

Meno. To have them. For what else (can I mean)?

Soc. Does he imagine that evil things profit the person who has them, or does he know that evil things are hurtful, to whomsoever they are present?

Meno. There are those who think that evil things are profitable; and those who know them to be hurtful.

Soc. Do you think that they know evil things to be evil, who imagine such evil things to be profitable?

Meno. By no means do I think that.

Soc. Is it not then evident, that those who do not desire evil things know not the nature of the things (they desire); but (rather), that they desire things which they imagine to be good, but which are in reality evil? So that they, who are ignorant of them, and imagine them to be good, do, it is plain, desire good things. Do they not?

Meno. They seem to be.

Soc. But they who desire evil things, as you say, conceiving at the same time that evil things are hurtful to the possessor, surely know that they will be harmed by those (evil things).

Meno. This must be.

Soc. But do they not think, that such as are harmed are in an evil plight, so far as they are harmed?

Meno. This also must be.

Soc. And that those in evil plight are unhappy?

Meno. Assuredly.

Soc. Is there a man, then, who wishes to be in evil plight,²⁷ and to be unhappy?

Meno. I think not any, Socrates.

²⁷ Aristotle, in *Nicomach. Eth.* iii. 5, quotes, probably from Euripides, a similar sentiment: Οὐδὲ τις ἰκὼν πονηρὸς, οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ: "None willingly is pained, nor gainst his will Blessed." S.

Soc. No man then, Meno, wishes for evils; unless he wishes to be such. For what else is it to be unhappy, than to desire evil things, and to possess them?

Meno. You are saying, Socrates, what is nearly true. For²⁸ no man wishes evil things.

[11.] *Soc.* Did you not say just now, that virtue consisted in the wishing for, and having a power over, good things?

Meno. I did say so.

Soc. From what has been said,²⁹ is not this a wish to all men? and in this respect one man is not better than another?

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. But it is clear, that if one man is better than another, he would be so in respect of his power.

Meno. Undoubtedly.

Soc. This then, as it seems, according to your account, is virtue, the power of obtaining good things.

Meno. The case seems to me, Socrates, to be entirely so, as you now understand it.

Soc. Let us see then if this too you say truly: for perhaps you will say well. You say, that to be able to gain good things is virtue.

Meno. I do.

Soc. Do you not call good things such as health and wealth? And I say,³⁰ to possess gold and silver, and honours in the state, and magistracies? You do not speak of any other things as good, except things of this kind?

Meno. No other; I mean all such sort of things.

Soc. Well then, to get money is virtue; as Meno says, the hereditary guest of the great king.³¹ But do you add to this (idea of) getting, (the ideas of) honesty and holiness? or is

²⁸ Ficin. "Nemo enim vult mala:" which leads to *kai γάρ* in lieu of *kai* alone.

²⁹ Ficinus has "ex eo quod dictum est." His manuscript therefore read *ἐκ τοῦ λειχθίντος*,—what the sense requires, not *τοῦτου λειχθίντος*. S. Hence Schleiermacher was led to—*τοῦτου τοῦ λειχθίντος*.—Perhaps Plato wrote—*ἀπὸ τοῦ λειχθίντος*. For *ἀπο τοῦ* differs by only one letter from *τοῦτου*.

³⁰ The introduction of the verb *λίσσω* is so perfectly useless, that it has been neglected by Ficinus; unless it be said, that it was omitted in his Greek MS., as it is in another collated by Bekker.

³¹ This was the title of the king of Persia. So the king of France used to be called "Le Grand Monarque."

this a matter of indifference to you ; but that, even if a person acquires them unjustly, you call the act³² equally virtue?

Meno. By no means, Socrates ; but (I call the act) wickedness.

Soc. By all means then there ought, as it appears, to be added to the act of acquisition justice, or prudence, or sanctity, or some other part of virtue ; for otherwise, it will not be virtue, notwithstanding it procures for us good things.

Meno. For without those how could it be virtue?

Soc. And to not obtain gold and silver, whether for himself or others, when the act is not just, is not this non-attainment likewise virtue?

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. The attainment then of these good things, is not more virtue than the non-attainment ; but, as it seems, that which is combined with honesty, is virtue ; and that which is separated from all such things, is wickedness.

Meno. I think it must of necessity be as you say.

[12.] *Soc.* Did we not say a little while since, that honesty, and prudence, and every thing of that kind, was a part of virtue?

Meno. We did.

Soc. Then, Meno, you are playing with me.

Meno. How so, Socrates?

Soc. Because, when I just now desired you not to break down nor split virtue into fractions, and gave you patterns, by which you ought to answer, you have paid no regard to them, but you tell me that virtue is the power of gaining good things with justice ; yet this, you say, is only a part of virtue.

Meno. I do.

Soc. It follows then, from what you confess yourself, that to do whatever one does with a part of virtue, this is virtue. For you say that justice, and each of those things (above-mentioned) is a part of virtue.

Meno. What then? granting that I say this.³³

³² In lieu of *αὐτὰ*, which is without regimen, Schneider correctly reads *αὐτὰ*, i. e. *τὸ πορίζεσθαι*. Stalbaum however vainly attempts, as usual, to defend the common text.

³³ The common text has ME. *τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω* ; ΣΩ. δ. *τί ἐμοῦ*.—Schleiermacher would read *τί οὖν δὴ* ; *εἰ τοῦτο λέγω*—similar to Sydenham's "granting that I say this." Stalbaum first suggested ME. *τί οὖν δὴ* ;

Soc. (Truly) that, having been requested to tell me what the whole of virtue is, you are far from stating what it is; but you say, that every act is virtue, if it is performed with a part of virtue; as though you had already told me what virtue was in the whole, and that I should now know it, when you split it into fractions. You have need therefore, as it seems to me, of the same question again from the beginning, friend Meno—What is virtue? Or³⁴ can every act, accompanied with a part of virtue, be said to be virtue itself? For it is to say this, when one says that every act accompanied with justice is virtue. Or do you think there is no need to you of the same question; but do you think that one may know a part of virtue, what it is, without knowing virtue itself?

Meno. I think he cannot.

Soc. For, if you remember, when I gave an answer just now respecting figure, we rejected such a kind of answer, as attempted to reply by terms still the subject of inquiry, and not as yet confessedly understood.

Meno. And we did rightly reject, Socrates.

Soc. Do not then imagine, my very good (friend), while we are as yet inquiring what virtue is in the whole, that, by answering in terms relating to its parts, you will show clearly to any one virtue itself; or, by speaking of any thing else in this very same manner; but that there will be still need again of the same question—Respecting virtue—as being what,³⁵ do you speak, what you speak? Or do you think that I am saying nothing (to the purpose)?

Meno. I think you are speaking correctly.

[13.] **Soc.** Answer then again, (as) from the beginning,—What do you and your friend say that virtue is?

Meno. I heard, Socrates, before I came together with you, that you (do) nothing else than doubt yourself, and cause others to doubt. And you seem to be now playing a wizard's tricks, and to drug me, and really use incantations so as to fill

ΣΟΚ. Τοῦτο λέγω—understanding λέγεις after Τι οὖν δὴ;—and so after him Buttmann.

³⁴ Instead of ἢ Bekker has edited εἰ from one MS., answering to “si quidem” in Ficinus. Stalbaum defends ἢ, and renders it “aliter, alioquin,” a meaning that ἢ never has.

³⁵ The neuter ὅτιος is here applied to the feminine ἀρετῆς, as in Rep. p. 336, A., οὐδέτις οὐτο ἰδάνῃ ἢ ἐκαιοσύνη: quoted by Heindorf on Hipp. Maj. § 43. BUTTM.

me with doubts. And, if I too must banter a little, I think you resemble exactly, both in form and in other respects also, that broad sea-fish, called the torpedo; for that too produces a numbness in the person whoever approaches and touches it.³⁶ You seem to have done some such thing at present to me, [to benumb³⁷ me]. For in very truth I am benumbed, both in mind and mouth,³⁸ and I have not what reply to give you. And yet I have spoken very many discourses ten thousand times about virtue, and to many persons, and extremely well too, as I thought myself; but now I have it not in my power at all to tell what (virtue) is. I think that you have consulted well for yourself in never sailing out from hence nor travelling abroad. For if you were as a stranger to act in this manner in another city, you would perhaps be driven thence³⁹ as a wizard.

Soc. You are full of craftiness, Meno, and you have nearly put a cheat upon me.

Meno. How particularly so, Socrates?

Soc. I know why you brought a simile against me.

Meno. Why think you?

Soc. That I might bring a simile against you in return. For this I know respecting all handsome persons, that they love to have likenesses made of them. For it is to their interest; since of handsome persons the pictures too are handsome. But I will not draw your likeness in return. As to myself, if the torpedo be thus numb itself, and produces a numbness in others also, then am I like to it; but if otherwise, I am not. For I do not, when not doubting myself, cause others to doubt; but rather when I am in doubt myself, I in like manner cause others to doubt. And now respecting virtue, what it is, I know not: you, however, knew it formerly; perhaps, before you had touched me. But now

³⁶ On the benumbing faculty of this fish, see Aristotle in *Hist. of Animal.* ix. 37. Oppian. *Halieut.* ii. 56—85; iii. 149. Plutarch. *Solert. Animal.* ss. *Plin. H.* iv., xxxii. 1; and *Ælian N. A.* i. 36; ix. 14. GEDIKE.

³⁷ The word *ναρκῶν* is evidently an explanation of *τοῦτο πεποιθεῖναι*.

³⁸ The reading *στόμα*, found in the best MSS., answers to "os" in Ficinus. BUTTMANN.

³⁹ Buttm. and Stalb, explain *ἀπαχθῆναι* by "you would be led off to prison." But it does not appear that wizards were so treated; although they might be expelled from a city, as Plato wished the Sophists to be in § 29. See *Euthydem.* § 2.

you are like one,⁴⁰ who knows nothing of the matter. I am desirous, however, of looking into the matter with you, and of searching out jointly, what (virtue) is.

[14.] *Meno*. But in what way, Socrates, will you search for a thing, which you do not know at all, what it is? For by placing before you what of the things, which you do not know, will you seek it? Or, if you should fall in with it, how will you know that this is the thing, of which you were ignorant?

Soc. I understand, Meno, what you mean to say. See you, how captions a method of reasoning you introduce? That it is impossible for a man to seek, either what he does know, or does not know. For no man would seek what he knows; because he knows it already; and for such a person there is no need of seeking. Nor (would any man seek) what he knows not; because he does not know what he would seek.

Meno. Do you then, Socrates, think that this way of reasoning is not fair?

Soc. I think it not (fair).

Meno. Can you say in what way?

Soc. I can. For I have heard men and women wise in divine matters—

Meno. Saying what?

Soc. Things, I think, true and fair.

Meno. What were they? and who said them?

Soc. They, who said them, were belonging to the priests and priestesses; whose business it is, and who are able to give a reason for the things to which they put their hands. Pindar, too, and many other of the poets, such as are divine, say them; and what they say is this. But do you consider whether you think they speak the truth. For they say that the soul of man is immortal; and at one time it ends, which they call dying; and that another it exists again; but is never destroyed; and that for this reason we ought to live throughout our lives as holy as possible. "To them, from whom has Proserpine received the payment for an ancient act of grief,

⁴⁰ From the words of Ficinus, "ignoranti mihi assimilis," Sydenham fancied the translator found in his MS. *ἰμοὶ ὁμοίος εἰ οὐκ εἰδότες*; which he says is a sense suited to the mask of ignorance, worn by Socrates throughout the dialogue.

she in the ninth year does give back their souls to the upper sun; and from them⁴¹ kings in splendour, and through their strength swift-footed, and in wisdom men mightiest increase, and heroes are called holy by mankind in future times."

[15.] The soul then, as being immortal, and born frequently, and having seen both the things here, and those in Hades, and⁴² all things, there is nothing it has not learned; so that it is no wonder that it is able to recollect, with regard to virtue and other things, what it formerly knew. For the whole of nature being of one kindred, and the soul having heretofore known all things, there is nothing to prevent a person, who remembers—what men call learning—only one thing, from discovering again all the rest; if he has but courage, and seeking faints not. For to search and to learn is reminiscence all. We must not, therefore, submit to that captious way of reasoning, for it would make us idle; since to persons of a soft nature it is pleasant to hear it; whereas this makes men active and inquiring; and which I believing to be true, I am willing with you to seek out what virtue is.

Meno. With all my heart, Socrates. But how⁴³ say you this, that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is reminiscence? Have you it in your power to teach me that this is so?

Soc. Even just now I said, Meno, that you are very crafty. Since now you ask me, if I have the power to teach you; I, who say there is not teaching, but (only) reminiscence; so that I may appear directly to contradict myself.

Meno. Not so, Socrates, by Jupiter. I did not say so with an eye to this; but (merely) from habit. But if any way you can prove to me that things are as you assert, prove it.

Soc. This is no easy task. However, for your sake, I am willing to show my readiness. Call hither to me then one of

⁴¹ Instead of *ἐκ τῶν* Steph. suggested, what Sydenh. has adopted, *ἕστ' αὖ—ἀρξέμενται*—similar to "quousque—evadant" in Ficin.; while to support *ἐκ τῶν* Boeckh. alters *ψυχὰν* into *ψυχάς*.

⁴² Struve and Buttman would expunge *καὶ* before *πάντα*—Stalbaum renders *καὶ* by "denique," i. e. summative; and refers to Schœfer on Demosth. Appar. i. p. 305. Fritzsche in Quæst. Lucian. p. 67. Winckelmann on Euthyd. p. 291, D. and his own note on Gorg. p. 465, B.

⁴³ Instead of *ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς* Stalb. has edited *ἀλλὰ πῶς* from two MSS. and Stobæus.

your numerous attendants here, whomever you please, that through him I may give you the proof.

Meno. Most readily. Come hither, you.

Soc. Is he a Greek, and speaks he Greek?⁴⁴

Meno. Perfectly well, as he was born in the family.

Soc. Now then pay attention, and (mark) whether he appears to recollect himself, or to learn from me.

Meno. I will be attentive.

[16.] *Soc.* Tell me, boy, do you know that a four-angled space is such as this?⁴⁵

Boy. I do.

Soc. A four-angled space then has all these lines, being four equal.

Boy. Certainly.

Soc. Has it not also these lines through the middle of it equal?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Could there be a space like this, larger and less?

Boy. Certainly.

Soc. Now if this side were two feet, and this two, how many feet would there be in the whole? Consider it in this manner. If, on⁴⁶ this (side) the space were two feet, and on this only one foot, would the space be other than⁴⁷ of two feet once (told)?

Boy. It would (not).⁴⁸

Soc. But since it is two feet on this side likewise, is it any other space than of twice two feet?

Boy. No.

Soc. It is then (a space) of twice two feet?

⁴⁴ This question is put, because slaves were frequently brought from foreign countries, where Greek was not spoken, just as they now are from Africa to America.

⁴⁵ During this conversation Socrates is supposed to draw on the ground the geometric figures to which he alludes.

⁴⁶ All the MSS. read *iv*: but as Ficin. has "*si latus hoc duorum esset pedum*," Wolf suggested *ἦν*—adopted by Bekk., Buttm., and Stalb.

⁴⁷ After *ἄλλο τι* Bekker constantly rejects, to the detriment of the sense, the particle *ἦ*, which is here correctly found in three MSS. and supported by "*quam*" in Ficin. Stalbaum too, although he follows Bekker here, yet in p. 83, B. justly objects to the practice of Bekker, misled, it would seem, by Hermann on Viger. n. 110.

⁴⁸ To the question asked by *ἄλλο τι*, Buttm. says the answer in Greek is by the affirmative *vai*, not the negative *oû*.

Boy. Yes.

Soc. How many feet are twice two? reckon, and tell me.

Boy. Four feet, Socrates.

Soc. Cannot there be another space, the double of this (in size), but of the same kind, having, like this, all its sides equal?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Of how many feet will it be?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Come now, endeavour to tell me, how long will each line of this (space) be? Now of this (space) the line is two feet. What (will be) the length of the line of (the space) double the size?

Boy. It is plain, Socrates, that it (will be) double (the length).

Soc. You see, Meno, that I teach this (boy)⁴⁹ nothing, but only question him about all. And now this boy thinks he knows of what length is the line from which a space of eight feet is produced. Do you not think he does?

Meno. I do.

Soc. And does he (really) know?

Meno. Certainly not.

Soc. But he thinks he does from (the idea of) a doubled (quantity).

Meno. Yes.

Soc. View him now recollecting in order (things) as he should recollect. [17.] Now speak to me, (boy). You say that from a line, double in length, there is produced a space double in size: I mean a space of this kind; not one side long, the other short; but let it be equal on every side, like this, but twice the size of eight feet. See now, whether you still think this will be from the doubled (line).

Boy. I do.

Soc. Does not this become the double of that, if we add another from this point?

Boy. Yes, surely.

Soc. Now, from this (line), you say that there will be a space of eight feet, if there be four such lines?

⁴⁹ Instead of *τούτων* Schliermacher suggested *τούρον*, found subsequently in four MSS., and adopted by Bekk. and Stalb. Buttman however prefers *οὐδὲν τούτων*, read in one MS. and acknowledged by Ficini "nihil ex his." Either will do.

Boy. I do.

Soc. Let us then draw from it four equal lines. Would this space be any other than that which you say is of eight feet?

Boy. Not at all.

Soc. Are there not in this space these four spaces, each of which is equal to that of four feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. How large is become the whole space? Is it not four times as large?

Boy. How not?

Soc. Is that two-fold which is taken four times?

Boy. No, by Jupiter.

Soc. How many fold?

Boy. Four-fold.

Soc. From a line, therefore, double in length, there is produced a space, not two-fold, but four-fold.

Boy. You say true.

Soc. Four times four is sixteen: is it not?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. But from what line is (to be drawn) a space of eight (square) feet? Is it not from this four-fold?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And from the half of this line (there is drawn) this space of four feet⁵⁰ (square).

Boy. There is.

Soc. Well; but is not that (square of) eight feet twice as large as this, and half as large as that?

Boy. Certainly.⁵¹

Soc. Will it not be from a line longer than this, and shorter than that?

Boy. So at least it appears to me.

Soc. (You say) correctly; for answer only what appears to you. And tell me this too. Was not this line two feet, and that four?

Boy. Yes.

⁵⁰ In lieu of *tetraprov* Cornarius suggested *τετράπων*, adopted by Bekk., Buttm., and Stalb. To meet the difficulty, Sydenham translated *tetraprov* "the fourth part." But *tetrapros* has never such a meaning.

⁵¹ This answer is omitted in all the best MSS. Ficin. however has "Ita"—the Latin for *Nai*—found in one MS. from a correction.

Soc. The line therefore of the eight-foot space must be greater than this of two feet, but less than that of four feet.

Boy. It must be.

Soc. Try now, and tell me how long you think it is.

Boy. Three feet long.

Soc. If then it be three feet, we will add the half of this (line), and now this will be three feet. For these are two (feet), and this is one foot: and in the same manner, these are two (feet), and this is one; and this space becomes such as you say.

Boy. It is so.

Soc. If then this line here be three feet, and that here three feet, the whole space becomes thrice three feet.

Boy. It appears so.

Soc. And how many feet are thrice three?

Boy. Nine.

Soc. But how many feet ought the doubled space (above mentioned) to be?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Hence from a line three feet (long) there is not (to be drawn) the space (above mentioned) of eight feet.

Boy. There is not.

Soc. But from how long a line? Endeavour to tell me exactly. Or, if you do not like to give it in numbers,⁵² at least point out from what line (it may be drawn).

Boy. By Jove, Socrates, I do not know.

[18.] *Soc.* Do you observe again, Meno, whither⁵³ this boy is proceeding in (the road to) recollection? since at first he knew not what is the line of the (above-mentioned) space of eight feet; as, indeed, he does not yet know; but he then fancied he knew it, and answered boldly, as a knowing person would, nor did he think he should be at a loss. But he now deems himself at a loss, and, as he knows not, does not even think he knows.

⁵² Had Socrates not added this, he would have put the boy on telling how long is the side of a square, the superficies of which contains eight square feet. Now the number of feet in the side of such a square cannot be expressed except by decimals, of which the boy could not be supposed to know any thing. S.

⁵³ Instead of *ov*, Beck suggested *ol*, which, though praised by Buttm., is rejected by Stalb., who should have remembered that *ov* is "where," but *ol* "whither," which alone can be united to a verb of motion.

Meno. You say what is true.

Soc. Is he not then in a better state now as regards the matter of which he was ignorant?

Meno. This too appears to me.

Soc. In causing him then to be at a loss, and to be benumbed, as is the torpedo, have we done him any harm?

Meno. None, I think.

Soc. We have at least made some progress, as it seems, towards his finding out where he is. For now, knowing nothing, he would readily search. But he then fancied he could readily, before many persons and often, say respecting the (above-mentioned) doubled space, that it ought to have a line twice as long.

Meno. So it seemed.

Soc. Think you, then, that he would have attempted to seek or learn that, of which, though ignorant, he fancied he knew it, before he had fallen into a difficulty,⁵⁴ by conceiving he did not know, and had felt a desire to know?

Meno. I do not think, Socrates, he would.

Soc. He was benefited, then, by being benumbed.

Meno. I think so.

Soc. Now mark what, after this difficulty, he will discover by searching with me, (doing) nothing else but asking questions, and not teaching. And watch me, if any where you can discover me teaching or telling him any thing, and not asking him rather his own opinions. [19.] Now, boy, tell me, is not this space four feet? Do you comprehend?

Boy. I do.

Soc. Now we will apply to it this other (space) equal to it.

Boy. Well.

Soc. And this a third (space) equal to either of these?

Boy. Very well.

Soc. What if we add this (space), likewise (equal),⁵⁵ to fill up the corner here.

Boy. Very well.

Soc. Will these be any thing else than these four equal spaces?

⁵⁴ From the words of Ficin., "potius quam," it would seem that he found in his MS. *μᾶλλον ἢ* instead of *ἀλλὰ μὴ*.

⁵⁵ To make all clear, there should be in the Greek some word answering to "equal." Hence, instead of *οἰκοῦν* we might perhaps read *καὶνόν*—

Boy. No.

Soc. Well then, how much larger is this whole space than that?

Boy. Four times.

Soc. But we wanted one only twice as large. Or do you not remember?

Boy. (I remember it) very well.

Soc. Does not this line from corner to some⁵⁶ corner, cut each of these spaces in half?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Are not therefore these four lines equal, which enclose this space?

Boy. They are.

Soc. Consider then, how large is this space.

Boy. I do not comprehend.

Soc. Has not each (line) of each (space) cut off within it half of these four (spaces)? or not?

Boy. They have.

Soc. How many such (spaces) then are there in this (figure)?

Boy. Four.

Soc. And how many in this (figure)?

Boy. Two.

Soc. How much of two is four?

Boy. Twice as much.⁵⁷

Soc. How many feet then does this (space) become?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Drawn from what line?

Boy. From this here.

Soc. From the line reaching from corner to corner of the space of feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Now the sophists call such a line the diameter; so that, if the diameter be its name,⁵⁸ from the diameter, as you,

⁵⁶ The common text has *εἰς γωνίαν τινὰ ῥιπνοῦσα*, which Wolf corrected into *εἰς γωνίαν ῥιπνοῦσα ῥίπτει*.

⁵⁷ Between this answer and the following question, Schleiermacher suspected there was a lacuna, to be thus supplied,—“*Soc.* How much again as that is this? *Boy.* Twice as much. *Soc.* And of what length is this space? *Boy.* Four feet.”

⁵⁸ This seems a rather strange supposition. For of the name of the diameter there could be no doubt. Besides the truth of the proposition

Meno's boy, assert, there can be produced a space twice as large.

Boy. Assuredly, Socrates.

[20.] *Soc.* Well, what think you, Meno? Is there an opinion, which he has given in his answers, that is not his own?

Meno. None, but his own.

Soc. And yet, as we said a little before, he knew nothing.

Meno. True.

Soc. Yet these very opinions existed in him. Or did they not?

Meno. They did.

Soc. In a man, therefore, who is ignorant, there exist true opinions concerning those very things of which he is ignorant.²⁹

Meno. So it appears.

Soc. These very opinions then have been lately stirred up afresh in him, as if it were a dream. And should any one put questions to him respecting these same matters at many times and in many places, be assured he will at length know them not less accurately than any man.

Meno. It seems so.

Soc. Will he not then, without any one having taught him, and by some one putting questions, recover, himself through himself, his (former) knowledge?

Meno. He will.

Soc. Now for a person to recover knowledge, himself through himself, is not this to recollect?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And this knowledge, which he now possesses, he has either at some time acquired, or has possessed it always?

Meno. Yes.

Soc. If then he was always possessed of it, he was always a person of knowledge. But if he acquired it at any time, he would not have got it in the present life; or has some one taught him geometry? For he will act in the very same manner with regard to the whole of geometry, and all other

depends not upon the name of the diameter, but upon the existence of such a line. There is an error here, which it would be easy to correct.

²⁹ The words *περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε*, which Schleiermacher and Bekker reject as spurious, were not found in the MS. of Ficinus. They ought to be inserted after *ἐδέξαι*, just above. They were, strange to say, defended by Heindorf.

matters of learning. Is there any one then who has taught the boy all this? (I ask you); for you ought to know, especially since he was born and bred up in your family.

Meno. I know well that no person has ever taught him.

Soc. And yet he entertains these very opinions; does he not?

[21.] *Meno.* There appears, Socrates, the necessity.⁶⁰

Soc. If, having got (this knowledge), not in this present life, he did not know this,⁶⁰ it is plain that he possessed it in some other time and had learnt it.

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. And is not then that the time, when he was not a man?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. If then, during the time when he is, and during the time when he is not a man, true opinions exist in him, which, roused up by questioning, become knowledge, will not his soul have learnt through eternity? for it is plain, that during all time he either is, or is not a man.

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. If then the truth of things, that are, exists always in the soul, the soul would be immortal; so that, whatever you happen now not to know, that is, not to remember, you ought to attempt with confidence to seek, and to recollect.

Meno. You seem to me, Socrates, I know not how, to speak rightly.

Soc. And I (seem) to myself too, Meno. And yet in other respects I would not contend very strenuously in defence of my argument; but that in thinking we ought to seek the things which one does not know, we should become better and more manly, and less idle, than if we supposed it impossible for us to find out, and that it did not behove us to inquire into what we know not; for this I would, if I were able, violently contest both by word and deed.

Meno. In this also, Socrates, you seem to me to say well.

[22.] *Soc.* Since then we are of one mind, that a person

⁶⁰ Bekk., *Ei δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβὼν οὐκ ᾔδει τοῦτο*. Sydenham wished to omit *οὐκ*, and so did Buttm. once; but he afterwards retained it for reasons that failed to convince even Stalbaum, who has edited *Ei δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβὼν, οὐκ ᾔδη τοῦτο δῆλον*. But *ᾔδη* could not be thus inserted between *οὐ* and *τοῦτο*. He should have suggested *Ei δὲ μὴ—λαβὼν ἦν δῆ, οὐ τοῦτο δῆλον—*

ought to inquire after what he does not know, are you willing for us to attempt jointly to inquire what is virtue?

Meno. By all means. Not but that I should with the greatest pleasure take into consideration, and hear you on the question I first asked you, whether we must put our hand to the inquiry about virtue as a thing to be taught, or as coming by nature, or by some other means to man.

Soc. Had I been master not only of myself, but of you too, Meno, we would not have considered whether virtue is a thing to be taught or not, before we had ascertained what is the first inquiry, what virtue is. But since you do not even attempt to master yourself in order that you may be a free-man, and yet undertake to govern me, and actually do govern me, I shall yield to you. For what must I do? We are to consider then, it seems, what belongs to a certain thing, whilst yet we know not what the thing is. But do you relax if not some,⁶¹ yet a little, the strictness of your rule, and agree to consider hypothetically, whether virtue can be taught to a man, or how otherwise (it is to be attained). I say hypothetically as geometricians often do in treating a question; when one asks them, as it were, about a space,⁶² whether it is possible for this space to be placed⁶³ triangularly⁶⁴ within this, a (geometrician) would answer,—I know not as yet, of what kind⁶⁵ the triangle is; but I think I have, as it were,⁶⁶ an hypothesis, that may be of use for the matter (in hand) of this kind.—If the space be of such a kind, as that by stretching⁶⁷ along the line given there, it would be deficient by such a space as would be the

⁶¹ The Greek is *εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γε*. But as *τι* and *σμικρόν* are synonymous, they could not be thus opposed to each other. Besides *οὖν* could not be thus inserted between *τι* and *ἀλλὰ*.—The train of ideas inanifestly leads to *εἰ μὴ τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ' οὖν σμικρόν γε*, "if not entirely, at least a little."

⁶² The word *χωρίον* was used by the Greek mathematicians to signify the space comprehended by the lines of any geometrical figure. S.

⁶³ In lieu of *ἵστασθῆναι*, which is applied only to a straight line, the sense requires here *ἵστασθῆναι*; and similarly *ἵστασίως*, found in three MSS. a little below, instead of *ἵστάσιως*.

⁶⁴ This is the interpretation of Stalbaum.

⁶⁵ Whether right-angled, obtuse, or acute-angled. S.

⁶⁶ In the Greek *ὥσπερ μὲν* there is evidently some error.

⁶⁷ Vulg., *παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ παρατείναντα ἑλλείπειν*. But as there is nothing to which *παρατείναντα* can be referred, Stalbaum suggested *παρατεῖναν*, i. e. *χωρίον*. To complete, however, the correction, he should have proposed *ἐν ἑλλείποι ἀν*. For the infinitive *ἑλλείπειν* is without regimen.

space itself stretched along, there would, I think, be one result ;⁶⁸ but another, if this (hypothesis) were impossible to occur. Laying down then an hypothesis, I am willing to tell you what will happen respecting the placing of it (the space) within the circle, whether it be impossible or not.—[23.] And thus too concerning virtue, since we know not, either what it is, or what is its quality, we will lay down an hypothesis, and consider whether it is to be taught or not, by stating the question thus. If virtue be in its quality one of things, which belongs to the soul, is it to be taught, or not to be taught? In the first place, if it is either different from knowledge, or of the same kind with it, is virtue or is it not to be taught, or (as we said just now) to be recollected ; for whichever of these expressions we use, let it make no difference to us. Is then virtue to be taught? Now is it not evident to every one, that a man is taught no other thing than knowledge?

Meno. To me it seems so.

Soc. If then virtue be a kind of knowledge, it is evident that virtue is to be taught.

Meno. For how not?

Soc. From this question then we have been quickly relieved, that, if virtue be such a kind of thing (as knowledge), it is to be taught ; but not, if it be not such a kind of thing.

Meno. Very true.

Soc. Next after this, it seems, we must consider whether virtue be knowledge or apart from knowledge.

Meno. We must, I think, consider this in the next place.

Soc. Well now ; say we that virtue is any thing else but a good ; and shall we abide by this hypothesis, that virtue is a good?

Meno. By all means.

Soc. Now if there be also any other good apart from knowledge, then perhaps virtue may not be a kind of knowledge. But if there be no good which knowledge does not comprehend, then in suspecting virtue to be a kind of knowledge we should suspect justly.

⁶⁸ Of the problem to which Plato alludes, solutions have been suggested by Sydenham, Grou, Gedike, Anonymous, J. W. Müller, Schleiermacher, Mollweide, Klügel, Tremble, Nickel, Buttmann, Wex, Dobree, and Stalbaum. But as all of them have supposed the existence of literal errors, or the omission of some words, or else attributed new meanings to well-known geometrical terms, it is evident that the passage must be left to exercise, as before, the ingenuity of critics, conversant alike with Geometry and Greek.

Meno. It is so.

Soc. And yet through virtue at least we are good.

Meno. Yes.

Soc. And if good, then useful. For all things that are good are useful: are they not?

Meno. They are.

Soc. Virtue then is a thing useful.

Meno. It must needs be, from what has been admitted.

[24.] *Soc.* Now let us consider what sort of things, taking each by itself, are useful to us: health, we say, and strength, and beauty, and wealth. These things and others of a like kind we call useful: do we not?

Meno. We do.

Soc. And say we not that these very things are sometimes hurtful to us? or do you say otherwise? or thus?

Meno. Not (otherwise); but thus.

Soc. Consider now, at what time is any one of each of these things, when it leads, useful to us; and at what time is it hurtful. Is it not, when a right use (leads), it is useful to us, but when not, it is hurtful?

Meno. Certainly so.

Soc. Further then let us consider the things belonging to the soul. You call something by the name of temperance, and of justice, and of fortitude, and of docility, and of memory, and of high bearing, and of all such things.

Meno. I do.

Soc. Now consider such of these things, as you think to be not knowledge, but apart from knowledge, whether they are not sometimes hurtful, and sometimes useful? for instance, unless prudence is present, fortitude is only a kind of boldness. Is not a man hurt, when he is bold without reason? but when he is bold with reason, is he not benefited?²⁰

Meno. Yes.

Soc. Is it not so with temperance, and docility? Are not things learnt and prepared (for use) with understanding useful, but without understanding hurtful?

Meno. Very much so.

Soc. In a word, do not all the endeavours and endurings

²⁰ So Horace—"Vis consilii expert, mole ruit sua."

of the soul, when prudence leads, tend to happiness; but if imprudence leads, to the reverse?

Meno. It seems so.

Soc. If virtue then be one of those things belonging to the soul, and if it is necessary, as you say, for it to be useful, it must be prudence: since all the things belonging to the soul are of themselves neither useful nor hurtful; but imprudence or prudence being added, they become hurtful or useful. Now according to this reasoning it must needs be that virtue, being useful, is a kind of prudence.

Meno. So it seems to me.

[25.] *Soc.* Now then as to the other things, which we said just now were sometimes beneficial and sometimes hurtful, both wealth and the things of that kind: does not prudence, when leading the rest of the soul, make the things belonging to the soul useful, but imprudence hurtful? and in like manner does not the soul, by rightly using and leading them, render them useful, but by (using) wrongly, hurtful?

Meno. Most certainly.

Soc. And does not a prudent soul rightly lead, but an imprudent one, incorrectly?

Meno. Such is the fact.

Soc. Thus then we may say universally, that in the case of man all the other things⁷⁰ depend on his soul; but the things belonging to the soul itself depend on prudence, if they are to be beneficial. And by this reasoning prudence would be the useful. But we said that virtue was useful.

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. We assert therefore that prudence is virtue, either wholly, or in part.

Meno. What has been said seems to me, Socrates, to have been well said.

Soc. If then it be so, the good are not good⁷¹ by nature.

Meno. It seems to me, they are not.

Soc. For then this too would follow. If the good were good by nature we should have some where persons, who

⁷⁰ By the words *τὰ ἄλλα πάντα* are meant all the things which are not within the soul. The Stoics described such things by *τὰ ἕξω*. S.

⁷¹ Vulg., οἱ ἀγαθοί. But Sydenham's tacit emendation οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοί, which Struve has likewise suggested, and Buttmann approved, and is found in the best MS. Flor. x., Stalb. rejects as unnecessary.

knew of our youths the naturally good; over whom, when those had shown them to us, we should place a guard in the citadel, putting a seal on them, rather than on gold, so that no person might corrupt them, and that, when they arrived at manhood, they might become useful to the state.

Meno. It were reasonable (to do so), Socrates.

[26.] *Soc.* Since then the good are not good by nature, are they by learning?

Meno. I think this is of necessity so. And it is plain, Socrates, that if, according to the hypothesis, virtue is a science, it is to be taught.

Soc. Perhaps so, by Jove. But did we admit that correctly?

Meno. And yet it lately seemed to be fairly said.

Soc. But I suspect, it ought not only to have seemed lately to be said fairly, but to seem so at present, and hereafter too, if there be any thing sound in it.

Meno. What is the matter now? looking to what are you dissatisfied with it? and why doubt that virtue is a science?

Soc. I will tell you, Meno. That virtue is to be taught, if it be a science, is a position I do not retract,⁷² (so to say) that it has not been correctly asserted. But consider whether I appear to reasonably doubt, that virtue is a science. For tell me this. If any thing is to be taught, not virtue only, must there not be of necessity both teachers and scholars?

Meno. I think there must.

Soc. Hence, on the contrary, that, of which there are neither teachers nor scholars, should we conjecture rightly, in conjecturing it is not to be taught?

Meno. Such is the fact. But do you not think that there are teachers of virtue?

Soc. After a lengthened inquiry, whether there were any teachers of virtue, I cannot, with all my efforts, discover any. And yet do I make the search with many, and those, too, whom I think would be the most skilled in the matter. And just now, Meno, in happy time has Anytus⁷³ sat down here

⁷² In the verb ἀναρῖσθαι, (I put back for myself,) there is an allusion to a game, similar to draughts or backgammon. Stalb. refers to Gorg. p. 461, D. 462, A., Protag. p. 354, F., Phædon. p. 87, A., and Charmid. p. 164, D.

⁷³ Steph. αὐτὸς, for which Struve proposed to read ἄνυτος, suggested perhaps by the note of Sydenham, who says that "Anytus had probably now seated himself close to Socrates." The reading, now happily con-

by us, to whom we can give a share in the search. And with reason should we give him a share. For, in the first place, he is the son of the wealthy and the wise Anthemion, a man who has become rich, not by accident, nor yet by a gift from any one, as Ismenias⁷⁴ of Thebes has done, who has lately obtained the property of Polycrates, but having acquired his wealth by his own wisdom and carefulness; and secondly, as regards his other qualities, he is a citizen deemed to be neither haughty nor puffed up, nor overbearing, but to conduct himself like a decent and well-behaved man; and then, he has brought up and educated his son here very well, in the opinion of the Athenian multitude; for they elect him to the highest offices in the state. With such men it is right then to make a search after teachers of virtue, whether there are any or not, and who they are. [27.] Do you then, Anytus, unite with me, and Meno here, your guest, in our search after this very thing, as to who are the teachers of it. Now consider the matter in this way. If we wished this Meno to become a good physician, to what teachers should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians?

Anytus. By all means.

Soc. And if we wished to make him a good currier, should we not send him to the curriers?

Any. To be sure.

Soc. And so as regards the rest of subjects?

Any. Without doubt.

Soc. But concerning the same things tell me again this. In sending him to the physicians we say we should do well, if we wished to make him a good physician. Now when we say this, do we not mean, that we should act with prudence in sending him to those, who make that art their profession, rather than to those who do not; and who making for themselves a remuneration for this very thing, put themselves forth as the teachers of any one willing to go and learn. Is it not from looking to these matters that we should do well in sending him?

Any. Yes.

firmly by the best MS. Flor. x., even Stalbaum is disposed to adopt; although he has left *αὐτὸς* in the text, misled by the subtleties of Buttmann's defence of *αὐτὸς*.

⁷⁴ Both Buttmann and Stalbaum confess that nothing can be said for certain of the person to whom Plato alludes.

Soc. Hence in the case of music, and the other (arts), the same things (take place). And it is a great folly for us, if we wish to make any one a flute-player, to be willing to send him not to such as profess to teach the art, and to make money by it; but, to give trouble to some other persons, and to look for his learning from those, who do not profess to be teachers, and have not one pupil in that branch of instruction, which we think proper that the person, whom we send, should learn. Does not this seem to you to be very unreasonable?

Any. Yes, by Jupiter, and ignorance to boot.

[28.] *Soc.* You say well. Now then you may consult in common with me about this guest of yours, Meno here. For he told me some while ago, Anytus, that he had a longing for that wisdom and virtue, through which men govern well both their household and the state, and pay attention to their parents, and know how to receive both their countrymen and foreigners, and to send them away in a manner worthy of a good man. Consider then, to what persons (about to teach)⁷⁵ this virtue, should we in sending him correctly send. Is it not clear that, according to the reasons (detailed) just now, (we should send him) to those who profess to be teachers of virtue, and publicly proffer themselves common to any one of the Greeks desirous to learn; after fixing the price, and making it a matter of business.

Any. Of what persons, Socrates, are you speaking?

Soc. You surely know that these are they whom men call sophists.

Any. O Hercules! speak fair words, Socrates. On none of my relations, or family, or friends, or fellow-citizens, or foreign guests, may ever such a madness seize, as to go and be spoiled by them. For those fellows are clearly the bane and corruption of their associates.

Soc. How say you, Anytus? Are they the only men among those who, so widely different from all the rest, profess the knowledge of doing something beneficial, and yet do not only not improve, as others do, what one puts into their hands, but

⁷⁵ Bekk. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει. Stephens was the first to remark a defect here, pointed out by the version of Ficinus—"ad quem potissimum hujus comparandæ virtutis gratiâ hunc mittere deceat." Hence he would read διὰ ταύτην οὖν—Sydenham suggested the insertion of διδάσκοντα or μαθησόμενον after ἀρετὴν.—Biester, whom Stalbaum follows, considers the accusative to be used absolutely.

on the contrary, spoil it? and do they think fit openly to make money for themselves for this? [29.] For my part, I know not how to believe you. For I know that one man, Protagoras (by name), has acquired singly more wealth from this wisdom, than both ⁷⁶ Phidias, who has produced works so conspicuously beautiful, and ten other statuaries besides. Indeed it is a prodigy you are telling me; if when the menders of old shoes and the patchers of old clothes could not escape for thirty days from being publicly known, if they returned the clothes or shoes in a worse condition than they received them, and if they did so, they would soon perish by hunger; yet, that Protagoras should undiscovered corrupt the whole of Greece by sending away his associates even worse men than he received them, and this for above forty years. For I think he was near seventy years of age when he died, after having passed forty in his profession. And during all that time he never ceased being in high repute, even to this day; and not only Protagoras (met with this success), but very many others, some born prior to him, and some still living. Shall we then say, according to your account, that they knowingly deceived and corrupted the youth, or that they did so unconscious of it to themselves? Shall we deem those to be so much out of their senses, who, some say, were the wisest of mankind?

Any. They are far from being out of their senses, Socrates. Much rather so are those youths, who give them money; and still more so than the youths are their relations in committing them to such men; but most so of all are the states that suffer them to come thither, and do not drive out a person, whether foreigner or citizen, who endeavours to do any such thing.

[30.] *Soc.* Has any of the sophists done you, Anytus, any injury? or why are you so hard upon them?

Any. I have never, by Jupiter, associated with one of them myself; nor would I suffer any person who belonged to me to do so.

Soc. You have no experience at all then of those men.

Any. And never may I have.

Soc. How then should you know, O happy man, respecting this matter, whether it has any good or harm, when you have no experience of it at all?

⁷⁶ Bekk. Φειδῖαν γε. Heindorf suggested γε, and so Stalbaum from the best MS. Flor. x.

Any. Easily enough. For I know what sort ⁷⁷ of fellows they are, whether I have any experience or not of them.

Soc. Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus. Since how otherwise you could know respecting them, I should, from what you say yourself, much wonder. But we were not inquiring, what the persons are, to whom Meno might go, and become a bad man. For let these, if you will, be the sophists. But now speak to us of those others; and do an act of kindness to this hereditary friend of yours, by telling him to what persons in this great city he may go and become worthy of note for that virtue which I was just now detailing.

Any. But why did you not tell him yourself?

Soc. What persons I conceived to be the teachers of these things I have told already. But I happen to have said nothing (to the purpose), as you inform me. ⁷⁸ And perhaps there is something in what you say. ⁷⁸ Now, therefore, do you in your turn tell him to whom of the Athenians he should go. Mention the name of whomsoever you like.

[31.] *Any.* What need is there of hearing the name of any one man? For whomsoever of the men of honour and virtue among the Athenians he may meet, there is not one of them who would not make him a better man, than the sophists would, if he will be but persuaded.

Soc. But did these men of honour and virtue become such spontaneously, and without having learnt from any man (to be so)? and are they able to teach others, what they were never taught themselves?

Any. They, I presume, learnt from their predecessors, being men of honour and virtue. Or think you that many excellent men have not been produced in this city?

Soc. I think, Anytus, that there are in this city men excellent in political affairs, and that there have been still not less so than there are. But were they good teachers of their own virtue? For it is this, about which our present discourse happens to be; not whether good men are at present here or not; nor whether such have been produced formerly; but

⁷⁷ Steph. *oi*. Wolf would read *oioi*, found subsequently in the two best MSS. Flor. x. and Coisl. He got the idea from Ficinus' "*quales sunt.*" Buttm. and Stalb. are content with *oi*.

⁷⁸ These words were, before the time of Bekker, assigned to Anytus. But he gave them to Socrates, on the faith of Ficinus' version.

whether virtue is to be taught or not, we have been for a long time considering: and in considering that question, we are come to consider this, whether those excellent men, either of the present or former (day), knew how to hand over to another that virtue, by which they themselves were good; or whether this cannot be handed over to, or received by, one man from another. This it is, which we have been long examining, I and Meno. [32.] Consider then the question in this manner, according to your own argument. Would you not say that Themistocles was a good man?

Any. Yes, the best of all.

Soc. And would you not then (say), that, if ever any other man was the teacher of his own virtue, he was one?

Any. I suppose so, if he wished it.

Soc. But would he not have wished, think you, for some others to become men of honour and virtue, and especially his own son? Or do you think that he envied his son, and did designedly not hand over to him that virtue, in which he himself was excellent? Have you not heard that Themistocles caused⁷⁹ his son Cleophantus to be taught to be⁸⁰ a good horseman? For example, he remained standing upright upon horses, and upright (too) upon horses he threw a javelin, and performed many other surprising feats, in which his father had caused him to be instructed; and that he made him skilled in such accomplishments as are connected with the having good teachers? Have you not heard this from the elderly people?

Any. I have heard it.

Soc. No one then would have accused his son of being of an evil nature.

Any. Perhaps not.

Soc. But what is this? That Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, became a good and a wise man, as did his father, have you ever heard this from any person, either young or old?

⁷⁹ On the difference between *διδάσκειν*, "to teach," and *διδάσκεισθαι*, (middle,) "to cause to be taught," see Porson on *Med.* 297, who might have said the same of *παιδεύειν* and *παιδεύεσθαι*, as shown here. But, as Porson confesses, the difference is sometimes neglected.

⁸⁰ Bekk. *ἰππία μὲν ἰδιδάξατο*. But *μὲν* has no meaning here. Sydenham was the first to see that *μὲν* is an error for *εἶναι*, found correctly in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, *Περὶ Ἀρετῆς*, § 3, where this part of the *Meno* is copied almost verbatim. Stalbaum indeed refers to *ἰππίας μὲν ἰδιδάξεν* here, in § 33. But there too *εἶναι* has dropt out after *μὲν*.

Any. No indeed.

Soc. Do we imagine then that he wished to bring up his own son in such studies, and yet, in the wisdom where he himself was wise, not to make his son at all better than his neighbours, if virtue could be taught?

Any. By Jove, perhaps not.

[33.] *Soc.* Such a teacher of virtue then is this one of yours, whom you yourself acknowledge to have been amongst the best men of former times. And now let us consider another, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. Do you not confess that he was a good man?

Any. I do entirely.

Soc. And did not he too give his son Lysimachus⁸¹ the best education at Athens, so far as depended on teachers? and do you think he made him a better man than any one whatsoever? For you have associated with him, and you see what sort of a man he is.⁸² But if you wish (another), you know that Pericles, a man of such lofty bearing and wisdom, bred up his two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

Any. I do.

Soc. These, as you know yourself, he taught to be horsemen not inferior to any of the Athenians; and he instructed them in music and gymnastics, and the rest of accomplishments that depend on art, so as to be inferior to none. But had he no wish to make them good men? I believe he had the wish; but I suspect it to be impossible (to teach virtue). And that you may not think that a few persons, and the most humble in means⁸³ of the Athenians, were incompetent for

⁸¹ It was common amongst the Athenians to give the eldest son the name of his grandfather; so that two names were continued alternately in the same family. S.

⁸² We find nothing more of this Lysimachus, than what Plutarch states, that the Athenians, out of respect for the memory of his father, who died poor, gave him a small landed estate, a sum of money in hand, and a trifling pension. He is one of the speakers, however, in Plato's *Laches*, where he complains that his father, Aristides, had too much indulged him in leading an idle and luxurious life, and, by giving himself up wholly to state affairs, had neglected his son's education. S.

⁸³ By *φauλοράτους* Sydenham, Gedike, and Schleiermacher understand meanness of birth; which, though applicable to Themistocles, and perhaps to Aristides, could not be said of Pericles, who was on his mother's side of a high family. By comparing however a little below *Θουρυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλείους φίλοι*, it would seem that *φauλοράτους* is here "the most humble in means."

such an affair, consider that Thucydides⁸⁴ likewise brought up his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and educated them well in other respects, and particularly in wrestling the best of the Athenians. For he intrusted one to Xanthias, and the other to Eudorus; and these (two) were thought to be the best wrestlers of that time. Do you not remember this?

Any. I do by hearsay.

[34.] *Soc.* Is it not plain then, that he would never have taught his children those things, in the teaching of which he must have been put to expense, and not have taught them to be good men, which would have required him to spend nothing, if such a thing could be taught? But Thucydides perhaps was of very humble means, and had not very many friends among the Athenians and their allies. (It was not so.) For he was of a noble family, and had great influence in the city and in the other Grecian states; so that if this could be taught, he might have found out a person, either one of his own countrymen or a foreigner, who might have made his sons virtuous, if, through his superintendence of the state, he had no leisure himself. But I fear, friend Anytus, that virtue is a thing not to be taught.

Any. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak ill of persons with great facility. But I would advise you, if you are willing to hearken to me, to be on your guard. For in another city too it is perhaps more easy to do a man mischief than good; but in this it is especially so; and I think you are sensible of it yourself.

[35.] *Soc.* Anytus seems to me to be angry, Meno. And I am not at all surprised at it. For, in the first place, he thinks I am speaking ill of those very persons; and then he considers himself to be one of them. But if he should ever know what it is to speak ill (of others), he will cease to be angry; but at present he is ignorant of it. Do you then tell me, are there not amongst us men of honour and virtue?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And are these men willing to offer themselves to youths as teachers? and to confess both that they are teachers and that virtue is to be taught?

⁸⁴ This Thucydides was not the historian, but a politician of the aristocratical party at Athens, and the opponent of Pericles, who favoured the democratic. S.

Meno. By Jupiter, Socrates, they do not. But you may hear them (saying) at one time that it is to be taught, at another, not.

Soc. Shall we say then that these men are teachers of that thing, about which they are not agreed?

Meno. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. Well; but do those sophists, who alone proclaim themselves teachers, appear to you to be so?

Meno. It is for this, Socrates, that I especially admire Gorgias, because you would never hear him making such professions. On the contrary, he laughs at the others, whenever he hears them making such a promise; and conceives that he ought to make men powerful in speaking.

Soc. Do not then the sophists seem to you to be teachers (of virtue)?

Meno. I know not, Socrates, what to say. For I have suffered myself, what the many do. Sometimes I think they are, and sometimes, not.

Soc. But you know, that not only to yourself and the others versed in civil affairs, it seems at one time that this is to be taught, and at another, not; and you know that the poet Theognis says the very same thing.

Meno. In what verses?

[36.] *Soc.* In his Elegiacs;⁸⁵ where he says,

With some drink thou and eat, and with some sit,
And pleasant be to those, whose power's far known:
Good from the good thou'lt learn; but with the bad
Mixing, thou'lt lose the good thoughts once thine own.

Do you perceive that in these (verses) he speaks of virtue as a thing to be taught?

Meno. So it appears.

Soc. And yet in other verses he says, passing on a little further, that

If wisdom could be made and placed in man,
they, who could accomplish this,

Many and great rewards would carry off;
and

⁸⁵ V. 33 and foll., ed. Bekker. They are quoted likewise by Xenophon in M. S. i. 2, 20.

From a good sire no bad son e'er would come,
To words of wisdom listening; but thou'lt ne'er
By teaching make the bad a virtuous man.

Do you observe, that in speaking upon the same subjects, he contradicts himself?

Meno. So it appears.

Soc. Can you tell me then of any other thing whatever, of which they, who profess to be teachers, are not only not held by others to be teachers, but who (confess) to be ignorant of it themselves, and who act like knaves in that very thing, which they profess to teach; and where they, who are allowed to be men of honour and virtue themselves, at one time say it is to be taught, and at another, it is not? Those then, who are so tossed about in mind about any subject whatever, would you say are the master-teachers of it?

[37.] *Meno.* By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. If then neither the sophists, nor they who are men of honour and virtue themselves, are teachers of this thing, it is plain there can be no others beside.

Meno. I think there can be none.

Soc. But if no teachers, then no scholars.

Meno. I think the matter is as you say.

Soc. But we have agreed that the thing, of which there are neither teachers nor scholars, is not to be taught.

Meno. We have agreed.

Soc. Of virtue then there appear no where any teachers.

Meno. It is so.

Soc. And if no teachers, then no scholars.

Meno. It appears so.

Soc. Virtue therefore cannot be taught.

Meno. It seems so, if we have considered the matter rightly; so that, Socrates, I am led to wonder whether there are any men really good; and if there are, what can be the manner of producing good men.

Soc. We are in danger, O Meno! of being, both you and I, men of no mark; and that Gorgias has not taught you sufficiently, nor Prodicus me. Above all things therefore we ought to apply our minds to ourselves, and to seek a person, who by one way at least would make us better men. I say this with an eye to the inquiry lately made; since it has escaped us ridiculously, that it is not only under the guidance

of science, that affairs are administered by men rightly and well; or, [if we should not grant that, (namely,) that it is not under the conduct of science only, but of some other thing also,]⁸⁶ perhaps the knowledge of the means, by which men become good, has escaped us.

Meno. How, Socrates, say you this?

[38.] *Soc.* In this way. Because, since we have rightly agreed that good men must be useful to us, this⁸⁷ cannot be otherwise. Is it not so?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And that they will be useful, should they conduct affairs rightly, did we not well admit this?

Meno. Yea.

Soc. But are we like persons that have not rightly agreed, (in saying) that unless one is prudent, it is not possible to conduct (affairs) rightly?

Meno. How say you rightly?

Soc. I will tell you. If a man, who knew the way to Larissa,⁸⁸ or wherever else you please, were to walk, and act as a guide to others, would he not conduct them well and rightly?

Meno. Without doubt.

Soc. What if one had only a correct opinion about the way, but had never gone it himself, nor had any certain knowledge of it, would not he also conduct (others) rightly?

Meno. To be sure.

Soc. And so long as he had anyhow a correct opinion of things, of which the other man had a certain knowledge, he would not be at all a worse guide, though (only) surmising justly, and not knowing (clearly), than the other with his (perfect) knowledge?

Meno. Not at all (worse).

Soc. Correct opinion, therefore, with regard to correct action, is not at all a worse guide than (perfect) knowledge.

⁸⁶ The Greek words for the English within brackets are omitted by all the MSS. but the one used by Aldus; nor were they read by Ficinus.

⁸⁷ Instead of *roûrô yâ, ôri*, the sense requires *roûrô y' êri*—

⁸⁸ The road to Larissa is taken as an illustration, because it was most familiar to Meno, who came from Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, near Larissa. S.

And this it is, which we omitted just now in considering of what kind is the nature of virtue, when we said that prudence only led to right action; now this is correct opinion.

Meno. It seems so.

Soc. Correct opinion therefore is not at all less beneficial to man than (certain) knowledge.

Meno. In this respect, however, Socrates, it is; because he, who has a (perfect) knowledge, would always attain his object; but he, who had only a correct opinion, would sometimes attain it, and sometimes not.

[39.] *Soc.* How say you? would not the man who has always a correct opinion, always attain (his object) so long as he had a correct opinion?

Meno. It appears to me that he must; so that, this being the case, I wonder, Socrates, on what account it is that science is so much more valuable than correct opinion; and in what respect it is that one is this thing, and the other another.

Soc. Do you know why you wonder? or shall I tell you?

Meno. By all means tell me.

Soc. It is because you never directed your mind to the images⁸⁹ made by Dædalus. But perhaps you have none of them amongst you.

Meno. With what view do you say this?

Soc. Because, if they are not fastened, they run away and become fugitives; but if they are fastened, they stay.

Meno. And what then?

Soc. To possess one of his works unfastened, is, like the possessing a runaway slave, a matter of little value, because it does not remain. But fastened, it is of great value; for indeed they are works of great beauty. But why do I thus speak of them? It is with reference to true opinions. For true opinions likewise, so long as they abide by us, are a valuable possession, and procure for us all good things; but they are not willing to abide a long time, for they run away from the soul of a man; so that they are of little value, until one has

⁸⁹ To these automaton figures of Dædalus there is an allusion in Euthyphr. p. 11, B. Suid. in *Δαιδάλου ποιήματα*. Schol. in Eurip. Hec. 828. Diodor. Sic. iv. 76. Pausan. ii. 4, ix. 40. Palæphatus c. 22. Tzet. Chil. i. 19. GEDIKE.

fastened them down by the reasoning respecting their cause.⁹⁰ And this, friend Meno, is reminiscence, as we before agreed. But when they are fastened down, in the first place they become (perfect) knowledge, and subsequently abiding. Now it is on this very account that (perfect) knowledge is a thing more valuable than correct opinion; and it is by this binding that (perfect) knowledge differs from correct opinion.

Meno. By Jupiter, Socrates, it seems like to some such thing.⁹¹

[40.] *Soc.* And yet I speak thus, not as one knowing, but only from conjecture. But that correct opinion and science are two different things, this I seem to myself not to conjecture; but if I should say I knew any thing else, (and there are but few things I would say I know,) I would set down this as one of those I do know.

Meno. And you say rightly, Socrates.

Soc. What then, (say I) not rightly this too, that correct opinion, having the conduct of any work of action⁹² whatever, executes (her office) not at all worse than (perfect) knowledge?

Meno. And this too I think you say rightly.

Soc. Correct opinion therefore is a thing not at all inferior to (perfect) knowledge, nor less beneficial with regard to action: nor is the man, who has a correct opinion, (inferior) to the man of (perfect) knowledge.

Meno. It is so.

Soc. And it has been agreed, that a good man is useful.

Meno. Yes.

Soc. Since then it is not through (perfect) knowledge alone that men can be good and useful to their country, (if there are any such men,) but by correct opinion likewise; and since neither of these exists to men by nature, [neither science nor

⁹⁰ The Greek is *αἰτίας λογισμῷ*, by a rational account of the cause; or by proving, how and from what cause it is that they are true. For the cause of every truth is some other truth, higher and more general, in which it is included. S.

⁹¹ In the words, *ἴσκει τοιοῦτω τινι*, there is nothing to which *ἴσκει* can be referred. Ficinus has, "congrua comparatio."

⁹² In the Greek text τὸ ἔργον τῆς πράξεως is a combination of words not to be found elsewhere; moreover as ἡγεῖσθαι governs a genitive or dative, but not an accusative, perhaps Plato wrote ἡγουμένη ἐκάστης τῆς πράξεως—ἀπεργάζεται τὸ ἔργον: and we shall thus recover the accusative required by ἀπεργάζεται.

correct opinion];⁸³ or⁸⁴ do you think that either of them comes by nature?

Meno. Not I.

Soc. Since then they are not by nature, neither is it by nature that men could have been virtuous.

Meno. Certainly not.

Soc. Since then (virtue comes) not by nature, we inquired, in the next place, whether it is to be taught.

Meno. Just so.

Soc. Did it not appear to us both, that it was to be taught, if virtue were wisdom?

Meno. It did.

Soc. And that if it were to be taught, then (virtue) would be wisdom?

Meno. Very true.

Soc. And that, if there were any teachers, it could be a thing to be taught; otherwise, not?

Meno. Just so.

Soc. But we have agreed that there are no teachers of it.

Meno. It is so.

Soc. We are agreed, therefore, that it is not to be taught, nor is it wisdom.

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. But we agreed besides, that it was something good.

Meno. Yes.

Soc. And that whatever conducted affairs rightly was a thing beneficial.

Meno. We did clearly.

Soc. And that affairs are conducted rightly by these two things only, correct opinion and (perfect) knowledge; by possessing which a man is a good guide. For what comes from fortune is not the effect of human guidance. But where a man is the guide to right, there are these two, correct opinion and (perfect) knowledge.

Meno. I think so.

⁸³ The words within brackets are evidently an explanation of the preceding "neither of these," a fact passed over by every commentator.

⁸⁴ After η in the Greek, follow two words, $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\delta\ \text{i}\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\eta\tau\alpha$, which Cornari was the first to expunge; and though Sydenham, and even the more recent editors, have adopted the idea, they have failed to show how they could be found here. There is here evidently some deep-seated corruption.

[41.] *Soc.* Now since (virtue) is not to be taught, it is not the effect of (perfect) knowledge.

Meno. It appears it is not.

Soc. Of the two things then, good and serviceable, one has been set loose, nor can (perfect) knowledge be a guide in the administration of civil affairs.

Meno. I think it cannot.

Soc. Not therefore as being wise in any wisdom, did such men take the lead in the state, as Themistocles, and the rest, of whom Anytus here has just now spoken. And for this very reason they were not able to make others such as themselves; because it was not through (perfect) knowledge they were such.

Meno. The case, O Socrates, seems to be as you represent it.

Soc. If then it is not by (perfect) knowledge, it follows it is by correct opinion; of which politicians making an use, regulate states, being men not at all superior in wisdom to oracle-singers and divine prophets; for these also utter many true sayings, but know nothing of what they utter.

Meno. This seem to be very near the fact.

Soc. Is it not meet then, O Meno, to call these men divine, who, without possessing a mind concerning what they do and say, direct many and great things aright?

Meno. By all means.

Soc. Rightly then should we call those men divine, whom we just now mentioned, the oracle-singers and the prophets, and all poetical persons. And not the least divine of such persons should we say that statesmen are, and no less enthusiasts, being inspired divinely, and possessed by the divinity, when in their speeches they direct aright many and great affairs, without knowing any thing of what they are saying.

Meno. Certainly we should.

Soc. And even women, Meno, call good men divine; and the Lacedæmonians, when they celebrate with encomiums any brave man, say, "This is a divine man."⁹⁵

Meno. And they appear, O Socrates, to speak justly too. And yet, perhaps, Anytus here is offended at what you say.

Soc. I care not. [42.] With him, Meno, we shall have some discourse at another time. But if we, during all this

⁹⁵ On this expression, Casanbon on Athenæus, viii. p. 631, refers to Aristot. Eth. Nicom. vii. 1, where it appears that Lacedæmonians said *Σειός ἀνὴρ* in their own dialect.

conversation, have inquired and spoken correctly, virtue can neither come by nature, nor yet be taught, but by a divine fate is present to those, with whom it is present, without intelligence; unless amongst statesmen there be such a person as is able to make another man a statesman; and if there be, he might almost be said to be such among the living, as Homer tells us Tiresias is among the dead; where, speaking of him, he says, [Od. x. 495,] that he alone, of those in Hades, was intelligent; but (the rest), like shadows, flitted. The same thing would forthwith⁹⁶ such a man be, with respect to virtue, as a true thing is compared with shadows.

Meno. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak most beautifully.

Soc. From this reasoning then, Meno, it appears to us that to whom virtue is present, it is present by a divine fate. But on this point we shall then know the truth, when, previous to our inquiries by what means is virtue present to men, we set about searching first, what virtue is by itself. But it is now time for me to go some where else. And do you, since you are persuaded yourself on these points, persuade also your guest Anytus here, in order that he may thus become more mild; so that, should you persuade him, it is possible for you to do some service to the Athenians likewise.

⁹⁶ None have as yet satisfactorily explained, nor could they explain, the meaning of εὐθὺς, "forthwith." Buttmann says that εὐθὺς ἀν εἶη is to be rendered "would immediately appear to be," as if εὐθὺς were meant merely to draw an inference.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYDEMUS.

PLATO, having proved in the *Meno* the impossibility of teaching virtue, in opposition to Gorgias, who boasted he could do it, has in this dialogue shown how equally incompetent were the Sophists of the schools of Protagoras and Prodicus to teach any of the arts and sciences, which they not only said they knew, but the knowledge of which they proclaimed they had the power to impart. For, like some of the schoolmen of the middle ages, they were wont to speak "*de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*," with the view of showing, as Horace has recorded, that a Sophist could with equal readiness become a cobbler or a king; while to their vaunted universality of attainments may be applied the well-known lines of Juvenal in *S. iii.* 73—77, who drew his information partly from personal observation, and partly probably from the perusal of this dialogue of Plato, or the *Clouds* of Aristophanes; between which there is a curious coincidence, as remarked by Winckelmann in the *Prolegomena* to the *Euthydemus*, p. xlv.

Ingenium velox, audacia perdita, sermo
Promptus et Isæo torrentior. Ede, quid illum
Esse putes? Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos,
Grammaticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Aleiptes,
Augur, Schœnobates, Medicus, Magus. Omnia novit.

In genius quick, of desperate impudence,
Ready in speech, and than Isæus dashing
More torrent-like, what think you is he? say.
He with himself brings whomsoe'er you will,
Grammarian, Orator, Geometrician,
Painter, oiled Wrestler, Soothsayer, Ropedancer,
Physician, Conjurer. All things he knows.

With regard to the matter of the dialogue, its object is to show that the subtleties, on which the Sophists relied to prove and disprove the same propositions, were in their hands only a play upon words; and that, like all such displays of misplaced ingenuity, they could lead to no practical and useful results on questions relating to

intellectual wisdom or political well-being; on both of which conjoined depends the happiness of man.

With respect, however, to the manner in which the subject is treated, Plato has here, as in the *Hippias Major*, given up occasionally the character of the serious philosopher and assumed that of the laughing one. For, as Horace says—

Ridiculum acri
Fortius ac melius plerumque secat res—

A knotty point oft ridicule assails
Strongest and best, where reason nought prevails—

a doctrine derived, it would seem, from Socrates, who says in *Legg.* vii. p. 816, D., that without the aid of ridicule one cannot even in serious matters arrive at the truth.

Did, however, the ridiculous specimens of the subtleties of the Sophists rest upon the testimony of Plato alone, we might perhaps have fancied, that to heighten the effect, he chose to draw rather a caricature than a portrait of the persons, whose pursuits he believed to be worse than useless, absolutely mischievous. But we have the evidence of Aristotle to show that the picture is not overcharged. For in his treatise “On the Disproofs of Sophists,” he has alluded to some of the instances produced by Plato; which he would scarcely have done, had they not been known as facts rather than as fictions. In truth, it may be said of the Sophists of Greece, in whose schools the orators learnt the rudiments of their art, what Gay has sung in his *Fables* respecting the barristers of more recent times—

I know you lawyers can with ease
Twist words and meanings as you please;
And language, by your skill made pliant,
Can bend to favour every client.

They, however, who wish to see even a greater abuse of the Sophists of Greece than is to be found in the dialogues of Plato, may turn to Mitchell's Preliminary Dissertation to his translation, or transformation rather, of Aristophanes; where the writer's zeal has, as is often the case, outstripped his discretion.

EUTHYDEMUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITO, SOCRATES, EUTHYDEMUS,¹ DIONYSODORUS,
CLINIAS, CTESIPPUS.

CRITO.

[1.] WHO was he, Socrates, with whom you were conversing yesterday in the Lyceum? where² so great a crowd stood around you, that though I approached, desirous to hear, I could hear nothing clearly. However, leaning over³ I looked down, and it seemed to me that it was a stranger with whom you were conversing. Who was he?

Soc. About which of them, Crito, are you inquiring? for there was not one, but two.

Cri. He whom I mean, sate the third from you on your right hand; but in the midst of you was a youth,⁴ the son of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great progress,⁵ and does not differ much in age from our Crito-

¹ Although Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Clinias, and Ctesippus do not actually speak, yet their names are given here, as they are reported to have taken a part in the conversation.

² The MSS. vary between *ἢ* and *ῖ*. Heindorf, after showing that *ἦ* could not be used here, wished to read *πολὺς γὰρ*. He should have adopted *ῖ*, found in many MSS., "where," which Stalbaum without reason rejects.

³ Budæus explains *ὑπερκύψας* by "standing on tiptoe and leaning over." But the word *ἀκροβατήσας*, or something like it, answering to "standing on tip-toe," could hardly be omitted.

⁴ His name was Clinias. See § 10.

⁵ The verb *ἐπιδιδέσκειναι*, is generally applied to "having made a progress in art," but here it refers to stature.

bulus;⁶ though that one⁷ is weazen-faced,⁸ but this one lanky but of a fair and engaging aspect.

Soc. This is Euthydemus, Crito, about whom you are inquiring: but he who sate by me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionysodorus, who also partook of the discourse.

[2.]⁹ *Cri.* I know neither of them, Socrates.

Soc. They are some new wisdom-mongers, as it appears.

Cri. Whence do they come; and what is their wisdom?

Soc. They are of a race some where hence, I think of Chius; but they migrated to Thurii,¹⁰ and having fled from thence, are dwelling for many years about these parts. But as to your inquiry (respecting) their wisdom, it is wonderful, Crito; they are indeed all-wise.¹¹ Since even I have not hitherto known they were pancratiasts:¹² for they are skilled in every kind of contest; not after the manner of the brother pancratiasts of Acarnania;¹³ for these are able to contend with their body alone; but those, in the first place, are most powerful in body, and excel in the contest, which consists in vanquishing all men. For they are very skilful themselves in contending

⁶ Who, as stated in § 81, was now an adult.

⁷ By *ἑκείνος*, "that one," Stalbaum understands Clinias, and by *οὗτος*, "this one," Critobulus: but Heindorf, by *ἑκείνος*, Critobulus; while Winckelmann refers *οὗτος* to Euthydemus. For the reasons that led those scholars to such different conclusions, the inquisitive reader must turn to their respective notes.

⁸ The Greek words *σκληρόδης* and *προφερής*, I have translated "weazen-faced" and "lanky," as being perhaps the nearest meanings in English. From the conflicting statements of Greek lexicographers and scholiasts it is evident that the words have never been thoroughly understood. Ficinus has "ille aridioris quodam corporis habitu, iste grandioris specimen præ se ferre videtur."

⁹ On the reading and arrangement of the words, spoken by Crito and Socrates respectively, Heindorf, Winckelmann, and Stalbaum all differ.

¹⁰ Thurii, or Thurium, was a town in the southern part of Italy, to which the Athenians sent a colony, and with which a communication was long kept up by the mother country.

¹¹ Here, too, critics differ. I have followed Stalbaum, although the passage is not even now correct.

¹² The contest called *παγκράτιον* is described by Lucian as the union of boxing and wrestling, during the latter of which the combatants were on the ground; but by A. Gellius as simply a stand-up pugilistic encounter. Lucian's account is the more correct, as may be inferred from Aristoph. *Eip.* 863.

¹³ Of these brother pancratiasts nothing, says Heindorf, is known elsewhere.

with their weapons, and they know how to impart their skill to any other person who will pay them. In the next place, they are most powerful in judicial contests, and are able both to contend themselves, and instruct others, to speak and write speeches suited for courts of justice. [3.] Formerly they were terrible in these things alone; but now they have put a finish to their pancratiastic art; for the kind of contest, which was left by them undone, they have now completed, so that no one is able to lift (a hand) against them; so skilful have they become in verbal contests, and in confuting whatever happens to be said, whether it be true or false. I have a mind therefore, Crito, to put myself under these men; for they say that in a short time they can make any other person whatever skilled in the very same things.

Cri. But fear you not, Socrates, for your age, that you are already too old?

Soc. By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument and consolation against fear. For these very men, so to say,¹⁴ have, though old, begun the study of this wisdom, which I am longing for, in the art of contending. For last year, or the year before last, they were not wise in the least. [4.] But of one thing only I am afraid, lest I should bring disgrace upon these strangers, as I do upon the harper Connus, the son of Metrobius, who teaches me even now to play on the harp. The boys, therefore, who are my school-fellows, on seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the teacher of old men. Lest therefore some one should reproach these strangers with the very same thing, and they, dreading this, should be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other old men to go thither as my school-fellows; and here also I will endeavour to persuade others; and do you frequent the school with us.¹⁵ Perhaps too, as an allurements, we may

¹⁴ The words "so to say," have no meaning here, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 219, where I proposed to read ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐπαγίοντες, in allusion to the Homeric word found in *Il.* *Ψ.* 793, and explained by γῆραι ὡμῶ in *Od.* *O.* 356. Others would prefer perhaps ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, Νίσοιτε ὄντε, as coming nearer to εἰπεῖν γίγοντε.

¹⁵ Bekk. καὶ σὺ τί τοῦ συμφοῖρα: where Heindorf correctly objected to τοῦ, thus united to an imperative. But he did not see that Plato probably wrote καὶ σὺ γ', ὦ παῖ, συμφοῖρα, for thus Socrates would facetiously address Crito, who was, like himself, an old man, as a boy. Stalbaum seems to approve of Winckelmann's καὶ σὺ τί οὐ συμφοῖρα. For Ficinus has "Sed cur non et tu venis?" Or we might read καὶ σὺ (τί δ' οὐ;) συμφοῖρα. "And do you, (why not?) come along with me."

bring your sons to them ; for having a hankering after them, they will, I know, instruct even us.

Cri. There is nothing to hinder us, Socrates, if it seems good to you. But first tell me what is the wisdom of these men, that I may know what it is we shall learn.

Soc. You shall quickly hear, since I cannot say that I did not attend to them ; for I paid great attention, and very well remember what they said ; and I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. [5.] For, by some act of a god, I had seated myself alone in the Apodyterium¹⁶ where you saw me : and I had it just in my mind to rise up ; but as I was rising up, there was the accustomed signal of my Genius. I therefore sat down again ; and soon after those two, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, entered, and with them many others, disciples, it seemed to me ; and having entered, they sauntered about in the covered course (of the gymnasium). But they had not yet gone two or three rounds, when Clinias entered, who you say, and say truly, has made a great progress. Behind him there were many others his lovers, and Ctesippus too, a youth of the district of Pæanea,¹⁷ very beautiful and good naturally, except that he was saucy in consequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, seeing me from the entrance sitting alone, came straight towards me, and sate down on my right hand, as you say. [6.] And Dionysodorus and Euthydemus perceiving him, at first stopped and conversed with each other, looking at us on this side and on that—for I beheld them very attentively—and then advancing, they sate down, Euthydemus by the youth, and the other (Dionysodorus) by me, on my left hand. The rest seated themselves just as each happened to do. These therefore I embraced, not having seen them for some time. After this, I said to Clinias, These men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, O Clinias, are wise not in small but in great things. For they know every thing pertaining to war, (and) whatever he, who would be a good general, ought (to know), the arrangement and management of encampments,¹⁸ and whatever is to be taught for engaging with weapons ;¹⁸ and they know too how

¹⁶ That part of the gymnasium, in which those who bathed or exercised put off their clothes.

¹⁷ One of the districts into which Athens was divided.

¹⁸ From the omission of these words, not found in the version of

to render a person able to assist himself in courts of justice, when any one injures him. [7.] For thus speaking, however, I was held in contempt by them; and both therefore laughed, looking at each other. And Euthydemus said, We no longer engage in these matters as being serious, Socrates, but as of secondary moment. And I being astonished said, Your (serious) studies must indeed be beautiful, if such great affairs are of secondary moment with you. Now by the gods inform me, what is this beautiful study (of yours).—We think, Socrates, said he, that we are able of all men to teach virtue in the best and quickest manner.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a mighty thing are you telling! From whence did you get this windfall?¹⁹ I had hitherto conceived of you, for the most part, as I just now said, that you were very skilful in this,²⁰ to fight in arms; and this I have said respecting you. For when you first tarried here, I remember, you publicly boasted of this. But now, if in reality you possess this science, may you be propitious. For I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreating you to pardon²¹ what I have before said. But see, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, if you have boasted truly: for it is by no means wonderful, from the magnitude of the boast, that a person should disbelieve.—[8.] Rest assured, Socrates, that it is so, they replied.—I therefore consider you (said I) much more blessed in this possession, than is the great king²² in his empire. But tell me thus much, whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom? or how have you determined?—We are here, Socrates, for this very purpose, as being about to exhibit and to teach, if any one is willing to learn. But that all, who do not possess (wisdom), will be willing to learn, I am a guarantee: first, I myself (am willing), and next, Clinias here; and in addition to us, Ctesippus and all the rest here—and I pointed out to him the

Ficinus, it is evident that Taylor made his English translation not from the Greek, but the Latin merely.

¹⁹ The word *ἱρμαῖον* was applied to any thing of value found in the road, over which *Ἐρμῆς* was the presiding deity.

²⁰ So Routh, whom Heindorf and Stalbaum, strange to say, follow. But to me the words are perfectly unintelligible. For it is absurd to suppose that the speaker would himself explain *τοῦτο* by *ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι*.

²¹ It is evident that Socrates is speaking ironically. For otherwise he need not have prayed for pardon.

²² Of Persia: see *Meno*, § 11.

lovers of Clinias, who happened to be standing round us: for Ctesippus at that time was sitting at a distance from Clinias. And as it seemed to me,²³ Euthydemus, while he was discoursing with me, did by his stooping forward darken Ctesippus's view of Clinias, who was seated in the middle of us. [9.] Ctesippus therefore wishing to see his boy-love, and at the same time curious to hear, was the first to leap up, and stood directly opposite to me. Thus too the rest, when they saw him do so, stood around us, both the lovers of Clinias, and the friends of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. I therefore, pointing them out to Euthydemus, informed him they were all ready to learn. And Ctesippus and the rest very readily assented; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wisdom. I therefore said, Do, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, by all means gratify these persons, and exhibit your wisdom for my sake. Now to demonstrate the most of the things pertaining to this subject will, it is evident, be no small labour; but tell me this, whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already persuaded that he ought to be instructed by you, or him also, who is not yet persuaded, through his not believing that virtue is a thing to be learnt, or that you are the teachers of it. Come then, (say,) is it the business of the same art, to persuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are the persons from whom one could learn it the best; or is it of another?—[10.] It is (the business), Socrates, said Dionysodorus, of the very same (art).—You therefore, Dionysodorus, said I, can, the best of all men now existing, exhort to philosophy and the study of virtue.—We think we can, Socrates.—Of other things put off, I said, for another time the exhibition, but show us this now. Persuade this youth that he ought to philosophize, and study virtue; and gratify me, and all these here. For this has happened to him, that both I, and all these, are desirous for him to become the best (of men). He is the son of Axiochus, who is descended from the Alcibiades of olden times, and the cousin of now-living

²³ Vulg. *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ὥς*, words which have puzzled not a little the modern editors; and so perhaps they did Ficinus, who has omitted *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν*. Taylor's version, which leads to *ὥς δ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ*, will seem perhaps to some to solve the difficulty. Stalbaum translates *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν*, "as far as I remember," a meaning those words never have and could not have.

Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is still young, and we have a fear about him, as is reasonable in the case of a youth, lest some one should anticipate us, and by turning his mind to some other pursuit, corrupt it. [11.] You are therefore come most opportunely; and, if it makes no difference to you, make a trial of the youth and converse with him before us.—When I had thus spoken nearly these very words, Euthydemus replied with courage, and even with confidence, It makes no difference, Socrates, if the youth is but willing to answer.—Nay, I replied, he is accustomed to do this. For frequently do these coming ask many questions of, and discourse much with him, so that he is sufficiently bold to answer.²⁴

But how, O Crito, shall I narrate to you correctly what occurred after this? For it is no trifling labour to be able to take up and go through wisdom so boundless. So that I am compelled, as poets are, in beginning the tale, to invoke the Muses and Mnemosyne. Euthydemus, then, began, I think, after some such manner.—Whether, O Clinias, are the men who learn, the wise or the unwise? [12.] But the youth, through the greatness of the question, blushed, and being at a loss, looked at me. And I, perceiving he was flurried, said, Cheer up, Clinias, and answer boldly whatever seems good to you; for perhaps you will be benefited²⁵ to the greatest extent. Whereupon Dionysodorus, bending a little towards my ear, and with a smile on his countenance, said, I tell you beforehand, Socrates, that in whatever manner the youth may answer, he will be confuted. While he was thus speaking, Clinias happened to give an answer, so that it was not possible for me to exhort the youth to be on his guard. And he answered, that the wise are those who learn. Euthydemus, therefore, said, Do you call certain persons teachers, or not?—He admitted he did.—[13.] Are not then teachers the teachers of those that learn? As, for instance, a harper and a grammarian were the teachers of you and other boys, and you were their disciples.—He assented.—When you

²⁴ The Greek is at present, ὥστε ἐπιεικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνισθαι. But since Ficinus translates, "quocirca consentaneum est, ut respondere audeat," he probably found in his MS. ὥστε ἔστιν εὐκὺς θαρρεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνισθαι, "So that it is likely he will have the boldness to reply."

²⁵ The Greek is ὥφελεῖ. Ficin. "juvabit." From whence Buttmann suggested ὥφελήσῃ, the fut. middle in the sense of the fut. passive, ὥφελήθησῃ.

learned, therefore, you did not know what you were learning.—I did not.—Were you then wise, when you were ignorant of these things?—By no means.—If then you were not wise, you were ignorant?—Entirely.—You then, when learning what you did not know, learned them as being ignorant?—The youth nodded assent.—The ignorant therefore learn,²⁶ O Clinias, and not the wise, as you think.—On his saying this, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, just like a chorus on a signal given by the ballet-master, made a great uproar and laughed. And before the youth could recover his breath, Dionysodorus, taking him up, said well and cleverly²⁷—But, Clinias, when the grammarian says any thing by word of mouth, are the boys who learn what he so gives out, the wise or the unwise?—The wise, said Clinias.—[14.] The wise therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and you did not rightly just now answer Euthydemus.—On this, the admirers of these men laughed very loudly and made an uproar, struck with their wisdom; but the rest of us were amazed and remained silent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our amazement, that we might yet still more wonder at him, did not let the lad go, but kept interrogating him; and, like skilful dancers, twisted his inquiries about the same thing in a double (maze),²⁸ and said, Whether do learners learn what they know, or what they do not know? And again Dionysodorus said to me in a whisper, This also, Socrates, is just such another question as the former.—O Jupiter, said I, even the former question appeared to be honourable to you.—We always ask, said he, Socrates, such-like questions, from which there is no escape.—[15.] Hence you appear to me, said I, to be in high repute amongst your disciples. In the mean time Clinias gave an answer to Euthydemus, that learners learn what they do not know. And Euthydemus interrogated him in the same manner as before.—Do you not, said he, know your letters?—I do.—Do you

²⁶ Bekk. *οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἄρα μαρβάνουσι*. But after *ἄρα* two MSS. insert *σοφοί*, which Winckelmann first adopted, and after him Stalbaum. Why they did so is beyond my comprehension.

²⁷ These words Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Stalbaum refer to *ἀναπνεῦσαι*. But Winckelmann more correctly, with Ficinus, to *τελεξάμενος*.

²⁸ Winckelmann was the first to remark, that in *διπλᾶ* there is an allusion to a so-called kind of dance, mentioned by Hesychius. Perhaps it was something like the modern waltz.

not then know all?—He acknowledged it.—When therefore any one recites any thing, does he not recite letters?—He confessed it.—Hence he recites, said he, something of what you know, if you know all (the letters).—This also he acknowledged.—What then, said he, do you not learn that, which some one recites?—He assented.²⁹—But do you learn,³⁰ not knowing your letters?—I do not, (said he,) but I learn, having known them.³¹—Do you not therefore learn what you know, if you know all the letters?—He acknowledged it.—Hence, said he, you have not answered rightly.—This had been spoken not violently³² by Euthydemus, when Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse, as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as at a mark, and said, Euthydemus is deceiving you, Clinias. [16.] For tell me, is it not to learn, to receive the science of that which any one learns?—Clinias assented.—But, to know, said he, is it any thing else than to possess science?—He acknowledged (it was nothing else).—To know not, then, is to not possess science.—He assented to this.—Whether then are the receivers of a thing, they who possess it already, or they who do not possess it?—They who do not possess it.—Have you not then confessed that they who do not know, are among those who do not possess?—He nodded assent.—They that learn, then, belong to those that receive, and not to those that possess.—He granted it.—They therefore, Clinias, he said, learn, who know not; and not they who know. After this Euthydemus rushed to the third, as it were, wrestler-fall, being about to throw³³ down the youth. But I, seeing the lad just sinking, and wishing to give him a respite, lest he should exhibit cowardice before us,³⁴ said, in order

²⁹ This answer is wanting in all the MSS. except the one used by Ficinus, who translates "Assensus est."

³⁰ The Greek MSS. read, ὁ δὲ—μανθάνει. Ficinus' version is "discis," i. e. σὺ δὲ—μανθάνεις.

³¹ The word εἰδώς was altered by Routh into ἡ δ' ὅς, but both seem to be required, or rather, what Plato perhaps wrote, ἡ δ' ὅς, εἰδώς τὸ εἶδος, μανθάνω, "I learn, said he, having known their shape."

³² I cannot understand σφόδρα τι. Ficinus has "Vix autem—"

³³ Steph. καταλαβόν. Heindorf suggested καταβαλόν, adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum. But Winckelmann prefers the old reading. For he saw that Heindorf's conjecture would make the collocation of the words very disjointed.

³⁴ This seems to be the meaning of ἡμῖν ἀποδουλιᾶσαι. But the passage is probably corrupt.

to console him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if these discourses appear to you to be unusual.³⁵ [17.] For perhaps you do not perceive what the two strangers are doing about you. They are doing the same, that persons do in the initiation of the Corybantes, when they make an enthronement for him whom they are about to initiate; for there takes place the leading out to dance and sports, (as I think you would understand)³⁶ if you had been initiated in these mysteries. And now these do nothing else but dance, and, as it were, sportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the first part of the sacred rites of sophists. For, in the first place, as Prodicus says, it is necessary to learn the proper signification of words; which these strangers exhibit to you, because you have not perceived that men apply "to learn" to a thing of this kind, when any one, having at first no knowledge respecting a thing, afterwards receives the knowledge of it; and when any one, having this knowledge, does by this very knowledge look into the very same thing, either while being done or being said. But they rather call this "to comprehend" than "to learn;" although sometimes they call it "to learn." But this, as they show, has lain hid from you, that the same word is applied to persons affected in a contrary manner, both to him who knows, and to him who does not know. [18.] Similar to this is that which was in the second question; in which they asked you, whether men learn what they know, or what they do not. These indeed are the playthings of learning. Hence I say that these men are playing with you. But I call these a plaything on this account; because, although some one may learn many, or even all such particulars as these, yet he would not in any respect know better how things exist. However, by the difference of words he may play with men, tripping up and overturning what they assert; just as they do, who, drawing away the stools from under those, who are going to

³⁵ There is evidently something wrong here. For the reasonings of the two sophists more than seemed to be unusual. They were really so. Hence Winckelmann adopted from five MSS. *ἀληθείς* for *ἀθηθείς*, to which Stalbaum objects; for he did not see that the train of thought required—"Do not wonder if these unusual reasons appear to be true."—In Greek, *Μὴ θαύμαζε, εἰ σοι φαίνονται ἀληθείς ἀθηθείς οἱ λόγοι*.

³⁶ There is nothing in the Greek to answer to the version of Ficinus, "Intelligere hæc te arbitror," words absolutely necessary for the sense.

sit down, are delighted and laugh, when they see him whom they have overturned lying on his back. Consider therefore what has happened to you from these men as fun. But what is to follow, it is clear, they will exhibit to you as serious concerns; and I will be their guide, that they may give what they promised me. For they said they would exhibit their exhortatory wisdom: but now, it appears to me, they have thought it was requisite first to play with you.

[19.] Thus far therefore, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, let it have been made a sport by you; and there is perhaps enough of it. But in the next place exhort the lad, and show how he must pay attention to wisdom and virtue. But first I will point out to you how I understand the matter, and what I desire to hear concerning it. If, then, I shall appear to you to do this in a simple and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me; for, through a desire of hearing your wisdom, I will venture for a time to speak before you off-hand. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your disciples, without laughing: but do you, O son of Axiochus, answer me.—Do we not all then wish to do well? Or is this question one of the ridiculous, of which I was just now afraid? For surely it is stupid to ask questions of this kind; for who is there that does not wish to do well?—There is no one that does not, said Clinias.—[20.] Be it so, said I.—But in the next place, since we wish to do well, in what manner shall we do well? Shall we say, if we have many good things? Or is this answer still more stupid than the former? for it is evident that this also must be the case.—He assented.—But come, what are the things, of those that exist, good for us? Or does it appear to be a thing neither difficult, nor belonging to a solemn person,³⁷ to be at no loss³⁸ in this? For every one will tell us that it is good to be rich; will they not?—Certainly, said he.—And is it not also (good) to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be sufficiently furnished with other things pertaining to the body?—So it appeared to him.—But nobility also, power, and honours, in one's own country are plainly good.—He ad-

³⁷ Ficinus translates *σεμνοῦ* by "elegant ingenio. Stalbaum, by "excellētis." Heindorf says it is the same as *οὐ φαύλου*. I suspect there is some error here.

³⁸ Stalbaum, with Winckelmann, prefers *εὐπορεῖν*, found in two MSS., to *εὔρεῖν*.

mitted it.—What then, said I, yet remains for us among things good? Is it to be temperate, just, and brave? Whether, by Jupiter, Clinias, do you think that we shall put down these things properly, if we consider them as good? or if we do not? for perhaps this may be disputed by some one. But how does it appear to you?—That they are good, said Clinias.—[21.] Be it so, said I; but in what part of the chorus shall we place wisdom? among things good? or how say you?—Among things good.—But consider lest among things good we omit what is worthy of mention.—But, said Clinias, we appear (to have omitted) nothing.—However, I recollecting said, But, by Jupiter, we appear to have nearly omitted the greatest of things good.—What is that? said he.—Felicity, Clinias; which all men, and even the very bad, say is the greatest good.—What you say is true, said he.—And I again, correcting myself, said, We have nearly, both I and thou, son of Axiochus, rendered ourselves ridiculous to these strangers.—How so? said he.—Because, having placed felicity in the things we before enumerated, we now again speak of it.—But why is this (improper)?—It is surely ridiculous to adduce that again, which was formerly proposed, and to say the same things twice.—[22.] How do you mean? said he. Wisdom, I replied, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.—And he indeed was astonished, so young and simple is he. And I, perceiving his astonishment, said, Do you not know, Clinias, that as regards the felicity of flute-playing, flute-players are the most happy?—He admitted it.—Are not then, said I, grammarians also (most happy) as regards (the felicity of) writing and reading?—Certainly.—But what, as regards the dangers of the sea, do you think that any one, so to say generally, are more happy than wise pilots?—Certainly not.—Again, With whom would you, when in the army, more readily share in danger and fortune? with a clever, or ignorant general?—With a wise one.—And under whom would you, when you are dangerously ill, more readily be? under a clever or ignorant physician?—Under a clever one.—Is it not therefore, said I, because you think that you would do better, by acting with a wise person than an ignorant one?—He granted it.—Wisdom, then, every where renders men happy; for surely no one can ever err through wisdom; but through this he must act rightly, and obtain (his end): for otherwise it

would not be wisdom.—[23.] At length, I know not how, we summarily agreed that this was the case; that, to whom wisdom is present, to him nothing of felicity is wanting.

After we had agreed on this point, I again asked him, how with regard to us would be what had been previously admitted? For, said I, we admitted that if many good things were present with us, we should be happy and do well.—He assented to this.—Should we then be happy through present good, if it did not benefit us, or if it did?—If it benefited us, said he.—Would then any thing benefit us, if we only possessed it, but did not use it? As, for instance, if we possessed much food, but did not eat it; or drink, but did not drink it; could we be benefited at all?—Certainly not, said he.—But if all artificers had every thing requisite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not use them, when thus procured, would they do well [through the possession]³⁹ merely, because they possessed every thing which an artificer ought to possess? Thus, if a carpenter had all kinds of instruments and wood prepared for him in sufficiency, but yet should fashion nothing, would he be benefited at all from the possession?—By no means, said he.—[24.] But what, should any one possess wealth, and all such things as we now denominate good, and should not use them, would he be happy through the possession of these goods?—He certainly would not, Socrates.—It is necessary then, said I, as it seems, that he, who is to be happy, should not only possess good things of this kind, but should likewise use them.—You speak truly.—Is not then, Clinias, the possession and the use of good sufficient to make any one happy?—It appears so to me.—Whether, said I, if any one uses good things properly, or if he does not?—If he uses them properly.—You say correctly, said I, for I think the evil is greater if a person uses any thing whatever not correctly, than if he lets it alone. For the former is wrong; but the latter is neither right nor wrong; or do we not say so?—He assented.—What then? In the workmanship and use of things pertaining to wood, is there any thing else that produces a right use than the science of

³⁹ These words are evidently a needless repetition; or else we must adopt what Ficinus found in his MS., and thus translated into Latin, "Num bene agent propter ipsam duntaxat possessionem eorum, quæ ad perfectionem operis requiruntur."

a carpenter?—Certainly not, said he.—So too, in the workmanship relating to vases, it is science which causes for them a right (use).⁴⁰—He admitted it.—[25.] Whether then, said I, with respect to the use of those goods which we first mentioned, wealth, health, and beauty, is it science, leading and directing properly action, which enables us to use every thing of this kind properly, or is it any thing else?—It is science, said he.—Science, then, imparts to men in possession and action, not only happiness, but, as it seems, likewise the well-doing.—He confessed it.

Is there then, said I, by Jupiter, any advantage to be derived from other possessions, without prudence and wisdom? Will a man be benefited, who, without intellect, possesses many things, and performs many actions? or, with intellect, possesses and performs a few? Consider it thus. Will he not, by doing less, err less? and erring less, will he not act less improperly? And acting less improperly, will he not be less miserable?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether then will he perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?—Being poor, said he.—And whether being weak or strong?—Being weak.—Whether also, being honoured or dishonoured?—Being dishonoured.—And whether, being brave and temperate,⁴¹ will he do less, or being timid?—Being timid?—[26.] (Will not then this happen) if he is indolent rather than active?—He admitted it.—And if he is slow, rather than quick? and if he sees and hears dully, rather than quickly?—In every thing of this kind we agreed with each other.—And to crown all, I said, it very nearly appears, Clinias, that, with respect to all the things which we first asserted to be good, the conclusion is not about this, that they are, taken by themselves, good naturally, but, as it seems, that they exist in this manner; that if ignorance guides them, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of ministering to that evil leader; but that if prudence and wisdom lead them, they are greater goods; but that taken by themselves, neither of them is of any worth.—It appears,

⁴⁰ In the Greek, after τὸ ὁρθῶς, Stalbaum thinks χρῆσθαι, found just above, is to be supplied. So Ficinus has "rectum usum scientia præstat."

⁴¹ As there is nothing in the reply of Clinias corresponding to "and temperate," it is evident there are either too many words in the question, or too few in the answer.

said he, to be as you say.—What then, from what has been said, takes place to us? Is it any thing else than this, that not one of the other things is either good or evil, but that of these, being two, wisdom is a good but ignorance an ill?—He assented.

Let us then, said I, consider further, what still remains. Since we all of us are eager to be happy, and we appear to become such from using things, and from using them rightly, and science affords the correctness (of use)⁴³ and felicity, it is requisite, as it seems, that every man should by all possible means endeavour to become most wise; or is it not so?—It is so, said he.—[27.] And he ought to think⁴³ that he receives this from his father, guardians, friends, and the rest, who profess themselves to be his lovers, much more than wealth; and to beg and pray strangers and fellow-citizens to impart wisdom, is in no respect base; nor is it reprehensible, Clinias, for the sake of this, to act the minister and slave to a lover and to every man, and to willingly serve him in any honourable service whatever, through an ardent desire of becoming wise. Or does it not appear so to you? said I.—You appear, said he, to me to speak very well.—If, said I, Clinias, wisdom can indeed be taught, and does not exist of its own accord among men. For this is yet to be considered by us, and has not yet been assented to by me and you.—But to me, said he, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.—And I, being delighted, said, you speak beautifully, O best of men; and you have done well in liberating me from a long inquiry about this very thing, whether wisdom can, or cannot be taught.⁴⁴ [28.] Now therefore since it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and prosperous, would you say that any thing else is necessary than to philosophize? And have you a mind to do this?—Entirely so, Socrates, said he, as much as possible.—

⁴³ The words "of use," have been inserted from Ficinus, "rectitudinem—usus." They are absolutely necessary to preserve the train of ideas.

⁴⁴ To explain this difficult passage, which he says is perfectly sound, Stalbaum, after Heindorf, gives a version of what is not in the Greek text.

⁴⁵ As the object of the Meno is to inquire whether virtue can or cannot be taught, it is probable that this dialogue was written about the same time as that.

And I, delighted to hear this, said, My pattern, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory discourses, such as I desired them to be, is of this kind, like a common person's perhaps, and stated at length with difficulty: but let whichever of you is willing, do this very thing according to art, and exhibit it to us. But if you are not willing to do this, show to the lad in order, from the point where I left off, whether he ought to get every science, or whether there is one, which, when he gets it, he will necessarily be a happy and good man; and what that science is. For, as I said in the beginning, it is of great consequence to us that this youth should become wise and good.

[29.] This then, Crito, did I say; and I paid very great attention to what followed, and considered after what manner they would handle the discourse, and whence they would begin, while they were exhorting the youth to study wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus then, who was the elder of them, first began the conference; and all of us looked at him, as about to hear immediately some wonderful reasons; which indeed happened to us. For the man, Crito, commenced an admirable discourse, which it is proper for you to hear, as being an exhortation to virtue.

Tell me, Socrates, said he, and the rest of you, who express a desire for this youth to become wise, whether you are jesting when you make this assertion, or truly and seriously desire it?—It was then I perceived, that they thought we had been previously jesting, when we exhorted them to converse with the youth, and that on this account they too had been jesting, and had not been acting seriously by him. Perceiving this, I said still more strongly, that we were serious in a wonderful degree. And Dionysodorus said, See, Socrates that you do not (hereafter) deny what you now assert.—I have considered this, said I: for I shall never deny it.—[30.] What is it then, said he? Say you that you wish him to become wise?—Certainly.—But, said he, is Clinias now wise or not?—He says, not yet at all, and he is no braggart.—But do you, said he, wish him to become wise, and not be unlearned?—We acknowledged it.—Do you not then wish him to become what he is not; and to be no longer what he now is?—And I, on hearing this, was confused. But he, on my being confused, taking up the discourse, said, Since you wish him

to be no longer what he now is, you wish, as it seems, for him to perish. And yet such friends and lovers would certainly be of much worth,⁴⁵ who should consider it a thing of great moment for their boy-loves to perish. Ctesippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his love for the youth; and said, O Thurian stranger, if it were not rather rude to say so, I would say, On your head be the evil;⁴⁶ for knowing what do you falsely ascribe to me and the rest a thing of this kind, which I think it is unholy to assert, that I should be willing for this youth to perish.

[31.] But, said Euthydemus, does it appear to you, Ctesippus, that it is possible to speak falsely?—By Jupiter, said he, it does, unless I am mad.—Whether, when a person is asserting a thing about which there is a discourse, or when not asserting it.—When asserting it.—If then he asserts it, he does not say any thing else of things existing than what he asserts?—For how should he do otherwise, said Ctesippus?—But of existing things that, of which he speaks, is one apart from the rest.—Certainly.—Does he then, when he speaks of that thing, not speak of that which has a being?—Yes.—But he who speaks of that which is, and of existing beings, speaks the truth; so that if Dionysodorus speaks of beings, he speaks the truth, and utters nothing false against you.—He does so, said he; but he, who says this, added Ctesippus, does not speak, Euthydemus, of beings.—To this Euthydemus (replied), Are non-entities any thing else than things which are not?—They are not.—Therefore, non-entities are beings no where.—No where.—Is it possible then for any one to do any thing about non-entities, so as to make them to exist no where?⁴⁷—It does not appear to me, said Ctesippus, that he can.—[32.] What then? When orators speak to

⁴⁵ Unless this is said ironically, the sense would require, as Taylor translated, “of little worth”—in Greek, not *καίροι πολλοῦ*, but *καίροι οὐ πολλοῦ*.

⁴⁶ That is, “to perish.”

⁴⁷ This is the English for the Latin of Ficinus. The Greek is a mass of corruption, as Winckelmann has the honesty to confess. Stalbaum adopts the reading found in three MSS., *ὥστ' ἵκεῖνά γε Κλεινία ποιῆσαι* *ἂν*—and renders the passage thus: “Is it possible for any one to do any thing about non-beings, so that any person whatever may do to Clinias what does not exist?” But why there should be any allusion to Clinias he does not state. Besides, after *ποιεῖν* correct Greek requires not the dative but accusative.

the people, do they nothing?—They do something, he replied.—If, then, they do something, do they not also make something? Yes.—To speak, then, is to do and to make.⁴⁸—He assented.—But no one, said he, speaks of non-entities: for he would make something; but you have acknowledged that no one can make non-entities: so that, according to your reasoning, no one can assert things which are false; but if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks things which are true, and he speaks of entities.—By Jupiter, said Ctesippus, (it is so,) Euthydemus. Yet he speaks of entities after a certain manner, though not as they subsist.—How say you, Ctesippus? said Dionysodorus. Are there some who speak of things as they are?—There are indeed, said he; and these are men worthy and good, and who assert things which are true.—What then? said he; are not good things, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?—[33.] He conceded.—And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good speak of things as they are?—I do.—The good therefore, Ctesippus, said he, speak ill of evil things, if they speak of them as they are.—Truly, said he, by Jupiter, they do very much so of bad men, for example; among whom, if you are persuaded by me, you will be careful not to be numbered, lest the good should speak ill of you; because you well know that the good speak ill of the bad.—Do they not also, said Euthydemus, speak in high terms of great men, and in warm terms of the fervent?—Very much so indeed, said Ctesippus; of cold men therefore they speak coldly, and assert that they converse (frigidly).⁴⁹—You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive.—Not I, by Jupiter, said he; for, Dionysodorus, I love you; but I admonish you as my companion, and I endeavour to persuade you, never in my presence to so rudely assert, that I wish for the destruction of those on whom I set a great value.

[34.] I then, since they seemed to me to conduct themselves in a rather rude manner towards each other, had some fun

⁴⁸ On the difference between *πράττειν* and *ποιεῖν*, see Heindorf in Charmid. § 23, p. 163, A.

⁴⁹ This word Ficinus has alone preserved in his version,—"aiuntque disserere frigide." How strange that the recent editors should have failed to remark that *ψυχρῶς* was evidently wanting after *διαλέγεσθαι*. With the passage of Plato may be compared that of Aristoph. in Thesm. 168.

with Ctesippus, and said, It appears to me, Ctesippus, that we ought to receive from the strangers what they assert, if they are willing to give, and not to contend about a word. For if they can destroy men in such a manner, as to make them, from being wicked and senseless, good and wise, and this too whether they have discovered themselves, or learnt from some other person a corruption and destruction of this kind, so that having destroyed him who is wicked, they might afterwards exhibit him an honest man,—if they know how to effect this, and it is evident that they do know; for they say that their newly discovered art does make men good after being wicked,—we must therefore⁵⁰ consent to this. Let them destroy the lad, and make him and all the rest of us wise. But if you young men are afraid, let the trial be made on me, as if I were a Carian;⁵¹ since, though an elderly man, I am prepared to run the risk; and I deliver myself up to this Dionysodorus, as (Pelias⁵²) did to [Medea] the Colchian (woman). Let him destroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever (else) he pleases with me if he does but render me a good man. [35.] And Ctesippus said, I also, Socrates, am prepared to deliver myself to these strangers, if they wish, for them to flay me more than they flay at present, provided my skin does not end in a bladder, like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. Dionysodorus indeed here thinks that I am angry with him. I am not, however, angry; but I contradict what I think he has not well said against me. But do not, said he, my noble Dionysodorus, call contradiction reviling; for reviling is a different thing.

To this Dionysodorus replied, Do you, Ctesippus, compose your discourse, as if contradiction existed?—⁵³ Entirely, and very much so, said he; or do you, Dionysodorus, think that there is not contradiction? You could not, said he, prove that at any

⁵⁰ This "therefore" is manifestly absurd. After *εἰ πιστάσθων* we must write not *συγχωρήσωμεν οὖν*, but *συγχωρήσομεν* with two MSS. and omit *οὖν* with one. Stalbaum vainly defends *οὖν*.

⁵¹ As if I were a person of no value, as the Carians were said to be in war, and hence frequently captured and sold as slaves; when they were sometimes put to the torture, for the benefit of their masters.

⁵² From the mention of Medea, it is evident that in the words "boil me" Plato alluded to Pelias; who suffered himself to be cut up and boiled in a magic cauldron, in the vain hope of being made young again. The same story Cicero had in mind, *De Senectut.* § 23, "*nec me, tanquam Peliam, recoxent.*"

time, since you have heard no one contradicting another.⁵³—True, said he; but let us now hear, whether I can prove it to you by Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus. Could you give a reason for this?⁵⁴—By all means, said he.—What then? said he; are there words⁵⁵ for each of the things that exist?—Certainly, said he.—Whether, then, as each thing is, or as it is not?—As it is. [36.] For if you remember, Ctesippus, said he, we have just now shown that no one speaks of a thing as it is not. For no one is seen to speak of that which is not. But why this? said Ctesippus. Do you and I contradict the less?—Whether then, said he, shall we contradict, if we both of us pronounce⁵⁶ the word for the same thing, or shall we thus assert the same thing?—He admitted (we should).—But, said he, when neither of us gives the word for that thing, shall we then contradict? Or, (will it not follow,) that thus neither will have made any mention at all of the thing?—And this too he granted.—But, said he, when I pronounce the word for that thing, and you for some other thing, do we then contradict each other? Or do I then speak of that thing, but you do not speak of it in any respect whatever? And how can he, who does not speak of a thing, contradict him who does?

And Ctesippus indeed was then silent. But I, wondering at the reasoning, said, How say you, Dionysodorus? For, though I have heard this reasoning often, and from many, yet I have always wondered at it. For Protagoras and others still more ancient have made much use of it. But to me it always appears to be wonderful, through its subverting the reasoning of others and itself too. I think, however, that I

⁵³⁻⁵⁵ Such is the literal translation of this passage; out of which none of the editors have, either with or without alterations, been able to elicit an atom of sense.

⁵⁴ So Stalbaum translates. But *παρίχειν λόγον* is "to give a reason," while *ὑπάρχειν λόγον* is "to bear with a reason," or "a speech," as in Protag. p. 338, D., and Gorg. p. 465, A., quoted by Stalbaum himself. More correctly then did Taylor translate, "Can you bear a discourse." Routh explains the words *Ἡ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἀν τούτου λόγον*—"Would you answer me on this point?" and attributes the whole question to Dionysodorus, in which he is followed by Winckelmann and Stalb.

⁵⁵ Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *λόγοι*, has rendered it "*sermones rationesque*."

⁵⁶ Heindorf's conjecture, *λῆγοντες* for *γνόντες*, has been confirmed by two MSS. The fact is, that if *λόγος* be translated "word," the sense requires *λῆγοντες*: if "reason," then *γνόντες* must be retained.

shall learn its truth the best from you. [37.]⁵⁷ Is the reasoning then other (than this), that it is not possible to assert things which are false? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not? And that the speaker asserts things which are true, or does not assert?⁵⁷ He admitted it. Whether, then, is it not possible to assert things which are false, but possible to form a false opinion?—It is not possible, said he, to form even a false opinion.—There is then, said I, no such thing as a false opinion at all.—There is not, said he.—Neither then is there ignorance, nor are there ignorant persons. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were the power to speak falsely of things?—Certainly, said he.—But, said I, this is not possible.—It is not, said he.—Do you make this assertion, Dionysodorus, for the sake of talking, that you may say what is strange? or do you really think that no man is ignorant?—Confute, said he, the assertion. Is it possible, according to your assertion, to confute when no man speaks falsely?—It is not, said Euthydemus.—Neither did I, said Dionysodorus, order you to confute.⁵⁸ For how can any one order that, which does not exist?—O Euthydemus, I said, I do not clearly understand these clever and coherent assertions; but I have somehow a muddled perception of them. Perhaps then I shall ask something rather unpleasant; but do you pardon me. See then. [38.] For if it is neither possible to speak falsely, nor to entertain a false opinion, nor to be ignorant, neither is it possible for any one to err, when he does any thing. For

⁵⁷—⁵⁷ Here too is another passage, which Heusde was the first to confess had become confused. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, “Num sibi id vult sermo, ut falsa dicere impossibile sit, oporteatque illum, qui loquitur, vera proferre, vel omnino non loqui.”

⁵⁸ Heusde was the first to notice the difficulty here. For Dionysodorus had just before bid Socrates to confute. He, therefore, proposed to read, Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ὡς νῦν δὴ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐκέλεξαι, “Nor did I bid you, said he, as did Dionysodorus just now, to confute.” This emendation so simple has been rejected by Winckelmann, who fancies there is some nice distinction, which, however, he does not point out, between ἐκέλεξαι and ἐκέλευσαι: while Stalbaum, after asserting that the learned have vainly tortured their brains about the meaning, adds, not very wisely, that no one will easily discover, by conjecture, what Plato really wrote. He was then not aware, that there is a lacuna here, supplied in part by three MSS.: “And do you not order me now, Euthydemus, said I.—(No.) For how, said he, can one order that which does not exist?” In Greek, Οὐδὲ κελεύεις ἐπεὶ νῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς Εὐθύδημος; Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὅν πῶς ἂν τις, ἢ δ' ὅς, κελεύσαι;

the doer cannot err in what he does. Do you not say so?—Just so, said he.—This then, said I, is the unpleasant question. For if we do not err, either acting, or speaking, or thinking, if this be the case, of what, by Jupiter, are ye come as the teachers? Did you not just now say, that you could, the best of all men, impart virtue to a person willing to learn?—Then said Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse, Are you such a crone,⁵⁹ Socrates, as to remember now what we first said, and would even now remember any thing I said last year, yet do not know how to use what has been said at present?—For (the words), said I, are difficult (to understand), and very reasonably so; for they are spoken by wise men; since it is very difficult to make use of the last words you are saying. For what do you mean, Dionysodorus, by the expression, “I know not how to use”? Does it not mean this, that I do not know how to confute it? Since,⁶⁰ tell me, what other conception do you form of these words, “I do not know how to use the words.”—[39.] But what you say, said he, this is very difficult to use. Since⁶⁰ answer.—(What,) before you have answered Dionysodorus? said I.—Will you not answer? said he.—Is it just? (said I).—It is certainly just, said he.—For what reason? said I. Or is it plain that it is for this; because you, a very wise person in words, have now come to us, and know when you ought to answer, and when not; and now you will not answer a jot, as knowing that you ought not.—You are a babbler, said he, and are careless in answering. But, my good man, be obedient and answer; since you acknowledge that I am a wise man.—I must yield then, said I, and, as it seems, to necessity; for you are the ruler. Ask, then.—Whether then do things that have a soul understand? or soul-less things also?—Those that have a soul.—Do you know then, said he, any word that has a soul?—Not I, by Jupiter.—[40.] Why then did you just now ask me, what my word understood?⁶¹—For what else, said I, than because

⁵⁹ The English “crone” is evidently derived from the Greek κρόνος, by which was meant “an old fool,” as shown by Aristoph. Νεφ. 926, Σφηκ. 1458. Winckelmann, however, still sticks to κενός, found in all the MSS. but two.

⁶⁰—⁶⁰ In these two places, “since” is perfectly absurd, although not noticed by any editor. In fact, the whole passage is a mass of corruption, arising chiefly from interpolations.

⁶¹ In the original, ὃ, τι μοι νοοῖ τὸ πῆμα, literally, “what my word

I have erred through my stupidity : or, did I not err, but rightly said this too, when I asserted that my words understood? Whether then will you say that I did err, or I did not? For if I have not erred, neither will you confute, although you are a wise man; nor have you the power to make use of my assertion; but if I have erred, neither thus do you speak rightly, in saying that it is not possible to err. And I say this not in opposition to what you asserted last year. But this discourse, said I, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, seems to remain in the same state, and still, as of old, having thrown down others, to fall itself; nor for this not to happen has it been discovered even by your art, and this too so wonderful for the accuracy of reasoning.—Ctesippus then said, You certainly say wonderful things, O men of Thurii or Chios, or from whatever place you are, and by whatever name you delight to be called; as you care not to talk wildly.—[41.] And I, fearing lest reviling should take place, again softened down Ctesippus, and said, What I told Clinias just now, I say also, Ctesippus, to you, that you do not know the wisdom of these strangers how wonderful it is. They are, however, unwilling to exhibit it to us seriously; but are imitating Proteus the Egyptian⁶² sophist, and deceive us by their sorcery. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus,⁶³ and not separate ourselves from the men, till they have thoroughly shown us on what point they are serious; for I think that something of theirs very beautiful will appear, when they begin to be serious; and let us beg and exhort and pray them to exhibit themselves thoroughly.

It seems then good to me to again point out in what manner I prayed them to appear to me; for I will endeavour, as far as I can, to go through all in order⁶³ from where I then left off, that I may call them out to pity me; and that commiserating me on a tenter-hook and acting seriously, they may act seriously themselves. But do you, Clinias, said I, enable me to recollect from what point we broke off. [42.] As I

UNDERSTOOD for me," the words of Socrates are perverted by the sophist, that he might play on the verb "understand." TAYLOR.

⁶²—⁶³ Plato here, and in Euthyphr. p. 15, and Pseudo-Plato in Ion, p. 541, E., refer to Hom. Od. iv. 354.

⁶³ The word *πᾶν*, which is required by *ἐξῆς* and *διαλεῖν*, has been luckily preserved in three MSS.

think, we broke off some where there, when we acknowledged at last that we ought to philosophize; did we not?—Yes, said he.—But philosophy is a possession of knowledge; is it not so? said L.—Yes, said he.—By possessing then what knowledge, shall we rightly possess it? Is not this the simple fact, that (it is by possessing) that (knowledge) which will benefit us?—Certainly, said he.—Would it then benefit us at all, if we knew to know⁶⁴ by going about in what part of the earth the most gold had been dug?—Perhaps so, said he.—But formerly, I replied, this was our decision, that we should gain nothing, even though, without labour, and without digging the earth, all the gold (that exists) should be ours. So that if we knew how to make the rocks of gold,⁶⁵ even this knowledge would be nothing worth: for if we knew not how to use the gold, (its possession) would appear to be of no advantage. Or do you not remember? said L.—I remember very well, said he.—Nor, as it seems, will any advantage be derived from any other science, either relating to money matters or to medicine, or to any other, by which a person knows how to make any thing, but does not (know) how to use what he makes. Is it not so?—He assented.—Nor even if there were a science to make men immortal, without their knowing how to make use of such immortality, would there be, it seems, any advantage from it, if it is fair to infer any thing from what has been previously admitted.—In all these points we both agreed.

[43.] There is a need then, O handsome youth, of some science of such a kind, said I, as that there may concur in it both the power to make, and the knowledge how to use that which

⁶⁴ Not a single editor has seen the absurdity of the expression, *ἐπιστάμεθα γινώσκειν*, and still less that the sense requires *ἐπιστάμεθα γινώσκειν*, i. e. "knew to proclaim;" for the two words are constantly confounded, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 314, and I could now add not a few places more. Ficinus has merely "*si sciremus, quibus in terris aurum multum effodiatur.*"

⁶⁵ From this passage it would seem that in Plato's time some attempts had been made to discover the philosopher's stone; unless it be said that there is an allusion to the circumstance mentioned in the fragment of a comedy by Eubulus, called Glaucus, who, like Proteus, was a marine deity, and was feigned to say—"We once the sons of Cecrops did persuade To march out to Hymettus, and with arms In hand and three days' food against the ants; Since grains of molten gold had there appeared."

one makes.—It appears so, said he.—⁶⁶ We are far then, it seems, from being skilful lyre-makers, or from possessing any knowledge of that kind; for there the art that makes is on one side, and on the other the art that uses, (and there is a division about the same thing).⁶⁶ For the lyre-making and the harp-making (arts) differ very much from each other. Is it not so?—He assented.—Nor shall we, it is plain, require the flute-making art: for this is another such-like art.⁶⁷—He was of that opinion.—But, by the gods, said I, if we should learn the art of composing speeches, is this the art from the possession of which we should be happy?—I think not, said Clinias, taking up the (discourse).⁶⁸—Of what proof, said I, do you make use?—I see, said he, some speech-makers, who do not know how to use their own speeches that they make themselves, just as lyre-makers do with their lyres;⁶⁹ but here are others able to use the speeches which those have made, although unable to make speeches themselves. It is plain, then, that with respect to speeches, the art of making is separate from the art of using them.—[44.] You appear to me, said I, to give a sufficient proof that the art of speech-makers is not that art, by the possession of which a person would be happy; and yet I thought that here would appear the science, of which for a long time we have been in search. For to me those very speech-makers, Clinias, appear to be vastly wise, when I am in their company; and this very art

⁶⁶ After all the efforts of scholars to recover what Plato wrote, I confess my inability to understand a word of what is found in Staibaum's text. Ficinus has, "Permulum igitur abest, ut lyrarum fabros esse nos oporteat; talemque scientiam assequi. In his enim ars efficiens ab arte, quæ utitur, circa idem distinguitur:" which is precisely what the train of ideas requires.

⁶⁷ Instead of the sense contained in these words, Ficinus has more to the purpose—"Ea siquidem ab illa, quæ utitur, discrepat."

⁶⁸ Taylor omitted "taking up (the discourse)" answering to the Greek *ὑπολαβών*, because he found in the Latin of Ficinus no translation of that word; while all the more recent editors have failed to observe that *ὑπολαβών* is never, and could be never, introduced into a reply. There is some error here, which I will leave for others to correct. The remedy, I suspect, is not far off.

⁶⁹ Ficinus has, what is much more clear than the Greek, "perinde uti nesciunt, ac lyris fabri ipsi lyrarum, qui ad aliorum usus lyras construxerunt, quas et, qui illis utuntur, facere nesciunt," i. e. "just as lyre-makers themselves, who make lyres for the use of others, cannot use the lyres, which those, who use them, cannot make."

of theirs also appears to be something divine and elevated. This, however, is by no means wonderful. For it is a portion of the art of charming, and is but a little inferior to it; for the art of charming is that by which vipers,⁷⁰ and phalangia,⁷¹ and scorpions, and other wild animals, and even diseases are charmed; but this happens to be the charming and soothing of judges, and of persons assembling at public meetings, and of other mobs. Or are you of a different opinion?—I am not, said he; but it appears to me as you say.—Where then, said I, shall we yet turn ourselves? to what art?—I do not well see the way, said he.—But I think, said I, that I have discovered (the art).—What is it? said Clinias.—The art of a general, said I, appears to me, more than any other, to be that, by possessing which a person would be happy.—It does not appear so to me.—Why not? said I.—This is certainly a man-hunting art.—What then? said I.—[45.] No (part), said he, of the hunting art itself⁷² extends beyond hunting and getting into the hand; but when persons have got into their hands what they have hunted, they are not able to use it; but hunters and fishermen assign it to cooks. But on the contrary, geometers, astronomers, and those skilled in arithmetic—for these also are of the hunting art—for each of these⁷³ do not make diagrams, but find out things existing. As then not knowing how to use them, but only to hunt for them, they deliver up their inventions for those to make a bad use⁷⁴ of in dialectics—such at least of them as are not very stupid.—Be it so, I said, O most beautiful and most wise Clinias. But is such the case?—Certainly. And thus in the same manner, said he, generals, when they have taken a city or camp, deliver it over to statesmen; for they know not how to use the things they have taken; just as, I

⁷⁰ Routh quotes from Virgil, *Æn.* vii. 755, "*Vipereo generi et graviter spirantibus hydri Spargere qui somnos cantuque manuque solebat Mulcebatque iras et morsus arte levabat.*"

⁷¹ The phalangia were a kind of venomous animal, with many legs, like a spider.

⁷² Out of this corrupt passage no editor has yet been able to make any thing satisfactorily.

⁷³ Here too is another corrupt passage; where a future editor of Plato will find not a little to try his sagacity.

⁷⁴ This is the proper meaning of *καταχρησθαι*. Hence it is evident that Plato is speaking ironically. Otherwise he would have said *χρησθαι*.

think, the catchers of quails deliver them up to quail-feeders. [46.] If then, he said, we are in want of that art which, whether making or hunting, knows itself how to use what it possesses, and is such an art as will render us happy, we must, said he, instead of the general's seek out some other art.

Cri. What say you, Socrates? Did that lad talk thus?

Soc. Do you not think he did, Crito?

Cri. By Jupiter, I do not indeed. For I think if he had spoken thus, he would not have wanted either Euthydemus or any other man for his instruction.

Soc. But, by Jupiter, was it not Ctesippus that spoke thus? for I do not remember.

Cri. What, Ctesippus?

Soc. This, however, I well know, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who spoke thus. But, good Crito, was it not some divinity, who being present said these things? For I well know that I heard them.

Cri. It is so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and to me it appears very much so indeed, to have been some divinity. But after this, did you still search out any art? And have you discovered or not that, for the sake of which you made the search?

[47.] *Soc.* Whence, blessed man, did we discover it? But we were altogether a subject of laughter, like children that run after larks; for we continually thought we should immediately catch each of the sciences, but they were always flying secretly away. Why therefore should I speak to you about the majority? But when we came to the regal art, and thoroughly considered whether it is that, which imparts and works out happiness, here falling, as it were, into a labyrinth, when we thought we were now at the end, we again turned round in our course, and appeared to be at the beginning of our inquiry, and we wanted just as much (of the mark), as when we were first making the search.

Cri. But how did this happen, Socrates, to you?

Soc. I will tell you. For the art of the statesman and that of the king it has been determined by us are the same.

[48.] *Cri.* What then?⁷⁵

Soc. To this art then, as alone knowing how to make a proper use of things, have the general's art and the other arts

⁷⁵ This question is omitted by Ficinus.

(determined)⁷⁶ to give dominion over those works of which they are the mere artisans. This then clearly appeared to us to be the art we were seeking, and the cause of good conduct in a city; and really, according to the Iambic verse of Æschylus,⁷⁷ that it alone is seated in the stern of the city, directing, as by the rudder, all things, and commanding all persons to do all things useful.

Cri. Does not this then appear to you to be well said respecting this art?

Soc. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after this happened to us. For we were considering again somehow thus. Does that regal art, which rules over all, effect any thing for us or nothing? We said to each other that it certainly will. For would not you too assert this, Crito?

Cri. I would.

Soc. What then would you say is its effect? Just as if I should ask you, what effect does the physician's art produce in all the things over which it rules? Would you not say it is health?

Cri. I should.

[49.] *Soc.* And what does agriculture, your art, effect in all the things over which it rules? Would you not say that it affords us food from the earth?

Cri. I would.

Soc. And what does the regal art effect, while it commands every thing over which it rules? Perhaps you do not very well see your way.

Cri. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Nor do we, Crito. But thus much at least you know, that if it is that art, which we are seeking, it ought to be useful.

Cri. Certainly.

Soc. Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?

Cri. Necessarily so, Socrates.

⁷⁶ Heindorf says that ἔδοξαν may easily be supplied from the preceding ἔδοξε. He got the idea from Ficinus, who has inserted the verb "viderentur." But the arts could not be said to come to any determination. Plato wrote, I suspect, παραδιδόασαι, corrupted subsequently into παραδιδόναι.

⁷⁷ The passage alluded to is in S. Th. 2.

Soc. But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is nothing else than a certain science.

Cri. Yes, you did say so.

Soc. The other works then, which one may say belong to the statesman's art—but these would be many—for example, to make the citizens rich, free, and free from sedition—do not they all appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is necessary for this art to make men wise, and to impart knowledge, if it is to be that, which benefits and renders men happy.

[50.] *Cri.* It is so: and thus it was agreed upon by you, as you have narrated the discourse.

Soc. Does then the regal art make men wise and good?

Cri. What prevents it, Socrates?

Soc. Does it then make all men so, and good in all respects? And is it the art which furnishes every science, that of the carrier, of the carpenter, and all the other crafts?

Cri. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. But what science (does it furnish)? To what purpose do we employ it? For of no works, either good or evil, ought it to be the artificer, but to impart no other science than itself. Let us then say what it is; to what purpose we should use it. Are you willing, Crito, we should say it is that, by which we make others good?

Cri. Entirely so.

Soc. But in what will these be good, and to what purpose will they be useful? Or shall we still say that they will make others good, and that those others will make others so? However, they no where appear to us in what way they are good; because we have held in no honour the works, which are said to belong to the statesman's science. But in reality, there is, according to the proverb,⁷⁸ Corinthus the son of Jupiter; and as I have said, we are still equally, or even more, wanting towards knowing what the science is, which will make us happy.

Cri. By Jupiter, Socrates, you have come, it seems, to a great difficulty.

[51.] *Soc.* I myself then, Crito, since I had fallen into this difficulty, sent forth every kind of cry and entreated the

⁷⁸ By this proverb is meant a weariness from words repeated vainly. Its origin is rather obscure: see the Scholia here, and on Pindar Nem. vii. 154.

strangers, and called upon them, as if they were the Dioscuri,⁷⁹ to save us, both me and the lad, from the triple waves of the discourse; to be by all means serious, and seriously to show us what that science is, by the possession of which we may pass well through the remainder of life.

Cri. And was then Euthydemus willing to show you any thing?

Soc. How not? And he began, my friend, the discourse very magnificently thus. Whether, said he, Socrates, shall I teach you this science about which you formerly were at a loss, or show you that you possess it?—O blessed man, said I, are you able to effect this?—Certainly, said he.—Show me, then, by Jupiter, said I, that I possess it; for this is much easier than for a man so old to learn.—Come then, said he, answer me. Is there any thing which you know?—Certainly, said I; many⁸⁰ things, but trifling.—[52.] It is sufficient, said he. Does it then appear to you to be possible, that any thing which exists should not be what it is?—It does not, by Jupiter.—Did you not say that you knew something?—I did.—Are you not then knowing, if you know?—Certainly, in that very thing.—It makes no difference. But is it not necessary that you, being knowing, should know all things?—It is not, by Jupiter, said I, since there are many other things which I do not know.—If then you do not know a thing, you are not knowing?—Of that thing, friend, said I.—Are you not then, said he, less knowing? But you just now said, that you were knowing; and thus you are the very same person that you are,⁸¹ and again not the same person, according to the same things, (and)⁸² at the same time.—Be it so, I said, Euthydemus: for, according to the saying, “You rattle indeed very pretty.”⁸³

⁷⁹ The Dioscuri are Castor and Pollux, the sons of Leda by Jupiter, who were invoked by sailors when in danger during a storm. See the commentators on Horace, *Od.* I. 3. 2.

⁸⁰ As Socrates professed to know only that he knew nothing, Serranus justly found fault with *καὶ πολλὰ*. Nor has a single scholar, as far as I can learn, been able to get rid of the objection; although it were easy to do so by a very slight alteration.

⁸¹ Instead of “that you are,” the train of ideas seems to require “that you were,” in Greek, *ὅς ἦσθα*, not *ὅς εἰ*.

⁸² This “and” Taylor found in Ficinus “*simul et secundum eadem* :” which leads to *ἅμα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτά*. And thus the difficulty is overcome, at which Schleiermacher and others had stumbled, in *κατὰ ταῦτά ἅμα*.

⁸³ In lieu of *καλὰ εἴη πάντα λέγεις*, Stalbaum has edited *καλὰ δὴ πα-*

How then do I know that science which we were seeking? since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. If I know one thing, do I know all things? For I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time. And since I know all things, do I possess that knowledge likewise? Is this then what you say? And is this that wise thing?—You are, Socrates, said he, confuting yourself.—[53.] But what, said I, Euthydemus, are you not suffering the very same thing? For whatever I may suffer together with you and Dionysodorus here, O beloved head, I shall not take much to heart. Tell me, do you not know some things, and know not others?—By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.—How say you? said I. Do you then know nothing?—Certainly,⁸⁴ said he.—Do you then know all things, said I, since you know any thing whatever?—All things, said he.—And you too, if you know one thing, know all things.—O Jupiter! I replied, how wonderful and mighty a good you tell me has appeared. Do then all other men likewise know all things, or nothing?—They surely, said he, do not know some things, but do not know others:⁸⁵ and are at the same time knowing, and not knowing.—But how is this? said I.—All men, he said, know all things, if they know one thing.—O, by the gods! said I, Dionysodorus,—for it is now manifest to me that you are serious, though I with difficulty invoked you to be so,—do you in reality know all things? For instance, the art of a carpenter and a cobbler?—Certainly, said he.—And are you also able to stitch shoes?—I am, by Jupiter, said he, and also to mend them.—Do you also know

ταυτίς, the conjecture of Abresch, who refers the gl. in Hesych. and Photius, *κατά δὴ παραταυτίς*, to this passage; where Plato seems from the Scholia to have alluded to the *Γεωργοί* of Aristophanes.

⁸⁴ This answer ought to be, as Taylor translated it, "Far from it." But such is not the meaning of *καὶ μάλα*. Instead then of *οὐδέν* in the preceding question one would prefer *εὖ γ' ἔν*.

⁸⁵ To get rid of the tautology in the two portions of this answer, Stallbaum supposes that Dionysodorus speaks ironically; as if a direct answer could be ironical, as well as an indirect question. Ficinus has "Non enim dicendum videtur scire eos aliqua, nescire alia:" which seems to lead to *Οὐ γὰρ δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἴφη, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐπίστανται, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστανται*. But a Sophist should assert something decisive; not say merely *οὐ δὲ εἰπεῖν*. Winckelmann preserves *δῆπου* but reads *ἴφη*, and gives all the words down to "All men, he said," to Socrates. But Stallbaum correctly observes that *ἴφη*—*ἴφη*—*ἦν δ' ἐγώ*, could not be thus applied to the same person; nor could *ἀλλὰ τί* be found except in the speech of another party. Perhaps Plato wrote,—*ἴφη, οἷός' ὅτι τὰ μὲν*—

such things as these, the number of the stars and the sands?⁸⁶ —[54.] Perfectly so, said he. Think you, we should not confess that we do?—And Ctesippus then, taking up (the discourse), said, By Jupiter, Dionysodorus, show me some proof of these things, that I may know that you are speaking the truth.—What proof shall I show? said he.—Do you know how many teeth⁸⁷ Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?—Is it not enough, said he, for you, to hear that we know all things?—By no means, said he; but only tell us this one thing more, and show that you speak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you appear on our counting them to have known this, we will then believe you in other things likewise. They then, thinking they were mocked at, were unwilling (to comply), but acknowledged they knew all things, while they were questioned on each point singly by Ctesippus. For there was nothing which Ctesippus did not ask them without concealment, and at last even if they knew the most indecent things. And they, confessing that they did know, advanced most bravely against the questions, like wild boars pressing on against the blow; [55.] so that I too, Crito, was at length compelled myself through my incredulity to ask Euthydemus, whether Dionysodorus knew also how to dance? and he said, Perfectly so.—However, said I, he surely does not know how to act the tumbler upon swords,⁸⁸ and to be whirled on a wheel,⁸⁹ being so old. (Or,)⁸⁹ so far (towards) wisdom has he come?—There is nothing, said he, which he does not know.—But whether, said I, do you only now know all things, or have you always (known them)?—Always, said he.—And when you were children, and as soon as you were born, did you know?—All things, said both of them together.—To us

⁸⁶ Here seems to be an allusion to a philosopher, like Archytas, whom Horace addresses "Te maris et terræ numeroque carentis arenæ Mensorem."

⁸⁷ Porson on Aristoph. *Plut.* 1057, was the first to point out the similarity in the jokes of the comic poet and the philosopher; and Dobree the fragment of Lysias, quoted by Athenæus, to which he might have added Pseudo-Demetr. *de Elocut.* § 275.

⁸⁸ Feats, like those mentioned in the text, are said to be performed even now in the East. Routh refers to Xenoph. *Sympos.* 2, and Winckelmann to Anabas. v. 9.

⁸⁹ Heusde and Heind. insert ἢ, "or," which Stalb. incorrectly rejects.

the thing appeared to be incredible. But said Euthydemus, Do you disbelieve, Socrates?—Except, I said, that it is likely you are wise men.⁹⁰—But, said he, if you are willing to give me answers, I will also show you, giving your assent to these wonderful things.—Indeed, I shall⁹¹ most gladly, said I, be confuted on these points. For if I am wise, not knowing it, and you demonstrate this that I know all things, and have always (known), what greater wind-fall than this could I find in all my life?—Answer then, said he.—[56.] Ask me, as one that will answer.—Whether, then, Socrates, said he, do you know any thing or not?—I do.—Do you then know by that thing, through which you are knowing, or by any thing else?—By that by which I am knowing: for I suppose you mean the soul. Or do you not mean it?—Are you not ashamed of yourself, Socrates? said he. You ask a question when you are asked one.—Be it so, said I; but what shall I do? For I will do as you bid me. (But) when I know not what it is you ask me, you nevertheless order me to answer and not to ask a question.—You, doubtless, said he, understand what I say.—I do, said I.—Now then answer to that which you do understand.—What then, said I, if you ask a question, thinking in one way, and I understand it in another, and then I give an answer to it, is it enough for you, if I answer nothing to the purpose?—To me it would, said he, but not to you, I think.—I will not, by Jupiter, answer, said I, before I hear.⁹²—You will not answer, said he, to what you may happen to understand, because you are a trifler, and more of a silly old man than is becoming.—And I then perceived he was annoyed at me for defining precisely what was said, as he was desirous to make me his prey by placing his words around me (as a net). I recollected, therefore,⁹³ that Connus was always annoyed at me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid

⁹⁰ On this passage see Heind., Winckelm., Stalb., who all differ, without any of them being able to discover what Plato wrote.

⁹¹ Ficinus has "redargutio erit," which leads to ἐξελέγχομαι, fut. med., for ἐξελεγχθήσομαι, in lieu of ἐξελέγχομαι.

⁹² After "I hear," there is evidently an omission of some words, which Ficinus supplies by his version, "non prius respondebo, quam quomodo respondendum sit, intellexero," i. e. "I will not answer, before I understand how I am to answer."

⁹³ This "therefore" is without meaning. One MS. has γὰρ for οὖν. Plato wrote δ' αὖ—

less attention to me, as one that was ignorant. [57.] But since I had determined to go as a scholar to those men, I thought I ought to yield, lest they should consider me a stupid fellow, and not receive me as a scholar. Hence I said, If it seems good for you to act thus, Euthydemus, let it be done: for perhaps in every respect you, who possess the art, know better how to converse than I do, who am an unskilled individual. Question me then again from the beginning.—Answer then again, said he, whether you know what you know by something or not.—I do, said I, by the soul.—Again, said he, this man in his answer adds to the questions he is asked. For I did not ask by what you know, but if you know by any thing.—Again I said, I have answered more than was necessary, through my want of instruction; but pardon me. For I will now answer simply, that I know always by something, what I know.—But, said he, whether do you always know by the same thing? Or is it at one time by this thing and at another time by another?—Always by this, said I, when I know.—Again, said he, will you not cease to speak beside (the question)?—But (I fear, said I,) lest this “always” should trip us up.—It will not us, said he; but, if at all, it will you. But answer me, Do you always know by this?—Always, I said; since I must take away the “when.”—[58.] You therefore always know by this. And always knowing, whether do you know some things by that, by which you know, and other things by something else? or do you know all things by that?—All things, said I, which I know, by that.—This has come, said he, the same by-answer.—I take away then, said I, the words “which I know.”—Take not away, said he, even one word; for I make you no request.⁹⁴—But answer me, Would you be able to know all things, unless you could know all things?—This would be a prodigy, said I.—Add now, said he, whatever you like; for you confess that you know all things.—I appear to have done so, said I; since the expression, “the things which I know,” possess no power whatever; [but I know all things].⁹⁵—Have you not then confessed that

⁹⁴ After “request” understand, “to take away any thing,” as shown by Phædon. p. 95, E., quoted appositely by Winckelmann, οὐδέν—οὐτ’ ἀρλεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι εἶμαι.

⁹⁵ Heindorf correctly wished to expunge the words πάντα δὲ ἰστέμαί, which Winckelmann and Stalbaum vainly attempt to preserve. For they plainly interfere with the whole train of thought.

you always know by that thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in whatever way you please: for you have confessed that you know always, and all things at the same time. It is evident, therefore, that you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begotten, and when you was born; and even before you was born, and before heaven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always possessed knowledge; and you,⁹⁶ by Jupiter, said he, will know always, and all things, if I wish it.—[59.] And may you wish it, much-honoured Euthydemus, said I, if you speak the truth in reality. But I do not quite believe that you are sufficient for this, unless this your brother here, Dionysodorus, assist you with his counsel: and thus perhaps you would be (sufficient).⁹⁷ But tell me, said I—for in other things I cannot contend against you, men of such portentous wisdom, (nor say) that I do not know all things, since you assert it—how, Euthydemus, shall I say that I know that good men are unjust? Come, tell me, do I know this, or do I not know it?—You certainly know it, said he.—What, said I, (do I know)?—That good men are not unjust.—This, I said, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I am not asking this; but where did I learn that good men are unjust?—No where, said Dionysodorus.—I do not therefore, said I, know it.—Euthydemus then said to Dionysodorus, You are destroying the reasoning; and this man will appear to be not knowing, that he is at the same time both knowing and not knowing. [60.] And Dionysodorus blushed. But, Euthydemus, said I, how say you? Does not your brother, who knows all things, appear to you to speak correctly?—But am I the brother of Euthydemus? said Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse.—And I said, Leave me alone, my good man, till Euthydemus shall have taught me how I know that good men are unjust; and do not begrudge me the lesson.

⁹⁶ Bekker has *καὶ καὶ μα Δ', ἐφη, αὐτὸς δὲ*—Heindorf was the first to object to *αὐτὸς*, and to suggest *εὐθὺς δὲ αὐ.*—Stalbaum prefers *αὐθὺς δὲ*.—Winckelmann unites *αὐτὸς* with *καὶ*, "and even you yourself—"

⁹⁷ Stalbaum omits the words *οὐκ οὐδὲν ἔχει*. He should have read, *οὐκ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἄν εἰς* scil. *ἰκανός*, by the aid of Ficinus, "Sic enim forte valebis." The ellipse, however, seems to be defended by *ἔχει ἄν*—in Sophist. p. 257, D., and *ἔχει ἄν οὐ μὴν*—in Phileb. p. 23, E., quoted by Winckelmann

—You are flying away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and are unwilling to answer.—And reasonably so, said I: for I am inferior even to either one⁹⁸ of you; so that I have a great need to fly from the two. For I am somehow far weaker than Hercules; who was not able to contend with the Hydra—a sophist that did by her wisdom, if one head of the discourse was cut off, send up again many instead of one—and at the same time with the Crab,⁹⁹ a certain other sophist, who, as it appears to me, had come recently from the sea; and when it was annoying Hercules on the left hand by speaking to and biting him, he called upon Iolaus, the son of his brother, to aid him; and he gave him sufficient aid. But if my Iolaus, Patrocles,¹⁰⁰ were to come, he would rather produce mischief.

[61.] Answer then, said Dionysodorus, since this tale has been sung by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.—It is then best for me, Dionysodorus, said I, to answer you. For you will not desist—of this I am pretty well certain—from asking questions, and grudging me (to learn), and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that wise thing.—Answer, however, said he.—I will answer then, said I, that Iolaus was the nephew of Hercules, but, as it appears to me, mine not at all. For my brother, Patrocles, was not his father; but Iphicles, who nearly resembles him in name, was the brother of Hercules.—But is Patrocles, said he, your brother?—Certainly, said I; for he had the same mother, though not the same father with myself.—He is then your brother, and not your brother.—I said, He was not from the same father, O best of men: for his father was Chæredemus, but mine Sophroniscus.—But, said he, Sophroniscus was a father, and Chæredemus (likewise).—Certainly, said I; the former was my father, and the latter his.—Was not then, said he, Chæredemus different from a father?—From my father, said I.—

⁹⁸ Instead of *ἑρίπων* Ficinus found in his MS. *ἐκρίπων*, as shown by his "alterutro."

⁹⁹ This contest of Hercules with the Crab is mentioned by Apollodorus in Biblioth. II. 5. 2, and Palæphatus Incredibil. fab. 39.

¹⁰⁰ To this brother of Socrates Winckelmann thinks there is an allusion in Aristoph. Plut. 84, where he is described as a person who had never washed himself from the time of his birth.

Was he then (said he) a father, different from a father? Or are you the same thing as the¹⁰¹ stone?—[62.] I fear, said I, lest under you I shall appear to be the same; but I do not think so myself.—Are you then, said he, different from the¹⁰¹ stone?—Different, certainly.—Being then something different from a stone, you are not a stone: and being different from gold, you are not gold.—It is so.—Will not Chæredemus then, since he is different from a father, be not a father?—It seems, said I, he is not a father.—For certainly, said Euthydemus, taking up the discourse, if Chæredemus is a father, and Sophroniscus, on the contrary, being different from a father, is not a father, so that² you, Socrates, are without a father.—And then Ctesippus, taking up the discourse, said, Is not your father in the very same predicament? for he is different from my father.—Very far from it, said Euthydemus.—Is he then the same? he replied.—Yes, the same.—I would not wish this. But whether, Euthydemus, is he my father alone, or the father of other men likewise?—Of other men likewise, said he. Or do you think that the same person, being a father, is not a father?—So I thought indeed, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he, (do you think) that a thing being gold is not gold? or (a person) being a man is not a man?—[63.] Say not so,³ said Ctesippus. According to the proverb, you do not, Euthydemus, join thread with thread.⁴ For you speak of a dreadful thing, if your father is the father of all.—But he is, said he.—Whether of men, said Ctesippus, or of horses too? or of all other animals likewise?—Of all (animals), said he.—Is your mother too the mother (of all)?⁵—Yes, the mother.—Your mother then, said he, is the mother

^{101—101} The article has no meaning here. The passage is corrupt, and may be corrected without much difficulty.

² This "so that," in Greek *ὥστε*, plainly proves that the hypothesis of the proposition is without its conclusion. There is another error too in *εἰ γὰρ δὴ πον*. For *δὴ πον* never follows *εἰ*, only *οὐ*. And hence Ficinus has "Haud—"

³ So Stalbaum renders *μὴ γὰρ*, as if *λέγε* were understood. But in this ellipse *γὰρ* never is, for it never could be, found.

⁴ This proverb was applied to those who say or do the same things through the same means, as remarked by the Scholiast; who quotes Aristotle, *Φυσικ. Ἀκροασ.* iii. 6. 9.

⁵ Ficinus alone has preserved, what no editor has yet remarked, the true readings here, as shown by his version, "An et mater tua mater omnium." The Greek is *ἡ καὶ μήτηρ ἡ μήτηρ*.

of sea-urchins.—And yours too, said he.—Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, and puppies, and little pigs.—And so are you, said he.—And besides this, your father is a dog too.—And so is yours, said he.—But, said Dionysodorus, if you would answer me, you would forthwith acknowledge these things. For tell me, have you a dog?—Yes, a very bad one, said Ctesippus.—Has he then puppies?—He has indeed, said he, others very much of the same kind (as himself).—Is not the dog then their father?—At least, I saw him having connexion with a bitch.—What then? Is he not your dog?—Certainly, said he.—Being a father then, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of puppies.—[64.] And Dionysodorus again, quickly taking up the discourse, that Ctesippus might not get a word in before him, said, Answer me still in a small matter. Do you strike this dog?—And Ctesippus said, laughing, By the gods, I do; for I cannot (strike) you.—You strike your father then, said he.—Much more justly, said he, should I strike your father, who, having endured what, has begotten such wise sons. But surely, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, your father and the father of the puppies has enjoyed many good things from this your wisdom. But neither is he in want of many good things, Ctesippus, nor are you.—Nor are you, Euthydemus, said he.—Nor is any other man (said he) in want of them. For tell me, Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good, when it is requisite; or when any one is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or unarmed?—To me, said he, (it appears);⁶ although I think that you are about to say some of your beautiful things.—[65.] You shall know the best, said he; but answer me. For since you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink medicine when it is requisite, is it not meet to drink as much as possible of this good, and will it not in this case be well there,⁷ if some one, bruising it, should mingle with it a cart-load of hellebore.—And Ctesippus said, This would be very proper indeed,

⁶ Here is evidently some omission. For to a double question there could not be a single answer.

⁷ Bekk. has *ἐκεί*, which, omitted by Ficinus, and Schleiermacher and Heindorf could not understand, is absurdly explained by Winckelmann, whom Stalbaum follows in ed. 2

Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the statue in Delphi.⁶—As therefore, said he, it is also good to have arms in battle, is it not meet to have a great number of shields and spears, since it is a good thing?—Very much so, said Ctesippus. But you are not of this opinion, Euthydemus; for you think that one (shield)⁷ and one spear are sufficient. Or do you not?—I do.—Would you, said he, arm Geryones too and Briareus in this manner? But I thought you were more skilful (than to do so), as being one who fights with a soldier's arms, and so too was this your friend.—And Euthydemus indeed was silent. But Dionysodorus asked, in reference to what had been before answered by Ctesippus, Does it not then appear to you to be good likewise to possess gold?—Certainly, said Ctesippus, and this too in plenty.—[66.] What then, does it not appear to you to be a good thing to possess riches always, and every where?—Very much so, said he.—Do you not then acknowledge gold likewise to be a good thing?—I have acknowledged it, said he.—Is it not then meet to possess it always, and every where, and especially in one's self? And would not a man be most happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his skull, and a stater of gold in each of his eyes?—They say indeed, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, that those amongst the Scythians are the most happy and the best men, who have much gold in their own skulls, just as you lately spoke of the dog being your own father: and, what is still more wonderful, they say, that they drink out of their own golden skulls, and look within them, having their own head in their hands.—[67.] Whether, said Euthydemus, do the Scythians and other men see things which can be seen, or things which cannot be seen?—Things, surely, which can be seen.—Do you then (do so) likewise? said he.—I do.—Do you then see our garments?—Yes.—Can then these things see?—Beyond all measure, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he.—Nothing. But perhaps you think you do not see them, so facetious are you; but to me you appear, Euthydemus, not sleeping to be asleep, and, if it were possible for a man, when speaking, to say nothing, to do this likewise.—Is it not then possible, said Dionysodorus, for him who

⁶ Of the statue alluded to it appears that nothing is told elsewhere.

⁷ The Greek word *ἀσπίς* is wanting in the text. Taylor supplied "shield" from the context. Ficinus has "unum duntaxat jaculum."

is silent to speak?—By no means, said Ctesippus.—Is it also impossible for him, who speaks, to be silent?—Still less so, said he.—When therefore you speak of stones, and woods, and things of iron, do you not speak of things silent?—I do not, said he, if I am walking in braziers' shops; but the pieces of iron are speaking, and make the greatest noise, if any one touches them. So that you know not that with (all) your wisdom you have said nothing. But further still, explain to me the other assertion, how it is possible for one who speaks to be silent.¹⁰—And Ctesippus appeared to me to be in great agony on account of his boy-love.—[68.] When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not silent as to all things?—I am, said he.—Are you not therefore silent as to things which speak, if things which speak¹¹ are among the number of all things?—But what, said Ctesippus, are not all things silent?—Certainly not, said Euthydemus.—Do then, thou best of men, all things speak?—The speaking things do.—But, said he, I do not ask this; but whether all things are silent, or speak?—They do neither, and they do both, said Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse. For I well knew, that you would not have any thing to say to this answer.—And Ctesippus, as was usual with him, laughing very loudly, said, Your brother, Euthydemus, has put his argument on both sides, and he has perished and is vanquished.¹² And Clinias was very much delighted and laughed; so that Ctesippus became ten times as great (as he was before). But Ctesippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have heard these things on the sly from these very men. For such kind of wisdom is not now possessed by any other persons. [69.] And I said, Why do you laugh, Clinias, at things so serious and beautiful?—What, Socrates, have

¹⁰ From the want of connexion it is evident that something has been lost here.

¹¹ Here Ficinus and a single MS. acknowledge λέγοντα in lieu of λεγόμενα, which Winckelmann has alone the hardihood to defend, at variance with the whole tenor of the passage.

¹² In the words "he has perished and is vanquished," there is either a tautology, or the cart is put before the horse. For the vanquishing ought to precede the perishing. The passage, as shown by the variations of MSS., is evidently corrupt, and may be easily mended by a critic of the least ingenuity. Heindorf would read ἀπολώλεκε καὶ ἡττηται, i. e. "it has destroyed and been vanquished," from the version of Ficinus, "eumque disperdidit, et ratio vestra succubuit."

you ever seen a beautiful thing? said Dionysodorus.—I have, said I, and many such, Dionysodorus.—Were they then, said he, things different from the beautiful, or the same with the beautiful?—And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had suffered justly for having grunted out a word. I said, however, they are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is present with each of them.¹³—If, then, said he, an ox is present with you, are you an ox? and because I now am present with you, are you Dionysodorus?—Say words of good omen, said I.—But after what manner, said he, if even one thing is present with another, will that which is different be different?—Are you then, said I, in a difficulty respecting this? For I have just now endeavoured to imitate the wisdom of the men,¹⁴ as being desirous of it.—How should I not doubt, said he, both I and all other men, of that which is not?—What do you say, said I, Dionysodorus? Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the base, base?—Provided, said he, it appears so to me.—Does it then appear so to you?—Entirely so, said he.—Is not likewise the same, same? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the same. And I thought that not even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. [70.] But this, Dionysodorus, you have willingly passed by;¹⁵ since in other respects, like the artists, on whom it is incumbent to work out each part in detail, you seem to me to work out a discourse in a thoroughly beautiful manner.—Do you know then, said he, what is proper for each artist? In the first place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in copper?—I know that this belongs to copper-smiths.—And to whom does it belong to fashion things in clay?—To a potter.—And whose business is it to cut a throat, to flay, and, cutting off small pieces of flesh, to boil and roast them?—It is the business of a

¹³ Respecting the notion that things are beautiful not in themselves but according to their adjuncts, see Hipp. Maj.

¹⁴ In "the men" the article has nothing to which it can be referred. Hence, since three good MSS. read τῶν ἀνθρώπων, Plato probably wrote τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, in allusion to the Sophists.

¹⁵ Heindorf perceiving that παρὶς could not mean here "passed by," renders it, "You have spoken rather carelessly." But no Sophist ever did or would speak carelessly. Plato wrote ἡπόρηκας, "you have doubted," an emendation so obvious, that even Winckelmann and Stalbaum, who have adopted Heindorf's translation, ought to have hit upon it.

cook, said I.—If then, said he, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?—Perfectly.—But it is proper, as you say, that a cook should cut a throat and flay. Have you assented to this or not?—I have assented, I said; but pardon me.¹⁶—It is evident, then, said he, that should any one cut the throat of the cook and chop him into small pieces, and boil and roast him, he would do what is proper; and should any one work like a brazier on the copper-smith himself,¹⁷ and like a potter on the potter, he too would do what is proper.—[71.] O Neptune, said I, now you put the Colophon¹⁸ on your wisdom. Will it then ever be present with me, so as to become familiar to me?—You will know it, Socrates, said he, when it becomes familiar to you.—This, said I, is evident, if you wish it.—But what, said he, do you think you know your own things?—Unless you say something else. For I must begin from you, and end with Euthydemus here.—Do you then, said he, consider those things yours, over which you have a power, and which you can use as you please, such as oxen and sheep? do you think that those are yours which it is lawful for you to sell, and to give away, and to sacrifice to whatever god you please; but that those, which are not so circumstanced, are not yours?—And I, for I knew that from the questions something beautiful would peep out, and at the same time I was desirous to hear as quickly as possible, said, It is perfectly so; things of this kind alone are mine.—But what, said he, do you not call those things animals, which possess a soul?—Yes, I said.—Do you acknowledge then, that those alone among animals are yours, to which you have the liberty of doing what I have just now mentioned?—I acknowledge it.—[72.] And he, pausing a while, as if reflecting upon something of great consequence, said with an assumed gravity, Tell me, Socrates, is there with you a paternal Ju-

¹⁶ Why Socrates should thus request pardon of the Sophist for asserting, it is difficult to explain; unless the clause be introduced a little below, after "your wisdom."

¹⁷ Stalbaum properly objects to this "himself;" which ought to be added to the cook and potter likewise, or else omitted entirely.

¹⁸ The origin of this proverb is explained by Strabo, xiv. p. 643, who says that the troops of the Colophonians were so excellent both by land and sea that a war always terminated in favour of the party on whose side they fought. See Erasmus on Adag. Chiliad, p. 570, and Ruhnken in Heusd. Specim. Crit. p. 33, on Thœtēt. p. 153, C.

piter?—And I suspecting that the discourse would come to the place where it ended, endeavoured to fly from a certain crafty turn, and now twisted myself,¹⁹ as if caught in a net ; and I said, There is not,²⁰ Dionysodorus.—You are therefore a miserable man ; nor are you an Athenian, since you have neither paternal gods, nor sacred rites, nor any thing else beautiful and good.—Hold, said I, Dionysodorus ; speak words of good omen, and do not instruct me harshly. For there are to me altars and sacred rites, both domestic and belonging to my country, and the rest of the things of this kind as appertain to the Athenians.—Then, said he, is there not a paternal Jupiter to the rest of the Athenians?—There is not, said I. This appellation exists not to any one of the Ionians, nor to such as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is (our) paternal (god),²¹ through the race of Ion ; and Jupiter is not called by us Paternal, but Herceus²² and Phratruius ;²³ and Minerva too is called Phratrion.—[73.] This is sufficient, said Dionysodorus ; for you have, as it seems, Apollo, Jupiter, and

¹⁹ This is the interpretation given by Heindorf to the words, *ἀπορὸν τινα στροφὴν ἔφηνεν τε καὶ ἐστρεφόμην*. But he did not perceive that *στροφὴ* would be applied not to the Sophist but to Socrates ; and that the endeavour to escape would follow, not precede, the act of twisting oneself. Had he remembered the passage quoted by Winckelmann from Rep. iii. p. 405, C., *ἱκανὸς πάσας στροφὰς στρίψεσθαι*, he would have seen perhaps that Plato wrote *ἀπορὸν τινα στροφὴν τοῦ φεύγειν ἕνεκα διεστρεφόμην*, "I twisted myself into some intricate turn, for the sake of escaping."

²⁰ This assertion has given rise to no little difficulty. For it is said, that, contrary to the express testimony of Plato, there was at Athens a paternal Jupiter. But the passages quoted from Soph. Trach. 764, Eurip. Electr. 675, and Æschyl. Niob. Fr. 1., prove only that Jupiter was the paternal deity of Hercules, Orestes, and Tantalus, not one of whom was an Athenian. We find indeed in Aristoph. Neph. 1468, *Ναὶ ναὶ καταϊδίσθητι πατρῶν Δία*. But if that verse were, as Porson supposed on Med. 1314, taken from a play of Euripides, it was probably spoken by some person not an Athenian, as remarked by Lobeck in Aglaophamus, p. 772, or else Aristophanes wrote, I suspect, *Ναὶ, ναὶ, καταϊδίσθητι πατρί, ὅλον Δία*, i. e. "Respect a father, as thou shouldst e'en Jove."

²¹ Apollo having had a connexion with Creusa, the daughter of Erechtheus, begot Ion, from whom the Athenians were at one time called Ionians, and he himself was worshipped as Paternal Apollo.

²² The Athenians called the enclosure round a house, *ἑρκος*, *Herkos*, and hence Jupiter was called Herkeus, as the guardian of the Herkos.

²³ This name is derived from *φάρπια*, by which was meant a third part of the φυλή, "tribe."

Minerva.—Certainly, said I.—Will not these then, said he, be your gods?—Progenitors, said I, and masters.—To you then, said he, they will be so. Or have you not confessed that they are yours?—I have confessed it, said I. For what could I do?—Are not then, said he, these gods animals likewise? For you have acknowledged that whatever have a soul are animals. Or have not those gods a soul?—They have, said I.—Are they not therefore also animals?—Animals, said I.—But of animals, said he, you have acknowledged these to be yours, which you can give and sell, and sacrifice to any god you please.—I have acknowledged it, said I. For there is no backing out, Euthydemus.—Come then, said he, and straightway tell me, since you acknowledge that Jupiter is yours and the other gods likewise, are you permitted to sell them, or give them, or to use them in any way you please, as you would do other animals? I then, O Crito, as if struck down by the argument, lay speechless; but Ctesippus, coming as it were to the rescue, Pyppax Hercules, said he, a beautiful discourse! And then said Dionysodorus, Whether is Hercules Pyppax, or Pyppax Hercules?—[74.] And Ctesippus said, O Neptune, what words of wisdom! I retire; the men are unconquerable.

Here indeed, friend Crito, there was not one of those present who did not exceedingly praise the discourse; and the two men were almost stretched at their length,²⁴ laughing, clapping, and exulting. For upon each (and²⁵) all of the things (said) previously in a very beautiful manner, the admirers alone of Euthydemus made an uproar; but here, al-

²⁴ Stalbaum has preferred *παριέρθησαν* to *παριέθησαν*, found in the best Vatican MS., which Abresch. had already conjectured, and confirmed by the gl. in Hesych. *Παριέθη παρελύθη*. He has, however, the good sense to add that he is unwilling to assert what is the true reading. For he probably perceived, that though *παριέρθησαν* would by itself be intelligible, it would not be so when united to *ὀλίγου*. For a person may be said to be stretched out positively or not; but he cannot be said to be nearly so. He may however be said to be dead or nearly so. Winckelmann has correctly edited *παριέθησαν*, and he might have referred to Petronius, "Gyton risu dissolvebat ilia sua." Porson too on Med. 585, *ἐν γὰρ ἱππενί σ' ἔπος*, defends *παριέρθησαν*, not aware that Euripides wrote, what is partly found in some MSS., *ἐν γὰρ ἐδ κτενεί σ' ἔπος*.

²⁵ Although *πᾶς τις ἕκαστος* is found in good Greek, yet here one would expect an antithesis between "each" and "all."

most the pillars in the Lyceum made a clattering in favour of the two men, and were delighted. I too felt disposed myself to acknowledge that I had never at any time seen men so wise; and being perfectly enslaved by their wisdom, I turned myself to praising and passing encomiums on them; and I said, O blessed ye for your wondrous genius, who have so rapidly, and in a short time, accomplished a thing of such magnitude! [75.] Your arguments indeed, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the most magnificent thing in them, that you care nothing for the mass of mankind, nor for persons of solemn mien, and who think themselves something, but only for those who are like yourselves. For I know well, that very few men similar to yourselves, would delight in these arguments; while the rest are so ignorant of them, that, I am sure, they would be more ashamed to confute others with such arguments, than to be confuted themselves. This too again is another popular and gentle character in your arguments, that when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or any thing else of this kind, and, in short, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality sew up the mouths of men, as indeed you assert you do; and not only the mouths of others, but ye would appear (to sew up) your own. (Now) this is a very gracious act, and removes whatever is oppressive in your arguments. The greatest thing however is, that these arguments subsist in such a manner, and have been discovered by you with such skill, that any one may learn them in a very short time. (For) I have perceived, by directing my attention to Ctesippus, how rapidly on the instant he has been able to imitate you. [76.] The (wisdom) then of your practice, with respect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful; but it is not adapted for discussion before men.²⁶ But, if you will be persuaded by me, be careful not to speak before many, lest through their learning rapidly, they should give you no thanks for your instruction. But especially con-

²⁶ This is a strange expression. Did Socrates then wish the Sophists to converse in the presence of animals? Ficinus has "coram multis hominibus" more correctly. But as πολλῶν would thus interfere with the same expression in the next sentence, instead of ἄνωγ', (for so ἀνθρώπων is generally written in MSS.,) perhaps the true reading is ἐννῶν, "sensible." For thus Socrates would give vent to a bitter sarcasm against the Sophists.

verse amongst yourselves alone: and if not, should you discourse in the presence of another, let it be before him alone, who gives you silver for what you say. The same advice, if you are wise, you will give to your disciples likewise, never to discourse with any man, except with you and themselves. For that which is rare, Euthydemus, is valuable; but water, although the best of things, as Pindar says, may be bought very cheap. But lead on, said I, and receive Clinias here and myself (as your scholars) on the sly.

Having, Crito, spoken these words and a few others, we departed. Consider therefore now, how you will accompany me to these men; for they say they are able to teach any one who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any natural disposition or age; and, what is especially proper for you to hear, they say that an attention to money-making does not hinder any one from easily receiving their wisdom.

[77.] *Cri.* In good truth, Socrates, I am desirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn something from them; although I almost appear to be one of those, not like to Euthydemus, but to those who, as you have just said, would more willingly be confuted by such arguments, than confute them. It seems however to me to be ridiculous to give you advice; nevertheless, I wish to relate to you what I have heard. Know²⁷ then, that as I was taking a walk, a man came to me from among those that had left you, and thinking himself to be very wise, as being one of those who are skilled in speeches suited for courts of justice, said to me—Crito, have you heard²⁸ nothing of these wise men?—By Jupiter, I have not, said I. For, on account of the crowd, I was unable to stand close and hear.—And yet, said he, it was worth while to hear them.—Why? said I.—Because you would have heard men discoursing, who are the wisest of all those who at present engage in such-like arguments.—And I said, What then

²⁷ Instead of *οἶσθα*, Heindorf suggests *ἴσθι*. Winckelmann and Stalbaum, however, still stick to *οἶσθα*, which they take interrogatively; as if a question would be thus asked at the commencement of a narrative. It was then either from his MS. or own good sense that Ficinus omitted *οἶσθα*. Taylor translated, "Do you not know?" but the negative is not found in the Greek.

²⁸ Instead of *ἀκροᾷ*, Heindorf suggested *ἠκροάσω*, from "audivisti" in Ficinus.

did they appear to you?—What else, said he, than that they are such as one will always hear from such-like triflers, who bestow unworthy attention on things of no worth. For so did he say in very words.—[78.] And I said, But certainly philosophy is an elegant thing.—How, elegant, said he, O blessed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been present just now, I think you would have been ashamed of your associate. He was so absurd, as willingly to put himself in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they say, but lay hold of every word. And these men, as I just now said, are among the best of those that exist at present. But indeed, Crito, said he, both the thing itself, and the men who are conversant with it, are worthless and ridiculous.—But to me, Socrates, neither he appears to blame the thing with justice, nor would any one else blame it.²⁹ To be willing, however, to discourse with these men in the presence of many appears to me to be an act that may be justly blamed.

Soc. Wonderful, Crito, are the men of this kind. But I do not yet know what I am about to say.³⁰ Of what class of men was he, who came to you, and blamed philosophy? Was he some pleader among those who are skilful in contending in courts of justice; or was he one of those who introduce men of this description, (and) a maker of the speeches with which orators contend?

[79.] *Cri.* The least of all was he, by Jupiter, an orator; nor do I think that he ever ascended the platform in a court of justice; but they say that he is knowing in the thing itself, by Jupiter, and likewise that he is a person of power and composes powerful speeches.

Soc. I now understand; and I was myself just now about to speak of those men. For they are those, Crito, whom Prodicus says are on the confines of a philosopher and politician; and think themselves to be the wisest of all men; and in addition to their being such, they (fancy) they seem so to the many; so that none others but the persons engaged

²⁹ The formula *εἰ τις ἄλλος* has no meaning here. The version of Ficinus, "vel quisquis alius improbet," leads at once to *οὐτ' ἂν τις ἄλλος ψέγοι*.

³⁰ This is rather strange language in the mouth of Socrates. The passage is no doubt corrupt; nor can it be compared with *Theætet.* § 109.

in philosophy are an impediment to their gaining a reputation amongst all. They think therefore, that if they can establish an opinion that philosophers are nothing worth, they shall, without a contest, carry off the prize of a reputation for wisdom amongst all mankind. For they consider themselves to be in reality most wise; but think that they are lessened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted³¹ in their private discourses. And yet they very reasonably think themselves wise men: for to possess philosophy in moderation, and with moderation to engage in political concerns, is very much according to reason; for (this is) to partake of both, as far as is requisite, and to enjoy the fruits of wisdom, secure from dangers and contests.

[80.] *Cri.* What then, do they appear to you, Socrates, to say any thing (of consequence)?

Soc. By no means.³²

Cri. Yet the discourse of the men possesses a certain speciousness.

Soc. It has in reality, Crito, speciousness rather than truth. For it is not easy to persuade them, that in the case of men and all other things, which subsist between two certain things, and partake of both, such as (are) from good and evil, become better than the one, and worse than the other; but that such things as (are) from two goods, not (tending)³³ to the same point, are worse than both, with respect to that, for which each of the things, of which they are composed, is useful; and that such things as are composed of two evils, not tending to the same, are in the middle, these taken alone are better than each of those things, in both of which they take a part. If then philosophy and political action are good, but each (tends) to something else, and these men, while they partake of both,

³¹ Instead of ἀποληρθῶσι, Ast on Sympos. p. 363, suggests ἀπολειφθῶσι, "are deficient."

³² This answer is found in Ficinus alone, "Nequaquam." Hence probably Heindorf wished to read, Οὐ μίντοι, or Οὐδὲν ἰμοιγε. He should have suggested Οὐ γάρ τι. For thus τι would answer to τι in the question of Crito. Routh, however, whom Heindorf, Winckelmann, and Stalbaum have followed, continues the speech, without any answer, in the mouth of Crito.

³³ Heindorf, perceiving that something was wanting after πρὸς ταῦτόν, wished to insert ὄντοι, as we find just after πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντοι. Ficinus supplies in the first sentence, "conducentibus," and in the second, "spectant."

are situated in the middle, they say nothing to the purpose ; for they are viler than both. But if (philosophy and political action) are both good and bad,²⁴ these men are better than some and worse than others. But if both are bad, they will thus assert something which is true ; but otherwise, not at all.²⁵ [81.] I do not therefore think they will acknowledge, either that both these are bad, or that the one is bad and the other good ; but partaking of both, they are in reality inferior to both, with respect to (the performing of) either, with a view to which both political science and philosophy are worthy of regard ; and though in reality they are the third, they endeavour to appear to be the first. It is requisite, therefore, to pardon their desire, and not to be indignant at them ; but we should consider them to be such as they are : for it is requisite to be content with whatever man says any thing bordering on intellect, and who courageously labours in going through²⁶ (his task).

Cri. And indeed, Socrates, I too, as I am always saying to you, am in a difficulty respecting my children, how I ought to treat them. The one indeed is still rather young, and little ; but Critobulus is already an adult, and requires some one to be a benefit to him. When therefore I am associating with you, I feel disposed to think that it is madness to be, for the sake of children, so much concerned about many other things, such as marriage, that they may be born of a mother of high family, and about wealth, that they may become very rich, and yet to neglect their education. But when I look at any one of those, who profess to instruct men, I am amazed ; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me, on reflection, to be unfit for the purpose ; so that I know not how to give the youth a turn for philosophy.

[82.] *Soc.* Know you not, friend Crito, that in every pur-

²⁴ Ficinus has, "sin autem unum quidem horum bonum, malum vero alterum, hoc quidem meliores, illo deteriores," i. e. "But if one of these is good, and the other bad, they are better than the latter, worse than the former." This is at least intelligible, which the Greek is not.

²⁵ In the whole of this passage I candidly confess my inability to discover a particle of meaning. Heindorf has recourse to the figure of speech called Chiasmus.

²⁶ Instead of *ἐπιτελών* the two best MSS. read *ἐπὶ δεξιῶν* : from which it were perhaps not difficult to elicit what Plato wrote. Ficinus has "viriliter peragit," as if his MS. read neither *ἐπιτελών* nor *ἐπὶ δεξιῶν*.

suit, the bad are many and of no worth, but the good are few and worthy of all regard?³⁷ For does not the art of the gymnast, that of the money-scrivener, that of the rhetorician, and that of the general, appear to you to be beautiful?

Cri. To me in every respect.

Soc. What then, in each of these do you not see that the many are to be ridiculed with respect to each of their doings?

Cri. Yes, by Jupiter; and you speak with great truth.

Soc. Would you then on this account avoid all those pursuits yourself, and not impose them on your son?

Cri. This surely, Socrates, would not be just.

Soc. Do not then, Crito, do what you ought not; but bidding farewell to those who study philosophy, whether they are good or bad, examine the thing itself, well and properly; and if it appear to you to be a vile thing, turn aside every man from it, and not your sons only; but if it appear to you such as I think it is, boldly pursue and practise it, according to the saying, 'both you and your children'.³⁸

³⁷ By comparing the language of Socrates just after, it is clear that Plato wrote, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ φαῦλοι—οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι σπουδαῖοι, not οἱ μὲν φαῖλοι πολλοὶ—οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι,—and so Taylor translated, led rather by the sense than syntax.

³⁸ On this saying see the commentators on Aristoph. 'Ορν, 132. Barp. 586. Plato Politic, p. 307, E. Rep. ii. p. 372, B.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST.

AFTER producing in the Euthydemus some specimens of the apparently clever but really absurd subtleties of which the Sophists of Greece were wont to make a display, and to gain the admiration of those, who could not detect a fallacy, and the contempt of those, who could, Plato has in this dialogue pointed out in what class of persons those must be placed, who professed to be on all questions of philosophy, politics, and science, equally competent to raise a doubt or to solve one.

In pursuing this inquiry, Plato has, like a keen sportsman, followed the track of the animal, to which he compares the Sophist, until he arrives at the long-sought-for lair; and he then discovers that, instead of the Sophist being the purveyor of intellectual food, he is occupied merely in the art of catching the many, and thus gaining a credit for talents which are not only of no use to himself and others, but are the bane of both.

During the course of the dialogue, he is led to examine the theory respecting the first element of all things, called *τὸ ὄν* or *ὄνεια*, which I have rendered "the existing" and "existence" respectively, and not, as others have done, "the being" and "essence." Of this existence, identified by some philosophers with "the one," and by others with "the whole," there were said to be an infinite number of parts, or species, all differing from each other, and yet producing what Horace calls "*rerum concordia discors*," through the properties of existence, connected respectively with the ideas of identity and difference, motion and rest.

From the fact of finding the same speakers in the Theætetus and Sophist, some have considered the latter dialogue to be only a continuation of the former; while its similarity in the manner of subdividing a genus into different species, proves its still greater

affinity with the Statesman—for such is the best English translation of the Greek Πολιτικός—and with the Cratylus, in its touching upon the phenomena of language, and with the Parmenides, as regards the doctrine of “the existing,” and the forms it assumes in the mind of “the one.”

THE SOPHIST.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS, SOCRATES, A GUEST FROM ELEA,
THEÆTETUS.

[1.] ACCORDING to our agreement yesterday, both we ourselves are come, Socrates, in due order, and we bring this our guest,¹ an Elean by birth, and a friend of Parmenides and Zeno, and a great philosopher.

Soc. Are you not, Theodorus, unconsciously bringing not a guest but some god, according to the language of Homer,² who says in behalf of such mortals, as have a portion of due respect, both other gods, and especially the deity who presides over guests, become a follower and survey the insolent and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he, who now follows you, may be one of the better beings about to survey and confute us, when ill-conducting ourselves in a strife of words, through his being a kind of a disproving god.

Theo. Such is not the manner of this stranger, Socrates; but he is more moderate than those that are studious of contention; and the man appears to me, not to be a deity, but divine: for such I denominate all philosophers.

[2.] *Soc.* And you do well, my friend. Although I fear this race (of philosophers) is scarcely more easy to distinguish, I may say, than that of the divinity. For they, who are philosophers, not made up, but in reality, appear, through the

¹ This Theodorus was a geometrician of Cyrene, and Plato's preceptor in that science.

² Plato here brings together two different passages of Homer; one from *Od.* I. 770, Ζεῦσιος (Ζεὺς) ὃς ξείνοισιν ἄμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδαῖ: and the other from *Od.* P. 485, Θεοὶ—πιστροφῶσι πόληας, Ἀνθρώπων ἔβρον τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἰφορῶντες.

ignorance of others, to be of a multiform kind, while they wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of those below them; and to some they seem to be worthy of no honour, but to others of all; and now they appear to be politicians; and now sophists; and sometimes there are those, to whom they give the idea that they are altogether mad. I would, however, gladly hear from this our guest, if it is agreeable to him, what the people about the place there think of these things, and how they denominate them.

Theo. What things?

Soc. The sophist, statesman, and philosopher.

[3.] *Theo.* What, and of what kind, is the doubt about them, respecting which you have it in your mind to make an inquiry?

Soc. It is this. Whether they consider all these as one or two? Or as there are three names, whether they distribute them into three kinds likewise, and attach to each singly a name?

Theo. He will not, I think, grudge to go through them. Or how shall we say, guest?

Guest. Thus, Theodorus. For I do not grudge, nor is it difficult to say, that they think them three kinds. But to define clearly what each of them is, is not a small nor an easy task.

Theo. You have by accident, Socrates, laid hold of questions similar to those, which we were asking this our guest, before we came hither. But he then made the same pretence to us, as he just now did to you: since he says that he had sufficiently heard, and did not forget.

[4.] *Soc.* Do not then, stranger, deny us the first favour we ask. But tell us thus much; whether you are wont more readily to go through by yourself and to state in a long discourse whatever you wish to show forth, or by interrogations? such as I once heard Parmenides employing, and at the same time going through very beautiful arguments, when I was a young man and he very old at that time.

Guest. With him who converses by answers, Socrates, without pain, and (as it were) with a light rein, it is more easy thus with another; but if not, by oneself.³

³ Such is the literal translation of the nonsensical Greek, ῥᾶον οὐκ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ καθ' αὐτόν; in lieu of which Ficinus has what

Soc. You are at liberty then to select whom you please of those present here: for we shall all of us readily obey you. You will however, if you take my advice, select some of the young men, either Theætetus here, or any of the rest, if such is your mind.

[5.] *Guest.* A kind of shame has come upon me, Socrates, in that, conversing with you now for the first time, I have not carried on the intercourse in detail, word for word, but by drawing out a discourse to a great extent, either by myself or to another, I have as it were made a display. For in reality, that which is now said is not (such) as a person would expect it to be, when interrogated about it;⁴ for it requires a very long discussion. But on the other hand, not to gratify you and these, especially since you have spoken as you have spoken,⁵ would, as it appears to me, be unlike a guest and boorish; since, from what I have before said, and from what you now urge me, I receive Theætetus here to be the respondent.

[6.] *Theæ.* Will you then, stranger, as Socrates said, gratify us all?⁶

Guest. It nearly appears then, Theætetus, that nothing further must be said on this point. And as it seems, the discourse must hereafter be addressed to you. But if, wearied by the length of the discourse, you shall be somewhat annoyed, blame not me, but these your companions, as the cause.

Theæ. But I think I shall not faint in this way for the present. If, however, such a thing should take place, then I will take to myself as an ally Socrates, the namesake of Socrates here, who is of the same age with me, and my

is at least intelligible, "facilius est cum alio interrogando disserere; sin contra, per se ipsum quisque facilius disputat," i. e. "it is more easy to dispute with another by interrogations; otherwise, every one converses more easily (by talking) himself."

⁴ So Stalbaum would have us translate the words τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὐχ ὅσον ὅδε ἰρωτηθὲν ἰληπίσμεν ἂν αὐτὸ εἶναι τις, out of which Stephens could make no sense, nor can I. Some error lies in οὐχ ὅσον ὅδε—εἶναι, which it were not difficult perhaps for a conjectural critic to correct.

⁵ On this formula see Blomf. on Agam. 66. Matth. Gr. Gr. § 558.

⁶ Strange to say even Heindorf, who once saw correctly that Ἀπαροίουν could not be here used interrogatively, afterwards vainly attempted to defend the reading; nor did he perceive, what is evident at a glance, that Plato wrote Ἀπὰροίουν, "Do so then, stranger, and you will gratify us all, as Socrates said." Stalbaum follows, as usual, Heindorf blindfold.

associate in gymnastic exercises, and not unaccustomed to labour in many things with me.⁷

Guest. You say well. Deliberate then about these things by yourself, as the discourse proceeds. But now you must consider in common with me, beginning in the first place, as it appears to me, from the sophist; and searching out and showing forth by a reason, what thing he is. For now both you and I have only the name in common respecting this thing; but as regards the thing by what name we call it, perhaps each of us have one peculiar to ourselves. But it is always requisite respecting every thing, to agree rather through reasons as to the thing itself, than to the name alone without a reason. [7.] However, with respect to the tribe which we now have it in our mind to investigate, it is not the easiest of all things to comprehend what a sophist is. But whatever things of moment ought to be well and thoroughly laboured at, respecting these it has been decreed by all of old that we must practise them first in small and more easy matters, previous to those in the greatest. Now then, Theætetus, I too recommend, since we conceive the genus of a sophist is difficult to hunt out, that we should in like manner practise the method in something more easy; unless you are able to show some other and easier road.

Theæ. But I am not able.

Guest. Are you willing then to go after something of little value, and to endeavour to put it as the pattern of a greater?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. What then if we propose a thing well known, and of trifling value, but possessing a subject for discourse not less than things greater? as, for instance, a fisherman. Is not this thing known to every one, and worthy of not very great and serious thought?

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. And I suspect it has a method and reasoning not unsuited for us.

[8.] *Theæ.* It would then answer well.

Guest. Come then, let us begin from it thus; and tell me, whether we shall put down a fisherman as skilled in some art, or unskilled in some art, but possessing another power.

Theæ. By no means as unskilled in some art.

⁷ As shown in the *Politic.* p. 257, C., where this same Socrates takes up the discourse, after Theætetus had ceased speaking.

Guest. But of all arts there are nearly two species.

Thea. How so?

Guest. Agriculture, and the care respecting every thing mortal, and that relating to the putting together and moulding what we call an utensil, and the imitative power, all these may be justly called by one name.

Thea. How so? and by what name?

Guest. When any one leads subsequently into existence that which was previously not in existence, then we say that he who leads, makes, and that the thing led, is made.

Thea. Right.

Guest. But all which we just now mentioned are wont to possess their own power (suited) to this.

Thea. They do.

Guest. This then let us summarily call the making power.

Thea. Be it so.

[9.] *Guest.* After this the whole species of discipline and knowledge, and the species relating to money-making, and contending, and hunting, may be said to be clearly a certain acquiring power, through all their details; since not one of these makes any thing, but gets hold of some things, which are and have been, through words and deeds, and does not give up to others who attempt to get hold⁶ of them.

Thea. Truly so; for it would be proper.

Guest. Since then all arts consist either in acquiring or in making, in which of these, Theætetus, shall we place the art of fishing?

Thea. Doubtless in the art of acquiring.

Guest. But are there not two species of the art of acquiring? the one being an interchange between those that are willing, through the medium of gifts, wages, and purchase? but the other would be a getting hold, effected entirely either by deeds or words.

Thea. So it appears from what has been said.

Guest. But must not the getting hold likewise receive a two-fold division?

Thea. In what way?

Guest. The one being openly done, and wholly from a contest; but the other secretly, and consisting wholly in hunting.

⁶ So Stalbaum translates *χειρομύνησις*.

Theæ. Yes.

[10.] *Guest.* It is likewise irrational not to give hunting a two-fold division.

Theæ. Say how.

Guest. By making one relate to a race inanimate, and the other to an animated one.

Theæ. How not? if there are both these.

Guest. How should there not be? But we may pass by (the hunting of) inanimate things as being without a name, except as regards some portions of the art of diving, and other trifling things of this kind; but call the other part, relating to the hunting of an animated race, animal-hunting.

Theæ. Be it so.

Guest. But is it not justly said, that of animal-hunting there is a twofold kind? one being the hunting of walking animals, which is distinguished by many species and names, but the other of swimming animals, and which is hunting in a liquid.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But of the swimming division, we see that one kind is winged and the other aquatic.

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Guest. But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called bird-catching.

Theæ. It is so called.

Guest. But that of nearly all the aquatic, sea-fishing.

Theæ. Yes.

[11.] *Guest.* But shall we not divide this hunting into two chief parts?

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. According as the one makes for itself a catch with nets, the other by a blow.

Theæ. How say you? And how do you divide each?

Guest. Whatever by enclosing on all sides restrains any thing for the sake of an hinderance, it is reasonable to call a net.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But do you call a net of twigs, of twine, of reeds, and a casting-net, any thing else than nets?*

* On the different kind of nets Heindorf refers to Oppian iii. 81, and Pollux v. 28.

Theæ. Nothing else.

Guest. We must therefore say that this hunting with nets is a part of fishing, or something of this kind.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. But that which takes place with hooks and three-forked harpoons, by a blow,¹⁰ and which is different from the other kind, it will be requisite for us now to call by one word, by-a-blow-hunting.¹¹ Or what would any one, *Theætetus*, say better?

Theæ. Let us disregard the name; for this is sufficient.

[12.] *Guest.* Of by-a-blow-hunting then one kind is, I think, at night effected by the light of fire; and it happens to be called the fire-kind¹² by those engaged in the hunting.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But the other kind is by day, and is effected with rods¹³ and harpoons, having hooks at their extremities, and is wholly hook-fishing.

Theæ. It is so called.

Guest. Of hook-fishing, and by a blow, that which takes place (by darting) downwards the harpoons from on high, is I think called harpoon-fishing, on account of persons using the harpoons in that way.

Theæ. So some persons say.

Guest. There remains then only one kind, so to say.

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. That which is with a blow contrary to this, and effected with a hook, but not striking, as it may happen, upon any part of the body of fishes, as in the case of harpoons, but about the head and mouth of the fish caught on each occasion, and drawing it from below to the contrary up¹⁴ by rods and

¹⁰ The Greek word *πληγῇ* is correctly omitted by Ficinus.

¹¹ I have been compelled to coin this uncouth compound in English, "by-a-blow-hunting," to suit the Greek.

¹² Of this fishing by the aid of fire an elegant description is given by Oppian iv. 640, and something is said to be done even to this day by the fishermen in the Straits of Messina. See too Casaubon on Athen. xv. p. 700, D.

¹³ Bekk. *ἰχόντων ἐν ἀκροῖς ἀγκίστρα καὶ τῶν τριόδοντων*. But *καὶ* is without meaning here. Ficinus has "in extremo virgæ cujusdam ferentes uncum, tridentibus usi."

¹⁴ Bekk. *τοῦναντίον ἀνω*. But *ἀνω* is an explanation of *τοῦναντίον*, or else there is some more deeply-seated disorder.

reeds; to which fishing what name, Theætetus, shall we say ought to be given?

Theæ. [That of hook-fishing with rods];¹⁵ and we now appear to have arrived at the end of that, which we proposed as being necessary to find out.

[13.] *Guest.* Now then, you and I have not only agreed about a name for the fishing art, but we have likewise sufficiently accepted the reason respecting the thing itself. For of the whole art, a half was in the acquiring; and of the acquiring, a half was in the getting hold; and of the getting hold, a half was in the hunting; and of the hunting, (a half) was in the animal-hunting; and of the animal-hunting, (a half) was in the hunting in a liquid; and of the hunting in a liquid, the downward division was wholly sea-fishing; and of the sea-fishing, (a half) was the fishing by a blow; and of the fishing by a blow, (a half) was by a hook; and of this (a half) was about the blow drawing from below upwards;¹⁶ and that from the act itself (to which) the name has been made to resemble the fisherman's art, having been now discovered, is called by that appellation.

Theæ. This, then, has been shown in every respect sufficiently.

Guest. Come then, let us endeavour according to this example to discover what a sophist is.

Theæ. By all means.

[14.] *Guest.* Now this was the first search in the pattern just adduced, whether we must put down a fisherman as an untaught individual, or as possessing some art.

Theæ. It was.

Guest. And now, Theætetus, shall we put down this person as an untaught individual, or as truly a sophist in all things?¹⁷

¹⁵ This answer, plainly required by the question, Taylor ventured to insert, without saying a word of its being not found in the original.

¹⁶ Such is the literal translation of the nonsense of the Greek text, which Heusde partially corrected by reading *ἀνασπώμενον* for *ἀνασπώ-μινην*. He probably got the idea from Ficinus, whose version is at least intelligible, and probably true to the Greek found in his MS. "Hujus denique percussio; quæ sursum versus ab inferiori parte conficitur retrahendo, et inde nomen sortita, 'retrahens,' et hamatoria piscatio dicitur." For it would be thus seen that *ἀσπαλιυτής* was supposed to have some affinity with *ἀνασπᾶσθαι*.

¹⁷ Here again is a mass of rubbish, which Stalbaum vainly endeavours

Thea. By no means as an untaught individual. For I understand what you mean,¹⁸ that he who possesses the name, ought to be such. But we must put him down as possessing some art.

Guest. What is then the art? By the gods, are we ignorant that one of these men is a relation of the other?

Thea. Whom of whom?

Guest. The fisherman of the sophist.

Thea. In what way?

Guest. Both of them appear to me to be hunters.

Thea. Of what prey is this (the hunter)? for we have spoken of the other,

Guest. We divided the whole of hunting into the swimming and the walking.

Thea. We did.

Guest. And we went through such a portion as related to the swimming part of the aquatic kind? but we left the walking undivided, having said that it was multiform.

Thea. Entirely so.

[15.] *Guest.* Thus far then the sophist and the fisherman equally proceed from the art of acquiring.

Thea. They appear so.

Guest. But they turn themselves from the animal hunting, one to the sea, and rivers, and lakes, and he catches animals in these.

Thea. Undoubtedly.

Guest. But another (turns himself) to the land, and some other rivers, as if they were meadows of wealth and youth without stint, with the view of getting hold of the animals nourished in them.

Thea. How say you?

Guest. Of the hunting on foot, there are two chief parts.

Thea. Of what kind is each?

Guest. One is the hunting of tame animals, and the other of wild.

to explain by saying that Plato is playing on the word *σοφιστήν*, by which he meant not a sophist, in a bad sense, but in a good one, as being *σοφόν*. But such a play would in a serious inquiry be quite out of character. Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "Et nunc quidem *sophistam* rudemne an *callidum appellabimus?*"

¹⁸ By the aid of Ficinus Heindorf was enabled to restore the arrangement of the speeches, and to correct some literal errors, found in all the Greek MSS.

Theæ. Is there any hunting then of tame animals?

Guest. If indeed man is a tame animal. But lay down in whatsoever way you like, either that no animal is tame, or that some other is tame, but that man is a wild one; or you say¹⁹ that man indeed is a tame animal, but you think¹⁹ that there is no hunting of men. Whichever of these suppositions you deem it agreeable to you to be stated, this do you define.

Theæ. I think, stranger, we are a tame animal, and I say that there is a hunting of men.

[16.] *Guest.* Let us say then that tame-animal hunting is of two kinds.

Theæ. Speaking according to what manner?

Guest. By defining the hunting by robbers, and that which makes slaves, and that by tyrants, to be one and all a hunting by force.

Theæ. Very well.

Guest. But by calling that which pertains to law-courts, popular assemblies, and (private) discourse, one and all a certain single persuasive art.

Theæ. Right.

Guest. Now of this persuasive art let us say there are two kinds.

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. One is private, and the other public.

Theæ. There are then these two species.

Guest. Again, with respect to private hunting, one kind is (connected with) wages, and the other with gifts.

Theæ. I do not understand.

Guest. It seems you have never given your mind to the hunting of lovers.

Theæ. Why say you so?

Guest. Because persons bestow even gifts in addition upon the caught.

Theæ. You speak most truly.

¹⁹ After *θις*—*τιθις*, by no process could *λίσσεσθαι* and *ἡγεῖσθαι* be introduced, as is evident from the nonsense of a literal translation; which is generally the best test of some error in the Greek. Plato might have written *λίσσεσθαι* *ἀν* for *λίσσεσθαι* *αὐ*, and *ἡγεῖσθαι* for *ἡγεῖσθαι*, taken interrogatively. But I suspect that he omitted, as Ficinus does, both the verbs. Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows as usual, saw there was some difficulty here, but failed to surmount it.

Guest. Let this then be a kind of the amatory art.

Theæ. By all means.

[17.] *Guest.* But as regards that connected with wages, that part of it which keeps up an intercourse through favour, and has in every way made a bait through pleasure, and bargains for food for itself as its wages, this, I think, we should all of us call adulation, or²⁰ a certain pleasure-giving art.

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Guest. But the other part of it, which professes to keep up an intercourse for the sake of virtue, and bargains for coin as its wages, is it not worthy to call by another name?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But with what (name)? Try to tell me.

Theæ. It is evident. For we appear to me to have found the sophist; and thus calling him, I think I should call him by a fitting name.

Guest. According to the present reasoning, it seems, Theætetus, the art of a sophist must be called²¹ domestic hold-getting, [acquiring,] hunting, animal-hunting, [land-hunting], on land, [tame-animal-hunting,] man-hunting, (by-persuasion-hunting,) individual-hunting, [wages-hunting,] coin-selling, and insnaring rich and noble young men, through a false reputation for erudition, as the present reasoning now goes with us.²¹

[18.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. Let us consider further still in this way. For the

²⁰ Taylor had anticipated Heindorf in supplying ἡ before ἡδυναικῆν.

²¹⁻²¹ In lieu of this mass of corruption, Ficinus has what is not indeed unworthy of Plato, but what he probably made out, not so much from the text found in his MS., as from his own good sense: "Ut ex hac disputatione colligitur, constat, O Theætete, sophisticam facultatem appellandam esse artem, quæ in conciliando comparandoque versatur, animaliumque gressibilibus et terrenorum domesticorumque venatio est, hominum videlicet privata captura ob nummorum mercedum et juvenum divitum atque nobilium opinione virtutis disciplinæque irretitio." With regard to the words within brackets [] and lunes (), the former have been rejected, and the latter inserted, by Schleiermacher, whom Heindorf and Stalbaum have followed. They failed, however, to perceive that in this enumeration, which is intended to be a summary of the preceding subdivisions, only such words would be introduced as had been mentioned already; and that consequently we must reject all the rest, with the exception of νέων πλουσιῶν καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομένη θήρα, which evidently belong to another place; for they could not occur here for the first time, as nothing had been said on that subject previously.

object of our present search does not participate in some contemptible art, but in a very clever one. For from what has been before stated, an idea presents itself that it is not that kind of art, which we just now said, but some other kind.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Of the art of acquiring, there was a two-fold kind, one consisting in the catching, and the other in the exchanging.

Theæ. There was.

Guest. Let us say then, that of the exchanging there are two kinds, the one consisting in giving, and the other in selling.

Theæ. Let it be so said.

Guest. And again, we will say that the selling must have a two-fold division.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. ²² He who exposes his own works for sale is called a seller of his own (property); but he who sells the works of others, an exchanger.²³

Theæ. Entirely so.

[19.] *Guest.* But is not the exchange, which takes place in (the same) city, and which is nearly a half of the whole of the trade, called capelic?²³

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And is not that which effects an exchange from one city to another, by buying and selling, (called) emporic?²³

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And do we not perceive, in the case of the emporic,²³ that the sale of the articles by which the body and soul are nourished, and which they use (respectively), becomes barter by means of coin?

²²⁻²³ Such is Taylor's translation of the version of Ficinus, "Qui opera sua venalia facit, propriorum venditor nominatur; qui aliena vendit, commutator." The Greek at present is, *τὴν μὲν αὐτοῦργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην, μεταβλητικὴν.* This Stephens could not understand, nor can I; even if we read, with seven MSS., *διαιρούμενοι* in lieu of *διαιρουμένην*, which Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows as usual, renders, "ex partitione orientem," a meaning that *διαίρεσθαι* never has nor could have. What Plato really wrote, might be elicited perhaps in part from Themistius Orat. xxiii. p. 297.

²³ I have preserved the Greek words in English letters, because we have none answering exactly to the original. Perhaps *κάπηλος* is huckster, chapman; or retail home tradesman, and *ἐμπορος*, trafficker, or wholesale foreign merchant.

Thea. How say you this?

Guest. Of that part, which relates to the soul, we are perhaps ignorant: but the other we understand.

Thea. We do.

Guest. ²⁴Let us say then as regards music in general, which is constantly purchased at one place, and, carried from city to city, is sold at another; and as regards painting, wonder-working, and other things pertaining to the soul, which are imported and sold, some for the sake of amusement, others for graver pursuits, that the person, who imports and sells them, would give a handle to be called a merchant no less than by the sale of meats and drinks.²⁴

[20.] *Thea.* You speak most true.

Guest. Will you not, then, call by the same name him who goes about from city to city to buy learning for money?

Thea. Certainly.

Guest. But of this soul-trafficking, would not one part be most justly called an exhibition; but the other part, although no less ridiculous²⁵ than the former,²⁶ still as being a selling of learning, there is a necessity to call it by a name the brother to the act.

Thea. Certainly.

Guest. But in this learning-selling, the trade which relates to other arts must be called by one name, and that which relates to virtue by another.

Thea. How not?

Guest. For as regards the others, the name "art-seller" would be fitting; but as regards this, do you consider what name to call it.

Thea. And what other name, except that sought out now for the sophistic race, could one mention without an error?

Guest. No other. Now then let us collect it together, by saying that by a second (search), the sophistic art appeared to consist in the acquiring, exchanging, buying, trafficking;

²⁴ The whole of this most corrupt passage is found in the version of Ficinus in apparently an abridged and certainly altered form.

²⁵ Heindorf says that *τὸ γίλοισιν* agrees with *ὄνομα* understood. To this Stalbaum objects, and would receive what Heind. rejects *γίλοιφ*—I cannot understand either, and still less the common text.

²⁶ By "the former" Heindorf understands "the name, *ψυχημπορικῇ*," which he says was ridiculous, as being not a Greek word.

soul-trafficking respecting discourses, and the selling the learning of virtue.

[21.] *Theæ.* Just so.

Guest. By a third (search), I think that you will call by no other name, than (we have done) just now, the person who, being settled in a city, partly buys and partly fabricates himself learning respecting these very same subjects, and by selling determines for himself to live by such a plan.

Theæ. Why, indeed, should I not?

Guest. And that part too of the acquiring art, which consists in exchanging, purchasing, and selling in both ways, either one's own inventions, or those of others, you will ever call, as you seem, a sophistic kind, whatever may be the learning-selling respecting such things.²⁷

Theæ. Necessarily so. For it is necessary to be the follower of reason.

Guest. Let us still further consider, whether the kind, which has been now pursued, is similar to some such thing as this.

Theæ. To what?

Guest. Of the art of acquiring a certain part consisted in contesting.

Theæ. It did.

Guest. It will not then be from the purpose to divide it into two.

Theæ. Say into what parts?

Guest. By laying down one part as a contest (of friends), and the other as the fight of (foes).

Theæ. It is so.

[22.] *Guest.* Of the fighting part then, when a body comes in conflict with a body, it is nearly reasonable and becoming for persons, laying down²⁸ a name, to pronounce it, as it were, violent.

Theæ. It may.

²⁷ This is the literal translation of the mass of nonsense in the text, which Stalbaum vainly endeavours to conceal by a more elegant but less faithful version. Ficinus has what is at least intelligible, by omitting the very words in which the chief difficulty lies, and by rendering *καπηλειὸν εἰς αὐτοπωλικὸν*, "sive sua inventa sive aliena—vendat," a version which Heindorf and Stalbaum have thought proper to adopt rather than confess, as they should have done, their inability to understand fairly the passage.

²⁸ Instead of the circumlocution found in the Greek text, which it is not easy to explain grammatically, Ficinus has merely, "Pugna utique corporis ad corpus violentia congrue nuncupatur."

Guest. But in the case of reasons (coming in conflict) with reasons, what else, Theætetus, would any one call it but contention?

Theæ. Nothing else.

Guest. But as to contentions, we must lay down a twofold division.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. So far as (contention) takes place through prolix arguments against prolix arguments and about things just and unjust in a public matter it is judicial.

Theæ. It is.

Guest. But when it takes place in a private one, and is broken to minute parts, by questions to answers,²⁹ are we accustomed to call it any thing else than contradiction.

Theæ. Nothing else.

Guest. But of contradiction, that part which respects (private) contracts is made the subject of dispute, and is carried on carelessly and without art, we must place as a separate (kind); since reason distinguishes it as being something different; but it has neither obtained an appellation from any of those of a former period, nor does it deserve to obtain one now from us.

Theæ. True, for it is divided into parts extremely small and very various.

[23.] *Guest.* But that which is according to art, and disputes about things just and unjust, in the abstract, and universally about other matters, we are accustomed to call contentious.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But of the contentious, one part destroys wealth, and the other makes it.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Let us then endeavour to state by what name it is needful to call each of these.

Theæ. It is proper to do so.

Guest. I think then that the neglect of private affairs, which takes place through the delight in the practice of contention, and through the telling to the majority of listeners

²⁹ To avoid the *ὑποτροπή* πρότερον in the words "by questions to answers" Ficinus has "interrogando respondendoque," which makes at least an intelligible sense.

what is not heard with pleasure, may be called, according to my notion, something not different from babbling.³⁰

Theæ. It is indeed called so.

Guest. But do you now in your turn endeavour to tell the contrary name of him, who makes money through private quarrels.

Theæ. Would not any one err, in calling him by any other name than that of the wonderful sophist, who, after being pursued by us, has now come again for the fourth time (in our view)?

Guest. The sophist then, as it seems, is nothing else but that money-making genus, which is a part of the arts of quarrelling, contradiction, controversy, (hostile) fighting, (friendly) contest, and acquisition, as our reasoning has pointed out.

Theæ. He is altogether so.

[24.] *Guest.* You see, then, it is truly said, that this wild beast is a various animal, and that, according to the proverb, he is not to be caught with the left hand.

Theæ. It is necessary then (to use) both hands.

Guest. It is necessary; and we must to the utmost of our power do something of this kind, by running after its foot-marks. But tell me, have we not words relating to household affairs?

Theæ. Yes, many. But about which of the many are you inquiring?

Guest. Such as when we say to pass through a cullender, to bolt through a bag, to pass through a sieve, [to separate.]³¹

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And besides these, we know the words, to card (wool), to draw it down, to weave it, and ten thousand others of a like kind existing in the arts. Do we not?

Theæ. What being desirous to point out respecting them, and to bring forward as a pattern, have you made this inquiry in general terms?

³⁰ In his translation of this passage Ficinus has introduced the words "quæstiunculas semper aucupatur," of which there is no vestige at present in the Greek text; where to restore the syntax we must read, *περί τὴν λίσιν τοῦ τοῖς πολλοῖς—ἀκουόμενον* in lieu of—*λίξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς—ἀκουόμενον*.

³¹ With his usual want of judgment Stalbaum defends *ἐιαρίνειν*, which Heindorf had correctly expelled as an interpretation. For a verb descriptive of some specific act, not a general one, is required here.

Guest. All the names that have been mentioned, are in a certain respect divisive.

Theæ. They are.

Guest. According to my reasoning then we will think worthy of one name the art, which as regards them is one in them all.

[25.] *Theæ.* What name calling it?

Guest. Discriminative.

Theæ. Be it so.

Guest. Consider again, whether we are able to perceive two kinds of it?

Theæ. You are imposing, for a person like me, a rapid consideration.

Guest. In the discriminations mentioned above it was our business to separate the worse from the better, and the similar from the similar.

Theæ. It appears that it was nearly so said.

Guest. Of the latter (discrimination) I cannot tell the name; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects the worse.

Theæ. Inform me what it is.

Guest. The whole of this discrimination, as I understand it, is called by all men a certain purification.

Theæ. It is so called.

Guest. Would not then every one see that the purification is in kind twofold?

Theæ. Yes, (looking at it) at leisure perhaps; but I do not see it at present.

[26.] *Guest.* It is proper then to comprehend in one name the many kinds of purifications appertaining to the body.

Theæ. What (are they)? and by what name (do you call them)?

Guest. Whatever within the bodies of living animals is, after being properly separated by the arts of exercise and of medicine, purified, and whatever the bath-art supplies, relating to things outside (the body) very vile to mention, and the things relating to inanimate bodies, of which the fuller's art, and the whole art of adorning the body, have the care in trifling matters, possess many and seemingly ridiculous names.²²

²² Such is the literal version of this perplexed passage, where something is evidently wanting to complete the sense. Ficinus could, I suspect, do no more than guess at the meaning of the Greek text, which he

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. Entirely so,³³ Theætetus. But the method of reasoning cares not either much or little about the art of wiping with a sponge or the drinking a medicine, whether the one benefits us little and the other much, by a purification. Since for the sake of the mind possessing something correctly,³⁴ (science)³⁵ endeavours to understand what is allied and what is not allied to all arts, and it honours all equally on this account; and does not consider that some things are more ridiculous than others as regards their similitude; nor has it held that he, who exhibits the hunting art in the character of a general, is at all more respectable than (he who does so) in that of a louse-catcher, but is for the most part more vain.³⁶ [27.] And now, indeed, which was what you asked, by what name shall we speak of all the powers together which are allotted for the purifying a body either animate or inanimate? But it makes no difference what name may appear to be more becoming. Let it be only separate from the purgations of the soul, and include (in itself) all such things as purify any thing else. For (the method of reasoning) has just now endeavoured to separate the intellect from the rest of things, if we understand what it means.

has thus translated:—"Purgatio animati corporis, intrinsecus operans per gymnasticam et medicinam et quæ extrinsecus balneis. quod dictu vile est mundat, item quæ inanimata corpora fullonum ministerio abstergendo colorat, et universa, ornandi corporis curatura, sigillatim varia viliaque nomina sortiuntur?"

³³ Stephens saw correctly, that after Theætetus had said, "Very much so," the Guest could not subjoin, "Entirely so." And hence he suspected that something was wanting. Heindorf however, who takes every opportunity of finding fault with Stephens, attempts to support the integrity of the text by a solitary passage, which he should have seen was not in point.

³⁴ I have translated this passage as if the original were, τοῦ κηρσασθαι ἐνεκ' αὐτοῦ τῆ, πασῶν—not ἐνεκεν τοῦ, πασῶν—For ἐνεκεν is never found in prose; nor could κηρσασθαι dispense with its object; while τῆ has been lost through π.

³⁵ I have introduced the noun, which is wanting at present, to agree with περιωμίνην. But the prosopopœia is rather violent.

³⁶ Here is evidently a lacuna. For some reason should be given for an assertion that admits of dispute. Respecting the meaning of χαῦνος, I have written something on Prom. 979, and I could now add a great deal more. The word answers exactly to Shakspeare's "A thing of sound and fury, signifying nothing."

Theæ. But I do understand, and I grant that there are two species of purification; one species respecting the soul, and separate from that respecting the body.

Guest. (You speak) in the most beautiful manner. Listen then to me in what follows, and endeavour to give a two-fold division to what has been said.

Theæ. Wherever you may lead, I will endeavour to make a division with you.

Guest. We say, then, that depravity in the soul is something different from virtue.

[28.] *Theæ.* How not?

Guest. And that to leave the one, and to cast out as far as may be the bad, was a purification.

Theæ. It was so.

Guest. Of the soul then, as far as we can discover a taking away of depravity, we shall, in calling it a purification, speak harmoniously.

Theæ. Yes, very much so.

Guest. As regards the soul, then, we must speak of two kinds of depravity.

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. The one is like a disease in the body, but the other is like an inherent baseness.

Theæ. I do not understand.

Guest. Perhaps you have not thought that disease is the same with sedition.

Theæ. Nor, again, have I what I ought to answer to this.

Guest. Whether do you think sedition is any thing else than the difference from a natural alliance through a certain corruption.

Theæ. It is nothing else.

Guest. And is baseness any thing else than that kind of dissonance which exists²⁷ every where disagreeable?

Theæ. It is nothing else.

[29.] *Guest.* What then, have we not perceived in the soul of those who conduct themselves ill, opinions at variance

²⁷ Heindorf adopted correctly Schleiermacher's *ἐν ὅν* for *ἐν δν*, which is however defended by Creuzer on Plotinus, *Περὶ Κάλλους*, p. 174, while Stalbaum reads *δν*, with four MSS. and Galen de Dogm. Hippocrat. et Platon. T. v. p. 288, ed. Bas.

with desires, anger with pleasures, reason with pain, and all these with each other?

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. And yet all (these) are necessarily allied to each other.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. In calling then depravity a sedition and disease of the soul, we shall speak correctly.

Theæ. Most correctly.

Guest. But when such things as participate of motion, and propose to themselves a certain end, are, in attempting to reach it, carried according to each impulse beside it, and miss it, shall we say that they are affected thus through a congruity towards each other, or, on the contrary, through an incongruity?

Theæ. It is evident through an incongruity.

Guest. But we know that every soul is involuntarily ignorant of any thing.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. But ignorance is nothing else than a delirium of the soul, which, while it is impelled to truth, is carried away from a (correct) perception.³⁸

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. We must consider, therefore, a soul without intelligence as base and incongruous.

Theæ. So it appears.

[30.] *Guest.* It seems then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul; one, which is called by the multitude depravity, and is most evidently its disease—

Theæ. It is.

Guest. But the other (the multitude) call ignorance; but they are unwilling to confess that it alone³⁹ is a vice in the soul.

Theæ. It must be readily granted, what, when you just now spoke of it, I doubted, that there are two kinds of vice in

³⁸ To obtain this sense, and to preserve the syntax, we must read παραρόπου δ' ἐκ ξυνίσεως, in lieu of παραρόπου ξυνίσεως.

³⁹ I cannot understand the words αὐτὸ—μόνον, which Ficinus has omitted. Stalbaum renders μόνον "eximie," and refers to his note on Sympos. p. 215, C. and p. 222, A. But αὐτὸ—μόνον, never does and never could mean any thing else but "itself—alone."

the soul; and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, injustice, all taken together as a disease in us; but we must lay down the accident of ignorance great and of various kinds as a baseness.

Guest. In the body then are there not two arts relating to these two accidents?

Thea. What are they?

Guest. Relating to baseness, the gymnastic; but to disease, the medical.

Thea. They seem so.

Guest. As regards insolence, injustice, and cowardice, is not the chastising [justice]⁴⁰ naturally the most fitting of all arts?

Thea. It is likely, as I may say,⁴¹ according to human opinion.

Guest. But can any one say that there is a more proper (remedy)⁴² for all ignorance than the teaching art.

Thea. There is none.

[31.] *Guest.* Come then, must we say there is only one kind of the teaching art, or more? But take notice, that there are two greatest kinds of it.⁴³

Thea. I do take notice.

Guest. And it appears to me that we shall very quickly discover this.

Thea. In what way?

Guest. By perceiving whether ignorance has a division in the middle of it. For being twofold, it is evident that it

⁴⁰ The word *δικη*, as remarked by Stalbaum, is evidently an interpretation of *ἡ κολαστική*, which agrees with *τίχνη* understood.

⁴¹ Stalbaum says that *ὥς εἰπεῖν* is added to give an excuse for the modest assent in the words, *τὸ γοῦν εἰκός*. But an excuse is required, not for a modest expression, but an hyperbolical one, as I have shown in Poppo's *Prolegom.* p. 217. From whence it will be seen that *ὥς εἰπεῖν* must follow either *ξύμπασαν* in the next question of the Guest, or *οὐδεμίαν* in the next reply of Theætetus.

⁴² This word Taylor introduced from the version of Ficinus—"quid aliud præter doctrinam remedium invenitur," which leads to *ἀλλήν τιν' ἢ διδασκαλικήν ὁρθότερον εὔροι τις ἴαμα ἂν*;

⁴³ There is evidently some error here. For after the Guest had asked whether there were one or more kinds of the teaching art, he could not immediately bid Theætetus to consider that there are two greatest kinds of it. Plato probably wrote, *ἀρα ἔν μόνον γένος φάριον εἶναι ἢ, εἰ πλείω, δύο γε*—"Must we say there is only one kind, or, if more, that there are at least two kinds."

compels the teaching art to have two parts, one for each one of its own.

Theæ. What then? Has the thing sought become visible?

Guest. I seem to see set apart a great and difficult kind of ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.

Theæ. Of what kind is it?

Guest. When he, who does not know a thing, thinks he knows it; through which it nearly happens that all those things, in which we are deceived by the imagination, take their rise in the case of all persons.

Theæ. True.

Guest. And I think that to this (division) of ignorance alone the name of non-erudition should be given.

Theæ. Entirely so.

[32.] *Guest.* By what name then is to be mentioned that part of the teaching art which frees (a person) from this (ignorance)?

Theæ. I think, *Guest*, that the other part is called handicraft teaching, but that this is called here through us discipline.⁴⁴

Guest. It is so called, *Theætetus*, by nearly all the Greeks. But this also must be considered by us, whether the whole of this is indivisible, or possesses a certain division worthy a name.

Theæ. It is requisite to consider this.

Guest. It appears then to me, that this may in some way be still further divided.

Theæ. In what?

Guest. Of the teaching art relating to discourses, one way appears to be more rough, but another part of it more smooth.

Theæ. Of what kind shall we call each of these?

Guest. One, the old-fashioned, paternal, which persons formerly adopted, especially towards their children, and many use even now, when children do wrong, partly by severely re-

⁴⁴ In this passage, easy as it seems to be, there are some difficulties which none of the editors have noticed. In the first place, the words "through us" are perfectly unintelligible, and are properly omitted by Ficinus; although less dependence is to be placed on his testimony than it would otherwise deserve, as he omits "here" likewise. Secondly, as the *εἰδασκαλία* is called *ἐπιμορφική*, so ought the *πατρὶς* to have its distinguishing epithet; and lastly, to preserve the climax in "here"—and, afterwards, "nearly all the Greeks"—the name of a place should be given or alluded to.

reproving, and partly by mildly admonishing them. Now the whole of this one may call most correctly admonition.

Thea. It is so.

[33.] *Guest.* But the other⁴⁵—since some seem, after giving themselves to reflection, to hold that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one, who thinks himself wise, is willing to learn those things in which he considers himself skilled, and that the admonitory kind of instruction, even with great labour, effects but little.

Thea. And they think right.

Guest. They therefore direct their course to an outlet for their opinion by another mode.

Thea. By what mode?

Guest. They inquire into those matters, about which a man thinks he says something to the purpose, when he is saying nothing. They then easily examine the opinions of persons as if they were in error, and bringing them together by a reasoning process to the same point, they place them by the side of each other; and by so placing, they show that the opinions are at one and the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, with reference to the same circumstances, and according to the same premises. And they seeing⁴⁶ are indignant with themselves, and become milder towards others; and in this way are liberated from strong and harsh opinions; a liberation of all others the most pleasant to hear, and the most firm to the party suffering. [34.] For they, my dear boy, who purify these, think as physicians do with respect to the body—that the body cannot enjoy food, which is brought to it, until some one casts out the impediments in it; and in like manner the others think that the soul can derive no advantage from the learning brought to it, until some one, by confuting, places the party confuted in a state of shame, and by taking away the opinions, which are the impediments to learning, exhibits him purified, and thinking that he knows those things alone which he does know, and nothing more.

Thea. This is the best and the most temperate of habits.

Guest. For all these reasons then, Theætetus, we must say, that confutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications;

⁴⁵ After "the other," there is an interruption in the definition.

⁴⁶ After "seeing," the editors understand "this," answering to "hoc" in Ficinus.

and we must think that he who is not confuted, even though he should be the great king himself, would be unpurified to the greatest degree, and become uninstructed and ugly with respect to those things, in which it is fit that he should be most pure and beautiful, who is to be in reality happy.

[35.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. But whom shall we say employ this art? For I fear to say the sophists.

Theæ. Why so?

Guest. Lest we should place on them a greater honour than is fitting.

Theæ. But yet what has been just now said appears to be suited to some such character.

Guest. So does a wolf (resemble) a dog, a most savage animal one the most mild. But he who wishes to be most of all free from stumbling, ought to keep ever a guard on similitudes; for it is a most slippery race. Let them however stand, for I think there will not be a dispute about trifling definitions, at a time when persons are watching them sufficiently.

Theæ. It is not likely at least.

Guest. Let then there be of the separating art one portion, the purifying; of the purifying, let the part relating to the soul be divided off; and of this let (a part) be the teaching art; and of the teaching art, let instruction (be a part); and of instruction, let that confutation, which takes place respecting a vain opinion of wisdom, be called, through the reason now exhibited, nothing else than the sophistic art of a noble race.

[36.] *Theæ.* Let it be so called. But in consequence of so many things having just now presented themselves, I am doubtful what, as speaking the truth and urging it strenuously, I ought to say the sophist really is.

Guest. You are very properly in doubt. And indeed one ought to think, that even a sophist himself will now very much doubt by what means he shall slip through the argument. For the proverb rightly says, It is not easy to avoid all (traps). Now therefore let us attack him with all our might.

Theæ. You speak well.

Guest. But, in the first place, let us stand and as it were take breath; and while stopping let us reason among ourselves.

Come then, in how many forms has the sophist appeared? For I think, he was found at first a hunter for wages of the youthful and rich.

Theæ. He was.

Guest. Secondly, a certain trafficker in the learning of the soul.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Thirdly, did he not appear as a chapman in the very same articles?

Theæ. He did. And fourthly, he was the seller of his own inventions.

Guest. You have properly reminded me of this; and of the fifth (form) I will endeavour to remind you. For he was a combatant in the contests of words, having been (so) defined from the art of contention.⁴⁷

[37.] *Theæ.* He was so.

Guest. The sixth form is indeed ambiguous; but nevertheless we laid it down and conceded to him,⁴⁸ that a sophist is a purifier, as regards the soul, of such opinions as are an impediment to learning.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Do you then perceive, that, when any one seems to know many things, and is called by the name of one art, this it is not a healthful seeming; but that he, who is thus affected with respect to any art, evidently cannot see that part of it to which all this learning tends? and hence he⁴⁹ calls the person possessing them by many names, instead of one.

Theæ. This almost appears to be very natural.

⁴⁷ In the Greek words, *τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος*, Heindorf not only gives to the perf. pass. an active syntax, but takes it in a middle sense, by rendering *ἀφωρισμένος* "sibi seorsim assumpsit." So too does Stalbaum. But neither of them have been able to produce a single passage in support of their views. I have followed Taylor, conceiving *κατὰ* to be understood. Ficinus has most loosely, "artificiosus nimium litigator."

⁴⁸ So Stalbaum translates *αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες*. But *αὐτῷ* has no meaning here. Ficinus has "in præsentiâ," which leads to *τίως*, a purely Attic word for "previously," as shown by Suidas.

⁴⁹ Fischer says, the nominative to *προσαγορεύει* is *ὁ πάσχων*. But it is not the person who is so circumstanced that gives the name, but something else. There is an error here, which it would not be difficult, perhaps, to correct.

Guest. Let us not then suffer the same⁵⁰ thing in this search through indolence; but let us in the first place take up again one of the things stated of the sophist; for one of them appeared to me especially to indicate him.

Theæ. Which of them?

Guest. We said that he was in a certain respect a contradictor.

Theæ. We did.

Guest. And does he not also become a teacher of this to others?

Theæ. How not?

[38.] *Guest.* Let us then consider about what such persons say they make contradictions. And let our consideration be from the beginning in this way. With respect to divine things, which are non-apparent to the many, do sophists make them able to do this, (viz. to contradict)?

Theæ. This is indeed asserted of them.

Guest. But with respect to the apparent things of earth and heaven, and what pertains to these?

Theæ. Why not?

Guest. In private meetings at least, when any thing is asserted of generation and existence in general, we are conscious that the sophists are powerful in contradicting, and that they make others as powerful as themselves.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But with respect to laws, and all political matters, do they not also promise to make men contentious in these?

Theæ. Not one, as I may say, would discourse with them unless they promised this.

Guest. But writings relating to all the arts, and to each art singly, are made public and deposited by him, who wishes to learn what he ought to say against each handicraftsman.

Theæ. You appear to me to speak of the writings of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts.

Guest. And to the writings of many others, O blessed man. But does not the art of contradicting seem to be a power sufficient for controversy about all things, (to speak) summarily?

Theæ. It appears that scarcely not a thing would be wanting.

⁵⁰ Instead of γὰρ αὐτὸ, Ficinus found in his MS. γὰρ ταὐτὸ, as is evident from his version, "Ne—nobis idem—contingat."

[39.] *Guest.* But by the gods, O boy, do you think this is possible? For perhaps you young men see more acutely, but we more dully, this thing.

Thea. What thing? and at what are you particularly talking? For I do not understand at all the present question.

Guest. (Consider,) if it be possible for any one man to know all things.

Thea. If it were possible our race, O guest, would indeed be blessed.

Guest. How then can any one without knowledge himself be able to urge any thing sound against him who possesses knowledge?

Thea. Not at all.

Guest. What then would be the wonder in the sophistic power?

Thea. About what?

Guest. The manner by which sophists are able to get up an opinion amongst the young, that they are the wisest of all men in all things. For it is evident that, if they neither contradicted rightly, nor appeared to the young to do so, and, when appearing to do so, unless they seemed to be more wise through their contentions, no one would, as far as your business is concerned, even at leisure,⁵¹ give them money, or be willing to become their scholar.

Thea. Not even at leisure indeed.

Guest. But now persons are willing.

Thea. And very much so.

Guest. For the sophists appear I think to have a knowledge themselves of that against which they speak.

Thea. How should they not?

Guest. But do they act so in all things? Say we it?

Thea. Yes.

Guest. They appear, then, to their disciples to be wise in all things.

Thea. How not?

Guest. But not being so in reality; for this appeared to be impossible.

Thea. For how is it not impossible?

⁵¹ On the use of the word *σχολῶ* see the commentators on Soph. Œd. T. 434.

Guest. The sophist, then, has been shown to us to possess a certain kind of a reputation for knowledge about all things, but not according to the truth.

Theæ. Entirely so. And what has been now said respecting sophists seems very nearly to be most rightly said.

[40.] *Guest.* Let us therefore take a clearer pattern respecting them.

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. This. But endeavour to answer by giving your mind very closely to what I am saying.

Theæ. Of what kind is the pattern?

Guest. As if any one should say, that he knows not (the art of) asserting and contradicting, but of making and causing all things by one art.

Theæ. How said you all?

Guest. Of the commencement of the discourse you are straightway ignorant; for, as it seems, you do not understand the "all."

Theæ. I do not.

Guest. I say then that you and I are in the number of all things, and besides us, there are other animals and trees.

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. If any one should assert that he would make you and me, and all the rest of productions—

Theæ. Of what making do you speak? For you are not speaking of a husbandman; because you mentioned him as a maker of animals.

Guest. I say, moreover, that he is the maker of the sea, the earth, the heavens, the gods, and all other things; and rapidly making each of these, he sells them for a small sum.

Theæ. You are speaking in jest.

Guest. What! must we not consider that as a jest, when a man asserts that he knows all things, and can teach another all things, for a small sum of money, and in a short time?

Theæ. Entirely so.

[41.] *Guest.* But have you any kind of jesting more artificial or agreeable than the imitative?

Theæ. I have not. For you have mentioned a very large kind, and comprehended all things in one, and that one nearly the most varied.

Guest. Do we not then know that he who undertakes to

be able to make all things by one art, will, by fabricating imitations and homonyms⁵² of things, through the art of painting, be able, by showing the pictures at a distance, to lie concealed from the stupid amongst young men (and) boys, as being a person most competent to do whatever he pleased?

Thea. How not?

Guest. ⁵³ But as to discourses, do we not expect that there is such another art? or is it not possible to bewitch the young men, and those still standing far off from the truth of things, through words (spoken) in their ears, and by showing them images, as they are called, of every thing, so as to cause them to be said to seem true, and for the speaker to be the wisest of all men in all things?⁵³

[42.] *Thea.* Why should there not be another such art?

Guest. Is it not then necessary, Theætetus, that the majority of those, who were then hearing, should, after a sufficient time has passed and they have themselves arrived at manhood, come near to things as they are, and be compelled through accidental circumstances to handle realities clearly, and to change their former opinions, so that things (once) great appear small, those (once) difficult, easy, and all the mere appearances produced by discourses, are entirely overthrown through works which occur in practice?

Thea. It appears so to me, as far as my age is capable of judging; for I think that I too am one of those who are far distant (from the truth).

Guest. All we then, who are present, will endeavour, and let us now endeavour,⁵⁴ free from all accidental circumstances,

⁵² What can be the meaning of *ὁμώνυμα*, I confess my inability to explain. Picinus has "picturam fingentem equivoca simulacra," which is equally unintelligible. The commentators, according to custom, are silent. Perhaps Plato wrote, what the train of thought evidently requires, *ὁμοιώματα*, "likenesses."

⁵³⁻⁵⁴ In the place of this mass of nonsense, it will be sufficient to give the English reader a translation of what it were easy to show Plato did actually write: "But as regards discourses, may we not expect that there is such another art, by which it is possible for a person to lie concealed from simpletons and those standing still further off from the truth of things, and to bewitch them by words (spoken) in their ears, while he is showing the images of things, so as to cause what is spoken to seem to be true, and the speaker on all subjects to be talked of as the wisest of all men upon all points?"

⁵⁴ Here is evidently some error, which it would require no great talent to correct.

to bring you as near as possible (to the truth). With respect to a sophist then tell me this. Is it clear, that he is one of enchanters, as being an imitator of things? or do we yet doubt, whether in the matters, respecting which he appears able to contradict, he possesses in reality the requisite science?

Theæ. But how, Guest, can we (doubt of this)? For it is nearly evident from what has been said, that he is one of those who take a part in jesting.

Guest. We must put him down then as some enchanter and mimic.

[43.] *Theæ.* How must we not so put him?

Guest. Come then, it is now our business not to let go the wild beast, for we have now nearly enclosed the sophist in a casting net, one of the instruments used in discourses about things of this kind,⁵⁵ so that he cannot any longer escape from this.

Theæ. From what?

Guest. That he is one of the wonder-workers.

Theæ. This also is my opinion respecting him.

Guest. It is decreed then, that we divide as quickly as possible the image-producing art, and, going down against it, seize upon the sophist, should he forthwith⁵⁶ wait for us, according to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit our prey to him (the king). But if he creeps into the parts of the imitative art, we are to follow him, always dividing the part which receives him, until he is caught. For neither will he, nor any other genus, ever boast to escape the method of those, who are able to follow thus the points singly and universally.

Theæ. You speak well. And in this manner, therefore, we must act.

⁵⁵ All the edd. have, *ἐν ἀμφιβληστροικῷ τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων*, which is evidently an explanation of a lost technical word. Ficinus translates, "veluti funda quadam irretitum, ratiocinando comprehendimus," as if he had found in his MS., *ὥσπερ σφενδόνη, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις*. But no person could be said to enclose an animal with a sling. Plato wrote, I suspect, *περιελήφαμεν νεφέλην*. For such was the name of a kind of net, as we learn from Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 194, *Μὰ γῆν, μὰ παγίδα, μὰ νεφέλας, μὰ δίκτυα*.

⁵⁶ This "forthwith" has no meaning here. In lieu of *εὐθὺς*, Plato evidently wrote *ὅλα-θώς*, similar to *θηρα* a little above. The *θώς*, says Hesychius, was a hybrid animal, the produce of a wolf and hyæna. The word has been corrupted elsewhere, as I have shown on Euripid. *Tro.* 692, and Soph. *Phil.* 760, and I could now add many more passages.

[44.] *Guest.* According to the preceding method of division, I now seem to see two kinds of the imitative art; but in which of these happens to be the idea of which we are in search, I do not now seem to be able to perceive.

Thea. But first tell me, and divide the two kinds of which you are speaking.

Guest. I see that one is the assimilative art. And this especially takes place, when any one according to the proportions of the original, in length, breadth, and depth, and moreover by adding fitting colours, works out the production of an imitation.

Thea. What then, do not all imitators endeavour to do this?

Guest. Not such as mould or paint any great work. For, if they would give the true proportion of beautiful things, you know that the upper parts would appear smaller than is fitting, and the lower parts larger, through the former being seen by us at a distance, and the latter close at hand.

Thea. Entirely so.

[45.] *Guest.* Do not then the artists, bidding farewell to truth, now work out not real proportions, but such as will seem to be beautiful in their representations?

Thea. Entirely so.

Guest. Is it not then just, as being at least probable,⁵⁷ to call one an image?

Thea. Yes.

Guest. And we must call the part of the imitative art, subsequent to this, as we said above, assimilative.

Thea. We must so call it.

Guest. But what shall we call that, which appears indeed similar to the beautiful, ⁵⁸ through the view taken from a favourable point,⁵⁸ but which, (when seen by him⁵⁹) who has the power to look on such things sufficiently,⁶⁰ is not like that to which it professes to be like? Must we not (call it) an appearance, since it appears to be, but is not like?

⁵⁷ I confess I do not understand the words *εἰκός γε ὅν*.

^{58, 59} These words were omitted by Taylor, because he did not know what to make of the version of Ficinus, "ex eo quod haud pulchrum respiciat," who found in his MS. the *οὐκ* before *ἐκ καλοῦ*, which three MSS. omit, as Schleiermacher conjectured.

⁶⁰ The words within the lunet were properly added by Taylor to complete the sense.

⁶¹ This "sufficiently" is scarcely intelligible.

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Guest. Is not this part to be found abundantly in painting, and in the whole of the imitative art?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But may we not most correctly call that art, which produces an appearance, but not an image, phantastic?

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. Now I have already said that these were the two kinds of the image-producing art, the assimilative and phantastic.

Theæ. Correctly so.

[46.] *Guest.* But that of which I doubted then, viz. in which of these kinds we must put the sophist, I am not at all able even now to see clearly. For the man is truly wonderful; and it is extremely difficult to get a view of him; since even now, very well and cleverly, he has fled into a species, where it is hard to track him out.

Theæ. So it seems.

Guest. Do you then assent to this through understanding it? or has a certain rush of reasoning carried you away to giving a rapid assent according to custom?⁶¹

Theæ. How and for what do you say this?

Guest. We are, O blessed man, truly engaged in a speculation thoroughly difficult. For that this thing should appear both to seem to be, and yet not be; and that a man should assert certain things, and yet not true,—all these things (were) always full of difficulty formerly, and are now. For he, who thus⁶² speaks, must either say or think that false things truly exist; and thus speaking, Theætetus, it is extremely difficult for him not to be hampered by a self-contradiction.

[47.] *Theæ.* Why so?

Guest. (Because) such a mode of speaking dares to suggest that a nonentity exists; for otherwise there would not be a falsehood, which exists. And the great Parmenides, O boy, while we were yet boys, did from the first to the last testify to this. For, both in prose and verse, he on every occasion

⁶¹ But so far was Theætetus from being accustomed to give a rapid assent, that he previously complained of the Stranger being too fast for a man so slow. Hence we must insert *οὐ* between *λόγου* and *συμβιθισμίνον*.

⁶² Had Heindorf seen Taylor's translation, he would perhaps have suggested *οὐτως*, and have thus obviated all the difficulty now found in *ὁπως*.

thus speaks, "You must not (think)," says he, "non-entities exist; but keep thy thoughts when searching from this road." This then is both testified by him, and this discourse will the most of all point it out, if examined with moderation. Let us then, if it makes no difference to you, consider this in the first place.

Thea. Put my business where you like. But in what way the discourse will best proceed, do you consider yourself, and lead me along in that path.

Guest. It will be proper so to do. Tell me, then. Dare we pronounce that which in no respect is?

Thea. How not?

[48.] *Guest.* If then, not for the sake of contention nor of jesting, but in seriousness, it were necessary for any of the hearers to join with us in considering and stating to what point one ought to carry the word "non-entity," for what thing and of what kind do we think he would be able⁶³ to use it himself, and to show (its use) to a person inquiring?

Thea. You ask a difficult question, and to a person like myself utterly insurmountable.

Guest. This however is evident, that to any one of entities the expression of non-entity cannot be referred.

Thea. For how could it?

Guest. Since then it cannot be referred to an entity, one cannot rightly refer it to any thing.

Thea. How could he?

Guest. And this too is evident to us, that we pronounce on each occasion this word "something" respecting an entity. For it is impossible to pronounce it alone, as if it were naked and placed in a desert from all entities.

Thea. It is impossible.

Guest. Thus considering, do you then agree with me, that he who pronounces the word "something," must necessarily mean some one thing?

Thea. Yes.

Guest. For you will say, that the word "something" is a sign of one thing, and that "somethings" is a sign of many things.

⁶³ Stalbaum omits *ἔχειν* and admits *τι* with MSS. which he considers the best; but which here and elsewhere frequently offer the worst readings.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But it is most necessary, as it appears, that he who speaks of that, which is not something, must speak entirely of nothing.

Theæ. This is most necessary.

Guest. Is not then this to be granted, that such a person speaks indeed, but speaks of nothing? But neither must we say that he speaks, who endeavours to enunciate non-entity?⁶⁴

Theæ. The discourse would have then an end of doubt.

[49.] *Guest.* Do not as yet speak any big word. For, O blessed man, the greatest and first of doubts still remain as regards these things: for it happens to be about the very commencement of it (the discourse).

Theæ. How say you? Speak, and do not hesitate.

Guest. To that, which is, something else may be added of things that are.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But to that, which is not, shall we say that something can be added of things that are?

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Now we place number universally among things that are.

Theæ. If indeed any thing else is to be placed as a thing that is.

Guest. Let us then not attempt to attribute "the many," nor "the one," to a non-entity.

Theæ. We cannot it seems⁶⁵ with propriety attempt it, as reason says.

Guest. How then can any one enunciate by the mouth, or comprehend at all by intellect, non-entities, or a non-entity, apart from number?

Theæ. Tell me why not.

Guest. When we speak of non-entities, do we not endeavour to add "the many" of number?

⁶⁴ I confess my inability to see what the speaker is aiming at. Ficinus too seems to have been equally in the dark. For he thus renders the whole passage: "*Hø.* Neque id concedendum hominem talem dicere quidem aliquid, sed non unum quid, id est nihil dicere. *The.* Atqui neque loqui dicendus est ille, qui conatur non-ens proferre. Unde sermo extremum dubitationis haberet."

⁶⁵ The words *ὡς εἶπεν* are correctly omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently superfluous on account of *ὡς φησιν ὁ λόγος*.

Thea. How not?

Guest. And (when we speak of) a non-entity, (do we) not (endeavour to adjoin) "the one" (of number)?

Thea. Yes, most clearly.

Guest. And yet we say, that it is neither just nor right to endeavour to add an entity to a non-entity.

Thea. You speak most truly.

Guest. You perceive then, that it is not possible correctly to enunciate, or speak of, or think of, a non-entity itself by itself; but that it is incomprehensible, unspeakable, unpronounceable, and irrational?

Thea. Entirely so.

Guest. Did I, then, just now speak falsely, when I said, that I would tell of the greatest doubt respecting it?

Thea. What then, can we mention any (doubt) greater than this?

Guest. Do you not see, O wonderful youth, from what has been said, that non-entity leads him, who confutes it, into such a perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it, he is compelled to contradict himself?

Thea. How say you? Speak yet clearer.

Guest. For me there is no occasion to consider any thing clearer. For, when I laid down the proposition, that non-entity ought to participate neither of "the one," nor of "the many," both a little before and now, I said "the one" abstractedly. For I was speaking of a non-entity; you perceived this?

Thea. Yes.

Guest. And again, a little before, I said that a non-entity was unspeakable, ineffable, and irrational. Do you follow me?

Thea. I do follow in a certain way.

Guest. When, therefore, I endeavoured to fit entity (to non-entity), did I not say what is contrary to former (assertions)?

Thea. You appear so.

Guest. What then, did I not, when attributing this to it, speak to it⁶⁶ as to one thing?

Thea. Yes.

Guest. And yet, while calling it irrational, ineffable, and unspeakable, did I not make the assertion as pertaining to one thing?

⁶⁶ So Stalbaum from many MSS., which I cannot understand. Heindorf would read οὐχ ὡς ἓν ἓν, in lieu of ὡς ἓν.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. For we say, that if any one correctly speaks of non-entity, he ought to define it neither as one, nor many, nor give it any appellation whatever; for it would be called already one thing, according to this appellation.⁶⁷

[51.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. What then will some one say of me? For, both formerly and now, he will find me overthrown respecting the proof of a non-entity. So that, as I have already said, let us not think, in my speaking at least, of logical precision respecting a non-entity. But come, let us now consider this affair in your speaking.

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. Come, endeavour in a becoming and noble manner, as being a young man, and exerting yourself with all your might, pronounce something about non-entity, conformable to right reason, without adding to it either existence, or the one or the many of number.

Theæ. The readiness of my attempt would be vastly absurd, were I, after seeing you suffer thus, to make it.

Guest. But, if it seems good, let us dismiss both you and myself with a farewell; and until we meet with some one who is able to do this, let us say that the sophist has, with a knavery greater than all, let himself down into a place from which there is no outlet.

[52.] *Theæ.* So indeed it appears.

Guest. If then we should say that he possessed a certain fancy-effecting art, he would, from his use of words, easily lay hold of us, and turn the discourse to the very contrary point. For when we call him a maker of images, he will immediately ask us, What do we assert an image to be universally. It is meet then, Theætetus, to consider what answer to this question should one give to the young man.

Theæ. It is evident that we shall say that things seen in water and mirrors are images, and moreover such things as are painted and fashioned and the rest of other things of this kind.

Guest. It is evident, Theætetus, that you have never seen a sophist.

Theæ. Why so?

⁶⁷ This is the translation of Stalbaum's text after a correction by Heindorf. I cannot understand it.

Guest. He will appear to you to wink, or to have no eyes at all.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. When you give him this answer,⁶⁸ should you speak of any thing (seen) in mirrors or mouldings, he will laugh at your reasons; when you speak to him as being able to see, he will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors, or water, or of sight at all, but will ask you of that, which depends on reason alone.

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. That, which in all those things you have mentioned, you, speaking of as many, think fit to call by one name, pronouncing the word image as being in them all one thing. Speak then and defend yourself, and yield nothing to the man.

[53.] *Theæ.* What then, O guest, can we say an image is, except that it is made to resemble the truth, being another thing the counterpart?

Guest. Do you say that such other thing is truly so, or to what do you apply the expression, such other?

Theæ. It is by no means truly a such other, but only seems to be.

Guest. Do you then call a truth a real entity?

Theæ. I do.

Guest. But is not that, which is not true, contrary to truth?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. ⁶⁹ You say then that the seeming is not an entity, if you assert that it is not a truth. It is however an entity.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Do you not say then truly?

Theæ. Certainly not, except a likeness in reality.

⁶⁸ Taylor, translating, as usual, from the Latin instead of the Greek, left out the words, "When you give him this answer," omitted by Ficinus; nor did even Heindorf perceive that they ought to commence the preceding speech of the Guest; and though he was offended at the double protasis, he did not see that Plato wrote "Ὅταν μὲν ἐν κατόπτροις — Ὅταν δ' ὡς βλέποντι—"

⁶⁹—⁷⁰ I cannot understand either this text, given by Stalbaum, or the corrections proposed by Schleiermacher and Heindorf. Ficinus has, "Ho. Si ergo id, quod simile vocas, verum esse negas, ens quoque existere negas; est tamen. The. Quo pacto? Ho. Esse quidem, sed vere esse non fateris? The. Certe non verum ens, sed imaginem veram. Ho. Ergo non vere et ens id, quod vere esse imaginem dicimus; et non vere ens est vere."

Guest. That then which is not really a non-entity, is really that which we call a likeness.⁶⁹

Theæ. It nearly appears that non-entity is entwined by a certain connexion of this kind with entity; and it is very strange.

Guest. How is it possible it should not be strange? You now therefore perceive that through this alternation, the many-headed sophist compels us unwillingly to confess that non-entity does somehow exist.

Theæ. I see it, and very much so.

[54.] *Guest.* How, then, shall we define his art, and yet be able to be consistent with ourselves?

Theæ. Why do you speak thus, and of what are you afraid?

Guest. When we say that he is a deceiver about an appearance, and that his is a certain deceptive art, whether shall we say that our soul then has a false opinion, through his art? or what shall we say?

Theæ. This very thing. For what else can we say?

Guest. But will false opinion be fancying things contrary to those that are?

Theæ. Contrary.

Guest. You say then that false opinion fancies things that are not.

Theæ. It does so of necessity.

Guest. Whether does it fancy that non-entities do not exist, or that non-entities do exist in a certain way?

Theæ. If any one is ever deceived even a little, he must (fancy)⁷⁰ that non-entities do exist in a certain way.

Guest. And will not entities entirely be likewise fancied not to exist at all?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And this too falsely?

Theæ. Yes, this too.

Guest. And false reasoning will, I think, be deemed, in the same way, to assert that entities do not exist, and non-entities do exist.

[55]. *Theæ.* For how can it otherwise become such (viz. false)?

⁷⁰ Ficinus has, "Si quis unquam quoquomodo opinando mentitur, necesse est ut, quæ non sunt, esse quodammodo judicet"—as if he had found in his MS. *δεῖ δοξάζειν* instead of *δεῖ γε*.

Guest. Nearly not at all. But the sophist will not say so. Or what device is there for any one of a sound mind to concede; when ⁷¹the things that have been granted before these⁷¹ have been admitted to be unspeakable, ineffable, irrational, and incomprehensible? Do we understand what (the sophist) says, Theætetus?

Thea. How is it possible we should not? For he will assert that we are saying things contrary to the present, in having dared to assert that falsehoods exist in opinions and reasons;⁷² for that having been often compelled to unite entity to non-entity, we have just now acknowledged, that this is somehow the most impossible of all things.

Guest. You have rightly recalled (me to the argument). But it is now time to consult about what we ought to do respecting the sophist. For, if we should attempt to search him out, by placing him in the art of falsehood-workers and enchanter, you see that his counter-graspings will be easy and (our) difficulties many.

Thea. Very.

Guest. We have then gone through only a small part of them; since they are, as I may say, boundless.

Thea. If such is the case, it would be impossible, it seems, to catch the sophist.

[56.] *Guest.* What then, shall we now stand cowardly aloof?

Thea. I say we ought not, if we are able by ever so little to lay hold in some way of the man.

Guest. You will then grant me pardon, and, as you just now said, be satisfied, if we can draw by some means even a little for ourselves out of such powerful reasoning.

Thea. How shall I not?

Guest. This too I beg of you still further.

Thea. What?

Guest. That you do not think I am become, as it were, a parricide.

Thea. Why so?

⁷¹⁻⁷¹ These words Heindorf fancied to be elegantly introduced by Plato, to avoid the repetition of *τὰ μὴ ὄντα*.

⁷² Ficinus has "cum nunc non ens in opinione et locutione ponamus," as if his MS. omitted *ψευδῆ* and read *ὡς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν*—instead of *ὡς ἔστιν*.

Guest. Because it will be necessary for us, in self-defence, to put to the torture the reasoning of my father Parmenides, and to compel a nonentity to exist in some way, and again an entity in some way not to exist.

Theæ. It appears that we must battle in our reasonings for a thing of this kind.

Guest. For how should this not be evident, as it is said, even to a blind man? For, while these things are neither confuted nor confessed, any one will be able to speak at leisure about false assertions, or opinions respecting resemblances, or images, or imitations, or appearances, or of the arts conversant with these, without being ridiculous through his being compelled to contradict himself.

Theæ. Most true.

Guest. Hence we must dare to oppose my father's reasoning, or we must dismiss it altogether, if any sluggishness restrains us from doing so (viz. opposing it).

Theæ. But let nothing by any means restrain us.

Guest. I will now beg of you still a third and trifling request.

Theæ. Only mention it.

Guest. I just now stated that I was always faint-hearted about the confutation of these points, and so I am now.

Theæ. You did say so.

Guest. I fear as regards what has been said, lest I seem to you to be insane, through my changing myself on the instant, up and down. For we will throw ourselves on the confutation of the reasoning, for your sake, if indeed we happen to confute it.

Theæ. As you will not then by any means appear to me to act improperly by advancing to the confutation and demonstration, on this account at least advance boldly.

Guest. Come then, what beginning shall we make to this very danger-bringing discourse? Now it appears, O boy, to be most necessary for us to turn to this road.

[58.] *Theæ.* What?

Guest. ⁷³To consider first those things which now seem to be clear, lest we become flurried about them; and that we without difficulty assent to each other, as if we were in a position to judge correctly.⁷³

⁷³—⁷³ In the whole of this passage Taylor merely put into English the Latin version of Ficinus, which differs so widely from the Greek, as to

Thea. State more clearly what you mean.

Guest. Both Parmenides and whoever else has rushed forward to the trial respecting the defining the quantity and quality of entities, seems to me to have discussed the question loosely.⁷⁴

Thea. How so?

Guest. Each seem to me to have told a tale to us, as if we were boys. One of them said that the entities are three;⁷⁵ but that some of them at one time are at war with each other in some manner; and at another, becoming friends, are married, bring forth, and furnish food to their offspring. But another⁷⁶ said that the entities are only two, the moist and the dry, or the hot and the cold; and these he unites in one house and gives them (in marriage) to each other. But the Eleatic sect among us, which derives its origin from Xenophanes, and from others still prior to him, details in fables that what is called the all is really one. But the Ionian,⁷⁷ and subsequently some Sicilian⁷⁸ muses have thought it more safe to connect these with each other, and to say that entity is both many and one, but held together by enmity and friendship. For that, which is separated, always comes together, say the

make one believe, that he supplied from his own head what was either wanting entirely, or only partially legible, in the MS. he had before him.

⁷⁴ So Heindorf understands *εὐκόλως*, which is literally, "of easy temper." But no philosopher would reason loosely. He might argue in a circle. Hence Plato wrote, perhaps, *εἰκυκλίως*.

⁷⁵ Of the ancient philosophers, some said that the first principles were three in number, the hot and the cold as extremes, but the moist as the medium; which sometimes conciliated the extremes, and sometimes not; but they did not place the dry in the rank of a principle at all, because they thought it subsisted either from the absence or evaporation of moisture. On the other hand, the followers of Anaxagoras asserted that there were four elements, heat and cold being the active powers, and dryness and moisture the passive. Heraclitus and Empedocles asserted that the matter of the universe was one, but its qualities many; with which the matter sometimes agreed, and at others disagreed. Heraclitus, however, conceived that the particles of the world were, through some discordant concord, always similar, though not the same; for all things were in a continual flux. But Empedocles asserted that the substance of the world remained the same; and that at one time all things were separated into chaos through discord, and in another were out of chaos reunited through concord. T.

⁷⁶ This was Archelaus, the pupil of Anaxagoras. See Heindorf.

⁷⁷ This alludes to Heraclitus of Ephesus.

⁷⁸ This refers to Empedocles of Agrigentum.

more energetic ⁷⁹ of the Muses. But the more gentle ⁷⁹ relax ⁷⁹ (the doctrine by saying) ⁸⁰ that this takes place always as regards (the whole), ⁸⁰ but that the whole is in turn now one, and friendly (to itself), ⁸¹ through Venus; and now many, and hostile to itself, through a certain strife. [59.] But whether any one has asserted all this truly or not, ⁸¹ it is difficult and wrong to bring so great a reproach upon illustrious and ancient men. ⁸¹ This, however, I may without envy show forth.

Theæ. What?

Guest. That they greatly looked down upon, and held in little esteem, us the many. For each of them finish their own work, without caring at all whether we follow them when speaking, or desert them.

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. When any one of them asserts in his speech that—many, or one or two, exist, or have been, or are in the course of production, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, (and) elsewhere lays down somehow discretions and concretions,—by the gods, Theætetus, do you understand what they are on each occasion asserting? Indeed, when I was younger, I thought that when any one spoke of a non-entity I accurately understood that, which is now doubtful; but now you see where we are in a difficulty respecting it.

Theæ. I do see.

[60.] *Guest.* Perhaps then, receiving in no less a degree the same feeling in our soul respecting an entity, we say we can easily understand it, when it is enunciated by any one; but not so, as regards the other, though similarly affected with respect to both.

Theæ. Perhaps so.

Guest. And let this very same thing be said by us respecting the other things before mentioned.

⁷⁹ In the words *συντονώτεται*, *μαλακώτεται*, and *ἐχάλασαν* there is, as Boeckh was the first to remark, an allusion to musical terms; which would now be called—"forte," "piano," and "the letting down a string" to convert a sharp into a flat.

⁸⁰ The words within lunas have been inserted to complete the sense.

⁸¹—⁸¹ The whole of this passage is in the original a mass of corruption; which I could easily correct. The sense evidently required is something to this effect—But whether any one has asserted all this truly or not, it is difficult to say; and it would be improper for me at least, if for any one, to bring a great reproach upon men of celebrity and of the olden time.

Thea. Entirely so.

Guest. We will speculate then, after this, about the many things, if it seems good; but let us now speculate about the greatest and first leading thing.

Thea. Of what are you speaking? Or is it plain that you assert that we ought in the first place to search after entity, and (see) what they, who speak of it, think they show.

Guest. You understand me, Theætetus, on the instant. For I say that we ought to adopt the same method, as if we were inquiring of them here present in this way. Come, ye who assert that the hot and the cold, or any two such things, are the whole, what is it you affirm to subsist in both of these, when you say that both and each exist? What are we to understand by this term of yours "to exist"? Is it a third thing different from those two, and are we to lay down three things as the whole, and no longer two things, according to you? For, while you call one of the two an entity, you cannot surely say that both are similarly an entity. For in both ways there would nearly be one thing, and not two.

Thea. You speak the truth.

Guest. Are you then willing to call both of them an entity?

Thea. Perhaps so.

Guest. But, O friends, we shall say, you would thus most clearly call even the two things one.

Thea. You speak most correctly.

[61.] *Guest.* Since then we are thus in doubt, do you sufficiently explain to us what you wish to signify, when you pronounce (the word) entity? For it is evident that you are conversant with these things long ago; and we formerly thought (we knew them), but now we are in doubt. Instruct us then, first in this very thing, that we may not fancy we understand what is asserted by you, when what is entirely contrary to this is taking place. In speaking in this manner, and making this request, both to these, and to such others as assert that the all is more than one thing, shall we, O boy, do any wrong?

Thea. By no means.

Guest. But ought we not to inquire, to the utmost of our power, of those who assert that the all is one, what they call entity?

Thea. How not?

Guest. To this question then let them answer, Do you assert there is one thing alone? They will say, We do assert it. Will they not?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. What then, do you call entity a thing?

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. Do you say, it is that which the one is, employing two names respecting the same thing? or how?

[62.] *Theæ.* What answer will they have after this, O stranger?

Guest. It is evident, Theætetus, that to him who lays down this hypothesis, it will not be the easiest thing of all to give an answer respecting the present question, or any other whatever.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. To acknowledge that there are two names, while laying down that there is not but one thing, is surely ridiculous.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And to receive (the assertion) altogether from him, who says that a name is a thing possessing no value—⁸²

Theæ. In what manner?

Guest. He who lays down a name as different from a thing, speaks of two certain things.

Theæ. He does.

Guest. And yet, if he lays down that the name is the same with the thing, he will be compelled to say, it is the name of nothing; or, if he says it is the name of something, it will result that a name is only the name of a name, but of nothing else.

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. And the one must be one entity alone of one, and not⁸³ itself the entity of a name.

⁸² To complete the sentence, Ficinus adds, "temerarium," i. e. it is rash; who omits, however, the words, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον, in which all the difficulty lies. Taylor translates, "of which no account can be given." Stephens, "rationi consentaneum haud fuerit," and reads ἔχον. Heindorf and Stalbaum retain ἔχον; but they do not condescend to tell us how they understand the words.

⁸³ This is the emendation of Ast and Stalbaum, who read καὶ οὐ τοῦ ὀνόματος, in lieu of καὶ τοῦτο ὀνόματος in some MSS., and καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος in others.

Thea. It is necessary.

Guest. But do they say that the whole is different from the one entity, or the same with it?

[63.] *Thea.* How will they not say it, and do say it?⁸⁴

Guest. If, then, a whole is, as Parmenides says, "Like the bulk of a sphere that is a perfect circle on all sides, and possessing equal powers on every part from the middle;⁸⁵ for there must needs be nothing greater or less on this side or on that;" it is necessary for entity, being of such a kind, to have a middle and extremities; and having these, there is every necessity for it to have parts. Or how shall we say?

Thea. Just so.

Guest. But nothing prevents the divided from having in all its parts the accident of the one; and in this way every entity and a whole would be one.

Thea. How not?

Guest. But is it not impossible that what suffers such accidents should itself be the very one?

Thea. How so?

Guest. Surely according to right reason, that, which is truly the one, must be said to be entirely without parts.

Thea. It must indeed.

Guest. But such a thing as consists of many parts would not harmonize with the one.⁸⁶

Thea. I understand you.

Guest. But whether will entity, having the accident of the one, be thus one, and whole? or must we by no means say that entity is a whole?

Thea. You have proposed a difficult choice.

⁸⁴ Here is some error. To a double question there could not be a single answer. Ficinus has "Cur non dixerint? Dicunt enim."

⁸⁵ Ficinus, perceiving doubtless that the definition given by Parmenides of a sphere was geometrically incorrect, added, I suspect, out of his own head, between "a medio," and "penitus æque distans," the words "ad circumferentiam." Had he been still living, I would have told him what, I suspect, the philosophic poet did really write. As it is, I will leave the truth to be discovered by future geometers and Greek scholars united.

⁸⁶ So Taylor translated, it would seem, from finding that the Greek $\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \delta\lambda\omega$ (or $\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \delta\lambda\omega\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega$ in some MSS., or $\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega\ \delta\lambda\omega$ in others) was at variance with the chain of reasoning. Heindorf indeed asserts that $\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega$ is to be referred to $\tau\acute{o}\nu\ \delta\rho\theta\acute{o}\nu\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega\nu$, mentioned just before. But in that case $\delta\rho\theta\tilde{\omega}$ would not have been omitted here. Perhaps Plato wrote $\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \epsilon\iota\tilde{\nu}\ \gamma\epsilon\ \delta\lambda\omega$.

Guest. You speak however most truly. For entity having the accident to be in some way one, it does not appear to be the same as the one; and the all will be more than one. Is it not so?

Theæ. Yes.

[64.] *Guest.* But yet if entity is not a whole, on account of its being subject to the accident belonging⁸⁷ to the whole, and yet is the whole itself, it follows that entity is in want of itself.⁸⁸

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. And entity, according to this reasoning, being deprived of itself, will be a non-entity.

Theæ. Just so.

Guest. And thus again the all becomes more than one; since both entity and the whole have obtained each their proper nature, apart from the other.

Theæ. True.

Guest. And if the whole has not an existence at all, the very same things will take place with respect to entity; and in addition to its not having an existence, it would at no time have been produced.

Theæ. Why so?

Guest. Whatever is produced is always produced as a whole. So that he, who does not place amongst entities [the one or]⁸⁹ the whole, ought to speak neither of existence or production as an entity.

Theæ. It appears that such is wholly the case.

Guest. Moreover, that, which is not a whole, must not have the accident of any quantity whatever. For, while it has the accident of quantity, whatever that may be, it must necessarily be a whole.

[65.] *Theæ.* Entirely so.

Guest. Each (view) then will appear to have taken up ten thousand other endless doubts for him, who says that entity is either two or only one.

Theæ. The light which is just now breaking almost shows

⁸⁷ This is the only intelligible rendering I can give to *ὅν τι ἐκείνου*. Heindorf refers to his note on *Phædon*. § 110.

⁸⁸ How entity can be said to be in want of itself, I confess I do not understand; unless it be said that by "itself" is meant "being" or "existence."

⁸⁹ Schleiermacher was the first to expunge the words within brackets as interfering with the chain of reasoning.

(this). For one thing is linked with another and brings with it a wandering (of the mind) greater and more dangerous respecting what has been from time to time asserted before.

Guest. But we have not yet gone through the whole⁹⁰ of those, who have accurately discoursed about entity and non-entity. Let, however, (this) suffice. And let us consider again those who speak inaccurately on these subjects, that we may perceive from all quarters, that it is in no respect more easy to say what entity is, than what non-entity is.

Theæ. We must therefore march against them.

Guest. Now, in truth, there appears to be among them, as it were, a kind of giants' war, through their conflicts with each other respecting existence.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Some of them draw down to earth all things from heaven and the unseen region, unskilfully⁹¹ laying hold for this purpose of rocks and oaks. For through their touching all such things as these, they strenuously contend that that alone exists, which affords impact and touch; and they define body and existence to be the same. But if any one says that of other things some have not a body, they thoroughly despise (the assertion), and are unwilling to hear another (word).

Theæ. You have spoken of terrible men. For I also have met with many such.

[66.] *Guest.* Wherefore the opponents⁹² of these men very carefully defend themselves from on high, from the invisible region, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal forms to be the true existence; and breaking into small pieces the bodies of the others, and that, which is called by them truth, they do in their own discourses, instead of existence, talk of some production carried on. But between these, Theætetus, an immense contest has always existed respecting these matters.

Theæ. True.

Guest. Let us now, therefore, receive from both these

⁹⁰ The reading of *πάντας*, preserved by Eusebius alone, has been adopted in lieu of *πάν*, by Stalbaum at Heindorf's suggestion. The whole passage is, however, far from being correct.

⁹¹ I have translated *ἀρίχνης* "unskilfully," to show what Plato thought of the Materialists of his day. Stalbaum has unskilfully preferred its ordinary meaning "really."

⁹² These, says Schleiermacher, were the philosophers of Megara; of whom the principal was Euclid.

aces⁹³ an account in detail of the existence which they lay down.

Theæ. But how shall we receive it?

Guest. From those that place existence in forms we may easily receive it; for they are more mild; but from those who violently draw all things to body, with more difficulty. And perhaps it will be nearly impossible. It appears to me, however, that we ought to act with respect to them in this way.

Theæ. In what?

Guest. Most of all to render them, if possible, better in deed; but if we make no progress in this, let us render them so in word, by supposing them to answer more equitably than at present they would be willing to do. For that, which is assented to by better persons, possesses more authority than that (which is assented to) by worse. However, we pay no attention to these things, but are seeking out the truth.

Theæ. Most right.

[67.] *Guest.* Order therefore those that have become better to answer you, and to interpret what they assert.

Theæ. Be it so.

Guest. Let them say then whether they call a mortal animal a thing?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And do they not acknowledge that this is an animated body?

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. Laying down that the soul is one of the things that exist.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. But do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust; and one prudent, and another imprudent?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But does not each soul become such through the habit and presence of justice, and the contrary (through the habit and presence) of the contraries?

Theæ. Yes; to this likewise they assent.

Guest. But will they say that what is able to be present to, and absent from, any thing, is something?

⁹³ I cannot believe that Plato wrote here *τοὺν γενοῖν*. One would prefer *τοὺν γηγενοῖν*, as in § 71, where there is an allusion to the giants mentioned in § 65.

Theæ. They say it.

Guest. Since then justice and prudence, and the other virtues, and their contraries, together with the soul in which they are implanted, exist, whether will they say that each of these is invisible and tangible, or that all of them are invisible?

Theæ. They will assert that nearly not one of them is visible.

[68.] *Guest.* But what? Do they say that any one of such things has a body?

Theæ. They do not give the same answer to the whole of this question; but that the soul itself appears to them to possess a certain body; but with respect to prudence, and each of the other things about which you just now inquired, they are ashamed to dare either to confess that they are not one of existing things, or to strenuously assert that all of them are bodies.

Guest. The men, Theætetus, have clearly become better. For such of them as are seed-sown,⁹⁴ or earth-sprung,⁹⁵ would not be ashamed to assert one of these points, but would contend that whatever they cannot squeeze together with their hands, is altogether nothing.

Theæ. You state very nearly what they think.

Guest. Let us then again ask them. For, if they are willing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is sufficient. For they must say, with respect to these (incorporeal) and those (corporeal), which have a body born with them, what it is they look to, when they assert that both exist.

[69.] ⁹⁶ *Theæ.* Perhaps, however, they would be in a difficulty.

⁹⁶ *Guest.* But if they suffer any thing of this kind, consider whether, on our proposing the question, they would be willing to admit and confess that existence is a thing of this kind.

Theæ. Of what kind? Speak, and we shall quickly know.

Guest. I say then, that what possesses any power soever, whether of doing any thing naturally to another, or of suffering

⁹⁴ In the expression "seed-sown," there is an allusion to the Thebans, who were said to be the descendants of the men, who sprung up from the teeth of the serpent, which Cadmus had scattered as seed.

⁹⁵ So too in "earth-sprung," there is a reference to the Athenians, who boasted that, like grasshoppers, they had sprung from the earth.

⁹⁶— I have followed, what common sense requires, the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Cornarius, and adopted by Taylor.

even the least thing from the vilest thing, although only once,— every thing of this kind does really exist. For I lay down a definition by defining that existences are nothing else but power.

Theæ. But since they cannot at present say any thing better than this, they receive it.

Guest. It is well; for perhaps hereafter both to us and them something different will appear. Let this then here remain acknowledged by us on their account.

Theæ. It shall remain.

[70.] *Guest.* Let us now proceed to the others, the friends of forms. And do you interpret to us what is said by them.

Theæ. It shall be so.

Guest. Do you then say that generation is one thing,⁹⁷ and existence another, separating them in some way?

Theæ. We do.

Guest. And that by body we communicate with generation, through sensation, but through reason by our soul with real existence, which you say is found for ever under the same circumstance in a similar manner, but that generation exists differently at different times?

Theæ. We do.

Guest. But, ye best of men, what shall we say you mean by the communion between both? Is it not that which we just now mentioned?

Theæ. What was that?

Guest. Passion or action arising from a certain power, from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps, Theætetus, you have not heard their answer to this question; but I have, through my familiarity with them.

Theæ. What answer then do they give?

[71.] *Guest.* They do not admit with us, what was just now said against the earth-born⁹⁸ respecting existence.

Theæ. What was that?

Guest. We laid down as a sufficient definition of existence, (that it is) when the power is present to any thing, either of suffering or doing in the smallest point.

⁹⁷ Ficinus has, "Aliud essentiam, aliud generationem dicitis." He found therefore in his MS., *τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν*, as Cornarius partly saw.

⁹⁸ By the "earth-born" are meant the "seed-sown" and "earth-sprung" mentioned in § 69, or the giants alluded to in § 65.

Thea. We did.

Guest. To this they say, that a power of doing and suffering has a share with generation; but that neither of these powers is adapted to existence.

Thea. Do they then not speak to the purpose?

Guest. To this we must say that we require to hear from them still more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the soul knows, and that existence is known.

Thea. They certainly say this.

Guest. But do you say that to know, or to be known, is action, or passion, or both? Or that passion is one thing, and (action)⁹⁹ another? Or that neither of these has a share in any respect with the other?

Thea. It is evident that neither (has a share) with the other. For, (if they admitted this,)¹⁰⁰ they would contradict what they before asserted.

Guest. I understand this at least, that if to know were to do something, it would necessarily happen that what is known would become passive. And according to this reasoning, existence being known by knowledge, would, as far as it is known, be, through becoming passive, moved; which we say cannot take place about the act of resting.

Thea. Rightly so.

[72.] *Guest.* What then, by Zeus, shall we be easily persuaded that motion, life, soul, and prudence, are not truly present to that which is existing in perfection, and that it neither lives, nor thinks, but stands immovable, not possessing an intellect as an object of respect and holy?

Thea. It would be a dreadful thing, O guest, to admit this.

Guest. Shall we say then that it possesses intellect, but not life?

Thea. And how?

Guest. But say we that both these reside in it, but shall we say that it does not possess these in soul at least?

Thea. But after what other manner can it possess?

⁹⁹ Taylor found in his copy of Ficinus, as Fischer did in his, "aut aliud quidem pati, aliud autem agere." But in the ed. pr. the whole clause is omitted, as it is in many MSS. And so it should be; or else we must insert with Heindorf $\pi\omicron\iota\nu\mu\alpha$ to balance $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\mu\alpha$, whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary.

¹⁰⁰ Ficinus has "Alioquin contraria illorum, quæ supra concesserant, nunc admitterent."

Guest. That it (possesses)¹ then at least intellect, life, and soul; but that, though animated, it abides perfectly immovable?

Theæ. All this appears to me at least to be irrational.

Guest. We must therefore grant that both the moved and motion are existences.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. It follows then, Theætetus, that intellect is never on any account in any way present to any one of things immovable.

[73.] *Theæ.* It (follows) easily.

Guest. And yet, if we grant that all things are borne along and moved, we shall by such an assertion take away this sameness from existences.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. Does it appear to you that what exists according to the same, and in a similar manner, and about the same, can ever exist without a standing?

Theæ. By no means.

Guest. But do you perceive that intellect ever is or would be without these?

Theæ. Least (of all).

Guest. And truly we should contend with every argument against him, who, causing science, or prudence, or intellect to disappear, strenuously insists in behalf of any thing in any way whatever.

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. But there is every necessity, as it appears, for the philosopher, and him who honours these things the most on this account, not to listen at all to those, who, asserting that there is either one or many forms, admit that the whole stands still; nor on the other hand, to those who are putting existence into motion by every means; but to say, according to the prayer of boys, ²whatever are immovable, and have been moved, are both the being and the all.³

¹ Heindorf says that, "although $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ might have dropt out easily after $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu$, he would not introduce it without the authority of MSS." Ficinus perhaps found it in his. For his version is "Utrum mentem, vitam, animam habere dicendum."

² Out of this mass of rubbish neither Schleiermacher nor Heindorf could elicit a particle of sense; for they did not see, what Stalbaum was the first to remark, that there is an allusion to some game, during which the children said, "What are unmoved, may they be moved." But in

Theæ. Most true.

[74.] *Guest.* Do we not then appear to have now reasonably in our discourse comprehended existence?

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Ho ! ho ! Theætetus, how do we now seem about to know the difficulty of the inquiry about it.

Theæ. How so ? and why do you assert this ?

Guest. Do you not perceive, O blessed man, that we are at present in the greatest ignorance respecting it ? And yet we appear to ourselves to say something about it.

Theæ. To myself at least. But I do not very well understand how we are unconsciously in this state.

Guest. Consider more clearly, whether, by assenting to this, we should not be justly asked, as we have asked them, who said that the whole consisted of the hot and the cold.

Theæ. Remind me what these questions were.

Guest. By all means : and I will endeavour to do this by asking you this, as I then asked them, that we may make some progress together.

Theæ. Rightly so.

[75.] *Guest.* Be it so. Do you not say then, that motion and standing are contrary to each other ?

Theæ. How not ?

Guest. And you surely say that both and each of them exist equally.

Theæ. I do.

Guest. Do you then say that both and each are moved, when you admit that they exist ?

Theæ. By no means.

Guest. But do you mean that they stand, when you say that both exist ?

Theæ. How can I ?

that case the past participle *κεκίνημένα* would not have been used instead of the present participle, *κινούμενα*. The allusion I suspect is to a top or tectotum, which the faster it is made to revolve on its axis, the more it seems to stand still, or, as boys say, to sleep ; and thus gives the best idea of the universe being in motion and standing still at one and the same time. Hence Plato perhaps wrote *κατὰ τὴν τῶν περὶ δίνων τίχην, οἷς δκίνητα τὰ καὶ κεκίνημένα, τὸ ἐν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν δίνην ξυναμφότερα λίγειν* : where *δίνην* still lies hid in *ῥή*, found in a single MS. The sense would then be, "To call both the one and the whole a whirl, according to the skill of those engaged in playing with tops, by whom even things which have been put into motion become unmoved."

Guest. Placing then existence, as a third thing, alongside these in your soul, and considering it as comprehending under itself standing and motion, and looking to their communion with existence, you have asserted that both of them exist.

Theæ. We seem nearly to prophesy very truly that existence is a certain third thing, when we say that motion and standing exist.

Guest. Existence then is not both motion and standing, but something different from them.

Theæ. It appears so.

Guest. Hence existence, according to its own nature, neither stands nor is moved.

Theæ. It is nearly so.

Guest. Whither then ought he to turn his thoughts, who wishes to fix in himself any clear conceptions respecting existence?

Theæ. Whither?

Guest. To no point do I think it is yet easy for him (to turn). For, if existence is not moved, why has it not stood still? Or on the other hand, why is that, which in no respect stands still, not moved? But existence has just now appeared to us to be apart from both of these. Is this, however, possible?

Theæ. It is the most impossible of all things.

[76.] *Guest.* In the next place, then, it will be just to call to mind this.

Theæ. What?

Guest. That being asked what name non-entity ought to bear, we were hampered by the greatest difficulty. Do you remember?

Theæ. How not?

Guest. Are we then in a less difficulty now respecting entity?

Theæ. We appear to be, O guest, if it be impossible to say so, in a greater.

Guest. Let then this question of difficulty lie here. But since both entity and non-entity have equally a share of difficulty, there is now a hope that, if one of them shall appear more obscure, or more clear, the other will appear such likewise; and on the other hand, if we should not be able to see either of them, (the other also will be in a similar state.)³

³ This clause, evidently required to balance the sentences, is omitted

And thus we shall pursue,⁴ in the most becoming manner we can, the discourse respecting both of them together.

Thea. Very well.

[77.] *Guest.* Let us state then after what manner we call on each occasion this same thing by many names.

Thea. Such as what? Give an example.

Guest. In speaking of man we give him various appellations, and attribute to him colour, figure, magnitude, vices, and virtues; in all which, and ten thousand other particulars, we not only say that he is a man, but that he is good, and an infinity of other things: and in the same manner we lay down other things, each as one, and we again call it many things, and by many names.

Thea. True.

Guest. Whence, I think, we have prepared a feast to young men, and to those old men who learn late in life.⁵ For it is easy for every one immediately to lay hold (of the doctrine), that it is impossible for the many to be one, and the one many. Hence they exult forsooth, not suffering us to say that a man is good, but that the good is a good, and the man a man. For I think, Theætetus, you have often met with those, who seriously apply themselves to things of this kind, (and) sometimes (even)⁶ with rather elderly persons, who, through the poverty of their possessions with respect to wisdom, admire such things as these, and think they have discovered the very-wise thing itself.

[78.] *Thea.* Entirely so.

Guest. That our discourse then may extend to all who have ever conversed at all respecting existence, let what will be now said in the way of interrogation, be for those and for the rest with whom we have before conversed.

Thea. What is this?

Guest. Whether we should neither join existence to motion

in all the Greek MSS., and preserved only in the version of Ficinus—"alterum quoque similiter fore."

⁴ All the MSS. have *ἑωσόμεθα*, contrary to the sense. Heind. suggested *διωξόμεθα*, from "persequamur" in Ficinus. Stalbaum prefers *διασωόμεθα*.

⁵ Stalbaum thinks that Plato alludes here to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who are said in Euthydem., p. 272, B., to have learnt Dialectics late in life.

⁶ Ficinus has "plerumque etiam seniores."

and standing, nor any thing else to any thing else; but as if things were unmixed, and impossible to take a part with each other, we should place them thus (separate) in our discourse? Or whether we should bring all things to the same, as if they were able to take a part with each other? Or (only) some, and some not? Which of these, Theætetus, shall we say they would prefer?

Theæ. I indeed have nothing to answer to this on their behalf. Why do you not, by answering each question, consider what follows from each?

[79.] *Guest.* You say well; and let us suppose them, if you please, to say, in the first place, that nothing has any power of communion with any thing for any thing. Will not then motion and standing in no respect take a part of existence?

Theæ. They will not.

Guest. But will either of them exist, not having a communion with existence?

Theæ. It will not.

Guest. By this admission, all the doctrines, it seems, have become rapidly subverted, as well of those, who put all things in motion, as of those, who make (all things) stand like one, and of those, who assert that entities, according to forms, subsist ever under the same circumstances and in a similar manner. For all these join existence at least (with their doctrines), some asserting that things are really moved, and others that they really stand.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Moreover, such as at one time unite all things, and at another separate them, whether⁷ dividing them into one and from one into infinite, or into finite elements, and composing from these,⁷ and whether they consider this as partially, or as always taking place,—in all these cases they will say nothing to the purpose, if there is in no respect a commingling.

[80.] *Theæ.* Right.

Guest. Further still, they will have gone through their discourse the most ridiculously of all men, who permitting no-

⁷—' I confess my inability to understand all this. I suspect there is an error here, arising from the wrong collocation of some words and the omission of others.

thing to the communion of the accident of "different," (have thought proper) to use the appellation, "the other."⁸

Thea. How so?

Guest. They are compelled somehow to employ about all things, "to be," and "apart," and "others," and "by itself," and ten thousand other (expressions), from which being unable to abstain, and⁹ not to insert them in their discourses, they do not require others to confute them, but walk about, having, as the saying is, an enemy and an adversary at home, vociferating within, and always carrying, as it were, the absurd Eurycles¹⁰ with them.

Thea. You really say what is similar and true.¹¹

Guest. But what if we permit all things to have the power of alternate communion with each other?

¹² *Thea.* This I myself am able to refute.

Guest. How?

Thea. Because motion itself would entirely stand (still), and on the other hand, standing itself would be moved, if they were alternately mingled¹³ with each other.

Thea. But this indeed is impossible from the greatest necessity, for motion to stand still, and standing to be moved.

Thea. How not?

¹³ *Guest.* The third thing therefore alone remains.

Thea. Yes.

[81.] *Guest.* For one of these things is necessary; either

⁸ To complete the sense I have ventured to supply the verb, which should govern *πρόσσυγορεύειν*.

⁹ I cannot understand this "and." The sense requires "so as," in Greek, *ὥστε*—

¹⁰ This proverb, says the Scholiast, was applied to those who prophesy evil to themselves. For Eurycles appeared to have a certain *dæmon* in his belly, from whence he was called a ventriloquist; but having on one occasion prophesied evil to some person, he was ill-treated by him; as Calchas would have suffered at the hands of Agamemnon for prophesying evil, had he not first engaged Achilles to defend him.

¹¹ Ficinus has "Verum est quod dicis ac simile." From whence it is easy to elicit *λέγεις ἀληθές τι ἢ καὶ ὅμοιον*. On *ἢ καὶ* see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 114.

¹²⁻¹³ In the arrangement of the speeches here I have followed Bekker; who knew, what Stalbaum did not, that the words *Ἀλλὰ μὴν—γε* always commence a speech in Plato.

¹³ Ficinus has, "si invicem commiscerentur," in Greek, *ἐπιμιγνυνοῖσθην*; and so probably reads one MS. Y., and not *ἐπιμιγνυνοίσθην*, as stated by Bekker.

that all things should be commingled, or nothing; or that some things should be willing to be commingled, and others not.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. Now it has been found that two cannot (be commingled).

Theæ. Just so.

Guest. Every one therefore who wishes to answer rightly, will adopt that which remains of the three.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. But since some things are willing to do so, (be mingled,) and others not, they will be affected nearly in the same manner as letters. For some of these do not fit with each other, but others do fit.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. For vowels being pre-eminently the bond, as it were, of the other (letters), it has come to pass, that without some one of them, it is impossible for any of the rest to fit one with the other.

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. Does then every one know what letters will unite with what? or is there a need of art to him, who is about to do this sufficiently?

Theæ. Of art.

Guest. What kind of art?

Theæ. The grammatic.

[82.] *Guest.* What then, with respect to sharp and flat sounds, is not he, who has the art to know the sounds that are combined or not, a musician, but he who does not know, not a musician?

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. And in other things of skill, and want of skill, we shall find other circumstances of such a kind.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. Since then we have acknowledged, that the genera (of things) have a mingling with each other, after the same manner, is it not necessary for him to proceed in his discourse with some science, who is about to show what kind of genera accord with what kind, and what do not receive each other? Likewise, whether these genera so hold together through all things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again

in their divisions, whether there are other causes of division through wholes?

Theæ. How is there not a need of science, and, perhaps, of nearly the greatest?

Guest. What then, Theætetus, shall we call this science? Or, by Jupiter, have we ignorantly fallen upon the science of freemen? And do we nearly appear, while searching after a sophist, to have found previously a philosopher?

[83.] *Theæ.* How say you?

Guest. Shall we not say, that to divide according to genera, and neither to think the same species different, nor a different species the same, is the business of the dialectic science?

Theæ. Yes, we will say so.

Guest. He then who is able to do this, perceives sufficiently one idea every way extended through many things, of which each one lies apart, and many different from one another, externally comprehended under one; and on the other hand, one idea through many wholes conjoined in one, and many ideas, every way separated (from each other). This is to know how to distinguish according to genus, in what point each can have a communion, and where they cannot.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But you will not, I think, assign the dialectic art to any other than one, who philosophizes purely and justly.

[84.] *Theæ.* For how should any one assign it to any other?

Guest. If we seek indeed, we shall find, both now and hereafter, a philosopher in a place of this kind, though difficult to see him clearly; but the difficulty in the case of a sophist and that of a philosopher is of a different kind.

Theæ. How so?

Guest. The one flying into the darkness of non-entity, and by rubbing touching it,¹² is through the obscurity of the place hard to be perceived. Is it not so?

Theæ. So it seems.

¹² This is the literal translation of the nonsensical *τριβὴ προσπρέμενος αὐτῆς*, with which some will perhaps compare Milton's "darkness palpable," derived from the Scriptural—"a darkness that could be felt." But such an idea is not what the train of thought requires. Ficinus has "et diuturna consuetudine tenebris illis offunditur," which Taylor translated "and by use becoming adapted to it."

Guest. But the philosopher, always lying, through reasoning, near the idea of entity, is, through the splendour of the region, by no means easily discerned. For the eyes of the soul of the many are unable to endure the looking upon what is divine.

Theæ. And this too it is likely is the case, no less than that.

Guest. On this point, therefore, we shall shortly reflect more clearly, if it be permitted to us wishing it. But with respect to the sophist, it is evident that we must not dismiss him, before we have sufficiently surveyed him.

Theæ. You speak well.

[85.] *Guest.* Since then it is acknowledged by us, that some genera have a communion with each other, and some have not, and that nothing prevents some from having a communion with a few, others with many, and others through all and with all,—let us, in the next place, follow the reasoning, and in this way speculate, not about all species, lest we be confounded by their multitude,—but, selecting some of those called the greatest, let us first consider the qualities of each, and then what power of communion they possess with each other, in order that, although we may not be able to comprehend entity and non-entity with all clearness, we may at least not want for reasons respecting them, as far as the manner of the present speculation admits, if perchance it be permitted us, when we assert that non-entity is in reality a non-entity, to escape unscathed.

Theæ. So must we do.

[86.] *Guest.* Now the greatest of all the genera, which we have now mentioned, are, entity itself, standing, and motion.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. And we have said that the two (latter) are unmixed with each other.

Theæ. Very much so.

Guest. But entity is mixed with both; for both do somehow exist.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. These things then become three.

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. Is not then each of these different from the other two, but the same with itself?

Theæ. It is.

Guest. What then have we now said of sameness and difference? (Must we say that), as there are two genera different from the other three, but yet always mingled with them from necessity, we have to consider about five, and not three genera only? Or have we unconsciously denominated the same and the different, as something belonging to them?¹³

[87.] *Thea.* Perhaps so.

Guest. But surely motion and standing are neither the different nor the same?

Thea. How so?

Guest. That which we in common call motion and standing can be neither of these.

Thea. Why?

Guest. Because motion would be standing, and standing be motion. For, with respect to both, either one becoming the other, would compel that other to change into the contrary to its nature, as participating in the contrary.

Thea. Very much so.

Guest. But yet both participate of the same and the different.

Thea. They do.

Guest. Let us then not assert that motion is either the same or the different, nor on the other hand (assert this), of standing.

Thea. Let us not.

Guest. But must entity and the same be considered by us as one?

Thea. Perhaps so.

Guest. But if entity and the same signify that which is in no respect different, when we again say that motion and standing both exist, we shall thus assert that they are the same, as things existing.

Thea. But this is surely impossible.

Guest. It is impossible then for the same and entity to be one.

Thea. Nearly so.

¹³ Instead of *ἐκείνων τι*, Ast has happily restored *ἢ ἐκείνων τι*, "something belonging to those five;" for thus numerals, by being united to nouns or pronouns, have frequently led to the corruption of the text; as I have shown in Poppe's *Prolegomena*, p. 223, by numerous instances; to which I could now add many more.

Guest. We must place then the same as a fourth species, in addition to the former three.

Theæ. Entirely so.

[88.] *Guest.* But must we say that the different is a fifth species? Or must we conceive that this and entity are some two names belonging to one genus?

Theæ. Perhaps so.

Guest. But I think you will grant, that of existences, some always subsist themselves by themselves, but others in relation to each other.¹⁴

Theæ. Why not?

Guest. But the different is always referred to the different. Is it not?

Theæ. It is.

Guest. But this would not be, unless entity and the different widely differed from each other. But if the different participated of both species, as entity does, there would be something even of the different not different with reference to the different. But now it happens from necessity that, whatever is really different, is so from its relation to that which is different.¹⁵

Theæ. You say, as the fact is.

Guest. We must say then, that the nature of the different must be added as a fifth to the species, of which we have already spoken.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. And we will say that it pervades through all these. For each one is different from the others, not through its own nature, but through participating in the idea of the different.

Theæ. And very much so.

[89.] *Guest.* Let us say thus of the five genera, taking each singly.

Theæ. How?

¹⁴ The antithesis in "themselves by themselves," requires here "others," not "each other," in Greek *ἄλλα*, not *ἀλλήλα*: unless it be said that Plato wrote *ἀλλῇ ἄλλα*, i. e. "some to one thing, and some to another."

¹⁵ So Taylor translates the version of Ficinus, "ut secundum id, quod est, alterum sit," answering to the Greek in some MSS., *πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἴσθιν, εἶναι*: for which Bekker and Stalbaum read from other MSS. *ἑαυτοῦ τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἴσθιν, εἶναι*: which I cannot understand.

Guest. In the first place, that motion is entirely different from standing. Or how shall we say?

Theæ. Thus.

Guest. It is not then standing.

Theæ. By no means.

Guest. But it exists through its participating in entity.

Theæ. It does.

Guest. Again, motion is different from the same.

Theæ. Nearly so.

Guest. It is not therefore the same.

Theæ. It is not.

Guest. And yet it was the same, through its participating on the other hand in the same.¹⁶

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. It must be confessed then that motion is both the same and not the same; nor must we be indignant at this. For, when we say that it is both the same, and not the same, we do not speak of it in a similar manner; but when (we say)¹⁷ it is the same, we call it so, through the participation of the same with respect to itself; but when (we say) it is not the same, (we call it so) through its communion with the different; through which, being separated from the same, it becomes not the same, but the different; so that it is again rightly said to be not the same.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. If, then, motion itself¹⁸ has in any respect participated in standing, there would be no absurdity in calling it stable.

Theæ. Most truly, if we should acknowledge that some of the genera are willing to be mixed with each other, but others not.

Guest. And yet we arrived at the proof of this prior to the present (remarks), by showing that it exists in this manner naturally.

¹⁶ I have adopted with Stephens the correction of Cornarius, who would read *διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὐτὸ πάλιν ταύτου* in lieu of *διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὐτὸ πάντ' αὐτοῦ*: out of which others may perhaps make, what I cannot, something like sense.

¹⁷ Heindorf would insert *λέγωμεν*, which Taylor had already anticipated by his "we say."

¹⁸ Instead of *αὐτῇ*, which has no meaning here, Ast would read *αὐτὴ ἡ*—Stalbaum prefers *αὐτῇ ἡ*.

Theæ. How not?

[90.] *Guest.* Let us then say again (that) motion is a thing different from the different, just as it was from the same and standing.

Theæ. It must be so.

Guest. It is then, in a certain respect, not different and different, according to the present reasoning.

Theæ. True.

Guest. What then follows? Shall we say it is different from the three (genera), but not from the fourth? acknowledging that there are five, about which, and in which, we propose to speculate?

Theæ. And how so? for it is impossible to grant that the number is less than it now appears.

Guest. We may, therefore, fearlessly contend that motion is different from entity.

Theæ. We may most fearlessly.

Guest. Clearly then motion is really a non-entity and an entity, since it participates of entity.

Theæ. Most clearly.

Guest. It is then of necessity that non-entity exists with respect to motion, and as regards all the genera. For as regards all, the nature of the different, rendering them different from entity, makes each to be a non-entity. Hence we rightly say, that all of them are, as regards the same, non-entities; and again, because they participate in entity, that they exist and are entities.¹⁹

Theæ. It appears so.

[91.] *Guest.* About each of the species then, the entity is many, but the non-entity is in multitude endless.²⁰

Theæ. It appears so.

Guest. Must not then entity itself be said to be different from the others?

¹⁹ If we wish to avoid the tautology in *είναι τε καὶ ὄντα*, we must adopt the version of Ficinus, "entiaque vocabimus"—i. e. "and we will call them entities."

²⁰ These, to me at least, perfectly unintelligible words are thus explained by Heindorf and Stalbaum: "To each species many things may be attributed; and in this respect entity is many; but as each of the many may be varied infinitely, in this respect it is infinite." But as this explanation takes no notice of the non-entity, it may fairly be considered a non-entity itself.

Thea. Of necessity.

Guest. ²¹ Entity then does not exist according to so many in number as the others; for entity, being one itself, is not them; but the others, being infinite in number, are not entity. ²¹

Thea. This is nearly the case.

Guest. We ought not then to be indignant at this, since the nature of the genera have a communion with each other. But if some one does not admit this, let him, having persuaded ²² our former reasoning, in like manner persuade ²² the subsequent assertions.

Thea. You speak most justly.

Guest. Let us look at this likewise.

Thea. What?

Guest. When we say non-entity, we do not, as it appears, speak of any thing contrary to entity, but only as something different from it.

Thea. How so?

Guest. Just as when we say a thing is not great, do we then appear to you to point out by this word what is small rather than what is equal?

Thea. How could you?

Guest. We must therefore admit that the contrary to a thing is not signified, when negation is spoken of; but thus much only, that the (prohibitive) "not," and the (negative) "no," when prefixed, signify something relating to the words that follow, or rather to the things, respecting which are placed the words of the negation afterwards enunciated. ²³

Thea. Entirely so.

[92.] *Guest.* This also let us consider, if it seems good to you.

²¹⁻²¹ Such is the literal translation of the Greek; where, however, I have tacitly changed the last word $\alpha\delta$ into $\delta\nu$, to preserve the antithesis. But of the first clause I confess my inability to understand the sense. Taylor's version is—"Being, therefore, is not so many in number as the others. For not being them it is itself one, but is not other things, which are infinite in number." The reader is therefore left to choose which he prefers.

²²⁻²³ In lieu of the nonsensical $\pi\iota\sigma\alpha\varsigma$ and $\pi\iota\theta\iota\tau\omega$, it is evident at a glance that Plato wrote $\alpha\pi\omega\sigma\alpha\varsigma$ and $\alpha\pi\omega\theta\epsilon\iota\tau\omega$ —i. e. "having rejected—reject."

²³ Here too is another unintelligible, because corrupt, passage.

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. The nature of the different appears to me to have been cut into fractional parts, in the same manner as science.

Theæ. How?

Guest. The (nature) is one; but the portion of it that is attached to any thing does, when separated, possess individually its peculiar appellation; on which account arts and sciences are said to be many.

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. Have not then the parts of the nature of the different, which is itself one thing, been affected in the very same way?

Theæ. Perhaps so. But let us tell how this takes place.

Guest. Is there any part of the different opposed to the beautiful?

Theæ. There is.

Guest. Shall we say it is nameless, or that it has some appellation?

Theæ. That it has. For that which we call on each occasion not-beautiful, is not different from any thing else but the nature of the beautiful.

Guest. Come, then, tell me this.

[93.] *Theæ.* What?

Guest. When any thing is separated from some kind of existences, and is again opposed to some kind of existences, does it happen that thus it is not beautiful?²⁴

Theæ. It does.

Guest. But the opposition of entity to entity happens, as it seems, to be not-beautiful.

Theæ. Most right.

Guest. What then, according to this reasoning does the beautiful belong more to entities, and the non-beautiful, less?

Theæ. Not at all.

²⁴ In the place of this mass of rubbish Ficinus has what is at least intelligible in part; for his MS. was fuller than any, which have been collated subsequently. "Cum aliquid in parte quadam entium determinatum sit, rursusque alicui entium opponatur, contingatque ita non pulchrum dici, sequitur non pulchrum esse aliquid, quandoquidem est illud cui opponatur." There is however something evidently wanting after "determinatum sit," to this effect, "id dici pulchrum debere, cui nihil opponatur." So too there is wanting in Ficinus the close of this speech of the Stranger and the whole of the next one, together with the intermediate answer of Theætetus.

Guest. We must say then, that the not-great and the great exist similarly.

Theæ. Similarly.

Guest. Hence too we must lay down respecting the just, in the same manner as of the not-just, that the one in no respect exists more than the other.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. And we will speak of other things in this way; since the nature of the different appears to be one of entities; and as it exists, it is necessary for us to lay down the parts of it, as no less existing.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. The opposition then, it seems, of a part of the nature of the different, and of entity²⁵ opposed to each other,²⁵ are no less existence, if it be lawful to say so, than existence itself; nor do they signify what is contrary to existence, but only so much, what is different from it.

Theæ. It is most clear.

[94.] *Guest.* What then, shall we call it the (antithesis)?

Theæ. It is evident that non-entity, which we have been seeking on account of the sophist, is this very thing.

Guest. Whether then, as you have said, is it no more deficient of existence than the others? And ought we now boldly to say, that non-entity possesses its own nature firmly, in the same manner as the great was found to be great, and the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great to be (not-great),²⁶ and the not-beautiful (not-beautiful)?²⁶ and that thus too non-entity was and is non-entity, as being one species numbered amongst the many existing? Or must we still, Theætetus, have with regard to this some want of faith?

Theæ. None at all.

Guest. Do you perceive then, how we have been with some prolixity disobedient to the prohibition of Parmenides?

Theæ. In what respect?

Guest. We have farther than he ordained²⁷ us to inquire, exhibited ourselves, still exploring onwards.

²⁵⁻²⁶ The words "opposed to each other" are omitted by Ficinus correctly. For they are only an explanation of the preceding "opposition."

²⁶⁻²⁷ The words "not-great" and "not-beautiful," which Heindorf and Stalbaum say that Boeckh was the first to restore, Taylor had already printed in his translation.

²⁷ Stalbaum, led no doubt by the version of Ficinus, "ulterius quam

Thea. How?

Guest. Because he says somewhere,—“Non-beings never and by no means are. And from this path thy searching thought restrain.”

Thea. And so he does say.

Guest. But we have not only shown that non-entities exist, but we have demonstrated what kind of thing a non-entity is. For, having proved that the nature of the different has an existence, and that it is cut up into fractions, (distributed) mutually through all things, we then dared to say, that each part of it, which is opposed to entity, is itself truly a non-entity.

Thea. And to me, O guest, we appear to have spoken with the greatest truth.

[95.] *Guest.* Let no one then say, that we, having proved that non-entity is contrary to entity, dare to assert that it exists. For we some time since did to something, contrary to it, bid a farewell, whether it exists or not, and possesses a certain reason, or is entirely irrational. But, with respect to that which we now call non-entity, either let some one persuade (us) by showing that we speak not well; or, as long as he is unable (to do this), he must also say, as we say, that the genera are mixed with each other, and that entity and the different pervading through all things, and through each other, the different, partaking of entity, does through this participation exist, not being that of which it participates, but something else; and being different from entity, it clearly follows that it is necessarily non-entity. And on the other hand entity, having partaken of the different, will be different from the other genera; but being different from all of them, it is not any one of them, nor all the others, nor any thing besides itself. So that incontestably entity is not ten thousand things in ten thousand things: and thus the rest taken singly and together exist in many forms, but do not exist in many forms.²⁸

[96.] *Thea.* True.

statuerit,” which Taylor translated “beyond the limits he appointed,” first objected to ἀνείκε : but he failed to see, what is obvious at a glance, that Plato wrote ἀνείκε, a word peculiarly applied to the ordonnance of a deity, with whom a philosopher was wont to be compared.

²⁸ This is an instance of the “reductio ad absurdum.”

Guest. Now if any one either does not believe in these contrarieties, let him reflect and produce something better than has been stated now;²⁹ or if, perceiving this to be a difficult speculation, he is pleased at drawing out his arguments now on this side and now on that, he is engaged, as our present reasoning shows, in a pursuit not deserving very serious attention. For this is neither a clever thing nor difficult to discover; but that is at one and the same time difficult and honourable.³⁰

Theæ. What?

Guest. That which has been stated before; so that, omitting these as possible, we may be able, by following up what has been said, each by itself, to confute a person, when he says that what is different is same, and what is the same different,³¹ in the way and according to the circumstance by which he says either is affected.³¹ For, to show that the same is different, and the different same, and the great small, and the similar dissimilar, and to be pleased in thus introducing contrarieties in discourse, is not a true confutation, but one evidently newly born of some one, who has recently laid hold of entities.

Theæ. Very much so.

[97.] *Guest.* For, my good (friend), to endeavour to separate every thing from every thing, is inelegant in other respects, and the part too of one untaught and unphilosophical.

Theæ. Why so?

Guest. To loosen each thing from all things, is the most perfect abolition of all discourse. For discourse subsists through the conjunction of species with each other.

Theæ. True.

Guest. Consider then, how opportunely we have now contended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit one thing to be mixed with another.

Theæ. With a view to what?

Guest. To this, that discourse may be one certain thing

²⁹ Compare Horace, "si quid novisti rectius istis, Candidus imperti; si non, his utere mecum."

³⁰ Here is an allusion to the saying, "Difficult things are honourable." See Hipp. Maj. § 56.

³¹—³¹ The whole of this passage Taylor tacitly omitted, at the suggestion of Cornarius, who considered it an interpolation.

belonging to the genera of existences. For, if we are deprived of this, we shall, for the most part, be deprived of philosophy. And further still, it is requisite at present that we agree about discourse what it is. But if we take it away entirely from us, so as not to exist at all, we can no longer speak about any thing. And we should take it away, if we admit that there is no mixing of any thing for any thing.

[98.] *Theæ.* This is (said) quite rightly. But I do not understand why we should agree about discourse.

Guest. But, perhaps, you will most easily understand by following me in this way.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. Non-entity has appeared to us to be one of the rest of genera, and to be dispersed through all existences.

Theæ. It has so.

Guest. After this, therefore, we must consider whether it is mixed with opinion and discourse.

Theæ. On what account?

Guest. Because, if it is not mixed with these, it must necessarily follow that all things are true; but, if it is mixed with these, false opinion and (false)²² discourse is produced. For to fancy or speak of non-entities, is a falsehood existing in the mind and in discourse.

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. But, being falsehood, it is deception.

Theæ. It is.

Guest. And deception existing, all things must necessarily be full of resemblances, images, and fancies.

Theæ. How not?

Guest. But we have said that the sophist flew to (and stayed) in this place, while he denies that there is any such thing as falsehood; for (he says) that no one can either think or speak of a non-entity; because it in no respect partakes of existence.

Theæ. It was (so) said.

[99.] *Guest.* But now it has appeared to partake of entity; so that in this respect perhaps he will no longer oppose us. Perhaps, however, he will say, that of species some partake of non-entity, and others not; and that discourse and opinion

²² This idea, wanting in the Greek, has been preserved in the "oratioque falsa" of Ficinus alone.

are amongst those things that do not partake of it. So that he will again contend with us, that the image-making and fancy-producing art, in which we have said he is concealed, exists not at all; since opinion and discourse have no communion with non-entity; for that falsehood does not exist at all, if this communion of things takes place no where. Hence we must search out discourse, opinion, and fancy, what they are, in order that we may perceive after their appearance their communion with non-entity; and having perceived this, we may prove that falsehood exists; and having proved this, we may put the sophist into bonds, if he is guilty; or, setting him free, search for him in some other genus.

[100.] *Theæ.* What was said, O guest, at first about the sophist, appears to be very true—that he is a genus difficult to hunt out. For he appears to be full of fences;²³ of which when he throws up one, it is necessary to take it by storm, before you can reach him himself. And even now we have scarcely passed over the obstacle he had raised, that a non-entity does not exist, when he immediately throws up another. Hence it is requisite to show that falsehood does exist, both in discourse and opinion; and after this perhaps something else, and another thing after that; and, as it seems, no end will e'er appear.²⁴

Guest. He, Theætetus, should be bold, who is able to proceed, though only a little, continually onwards. For what will he be able to do in other things who is faint-hearted in these, and is either effecting nothing in these, or is driven back again? Such a person will scarcely, according to the proverb, ever take a city. But now, O good man, since this, as you say, has been passed through, the greatest wall will have been taken by us, and the rest will be more easy and of small account.

Theæ. You say well.

Guest. Let us then now in the first place take up, as we said, discourse and opinion, that we may more clearly cal-

²³ In the Greek word *πρόβλημα* there is a double sense; one applicable to a war carried on by soldiers in the field, and the other to that by philosophers in their schools; as Stalbaum has correctly observed.

²⁴ I have designedly put the concluding words into verse; as Plato himself has almost done in a trochaic line—*Καὶ τίρας, ὡς τοικον, οὐδέν (ἐκ)φανήσεται ποτε.*

culate,³⁵ whether non-being touches upon these, or whether both these are in every respect true, and neither of them at any time false.

Theæ. Right.

Guest. Come then, let us again speculate about nouns, in the same manner as we did about species and letters. For the present inquiry appears³⁶ somehow to lie in this road.

Theæ. What then is to be heard forsooth about nouns?

Guest. Whether all of them fit together, or not; or some are wont to do so, but others not.

Theæ. This is evident, that some are wont and others not.

Guest. Perhaps you mean some such thing as this; that some being spoken in order and signifying something, do fit together; but that such as in continuity signify nothing, do not fit together.

[102.] *Theæ.* Why, and how say you this?

Guest. What I thought you would understand and acknowledge. For there is a twofold kind of significations by the voice respecting existence.

Theæ. How?

Guest. One called nouns, and the other verbs.

Theæ. Speak of each.

Guest. That which has a signification in the case of actions, is called a verb.

Theæ. It is.

Guest. But a sign of the voice, applied to the doers themselves of those actions, we call a noun.

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. From nouns then alone, spoken in succession, there is not a discourse; nor, on the other hand, from verbs spoken without nouns.

Theæ. I have not learned this.

Guest. Yet it is plain that you just now acknowledged this, when looking to something else. For this very thing I meant to say, that when these are spoken in succession, there is not a discourse.

³⁵ Instead of ἀπολογησώμεθα, Heindorf conjectured ἀπολογισώμεθα. Ficinus had already "ostendamus."

³⁶ Stalbaum has adopted Heindorf's φανίται for φαίνεται unnecessarily.

Thea. How so ?

Guest. As for instance, should any one say in succession "walks," "runs," "sleeps," and such other words as signify actions, he would not form a discourse at all.

Thea. For how could he ?

[103.] *Guest.* Again then, when any one says, "lion," "stag," "horse," and such other nouns, as are named after those doing acts, no discourse is composed by such a continuity. For the words spoken do not, ³⁷either in this way or that, ³⁷signify action, or non-action, or the existence of a thing which is or is not, until one mixes verbs with nouns ; and then they fit (with each other), and a discourse is produced immediately, and their first connexion is nearly the first and shortest discourse.

Thea. How say you this ?

Guest. When any one says, "Man learns," would you not say that this is the shortest and first discourse ?

Thea. I should.

Guest. For he then points out something respecting things which exist, or are in the course of existing, or have been, or will be ; nor does he name a thing merely, but completes something by connecting verbs with nouns. Hence we say that he speaks, and does not merely name a thing ; and through this connexion we pronounce the noun "discourse."

[104.] *Thea.* Right.

Guest. Thus too in the case of things, some did fit with each other, and others did not ; so likewise with respect to the signs of the voice, some do not fit, but others of them by fitting produce discourse.

Thea. Entirely so.

Guest. There is still this trifling thing.

Thea. What ?

Guest. It is necessary for a discourse, when it takes place, to be a discourse about something ; for it is impossible to be about nothing.

Thea. It must.

Guest. Ought it not then to be of some particular kind ?

Thea. How not ?

Guest. Let us then pay attention to ourselves.

^{37—37} These words are omitted by Ficinus. They are perfectly unnecessary.

Thea. For it is requisite.

Guest. I will then pronounce you a discourse, having united a thing with an action, through a noun and a verb; and do you tell me of what it is the discourse.

Thea. This shall be as far as I am able.

Guest. Theætetus sits.—This is not a long discourse.

Thea. No; a moderate one.

Guest. It is now your business to say about whom is the discourse, and whose it is.

Thea. It is evident that it is about me and mine.²⁸

Guest. But what again is this?

Thea. What?

Guest. Theætetus, with whom I am now conversing, flies.

Thea. Respecting this also, no one can say but that it is mine,²⁸ and of me.

[105.] *Guest.* But we said it was necessary that every sentence should be of some particular kind.

Thea. Yes.

Guest. But of what kind must each of the sentences just now mentioned be?

Thea. One must be false and the other true.

Guest. But of them the one which is true asserts things respecting you, as they are.

Thea. How not?

Guest. But the one which is false (asserts) things respecting you, different from what they are.

Thea. It does.

Guest. It speaks then of things which are not, as if they were.

Thea. Nearly so.

Guest. And it speaks of things about you different from the existing. For we said that about each thing there are many things which exist, and many which do not.

²⁸—²⁸ This is a remarkable instance of the carelessness of even the most attentive editors. For not one has remarked that, as the *Guest*, and not *Theætetus*, had pronounced the words "*Theætetus sits*," the discourse belonged to the former, although it was about the latter. Plato must therefore have written not *ἐμὸς* but *ὁ σός*: while instead of *περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅρου* we must read *περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὗ*—"about whom and whose," as shown by the version of Ficinus, "*de quo et cuius*;" although he shortly afterwards supports *πλήν ἐμὸν* by his "*nisi de me mea que*;" where, for a similar reason, we must read *πλήν γε σόν*, as we find a little below *Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ σός*.

Theæ. Certainly.

Guest. The discourse then which I last spoke about you, should, from what we have defined a discourse to be, of necessity be, in the first place, one of the shortest.

Theæ. This we have just now acknowledged.

Guest. In the next place, it is a discourse of some one.

Theæ. It is so.

Guest. But if it is not yours, it is not of any one else.

Theæ. For how should it?

Guest. And if it is not about some thing, it cannot be a discourse at all. For we have shown that it is (one) of things impossible, for a discourse to exist about nothing.

Theæ. Most correctly.

Guest. When therefore the different is asserted of you as if it were the same, and things not existing as if existing, such an arrangement of verbs and nouns altogether becomes, as it appears, a really and truly false discourse.

Theæ. Most true.

[106.] *Guest.* But what, is it not now evident, that all these genera, both false and true, such as thought, opinion, and fancy, are produced in our souls?

Theæ. How?

Guest. You will more easily understand it thus, if you first take,³⁹ what each of them is, and in what they differ each from the other.

Theæ. Only give.

Guest. Are not then thought and discourse the same, except that the former being within the soul a voiceless dialogue with itself, is called by us by the name of thought?⁴⁰

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. But the stream of thought passing through the mouth with a sound is called discourse.

Theæ. True.

Guest. We know of this too in discourse.

Theæ. What?

Guest. Affirmation and negation.

³⁹ The verb "take" is used in English as λαμβάνειν is in Greek, in a mental as well as manual sense. Hence the joke in the answer of Theætetus, "Give."

⁴⁰ It was with reference to this notion, that the Greek verb φράζειν, "to speak" to another in the active voice, means in the middle, φράζεσθαι, "to think," i. e. to speak to oneself.

Thea. We do.

Guest. When therefore this is generated in the soul according to thought, accompanied with silence, can you call it any thing else than opinion?

Thea. How can I?

Guest. But when, again, some circumstance of this kind is present to any one, not according to itself,⁴¹ but through sensation, is it possible to call it correctly any thing else than fancy?

Thea. Nothing else.

[107.] *Guest.* Since then discourse is both true and false, and it appears that thought is a dialogue of the soul with itself, but opinion the termination of thought, and what we mean by "it appears" is the mixture of sensation and opinion, it is necessary, that of these, being allied to discourse, some should be false and sometimes.⁴²

Thea. How not?

Guest. Do you perceive then, that opinion and discourse have been previously found to be false more easily, than according to our expectation? For⁴³ just now we were afraid, lest by searching into this matter we should throw ourselves upon a work perfectly impracticable.

Thea. I do perceive.

Guest. Let us not then be faint-hearted as to what remains. For since these have been made to appear, let us recall to our memory the previous divisions according to species.

Thea. Of what kind were they?

Guest. We divided image-making into two species; the one assimilative, and the other fanciful.

Thea. We did.

Guest. And we said we were dubious in which of these we should place the sophist.

⁴¹ I cannot understand the words "according to itself," nor could Taylor, who translated "according to the dianoëtic energy," as if he wished to read *κατ' αὐτήν*, and thus to make a proper distinction between *κατὰ διάνοιαν*, and *κατὰ μὴ διάνοιαν*.

⁴² Had the editors looked to the version of Ficinus, "*ut cogitationes opinionesque partim veræ, partim falsæ sint*," they would perhaps have seen that Plato did not write the nonsensical *ψευδὴ τε αὐτῶν ἵνα καὶ ἐνιότε εἶναι*, where *τε* wants its corresponding conjunction, but something more fit to be read to this effect—*ψευδὴ τε αὐτῶν τιν' ἐνιότε καὶ αὐ ἐνιότε μὴ εἶναι*. Stephens and Heindorf would expunge *τε* after *ψευδὴ*.

⁴³ Here again Ficinus found in his MS. the correct reading, *προσδοκίαν ἰσοβήθημεν γὰρ ἀπρί*—instead of *προσδοκίαν, ἣν ἰσοβήθημεν ἀπρί*—

Thea. It was so (said).

Guest. And while we were doubting of this, a still greater dizziness was shed around us, through the assertion appearing a matter of doubt to all men, that there cannot be at all either a resemblance, or an image, or fancy; because no falsehood exists by any means at any time or in any place.

Thea. You speak the truth.

[108.] *Guest.* But now since discourse has made its appearance, and false opinion likewise, it is conceded that there are imitations of things existing; and that from this disposition of things the art of deceiving is produced.

Thea. It is agreed.

Guest. And yet was it not also acknowledged by us above, that the sophist is one of these?

Thea. It was.

Guest. Let us then again endeavour, by always bisecting the proposed genus, to proceed along the right hand⁴⁴ of the section, and attend to its communion with the sophist, until, having cut off all his common properties, we leave the nature peculiar to himself, and exhibit it to ourselves especially, and afterwards to those also, who are naturally the nearest of kin to this method.

Thea. Right.

[109.] *Guest.* Did we not then begin by dividing the making art and the acquiring art?

Thea. Yes.

Guest. And the acquiring art presented itself to us in hunting, contests, traffic, and in some such-like species.

Thea. Entirely so.

Guest. But now, since the imitative art comprehends the sophist, it is evident that the making art must first receive a twofold division. For imitation is a certain kind of making. We said, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of each themselves.⁴⁵ Did we not?

Thea. Entirely so.

⁴⁴ This seems to have been a phrase in Greece, something like the one in England, borrowed from horse-racing, "to get the whip-hand of a person."

⁴⁵ This nonsense was, strange to say, passed over by Heindorf. Ficinus has "non verarum rerum:" which leads at once to *οὐκ αὐτῶν τῶν ἰδεώσιν ὄντων*, "not of the things themselves existing on each occasion," in lieu of *οὐκ αὐτῶν ἰδεώσιν*.

Guest. But, in the first place, let there be two parts of the making art.

Theæ. What are they?

Guest. One divine, the other human.

Theæ. I do not understand you.

Guest. The making art, if we remember what was said at first, we asserted to be every power, which might be the cause of things being produced subsequently, that did not previously exist.

Theæ. We do remember.

[110.] *Guest.* But, with respect to all living animals, and plants, which are produced in the earth from seeds and roots, together with such inanimate bodies as subsist on the earth, able to be liquefied or not, can we say that not existing previously they were subsequently produced by any other than some fabricating god? Or making use of the opinion and assertion of the many—⁴⁶

Theæ. What is that?

Guest. That nature generates these from some self-acting fortuitous cause, and without a generating intellect; or (is it) with reason and divine science, originating from a god?

Theæ. I, perhaps, through my age, am often changing my opinions to both sides. But at present looking to you, and apprehending that you think these things are produced according to (the will of) a deity, I think so too.

Guest. It is well, Theætetus. And if we thought that you would be one of those, who at a future time would think differently, we should now endeavour to make you acknowledge this by the force of reason, in conjunction with the persuasion of necessity. But since I know your nature to be such, that, without any arguments from us, it will of itself arrive at that conclusion to which you say you are now drawn, I will leave the subject; for the time⁴⁷ would be superfluous. But I will

⁴⁶ After *χρώμενοι* Fischer would supply *φήσομεν*. Heind. and Stalb. dream about an aposiopesis. Had they duly weighed the various readings, preserved by Stobæus in quoting this passage, *χρώμενοι ποιητῶν τὴν φύσιν* in lieu of *χρώμενοι ποιῶ τῇ τὴν φύσιν*, they would have been able perhaps to see that Plato wrote—*ἢ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι ποιητῶν, τὴν φύσιν φήσομεν*—where *φήσομεν* has been lost on account of *φύσιν*.

⁴⁷ Ficinus has "nam supervacua talis disputatio esset," which shows, as Heindorf remarked, that he found not *χρόνος* but *λόγος* in his MS., as the sense evidently requires. Stalbaum still sticks to *χρόνος*.

lay this down, that the things, which are said to be made by nature, are (made) by divine art; but that the things, which are composed from these by men, are produced by human (art): and that, according to this assertion, there are two kinds of the making art, one human, and the other divine.

Thea. Right.

[111.] *Guest.* But, since there are two kinds, bisect each of them.

Thea. How?

Guest. Just as the whole of the making art was then divided, according to breadth, so now divide it according to length.

Thea. Let it be so divided.

Guest. And thus all its parts will become four; two of which, with reference to us, will be human; and two again, with reference to the gods, divine.

Thea. They will.

Guest. But with respect to these, as being again divided in a different manner, one part of each division is self-making, but the remaining parts may be nearly called image-making; and in this way again, the making art is divided into two parts.

Thea. Tell me again how each is (to be divided).

Guest. With respect to ourselves and other animals, and the things from which they naturally consist, fire and water, and the sisters of these, we know that all these productions are individually the offspring of a deity. Or how?

Thea. Thus.

Guest. And that the images of each of these, and not the things themselves, follow, and these too produced by the artifice of some dæmon-like power.

Thea. Of what kind are these?

Guest. Fancies, which occur in dreams, and such as appear in the day, are called self-produced; (as, for instance,) a shadow, ⁴⁸ when darkness is generated in fire: ⁴⁸ but this is

⁴⁸—⁴⁸ This I cannot understand. Ficinus has, "cum tenebræ igni miscetur," which shows that he found in his MS. *ὅν τῷ πυρὶ σκόρος ἐγγιγνῆται*, in lieu of *ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκόρος ἐγγιγνῆται*. But perhaps Plato alluded to those fantastic forms, which are seen in a fire, when it is gradually dying away. But in that case he would have written, I think, *ἐν τῷ πυρὶ*, (as in the *Timæus*, p. 46, A., *ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐκτὸς ἐντὸς τε τοῦ πυρὸς*—,) and *σκόρος ἐν αὐτῇ γιννῆται*, "when darkness with light produces one," i. e. a shadow.

⁴⁹twofold, when its own and foreign light meeting in one about shining and smooth bodies, effects by these means a species,⁴⁹ producing a sensation of seeing contrary to accustomed vision.

Theæ. These works then of divine making are two, the things themselves, and the image which follows each.

[112.] *Guest.* But what of our art? Shall we not say that it does, by the art of house-building, make a dwelling, and has made by painting another (dwelling), which is, as it were, a dream made by man to persons awake?

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. ⁵⁰In this way then are the rest. (Divided) into two parts are the works of our making power; that which relates to the thing itself we call thing-itself-making, but that which relates to the image, image-making.⁵⁰

Theæ. I now understand you better; and I lay down in two parts two kinds of the making art, the divine and human, according to one section; and, according to the other, ⁵¹one (a production) from themselves, and the other of certain resemblances.⁵¹

⁴⁹⁻⁵⁰ On these unintelligible words, all that the editors have hitherto been able to do, is to quote a still more obscure passage of Plato's *Timæus*, and his Latin commentator, Chalcidius. I suspect the author wrote—*διόπτρου δὲ ἡνίκ' ἂν φῶτε, οἰκείδον τε καὶ ἀλλότριον, παρὰ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς ἓν συνελθόντε, τῆς ἐμπροσθεν εἰσθυσίας ὀψέως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον ἰδὸς ἀπεργάζεται*, i. e. "When two lights, its own and foreign, coming to one point along the shining and smooth part of a reflector, work out a form, that produces a sensation of seeing, opposite to the previously accustomed one." For the allusion is to a sheet of water, on the surface of which two lights were supposed to meet, one from within the water, and the other from without, and thus forming a dioptron, or transparent mirror, that reflected an image directly contrary to what the object appeared itself out of the water. Compare § 53, where reflexion by mirrors (*κάροπτρα*) and by water are alluded to. That there was here a reference to an optical illusion, is plain from the words of Chalcidius, p. 333, "At vero Plato censet duum luminum coitu confluentium in terram speculi et solidam cutem, id est diurni luminis et intimi—" from whence I have altered *φῶς* into *φῶτε* for the sense; and, for the syntax, *ἐνελθόν* into *ἐνελθόντε*, with which neuter dual nominatives the singular *ἀπεργάζεται* agrees.

⁵⁰⁻⁵¹ This seems to be the meaning of what Stalbaum thinks Plato wrote. Ficinus has, "In aliis quoque similiter per duo partiendo, gemina opera electricis nostræ actionis invenimus; ipsam quippe rem principali facultate, imaginem vero imaginaria facimus." This is certainly intelligible, but not to be elicited from the Greek, as found at present.

⁵¹⁻⁵² Here again I am utterly in the dark. Ficinus has, "deinde in rerum ipsarum imaginumve effectiōnem."

Guest. Let us then recollect, that of the image-producing art we said, one kind was about to be a likeness-producing, and the other a fancy-producing, if it should appear that falsehood is in reality a falsehood, and one of things existing.

Theæ. It was so.

Guest. There have then appeared, and we shall on this account enumerate ourselves,⁵² incontestably two species.

Theæ. Yes.

[113.] *Guest.* Let us then again divide into two the fancy-producing species.

Theæ. In what way?

Guest. One produced through instruments, but ⁵³the other, when he, who causes the fancied appearance, exhibits himself as the instrument of the thing.⁵³

Theæ. How say you?

Guest. I think, when any one employing his own body, causes your figure to appear similar to (his own),⁵⁴ or voice to voice, this is especially called an imitation belonging to the fancy-producing species.

Theæ. It is.

Guest. Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but let us, now reduced to a jelly,⁵⁵ dismiss all the rest, and we will permit some other person to collect (the facts) into one, and to give them a proper appellation.

⁵² Ficinus has "ipsi—enumerabimus," which leads to *αὐτῶ*, found in one MS. and adopted by Bekker. Heindorf and Stalbaum prefer *αὐτῶ*, which they refer to *ψεύδει*, understood. But the dative would be without regimen.

⁵³⁻⁵⁴ Such is the English of Stalbaum's Latin version of the Greek, out of which the reader is left to make what sense he can. It is beyond my comprehension. How superior is that of Ficinus, "Illius, qui sese instrumentum, phantasma efficientis, exhibet," i. e. "of him, who affords himself as an instrument of the person, who is working the fancied appearance;" just as persons do in the present day, when they put themselves into the hands of a mesmerizer or any other charlatan in any science real or unreal. There is however a slight error in the Greek, where we must read τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ παρίχοντος αὐτὸν ὄργανον. For thus διὰ τοῦ παρίχοντος will balance the preceding δι' ὀργάνων.

⁵⁴ Ficinus has preserved some words wanting here to complete the sense, "corpus suum tuo reddit persimile."

⁵⁵ This pugilistic phrase is the best version of the Greek word *μαλακισθίντες*. For to mental encounters are thus constantly applied the terms used in corporeal contests.

Theæ. Let one then be divided, and the other dismissed.

Guest. And yet, Theætetus, it is fit to think that this also is twofold ; but take notice on what account.

Theæ. Say on.

Guest. Of those who imitate, some knowing what they imitate, do this, but others not knowing. And yet what division can we make greater than that of ignorance and knowledge?

Theæ. Not one.

Guest. Will not then that, which was just now mentioned, be an imitation by those, that are endued with knowledge? For a man by knowing you, would imitate your figure likewise.

Theæ. How not?

[114.] *Guest.* But what shall we say respecting the figure of justice, and, in short, of the whole of virtue? ⁵⁶ Do not many, though ignorant, yet fancying they know it, vehemently endeavour to make it appear that, what seems to be (justice in them), is inherent in them, and that they are particularly desirous of it, by imitating it in deeds and words.⁵⁶

Theæ. Very many indeed.

Guest. Do not then all fail in seeming to be just, by their not being just at all? Or does the contrary of this take place wholly?

Theæ. Wholly.

Guest. I think then we must say that the imitator, who is ignorant, is different from the other who knows.

Theæ. Yes.

Guest. Whence, then, can any one of them obtain a name adapted to each? Or is it evident that it is difficult ; because a certain ancient cause⁵⁷ of the division of genera into species

^{56—58} Such seems to be the meaning of the original ; where I have endeavoured to overcome the difficulty by supposing that *δίκαιον* has dropt out before *δοκοῦν*, and by changing *προθυμῖσθαι*—*ὅτι μάλιστα* into *προθυμῖσθαι τε μάλιστα*.—Ficinus has "An non multi, dum ignorant, nosse autem hanc opinantur, quod illis videtur, id ipsum imitantes tam verbis quam operibus annuntiant, ut inesse ipsis appareat?" as if his MS. omitted *προθυμῖσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα*.

^{57—57} Boeckh was the first to find fault with *αἰρία*, and Heindorf with *ἀσύννοος* : for which the former would read *ἀήθλια* and the latter *ἀσύννοη*. Plato wrote perhaps—*ἐπαιρίστως περὶ παλαιά τις, ὥς ἰοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσυνεσία*, i. e. "some old-fashioned, as it seems, idleness and stupidity respecting the division—"

was unknown⁵⁷ to our ancestors, so that none of them attempted even to divide; and on this account there was a necessity for them not to be very ready at names. But at the same time, although it may be rather bold to be asserted, for the sake of distinction, let us call the imitation which subsists with opinion, the "opinion-mimicking," but that which subsists in conjunction with science, a certain scientific⁵⁸ imitation.

Theæ. Be it so.

[115.] *Guest.* We must therefore make use of the other: for a sophist was not among the scientific but the imitators.

Theæ. And very much so.

Guest. Let us then look into this opinion-mimic, as if he were a piece of iron, and (see) whether he is sound and whole, or contains in himself some layer doubled over.

Theæ. Let us consider.

Guest. He has it indeed very thick. For, of sophists, one is a simpleton, and thinks he knows what he (merely) fancies. But the figure of another, through his tossing about in his discourse, carries with it much of suspicion and fear, that he is ignorant of what before others he pretends to know.

Theæ. There are both these kinds of sophists, of whom you have spoken.

Guest. We will therefore place one as a simple imitator, but the other as an ironical one.

Theæ. It is proper (to do so).

Guest. And again, shall we say that the genus of this is one or two?

Theæ. Do you look to it.

Guest. I do consider; and some two imitators appear before me. One I behold able to employ irony in public, and in lengthened speeches before the masses; but the other in private, and in short discourses, compelling the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

Theæ. You speak most correctly.

[116.] *Guest.* What then may we show the imitator to be, who employs lengthened discourses? A statesman, or a mob-orator?

⁵⁷ Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *ιστορικὴν*, has—"historicam quandam scientemque? I suspect the word conceals some corruption; which I confess I am unable to correct satisfactorily.

Theæ. A mob-orator.

Guest. But what shall we call the other? a wise man, or wiseman-like?

Theæ. To (call)⁵⁹ him a wise man is impossible, since we have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an imitator of a wise man, it is plain he must receive some similar appellation; and I now nearly understand, that we ought truly to call this person the perfectly real sophist.

Guest. Shall we not then bind together his name, as we did before, connecting (every thing)⁶⁰ from the end to the beginning?

Theæ. Entirely so.

Guest. ⁶¹He, then, who is a portion of the art that makes a discourse to contradict itself, (and) a part of the ironic species, and of the opinion-mimicking, (and) of the fancy-producing, (and) of that (proceeding) from the image-making, (and) separated from the making, not as a god but man, (and) in discourses is the wonder-working portion,⁶¹ whoever shall say that he is "of this race and blood"⁶² a real sophist, such a person will, as it appears, speak with the greatest truth.

Theæ. Entirely so.

⁵⁹ Ficinus has "Sapientem quidem illum vocare non licet." Hence he probably found in his MS. *Tò μὲν αὐτὸν σοφὸν δέονταρον εἶπεν, ἰστέι περ*—for *εἶπεν* might easily have been lost through *ἰστέι*, while from hence Stephens got his *τὸ* for *τὸν*.

⁶⁰ Ficinus has "omnia complicantes," which shows that his MS. supplied *πάντα*, now wanting before *ἀπὸ*—

⁶¹—⁶² The whole of this passage in the original presents considerable difficulties, as Stalbaum confesses; and even Heindorf has not been able to master them; for he did not perceive that there are not only interpolations and literal errors in the Greek, but a lacuna likewise, which it were easy to supply from the version of Ficinus, were this the place for a lengthened discussion.

⁶² The words "of this race and blood," are taken from Homer, *Il.* Z. 211

INTRODUCTION TO THE STATESMAN.

Or this dialogue, which is feigned to have taken place on the same day as the *Sophist*, and may be considered both in manner and matter a continuation of it, although directed to a different subject, the argument may be comprised in a very few words. Its object, as stated towards the close of it, is to show that the head of the state, who should be a king, ought to combine not only in his own person, but in that of the people over whom he rules, the two conflicting characters of manliness and moderation. For by such an union alone is it possible to correct the mischiefs arising equally from the excess and deficiency of energy in all matters relating to the well-being of the state.

To arrive at this conclusion Plato has thought proper to give the rein to his imagination instead of curbing it; and he has been compelled in consequence to apologize for the prolixity of his discourse; where he was evidently carried away with the same desire to draw subtle distinctions in things apparently similar, as he has done in the *Sophist*. For he was anxious, perhaps, to show his acquaintance with the minutiae of some handicraft trades, instead of keeping rather the attention of the reader fixed to a few leading points, and putting down only

Quod bene proposito conducatur et hæreat apte.

What to the subject's fitted and sticks close.

In the midst, however, of this discursive matter, we meet with a curious digression, where Plato has in part anticipated the theory of the Geologists of the present day, respecting the changes which the earth has undergone at different periods, together with an allusion to a primæval state, not very unlike that recorded in Holy Writ; although in neither case did he probably do more than put into his own words, what he found in the writings of preceding philosophers

This dialogue is remarkable, moreover, for the development of the notion, so contrary to that of modern times, that laws should be made not so much to chime in with the feelings of the people, as to oppose their prejudices, provided the object of such legislation be to improve their moral and physical condition. But as this end could not be accomplished, where the ruling power rests with the masses, who, as Plato had seen at Athens, were alternately ferocious despots or fawning slaves, he suggested the propriety of establishing in conjunction with a king, an aristocracy, composed of persons, not superior to their countrymen in wealth, but in virtue, and possessing, like the king, the qualities necessary for a real statesman; who should be at once a shepherd, to look to the rearing of his charge, and a physician, to watch over their health, and a philosopher, to superintend their mental and moral culture.

As this dialogue has been edited separately only by Stalbaum—for Fischer's publication is, like the rest of that scholar's works, beneath even a passing notice—it presents not a few passages to exercise, and, as I have found, to baffle the ingenuity of emendatory criticism; to which Stalbaum should have resorted rather than have sought to support the nonsense of a corrupt text. As regards, however, the matter of the dialogue, he has left little to desire in his *Prolegomena* of 132 8vo pages; to which the reader is referred, who wishes to know something of what has been written by the more recent scholars of Germany on questions, that will, it is to be feared, remain for ever in their present obscurity.

THE STATESMAN.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, THEODORUS, A GUEST, AND SOCRATES JUN.

SOCRATES.

[1.] I OWE you, Theodorus, surely many thanks for my acquaintance with Theætetus and this guest to boot.

The. Perhaps, Socrates, you will owe me thrice as many, when they shall have worked out for you a statesman and a philosopher.

Soc. Be it so. But shall we say we have thus heard this from you, the most powerful in calculations and geometry?

The. How, Socrates?

Soc. As having put down each of these men of equal worth, who are in value more removed from each other than accords with the analogy of your art.

The. By our god Ammon,¹ Socrates, you have well and justly, and very rememberingly² reproved me for my error in calculation. But I will follow you up about this at a future time. But do not you, O guest, in any respect be faint-hearted in gratifying us; but select for us either first a

¹ Theodorus, who was a mathematician of Cyrene, is feigned to swear by Jupiter Amm-on, (literally, "Sand-Being,) the tutelary deity of his native city, situated on the confines of the sandy desert of Libya.

² Edd. πάνυ μὲν οὖν μνημονικῶς. This I cannot understand. The sense required seems to be, "and you have very kindly reproved me, forgetful with respect to the error in calculation." At all events μὲν οὖν could not be found in this member of the sentence; while μνημονικῶς belongs to ἀμάρτημα rather than to ἐπίπληξας.

statesman, or a philosopher; and having selected go through (the discussion).

Guest. This must be done, Theodorus; for since we have put our hand to this discussion, we must not stand aloof, till we arrive at the end of it. But what must I do with Theætetus here?

The. As regards what?

Guest. Shall we suffer him to rest, and take in his stead Socrates³ here, his fellow-combatant? Or how do you advise?

The. Take him, as you say, in his stead. For, both being young men, they will after resting easily endure every labour.

Soc. And indeed, O guest, both of them appear almost to have an affinity with me from some quarter. For you say that one of them (Theætetus) seems to resemble me in the natural form of his face;⁴ and the appellation of the other, being of the same name as myself, and his address⁵ furnish a kind of family connexion. It is meet then for us to recognise always with readiness in conversation those of the same kin. Now yesterday I mingled in a conversation with Theætetus,⁶ and I have now heard him answering; but neither (case applies) to Socrates (here). It is meet, however, for us to consider him likewise. Let him then at some other time answer me, but at present you.

Guest. Be it so. Do you, Socrates (junior), hear this Socrates?

Soc. jun. I do.

Guest. Do you then agree to what he says?

Soc. jun. Entirely.

Guest. It appears then, that your affairs will not be an hinderance; and perhaps it is requisite for me to be much less an hinderance. But after the sophist⁷ it is necessary, as it appears to me, for us to seek out the statesman. [2.] Tell me then, whether must we place this (character) too among the possessors of knowledge, or how?

³ Respecting this Socrates junior see Sophist, § 6, and Theætet. § 13.

⁴ See Theætet. § 5.

⁵ As *κλησις* and *πρόσρησις* have the same meaning, it is evident that Plato did not write both those words; but which of them he did write, is not quite so clear.

⁶ From hence it appears that the present dialogue is feigned to have taken place the day after that in which the Theætetus occurred.

⁷ This dialogue was written, then, after the Sophist.

Soc. jun. In this way.⁸

Guest. We must then divide the sciences, as (we did) when we were inquiring into the former (character).

Soc. jun. Perhaps so.

Guest. But yet the division appears to me, Socrates, to be not after the same manner.

Soc. jun. Why not?

Guest. But after another.

Soc. jun. It would seem so.

Guest. Where then can one find the statesman's path? For find it we must; and separating it from the rest, put on it the seal of one (general) form, and on the other deflections the mark of another species; and thus cause our soul to conceive that all the sciences do in reality belong to two species.

Soc. jun. I think, O guest, that this is your business, and not mine.

Guest. But indeed, Socrates, it must needs be yours too, when it becomes apparent to us.

Soc. jun. You speak well.

Guest. Are not then arithmetic, and certain other sciences allied to this, divested of action; and do they not afford a subject of thought alone?

Soc. jun. It is so.

Guest. But those which pertain to carpenter's work, and the whole of handicraft trades, possess a science, as it were, innate in their operations, and at the same time complete the bodies produced by them, which had not an existence previously.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. In this manner then divide sciences in general, calling one practical and the other merely intellectual.

Soc. jun. Let there be then of one whole science two species.

Guest. Whether then shall we lay down the statesman, the king, the despot, and the head of a household, and call them all by one name? Or shall we say there are as many sciences as have been their mentioned names? Or rather follow me hither.

⁸ To a bipartite question there could not be a single answer. Ficinus has correctly, "Utrum hunc in eorum, qui scientes dicuntur, numerum referre deceat? Decet—" omitting ἡ πῶς.

Soc. jun. Whither?

Guest. On this road. If a private person is able to give advice sufficiently well to any of the public physicians,⁹ is it not necessary for him to be called by the name of the art, the same as he is, to whom he gives advice.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. What then, whatever private person is skilled in giving advice to the king of a country, shall we not say that he possesses the science, which the ruler himself ought to possess?

Soc. jun. We shall.

Guest. But surely the science of a true king is a kingly (science).

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. And may not he, who possesses this science, whether he is a private man, or a king, be in every respect rightly called, according to this art, king-like.

Soc. jun. Justly so.

Guest. And are not the head of a household and a despot the same?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But what, will the size of an extensive household or the swollen form¹⁰ of a small state make any difference as regards the government?

Soc. jun. Not at all.

Guest. It is evident then, what is indeed the thing we were just now inquiring, that there is one science respecting all these. But whether any one calls it the science of a king, a statesman, or a family-man, let us not differ about it.

Soc. jun. Why should we?

[3.] *Guest.* This too is evident, that each individual¹¹ king

⁹ By comparing this and some other passages of Plato and of Xenophon, *M. S.* iv. 2, 5, Aristotle, *Polit.* ii. 4, Strabo iv. p. 125, and Schol. on Aristotle. *Ax.* 1029, quoted by Casaubon, Schneider, and Boeckh, *Œcon.* Athen. i. p. 132, it appears that there was at Athens a body of medical men paid by the state, as well as those in private practice.

¹⁰ Instead of *μεγάλης σχῆμα—σμικρᾶς—ὄγκος*, one would have expected *μεγάλης ὄγκος—σμικρᾶς σχῆμα*: for *ὄγκος* applies rather to a thing of large size than a small one.

¹¹ Stalbaum renders *ἄπας* "unusquisque," a meaning that word never has. The train of thought requires *βασιλεὺς πᾶς αὐτὸς*, in lieu of *βασιλεὺς ἄπας*, "every king by himself." Compare a little below *ἀρχιτέκτων πᾶς αὐτὸς*.

has in his hands, and the whole of his body, some little power towards retaining his rule, as compared with the intelligence and strength of his soul.

Soc. jun. It is evident.

Guest. Are you willing then for us to say that a king is more allied to intellectual than to manual and wholly practical science?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. We will then put together in the same (class) statesmanship and a statesman, kingship and a king, as being all one thing.

Soc. jun. It is evident.

Guest. Shall we not proceed then in an orderly manner, if after this we divide the intellectual science?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Attend, then, and inform me whether we can perceive any point of union?¹²

Soc. jun. Tell me of what kind.

Guest. Of this kind. We have a certain calculating art.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. And this I think entirely belongs to the intellectual arts.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Shall we concede to the calculating art, that knows the difference in numbers, any thing more than that it distinguishes things, the subjects of intellect.

Soc. jun. How should we?

Guest. For every architect is not a workman himself, but is the ruler over workmen.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. And he imparts indeed intellect, but not the work by hand.

Soc. jun. Just so.

Guest. He may justly then be said to have a share in intellectual science.

Soc. jun. Entirely.

Guest. And for him I think it is fitting, after he has

¹² Instead of *διαφύνην*, Heindorf, on *Phædon*. p. 98, C., suggested, what has been subsequently found in three MSS., *διαφύνη*—a word applied to the knotty parts of a blade of straw, and to the union of bones and joints.

passed a judgment, not to have an end, nor to be freed, as the calculator was freed (from doing more), but to command every workman (to do) that which is suited to him, until they shall have worked out what has been commanded.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. Are not then all such as these, and such as are consequent upon the calculating art, intellectual? And do not these two genera differ from each other in judgment and commandment?

Soc. jun. They appear to do so.

Guest. If then we should divide the whole of the intellectual science into two parts, and call the one mandatory, and the other judicial, should we not say that we have made a careful division?

Soc. jun. Yes, according to my mind.

Guest. But for those, who do any thing in common, it is delightful to be of one mind.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. As far then as we participate¹³ on this point, we must bid farewell to the opinions of others.

[4.] *Soc. jun.* Why not?

Guest. Come, then, inform me in which of these arts we must place the kingly character. Must we place him in the judicial art, as some spectator? Or rather, shall we place him in the commanding art, as being a despot?

Soc. jun. How not rather in this?

Guest. We may consider again the commanding art, whether it stands in any way apart. For it appears to me, that as the art of a huckster is separated from his, who sells his own goods,¹⁴ so is the genus of a king from the genus of public criers.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. Hucksters, having received the previously sold works of others, afterwards sell them again themselves.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. The tribe of criers too, after receiving the thoughts of strangers, enjoins them again to others.

¹³ I suspect there is some error in *κοινωνῶμεν*, which it were easy to correct, if requisite.

¹⁴ On the difference between the *κάπηλος* and *αὐτοπώλης*, see Sophist, § 18.

Soc. jun. Most true.

Guest. What then, shall we mix in the same (class) the king-art, and that of the interpreting, ordering, prophesying, and public-crying, and many other arts allied to these, all which have this in common that they command? Or are you willing that, as we just now instituted a resemblance (in things), we should make a resemblance in the name likewise? since the genus of those, who rule their own concerns, is nearly without a name; and shall we so divide these, by placing the kingly genus among those, who command their own concerns, and by neglecting every thing else, leave any one to put another name on them? For our method was (adopted) for the sake of a ruler, and not for its contrary.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

[5.] *Guest.* Since then this stands at a moderate distance apart from those, and is separated from that, which is foreign, into that which is domestic, it is necessary to divide this again, if we have yet any yielding¹⁵ section in this.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow me and divide.

Soc. jun. Whither?

Guest. Shall we not find that all such as we conceive to be rulers, do, by making use of a command, give a command for the sake of producing something?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And indeed it is not at all difficult for all things that are produced, to receive a twofold division.

Soc. jun. In what way?

Guest. Some among all of them are animated, and others are inanimate.

Soc. jun. They are so.

Guest. If we wish to cut the portion of intelligence, that has a commanding power over these very things, we will cut¹⁶ it.

¹⁵ Instead of *ὑπεκκινουσαν*, some one, says Stalbaum, wished to read *ὑπαρχουσαν*: which would certainly make a somewhat clearer sense. But I confess I do not very well see the meaning of the whole of this speech, and especially of the words *ἀλλοτριῇ διανοίᾳ πρὸς οἰκίωσιν*.

¹⁶ Instead of *τεμνοῦμεν*, Ficinus found in his MS. *τίμωμεν*, as shown by his "secemus." One would prefer, however, *τίπομεν ἂν*, "If we wish to cut, we can."

Soc. jun. According to what?

Guest. By assigning one part over the generation of inanimate things, and the other over the generation of animated. And thus the whole will be divided into two parts.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. One part then let us put aside, and take up again the other; and after taking it up, divide the whole into two parts.

Soc. jun. But which of these do you say is to be resumed?

Guest. By all means, that which has a command over animals. For it is not the province of the kingly science to have a command over things inanimate, like the science of architecture; but, being of a more noble nature, over animals; and it ever possesses a power relating to such very things.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. (With respect to) the generation and nurture of animals, a person may see the former as single-feeding, but the latter as the common-feeding of the nurslings in herds.¹⁷

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. But we shall find that the statesman is not a breeder of his own property, like an ox-driver, or some horse-currer;¹⁸ but is rather like the person who rears horses and oxen.

Soc. jun. What has been just said seems to be the fact.

Guest. Whether then (with respect to) the nurture of animals, shall we call the common-rearing of all together a herd-rearing, or a certain general-rearing.

Soc. jun. Whichever may happen in the discourse.

[6.] *Guest.* You (have said) well, Socrates. And if you avoid paying too serious an attention to names, you will appear in old age to be more rich in prudence. But now we must do as you recommended. But do you understand how some one will, having divided the herd-rearing art into two,

¹⁷ On this mass of nonsense Stalbaum says, as usual, not a word; nor does he notice even the remarkable version of Ficinus, "Circa generationem nutritionemque animalium cura duplex invenitur; animalis cujusdam una; gregis totius altera." By uniting the Greek and the Latin, one might perhaps recover, without difficulty, the very words of the author.

¹⁸ Here again Ficinus exhibits a curious variation from the text found at present in the Greek. "Civilis autem non propriam curam aggreditur, quemadmodum arator, qui bovem agit, vel minister, qui sternit equum;" from whence Cornarius was the first to elicit *ἰδιωρόφων*, in lieu of *ἰδιότροπον*, found in all the MSS. but a solitary one at Paris.

cause, what is now sought for in a double, to be sought for then in halves?¹⁹

Soc. jun. I shall be eager (to do so): and it appears to me that there is one rearing of men, and another of beasts.

Guest. You have divided in every respect most readily and courageously. However, (we must be careful) to the utmost of our power not to suffer hereafter this.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That we do not take away one small part as applicable to many and great parts, nor yet without a species; but let it always have at the same time a species. For it is very well to separate immediately the thing sought for from all the rest, if the separation be rightly made; just as you did a little before, through conceiving the division to be rightly made, hasten on, seeing that the discourse was tending to man. But, my friend, it is not safe to divide with subtlety;²⁰ but it is more safe to proceed in the middle²¹ by dividing (continually); for thus will one more (readily)²² meet with forms (of existence). But the whole of this relates²³ to our inquiries.

Soc. jun. How say you this, O guest?

Guest. I must endeavour to speak yet more clearly, through a kind feeling towards your disposition,²⁴ Socrates. But it is impossible in the subject at hand to show what is now

¹⁹ Such is Stalbaum's version of the Greek text. Both are equally beyond my comprehension; and so is the Latin of Ficinus: "Sed nunquid vides, quo pacto quis, gregis nutritionem geminam ostendens, efficiat ut, quod in duplis ad id, quod nunc propositum est, investigabitur, in dimidiis iterum perquiratur." By following however the train of thought, and adopting the alterations to which it leads, one might perhaps recover what Plato wrote.

²⁰ Ficinus has, "ad extremum quiddam et tenue protinus adventare."

²¹ So Ovid, "medio tutissimus ibis."

²² Ficinus has "facilius meliusque," as if he had found in his MS. *καλλιον και μαλλον*, as a little below, *καλλιον δι που και μαλλον*.

²³ To prove that *διαφέρειν*, which is elsewhere "to differ," is here "to refer," Stalbaum quotes Xenophon *Œconom.* 20. 16, *μὴτα διαφέρειν εἰς τὸ λυσιτελεῖν γεωργίαν*—not aware that the author wrote *μὴτα ἐν φέρειν*, and Plato perhaps *ΔΙΑΝ φέρει*, not *ΔΙΑΦέρει*.

²⁴ Such is Stalbaum's version. But *εὐνοία* is generally followed by a dative, as in Eurip. *Tro.* 7, *Εὐνοία—πόλει*. Orest. 858, *εὐνοίαν πατρί*. Isocrat. *εὐνοίαν—τοῖς πραγματοποιοῦντες*. Demosth. *Olynth.* ii. *εὐνοίαν τῇ πόλει*. Coron. *εὐνοίαν—τῇ τε πόλει και πᾶσιν ὑμῖν*. Midian. *τὴν εὐνοίαν—τῇ πατρίδι*.

said in a manner wanting in nothing; still we must endeavour, for the sake of perspicuity, to carry on the inquiry a little further.

Soc. jun. In what respect then do you say we have, by dividing, just now not rightly done?

Guest. In this respect; that, should any one attempt to give a twofold division to the human genus, he would divide, in the way that the majority here divide. For by separating the Grecian genus, as one apart from all, they give to all the rest, who are innumerable, unmixed, and not speaking the same language with each other, one name, that of a Barbarian race; and through this one name they fancy the race itself to be one; or as if some one, thinking that number should be divided into two species, should, after cutting off ten thousand from all numbers, put it aside as one species, and, giving one name to all the rest, should think that, through that appellation, this genus will become separate and different from the other. He however would make in a more beautiful manner, and more according to species, and²⁵ a two-fold division, who should divide number into even and odd, and the human species into male and female; and, after arranging the Lydians or Phrygians, or some other nations, should then separate them into wholes, when he is incapable of finding the genus, and at the same time the species of each of the divided portions.

[7.] *Soc. jun.* Most right. But (explain),²⁶ O guest, this very thing—How can any one rather clearly know that genus and species are not the same, but different from each other?

Guest. O Socrates, thou best of men, thou commandest no trifling thing. Already have we wandered further from our proposed discourse than is fitting; and yet you order us to wander still further. Now then let us, as is reasonable, turn back again; and hereafter we will at leisure pursue this point, as having come upon the track. Do not, however, by any means guard against this,²⁷ that you have heard from me this point clearly determined.

²⁵ Sauppe would omit *kai* before *διχα*.

²⁶ Ficinus has, "At illud—ostende," which leads to *ἀλλὰ λέγεις καὶ*, in lieu of *ἀλλὰ γάρ*—

²⁷ The common text exhibits a combination of words at variance with correct Greek, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γι—φυλάξαι*. For *οὐ μὴν* are

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That species and part are different from each other.

Soc. jun. Why (say you) so?

Guest. When any thing is a species of some thing, it is necessary for it to be a part of the thing of which it is said to be the species: but there is no necessity for a part to be a species. Always consider me, therefore, Socrates, as asserting this rather than that.

Soc. jun. Be it so.

Guest. But tell me that, which is after this.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. The point of the digression which has brought us hither. For I think it was especially at that point, when, on your being asked how we must divide herd-rearing, you answered very readily, that there were two kinds of animals, the one of man, and the other of brutes taken all together.

Soc. jun. True.

Guest. And you then appeared to me, after taking away a part, to think that you ought to leave²⁸ the remainder as one genus of all (brutes), because you could give to them all the same name, by calling them brutes.

Soc. jun. Such was the case.

Guest. But this, O most courageous of men, is just as if some other prudent²⁹ animal, such as seems to be the crane, or some other animal of a similar kind, should, in the same manner as you do, oppose the cranes, as one race, to all other animals, and make itself an object of respect; and, putting all the rest together with men into one race, call them perhaps nothing else but brutes. Let us then endeavour to avoid every thing whatsoever of this kind.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. By not dividing every genus of animals, that we may suffer the less.

Soc. jun. For there is no necessity.

never united to an imperative; nor does ἀλλὰ, as far as I remember, ever follow οὐ μήν. To avoid the difficulty, Ficinus omits οὐ μήν ἀλλὰ, and makes Plato write something like sense.

²⁸ Ficinus has, "putavisse ponendum," as if he had found in his MS. not καταλείπειν, but καταλείπειν εἶναι, what the sense manifestly requires. After verbals in—ρίον, εἶναι is thus found perpetually.

²⁹ Plato had probably in his mind the expression φρονιματάρους, applied to birds by Sophocles in Electr. 1047.

Guest. For we then erred in this way.

Soc. jun. In what?

Guest. Such part of intellectual science as related to commanding was (said) by us to be of the animal-rearing kind, as regards gregarious animals. Was it not?

Soc. jun. It was.

Guest. The whole animal genus, therefore, was even then divided into the tame and wild. For those animals that have a nature to become gentle, are called tame; but those that have not, are (called) wild.

Soc. jun. Correctly.

Guest. But the science, of which we are in the hunt, was and is in the case of tame animals, and is to be sought for among the gregarious rearlings.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. Let us then not divide, as formerly, looking to all animals, nor with haste, so that we may quickly arrive at state-science. For this has caused us to suffer even now according to the proverb—²⁰

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. By not well dividing²¹ quietly, to complete (the task) more slowly.

Soc. jun. And it has, O guest, properly caused (us to suffer).

[8.] *Guest.* Be it so then. But let us again from the beginning endeavour to divide the common-rearing (of animals). For perhaps the discourse itself, being brought to a conclusion, will more clearly unfold what you desire. But tell me—

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. This; if indeed you have frequently²² heard it from

²⁰ The proverb was, perhaps, *Οὐχ ἡσυχοὶ βραδύτερον ἀνέτουνσιν*, similar to the Latin "*Festina lente*," according to Stalbaum; who, to avoid the doubled tribrach and to preserve the Attic form, should have suggested *βράδιον* and added *πόδες* to complete the verse.

²¹ As there is nothing in the proverb to which Plato alludes, relating to "well dividing," C. Badham has, in *The Surplice*, No. 32, for July 4, 1846, suggested *ὀδοιποροῦντας* in lieu of *εὖ διαιροῦντας*; which led me, in No. 33, to propose *ἡσύχως πόδ' αἶροντας*—a form of expression found in MSS., or, from conjecture, in *Hecub.* 950, *πόδα—αἶροντι*. *Phæn.* 1034, *πόδ' αἶρουσ'*. *Herc. F.* 882, *Νῦν θίς πόδ'. αἶρε κῶλον*. 868, *Στείχ' Ὀλύμπουδ' αὖ, πόδ' αἶρουσ'*, *Ἴρι. Ip. Γίγνομαι κποδών*. *Phaethont. Fr.*, *Ἐκτόπιόι τε δόμων πόδ' αἶρατε*.

²² In the phrase, *εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις*, Heindorf on *Phædon.* p. 60, e., says

certain persons. For I do not think you have met with the tame-fish places in the Nile, or in the royal lakes. But perhaps you have seen the taming of these in (artificial) fountains.

Soc. jun. I have seen these frequently, and I have heard of those from many.

Guest. You have likewise heard and believe that geese and cranes are reared, though you have never wandered about the Thessalian plains.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. On this account I have asked you all these questions, because the rearing of herds of animals is partly of those moving²³ in the water, and partly on dry land.

Soc. jun. It is so.

Guest. Does it not then appear to you likewise, that we ought to cut in two the common-rearing science, [distributing to each of them its own part,²⁴] and call the one a rearing-in-moisture, and the other a rearing-on-dry-land.

Soc. jun. (It does so appear) to me.

Guest. But we will not in the same manner inquire to which of these arts king-science belongs. For it is evident to every one.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And every one can separate the dry-rearing portion of the herd-rearing.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. Into the flying and walking-on-foot.

Soc. jun. Most true.

Guest. But what of state-science, must it be inquired whether it relates to the walking-on-foot? Or do you not think, that the most stupid person, so to say, would imagine so?

Soc. jun. I do.

Guest. But it is requisite to show that the art of rearing foot-walking (animals) is, as number was just now, cut into two parts.

that *πολλάκις* means "perchance." But how *πολλάκις*, "frequently," could have such a meaning, it is difficult to understand. Plato wrote *δ δη*, to which *οὐδὲ* for *εἰ*, in one MS., plainly leads.

²³ In lieu of *ἐνυδρον*, Athenæus, in iii. p. 99, B., gives another reading, *ὕδροβατον*. My friend Buckley would form the two into *ἐνυδροβατον*.

²⁴ All the words between brackets are omitted by Ficinus.

Soc. jun. This is evident.

Guest. And yet to the part, to which our discourse has led us on, there seem to be some two paths extending themselves; the one quicker, by being divided, a small part as compared with a large one; but the other longer, from preserving rather the precept, which we mentioned before, that we ought to cut as much as possible through the middle. It is in our power then to proceed by either of the paths we may wish.

Soc. jun. Is it then impossible to proceed by both?

Guest. What by both at once, O wonderful youth? Alternately, however, it is plain the thing is possible.

Soc. jun. I choose then both alternately.

Guest. The thing is easy; since short is the remainder (of the road). In the beginning indeed and middle of our journey the command³⁵ would have been difficult. But now, since this seems good, let us first proceed by the longer road. For, as we are fresh, we shall more easily journey through it. But do you look to the division.

[9.] *Soc. jun.* Speak it.

Guest. Of such tame animals as are gregarious, the foot-walking have been divided by us according to nature.

Soc. jun. What (nature)?

Guest. By some of their race being hornless and others horned.

Soc. jun. So it appears.

Guest. Divide then the art of rearing foot-walking animals, and assign to each part,³⁶ making use of reason. For should you wish to name them, the thing will become complicated more than is fitting.

Soc. jun. How then must one speak (of them)?

Guest. Thus. Of the science of rearing foot-walking animals, divided into two parts, let one portion be assigned to the horned part of the herd, but the other to the hornless.

³⁵ As no command had been given, C. Badham, in *The Surplice*, quoted in n. 31, would read *πρᾶγμα*.

³⁶ After "part," some word is evidently wanting. Ficinus has "utriusque partis conditionem sermone describe." Perhaps *ὅρον* has dropt out after *μῆτις*. Stalbaum translates *λόγῳ χρώμενος*, "using a definition." But he does not say what noun is to follow *ἀπόδος*.

Soc. jun. Let this be so said: for they have been sufficiently shown to be so.

Guest. Now then the king is evidently the shepherd over a flock of animals deprived of horns.

Soc. jun. For how is he not evident?

Guest. Breaking then this (herd) into portions, let us endeavour to assign the result³⁷ to him (the king).

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Whether then are you willing for us to divide it (the herd) by the cloven, or, what is called, the solid hoof? Or by a common or individual generation? For you understand.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That the race of horses and asses naturally procreate with each other.

Soc. jun. It does.

Guest. But the other still remaining portion of the smooth³⁸-haired herd of tame animals, is unmixed in their generation with each other.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But whether does the Statesman appear to take care of animals having a common, or individual generation?

Soc. jun. It is evident of the unmixed (generation).

Guest. We must then, as it seems, divide this, as those before, into two parts.

Soc. jun. Yes; we must.

Guest. But we have cut into minute portions nearly every tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is not fit to rank the genus of dogs³⁹ among gregarious cattle.

³⁷ Stalbaum explains τὸ γιγνόμενον, the emendation of Cornarius, by "what is belonging to." The expression means rather "what is produced" by the breaking. The word in Latin would be "proventus." Ficinus has "quod movetur," answering to τὸ κινούμενον, found in all the MSS. but one; and even there γίνο is merely a reading over κινούμενον, which would lead to κινούμενον, "the result."

³⁸ Stalbaum after Bekker has adopted from four MSS. λείας, in lieu of μᾶς, and refers to Cratyl. p. 406, A., where ἡμερον τε καὶ λείον are united and opposed to ραχύ. But λείος is here rather "smooth-haired," or "without manes," such as kine are. Ficinus acknowledges neither μᾶς nor λείας in his version. "Reliqua vero domestica et socialis generis animalia, sine aliena commixtione, propria tantum ex specie procreant."

³⁹ Why dogs should be excluded, if they are gregarious, it is difficult to say; and if they are not, it is still more difficult to explain, why Plato mentioned them at all. Ficinus has "genus porro nostrum inter grega-

Soc. jun. It is not. But in what manner shall we divide these two?

Guest. In that, by which it is just for you and Theætetus to divide them, since you are handling the science of geometry.

Soc. jun. In what manner?

Guest. By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the diameter.⁴⁰

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. Is the nature, which the race of us men possesses, adapted to locomotion in any other way than as a diameter, which is two feet in power?⁴⁰

Soc. jun. In no other way.

Guest. Moreover the nature of the remaining genus is again according to the power of our power, a diameter, if it naturally consists of twice two feet.

Soc. jun. Undoubtedly. And now I nearly understand what you wish to show.

Guest. But in addition to these, do we perceive, Socrates, something else belonging to those having a reputation for laughter,⁴¹ which happened to us in making the former division?

Soc. jun. What is that?

Guest. This our human race, sharing the same lot and running the same course with a race the most generous⁴² and most handy of existing (animals).

bilia pecora numerare non decet," as if he found in his MS. τὸ γὰρ τῶν γ' ἄνωγ, (i. e. ἀνθρώπων).

⁴⁰—Others may perhaps, but I cannot, understand what is meant by the diameter of a diameter; except by saying, as Stalbaum has in part suggested, that as the diagonal of a square of one foot is two square feet, a man with two feet is compared to the diagonal of such a square; and that as a four-footed animal is in that respect the double of a two-footed one, it may be called the diameter of a diameter. I suspect, however, that the whole passage has come down to us in a very imperfect state.

⁴¹ The expression τῶν πρὸς γέλωτα εὐδοκίμησάντων, seems very strange in Greek. Ficinus has merely "risu dignum." Plato wrote perhaps τῶν παρ' Ἰνδοῖς κινησάντων γέλωτα—

⁴² Of this utterly unintelligible word different emendations have been suggested by different scholars. Stalbaum alone has had the hardihood to attempt to defend a mass of nonsense by comparing γενναϊοράται καὶ εὐχεριεσάται in this place, with τῆς ἀνδρείας τε καὶ εὐχρείας in Rep. iv. p. 426, D. But even he is unable to tell what is the animal to which Plato alludes. Winckelmann suspected it was the monkey. But he failed to see that the author wrote γελοιοράται, which was first proposed

Soc. jun. I perceive it happening very absurdly too.⁴³

Guest. Is it not fit that the slowest things should arrive last of all?⁴⁴

Soc. jun. It is.

Guest. But we do not perceive this, that a king appears still more ridiculous, when running together with the herd,⁴⁵ and performing his course in conjunction with him, who is exercised in the best manner with respect to a tractable life.⁴⁶

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

by C. Badham in *The Surplice*, No. 32, July 4, 1846, which I supported in No. 33, by quoting Hipp. Maj. p. 289, A., where Plato compares man to a monkey, as Heracleitus had done before him; who said that the most beautiful monkey would appear an ugly creature, when compared with a man; and so, says Plato, the wisest of men would be no better than a monkey, when compared with the Creator. And it was in allusion to this doctrine of Heracleitus, that Ennius said, as we learn from Cicero, "*Simia quam similis, turpissima bestia nobis.*" It will however be objected, perhaps, that monkeys do not herd together, nor converse with their keepers. But the monkey is known in its natural state to be a gregarious animal; and though their talk is not intelligible to man, their chatter, no doubt, is to each other. Besides, in this allusion to a monkey in a dialogue relating to Statesmanship, Plato had in mind, I suspect, an *Æsopo-Socratic* fable preserved in the prose of the *Progymnasmata* of Hermogenes to the following effect—The monkeys came together to consult about the necessity of fixing their dwelling in a city. After they had so decreed, and were about to put their hands to the work, an old monkey stopped them by saying that they would be caught still easier, should they shut themselves up within enclosures.—To the same fable there is an allusion in the *Gorgias*, p. 484, F., *ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινὰ ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγίλαστοι γίνονται, ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτικοί*; where, since *ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι* have not a particle of meaning, it is evident that Plato wrote, *ὥσπερ αἱ γε Μῖμῶ αἱ πολιτικαί*. For *Μῖμῶ* is the synonyme of *Πίθηκος*, as shown by Suidas, *Πίθηκος ἢ Μῖμῶ*. With regard to *εὐχερεστάτῃ*, since man is, according to the theory of Helvetius, "the handy animal," and called by that name, from the Latin *man-us*, "hand," the same epithet may be fairly applied to the monkey, whose hand, both in form and power, is very similar to that of man; and whose very name, "monkey," is only a corruption of "mannikin," the diminutive of "man."

⁴³ In lieu of this mass of nonsense, Ficinus has, "*Cerno, et quidem clare, quod sequitur*;" which leads distinctly to *καθ' ὅσον καὶ μάλ' ἐν τῷ πᾶσι συμβαῖνον*, instead of *μάλ' ἀτόπως*.

⁴⁴ I confess I do not see the relevancy of this remark; the words seem to contain a Choliambic verse spoken of the tortoise, *Οὐκ εἰσὸς ἔστατ' ἦν βραδύστον ἀφικνεῖσθαι*.

⁴⁵—⁴⁶ Here again are some words, which having not the least connexion with what precedes, plainly prove that something has dropt out; to say nothing of the literal errors to be found in them.

Guest. For now, Socrates, that is more apparent, which was said by us in our search for a sophist.⁴⁶

Soc. jun. What is that?

Guest. That in such a method of discourse there is no greater care for what is venerable, than what is not, nor does it prefer the small to the great, but always accomplishes that which according to itself is most true.

Soc. jun. It appears so.

Guest. After this, that you may not anticipate me by asking what is the shorter road to the definition of a king, shall I traverse it the first?

Soc. jun. By all means.

Guest. I say then, that we ought to have divided forthwith the foot-walking genus into the biped and quadruped; and, seeing that the human race shared the same lot with the flying genus alone, we ought to have again divided the two-footed into the wingless and winged; and this division having been made, and the art shown, which is the rearer of men, we ought to have brought forward and placed over it the statesman and kingly character, like a charioteer, and given him the reins of the city,⁴⁷ in consequence of this science being peculiarly his own.

Soc. jun. You have (spoken) beautifully, and given me an account, as it were, of a debt,⁴⁸ and added a digression, by way of interest, and completed (the transaction).

[10.] *Guest.* Come then, let us, going back to the beginning, connect with the end the discourse concerning the name of the statesman's art.

Soc. jun. By all means.

Guest. One part then of intellectual science was at the beginning the commanding; and the part assimilated to this was called the self-commanding. Again, of the self-commanding, the rearing of animals was cut off, as not the smallest part of the genera; and of the rearing of animals, the rearing of herds was a species; and of the rearing of herds, (a part) was the care of foot-walking animals; and of the care

⁴⁶ The passage of the Sophist alluded to is in p. 227, A. § 26.

⁴⁷ On the phrase, *τὰς τῆς πόλεως ἡνίας*, Stalbaum refers to Aristoph. Eccl. 466, Eq. 1109, and Boissonad on Marin. p. 81.

⁴⁸ Instead of *καθαπτεῖ χρεῖος*, the sense evidently requires *καθάπτε του χρεῖους*. For *λόγος* is here "an account," not "a speech."

of foot-walking animals, the science of rearing the hornless race was especially cut off. But of this again, it is necessary to connect a part, not less than the triple, if any one is desirous of bringing it under one name, by calling it the science of tending an unmixed genius. But a section from this, which alone remains, and which rears men, as being a biped flock, is the part which has been just now explored, and is called, at one and the same time, the kingly and statesmanly kind.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Do you then, Socrates, think that this has been, as you say, really done well?

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That the thing proposed has been in every respect sufficiently discussed. Or has our investigation been particularly deficient in this very thing, that the account has been given in words, but not in all respects worked out to the end?

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. I will endeavour to explain to ourselves more clearly what I am thinking of.

Soc. jun. Say it.

Guest. There is then of many herdsmen's arts, that have appeared to us, one, the statesman's, and the guardianship of some one herd.

Soc. jun. There is.

Guest. This our discourse has defined to be neither the rearer of horses, nor of other animals, but to be the science of rearing men in common.

[11.] *Soc. jun.* It did so.

Guest. Now let us see what is the difference between all herdsmen and kings.

Soc. jun. What is it?

Guest. If any one of the rest,⁴⁹ possessing the name of another art, says and pretends to be the rearer in common of the herd, (what should we say)?⁵⁰

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. Just as if all merchants, and husbandmen, and pur-

⁴⁹ I confess I cannot understand τῶν ἄλλων here, nor τῆς ἀγέλης just afterwards; although Stalbaum says the sense is plain from what follows.

⁵⁰ These words Taylor added from Ficinus, "quid dicendum?"

veyors of food, and besides these, teachers of gymnastics, and the genus of physicians, should, you know that⁵¹ by their speeches oppose altogether the herdsmen of the human race, whom we have called statesmen, and assert that it is their care to rear men, and not only men herded together, but even the rulers themselves—

Soc. jun. Would they not rightly say?

Guest. Perhaps so. And we will consider this too. We know that no one will contend with a herdsman about things of this kind; since he is himself the rearer, himself the physician, and himself, as it were, the bridesman (of the herd), and is alone skilled in the midwife's art respecting the birth and delivery of the produce.⁵² No one, besides, is better able, by such sport and music as cattle can, by their nature, share in, to console and soothe, and render gentle, both with instruments and the naked mouth, handling in the best way the music of his flock.⁵³ And the same may be said of other herdsmen. Or may it not?

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. How then will our discourse respecting a king appear to be right and entire, when we place him alone, as the herdsman and rearer of the human herd, selecting him alone out of ten thousand others contending with him?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. Did we not then a little before very properly fear, when we suspected, lest we should only speak of a certain figure of a king, and not perfectly work out the statesman, until by taking away those, who were diffused around him, and laid claim to a fellow-rearing, and, by separating him from them, we should exhibit him alone and pure?

Soc. jun. Most rightly (did we fear).

Guest. This then, Socrates, must be done by us, unless we are about to bring disgrace upon our discourse at its end.

⁵¹ The phrase, οἷός ἐστι, is here manifestly absurd, and omitted by Ficinus. Two MSS. read, οἷός ἐστι, from which nothing is to be gained.

⁵² Instead of τῶν γιννομένων one would prefer τῶν ἐπ'αυτοῖς γιννομένων, "of the increasing produce."

⁵³ That Plato thus repeated μουσικὴν after the preceding μουσικῆς, I for one will never believe; and still less that any Greek author would have written, εἴην τῆς κοίμνης μουσικῆν. The whole passage has been corrupted by design rather than accident, and might perhaps be emended by a critic, conversant with the customs of ancient times.

Soc. jun. But this at least must by no means be done.

12.] *Guest.* We must then march by another road again from another beginning.

Soc. jun. By what road?

Guest. By mixing up almost some merriment. For it is requisite to make use of the prolix portion of a long story, and, as regards what still remains, to take away, as we did before, always a part from a part, till we arrive at the summit of the inquiry. Must we not do so?

Soc. jun. Certainly.

Guest. Give then, as children do, entirely your attention to my story; (for)⁵⁴ you are not altogether flying from many years⁵⁵ of merriment.

Soc. jun. Relate it.

Guest. Of the things then said of old, there have been, and will be still, many others (preserved), and the prodigy likewise relating to the reported contests between Atreus and Thyestes. For you have surely heard and remember what is then said to have happened.

Soc. jun. Perhaps you mean the prodigy respecting the golden ewe.

Guest. By no means; but respecting the change in the rising and setting of the sun, and of the other constellations, how that they set then at the very place from whence they now rise, and rose from the opposite one;⁵⁶ and that the deity gave a testimony in favour of Atreus, and changed (the heavens)⁵⁷ into the present figure.

Soc. jun. This too is reported.

Guest. And we have likewise heard from many of the kingdom over which Kronos (Saturn) ruled.

Soc. jun. We have from very many.

⁵⁴ Ficinus alone has "enim," required to supply the asyndeton.

⁵⁵ Instead of *ἐτη*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἔτη*, "words;" and in lieu of *πολλά*, Stalbaum would read *πολὺ*: the error is in *πάντως* rather, which it would not be difficult to correct.

⁵⁶ In this solution of the story is to be found the germ of the notion of modern geologists, that the position of the poles of the earth has been changed at some very remote period.

⁵⁷ Ficinus has "in hanc cœli figuram mutavit," which is more intelligible than the Greek *μετέβαλεν αὐτὸ* (one MS. *αὐτὸν*) *ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν σχῆμα*: unless we read *τὸ νῦν οὐνοῦ* (i. e. *οὐρανοῦ*). As regards the story Stalbaum refers to Orest. 800 and 989. Add. Iph. T. 187.

Guest. And that the men of former times were produced earth-born, and not begotten from each other?⁵⁸

Soc. jun. This too is one of the things said of old.

Guest. All these things then arose from the same circumstance, and in addition to these ten thousand others, and still more wonderful. But, through the length of time, some of them have become extinct, and others are told in a dispersed manner, separate from each other. But that which is the cause of this to all these, no person has told as yet; and it must be now told; for being told it will be something conspicuous for showing forth the king.

[13.] *Soc. jun.* You have spoken most beautifully. Say on then, and omit nothing.

Guest. Hear, then. This universe the deity does at one time conduct himself, as it proceeds, and with it rolls on; but at another leaves it, when its revolutions shall have received the measure of the fitting time; and it is then brought back again of its own accord to a contrary state, being a thing of life, and having a share of intelligence from him, who put it together at its outset. Now this movement backwards has been of necessity implanted in it through this.

Soc. jun. Through what?

Guest. To subsist always according to the same, and in a similar manner, and to be the same, belongs to the most divine of all things alone. But the nature of body is not of this order. But that, which we have called heaven and the world, has a share in many and blessed (gifts) from the producing (cause); moreover,⁵⁹ it has had a share of body; from whence it cannot be entirely without a share of change; nevertheless, according to its power it is moved as much as possible in the same, and according to the same, by one impetus. Hence it is allotted a revolving movement, as being the smallest change in its motion. But scarcely any thing is able to turn itself by itself, except that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And it is not lawful for this to move at one time in one way, and at another in a contrary way. From all this then we must say,

⁵⁸ This is a strange expression; as if both children were begotten by their parents, and parents by their children. Plato wrote, *ἐξ ἑκαλλήλων*—“from one after the other in succession,” and similarly in § 15.

⁵⁹ I confess I do not understand *ἀνά οὐν ἐν*—*γε*—a combination of particles not to be found, I suspect, elsewhere.

that the world does not always cause itself to revolve, nor that the whole is always made by the deity to revolve in two and contrary revolutions: nor, again, that some two deities, whose thoughts are contrary to each other, cause it to revolve; but what has been said just now, and remains alone, that at one time it is conducted by another divine cause, possessing the power to live again, and receiving an immortality prepared by the demiurgus; but that at another time, when it is let loose, it proceeds itself by itself; and, after being thus let loose for such⁶⁰ a time as to perform back again many myriads of revolutions, it proceeds by its being of the greatest size, and most equally balanced, to move at the smallest foot.⁶¹

Soc. jun. All that you have gone through appears to be said very reasonably indeed.

[14.] *Guest.* Reasoning then from what has been said already, let us think together on the circumstance, which we stated was the cause of all these wonderful doings. For it is this very thing.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That the movement of the universe is at one time carried on, as it is at present, in a circle, and at another time in the contrary direction.

Soc. jun. How is this?

Guest. We must consider this change of motion to be the greatest and most perfect of all the revolutions, relating to the heavenly bodies.

Soc. jun. It is likely.

Guest. It is proper then to think that the greatest changes happen at that time to us, who are living within the universe.

Soc. jun. And this too is likely.

⁶⁰ I have with Sauppe united *ροσούρον* to *καρπὸν*, despite the opposition of Stalbaum, who might have found in Ficinus "tali tempore."

⁶¹ I am quite at a loss in the words *ἐνὶ μικροτάτῳ βαῖνον ποδὸς ἵναι*. For though *βῆ ἵναι* is constantly found in Homer, yet *βαίνει* is never, I believe, united to *ἵναι*. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἐνὶ μικροτάτῳ βῆμα οὐνοῦ πόλιν ἵναι*, i. e. "to send the poles of heaven on the shortest march." For there would thus be an allusion to the theory, that the whole system of the universe had a progressive movement in space, but of so slow a kind, that it took about 120,000 years to complete the great year, when every thing was brought back to the point from whence the system first started. Respecting the loss or confusion of *οὐρανοῦ πόλιν*, I have written something worth reading on *Æsch. Suppl.* 24, and I could now add not a little more equally valuable.

Guest. But do we not know that the nature of animals sustains with difficulty changes great, numerous, and of all kinds?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Hence the greatest destruction of other animals necessarily takes place at that time, and that of the human race only some small portion remains. And to these many other wonderful and novel circumstances happen at the same time; but this is the greatest, and follows that revolution of the universe at that period, when a turn occurs contrary to the present state of things.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. The period of life, which each animal then had, this was first arrested in all; and all that was mortal ceased to be seen advancing to old age, but changing back to the contrary, grew, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white hairs too of older people became black, and the cheeks of those that had beards becoming smooth, brought back each person to the past blooming period of life. The bodies likewise of such as were in manhood's prime, becoming smoother and smaller each day and night, returned again to the nature of a newly-born child, and were assimilated to this nature, both in soul and body; and thenceforth wasting away, disappeared in reality entirely;⁶² and the corpses of those, who died at that time through violence, did, through undergoing the self-same fate, become in a manner unseen, and in a few days, quite putrid.⁶²

[15.] *Soc. jun.* But what was then, O guest, the generation of animals, and in what manner were they produced from each other?

Guest. It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was no generation of one thing from another; but, it is said, there was once an earth-born race; this was at that period restored back again from out the earth; and the tradition of it was remembered by our first progenitors, who were close upon the revolution (that reached to) the period next in order, and were

^{62—62} Ficinus offers a remarkable variation here. "*Cadavera præterea illorum, qui cælestis mutatione vertiginis subito corruerunt, idem patiuntur, et simili retrogressionem clam ac brevi putrescunt,*" and such in fact is what the context requires; where the mention of violence in the present Greek text is scarcely intelligible.

born at the beginning of the present state of things. For they became the heralds to us of those accounts, which are at present disbelieved improperly by the multitude. For I think we ought to reflect together on the consequence. For from the fact of old men coming to the nature of boys, it follows,⁶³ ⁶⁴that of such as were dead, but (not) laid in the earth, the corpses would be put together and made to revive⁶⁴ by the turn of production revolving in a contrary direction; and that the earth-born race would, according to this method⁶³ being necessarily produced, have their name and speech, except such as a deity conveyed (elsewhere), or invested with another fate.⁶⁶

Soc. jun. This really follows from what has been said above. But with respect to the life, which you say was under the rule of Kronos (Saturn), did it subsist in those revolutions, or in these? For it is evident that the change in the position of the stars and the sun coincides with both these revolutions.

Guest. You have followed well the discourse. But, in answer to your question respecting all things being produced spontaneously for mankind, this by no means is the case in the present revolution; but it occurred in the former. For then the deity was at first the ruler and guardian of the whole revolving circle; just as now the parts of the world are locally distributed by gods ruling in the very same way. Divine dæmons, too, had a share, after the manner of shepherds, in animals according to genera and herds, each being sufficient for all things pertaining to the several particulars over which

⁶³ Instead of *ιχόμενον*, Stalbaum suggests *ιπόμενον*, to which he was probably led by "consonum" in Ficinus, translated by Taylor, "it follows."

⁶⁴⁻⁶⁴ I have translated this passage, as if the Greek were—*ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων μὲν, κειμένων δ' οὐκ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν νεκρὸς συνισταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους ἵσθαι*, instead of *ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων αὐτῶν, κειμένων δ' ἐν γῇ, πάλιν ἐκεῖ συνισταμένους—ἵσθαι*, words, I confess, beyond my comprehension.

⁶⁵ Heusde properly referred to this place the variation of *τρόπον* for *λόγον*, preserved by Eusebius just afterwards.

⁶⁶ The MSS. vary between *ἐκόμισε* and *ἐκόσμησε*. The MS. used by Ficinus united both, as shown by his version "in aliam sortem—trans-tulit vel exornavit." I have therefore introduced "elsewhere." For *ἄλλοις* might easily have dropt out before *ἐς ἄλλην*. I suspect, however, that Plato wrote *ἐς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν ἢ ἐκόμισεν*, i. e. "conveyed to some other fate or put to sleep:" where there is an allusion to the fates respectively of Prometheus and Typhæus.

he presided ; so that there was nothing of a wild nature, no eating of each other, no war, nor sedition of any kind ; and ten thousand other things might be stated, which follow upon such an arrangement. But what is said respecting the spontaneous life of these men, has been stated on this account. The deity himself tended them, and was their protector ; just as men now, being an animal more divine than others,⁶⁷ tend other races meaner than themselves ; and as he tended them, there were no forms of state or polity, nor a property in women and children ; for all these were restored to life from the earth, and had no recollection of former events.⁶⁸ But all such things were absent ; they had however fruit in abundance from oaks, and many other trees, not grown by land tilling, but given spontaneously by the earth. They lived, too, for the most part naked, upon no strewed couch, and in the open air ; for the temperament of the seasons was not painful to them ; theirs were soft beds of grass, springing up without grudging from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you hear what was the life of men under Kronos (Saturn) : but you, being present yourself, perceive what is life now, which is said to be under Zeus (Jupiter). But are you able and willing likewise to judge which of these is the happier ?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. Do you wish then that I should, after a fashion, judge for you ?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

[16.] *Guest.* If then those nurtured by Kronos (Saturn), when they had so much leisure and the power to converse not only with men, but with brutes likewise, had used all these means for the purposes of philosophy, associating with brutes and with each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a perceptive power of its own, in what respect it differed from the rest for the collecting together of prudence, it is easy to judge that the men of that time were ten thousand-fold happier than those of the present. But if, being filled to satiety with meats

⁶⁷ I have adopted *ἱρίων*, found in one MS., in preference to *ἱρίων*.

⁶⁸ On the other hand Plato, in the *Meno* and *Phædo*, says that man's present knowledge is only the recollection of what the soul knew in a previous state of existence, according to the Pythagorean doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*.

and drinks, they discoursed with each other, and with brutes, in fables⁶⁹ such as are now told of them, it is easy, according to my opinion, to prove the very same⁷⁰ thing. Let us, however, dismiss this question, until some one shall appear sufficient to point out whether the men of that time had any desire for science and the need of discourse. But let us now state for what reason we have raised up the fable, in order that we may after this proceed onwards.⁷¹ For when the time of all these was completed, and it was necessary for a change to take place, and moreover when the whole race on earth was already consumed, ⁷²and every soul had given up its generations, and as many seeds as were ordained for each soul, it having fallen on the earth,⁷³—then did the governor of the universe, releasing himself, as it were, from the handle of a rudder, depart to

⁶⁹ Here is evidently an allusion to the *Æsopic Fables*, which I have shown in *The Surplice*, No. 35, July, 1846, and foll., to have been written by Socrates; to which Plato has thus properly paid no mean a compliment; for they were above all praise; although they are found at present in only a mutilated form, like some of the finest temples of former times.

⁷⁰ I have translated as if the Greek were *ταὐτό*, not *τοῦτο*.

⁷¹ Ficinus has a remarkable variation—"ut sequentia cum anteceden-
tibus jungamus," as if his MS. read—*ἵνα τοῖς πρόσθεν τὰ ὀπίσω συνειρωμην*. For *τὰ ὀπίσω* means the future. Hesych. *Ὀπίσω*—*τὸ μίλλον*. See Elmsley on Soph. CEd. T. 490.

^{72, 73} On this mass of nonsense Stalbaum has written a lengthy note, where he vainly endeavours to explain what is absurd, and still more vainly to correct what is corrupt. Plato wrote, I suspect, something to this effect—*πάσας αὖ ἐκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς ἐς τὰς γενέσεις ὑποειδυνκίας, ὅσα τε ἦν ἐκάστη προσταχθίνα, τοσαῦτα αὐγῆς σπέρματα ἀπὸ τοῦ ὦ ἀγούσης*—i. e. "each soul having again secretly entered into all generations, and bringing from the sun seeds of light, as many as were ordained for each generation—" This would be intelligible to those at least, who know that the word *ἡλίον* is often expressed by the symbol *☉*, as shown by Schæfer on Aristoph. Plut. Epimetr. p. xlii., and Gaisford on Hesiod. Theogon. 709, and of myself on *Æsch. Eum. 2*: while they who remember the *σπέρμα πυρὸς* of Homer, and the "*semina flammæ*" of Virgil, will be ready to receive here *αὐγῆς σπέρματα*. The fact is, that Plato alluded to the story of Prometheus bringing fire from heaven, which he obtained from a ferule applied to the wheel of the chariot of the Sun, as we learn from Servius on Virgil. Bucol. vi. 42. But as the light of the soul is an immaterial light, and arising from reflexion, it would be said more correctly to be derived from the Moon, which shines itself by a reflected light; and hence we ought to read perhaps, *αὐγῆς σπέρματα ἀπὸ τῆς (ἀγούσης)*. For Dobree has shown, on Photius, p. 699, that, instead of *Σελήνη*, the symbol *☾* is found in MSS.; and hence in Suid. *Ἐπη-κυλημίνα*—*Θιοειδῆ*, where Toup wished to read *μηνοειδῆ*, we must write what Gaisford failed to see, *(ιοειδῆ, i. e. Σιληνοειδῆ)*.

his own place of a look-out; and then Fate and implanted Desire again caused the world to revolve. All the gods then, who govern locally, in conjunction with the greatest divinity, knowing what was now taking place, again deprived the parts of the world of their providential care. But the world having undergone a change in its revolution, conflicting⁷³ and rushing with the contrary impulse of a beginning and end, and producing in itself a mighty concussion, worked out again another destruction of all kinds of animals. After this, when a sufficient time had gone on, the world ceasing from tumult, confusion, and concussions, did, taking advantage of a calm, proceed, arranged most beautifully⁷⁴ in its usual course, possessing a guardianship and dominion itself over the things in itself and belonging to itself; (and) remembering, to the utmost of its power, the instructions of the demiurgus and father. Now at the commencement it performed this duty more carefully, but at the end more obtusely. But the cause of this is in the corporeal form of the temperature, which had grown up⁷⁵ with its former nature; since it partook of much disorder,⁷⁶ before it arrived at its present orderly arrangement. For from him, who put it together, it obtained every good; but from its previous habit, whatever harshness and injustice exist in heaven, these it does both possess itself from that former habit, and introduce likewise into animals. In conjunction then with the ruler, the world, when nourishing the animals within it, brings forth evil of a small kind, but good of a large; but separated from him, it conducts all things beautifully during the time nearest to his departure; but as time goes on, and oblivion comes on it, the circumstance of its former unfitness domineers with greater force; and at the concluding period of time it bursts out into the full flower of wrong;⁷⁷ and (producing) only a little good,

⁷³ I confess I cannot understand *ξυμβάλλον* thus standing by itself. Ficinus has omitted the word entirely. His version is, "Mundus deinde contraria principii finisque sese agitatione re reflectens."

⁷⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *κάλλιστα κοσμούμενος*, not *κατακοσμούμενος*. Ficinus has "in ordine debito constitutus."

⁷⁵ So Stalbaum understands *ξύντροπον*. Ficinus has "priscae naturæ fomes." He therefore found some other word in his MS.

⁷⁶ Ficinus, "Nam valde deforme erat et ordinis expers," as if his MS. read *ἀμορφίας μετήχον καὶ ἀταξίας*—On *ἀμορφία*, see my note on Prom. 504.

⁷⁷ Stalbaum says correctly, that *ἔξανθεῖν* is applied to a disorder or

but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary to good, it arrives at the danger of both its own destruction, and of the things within it. Hence the god, who arranged the world, perceiving it in difficulties, and anxious lest, being thus tempest-tost, it should be thoroughly loosened by the hurly-burly, and be plunged into the infinite sea⁷⁸ of dissimilitude, again seats himself at the helm; and whatever is labouring and loosened⁷⁹ in its own former period, he having turned arranges, and by putting straight, renders the world free from death and old age. This then is (one) end of the whole story. But this is sufficient to show, from what has been said, the nature of a king to such, as lay hold of the discourse. For the world having been again turned to the present path of generation, its age was again stopped, and it imparted novel things, the contrary to what it had done formerly. For animals, wanting but little to be through their small size annihilated, are increased; and hoary bodies recently born from the earth, dying again, descend into the earth; and all other things are changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe. The imitation, likewise, of conception, generation, and nourishing, followed all things from necessity. For it was no longer possible for an animal to be produced in the earth, through the different things, which compose it; but, as the world was ordained to be the absolute ruler of its own progress, so after the

evil that bursts out into full strength; and aptly compares *Æsch. Pers.* 821, ὕβρις γὰρ ἐξανθούσ' ἐάρπωσε στάχυν Ἀρης, and *Plutarch Thes.*, § 6, ἐξηθήσαν αἱ κακίαι καὶ ἀνεπράγησαν. *Ficinus*, mistaking the meaning, rendered it "deflorescit."

⁷⁸ This is the translation of *Taylor*, who doubtless wished to read *πόντον* for *τόπον*: and so too *Stalb.* For the whole description is taken from a ship in a storm. On the metaphorical use of *πόντος*, see *Monk* on *Hippol.* 824.

⁷⁹ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is as unintelligible as the English. The natural flow of ideas seems to require something of this kind—*τὰ νοσήσαντα ἀκίται, λυθίντα τε συνδῆι, καὶ στρεφθίντα ἱκανοθῶν, τῇ καθ' αὐτὸν προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ κοσμίῃ τε καὶ ἀγῆρων αὐτὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον ἀπεργάζεται*, i. e. "he repairs what has become disordered, and binds together what has become loosened, and making straight again what has become bent, he arranges it according to its former revolution under himself, and renders it free from old age and death." With respect to *ἀκίται*, that verb is properly applied to repairing a shattered ship, with which the world is here compared. It would be, however, hazardous to assert, that *Plato* did write so in reality. For if he did, the passage must have been corrupted antecedent to the time of *Eusebius*, who in *Præpar. Evang.* xi. 34, quotes it nearly as it is found here.

same manner its parts also were destined by a similar guidance to spring forth,⁸⁰ generate, and nourish, as far as they were able. But we have now arrived at the very question for the sake of which the whole of our discourse has proceeded. For, with respect to other beasts, many circumstances, and of a prolix nature, might be gone through; such as, from what each is, and through what cause they have been changed; but those relating to man are shorter, and more to our purpose. For mankind having become destitute of the guardian care of the dæmon, who possesses and tends us, while the majority of animals, that were naturally cruel, have on the other hand become savage, men, now weak, and without a guard, were torn in pieces by such animals; and, in those earliest times, they were without inventions and arts; for after the earth had failed in its spontaneous food, they did not know how to procure it, through no want having previously compelled them (to get it). From all these causes they were in the greatest difficulties. Hence, the old-mentioned gifts were given us by gods, together with the necessary instruction and erudition;⁸¹ fire from Prometheus, and arts from Hephæstus (Vulcan), and his fellow-artist (Pallas); on the other hand, seeds and plants were given by others, and all such things as furnish a support for human life, were produced from these; since, as was stated just now, the guardian care of the gods had deserted mankind; and it became requisite for men to have the conduct and care of themselves, in the same manner as the whole world; in the imitating and following which, through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born, now in this way, and now in that. Let this then be the end of the story. But we will make it useful for discovering how far we have erred in defining the characters of a king and statesman in our previous discourse.

[17.] *Soc. jun.* In what respect then, and how far, do you say has there been an error?

⁸⁰ Instead of *φύειν* two MSS. have *φύρειν*. They should have read *κύειν*, "to conceive," as shown by *κνήσεως καὶ γεννήσεως καὶ τροφῆς*, just above.

⁸¹ In what way *διδασχῇ* differs from *παιδείσεως*, neither myself nor any one else could tell. Hence I suspect *καὶ παιδείσεως* is an explanation merely of *διδασχῆς*, or else those letters conceal some words not difficult to elicit, relating to the givers of good things.

Guest. ⁸²Partly less, and partly in a very generous manner, and in a greater degree, and more than before.⁸³

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. Because, when we were asked respecting a king and a statesman belonging to the present revolution and generation, we spoke of a person tending a human herd of the contrary period, and this too a god, and not a man. In this then we transgressed very much. But when we exhibited him as the ruler of the whole state, we did not say in what manner (he was so); and in this respect the truth was told, but not the whole (truth), nor was it clearly enunciated; hence we erred less in this case than in that.

Soc. jun. True.

Guest. We ought, then, it seems, to expect that the statesman will have been completely described by us, when we shall have defined the manner of governing a state.

Soc. jun. Very well.

Guest. On this account we have brought forward the story, in order that (one)⁸³ might show, with respect to the herdtending, not only that all contend about it with the person now sought for; but that we might more clearly perceive him, whom alone it is fitting, according to the pattern of shepherds and neat-herds, to have the tending of the human herd, and alone worthy to be called by that name.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine shepherd is still greater than becomes a king; and that the statesmen now existing here are much more like subjects in their nature, and take more nearly a share in discipline and nurture.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. But they will have to be investigated neither more nor less, whether they are naturally in this position or in that.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Let us then turn back again. For we said, that

⁸²⁻⁸³ Ficinus has, "Partim minus, partim generosius magisque, et plus quam tunc erratum," which is a far more elegant collocation of words than the Greek is at present.

⁸³ I have inserted "one" answering to *τις*, which has evidently dropt out after *ἐνδείκναιτο*: that would otherwise want its nominative.

there was a self-commanding art respecting animals, which took care of them, not privately, but in common; and this art we then straightway called the herd-tending art. Do you recollect?

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. In this then we erred. For we have not by any means laid hold of the statesman, nor given him a name; but as regards the appellation, it has lain hid from and escaped us.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. To tend the several kinds of herds belongs to all other herdsmen; but we have not given a fitting name to the statesman, it being requisite for him to bear one of those common to all.

Soc. jun. You speak the truth, if indeed there happens to be (a common one).⁸⁴

Guest. But how is it not possible to apply the word healing, as something common to all, neither tending nor any other occupation being stated? and if⁸⁵ it is lawful for persons giving a name (to an art) to wrap it up (in words like) herd-tending, or healing in any way, as being applicable generally, (it is lawful to wrap up) the word statesman likewise⁸⁵ together with others, especially since reason shows that this should (be done)?

[18.] *Soc. jun.* Right. But after this in what manner would the division be made?

Guest. In the same manner, as we before divided the herd-tending art for the walking and wingless⁸⁶ tribes, and for the unmixed and hornless, in the very same manner by dividing the herd-tending, we shall have comprehended both the present kingly rule and that in the time of Kronos (Saturn) similarly in our discourse.

⁸⁴ Heusde was the first to see that something was wanting after εἶπερ ἐπύχανί γε δν. But he did not see that Plato wrote—γε κοινόν δν. Stalbaum vainly, as usual, defends the old reading.

⁸⁵⁻⁸⁶ Such seems to be the meaning which Plato wished to convey. But to get at it we must read ἀλλ' εἰ for ἀλλ' ἢ—which Bekker found in some MSS. in lieu of ἀλλήν—and to repeat ἐξῆν before καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν—For when a word is thus repeated, it is generally followed by καὶ, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 156 and 281, and I could now add a host of similar passages.

⁸⁶ Ficinus has "et volatiliūm," which leads, as Stephens remarks, to πτηνοῖς.

Soc. jun. It appears so. But I am seeking what (will be) after this.⁸⁷

Guest. It is plain that if the word herd-tending had been thus spoken, no one would have contended with us that there is no idea whatever of attention in it; as it was then justly contended, that there is no art amongst us which deserves the appellation of tending; and that if there were, it belongs to many things prior and preferable to any thing pertaining to kings.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. ⁸⁸ But no other art would be willing to say that it is more and before kingly rule, as a careful tending of the whole of human fellowship, and of men taken generally.⁸⁸

Soc. jun. You say rightly.

Guest. But after this, Socrates, do you perceive that an error has been made frequently towards the very end?

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. In this, that though we have conceived that there is a certain rearing art of a biped herd, we ought not any more to have straightway called it, as if entirely complete, the art of the king and statesman.

Soc. jun. Why not?

Guest. In the first place, as we said, we (ought) to have suited the name more to guardianship than to nutriment: and in the next place, to make a division in this (guardianship). For it will have no small divisions.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. In that we can surely place apart the divine shepherd, and the human guardian.

Soc. jun. Right.

⁸⁷ Ficinus has merely "Videtur; sed quid tum?"

⁸⁸—⁸⁸ Such according to Stalbaum is the version of the Greek, where he would adopt *πρωτέρα*, found in Stobæus, ed. Trincavell., in lieu of *πρωτέρα*, and support *μᾶλλον καὶ πρωτέρα* by *μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφροδρωτέρα* in Phileb. p. 41, C. But the syntax and the sense appear to me equally objectionable. Instead, then, of *ἰθελήσειεν ἑτέρα μᾶλλον καὶ τραυτέρα* I should prefer—*ἰθελήσειεν εὐνουστέρα μᾶλλον καὶ πρωτέρα*, i. e. "more kindly disposed and more mild." Ficinus has—"Nulla vero ars alia de hoc contendit, quasi sit totius humanæ communionis curatio major mitiorque regia," thus omitting entirely the concluding words of the speech, either because they were not in his MS., or because, like myself, he could not understand them.

Guest. And again it is necessary to cut into two the distributed⁸⁹ guardianship.

Soc. jun. Into what?

Guest. Into the violent and the voluntary.

Soc. jun. What then?

Guest. By erring before in this more stupidly than was fitting, we put down together a king and a tyrant as the same; although they are most dissimilar both in themselves and in their form of government respectively.

Soc. jun. True.

Guest. Now therefore, again correcting ourselves, let us, as I have already said, divide human guardianship into the violent and the voluntary.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. And calling the guardianship by the violent tyrannic, but the voluntary,⁹⁰ [and the herd-tending of voluntary biped animals,]⁹⁰ statesmanship, let us show, that he who possesses this [art and]⁹¹ guardianship is truly a king and a statesman.

[19.] *Soc. jun.* And thus the demonstration, O guest, respecting the statesman, is very like to appear to us as being perfect.

Guest. This would be well for us, Socrates. But it is requisite that this should appear not only to you, but likewise to me, in common with you. At present, however, the king appears to me not to possess as yet a perfect figure; but just as statuary, who by hastening their work sometimes unseasonably, do, through introducing more and greater things than are fitting, retard it; so have we at present, in order that we might show both quickly and splendidly, that we

⁸⁹ As ἀπονημεθεῖσαν could hardly stand here by itself, Ficinus has correctly supplied "curationem item humanam in duo," which leads at once to τὴν ἀνὴν ἀπονημεθεῖσαν, where ἀνὴν is the perpetual abbreviation of ἀνθρωπίνην, as I have shown in Append. ad Troad. p. 160. This introduction of ἀνθρωπίνην is plainly confirmed by what follows just after, τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμελητικὴν δίχα διαιρώμεθα.

⁹⁰⁻⁹⁰ All the words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation; or else something has been lost after the preceding τῶν βαιῶν, to preserve the balance of the two sentences; which leads to τὴν μὲν—τῶν βαιῶν, and τὴν δὲ τῶν ἰκουσίων.

⁹¹ Here again is another interpolation

erred in the former part of our digression, through thinking that great patterns should be employed in the case of a king, have brought in a marvellous mass of a myth, and been compelled to use a greater portion of it than was proper. On this account, we have made a rather prolix demonstration, and have not entirely finished the fable. But our discourse really appears somewhat like an animal, to have its outline defined sufficiently, but to have not received the distinctness given by pigments, and the mixture of colours. But it is more becoming to exhibit every animal by a description, to such as are able to follow the account,⁹² than by painting, and all the work of hand; but to other persons through works of the hand.

Soc. jun. This indeed (is said rightly): but show me why you say you have not yet spoken sufficiently.

Guest. It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great things sufficiently, without using patterns. For each of us appear to know all things as in a night-dream, and again to be ignorant of all things according to a day-dream.⁹³

Soc. jun. How said you this?

Guest. We appear in the present case to have mooted very absurdly the circumstance relating to the knowledge (which is) in us.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. The pattern, O blessed one, has required itself again a pattern.

Soc. jun. What? Tell me, and do not, on my account at least, hesitate.

[20.] *Guest.* I must speak, since you are ready to follow. For we know, that children know their letters.

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. That they understand sufficiently each of the letters in the shortest and easiest syllables, and are able to speak the truth concerning them.

⁹² I have translated this passage as if *καί* (or rather *γε*) *λόγῳ* were inserted between *δυναμίνοις* and *ἰπεσθαί*. For *λίξει καὶ λόγῳ* could not be thus united, nor could *ἰπομίνους* here dispense with its case.

⁹³ On the difference between *ὕπνῳ*, "a night-dream," and *ὕπαρ*, "a day-dream," applied respectively to the things of fancy and fact, see Blomfield on *Prom.* 495.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But, being on the other hand doubtful about those in other syllables, they say what is false in idea and word.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Is it not then the easiest and the best thing to lead them thus to what is not yet known?

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. By first leading them back to those things, in which they had correct ideas respecting those very same matters; and after leading them, to place before them things not yet known; and by comparing them together, to show that there is the same likeness⁹⁴ and nature in both the combinations, till the things conceived, having been compared with all the unknown, are shown correctly; and, after being shown and becoming thus patterns, cause each one of all the letters in all the syllables to be called one different, and another the same, as being always under the same circumstances, different and the same (respectively).

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. This then we sufficiently comprehend, that the production of a pattern then takes place, when that, which is the same, is, in the case of another thing placed apart, rightly conceived by opinion, and being brought together to it, produces one true opinion respecting either, as it did about both.

Soc. jun. It appears so.

Guest. Shall we then wonder, if our soul, suffering naturally the same thing respecting the elements of all things, does at one time stand firm in certain points under the influence of truth respecting each individual thing, and at another time fluctuates in other points respecting all things? and that when, (as regards) some (elements) of comminglings, it thinks rightly, it should somehow or another again be ignorant of these very same things, when they are transferred to long and difficult syllable-like unions of things?⁹⁵

⁹⁴ In lieu of *τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν*, where there is a combination of words at variance with common sense, Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ καὶ ὁμοιοτάτην φύσιν*, i. e. "a nature the same or very similar."

⁹⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek; out of which the reader is left to make what sense he can. There is evidently something wanting in the first clause to preserve the balance of the sentence in the second.

Soc. jun. There is nothing wonderful in this.

Guest. But ⁹⁶ how, my friend, can any one, beginning from false opinion, arrive at even a small portion of truth, and thus acquire wisdom?

Soc. jun. Nearly not at all.

Guest. If then these things are naturally in this way, you and I shall not in any respect overdo it, if, by first endeavouring to perceive the nature of the whole pattern in some other small and partial one, and after this, ⁹⁷ by transferring to the nature of a king, which is the greatest of all patterns, the same species, from lesser things from some quarter, we shall be about to endeavour again, through a pattern, to know by art the care of state affairs, ⁹⁷ so that there may be a day-dream instead of a night one.

Soc. jun. Perfectly right.

Guest. Again then let us take up the preceding reasoning, that since ten thousand persons contend with the kingly genus, respecting the guardianship of a state, it is requisite to separate all these, and to leave it by itself. And for this purpose we said we have need of some pattern.

Soc. jun. And very much so.

[21.] *Guest.* By producing then what pattern, which embraces an occupation similar to statesmanship, ⁹⁸ and is the smallest possible, ⁹⁸ could one sufficiently find the thing sought for? Are you, Socrates, willing, by Zeus, unless we have something else at hand, for us to choose at least the weaving

⁹⁶ Instead of πῶς γὰρ Stalbaum suggests πῶς ἄρ. Read πῶς δ' ἄρ.—

⁹⁷ Here again a literal English version of Stalbaum's Latin translation proves, if any thing can, the mass of nonsense to be found in the Greek; which I can neither construe nor correct, except by reading—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἰδόντες αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ βασιλῆως, μέγιστον ὄν, σχῆμα, διὰ παραλείψματος, ταῦτόν εἶδος ἀπ' ἱλαττόνων φέροντός ποθεν, ἐπιχειρῶμεν τὴν τῶν κατὰ πόλιν θεραπειαν τέχνην γνωρίζειν, ἵνα ὕπαρ ἀντ' ὀνειράτος ἡμῖν γίγνηται, i. e. "and after this taking the form itself of the king, as being the greatest, we should endeavour by a pattern, that brings from some quarter the same form from lesser things, to discover by art the care of the things that relate to a state, so that there may be a day-dream (of fact) instead of a night-one (of fiction)." To the change of μέλλοντες into ἰδόντες, I was led by finding in one MS. μέλοντες.

⁹⁸—⁹⁸ Instead of τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτικὴν πραγμάτων, which is here manifestly absurd, Ast correctly suggested—πολιτικῇ, which even Stalbaum is disposed to adopt. But even thus the passage is not correct. For Plato wrote μικρότατον μὲν, ἔχον ἔτι, as found in the MS. of Ficinus; who translates "exemplum exiguum quidem et—continens."

art? and this too not the whole, if it seems good; for, perhaps, the art relating to weaving of wool will suffice. For it may happen, that even this portion being chosen will witness to what we want (to show).

Soc. jun. For why should it not?

Guest. Why then have we not, as we did before, after cutting the parts, each of them separate, done the very same thing now in the case of the weaving art? and why, after passing over all things to the best of our power in the shortest manner possible, have we not come to what is useful at present?

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. I will make the digression itself an answer.

Soc. jun. You speak most excellently.

Guest. Of all the things which we fabricate and possess, some are for the sake of our doing something, and others are defences against our not suffering. And of these defences some are medicinal, both divine and human; others are protective. And of the protective, some are warlike implements, others (peaceful) defences. And of the (peaceful) defences, some are veils, others are to ward off heat and cold. And of those that ward off, some cover at a distance, others near. And of the near, some are extended under, others around. And of those extended around, some are cut as a whole piece, others put together. And of those put together, some are perforated, others are bound together, not perforated. And of those that are not perforated, some are composed of the fibres of the plants of the earth, others are hairy. And of the hairy, some are conglutinated by water and earth, others are connected themselves with themselves. Now to these defences and coverings, which are wrought from the things bound together, themselves with themselves, we give the name of dress. And let us call the art, which is especially conversant with dresses, dress-making, from the thing itself; in the same manner as we called above the art respecting a state, statesmanship. And let us say too, that the weaving art, so far as it weaves for the most part garments, differs in nothing but the name from the dress-making art; just as (we said) there, that the king-art (differed only nominally) from statesmanship.

Soc. jun. Most correctly.

Guest. After this let us reason (thus), that some one may

perhaps think that the weaving art relating to dresses has been thus defined sufficiently, he being unable to perceive that it is not yet distinguished from its proximate co-operators, but is separated from many other things of a kindred nature.

[22.] *Soc. jun.* Tell me what things of a kindred nature.

Guest. You have not followed what has been said, as it seems.⁹⁹ It appears, therefore, that we must return from the end to the beginning. For, if you understand affinity, we have now separated this from that, by separating the composition of coverings into things put under, and around.

Soc. jun. I understand you.

Guest. We have likewise separated every kind of manufacture from flax and hemp, and all such things as we just now described in the list of the fibres of plants. We also defined the art of making a felt-like substance, and the putting together by means of perforation and sewing, which for the most part pertains to the cobbler's art.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. We have also separated the care¹⁰⁰ bestowed on the cobbler's art relating to coverings cut in the whole piece, and of such as are employed in building, and in the whole of the carpenter's art, and in all others that are employed in stopping the flowing of water, and such arts too of (peaceful) defences as furnish works to be an impediment to thieving and to acts of violence, and which are employed about the production of obstacles and the fixing of doors, and are distributed as parts of the bolt-making art. We have likewise divided the armour-making art, which is a section of the great and varied power of defence-making. We also defined, in the very beginning, the whole art of quackery, which is conversant with medicines; and we left, so that we might seem (to be) the very art defensive against storms, of which we

⁹⁹ Instead of ὡς φαίνεαι, one would prefer, as Taylor translated, ὡς φαίνεται. But see Sophist, § 21, προσπειτς, ὡς φαίνεαι.

¹⁰⁰ The word *θεραπείαν* is properly omitted here by Ficinus. I suspect it ought to be inserted a little below after *μαγυστικῇν*, for it is applied to the art of medical quacks.

Of this nonsense Stalbaum has taken not the least notice. After *λαλοῦσμεν*, correct Greek would require ὡς δόξαμεν without *ἀν*. Ficinus has, "artem—quæ visa est illa esse, quam querimus," as if his MS. read, ἡ ἰδοῦσιν εἶναι αὐτῇ ἡ ζήτησις. Plato wrote, I suspect, ὡς δεικναιμεν αὐτῷ—for he goes on to show the weaving art.

are in search, and which produces woollen vestments, and is called the art of weaving.

Soc. jun. It seems so.

Guest. But this matter, O boy, has not been perfectly detailed. For he, who first engaged in the making of garments, appeared to act in a manner directly contrary to weaving.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. For the work of weaving is a certain knitting together.

Soc. jun. It is.

Guest. But the work (of the garment-maker) consists in loosening things put together, and felted together.

Soc. jun. What kind of work is this?

Guest. The work of the art of the wool-carder. Or shall we dare to call the art of wool-carding the weaving art, and a wool-carder a weaver?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. But if any one should call the art of making the warp and woof the weaving art, would he not assert a paradox, and give it a false name?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But whether shall we say that the whole of the fuller's and the mender's art contribute nothing to the attention to and care of garments? Or shall we call all these weaving arts?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. But all these contend with the power of the weaving art, respecting the care and the production of garments; attributing, indeed, to it the greatest part, but likewise assigning to themselves great portions of the same art.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Besides these, it further appears requisite, that the handicraft arts, relating to the instruments through which the works of the weaver are performed, should lay claim to be co-causes of all weaving.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. Whether then will our discourse about the weaving art, a part of which we have chosen, be sufficiently defined, if we lay it down that it is the most beautiful and the greatest of all the arts, which are employed about woollen garments? Or shall we thus, indeed, speak something of the truth, but

yet neither clearly nor perfectly, till we have separated all these arts from it?

Soc. jun. Correctly.

[23.] *Guest.* Must we not then after this so act, that, what we say, may proceed in an orderly series?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. In the first place then let us consider two arts, which exist about all things.

Soc. jun. What are they?

Guest. One is the co-cause of generation, and the other is the cause itself.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. Such arts, as do not fabricate the thing itself, but prepare instruments for the fabricating (arts), without the presence of which the proposed work could not be effected ² by each of the arts,³ these are co-causes: but those, which fabricate the thing itself, are causes.³

Soc. jun. This is reasonable.

Guest. In the next place, those arts which produce the distaff, and the shuttle, and such other instruments as contribute to the making of garments, all these are co-causes:⁴ but those which pay attention to and fabricate garments, causes.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. But of causes, it is reasonable to comprehend that portion of it⁵ especially, which pertains to washing and mending, and all the caring about these, since the adorning art is abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller's art.

Soc. jun. It will so.

Guest. Moreover, the carding and spinning, and all that relates to the making of the garment, of which we are detailing the parts, is one art, called by all persons the wool-working.

Soc. jun. How not?

¹⁻³ These words are omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently unnecessary.

² Hertelius, quoted by Stalbaum, would insert καλῶ, which he got from the version of Ficinus, "ut ita dixerim, nominamus—causas appellamus." Stalbaum says that by a kind of zeugma we are to understand θιασώμεθα, especially as Stobæus, who quotes this passage in Ecl. Eth. p. 380, does not acknowledge any verb here.

⁴ Here, too, Ficinus has "concausas nuncupemus."

⁵ I confess I do not understand the words—ροῦνταῦθα αὐτῆς μόριον, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them.

Guest. Of the wool-working there are two sections, and each of these are together naturally parts of two arts.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. The carding, and the half of that which uses the shuttle, and separates from each other whatever are placed together, all this in short is a part of the wool-working art; and there were two great parts as regards the whole, one commingling, and the other separating.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. Of the separating then, both the carding and all those just now mentioned are a part. For that, which in the case of the wool and thread is the separating art, takes place, after one manner with the shuttle, and after another with the hands, has the names which we have just now mentioned.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Again, let us take a part of the commingling, and of the wool-working contained in it; but let us pass by all that was there relating to the separating, and let us bisect the wool-working (art) together into the commingling and separating section.

Soc. jun. Let it be so divided.

Guest. We must then, Socrates, divide the commingling, and at the same time the wool-working, if we are about to comprehend sufficiently the proposed weaving art.

Soc. jun. It will be requisite.

Guest. It will indeed; and let us say, that one part of it is twisting, and the other complicating.

Soc. jun. Do I then understand you? For you appear to me to say that the working of the thread is twisting.

Guest. Not the working of this only, but likewise of the woof.⁶ Or shall we find any production of it which is not twisting?

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. Define also each of these: for perhaps the definition will be suitable.

Soc. jun. In what way?

Guest. In this. We say that of the operations of wool-

⁶ As I am not a learned weaver, and do not know the words in English corresponding to the Greek, I must refer the reader, who wishes for the fullest information, to Salmasius Exercitat. Plinian. p. 277, and Schneider on Scriptores de Re Rustic. T. iv. p. 364, quoted by Stalbaum.

carding, that which has been drawn out into length and possesses breadth, is a certain filament.

Soc. jun. We do.

Guest. And of this, when it is turned by the spindle, and becomes a solid thread, do thou call a stamen; but the art, which regulates it, let us say that this is stamen-weaving.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. But such fabrics as receive a loose twisting, and, by the infolding of the stamen through the dragging of the knapping process, acquire a moderate softness, of these we call what is spun the woof, but the art itself which presides over these, woof-spinning.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. And now that part of the weaving art, which we have brought forward, is obvious to every one. For, with respect to a part of the commingling art in wool-working, when it accomplishes that, which is woven by a straight-knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole of the thing woven we call a woollen garment, but the art (presiding) over it, weaving.

Soc. jun. Most right.

[24.] *Guest.* Be it so. But why then did we not immediately answer, that the weaving (art) is that which infolds the woof and the thread, instead of proceeding in a round-about way, and defining many things in vain?

Soc. jun. It does not appear to me, O guest, that of what has been said a single thing has been said in vain.

Guest. This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O blessed youth, it will appear so. But against such a disorder, should it hereafter by chance⁷ come upon you—⁸for nothing is wonderful⁸—hear a certain discourse, proper to be spoken about all such things as these.

Soc. jun. Only relate it.

Guest. Let us then in the first place look into the whole of excess and deficiency, in order that we may praise and blame

⁷ Here, as in § 8, n. 32, Stalbaum translates *πολλάκις* "by chance." This sense was first pointed out by Abresch in Dilucid. Thucyd. on § 13, and has been adopted by the generality of modern scholars.

⁸ This clause seems to be an explanation of the words *τὸ νόσημα τὸ τοιοῦτον*.

according to reason whatever is said on each occasion at greater length, or the contrary, than is becoming in disputations of this kind.

Soc. jun. It will be proper so to do.

Guest. Our discourse taking place on these points, would, I think, take place rightly.

Soc. jun. About what things?

Guest. About length and shortness, and the whole of excess and deficiency. For the art of measuring is conversant with all these.

Soc. jun. It is.

Guest. Let us divide it then into two parts. For it is necessary for that, to which we are hastening.

Soc. jun. Inform me how this division (is to be made).

Guest. Thus. One part according to the ideas relating in common to great and little, but the other part according to the necessary existence of production.

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. Does it not appear to you to be according to nature, that we ought to speak of the greater as being greater than nothing else but the lesser? and on the other hand of the lesser, as being lesser than the greater, but nothing else?

Soc. jun. To me it does.

Guest. But what, must we not say that, what surpasses the nature of moderation, and is surpassed by it, whether in words or actions, is, when produced in reality, that by which the good and bad of us differ the most from each other?

Soc. jun. It appears so.

Guest. These twofold existences then and judgments respecting the great and the small we must lay down; but not, as we just now said, with reference to each other only; but, as is just now said, we must speak of one as being referable^{*} to each other, but of the other (as referable) to moderation. Are we however willing to learn on what account this is requisite?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. If any one admits the nature of the greater (to

* After δειν Heindorf wished to insert εἶναι; and so does Stalbaum Schleiermacher conceived the passage to be imperfect. Hence it is evident he did not see what Plato meant to say; nor do I.

be referable)¹⁰ to nothing but the lesser, it will not be (referable) to moderation. Will it?

Soc. jun. (It will be) thus.

Guest. Shall we not then destroy the arts themselves, and all their works, according to this reasoning? And shall we not cause to disappear entirely the statesman's science, which we are now investigating, and that which is called the weaving art? For all such things as these guard against that, which is more or less than moderation, not as if it had no existence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in practice; and after this manner preserving moderation, they effect every thing beautiful and good.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. If then we cause to disappear the statesman's science, will not our subsequent search of king-science be without a road?

Soc. jun. Very much so.

Guest. Whether then, as in the Sophist, we compelled non-entity to exist,¹¹ after the discourse about it had fled from us in that direction, so now we shall compel the more and the less to become measured, not only with reference to each other, but likewise to the production of moderation? For no one can become indisputably a statesman, or be any person else, possessing a knowledge relating to actions, if this be not acknowledged.

Soc. jun. We ought then to do this even now as much as possible.

[25.] *Guest.* This, Socrates, is a still greater work than that; although we remember how great was its prolixity. But it is very just to put hypothetically something of this kind respecting them.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. That there will be a need of what has been just stated, for the demonstration of what is accurate respecting it.¹² But as regards the present question, this reasoning is

¹⁰ For the sake of perspicuity, Plato must, I think, have written, *ἴδου τις φύσιν εἶναι*—

¹¹ See Sophist, p. 240, C. § 53.

¹² Ficinus has, "ad sinceri ipsius absolutique ostensionem," which leads to *τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς ἐκιδούξιν*, instead of *τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ ἁκριβοῦς ἐκιδούξιν*. From the two we may elicit what Plato wrote, *τὴν*

shown, well and sufficiently, it appears to me, to assist us in a conspicuous manner, so that¹³ we must think all arts are to be measured according to something more and at the same time less, not only with reference to one another, but to the production likewise of moderation. For when this exists, they exist also; and when they exist, this exists also; but when either of these does not exist, neither of those will exist.

Soc. jun. This indeed is right. But what is there after this?

Guest. It is evident that we should divide the art of measuring, as has been said, into two parts; placing as one of its parts all those arts, which measure number, and length, and depth, and breadth, and thickness, with reference to the contrary; but placing as its other part, such arts as regard the moderate and the becoming, the seasonable and the fit, and all such as are separated from the extremes towards the middle (point).

Soc. jun. Each of these sections is great, and they differ much from each other.

Guest. That, Socrates, which many clever men, who think they are saying something wise, sometimes assert, when they say that the art of measuring is conversant with all generated natures, that very thing happens to be now asserted by us. For all things of art do after a certain manner partake of measure; but, in consequence of not being accustomed to divide according to species, these men immediately bring together to the same point things widely differing from each other, and consider them as similar; and, on the other hand, they do the very contrary to this, by not dividing according to their parts things that are different; although it is requisite that when any one first perceives the communion of many things, he should not desist till he perceives all the differences in it, which are placed in species; and again, when the all-various dissimilitudes in multitudes are perceived, he should not be able, through a feeling of disgust, to desist * (from this un-
περι αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς ἐπιδείξειν, "the demonstration of accuracy respecting it."

¹³ By taking *δοκεῖ μοι* parenthetically, and reading *ᾧστ'* for *ὥς*, and uniting *εἶναι* to *ἡγηρέον*, we can not only perceive what Plato wrote, but get rid of Stalbaum's lengthy and unsatisfactory annotation.

— Ficinus has alone "ab hac aspectus molestia,"—required by the sense.

pleasant view),* till, having enclosed all such things as are allied in one similitude, he invests them with the existence of a certain genus. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars, and concerning defect and excess. Let us only carefully observe, that two genera of the measuring art respecting these have been found out, and let us remember what we say they are.

[26.] *Soc. jun.* We will remember.

Guest. After this discussion, let us assume another respecting the objects of our search, and the whole mental exercise in discourses of this kind.

Soc. jun. What is it?

Guest. If any one should ask us respecting the assembling together¹⁴ of those that learn their letters, when one is asked of what letters does any word (consist), shall we say that the inquiry is then made for the sake of the one word proposed, rather than that of the party becoming more skilful as a grammarian, with respect to every thing placed before him.

Soc. jun. Evidently as regards every thing (of grammar).

Guest. Has the inquiry respecting a statesman been proposed by us more for the sake of the statesman himself, than for ourselves to become more skilful dialecticians on every point?

Soc. jun. This too is evident, that (it is for ourselves to become such) on every point.

Guest. No one indeed endued with intellect would be willing to hunt out the rationale of the art of weaving, for its own sake alone. ¹⁵ But I think it has lain hid from most men, that to some things, which are naturally easy to learn, there are certain similitudes to be perceived by the senses, which it is not difficult to make manifest, when any one wishes to point them out to some one inquiring a reason respecting a thing, not with trouble, but easily without a (long) speech.¹⁵ But of

¹⁴ I confess myself unable to understand *συνουσία*. Ficinus has "de puerorum—exercitatione." Perhaps Plato wrote *σύνεσις*, "the intelligence."

¹⁵—¹⁶ Such is the literal English version of the Latin one, given by Heusde in *Init. Philosoph. Platon.* vol. ii. P. 2, p. 119, which Stalbaum has thought proper to praise, without being able to understand it; for most assuredly *μη μετὰ πραγμάτων* could never mean "non egre et cum molestia." Equally unintelligible, to myself at least, is the representation of Ficinus, "non cum ipsis rebus, sed seorsum ratione facile demonstrare." Had Plato written *μη μετὰ πραγμάτων*, there would have

things the greatest and the most honoured, there is not any image made clear for men, by which being shown, he who wishes to fill the soul of the inquirer, will fill it sufficiently by suiting it to one of the senses. Hence it is requisite to practice oneself in being able to give and receive a reason for every thing. For incorporeal natures, being the most beautiful and the greatest, are exhibited by reason alone, and by nothing else; and it is for this that all has been said now. But the consideration of every particular occurs more easily in small things than in great.

Soc. jun. You speak most beautifully.

Guest. Let us then remember that all these things have been said by us on this account.

Soc. jun. On what?

Guest. Not the least on account of the disgust, which we have felt disgustingly ¹⁶through the prolix discourse about the weaving art, and about the revolution of the universe, and that of the sophist about the existence of a non-entity, conceiving it to have a rather (considerable) length. And on all these accounts we reproached ourselves, fearing lest we should speak superfluously in conjunction with prolixity.¹⁶ That we may not then suffer any thing of this kind again, think that on account of all these things our former remarks have been made.

Soc. jun. Be it so. Only say what is in order.¹⁷

Guest. I say then, it is requisite that both you and I should be mindful of what we have now said, ¹⁸and to give on each occasion blame and praise of brevity as well as prolixity ¹⁸

been less perhaps to object to, as being opposed to *ῥαδίως*. But even thus the whole passage still fails to present a perspicuous sense.

^{16—16} To avoid the insufferable tautology in *τῆς δυσχειρίας ἦν—ἀπειδείαμεθα δυσχερῶς*, Heindorf and Schleiermacher proposed to place *ἦν* after *ὕφαντικῇν*. They should have suggested *ὀλοσχερῶς*, explained by Suidas *ὀλοτελῶς*, or have omitted *δυσχερῶς*, with Ficinus. Unless it be said that *ὀλοσχερῶς* ought to be inserted between *περίεργα* and *λέγοιμεν*, in lieu of *καὶ μακρὰ*, which are plainly superfluous after *περίεργα*; but if altered into *ἡ καὶ μακρὰ*, they might be placed after *πλέον*, a little before. At least by such changes we can get rid of all that is objectionable in the present state of the Greek text.

¹⁷ Ficinus has "Dic age quæ restant," as if he had found in his MS. *μόνον τὸ λοιπόν*.

^{18—18} In the place of this mass of nonsense, Ficinus has what is at least intelligible in part—"ita ut non invicem prolixitates dijudicemus, sed secundum facultatis dimetiendi partem, quam supra diximus ad decori normam esse referendam." From whence it is evident that he did not

respecting what we may happen to be speaking, not judging of prolixities with reference to each other, but according to that part of the measuring art, which we then said we ought to remember relating to the becoming.¹⁸

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. But yet all things are not (to be referred) to this.
¹⁹ For we shall not be in need of prolixity, which, as regards pleasure, is not all fitting, unless as something of no importance:¹⁹ on the other hand, as regards the search of what has been proposed, in order that we may find it most easily, and quickly, reason bids us regard it as a secondary, not primary object; but to honour the most and in the first place, the method of being able²⁰ to divide according to species; and to pay a serious regard to a discourse, if when spoken at great length it renders the hearer more inventive; and not to take it ill; and in like manner, if it be shorter. And still, in addition to this, (reason says)²¹ that he who blames long discourses in meetings such as these, and who does not admit round-about periods, must not dismiss them altogether, rapidly, and immediately, by abusing merely what has been spoken at great length, but he must show moreover that he²² thinks that (words) being shorter²² would render persons coming together more fitted for dialectics, and more able to discover the demonstration by reason of existing things; but of the praise and blame of others relating to any other subjects we need take no thought, nor appear to hear at all such words as these. [27.] But of this there is enough, if so it seems likewise to you. Let us then again return to the statesman, introducing the pattern of the above-mentioned weaving art.

find in his MS. *μνησθαι*: in lieu of which Schleiermacher would read *ὅ τὸ ἐφάμεν δεῖν μετρίσθαι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον*, in allusion to what is stated in § 25, *μετροῦσι—πρὸς τὸ πρέπον*.

^{19—19} I confess I do not perceive what Plato is aiming at.

²⁰ Here again I am in the dark. I could have understood "the method of a person able to divide genera according to species" in Greek,—*τοῦ κατ' εἶδη ἑννατοῦ γίνη διαιρεῖν*.

²¹ Stalbaum says that the ellipse, "reason says," is to be supplied from the expression used a little before, *ὁ λόγος παραγγέλλει*. He got the idea from Ficinus' version, "eumque jubet."

^{22—22} Ficinus has "immo potius ostendere disputationem breviorē," which shows that *οἰεσθαι* was certainly omitted in his MS., and *ὡς βραχύτερα ἂν τὰ λεγόμενα* probably found there instead of—*ἂν γενόμενα*: for *γενόμενα* and *λεγόμενα* are constantly confounded in MSS.

Soc. jun. You speak well; and let us do as you say.

Guest. Has not then the king been separated from the majority (of arts), as are fellow-tending, or rather from all that relate to herds? But the remaining, we say, (are those) that (belong to) the co-causes, and causes relating to the state itself, which we must separate from each other.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. You know then that it is difficult to bisect these; and the reason will, I think, as we advance, be not the less apparent.

Soc. jun. It will be then meet to do so.

Guest. Let us then separate them like a victim piecemeal; since we cannot do so by a bisection: for it is always requisite to cut into the nearest number possible.

Soc. jun. How then shall we do so at present?

Guest. Just as before; for we laid down as co-causes whatever (arts) furnished instruments for weaving.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. The same thing therefore we must do now, and still more than then. For such arts as fabricate, with regard to a state instrument, either small or large, we must lay down all of them as co-causes; since without these a state could not exist, nor yet statesmanship. But on the other hand we will not lay down any one of these as the work²³ of kingship.

Soc. jun. We will not.

Guest. And yet we are attempting to do a difficult thing, in separating this genus from the rest.²⁴ For if it appears that he, who says that whatever exists is an instrument of some one thing, says what is credible,²⁵ still on the other hand let us say that there is this thing different from the possessions in a state.

Soc. jun. What thing?

²³ Instead of *ἔργον* the train of ideas seems to lead to *δργανον*.

²⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐν τῇ—δοκεῖ τιν' εἰρηκίνας*, instead of *ὅτι—δοκεῖν εἰρηκίνας*. For whatever Stalbaum may assert to the contrary, *εἰδόντα* must have either the positive article before it, or the indefinite pronoun after it. To meet the difficulty in the syntax, Stephens suggested *ἐστὶ* for *ὅτι*. Ast would insert *δεῖ* before *δοκεῖν*, but Stalbaum, *ἀνάγκη* after *πιθανόν*.

²⁵ If I have restored correctly the preceding sentence, we must read here *ὅπως εἶναι* for *ὅπως δὲ*, or else omit *δὲ* entirely.

Guest. As²⁶ it is not having this very power. ²⁷For that thing is not put together like an instrument, as a cause of production, but for the safety of that which is fabricated.²⁷

Soc. jun. What kind of thing?

Guest. That thing, which being worked up from materials dry and moist,²⁸ and exposed to fire, and without fire,²⁸ is a species of varied kind, which we call by one appellation, a vessel; and though it is a numerous²⁹ species, it does not I think belong³⁰ at all to the science we are seeking.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Of these possessions, there is another and third species very numerous to be looked into, being on land and in the water, and much-wandering and not-wandering, and honourable and dishonourable; but possessing one name, because the whole of it exists for the sake of a certain sitting, as becoming always a seat for something.

Soc. jun. What kind of thing is it?

Guest. We call it a vehicle, a thing not at all the work of the statesman's science, but rather more of the carpenter, potter, and brass-founder.

[28.] *Soc. jun.* I understand.

Guest. What of the fourth (species)? Must we speak of one different from these, in which the most of the things formerly mentioned are contained; every kind of dress, the greater part of arms, and all walls, such as are thrown round, of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things. And since all these are constructed for the sake of a protection, the whole may most justly be called a defence; and may, for the most part, be considered much more the work of the architect, and more rightly³¹ of the weaver, than of the statesman.

²⁶ Instead of ὥς the train of ideas leads to "Ο.γ", "Which is—" For there is evidently required an answer to the preceding question.

^{27—27} Here again I scarcely perceive what Plato means to say.

^{28—28} The words καὶ ἱμῦροις καὶ ἀπύροις are omitted by the three MSS. of the same family, considered by Stalbaum as the best; who, after describing the passage as wretchedly corrupt, attempts to amend it by reading παντοδαπὸν εἶδος ἰργασθῆν ἰργαλεῖον καὶ ἀγγεῖον, ὃ δὴ μὲν κλήσει προσθεγγόμεθα.

²⁹ What can be the meaning of συχρὸν here, without a more specific enumeration?

³⁰ If the species did not bear upon the searched for science, what could have led Plato to allude to it?

³¹ Stalbaum, who seems quite enamoured of the intolerable tautology

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Are we willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of adorning and painting, and such as making use of it (painting) and music, finish as imitations, fabricated for our pleasure, and which may be justly comprehended in one name?

Soc. jun. In what name?

Guest. They may be surely denominated amusement.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. This one name then will suit, when pronounced, with all these: for not one of these things is done through seriousness, but all for the sake of amusement.

Soc. jun. This too I nearly understand.

Guest. But that, which prepares for all these materials bodies, out of which and in which, whatever arts have now been mentioned, manufacture (something),³³ shall we not place as a sixth all-various species, the offspring of many other arts.

Soc. jun. Of what (art) are you speaking?

Guest. ³³That (which furnishes) gold and silver, and other substances found as metals, and whatever the art of felling trees, and the whole of the clipping art, furnishes to the carpenter, and the knitting art, and still further that which barks trees, and takes off the skins of living animals, [the currier's art,]³⁴ and all such (arts) as are conversant with things of this kind, and such as working on corks, and papyrus-reeds, and withies, furnish the means of manufacturing from genera, not put together, species that are put together. The whole of this let us call the first-born possession of man, without any putting together, and by no means the work of the science of kingship.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. The possession of nutriment, and of such things as when mingled with the body possess a certain power, by their

in πολλῶ μάλλον and ὁρθότερον, was not aware that Ficinus has properly omitted ὁρθότερον, which is evidently a gl. of πολλῶ μάλλον.

³² To preserve the syntax, we must insert τε after δημιουργοῦσι.

³³ The whole of this passage was found in a better state in the MS. used by Ficinus, than in any other collated subsequently; as is evident from his version: "Eam, quæ aurum et argentum ceteraque metalla, terræ eruta visceribus, præparat; item, quæ silvas incidit, quæ tondet, quæ ex his construit aliquid, quæ plicat atque contextit, seu quæ cortices arborum, sive quæ animalium pelles circumcidit et polit."

³⁴ Stalbaum considers σκυτομοική as an interpolation.

parts, to be subservient to the parts of the body, we must rank in the seventh place, by calling it altogether our nurse, unless we have some other better name to give. However, we will place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting, exercise, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to these arts more properly than to the science of the statesman.

[29.] *Soc. jun.* How not?

Guest. Nearly then all, whatsoever is connected with possession, with the exception of tame animals, has I think been mentioned in these seven genera. But consider. For it was most just that the species (called) first-born should be placed first; and after this, instrument, vessel, vehicle, protection, amusement, and cattle.³⁵ But if any thing of no great consequence has escaped us, which it is possible to suit only (with difficulty)³⁶ to some one of these, we omit it; such as the idea of coin, of seals, and of every thing bearing a mark. For these things have not in themselves a genus much in common; but some will agree as regards ornament, others as regards instruments, drawn (into the discussion) indeed with violence, but nevertheless completely. But the tending of herds, as previously divided, will appear to have comprehended the whole possession of tame animals with the exception of slaves.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. The genus of slaves and of all servants remains; amongst whom I conjecture will become apparent those, who engaged in the very thing woven,³⁷ contend with the king in the same manner as those above, that are engaged in knitting, and in wool-combing, and in such other arts as we then mentioned, did with the weavers. But all the rest, spoken of as co-causes, have, together with the works just now mentioned,

³⁵ So Taylor translates *θρίμμα*, which is literally "a nursling." Stalbaum says the word is here taken actively, as *γίννημα* is in the Sophist, p. 266, D. § 112. But nouns derived from the perfect passive of a verb, could never have an active meaning. Schleiermacher wished to read *τροφήν* for *θρίμμα*, and Ast *θεκτρικόν*. They ought rather to have altered *τροφόν* just before into *θρίμμα*.

³⁶ So Stalbaum, by reading *μόγισ* for *μία*, which is omitted not only in his three best MSS., but by Ficinus likewise.

³⁷ This, says Ast, is to be explained by what the author states subsequently in p. 308, D., § 46, where the science of the king is compared with that of the weaver.

been done away with,³⁸ and separated from the action of the king and statesman.

Soc. jun. So they seem.

Guest. Come then, let us approach nearer, and consider the rest, that we may perceive them more firmly.

Soc. jun. It is requisite (to do so).

Guest. We shall find then that the greatest servants, so far as we can see from those here, are in a pursuit, and under circumstances the very contrary to what we have suspected.

Soc. jun. Who are they?

Guest. They who are purchased, and in this manner become a property; whom, beyond all controversy, we may call slaves and laying the least claim to the kingly science.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But what shall we say of those free-born persons, who willingly put themselves to ministering to the parties³⁹ mentioned just now, and by conveying the produce of agriculture, and of other arts, to each other, and⁴⁰ by equalizing the possession and value of articles,⁴⁰ do some at (home) markets, and others by going from state to state, by sea and land exchange coin against other things, or itself against itself, (whom we have called money-changers, ship-owners, and hucksters,) will these contend for any part of the statesman's science?

Soc. jun. Perhaps some of the foreign merchants will.

Guest. And yet we shall never find those, who for wages most readily become servants to all persons, laying any claim to the science of a king.

Soc. jun. For how should we?

Guest. What then (shall we say) of those, that do such ministerings for us on each occasion.

Soc. jun. Of what and whom are you speaking?

³⁸ Instead of ἀνέληνται Stalbaum says it were easy to read ἀνέληνται, "done away with:" but the alteration is not necessary. Ficinus has "sejuncti atque discreti," by an hendyadis, from which it is difficult to ascertain more than that his MS. did not read ἀνέληνται. Perhaps ἀναλίλυνται, "loosened."

³⁹ Instead of taking τοῖς—ῥηθεῖσιν as dependent on ὑπηρετικῇν, Stalbaum would read ὅσοι σὺν τοῖς—ῥηθεῖσιν, i. e. "as many as together with those mentioned—"

⁴⁰—"Such is perhaps the meaning of ἀνισοῦντες, in the language of commerce, that equalizes the products of different climes.

Guest. I speak of the tribe of heralds,⁴¹ and of those who become accomplished in the art of writing,⁴² and often act as ministers, and certain other persons, who have very great talents for some other and many kinds of business connected with public offices. What shall we say of these?

Soc. jun. What you have said just now, that they are ministers, but no rulers in states.

Guest. But surely ⁴³I was not, I think, seeing a vision,⁴³ when I said that in this way, perchance, would be seen those strenuously contending for the science of a statesman. And yet it would seem to be very absurd to seek after these in any ministering portion.

Soc. jun. Very much so, indeed.

Guest. Let us then approach still nearer to those who have not been as yet examined. Now these are such as possess a certain portion of ministering science relating to divination. For they are held to be the interpreters of gods to men.

Soc. jun. They are.

Guest. The genus too of priests, as the law says, knows how gifts should be offered by us through sacrifices to the gods, agreeably to them; and how we should request of them by prayer the possession of good things. Now both these are parts of the ministering art.

[30.] *Soc. jun.* So it appears.

Guest. Now then we seem to me to touch, as it were, upon some foot-print of the object to which we are on the road. For the figure of priests and prophets is replete with pru-

⁴¹ The persons alluded to would be now called "diplomatists," as is evident from the Hippias Major; where the Pantologist of his day is said to have been frequently employed in that character.

⁴² As the art of writing was in ancient times known only to a few, such persons became of necessity the men of office and consideration in the state; just as no man will ever become the prime minister of England, unless he can figure as a debater. For though nearly every body can read and write, yet few can open a debate with a long speech, and fewer still close it with a reply to the different arguments urged on the opposite side. The persons to whom Plato alludes were called Γραμματεῖς or Τρογγραμματεῖς, i. e. "Secretaries," or "Under-secretaries;," who, says Aristophanes in *The Frogs*, 1095, while they amuse the people with monkey-tricks, pick their pockets. Stalbaum refers here to Boeckh's *Oeconom. Athen. i. p. 198*, and Schœmann. *de Comit. p. 318*.

⁴³—"In the place of the words between the figures Ficinus has merely, "Haud abs re—"

dence, and obtains a reputation for respect through the greatness of the matters in their hands; so that in Egypt it is not permitted for a king to govern without the sacerdotal science; and should any one previously of another genus⁴⁴ of men become by violence (the king), he is afterwards compelled to be initiated in the mysteries of this genus.⁴⁵ Further still among the Greeks, one may find in many places that the greatest sacrifices relating to matters of this kind are imposed upon the greatest offices; and what I assert is shown particularly among you. For to him who is chosen by lot the king here,⁴⁶ they say that of all the ancient sacrifices, those held in the highest veneration and most peculiar to the country are assigned.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. We must then consider these kings chosen by lot, together with the priests, and their ministers, and a certain other very numerous crowd, which has just now become manifest to us, apart from those previously mentioned.

Soc. jun. Of whom are you speaking?

Guest. Of certain very strange persons.

Soc. jun. Why so?

Guest. As I was just now speculating, their genus appeared to me to be all kinds. ⁴⁷For many men resemble lions and centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are similar to satyrs, and to weak and versatile wild beasts. They likewise rapidly change their forms and their power into each other.⁴⁷ And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myself to have just now perceived these men for the first time.

Soc. jun. Speak; for you seem to see something strange.

Guest. I do; for what is strange is the result of ignorance

⁴⁴ The modern name is "caste," still found in Hindostan; where have been preserved not a few of the customs of Egypt.

⁴⁵ Ficinus has, what appears requisite to complete the sense, "ut rex denique sit et sacerdos."

⁴⁶ The second archon at Athens was called "the king," and had cognizance over the principal religious festivals.

⁴⁷—⁴⁷ With this passage in Plato may be compared that in Shakspeare, where Hamlet thus amuses himself at the expense of Polonius. "*Ham.* Do you see yonder cloud that is almost in the shape of a camel? *Pol.* By the mass, and it is like a camel, indeed. *Ham.* Methinks it is like a weasel. *Pol.* It is backed like a weasel. *Ham.* Or like a whale. *Pol.* Very like a whale."

in the case of all.⁴⁸ And I myself just now suffered the very same thing: for I was suddenly involved in doubt on seeing the dancing-troop⁴⁹ relating to state affairs.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. The greatest wizard of all the wise,⁵⁰ and the most skilled in this art; who must be separated from the really existing statesmen and kings, although it is very difficult so to separate him, if we are about to see clearly the object of our search.

Soc. jun. We must not give up this, at least.

Guest. Not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me this.

[31.] *Soc. jun.* What?

Guest. Is not a monarchy one of the forms of state-rule?

Soc. jun. It is.

Guest. And after a monarchy one would, I think, speak of an oligarchy.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But is not the rule of the many called by the name of a democracy, a third form of state-polity?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Do not these being three become after a manner five, by two producing from themselves two other names in addition to their own?

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. They who look to the violent and the voluntary, to poverty and wealth, to law and lawlessness, which take place in them, give a twofold division to each one of the two, and call monarchy, as exhibiting two species, by two names, one tyranny, the other royalty.

Soc. jun. How not?

⁴⁸ So Johnson said that wonder was the effect of novelty upon ignorance.

⁴⁹ By no process of thinking and writing correctly could a single person be called "a dancing-troop." He might indeed be called the leader of such a troop. Hence it is evident that Plato wrote not χορόν but χορηγόν.

⁵⁰ This is the correct reading found in six MSS., in lieu of σοφιστῶν: which Stalbaum says was altered by scribes, who did not perceive the ridicule which Plato was throwing on the Sophist, whom Stalbaum should have seen the author had not here, and could not have had, in his thoughts.

Guest. But the state ever governed by a few, (we call) an aristocracy and an oligarchy.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. But of a democracy, whether the people govern the rich violently, or with their consent, and whether they strictly guard the laws or not, no one is ever accustomed to change the name at all.

Soc. jun. True.

Guest. What then? Do we think that any one of these state-polities is right, thus bounded by these definitions, such as by one, and a few, and a many, and by wealth and poverty, by the violent and the voluntary, ⁵¹and happening to exist⁵¹ by statutes and without laws?

Soc. jun. What should hinder?

Guest. Consider more attentively, following me by this road.

Soc. jun. What road?

Guest. Shall we abide by what was asserted at first, or shall we dissent from it?

Soc. jun. To what assertion are you alluding?

Guest. I think we said that a regal government was one of the sciences.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. Yet not of those taken together as a whole; but we selected it from the other sciences, as something judicial and presiding.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. And from the presiding science (we selected) one part, as belonging to inanimate acts, and the other as belonging to animals. And dividing after this fashion, we have arrived thus far, not forgetful of science, but unable to determine with sufficient accuracy what science is.

Soc. jun. You say rightly.

Guest. Do we then understand this very thing, that the definition must be respecting them,⁵² not (as regards) the few,

⁵¹—⁵¹ The words *συμβαίνουσιν γίγνεσθαι* are omitted by Ficinus, and, after him, of course, by Taylor.

⁵² I confess I cannot understand *περὶ αὐτῶν*. For *αὐτῶν* can hardly be referred to the forms of government; and if it could, the words *περὶ αὐτῶν* should be placed between *τὸν* and *ὅρον*, as in Ficinus, "ipsorum determinationem descriptionemque;" whose "secundum paucos" shows that he probably found in his MS. *οὐ κατ' ὀλίγους* in lieu of *οὐκ ὀλίγους*.

nor the many, nor the voluntary or involuntary, nor poverty or wealth, but (as regards) a certain science, if we follow what has been formerly detailed?

[32.] *Soc. jun.* It is impossible, indeed, not to do this.

Guest. We must of necessity then consider now this; in which of these does the science respecting the government of men happen to exist, being nearly ⁵³ the greatest and most difficult⁵³ to obtain. For it is requisite to inspect it, that we may perceive who are the parties we must take away from a prudent king, who lay claim to be statesmen, and persuade the multitude (of it), and yet are so not at all.

Soc. jun. We must do so, as the reasoning has previously told us.

Guest. Does it then appear to you that the mass in a city is able to acquire this science?

Soc. jun. How can they?

Guest. But in a city of a thousand men, is it possible for a hundred, or even fifty, to acquire it sufficiently?

Soc. jun. It would be then the most easy of all arts. For we know that among a thousand men there could not be found so many tip-top draught-players as compared with those in the rest of Greece, much less kings. For, according to our former reasoning, we must call him, who possesses the science of a king, whether he governs or not, a regal character.

Guest. You have very properly reminded me. And I think it follows from this, that a right government, when it exists rightly, ought to be investigated as about one person,⁵⁴ or two, or⁵⁴ altogether about a few.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And we must hold, as we think now, that these exercise rule according to a certain art, whether they govern the willing or the unwilling, whether according to statutes or without statutes, and whether they are rich or poor. For we

⁵³⁻⁵³ This, which is the natural order of ideas, is properly found in Ficinus, "comparatu maxima—atque difficillima." The common order, χαλεπωτάτης καὶ μεγίστης, is supported however by Repub. viii. p. 551, C.

⁵⁴⁻⁵⁴ So Ficinus has "unum vel duo vel paucos," which shows that his MS. read ἵνα τινὰ ἢ δύο ἢ—δλίγους instead of καὶ δύο καὶ. On the confusion of ἢ and καὶ, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 112.

have considered those as not the less physicians, whether they cure us, willing or unwilling, by cutting, or burning, or applying any other pain; and whether according to written rules or not, and whether they are themselves poor or rich. In all (these cases) we say that they are no less physicians, so long as they stand over (the patient)⁵⁵ according to art,⁵⁶ purging or some other way attenuating (the body), or in causing (it) to increase, and so long as, for the good of the body alone, they bring it from a worse to a better state, and by attending preserve each⁵⁷ (body) attended to. After this manner, and in no other, as I think, we will lay down that the definition of the medicinal or any other rule is rightly made.

Soc. jun. And very much so.

[33.] *Guest.* It is necessary then, as it seems, that of polities that must be pre-eminently correct, and the only polity, in which the governors are found to possess science truly, and not in appearance merely; whether they rule according to laws or without laws, over the willing or the unwilling, and are themselves poor or rich. For not one of these things must we consider at all, as regards any rectitude (of government).

Soc. jun. Beautifully (said).

Guest. And whether they purge the state to its good, by putting to death or banishing certain persons; or by sending out colonies some where, like a swarm of bees, they reduce it to a less size; or whether by introducing some others from abroad they make citizens of them, and thus increase its size, so long as by making use of science and justice, they preserve it, and cause it to the utmost of their power to pass from a worse condition to a better one, then, and according to such limits, must we speak of a polity as alone rightly existing. But we must say that such others, as we have mentioned, are not genuine, nor do they in reality exist; ⁵⁸ but that those, which we call well-regulated, imitate this for the better, the others for the worse.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ This word is graphically applied here to a physician standing over the bed of the patient.

⁵⁶ Stalbaum says that the generality of translators have considered *τις* as governed by *ἐπιστατούντες*, instead of taking it as the dative of the manner. Ficinus has however, "arte—præsident."

⁵⁷ I have adopted *ἕκαστα* (i. e. *σώματα*), found in one MS., in lieu of *ἑκάστω*, which is superfluous here as applied to the physicians.

⁵⁸⁻⁵⁹ The version of Ficinus exhibits here a remarkable variation from the Greek text of Stalbaum, which is made up in part from the conjectures

Soc. jun. The other points, O guest, appear to have been stated with moderation: but that it is requisite⁵⁹ to govern without laws, has been stated as a thing rather harsh to hear.

Guest. You have anticipated me a little, Socrates, by your question. For I was about to ask you, whether you admit all these points, or whether you find any difficulty in any matter that has been stated. It is however evident, that we now wish to discuss the point respecting the rectitude of those, who govern without laws.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. After a certain manner it is evident that legislation is a part of the science of a king: but it is best, not for the laws to prevail,⁶⁰ but for a man, who has with prudence the power of a king. Do you know in what way?

Soc. jun. In what way do you mean?

Guest. Because the law cannot, by comprehending that which is the best and most accurately just in all cases, at the same time ordain what is the best. For the inequalities of men and their actions, and the fact that not a single atom, so to say, of human affairs, enjoys a state of rest, do not permit any art whatever to exhibit in any case any thing simple (without exception) respecting all matters and through all time. Shall we admit this?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And yet we see the law tending nearly to this very point; and, like a certain self-willed and ignorant man, it does not suffer any person to do any thing contrary to its own orders, nor to put a question, not even should something new happen to be in some case⁶¹ better as compared with the decree⁶¹ it had ordained.

of Heindorf and his own, "Sed eas, quæ hanc imitantur, libenter laudamus, quasi facile ad meliora tendentes; alias vero contra vituperamus, tanquam imitatione malorum ad deteriora proclives."

⁵⁹ Instead of *δεῖν*, which Stalbaum absurdly endeavours to defend, Ast suggested *εἶναι*, to which he was probably led by Ficinus' version, "gubernationem sine legibus rectam esse posse;" from whence I would rather elicit, *ἀνευ νόμων εἶναι εὖ ἀρχειν ἐξεῖν*—

⁶⁰ This was a Pythagorean doctrine. Compare The Laws, ix. p. 875, C. So says Stalb., who refers to Valckenaer on Herodot. iii. 38.

⁶¹ Stalbaum translates *παρὰ τὸν λόγον* "præter opinionem." But *λόγος* is "reason," not "opinion." And if it ever did mean "opinion," it could not do so here, where it is followed by *ὃν ὁ νόμος ἐτίταξεν*. For the law can never ordain an opinion, only a fact.

Soc. jun. True. For the law does really so, as you have just now said, to each of us.

Guest. Is it not then impossible for that, which is under all cases simple, to do well in cases which are never at any time simple?

Soc. jun. It appears so nearly.

[34.] *Guest.* Why then is it necessary to lay down laws? since law is not a thing of the greatest rectitude. Of this we must inquire the cause.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Are there not then amongst us, as in other cities likewise, certain exercises of men collected together for the sake of competition relating to running, or something else?

Soc. jun. Yes. There are very many.

Guest. Come then, let us again recall to our memory the orders of those, who practise scientifically exercises in meetings⁶² of this kind.

Soc. jun. What is this?⁶³

Guest. They do not conceive it is requisite to be very fine in ordering, according to each individual, what is suited to the body of each; but think more stupidly,⁶⁴ that they ought to make their arrangements of what benefits the body, suited to the majority of circumstances and persons.

Soc. jun. Excellent.

Guest. On which account assigning now⁶⁵ equal labours to persons collected together, they urge them on together, and stop them together in the race, and wrestling, and all the labours of the body.

Soc. jun. Such is the fact.

Guest. Let us hold then, that the legislator who would preside over his herds⁶⁶ in matters of justice, and their contracts

⁶² I have translated as if the Greek were ἀγοραῖς, not ἀρχαῖς, which is manifestly absurd. Stalbaum suggests ἀγίλαις. But as laws were made in the ἀγορά, and gymnastic exercises took place there likewise, a word is required suited at once to the arena of law and of gymnastics. Besides, in ἀγοραῖς there is an allusion to the mention of ἀθρόων ἀνθρώπων. For Hesychius explains Ἀγορά by ἄθροισμα.

⁶³ The question τὸ ποῖον seems strange, thus following ἐπιτάξεις.

⁶⁴ Instead of παχύτερον Plato evidently wrote παχύτεροι, opposed to λεπτοურγῆιν: and so too shortly afterwards, παχύτερος ὢν instead of παχύτερος.

⁶⁵ To avoid the unmeaning "now," Stalbaum would read ἀποδιδόντες.

⁶⁶ Although Ficinus renders ταῖσιν ἀγέλαις "suis gregibus," yet it is

with each other, will never be sufficient for all collectively, by accurately enjoining upon each individual what is fitting.

Soc. jun. This is likely.

Guest. But I think he will establish laws suited to the majority of persons and circumstances, and somehow thus in a more stupid way for each, delivering them in writings, and in an unwritten (form),⁶⁷ and legislating according to the customs of the country.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can any one be so all-sufficient as, by sitting near⁶⁸ through the whole of life, to enjoin accurately what is adapted to each? Since, although any one soever of those who possess the science of a king could, I think, do this, he would scarcely impose on himself impediments, by writing down the so-called laws.

Soc. jun. (So it appears,) O guest, from what has been now said.

Guest. And still more, O thou best one, from what will be said.

Soc. jun. What is that?

Guest. Of this kind. For let us thus say to ourselves.

no where stated that the legislator has, like a king, a herd of his own. And were the fact otherwise, yet *ταῖσιν* could not be found in prose for *ταῖς*. Opportunely then do the three oldest MSS. offer *ταῖσιν*, without an accent; a proof of the reading being corrupt. Plato wrote, I suspect, *διπλοῖσιν*, which would be in MSS. *ὑπλοῖσιν*. For thus errors constantly arise from the loss or confusion of letters indicative of numerals, as I have shown in Poppe's Prolegom. p. 223, and 329; and to the passages corrected there by myself, Bentley, Porson, Kidd, and Dobree, I could now add full twenty more, where all the modern editors have, like Stalbaum here, been utterly in the dark. With respect to *ὑ*, thus written for *β*, see Bast in Palæograph. Græc. p. 218, and Wellaver on Eumen. 115, who has stolen there an emendation of mine.

⁶⁷ The words *καὶ ἐν γραμμασὶν ἀποδιδούς καὶ ἐν ἀγραμμάτοις καρπίους δὲ ἰθεοὶ νόμοθετῶν* Stalbaum thus paraphrases, misled, it would seem, as Stephens was likewise, by Ficinus—"Et scriptis leges promulgans et secundum mores et instituta litteris quidem non consignata, sed tamen patria, leges sanciens—" observing that *ἰθος* is here, as in Critias, p. 121, B., the same as *νόμος*. Had he remembered that the laws, which Pythagoras gave his disciples, were unwritten, he would have seen to what is to be referred the expression *ἐν ἀγραμμάτοις*.

⁶⁸ I cannot understand *παπαθήμενος* thus written by itself. Ficinus has "*sedulusque assidere cuique.*" But even thus the passage is not complete. The place where the lawgiver is supposed to sit should be mentioned. There is a lacuna here, which it would not be difficult to supply by the aid of Æschylus and Aristophanes.

Would not a physician, or any teacher of gymnastics, being about to travel, and to be absent as he fancied from those under his care for a long time, and thinking that those engaged in exercises, or sick, would not remember his precepts, be willing to write something to refresh their memory? Or how (would he act)?

Soc. jun. In this way.

Guest. But what, if the physician, having been abroad a less time than he expected, should come back, would he not dare to suggest certain other things besides those contained in his writings, other circumstances occurring more favourable for the sick, through winds, or any thing else of those that are wont to take place from Zeus (the air), contrary to expectation? Would he think that he ought to persevere in not going out of his old injunctions, and neither himself order other things, nor dare to do to the sick man things different from what had been written, as if these were medicinal and salubrious, but those of a different kind noxious, and not according to art? Or rather, would not every thing of this kind, occurring according to science and true art, in all matters become altogether the greatest ridicule of such injunctions?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. But shall not he, who writes down what is just and unjust, beautiful and base, good and evil, and who establishes unwritten laws for the herds of human beings who live in cities, in each⁶⁹ according to the laws of those who have written them,—whether he comes himself (back)⁷⁰ after having written (laws) contrary to art, or some other like him, be permitted to enjoin things different from these? Or, would not this interdiction appear to be in reality no less ridiculous than the former?

Soc. jun. How not?

[35.] *Guest.* Do you know then the language spoken by the multitude respecting such a thing?

Soc. jun. I have it not at present in my mind.

⁶⁹ The words "in each," which are here manifestly absurd, Stalbaum vainly, as usual, attempts to defend. For he did not know that Plato inserted them between *τῶν* and *γραψάντων*, understanding *πόλεις*. They are omitted by Ficinus entirely.

⁷⁰ Ficinus renders *ἀφίηται* "redeat," which shows that he found in his MS. *ἀφίηται αὐ*.

Guest. And yet it is very specious. For they say that, if any one knows of laws better than those of their ancestors, such a person should, after persuading his own state, become a legislator; otherwise not.

Soc. jun. Do they not then (say) rightly?

Guest. Perhaps so. But if any one should, not by persuasion, force on the better, what would be the name of this violence? Do not however (say) a word, but previously respecting the former.

Soc. jun. What do you mean?

Guest. Should some one, not by persuading a person under a physician, but by possessing his art correctly, compel a boy, or a man, or a woman, contrary to prescriptions, to do that which is better, what will be the name of this violence? Ought it not to be called rather any thing than some⁷¹ mischievous transgression of art? And is it not for us to say, that every thing (has happened⁷²) to the compelled person, rather than that he has suffered any thing mischievous and without art from the compelling physicians?

Soc. jun. You speak most true.

Guest. But what is that error called by us, which is contrary to the statesman's art? Must it not be the base, evil, and unjust?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Of those, who have been forced to act contrary to the written precepts, and the customs of the country, more justly, better, and more beautifully than before, come, (tell me,) ⁷³(can any one), unless he is about to be the most ridiculous of all men, (pronounce) a disapprobation of such violence done to such persons? Must it not be said⁷³ rather

⁷¹ Stalbaum endeavours absurdly to defend ἀμάρτημα, τὸ νοσῶδες, where Stephens correctly suggested ἀμάρτημά τι—

⁷² The word necessary for the sense Ficinus has supplied by his "*contigisse dicendum*," from which, one would suspect that he found in his MS. πάντα ὁρθῶς εὐ πείσιν εἶπείν ἐστι. For εὐ πείσιν has been similarly corrupted in the passages corrected by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 148.

⁷³—⁷³ In translating this passage, where only a Stalbaum would attempt to defend the want of connexion in the syntax, I have put into English what I suspect Plato wrote to this effect, in Greek—οἶρα, τὸν τῶν τοιοῦτων ψόγον ἂν τις περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης βίας ἱροίη, εἰ μίλλει—πάντα ὁ αὐτῷ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐκάστοτε, ὥς, πλὴν αἰσχροῦ—instead of

by him on each occasion, that they, who have been forced, have suffered at the hands of the forcing party every thing, except what is base, unjust, and evil?

Soc. jun. You speak most true.

Guest. But if he who forces is rich, will the acts done forcibly by him be just, but, if he is poor, unjust? Or, whether a person persuades or does not persuade, (whether) rich or poor, and (whether) according or contrary to written statutes, he does what is useful, must this be the definition the most true on all sides of the correct administration of a state, by which⁷⁴ a wise and good man will (well) administer the interests of those under his charge; just as a pilot watches over whatever happens to conduce to the welfare of the vessel and crew; and not by laying down written orders, but by making his skill a law, he preserves his fellow-sailors. And thus, ⁷⁵[after this very same manner,]⁷⁶ will an upright polity be produced by those who are able to govern thus, by exhibiting a strength of skill superior to the laws. And indeed in the case of prudent rulers there will be no error, let them do every thing; as long as they observe this one great maxim, to distribute ever with intellect and art to those in the state what is the most just, to keep them such as they are, and to finish by rendering them, as far as possible, better instead of worse.

Soc. jun. It is not possible to say the contrary to what has been now asserted.

Guest. Nor yet against those to say even a word.

[36.] *Soc. jun.* Of what are you speaking?

Guest. That no mob of any persons whatever can receive this kind of science, and be able to administer with intellect a state, but that we must seek for a correct polity amongst a small number, and a few, and one person;⁷⁶ and that we must lay down other polities as imitations, as we observed a little before, some for the better, and some for the worse.

τοιούτων αὐ ψόγον—βίας, ἀρ', εἰ μέλλει—πάντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον—πλην ὧς—

⁷⁴ Stalb. with Steph. considers ὅν governed by κατὰ understood. But as two MSS. read ἐν, perhaps Plato wrote ἐν ᾧ εἶναι—

^{75—76} These words are an intolerable tautology after οὕτω, "thus."

⁷⁶ Ficinus has, "apud unum vel paucissimos," which makes a far better sense.

Soc. jun. How and why say you this? For I did not understand just now forsooth⁷⁷ the remark respecting imitations.

Guest. Truly it were not a stupid act for a person, after starting an argument of this kind, to lay it down there,⁷⁸ and not, by going through it, to show the error which at present exists about it.

Soc. jun. What error?

Guest. It is meet to search into a thing of such a kind as⁷⁹ is not very usual, nor easy to perceive; but at the same time we must endeavour to apprehend it. For, come, since the polity of which we have spoken is the only correct one, you know that other polities ought to be thus⁸⁰ preserved, while they use the institutions of this, and do what was just now praised, though it is not most right?

Soc. jun. What is that?

Guest. That no one of those in the city dare to do any thing contrary to the laws; and that he who dares, shall pay the forfeit by death, and all the extreme of punishments.⁸¹ This too is most right and beautiful, as a second thing; ⁸²after that some one shall have first changed the just now said.⁸³ But in what manner that, which we have called second, exists, let us proceed to state. Shall we not?

Soc. jun. By all means.

[37.] *Guest.* Let us then again return to the images, to which it is ever necessary to assimilate kingly rulers.

⁷⁷ In ἀπρὶ δῆθεν is an error, not as yet noticed by any editor; but which it were not difficult perhaps to correct.

⁷⁸ Stalbaum explains αὐτοῦ by "immediately," a meaning that word never has. He should have suggested αὐτῶς, rendered "at ease." See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 141.

⁷⁹ Stalbaum has failed to notice that ὃ has dropt out before οὐ, but is preserved by Ficinus, "quod—"

⁸⁰ Stalbaum says that "thus" is explained by the following expression, "do what was just now praised." I suspect however that οὕτως is a corruption of δει πῶς, for δει πῶς carries with it the idea of a doubt.

⁸¹ This alludes to the confiscation of property, and the prohibition of burial, which, as seen by the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles, was considered the extreme of punishment.

⁸²⁻⁸³ This is a literal translation of the nonsense of the Greek text; which Stalbaum vainly endeavours to conceal by his version, "ubi quis mutaverit ac seposuerit primum illud, de quo modo dictum est;" which I will leave for himself alone to understand, for nobody else can. Ficinus has, "primo namque in loco ponendum quod nunc est dictum," as if he had found in his MS. ἐκπυδὴ ἦν ἐς τὸ πρῶτον ἐμμεταθεῖον τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. The noble-minded pilot, and ⁸³the physician, who is of equal worth with many others.⁸³ Let us then, after moulding from these (two) a certain figure, contemplate it.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. Such a one, as if we all conceived that we are suffering the most dreadful things from them. For such of us as either of them wish to save, they do equally save;⁸⁴ and such as they wish to injure, they injure by cutting and burning, at the same time ordering us to bring to them the means of expense, as a tribute, of which they spend on the sick little or even nothing,⁸⁵ but they and their domestics make use of the rest. And lastly, receiving money (as) wages,⁸⁶ from either the kindred or some enemies of the sick man, they cause him to die. They too who have the command of a vessel, do ten thousand other things of this kind. ⁸⁷For after some plotting, when out at sea, they leave persons deserted, and, committing errors at sea, hurl them into the sea, and do them other mischief.⁸⁷ If then, reflecting on these matters,

⁸³—⁸³ Plato here alludes to the Homeric,—*Ἰητρὺς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιός ἄλλων*, in *Il.* xi. 514.

⁸⁴ I confess I cannot understand here *ὁμοίως δὴ*, which Ficinus has omitted. I could have understood *δλούμενον διασώζουσιν*, "they save completely about to perish," or *εὐνόως δὴ*, "with a kind feeling."

⁸⁵ Ficinus has "*nihil aut parum admodum*—". His MS. had therefore *σμικρά—ἢ καὶ οὐδὲν*, not *καὶ οὐδὲν*. A similar error is to be corrected similarly in the passages quoted by Stalbaum. See my Poppo's *Prolegom.* p. 114.

⁸⁶ To avoid the tautology we must omit *μισθόν*, as Ficinus does, who has merely "*pecuniis acceptis*."

⁸⁷—⁸⁷ If Plato alluded, as I suspect he did, to the story of Arion, against whom some sailors laid a plot and threw him into the sea; and to that of Philoctetes, against whom the Greeks, alleging some fault, left him on a desert island, he would have written perhaps to this effect. "For after some plotting, they do, when out at sea, throw persons into the water, or, alleging some fault against them, leave them deserted in shallow places, and do them, beyond common ills, a wrong." For in the concluding words there is an allusion perhaps to the anecdote told by Plutarch in *Dion.* § 5, respecting the tyrant of Syracuse bribing one Pollis to murder Plato during his voyage home; or, if that were not practicable, to sell him into slavery; which would be considered by a person like Plato, the very height of wrong. To arrive however at this sense, greater alterations would be requisite than an ordinary scholar would admit; who is therefore left to believe, if he will, that Plato wrote what is found in the present text.

we should enter into some consultation respecting them, (so that)⁸⁸ we should no longer permit either of those arts to have an absolute control over slaves or the free-born; but that we should collect together an assembly consisting of ourselves or all the people, or the rich alone; and that it should be lawful for private individuals, and the rest of the operatives, to bring together their opinions respecting sailing and diseases, as to what manner it is meet to use medicines, and medical instruments, for those that are ill; and moreover, (how to use) both the vessels themselves and nautical instruments for the requirements of vessels in case of danger during the voyage from winds and the sea and the meeting with pirates, and, if requisite, in fighting with long ships⁸⁹ against others of the like kind; and that, what shall have been decreed by the multitude on these points, by the advice of physicians and pilots, or of other⁹⁰ unskilled individuals, persons should inscribe in triangular tables⁹¹ and pillars, and laying down other unwritten regulations, as the customs of the country, it should be necessary to navigate vessels in all future times according to this method, and to administer remedies to the sick.

Soc. jun. You have mentioned things really very absurd.

Guest. Further, that rulers of the people should be appointed yearly, whoever may be chosen by lot from the rich or from all the people; and that the rulers so appointed

⁸⁸ To destroy the asyndeton in the protasis of this long-winded sentence, of which, says Stalbaum, the apodosis is to be found a full page lower, it was merely necessary to suppose, that ὥστε had here dropt out between *τινα* and *τοῦτων*, and that a little below *ταῦτα δεῖν* had been corrupted into *ταῦτα δὴ*.

⁸⁹ Amongst the ancients, ships of war were long, those of commerce more round.

⁹⁰ Instead of ἄλλων, which, despite what some scholars say about ἄλλος being used pleonastically, makes nonsense here, Plato wrote ἄλλως, "merely," a meaning on which Ruhrken on Timæus, Οὐκ ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτῷ, and Toup on Longinus, § 7, have said all that is requisite.

⁹¹ The tablet called Κύρβις had three faces forming a triangle, fixed to a centre pole, called the ἀξων, and on each face was laid, probably, a volume of the laws originally relating to religious matters, but subsequently to civil likewise. Such tablets were once found in Christian churches; and the priest, or rather some clerical assistant in the character of a canon or chorister, used to chant from it the Psalms, and to read the two Lessons of the morning or evening service, which were placed respectively on the three faces of the tablet.

should rule according to the written regulations, like pilots over vessels and physicians over the sick.

Soc. jun. These things are still more harsh.

[38.] *Guest.* Let us see now after this what follows. For when the year of each governor shall have expired, it will be necessary to appoint⁹² tribunals of persons, taken either by a selection from the rich or from all the people by lot, and to bring the rulers before them and to pass their accounts, and for any one to accuse them for not having acted, during his year, the pilot, according to the written regulations, nor according to the old customs of their forefathers; and for the very same things to take place in the case of those healing the sick; and that whoever of them should be convicted, certain persons should fix what the party must suffer (in person) or pay (in purse).

Soc. jun. Would not he, who is ready of his own accord to be a ruler under such circumstances, most justly suffer (in person) and pay (in purse)?

Guest. Further still, it will be necessary to make a law on all these points, that, if any one be proved to be seeking out the art relating to piloting and ships in general, or to health, and the truth of the physician's theory about winds, heat and cold, contrary to the written regulations,⁹³ or devising⁹⁴ any thing whatever about affairs of this kind, he shall, in the first place, be called neither as one skilled in physicking or piloting, but a talker of matters on high, or some babbler; and that, in the next place, it shall be lawful for any one to write down an indictment against him for lawlessness,⁹⁵ and to

⁹² Stalb. has adopted *καθίσαντες* from two MS. He did not know that *καθίζειν* would be said of a judge; *καθιστάναι*, of a tribunal.

⁹³ Here and elsewhere the English phrase, answering to the Greek *παρὰ τὰ γράμματα*, is "contrary to the statutes, made in that case and provided."

⁹⁴ After *σοφίζομενος*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *καὶ διδάσκων*, as shown by his "*philosophetur et doceat*." At all events, such an idea is requisite on account of the subsequent "corrupting."

⁹⁵ The edd. have *γραφάμενον εἰσάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον οἷς ἔξισιν εἰς ἐῆ τι δικαστήριον*. Here Ast was the first to object to *οἷς ἔξισιν*, as being without syntax, and consequently without sense. But his proposed new reading, *οἱ ἔξισιν*, is, if possible, worse than the old one; while Stalbaum's notion that *οἷς ἔξισιν* is an interpolation, arising from *τὸν βουλόμενον*, may be safely left to its own refutation. Had these scholars

bring him before some court of justice, as corrupting the younger,⁹⁶ and persuading the silly to put their hands to the arts of a pilot and a physician not according to the laws, and to rule self-willed over vessels and the sick; and that if any one shall be found persuading either young or old men, contrary to the laws, and the written regulations, (it shall be lawful) to punish him with the extreme (of punishments). For no one⁹⁷ ought to be wiser than the laws; nor on the other hand,⁹⁸ should any one be ignorant of the arts of medicine and of healing, nor of piloting and shipping, (according to) the written regulations and the customs laid down of the country; for he who wishes may learn. If then, Socrates, this should take place about the sciences we mentioned, and we should look into any portion of the general's art, and the whole of any kind of hunting, and of painting, or of imitation in general, and carpentry, and the formation in general of instruments of any kind, and of agriculture, and the art relating to plants in general; or, again, into the care of breeding horses, according to written regulations,⁹⁹ and herds of cattle of every kind, and prophecy, and all the portion that the ministering art embraces, the playing at games of dice, the whole of arithmetic, (whether) simple or (relating to) a plane, either in depth, or swift-ness;¹⁰⁰ ¹(if) respecting all these things (it were) so done, what would appear produced according to written regulations, and not according to art?¹

remembered that a genitive of the crime, laid to the charge of a person indicted, follows *γράφεσθαι*, they might perhaps have seen that Plato wrote *γραφάμενον—βουλόμενον ἀνομίας ἐξίσται*, as I have translated.

⁹⁶ Edd. *ἄλλους νεωτέρους*. One MS. *τοὺς ἄλλους νεωτέρους*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *τοὺς νεωτέρους*: while from *ἄλλους* I have elicited *ἀνους*, and inserted it after *ἀναπειθόντα*. On the confusion between *ἀνους* and *ἄλλους*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

⁹⁷ Instead of *οὐδὲν* common sense requires *οὐδὲνα*, and *οὐδ' ἵνα γ' αὖ* in lieu of *οὐδὲνα γάρ*.

⁹⁸ By inserting *κατὰ τὰ* before *γεγραμμένα*, required alike by the sense and syntax, and placing *ἐξείναι—μανθάνειν* after *κείμενα*, and not, as usual, after *ναυτικόν*, I have made Plato talk something like sense, in lieu of the nonsense with which Stalbaum is so highly delighted.

⁹⁹ The words *κατὰ συγγράμματα* are omitted by Ficinus, for he was not aware perhaps that horses, as shown by Xenophon, were reared by rules.

¹⁰⁰ Of the mass of nonsense to be found here, it is easy to see the correction by turning to p. 284, F. § 25.

¹ Of all this heap of rubbish, without sense or syntax, Ficinus has omitted every atom; and in the preceding summary of different arts, he

Soc. jun. It is evident that all arts would be entirely subverted, nor would they exist again, through such a law forbidding one to investigate. So that life, which is now difficult, would at that time become utterly unable to be endured.

[39.] *Guest.* But what (will you say) to this? If we should compel each of the above-mentioned to take place according to written regulations, and should appoint as the guardian of these statutes a man either chosen by suffrage, or chance, but who, giving no thought to them, either for the sake of a certain gain, or private pleasure, should endeavour, although knowing nothing, to act contrary to these statutes, would not this be a still greater evil than the former?

Soc. jun. Most truly so.

Guest. For he, who should dare to act contrary to those laws, which have been laid down after much experience, (or) through certain advisers recommending each in a pleasant manner, and persuading the people to pass them, will commit an error many-fold greater than an error,² and subvert every process much more than written statutes.

Soc. jun. How is he not about (to do so)?

Guest. Hence there is a second sailing, as is said, for those that establish laws and statutes respecting any thing whatever, that is, not to suffer any one person, or the multitude, to do any thing of any kind at any time contrary to them.

Soc. jun. Right.

Guest. Will not these statutes then, written by men intelligent as far as their power permits, be imitations of the truth of each of these?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. And yet, if we remember, we said that the man, who is in reality a statesman, would, being intelligent, do many things from art, in reference to his own course of action, without giving a thought to statutes, when other things seem to him better than what had been written by himself and enjoined upon some persons absent.

Soc. jun. We did say so.

Guest. Would not then any single man whatever, or any

has shown that his MS. omitted words that have been interpolated, and transposed those which have been misplaced.

² Ficinus has "*scelus committit superiori peccato longe deterius*," which is far more intelligible than the Greek.

people whatever, by whom laws happen to be laid down, act in the same way as that true (statesman), should they endeavour to do to the utmost of their power contrary to them³ (the laws) what is something different and better?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. If then they should without knowledge act in this manner, would they not attempt to imitate what is true? and yet they would imitate all badly; but if with art, this is no longer an imitation, but is the very truth itself.

Soc. jun. Altogether so.

Guest. And yet it was before laid down as a thing acknowledged by us, that the mob is incapable of receiving any art whatever.

Soc. jun. It was so laid down.

Guest. If then there is a certain kingly art, the mob of the rich, and the whole of the people, could never receive this science of the statesman.

Soc. jun. For how can they?

Guest. It is requisite then, as it seems, that such-like polities, if they are about to imitate correctly, to the best of their power, the true polity under a single person ruling with art, must never, 'the laws having been laid down by them,' do any thing contrary to the written statutes and customs of the country.

Soc. jun. You speak most beautifully.

Guest. When therefore the rich imitate this polity, we then denominate such a polity an aristocracy; but when they give no thought to the laws, an oligarchy.

Soc. jun. So it nearly seems.

Guest. And again, when one man rules according to the laws, imitating the person endued with science, we call him a king, not distinguishing by name the person ruling alone with science, or with opinion according to the laws.

³ Stalbaum says that *τῶν* is to be referred to νόμων; (the laws). But how a neuter noun could thus be made to agree with a masculine one, was known only, I suspect, to himself and Matthiæ, whom he quotes. To my mind the noun to be understood is *συγγράμματα*.

⁴ Of these words, perfectly useless here, Ficinus has taken not the least notice, either because he could not understand them, or because they were not in his MS. Perhaps *καμίνων αὐτοῖς* ought to be inserted between *τῶν* and νόμων in the next speech of the Guest, where αὐτοῖς, "by themselves," would refer to the rich.

Soc. jun. We nearly appear to do so.

Guest. If then a person possessing in reality science rules alone, he is called altogether by the same name, a king, and no other will be mentioned in addition: through which⁵ the five names of the polities just now mentioned become only one.

Soc. jun. So it appears.

Guest. But when one man rules neither according to the laws nor the customs of the country, but pretends, as the person possessing science, that the best is to be done, contrary to the written statutes, and there exist a certain desire and ignorance as the leaders of this imitation, must we not call each man of this kind a tyrant?

[40.] *Soc. jun.* How not?

Guest. Thus then we say has been produced a tyrant, a king, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, from mankind indignantly bearing with such a single monarch, and not believing that any one would ever be worthy of such an office, so as to be both willing and able to rule with virtue and science, and to distribute properly to all persons things just and holy;⁶ but (disposed) to maim, and kill, and maltreat⁷ whomsoever he might wish: yet, if such a person should arise, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved and live at home happily,⁸ guiding throughout, like a pilot, alone a polity accurately correct.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But now, as we truly say, since there is no such king produced in states, as is produced by nature in a swarm of bees, excelling straightway alone in body and soul, we must,

⁵ As there is nothing to which $\delta\iota'$ δ can be referred, one would read here, either $\delta\iota'$ δ , "through which thing," or $\delta\iota'$ $\delta\nu$, "through which person."

⁶ Ficinus inserts here, "timerentque præterea, ne forte vir unus licentiam nactus—" I suspect rather from his own head than his MS.: and he is followed, as usual, by Taylor, who rarely troubled himself with looking at the Greek.

⁷ Here the maltreating, after killing, has reference to the conduct pursued by tyrants to the dead bodies of their political enemies, as shown in the case of Ajax by the Atridæ, and in that of Polynices by Creon.

⁸ To obtain this sense, it will be requisite to put $\epsilonὐδαιμόνως$ before $\deltaιακυβερνῶντα$, instead of after it. But if $οἰκτῖν$ is to be taken transitively, which can hardly be done, after the preceding passive verb $\alphaἰγαπαῖσθαι$, we must translate, "he would be beloved through his administering alone, and guiding throughout, like a pilot, happily a polity accurately correct:" as if the Greek were $\alphaἰγαπαῖσθαι \alphaὐτὸν διὰ τὸ οἰκτῖν$ —not $\alphaἰγαπαῖσθαι \tauὲ \alphaὐτὸν καὶ οἰκτῖν$.

as it seems, come together and write down statutes, treading in the footsteps of a polity the most true.

Soc. jun. It nearly appears so.

Guest. And do we wonder then, Socrates, that in such-like polities evils, such as do happen, and will happen, are produced, when the foundation placed under them (exists) by statutes and customs,⁹ and not with the foundation of science, which performs its actions in a different way than what a polity does, which, making use of imprudence, will be evident to every one, that it will destroy every thing produced by that (imprudence).⁹ Or ought we not to wonder rather at this, how strong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have for time without end been suffering thus, yet some of them are still remaining, and are not overturned. Many however sometimes, like sinking¹⁰ vessels, are perishing, have perished, and will perish,¹¹ through the incorrect conduct of the pilots and sailors,¹² who, having obtained the greatest ignorance respecting the greatest concerns, do still, although they know nothing about state affairs, think they have obtained this knowledge the most clearly of all.

[41.] *Soc. jun.* Most true.

Guest. Which then of these incorrect polities, where all are full of difficulties, is the least difficult to live in, and which the most oppressive, it is meet for us to look into a little; although it is what is called a by-deed¹³ as regards our present inquiry; yet, perhaps, on the whole, we all of us do all things for the sake of a thing of this kind.¹⁴

⁹⁻⁹ Such is my translation of this passage, which is perfectly unintelligible in the Greek, through the loss of some words that neither Schleiermacher nor Stalbaum had the sagacity to supply, here enclosed within luncs—(καὶ) μὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης (τῆς) πραττοῦσης τὰς πράξεις ἐντὶρα πως (ἢ ἡ), χρωμένη (ἀνοίᾳ), παντὶ κατὰδὲλος (ἔσται), ὡς πάντ' ἂν διορίσει τὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα.

¹⁰ Instead of καταδύμεναι, one would prefer καταλνόμεναι, i. e. not "sinking," but "loosened as to their timbers."

¹¹ Ficinns has, "perierunt pereunt atque peribunt," which is the more natural order of ideas.

¹² By sailors are meant those who are sailing in the vessel of the state.

¹³ So we say "by-play" and "by-blow."

¹⁴ Stalbaum defends, with Wyttenbach in Select. Histor. p. 414, and Hermann on Philoct. 557, the pleonasm in ἐντα and χάριν, not aware that the passage here is corrupt. Donaldson in The New Cratylus, p. 350, renders ἐντα "only," a meaning never found elsewhere. Had he read my note on Phil. 549—556, he would have found there something better than his borrowed nonsense.

Soc. jun. It is meet. How not?

Guest. Of three things then, say that the same is remarkably difficult, and at the same time most easy.

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. Not otherwise than, as I said before, that a monarchy, the government of a few, and of many, are those three polities mentioned by us at the commencement of the discourse, which has now flowed upon us.

Soc. jun. They were.

Guest. Bisecting then each of these, we shall produce six, separating from these the correct polity, as a seventh.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. Out of monarchy there came, we said, the regal and the tyrannic; and out of that (composed) not of the many, the well-omened aristocracy and oligarchy. But out of that (composed) of the many, we then laid it down under the name of a simple democracy; but we must now lay it down as two-fold.

Soc. jun. How so? And after what manner do we make this division?

Guest. Not at all different from the others; even although the name of this is now two-fold. But to govern according to the laws, and contrary to them, is common both to this and the rest.¹⁵

Soc. jun. It is so.

Guest. Then indeed, when we were seeking a correct polity, this bisection was of no use, as we have shown above; but since we have separated it from the others, and have considered the others as necessary, the being contrary or according to law causes a bisection in each of these.¹⁶

Soc. jun. So it appears from what has now been said.

Guest. A monarchy then, yoked to correct writings, which we call laws, is the best of all the six polities; but when it is without law, it is grievous, and most burthensome to live under.

¹⁵ As this passage is at variance with that in p. 292, A. § 31, where Plato denies that a peculiar name can be given to a democracy, according as the people exercise their power wisely or wickedly, some person, as stated by Stalbaum, conceived the existence of an error here.

¹⁶ Ficinus seems not to have found *νόμον*, evidently unnecessary, after *ἐν νόμῳ*, in his MS. His version is, "in his jam legis servatio et transgressio singulas bifariam partiuntur."

Soc. jun. It nearly appears so.

Guest. But the polity of the not-many we have considered as a medium between both, as a few is a medium between one and many; but on the other hand, the polity of the many, as being weak in all things, and unable, as compared with the others, to do any thing great, either for good or evil, through the offices in this polity being divided into small parts amongst many. Hence, of all the polities acting according to law, this is the worst, but the best of all such as act contrary to law. And where all are intemperate, it is the best to live in a democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the worst to live in. In the first polity is the first and best condition (of life), with the exception of the seventh; for we must separate this from all the other polities, as a god from men.

Soc. jun. These things appear thus ¹⁷ to be produced ¹⁷ and happen; and that must be done, which you mention.

Guest. Ought we not then to take away the sharers in all these polities, with the exception of the scientific one, as being not truly statesman-like but seditious-like; and as presiding over the greatest resemblances, and being such themselves; and, as they are the greatest mimics and enchanterers, to be called ¹⁸ too the greatest sophists of sophists?

Soc. jun. This appellation seems nearly to be retorted most correctly on those called statesmen.

Guest. Be it so. This indeed is, as it were, a drama for us; just as it was lately said, that we saw a certain dancing-troop of Centaurs and Satyrs, which was to be separated from the statesman's art; and now this separation has been with so much difficulty effected.

Soc. jun. So it appears.

Guest. But another thing remains, still more difficult than this, through its being more allied to the kingly genus, and at the same time more difficult to understand. And we ap-

¹⁷⁻¹⁷ The words *γίγνισθαι τε καὶ* are omitted in the three oldest but not the best MSS. They are rejected by the Zurich editors, but defended by Stalbaum. They are certainly here perfectly useless. But, if interpolated, why and from whence did they come?

¹⁸ Instead of *γίγνισθαι*, the train of ideas leads to *λίγισθαι*, as I have translated; unless it be said that Plato wrote both, *γίγνισθαι τε καὶ λίγισθαι*, and that from this passage came the *γίγνισθαι τε καὶ* found at present a little above.

pear to me to be affected in a manner similar to those that wash gold.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. Those workmen first of all separate earth, stones, and many other things; but after this there are left substances, allied to gold, mixed together and of value, and to be separated only by fire, such as brass and silver, and sometimes a diamond; which¹⁹ being with difficulty separated by the experiments of fusion (in the crucible), suffer us to see itself by itself that which is called pure gold.

Soc. jun. It is said that such things are so done.

[42.] *Guest.* After the same manner then it seems that things different from, and such as are foreign and not friendly to, the statesman's science, have been separated by us; but there have been left such as are of value and allied to it. Now of these are the military and judicial arts, and that oratory, which has a share of the kingly science, and does, by persuading men to do justice, conjointly regulate affairs in states; by separating (all) of which in a certain manner, most easily will a person show naked and alone by itself the character of which we are now in search.

Soc. jun. It is evident that we should endeavour to do this in some way.

Guest. As far as experiment goes, it will be evident. But let us endeavour to show it by means of music. Tell me, then—

Soc. jun. What?

Guest. Have we any teaching of music, and universally of the sciences, relating to handicraft trades?

Soc. jun. We have.

Guest. But what, shall we say that there is this too, a certain science respecting those very things, ²⁰(which teaches

¹⁹ This word, wanting in all the MSS., has been preserved by Ficinus alone; from whose version, "quæ," Stephens elicited, with the approbation of all modern scholars, &—required by the syntax for the following ἀφαιρῆθινα—

²⁰—²⁰ The words "which teaches" are taken from "quæ doceat" in the version of Ficinus, who probably found in his MS. διδάσκειν in lieu of αὐ καὶ ταύτην, that are quite superfluous; to say nothing of the repeated αὐ, which even Stalbaum can hardly stomach; while, instead of ἔστι· τί δὲ τὸ δ' αὖ, which he vainly attempts to defend, we must read, *Soc. jun.* ἔστι· τί δ' οὐ. *Guest.* τί δὲ—

us)²⁰ whether we ought to learn any one of them whatever or not? Or how shall we say?

Soc. jun. We will say that there is?

Guest. Shall we not then confess, that this is different from the others?

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. But whether must we say that not one of them ought to rule over the other? or the others over this? or that this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?

Soc. jun. That this science (ought to rule)²¹ over those; (which teaches)²¹ whether it is requisite to learn, or not.

Guest. You tell us then, that it ought to rule over both the taught and the teaching.

Soc. jun. Very much so.

Guest. And that the science (which decides)²² whether it is requisite to persuade or not, should rule over that which is able to persuade?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. To what science then shall we attribute that, which persuades the multitude and the crowd, through fable-talking,²³ but not through teaching?

Soc. jun. I think it is evident that this is to be attributed to the science of the orator.

Guest. But on what science, on the other hand, shall we impose this, (to decide)²⁴ whether it is meet to do any thing whatever to any persons by persuasion, or violence, or to abstain²⁵ entirely.

²⁰⁻²¹ The words within lunes were inserted by Taylor to complete the sense. Stalbaum follows Ast, who thus arranged the speeches. *Soc. jun.* This over those. *Guest.* Do you then tell us, that the science, (which teaches) whether it is requisite to learn or not, ought to rule over the taught and teaching?

²² Ficinus supplied, what Taylor adopted, "quæ—dijudicat."

²³ There is the same distinction drawn between *ρητορικὴ* and *διδασχὴ* in Gorg. p. 454, E. § 22, as remarked by Stalbaum; who however does not state in what way *ὄχλος* differs from *πληθος*; and still less that Ficinus has merely "ad turbam," as if *πλήθους κε καὶ* were wanting in his MS.

²⁴ Here again Ficinus has inserted the word "judicare," requisite to supply the sense.

²⁵ So Stalbaum, by reading *ἀπέχειν* for *ἔχειν*. Ficinus has "in quibus et in quos uti deceat," as if he had filled out the sense from his own head, in consequence of some defect in his MS.

Soc. jun. To that, which rules over the arts of persuasion and discourse.

Guest. But this, as I think, will not be any other than the power of the statesman.

Soc. jun. You have spoken most beautifully.

Guest. Thus then the science of the orator appears to have been very rapidly separated from that of the statesman, as being another species, but subservient to this.

Soc. jun. Yes.

[43.] *Guest.* But what on the other hand must we conceive respecting this power?

Soc. jun. What power?

Guest. (Respecting) that, by which we are to war with each of those against whom we may have chosen to war. Whether shall we say that this power is without art or with art?

Soc. jun. And how can we conceive that power to be without art, which the general's art and all warlike operations put into practice?

Guest. But must we consider that power, which is able and skilful in deliberating, whether we ought to engage in war, or separate peaceably, as different from this, or the same with it?

Soc. jun. To those following²⁶ the preceding (reasoning) it is of necessity different.

Guest. Shall we not, then, assert that this (the art of deliberation) rules over that (which carries on war), if we understand in a manner similar to what has been advanced before?

Soc. jun. So I say.

Guest. What power then shall we endeavour to show as the mistress of the whole art of war, so terrible and mighty, except the truly kingly science?

Soc. jun. None other.

Guest. We must not then lay down the science of generalship as that of the statesman, of which the former is the ministering assistant.

²⁶ In *ἐπομίνουσιν*, an Ionic form, inadmissible in an Attic writer, evidently lies hid *ἐπομίνους ἦν*. We find indeed in p. 291, A. § 30, *ροῦροις ἐρέποις*, where it is easy to read *ροιοῦροις γ' ἐρέποις*. Stalbaum refers to Zeller in *Commentat. de Legg. Platon.* p. 87. But I suspect nothing more is to be found there than what Matthiæ has stated in *Gr. Gr.* § 69. 7.

Soc. jun. It is not reasonable.

Guest. But come, let us contemplate the power of judges, who judge rightly.

Soc. jun. By all means.

Guest. Is it then capable of doing any thing more than merely judging respecting compacts, when, having received from a king the lawgiver, whatever has been laid down as legal, and looking both to those, and to what has been ordained to be just and unjust, it exhibits its own peculiar virtue, of never being overcome by certain bribes, or fear, or pity, or any other²⁷ hatred, or love, so as to be willing to settle mutual accusations contrary to the ordonnance of the legislator.

Soc. jun. The employment of this power is nearly nothing else,²⁸ than what you have mentioned.

Guest. We find then, that the strength of judges is not kingly, but the guardianship of the laws, and ministering to the kingly science.

Soc. jun. It appears so.

Guest. This also must be understood by him, who looks into all the aforesaid sciences, that the statesman's science has not appeared to be one of them. For it is not meet for the truly kingly science to act itself, but to rule over those able to act; since it knows that the commencement and progress²⁹ of things of the greatest consequence in states depends on opportunity²⁹ and the want of it; but it is the province of the other sciences to do as they are ordered.

Soc. jun. Right?

Guest. Hence, since the sciences which we have just now

²⁷ On the pleonastic use of ἄλλος, which Stalbaum renders "moreover," various scholars, quoted in his note, have produced various instances. But in all of them it were easy to show, that there is some error hitherto unnoticed. Here Ficinus has omitted ἄλλης. Plato wrote ἄλλους ἐχθρας, "enmity to others." For nouns of anger govern a dative. See my note on *Æsch. Suppl.* 125, and *Poppo's Prolegom.* p. 173, 264, 313.

²⁸ Ficinus has "Non aliud certe quam," which leads to Οὐκ ἄλλ' ἢ—in lieu of Οὐκ ἄλλα σχεδόν.

²⁹ Ficinus translates τὴν ἀρχὴν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν by "principium et progressum." De Geer, in *Diatrib. de Politic. Platon. Princip.* p. 144, wished to read ῥώμην. Stalbaum defends ὁρμὴν, and renders it "aggressionem," attack. But in that case he should have applied τῶν μεγίστων to persons and not to things. With regard to the sentiment, we may compare the proverb that "opportunity makes the thief." Some however would prefer perhaps to translate "since it knows that the power and onward movement of the greatest men in states—"

discussed, neither rule over each other nor themselves, but that each is occupied with a certain proper employment of its own, they have justly obtained according to the peculiarity of their actions a peculiar name.

Soc. jun. So they seem.

Guest. But we having rightly comprehended its power under an appellation in common, should, it seems, most justly call that the science of the statesman, which rules over all these and takes care of the laws, and of every thing relating to the state, and weaves all things together most correctly.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

[44.] *Guest.* Are we then willing to go through this science at present, according to the pattern of the weaving art, since all the genera pertaining to a state have become manifest to us?

Soc. jun. And very much so.

Guest. We must then, as it seems, define what is the kingly entwining, and what, after entwining, is the web it produces for us.

Soc. jun. It is evident.

Guest. It has become necessary, as it appears, to show forth a thing really difficult.

Soc. jun. It must however be told by all means.

Guest. For that a part of virtue differs in a certain manner from a species of virtue, is a point that may be very easily attacked by those, who contend in discourses against the opinions of the many.

Soc. jun. I do not understand you.

Guest. (Think) again in this way.³⁰ For I suppose you consider fortitude to be one part of virtue.

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. And that temperance is different indeed from fortitude, but that this is also a part of what that is likewise.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. On these points then we must dare to unfold a certain marvellous discourse.

Soc. jun. Of what kind?

Guest. That they have after a certain manner very greatly

³⁰ Stalbaum supplies the ellipse by 'ἄλλ' ὥδε πάλιν ἰδωμεν, and refers to Heindorf on Sophist. p. 262, A. ἐτι δὲ μικρὸν τόδε. Ficinus has "Sic forte intelliges."

an enmity with each other, and are of an opposite faction in many of the things that exist.³¹

Soc. jun. How say you?

Guest. An assertion by no means usual. For all the parts of virtue are said to be friendly to each other.³²

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. Let us consider then, applying very closely our mind, whether this is so without exception,³³ or whether rather any part³⁴ of them differs from their kindred.

Soc. jun. Inform me how we are to consider.

Guest. In all such things as we call beautiful, it is proper to investigate, but we refer them to two species contrary to each other.³⁵

Soc. jun. Speak more clearly.

Guest. Of acuteness then and swiftness, either in bodies or mind, or of the throwing out the voice, when such things exist themselves or in their resemblances, such as music and painting by imitating exhibit, have you ever been a praiser yourself, or, being not³⁶ present, have you heard another person praising any one of these things?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Do you likewise remember after what manner they do³⁷ this in each of these cases?

³¹ In this speech Ficinus has omitted the Latin for the Greek words *τὸ μᾶλα* and *στράσιν ἰναντία*, either because they were not in his MS. or rejected as unnecessary.

³² Ficinus has "*amicitia vinciri dicuntur*," as if he had found in his MS. *σύνδεσθα ἀλλήλοις—λίγεται φίλια* instead of *οὖν δὴ—φίλια*: where *οὖν δὴ* have not an atom of meaning.

³³ So Stalbaum translates here and elsewhere *ἀπλῶς*.

³⁴ Here Stalbaum has inserted *τι* after *ἵστι* from the conjecture of Heindorf.

³⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I confess I do not understand, even though Stalbaum says that by a change of construction the demonstrative pronoun *αὐτὰ* is put for the relative *ἃ*. I could have understood a sense to this effect—"In all things, such as we say are beautiful, it is meet to seek, whether there are two species, which we place opposite to each other—" in Greek, *Ἐν τοῖς ξύμπασιν χρήζητιν, ὅσα καλὰ γ' εἶναι λέγομεν, εἰ ἵστι δύο δὴ, ἃ γὰρ τίθεμεν ἰναντία ἀλλήλοιν εἶδη*, instead of *καλὰ μὲν λέγομεν εἰς δύο δ' αὐτὰ τίθεμεν*—

³⁶ I cannot understand *εἴτε ἄλλου παρῶν*, nor could Ficinus, I suspect, who has omitted *παρῶν*. I have therefore translated as if *οὐ* had dropt out after *ἄλλου*.

³⁷ Stalbaum explains *ἐρῶσι* by "they praise," and so Ficinus, "laudant."

Soc. jun. By no means.

Guest. Shall I then be able to point out to you through words, as I have it in my mind?

Soc. jun. Why not?

Guest. You seem to think a thing of this kind easy. Let us consider it then in genera somewhat contrary. For in many actions, and oftentimes on each occasion,³⁸ when we admire the swiftness, vehemence, and acuteness of thought, body, or voice, we praise them, and at the same time employ one of the appellations of manliness.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. We say it is acute and manly, swift and manly, and in a similar manner vehement:³⁹ and, universally, by applying the name which I say is common to all these natural qualities, we praise them.

Soc. jun. Yes.

Guest. But what, have we not often praised in many actions⁴⁰ the species of quiet production?⁴⁰

Soc. jun. And very much so.

Guest. Do we not then, in saying the contrary to what (we did) about them, say this?⁴¹

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. As⁴² we speak on each occasion of things done quietly and moderately as regards the mind, and admire them; and as regards actions, slowly and softly; and further as respects voice, smoothly and gravely, and of all rhythmical movement, and the whole of music which makes use of slow-

³⁸ Of the absurdity of thus uniting *καὶ πολλάκις ἐκάστοτε*, Ficinus seems to have been aware. At all events he has omitted those words. I suspect, however, that Plato wrote, *πολλάκις πολλάκις καὶ τάχος καὶ σφοδρότητα*—*λίγομεν ἐκάστοτε*—For thus *ἐκάστοτε* is perpetually united to verbs of speaking, as may be seen in Ast's Lexicon Platon., while *ἐν πολλάκις πολλάκις* is supported by *πολλάκις*—*ἐν πολλάκις* a little below.

³⁹ Ficinus has, "vehemens et forte," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ σφοδρὸν καὶ ἀνδρείον*, not *καὶ σφοδρὸν ὡσαύτως*.

⁴⁰—⁴⁰ Stalbaum remarks that this is said for "the species of things produced in quietness."

⁴¹ Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, "Non contrariis in hac atque in illis laudibus utimur."

⁴² Both Ast and Stalbaum would expunge 'ὤς, as being merely a repetition in part of the preceding πῶς. They should have suggested either Οὕτως or 'Ὡδ'.

ness opportunely, do we not assign to all these the appellation of the moderate, and not of the manly?

Soc. jun. Most assuredly.

Guest. But when, on the other hand, both these take place unseasonably,⁴³ we then in turn blame each of them by their names, distributing (them) back to their opposites.⁴⁴

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. By calling things that are and seem (to be) more acute, and quick, and harsh than is seasonable, by the names of insolent and mad; but those that are more slow and soft, (by the names of) timid and slothful. And for the most part nearly we find that these, and the moderate and manly natures, having like hostile species obtained by lot their respective stations⁴⁵ opposite to each other, never mingle together in actions about things of this kind; and still further we shall see, if we pursue (the inquiry) diligently,⁴⁶ that they, who possess these in their souls, are at variance with each other.

[45.] *Soc. jun.* Where do you say?

Guest. In all the points which we have just now mentioned, and, it is likely, in many others. For I think that, on account of their alliance with each,⁴⁷ by praising some things as their own property, but blaming the things of those who differ, as being foreign, they stand in great enmity with each other and on account of many things.

Soc. jun. They nearly appear to do so.

Guest. This difference then between these species is a kind of sport. But a disease the most baneful of all others happens to states about things of the greatest consequence.

⁴³ All the MSS. read absurdly *ἀκρίαια*. Ficinus has "opportunitatem — non servant." From which Stephens elicited *ἀκρίαια*.

⁴⁴ This is the only version I can give to *ἐπὶ τὰναντία πάλιν ἀπονέμονται*. Ficinus omits *ἀπονέμονται*, in which the whole difficulty lies.

⁴⁵ Stalbaum renders *διαλαχούσας στάσιν* by "seditionem sortitas." But no person or thing could be said to have obtained by lot a sedition. There is here, I suspect, an allusion to the three powers of matter, called respectively, the creative, the conservative, and the destructive, each having its allotted station; and on which was founded some unknown boys' game.

⁴⁶ With a perversity of judgment, to be found only in a stickler for the received text, Stalbaum rejects *σπουδῇ*, furnished by the very MSS. which he elsewhere follows, almost to the very letter, and supported by "diligenter" in Ficinus, as Winckelmann was the first to remark.

⁴⁷ Ficinus has "utrique pro naturæ suæ convenientia."

Soc. jun. About what things are you speaking?

Guest. About the whole form of living, as it is reasonable I should. For they who are pre-eminently well-ordered are always prepared to live a quiet life, themselves by themselves, managing only⁴⁸ their own concerns, and so associating with all at home, and being ready, in like manner, to be at peace, after a certain fashion, with foreign states; and through this desire, more unseasonable than is fitting, when they are doing that which they wish, they become unconsciously unwarlike, and affect the young men in a similar manner, and become ever the prey of parties attacking; of whom in not many years themselves, their children, and the whole city, often unconsciously, instead of being free, become the slaves.

Soc. jun. You speak of a severe and terrible suffering.

Guest. But what are they, who incline more to manliness? Do they not incite their own cities ever to some warfare, through a desire more vehement than is becoming of such a kind of life; and thus standing in hostile array against many and powerful (nations), either entirely destroy their own country, or place it in slavery under the power of their foes?

Soc. jun. This too is the case.

Guest. How then shall we not say, that in these cases both these genera have ever against each other the greatest enmity and array?⁴⁹

Soc. jun. It can never be that we should say no.

Guest. Have we not then found out, what we were considering at the beginning, that certain parts of virtue differ not a little from each other naturally, and that they likewise cause those, who possess them, to do the same?

Soc. jun. They nearly appear (to do so).

Guest. Let us handle again this too.

[46.] *Soc. jun.* What?

Guest. Whether any one of the sciences, that bring things

⁴⁸ By reading *μόνον* for *μόνοι*, we can get rid of the objection started by Valckenaer on Hippol. 785, against *αὐτοὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς μόνοι*. It is good Greek to say, *αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν*, or *μόνος καθ' αὐτὸν*, or *αὐτὸς μόνος*, but not *αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν μόνος*. In Rep. x. p. 604, A., *ὅταν ἐν ἰσημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν γίγνηται*, the *μόνος* is evidently an interpretation of *αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν*.

⁴⁹ Although *στάσιν* seems to be supported by *διαλαχούσας στάσιν* a little above, yet here it is quite superfluous.

together, does compose any act of its works,⁵⁰ although it should be the vilest, willingly from things evil and useful? Or does every science always reject things evil to the utmost of its power, and receive such as are apt and useful? and that from these, both similar and dissimilar, it does, by collecting all into one, fabricate one certain power and form?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. The statesman's science, when it really exists according to nature, will never willingly form a state composed of good and bad men; but it is very evident, that it will first examine by means of play;⁵¹ and, after the examination, it will hand over to such as are able to instruct and to minister to this very purpose, itself commanding and presiding, just as the weaving art presides over the wool-combers,⁵² and those who prepare the rest of the materials for weaving, and following them up, gives its orders and stands over them, pointing out to each to complete their work, such as it conceives to be fitted for its own putting together.⁵³

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. In the very same way the kingly science appears to me to keep to itself the power of the presiding art, and not to permit all, who instruct and rear up according to law, to practise aught, except what any one would, by working out a manner suited to its own temperament, effect; and this alone it exhorts them to teach; but those who are unable to communicate a manner manly and moderate, and whatever else tends to virtue, and through the force of a depraved nature are impelled⁵⁴ to ungodliness, and insolence, and injustice, it casts

⁵⁰ Such a union of *πρᾶγμα* and *ἔργον*, is, I believe, not to be found elsewhere. Ficinus has "opus aliquod suum," as if his MS. omitted *ἔργον*.

⁵¹ Stalbaum, adopting *παίδια* from fifteen MSS., explains it by saying that Plato considered that the disposition of boys was to be first ascertained in their sports. But the mention of boys could not be omitted. Opportunely then two MSS. offer *παῖδια*, "children." But as the subject of the examination ought to be stated, something it is evident has dropped out. Ficinus has "immo disciplina unumquemque primum examinabit." Perhaps Plato wrote *παῖδια παῖδας*, "children by their sports."

⁵² Ficinus has exhibited the whole of this passage in an abridged and somewhat better form—"cæterisque lanificii præparationibus præsidet, talia præcipientis singulis, qualia ad texturam suam conducere arbitratur."

⁵³ Stalbaum has adopted *ἀποθουμένους* in lieu of *ἀποθούμενα* from a solitary MS. It was so written however in the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version, "qui—ad impietatem—raptantur."

out, punishing them with death and exile and the greatest of dishonours.

Soc. jun. This is said to be the case.

Guest. But those who wallow in ignorance and have a very abject spirit, it yokes to the race of slaves.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. With respect to the rest however, whose natures meeting with instruction are sufficient to reach⁵⁴ to what is high-minded, and to receive through art a commingling with each other, of these it considers such, as incline more to manliness, to have a firmness of conduct like the strong thread in the web; ⁵⁵but such (as incline) more to a well-ordered conduct (it considers) as making use (of a thread) supple and soft, and, according to the simile (from weaving), suited to a thinner stuff;⁵⁵ and it endeavours to bind and weave together the natures inclining in a contrary direction from each other in some such manner—

Soc. jun. In what manner?

Guest. ⁵⁶In the first place, according to the alliance having fitted together the eternal part of their soul with a divine bond; and after that the divine (portion) that produces life with human—⁵⁶

[47.] *Soc. jun.* Why again have you said this?

Guest. When an opinion really true exists with firmness in the soul, respecting the beautiful, and just, and good, and the contraries to these, I say that a god-like (opinion) is produced in a divine genus.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Ficinus has “ad generosum habitum—evehī,” as if he had found in his MS. either *καθελκυσθαι* or *καθάρπυσθαι*, instead of *καθίστασθαι*.

⁵⁵—⁵⁶ Such is the only intelligible translation I can give to the elliptical and technical language of the original.

⁵⁶—⁵⁷ Such is the literal version of the Greek text; where I confess I am utterly in the dark. For I cannot understand why the middle voice, *ἐνναρμυσμένην*, is here used instead of the active, nor what is the verb required to complete the sentence, nor how *δεσμοῖς* can be supplied after *ἀνθρωπίνους*; nor in what way *δαίμονες* and *ζωογενεῖς* could be, as they seem to be here, opposed to each other. Ficinus has “Primo quidem secundum cognationis naturam, animæ ipsorum partem, quæ sempiternæ generationis est, divino vinculo nectit; post divinam autem illam, quæ animalis naturæ est, humanis.”

⁵⁷ Here again I must leave for others to understand what is quite beyond my comprehension. Stalbaum explains *ἐν δαιμονίῳ γένει* by *ἐν τῷ θείῳ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν οὐρίῳ*. But if Plato intended to say so, what

Soc. jun. It is proper it should.

Guest. Do we not know that it befits the statesman and a good legislator alone to be able, with the discipline of the kingly science, to effect this very thing in those who take properly a share in instruction, and whom we have just now mentioned?

Soc. jun. This is reasonable.

Guest. But the person, Socrates, who cannot accomplish a thing of this kind, we must by no means call by the names now sought for.

Soc. jun. Most right.

Guest. What then? Is not a manly soul, when it lays hold of a truth of this kind, rendered mild? and would it not be willing in the highest degree to partake of things just? But not sharing it, will it not incline rather to a certain savage nature?

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. But what, does not that, which is a part of a well-ordered nature, after receiving these opinions, become truly moderate and prudent, at least in a polity? But when it has not partaken of the things we are speaking of, does it not obtain most justly some disgraceful reputation for stupidity?

Soc. jun. Entirely so.

Guest. Must we not say that this entwining and binding together of the evil with themselves, and of the good with the evil, can never become stable, and that no science will ever employ it with any serious care on such as these?

Soc. jun. For how can it?

Guest. But that in those alone, who have been born with noble manners from the first, and educated according to nature, this (bond) is naturally implanted through the laws? and for these too there is a remedy through art; and, as we said before, that this is the more divine bond of the parts of virtue which are naturally³⁶ dissimilar, and tending to contraries?

Soc. jun. Most true.

Guest. Since then this divine bond exists, there is scarcely could induce him to put down words not necessarily conveying such a meaning?

³⁶ Instead of *φύσιν* Stalbaum would read *φύσει*, with Stephens, who got the idea from the version of Ficinus, "natura contrariarum."

any difficulty in either understanding the other bonds which are human, or for a person understanding to bring them to a completion.

Soc. jun. How so? And what are these bonds?

Guest. Those of intermarriages and of a communion of children, and those relating to private⁵⁹ betrothals and espousals. For the majority are in these matters not properly bound together for the purpose of begetting children.

Soc. jun. Why?

Guest. The pursuit of wealth and power on such occasions who would seriously blame, as being worthy of notice?⁶⁰

Soc. jun. It is not.

[48.] *Guest.* But it will be more just to speak of those, who make the genera⁶¹ the object of their care, should they do any thing not according to propriety.

Soc. jun. It is at least reasonable.

Guest. They do not indeed at all act from right reason, but pursue a life easy for the present; and through their hugging those similar to themselves, and of not loving those that are dissimilar, they give up themselves for the greatest part to an unpleasant feeling.

Soc. jun. How so?

Guest. They that are well-ordered seek after manners like their own, and as far as they can marry from amongst such; and on the other hand send away to them their own daughters to be married. In the same manner acts the genus that delights in manliness, while going in the pursuit of its own nature; whereas it is requisite for both the genera to do entirely the contrary.

Soc. jun. How, and on what account?

Guest. Because manliness, having been propagated, un-mixed for many generations with a temperate nature, is

* I cannot understand here *ιδίαις*, "private," as if there were ever public betrothals. Ficinus exhibits a remarkable variation, "*Conjugia inquam maris et feminae ad filiorum procreationem. Plurimi enim circa hæc tum accipiendū tum dando aberrant.*"

** Such is the version of the Greek, with the exception of the words *τι καὶ* before *τις αὖ*, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them. One MS. has *τινα*—another omits *τι*. There is some error here.

** Stalbaum, uncertain to what *τὰ γίγνη* can be applied, would read *ἵθνη*, referring that word to the varieties of disposition, mentioned just afterwards.

naturally at the beginning blooming with strength, but in the end bursts out altogether into madness.

Soc. jun. It is likely.

Guest. On the other hand, a soul very full of modesty, and unmixed with manly boldness, when it has been propagated in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes unseasonably sluggish, and at last perfectly mutilated.

Soc. jun. And this also is likely to happen.

Guest. I have said that it is not difficult to bind together these bonds,⁶² the fact being that both genera have one opinion respecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one and entire work of kingly weaving, never to suffer moderate manners to subsist apart from such as are manly; but, placing both in the same shuttle, to bring out from them a web smooth, and, as it is said, well-woven, by means of similar opinions, and honours, and dishonours, and glories,⁶³ and the interchange of pledges,⁶⁴ and to commit over to these in common the offices in the state.

Soc. jun. How?

Guest. Wherever there happens to be a need of one governor, by choosing a president who possesses both these (manners); but where (there is need) of more than one, by mingling a portion of both of them. For the manners of temperate governors are very cautious, just, and conservative; but they are in want of a certain sourness, and a sharp and practical daring.

Soc. jun. These things also appear so to me.

Guest. On the other hand, manliness is with respect to

⁶² Ficinus has "His, ut diximus, ligamentis vincire utraque hominum genera facile possumus," which is, what the Greek is not, intelligible. Perhaps Plato wrote *Τούτοις ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς—ἐννέειν τῷ γίνῃ, ὑπάρξαντε τοῦ—μίαν ἔχειν ἀπόρρητα δόξαν*—i. e. "With these bonds—to bind the two genera, after they have begun to have both one opinion." For thus we get rid of the strange use of *ὑπάρξαντος*, thus found absolutely in the sense of existing.

⁶³ Ficinus correctly omits *δόξαις*: which, if it means "glories," is almost synonymous with *τιμαῖς*; if "opinions," with *δοκοῦσιν*. On the other hand, the oldest MS. omit *ἀνιμίαις*, which Ficinus renders "vituperationes."

⁶⁴ Such is Stalbaum's version of *δηρῶν ἐκδόσεις*. But interchange is in Greek *ἀντιδοσις* or *ἐκδοσις*. In *ἐκδόσεις* there is evidently an allusion to the "giving in marriage" mentioned above. Hence Ficinus has "per alterna conjugia." There is however some deep-seated disorder here, which only a bold conjecture will be able to cure.

justice and caution rather deficient in those virtues; but it has pre-eminently in actions a daring.⁶⁵ It is however impossible for all things pertaining to states, both of a private and public nature, to well exist, unless both of these are present.

Soc. jun. How not?

Guest. Let us say⁶⁶ then that this is the end of the web of the statesman's doing, (so as for him) to weave with straight-weaving the manners of manly and temperate men, when the kingly science shall by bringing together their common life, through a similarity in sentiment and friendship, complete the most magnificent and excellent of all webs, ⁶⁷[so as to be common,]⁶⁷ and enveloping all the rest in the state, both slaves and free-men, shall hold them together by this texture, and, as far as it is fitting ⁶⁸for a state to become prosperous, shall rule and preside over it, deficient⁶⁸ in that point not one jot.

Soc. jun. You have brought, O guest, most beautifully, on the other hand,⁶⁹ the characters of the king and statesman to a finish.

⁶⁵ From the letters τὸ μὲν, which Stalbaum has cancelled, as if they had dropped from the clouds, Ast most happily elicited ἱραμὸν, the very word requisite to complete the sense.

⁶⁶ Stalbaum has improperly adopted φάμιν, with his three best MSS., in lieu of φῶμεν.

^{67—67} To the words within brackets, in Greek ὥστ' εἶναι κοινόν, Ast, whom Stalbaum follows, first objected; for he probably saw that they were omitted by Ficinus. They ought not however to be rejected entirely, but inserted a little above, by reading—Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τέλος, ὑφάσματος ὡς εὐθοπλοκία ξυμπλεκτὴν, γίνεσθαι φῶμεν πολιτικῆς πράξεως, ὥστ' εἶναι κοινόν τὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ σωφρόνων ἦθος, ὁπόταν—i. e. "Let us say then that this is the end, as of a garment woven by a straight weaving, of the statesman's working, so that the manners of manly and moderate men may be in common." To get, however, at this sense it was requisite to retain the old reading, ξυμπλεκτὴν, for which Stalbaum has from his three best MSS. substituted ξυμπλέκειν, to the destruction alike of sense and syntax, and to insert ὡς after ὑφάσματος.

^{68—68} Ficinus has more intelligibly, "ut nihil prætermittat eorum, quæ, quoad fieri potest, beatam efficiunt civitatem."

⁶⁹ In lieu of αὖ, which has no meaning here, one MS. has ἀν, which would lead to δὲ, as shown by Porson in Miscellan. Crit. p. 182. Unless indeed it be said with Stalbaum that the concluding speech is to be assigned to the elder Socrates; who would thus be seen to praise this dialogue at its end, as he does at its commencement the Sophist; which is feigned to have taken place on the same day as this, and of which the Statesman is merely the continuation.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRATYLUS.

PLATO having on various occasions, and especially in the Sophist and Statesman, applied some of the phenomena of language to the illustration of his argument on questions relating to Dialectica, and Moral and Political Philosophy, has in this Dialogue entered more at length on so much of the same subject, as is connected with the origin of words in the case of persons, acts, and things.

To this step he was probably led by finding that the Sophists, whom he every where opposes with reason and ridicule united, and whom he hunted down with all the ardour of a philosophical Nimrod, were generally the followers of the school of Parmenides or Heracleitus. Of these, the former asserted that all the phenomena of existence could be explained on the principle, that all things are ever at rest; the latter on the contrary principle, that every thing is in motion. To prove then that both were equally wrong, Plato had recourse to the phenomena of language. For as they formed a part of things in existence, the supporters of those theories ought to be able to explain, why certain names were given to certain persons, acts, and things. And so, it would seem, Protagoras did in reality attempt to do in that part of his work under the title of *Ἀλήθεια* (Truth), which was *Περὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος* (On the propriety of names), as Stalbaum has suggested; and so too, I suspect, did Euthyphron, in his philosophical poem called *Μεῦσα Φιλόσοφος*, where the doctrines attributed to Orpheus were developed; and from whence Proclus probably obtained the quotations from the Orphic poems, to be found in his Commentaries on the Cratylus and Parmenides. For such was the elasticity of the Greek language, that subjects, apparently the least suited to verse, were treated in a metrical form; as is shown by the fragments of Empedocles, Parmenides, and of Epicharmus the philosopher.

But as the reasons, by which the Philosophical Etymologists arrived at their conclusions, were little satisfactory to Plato, he probably thought, that to prove the absurdity of their theories, it was only requisite to carry out their principles to the fullest extent. He therefore amused himself with bringing forward some proper names, and nouns appellative, and a few verba, which he pretends to explain on their own principles. But this is done in a manner so utterly ridiculous, as to exhibit its own refutation on its very face; but with an air so grave, that Payne Knight said it was difficult to decide whether Plato was in jest or in earnest. So successfully indeed has the mystification been carried on, that, as stated by Stalbaum, while Menage and Tiedemann believed Plato to be speaking seriously his real sentiments, Garnier and Tennemann perceived that he was playing his usual part of an ironical philosopher. For the etymologies are not only at variance with all the well-ascertained principles of the Greek language, but they are supported by arguments one can hardly believe to be other than, as in the case of the Hippias Major, the broadest caricature of those brought forward by the persons, whom it was Plato's intention to ridicule.

To preserve however his assumed character the better, Plato pretends to account for his ignorance of the origin of some words by saying, as probably did some of the Pseudo-philosophical Etymologists of his day, and as their counterparts of the present time do certainly, that to the East we must look for the solution of many difficulties connected with this inquiry; as if any person, acquainted with all the dead and living languages of the whole world, could arrive at the origin of words, unless he could tell—what, I suspect, Prodicus or some other of the philosophers, whom Plato had in mind, attempted to do—what was the origin of each letter, and why they had a certain form, and how that form was connected with the sound of each, and how they came to follow each other in a certain order. It was not then without reason that Plato concluded the Dialogue by saying, that the question was one of so intricate a nature, as to require much further consideration; as it was impossible to prove in all cases that the names of persons, things, and acts were originally given with reference to the inherent nature of the objects represented by them, or from the caprice of one person, or the agreement of many.

THE CRATYLUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES.

HERMOGENES.

[1.] ARE you willing then that we should communicate our discourse to Socrates here?

Crat. If it seems good to you.

Herm. Cratylus here, O Socrates, says that there is a propriety of appellation naturally subsisting for every thing that exists; and that this name is not, what certain persons conventionally call it, while they articulate with a part of their speech; but that there is a certain propriety of names, naturally the same both among the Greeks and all Barbarians. I ask him then whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is. What then is the (true name) of Socrates? He replies, Socrates. In the case of all other persons then, said I, is not that the name of each, by which we call him? Your name, says he, is not Hermogenes, although all men call you so.¹ And upon my putting a question, and being very desirous to know what he means, he does not state any thing distinctly, but uses dissimulation towards me, and a feint, as if he had some thoughts in his own mind, which, should he, as being conversant with the subject, be willing to state clearly, he would cause me to agree with him, and to say

¹ "Cratylus," says Stalbaum, "denies that Hermogenes was correctly so called. For Hermogenes was neither wealthy nor eloquent, as shown by § 3 and § 54."

what he does himself. [2.] If then you can by any means unfold by guessing this oracular language of Cratylus, I shall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I would much more gladly hear about the propriety of names, in what way the matter seems to stand to you.

Soc. O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus,³ there is an old proverb, that beautiful things are somehow difficult to learn.⁴ Now the learning relating to names happens to be no small affair. If however I had heard that exhibition of Prodicus valued at fifty drachma,⁴ by which he who heard might have been instructed, as he himself says, on this very point, nothing would have prevented you from knowing immediately the truth respecting the propriety of names. But I never heard except the one for a single drachm.⁶ Hence I know not where the truth is on such-like points; but am nevertheless prepared to seek it along with you and Cratylus. [3.] But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he is, as it were,⁶ scoffing at you; for he thinks, perhaps, that though covetous of wealth, you have failed on each occasion in acquiring it. But, as I just now said, it is hard to know such-like matters; by placing however (the arguments) in common, it is meet to consider whether the fact is as you say, or as Cratylus.

Herm. In good truth, Socrates, although I have frequently disputed with this person and many others, I cannot be persuaded that there is any other propriety of appellation, than through convention and common consent. For to me it appears, that the name, which any one assigns to a thing, is the proper one; and that, if he should even change it to another,

³ Respecting this Hipponicus, Heindorf refers to Thucyd. iii. 91; Andocid. Orat. iv. p. 296; Plutarch, Alcibiad. p. 195; and Athenæus v. p. 218.

⁴ On this proverb, see the Schol. here, and Hesych. in *Χαλερά*.

⁴ To this high-priced exhibition Plato alludes in *Charmid.* § 24, and Aristotle in *Rhetor.* iii. 14. HEIND.

⁵ From this passage, and the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called *Axi-ochus*, § 6, it has been inferred that Prodicus used to suit the price of his instructions to the purse of his pupils. Hence as Socrates was a very poor man, he could only get at the lectures given for a very low sum, and consequently of very little value.

⁶ I have translated *ωσπερ* as if it were *ωσπερι*. Ficinus has, "tibi non esse revera nomen Hermogenis, quod a lucro dicitur," either from his own head or the MS. before him.

and call it no longer by the previous one, the latter name will be no less right than the former; just as we are accustomed to change the names of our servants, '[and the name so changed is not the less proper than the one previously given]';⁷ for to each thing there is no name naturally inherent, but only through the law and custom of those who are wont so to call them. But, if the case is otherwise, I am ready both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other person whatever.

[4.] *Soc.* Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something (to the purpose). Let us then consider, Is that the name of a thing, which any one puts on each thing as its appellation?

Herm. To me it appears so.

Soc. And this, whether a private person so calls it, or a state?

Herm. So I say.

Soc. What then, if I should give a name to whatever that exists, in such a manner, as to denominate that a horse, which we now call a man, and that a man, which we now call a horse, the name of man will, as regards the public, remain to the same (object); but as regards the individual, the name of horse? and on the other hand, as regards the individual, the name of man, but as regards the public, the name of horse? Do you say so?

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me then, do you say it is a thing, to speak true and false?

Herm. I do.

Soc. There will then be a discourse, one true but another false.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not that discourse then, which speaks of things as they are, be true; but that which (speaks of them) as they are not, false?

Herm. Yes.

[5.] *Soc.* This then is possible,⁸ to speak in a discourse of things which are, and which are not.

⁷ Cornarius was the first to reject as spurious the words within brackets; for he doubtless saw they were omitted by Ficinus. They are vainly defended by Heindorf and Stalbaum.

⁸ So Heind. explains *ἔστιν ἀπα τοῦτο*, as if *ἔστιν* were used in the

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Is the discourse, which is true, true as a whole, while its parts are not true?

Herm. No; but the parts are true likewise.

Soc. But are the greater portions true, and the smaller, not? or are they all (true)?

Herm. I think all.

Soc. Is there any part of a discourse, of what you are speaking, smaller than a name?

Herm. No. This is the smallest of all.

Soc. And the name is said to be a part of a true discourse?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. And it is, as you say, true.

Herm. Yes.

Soc. But is not the part of a false discourse false?

Herm. I say so.

Soc. It is then permitted to call a name true and false, since (we can call) a discourse so.

Herm. How not?

Soc. Is that, which each person says is the name of a thing, the name of each thing?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. Will there be as many names to a thing, as any person assigns to it? and at that time, when he assigns them?

[6.] *Herm.* I have no other propriety of appellation, Socrates, than this; that I should call a thing by one name, which I assign to it, and you by another, which you (assign) to it. And after this manner, I see that by each state, names are assigned individually, sometimes⁹ to the same things, both by Greeks apart from¹⁰ the other Greeks, and by Greeks apart from Barbarians.

sense of *ἐνέστι*. But in that case, as Heindorf confesses, one would expect *τοῦτο*, *τὸ—λέγειν*, although the article is omitted in Euthyd. § 37, *ἢ καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦτο—ἐξελέγξει*. Had however Heindorf known that one MS. reads *τοῦτ'οὖν* for *τοῦτο*, and another *τῷ*, perhaps he would have seen that Plato wrote *ὅτ'οὖν λόγῳ*, i. e. "by any discourse whatever."

⁹ Buttmann's emendation, *ἐνίοτε* for *ἐνίοις*, preserved by some MSS. after *ἐκάσταις*, has been adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb.

¹⁰ So Stalbaum translates *παρὰ*. I suspect however that *πᾶσι* has dropped after the first "Ἕλλησι, and *πᾶσι* after the second, to preserve the balance in the two parts of each sentence.

Soc. Come, let us see, Hermogenes, whether things that are, appear to you to exist in such a manner, ¹¹ with respect to the peculiar essence of each, ¹¹ as Protagoras said, when he asserted that man was the measure of all things; ¹² (and) ¹³ that things are to me, such as they appear to me; and that, on the other hand, they are to you such, as (they appear) to you; or do some of these seem to you to possess a certain stability of existence?

Herm. Already, Socrates, I have, through doubting, been led to this, which Protagoras asserts; ¹⁴ but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the case.

[7.] **Soc.** But what, have you ever been led to this, so that it never seemed to you that a man existed perfectly evil?

Herm. Never, by Zeus! But I have often had this feeling, so as to think, that there are some men, and very many too, profoundly wicked.

Soc. But what, have there never seemed to you to be men very good?

Herm. Very few, indeed.

Soc. Yet they have seemed to be?

Herm. Yes, to me.

Soc. How, then, do you establish this? Is it thus? That the very good are very prudent, and the very bad are very imprudent?

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. Is it possible then, if Protagoras speaks the truth, and this is the truth itself, ¹⁵ that each ¹⁶ thing is such, as it appears to each one to be, for some of us to be prudent, and some imprudent?

¹¹⁻¹¹ So Taylor translates the Greek words *ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν ἢ οὐσία εἶναι ἐκάστω*, where I can discover neither sense nor syntax; nor could Ficinus, as may be inferred from his version, "ut propria rerum apud unumquemque essentia sit," which to me is quite as unintelligible as the Greek.

¹² On this celebrated doctrine of Protagoras, see Theætet. § 23, and the authors quoted by Menage on Diogen. L. ix. 61.

¹³ I have translated as if *kai* had dropped out before *εἷς*.

¹⁴ Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain away the incorrect Greek in the words *ἑνταῦθα—εἰς ἅπασιν—λίγαι*. There is some error here, which only a bold critic would be able to correct.

¹⁵ Stalbaum conceives there is an allusion to a work of Protagoras under the title of "The Truth."

¹⁶ Heindorf thinks that Ficinus found in his MS. *ἐκάστω ἑκάστα*: for his version is "qualia quæque cuique videntur."

[8.] *Herm.* By no means.

Soc. And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, since prudence and imprudence exist, it is not possible for Protagoras to speak the truth entirely; for one person will not in truth be more prudent than another, if that, which seems to each one, is to each one true.

Herm. It is so.

Soc. I think however you will not, according to the theory of Euthydemus,¹⁷ imagine that all things exist to all persons in a similar manner, and at the same time,¹⁸ and always; for thus some persons would not be good, and others bad, if virtue and vice existed to all persons, and in a similar manner, and always inherent in all things.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. If then neither all things exist similarly and at the same time, and always to all persons,¹⁹ nor each thing is what it seems to each person,¹⁹ it is evident that there are things, which possess themselves a certain firm existence of their own; and this not as regards us, nor by being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through our imagination,²⁰ but possessing of themselves their own existence, which is naturally theirs.²⁰

Herm. This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.

[9.] *Soc.* Will then the things themselves exist naturally in this manner, but their actions not in the same manner? or are not their actions themselves one species of things?

¹⁷ This is the same person as he who is mentioned in the dialogue of that name, where his theory is explained in § 55.

¹⁸ Ficinus omits *ἅμα*, correctly it would seem, for it is not introduced into the next sentence. But as it is repeated in the next speech of Socrates, perhaps *καὶ ἅμα* ought to be inserted here before *καὶ αἰεί*, or else *ἅμα* omitted again with Ficinus.

^{19—19} So Taylor translated, as the train of ideas evidently requires. The Greek is literally, "nor to each person individually are each of the things existing." Ficinus has, "neque cuique proprium unumquodque," as if his MS. omitted with thirteen others *τῶν ὄντων ἑστί*.

^{20—20} I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἥπερ πίπτειν*—not *αὐτὰ πρὸς τὴν—ἥπερ*, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, whose version is "*sed secundum se ipsas, quoad ipsarum essentiam, ut naturæ institutæ sunt, permanentes*," as if he had found in his MS. *ὄντα* instead of *ἔχοντα*, in which word the whole difficulty lies; for it could not be taken here intransitively, as shown by the preceding *αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα*, and by *αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰς—τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσι* in Parmenid. § 15, quoted by Heindorf.

Herm. They are perfectly so.

Soc. Actions too are performed then according to their own nature, (and) not according to our opinion. As, for instance, if we should attempt to cut any of things existing, whether must each (particular) be cut as we please, and with what we please? or if we should desire to cut any thing, ²¹ according to its nature of being cut, and with the (instrument) of which it is the nature to cut, ²¹ ²² shall we both cut and will something more take place, and shall we do this rightly? ²² But if (we wish to act) contrary to nature, shall we (not) err, and effect nothing?

Herm. To me it appears so.

Soc. If then we should attempt to burn any thing, we ought not to burn it, according to every opinion, but according to that which is the right one; ²³ and this is in the way, in which each thing is by nature to be burnt and burn, and with what it is by nature. ²³

Herm. It is so.

[10.] *Soc.* Are not thus too the rest of things?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Is not then to speak one of the things (called) actions?

Herm. Yes.

²¹⁻²¹ All the MSS. have *κατὰ τὴν φύσιν*—*τοῦ τίμνειν τε καὶ τίμνεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε*, nor has a single editor seen that the thing to be cut can alone have the nature to be cut, and the cutting instrument alone the nature to cut. Wisely then did Taylor omit the words *τίμνειν τε καὶ*. But he failed to see that *τίμνειν τε* should follow *ᾧ πέφυκε*, as I have translated.

²²⁻²² Others may, but I never will, believe that Plato wrote *τεμοῦμιν τε—καὶ ὁρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο*, as if the latter expression were not perfectly superfluous after the former. He might indeed have written, and probably did, *καὶ ὁρθῶς πράξομεν τὸ πᾶν*, as opposed to *οὐδ' ἐν πράξομεν*: while, as opposed to *ἐξαμαρτησόμεσθα*, common sense requires *τελοῦμιν τε εὖ*.

²³⁻²³ Here again, in the place of a mass of nonsense, Plato wrote, I suspect, something more fit to be read, to this effect, "And this is for each thing to be burnt in the way it is naturally, and with the material which naturally burns,"—in Greek, *αὕτη δὲ ἴσθι τὸ, ᾧ γε πέφυκεν, ἔκαστον καίεσθαι, καὶ, ᾧ γε πέφυκε, καίειν*: where I have substituted *ᾧ γε πέφυκε* and *ᾧ γε πέφυκε*, partly with two MSS., instead of *ᾧ ἐπιφύκει* and *ᾧ ἐπιφύκει*, where the preposition is perfectly absurd, as Hermann might have remarked, who, in his book, *De Emendand. Ration. Græc. Gramm.* p. 202, and on Eurip. *Hec.* 213, ed. pr., correctly objected to the plus-perfect.

Soc. Whether then does he, who speaks in the way he thinks he ought to speak, correctly speak? ²⁴or, should he speak in the way in which it is the nature of things to speak and be spoken of, and with the instrument,²⁴ will he effect something and speak; but if not, will he err and effect nothing?

Herm. It appears to me it is thus as you say.

Soc. Is it not then a part of speaking to name a thing?

²⁵For they who name a thing, speak the discourses.²⁵

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Is it not then an action to name a thing? since to speak about things was a certain action.

Herm. Yes.

Soc. But actions have appeared as existing not with respect to us, but as having a certain proper nature of their own.

Herm. They have so.

Soc. We must then give names to things, in the way and by the instrument through which they exist in nature, ²⁶[to name and be named,]²⁶ and not as we please, if there is about to be an assent to what has been said before. And thus we shall do something more, and give a name, but otherwise not.

Herm. It appears so to me.

[11.] **Soc.** Come then, say we that a thing which we ought to cut, we ought to cut with something?

²⁴⁻²⁴ Here again the Greek presents the same incorrect collocation of words, as I have already noticed, and at variance with the natural flow of ideas, which is partially preserved in the version of Ficinus—"an potius quisquis ita dicat, ut natura ipsa rerum dicere dicique requirit? et, quo natura exigit, eo et dicat, aliquid dicendo proficiet?" From whence it is easy to see that Plato wrote—*ἴδν μὲν, ἧ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα λέγεσθαι καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε λέγειν—ταύτην καὶ τούτῳ λέγῃ.*

²⁵⁻²⁵ Heindorf considered the whole of this clause as an interpolation. For *λέγοναι* is not used by Plato, like *φασι*, without a nominative. Stalbaum, in defence of the omitted article, quotes, as Heindorf had done himself, Thucyd. vii. 69, *ὅπερ πάσχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσιν.* But there I have restored *οἱ* before *ἐν*, in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 107. The preceding however is not the only error here. For *τοὺς* before *λόγους* is perfectly unintelligible. Plato wrote, *οἱ ὀνομάζοντες γὰρ τι οὐ λέγουσι τοῦ λόγου τι*; i. e. "For do not they, who name a thing, speak a part of a discourse."

²⁶⁻²⁶ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation. Opportunely then does one of the three oldest MSS. omit *ὀνομάζειν τι*, and another *καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι*, and a third place *ὀνομάζειν τι καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι* only in the margin.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. And that what we ought to weave, we ought to weave with something? And that what we ought to bore, we ought to bore with something?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And what we ought to name, we ought to name by something?

Herm. It is so.

Soc. Now what is that with which we ought to bore?

Herm. An auger.

Soc. And what (is that) with which (we ought to weave)?

Herm. A shuttle.²⁷

Soc. And what (is that) by which (we ought) to name?

Herm. A name.

Soc. You speak well. The name then is a certain instrument.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. If then I were to ask, What instrument is a shuttle?
²⁸(would you not answer,)²⁸ It is that with which we weave?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. But what do we perform with the shuttle? Do we not separate the warp and the woof, which have been mixed together?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. Would you not be able to speak in the same manner of an auger, and the other (instruments)?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Can you in like manner speak of a name? Using the name as an instrument, what do we perform by naming?

Herm. I cannot tell.

[12.] *Soc.* Do we teach one another something, and distinguish things as they are?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. A name then is a kind of instrument to teach and

²⁷ Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *κρηξίς*, makes use of two words, "radius pectenque."

²⁸ The words within lunet Taylor inserted from "responderes" in the version of Ficinus. Stalbaum says that the apodosis is omitted, where one would expect *οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι λίγους ἀν*, as supplied by Heindorf. But why Plato should thus omit what is absolutely requisite for the sense, Stalbaum does not, for he could not, tell. I suspect that *ἑστῆς* has dropped out after *ᾧ κρηκίζομεν*.

distinguish the (parts) of existence,²⁹ as a shuttle (does those) of a web.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. The shuttle is a weaving instrument?

Herm. How not?

Soc. He who weaves then will employ a shuttle well,³⁰ and by well, is meant in a weaver-like manner; and he who teaches (will employ) a name well, and by well, (is meant) in a teacher-like manner.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. By the work of whom does the weaver employ properly the shuttle, when he uses it?

Herm. The carpenter.

Soc. But is every one a carpenter, or he only who possesses that art?

Herm. He (who possesses) the art?

Soc. By the work of whom does the borer properly use the auger, when he uses it?

Herm. The smith's.

Soc. Is then every one a smith, or he only who possesses that art?

Herm. He (who possesses) the art.

Soc. Well then, by the work of whom does the teacher employ a name, when he uses it?

Herm. Not even this can I tell.³¹

Soc. Nor can you tell even this, who has handed down to us the names which we use?

Herm. Not I.

Soc. Does it not appear to you that custom³² has handed down these?

²⁹ As the genitive τῆς οὐσίας cannot thus depend upon διακριτικόν, Plato wrote, I suspect, τὰ οὐσία. For otherwise the article τοῦ would be required before ὑπόστατος.

³⁰ The word "well," in Greek καλῶς, Cornarius was the first to see was wanting here; for he found "recte utetur" in the version of Ficinus.

³¹ Heindorf says that in Οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἔχω, without λέγειν, there is an allusion to Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν in § 11. But as the allusion would be too distant, one would have expected rather Οὐκ ἔχω, similar to "Nescio" in Ficinus.

³² So Heindorf explains ὁ νόμος, referring to νόμος καὶ ἔθις τῶν καλούντων in § 3, whom Stalbaum follows. But instead of ὁ νόμος, "a thing," the train of reasoning evidently requires ὁ ὀνομασθεὶς, "a person," as is read in MS. Gud. here and elsewhere. Besides, although a person may be said to introduce a custom, he can scarcely be said to

Herm. It does.

[13.] *Soc.* He then who teaches, employs the work of the custom-introducer³³ when he uses a name.

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. But does every man appear to you to be a custom-introducer, or he only who possesses that art?

Herm. He (who possesses) that art.

Soc. It is not then the province of every man, Hermogenes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names; and this, as it seems, is the custom-introducer,³⁴ who is the most rare of artificers among men.

Herm. So it appears.

Soc. But come, consider, to what does the custom-introducer³⁵ look when he establishes names; and make the survey from the previous instances. To what does the carpenter look, when he makes a shuttle? Is it not to some such thing as is weaving naturally?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. But if the shuttle should be broken by him while making it, would he make another, looking to the broken one, or to that form, according to which he was making the shuttle he had broken?

Herm. To that, it appears to me.

Soc. ³⁶Should we not therefore most justly call that very form the shuttle itself?³⁶

possess the art of introducing a custom. For there is not, and never was, such an art.

³³ So Stalbaum understands νομοθίτου. But νομοθίτης always means elsewhere in Greek a "law-giver;" nor is Plato thus wont to affix new meanings to well-known words.

³⁴ Heindorf says, that if ὀνομαθοίτης be rendered "a name-imposer," Plato will be guilty of a wretched tautology in thus introducing ὀνομαθοίτης after ὀνοματουργός. But ὀνομαθοίτης, found in the margin of one MS. and in the text of the MS. used by Ficinus, as shown by his version, "hic autem etiam, ut videtur, nominum institutor," is evidently an interpretation of ὀνοματουργός, a word coined by Plato, after the analogy of δημιουργός; and hence the whole clause, οὗτος δὲ ἴστιν, ὡς ἴσκειν, ὁ ὀνομαθοίτης, must be rejected as the interpolation of some Scholiast.

³⁵ One MS. has ὀνομαθοίτης as a var. lect., which Ficinus found in the text of his MS. For he translates it "nominum institutor."

³⁶ Ficinus seems to have found something different from the present Greek text in his MS., for his version is, "Nonne speciem ipsam merito ipsius radii rationem ipsumque radium nominabimus?"

Herm. It appears so to me.

[14.] *Soc.* When therefore it is requisite to make a shuttle, (adapted) to a thin or thick garment, either of thread or wool, or of any material whatever, it is necessary for all of them to have the form of the shuttle; but to impart its nature to each kind of work according as it is naturally the best suited for it.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. And the same method applies in the case of other instruments. For he who has discovered an instrument naturally suited to each thing, must assign it to that work, from which he will make not what he pleases, but that which is natural (to the instrument). ³⁷ For as it seems, a person ought to know how to form of iron an auger naturally suited for each (work).³⁷

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And of wood a shuttle naturally suited for each (work).

Herm. It is so.

Soc. For each shuttle, as it seems, is naturally suited to each kind of weaving; and so are the other (instruments).

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. It is necessary then, O best (of men), for the custom-introducer³⁸ to know how to form a name of sounds and syllables; and looking to what is really a name,³⁹ to frame and establish all names, if he is about to be the master-founder of names. [15.] But if each founder of names does not form of the same syllables a name,⁴⁰ we ought not to be ignorant of this.⁴¹ For neither does every smith use the same iron, when

³⁷—³⁷ Ficinus has, "Terebrum namque cuique accommodatum scire oportet in ferro perficere," omitting φύσει—ὡς εἶκε—πεφυκός—

³⁸ Heindorf and Stalbaum still stick to νομοθετην, although MS. Gud. has ὀνοματοθετην, and Ficinus "nominum institutor." But a little below, (n. 5,) Heindorf has correctly preferred ὀνοματοθετης, found in the same MS.

³⁹ Instead of οὗ ἐστιν ὄνομα, Buttmann, with the approbation of Heindorf and Stalbaum, suggested ὃ ἐστιν ὄνομα, which he obtained from Ficinus, "quod ipsum nomen est."

⁴⁰ Ficinus has "nominum conditor nomen exprimit," for he doubtless found in his MS. ὀνοματοθετης τιθησιν ὄνομα—

⁴¹ Stalbaum, as usual, vainly attempts to defend the unintelligible οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν, by saying that "one must not be ignorant of this," is the same as, "one must remember this." Heindorf more cor-

making the same instrument for the sake of the same thing; but as long as he gives it the same form, although from even⁴² a different kind of iron, the instrument is equally⁴³ correctly made, whether one makes it here, or among the Barbarians. Is not this the case?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Will you not therefore deem it right to say, that, so long as the founder of names,⁴⁴ both here and among the Barbarians, assigns the form of a name accommodated to each thing, in any kind of syllables whatever, the founder of names here is not worse than the founder in any other place whatever?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Who then is likely to know whether the convenient form of a shuttle exists in any kind whatever of wood? Is it the carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it?

Herm. It is more probable he who is to use it, Socrates.

[16.] *Soc.* Who is it then that uses the work of the lyre-maker? Is it not he, who knows how best to superintend the maker, and knows when it is made, whether it is properly made or not?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. But who is this?

Herm. The lyre-player.

Soc. And who is it (that uses) the work of the shipwright?

Herm. The pilot.

Soc. And who is he, that would superintend the best the work of the founder of names, and decide about it when finished,

rectly saw that the version of Ficinus, "animadvertendum est quod," gave a sense better suited to the train of thought. Hence out of οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν, οὐδε γὰρ, one might elicit εἰδέναι εὐ τοῦτο γ' ἄνθρωπος ἦν οὐτε οὐδὲ εἰς—"a man without wit might know this well, that not even"—

⁴² Stalbaum would read, *ἴαν* *καὶ* for *ἴαν* *τε*. He should have suggested *ὄψεσθαι* *ἐν* *ἄλλῃ* as being nearer to *ἴαν* *τε* *ἐν* *ἄλλῃ*.

⁴³ Stephens correctly suggested *ὁμοίως* for *ὅμως*. Heindorf quotes opportunely Euthyd. § 3, *ἐξελίγχειν—ὁμοίως, ἴαν* *τε* *ψευδὸς ἴαν* *τε* *ἀληθὲς γ'.* Stalbaum still sticks to the doubled *ὅμως*, because forsooth *ὁμοίως* is opposed to the reading of the MSS.; as if all conjectures are not made in defiance of them.

⁴⁴ Here, and shortly afterwards, Stalbaum rejects, what Heindorf had properly restored from MS. Gud., *ὀνοματοθέτην*: and a similar observation applies to all the subsequent passages of the same kind.

both here and among the Barbarians? Is it not he, who is to use it?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. And is not this person, one who knows how to interrogate?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And likewise to answer?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and answer, any thing else, than a dialectician?

Herm. No; but this.

Soc. It is the business then of the shipwright to make a rudder, while the pilot is superintending, if the rudder is about to be a good one.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. And (to make) a name (it is the business) of the name-founder, it seems, to have a dialectician as his superintendent, if he is about to found names correctly.

Herm. Such is the case.

[17.] *Soc.* It nearly appears then, Hermogenes, that the imposition of names is not, as you think it, an affair of no moment, nor for men of no mark, nor of such as may be met with any where. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that names belong to things from nature; and that every one is not the artificer of names, but he alone, who looks to that name, which is naturally suited to each thing, and who is able to mould its form into letters and syllables.

Herm. I know not, Socrates, how I ought to oppose myself to what you are saying. It is not however easy perhaps to be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think I should be more easily persuaded by you, if you could show me what is that which you call a natural propriety of appellation.

Soc. I myself, O blessed Hermogenes, say there is none. But you have forgotten, what I said a short time previously, that I knew nothing, but would consider the matter together with you. But now, to myself and you considering well the question together,⁴⁵ thus much appears contrary to our former opinion, that the name possesses some natural propriety, and

⁴⁵ Ficinus has "mihi et tibi simul investigantibus." From whence it is easy to read $\acute{\alpha}\mu' \epsilon\upsilon$ for $\eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ —

that it is not for every man to know how to give a name to any thing whatever correctly. Or is it not so?

Herm. Entirely so.

[18.] *Soc.* It is necessary then to inquire, if you desire to know it, after this, in what does the propriety of a name consist.⁴⁶

Herm. But I do desire to know it.

Soc. Consider then.

Herm. How must I consider?

Soc. The most correct inquiry, my friend, (will be) with those, who know through your telling out money to them, and giving them thanks. These are the sophists, to whom your brother Callias⁴⁷ told out a mint of money, and (now) appears to be a wise man. But, since you are not the master of your patrimony,⁴⁸ you must earnestly entreat your brother, and beg of him to show you the propriety respecting things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.

Herm. But this request of mine would be absurd, Socrates, if, when I reject entirely "The Truth"⁴⁹ of Protagoras, I should embrace what is stated in such a truth,⁵⁰ as things of any value.

[19.] *Soc.* But if this does not please you, we must learn from Homer, and the other poets.

Herm. And what says Homer, Socrates, about names; and where?

Soc. In many places. But those are the chief and most beautiful (passages), in which he distinguishes between the names, which men and gods assign to the same things. Or do you not think that he says something great and wonderful

⁴⁶ Instead of αὐ ἱερὸν, where αὐ has no meaning, one MS. has correctly ἱερὸν.

⁴⁷ On this Callias, see Heindorf on Thætet. § 57.

⁴⁸ From this it would seem that the father of Hermogenes was still alive. Compare Aristoph. Σφηκ. 1354. Νῦν δ' οὐ κρατῶ γὰρ τῶν ἱμαντοῦ χρημάτων. Νέος γάρ εἰμι.

⁴⁹ Here is an allusion to the work of Protagoras called "The Truth," as in § 8.

⁵⁰ Unless τῇ τοιαύτῃ be said in contempt of the work, one would suspect that Plato—τὰ δὲ ἐπη ἐν αὐτῇ, of which τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ would be the interpretation. On the loss or confusion of ἐπη, I have written something worth reading in Poppe's Prolegom. p. 180, and in the Glossary appended to my translation of the Midian oration of Demosthenes, p. 68, and I could now add a great deal more.

in those passages relating to the propriety of names? For it is evident surely that the gods call things according to the propriety which names naturally possess. Or do you not think so?

Herm. I well know, that if (the gods) call any thing by a name, they call it so correctly. But of what passages are you speaking?

Soc. Do you not know, that when speaking of the river at Troy, which fought in a single combat with Hephæstos, (Vulcan,) he says, (Il. xx. 74,)

Whom gods call Xanthus, but Scamander, men.

Herm. I do. What then?⁵¹

Soc. Do you not think that this is something of high import, to know in what way it is right to call that river Xanthus, rather than Scamander? [20.] Or, if you prefer it, in the case of the bird, which he says, (Il. xx. 291,)

Chalcis the gods, but men Kymindis call.

Do you think this is a trifling piece of learning, (to know) how much more proper it is to call the same bird Chalcis than Cymindis, or Myrine than Batiea;⁵² and there are many other (passages), both in this poet and in others. But these things are perhaps too great for me and you to discover. But the names Scamandrius and Astyanax are, as it appears to me, more for a (common) man to investigate and more easy (to see), what is the propriety of the names, which, he says, were given to the son of Hector. For you doubtless know the verses, in which are the names I am speaking of.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Which then of these names do you think Homer considered as more correctly given to the boy, Astyanax or Scamandrius?

Herm. I cannot tell.

Soc. But reflect in this way. If any one should ask you, whether you thought the more wise or the less wise would call things in the more correct manner?

⁵¹ I have adopted with the Zurich editors Heindorf's suggestion in assigning "What then?" to Hermogenes, and not, as in other editions, to Socrates.

⁵² The passage alluded to is in Il. ii. 813.

Herm. It is manifest I should answer, the more wise.

[21.] *Soc.* Whether then do women, or men, to speak of the whole (human) race, appear to you to be the wiser in cities?⁵³

Herm. The men.

Soc. Do you not then know, that Homer says that the son of Hector was called by the men of Troy,⁵⁴ Astyanax, but Scamandrius, ⁵⁵it is plain,⁵⁵ by the women; since the men⁵⁶ were wont to call him Astyanax.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. Do you not then conceive that Homer considered the men of Troy wiser than the women?

Herm. I think so.

Soc. He therefore thought that the name Astyanax was more correctly given to the boy than Scamandrius.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. But let us consider why he did so. Or does he not himself give the best explanation for the reason? For he says,

To throw a bulwark he alone was found,
The city's gates⁵⁷ and the long walls around.

On this account then, as it seems, it is proper to call the son of the saviour, Astyanax; of that⁵⁸ which, as Homer says, his father preserved.

[22.] *Herm.* So it appears to me.

⁵³ i. e. in a civilized state.

⁵⁴ In Il. xxii. 506.

⁵⁵—⁵⁶ The words *ἦλλον ὅτι* are omitted in MS. Gud. and the version of Ficinus. They are perfectly unnecessary.

⁵⁶ It was not the men of Troy, but Hector himself, who called his son Astyanax, as stated in Il. vi. 402.

⁵⁷ In Homer, Il. x. 506, the existing text has *πόλας* instead of *πόλιν*, as quoted by Plato. I have united the two readings.

⁵⁸ In lieu of the unintelligible *τούτου*, which has nothing to which it can be referred, Ficinus offers a supplement, nothing similar to which seems at present to have been found in any MS.—“Quapropter decet, ut videtur, protectoris filium nominare Astyanacta, *id est regem urbis*; *urbis, inquam, ejus*, quam pater suus servavit, ut inquit Homerus.” Perhaps Plato wrote *καλεῖν τὸν Ἑκτορος υἱὸν Ἀστυάνακτα, ὅτι τὸ ἄστυ ἔσωζεν ἀναξὶς ὁ πατὴρ αὐτός*, i. e. “to call the son of Hector Astyanax, because the father had, as a prince, himself saved the city.” Opportunely then does MS. Gud. read *Ἑκτορος* for *σωτήρος*.

Soc. But what is this? For I do not myself understand this at all. Do you understand it?

Herm. By Zeus, I do not.

Soc. But, my good (friend), Homer has himself given to Hector his name.

Herm. Why so?

Soc. Because it appears to me that this name (of Hector)⁵⁹ is something similar to Astyanax,⁶⁰ and these names appear to be Greek; for king and Hector signify nearly the same thing, both the names to be royal.⁶⁰ For over whatsoever one is a king, he is also doubtless a Hector over it; since he evidently rules over it,⁶¹ possesses and has it.⁶¹ Or do I appear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but unconsciously (err), in thinking I have hit upon, as it were, the track of Homer's thoughts respecting the propriety of names?

Herm. By Zeus, not you indeed, as it seems to me; but perhaps you have hit upon something.

Soc. For it is just, as it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do not mean, should something else than a horse be produced, like a monster, from a horse, but I speak of that which should be its offspring as a natural production. For ⁶²if a horse

⁵⁹ Ficinus alone has "id nomen Hector."

⁶⁰—⁶⁰ Such is the literal version of the nonsense in the Greek text. Ficinus has "Ferre enim idem significant; putantque Græci utraque hæc nomina regia esse." Heindorf, translating *ἵκειν* by "like to," would read *ἵκει—*Ἀστυνάκτι καὶ ἱκίναί *Ἑλληνικοῖς ταῦτα τὰ δυνάματα (ὁ γὰρ ἀναξ καὶ ὁ Ἑκτωρ σχεδὸν τι ταυτὸν σημαίνει) βασιλικά ἀμφοτέρω εἶναι τὰ δυνάματα*; while Stalbaum would incorrectly expel *βασιλικά*, κ. τ. λ., as an addition arising from a gloss. He saw however correctly that *τὰ δυνάματα* could not be thus repeated. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, καὶ γὰρ σχεδὸν τι ταυτὸν σημαίνει ταύτῳ τῷ δυνάματι ὁ τε ἀναξ καὶ ὁ Ἑκτωρ καὶ ἵκειν *Ἑλληνικῶς ἀμφοτέρω βασιλικά εἶναι*. The source of the error is to be traced to the transposition of some words and the interpolation of others.

⁶¹—⁶¹ This repetition of *αὐτοῦ* and *αὐτὸ* is extremely inelegant. Instead of *κρατεῖ τε αὐτοῦ* one would prefer *κρατεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος*. With regard to the derivation of *ἔκτωρ* from *ἔχω*, like *ἄκτωρ* from *ἄγω*, Plato seems to have forgotten that it was contrary to analogy. For all nouns in *τωρ* are derived from the third pers. sing. of the perf. pass. But as *ἔχω* has no perf. pass., there could be no such noun appellative as *ἔκτωρ*. But though *ἔχω* has no perfect passive in use, it seems to have had one originally. At least there would be naturally formed from it *ἔχμα*, as remarked by the Etymol. M. p. 405, 19, and *ἔξικ*.

⁶²—⁶² Such is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek; and equally

should, contrary to nature, beget a calf, the produce of a cow by nature, we must call it not a colt, but a calf.⁶² ⁶³ Nor do I think that, if from a man an offspring should be produced not of a man, the progeny ought to be called a man; but if it be the offspring.⁶³ And similar is the case of trees, and all other things. Or do you not agree with me?

Herm. I do agree.

[23.] *Soc.* You speak well. But take care lest I somehow cheat you. For according to the same reasoning, the offspring of a king ought to be called a king. Now it matters not whether the signification be the same in syllables different in one way

nonsensical is the version of Ficinus, "*Si enim bovis secundum naturam filius equum gignit, non vitulus, qui nascitur, sed pullus equinus est nuncupandus.*" Plato wrote, *ἴδν γὰρ βοὺς ἵππον ἱκγονον, ὃν φασιν ἡμίππον παρὰ φύσιν τέκν, οὐ μόσχον, κλητίον ἀλλὰ πῶλον*, i. e. "if a bull should, contrary to nature, beget the progeny of a mare, which they call a half-horse, we must call it not a calf, but a colt." With regard to *ἡμίππον*, the compound follows the analogy of *ἡμιάνθρωπος*, and *ἡμίονος*, and *ἡμίθειος* in Greek, and of "semivir" and "semibos" in Latin. This, however, is not the only error in this passage. For, as Taylor was the first to remark, Ficinus found in his MS. something at present wanting in the common text, *ἴδν βοὺς ἱκγονον φύσει ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκν μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητίον, ἀλλὰ μόσχον*. Instead of which we ought, says Taylor, to read, *ἴδν βοὺς ἱκγονον φύσει ἵππον τέκν οὐ μόσχον κλητίον, ἀλλὰ πῶλον, καὶ ἴδν ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκν μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητίον, ἀλλὰ μόσχον*, corresponding to the version of Ficinus, "*Si enim bovis secundum naturam filius equum gignit, non vitulus, qui nascitur sed pullus equinus est nuncupandus; et, si equus præter naturam gignit vitulum, non pullus equinus dicendus est iste, sed vitulus.*" By the aid of which, Buttman would read, with the approbation of Heindorf, *Ἐάν γὰρ βοὺς ἵππου ἱκγονον φύσει παρὰ φύσιν τέκν, οὐ μόσχον ἀλλὰ πῶλον κλητίον καὶ ἴδν βοὺς ἱκγονον φύσει ἵππος τέκν, οὐ πῶλον κλητίον ἀλλὰ μόσχον*. But in the first clause, *φύσει παρὰ φύσιν* could not be thus united; and if they could, *παρὰ φύσιν* could not be omitted in the second clause. I suspect then that, as the whole of this sentence was meant to balance the preceding one, Plato wrote, *ἴδν δὲ ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν, ὃν φασιν ἡμίβουν, βοὺς ἱκγονον τέκν, οὐ πῶλον κλητίον, ἀλλὰ μόσχον*, i. e. "if a horse should, contrary to nature, beget a progeny from a cow, what they call a half-cow, we must call it not a colt but a calf." See § 25, *κάν ἵππος βοὺς ἱκγονον τέκν*. Stalbaum however conceives, with Schleiermacher and Beck, that no alteration will be requisite if we merely expunge the first *μόσχον*.

⁶²—⁶³ Here again the Latin of Ficinus is both different from, and superior to, the present Greek text—"Neque etiam, si ex homine alia proles, quam humana, producitur, quod nascitur, homo vocari debet," which would be in Greek, *οὐδ' ἄλλ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, οἶμαι, ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπου, ἱκγονον γίνηται, τὸ ἱκγονον ἀνθρώπος κλητίον*.

or another; nor if a letter be added or taken away, is even this any thing, so long as the existence of the thing is in force, and shown by the name.

Herm. How say you this?

Soc. Nothing complex; but as you know we pronounce the names of the elements, but not the elements themselves, except four, ε and υ, and ο and ω; and placing round,⁶⁴ you know, other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, (consonants,) we form names, and pronounce them. But, as long as we insert the exhibited power of the element, it is well to call it by the name which the element exhibits. As, for instance, βῆρα. Here you see that, although the η and the τ and the α have been added, there is nothing to pain⁶⁵ us, so as not to exhibit by the whole name the nature of that element which its name-founder⁶⁶ intended; so well did he know how to give names to letters.

Herm. You appear to me to speak the truth.

[24.] *Soc.* Will not then the same reasoning take place respecting a king? For a king will be produced from a king, both good from a good one, and beautiful from a beautiful one;⁶⁷ and so in the case of every thing else, from each genus another such is the progeny, unless something monstrous is produced, and they must be called by the same name. But it is possible to vary (the names) by syllables, so that, to an unskilled person, what are the same would appear to be different from each other. Just as the drugs of physicians, when varied by colours or smells, appear to us to be different, although really the same; but to the physician, as one who looks to the power of the drugs, they appear to be the same, nor is he struck at all with astonishment by the additions to them. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled in names looks to their value, and is not struck with astonish-

⁶⁴ Ficinus has "addentes," as if he found in his MS. προστιθέντες. Perhaps Plato wrote ἡ προστιθέντες ἡ περιτιθέντες—

⁶⁵ The verb constantly used elsewhere by Plato in this formula is κωλύει.

⁶⁶ Strange to say, Heindorf has here left ὁ νομοθέτης in the text, although Ficinus had already pointed to ὀνοματοθέτης by his "nominum auctor."

⁶⁷ Such too is the sentiment of Horace, "Fortes creantur fortibus; et bonis Est in juvenis, est in equis patrum Vigor," for so Wakefield correctly points that passage.

ment if a letter is added, or changed, or taken away, or the same value of the name is found in the other letters taken all together. [25.] As in the names of Astyanax and Hector, which we have just spoken of; they do not possess any one of the same letters, except the τ , and yet they signify the same thing. And what has ἀρχέπολις (ruler of a city) in its letters common (with the two preceding names)?⁶⁸ and yet it means the same thing. And there are many other words which signify nothing else than a king; and others again (which signify) an army-leader, as Ἄγις, Πολέμαρχος, Εὐπόλεμος; and others connected with medicine, as Ἰατροκλῆς and Ἀκισίμετρος. And perhaps we could find many others disagreeing in syllables and letters, but in their value speaking the same sense. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And that to those, who exist according to nature, the same names should be assigned?

Herm. Perfectly so.

Soc. What then, to those, who are born contrary to nature, and in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious man an impious one is produced; surely, as we said before, that if a horse should beget a progeny from a cow (the offspring)⁶⁹ ought not to have the name of the begetter, but of the party that brought it forth?⁷⁰

Herm. Entirely so.

[26.] *Soc.* To the impious man, then, produced from the pious one, the name of his genus must be assigned?

Herm. Such is the case.

Soc. Not Theophilus, (god-loving,) nor Mnesi-theus, (god-remembering,) nor any name of this kind, but something which

⁶⁸ The words within lunes Taylor took from the version of Ficinus, "cum duobus superioribus."

⁶⁹ Heindorf acutely saw that τὸ ἔκγονον, which is wanting, was preserved correctly in the version of Ficinus, whose Latin is rather more intelligible than the Greek: "qui genitus est, non genitoris nomen sortiri debet; sed, ejus in quo ipse est generis; quemadmodum supra diximus, si equus bovis prolem generat, non equum ejus filium sed bovem denominandum."

⁷⁰ Such is evidently the sense required by the antithesis; although it can hardly be got from the words τοῦ γένους οὗ ἐστίν, which mean literally, "of the genus to which it belongs." But as the offspring in this case would belong to two genera, that genus should be distinctly stated, from which it has to take its name.

signifies the contrary to these, ⁷¹(must we call such a son,) ⁷¹if names are to possess any propriety.

Herm. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. Just as, Hermogenes, the name of Orestes nearly appears to be correct; whether a certain fortune assigned to him this appellation, or some poet, ⁷²pointing out by this name the savageness of his nature, and his wildness, and the (habits) of a mountaineer. ⁷²

Herm. So it appears, Socrates.

Soc. It seems also that the name of his father was according to nature.

Herm. It does so.

Soc. For it nearly appears that Agamemnon was ⁷³such a person as, with respect to whatever he had determined to labour through and endure, to put the finish to what he had determined on through valour. ⁷³ And the proof of his patient endurance is his staying at Troy with so great a host. ⁷⁴ That

⁷¹—⁷¹ Ficinus has in his version alone, "vocare filium talem decet," preserved the words wanting to complete the sense.

⁷² This notion turns on the supposition that 'Ορίστης, like 'Ορεισιάς, the name for a mountain-nymph, is derived from 'Ορος, a mountain. While from the allusion to a poet, it is easy to see that Æschylus or Euripides wrote in some play the distich—Καλῶς 'Ορίστην ὀνομά τις τύχη θεῖο, Τὴν θηριώδους σὴν δρεινὴν γνούς φύσιν—addressed to Orestes by Clytemnestra, Menelaus, or some other character.

⁷³ Such is the literal version of the Greek text, οἷος, & ἂν δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν, τίλος ἐπιτιθεῖς τοῖς δόξαισι δι' ἀρετὴν: where others may, but I will never, believe that Plato wrote & ἂν δόξειεν—τοῖς δόξαισι—or that οἷος ἐπιτιθεῖς is any thing but a barbarism. Opportunely then does MS. Gud. offer ἐπιτιθέναι. Unless I am greatly mistaken, in τοῖς δόξαισι δι' ἀρετὴν there lies hid τῆς ἐδόξης διδίας δι' ἀρετὴν. For the whole sentence was originally to this effect—οἷος, οἷς ἂν δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν, τίλος ἐπιτιθέναι τῆς ἐδόξης διδίας δι' ἀρετὴν, i. e. "such as to put by his valour the finish of an eternal glory to whatever he had determined to labour through and endure." For thus, δόξης διδίας may be compared with διδίων ἐόξαν in Thucyd. iv. 87; ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς περὶ in Plato Sympos. p. 208. D., ἀθάνατον δόξαν in Isocrat. Archidam. p. 138. B.

⁷⁴ I have adopted, with Heindorf, what Ficinus found in his MS. as shown by his version: "Argumentum vero tolerantiae suæ apud Trojam tanto cum exercitu perduratio præbuit:" which is far more intelligible than the Greek, σημείον δὲ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐν Τροίᾳ μνη τοῦ πλήθους τε καὶ καρτερίας—which Stalbaum fancies is to be restored by reading τοῦ πλήθους μετὰ καρτερίας. But it was not by his staying with a great or small army that Agamemnon gave any proof of his patient endurance. It was rather by the great number of the years, during which he staid at

this man therefore is to be admired for his staying, and is denoted by the name Agamemnon.⁷⁵ [27.] Perhaps, too, Atreus is correctly said; for his murder of Chrysippus, and what he did so very cruelly to Thyestes, were all noxious and hurtful as regards virtue.⁷⁶ The appellation, therefore, of the name⁷⁷ turns a little on one side, and conceals its meaning, so as not to show the nature of the man to all; but to those who are skilled in names, Atreus sufficiently points out what it means. For his name properly exists in every way with reference to what is not worn down, not fearing,⁷⁸ and hurtful. It appears also to me, that his name was properly given to Pelops: for this name signifies one who sees things near; and I think⁷⁹ he is worthy of the appellation in some such way as this.

Herm. How?

Soc. In such a way as this. It is reported against this man, that in the murder of Myrtilus, he was neither able to think beforehand, nor perceive any of the things afar off relating to his whole race, with how great a calamity he would fill it; but only to see⁸⁰ what was near, and on the instant; for such

Troy. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, σημείον δὲ αὐτοῦ τῆς καρτερίας ἢ ἐν Τροίᾳ μονή ἀν' ἐτῶν τόσον πλήθος: where I have elicited μονή ἀν' ἐτῶν τόσον πλήθος from μονή μετὰ τόσου πλήθους in a solitary MS. Respecting the loss or corruption of ἐτῶν see my Poppe's Prologem. p. 222; and with the phrase ἐτῶν πλήθος compare χρόνου πλήθος in Thucyd. i. 1, Plato Theætet. p. 158, D., μηνῶν πλήθει in Soph. Philoct. 724, πλήθους ἐτῶν in Aristoph. Νεφ. 845, and πλήθος—ἐτῶν in Isocrates.

⁷⁵ For Ἀγαμέμνων, says the Etymol. M., is formed from ἄγαν, "very," and μένων, "staying."

⁷⁶ As the name of Ἀτρεὺς is thus feigned to be connected with ἀτρεὺς, the words ζημιώδη πρὸς ἀρετὴν ought to follow ἀτρεὺς, not precede it. Plato wrote πάντα ταῦτα ἀτρεὺς καὶ ζημιώδη πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἦν.

⁷⁷ Heindorf vainly attempts to explain τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπωνυμία. For he did not see that Plato wrote τοῦ ἀνόμου τόσου ἐπωνυμία, i. e. "the appellation for such iniquity."

⁷⁸ Etymol. M. Ἀτρεὺς—παρὰ τὸ τρίω γίνεται τρεὺς: καὶ μετὰ τοῦ στερητικοῦ α ἀτρεὺς, ὁ ἀφοβός, ἢ παρὰ τὸ τείρω τὸ καταπονῶ, μετὰ τοῦ στερητικοῦ α, ἀτρεὺς καὶ συγκοπῇ ἀτρεὺς, ὁ ἀκαταπόνητος.

⁷⁹ The common text is ἄξιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπωνυμίας. But one MS. has καὶ ἄξιον, and another τῆς οὕτως πῶς ἐπωνυμίας: while to support the syntax Buttmann would read οἶμαι for εἶναι. Plato wrote, as I have translated, καὶ ἄξιον οἶμαι εἶναι αὐτὸν οὕτως πῶς τῆς ἐπωνυμίας. Stalbaum's rendering is, "For this name signifies that he, who looks near, is worthy of such an appellation." But the word Pelops could not signify that such a person was worthy of such a name.

⁸⁰ One MS. has ὁρᾶν for ὁρῶν, which leads to τὸ δ' ἔγγος, for τὸ ἔγγος—Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend the anomaly of the syntax.

is the meaning of *πῆλας* (near), when he desired to obtain, by all means, his marriage with Hippodamia. ⁸¹ (From whence the name of Pelops comes from *πῆλας*, near, and *ὄψις*, sight).⁸¹ [28.] To Tantalus, likewise, all would deem the name to have been properly and naturally assigned, if it be true what is told of him.

Herm. What is it?

Soc. That, while he was yet living, many and terrible misfortunes happened to him; of which⁸² at last his whole country was overthrown;⁸³ and that, when he was dead, there was the vibration⁸⁴ of the stone over his head in Hades, it being wonderfully in unison with his name; for it really seems as if one, wishing to call him *ταλάντατος* (most miserable), did,⁸⁵ concealing (that name), call him by the name of Tantalus (instead of Talantatus).⁸⁵ And it seems that the accident

⁸¹—⁸¹ The words within lunas are found only in the version of Ficinus, "Unde Pelopi nomen a pelas, id est prope, et opsia, quod ad visionem pertinet."

⁸² Stalbaum fancies that *ὤν* can follow *τάλος* used adverbially. Heindorf would supply the ellipse by *τὸ τάλος ἦν*. Plato wrote perhaps *ὥστε καὶ*—for *καὶ* thus follows *ὥστε*, as shown by Elmsley in Cl. Jl. N. xi. p. 222.

⁸³ Stalbaum would translate *ἀνετράπετο*, "corruit." But the aor. 2, in the middle voice of *τρέπω*, could not be thus used passively. He should have read *ἀνετρίπετο*, or *ἀνετίραπτο*.

⁸⁴ Bekker has *ἡ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ λίθου τανταλεία, θαυμαστὴ ὡς ξύμφωνος τῇ ὀνόματι*. But as *τανταλεία* could not be used for *ταντάλεισις* or *ταντάλωσις*, or, if it could, it would not suit the subsequent *ταλάντατον*, Stalbaum has adopted *ταλαντεία*, the conjecture of Schleiermacher, found subsequently in one MS., and to which Schleier was probably led by "sors certe durissima" in Ficinus. But *ταλαντεία*, not *ταλαντεία*, would come legitimately from *τάλας*. I suspect that Plato wrote *ἡ τοῦ λίθου ταλαντιαίου θαυμαστὴ στάσις, οὕσα ξύμφωνος τῇ ὀνόματι*. For *λίθου ταλαντιαίου* would be similar to *ταλαντιαῖον κλῆρον* in Suid. *Ἐγγιον*, and to *χρημάτων βάρος τριταλαντιαῖον* in Suid. *Τριτάλαντον*: while in the play upon the words *Τάνταλος* and *Ταλαντιαῖος*, there would be an allusion to the proverb *τὰ Ταντάλον τάλαντα*, which Plato had in mind, when he was speaking of the *Ταντάλον χρήματα* in Euthyphr. p. ii. D.=§ 12. With regard to *στάσις*, the more correct word would perhaps be *κρίμασις*, as may be inferred from the passages quoted by Porson on Orest. 5. But *στάσις οὕσα* are nearer the letters *αση ὡς συμ* than *κρίμασις οὕσα*.

⁸⁵—⁸⁵ Edd. *ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὀνομάσει καὶ εἶποι ἀντ' ἐκείνον*. But Ficinus, "paulo locutus obscurius pro Talantulo Tantalum posuisset," thus avoiding the inelegant tautology in *ὀνομάσει καὶ εἶποι*, where lies hid, I suspect, *εὐ τὰ ἀνόσια καὶ ἄθια, εἶποι*— For the acts of Tantalus were *ἀνόσια* and *ἄθια*.

of the rumour⁶⁶ contributed to some such appellation. But it appears that the name of him, who was called his father, was made in an all-beautiful manner. It is however by no means easy to understand it. For in reality the name of Zeus is, as it were, a sentence; and persons dividing it into two parts, some of us make use of one part, and some of another; for some call him Ζῆν, and some Δίς. But these parts collected into one, exhibit the nature of the god; which, as we have said, a name ought and should be able to do. For there is no one, who is more the cause of living, both to us and every thing else, than he who is the ruler and king of all.⁶⁷ [29.] It follows therefore that this god is rightly named, through whom life is present to all living beings; but the name, though one, is distributed, as I have said, into two parts, Dis and Zēn. Now he, who hears on a sudden that this god is the son of Kronos, may perhaps think it an insulting assertion. But it is according to reason for Zeus to be the offspring of some great intellect. Now Koros⁶⁸ does not signify a boy, but the pure and unmixed nature of intellect. Now he (Kronos) is the son of Ouranus (Heaven): and the sight directed to things above has fairly a right to be called by this name, Ourania (heavenly), from beholding things on high. From whence too, Hermogenes, they who discourse on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with

⁶⁶ I cannot understand ἡ τύχη τῆς φήμης. I could however ἡ τῆς τύχης ἡ φήμη, i. e. "the report of his misfortune."

⁶⁷ From this passage of Plato were perhaps derived the Pseud.-Orphic verses, quoted by Joannes Diac. Allegor. on Hesiodi Theog. p. 278; 482, Gaisf. Ἔστιν δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ Ζεὺς. Ζεὺς γὰρ ἰδῶκε, Ζῶα τ' ἐγέννησεν καὶ Ζῆν' αὐτὸν καλεῖουσι, Καὶ Δία τ' ἡδ' ὅτι δὴ διὰ τοῦτον ἅπαντα τίτκεται. Εἰς δὲ πατὴρ οὗτος πάντων, θηρῶν τε βροτῶν τε. i. e. "Zeus is the beginning of all things. For Zeus has given and generated animals, and men call him Ζῆν, and also Δίς: because all things were fabricated through him; and he is the one father of all things, both beasts and men."

⁶⁸ Ficinus has "Quod enim Coros dicitur." But the train of ideas evidently requires something to connect Kronos with Koros. Hence, says Heindorf, one would have expected that Plato wrote Κρόνος γὰρ κόρον σημαίνει· κόρος δὲ οὐ παῖδα. There was, I suspect, originally something to this effect, "Now Koros, which Kronos was once, signifies not a boy." For that Kronos was once a boy, is evident from the legend that makes him the son of Ouranus. To this passage is to be referred Etymol. M. Κρόνος· ὁ Κρόνος τῆς νοεῖας ζωῆς ἐστὶ δοτήρ, κόρος ὦν τοῦ νοῦ· μαλλον δὲ κόρος νοῦς καὶ καθάρως

him, and that the name of Ouranus⁹⁰ is very properly given to him. Indeed, if I had remembered Hesiod's genealogy of the gods, (and)⁹¹ whom he mentions as their still preceding progenitors, I should not have desisted from showing you how correctly their names have been laid down, until I had made trial of this wisdom, what it will effect, whether it faints or not, which has now recently come upon me so suddenly, I know not from whence.

[30.] *Herm.* Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to speak oracles on a sudden, like those inspired by a god.

Soc. And the reason I assign,⁹² Hermogenes, is, that this wisdom has come upon me through Euthyphron of the ward of Prospaltius:⁹³ for I was much with him in the morning, and I gave him my ears.⁹⁴ It nearly appears then, that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wisdom, but laid hold also of my very soul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in this way; to make use of this wisdom to-day, and to contemplate what yet remains concerning the propriety of names; but to-morrow, if it seems good to you, we will send it away (as a pollution), and purify ourselves from it, after finding out a person who is skilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he be one of the priests, or the sophists.

Herm. I assent to this; for I shall hear, with great pleasure, what remains (of the discussion) respecting names.

Soc. But it is necessary to act thus. From whence then do you wish us to begin the inquiry, since we have arrived at a certain form,⁹⁵ that we may know whether the names them-

⁹⁰ For Οὐρανός is feigned to be derived from ὀρᾶν ἄνω, "to look above."

⁹¹ This "and," requisite for the sense and syntax, has been preserved by Ficinus alone.

⁹² Ficinus translates αἰριῶμαι by "reor," as if he had read ἀξιοῦμαι.

⁹³ This was a ward of the tribe of Acarnas. On the wards of Athens the reader may consult Gronovius' Thesaur. Antiquitat. t. xi. Leake in The Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, t. i. p. 2, p. 114, and foll. A Dissertation by Westermann in Zeitschrift für die Alterthums-wissenschaft, 1848, No. 5—8. Sauppe too has written "De Demis Urbanis Atheniensibus," Leips. 1846, and Ross, "Die Deme von Attika," Halle, 1846. But of the two last works I know nothing except the titles.

⁹⁴ The phrase in Shakspeare is "Lend me thine ears."

⁹⁵ Instead of τύπον one would expect either τόπον, "place," or ἄτρακτον "path." For though I am well aware that τύπος is constantly applied

selves will testify in our favour, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but possess a certain propriety? [31.] Now the names that are mentioned of heroes and men would perhaps deceive us; for many of these exist according to the appellations of their ancestors, and do not suit some persons,⁹⁶ as we stated at the commencement. But many assume them, as matters of boasting,⁹⁷ such as Eutychides (the son of the fortunate), Sosias (the son of the saved), and Theophilus (the god beloved), and many others. Such then as these, it appears to me, we ought to dismiss. But it is most probable that we shall find names properly imposed, respecting things existing for ever, and naturally produced; for in these it is especially fitting for the imposition of names to be a careful study. But perhaps some of these have been given by a power more divine than that of man.

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak well.

Soc. Will it not then be just, to begin from the gods, when we are considering that very thing, why the gods are properly called by that name?

Herm. It will be reasonable.

Soc. I suspect then it is of this kind. It appears to me that the first men of those connected with Greece, considered those only as gods, whom many at present of the Barbarians do; the sun, and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heavens. Now as they perceived all these moving and running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of running they called them gods;⁹⁸ but afterwards, perceiving that there were others, they called all of them by the same name. Seems what I say to be like the truth, or not?

Herm. It seems very like.

to a discourse, yet, I believe, it is not elsewhere united to *εἰσβαλεῖν*. Ficinus has "formulam præscripsimus."

⁹⁶ Some MSS. *ἐνίοις*, others *ἐνίοτε*. Perhaps Plato united the words.

⁹⁷ Stalbaum has failed to see that in *εὐχόμενοι* there is an allusion to the Homeric *εὐχομαι εἶναι*.

⁹⁸ For *θεός* was supposed to come from *θεῖν*. Hence in Etymol. M. *θεός*, παρὰ τὸ *θεῖω*, τὸ *τρίχω*—οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἐπὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων, ἀστατοῦσι γὰρ, ἐτίθεισαν τὸ ὄνομα παρὰ τὸ *ἀεὶ θεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι*—ἢ παρὰ τὸ *θεῖω*, τὸ *κατασκευάζω καὶ ποιῶ*· ὁ πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων κατασκευῆς αἰτίας γίνεσθαι *θεός* καὶ *θεός*; where instead of *ΘΟC*, one would prefer *ΘΘΘ*. For, as Herodotus says in ii. 52, the Egyptians called the deities *θεοὺς*, as *θεῖντας* (having placed) the universe in order.

[32.] *Soc.* What then shall we consider after this? Is it not clear, (we ought to consider about) dæmons, heroes, and men?

Herm. About dæmons.

Soc. Now in good truth, Hermogenes, what does the word dæmons mean? Consider whether I say aught to the purpose?

Herm. Only say what it is.

Soc. Know you then whom Hesiod says are dæmons?

Herm. I do not understand.

Soc. But know you not that he says, the golden race of men was first created?

Herm. This I know.

Soc. He says, then, concerning it,⁹⁹

But when concealed had Destiny this race,
Dæmons there were, called holy, upon earth
Good, ill-averters, and of man the guard.

Herm. What then?

Soc. I think he calls the race golden, not as being naturally of gold, but as being beautiful and good. And I infer this, from his calling us an iron race.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. Do you not then think, that if any one of those living now were good, Hesiod would say he was of that golden race?

Herm. Probably.

Soc. But are the good any other than the prudent?

Herm. The prudent.

[33.] *Soc.* On this account then, especially, as it appears to me, he speaks of them as dæmons; because they were (dæmones) prudent and learned. And, in our old language, this very name occurs. Hence both he, and many other poets, say well, who say that when a good man shall have reached his end, he receives a mighty destiny and honour, and becomes a dæmon, according to the appellation of prudence. I therefore give (my vote)¹⁰⁰ for this, that every¹

⁹⁹ In Hesiod's Works and Days, v. 120, the present text has more correctly Γαῖα, instead of Μοῖρα, while Plato, in Rep. v. p. 468, E., has more correctly τελίθουσι than καλίουται.

¹⁰⁰ After τίθειμαι, we must understand γνώμην, as shown by the passages quoted by myself on Soph. Philoct. 1445, or ψῆφον, as shown here by the subsequent ὁμόψηφος.

¹ Stalbaum omits πάντα with a single MS. He should have inserted

dæmon (learned) man, who is good, is dæmon-like, both while living and when dead, and is properly called a dæmon.

Herm. And I, Socrates, seem to myself to give entirely the same vote with you on this point. But what can the name of hero be?

Soc. This is by no means difficult to understand. For their name is drawn aside a little, showing that its origin is from love.

Herm. How is this?

Soc. Do you not know that heroes are demigods?

Herm. What then?

[34.] *Soc.* All of them were doubtless begotten either from a god falling in love with a mortal woman, or from a mortal man (falling in love) with a goddess. If then you consider the matter according to the old Attic language, this too you will more clearly understand. For it will show you that the word (hero) is slightly drawn aside, for the sake of the name,² from the word love, through which the heroes were begotten. And either this says the heroes,³ or because they were wise and rhetoricians, powerful and skilled in dialectic, and all-sufficient to interrogate;⁴ for εἶπειν is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said, in the Attic language they, who are called heroes, coincide⁵ as certain rhetoricians,

it before ἀγαθός. For πάντα is thus constantly united with ἀγαθός. See Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 1402, τῷ πάντ' ἀγαθῷ.

² This derivation depends on the affinity between ἥρωας and ἔρωας.

³ This is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, ἦτοι τοῦτο λέγει τοὺς ἥρωας, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, whose version is, "aut hinc heroum est nomen ductum." Opportunely then does the best MS. Gud. read λέγειν, by the aid of which it is easy to see that Plato wrote ἦτοι ἐκ τοῦτου λέγ' εἶναι τοὺς ἥρωας, i. e. "either from this (love) say thou the heroes are."

⁴ After ἔρωτᾶν, Stephens wished to insert καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. For in p. 390, § 16, the dialectician is said to be ἔρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενος. Besides, Ficinus has "ad interrogandum disserendumque promptissimi." From whence Stalbaum endeavoured to elicit λέγειν, to preserve the train of thought between λέγειν and εἶπειν. He should have suggested ἔρωτᾶν καὶ εἶπειν, which latter verb Plato naturally explains by λέγειν, for it is very rare in Greek. It is however found in Hesiod. Theog. 38, Εἰπεῦσαι (Μοῦσαι) τὰ τ' ἰόντα—quoted by Heindorf.

⁵ So we may perhaps render συμβαίνουσιν. But as the translation of Ficinus is "videntur," it would seem that he found in his MS. συμφαινουσιν, a corruption, I suspect, for συμφωνοῦσιν, i. e. "harmonize," as in § 41, συμφωνεῖ.

interrogators, and lovers:⁶ so that the genus of rhetoricians and sophists becomes an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to understand; but rather this respecting men, why they are called *ἄνθρωποι*. Can you tell the reason?

Herm. From whence, my good (man), can I? And indeed were I at all able to find this out, I shall not exert myself, through my thinking that you will more easily discover it than myself.

Soc. You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthyphron.

Herm. Evidently so.

Soc. And rightly relying. For I now seem to myself to understand it in a clever manner; and I shall run the risk, if I do not take care, of becoming to-day wiser than is fitting. [35.] But consider what I am saying. For this ought in the first place to be understood concerning names, that we often introduce letters, and (often)⁷ take some away, while we give names, as we please: and (often)⁸ change the acute syllables. As when we say *Διὶ φίλος* (a friend of Dis): for, in order that there may be a noun instead of a verb, we take away the second *ῖω-α*, and, instead of an acute syllable in the middle, we pronounce a grave one. But on the contrary, in others we introduce letters, and others again, with a graver accent, we pronounce with a more acute one.⁹

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. Of these things one, as it appears to me, takes place in the name *ἄνθρωπος* (man): for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, *α*, being taken away,¹⁰ and the end of the word becoming more grave.

Herm. How do you mean?

* The MSS. vary between *ῥωτητικοί* and *ῥωτικοί*. Ficinus found both in his MS. For his version is, "disputatores et amatorii." Stalbaum omits *ῥωτικοί*, although Plato had just above shown the affinity between *ῥως* and *ἔρως*. To this passage is to be referred the gl. of Etymol. M. in *Ἡρώες*—ἀπὸ τῆς ῥωτησεως διαλεκτικοί γὰρ—ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ῥώτων ἐξ ῥώτων γὰρ θεῶν ἰγίνοντο—οἱ γὰρ θεοὶ θνηταῖς γυναιξὶ συνεχόμενοι ἐκπίουσι τὸ τῶν ἡρώων γένος.

⁷—⁸ This "often" is found only in Ficinus—"sæpe etiam demimus"—and again, "sæpenumero transmutamus."

⁹ From the MS. of Serranus, whose version is, "et quæ acute pronuntiabamus, graviter pronuntiamus." Buttmann was led to introduce *ἐξέ-ριπα*, adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb.

¹⁰ "For according to the derivation it should be *ἀναθρώπος*." STALB.

Soc. Thus. This name (*ἄνθρωπος*) indicates that other animals, who can see, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but that man sees—for such is the meaning of *ὄπωπε*—¹¹ and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon what he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated *ἄνθρωπος*,¹¹ contemplating what he sees.

[36.]¹² *Herm.* What then, shall I ask you what follows after this, (and) which I would very gladly hear?

Soc. By all means.

Herm. As then there appears to me to be something in order after these; for we surely call the soul and body of man by some name.¹³

Soc. How not?

Herm. Let us, then, endeavour to divide these too, as we did the former subjects.

Soc. Do you say that you have considered¹⁴ first the soul, that it has with reason this name, and afterwards so has the body?¹⁵

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. To speak then off-hand, I think that those, who called the soul by that name, understood some such thing as this; that whenever it is present to the body, it is the cause of its life, giving it the power to breathe, and cooling it; but as soon as the cooling power ceases, the body is dissolved and comes to an end. From whence, as it appears to me, they

¹¹—¹¹ This clause is omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. By its aid, however, we can restore what Plato wrote—*ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα ὄπωπε—τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἰώραν*. For it is evident that *ἰώραν*, the more common word, would be the interpretation of the less common one; and that *ὄπωπε* would be mentioned here as being one of the words, from which *ἄνθρ-ωπος* is supposed to be derived. With regard to this description of man, Ovid has something similar in *Metam. i.*: “*Os homini sublimē dedit, cœlumque tueri Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.*”

¹²—¹³ In the arrangement of the speeches Heindorf, whom Bekker and Stalbaum follow, has done all that a critic should do. But with respect to the words, he has been unable to explain *ὥσπερ τοίνυν*, in which lie hid *Ὡς τὸ πρὶν, τὸ νῦν*, i. e. “As before, (so) now—” Ficinus has, “*Succedere statum superioribus mihi videtur de anima et corpore consideratio.*”

¹⁴ Stalbaum learnedly defends the reading furnished by ten MSS., *σῶμα τι καλοῦμεν*, where Bekker had rejected *τι*. Ficinus, too, has “*nam anima et corpus aliquid hominis sunt.*”

¹⁵ I cannot understand *ψυχὴν λέγεις ἰσκιῶσθαι*: I could, *ἰσκιῶσθαι*, “Say you that you will consider?” Ficinus, “*Quærendum primo de anima putas?*”

called the soul (*ψυχή*).¹⁵ But, if you please, be quiet. For I think I see something carrying more conviction than this to the followers of Euthyphron; for this, as it appears to me, they would despise, and consider it as farcical. But consider whether this will please you.

Herm. Only say it.

[37.] *Soc.* What else but the soul do you think contains and carries the nature of the whole body, so that it lives and goes about.

Herm. No other.

Soc. But what, do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that intellect and soul orders and holds the nature of every thing else?

Herm. I do.

Soc. It will be proper then to give this name to that power which carries and holds nature, *φυσίχην*: but it may be called more elegantly *ψυχή*.¹⁶

¹⁷ *Herm.* Entirely so; and this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.

Soc. For it is certainly so. It would however appear to be truly ridiculous, if it were named, as it is formed.¹⁷

Herm. But what shall we next consider after this?

Soc. Are you speaking of the body?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. In many ways this appears to me, whether one causes it to deflect little or much.¹⁸ For some say it is the sepulchre

¹⁵ From the affinity between *ψυχος*, "cold," and *ψυχή*, "soul," which some considered to be warm, others cold, as we learn from Aristotle, *Περὶ Ψυχῆς*, i. 223, quoted by Stalbaum, *Διὰ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὀνόμασται, οἱ δὲ τὸ ψυχρὸν διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν*. And it was perhaps in ridicule of this theory, that Socrates wrote the *Æsopic fable* of the person who blew hot and cold with the same breath.

¹⁶ By the change of *φυσ* into *ψυ*. See Eustath. *Il. A. p. 22, 50, Bas.*

¹⁷—¹⁸ Heusde was not the first to arrange the speeches in a correct order. For Ficinus had done so already.

¹⁸ Stalbaum's translation is, "The name of the body seems to me to be many-fold; if any one causes it to deflect even a little, it is still many-fold." But this is at variance equally with the Greek words and with common sense. He did not perceive that Plato wrote *Πόλλ' ἔχων μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε, ἂν μὲν ἢ σμικρὸν τι τις παρακλίνει ἢ καὶ πάνν*, i. e. "This word (body) seems to me to have many (meanings), whether any one causes it to deflect either little or much:" where the edd. have *Πολυλaxῆ—καὶ σμικρὸν τις—καὶ πάνν*.

of the soul, as being buried¹⁹ at the present time; and on the other hand, because whatever the soul marks out it marks out by the body; on this account it is properly called a mark. [38.] The followers however of Orpheus appear to me to have founded this name, especially since the soul suffers a punishment on account of the things it suffers;²⁰ and that it may be preserved, it has this enclosure, the image of a prison; and that (the body), as it is called, is the saving of the soul, until it (the soul) shall have paid the penalty due; and that there is no need of introducing²¹ a single letter.

Herm. On this, it appears to me, Socrates, enough has been said. But about the names of the gods, could we, in the same manner as you have just now spoken about Zeus, consider by what propriety their names are laid down.

Soc. By Zeus, Hermogenes, if we possessed any mind, (we should have)²² one the most beautiful method, (by confessing)

¹⁹ This was the doctrine of Philolaus the Pythagorean, in the passage preserved by Clemens Alexandr. Strom. lib. iii. p. 403, *Μαρτυρίωνται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολογοὶ τε καὶ μάντις, ὡς διὰ τινὰ τιμωρίαν ἢ ψυχὰ τῇ σώματι συνίζονται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σώματι τοῦτω τίθασθαι*, i. e. "The ancient theologists and priests also testify that the soul is united with body for the sake of suffering punishment; and that it is buried in a body, as in a sepulchre." T.

²⁰ I confess I cannot understand *δίκην διδούσης*—*ὣν δὴ ἔνεκα δίδωσι*, nor could Ficinus, whose version is, "quod anima in corpore hoc delictorum det pœnas," which gives a sense perfectly intelligible; but not to be obtained from the Greek. Some error had crept in here before the time of Stobæus, who has quoted this passage in Eclog. Physic. p. 86, where Gesner has given the version of Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote *δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς νῦν, ὣν δὴ ὁ ὦν ἐκεῖ οὐ δίδωσιν*. For thus *ἐκεῖ* is said *δικτικῶς* of the grave in § 43, and Rep. i. p. 330, D., *τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ δίδόναι δίκην*; ii. p. 365, A., *τελευταίος—αἱ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς*; p. 366, A., *ἐν Αἴδου δίκην δώσομεν, ὣν δὲν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν*. The followers of Orpheus seem to have thought with Juvenal, "Exemplo quodcunque malo committitur, ipsi Displicet auctori; prima est hæc ultio quod, se Judice nemo nocens absolvitur," and with Cicero in Milon. § 23, "pœnam semper ante oculos versari putant, qui peccaverunt." Or we might read *ὦν ὁ νεκρὸς οὐ δίδωσι*, "which the dead body does not suffer." For the Orphic verse might have been *Ψυχὴ δούσα δίκην ὦν οὐχὶ δίδωσιν ὁ νεκρός*. The preceding is however not the only error here. For the version of Ficinus points to a lacuna, which it were easy to supply by the aid of Etymol. M. in *Σῶμα*.

²¹ I have translated *παράγειν* "to introduce." Ficinus has "neque literam aliquam adjiciendam putant," which leads to *ἐπάγειν*.

²² Heindorf says that it is easy to supply *ἔχομεν ἂν ποῦ—ἰπισκίψασθαι*. But words are not to be thus supplied at random. Ficinus has "præcipuum rectitudinis modum arbitraremur, fateri—"

that we know nothing of the gods either themselves or the names by which they call themselves; for it is evident that they call themselves by correct names. But the second mode of propriety consists in our calling the gods by those names, by which there is a law for us to invoke them in our prayers, whatever they are, and by whatever name they like to be addressed, since we know of nothing else; for this appears to me to have been beautifully ordained. [39.] If you are willing, therefore, let us consider this point, having previously, as it were, declared to the gods, that we shall speculate nothing about them—for we do not think ourselves worthy to do so—but about the men, what thoughts they had, when they gave the names; for this will not expose us to their wrath.

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak with moderation; let us therefore act in this manner.

Soc. Ought we not then to begin, according to custom, from Hestia?²³

Herm. It is just what we should.

Soc. What then shall we say the person intended, who gave the name of 'Εστία?

Herm. By Zeus, I do not think this is an easy thing.²⁴

Soc. The men, O good Hermogenes, who first founded names, seem almost to be no mean persons, but conversant with high subjects and discourses on them.²⁵

Herm. What then?

Soc. It seems to me that the founding of names was the work of some such men. And indeed, if any one considers foreign names, what each means is not the less discovered. [40.] For instance, in the case of that which we call *Ὀβία*, there are, who call it 'Εσία,²⁶ and others again 'Ἰσία.²⁶ In

²³ The goddess whom the Greeks called 'Εστία, was the Vesta of the Romans. From which it would seem that the Greek word had originally the digamma F placed before the aspirate, just as we have a *w* before *h* in some words. The altar of the deity was in the centre, as it were, of the house, and sacrifices commenced with her; because, as Plato says in the *Timæus*, she was the oldest of all the gods; or rather the pivot on which all the others turned.

²⁴ Ficinus, "facile inventu," as if his MS. had *γυνῶναι* instead of *εἶναι*.

²⁵ Originally *μετρωπολῶγοι* and *ἑδολίσχαι* were taken in a good sense; but subsequently in a bad one, as shown respectively by *Phædr.* § 120, and *Rep.* vi. p. 488, quoted by Heindorf. Add *Aristoph. Neph.* 148.

²⁶—²⁶ It is not known in what dialect *ὀβία* became *ἰσία*: but *ἑσία*

the first place then, according to one of these names ('*Ἑστία*), the existence of things (*Ὀυσία*) has a right to be called '*Ἑστία*'; and again, because we call that which participates in existence by the name of '*Ἑστία*', it would on this ground be properly called '*Ἑστία*': for we too seem of old to have pronounced *Ὀυσία*, '*Ἑστία*'.²⁷ Moreover, if any one bears in mind the business of sacrifice, he will deem that this was in the thoughts of those who instituted (the names). For it is likely, that they, who called *Ὀυσία* (*Ousia*), the existence of all things, '*Ἑστία* (*Hestia*), sacrificed to Hestia before all the gods. But they who called it '*Ὀσία* (*Osia*), would nearly, according to Heraclitus, consider that all things move, and nothing is at rest. The cause therefore and leader of things with them was τὸ ὄθον (the pushing on): and hence they very properly called it '*Ὀσία* (*Osia*).²⁸ And thus much let it be said as if from those who know nothing.²⁹ But, after Hestia, it is just to speculate about Rhea and Kronos, although we have discussed already the name of Kronos. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose.

[41.] *Herm.* Why so, Socrates?

Soc. I perceive, (my) good man, a certain hive³⁰ of wisdom.

Herm. Of what kind is it?

Soc. It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it has some plausibility.

Herm. What is this?

Soc. I seem to myself to see Heracleitus speaking artlessly³¹

for *οὐσία* is found in the Doric of Archytas and Ocellus, quoted by Stobæus, p. 76, and p. 44.

²⁷ This may fairly be doubted. They more probably pronounced it '*Ὀσίαν*', the very word found in MS. Gud. But such a pronunciation would not suit the argument. Stalbaum has however acutely seen that in '*Ἑστία*, or rather '*Ἑστία*, there is perhaps an allusion to the doctrine of the Eleatic school, who considered the universe as a "one-ness," i. e. '*Ἑστία*, derived from *ἔλς*, as *Ὀυσία* is from *εἶμι*.

²⁸ For '*Ὀσία* is derived from '*Ὀσις*, the root of which is '*ὀθίω*, "I push."

²⁹ From this it is evident that the whole of the preceding derivation of '*Ἑστία* is a ridicule of those, whom Plato considered as knowing nothing on the subject; although it is quite clear that '*Ἑστία* is derived from *ἥστ-αι*, the third pers. perf. pass. of *ἥζομαι*, and means that point at the centre of the universe, where sits the power that gives motion to all the particles of matter around it.

³⁰ This is a favourite metaphor of Plato. Heindorf refers to *Meno*, p. 72, A. § 3, and *Rep.* v. p. 450, A.

³¹ I have translated ἀρίχυνς "artlessly," and united it to λήγοντα, to

some old wise saw about Kronos and Rhea, which Homer too asserts.

Herm. How say you this?

Soc. Heracleitus says some where that all things move, and nothing is at rest; and comparing things to the flowing of a river, observes that "Thou canst not twice into the same stream go."²²

Herm. Such is the fact.

Soc. What then, does he appear to you to think differently from Heracleitus, who gave the names of Rhea and Kronos to the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heracleitus by chance assigned to both of them the names of flowing streams?²³ As then²⁴ Homer (Il. xiv. 201) calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod.²⁵ Likewise Orpheus says some where,

Ocean with lovely streams did first begin
Marriage, and wedded Tethys, sister-kin.

Consider then, how all these harmonize with each, and all tend to the doctrine of Heracleitus.

[42.] *Herm.* You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose. I do not however understand what the name Tethys means.

Soc. Surely it nearly implies this of itself, that there is a name of a fountain concealed; for that which is percolated,²⁶ and strained through, is the representation of a fountain; and from both these names the name Tethys²⁷ is composed.

show what Plato really thought of the doctrine of Heracleitus, as being Kronika, that is, old and silly, as in Aristoph. Plut. 581.

²² As the words of Heracleitus fall into a Choliambic verse, Δις εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἱμβαίης, I have designedly introduced a metrical version.

²³ To understand this, Buttmann conceived that Plato alluded to a fancied affinity between Κρόνος and Κροννός, "a rivulet."

²⁴ Instead of αὐ, adopted by Bekk. and Stalb. from nearly all the MSS., Stephens has οὐν, and so MS. Gud., which is far preferable to αὐ. Heindorf indeed refers to § 48, ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ θεῖοι. But Plato wrote ὥσπερ οὖν—

²⁵ "In Theogon. v. 337, Hesiod says that Ocean and Tethys were the parents of rivers and ocean nymphs, but not of all the gods." HEIND.

²⁶ The reading διαττώμενον, in lieu of διαττόμενον, which Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 80, discovered in Proclus on the Timæus, p. 294, has been subsequently found in five MSS.

²⁷ For τηθύς was supposed to have some affinity with τὸ ἡθοῦν.

Herm. This, Socrates, is elegant.

Soc. How is not about to be?³⁸ But what is after this? Of Zeus we have already spoken.

Herm. Yes.

Soc. Let us then speak of his brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, and of that other name³⁹ by which he is called.

Herm. By all means.

Soc. The name then of Poseidon appears to me to have been given by⁴⁰ the party first naming it, because the nature of the sea stopped him when walking, and did not permit him to proceed any further, but became as it were a chain to his feet. He therefore denominated the ruler of this power Ποσειδῶν, as Ποσι-δεσμος ὢν being (a foot-chainer). But the ε was perhaps added for the sake of elegance. And perhaps too it would not mean this; but two λλ were originally spoken instead of σ; signifying that this god is much-knowing.⁴¹ And perhaps likewise he was denominated ὁ σειῶν (the shaking), from σειν (to shake), and π and δ were added.⁴² [43.] But Πλούτων (Pluto) was so called from the gift of Πλοῦτος (wealth), because riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth.⁴³ But by the appellation Αἰδης, the multitude appear to me to understand that τὸ αἰδῆς⁴⁴ was spoken of, and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.

Herm. But how does it seem, Socrates, to you?

Soc. In many ways do men appear to me indeed to have erred about the power of this god, and to have a fear of him, who is not worthy of it. For they fear that, when any one

³⁸ Heind. was the first to restore Τι δ' οὐ μίλλει instead of μίλλω from MS. Gud. And so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. For his version is "Quid ni?"

³⁹ This was Αἰδης.

⁴⁰ Heindorf, whom Stalbaum should have followed, has properly inserted ὑπὸ, preserved only in the best MS. Gud.

⁴¹ For Πολλ-ειδῶν would thus be formed, similar to πολλὰ εἰδώς, "much-knowing."

⁴² Cornarius, perceiving that σειῶν could not become ποσειδῶν by adding π and δ, proposed to read τὸ π καὶ τὸ ο καὶ τὸ σ; and so one MS. subsequently collated. Heindorf however says that the ο is to be got from ὁ σειῶν.

⁴³ In allusion to this notion, Æschylus says in S. Th. 948, ὑπὸ γὰρ πλοῦτος ἄβυσσος ἵσταται. See more in Spanheim's Commentary on Callimach. p. 841.

⁴⁴ The word αἰδῆς is either "unseen" or "unseemly,"—both equally suited to the receptacle for the dead.

of us dies, he remains⁴⁵ there for ever, and that the soul, divested of the body, departs to him,⁴⁶ this too they fear.⁴⁶ But all these things, the empire of the god, and his name, appear to me to tend to something the same.

Herm. How so?

Soc. I will tell you what appears to me. For tell me, Which of these is the stronger bond to any animal whatever, so as to cause it to remain in any place whatever, necessity, or desire?

Herm. Desire, Socrates, is by far the superior.

[44.] *Soc.* Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unless it held those who go thither by the strongest bond?

Herm. This is evident.

Soc. It binds them then, as it appears, by a certain desire; since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with necessity.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. Now are there not many desires?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. It binds them therefore with the greatest of all desires, if it is about to bind them with the greatest of bonds.

Herm. Yes.

Soc. Is there then any greater desire, than when any one, by associating with another, thinks that, through him, he shall become a better man?

Herm. By Zeus, Socrates, there is not any whatever.

Soc. On this account, Hermogenes, let us say, that not one of those there⁴⁷ is willing to come hither, not even the Syrens themselves;⁴⁸ but that both they, and all others, are enchanted; such beautiful discourses does Pluto, it seems, know how to utter. And by this reasoning this god is both a perfect sophist, and a great benefactor to those with him; and who sends up to those here such good things; so many things does he have in superfluity; and from hence he has the

⁴⁵ Instead of *ἔστι*, one would prefer *ἔσται*. Ficinus has "quod nemo—huc redit," i. e. *οὐ κάρησι τις*. On *κάρημι* see Porson Med. 1011.

⁴⁶— This clause Ficinus has properly omitted.

⁴⁷ Instead of *τῶν ἐκείθεν*, one would prefer, as I have translated, *τῶν ἐκεί*, unless we omit *τῶν*, as Ficinus has done, "huc illinc—reverti."

⁴⁸ "There is," says Heindorf, "frequent mention of the Syrens on sepulchres, but not of them in Hades."

name of Pluto. [45.] And on the other hand, through⁴⁹ his unwillingness to associate with men invested with bodies, but only to have an intercourse with them, when the soul becomes cleansed from all the evils and desires which were around the body, does he not appear to you to be a philosopher,⁵⁰ and to have well considered this, that he should thus detain them, by binding them with the desire for virtue; but that if they possessed the flutterings and mad feelings⁵¹ of the body, not even his father Kronos would be able to detain them with him, in those bonds with which he was said to be bound.⁵²

Herm. You nearly seem, Socrates, to speak something to the purpose.

Soc. The name then, O Hermogenes, of *Ἀΐδης*, wants much of being called *Ἀΐδης* from *Ἀεΐδης*, "unseemly:" but it is much rather from knowing all beautiful⁵³ things, that *Ἀΐδης* was so called by the fabricator of names.⁵⁴

Herm. Be it so. But what shall we say of Demeter, and Hera, and Apollo, and Athena, and Hephæstus, and Ares, and of the rest of the gods?

[46.] *Soc.* It appears that *Δημήτηρ* (Demeter) was so called from the gift of food, as being *διδούσα μήτηρ*, "a giving mother." But *Ἥρα* (Hera) from being *Ἐρατή* (beloved); as if⁵⁵ Zeus is said to have loved her, and had her (for a wife).⁵⁶ Perhaps, also, the founder of this name, speculating upon things on

⁴⁹ The syntax requires *ΚΑΙΔΙΑ*, not *ΚΑΙ* simply.

⁵⁰ Heindorf has without reason approved of the reading suggested by Heusde, and founded on the version of Ficinus—"annon philosophi tibi videtur officium virique summa prudentia et consilio præditi."

⁵¹ The words *πρῶλῃσις* and *μανία* are frequently used to express any strong carnal desires. See my notes on Bailey's *Hermesianax*, p. 79.

⁵² To the bonds with which Zeus is said to have bound his father, there is an allusion in *Æsch. Eum.* 627, and *Aristoph. Neph.* 898, while Macrobius, in *Saturn.* i. 8, has preserved the interpretation of the legend given by Apollodorus.

⁵³ Although *Ἀΐδης* might be formed from *εἶδω*, yet there is nothing in that word to which *τὰ καλά* can be referred. Hence there is probably some error here. Plato wrote, I suspect, *βαντί τῷ κάτω δεῖ δούναί τι*, i. e. "ever giving something to a person going below," for thus *Ἀΐδης* would be from *ὁ δεῖ δόεις*.

⁵⁴ Here, as before, and shortly afterwards, Heindorf properly reads with MS. Gud. and Ficinus, *ὀνοματοθῆρου* for *νομοθῆρου*.

⁵⁵ In the words *ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ* there is not a particle of meaning. In Poppo's *Prolegom.* p. 317, I have restored *εἰς σκόρον γι*—

⁵⁶ So Stalbaum, after Matthiæ in *Gr. Gr.* § 559, b., explains *ἔχεν*.

high, denominated Ἄηρ (air) Ἥρα: but, for the sake of concealment, he placed the beginning at the end.⁵⁷ And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name Ἥρα.⁵⁸ But Φερρέφαττα (Proserpine) many are terrified at, and at Ἀπόλλων (Apollo), through a want of skill, as it appears, in the propriety of names. For by making a change, they think upon Φερσεφόνη; and this appears to them a thing of dread.⁵⁹ But it (Φερρέφαττα) means, that the goddess is wise. For while things are carried along, that which [touches upon],⁶⁰ and handles, and is able to follow them, will be wisdom. This goddess therefore may with great propriety be named Φερέπαφα, or something of this kind, on account of her wisdom, and contact of that which is borne along: and hence the wise Ἀΐδης (Pluto) associates with her, because she too is such (i. e. wise). But men now turn aside from this name, setting more value upon a good pronunciation than truth, so as to call her Φερρέφαττα. [47.] In like manner with respect to Ἀπόλλων (Apollo), many, as I said before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it signified something dreadful.⁶¹ Or know you not this?

⁵⁷ That there is some affinity between HPA and AHP is true enough. But to understand what Plato says respecting the placing the beginning at the end, we must suppose him to have written τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ η, "the letter η at the beginning," instead of τὴν ἀρχήν.

⁵⁸ Boissonade, on Excerpt. ex Procl. Schol. in Platon. Cratyl. p. 99, says, after Heindorf, that ἄηρ will be seen if one pronounces ηρα ηρα. Of this doctrine there is a ridicule in Aristoph. Ἰππ. 25, where no critic has yet seen, what it is easy enough to discover by the aid of the Scholiast, all the jokes of the dramatist, concealed at present by the corruptions of the text. To this passage of Plato, allusion is made by Athenagoras Legat. pro Christian. § 18, p. 83, quoted by Stalbaum.

⁵⁹ As if Φερσεφόνη were derived from Φέρειν, "to bring," and Φόνος, "slaughter."

⁶⁰ The words ἵπαπτόμενον καὶ are evidently a gl. of ἵπαφῶν. Respecting καὶ, or ἦ, or ἥγουν thus introducing an interpretation into the text, I have written something worth reading in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 188, although neither Poppo, nor Arnold, nor Bloomfield, have thought proper to take notice of the truths developed in that volume; and I could now add not a little more equally valuable.

⁶¹ For Ἀπόλλων was supposed to have some affinity with Ἀπολλύων, as shown by Æschylus in Agam. 1048, Ἀπολλων—ἀπολλὸν μένος Ἀπώλεισας γάρ μ' ἐν βολαῖς τὸ δεύτερον. For so we must read, in lieu of ἀπολλων ἰμός: Ἀπώλεισας γάρ οὐ μόλις τὸ δεύτερον: where οὐ μόλις is an absurdity, that only a Hermann would have dared to defend. So too Euripides in Phaëthont. Fr. has Ὁ χρυσοφεγγής Ἠλί, ὥς μ' ἀπώλεισας· Κάκ τοῦδ' Ἀπόλλων ἰμφανῶς κληῖται βροτοῖς.

Herm. I (know it) very well; and you speak the truth.

Soc. But this name, as it appears to me, is most beautifully laid down, with respect to the power of the god.

Herm. How?

Soc. I will endeavour to tell you what the fact appears to me. For there is no other name, which, although one, fits⁶² better with four powers of this god, so as to touch upon them all, and to show, in a certain manner, his art in music, prophecy, medicine, and archery.

Herm. Tell me, then; for you seem to me to speak of this name as something strange.

Soc. This name then is well fitted, as belonging to a musical god. For, in the first place, would not purgations and purifications, both according to the arts of medicine and prophecy, and likewise the going round with torches steeped in drugs, ordered by medical men and prophets,⁶³ and the lustrations on such occasions,⁶⁴ and the sprinklings, would not (I say) all these be able (to do)⁶⁵ one thing, (namely,) to render a man pure, both in body and soul?

Herm. Entirely so.

[48.] *Soc.* Will not then the god who purifies, who washes, and who releases us from such evils, be of such (a name)?

⁶² Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, adopted *ἡρμῶσιν* from MS. Gud., with which many MSS. coincide. But in that case *ἄν* should be omitted. For *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἄν ἡρμῶσιν* is a solæcism, as I have shown on Prom. 299. Other MSS. offer *ἡρμῶσμένον* in lieu of *ἡρμῶσιν ἐν ὄν*. But in that case we must read *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ, τι ἄν ὀνομ' εἶη ἡρμῶσμένον*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα μᾶλλον ἡρμῶσμένον*—

⁶³ They, who have seen in a Roman Catholic chapel the young choristers going round with censers filled with frankincense, will be the best able to understand this passage; which is well illustrated by Casaubon on Theophrast, Character. xvi., and Turnebus Adversar. iv. 15, where reference is made to Virgil. *Æn.* vi. 226, "Idem ter socios pura circumtulit unda:" and to Tibullus, i. 5, "Ipseque ter centum lustravi sulfure puro, Carmine quum magico præcinuisset anus;" from which last passage one would have suspected that Plato wrote *μαγικὴν* and *μαγικοῖς*, instead of *μαντικὴν* and *μαντικοῖς*, were it not that *μαντικὴν* has reference to what had just been stated.

⁶⁴ I confess I do not understand *ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις*, omitted by Ficinus; while one MS. has *τὰ ἐν τούτοις*. I could have understood *καὶ αἱ περιθειώσεις τε καὶ τὰ λουτρά καὶ αἱ περιβάσεις ἐν τοῖς ἱατρικοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τοῖς μαγικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις*. For all three are alluded to in Eurip. *Helen.* 872—878.

⁶⁵ Heindorf says *δύνασθαι* is here "to be able to do;" and Stalbaum refers to Phileb. p. 23, A., Gorg. p. 453, Phædr. p. 275, A.

Herm. Perfectly so.

Soc. According then to the releasings and washings which he affords, as being the physician in the case of such-like things, he will be properly called 'Απολούων (the washer). But according to his prophetic power, and truth and simplicity, for these two are the same,⁶⁶ he would most properly be called 'Απλούς (simple), as the Thessalians call him now⁶⁷ [for all the Thessalians call this god 'Απλῶν].⁶⁸ But, on account of his being ever mighty in shooting arrows by his skill in archery,⁶⁹ he is 'Αει-βάλλων (ever-darting).⁷⁰ But with respect to his musical power, it is proper to understand that, as in the words ἀκόλουθος (a follower), and ἄκοιτις (a wife), α often signifies the same as together; so here (α and πολέω signify)⁷¹ τὴν ὁμοῦ πολησιν (the rolling together), both about heaven, which men call πόλους⁷² (the poles); and about the harmony existing in song, which is called symphony; because all these, as the clever in music and astronomy assert, cause all things to roll together with a certain harmony.⁷³

⁶⁶ Instead of ταῦτον γάρ ἓστιν, the sense manifestly requires τοῦτω γάρ ἓστιν ἓν, i. e. "for these two are one." With regard to the identity of truth and simplicity, it will be sufficient to quote the well-known verse of Euripides, 'Απλούς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔσθι, in Phœn. 472.

⁶⁷ In lieu of ὥσπερ οὖν, I have translated as if the Greek were ὥσπερ ἓν. See at § 41. Of course I am aware that ὥσπερ οὖν are sometimes found thus united. But all the passages are corrupt, and have been corrected by myself in The Surplice, No. 22, April 25, 1846.

⁶⁸ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

⁶⁹ On the subject of Apollo's skill in archery, there is an elegant Pseudo-Babrian fable, No. 68, amongst those discovered a few years ago in an Athos MS., in a more perfect state than it had been previously in a Vatican one; but which I partially emended on the Pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus, § 5, n. 3, and restored completely in Revue de Philologie, T. ii. p. 225.

⁷⁰ Plato, remembering no doubt the commutability of the cognate letters π and β, considered 'Α-πόλλων as an abbreviation of ἀει-βάλλων.

⁷¹ The words within lunes have been happily preserved in the version of Ficinus alone, "in his quoque a et polleo significant versionem, quæ simul et una peragitur," and we thus get rid of Stalbaum's abortive attempt to explain and correct a corrupt text.

⁷² With regard to the etymology, it was evidently ridiculed by Aristoph. in 'Ορν. 181, 'Οτιη πολῆι τις ταῦτα καὶ διερχεται τὰ πάντα, διὰ τοῦτ' εὖ καλεῖται νῦν πόλος: which Cobet, whom Holden has incorrectly followed, should have emended as I have done, and not have rejected as an interpolation.

⁷³ Plato alludes here to the so-called harmony of the spheres, which was founded on the similarity of the phænomena of light and sound, over both of which Apollo presided. For as there are seven prismatic

Now this god presides over harmony, ὁμοπολῶν, (causing to roll) all these things together, both among gods and men. [49.] As therefore we call ὁμόκελευθος (following together) and ὁμόκοιτις (lying together), ἀκόλουθος and ἄκοιτις, by changing *o* into *a*, so likewise we denominate Ἀπόλλων, who was ὁμοπολῶν, by inserting another λ, because it would have been⁷⁴ synonymous with the harsh name.⁷⁵ And this some at the present day suspecting, in consequence of the value of this name not being rightly considered, are terrified at it, as if it signified some destruction. But, as was just now stated, the much⁷⁶ is laid down, touching upon all the powers of the god, his simple, ever-darting, purifying, and together-rolling nature. But the name of the Μοῦσαι (Muses), and of music universally, some one,⁷⁷ as it seems, made from μῶσθαι (to inquire), and from investigation and philosophy. But Ἀητώ (Latona), (is derived) from the mildness of the goddess, ⁷⁸ with reference to her being ἐθειλήμων (willing), in what any one might request; but perhaps, as foreigners call her; for many call her Ἀηθώ. It seems then that she was called Ἀηθώ by those calling her by this name, with reference not to the roughness, but the gentleness and smoothness of her manner.⁷⁸ [50.] But Ἀρτεμις (Diana) appears to be (so

colours, from whence the sun was called, by the Chaldeans, a seven-rayed god, so there are seven notes in the diatonic scale of sound. For a list of the writers on the harmony of the spheres, the reader must turn to Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. Advers. Music. p. 363.

⁷⁴ Ficinus has, "æquivocum fuisset," which leads to ὁμώνυμον ἀν' ἰγίνετο.

⁷⁵ i. e. ἀπολλύνων, "destroying."

⁷⁶ Heindorf, justly objecting to πολὺ, felt half inclined to omit it, with MS. Gud. Stalbaum would read with one MS. τὸ δὲ πολὺ μάλλον—Ficinus has "re vera." Perhaps Plato wrote τὸ δὲ διὰ πολλὴν ἄμειλλαν ἶόν, i. e. ὄνομα, "But the name which has gone through a great contest:" or we may read τὸ δὲ πολλοῦν μετὰ λλ ἢ ἐνι, i. e. "but the word πολλοῦν with two λ or one."

⁷⁷ Between τοῦτο and ἰκωνόμασιν, τις has perhaps dropt out; unless we read ἰκωνόμασαν with MS. Gud., which Heindorf adopted.

⁷⁸ This derivation, and indeed the whole passage, would have been perfectly unintelligible, but for the gloss in Etymol. M. Ἀητώ· παρὰ τὸ λήθω, τὸ λανθάνω· ὁ μὲν Πλάτων φησὶν Ἐλειτῷ· ἐλειήμων γὰρ ἡ θεὸς καὶ πραΐα καὶ πάντας ἐλειοῦσα· κατὰ δὲ τινὰς Ἀηθώ· τὸ γὰρ ἡμερον καὶ πραῖον, ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιλελῆσθαι τῶν εἰς αὐτὴν πλημμυλημάτων ἐμφαίνεται· ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος παρὰ τὸ λῶ τὸ θίλω.—καὶ τὸ λῆ τὸ θελεῖ Δωρικῶς· ἐπιειδῆ δ' ἀν τις θίλη, παρ' αὐτῆς λαμβάνει. From hence Buttmann was led to believe that the writer of the gloss found in his copy of Plato not ἐθειλήμονα,

called) on account of her conduct being ἀρτεμής,⁷⁹ flawless and orderly through her desire of virginity.⁸⁰ Perhaps also the founder of her name so called her, as being cognizant of virtue.⁸¹ And it may be, that hating the ἀροτον⁸² (ploughing) of man in a woman, or through some of these or all of them, the founder of the name gave it to the goddess.

Herm. But what is Dionysus and Aphrodite?

Soc. You are asking about great things, O son of Hipponicus. But the manner of the appellations given to these divinities, has been said to be both serious and jocose. Ask therefore others about the serious manner;⁸³ but nothing

but ἐλεήμονα. He ought rather to have said that Plato probably wrote to this effect—*Λητώ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πραότητος τῆς θεοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἐλεήμονα εἶναι δοῦναι, ὡν ἂν τις τι αἰγῇται· ὡς γὰρ ξίνοι καλοῦσι τινες, τὸ λῆν τὸ ἐλεῖν· ἴσως δὲ καὶ Ἑλετῶ· ἀφ' ἧς, τοῦ ε δις ἀφρημένον, γίνεται Λητώ, ἢ πάντας ἰλεούσα· πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ Ληθῶ καλοῦσι· τὸ γὰρ ἡμερον καὶ πρᾶον ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιλελῆσθαι τῶν εἰς αὐτὴν πλημμελησάντων ἰμφάινεται· ἵοικεν οὖν πρὸς τὸ μὴ τραχὺ τοῦ ἡθους ἀλλὰ τὸ λείον Λητώ κεκλησθαι.* i. e. "But Λητώ (Latona) (is derived) from the mildness of the goddess, with reference to her being willing to give something of what any one may request. For as some foreigners say, τὸ λῆν means "to be willing." Perhaps too (her name was) Ἑλετῶ, from which, the ε being twice taken away, there becomes Λητώ, "who pities all." Many too call her Ληθῶ. For her gentleness and mildness is shown by her forgetting those who sin against her. It seems then that she is called Λητώ from not the roughness, but the smoothness of her conduct." This at least would be worthy of Plato, which cannot be said of the rubbish in the text.

⁷⁹ This derivation is adopted by the Etymol. M. and his transcriber Eustathius; from whom it would seem that Plato wrote Ἀρτεμὶς δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀρτεμὶς ἢ ἄρτιον, κατὰ τὸ κόσμιον.

⁸⁰ As shown by Callimachus H. in Dian. 6. Δός μοι παρθένην.

⁸¹ By what process Ἀρτεμὶς could be derived from, or explained by, ἀρτεμῆς ἴστορα, even Plato, or the philosophers whom he is ridiculing, would have been unable to state. By turning however to Etymol. M. in "Ἀρτεμὶς· ἡ θεὸς ἀρότεμῖς τις οὖσα ἢ τὸν αἶρα τέμνουσα· ἢ αὐτὴ γὰρ ἴσσι τῇ Σελήνῃ, it is easy to see that Plato probably wrote ἴσως δὲ αἶρα τέμνουσα δι' ἄστρα: with which may be compared the expression of Euripides in Phœn. 1, Ὁ τὴν ἐν ἀστροῖς οὐρανὸς τέμνων ὁδὸν—Ἕλις. Stalbaum indeed says that the reader must be as stupid as the stump of a tree not to see that Plato is here having a bit of fun. But even fun ought to be something more than folly merely.

⁸² On the metaphorical use of ἀροτον, see Hemsterhuis on Lucian. Timon. § 17; D'Orville on Chariton. p. 345, ed. Lips; Bergler on Alciphron i. 6; myself on Æsch. Eum. 400; Peerlkamp in Bibliothec. Crit. Nov. T. i. p. 96; Winckelmann on Plutarch, Amator. p. 757.

⁸³ Plato, who had been partly initiated in the mysteries of Demeter and Dionysus, where the meanings of those names were expounded in a

hinders us from relating the jocose; for these deities are lovers of jesting and sport. Now Διόνυσος (Dionysus) would be the giver of wine, and may be jocosely called Διδ-οίνυσος. And οἶνος (wine) may be most justly called οἰόνους, because it makes the majority of those who drink it to have wit, not having it (before).⁸⁴ But, with respect to Aphrodité, it is not proper to contradict⁸⁵ Hesiod, (Theog. 195,) but to allow that she was called Ἀφροδίτη, through her generation from ἀφρός (foam).

[51.] *Herm.* But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you will not forget either Athena, or Hephestus, or Ares.

Soc. For it is by no means reasonable.

Herm. It is not.

Soc. One of the names of her, (Athena,) it is not difficult to say why it was imposed.

Herm. Which?

Soc. We surely call her Pallas?

Herm. How not?

Soc. Considering then this name to have been formed from dancing in armour,⁸⁶ we shall, as it appears to me, think properly; for to lift up oneself or any thing else on high, either from the earth, or to shake or be shaken in the hands, we call it to 'make to'⁸⁷ dance and to dance.

serious manner, thus avoids the necessity of breaking his oath of secrecy. So Herodotus constantly does by his formula, *εἰδοτά μοι κείσθω*.

⁸⁴ With this passage may be compared the expression in Horace, applied to the wine bottle, "Tu lene tormentum ingenio admoves Plerumque duro:" although Shakspeare says that "when the wine is in, the wit is out."

⁸⁵ Plato said this, because he doubtless knew that Euripides had, in Tro. 992, given a less favourable etymology in the words—Τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάντ' ἀφροσι δὴ κραίνει βροτοῖς, Ἦς τοῦνομ' ὁρθῶς ἴστιν Ἀφροδίτη, Κύπρις. For so I would have edited that passage, had the dissertation of Lydus *περὶ Μηνῶν*, been published in 1807, who says, in p. 88—212, *Ἐνταῦθα δὲ Ἀφροδίτην αὐτὴν αἰετοῖ ἀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ ἀφρονος ἰρῶντας ἀποτελεῖν*.

⁸⁶ How Plato could assert that Παλλὰς has any affinity with ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ὀρχεῖσθαι, is past my comprehension. The Etymol. M. has more properly—παρὰ τὸ αἰετὰ πάλαιεν—δόρυ. I suspect that the passage has come down in an imperfect state, and that Plato wrote something to this effect—ἀπὸ τοῦ πάλαι ἔλλεισθαι ἡγούμενοι—and shortly afterwards—μετὰ τοῦ ἀπὸ γῆς δια τῆς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ὀρχήσεως. For the word μετῴρωτος is particularly applied to vessels seen at a distance from the land, and, as it were, dancing on the water, while the tide is flowing or ebbing, or tost in a storm.

⁸⁷ The verb ὀρχεῖν is rarely found in a transitive sense. Heindorf

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. The goddess therefore on this account (we call)⁸⁸ Pallas.

Herm. And properly so. But what say you of her other name?

Soc. That of Athena?

Herm. Yes.

[52.] *Soc.* This name, my friend, is of greater weight. For the ancients appear to have considered Athena, as those of the present day do, who are skilled in the interpretation of Homer. For the majority of these, in explaining the poet, say that by Athena he intended mind and intellect. Now he who founded names seems to have understood some such thing as this respecting the goddess; or expressing rather something yet greater, he speaks of her as the intelligence of a god;⁸⁹ for that she is a Θεοσνόνη, (the god-mind,) employing after a foreign mode α instead of η, and taking away ι and σ. But perhaps it is not even in this way. But he called her Θεονόη, as she understood divine concerns better than all the rest. Nor is it far off to say that he was willing to call "intelligence in manner," [as being this deity,]⁹⁰ by the name of Ἡθονόη. But either the founder himself, or some persons afterwards, turned the name aside to something more beautiful, as they thought, and called her Ἀθηνάα (Athena).

Herm. But what will you say of Hephæstus?

Soc. Are you asking about the noble (deity) skilled in light?

Herm. I seem so.

Soc. Is he not evident to all as being Φαῖστος (luminous), having drawn to himself the η?⁹¹

Herm. It nearly appears so; unless [as it seems]⁹² it appears to you in some other way.

quotes opportunely Athen. i. p. 21, A. Ἴων Ἐκ τῶν διλπτων μᾶλλον ὠρχησιν φρίνας:

⁸⁸ Ficini. "Palladem eam vocamus." The verb can scarcely be omitted.

⁸⁹ Ficinus has "ut Dei mentem induxit," as if he had found in his MS. νόησιν, ὡς περὶ θεοῦ, ἐπάγει, instead of λέγει.

⁹⁰ The words within brackets, which are an evident interpolation, Ficinus has correctly omitted. To understand however the etymology, we must suppose Ἡθο-νόη to come from Ἡθος and νόος, and to be corrupted into Ἀθηνάα.

⁹¹ Ficinus adds, "Unde Ephæstos, id est luminis præses, est dictus," which is evidently an interpolation.

⁹² The words between brackets Bekker was the first to introduce from

Soc. But, that it may not appear, ask about "Αρης (Mars).

Herm. I ask then.

Soc. If you please, then, the name of "Αρης shall be derived from τὸ ἄρρεν (the male), and τὸ ἀνδρείον (the manly). But if, on the other hand, (you wish it) from his harsh and not-to-be-turned nature, which is called ἄρραρον,⁹³ it will be proper for a god warlike every where, to be called by this name.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Let us then, by the gods, free ourselves from the gods; for I fear to discourse about them. But about some others, if you wish it, propose as questions, that you may see of what kind are the horses of Euthyphro.⁹⁴

Herm. I will do what you say, after asking you one thing yet about Ἑρμῆς (Hermes), since Cratylus says⁹⁵ that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavour then to look into the name Hermes, that we may know whether he says any thing to the purpose.

Soc. This name of Hermes⁹⁶ does indeed seem to pertain somewhat to discourse, and to imply that with reference⁹⁷ to his being an interpreter and a messenger, and to his stealing and deceiving in discourses and market-dealing,⁹⁸ the whole of his business is connected with the power of speech. [54.]

⁹⁹ As then we said before, (§ 34,) τὸ εἶπειν is the use of speech, and as Homer frequently says, ἐμήσατο, (he planned), [now

all the MSS. They are perfectly useless, and correctly omitted by Ficinus. As far as I remember, ὡς τοῦτοι never thus follows κινδυνεύει. Perhaps Plato wrote εἰν μὴ πᾶσι σοι, ὅς ἐθηκεν αὐτὸ, εἰτε ἄλλο θέλειν δόξῃ, i. e. "Unless it appears that he, who founded the name, meant something else."

⁹⁵ This word is found only in Plato, and even there very seldom. See Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 50.

⁹⁶ Here is an allusion to Homer, Il. v. 221, ὕφαρ ἰδοῖαι Οἴοι Τρώϊοι ἔκπαι.

⁹⁷ In § 1 and 3.

⁹⁸ The words ὁ Ἑρμῆς, are evidently an explanation of τοῦτο.

⁹⁹ I have adopted καὶ κατὰ τὸ, found in one MS. for καὶ τὸ—

⁹⁵ Ficinus improperly translates τὸ ἀγοραστικόν, "vehemens concionator." The reference is to Hermes, the god of gain, arising from dealings in a market. In enumerating these attributes of the god, Plato had probably in mind Aristoph. Plut. 1153—1161.

^{96—98} Out of this mass of rubbish Ficinus has contrived to elicit something like sense—"Profecto, quemadmodum in superioribus diximus, irin sermonis est usus. Sæpe vero de hoc Homerus ait, emesato, id est

this is to plan.] From both of these then this god, planning to speak, and the speech—but εἶπειν means to speak—just as if the name-founder gives his command to us, He, O men, who has planned the speaking, would be justly called Εἰρέμης.⁹⁹ But we of the present times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him Ἑρμῆς, Hermes.
¹⁰⁰[And Iris too it seems is so called, from εἶπειν, (to speak,) because she is a messenger.]¹⁰⁰

Herm. By Zeus, well does Cratylus seem to me to have said that I am Hermogenes. I am not indeed a ready planner of a discourse.

machinatus est. Ex utrisque igitur nomen hujus dei componitur, tum ex eo, quo loqui est, tum ex eo, quod machinari et cogitare dicenda. Perinde ac si nominis auctor nobis præciperet, Par est, O viri, ut deum illum, qui irin emesato, id est loqui machinatus est, Iremen vocetis." Different however as this translation is from the Greek text at present, it is easy to see that, instead of τοῦτο δὲ μηχανήσασθαι ἔστι, he found in his MS. τοῦτο δὲ ἐμηχανήσατο: and made perhaps out of his own brain ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὖν τούτων, τοῦ τε εἶπειν, ὃ ἔστι λέγειν, καὶ τοῦ τὰ λόγον μῆσασθαι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ τίθεται, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπιτάττοι ἡμῖν ὁ ὀνοματοθῆτης, τοῦτον τὸν θεόν, ὃ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἶπειν ἐμησατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο Εἰρέμην. And this indeed is, as regards the substance, nearly what the author in all probability wrote. One would however prefer something to this effect—τό τε εἶπειν, ὃ λόγον χρεια ἔστι, το τε, οἷον καὶ "Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ λέγει, ἐμήσατο—τοῦτο δὲ ἐμηχανήσατό ἔστι—τίθει σὺ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ, οἶμαι, τούτων τοῦ τε εἶπειν καὶ τοῦ τὰ λόγον μησαμένου, τοῦτον τὸν θεόν περὶ, οὕτως ἐπιτάττει ἡμῖν ὁ ὀνοματοθῆτης. Ὁ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἶπειν ἐμήσατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ὑπὸ ὑμῶν Εἰρέμης; i. e. do you put down both the word εἶπειν, which means the use of speech, and, what Homer frequently says, ἐμήσατο—that is, he planned. For from both of these, the act of speaking, and the party planning the things belonging to speech, I think, the founder of the name does, as regards this deity, thus give us an ordonnance—"O men, he who has planned the art of speaking, may be justly called by us Εἰρέμης." To arrive however at this sense, it is necessary to reject what has been interpolated, and to correct what has become corrupt; of which latter the most remarkable are the change of φησι into τίθει σὺ: of ἂν into γὰρ οἶμαι; and of ὥσπερ into περὶ οὕτως.

¹⁰⁰—¹⁰⁰ All the words between the brackets Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Bekker consider as an interpolation. But who would have interpolated them, or why, those critics have not deigned to tell us. I suspect they ought to be inserted a little above, after τό τε εἶπειν, ὃ λόγον χρεια ἔστι, to show that as both Ἑρμῆς and Ἴρις were the messengers of the gods, their names were derived from the same verb εἶπειν, "to speak," as remarked by Eustathius, l. A. p. 84, 50. ed. Bas. ὅτι δὲ κήρυκες—λέγονται Ἑρμῆς καὶ Ἴρις παρὰ τὸ εἶπειν, δῆλόν ἔστι. And if this notion of mine be correct, we must read καὶ γὰρ ἢ Ἴρις, instead of καὶ ἢ γὰρ Ἴρις.

Soc. It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan is the two-formed son of Hermes.

Herm. How so?

Soc. You know that speech signifies the all,¹⁰¹ and circulates and causes to roll perpetually; and that it is two-fold, true and false.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Is not then the truth of it smooth and divine, and dwelling on high amongst the gods; but that which is false (dwells) below amongst the mass of mankind, and is rough and goat-like? For from hence are the greatest number of fables, and the falsehoods connected with the goat-like life.²

[55.] *Herm.* Entirely so.

Soc. Rightly then would he, who indicates every thing,³ and ever rolls, be Πάν αἰπόλος, the biform son of Hermes; who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let us free ourselves from the gods.

Herm. From gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates.

¹⁰¹ How speech can be said to signify the all, is beyond my comprehension. Perhaps we ought to read Οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἐς τὰ ὅρα πᾶν σῆμα νοῦ κατακυλίει [ἢ πολεῖ] δει, i. e. "You know that speech ever rolls to the ears every indication of mind." For thus ἢ πολεῖ would be the interpretation of κατακυλίει, which I have elicited from καὶ κυκλεῖ; and this with the greater readiness, as δει πολῶν is said just below to be the origin of αἰπόλος; while ὅρα and νοῦς would be corrupted here, as they are elsewhere, as shown by myself in Tro. Append. p. 176, C., Æsch. Eum. 120, Prom. 667, and Soph. Philoct. 49, 86. With regard to the general idea, it may be compared with what Pope says in his Abelerd and Eloisa of letters, that they

"Speed the soft intercourse of soul with soul,
And waft a sigh from Indus to the Pole."

² Heindorf conceives that there is a pun in τραγικόν, where allusion is made to the goat-like form of Pan, and to tragedies, so called from the goat given as a prize for the best tragedy. Such a pun would however be frigid beyond conception. Plato wrote, I suspect, περὶ τὸν Σατυρικὸν βίον, in reference to the satyric drama, where Pan was no doubt frequently introduced and ridiculed.

³ If I have rightly altered, just above, τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει into τὸ πᾶν σῆμα νοῦ, it is easy to read here ὁ πᾶν νόημα μηνύων, in lieu of πᾶν μηνύων.

But what hinders you from discussing such divinities⁴ as Ἥλιος (sun), and Σελήνη (moon), and Ἄστροι (stars), and Γῆ (earth), and Αἰθήρ (æther), and Ἄηρ (air), and Πῦρ (fire), and Ὑδωρ (water), and Ὠραὶ (seasons), and Ἐνιαυτός (year)?

Soc. You enjoin me many things; still if it will gratify you, I am willing (to speak).⁵

Herm. You will indeed gratify me.

[56.] *Soc.* What then do you wish the first? Or shall we discuss as you have enumerated, (first) the sun?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. It seems then that this would become more manifest, if one should use the Doric name: for the Dorians call the sun Ἄλιος. He will therefore be Ἄλιος, from ἀλίζειν (collecting) men into one spot when he rises; and he would be so, from always εἰλεῖν (revolving) while going round the earth. And he would seem to be so, because in going he causes to be various the productions of the earth. Now the verbs ποικίλλειν and αἰολεῖν have the same meaning.

Herm. But what will you say of Σελήνη (moon)?

Soc. This name seems to press upon Anaxagoras.

Herm. Why?

Soc. It seems to indicate something of a more ancient date than⁶ what he lately stated, that the moon obtains her light from the sun.

Herm. But how?

Soc. Σέλας is the same with φῶς (light).

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. Now this light about the moon is perpetually νέον (new), and ἔρον (old),⁷ if the Anaxagoreans say true; for, perpetually revolving in a circle, she perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. And many call her Σελαναία.⁸

⁴ For such alone were once considered divinities, as stated in § 31.

⁵ The word λέγειν is supplied by only one MS.

⁶ Had Heusde seen that ἦ had dropt out, he would not have altered δηλῶν τε into δηλῶν τε: which, though adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum, I cannot understand.

⁷ According to the Etymol. Σελήνη is παρὰ τὸ σίλας νέον ἔχων ἢ παρὰ τὸ σίλας αἰεὶ ἐν ἔχων, ὅθεν καὶ ἔνος, ὁ ἐνιαυτός, ὁ αἰεὶ νιάζων. On ἔρον see Ruhnken, Tim. p. 103.

⁸ Heindorf quotes Phæn. 178, and Aristoph. Νεφ. 614.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. But, because it perpetually possesses new and old splendour, it may be more justly called *σελα-ενο-νεο-άει-α*, but compressed together it is called *Σελαναία*.

[57.] *Herm.* This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But what will you say of *Μῆν* (month), and *Ἄστρο* (stars)?

Soc. *Μεῖς* (month) would be properly called *μείης*, from *μει-οῦσθαι* (to be diminished);⁹ but *Ἄστρο* (stars) appear to derive their name from *Ἄστραπῆ* (lightning). Now *ἄστραπῆ* would be *ἀναστρωπῆ*, because it *ὥπα ἀναστρέφει* (turns the eyes); but being formed with elegance, it is now called *ἄστραπῆ*.

Herm. But what (are) *Πῦρ* (fire) and *ὕδωρ* (water)?

Soc. About *Πῦρ* (fire) I am at a loss; and it nearly appears, that either the Muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or this word is very difficult. Behold then the artifice which I introduce in all such cases where I am at a loss.

Herm. What is it?

Soc. I will tell you. Answer me then. Do you know on what account *Πῦρ* (fire) was so called?

Herm. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. Consider then what my suspicions are concerning it. For I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.

Herm. What then?

[58.] *Soc.* Should any one then investigate how reasonably these names were given according to the Greek language, and not according to that from which the name happens to come, you know he would be at a loss.

Herm. Very likely.

Soc. Consider then, whether this name, *πῦρ* (fire), is not of Barbaric origin. For it is by no means easy to adapt this to the Greek language. But the Phrygians are thus clearly calling fire, with a trifling deviation, and the word *ὑδωρ* (water), and *κύνας* (dogs),¹⁰ and many other names.

Herm. They are so.

* How the idea of diminution came to be connected with the name of a month Plato has failed to explain. By comparing however Etymol. M. in *Μεῖς*, where Plato is quoted, it would seem that something has dropt out here.

¹⁰ From this confession on the part of Plato that *πῦρ*, *ὑδωρ*, and *κύνας* are foreign words, it would seem that *fire*, *water*, and *canis*, found in the

Soc. It is not proper then to use violence with these words; since any one can say about them.¹¹ On this account therefore I reject the words πῦρ and ὕδωρ. But Ἄηρ (air), Her-mogenes, (is so called)¹² because αἶρει (it raises) things from¹³ the earth; or because αἶει ρεῖ (it always flows); or because, from its flowing, a breathing is produced: for the poets¹⁴ call winds αἶηται (breathings). Perhaps then it means as if a person¹⁵ should say πνευματόρρουν (a flowing breathing), or αἶητόρρουν (a flowing wind),¹⁶ [from whence he wishes to call it thus, because it is Ἄηρ].¹⁶ But I consider αἰθήρ (æther) in some way as this; because αἶει θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ρέων (it always runs and flows about the air), it would be called αἰεθεῖρ. [59.] But Γῆ (earth), more plainly indicates its meaning, if any one calls it Γαῖα. For γαῖα would be properly called γεννήτειρα (producer), as Homer says; for he speaks of γεγάσι as γεγενῆσθαι (to have been produced).

Northern and Latin languages, were of Phrygian origin. According to Etym. M. Πῦρ φῦρ τι ἐστίν, where is the Teutonic "fire."

¹¹ Ficini, "de ipsis nihil dicere quisquam potest." From whence Cornarius got his ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔχει γ' ἂν τις. He should have written ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔχει—Heindorf attempts to support ἐπεὶ ἔχει γ' ἂν τις, by rendering "nam possit quispiam aliquid:" which would be in Greek ἐπεὶ ἔχει ἂν τις; and hence in Rep. i. p. 350, D. καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν, he should have read καὶ ἔχω τι περὶ—and in Euthyphr. p. 9, B. ἐπεὶ παντὶ τι σαφῶς ἔχειμ' ἂν, instead of πάνυ γε, especially as in the former case λέγειν, and in the latter ἐπιδείξαι, require an accusative.

¹² Ficini, "sic est dictus."

¹³ Ficini, "quæ circa terram," i. e. τὰ περὶ τῆς γῆς. This derivation was obtained from a philosopher of Cyrene, as shown by the Etymol. M. Αἰθήρ, παρὰ τὸ θεῖν κυκλοφορικῶς, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ Κυρηναίων, by whom Ζεὺς was called Αἰθήρ, as may be inferred from Eustath. Il. Σ. p. 972, 47, ὁ Ζεὺς αἰθήρ αἶι ἐγρήγορε τῇ κυκλοφορίᾳ, ὃς καὶ παρὰ τὸ αἶι θεῖν αἰθήρ καλεῖται.

¹⁴ Homer Il. O. 626, and Hesiod frequently.

¹⁵ In the formula ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι τις cannot be omitted. See Heindorf on Phædon. p. 87, B. G. C. Lewis in Cl. Jl. No. 68, p. 198, and myself on Pseudo-Platon. Sisyph. § 2, n. 4.

¹⁶—¹⁶ This mass of nonsense Ficinus omitted, either because he could not understand it, or because it was not in his MS. Heindorf considers it as an interpolation. Hence Stalbaum has bracketed it. Perhaps Plato wrote ὅθεν δὴ βούλοισ' ἂν τις αὐτὸν οὕτως εἰπῇ, ὅστις ἐστὶ νοήρης, where I have elicited βούλοισ' ἂν τις from βούλεται, and ὅστις ἐστὶ νοήρης from ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀήρ in MS. Gud. For Hesych. has Νοαρίως νονηχόντως, the Doric form for Νοήρως, similar to Φρενήρης. On words in -ήρης I have said something at Æsch. Suppl. 34, and I could now say a great deal more.

Herm. Be it so.

Soc. What is there then for us after this?

Herm. Ὀραι (hours), Socrates, and Ἐνιαυτός and Ἔρος.¹⁷

Soc. Now Ὀραι must be pronounced (Ὀραι),¹⁸ as of old in the Attic dialect, if you wish to know what is reasonable. For they are ὄραι, through their determining winters and summers and winds, and the fruits¹⁹ of the earth; and as ὀρίζουσαι (determining), they would be justly called ὄραι. But Ἐνιαυτός and Ἔρος (year), nearly appear to be one thing, each in turn. For that which brings to light the natural productions of the earth, and does, itself by itself, explore them, is Ἐνιαυτός (the year). And as stated before, regarding the name of Zeus, divided into two, some called the deity Zeus and some Dia, so here with respect to the year, it is called by some Ἐνιαυτός, because it (explores) ἐν ἑαυτῷ (in itself); but Ἔρος, because ἐράζει²⁰ (it explores).²¹ And the whole reasoning is for that, which explores in itself, to be called, being one, twofold;²¹ so that two names are produced, Ἐνιαυτός and Ἔρος, from one reason.

¹⁷ MS. Gud. and Ficin. omit *kai ἔρος* incorrectly.

¹⁸ Heusde and Heindorf correctly saw that ὄραι had dropt out between *παλαιὸν* and *ῥητίον*.

¹⁹ Serranus proposed to read, what the sense requires, and is therefore adopted by Heindorf, τοὺς καιροὺς πρὸς τοὺς καρποὺς, "the seasons suited for fruits." Stalbaum, however, sticks as usual to the non-sense of the common text. Etymol. M. Ἐνιαυτός—παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ διειληφέναι πάντα τοὺς τε καρποὺς καὶ τὰς τροφάς.

²⁰ Although the word ἐράζειν is thus repeated in the text, I cannot believe that it was written even once by Plato. For by comparing Etymol. in Ἔρος—παρὰ τὸ ἔρι καὶ ἔρι εἶναι ἢ ἕναι, and in Ἐνιαυτός—παρὰ τὸ λαύω, σύνθετον ἱνιαύω τὸ ἐνδιατρίβω, and Eustath. Il. B. p. 144, 49, Bas. ὁ ἱνιαυτός γίνεται μὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λαύω τὸ διατρίβω—δηλοῖ δὲ χρόνον μακρόν—λαύειν γὰρ τὸ διατρίβειν, Plato wrote, I suspect, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔρος ἐξ ἑρως ζῶν—and οἱ μὲν ἱνιαυτὸν, ὅτι ἔστιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οἱ δὲ ἔρος, ὅτι ἔρι ζῇ. For thus ἔρος ἐξ ἑρως, is similar to ἔρως εἰς ἔρος in Soph. Antig. 348. If however ἐράζον is to be preserved, it is evident that the preposition ἐξ would be at variance with the derivation.

²¹—²¹ Stalbaum proposed to read ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐράζον· τοῦτο δὲ προσαγορεύεται ἐν ὃν δίχα, which he got from Ficinus; "Integra vero oratio est ipsum quod in se ipso examinat: unde ex oratione una nomina duo selecta sunt." I suspect however that we ought to read ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἔστιν, ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔρι ζῶν οὕτω προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἐν ὃν, δίχα χρῆ—for thus ὅτι might have easily dropt out between ἔστι and τὸ, and χρῆ after δίχα.

Herm. But then,²² Socrates, you have made a great progress.

[60.] *Soc.* I seem, indeed, to have driven a long way on the road to wisdom.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Perhaps you will speak something²³ more.

Herm. But after this species (of inquiry), I would most gladly contemplate those beautiful names relating to virtue, with what propriety *φρόνησις* (prudence), *σύνεσις* (consciousness), *δικαιοσύνη* (justice), and all the rest of this kind are given.

Soc. You raise up, my friend, no mean a genus of names. But however, since I have put on the lion's skin,²⁴ I must not act the coward; but, as it seems, look into prudence, and intelligence, and thought, and knowledge, and all the other beautiful names of which you speak.²⁵

Herm. We ought by no means to stand apart previously.

Soc. And indeed, by the dog,²⁶ I seem to myself not to act the part of a prophet badly, about what I understand at present, that those ancient men, who laid down names, did, like the majority of the wise men of the present period, through their frequently turning themselves round, while in search of the spot where existences are, become dizzy beyond all bounds; and that subsequently all²⁷ things appear to them to turn round²⁸ and to be borne along on every side. [61.] They do not however blame what they suffer within them-

²² In lieu of the nonsensical *δῆτα*, three MSS. read *ἐῆλα*, which leads to *ἐῆλα δῆ*—a phrase perpetually used by Plato. The error arose from the similarity of *τ* and *λ* in MSS. as shown by Pierson on *Moris*, p. 254.

²³ Heindorf was the first to read *φήσεις* for *ἐφήσεις*, and to support it by *Legg.* i. p. 625, C., and *Rep.* x. p. 596, C. Perhaps however in *ἐφήσεις* lies hid *τι φήσεις*.

²⁴ Here is an allusion to a well-known *Æsopo-Socratic* fable, to which Shakspeare alluded in *King John*.—"Thou wear the lion's hide! Doff it, for shame; And hang a calf's skin on thy recreant limbs."

²⁵ Instead of *ἂ φῆς*, MS. *Gud.* *ἀφῆς*, which leads to *ἂ ἐφῆς*, "of which you were speaking."

²⁶ On this Socratic oath see my note on *Hipp. Maj.* § 18, n. 1.

²⁷ In lieu of *τὰ πράγματα*, common sense demands *πάντα*; for thus *πάντα* and *πάντως* are perpetually united, as shown by myself in *Poppo's Prolegom.* p. 178, and by *Lobeck* on *Soph. Aj.* 852, ed. 2.

²⁸ One MS. has alone preserved *περιστρέφισθαι*. *Ficinus* has "*perferri et vacillare*," which leads to *περιφέρεισθαι*, and *στρίφισθαι*.

selves as the cause of this opinion, but that things are of themselves so formed by nature, (that)²⁹ nothing is abiding and firm, but that all things³⁰ flow and are carried along, and are full of all kinds of generation and destruction.³¹ I speak this, as having thought on the names just now (mentioned).³²

Herm. How is this, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps you have not perceived that those lately mentioned were imposed upon things altogether borne along, flowing, and in a state of generation.³³

Herm. I do not altogether consider it.

Soc. Now, in the first place, what we mentioned first is entirely something of this kind.

Herm. Which is that?

Soc. Φρόνησις (prudence). For it is the perception of a movement and flowing. One may also understand by it the utility of movement.³⁴ But at least it is connected with the idea of being carried along.³⁵ But if you will, Γνώμη (thought) indicates altogether the looking-into and agitating (mentally) a begetting;³⁶ for the word νωμᾶν (to agitate) is the same as the word σκοπεῖν³⁷ (to look into). Or if you will, νόησις (intelligence) is τοῦ νέου ἔσις (the desire of a novelty); since for existing things to be new, it indicates that they are perpetually in the course of being produced. Hence he, who founded the word νέεσθαι, pointed out that the soul was desirous of this (novelty): for it was not called νόησις anciently, but instead of η,

²⁹ After οὕτω πεφυκέναι we must insert ὥστε, despite the authority of all the MSS. that omit it, except the one used by Ficinus; who has "ita natura habere se putant, ut nihil—sit."

³⁰ Here again Ficinus shows by his "fluant omnes," that he found in his MS. μετὰ εἶναι πάντα πάσης—

³¹ In lieu of φορᾶς three MSS. read φθορᾶς. Ficinus has "gignantur et defluant," which leads to γενέσθαι καὶ φθορᾶς, found in Parmen. § 20. Rep. vi. p. 485, B., Legg. x. p. 891, E. 894, B., all quoted by Heindorf. Cornarius was the first to suggest φθορᾶς.

³² Ficinus. "quæ nunc relata sunt," as if his MS. read τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα.

³³ Ficinus. "jugi generatione," as if he found in his MS. αἰὶ ἐπιγεννομένης.

³⁴ This is said, as if φρόνησις were derived from φορὰ and ὄνησις.

³⁵ As the Schol. has preserved a various reading—καὶ περὶ τὸ ρεῖν γε, Heindorf would unite the two—περὶ γε τὸ ρεῖν τε καὶ φέρεσθαι—correctly: to which ρεῖν for περὶ in one MS. plainly leads.

³⁶ This appears from Æsch. S. Th. 25, 'Ὑν ὥσι νωμῶν καὶ φρεσίν: and Soph. Œd. T. 300, 'Ὁ πάντα νωμῶν Τειρεσία διδασκὰ τε Ἀρρητὰ τε.

³⁷ For γνώμη is thus feigned to be derived from γονή and νωμᾶν.

it was necessary to pronounce ϵ twice,—*νεόεσιν*.³⁸ [62.] But *Σωφροσύνη* (temperance) is the *σωτηρία*³⁹ (safety) of that *φρόνησις* (prudence) which we have just now considered. *Ἐπιστήμη* (science) moreover points out that the soul, which is worthy of notice, follows things hurried along, and is neither left behind them, nor goes before them. Hence⁴⁰ by throwing out ϵ , it ought to be called *πιστήμη*.⁴⁰ But *Σύνεσις* (understanding),⁴¹ on the other hand, would thus⁴¹ appear to be, as it were, a syllogism. ⁴²For when it says⁴² *συνιέναι* (to understand), it follows that the same thing in every respect is meant as by the word *ἐπιστάσθαι* (to know): for *συνιέναι* means that the soul marches along with things.⁴³ *Σοφία* (wisdom), however, means to touch upon movement. This, however, is rather obscure and foreign. But we should recollect, from out of the poets, that they often say, (when they happen to say)⁴⁴ of a person from among those, who begin to go forward quickly, that *ἑσίθη* (he rushed forth) they say:⁴⁴ and a man

³⁸ Ficinus adds “quasi neu (*νέον*) id est novi, et esia, appetitia;” as if he had found in his MS. *ἄτε νέον ἔσιν τὸ ὄνομα ὄν*: what the train of thought manifestly requires.

³⁹ For Plato feigns that *σωφροσύνη* is derived *παρὰ τὸ σῶζειν τὸ φρονεῖν*, as stated by Etymol. M. in p. 744, 33, who has thus preserved some words that were found in this passage originally, as shown by Aristotle in *Ethic.* vi. 5, *ἐνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τοῦτω προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῶζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν*.

⁴⁰⁻⁴¹ Although Stalbaum has left in the text *ἐμβάλλοντας δὲ τὸ εἰ, ἐπιστημένην αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν*, he prefers in the notes the correction of Cornarius—*ἐμβάλλοντας δὲ τὸ εἰ, πιστήμην*. But as we thus not only lose sight of *ἔπεισθαι*, but introduce *πιστήμη*, a word to which there is not the most distant allusion in the text, Heindorf suggested *ἐμβάλλοντας δὲ τὸ εἰ, ἐπιστήμην*. The reader is therefore left to take his choice; for I confess I am here quite in the dark.

⁴¹⁻⁴² Heindorf explains *αὐ οὕτω μὲν* by “thus, the matter not having been considered.” But such could not be the meaning of those words. Ficinus takes no notice of them. They conceal something like *ἐννῶ τινα ἄν*—“to any person of mind.”

⁴² Ficinus has “cum autem syniennæ dicitur;” from whence Heindorf would read *λέγεται*, instead of *λέγῃ*, which wants its nominative. Stalbaum suggests *λέγῃς*—I should prefer *λέγῃ τις*—

⁴³⁻⁴⁴ To understand this etymological syllogism, we must suppose that *συνιέναι*, “to understand,” is derived from *συνιέναι*, “to go together,” like *συμπορεύσθαι*. Now as *ἐπιστήμη* has been shown to come from *ἔπεισθαι* and *ἴσημι*, and as *ἔπεισθαι* is the same as *συμπορεύσθαι*, it follows that *σύνεσις* is the same as *ἐπιστήμη*.

⁴⁴ This is Stalbaum’s translation of the words in the text; as if *λίσσονται* and *φασὶ* could be thus repeated actually, and *λέγοντες* too be

of Lacedæmon, (one) of the famous, had the name of Σοῦς⁴⁵ (rusher): for by this appellation the Lacedæmonians denominate a rapid rush. Of this hurried motion then Σοφία (wisdom) signifies ἐπαφήν⁴⁶ (the contact), as if things were continually carried along. [63.] But the word Ἀγαθόν (good) is wont to be imposed as the name for that portion of all nature which is ἀγαστόν (to be admired): for since all⁴⁷ existences march on, there is in some swiftness, but in others slowness prevails. ⁴⁸ Every thing therefore is not swift, but there is a part of it ἀγαστόν (to be admired). To this portion, ἀγαστόν (to be admired), is given the appellation ἀγαθόν (good).⁴⁸

understood. How superior to this rubbish is the version of Ficinus—"quotiens volunt adventantem aliquem et irruentem exprimere, esythe (id est erupit, proslit) dicere." Perhaps Plato wrote δ τι πολλαχού λιγούσι, ἀν τύχη τις ἐκὼν ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἀρχόμενος προΐσται, ἰσούθη φασὶ δὲ Δακτυλῶ γε ἀνδρὶ—αἶναι, i. e. "that they often say, should a person, either willingly or being commanded respecting a thing, happen to go forward quickly, that ἰσούθη (he rushed). It is said too that there was the name of Σοῦς borne by even a Lacedæmonian."

⁴⁵ The name of the Lacedæmonian was probably Σόφος, not Σοῦς, as acutely remarked by Valckenaer in Digress. in Theocrit. p. 271, C., who wonders that Plato should not have so written, as being nearer to Σοφός. I suspect that he did so. But that when the F became obsolete, its place was supplied by another letter, just as we find Γερωφία altered into Γερωσία, as Valckenaer has pointed out himself.

⁴⁶ By the introduction of the word ἐπαφή, Plato shows that he meant to derive Σοφός from σόω and ἀφή, for so we must read in lieu of ἐπαφή, where the preposition interferes with the etymology.

⁴⁷ Ficin. has "postquam fluunt omnia," which leads to ἐκτεδή πορεύεται πάντα τὰ ὄντα, instead of ἐκτεδή πορεύεται τὰ ὄντα.

⁴⁸—⁴⁸ The Greek is ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν τὸ ταχὺ, ἀλλὰ τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν, τοῦτε οὖν δὴ τῷ ἀγαστῷ αὐτῇ ἢ ἐκωνυμία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. This even Stalbaum confesses to be wretchedly corrupt; and he proposes to read ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν, τὸ θεόν. For it appears from § 83, that the word θεόν formed a part of the etymology of the word ἀγαθόν, as Heindorf saw acutely. The words there are οἷον νῦν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἔφαμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ συγκείσθαι. But neither of those Scholars have told us why any part of the quick moving should be said to be admired. I suspect then that the Etymol. M. in Ἀγαθόν, παρὰ τὸ ἀγαν θίειν ἡμᾶς ἐκ' αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγάζω, has preserved some words that have dropt out here, and that Plato wrote ἔστιν οὖν οὐ τὸ πᾶν θεόν, ὃ ἐστὶ ταχὺ, ἀλλὰ τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν, διὰ τὸ ἀγαν θίειν ἡμᾶς ἐκ' αὐτοῦ. τοῦτε οὖν, ὃ δὴ τι τῶν ἀγαστῶν, αὐτῇ ἢ ἐκωνυμία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. i. e. The whole is not θεόν, that is, quick, but some part of it is to be admired, through our running quickly to it. Hence to that, to which there is a portion of the admired, this appellation is given of good—where I have adopted ὃ from one MS. and τῶν ἀγαστῶν from another. Ficinus has "Est igitur non omne velox; sed ipsius aliquid agaston; quid

But of *Δικαιοσύνη* (justice) it is easy to conjecture that its name was imposed on the perception of what is just. But what is just in itself, it is difficult (to say):⁴⁹ for it appears to be agreed upon by the multitude up to a certain point; but beyond it to be disputed. For indeed, such as think that the universe is on a march, conceive the greatest part of it to be of such a nature, that it does nothing but yield; and that, on this account, there is something pervading the universe⁵⁰ by which all generated natures are produced; and that this pervading thing is most swift and most attenuated: for otherwise it would be unable to pass through every thing while going on, unless it were the most attenuated, so as to hold nothing; and the most swift,⁵¹ so as to make use of the other things as if in a state of rest.⁵¹ Because therefore it governs all other things *διατὼν* (by going through), it is properly called *δίκαιον*, receiving the value of the letter *κ* for the sake of an elegant pronunciation. [64.] And thus far, as we have just now stated, the multitude agree with us, that this is the meaning of the word *δίκαιον* (just).⁵² But I, Hermogenes, being eager on this point, have inquired about all these things, (and heard)⁵³ in the *Ἀπόρρητα* (Mysteries to be unrevealed),

quidem agathon ipsius agathon nomine declaratur," where the first "agathon," in Bekker's reprint, is a typographical error for "agaston," found correctly in ed. pr.

⁴⁹ Although *συμβάλλειν* might be supplied after *χαλεπὸν*, yet as Ficinus has "difficile cognitu," one may suppose that he found in his MS. either *χαλεπὸν γινῶναι*, as in § 65, *οὐ ῥάδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι*, or *χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν*.

⁵⁰ The Greek is *διὰ δὲ τοῦτον παντὸς εἶναι τι διεξίον*, which Ficinus translates "perque omne aliquid permanere," as if his MS. had, what is found in three others, *διὰ δὲ τοῦ παντός*—Plato wrote *διὰ δὲ αὐτὸ* (i. e. *τὸ χωρεῖν*) *τοῦ παντός*—

⁵¹ "I confess I hardly understand what is meant "by making use of the other things as if in a state of rest."

⁵² That the multitude had any such notion of the meaning of *δίκαιον*, Plato has indeed asserted; but "credat Judæus Apelles, Non ego," to use the words of Horace.

⁵³ It seems very strange that Plato should confess that he had heard any secrets from those who had sworn in the Mysteries not to reveal them. Perhaps he wrote *ἐν αἰεὶ ποτε ῥητοῖς*, "in words ever spoken," to which the subsequent *ἰδίᾳ*, "privately," would be properly opposed. Ficinus has "perscrutatus sum, et in arcanis percepi," as if *ἀπόρρητα* meant here simply "a secret;" for the philosophers of antiquity were wont to make a secret of their doctrines, as may be inferred from Phædon. p. 62, B. § 16, Theætet. p. 152, C. § 25, Rep. ii. p. 378, A. In that case however the subsequent *ἰδίᾳ* would be superfluous. Ficinus indeed

that this is⁵⁴ the just and the cause; for that, through which a thing is generated, is the cause;⁵⁵ and some one has said privately, that it was on this account it was (said) so correctly. But when, after hearing this, I nevertheless quietly ask them, What, O best of men, is the just, if this is (said) so correctly? I seem to inquire beyond what is becoming, and to leap, as it is said, over the lines dug out;⁵⁶ for they say I have sufficiently inquired and heard, and they endeavour, through the wish to satisfy me, to say, one one thing, and another another, and they no longer chime-in together. For one says that the Sun is τὸ δίκαιον (the just); for that by it alone, διαίοντα (pervading) and καίοντα (burning), it becomes the guardian of all things. But when, delighted, as having heard something beautiful, I mention⁵⁷ this to another person, the hearer laughs at me,⁵⁸ and asks me if I think there is nothing just amongst men, when the sun has set? [65.] Upon my begging then (to know) what the other means, he says it is fire itself.⁵⁹ But this is by no means easy to understand. But another person says, it is not fire itself, but the heat itself which exists in fire. Another again says, that he laughs at all these opinions; but that the just was that intellect of which Anaxagoras speaks; for he said that this possesses a power from itself, and is not mixed up with anything,

translates ἰδίᾳ καλεῖν by "proprie vocare." But that would be εἶδ, or καλῶς, or ὁρθῶς, or δίκαιως. Hence Buttman proposed to read καὶ διακὸν καλεῖν, as if διακὸν were derived from δι' ὃ and the origin of δίκαιον: while C. F. Hermann on Lucian De Hist. Conscrib. p. 21, prefers καὶ τὸν Δία καλεῖν. Stalbaum's version is "et peculiariter justum causæ nomine appellare;" where his "peculiariter" in Latin is quite as unintelligible as ἰδίᾳ in Greek.

⁵⁴ Buttman would read ταὐτὸ for τοῦτο—And so Taylor had already translated "the same."

⁵⁵ This is certainly true; but how δίκαιον could thus be shown to be the same as, or similar to, αἴτιον, I cannot understand.

⁵⁶ With this proverb, Leopard. in Emendat. i. 22, compares the expression in Horace, "Sæpe trans finem jaculo nobilis expedito." Hesych. Σάμμα· ὃ ἀγών, στάδιον. It was rather the dug-out limit of the arena, where a contest took place; answering to the ring of English prize-fighters.

⁵⁷ Ficinus, "omnia gubernare," which leads to πάντα τα ὄντα, instead of τὰ ὄντα, or else to τὰ ὅλα, found in one MS.

⁵⁸ Compare Hipp. Maj. § 15 and 32.

⁵⁹ This was the doctrine of Heracleitus and of Hippasus, as we learn from Aristot. Metaphys. i. 3. HEIND.

but that it puts into order (all)⁶⁰ things while pervading all things. But here, my friend, I am in a much greater difficulty than before I attempted to learn what justice is. But⁶¹ at least this name, for the sake of which we have been making the inquiry,⁶² appears to have been given to it (justice) for these reasons.

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these (notions) from some one, and not to improvise⁶³ them yourself.

Soc. But what of the rest?

Herm. Not entirely so.

Soc. Hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, as if I had not heard (what)⁶⁴ I am saying. What then remains for us after justice? [66.] I think we have not yet discussed 'Ανδρεία (fortitude); for injustice is evidently a real hinderance to the pervading power;⁶⁵ but 'Ανδρεία (fortitude) signifies that it is so named from fortitude in fight.⁶⁶ Now a fight, if things flow in reality, is nothing else than a contrary flowing. If then one takes away the δ from the name ἀνδρία, the name 'Ανρεία, which remains, points out the thing itself.⁶⁷ Hence it is evident that not the flowing, which is contrary to every flowing, is 'Ανδρία (fortitude), but only that which flows contrary to what is just; for (otherwise)⁶⁸ fortitude would not be praised. In some similar man-

⁶⁰ Ficinus, "exornare omnia per omni penetrantem," who found doubtless in his MS. κοσμεῖν πάντα τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων λόντα, not κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα.

⁶¹ Ficinus, "Cæterum, ut redeamus ad id, cujus gratia disputamus," which would lead to the insertion of ἐκανίωμεν after ἰσκοπούμεν.

⁶² Since two MSS. read οὕτω κείσθαι, one would suspect that Ficinus found the same word likewise in his; for he renders "quale diximus." Unless in οὕτω lie hid εὐ πῶ—

⁶³ This is the exact meaning of αὐτοσχεδιάζειν.

⁶⁴ Ficinus, "quasi quæ afferam, non audiverim," which leads to εἰς αὐκ ἀκηκοώς δὲ λέγω. Or we may read τὰ ἱπλοῖκα—λέγων. The common text, εἰς οὐκ ἀκηκοώς λέγω, is unintelligible.

⁶⁵ i. e. τοῦ διαίοντος, which τὸ δίκαιον was said to possess, and from which it was feigned to be derived.

⁶⁶ In lieu of this inelegant repetition of ἀνδρείας, Ficinus has simply "Andria in pugna versatur," as if his MS. had ἀνδρεία δὲ ἵσταιν ἐν μάχῃ.

⁶⁷ For ἀνρεία is feigned to be formed from ἀνά (back) and ῥοή (flowing).

⁶⁸ Ficinus has "neque enim aliter," absolutely requisite for the sense. Hence it is evident that ἄλλως has dropt out after ἀν.

ner τὸ ἄρρεν (the male) and ὁ ἀνὴρ (man) (derive their origin)⁶⁶ from ἄνω ροή (an upward flowing). But Γυνή (woman) appears to me to mean γονή (begetting); and τὸ θῆλυ (the female) seems to be so called from θηλή (the pap); but θηλή, Hermogenea, from causing, as it were, things irrigated to germinate.

Herm. It appears so, Socrates.

Soc. But the word θάλλειν (to germinate) appears to me to represent the increase of younglings, because it takes place swiftly and suddenly. Such then has he⁷⁰ imitated by the name, having fitted it together from θεῖν (to run) and ἄλλασθαι (to leap). But do you not perceive that I am carried, as it were, out of the course, since I have come upon a smooth (path)? But many words yet remain of those that seem worthy of attention.

Herm. You speak the truth.

[67.] *Soc.* One of these is Τέχνη (art), which we must look into (and see) what it means.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Does not then this signify ἔχειν νοῦ (a habit of thought), by taking away τ, and inserting ο between χ and ν, and between ν and η?

Herm. And this in a very poor⁷¹ manner, Socrates.

Soc. But do you not know, blessed man, that the names first formed, are now overlaid by those desirous of travestying them in a stilted style; and who, for the sake of an elegant pronunciation, add and take away letters, and twist them in every way, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For in the word Κάροπτρον (mirror), does it not appear to you that the ρ has been absurdly introduced? But such alterations some, I think, make, who care nothing for truth,

⁶⁶ In lieu of ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ τινι τοῦτω ἴσθι τῇ ἄνω ροῇ, where τοῦτω is perfectly unintelligible, Ficinus has "a simili quodam ducunt originem, scilicet ab ano rhoe." Perhaps Plato wrote, ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ τινι τῷ ῥοῦ ἴσθι ἴσθι (are equal) τῇ ἄνω ροῇ: where ἐπὶ (say thou) lies hid in ἐπὶ, found in three MSS., one of which is Gud., that in this dialogue is the best of all.

⁷⁰ Edd. οἷον περ οὖν μιμήνεται, which Stalbaum defends by taking οἷον in the sense of ὅ, "quod," as translated by Ficinus. Plato wrote, I suspect, τοῖον τι ὁ ἐρῶν μιμήνεται, i. e. "He who was about to speak of some such thing, has imitated"—

⁷¹ Heindorf quotes γλίσχρως ἐκάζω from Rep. vi. p. 488, A. Ficinus, "aride et inculte."

but moulding (prettily)⁷² the mouth; so that, after adding much to the first names, they at length rendered it impossible for a single man to understand what the name means; as in the case of the Sphynx, which they call Σφίγξ instead of Φίγξ,⁷³ and so in many others.

Herm. Such is indeed the case, Socrates.

[68.] *Soc.* Indeed, should any one permit one to add to names, and take away from them whatever he wishes, there would be a very easy road; and one might adapt every name to every thing.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. The truth indeed. But I think that you, who are a wise president, ought to keep a guard over what is moderate and the probable.

Herm. I wish I could.

Soc. And I too, Hermogenes, wish it with you. But do not, O divine man, discuss too accurately, "lest you perfectly exhaust my force:"⁷⁴ for I shall ascend to the summit of what I have said, when, after τέχνην (art), I have considered μηχανήν (artifice). For Μηχανή (artifice) seems to me to mean τὸ ἀνεῖν (to complete a thing for the most part). For μῆκος signifies "length." From both of these, μῆκος (length) and ἀνεῖν (to complete), is formed the word μηχανή. But, as I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our discourse. For we must inquire what the names of Ἀρετή (virtue) and Κακία (vice) mean. Now one of these I do not as yet see clearly; but the other appears to me to be manifest; for it chimes-in with all that has been said before. For in consequence of all⁷⁵ things moving on, whatever is κακῶς ἰὼν (moving on badly) will be κακία (bad-moving); but this, when it subsists in the soul, through its badly moving on to her concerns, ⁷⁶most eminently possesses the appellation of the whole of depravity.⁷⁶ [69.] But that to move on badly,

⁷² Ficinus has, with more elegance than truth, "talía—faciunt quod oris illecebras pluris æstimant, quam veritatem." From whence, however, I conceive εὖ has dropt out between στόμα and πλάττοντες.

⁷³ On the word Φίγξ, which seems to have been peculiar to Boeotia, see J. Clericus in Hesiod. Theogon. 326.

⁷⁴ Here is a quotation from Homer, Il. vi. 265.

⁷⁵ Ficinus, "tanquam eant omnia," which leads to ἰόντων πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων, not merely ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων.

⁷⁶—⁷⁶ Such is Taylor's translation of the words μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου

whatever it is, appears to me to show (itself) in *Δειλία* (timidity), which we have not yet discussed, but have passed it over; although it is proper to consider it, after fortitude. And we likewise seem to have passed over many other names. Now *δειλία* (timidity) means, that the bond of the soul is strong: for the word *λίαν* (vehemently) is (applied to) strength: and hence the vehement and greatest bond of the soul will be timidity,⁷⁷ just as *ἀπορία* (want) is an evil, and every thing, as it seems, which is an impediment to [going and] marching on.⁷⁸ To go on badly, then, seems to signify the marching on in a restrained and shackled manner; which when the soul suffers,⁷⁹ it becomes full of *κακίας* (evil). But if to such things the name of vice is applicable, the contrary of this would be *ἀρετή* (virtue), signifying, in the first place, ease in marching; and, in the next place, that *τὴν ῥοήν* (the *ἰκονομίαν* *ἔχει τῆς κακίας*. Stalbaum's is, "hoc a toto maxime appellatur, hoc est, a pravitate," which I hope he could understand. It is above my comprehension. Ficinus has, "communiter prava dicetur," which is evidently a guess at the meaning.

⁷⁷ That Plato would thus, after saying in one sentence that timidity is the greatest bond of the soul, repeat the very same idea in almost the next sentence, I for one will never believe; and still less that in deriving *δειλία* from *δεῖν* (to bind) and *λίαν* (vehemently), he would omit one half of the etymology; and least of all that he would here assert that *δειλία* is *τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμός*, when that is the very proposition to be proved. There is evidently a lacuna here, which might be thus supplied, "Now *δειλία* is some evil of the soul, and signifies, I think, a strong binding. For *δῖος* (fear), from whence is *δεσμός*, binds the foot, the tongue, and the mind; and *λίαν* (vehemently) is applied to strength. Hence *δειλία* would be the vehement binding of the soul." That there was some allusion to *κακόν* here, is evident from the subsequent expression, *ὥστε ἔστι καὶ ἡ ἀπορία κακόν*; and it is equally evident that some affinity was pointed out between *δειλία* and *δῖος*, of which the Etymol. M. says that it is derived, *ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσμεύειν ὃ γὰρ φόβος συνδίδι τοῖς πόδας καὶ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος*: in lieu of which I have substituted some words taken from Euripides, probably—*Πόδας τε γὰρ γλῶσσάν τε καὶ νοῦν εἰ φόβος*, a sentiment it were easy to support by numerous parallel passages. Instead, however, of endeavouring to follow out the chain of reasoning, Stalbaum is content to say that "Plato derives ridiculously *δειλία* from *δεσμός* and *λίαν*," which, if my notions are correct, Plato did not do; and, even if wrong, no man in his senses would ever attempt to do.

⁷⁸ As *ἀπορία* has an affinity with *πορεύεσθαι*, it is evident that *εἶναι* and *καὶ* are from a gl.; nor were they in the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is "ac summatum quodcunque progressus ipsius impedimentum," as if he had found *καὶ πάντως εἰπεῖν*, instead of *καὶ πᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν*.

⁷⁹ Ficinus renders *ἔχει* by "subit," which leads to *πάσχη*.

flowing) of a good soul is ever let loose; so that what always flows unrestrained and unimpeded, very properly, as it seems, receives this appellation. [It is right then to call it]⁸⁰ αἰρεῖτη. Perhaps also (some one⁸¹) may call it αἰρετή, as this is a habit the most eligible.⁸² But the word is moulded together and called ἀρετή.⁸³ Perhaps, too, you will say again, that I feign; but I assert, that if the name of vice is correct, as I have said above, this name of virtue is correct likewise.

[70.] *Herm.* But what does Κακὸν (evil) mean, through which word you have explained many things previously?⁸⁴

Soc. It appears to me, by Zeus, something strange, and difficult to conjecture. I bring therefore to this too that artifice.

Herm. What is that?

Soc. To assert that this name too is something barbaric.

Herm. And you seem to be like a person speaking correctly. But, if it seems good, we will omit⁸⁵ these; and endeavour to see in what way the words Καλὸν (beautiful) and Αἰσχροὺς (base) are well said.

Soc. Αἰσχροὺς (base), then, seems to me just now⁸⁵ to be very plain as to what it means. For it corresponds with the preceding remarks. For he who founded names, appears to me to have throughout found fault with that, which hinders and restrains things from their flowing; and that he now

⁸⁰ The words within brackets are rightly omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently an interpolation. They show, however, that Plato wrote εἰληφεν εὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, αἰρεῖτην; where εὖ answers to ὀρθῶς.

⁸¹ Ficinus has "vocet quis," which leads to λέγει τις. One MS. has λέγειν, i. e. λέγειν ἦν. Heindorf and Stalbaum understand ὁ ὀνοματοθετήσας. But nominatives are not to be thus understood at random.

⁸²⁻⁸³ All these words were omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus' version. They ought, however, to be inserted after αἰρεῖτη. For those are the letters moulded together to form ἀρετή. Besides, the repeated "perhaps" ought not to be separated by any extraneous matter.

⁸⁴ So Stalbaum; and so, long before him, Taylor had correctly translated this passage.

⁸⁵ This was very clever in Plato; for he was, doubtless, unable to suggest an etymology for κακός.

⁸⁶ Stalbaum agrees with Hartung in his German work on Greek Particles, i. p. 254, who explains καὶ δὲ "jam adeo." They did not know that Plato wrote καὶ παιδί, "to me even a boy." Heindorf quotes Thesm. 769, οἷδ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἐν πόρον 'Εκ τοῦ Παλαμήδους. He should have suggested τόνδ' ἐγὼγ' οἷδ' ἐν πόρον—For καὶ δὲ are never found except in the beginning of a sentence.

assigned the name *ἄεισχορρῶν* to that which is *αἰ ἰσχον ροῦν* (ever restraining the flowing). But at present they call it, by moulding the words together, *αἰσχροῖν*.

Herm. But what is *Καλόν* (beautiful)?

Soc. This is more difficult to understand; ⁸⁶ although he says that it is derived only by the harmony and length of the *ov*.⁸⁶

Herm. But how?

Soc. It appears that this name is some appellation for intellect.

Herm. How say you?

[71.] *Soc.* What think you is the cause of each existing thing being called by some⁸⁷ name? Is it not that which gives names?

Herm. Entirely so.

⁸⁶⁻⁸⁸ Such is the literal English translation of Stalbaum's text—*καίτοι λέγει γὰρ αὐτὸ ἁρμονία μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ ου παρῆται*, which Stalbaum thus renders into Latin, "Quamquam τὸ καλὸν dicit numeri tantum gratia; atque hoc nomen mora syllabæ *ov* est mutatum." But what he meant by those words I confess myself unable to explain. For, 1. *λέγει* wants its nominative. 2. Even if *λέγει ἁρμονία* could mean "dicit numeri gratia," *καὶ μήκει* would not be thus separated from *ἁρμονία*, especially if *μήκει* means, as Buttman and Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, understand it, the metrical quantity of a syllable. 3. A nominative is required for *παρῆται*: and lastly, *παρῆται* does not mean "mutatum;" for *παράγειν* is, etymologically speaking, "to derive." Correctly then did Heindorf conceive the whole passage to be most obscure and corrupt. And so too did Buttman; who, thinking that *καλόν* had some affinity with *καλεῖν*, wished to read *καίτοι τοῖς λέγουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ ἁρμονία μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ ου παρῆται*, i. e. "although by those pronouncing it there is a change only in the harmony and length of the vowel *o*," which was written and called in the time of Plato *ov*: and hence *καλόν* was originally *καλοῦν*, a notion for which Buttman was indebted, I suspect, to Etymol. *Καλός*—*παρὰ τὸ καλῶ ἐκ τοῦ καλεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστον, ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἐφ' ὃ ἀγαν θίσμεν*. Creuzer however seems to have been nearer the mark in his Prolegom. in Plotin. Περὶ Κάλους, p. xvii., where he wishes to read *μήκει τοῦ νοῦ παρῆται*. For, says he, to the question of Hermogenes, What is *καλόν*? Socrates replies by saying, "It is difficult to understand. But by those who pronounce the word, it is turned aside from *νοῦ* by its harmony and length." For thus the mention of *νοῦ* is connected with that of *διανοίας* just afterwards; while both are subsequently united. By following then this clue it is easy to suggest that Plato wrote something to this effect—*καίτοι λέγουσι γ' ὅτι, αὐτοῦ ἡ ἁρμονία μόνον μὴ κάμη μήκει, τὰ νοῦ περιέρχεται*—"And yet they say that the letters *νοῦ* have been clipt off, merely that its harmony might not labour from its length." For the word was originally *καλόνου*.

⁸⁷ Stalbaum would insert *τι* after *αληθῆναι*—

Soc. Will not then this (cause) be the intellect either of gods, or men, or of both?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. That then which calls things, and the beautiful, are the same, this⁸⁸ intellect.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. Whatever things then mind and intellect effect, these are to be praised; but what they do not, are to be blamed?

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Now the medicinal business produces medical results; and the carpenter's business carpentry results: or how say you?

Herm. I (say) thus.

Soc. And the beautiful produces things beautiful?

Herm. It must needs do so.

Soc. But this, as we have said, is intellect.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Τὸ καλὸν (the beautiful) then will be properly the appellation of that φρόνησις (prudence) which produces such things as we call beautiful, and which we embrace.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. What then remains of such like names?

Herm. Those that are conversant with the ἀγαθὸν (good), and the καλὸν (beautiful), such as Συμφέροντα (things conducive), and Λυσιτελοῦντα (profitable), and Ωφέλιμα (advantageous), and Κερδαλέα (gainful), and their contraries.

[72.] *Soc.* You may then by reflecting find τὸ συμφέρον (the conducive) from the previous remarks; for it appears to be a kind of a brother to science. For it exhibits nothing but the motion of the soul in conjunction with things; and that what results from some such a thing should be called συμφέροντα and σύμφορα (conducive), from συμπεριφέρεσθαι (to be carried round in conjunction), is reasonable.⁸⁹

Herm. It is reasonable.

⁸⁸ I cannot understand ταῦτόν ἐστι τοῦτο διάνοια. I could ταῦτόν ἐστι που τῇ διανοίᾳ—i. e. "it is the same with intellect."

⁸⁹ By adding here ἵσκει with Heusde, and repeating "ἵσκει μίντοι in the answer of Hermogenes, we shall not only support the syntax, but restore Plato's usual method of uniting μίντοι with the word repeated in the answer, as I have shown on Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2, and to the passages there quoted I could now add many more. Here μίντοι might easily have dropt out between ἵσκειν and τὸ—

Soc. But *κερδαλέον* (gainful) is from *κέρδος* (gain); and to him, who puts a *ν* instead of a *δ* in this name, it points out what it means: for it thus gives, after another manner, the name for "good;" for as it is mingled with⁹⁰ and pervades all things, he who assigned it this name expressed its power, and thus, by placing *δ* instead of *ν*, he pronounced it *κέρδος*.⁹¹

Herm. But what is *λυσιτελοῦν* (profitable)?

Soc. It seems,⁹² *Hermogenes*, not as hucksters use it, should any one⁹³ settle an expenditure, does it seem good to me to understand *τὸ λυσιτελοῦν* (the profitable); but being the swiftest⁹⁴ thing in existence, it does not suffer things to stand still, nor the rushing-on to obtain an end of being borne along, and to stand still⁹⁵ and to cease; but always⁹⁶ frees it,

⁹⁰ *Ficin.* "omnibus immiscetur diffusum per omnia," as if he had found in his MS. *κεράννυται πᾶσι, πάντα διεξιών* instead of *κεράννυται ἐς πάντα διεξιών*—

⁹¹ Since by changing *δ* into *ν*, *κέρδος* would become *κέρνος*, a word would be formed which Plato must have known never existed in Greek, the derivation was feigned, I suspect, with the view of ridiculing something equally absurd propounded by other etymologists.

⁹² Enamoured, as usual, with a faulty expression, *Stalbaum* endeavours to defend the union of *λοικε* with the subsequent *μοι δοκεῖ*. Had he remarked that for *εἰ τί δῃ*, in the question of *Hermogenes*, the best MS. *Gud.* reads *τῷδ*—he would perhaps have seen that Plato wrote *Λυσιτελοῦν εἰ τί*; *ΣΩΚ.* *τῷδ* *λοικεν εἶναι, ὡ* *Ἑρμόγηνες* i. e. "It seems to be in this way."

⁹³ Here again *Stalbaum* would mislead an incautious reader by his assertion that *κάπηλος* is to be understood before *ἀπολύψ*. For there *τις* has evidently dropt out after *ἴαν*. Nor is this the only error; for the expression is not *ἀπολύειν*, but *λύειν τάνάλωμα*, as shown by *Diphilus* in *Athen.* vi. p. 227, F. *Ἦς αἱ πρόσοδοι λύουσι τάνάλωματα*. And were the fact otherwise, *ἀπό* could have no part here, where Plato is explaining the word *λυσιτελοῦν*, not *ἀπολυσιτελοῦν*. Nor could *τὸ ἀνάλωμα* be introduced here without showing its affinity in meaning with *τίλος*. He wrote, I suspect, *ἴαν τις τίλος, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀνάλωμα, πᾶν λύψ*. For *Etymol. M.* has *Τίλος—δαπάνημα*. Besides it is only after the whole bill has been settled, that a tradesman can count up his profit.

⁹⁴ How the profitable can be the swiftest thing in existence I must leave for others to explain; and even if it were the quickest, it would be unable to keep every thing in motion, unless it had a weight, or rather a momentum, which in mechanics represents the velocity multiplied into the mass of matter.

⁹⁵ *Edd.* *τὴν φορὰν τοῦ φέρεσθαι*. But that Plato would thus unite *τὴν φορὰν* and *τοῦ φέρεσθαι*, and repeat here *σῆναι* after the preceding *ἴστασθαι*, others may, but I will not, believe. Correctly has *Ficinus*, "neque permittit lationem telos (id est finem) progressionis accipere atque cessare," which leads to *τὴν φορὰν πορεύεσθαι καὶ παύεσθαι*.

should any end attempt to be produced,⁹⁶ and renders it unceasing and immortal. In this way it seems to me that λυσιτελοῦν (the profitable) obtained the reputation of ἀγαθόν (the good); for τὸ τῆς φορᾶς λύον τὸ τέλος (that which dissolves the end of rushing) was called λυσιτελοῦν. [73.] But ⁹⁷ὠφέλιμον (useful) is a foreign name which Homer himself often uses, τῷ ὀφέλλειν.⁹⁷ But this is the appellation of increasing and making.⁹⁸

Herm. But how stand the contraries of these?

Soc. Such of these as express a negation, there is no need, it appears to me, to go through.

Herm. But what are they?

Soc. The non-conducive, and useless, and unprofitable, and the non-lucrative.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. But βλαξερὸν (hurtful), and Ζημιῶδες (noxious).

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. Now τὸ βλαξερὸν (the hurtful), he says,⁹⁹ is that which is βλαπτὸν τὸν ῥοῦν (hurting the flowing). But βλάπτον means τὸ βουλόμενον ἄπτειν (that which wishes to bind); and ἄπτειν (to bind), is the same as δεῖν: but this he blames¹⁰⁰ every

⁹⁶—⁹⁸ Edd. ἀλλ' αἰεὶ λυεῖ αὐτῆς, ἂν τι ἐπιχειρῇ τέλος ἐγγίγνεσθαι, which words, says Stalbaum, are to be thus resolved—ἀλλ' αἰεὶ λυεῖ, ἂν τέλος τι αὐτῆς ἐπιχειρῇ ἐγγίγνεσθαι: as if Plato would have thus separated αὐτῆς from τέλος, and have used ἐγγίγνεσθαι for the simple γίγνεσθαι. Ficinus has, "sed semper solvit ab illa fugatque, si quis terminus superveniat." Plato wrote, I suspect, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ λυεῖ αὐτῇ ἂν γε ἐπιχειρῇ τέλους ἐγγὺς γίγνεσθαι, i. e. "but ever does what is good for it (τῇ φορᾷ), should it attempt to be near its end." For thus λυεῖ αὐτῇ is similar to τέλη λυεῖ φρονούντι in CED. T. 324.

⁹⁷—⁹⁷ Such is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, ὠφέλιμον δέ, ξενικόν τὸ ὄνομα, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κίχρηται, τῷ ὀφέλλειν. But Homer never uses ὠφέλιμον, although he frequently does ὀφέλλειν. Plato wrote εἰ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κίχρηται τῷ ὀφέλλειν. Nor is this the only error. For the article before ὄνομα is superfluous. Read then ξενικόν τι, as in § 70, βαρβαρικόν τι, and ξενικόν τι in § 77, and βαρβαρικόν τι in § 82, where many MSS. omit τι.

⁹⁸ Instead of ποιεῖν Heindorf suggested, even with the approbation of Stalbaum, πιαίνειν, of which the interpretation would be πίονα ποιεῖν.

⁹⁹ Both Heind. and Stalb. understand ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης before λέγει. But as one MS. has λέγειν, and εἶναι is perfectly useless, we must read, what Plato wrote—οἶμαι λέγειν, "I think it means"—

¹⁰⁰ Here again Heind. and Stalb. supply ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης before λέγει. But why the founder of the name should find fault with the notion that ἄπτειν καὶ δεῖν mean the same, we are not told. Since then MS. Gud.

where. He, therefore, who wishes ἀπτεῖν ροῦν (to bind a flowing), will be most properly called βουλαπτεροῦν; but it appears to me, that, being spoken elegantly, it (becomes) βλαβερόν.

Herm. A variety of names come out, Socrates, to your view; and you just now appeared to me to have played a prelude with your mouth, as it were, of the melody belonging to Athena, while you pronounced this name βουλάπτεροῦν.¹

Soc. I am not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but those who founded the name.

[74.] *Herm.* You speak the truth; but what can the word ζημιῶδες (noxious) be?

Soc. What can ζημιῶδες (noxious) be? Behold, Hermogenes, how I shall speak the truth by saying, that through adding and taking away letters, persons vary so very much the meanings of names, that by turning then aside sometimes only a little they cause words to have the very contrary meaning. As in τὸ δέον (the needful). For I understood, and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am about to say to you, that² this new speech of ours, itself the beautiful, has turned round τὸ δέον and ζημιῶδες, (so as) to indicate the contrary,³ and causing to disappear what they

has ἀπανταχοῦ, I suspect Plato wrote τοῦτο δ' εἰπόντα γ' οὐ ψίγει τις τὸ—i. e. "And no one blames a person so speaking."

¹ How Socrates could be feigned to have played a prelude with his mouth to the hymn of Athena, the goddess of wisdom, by his absurd etymology of βλαβερόν, I cannot understand; unless it be said that Plato is here, as elsewhere, speaking ironically. Instead of τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, I suspect the author wrote τῆς σῆς Ἀνελιθίας. For as Socrates was the son of a midwife, and professes, in *Theæt.* p. 151, B. § 22, to practise in the case of the mind, what his mother did in that of the body, the midwife's art, the tutelary deity of his family would be not Ἀθηνᾶ but Ἀνελιθία. But as Euripides in *Ion*, 452, thus identifies the two, Σὶ τὰν ὠδίνων λοχίαν Ἀνελιθίαν ἱμὲν Ἀθανᾶν ἱκετεύω, we might perhaps read here σῆς Ἀθηνᾶς Ἀνελιθίας.

² Such is the literal translation of the Greek; where, says Heindorf, there is a ridicule of the new speech in the words ἡ καλὴ αὐτῇ. But why Plato should introduce this ridicule, neither he, nor Stalbaum, who follows him, has deigned to explain. Besides, although Stalbaum asserts that περιέτρεψε καὶ μὲνύειν is the same as περιέτρεψεν ὥστε καὶ μὲνύειν, no one conversant with the language will admit the assertion for a moment. And even if such an ellipse would preserve the syntax, still the sense would be none. For we have still to learn what is the contrary meaning, which the new speech attributes to the words δέον and ζημιῶδες. Lastly, in the phrase "to turn round to the contrary," correct Greek would require ἐς τὸναντίον περιέτρεψε. Unless I am egregiously mis-

mean: but the ancient speech points out what both these words mean.

Herm. How say you?

Soc. I will tell you. Our ancestors you know very frequently used the ϵ and δ , and not the least the women, who particularly preserved the ancient tongue.³ But now, instead of the ϵ , they perversely use either ϵ or η , and ζ instead of δ , as being more stately.

Herm. But how?

Soc. Just as, for instance, the most ancient men called *ἡμέρα* (day) *ιμέρα*, and some of them *ἐμέρα*; but those of the present times *ἡμέρα*.

[75.] *Herm.* This is so.

Soc. You know then that this ancient name alone points out what was in the mind of the founder; for, because light is wont to emerge from darkness upon men pleased with and desiring its beams,⁴ on this account they called day *ιμέρα*.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. But as it is now spoken in high-flown language, you can by no means understand what *ἡμέρα* means; although some think that day is called on this account *ἡμέρα*, because it renders things *ἡμερα*, gentle.

Herm. So it appears to me.

Soc. And you likewise know that the ancients called *Ζυγόν* (a yoke) *Δυογόν*.⁵

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. Now *ζυγόν* indicates nothing. But that which exists for the two things together, for the sake of a binding, is justly

taken, Plato wrote—*ἡ μὲν νέα φωνὴ κεκαλλιπημένη οὐκ εὖ ἐς τοῦναντίον περιστρέψεν, ἀ μὲν νῦν ἐν, τὸ δὲ καὶ ζημιῶδες*, i. e. "the new speech, having been beautified by words, has not well turned round to the contrary the words *οἶον* and *ζημιῶδες*, which now signify one thing:" where I have adopted *περιστρέψεν* from three MSS., and *μὲν* from one; and been led to *κεκαλλιπημένη* by *κεκαλλιπημένους λόγους* in *Apolog.* p. 17, B., and *οὐ καλλιπούμεθα* in *Thucyd.* vi. 83, which Valckenaer, in *Diatrib.* p. 291, so beautifully elicited from *οὐκ ἄλλω ἐπόμεθα*.

³ The same thing took place in Italy, as remarked by Cicero de Orator. iii. 12, "Facilius mulieres incorruptam antiquitatem conservant sermone."

⁴ Compare *Æsch. Prom.* 23, *ἀσμένω δὲ σοὶ—Πάχυν ἰψάν ἥλιος σκιδῶ πάλιν*.

⁵ Schneider would read *δυαγόν* from *Etymol.* *Ζυγὲς παρὰ τὸ οὐκ ἄγειν δυαγός, καὶ ἐν συγκοπῇ δυγός καὶ ζυγός*.

called *δυογόν*. But it is now *ζυγόν*. And there are many others so circumstanced.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. In this way then at first the word *δέον* (binding), when it is thus spoken, signifies the contrary to all the names connected with *ἀγαθόν* (good). For this name being a species of the good, appears to be a binding of, and hinderance to, a rushing-on, as being the brother of *βλαβερόν* (noxious).

[76.] *Herm.* It appears, Socrates, to be very much so.

Soc. But not if you use the ancient name; which it is likely was founded with much more propriety than the present one. And it will agree⁶ with those former good names, if you substitute as of old *ε* for *ε*; for *διδόν*⁷ and not *δέον*, signifies that good, which (the founder of names)⁸ praises. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself; but the names *δέον*, *ωφέλιμον*, *λυσιτελοῦν*, *κερδαλέον*, *ἀγαθόν*, *συμφέρον*, *εύπορον*,⁹ (easily-going,) all appear the same; signifying by different names that¹⁰ what adorns and pervades every where (is) praised,¹⁰ but that what detains and binds, is blamed. And indeed, in the name *ζημιῶδες*, if, according to the ancient speech, you substitute *δ* for *ζ*, it will appear to

⁶ Ficinus, "consenties." But *ὁμολογήσει* is not the fut. med. 2 pers., but fut. indic. 3 pers., and agrees with *ὄνομα* understood, as Heind. was the first to remark.

⁷ As *διδόν* at no period was written for *διδόν*, it is evident that Plato wrote *τὸ ἴσῃα ἀποδιδῶς δις*. For thus *δις* might easily drop out after *-δῶς*.

⁸ Ficinus alone has preserved the nominative to *ἐπαινεῖ* in his "quod semper nominum laudat institutor." But not the name-founder alone praises the good, but every one else. Hence I suspect we ought to read *ὅπερ δὲ πᾶς ἐπαινεῖ*, similar to *πανταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον*, a little below. Stalbaum, with his so-called best MSS., reads *δὴ* and omits *AEI*, of which *ΔΗ* is the evident corruption.

⁹ The introduction of *εύπορον* seems strange here; for neither before nor subsequently is there given any etymology of it, as there is of all the other words; and though *εὐπορία* is mentioned in § 77, yet there it has come from a gloss.

¹⁰ Ficinus has "aliquid per omnia penetrans, omniaque perorans, idque ubique laudatum," which leads, as Heindorf saw, to *καὶ διδόν πάντα, πάνταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον*. Instead however of *διδόν*, nearly all the MSS. read *καὶ δὲ*, from whence Bekker elicited *καὶ ἰδόν*, with the approbation of Stalbaum; who forgot that the whole chain of reasoning imperiously demands *διδόν*, of which *οἶον*, found in two MSS., preserves the vestige. For *δ* and *ο* are constantly confounded, as shown by Koen on Gregor. de Dialect. p. 120, ed. Schæf.

you that this name was applied to δούντι τὸ ἰὸν (binding that which is going), and was called *δημιῶδες*.¹¹

[77.] *Herm.* But, Socrates, what is Ἥδονή (pleasure), and Ἀλγῆ (pain), and Ἐπιθυμία (desire), and such like names.

Soc. They do not appear to me to be very difficult, *Hermogenes*. For ἡδονή (pleasure) seems to have obtained this appellation as an action tending towards ὄνησις (enjoyment); but the δ was added, that it might be called ἡδονή instead of ἡοιή.¹² But λύπη (pain) seems to be so named from the διάλυσις (dissolution)¹³ of the body, which the body undergoes in that suffering; and Ἀνία (grief), as impeding τὸ ἵεναι (going):¹⁴ but Ἀλγῆδών (torture) appears to me to be some foreign word, and to be so called from ἀλγεινός (torturing).¹⁵ But Ὀδύνη (anxiety) appears to be called from the ἐνδυσις (ingress of pain). But Ἀχθηδών (heaviness of heart) is clear even to all¹⁶ that it is a name assimilated to the heaviness of rushing: ¹⁷ (for ἄχθος is "a burden," and ἰὸν "a thing moving").¹⁷ But Χαρά (joy) seems to be called from the ¹⁸ διάχυσις (diffusion) and Εὐπορία (easy going) of the flowing ¹⁸ of the soul; but Τέρψις (delight) was derived from τερπνὺν (pleasant); but τερπνὸν was so called from being assimilated to πρὸς

¹¹ Compare Etymol. Ζημία—ἡ δημία τις οὐσα ἡ πολιτικῇ.

¹² For Plato thus supposes the existence of ὄνη, the root of ὄνημι.

¹³ On λύπη, as if it were derived from λύνειν, and its affinity with διάλυσις, Heind. refers to Wyttenbach upon Plutarch. S. N. V. p. 103. But even he failed to see that, as Chrysippus, quoted by Cicero in Tusc. Disp. iii. 25, considered λύπη to be λύσις totius hominis, Plato perhaps wrote here ἰσχει τις ἀνὼς, not ἰσχει τὸ σῶμα: where σῶμα is inelegantly repeated after τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος. Stalbaum would read ἦ—ἰσχει, and render ἰσχει "keep in, restrain."

¹⁴ Hence Etymol. Ἀνία—δύναται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵεναι γίνεσθαι ἐμποδιστικὸν γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ ἀνία.

¹⁵ That Plato derived ἀλγῆδών from ἀλγεινόν, and then lost all sight of -δών, it is impossible to believe. He might have written ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγῆ εἶναι; just as he derives ὀδύνη from ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης.

¹⁶ The expression "even to all" is a manifest absurdity. Plato wrote καὶ παιδί, "even to a child."—The word παντὶ without καὶ would have been intelligible. There is a similar error in Sympos. p. 187, A. § 14.

¹⁷—"The words within lunes have been found only in Ficinus' version, "achthos enim onus est; ion vero pergens."

¹⁸—"By comparing Etymol. Χαίρω, παρὰ τὸ χῶ τὸ διαχίω, παραγωγὸν χαίρω, one would have expected χαρὰ δὲ τῇ χύσει καὶ εὐροίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς. So that χαρὰ might be derived from χίω and εὐροία: for most assuredly it could not be from διάχυσις and εὐπορία.

(the breath), creeping through the soul; it would be therefore justly called *ἐπ-ρουν*¹⁹ (mind-creeping), but in time it was deflected into *ρεπρὸν*. [78.] But *Εὐφροσύνη* (hilarity) wants nothing to explain "the why" of its denomination; for it is obvious to all, that it received its name, *εὐφροσύνη*, in strict justice from the soul being *εὖ* (well) *συμφέρεισθαι* (borne along) with all things;²⁰ nevertheless we call it *εὐφροσύνη*. Nor is *Ἐπιθυμία* (desire) difficult:²¹ for it is plain that this name was applied to a power going on to *θυμός* (anger). But *θυμός* (anger) would have its appellation from *θύσεως* (raging) and *ζέσεως* (boiling). And again, *Ἱμερος* (desire) was so called from *ροῦς* (a flowing) vehemently drawing the soul. For because *ἰέμερος* *ρεῖ* (it flows urged on), and is desirous of things, and thus strongly draws the soul through the sending-forth of its flowing, it is, from the whole of this power, called *Ἱμερος*. Moreover *Πόθος* (regret) is so called signifying²² that there is (something) of desire not present, and of a stream,²³ but from that which is elsewhere, and absent.²³ From whence it is called *πόθος* (regret), a feeling which is then called *Ἱμερος* (desire), when that is present, for which there is a wish.²³ [79.] But *Ἔρως* (love), because it flows inwardly from without,²⁴

¹⁹ Ficin. "merito vocaretur empnum, id est inspirans," this MS. therefore read *ἱμπρουν*.

²⁰ Ficinus has strangely misunderstood this passage; "hoc nomen trahitur ab eo quod dicitur eu, id est bene, et sympheresthæ, id est una sequi, quasi dicatur anima bene res assequi."

²¹ The ellipse, supplied by Stalbaum, is seen in the version of Ficinus—"neque difficile est assignare quid epithymia—sibi velit." But whether he found the corresponding Greek words, *οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι βούλεται*, in his MS. is another question.

²²⁻²³ To get rid of the nonsense in the words *σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἱμῖρον τε καὶ ρεύματος*, Stalbaum would reject *ἱμῖρον τε καὶ ρεύματος* as an interpolation. But why they were interpolated he does not, for he could not, tell. Ficinus has "quod sane presentem suavitatem non respicit, quemadmodum himeros, sed absentem ardet." Perhaps Plato wrote *σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἱμέρον γε κατὰ ρεύματι ὅσον*, i. e. "signifying that there is not of something present the desire, how great, rushing stream-like." Stalbaum indeed fancies that *πόθος* was derived by Plato from *πόθι*, not aware that *τὸ ὑπαῖθον* had probably dropt out between *ἀπόντος* and *ὅθεν*. For both the desire of something present, and the regret of something absent, carry away the mind, as with a torrent, or inflame it, as with a torch.

²³⁻²³ All the words between the figures were omitted by Taylor, although found in the version of Ficinus.

²⁴ The same doctrine broached in the Phædrus, p. 251, B. § 68.

and because this flowing is not the property of him who possesses it, but is introduced through the eyes, was on this account called of old ἔσρος, from ἐσρεῖν (to flow towards); but at present it is called ἔρως, through the change of ω into ο.²⁵ But what say you²⁶ shall we still consider?

Herm. What does Δόξα (opinion), and such-like names, seem to you (to signify).

Soc. Δόξα (opinion) was denominated either from διώξεις (pursuit), in which the soul proceeds, while pursuing its knowledge as to how things exist; or else from τόξου βολή (the darting of an arrow);²⁷ and to this it seems more like.²⁸ Hence Οἴσις (opinion) chimes in with this; ²⁹ for it seems to be like ἰέσις (a sending-forth) of the soul to all things, when it is showing to those in doubt what each is in reality.³⁰ For

²⁵ Beck was the first to remark that there is some error here. It should have been stated that ἔσρος first became ἔρος by throwing out the σ, and then ἔρως by the change of ο into ω.

²⁶ Ficinus has "Verum quid deinceps considerandum præcipis." From whence Heindorf elicited τί ἐτι σὺ λέγεις—Stalbaum still sticks to σέ, although he confesses that, if σὺ be retained, ἐτι should follow σκοπῶμεν.

²⁷ That Plato would thus compare δόξα with the shooting of arrows, without assigning some reason for the comparison, it is impossible to believe. I suspect there is a lacuna here, which it would be easy to supply.

²⁸ In lieu of τοῦτο in some MSS., Bekker has edited from others τοῦτο, which I cannot understand: while instead of μάλλον two MSS. read μάλιστα. I suspect that Plato wrote τοῦτο τὸ βαλλόμενον μάλιστα' εἰ, in allusion to the preceding βολή. We should say in English, "This appears to be the best shot." Or we may read κάλλιστα, which is perpetually confounded with μάλιστα.

²⁹⁻³⁰ Such is the meaning of the words which Plato wrote, I suspect—ἰέσις γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὄν, δηλοῦσης τοῖς ἀπόροις, ἵκειν εἶναι, in lieu of which Bekker's edition has—οἷσιν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν πᾶγμα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων δηλοῦση προσίειν. But of the strange word οἷσιν, which some have attempted to derive from οἶσω, the fut. of φέρω, the variations in MSS. are very remarkable. Some read οἷσιν ἰσως, others οἷσιν ἰσως, and others εἷσιν ἰσως. Some again, omitting ἰσως, have οἷσιν or εἷσιν, and

εἷ οἷ
some have both, οἷσιν, or εἷσιν: one reads οἷ εἷσιν, and one ἰση. Heindorf acutely saw that the word, ἰέσις, derived from ἵεναι, lay hid here; for thus ἰέσις would be similar in meaning to βολή. But beyond this he did not venture to go. Stalbaum has however not only adopted the correction, which he calls "egregious," but edited τὸ πᾶγμα for πᾶν πᾶγμα, from seven MSS., without deigning to explain how ἕκαστον could thus follow τὸ πᾶγμα, or, if in ἕκαστον there is no reference to τὸ πᾶγμα, what is the meaning of τὸ πᾶγμα; and still less has he shown

³⁰ just as *Βουλή* (counsel) is to *βολή* (shooting), so *βούλεσθαι* (to wish), which signifies *τὸ ἐφίεσθαι* (to desire), is to *βουλευέσθαι* (to consult).³⁰ For³¹ all these in following *δόξα* (opinion), appear to be certain resemblances of *βολή* (shooting);³² just again as, on the contrary, *Ἀβουλία* (a want of counsel), appears to be the mishap³³ of a person neither shooting, nor obtaining that at which he shot, and what he wished, and about what he deliberated, and what he desired.³³

[80.] *Herm.* ³⁴ You seem to me, Socrates, to have just now introduced these names rather thickly and rapidly.

Soc. For I now wish an end.³⁴ But I wish then still to go through *Ἀνάγκη* (necessity), which comes in order after those, and also *Ἐκούσιον* (voluntary).³⁴

what he understands by *δηλοῦσιν προσίεικε*, or how *προσίεικε* could be used here for the simple *εἰκε*.

^{30—30} Here again, aided partly by Stalbaum, I have been able to restore what Plato wrote—*ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχει ἡ βουλή πρὸς τὴν βολήν, καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, δὲ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει, πρὸς τὸ βουλευέσθαι*, in lieu of the unintelligible *ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ βουλή πρὸς τὴν βολήν καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει καὶ βουλευέσθαι*: where Stalbaum was the first to see that to preserve the balance of the sentence *πρὸς* must be inserted in the second clause. With regard to the affinity between *βούλεσθαι* and *βουλευέσθαι*, Shakspeare has something similar in his well-known—
“Harry, thy wish was father to the thought.”

³¹ Taylor has properly introduced “for,” to preserve the connexion of the sentences.

³² As MS. Gud. has *τῆς ψυχῆς* instead of *τῆς βολῆς*, Heindorf wished to read *τῆς βολῆς τῆς ψυχῆς*.

^{32—32} Even Heindorf failed to see the absurdity of the present text. For most assuredly, it cannot be said of him who does not shoot at all, that he misses what he shot at; nor would Plato have been guilty of a tautology in writing *οὐ ἐφίετο* after *δὲ ἐβούλετο*: unless it be said that *οὐ ἐφίετο* is to be rendered “at what he aimed;” but even then it would be unnecessary after *περὶ οὐ ἐβουλευετο*. Common sense evidently leads to—“of a person neither shooting where he intended, nor hitting what he wished, or, obtaining what he did not desire;” according to the saying in English, “He shot at a pigeon, and killed a crow;” and, “He shot at a barn-door, and missed the barn.” The Greek then would be *ὡς οὐ βαλόντος του, οἱ ἐβουλευετο, οὐδὲ τυχόντος, οὐ ἐβούλετο, ἢ καὶ, οὐ ἐφίετ’ οὐ, λαβόντος*.

^{34—34} All within the figures are generally assigned to Hermogenes; in Ald., to Socrates, from *ταῖος* to the end, which Stalbaum after Stephens adopts, and reads *θαίω* for *θειῶ*, or, as it is written in one MS., *σὲν θειῶ*, as Ficinus found in his MS. likewise. For his version is, “Quare finis sit jam favente deo.” But as scarcely more than two-thirds of the dialogue has been gone through, there would be scarcely any allusion here to its termination; and even if there were, correct Greek would require

Soc. Now τὸ ἐκούσιον (voluntary) signifies τὸ εἶκον (the yielding), and not the beating-against; but, ³⁵ as I say, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι (yielding to what is going on) would be shown by this name, which exists according to βούλησις (the will).³⁵ But τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (the necessary), and ἀντίτυπον (the beating-against), the being contrary to the will, would be connected with ἀμαρτία (error), and ἀμαθία (ignorance).³⁶ But they are

τὸ τέλος. Some one says Stephens wished to read θεῶ, "video;" but θεῶ in that sense is found only in the middle voice. Hence he suggested εἰς τέλος θίω, "ad finem propero," i. e. "I am hastening to the end." But that could be no reason for Socrates introducing a number of names. He would rather have cut short his speech. Abresch, in Auctor. Thucyd. p. 306, suggests τέλος θεῶ, "look to the end." He ought rather to have proposed θίς εὔ—But the imperative could not thus follow γάρ. Plato wrote, I suspect, βίλος γάρ ᾗδ' ἴσον θείω, "For I have witnessed a bolt equal to a divine one." And thus there would be an allusion to the βολή just spoken of, and to the fact that in a storm the bolts of heaven fall fast and thick." So in CEd. C. 1462, we must read οὐρανοῦ γάρ ἀστραπὴ φλέγει πόλον, μάταν ἐφείσ' οὐ βίλος· δίδια δ'—not φλέγει πάλιν τί μὲν ἀφήσει τέλος: where βίλος is due to London ed. B., noticed by Elmsley; while μάταν ἐφείσ' οὐ βίλος may be compared with the Homeric οὐχ ἄλιον βίλος, and θεῖον βίλος. After this compliment, Socrates returns to the subject, by saying Ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, not οὐν ἐτι βούλομαι: to which Hermogenes rejoins, Καὶ βούλομαι. At least by such a remodeling of the speeches, can we understand the course of the dialogue.

³⁵—³⁶ I cannot understand how after τὸ εἶκον Plato could add ἀλλ' ὥσπερ λέγω εἶκον: still less how εἶκον could stand here by itself; and least of all, what Heindorf was the first to notice, how a name could be said to be produced according to will in the abstract. Ficinus has, "Ecusion equidem est icon, id est cedens, neque renitens. Hoc si quidem nomine declaratur icon ionti, id est, cedens eunti, quodve ex voluntate perficitur." He therefore did not find ὥσπερ λέγω in his MS., or finding it, designedly omitted it, as being unintelligible. Heindorf proposed to read ὀνόματι τοῦ—γιγνομένου. From which I do not see what we are to gain. Perhaps Plato wrote τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκούσιον τὸ εἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀντίτυπον ἦν τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ γιγνομένου· καλῶς ἄρα, λέγω, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι τι δεδηλωμένον ἂν εἴη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι—i. e. "The word ἐκούσιον (voluntary) means yielding to, and not beating against, that which exists according to the will of some one. I say then that by this name would be correctly indicated any thing yielding to what is going on." This, I flatter myself, is something more fit to be read, than the rubbish which Stallbaum attempts to explain by asserting that the words τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν γιγνομένου are added after τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι as an epexegesis to, and having the same meaning as, τῷ ἐκουσίῳ. If then I have correctly restored here κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ, we must read just afterwards παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ—

³⁶ This is said because, according to Plato's theory, no one errs except unwillingly or unwittingly.

likened to a going along *κατὰ ἄγκη* (gorges); because being difficult to pass, and rugged and thick (with bushes), they impede a going-on. And hence, perhaps, *ἀνάγκη* (necessity) was so called from its resemblance to a journey through a gorge. But as long as our strength remains, let us not give up the journey. Do not you then give up, but interrogate me.

Herm. I ask then about things the greatest and most beautiful, *Ἀλήθεια* (truth), and *Ψεῦδος* (falsehood), and τὸ Ὀν (entity); and that very thing, about which is the subject of our present discourse, *Ὄνομα* (name), why was it so called?

Soc. You say that *μαίεσθαι* means something.

Herm. I say it means *ζητεῖν* (to inquire).

[81.] *Soc.* ³⁷ It looks like a name moulded together from a discourse, which says that this name is an entity which an inquiry hits.³⁷ But you would know it rather in the word which we pronounce *ὀνομαστόν* (to be named); ³⁸ for there it clearly states ³⁸ that that is *ὄν* (entity) of which there is *μάσμα* (an in-

^{37—37} Such is the literal version of the Greek, *Ἔοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένον, λίγοντος ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὄν, οὐ τυγχάνει ζήτημα, τὸ ὄνομα.* Ficinus has, "Videtur nomen hoc ex illo sermone confiatum, quo dicitur *ὄν*, id est ens, esse, cujus nomen inquisitio est?" He therefore found in his MS. *Ἔοικε τοίνυν τὸ ὄνομα ἐκ λόγου τοῦ συγκεκροτημένον, λίγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐ ὄν τυγχάνει ζήτημα τὸ ὄνομα.* "The word *ὄνομα* seems to have been moulded from some discourse, which asserts that the entity exists, the name of which happens to be the object of inquiry." But how Hermogenes could get any clue to the meaning or etymology of *ὄνομα*, I must leave for others to explain. Heindorf cuts the matter very short by saying, that according to Socrates "the word *ὄνομα* is derived from *ὄν* and *μαίεσθαι*, i. e. *ζητεῖν*, to seek, for that *ὄνομα* is that entity about which there is an inquiry. But in that case *μαίεσθαι* would have been distinctly mentioned or alluded to. Besides, there is not here at least, whatever there may be in other dialogues, especially the *Parmenides*, any inquiry about entity, or its correct name. Moreover unless *τυγχάνειν* means "to hit upon," it would require the participle *ὄν*, which might however have easily dropt out after *οὐ*.

^{38—38} Here again I confess myself completely in the dark. The Greek is, *ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς λίγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὀνομασμά ἐστιν*, which Ficinus thus translates, "Hic enim exprimitur nomen quid sit, entis videlicet inquisitio." From whose "inquisitio" both Heusde and Buttmann were led to *ὄν μάσμα ἐστιν*. But if *μάσμα* formed any portion of *ὄνομα*, most assuredly some reason would have been assigned for the change of *μάσμα* into *ομα*. But as no such reason is here given, it is evident that after all the exertions of critics we neither know now, nor perhaps are ever likely to know, what Plato wrote, except by the aid of conjectural criticism, which few can apply successfully, and fewer still appreciate, when so applied. I shall therefore refrain from producing my own.

quiry). ³⁹ But Ἀλήθεια (truth), this seems to have been moulded together ³⁹ like the rest; for the divine rushing-on of entity appears to have been addressed by this name ἀλήθεια, as being *ῥεῖα ἄλη* (a divine wandering). But *Ψεύδος* (falsehood) is contrary to a rushing-on. For here again returns that which is abused as being detained and is compelled to be at rest; and (the name) is assimilated to those, who sleep; ⁴⁰ but the *ψ* being added conceals the meaning of the name. But ὄν (entity) and οὐσία (existence) agree with ἀλήθεια (truth), by receiving the addition ⁴¹ of an *ι*; for then they signify *ἰὸν* (going), (and *ἰουσία*) ⁴² (the act of going). And on the other hand *οὐκ ὄν* (non-being), as some also call it, *οὐκ* ⁴³ *ἰὸν* (not-going.)

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to have rattled through these questions in a very manly manner. But should any one ask you, what propriety of appellation have the words *ἰὸν* (going), *ῥεῖον* (flowing), and *Δοῦν* (binding)—

³⁹⁻⁴⁰ The Greek is, *ἡ δ' ἀλήθεια καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰσχυρὰ συγκειρομένησθαι*, which Stalbaum thus translates, "Quod autem attinet ad nomen ἀλήθεια, etiam hoc reliquis simile videtur, hoc est, confiatum esse ex integra propositione." But as there is nothing in the original to which the words "ex integra propositione" can be referred, we may dismiss his interpretation as utterly untenable. Heindorf was near the mark in suggesting *κατὰ ταῦτα*, and so was Stephens in proposing *ἐκ τοῦ τῆς ἄλης*. For Plato probably wrote, *κατὰ ταῦτ' ἀπὸ τίνος ἄλης*—and shortly afterwards—*τοῦτ' ἂν ῥήματι, ὡς ἄλη θεία οὐσα*—for *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* is evidently as gl. for *τοῦτ' ἂν ῥήματι*: while the etymology in ἀλήθεια requires not *θεία οὐσα ἄλη*, but *ἄλη θεία οὐσα*.

⁴⁰ Instead of *καθεύδουσι* it is manifest that Plato wrote *τοῖς γε εὐδουσι*, instead of *τοῖς καθεύδουσι*. For *ψεῦδος* is formed, not by adding *ψ* to *καθευδω*, but to *εὐδω*.

⁴¹ Instead of *ἀποβαλὼν*, which makes absolute nonsense, Heusde was the first to conjecture *ἀπολαβὼν*, which he got from the version of Ficinus, "si i apponatur," and is confirmed by three MSS. I do not however remember another passage where *ἀπολαμβάνειν* means "to receive in addition." Hence I should prefer *τοῦ ἰῶτα ἐπιβαλλομένου*. But this is not all. For instead of *τῷ ἀληθεῖ* we must read *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*. For *τὸ ἰὸν* and *ἡ ἰουσία* have an affinity with ἀληθείᾳ rather than τῷ ἀληθεῖ.

⁴² To complete the sense I have added the words within lunas.

⁴³ Out of this mass of nonsense we may elicit something intelligible by reading in the Greek, *καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἰὸν αὐτὸ εἰσὶ τινες οἱ ὀνομά τι νομίζουσιν, αὐτὸ δ' οὐκ ὄν*—and rendering in English, "and on the other hand, there are some who consider that what does not go on is a name merely, and does not itself exist:" where, since the two oldest MSS. read *τίνες ὀνόματι* instead of *ὡς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν*, I have, by uniting the readings, obtained *τίνες οἱ ὀνόματι μόνον νομίζουσιν*, adding to complete the sense and syntax *δ'* after *αὐτό*.

Soc. Should I be able to answer him? you mean. Is it not so?

[82.] *Herm.* Perfectly so.

Soc. One thing I have just now got somehow, so that by answering I shall appear to say something to the purpose.

Herm. What is it?

Soc. To say that what we know not is of Barbarian origin: for perhaps this would be really the case with some; and the first names would be inscrutable on account of their antiquity. For through the names being twisted in every way, it would be not at all wonderful if the ancient speech, as compared with the present, differed in nothing from a Barbarian one.

Herm. You speak nothing from the purpose.

Soc. Nay, I speak what is reasonable. But yet the contest does not appear to me to admit of excuses;⁴⁴ but we must be ready to reflect upon these matters; and let us consider, that, should any one always inquire into the verbs, through which a noun is spoken; and again those nouns through which verbs are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, must not he, who answers such a one, fail at length in his replies?

Herm. It appears so to me.

[83.] *Soc.* When therefore will he, who fails to answer, justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names, which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses and names? For these, if they are so circumstanced, can no longer justly appear to be composed from other names. Just as we said above,⁴⁵ that τὸ ἀγαθόν was composed from ἀγαστός (to be admired) and ὄος (swift). But ὄος, we may perhaps say, is composed from other words, and these last again from others: but if we ever lay hold of that, which is no longer composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.

Herm. You seem to me to speak correctly.

Soc. Are not then the names, about which you are asking, elements? And must we not consider in some other manner what is their propriety?

Herm. It is likely.

⁴⁴ On this expression see Heindorf's learned note.

⁴⁵ See § 63.

Soc. It is likely indeed, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, must come back to these. And if this be the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again with me, lest I act like a silly person, while stating what the propriety of the first names ought to be.

[84.] *Herm.* Only do but speak, and I will, to the utmost of my power, consider the matter with you.

Soc. I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one propriety in every name, both first and last; and that none of them differ, so far as they are names.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. But the propriety of the names we have just now discussed, was such as to show of what kind is each of the things existing.

Herm. How should it be not so?

Soc. This property then the prior names ought to possess no less than the posterior, if they are to be names.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. But the posterior names, as it appears, are able to effect this through the prior.

Herm. It appears so.

Soc. Be it so then. ⁴⁶But after what manner will the first names, which no others precede,⁴⁷ make, as much as they possibly can, the things existing clear to us, if they are about to be names?⁴⁸ But answer me this. If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wished to point out things to one another, should we not, as the dumb do at present, endeavour to indicate them by the hands, head, and the rest of the body?

[85.] *Herm.* How could we otherwise, Socrates?

Soc. I think then that if we wished to indicate that which is (going)⁴⁹ upwards and is light, we should raise our hands towards heaven and imitate the nature of the thing itself; but if (to indicate) things (going) downwards and heavy, (we should point) to the earth. And if we were desirous of indicating a horse running, or any other animal, you know that

⁴⁶—⁴⁸ I fear I do not quite understand this.

⁴⁷ So the sense requires. But *ὑπόκειται* is "succeed." Hence since MSS. vary between *ἔρεπα* and *πρότερεπα*, we must read *ἔρεπα πρότερεπα κείναι*.

⁴⁸ This is evidently required by the sense. The word *ὅν* has accidentally dropt out between *τὸ* and *ἀνν*, and *ὄν* after *κοῦρον*.

we should make our bodies and gestures as like as possible to those things.

Herm. It appears to me that the facts are necessarily as you say.

Soc. For in this manner, I think, the indication of any thing is produced by the body imitating,⁴⁹ as it seems, that which any one wishes to point out.

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. But since we wish to indicate a thing by our voice, and tongue, and mouth, will not an indication of each thing then take place through these, when an imitation of any thing whatever is produced through them?

Herm. It appears to me necessarily so.

Soc. A name then is, as it seems, an imitation by the voice⁵⁰ of that, which he who imitates, imitates and nominates by the voice what he imitates.⁵¹

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. But, by Zeus, my friend, I do not think that I have yet spoken in a becoming manner.

Herm. Why so?

Soc. Because we should be compelled to confess, that they who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals, give names to the things which they imitate.

Herm. You speak the truth.

Soc. But do you think this is correct?

Herm. I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will the name be?

⁴⁹ Edd. τῷ σώματι — μιμησάμενον — τοῦ σώματος. But two MSS. μιμησάμενους. To avoid the inelegant repetition in σώματι and σώματος, it is easy to read μιμησάμενον, and to omit τοῦ σώματος, and to insert τις after ἐβούλετο, as I have done in the translation.

⁵⁰ Stalbaum unjustly hesitates between φωνῇ and φωνῆς. For μίμημα φωνῆς is "imitation of a voice," but μίμημα φωνῇ, "imitation by a voice," what the sense manifestly requires.

⁵¹ In this definition Heindorf has corrected one error by reading ὅταν μιῆται for ὃ ἂν μιῆται; which Stalbaum has properly praised and learnedly supported. But Heindorf failed even to see the other error. For who can believe that Plato wrote ὃ μιῆται — ὃ μιμούμενος — ὅταν μιῆται. He might however have written ὃ μιῆται τις, καὶ ὀνομάζει τῇ φωνῇ, ὅταν μιῆται, "which some one imitates, and, when he imitates, gives it a name with his voice." Ficinus has, "imitatio vocis, qua quisquis aliquid imitatur, per vocem imitatur et nominat," omitting ὃ ἂν μιῆται.

[86.] *Soc.* ⁵²In the first place, as it appears to me, not if, as we imitate things with music, we so imitate, although we then imitate with the voice: and in the next place, if we imitate what music imitates, we do not appear to me to make use of names.⁵³ But I assert something of this kind. There is a certain voice, figure to each thing, and a colour to many.

Herm. Entirely so.

Soc. It appears then that although any one should imitate in this way, the name-giving art would not be conversant with these imitations; for these are partly musical and partly painting. Is it not so?

Herm. Yes.

Soc. But what is this? Seems there not to you an existence to every thing, as well as colour, and the other things we just now mentioned? In the first place,⁵⁴ is there not an existence to colour itself, and voice, and to all the rest, which are deemed deserving of the appellation of being?

Herm. It appears so to me.

Soc. But what then, if any one is able to imitate this very thing, the existence of each thing,⁵⁴ by letters and syllables, would he not indicate what each thing is?

Herm. Entirely so.

⁵²⁻⁵³ This is the literal English version of Stalbaum's Latin translation of the Greek, which I confess I cannot comprehend; nor will, I suspect, any one else. Ficinus has, "Non talis imitatio, qualis per musicam fit, quamvis voce fiat; neque etiam eorundem, quorum et musica imitatio est, neque per musicam imitationem enim nominare videmur," which is evidently a vain endeavour to give, what he believed to be the general sense of the passage; which was perhaps originally to this effect, "In the first place, as it seems to me, (the name) would not be an imitation, should we, as with music, imitate with the voice things well and beautifully; nor, secondly, should we well imitate, what music does not, do I think a name would be an imitation;" i. e. in Greek, Πρῶτον μὲν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἵδαν, καθάπερ τῇ μουσικῇ, οὕτω καὶ τῇ φωνῇ εὖ καλῶς τε μιμῶμεθα τὰ πραγματὰ ἔκπαιτα δὲ οὐκ ἂν, ἵδαν, ἅπερ ἡ μουσικὴ οὐ μιμῶται, εὖ ἡμεῖς μιμῶμεθα, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ὄνομα μίμησιν.

⁵³ Ficinus has, "Annon inest colori ac voci essentia quedam et aliis," omitting πρῶτον αὐτῷ before τῷ χρώματι, and ἑκατέρω αὐτῶν, not without reason; for all those words are quite useless; and so too does the whole clause, πρῶτον—ἑκατέρω αὐτῶν, after the preceding sentence.

⁵⁴ Either αὐτὸ τοῦτο or ἐκάστου τῇν οὐσίαν is an interpolation. Ficinus omits αὐτὸ τοῦτο. Perhaps, however, as MS. Gud. has αὐτῶν τοῦτο, there lies hid ἐκ του θιών ἡ αὐτῶς; for τοῦτων and τοῦ θιών are confounded in Eurip. Bacch. 328, as I have shown on Æsch. Suppl. 336 or we may read ἀπ' ἄλλον του ἡ αὐτῶς—

Soc. And what would you call him who is able to do this, as you called, of the former characters, one conversant with music, and the other with painting; how (call you) this?

[87.] *Herm.* This name, Socrates, appears to me what we are for some time seeking. For he would be a name-giver.⁸⁶

Soc. If then this is true, as it appears to be, let us consider those names about which you were inquiring; about *Ροή* (flowing), and *Ιέναι* (to go), and *Σχίσσις*⁸⁶ (holding), whether in their letters and syllables a person lays hold⁸⁷ of entity, so as to imitate existence or not.

Herm. By all means.

Soc. Come then, let us see whether these alone are a part of the first names, or whether there are many others.

Herm. I think there are many others.

Soc. For it is probable. But what shall be the mode of division from whence the imitator begins to imitate? Is it not, since the imitation happens to be by syllables and letters, the most proper to distribute first the elements? just as those who put their hands to rhythms,⁸⁸ distribute first the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables, and thus at length come to consider the rhythms themselves, but previously not?

Herm. Yes.

[88.] *Soc.* Ought we not then to divide thus the vowels, and afterwards the rest according to species, both consonants and mutes?—for so say⁸⁹ those who are skilled in these matters—and again, such as are not indeed vowels yet are not mutes? and of the vowels themselves, such as have a different species from each other? and after we have properly distributed

⁸⁶ Heindorf vainly attempts to defend *τοῦτο—οὗτος—ὁ ὀνομαστικός* by two passages, where, after *τοῦτο*, have been interpolated the word to which it refers; while the third I have corrected at Hipp. Maj. § 54, n. 2, by the aid of Ficinus. Here it is evident that Plato wrote *ἐζητοῦμεν εἶναι ἂν αὐτός ὁ ὀνομαστικός*.

⁸⁷ By *σχίσσις*, says Heindorf, we must understand *δίσσις*, as shown by § 81. Ficinus renders it "detentione."

⁸⁸ Heindorf understands *ὁ ὀνομαστικός* as the nominative to *ἐπιλαμβάνεται*. He should have suggested, *τοῦ ὄντος γὰρ τι λαμβάνεται, ὥστε αὐτῶν*—instead of *τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν ὥστε*, i. e. "any part of entity is understood, so that it imitates their existence."

⁸⁹ Heindorf refers to Rep. iii. p. 400, B.

⁹⁰ Heindorf refers to Theætet. § 142.

all these [existences]⁶⁰ it is again requisite to impose names, and to consider, if there are certain things into which, as into elements, these may be referred; and from which it is possible to see both them, and whether there are species in them in the same manner as in the elements;⁶⁰ (and) having well and thoroughly looked into all these points, (it behoves us)⁶¹ to know how to bring in each⁶² according to its likeness; whether it is necessary to bring in one to one, or to mix⁶³ many with one; just as painters do, when they wish to produce a resemblance, sometimes introduce only the oyster⁶⁴ (a scarlet colour), and sometimes any other pigment whatever; and sometimes again they mingle many colours together, as when they prepare the likeness of a man,⁶⁵ or any thing else of this kind; according as, I think, each picture seems to require each colour. In the same manner we will bring the elements (of words) to things, and one to one, wherever it seems to be necessary, and many together,⁶⁶ making what persons call syllables; and again, combining those syllables together, from which nouns and verbs are composed; and again, from these nouns and verbs we will compose something

⁶⁰⁻⁶² Beck, whom Stalbaum follows, would omit *τὰ ὄντα*, as Ficinus had done already. Heindorf more acutely would read, *ἐπειδὴν ταῦτα διελόμεθα πάντα εἰ, τὰ ὄντα αὖθις δεῖ (διελίσθαι) καὶ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι*. Stalbaum however conceives the whole passage to have been originally to this effect: "And after we have properly distributed all these, we must again consider, whether there are not certain genera, to which all the existences are to be referred, as in the case of the elements in letters; from which genera it is possible to perceive the existences themselves, and also to understand this, whether in them there are species and genera in the same manner, as in the elements of letters," thus omitting entirely *ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι*, or rather considering *ὀνόματα* as a corruption of *ὄντα*, and *ἐπιθεῖναι* of *ἐπισκίψασθαι*.

⁶¹ Ficinus has "scire oportet." Stalbaum thinks that *ἐπισκίπασθαι* depends on the preceding *δεῖ*.

⁶² Stalbaum would read *ἕκαστον ἐκάστω*, "each to each," which he got from Heindorf's note, *ἕκαστον ὄνομα ἐκάστω πράγματι*.

⁶³ The balance of the sentence requires *ἐπιφέρειν* and *συγκεραννύναι*, not *συγκεραννύντα*.

⁶⁴ On the scarlet dye obtained from a kind of oyster found near Tyre, see Smith's Greek and Roman Antiquities.

⁶⁵ On the word *ἀνδρείκλον* Stalbaum refers to E. H. Barker's dissertation in Wolf. Analect. Literar. T. i. P. 2. p. 388.

⁶⁶ So seven MSS. for *σύμβολα* acknowledged by Ficinus. The passage however is not even now correct.

great and beautiful and entire, and like the animal there (described) by the painter's art, discourse by the name-giving, or rhetorical, or whatever art it may be. [89.] Or rather, we will not do it.⁶⁷ But I have in speaking been carried out (of the course), for the ancients have put together the words in the way as they lie together. But we must, if we know how to consider them artistically, to distinguish them thus, and to see whether the first and last names were laid down in a proper manner or not; for to connect them otherwise (take care) lest it be wrong, my dear Hermogenes, and not in the road to reason.

Herm. Perhaps so, by Zeus, Socrates.

Soc. What then, can you trust yourself as being able to divide them in this manner? for I cannot.

Herm. I want indeed much of doing this.

Soc. Let us leave it then; or are you willing we should undertake it as we best can, although we are able to look but very little into them; by stating, as we said before,⁶⁸ in the case of the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth, we merely conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them; so now, on the other hand, we should proceed⁶⁹ in our own case by declaring that, ⁷⁰if these have been distributed in the best way either by us or by any other, they ought to have been so divided;⁷⁰ but now it will be requisite for us to be busy about them as it said,⁷¹ as best we may. Or how say you?

⁶⁷ Ficinus alone supplies the ellipsis. "Immo nos non istud agemus; modum namque loquendo transgressus sum," which seems to lead to *μᾶλλον δὲ οὐχ ἡμεῖς αὐτο—πολλὰ γὰρ λόγων ἐξηνίχθημεν—δράσσομεν* where *ἐξηνίχθημεν* is due to three MSS.

⁶⁸ See § 39.

⁶⁹ Instead of *ἴωμεν* Heusde wished to read *ἰδωμεν*, similar to the preceding *καρῖδεν*. But Heindorf renders *ἴωμεν* "pergamus," with Ficinus. But that would be in correct Greek *προῖωμεν* rather, or *πόρρω ἴωμεν*.

⁷⁰—⁷¹ Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, which both Heindorf and Stalbaum seem inclined to adopt; although the former once wished to read, *ὅτι εἰ μὲν τοι, ᾗ χρη, ἰδεῖ αὐτὰ διελίσθαι*, and the latter would prefer *ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὡς ἀριστον ἰδεῖ*, obtained from Buttmann's *ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἀριστα ἰδεῖ*—They should have proposed *ὅτι, εἰ μὲν γε χρη ἀριστα δὴ αὐτὰ*, which differs but little from *ὅτι εἰ μὲν τι χρηστὸν ἰδεῖ αὐτὰ*—

⁷¹ Heindorf considers the proverb alluded to is the line, *Ζῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὡς θέλομεν, ἀλλ' ὡς δυνάμεθα*, attributed to Menander, and translated by Terence in *Andr.* iv. 6, 10, "Ut quimus, aiunt, quando, ut volumus, non licet." But then Plato would have written *κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐ θέλησιν*,

[90.] *Herm.* It seems so to me.

Soc. I think, Hermogenes, it will appear ridiculous for things to become manifest through being imitated by letters and syllables. And yet it must be so. For we have not any thing better than this, to which we can refer, touching the truth of the first names; unless, indeed, as the writers of tragedies, when they are in any difficulty, fly to their machinery and introduce the gods,⁷² so we shall be released by asserting that the gods founded the first names, and that on this account they exist correctly. Is not this the best of reasons? or the other, that we have got them from some Barbarians?—for the Barbarians are more ancient than us.—Or that, through their antiquity it is impossible to perceive their meaning, as is the case with the Barbaric names? But all these would be the (not)⁷³ very clever evasions on the part of him who is not willing to give a reason for the right imposition of the first names; although he who does not know the propriety of the first names, is surely unable to know that of the subsequent, which must necessarily be made manifest from the former, of which he knows nothing. But it is evident, that he who professes to be skilled in subsequent names ought to be able to explain the first, in the best⁷⁴ and clearest manner, or to be well convinced that, as regards the subsequent, he is a mere trifler. Or does it appear otherwise to you?

[91.] *Herm.* Not otherwise, Socrates, in any respect whatever.

Soc. What I formerly fancied about the first names, appear to me now very saucy and ridiculous. If you wish it then, I will communicate them to you; but if you have any thing better to obtain from any quarter, communicate it to me.⁷⁵

Herm. I will do so; but do you speak now boldly.

Soc. In the first place then ρ appears to me to be, as it

and so perhaps he did write. For οὐ θίλῃσιν might easily have dropt out before δῆσιν .

⁷² Erasmus, in Adag. p. 591, compares this passage of Plato with that of Cicero Nat. Deor. i. 20, "Ut tragici poetæ, quum explicare argumentum non potestis, confugitis ad deum." HEND.

⁷³ Unless καὶ μάλα κομψαὶ be said ironically, which could hardly be done here, Plato must have written οὐ μάλα κομψαὶ —

⁷⁴ Instead of μάλιστα , common sense leads to κάλλιστα . The two words are constantly confounded, as shown by Porson on Phœn. 878.

⁷⁵ So Horace, "si quid novisti rectius istis, Candidus imperti."

were, the organ of all motion; although we have not yet stated why *Κίνησις* has this name. It is evident however that it implies *ῥσις* (going); for *η* was not used formerly, but *ε*. Its origin is from *κίειν* (to go), which is a foreign name,⁷⁶ and signifies *ίέναι*. If then any one could find out its ancient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called *ῥσις*. But now from the foreign name *κίειν*, and the change of the *η*, together with the interposition of the *ν*, it is called *κίνησις*, but it ought to be called ⁷⁷ *κίεισις* or *ῥσις*.⁷⁷ But ⁷⁸ *Στάσις* (standing) is the negation of *ίέναι* (to go); and for the sake of elegance is called *στάσις*.⁷⁸ [92.] The element therefore *ρ*, as I said, appeared to the founder of names to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of expressing a similitude to rushing on; and hence he in many places employed it for this purpose. And in the first place, the words *Ῥεῖν* (to flow) and *Ῥοή* (flowing) imitate a rushing-on by this letter; and in the next place, in the words *Τρόμος* (trembling) and *Τραχὺς* (rough); also in such verbs as *Κρούειν*, (to strike), *Θραύειν* (to break), *Ῥεῖν*⁷⁹ (to pierce), *Θρύπτειν* (to friter), *Κεμματίζειν* (to cut into small pieces), and *Ῥυμβεῖν* (to rumble): in all these he made for the most part a resemblance to *ρ* (to a rushing-on).⁸⁰ For he saw that the tongue remains quiet for the least time on this letter, but is moved the most; and hence it appears to me that he employed this letter for those words, but the *ι* for all things attenuated, which especially go through all things. And hence he imitated, by the words *ίέναι* (to go) and *ῥσθαι*⁸¹ (to be sent), *ι*, just

⁷⁶ As the word *κίω* is found in Homer, and even in Æschylus, it seems strange that Plato should rank it amongst foreign words; unless he considered all words as foreign that were not used generally at Athens.

^{77—77} Such is the correction of Cornarius for *κίνησιν—ἡ εἶναι* in some MSS., or *κίνησιν—ίειν* in others.

^{78—78} Schleiermacher was the first to remark that there is evidently a lacuna here. For it ought to be told how *στάσις*, which is the negation of *ῥσις*, was formed from *δ-ῥσις* into *στάσις*, by throwing out *ε* and prefixing *στ*.

⁷⁹ This was the correction of Buttman, subsequently confirmed by MSS., for *ῥεῖν*. On the loss of *ῥεῖν*, or rather its confusion with *ῥεῖν*, see my note on Eurip. Tro. 88.

⁸⁰ Between *ροῦ ῥω* and *ῥω* (which Heindorf has acutely restored in lieu of *ῥω*) there has dropt out I suspect *τῇ φορῇ*, similar to *ἀφομοῶν τῇ φορῇ*, a little above. Picinus, "ad similitudinem motionis effingit."

⁸¹ Instead of *ῥσθαι* one MS. has *ῥνσθαι*; another, *ῥσθαι*; which seems to lead to *ῥνσθαι*. At all events *ῥσθαι* is superfluous after *ῥναι*.

as by φ, ψ, σ, and ζ, because these letters are inflated, the name-giver imitated all such things as Ψυχρὸν (cold), Ζέον (boiling), Σείσθαι (to be shaken), and universally Σεισμόν⁸² (a shaking). And when the name-founder would imitate any thing inflated, he every where, for the most part, appears to have introduced such-like letters. [93.] But he seems to have thought that the power of compression in δ and τ, and the pushing the tongue (against the roof of the mouth),⁸³ were useful for the imitation of the words Δεσμός (bond) and στάσις (standing). But perceiving, on the other hand, that the tongue moves glibly in λ, by means of the resemblance he formed the names Λεῖα (smooth), and the very word Ολισθάνειν (to slide), Λιπαρόν (oily), Κολλῶδες (glue-like), and all other such-like words. But where the power of γ lays hold of the tongue, sliding through λ, he imitated the Γλισχρὸν (stickiness) in Γλυκὺ (sweet) and Γλοιῶδες (viscous). Perceiving likewise that the sound of the ν was within, he made the names Ἐνδον (the within) and Ἐντός (within), that he might assimilate the acts to the letters. But he assigned α to Μέγας (great) and η to Μῆκος (length), because these letters are great.⁸⁴ But requiring for Γογγύλος (round) the sign of ο, he mixed up ο for the most part in that name. And thus too the name-giver⁸⁵ appears to have forced, as regards both letters and syllables, other circumstances to each of existing things, making both a mark and name; and from these to

⁸² Heindorf justly found fault with ὅλως σεισμόν, as being superfluous after σείσθαι; and wished to read ὅλως σισμόν (hissing).

⁸³ I have introduced all between the lunes, as absolutely requisite for the sense. For unless I am greatly mistaken, πρὸς ὑπερώην has dropt out before ἀπερίσειως. The word ὑπερώην is found in the well-known Homeric, Il. x. 495, Χεῖλα μὲν τ' ἰδὲν, ὑπερώην δ' οὐκ ἰδὲν. Stalbaum translates ἀπερίσειως τῆς γλώττης, "innixus linguæ;" but even he would find it difficult to explain the meaning of those words. Ficinus has, what is equally unintelligible, "linguæ velut hærentis retractionem."

⁸⁴ How α and η can be said to be greater letters than the rest of the alphabet, I cannot understand. In this passage, as in others, there is doubtless an allusion to notions current at the period when Plato lived, but which have been lost in the lapse of time. To something of this kind is to be referred the nursery-song, "Great A, little a; bouncing B." Here, after μεγάλη τὰ γράμματα, one would expect καὶ μακρά, in allusion to μέγας καὶ μῆκος.

⁸⁵ Here, as elsewhere, Heindorf has adopted from MS. Gud. ὀνοματοθέτης, confirmed by "nominum auctor" in Ficinus. Stalbaum sticks as usual to νομοθέτης.

have composed what still⁸⁶ remains, by imitating in this way. [94.] Such, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the propriety in names, unless Cratylus here asserts any thing else.

Herm. In truth, Socrates, Cratylus very often gives me much trouble, as I stated at the beginning, by his asserting that there is a propriety in names; but he does not clearly inform me what it is; so that I am unable to know whether he thus obscurely speaks on each occasion willingly or unwillingly. Now then, Cratylus, state before Socrates, whether what Socrates says respecting names is pleasing to you, or whether you have any thing better to produce? and if you have, mention it, so that either you may learn from Socrates, or teach us both.

Crat. But what, Hermogenes, does it appear to you to be an easy matter to learn and teach any thing so suddenly, and much less that which seems to be amongst the greatest?⁸⁷

Herm. To me, by Zeus, it does not. But the saying of Hesiod ('Epy. 359) appears to me well said, that, should one a little to a little add, there would be something done of moment. [95.] If then you are able to do any thing at all, although but trifling, do not be faint-hearted, but benefit Socrates here, for⁸⁸ you can, and me.

Soc. I would not myself, Cratylus, confidently assert a single point of what I have said above. But I have considered with Hermogenes in the way it seemed good to me; so that, on this account at least, speak boldly, as I am ready to receive it, if you have any thing better to say than this. Nor shall I wonder, if you have something to say better; for you seem to me to have considered things of this kind yourself, and to have learnt them from others. Should you then say any thing better, write me down as one of your disciples respecting the propriety of names.

Crat. And in truth, Socrates, I have, as you say, made this the subject of my meditations; and perhaps I shall cause you to become one of my disciples. And yet I fear that the

⁸⁶ In lieu of εἶδη, MS. Gud. alone has in the text ᾗδη, which is constantly united to λοιπὸν, as shown by Elmsley on CEd. C. 1619.

⁸⁷ On the formula ἐν τοῖς μέγιστον, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 289.

⁸⁸ Instead of δὲ, I have substituted γὰρ from Ficinus—"debes enim." The two particles are frequently confounded. See Schäfer's Index to Porson's Euripides, in Γάρ.

very contrary of all this will take place. For somehow it comes into my mind to say to you, what Achilles did to Aias in that part of the poem called *Αἰται*⁸⁹ (supplications). For he says,

“Aias, of Telamon the son, and sprung
From Zeus, and leader of the people, all
To my own heart thou seem'st to have well said.”

And you too, Socrates, seem to have acted the prophet in a reasonable manner according to my notions, whether you were inspired by Euthyphron, or whether some other muse has been existing in you in secret.⁹⁰

[96.] *Soc.* My good Cratylus, I have for a long time ago been wondering myself at my own wisdom; and still do not believe it. I think it therefore requisite for me to examine again what I am saying. For to be deceived by one's own self is the most terrible of all things; for since the deceiver is never for a moment absent, but always present, how can it not be terrible? It is necessary then, as it seems, to turn ourselves frequently to what has been said before, and to endeavour, according to the saying of the poet,⁹¹ “to look at the same time before and behind.” Let us then now take a view of what has been asserted. We said then, that the propriety of name is that which points out the quality of a thing. Shall we say that this is sufficiently laid down?

Crat. To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Soc. Names then are spoken for the sake of teaching?

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Shall we not therefore say that this is an art, and that there are workmen of it.

Crat. Perfectly so.

Soc. But who are they?

⁸⁹ Originally the *Iliad* was not divided into books, but into subjects. The passage alluded to is in ix. 640, where an embassy is sent to Achilles to entreat him to take again a part in the war, from which he had been so long absent.

⁹⁰ From this passage it may be inferred that Socrates was thought to have written something in verse anonymously, in ridicule. I suspect, really, but apparently in praise of Euthyphron, who seems, from p. 409, D. § 57, to have published a poem under the title of *Μούσα Σοφίας*. At least, in the words of Plato there lies hid an heroic distich, *Εἴτε παρ' Εὐθύφρονός γε νοήμονος ἦν ἄρ' ἐπίπνους, Εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη Μοῦσα πάλαι αἰ γ' ἰνοῦσ' ἐλελήθει*.

⁹¹ Hom. *Il.* iii. 109.

Crat. Those name-givers⁹² which you spoke of at the beginning.

[97.] *Soc.* Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men, like other arts also, or not? I mean to say some such thing as this. Painters are surely some worse, some better.

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not the better exhibit more beautiful pictures of animals as their productions; but the worse, worse?⁹³ And in like manner, do not builders erect some more beautiful dwellings, others more ugly?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And with respect to name-givers,⁹⁴ will not some exhibit their works more beautiful, others more ugly?

Crat. This does not appear to me.

Soc. Does it not therefore appear to you, that some name-workers⁹⁵ are better and others worse?

Crat. It certainly does not.

Soc. And does not one name seem to you to be better laid down than another?

Crat. It does not.

Soc. Are all names then correctly laid down?

Crat. As far as they are names.

⁹² Ficinus has "legum et nominum conditores." From whence it is

evident that he found in his MSS. *ὀνοματοθέτας*. Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, here retains *νομοθέτας* on account of § 12 and 13. But there MS. Gud. has, as here, preserved the right reading. For names never were, and never could be, imposed by a legislator, except so far as they related merely to some technical expressions in legal enactments, such as Solon is said to have introduced.

⁹³ Unlike himself, Heindorf, although he saw that the balance of the sentence required *οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους—καλλίως—οἱ δὲ φαυλότεροι φαυλότερα*, says that the common reading *οἱ δὲ φαυλότερα* is preferable; while Stalbaum flies to the modern panacea of an *anacolouthon*; a figure of speech, which Matthiæ says truly it is very dangerous to apply, except in a very few cases; of which the present is certainly not one, where *φαυλότερα* could have easily been lost before *φαυλότεροι*.

⁹⁴ MSS. Gud. and Par. read here correctly *ὀνοματοθεῖται* from a recent hand.

⁹⁵ Had Heindorf remembered the word *ὀνοματουργός*, found in § 13, and similar to *δημιουργοί*, both there and in § 96, he would perhaps have seen that Plato wrote, not *νόμοι*, but *ὀνοματουργοί*. Stalbaum, in defence of *νόμοι*, says that not all laws are here meant, but laws in the abstract—a distinction which those perhaps will acknowledge, who can understand his German interpretation, which I do not.

Soc. But what then shall we say to the name of Hermogenes here, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that this name was not rightly given him, unless something of Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως (of the generation of Hermes) belongs to him, or that it was indeed given him, but not correctly?

Crat. It seems to me, Socrates, to be not given to him, but only appears to be given; but that this is the name of some other person, whose nature points out the name.⁹⁶

[91.] *Soc.* Will not then a person say false, who says that he is Hermogenes? ⁹⁷for (see), lest on the other hand even this be possible, to call this person Hermogenes,⁹⁷ if he is not so.

Crat. How say you?

Soc. Does your reasoning mean this, that it is impossible to speak a falsehood?⁹⁸ For there are many, my dear Cratylus, who say this now, and (have said it) of old.

Crat. How is it possible, Socrates, that, when any one speaks about any thing, he should speak about that which is not? Or is not this to speak a falsehood, to speak of things which are not?

Soc. This reasoning, my friend, is more clever than suits me or my time of life. But however tell me thus much. Does it appear to you not possible to speak about a falsehood, but (possible) to pronounce it?

Crat. It appears to me not possible even to pronounce it.

Soc. Nor to speak of, nor to address you. As, for instance, if any one, meeting you, should, through his feeling as an host, take you by the hand, and say, All hail, Athenian guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion—would he ⁹⁹say this, or pronounce this, or speak of this,⁹⁹ or thus address, not you, but Hermogenes here, or no one?

⁹⁶ In § 23, it is stated that the name points out the nature. Hence Heindorf would read οὐπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἣν τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ, whose note Stalbaum reprints; but without passing any judgment upon it.

^{97—97} Ficinus has "neque enim hoc est dubitandum, quin eum dicat Hermogenem." From which it is evident that he did not understand the elliptical expression, (ὅρα) μὴ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ᾗ. But even Heindorf has failed to see that αὐ has no meaning here. Perhaps Plato wrote ΔΥΝΗ, (you are not able), which might easily have been corrupted into ΑΥΗ.

⁹⁸ On this doctrine of the Sophists, see § 5, where Heindorf properly refers to Euthyd. § 37; Sophist, p. 260, C. § 98; and Isocrat. Helen. Encom. § 1.

^{99—99} I confess my inability to point out the difference here between

Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that he would pronounce these words in vain.

[99.] *Soc.* With this then let us be contented. But whether would he, who pronounced these words, pronounce that which is true or false? Or would a part be true, and a part false? for this last would be sufficient.

Crat. I should say, that such a one would, moving himself in vain, make a noise, as the person would, who should move a piece of brass and strike it.¹⁰⁰

Soc. Come then, Cratylus, (and see) since¹ we are reconciled somehow, would you not say that the name is one thing, and that, of which it is the name, is another?

Crat. I would.

Soc. And do you not confess, that the name is some imitation of a thing?

Crat. Most of all.

Soc. And do you not say, that pictures are in some other manner imitations of certain things?

Crat. I do.

Soc. Come then—for perhaps I do not understand sufficiently what you mean, although you are perhaps speaking correctly—is it possible to distribute and assign both these imitations,² [the pictures and the names,]² to the things, of which they are imitations, or not?

Crat. It is possible.

[100.] *Soc.* But consider this first. Can any one assign the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and so in other things?

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. And is it possible, on the contrary, to assign the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?

λίξιν, φαίη, and εἶποι. Others may perhaps be more acute. Although they seem all required by the preceding, λίγειν, φάναι, εἰπεῖν, and προσεπείν.

¹⁰⁰ Heindorf refers to Protag. p. 329, A. § 49, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγίνα μακρὸν ἤχῃ.

¹ Ficinus translates Φέρε δὴ—ἰάν πρ διαλλαχθῶμεν by “Animadvertite—utrum quoquo modo conveniamus,” correctly, as shown by Stalbaum, who quotes Legg. i. p. 660, E., φέρε δὴ, ἰάν ξυνομολογησώμεθα. Rep. v. p. 453, E., φέρε δὴ, ἰάν πρ εὐρωμεν: iv. p. 434, A., ἰδε δὴ, ἰάν—δοκῇ.

² The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of ἀμφότερα τὰ μμήματα. The same thing has taken place in § 100.

Crat. This also is possible.

Soc. Are then both these assignments correct; or only one of them?

Crat. Only one of them.

Soc. That, I think, which assigns to each, what is suited to it and similar?

Crat. It appears so to me.

Soc. Lest then you and I, who are friends (in fact), should become foes in words, receive from me what I say. For, my friend, I call such a distribution in the case of both imitations [pictures (of animals)² and names] correct; but in the case of names, in addition to its being correct, true likewise: but I call the other, [the giving and introduction,]³ relating to the dissimilar, not correct; and, when it takes place in names, false.

Crat. But (consider), Socrates, whether this may not be in the case of paintings, to make an incorrect distribution, but in the case of names, not so; but that in this it is always necessarily correct.

[101.] *Soc.* How say you? In what does this differ from that? May not a person, on meeting a man, say to him, "This is your picture," and show him, it may be, his own likeness, or it may be, that of a woman? by showing, I mean, placing it before the sense of seeing.

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. But what, may he not again, meeting with the same person, say to him, "This is your name?" for a name, as well as a painting, is an imitation. I mean this. May he not say, "This is your name?" And after this, may he not present to the sense of hearing, it may be, an imitation of himself, by saying that it is a man; and, it may be, an imitation of a female of the human species, by saying that it is a woman?

² Ficin. has "distributionem in imitationibus utrisque tam nominibus quam picturis," as if his MS. read *τοῖς τε ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν*. But Heindorf says that *ζώοις* is put here for *ζωγραφήμασι*, as in § 97. But as MS. Gud. and two others offer *ζωγραφήμασι*, it was doubtless so read in the MS. of Ficinus. The words, however, within brackets are here, as in § 99, evidently an interpolation.

³ The words between brackets are clearly an interpolation. From the preceding use of the verbs *ἀποδοῦναι* and *προσενεγκεῖν*, it is plain that Plato would have written here not *δόσιν* and *ἐπιφορὰν*, but *ἀπόδοσιν* and *προσφορὰν*, although *ἐπιφέρειν* is found in § 105.

Does it not appear to you, that it is possible for this to occur sometimes?

Crat. I am willing to concede it, Socrates; and let it be so.

Soc. You do well, my friend, if such be the state of the case; for there is no need at present to contest much about it. If, then, there is a distribution of this kind on this point⁴ (in names), we are willing to say⁵ that one of these speaks truly, but the other falsely. [102.] And if this be the case, and it is possible to distribute nouns not correctly, and not to assign things adapted to each, ⁶and (to assign) what is not adapted,⁶ it will be possible to do the very same thing with verbs. And if it is possible to thus put down verbs and nouns, there is a necessity to do so with sentences likewise; for sentences are, I think, but the putting together of those. Or how say you, Cratylus?

Crat. Thus; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.

Soc. If then we assimilate the first names to letters, it is possible, as in the pictures of animals, to assign all the fitting colours and figures; and on the other hand, not to assign all, but to leave some and to add others, more and greater.⁷ Is it not so?

Crat. It is.

Soc. Does not he then, who assigns every thing (proper),⁸ render beautiful both letters and resemblances; but he, who adds or takes away, works out indeed letters and images, but such as are faulty?

Crat. Certainly.

⁴ The adverb *ἐνταῦθα* is rarely thus applied to a thing, instead of a place. Plato wrote perhaps γ' *ὀνοματοθεῖν*, not *καὶ ἐνταῦθα*.

⁵ I scarcely understand *βουλόμεθα καλεῖν*, where one would expect *λέγειν*. Ficinus "vere loqui—vocamus." But "voco" can hardly be used in the place of "dico."

⁶ All between the figures, though found in Ficinus, Taylor omits.

⁷ Ficin. "pluraque et pauciora exhibeamus;" which leads to what the sense requires, *πλείω καὶ μείω*, or *ἐλάσσω*, in lieu of *πλείω καὶ μείζω*. Compare Herod. i. 201, *μείζων καὶ ἐλάσσων*. ii. 19, *πλείων—καὶ ἐλάσσων*. Thucyd. ii. 49, *τό τε πλέον καὶ ἐλάσσων*. Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 489, *Ἦν μείζων ἐλάσσων*.

ἦν τ' ἐλάττων. From *μείω* came *μείζω*.

⁸ Ficin. "Qui convenientia omnia tribuit;" who therefore found in his MS. *πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα*, as just above and below, or *πάντα τὰ εὖ*. For thus *εὖ* is united to the article, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 154, and to the instances there given of the loss of *εὖ*, or *τὸ εὖ*, I could now add not a few more.

Soc. But what does the person imitating the essence of things through syllables and letters? Will not there be, according to the same reasoning, a beautiful image, when he assigns every thing fitting? Now this is a name. But if he is deficient even in small matters, or sometimes makes an addition, a resemblance will be produced, but not a beautiful one, so that some of the names will be beautifully formed, but others badly?

Crat. Perhaps so.

[103.] *Soc.* Perhaps then the one will be a good artificer of names, but the other a bad one.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. Now was not the name of this person a name-founder?⁹

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Perhaps then, by Zeus, as in other arts, one name-founder is good and another bad, if we agree in what has been said before.

Crat. It is so. But you surely perceive, Socrates, that,¹⁰ when we assign the letters α and β , and each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change any thing, a name indeed is written by us, yet not properly; or it is not written at all; but there is immediately something else, if it suffers any thing of this kind.

Soc. (See), Cratylus, lest in viewing the matter in this way, we do not view it correctly.

Crat. How then?

Soc. Perhaps such things as must necessarily be or not, when composed of a certain number, suffer what you say; as in the case¹¹ of ten things, or whatever other number you will, if you take away or add aught, it immediately becomes some other number. But (see) that there is not the same propriety in the case of any certain quality and of every resemblance, but a contrary one; and that it is not necessary to assign to

⁹ Here and shortly afterwards, in despite of common sense, Stalbaum still sticks to *νομοθίτης*, although *ὀνοματοθίτης* is found in MS. Gud. and supported by Ficinus's "conditor nominum."

¹⁰ Instead of *ὅταν* Heindorf correctly suggested *ὅτι* *ἀν*. Ficinus "cernis—quod."

¹¹ Instead of *αὐτὰ*, which has no meaning here, Ast suggested, what Stalbaum approves of, *αὐτίκα*.

an image ¹² all such as is that which one represents, ¹² if it is about to be a resemblance. [104.] But consider if I say any thing to the purpose. Would there not be two things, such as Cratylus and the resemblance of Cratylus, if any one of the gods should not only make a likeness of yourself in colour and figure, as painters do, but should make all the inward parts such as yours are, and infuse into them the same softness, and warmth, and motion, and soul, and intellect, as is in you; and, in one word, fashion every thing as you have, ¹³ and place such other things close to you, ¹³ whether would there be one Cratylus, and a resemblance of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?

Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.

Soc. You see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek after another propriety of a resemblance than what we just now spoke of; and that there is no necessity, that, if any thing is taken away or added, for it to be any longer a resemblance. Or do you not perceive how much resemblances want from being the same as their patterns?

Crat. I do.

Soc. Those things then, ¹⁴ of which the names are names, ¹⁴ would suffer a ridiculous fate through their names, if they were in every respect assimilated to them; for all things would become double; nor could one ¹⁵ tell of either of them, which was the thing itself and which the name.

Crat. You speak the truth.

[105.] *Soc.* Boldly then, my noble fellow, admit that one name is well imposed and another not; nor compel it to have

¹²⁻¹³ I cannot understand the Greek πάντα—ὅλον ἵστιν δ' εἰκάζει, nor the Latin of Ficinus, "omnia—quæcunque illud, cuius imago est." One MS. has ὅ for δ, which leads to πάντα—ὅλ' ἵστιν ψ εἰκάζεται, i. e. "all—that exists in that, to which it is a resemblance." And thus we avoid the necessity of supposing that τινα is to be supplied before ἀποδοῦναι and εἰκάζει. Stalbaum's version is, "omnia—alia, quale est quod, quis imitando exprimit," i. e. "all such things as is that, which any one exhibits by an imitation"—

¹³⁻¹⁵ All the words between the figures are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

¹⁴⁻¹⁶ This I confess I cannot understand. I could have understood—"of which the names are the imitations," in Greek, ὧν μὴ μῆμαρά ἵστι τὰ ὀνόματα. Unless it be said that Plato meant, "of which the names are nouns."

¹⁵ Heindorf acutely saw that τις has dropt out after εἰπεῖν. For otherwise ἔχοι would want its nominative.

every letter, in order that it may be really such as is that, of which it is the name; but suffer it to introduce a letter which is not fitting, and if (you suffer) a letter (to do so, suffer) likewise a noun in a discourse; and if a noun, (suffer) a sentence not suited to things to be introduced in a discourse, and not less a thing to be named and spoken of, so long as the type exists of the thing respecting which there is the discourse; just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes just now discussed.

Crat. I do remember.

Soc. It is well. For when this (the type)¹⁶ is there, although it may not have all that is fitting,¹⁷ yet the thing itself will be told¹⁸ correctly, when all¹⁹ (fitting) things (are there); incorrectly, when only a few.¹⁷ But let us now, blessed man! ²⁰permit that the thing is spoken of,²⁰ in order that we may not, like those who walk about late at night in Ægina, (owe a debt); ²¹and thus appear to have arrived at the things by the truth itself, later than is becoming.²¹ Or at least seek after

¹⁶ For the sake of perspicuity one would expect οὗτος, to be referred to τύπος.

^{17—17} In the place of these intelligible words, of which the Latin is to be found in the version of Ficinus, Taylor has, I know not from whence, introduced the following, "Yet the representation may be said to subsist, as it ought." And this he doubtless considered a translation of Plato!

¹⁸ Instead of λελέξεαι, all the MSS. read λήξεαι: incorrectly, says Stalbaum; for he did not know that, in many verbs, the future middle is used for the future passive. A large list of such verbs was given first by Burney, *alias* Porson, in the Monthly Review for July, 1789, p. 13, and afterwards by Monk on Hippol. 1458.

¹⁹ The antithesis requires not πάντα, as opposed to ὀλίγα, but πολλά—

^{20—20} Stalbaum renders λήγεσθαι—ἵωμεν by "let us permit the thing to be named;" that is, says he, "let us concede that a thing may have a name." But how τὸ πρᾶγμα, or πρᾶγμα, could be understood, or what is the meaning of the whole sentence, he does not deign to explain.

^{21—21} Such is the literal and unintelligible translation of the nonsensical Greek; where, since Heindorf and Stalbaum confess themselves equally in the dark, I hope it will be said I have thrown some light on the passage, by reading, Διαλήγεσθαι δ', οἶμαι, ἄκαιρα ἵωμεν, ἵνα μὴ σφαλῶμεν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιούντες ὅψι ἐν ἀφόδοις· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πρᾶγματα δόξομεν οὕτω πως ἐληλυθῆναι ὀψιαιτέρον τοῦ δέοντος: i. e. "Let us leave off conversing, I think, unseasonably; lest we stumble at the very truth, as persons, who walk about late at Ægina do, in the ordure (of the street); for we shall appear to have arrived at the facts, later than is fitting." The Greek is in all the MSS. but one—Λήγεσθαι δ' οὖν ὧ μακάριε ἵωμεν ἵνα μὴ θλωμεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιούντες ὅψι ὕδου καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πρᾶγματα δόξ-

some other propriety of name, and do not confess that an indication by letters and syllables is a name: for, if you admit both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.

[106.] *Crat.* But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in a moderate manner; and I so do put down (my vote).²³

Soc. Since then the same things²³ seem good to us after these, let us consider this too.²⁴ We say, that if the name is about to be properly imposed, it ought to have fitting letters.

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And it ought (to have) the letters similar to things?

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Such then as are beautifully composed are composed in this manner. But if any one is not correctly composed, it will perhaps, for the most part, consist of fitting and similar letters, if it shall be a resemblance; but it will have a portion not fitting, through which the name would be neither beautiful nor beautifully formed. Shall we speak²⁵ in this way, or otherwise?

Crat. There is no need, I think, to quarrel, Socrates; although it does not please me to say, that a name exists, and yet is not beautifully composed.

Soc. Does this too not please you, that the name is an indication of a thing?

Crat. It does please me.

Soc. And does it not seem to you to be well said, that of

ωμεν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθῆναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ ἐέοντος. The best MS. Gud. has, however, ὅψι ἐφ' ὁλοῖς. From which I have elicited ὅψι ἐν ἀφόδοις, by the aid of Suidas, Ἀφοδεῦσαι, Πλάτων Ἀδωνισι, καὶ Ἀφοδος ὁ ἀπόπατος. Hence it is fair to infer that the people at Ægina were accustomed, like those of Edinburgh not many years ago, to place, at night-fall, the filth of their dwellings in the street, thus rendered slippery by the accumulation of ordure. A similar practice took place at Athens, as shown by Aristophanes in Ἡρωσι—Μήπορ' ἀπόνιπτρον θύραζ' ἐκχεῖτε μηδὲ λουτρίον. With regard to the alteration of δρεῖλωμεν into σφαλῶμεν, and its union with τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, it may be compared with ἰσφαλταὶ τῆς ἀληθείας in § 112.

²³ On *τίθεμαι*, with or without *γνώμην*, see at Philoct. 1445.

²⁴ Instead of *ταῦτα*, common sense requires *ταῦτά*—

²⁵ Ficinus—"quod restat, discutiamus;" as if he had found in his MS. τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν.

²⁶ Although Ficinus has "censemusne," answering to *φάμεν* in all the MSS. but one, yet that one, Gud., has here, as elsewhere, preserved the correct reading, *φῶμεν*, which is the constant formula in Plato, as shown by Heindorf.

names some are formed from the preceding, and others are themselves the first?

Crat. To me it seems so.

[107.] *Soc.* But if the first names should be indications of certain things, have you any better method for their being indications than to make them as nearly as possible such as are the things which they ought to indicate? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others speak of please you more, that names are conventional, and indicate (their meaning) to those who have agreed together and known beforehand the things (so named); and that in this conventionality exists²⁶ the propriety of names; and that it matters not whether any one agrees to call them, as they are at present imposed, or the contrary, (to call) that which is now²⁷ small \omicron great ω , and great ω small \omicron ?²⁷ Which of these methods is agreeable to you?

Crat. It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to indicate by a resemblance what one wishes to indicate,²⁸ but not by any chance²⁸ method.

Soc. You speak well. If then the name shall be similar to a thing, is it not necessary for the elements, from which a person shall have composed the first names, to be naturally similar to the things themselves? My meaning is this, Could any one put together a picture, which we have just now said is the resemblance of something existing, unless the pigments, from which the picture of living things is composed, were naturally similar to those which the art of painting imitates? Or is it impossible?

Crat. Impossible.

[108.] *Soc.* In like manner then names would never become similar to any thing, unless the things, from which names are

²⁶ To preserve the sense we must read, *καὶ εἶναι ἐν ταύτῃ τὴν ὁρθότητα ὀνόματος τῇ ξυνθήκῃ*, in lieu of *καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ὁρθότητα ὀνόματος ξυνθήκην*: unless it be said that Plato wrote, *καὶ εἶναι ταύτῃ* (in this way) *τὴν ὁρθότητα ὀνόματος*, without *ξυνθήκῃ*, a gl. for *ταύτῃ*.

²⁷—²⁸ Such is the version of what Ficinus found in his MS. and is acknowledged by all the others. Heindorf was the first to adopt from MS. Gud., with which the three oldest agree, *ἐπὶ μὲν ᾧ νῦν σμικρὸν μέγα καλεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ᾧ μέγα σμικρὸν*, i. e. to call by the name of little, what is now called great, and of great, what is now little."

²⁸—²⁹ Ficinus has, "præstat—quam quovis alio modo." From whence I suspect he found in his MS. *μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ γε τυχόντι*, in lieu of *ἀλλὰ μὲν τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι*. For *ὁ τυχών*, not *ὁ ἐπιτυχών*, means "fortuitus" in correct Greek.

composed, possessed originally at first²⁹ some similitude to those of which the names are the imitations. Now elements are the things from which names are to be composed.

Crat. Yes.

Soc. You therefore now take a share in the discourse which Hermogenes did a little before. Come then, do we seem to you to have said correctly, or not, that the letter ρ is similar to a rushing-on, and to motion, and to hardness?

Crat. To me, correctly.

Soc. And that the letter λ (is similar) to the smooth and soft, and to what we just now mentioned?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Do you know then that for the same thing we say *Σκληρότης*, but the Eretrians *Σκληρότηρ*?

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Do then both ρ and σ seem to be similar to the same thing? and does that word indicate the same thing to them, ending with a ρ , as it does to us ending with a ς ? or does it indicate nothing to the others of us?³⁰

Crat. It indicates one thing³¹ to both.

Soc. Whether in that ρ and ς are similar, or in that they are not?

Crat. In that they are similar.

Soc. Are they then similar in every way?

Crat. At least in indicating a rushing-on.

Soc. But what as regards the inserted λ ? Does it not indicate the contrary of hardness?

[109.] *Crat.* Perhaps, Socrates, it is not correctly inserted; just as in the names which you lately mentioned to Hermogenes, by taking away and adding letters where it was requisite. And you then appeared to me (to act)³² properly. And now, perhaps, ρ ought to be inserted instead of λ .

Soc. You say well. What then, do we, as we are now speaking, mutually understand nothing, when one pronounces

²⁹ The word *πρῶτον* is superfluous after *ὑπάρξει*, and is correctly omitted by Ficinus.

³⁰ This is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, which Ficinus renders by "quibusdam nostrum;" Stalbaum, by "alterutris," which leads at once to *ἐκατέρωθεν*, instead of *ἐτέρωθεν*, as he should have seen, opposed to *ἀμφοτέρωθεν* in the answer of Cratylus.

³¹ Instead of *οὐν* Plato wrote *ἔν*, as I have translated.

³² Ficinus, "facere videbaris," as if he had found *ἐπ' αὐν* before *ἰδούκει*.

the (hard) word σκληρόν (hard)? And do you not understand what I am saying?

Crat. I do, my very good friend, through custom.

Soc. But in saying custom, do you think you are saying any thing different from convention? Or do you call custom any thing else than this, that when I pronounce this word, I understand it, and you know that I understand it? Do you not mean this?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. If then you know this, when I pronounce it, there is an indication (of something)³³ to you through me.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. From that which is dissimilar to what I have in mind, when I pronounce it, if λ is dissimilar³⁴ to the σκληρότης, which you pronounce. [110.] And if this is the case, what else is it, than that you have made a convention with yourself, and that the propriety of the name is a compact with yourself; since both similar and dissimilar letters, when meeting with custom and compact, indicate (the same thing)³⁵ to you? But if custom is very far from being a compact, it will be no longer proper to say that similitude is an indication, but custom (rather): for this, as it appears, indicates both by the similar and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we agree in this—for I will put down your silence as consent,³⁶ it is surely necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the indication of what we have in mind and pronounce; since if, O best of men! you are willing to come to number, from whence do you think you will be able to attribute similar names to each number, if you do not permit this consent and compact of yours to possess some authority about the propriety of names? It pleases me, indeed, that names should be, as much as possible, similar to things; but yet I fear, lest per-

³³ After γίνεται I suspect του has dropt out.

³⁴ As it would be absurd to say that the letter is dissimilar to σκληρότης (hardness), Plato wrote, no doubt, εἴπερ τὸ τοῦ λ—i. e. if the idea of softness in the letter λ is dissimilar to the idea of hardness in the word σκληρότης.

³⁵ Ficinus, by his "idem—representant," shows that he found in his MS. ταὐτὸ after γράμματα, as required by the sense.

³⁶ Compare Eurip. Iph. A. 1142, Αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ σιγῆν ὁμολογοῦντός ἐστι σοῦ: Plutarch, ii. p. 532, F., Ἡ γὰρ σιωπὴ τοῖς σοφοῖσι γ' ἀποκρίσις. So in English, "Silence gives consent."

chance the attraction of this similitude be really very slight, according to the language of Hermogenes,³⁷ and that it will be necessary for us to make use of that ridiculous thing, called compact, as regards a propriety of names; since (words)³⁸ will be spoken perhaps in the most beautiful manner possible, when they shall be spoken (by letters) either entirely, or for the most part similar,³⁸ that is, fitting; but in the most ugly manner, when the contrary takes place. But after these still tell me this. What power do names possess with respect to us, and what beautiful effect must we say they produce?

[111.] *Crat.* To me, Socrates, they appear to teach; and that it is without exception true, that he who knows the names, knows the things likewise.

Soc. Perhaps, Cratylus, you mean some such thing as this; that when any one knows the quality of the name,—now it is of the same quality as the thing,—he then also knows the thing; since it is similar to the name; and that there is one and the same art in all things, which are similar to one another; and in consequence of this you appear to me to assert, that he, who knows the names, knows also the things.

Crat. You speak most truly.

Soc. Come now, let us see what is this mode of teaching existing things, of which you are now speaking, and whether there is any other method, this however being the better;³⁹ or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the case?

Crat. I think thus, that there is no other method; but that this is the only one, and the best.

Soc. But whether do you think that there is likewise the very same invention of things existing, (and)⁴⁰ that he, who

³⁷ In § 67, where γλίσχρως is used as γλίσχρᾱ is here.

³⁸⁻³⁹ Heindorf says that *ὀνόματα* is to be thus supplied. He should have corrected *λέγοιτο* into *λέγοι τις*, and *λέγεται* into *λέγει τις*; for the sense would then be—"Since a person would then speak perhaps in the most beautiful manner possible, when he shall speak any thing in words either wholly or for the most similar, that is to say fitting (to things)." With regard to *ὁμοίως* for *ὁμοίως*, the true reading has been preserved, as Heindorf was the first to notice, by Ficinus alone.

³⁹ Ficinus has "utrum alius præterea sit, hic tamen potior habeatur;" where there is a proper antithesis between "sit" and "habeatur," not found in the Greek.

⁴⁰ The conjunction *καὶ* has evidently dropt out after *εἶναι*, whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary.

invented the names, invented also the things, of which there are the names? Or that it is necessary to seek and find another method, but to learn this?

Crat. Above all things to seek after and discover the very same method, as regards the same things.

[112.] *Soc.* Come then, let us consider, ⁴¹Cratylus, if any one, while seeking after things, follows after names, and looks upon the quality of each, do you not consider ⁴¹that there is no small danger of his being deceived?

Crat. How?

Soc. It is plain, that he, who first founded names, formed them, as we have said, such as he thought the things themselves were. Is it not so?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. If then he did not think rightly, but formed them, as he fancied, ⁴²what think you shall we suffer, who are his followers? ⁴²Is it aught else, than for us to be deceived?

Crat. But (see), Socrates, lest this be not the case; but that it is necessary for him, who founded the names, to have founded them knowingly; for otherwise, as I before remarked, names would never have existed. And let this be the greatest proof to you that he, who founded them, did not stumble from the truth. For all things would not have thus chimed in with him. Or, did you not perceive this yourself, when you were saying, that all names were composed ⁴³according to the same, and for the same? ⁴³

[113.] *Soc.* But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight. For if the founder of names, after stumbling at

⁴¹—⁴¹ Neither Heindorf nor Stalbaum have remarked, that, as *ἐννοήσωμεν* could not be thus followed by *ἀρ' ἐννοεῖς*, we must, in lieu of *Φέρε δὲ ἐννοήσωμεν*, read *Φέρε ὥς ἐννοήσωμεν*, what Picinus found in his MS., as shown by his version, "Age, ita consideremus."

⁴²—⁴² Although every page of Taylor's translation betrays an ignorance quite marvellous of the original, yet in this passage he has outdone all his former mistakes by his version of the most easy of Greek texts. "What must we think of those who were persuaded to follow him?" And yet this was the person, who presumed to put the Athenian philosopher into an English dress, for the benefit, forsooth, of those, who were to be led to the greater mysteries of Proclus, after they had been initiated by the self-taught hierophant into the lesser of Plato.

⁴³—⁴³ Taylor has anticipated by his "according to the same," the reading *κατὰ ταὐτόν*, first introduced by Heindorf from MS. Gud., in lieu of *κατ' αὐτό*.

first, forced the rest (of the words) to this point, and compelled them to chime in with himself, there is nothing strange; just as in the case of diagrams, in which sometimes the first mistake being trifling and unapparent, all the remaining parts, although very numerous, follow as they ought,⁴⁴ and agree with each other. There ought then at the beginning of every thing to be to every person much discussion and reflection, whether the principle is properly laid down or not; and this being sufficiently examined, the rest, I say, will appear⁴⁵ to follow it. And yet I should not wonder if names chime in with each other. For let us again consider, what we discussed before, that of the whole going on, and carried on, and flowing, the names signify to us, we say, the existence. Do they seem to you to indicate any thing else than⁴⁶ in this way?

Crat. Very much so; and that they correctly signify this.

[114.] *Soc.* Let us consider then again taking from out of them, in the first place, this name, Ἐπιστήμη (science); since it is doubtful, and seems to signify that ἵστησιν (it stops) our soul in acts, rather than that it is borne along with them; and hence it is more proper to enunciate its beginning as now, ⁴⁷ than by throwing out ε, πιστήμη, and to make an insertion in that of ι⁴⁷ in the place of that in ε. ⁴⁸ In the next place, the word Βεβαιον (firm) is so called, because it is the imitation of a certain βάσις (basis), and στάσις (standing), but not of φορά (rushing-on). Again, Ἱστορία (history) indicates surely that ἵσθησι τὸν ροῦν (it stops the flowing); and the word (Πιστόν) (credible) indicates a thing ἱστᾶν (causing to stand).⁴⁸ Likewise Μνήμη (memory) indicates surely to every one, that there

⁴⁴ Instead of ἡδὴ ὄντα ἐπόμενα I have translated as if Plato had written, ὄντα, ᾗ δὲ, ἐπόμενα.

⁴⁵ As there is nothing on which φαίνεσθαι can depend, I suspect Plato wrote τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν φημί φαίνεσθαι, instead of τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι. Ficinus has "cætera jam principium sequi debent."

⁴⁶ I have followed Heindorf in adopting ἄλλο τι ἢ, from MS. Gud., with which seven other MSS. agree. Stalbaum omits ἢ.

⁴⁷—⁴⁸ Such is the version of Bekker's text; and this of Stalbaum's—"than ἐπιστήμη, by throwing in ε, but to make a throwing-in, instead of that in ε, in that of ι." I can understand neither; nor perceive even what Plato meant to say.

⁴⁹—⁵⁰ All between the numerals Stalbaum considers an interpolation. But why any one should have interpolated words which no one can understand, he does not deign to state.

is a *μονή* (abiding) in the soul, but not a rushing-on. And, if you will, *Ἀμαρτία* (error), and *Συμφορὰ* (contingency), if any one follows them according to their name, will appear to be the same with the aforesaid⁴⁹ *Σύνεσις* (intelligence), and *Ἐπιστήμη* (science), and all the other names connected with serious matters. [115.] Still further, *Ἀμαθία* (ignorance), and *Ἀκολασία* (intemperance), appear to be similar to these: for *ἀμαθία* (ignorance) appears to be the march of one going *ἄμα θεῷ* (with a god); but *ἀκολασία* (intemperance) appears to be *ἀκολουθία* (a following) in all respects of things. And thus, the names which we consider applicable to the basest things, would appear to be most similar to those applicable to the most beautiful. And I think that any one would discover many others of this kind, if he busied himself about them; from which he would imagine, that the founder of names did not indicate things going on and borne along, but such as have an abiding.

Crat. And yet you see, Socrates, that he indicated many things by that (notion).⁵⁰

Soc. What is this, Cratylus? Shall we count the number of names as if they were (votes by) pebbles? And will their propriety consist in this, that the truth will be there, to which side soever the greater number of the names appear to point.

Crat. Is not this⁵¹ reasonable?

Soc. Not in the least, my friend. But let us leave these points there,⁵² and consider whether you will agree or not with us in this. [116.] Have we not lately acknowledged, that those who founded names on each occasion⁵³ in cities,

⁴⁹ So Stalbaum; but Heindorf prefers Buttman's *αὐτῇ*, "itself;" I can understand neither. For *ταύτῃ* could not mean "the aforesaid." The proper word would be *ἐκείνῃ*.

⁵⁰ Ficinus has "secundum agitationis significationem," as if he had found in his MS. *κατὰ κίνησιν* in lieu of *ἐκείνως*.

⁵¹ Instead of *οὐκ οὖν*, said positively, I have translated as if it were *οὐκ οὖν*, interrogatively, on account of the answer; where Plato very cunningly dismisses the consideration of the question, whether the number of names was, or was not, to decide the truth of the doctrine in dispute.

⁵² Instead of *αὐτοῦ*, "there," one would prefer *ταύτῃ*, "in this way," as in *Sympos.* p. 220, C., *καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταύτῃ*; in two MSS. correctly.

⁵³ In lieu of *ἐκάστοτε*, an adverb of time, one would prefer *ἐκασταχοῦ*, an adverb of place.

both Grecian and Barbarian, were name-founders, ⁵⁴ and that the art, competent for this, is name-founding.⁵⁴

Crat. Entirely so.

Soc. Tell me now, did they, who were the first name-founders, found the first names, while they knew the things to which they assigned their names, or did not know?

Crat. I think, Socrates, while they knew them.

Soc. For surely, friend Cratylus, (they could not do so) while they did not know.

Crat. It does not appear to me (that they could).

Soc. Let us then return to the point from whence we digressed; for you just now,⁵⁵ in what has preceded, (stated,) if you recollect, that he, who founded names, must have previously known the things to which he assigned their names. Are you then of this opinion still, or not?

Crat. Still.

Soc. Say you, that he who founded the first names, founded them knowing (the things)?

Crat. Knowing them.

Soc. From what names then did he either learn or find out the things, if the first names were not yet laid down? But, on the other hand, said we not, that it is impossible to learn and find out the things by any other way,⁵⁶ than by learning or finding out ourselves the quality of names?

Crat. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

⁵⁴ Here, as elsewhere, I have, with Heindorf, adopted what common sense requires, *ὀνοματοθείας*, and *ὀνοματοθετικὴν*, and *ὀνοματοθεῖται*, preserved in MS. Gud. alone, and in the corrected version of Ficinus; for in the ed. pr. all is omitted between *ὦ φίλε*, just before, down to *ἐκπαύσωμεν*.

⁵⁵ Schleiermacher suggests, with the approbation of Stalbaum, *ἀπὸ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν*. For *ἀπὸ* would refer to the preceding answer, and *ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν* to p. 433, B. § 106. Ficinus omits *ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν*.

⁵⁶ Although even Heindorf failed to see any difficulty here, it is evident that Plato wrote, *ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ ἀπ' ἄλλων μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἱξευρόντας*. For thus *ἄλλοι* and *αὐτοὶ* are perpetually opposed to each other in this formula, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 254 and 356, where I should have stated that in Thucyd. i. 22, Dionysius Hal. in p. 820, found the correct reading in his MS., *οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ, ὡν περ ἀπελείφθη, παρ' ἄλλων*: and we shall thus obviate the objection started by Poppo against my *ἐκλυον*, as being found only in poetry. To the passages already quoted in defence of the antithesis I could now add full twenty more.

[117.] *Soc.* After what manner then shall we say that they knew (the things) and founded their names? or that there were name-founders before any name whatever was laid down, and that they knew (the things),⁵⁷ if indeed it is impossible to learn things otherwise than from names?

Crat. I think, Socrates, that the account respecting these matters is the most true, (which says) that a power greater than that of man assigned the first names to things, so that they must of necessity be in a correct state.

Soc. Do you think then that he who laid down names, whether he was a certain *dæmon*, or a god,⁵⁸ would lay down things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have just now said nothing to the purpose?

Crat. But (see) lest the other sort of these are not names.

Soc. Which sort, thou best of men? those which lead to standing, or those to rushing-on? For, as we just now said, it will not be determined by their number.

Crat. It is thus indeed just,⁵⁹ Socrates.

Soc. The names then being divided into factions, and some asserting that they are like the truth, and others that they are, how shall we decide? or to what (tribunal) go? For surely (we cannot go) to other names, different from these;⁶⁰ for there are no others. But it is plain that certain other things, besides names, must be sought after, which will show

⁵⁷ After *εἶδεναι* Heindorf understands *τὰ πράγματα*, as did Ficinus, whose version is, "eosque res antea cognovisse." Stalbaum supplies *αὐτὸ*, i. e. *ὄνομα*, as Taylor did. But the sense is, I think, "and they knew them," i. e. that the persons who knew the things, knew the parties who gave the names. For most assuredly *ἐκείνους* cannot be referred to the same persons as *αὐτούς*.

⁵⁸ So *δαίμων* and *θεός* are opposed in Eurip. Hec. 164.

⁵⁹ So all the MSS. and Ficinus. Heindorf suggested, with the approbation of Stalbaum, *Οὔτοι δὲ δίκαιόν γε*, in lieu of *Οὔτω δὲ*—But *δὲ* never thus follows *οὔτοι δὲ*. Plato wrote, *Οὐ γὰρ τόδ' ἦν δίκαιόν γε*.

⁶⁰ So Taylor translated *ἔτι αἷμα ἄλλα τούτων*, before Heind. and Stalb. But though *ἔτιρος* can and does govern a genitive, *ἄλλος* cannot and does not, except in the passages quoted by Matthiæ and Kühner, which are either corrupt or interpolated. But were the fact otherwise, *ἔτιρα* and *ἄλλα* could not be thus united in Plato. The usage was of a later date—a fact not known to Hermann; who would defend, in Eurip. Suppl. 589, *Πολλοὺς ἔτλην δὲ χάτιρους ἄλλους πόνοους*: although it is evident that the dramatist wrote, *Πολλοὺς ἔτλην δὲ καρτεροὺς καλοὺς πόνοους*: where *καλοὺς* is due to Markland, and *καρτεροὺς* to Musgrave; for which I have substituted *καρτερός*, remembering that Ulysses is called *καρτερός ἀνὴρ* in Od. Δ. 242. Correctly then did Heusde read in Plato *ἔτιρα* for *ἄλλα*.

us, without names, which of these are true, after having pointed out, it is evident that,⁶¹ the truth of things.

[118.] *Crat.* It appears so to me.

Soc. It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, if such be the case, to learn, as it seems, existing things without names.

Crat. It appears so.

Soc. Through what else then do you expect to learn them? Is it through any thing else than what is reasonable and most just, through their communion with each other, if they are in any way mutually allied, and especially through themselves? For surely that, which is different from and foreign to these, would indicate something different and foreign,⁶² but not them?

Crat. You appear to me to speak the truth.

Soc. But hold, by Zeus. Have we not often confessed that names properly imposed are like the things, of which they are the names laid down, and are the resemblances of the things?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. If then one may learn, as much as possible,⁶³ the things through names, and likewise through themselves, which will be the best and clearest method of learning? To learn from a resemblance, both itself, whether it is a beautiful likeness, and likewise the truth, of which it is the resemblance; or from the truth, both itself, and whether its resemblance has been fashioned in a becoming manner?

Crat. There appears to me a necessity (to learn) from the truth.

[119.] *Soc.* After what manner then one must learn, or find out existing things, is perhaps a greater task than for me and you to know; and we must be content to confess this, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from the names, but much rather themselves from themselves?

Crat. It appears so, Socrates.

Soc. Still further let us consider this; that these many names tending to the same thing may not deceive us; if,⁶⁴ in reality,

⁶¹ In lieu of the nonsensical *δείξαντα δῆλον ὄντι*, for which some would read *δηλονόντι*, answering to "videlicet" in Ficinus, Plato evidently wrote *δείξαντι ἀδῆλον ἔντι*,—"having pointed out the truth, still not evident."

⁶² The emendation *ἀλλοῖον* for *ἄλλο ὄν*, suggested by Heusde, has been adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb.

⁶³ Instead of *μάλιστα*, common sense requires *κάλλιστα*, "as well as possible," similar to the subsequent *καλλίων*.

⁶⁴ In thus inserting "if," Taylor has anticipated Wyttenbach; both of whom found the idea in the "cum" of Ficinus. Stalbaum is content

they who founded them considered all things as going-on ever and flowing—for they appear to me to have so considered—and if this were the case it would not thus (be well).⁶⁵ But these men have fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, and are themselves stirred about,⁶⁶ and by dragging us along, hurl us into it. For consider, O wondrous Cratylus, what I often dream about, whether we should say or not that there exists in the abstract the beautiful and the good, and each of the things existing.

Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that there does exist.

Soc. Let us then consider that very thing, not as if a countenance or any thing of this kind were beautiful—for⁶⁷ all these appear to flow—but shall we say that beauty in the abstract is not always such as it is?

Crat. We must.

[120.] *Soc.* Can one then correctly say, if it is always secretly going away, first, that it is, and next, that it is of such a kind? Or is it necessary, while we are speaking about it, for it to become immediately something else, and to secretly withdraw itself, and to be such no longer.

Crat. It is necessary.

Soc. How then can that be any thing, which never subsists in a similar manner? For if it ever subsists⁶⁸ in a similar

with *ἐξαπαρᾶται τῷ ὄντι μὲν*—For he takes *ἐξαπαρᾶται* in an active sense, misled by a corrupt passage in Aristotle's Problem. § 28; and rejects entirely *τι* after *διανοηθέντες*, and says that *μὲν* is used by an elegant asyndeton for *μὲν γάρ*. What Plato wrote might perhaps be guessed at; it is however quite certain to me that he did not write *ἐξαπαρᾶται τῷ ὄντι μὲν*—

⁶⁵ Instead of *οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ'*, one would expect *οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ἀν καλῶς, ἀλλ'*—and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. For his version is, "quorum tamen opinio, si talis exstitit, falsa habenda est." On the expression *καλῶς ἀν ἔχει*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 182. Stalbaum, after Heindorf, renders, "quum tamen fortasse non ita sit." But that would be in correct Greek *τὸ δὲ τυχόν οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει*.

⁶⁶ Instead of *κυκλῶνται*, one would prefer *κύκλῳ κινῶνται*, i. e. "are carried about in a circle." Ficinus has "vacillant jactanturque." The verb *κυκᾶν* seems scarcely adapted to *δίνη*; which is connected with the idea of a circular movement, not a stirring about, as a cook stirs a pot of porridge.

⁶⁷ Instead of *καὶ* we must read with Heindorf *καὶ γάρ*—Ficinus has "quippe." Stalbaum absurdly, as usual, defends the common reading.

⁶⁸ Bekker and Stalbaum have incorrectly adopted *ἴσχει* from many MSS. in lieu of *ἔχει*. They did not know that *ἴσχει* is never used intransitively, except in Politic. p. 307, F., Legg. viii. p. 846, C., Rep. p. 484, B., and even there it is easy to restore the more usual form. Vainly

manner, during that time ⁶⁹[when it subsists in a similar manner], ⁶⁹it is evident that it does not change; but, if it always subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can it change, or be moved, not having started out from its own form of existence?

Crat. By no means.

Soc. But neither can it be known by any one. For, as soon as that approaches which is about to know it, it becomes something else, and of a different kind, so that it cannot be known of what quality it is, or how it subsists. Now surely no knowledge knows that, which it knows has no manner of subsistence.

Crat. It is as you say.

Soc. But neither, Cratylus, is it reasonable to say that knowledge exists, if all things change and fall away, and nothing abides. For if this very thing [I mean knowledge] ⁷⁰itself does not change and fall away, so as to be not knowledge, it would remain for ever [knowledge], ⁷¹and be knowledge; but if the form itself of knowledge changes and falls away, it will at the same time change and fall away into a form different from knowledge, and will be knowledge no longer; but if it always changes and falls away, it will always be not knowledge: and by this reasoning there would be neither the thing about to know, nor that about to be known. [121.] But if that always subsists which knows, then that which is known subsists, and the beautiful subsists, and the good subsists, and each single thing else of those existing; ⁷²nor do these appear to me to be really similar to the flowing, or rushing-on, of which we were speaking. ⁷²But whether these things subsist in this way, or in the way that

then does Buttmann attempt to draw a nice distinction between *ἔχειν* and *ἵσχειν*.

⁶⁹—⁷⁰ The words within brackets are omitted by twenty MSS. and Ficinus. They are evidently an interpolation.

⁷⁰ The words *ἡ γνῶσις* are clearly an explanation of *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*.

⁷¹ Here too the words *ἡ γνῶσις* have been unnecessarily foisted in.

⁷²—⁷³ I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐδὲ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὁμοία τῷ ὄντι εἶναι—ῥοῇ οὐδαμὰ οὐδὲ ποταμῷ*. For I cannot understand *ὅς μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὁμοία ὄντα*, *ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ποταμῷ*. After *φαίνεται* the verb *εἶναι* could not be omitted; nor is there any need of *ὄντα*, to say nothing of the asyndeton in *ὅς μοι*. Ficinus has “*quæ in præsentia dicimus, fluxus lationis similia non videntur.*”

the followers of Heraclitus and many others⁷³ assert, (see) that it is by no means an easy subject of inquiry; nor is it the part of a person possessing much mind, to give himself up, and his own soul, to the study of names, (and) confiding⁷⁴ in them and those that founded them, to make a bold assertion, as if he knew something, and to give a verdict against himself and existing things, as if nothing of any thing were sound,⁷⁵ but that all things did, like (unsound)⁷⁶ vessels of clay, let the water run through; and really, like persons labouring under a catarrh, fancy that things are so disposed, and⁷⁷ things are seized with a flowing and catarrh.⁷⁷ [122.] Perhaps then, Cratylus, this is the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to reflect upon this well and manfully,⁷⁸ and not to receive any thing easily:⁷⁹ for as yet you are a young man, and possess the vigour of age;⁸⁰ and if, after reflecting, you discover any thing, communicate it to me.

Crat. And so I will do. But rest assured, Socrates, that even now I am not without consideration; but to me on reflection, and⁸¹ having had trouble, it appears to be much more on that side⁸¹ as Heraclitus asserts.

⁷³ Such as Protagoras and Empedocles. See Theætet. § 25. HEIND.

⁷⁴ By simply inserting *τε* after *πεπιστευκότα*, I have restored the syntax, that previously laboured not a little. Taylor too has "and confiding."

⁷⁵ On *οὐδὲν ὑγίει οὐδένος*, Heindorf refers to Phædon. p. 68, A.

⁷⁶ As not all clay-vessels, but only the unsound, let the water run through, it is evident that Plato wrote *ὥσπερ κεράμια σαθρά ρεῖ*. Compare Gorg. p. 493, E. § 106, where a person is said to fill with difficulty *ἀγγεῖα σαθρά*. On the word itself see Toup. on Longin. § 18, Heindorf on Theætet. p. 179, D., Stalbaum on Phileb. p. 56, C., and myself on Prom. 966.

⁷⁷—⁷⁷ Unless I am greatly mistaken, the words *ὑπὸ ρεύματός τε καὶ καταρροῦ* are the explanation of *οὕτως*: while it is impossible to believe that *πάντα χρήματα* would be thus repeated after *τὰ πράγματα*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *οἰσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακίεσθαι, καὶ πανταχοῦ ρεύματι ἔχουσθαι*, i. e. "and are every where seized with a flowing."

⁷⁸ Here, as elsewhere, MS. Gud. has alone preserved the true reading, *εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως*.

⁷⁹ After *ἀποδέχσθαι* an accusative could scarcely be omitted. Hence Plato probably wrote *ἀποδέχσθαι γέ τι*. For *γέ τι* could easily drop out before *ἐτι*.

⁸⁰ Ficinus has "atque tibi sufficit ætas." For he perhaps found in his MS. *ἡλικίαν ἱκανὴν ἔχεις*.

⁸¹—⁸¹ Although *πράγματα ἔχειν* is correct Greek, and so is *πολὸν μᾶλλον*, yet one would prefer *πράγματα ἔχοντι πολλὰ, μᾶλλον εὖ καὶ ἰσθύνως*

Soc. Do you then hereafter, my friend, when you return⁸² hither, instruct me; but now, as you have made preparations, proceed to the country; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.

Crat. This shall be, Socrates; and do you also endeavour to think upon these matters, as is meet.⁸³

φαίνεται ἔχειν, in lieu of *ἰκείνως*, or retaining *ἰκείνως*, *φαίνεται εὖ ἔχειν*. For *ἔχειν* could not here stand by itself; and scarcely *ἰκείνως*, where the usual word is *οὕτως*.

⁸² Ficinus, "quando redieris," which leads to *ἰπειδὴν ἀνήκες*, instead of *ἰπειδὴν ἦκες*.

⁸³ In lieu of *ἤδη*, which never ends a sentence, one would expect *ᾗ δέ*, as I have translated; or else *ταῦτα δὴ*. For *δὴ* thus closes a sentence in *Meno*, § 24, *καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ*: where Buttmann quotes Demosth. *Midian*, § 8, *καὶ ἄλλα δὴ*. We meet indeed with *λείπομεν ὑμᾶς*, *λείπομεν ἤδη* in *Philoct.* 1459. But there I have restored—*λείπομενοι δὴ*, which I should have supported by quoting *Eurip.* *El.* 1310, *Καὶ σ' ἀπολείψω, σοῦ λειπόμενος*.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PARMENIDES.

Of all the Dialogues of Plato the *Parmenides* is one of the most remarkable. For not only does it turn upon questions relating to the most abstruse abstractions of metaphysics, but the manner too, in which the subject is handled, affords the best illustration of that "*sapientiae insanientis*"—cleverness without sound sense—in the meshes of which Horace says he was at one time caught; and to which he might have fairly applied his own graphic verse—

"Diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis."

Pulls down, builds up, and changes squares for rounds.

By a chain of reasoning, where subtleties assume the garb of truths, conclusions are arrived at, so as to fully justify the fear, which Socrates is here feigned to feel, that by pursuing metaphysical inquiries, he would fall into the bottomless sea of trifling; from which, as from Hades, according to Virgil, only they,

"quos ardens evexit ad æthera virtus,"

Valour soul-burning to the skies hath borne,

could hope to escape; and, like Ulysses under the guidance of the goddess of wisdom,

"Salvos se superas potuisse evadere ad auras."

In safety could to upper air return.

Such at least seems to have been the fate of every Commentator, who has ventured to enter the maze of mind, which Plato has with such art built up. For neither Proclus and Damascius of the olden time, nor more recently Ficinus, nor, within the last hundred years, Taylor in England, Schleiermacher and others in Germany, nor

Cousin in France, have been able to understand thoroughly themselves, and to explain satisfactorily to others, what is likely to remain for ever an intellectual puzzle.

It is then a fortunate circumstance for such as may be still disposed to enter the labyrinth, that Stalbaum has furnished them with a clue, by prefixing to his edition of the *Parmenides*, published at Leipsig in 1848, four books of elaborate *Prolegomena*, running to 343 octavo pages. For the reader will find there an ample and generally satisfactory discussion on various points connected with the doctrines promulgated in the dialogue. Of these perhaps the most startling is the theory of Socher, who would have the world believe that the *Parmenides* was not written by Plato, but by some anonymous philosopher, to whom is to be attributed likewise the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. In defence of this novel notion, which, says Stalbaum, Socher has been unable to support by a single argument of the least weight, Stalbaum himself has produced one, that Socher has omitted. For according to Stalbaum, Aristotle has never made a direct allusion to the *Parmenides*; although there seem to be two indirect in *Physic.* i. 3, and as many in *Sophist.* El. c. ix. But he might have added that, even if there were not a single one of any kind whatever, it is easy to understand why Aristotle would take no notice of Plato. For the Stagirite could not have failed to perceive, that Plato was not so much giving expression to his own opinions, as putting into prose what *Parmenides* appears to have written in verse; while, as regards the doctrines of Zeno, it was far better for Aristotle to draw them from the discourses of that philosopher himself, than from the representations of a less faithful reporter.

With far greater reason have Schleiermacher and Ast imagined that the dialogue was left in an unfinished state. Perhaps it would be safer to assert that it has come down to us 'shorn of its fair proportions.' For it is hard to believe that Plato wanted either the power or inclination to put the finishing hand to a production, which exhibits the marks of no common mind.

Respecting the object of the Dialogue, Taylor, echoing, as usual, the sentiments of his favourite Proclus, fancies it was intended to exhibit a complete system of a philosophical theology; and hence he has given it the title of "*Parmenides, or on the Gods.*" But here, as indeed through the whole of Plato, the two Neo-Platonists have

preferred to float amidst the mists of mysticism, rather than breathe the generally clear empyreum of Plato's mind. More correctly does Diogenes Laert., in ix. 13, entitle it *Παρμενίδης ἡ περὶ ἴδεων*, and, in iii. 50, class it with the Statesman, the Sophist, and Cratylus, as exhibiting proofs of the philosopher's powers as a dialectician.

Amongst the more recent translations of this Dialogue, is one in French by Schwalbé, Par. 1844, 12, where, in a note at the end of the argument, a reference is made to his "*Parmenide, traduit et expliqué.*" But whether he has been able to overcome any of the difficulties arising from the corruptions of the text, I am unable to state, as I have never seen the work; and a similar remark is applicable to the various publications quoted by Stalbaum, who has seldom taken the least notice of his countrymen's verbal criticism; for, like Poppo in the case of Thucydides, he seems to think that the very words of the author have been miraculously preserved by a certain class of MSS.; and that if they are not found there, it is merely labour in vain to endeavour to seek for them elsewhere; and even in the Latin version of Ficinus, which was evidently made from a MS. frequently superior to all that have been hitherto collated by Bekker and others. I suspect, however, that, like the majority of modern scholars in France, Schwalbé does not feel himself sufficiently strong in Greek to grapple with verbal difficulties; which after all must be first successfully mastered, before a person presumes to talk of that, with which most readers are satisfied, the conventional sense of a passage which is felt to be difficult; but which the genuine verbal critic knows to be difficult generally, only because it is corrupt.

As it is by no means easy, even with an attention constantly exerted, to follow the subtleties that pervade the whole Dialogue, it will be perhaps not without its use to give Stalbaum's summary of the principal questions discussed, and of the conclusions to which they lead.

A. If "the one" be supposed to exist—

In the first place, it is necessary to consider it abstractedly by itself, and likewise in a double point of view, either as existing apart by itself, or united to "being;" from whence there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions—

1. If "the one" exists, it is nothing, p. 137, C.—142, B.
2. If "the one" exists, it is every thing, p. 142, B.—157, B.

Secondly, we must consider "the others;" by which is meant every thing except "the one" (p. 159, B. § 63); and respecting these there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions: for,

1. If "the one" exists, "the others" are all things, p. 157, B.—159, B.

2. If "the one" exists, "the others" are nothing, p. 159, B.—160, B.

B. If "the not-one" be supposed to exist—

In the first place, we must consider "the not-one" abstractedly by itself, and likewise in a double point of view; from whence there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions—

1. If "the not-one" exists, and is understood in a relative sense with respect to "the others," it is by itself every thing, p. 160, B.—163, B.

2. If "the not-one" exists abstractedly, it is by itself nothing, p. 163, B.—164, B.

So too we must consider "the others." And hence there arise two conflicting propositions and conclusions—

1. If "the not-one" exists, "the others," as being freed from one-ness, are every thing, p. 164, B.—165, E.

2. If "the not-one" exists, "the others" are nothing, p. 165, E.

Before, however, Parmenides, of whom Plato is the mouth-piece, entered upon these inquiries, there should have been given definitions of the terms employed, or at any rate care should have been taken by Plato to use the same terms in always the same sense. But so far is this from being the case, that, as remarked by Wytténbach, on Phædon. p. 270, with whom Creuzer, on Plotinus *Περὶ Κάλους*, p. 169 and 388, agrees, the same meaning is assigned to *εἶναι* and *εἶδῃ*; although Stalbaum, on Parmenid. p. 128, E., attempts to draw a nice distinction between them; and so he does too in the case of *ἅλλα* and *ἕτερα*, in Prolegom. p. 114, although he fairly confesses that those two words are sometimes used indiscriminately.

PARMENIDES.

OR

ON IDEALITIES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CEPHALUS, ADEIMANTUS, ANTIPHO, GLAUCO, PYTHODORUS, SOCRATES, ZENO, PARMENIDES.

[1.] WHEN we arrived at Athens from home, [from Clazomenæ,¹] we happened to meet with Adeimantus and Glaucon² in the place of assembly. And Adeimantus, taking me by the hand, said, Hail, Cephalus;³ and if you are here in want of any thing over which we have any power, mention it to me. Nay, I replied, I came for this very purpose, to beg of you a favour. Will you then, says he, state your request? And I replied, What was the name of your brother by the same mother? for

¹ Although *οἰκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν* would, no doubt, appear unobjectionable to those, who are satisfied with *ἐκ τοῦ Ἀργεῖος ἀντρόθεν* in Thucyd. v. 83, *αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ* in Plato Theætet. p. 143, D., *αὐτοῦ—ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ*, Alcibiad. i. p. 105, B., *οἰκοθεν—Φαληρόθεν* in Sympos. p. 172, *ἐν τῇ Τεγίᾳ αὐτοῦ*, Xenoph. K. A. vii. 4. 36, yet as *ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν* is repeated immediately afterwards, it is evident that in this place those words are an interpolation. We meet indeed with *οἰκονδε—Εἰς Ἰθάκην* in Od. A. 17. But the words are properly separated there, not, as here, united.

² Of the Adeimantus and Glaucon mentioned here, and introduced as speakers in the Republic, nothing is known, except that they were not the brothers of Plato; although, according to C. F. Hermann, quoted by Stalbaum in Prolegom. p. 302, they were older members of the same family stock; from whom the younger and collateral branches derived their names.

³ That the Cephalus here alluded to was not the father of Lysias the orator seems to be clearly made out. But beyond that fact, nothing is known satisfactorily.

I do not remember it: for he was a child when I first⁴ came here from Clazomenæ; and it is now a long time since then. His father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes.⁵ Just so, says he, and (his brother's) was Antipho. But why do you especially ask? These, my fellow-citizens, said I, are much given to philosophy, and have heard that this Antipho had frequently met with one Pythodorus,⁶ a friend of Zeno; and that having frequently⁷ heard from Pythodorus the conversations which Socrates,⁸ Zeno, and Parmenides held with each other, he had remembered them. You speak the truth, says he. These then, said I, we beg to hear. This, says he, is no difficult matter. For, although young, he has exercised himself greatly in them; since⁹ he now, after the example of his grandfather, who is his namesake, applies himself much to equestrian affairs. [2.] But, if it seems good,¹⁰ we will go to him: for he is just gone home¹¹ from hence; and dwells hard by, in Melita.¹² So saying, we went, and caught him at home, giving orders to a coppersmith to make him a bit. But as soon as he was at liberty, and his brothers told him the cause of our coming,

⁴ The MSS. vary as usual between *πρότερον* and *πρῶτον*: which is the correct reading Stalbaum says he is unable to decide.

⁵ Although Plato in *Charmid.* § 12, speaks of a Pyrilampes, as the uncle of Charmides, and in *Gorg.* § 82, as the father of Demus, yet C. F. Hermann conceives that the one here mentioned was of a different family, and related to Plato by his mother's side.

⁶ Pythodorus is mentioned as the friend of Zeno in *Alcibiad. i.* p. 119, A.

⁷ Here *πολλά* is put for *πολλάκις*. Stalbaum aptly quotes *Phædon.* p. 61, C., *πολλά—ἐντετύχηκα*.

⁸ *Athenæus* in xi. p. 505, F., and *Macrob.* in *Saturnal. i.*, accuse Plato of an anachronism in making Socrates converse with Parmenides. But they forgot, as remarked by Heindorf, that Socrates here and in the *Theætetus*, § 101, and *Sophist.* § 4, speaks of himself as being very young, when Parmenides was an old man.

⁹ Instead of *ἴτε*, which is here absurd, and omitted by Ficinus, one would expect *εἰ καί*, "although—"

¹⁰ In lieu of *ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ*, Heind. suggested *ἀλλ', εἰ δοκῇ*, which is the phrase constantly in use, as I have shown on *Philoct.* 1398, and to the passages quoted there I could now add a dozen more. Stalbaum defends *εἰ δεῖ*, acknowledged by Proclus, and translates—"if I must;" as if Adeimantus, who had professed his readiness to do Cephalus a service, would consider it an act of compulsion to go with his friend to Antipho, whose house was close at hand.

¹¹ Stalbaum justly finds fault with Bekker for omitting *οἰκαδε*, which is required by the tenor of the story.

¹² This Melité was a demus of the tribe of Cecrops.

he recognised me through my previous sojourn at this place, and he embraced me; and on our begging him to go through the conversations, he at first shrunk back, for he said it would be a troublesome task; but afterwards, however, he detailed them.

Antipho then said that Pythodorus had told him that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the great Panathenæa;¹³ that Parmenides was then a rather old man, with very hoary locks, but of a handsome and noble aspect, and full sixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, very tall and graceful to behold, and was reported to have been the bosom friend of Parmenides; he said, too, that they lodged with Pythodorus, in the Cerameicus,¹⁴ beyond the walls; whither also Socrates came, and many others with him, who were eager to hear the writings of Zeno; for then for the first time they had been brought by the (strangers); but that Socrates was at that time very young. [3.] That Zeno therefore himself read the writings to them; and Pythodorus further related that Parmenides happened to be gone out; and that of the discourses so read there remained only a very small portion, when he himself entered, and Parmenides with him and Aristotle,¹⁵ who was one of the Thirty (Tyrants); and that he heard but a little at that time; ¹⁶but that nevertheless he had (often) heard the (whole)¹⁶ discourse previously from Zeno.

(He added) that Socrates, on hearing (the discourses), entreated him to read again the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that, when it was read, Socrates said—How do you, Zeno, assert this, that if the things existing are many, the

¹³ On the Panathenæa, see Potter's or Smith's Grecian Antiquities.

¹⁴ On the two Cerameici, see Schol. in Aristoph. *Ἰππ.* 769. They were in fact burial-grounds, and strewed over with fragments of the cinerary urns there deposited in honour of the dead. Of the same kind was doubtless the Potter's Field, near Jerusalem, where the body of Judas Iscariot was thrown.

¹⁵ This Aristotle is numbered by Xenophon, in *H. G.* ii. 2, amongst the Thirty Tyrants, as they were called, whom Lysander appointed to be the governors of Athens, after it fell into his hands. Stalbaum thinks he was the author of some Forensic speeches, mentioned by Diogenes Laert. v. 34.

¹⁶—¹⁶ Heindorf says that in the words *οὐ μὴν αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀλλὰ καὶ*, there is an unusual transposition of *ἀλλὰ*, which should follow *οὐ μὴν*. But *ἀλλὰ καὶ*, I suspect, is a corruption of *πολλὰκις*. Taylor, too, has inserted "often" from his own head; and "whole" from "omnia" in Picinus; unless it be said that Plato wrote *γὰρ ὅλα*, which come nearer to *γὰρ ἀλλὰ*.

same things must be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this what you assert? Zeno answered, It is. [4.] If then it is impossible for dissimilars to be similar, and similars dissimilar, it is impossible likewise for many things to exist? For if there were many, they would undergo impossibilities. Is this what your discourses mean? Is it any thing else than to contest, contrary¹⁷ to all that is (usually) asserted, that "the many" does not exist? And do you fancy that each of your discourses is a proof of this very doctrine? so that you conceive you have produced as many proofs as you have written discourses, (to show) that "the many" does not exist? say you thus, or do I not rightly understand you? No, said Zeno; but you understand quite well the meaning of the whole work. Then said Socrates, I perceive, Parmenides, that Zeno here wishes not only to be familiar with you in other bonds of friendship, but in your writings likewise. For Zeno has, in a certain manner, written the same as yourself; but by some change he endeavours to deceive us, as if asserting something different. For you in your poems assert that the universe is "one;" and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion. [5.] But Zeno says that "the many" does not exist, and he too produces very many and mighty proofs. With regard then to the fact, that you assert that "the one" exists, and he, that "the many" does not exist; and that each of you speak so as to appear to have said not an atom of the same things, although you both assert nearly the same, it seems to me that what has been said by you is above us the rest.¹⁸ It is so, Socrates, said Zeno. But you do not perfectly comprehend the truth of my writings; although, like the dogs of Laconia,¹⁹ you excellently pursue and track out

¹⁷ Heindorf properly translates *παρὰ*, "contrary to;" Ficinus, by "per," "through," which Stalbaum adopts in defiance of the language; for *παρὰ* never has that meaning. To show more clearly what Plato intended, I have inserted "usually," unless it be said that he wrote *παρὰ τὰ παντί τῃ λεγόμενᾳ*, not *παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα*.

¹⁸ In lieu of *τοὺς ἄλλους* one would prefer *τοὺς ἄνους*, "the simpletons." On the change of *ἄνους* and *ἄλλους*, see my Poppe's Prolegom. p. 106.

¹⁹ On the superiority of this breed of dogs, see the Commentators on Soph. Aj. 8, and Virgil. Georg. iii. 345. Hence, says Proclus, that animal was called a philosopher; just as Pope describes the elephant as "half-reasoning."

what is there asserted. But this in the first place lies hid from you, that this discourse is not in every respect of so solemn a cast, that it was written, as you say, with the set purpose²⁰ of being concealed from mankind,²¹ as if effecting something great; yet you have spoken something of what has happened; and in truth, these writings are a kind of support to the doctrine of Parmenides against those who endeavour to ridicule it, (by saying) that if "one" exists, it would follow that such an assertion would suffer many things of a laughable kind, and contrary to itself. This writing therefore contradicts those, who assert that "the many" exists; and it gives in return these²² and many other reasons; as it intends to show that the hypothesis, which (asserts) the existence of "the many," would suffer things still more laughable than that, which says of²³ if "many" exist, or of "one" existence,²³ should a person go through the question sufficiently. [6.] Through some such love of contention was this discourse composed by me, when a youth; but some one stole it after it was written, so that it was out of my power to deliberate whether it should be brought out into the light or not.²⁴ Hence it lies hid from you, Socrates, that it was written by a

²⁰ Perhaps *διανοηθῆν* might be translated, "with a mental reservation." Unless it be said that Plato wrote *ἰδίᾳ νοηθῆν*, "to be understood privately."

²¹ Here again one would prefer *τοὺς ἀνους*, "the silly," to *τοὺς ἀνους*, "mankind."

²² In lieu of *ταῦτα*, Heindorf with Schleiermacher would read *ταῦτ᾽*, i. e. *τὰ γελοῖα*. Stalbaum defends *ταῦτα* by saying that it refers to the arguments, brought forward by the opponents of Parmenides. The word is omitted by many MSS., and Ficinus. The sense seems to require *ἄλλα καὶ καλλίω ἐτι*, "other things and better still;" for the question would be decided by the excellence, not the number merely, of the arguments.

²³ I cannot make out the syntax in, nor see the sense of, *ἢ εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἑν εἶναι*. I could have done both had the words been, *ἢ λέγει ὅτι πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἢ τοῦτου, ὅτι ἑν*: and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS., for his version is, "ex opinione illorum, quod scilicet multa sint, quam ex opinione Parmenidis, quod sit unum;" in English, "their hypothesis, which says that 'many things exist,' than the hypothesis of this person, that 'one exists.'"

²⁴ This is evidently the sense of the passage. But to get at it, we must suppose Plato to have written, *ταύτη οὖν σε λαμβάνει, ὦ Σωκράτης. τὸ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας ἔνεκα αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὡς οἶμι, ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας*. Ficinus found something different in his MS., for his version is, "Id ergo te fugit, O Socrates, quod existimas, non a juvenili certamine sed a senili ambitione scriptum fuisse."

young person through the love of contention, and not, as you fancy, by an older one, through the love of renown,²⁵ since, as I have said, you have not made a bad guess. I receive (the account), says Socrates; and I think the case is as you have stated. But tell me this too. Do you not think there is a certain form of similitude, existing itself by itself? and that another is contrary to this, which is dissimilar? and that you and me, and other things, which we call many, participate in these two? and that some things, participating in similitude, become similar in that respect and so far as they participate? but that others, (which participate) in dissimilitude, (become) dissimilar? and that those (which participate in) both (become) both? But if all things participate in both, which are contrary to each other, and that similar and dissimilar to each other exist through participating of both, what is the wonder? [7.] For, if any one should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy. But if he shows that such things, as participate in both of these, suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, Zeno, that there would be any thing absurd in the case; nor again, if any one should show that all things are one, through their participating in "the one," and that very same things are many, through their participating in multitude. But I should very much wonder if any one should show that what is one, is itself many, and on the other hand, that what are many is one; and in a similar manner concerning all the rest. It would indeed be worthy of wonder, if he should show that both the genera themselves and the species in them suffered these contrary affections. But what is there wonderful, if any one should show that I am both one thing and many, by saying, that when he wishes to prove I am many, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the anterior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts—for I think that I participate in multitude—but when (he desires to show that) I am one, he will say, that, we being seven in number, I am one man, and participate in "the one"? so that he would by this means prove both to be true. If then any one should en-

²⁵ Here again *ἐπει*, "since," is quite unintelligible. Ficinus has "Veruntamen," from which I can elicit nothing except *αὐτοῦ δὲ πίρι, ὡς ἐπὶ*.

deavour to show that stones, wood, and all such things, are both many and one, we would say that he shows such things as are many and one, but not that "the one" is many, nor "the many" one; and that he does not say any thing wonderful, but what we should all confess. [8.] But if any one should, in the first place, distribute the species of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them according to their very selves, such as similitude and dissimilitude, and multitude and the one, and standing and motion, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show that these things can in themselves be mixed and separated, I should, Zeno, says he, be marvellously astonished. But it appears to me that you have very manfully made this your business; yet I should be much more astonished if any one could solve this very same difficulty, which is involved on all sides in species themselves; and, as you have gone through in the case of things sensible to the sight, so (should he go through) in the case of things comprehended by reason.

On Socrates saying this, Pythodorus observed that he thought that Parmenides and Zeno were at each remark annoyed;²⁶ but they gave the greatest attention to him, (Socrates,) and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates. Hence on his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said—How worthy, Socrates, are you of admiration²⁷ for your ardour in what relates to reasoning! Tell me then, have you thus separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves, and likewise those, that participate in them, apart? And does similitude itself appear to you to be separate from that similitude which we possess,²⁸ and "one" and "many," and all such other things as you have just now heard of from Zeno? To me, said Socrates, it does. [9.] And does it appear to you, (said Parmenides,) that these things too exist, such as a species of justice, itself by itself, and of the beautiful and the good, and all things of such a kind? Yes, says he. What, is there a species

²⁶ Instead of ἀχθίσθαι Heindorf suggested, what Stalbaum is disposed to approve, ἀχθίσσισθαι, "would be annoyed."

²⁷ As the verb ἀγασθαι is never, I believe, used in a passive sense, one would prefer ἀγασθῆναι, found in Herc. F. 847, of which θαυμάζεσθαι, in two MSS., is the interpretation, as in Hesych., Ἀγασθεῖς θαυμάσθεις.

²⁸ Ficinus has "cujus nos participes sumus." So too one MS. from a recent hand, μετέχομεν. But Proclus, ἔχομεν, with which Thomson and Heindorf are satisfied.

of man separate from us and all the things, such as we are,²⁹ some species itself of man,²⁹ or of fire, or water? I have often, said (Socrates), been in doubt, Parmenides, on this point; whether it is necessary to speak of these in the same manner as of those, or in a different manner. And do you doubt, Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that of each individual thing, as may appear to be ridiculous, such as hair, clay, and filth, or any thing else the most worthless and vile, there is a species apart, as being different from those which we take into our hands? By no means, said Socrates; but (I think)³⁰ that things are as we see them: but (consider) lest it be not very absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? Already it has at some time disturbed me, lest there be something of the same kind in the case of every thing. But afterwards, when I have been standing³¹ in this way, I rapidly take myself off, fearing lest, falling into an abyss of trifling,³² I should utterly perish and be lost. But, returning from thence³³ to what we have just now asserted as possessing species, I have passed my time in busying myself about them. [10.] For, said Parmenides, you are as yet but a young man, Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet laid hold of you, as she will yet lay hold of you, according to my thinking, when you shall not despise any of these things: but now, through your juvenile age, you still look to the opinions of men. Tell me then this. Does it appear to you, as you

— The words within the numerals I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them.

²⁹ Heindorf says that there is an ellipse of οἶμαι. He ought to have elicited οἶμαι from εἶναι.

³¹ Ficinus has "paulisper institi." Hence one would read *τίως στῶ*, where *τίως* still lies hid in *ἐγὼ*, found before *στῶ* in two MSS., and before *ιστῶ* in one. On *τίως* see Ruhnkens on Timæus, p. 256.

³² In lieu of *ἀβυσθον φλυνάριαν*, Wytttenbach, on Plutarch de S. N. V. p. 72, suggested *ἀβυσσον φλυνάριαν*, as quoted by Synesius in Dion. p. 52, A., and *ἀβυσσον* is now found in many MSS., and *φλυνάριαν* in one. Stalbaum still sticks to *ἀβυσθον φλυνάριαν*, with Schæfer on Plutarch, t. v. p. 181.

³³ Stalbaum seems to think that *ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἃ διίγομεν* is such Greek as Plato would not have disdained to write. Some scholar with better taste would expunge *εἰς*. He should have suggested rather *ἐκείθεν*, similar to "unde reversus" in Ficinus; or still better, *ἐκείθεν δὲ ἀφικόμενος ὧς*, ἃ—For *ὧς* has been constantly lost, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 304; and to the passages quoted there, and corrected, I could now add not a few more.

say, that there are certain species, of which these the rest²⁴ participating retain their appellations; as, for instance, that such things as participate in similitude are similars; in greatness, are great; and in beauty and justice, are beautiful and just? Entirely so, said Socrates. Does not every thing which participates, either participate in the whole species, or only in a part of it? Or can there be any other mode of participation besides these? How can there be? said (Socrates). Does it then appear to you that the whole species in each individual of many things is one? Or how? What, said Socrates, prevents it, Parmenides, from being so?²⁵ Being, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, it will be²⁶ at the same time whole, and thus it will be separate itself from itself. It would not be so, said (Socrates), if, just as the day, being one and the same, is present in many places at the same time, and yet is not the more separate from itself; in the same manner,²⁷ if every species may be at once one and the same in all. [11.] Pleasantly indeed, said Parmenides, do you, Socrates, make one and the same thing to be in many places; just as if, covering many men with a sail-cloth, you should say that there is one whole over many; or do you think that you would not assert something of this kind? Perhaps so, said Socrates. Will then the whole sail-cloth be over each person, or one part of it over one person, and another over another? A part. Then, said Parmenides, these species, Socrates, are divisible; and that which participates in them, would participate only in a part of them; and there would no longer be in each a whole, but only a part of each.²⁸ So it seems. Are you then willing to assert that one species is in truth

²⁴ I scarcely understand τὰτε τὰ ἄλλα. Ficinus has "species quædam existere, et ea, quæ illis participant," as if he had found in his MS. ὧν τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα—

²⁵ Instead of ἔν εἶναι, Stalbaum has adopted ἐνείναι, the correction of Schleiermacher.

²⁶ Heindorf reads ἐνισταί for ἐν ἵσταί.

²⁷ Ficinus supplies, what makes the sense clearer, "ita nihil prohibet," unless we omit εἰ, with Stephens, and read εἰδῶν ἂν ἐν—to which ἐν, omitted by Bekker, from many MSS., before ἐν, seems to lead.

²⁸ Schleiermacher once wished to read ἐκάστω for ἐκάστον, which Heindorf adopted. He was subsequently content with the old reading. Stalbaum has suggested ἐκάστον ἂν. But ἐκάστον is seldom found in Plato except united to verbs of speaking.

divided, and that it is still one? By no means, said (Socrates). For see, said (Parmenides), whether, if you should divide magnitude itself, and if each of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude, less than magnitude itself, it would not appear absurd. Entirely so, said (Socrates).

What then? ³⁹ Will each little thing, by taking a part of the equal, have that, which, to a thing less than the equal itself, will be the thing having equal to some thing? ³⁹ It is impossible. ⁴⁰ But some one of us will possess a part of the small; and the small itself will be greater than this, inasmuch as it is a part of itself; and thus the small itself will be greater: but that to which the part taken away shall be added, will become smaller, but not greater than before. [12.] This, said Socrates, cannot be. ⁴⁰ After what manner then, Socrates,

³⁹⁻⁴⁰ Such is the literal and nonsensical version of the unintelligible Greek. Ficinus has, "Ipsius æqualis parte unumquidque parvum participans habebit, quo minore existente quam ipsum æquale, id, quod habet, æquale alicui sit;" which I cannot understand: and I am equally in the dark as regards Heindorf's translation—"Quando quidque parvam aliquam τοῦ ἴσου particulam acceperit, continebitne hoc in se aliquid; quo, quanquam id minus sit quam ipsum τὸ ἴσον, tamen cuiquam rei æquale effici possit?" But to get even at this sense, Heindorf is compelled to acknowledge that the words τὸ ἴσον, in which the principal difficulty lies, might be omitted without any detriment to the sense; as if either Plato or any other correct writer would thus insert words perfectly useless. Stalbaum, who hardly ever pens a note at once original, acute, and satisfactory, is content to reprint Heindorf's, as if it had left nothing to desire. I could, perhaps, have understood the Greek, had it been to this effect—Τί δαί; τοῦ ἴσου μέρος ἕκαστον μικρὸν ἀπολάβον, τί ἔξει: Τῷ ἰλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ἔχειν τοῦ ἴσου τι ἀδύνατον, i. e. "What then? If each small thing obtains a part of the equal, what will it have? It will be impossible for that, which is less than the equal itself, to have any part of the equal." With regard to the general sense, Proclus says, as translated by Taylor, "If any thing has a share in a part of equality, it has a share in something less than the whole; but that which participates in the lesser, is no longer lesser, but equal. This, however, ought not to be; since it has been agreed that forms (εἶδη) give the appellation of themselves to sensibles. Hence that which participates in the lesser, must not be called equal, but lesser; nor must that, which participates in the equal, be called lesser, but equal; nor that, which participates in the greater, be called equal or lesser, but greater."

⁴⁰⁻⁴⁰ According to Proclus, all within the numerals was thought by some persons to be spurious in consequence of the difficulty of perceiving what Plato was aiming at. Tried by this test, nearly the whole of what Proclus has written himself might be rejected as apocryphal. Absurd as the theory is, it has been adopted by some of the modern scholars of Germany,

can the other things participate in species, if they are able to participate neither according to parts, nor according to wholes? It does not, said (Socrates), appear to me, by Zeus, to be at all an easy matter to define in a question of this kind. What then? How stands the case with you in regard to this? To what? I think that you consider every species as one, on some such account as this. When some things many in number seem to you to be great, there seems perhaps to be one and the same idea to you, who survey them all; from whence you consider the great to be one. You speak the truth, said Socrates; but what, as regards the great itself, and the other things which are great, if you look upon them all in like manner through the soul, will not, on the other hand, a certain one thing appear to you great, through which all these necessarily seem to be great? It seems so. Another species of magnitude will then become apparent, besides magnitude itself and its participants: and in addition to all these, another (species), through which all these become great; each of your species will no longer be one, but infinite in number. But,

in the case of Thucydides especially; for they thus found it much easier to cut out corruptions than to cure them. In the present case, however, Stalbaum refuses to admit the notion of an interpolation, and least of all in a passage which, he says, is so clear, that a person must be blind indeed not to understand it. Accordingly he thus translates the first sentence; "Let us suppose that any one of us contains in himself a part of smallness itself." But although he asserts that the use of the future in a hypothetical sense has nothing uncommon in it, he will find it difficult to produce a single similar instance in the whole of Plato. And even if he could find one in every page, yet he ought to have shown likewise how, in a purely abstract question, there could be any allusion to human beings, taken individually; for the expressions *ἐν ἡμῖν* and *παρ' ἡμῖν*, in § 15, are not in point. By observing, however, the balance of the sentences, it is easy to see that as *τοῦ μικροῦ μέρος* is opposed to the preceding *τοῦ ἰσού μέρος*, so ought the latter part of one clause to balance the latter part of the other. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote—*Ἀλλὰ τοῦ μικροῦ μέρος ἕκαστον μέγα ἀπολάβον τι ἔξει; Ὅς οἶμαι, τοῦτον δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ μικρὸν μείζον ἔσται, ἄτε μέρους αὐτοῦ ὄντος*: i. e. "But if each great thing obtains a part of the small, what will it have? As I think, the small itself will be greater than this (great thing), as being (the great) in a part of it (the small)." And if this be a real restoration of what Plato wrote, we must read—*Καὶ εἰ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ μικρὸν μείζον ἔσται μεγάλου, ὃ γ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν, τοῦτ' ἔτι μικρότερον ἔσται, ἀλλ' οὐ μείζον ἢ τὸ πρῖν*. i. e. "And if the small itself is thus greater than the great thing, that, to which what has been taken away shall be added, will be still smaller, and not greater than before."

said Socrates, (Have a care,) Parmenides, lest each of these species be nothing more than a mental conception, and that it is not meet for it to exist any where but in souls. For thus each would be one, nor would the consequences, just now mentioned, occur. [13.] What then, said (Parmenides), is each of these mental conceptions one, and is there a mental conception of nothing? This, (said Socrates,) is impossible. It is then of something? Yes. Of a being or of a non-being? Of a being. Is it not of some one thing, ⁴¹which that mental conception understands as being a one certain idea over all things?⁴¹ Yes. Will not then that species, which is understood to be one, be always the same over all things? This, on the other hand, seems to be necessary. But what, said Parmenides, Is it not necessary, since you say that the other things participate in species, either that each should seem to you to be from mental conceptions, and that all of them understand, or that being mental conceptions, they understand nothing? But this, said Socrates, has no reason for it. But this appears, Parmenides, to me to be for the most part the case. That these species stand, as it were, patterns in nature; but that the other things are similar to them, and are their resemblances: and that this participation of species by the other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to them. If then any thing, said (Parmenides), becomes similar to the species, can it be possible for that species not to be similar to the assimilated, so far as it is rendered similar? Or is there any method by which the similar would not be similar to the similar? There is not. Is there not, therefore, a great necessity for the similar to participate in one and the same form as the similar? There is a necessity. But will not that, through the participation of which the similars become similars, be species itself? Entirely so. [14.] It is not, therefore, possible for a thing to be similar to the species, nor the species to another. For otherwise an-

⁴¹—⁴¹ Instead of *ἐπὶ δὲ νοεῖ*, Thomson proposed to read *ἐπὶ νοεῖ*, and so one MS. But *ἐπὶ* would have no meaning here. The three oldest MSS. offer *ἐπὶ νοεῖν*. Ficinus found in his MS. *ἐπομένην*. For his version is "notionem—sequentem." There is some deep-seated error here. From the subsequent *ὅν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πάντων*, it is evident that Plato did not write *ἐπὶ δὲ*. He might have written, *ὃ ἐπὶ πάντων ὅν ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα νοεῖ, εἰπεῖν τ' ἢ μίαν τιν' οὐσαν ἰδίαν*, i. e. "which that conception understands as being over all, and of which one may speak as being a certain one idea."

other species will always appear by the side of the species; and should this again become similar to another, another (would appear); and a new species would never cease to be continually produced, if the species should be produced similar to its participant. You speak most truly. Hence, then, the other things do not participate in species through similitude; but it is necessary to seek after something else, through which they do participate. So it seems.

See you then, Socrates, said (Parmenides), how great is the difficulty, should any one define species as existing themselves by themselves? Very much so. Know then well, said (Parmenides), that you do not apprehend at all, so to speak, how great is the difficulty, if, separating each of the things existing, you should lay down one species. How so, said (Socrates)? There are many and other (doubts), said (Parmenides); but this is the greatest. Should any one assert that it is not proper for the species to be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, a person would not have it in his power to demonstrate to the party asserting this, that he is deceived; unless he who doubts is skilled in many things, and is of a good disposition, and willing to follow the demonstrator, while busied in many (proofs), and these far-fetched; while he who holds, as a matter of necessity, that they are not to be known, will be unpersuaded. [15.] In what way, Parmenides? said Socrates. Because, Socrates, I think that both you and (any)⁴² other person, who lays down that the essence of each species exists itself by itself, would allow, in the first place, that not one of them exists in us. For, said Socrates, how could it still exist itself by itself? You speak well, (Parmenides) said. But do not such ideas as are, with relation to each other, such as they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves, and not with reference to things existing among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner a person may set them down; by the names of each

⁴² This "any" is supported by "quemvis" in Ficinus; who found, I suspect, in his MS. *ἄλλον τινα, ὅστις αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τινα τῖθαι εἶναι*: for his version is, "quicumque essentiam quandam cujusque ipsam secundum se existentem ponit;" and thus we shall get rid of *τινα*, improperly interposed between *αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν*, and of *αὐτοῦ* (omitted likewise in the oldest MS.) before *ἐκάστου*, and unite *τινα* closely, as it should be, to *οὐσίαν*. To these niceties, strange to say, not even Heindorf has paid the least attention.

of which, while we participate in them, we are called? but the things existing among us, and which are synonymous to those, exist, on the other hand, with reference to themselves, and not with relation to the species; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive from them a common appellation. How say you? replied Socrates. As if, said Parmenides, some one of us should be the master or slave of any one; ⁴³ for a slave is surely not the slave of a master, who is abstractedly speaking a master, nor is a master the master of a slave, who is abstractedly speaking a slave; ⁴³ ⁴⁴ but being a man, both these are of a man; ⁴⁴ ⁴⁵ but master itself is that, which it is from its relation to slavery itself; and slavery itself is in a similar manner slavery with reference to mastery itself. ⁴⁵ But what are in us do not possess any power, as regards those, nor those any, as regards us; but they exist, as I say, from themselves, and with relation to themselves; and those by us in a similar manner with relation to themselves. Or do you not understand what I am saying? I understand, said Socrates, perfectly. [16.] ⁴⁶ Would not science itself, said (Parmenides), which is a thing science, be a science of that itself which is a thing truth. ⁴⁶ Certainly. But would each of the sciences which

⁴³⁻⁴⁴ This I presume is the meaning of the Greek words, *οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου ὃ ἐστὶ δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δούλος ἐστίν· οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὃ ἐστὶ δούλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης*: where, I confess, I cannot understand *ἐκείνου*: nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were, *δούλος ὁ δούλος*, to balance *δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης*.

⁴⁴⁻⁴⁵ Here again the sense is obscure, because the words are corrupt. Ficinus renders "*sed hæc utraque est tanquam homo.*" For he found in his MS. *ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὡς ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτά ἐστι*: where *ἀνθρώπου* was omitted, as it is in five MSS. What Plato even meant to say, I will leave for others to discover.

⁴⁵⁻⁴⁶ Such is nearly Taylor's translation of the Greek words, *αὐτῇ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστίν, ὃ ἐστὶ, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτῇ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας*: where the balance of the sentence plainly proves that *δουλεία* is an interpolation; although it is acknowledged by the version of Ficinus, "*ipsa vero dominatio servitutis ipsius existit id, quod est; et ipsa iterum servitus eodem modo ipsius dominatio est servitus.*" Heindorf indeed asserts that *δουλεία* here answers to *ὃ ἐστὶ* in the preceding clause; but to those words is to be referred *ὡσαύτως*. From the "*iterum*" in Ficinus, it is evident he found in his MS. *καὶ—αὐτῇ*.

⁴⁶⁻⁴⁷ Here again is a mass of Greek words, out of which I can make not an atom of sense. I have given therefore an unintelligible literal translation. Ficinus has, "*Nonne et scientia ipsa, quod scientia est, illius ipsius, quod est veritas, scientia?*" He therefore found in his MS.

exists really, be the science of each of the things which exist really, or not? Yes, it would. But would not the science which is among us be the science⁴⁷ of the truth which is? And again, would not each science that is among us, turn out to be the science of things existing among us? It is necessary. But, as you have admitted, we do not possess species themselves, nor is it possible for them to exist among us. For it is not. But each of the genera, which really exist, are surely known by the species itself of its proper science. Yea. But this species we do not possess. For we do not. No species therefore is known by us, since we do not participate in science itself? It appears it is not. Therefore the beautiful itself, which exists really, and the good itself, and all the things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us? It nearly seems so. [17.] Now look at this, which is yet still more dreadful. What? Would you say, or not,⁴⁸ that, if there is a certain species itself of science, it would be⁴⁹ much more accurate than the science which is among us? and beauty (itself),⁵⁰ and every thing else in the same manner?⁵¹ Certainly. If then any thing else participates in science itself, would you not say that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a god? It is necessary (to say so). But will a god, possessing science itself, be able to know the matters among us? Why not? Because, said Parmenides, it

Οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν, ὃ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὐτῆς ἑκείνης, ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, ἐπιστήμη, instead of ἐπιστήμη τῆς, ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, αὐτῆς ἂν ἑκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη: while Proclus, in lieu of τῆς, ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, has τῆς ἀληθείας, correctly as far as the language is concerned; for ὃ ἔστιν cannot be thus inserted between τῆς and ἀλήθεια or ἀληθείας, but must follow the noun or pronoun to which it belongs, as shown by ἐπιστήμη αὐτὴ μὲν, ὃ ἔστιν, and ἐπιστημῶν ἣ ἔστιν, and τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν. Had the Greek been Οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν, ὃ ἔστι, ἀληθείας ὃ ἔστιν, αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη, the sense would have been as intelligible in that language as it is in English—"Would not science too itself, said Parmenides, which exists really, be the science of truth itself, which exists really."

⁴⁷ The MS. of Ficinus has luckily preserved the word ἐπιστήμη, wanting in all the other MSS., as shown by his version—"Scientia vero nostra nonne veritatis, quæ circa nos, scientia erit?"

⁴⁸ Ficinus omits ἢ οὐ. His version is "Num fateris, si—"

⁴⁹ I have translated as if the Greek were ἂν εἶναι instead of εἶναι.

⁵⁰ Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "et ipsam pulchritudinem," for he doubtless found in his MS. καὶ αὐτὸ κάλλος, not καὶ κάλλος.

⁵¹ Ficinus, "eodem pacto," which leads to ὡσαύτως in lieu of οὕτως.

has been, Socrates, confessed by us, that those species do not possess the power, which they possess, in relation to those among us, nor those among us in relation to them; but that each (possess their power) in relation to themselves. It was so confessed. If then there is this⁵² the most exact mastery with the deity, and this the most exact science, their⁵³ mastery will not rule over us, nor will (their) science know us, nor aught of the things among us; and similarly we do not rule⁵⁴ over them by our rule, nor do we know aught of things divine⁵⁵ by our science. [18.]⁵⁶ [And again, according to the same reasoning, they will neither, though gods, be our masters, nor have any knowledge of human affairs].⁵⁶ But (have a care), said (Socrates), lest the reasoning be not very wonderful, should it deprive the deity of the power of knowing. These, said Parmenides, and very many others, Socrates, in addition to these, it is necessary for the species to undergo, if there are these ideas of things existing, and if any one shall define each species, as being something itself; so that the hearer may be in a difficulty, and, doubting, contend that such species do not exist; or if they do exist ever so much, that there is a great necessity for them to be unknown by human nature; and that he who says so, seems to say something to the purpose; and to be, as we just now stated,⁵⁷ a person wonderfully difficult to be persuaded, and that there is (need)⁵⁸ of a person

⁵² Heindorf would read twice *αὐτῇ* for *αὐτῇ*, from Ficinus's version, "suprema ipsa dominatio—ipsa suprema scientia." Stalbaum retains *αὐτῇ*, which he explains by "illa, quam dixi."

⁵³ The introduction of the plural *ἐκείνων*, when only a single deity had been just before mentioned, seems very strange. Correctly then has Ficinus omitted *ἐκείνων* here, although he acknowledges the same word a little below.

⁵⁴ After the preceding *ἀν δεσπόσειεν*, one would expect here, to preserve the balance of the sentence, *ἀρχομεν ἀν*, and *γινώσκομεν ἀν*, instead of *ἀρχομεν* and *γινώσκομεν ἀν*: and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. For his version is, "imperabimus—percipiemus."

⁵⁵ Here likewise, to preserve the antithesis in *ἡμᾶς οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν*, one would have expected to find before *τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν* the words *τὸν θεὸν οὐτε*, or *τοὺς θεοὺς οὐτε*.

⁵⁶⁻⁵⁸ All within the brackets is evidently useless after the preceding reasoning; although the whole clause was read by Proclus, who says that the expression "*θεοὶ ὄντες*" being added, affords a considerable demonstration of the difficulty.

⁵⁷ In p. 133, B. § 14.

⁵⁸ Heindorf was the first to see that *δεῖν* had dropt out here. He

naturally clever to be able to perceive that there is a certain genus of each thing, and an essence existing itself by itself: but of a person still more wonderful, who shall discover (himself),⁵⁹ and be able to teach another to distinguish⁶⁰ all these in a sufficient manner. I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates, for you speak entirely to my mind.

But however, said Parmenides, If any one, Socrates, on the contrary, will not admit that there are species of existing things, looking to what has been now said, [and to other things of the same kind,⁶¹] ⁶² nor will define the species of each thing as being something itself,⁶³ he will not have where to turn his thoughts, while he does not permit the idea of each existing thing to be always the same; and by this means he will entirely destroy the power of speaking logically. Some such thing as this you seem to me to have perceived even more.⁶³ You speak the truth, Socrates said. [19.] What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself, if these are unknown? Indeed I do not seem to myself to see clearly at present. Before you exercised yourself, said (Parmenides), you endeavoured,⁶⁴ Socrates, be-

should have inserted it before ἀνδρὸς, not after εὐφροῦς. Ficinus has, "viri admodum ingeniosi esse;" for he found perhaps in his MS. μὲν εἶναι, similar to which is μὲν οὖν in one of the oldest MSS.

⁵⁹ The antithesis in εὐρήσονται and ἄλλον διδάξαι, plainly proves that αὐτοῦ has dropt out after εὐρήσονται—Ficinus has "postquam inveniit," as if his MS. offered εὐρόντος or εὐρηκότος.

⁶⁰ As the act of distinguishing must be subsequent to, or coincident with, that of teaching, we must read διευκρινησόμενον, as I have translated, in lieu of διευκρινησάμενον.

⁶¹ Ficinus omits the words καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα correctly, for they are not only useless, but actually absurd; as if Plato would thus allude not only to what had been said, but to something similar, which had not.

⁶² All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; although duly translated by Ficinus—"neque speciem ipsam uniuscujusque distinguat," who therefore found in his MS. not μηδὲ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, but μηδὲ αὐτὸ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, as just above, ὁριεῖται τις αὐτὸ τι ἑκάστου εἶδος.

⁶³ Stalbaum says that "although one would easily suspect that καὶ μάλα ought to be read, yet we must not alter any thing." He did not perceive however, that as Ficinus has not badly, as he confesses himself, "tu præcipue sensisse mihi videris," we might elicit from thence καὶ μάλιστα, in lieu of καὶ μᾶλλον: and still less that the sense requires here κάλλιον εἶναι ἡσθῆσθαι, "to have perceived better than a young person;" for that Socrates was then very young, is shown by § 2.

⁶⁴ I have adopted ἐπιχειρεῖς, found in two excellent MSS., in lieu of ἐπιχειρεῖς, for the allusion is to a past act.

times⁶⁵ to define what is the beautiful, the just, and the good, and each of the other species: for I lately perceived, and I heard you discoursing with this Aristotle here. Beautiful and divine, be assured, is that ardour of yours, by which you rush onwards to rational conversations. But draw yourself out,⁶⁶ and exercise yourself (still) more while you are yet young, on account of (the ardour) appearing useless to the many, and being called by them a mere idle talking; for if you do not, the truth will escape you completely.

What then, said (Socrates), is the method of the exercise, Parmenides? That, said (Parmenides), which you have heard from Zeno, except this,⁶⁷ I admired you while asserting, contrary to Zeno,⁶⁸ that you did not permit (a person) in the things seen (by the eye) to look into the aberration about them, but about those, which a person could especially lay hold of by reason, and would consider to be species.⁶⁹ For it appears to me, said (Socrates), that in this way it would be not difficult to prove that the things existing are both similar and dissimilar, and suffering any other state whatever. You speak well, said (Parmenides): but it is necessary for you to do this likewise; not only to make a supposition, whether each thing exists, and to consider the consequences from the supposition, but also, if it does not exist, to suppose this same thing,⁷⁰ if you wish to be more exercised (in this matter). How say you,

⁶⁵ Ruhnken, on Timæus, p. 226, says that *πρῶ* rarely means *πρὸ τοῦ ὀπίοντος*, "too early." It never has that meaning. Heindorf vainly refers to Trach. 630, *δίδοικα γάρ, Μὴ πρῶ λέγοις ἀν τὸν πόθον τὸν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, Πρὶν εἶδέναι τάκτιθιν*. For there Sophocles wrote *Μὴ πρὶν—λέγεις ἀν Πρὶν*, for thus *πρὶν* is repeated perpetually in both clauses.

⁶⁶ The metaphor in *ἐλκεσον σαυτόν*, "draw yourself out," Heindorf says is taken from weaving; where a thread becomes the finer the more it is drawn out. We have a similar metaphor in English; where a person is said "to draw out the thread of his verbosity finer than the staple of his argument;" quoted from one of Foote's farces by Porson in his Letters to Travis, if I rightly remember. Ficinus has "collige te ipsum."

⁶⁷ I cannot understand *πλὴν τοῦτο*. Ficinus has, "Sed etiam illud."

⁶⁸ See § 7 and 8.

⁶⁹ The reading *εἶδη*, which Heindorf rejected, is found in all the MSS. but two, and confirmed by "Species" in Ficinus. The sense seems however to require *καὶ εἶδη ἀν ἡγήσασαιτο ὄντως εἶναι*, i. e. "and would consider to be in reality species."

⁷⁰ I confess I cannot understand what is meant here by *τὸ αὐτο τοῦτο*. I could have understood *τοιούτῳ γ' αὐτῷ*—i. e. "some such thing on the other hand."

said (Socrates)? [20.] As if, said (Parmenides), you should wish to (exercise yourself) in the hypothesis which Zeno has laid down, that, "if there are many things," what must happen both to "the many," with respect to themselves, and to "the one;" and to "the one" with respect to itself, and to "the many;" and "if many are not," to consider again what will happen both to "the one" and to "the many," with respect to themselves and to each other: and again, if you made the supposition "if similitude is," or "if it is not," what will on each supposition happen both to the things supposed and to the others, with respect to themselves and to each other; and the same reasoning (must be) concerning "the dissimilar," and "motion" and "standing," and "generation" and "destruction," and "entity" and "non-entity;" and, in one word, concerning every thing which you suppose either to be or not to be, or suffering any other state whatever, it is necessary to consider what will happen both to itself and to each individual of the other things, which you may select, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner; and again, how the other things are related to themselves, and to another, which you may select, whether you suppose that, which is the subject of your supposition, as existing or not existing; if you are about to be exercised in a masterly manner, and to perceive thoroughly the truth.

You are speaking, Parmenides, of an impossible occupation, said Socrates, nor do I very well understand you. But why do you not go through a certain supposition yourself, that I may learn the better? You enjoin, Socrates, said (Parmenides), a great task upon a man so old as myself. But why do not you then, Zeno, said Socrates, go through it for us? And then (Pythodorus) stated that Zeno laughing said—[21.] Let us, Socrates, request Parmenides himself; for (see) lest it be no trifling matter, as he says; or do you not perceive how great a task you are enjoining? If then we were many it would not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially for a man of such an age, to speak things of this kind before many. For the many are ignorant that, without this discursiveness and wandering through all things, it is impossible for the mind to meet with the truth, and to keep possession of it. I therefore, Parmenides, do, together with Socrates, make the request in order that I too may after a long time hear it. On Zeno so saying, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that

he too, and Aristotle, and the rest, entreated Parmenides to declare what he had said, and not to do otherwise. There is a necessity then, said Parmenides, for me to comply; although I seem to myself to suffer the fate of the horse of Ibycus, to whom as being a competitor and rather old, when about to contend in a chariot race, and fearing through his experience for the event, Ibycus⁷¹ compares himself by saying, "Thus I too, who am so old, am forced to the contests of love to go;" so I, upon recollection, appear to myself to feel a great fear how I, at such an age, must swim through such and so great a sea⁷² of words;⁷³ yet I must gratify you, since, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves. Whence then shall we begin; and what shall we first of all suppose? [22.] Or are you willing, since it seems good to play a business-like game, for me to begin from myself, and my own hypothesis, by supposing, with respect to "the one itself," if one "is," or "is not," what must happen? By all means, said Zeno. Who then, said (Parmenides), will answer me? Will the youngest? For he will have very little trouble; for⁷⁴ he will answer what he thinks; and his answer will be at the same time a resting-place for me. I am prepared, said Aristotle, in this point,⁷⁵ for you, Parmenides; for you mean me, when

⁷¹ The fragment preserved by the Scholiast here and Proclus was first edited by F. Ursinus in *Fragm. Lyr.* p. 115, and reprinted by Schneidewinn in *Ibyci Fragm.* Gotting. 1833, and restored to a new metrical form by Hermann in *Jahn's and Klotz's Pædagog.* 1833, p. 380, and by Bergk in *Lyrici Græci.*

⁷² With a want of critical taste and tact, very unusual, Heindorf rejects the reading *πίλαγος* in lieu of *πλήθος*, preserved by Ficinus alone, and which even Fischer was disposed to adopt after he had read what had been written in its support by Ruhnken on *Timæus*, p. 79, and Valckenaer on *Hippol.* 822, and that Hesychius explains *πίλαγος* by *πλήθος*. Stalbaum however and Koch still stick to *πλήθος*.

⁷³ Stalbaum has edited *ὅμως δὲ—δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁ Ζήνων λέγει—αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἴσμεν*. But the second *γὰρ* is properly omitted by Bekker with the five best MSS., although it is found in *Legg.* viii. p. 636, B., *Protag.* p. 309, A., *Aristoph. Ach.* 506, but omitted in the similar phrase in *Menex.* § 5, *σοὶ γι δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι—ἐπειδὴ γε μόνω ἴσμεν*. *Alcib.* i. p. 118, *ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἴσμεν, ῥητιόν*. Stalbaum ought rather to have omitted the first *γὰρ* with three MSS., and to have read *καθ' ὃ* instead of *καὶ ὃ*—

⁷⁴ Instead of *καὶ* Plato evidently wrote *καὶ γὰρ*—

⁷⁵ The MSS. offer here *τοῦτο* for *τοῦτον*, to which Heindorf properly objected. But *ἔτοιμος τοῦτο* is scarcely good Greek. One would expect *τοῦτο ποιῖν*, or we must omit *τοῦτο* with Ficinus.

speaking of the youngest. Ask me then, as one who will answer you. Be it so, said (Parmenides).

If "one" is, is it not that "the one" will not be many? For how can it be? There must then be of it neither a part nor a whole. How so? Is not a part a part of a whole? Yes. But what is a whole? Would not that, to which no part is wanting, be a whole? Entirely so. On both sides then "the one" would be (composed) of parts, as being a whole and having parts? It is necessary. And so in both ways "the one" will be many, but not one. True. But it must be not many, but one. It must. Hence, it will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if "the one" is one. It will not. [23.] If then it has no parts, it has neither beginning, nor middle, nor end; for such as these would be its parts? Right. But end and beginning are the bounds of each thing? How not? "The one" therefore is infinite, if it has neither beginning nor end? Infinite. And therefore without figure; for it neither participates of the round nor the straight. How so? For the round figure⁷⁵ is that, the extremities of which are on all sides equally distant from the middle. Yes. And the straight is that, the middle of which is situated before both the extremes?⁷⁶ It is so. Would not then "the one" have parts, and be many, whether it participates in a straight figure or a round? Entirely so. It is therefore neither straight nor circular, since it has not parts. Right. And being such, it will be no where; for it would be neither in another, nor in itself. How so? Being in another, it would somehow be surrounded circularly by that, in which it might be, and it would be touched by many things in many places. But it is impossible for "the one," being without parts, and not participating in a circle, to be touched in a circle in many places. It is impossible. [24.] But being itself in itself, it would be likewise surrounding itself; since it is no other than itself, ⁷⁷if it were in itself:⁷⁷ for it is

⁷⁵ Thomson appositely refers to Cicero. N. D. ii. 18.

⁷⁶ This is a strange definition of a straight line, or figure. In lieu of *εὐκρίστην*, Proclus has *εὐκρίσθησαν*. From which others may perhaps, what I cannot, elicit the true reading by the aid of Euclid's definition of a straight line—*Εὐθεία γραμμὴ ἴστω, ἥτις ἐκίστου τοῖς ἐφ' αὐτοῦ σημείοις αἰτᾶται*. Ficinus has "Rectum vero, cujus medium extremis utrisque præcedit," which is just as unintelligible as the Greek.

⁷⁷—⁷⁷ The words between the numerals, Stalbaum says, merely repeat

impossible for a thing to be in that, which does not surround it. It is impossible. [24.] Would not then that, which contains, be one thing, and that which is contained, another?⁷⁸ For the same whole cannot at the same time suffer and do both these:⁷⁸ and thus "the one" would no longer be one, but two. It certainly would not. "The one," therefore, is not any where, being neither in itself nor in another. It is not. But consider, whether, being in this state, it is possible for it to stand or be moved. Why can it not? Because being moved it would be carried on or be changed;⁷⁹ for these alone are the kinds of motion. Certainly. But "the one" being changed from itself, it is impossible surely for it to be still one. Impossible. It is not then moved as regards a change. It appears it is not. But is it by being carried on? Perhaps so. And yet if "the one" is carried on, it would be either carried round in the same circle, or it would change from one place to another. Necessarily so. But ought not that, which is carried round in a circle, to stand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itself carried about the middle? But what method is there for that, which has neither a middle nor parts, to be carried circularly about the middle? There is none. But by changing its position it is sometimes here and other times there, and is moved? If indeed it (were moved).⁸⁰ Has it not appeared to be impossible for "the one" to be in any thing? It has. [25.] Is it not much more impossible for it to be in the act of being (in any thing)?⁸¹ I do not understand how. If any thing is in the act of being in any thing, is it not necessary for it to be not yet in it, since it is in the act of being; nor yet entirely

the preceding *ἐν ταύτῳ ὄν*. But he does not say what could induce Plato to introduce so useless a repetition.

⁷⁸⁻⁷⁹ Such is the translation of the Latin of Ficinus, "Nunquam enim idem ipsum totum utraque hæc simul pateretur et ageret," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ταύτῳ ἀμφω τοῦτῳ ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει*, of which both Heind. and Stalb. approve.

⁷⁹ The same idea in Theætet. p. 181, D. § 95.

⁸⁰ In lieu of *Εἴπερ γε δὴ*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ἴσως*, answering to his "Forte." But after *Εἴπερ* is to be supplied *κινεῖται*, as remarked by Stalbaum.

⁸¹ Ficinus has "in aliquo fieri," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι*, not simply *ἐν γίγνεσθαι*; or else *ἐν πρ*, answering to *ὅπρ* in the next remark of Aristotle: although *ἐν τῷ* is supported by the next question of Parmenides.

out of it, if it be already in the act of being? It is necessary: If then any other thing suffers this state, that alone would suffer it, which possesses parts; for one part of it would be in that thing, but another out of it; but it will not be possible for that, which has no parts, to be by any means wholly within or without any thing. It is true. But is it not much more impossible for that, which neither has parts nor happens to be a whole, to be in the act of being in any thing; since it can neither exist in the act of being according to parts, nor according to a whole? So it appears. Hence it does not change its place, neither by going any where, nor in the act of being in any thing, nor in being carried round in the same, nor in being changed. It does not appear it does. "The one" therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion. Im-movable. But we have likewise asserted that it is impossible for "the one" to be in any thing. We have said so. It can never therefore be in "the same." Why so? Because it would be already in that,⁸³ in which it is (as if) in "the same."⁸³ Entirely so. But the one itself⁸⁴ can neither be in itself nor in another. It cannot. The one therefore is never in "the same." It does not appear that is. But that which is never in "the same," is neither at rest nor stands still.⁸⁵ For it cannot. "The one," therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is it moved. [26.]⁸⁶ It does not appear indeed.⁸⁶ Nor

⁸³⁻⁸³ Such is Stalbaum's version of *ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσθιν*: where although *τῷ αὐτῷ* thus follows *ἐν ᾧ*, as in § 63, quoted by Heindorf, yet there Ficinus has, "in quo velut in eadem sede," which is much more intelligible than his version here, "in quo eodem est." Taylor's translation is, "in which same is;" who has thus anticipated partially *τὸ αὐτὸ*, found in the text of three MSS., and written thus in three others,

τῷ αὐτῷ. What Plato meant to say is beyond my comprehension.

⁸⁴ Instead of *αὐτῷ ἐν εἶναι*, Heind. suggested *αὐτῷ ἐν εἶναι*, subsequently found in two MSS. and adopted by Bekk. and Stalb. But Ficinus has "ipsam unum esse poterat." For he found in his MS., *αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν εἶναι* as, read in two MSS.

⁸⁵ I cannot see the difference between *ἡσυχίαν ἄγει* and *ἴσθηκεν*.

⁸⁶⁻⁸⁶ To the assertion *ὥς ἔοικεν οὐθ' ἴσθηκεν οὐτε κινεῖται*, the answer could not be *οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γε δὴ*, by way of an assent; and if dissent be intended, the grounds of such dissent should be stated by one party and met by the other. Moreover, although *οὖν*—*γε* thus follow *ἀλλὰ*, yet these particles do not, and could not, I imagine, follow *οὐκ*. For in § 28, *Οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γε*, one MS. correctly omits *γε*. There is therefore either something too much or too little in the text, as it stands at present.

will it be the same either with "different,"⁸⁷ or with itself; nor again different either from itself or from "different." How so? Being different from itself, it would surely be different from "one," and so would not be "one." True. And if it should be the same with "different," it would be that ("different"), and would not be itself; so that "one" would thus be not what it is, but different from "one." It would not indeed.⁸⁸ It will then be not the same with "different" or different from itself? It will not.⁸⁹ But it will not be different from "different," while it is "one." For it does not belong to "one" to be different from any thing, but to be "different" alone, and to nothing else. Right. In consequence, then, of its being "one," it will not be "different;" or do you think (it can)? Certainly not.⁹⁰ But if it is not (different) through this, neither will it be through itself.⁹¹ But if not different in any way, it will be different from nothing. Right. Nor yet will it be the same with itself. How not? ⁹²The nature of "the one" is surely this of "the same."⁹³ How? Because, when any thing becomes the same with any thing, it does not become one. But what then? That, which becomes the same with many things, must necessarily become many, and not one. True. ⁹⁴But if "the one" and "the same" differed⁹⁵ in no respect, whenever any thing became

⁸⁷ Here *ἕτερον* means not another, as Taylor translated, but "different," as understood by Stalbaum: although when *ἕτερον* has this meaning elsewhere, it has the article prefixed: which Plato has omitted on this occasion, because *ἐν* is without its article likewise.

^{88—89} Here again I cannot understand a single answer given to a bipartite question.

^{90—91} Stalbaum thus explains this difficult passage, 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἴσται· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ αὐτό, by supposing that from the preceding speech of Parmenides *ἕτερον* is to be supplied, and *τούτῳ* is to be referred to *τῷ ἐν εἶναι*. But on what *ἑαυτῷ* is to depend, he does not say; nor has any one observed that the balance of the sentence requires *εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ—εἰ δὲ μὴ ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ*, i. e. "if not by this, then not by itself; and if not by itself, then not by any thing."

Correctly then has one MS. *αὐτό*.

^{92—93} Ficinus has, "Non ea est ipsius unius natura, quæ ipsius ejusdem natura." He therefore found in his MS. *Οὐχ, ἡπερ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις ἴσται δῆπον ἢ ταύτου*, i. e. "The nature of the same itself is not surely that, which is of the one itself." Words somewhat more intelligible as regards the sense, and more correct as regards the language, than the present Greek text, *Οὐχ, ἡπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις, αὐτῇ δῆπον καὶ τοῦ ταύτου*.

^{94—95} Ficinus has, "Ac si ipsum unum atque ipsum idem nihil discre-

"the same," it would always become "one," and whenever it (became) "the one" it (would be) "the same." Entirely so. [27.] If then "the one" shall be "the same" to itself, it will not be "one" to itself; and thus "one" will not be "one." But this indeed is impossible. It is impossible, therefore, for "the one" to be either different from "different," or the same with itself. Impossible. And thus "the one" would be neither different nor the same, either with respect to itself or different. It would not. But neither will it be similar to any thing, or dissimilar either to itself or to different. Why so? "Because the "similar" somehow has the accident of" "same." Certainly. But it has been seen that "the same" is naturally separate from "the one." It has been so seen. But if "the one" should suffer any thing apart from being "the one," it would suffer the being more than one; but this is impossible. Certainly. In no respect then can "the one" suffer the being "the same," either with another or with itself. It does not appear it can. Nor can it therefore be similar either to another or to itself. It seems it cannot. Nor yet has "the one" suffered the being "different;" for thus it would suffer the being more than one. For (it would) more. But that which suffers the being different either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers the being the same is similar. Right. But "the one," as it appears, since it in no respect suffers the being "different," would in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another. It would not. "The one," therefore, would be neither similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself. It does not appear (that it would). [28.] But since it is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal, either to itself or to another. How so? Being equal, it would be of the same measure as that to which it is equal. Certainly. But being greater or less than the things, with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the less quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But of those, with which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one

parent:" from whence Heindorf would read *ἐκίπει* for *διαίπει*. He should have read likewise, 'Αλλ' εἰ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτόν.

"Ficinus has, "Quia simile est, quod ipsius ejusdem est particeps," and which leads to "Ὅτι αὐτὸ ταῦτόν ἐστι πῶς, in lieu of "Ὅτι τὸ ταῦτόν πῶς: where one MS. reads *τι* for *πῶς*.

part, it will consist of lesser ; and with respect to the other, of greater measures. How should it not ? Is it not therefore impossible for that which does not participate in "the same," to consist either of the same measures, or of any thing else whatever the same ? It is impossible. It would therefore be equal neither to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures. It appears not. But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures ; and thus again it will no longer be "one," but as many as there are measures. Right. But even if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure. But it has been seen to be impossible for one (itself)⁹³ to be equal to any thing. It has been seen. [29.] "The one" therefore neither participates in one measure, nor in many, nor in a few, nor in any way participates in "the same," nor will it ever, as it seems, be equal to itself or to another ; nor, on the other hand, greater or less either than itself or "different." It is in every respect so. But what,⁹⁴ does "the one" seem (to be) older or younger (than any thing), or to be of the same age (with any thing) ? Why should it not ? If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself or with another, it would participate in the similitude and equality of time, in which properties we have asserted "the one"⁹⁵ does not participate⁹⁶ [either similitude or equality].⁹⁶ We so asserted. And this also we asserted, that it participates neither in dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely so. How then, being such, can it be either older or younger (than any thing),⁹⁷ or of the same age with any thing ? By no means. "The one" therefore will be neither younger, nor older, nor of the same age, either with itself or with another. It does

⁹³ Ficinus has "ipsum unum æquale cuique esse," which leads to *ἴσον τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν εἶναι*, in lieu of *ἴσον τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι*.

⁹⁴ Heindorf was the first to see that *εἶναι* had dropt out after *νιώτερον* : and Stalbaum to remark that *τῷ* depends upon *τὴν αὐτὴν*, not on *δοκεῖ*. Hence, as Ficinus has "aut junius aliquo—ipsum unum—" it is plain that Plato wrote *πρεσβύτερον ἢ νιώτερόν του εἶναι ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν αὐτὸ ἐν δοκεῖ δυνατόν εἶναι* ;

⁹⁵ Ficinus has "ipsi uni adesce," as if he had found in his MS. *παρεῖναι αὐτῷ ἐνί*, instead of *μετεῖναι τῷ ἐνί*.

⁹⁶—⁹⁶ The words within brackets were properly omitted by Taylor. For they are evidently an interpolation of the preceding relative "which."

⁹⁷ Here again Ficinus has correctly, "junius aliquo," in Greek, *νιώτερόν του*. See just above, n. 94.

not appear it would. Would it not then be impossible for "the one" to exist at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing exists in time, it should always become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not the older always older than the younger? What then? That which is in the act of being older than itself, is at the same time in the act of being younger than itself,⁹⁸ if it is about to have that (through) which it is in the act of being older.⁹⁹ [30.] How say you? Thus. It is requisite that nothing should exist in the act of being at variance one with another,⁹⁹ when it is already at variance;⁹⁹ but that being now at variance, to be so now; and having been, to have been so (formerly), and being about to be, to be so (hereafter);¹⁰⁰ but being in the act, to neither have been, nor to will be, nor to be at all at variance,¹⁰⁰ but to be in the act, and not otherwise to exist. It is necessary. But the older is at variance with the younger, and with nothing else. Certainly. Hence, that which is in the act of being older than itself, must necessarily at the same time be in the act of being younger than itself. It seems so. ¹But likewise to be in the act of being ¹for a time not longer than itself, nor shorter; but for a time equal to itself to be in the act of being, and to be, and to have been, and to be about to be.¹ For these are necessary. It is necessary therefore, as it appears, for such things as are in time, and participate in some such thing, to be, each of them, [itself]² the same age with itself, and

⁹⁸⁻⁹⁹ Such is Taylor's translation of the Greek, εἴπερ μάλ' αὖτε ἔχειν ὅπου προσβύτερον γίγνεται. Ficinus has "si quidem aliquo senius esse debet;" as if he had found in his MS. εἴπερ μάλ' αὖτε γὰρ προσβύτερον του γίγνεσθαι.

⁹⁹⁻¹⁰⁰ Although ἕτερον ἑτέρου might mean "one with another," yet as ἕτερον has hitherto meant "different," the other meaning seems rather strange here.

¹⁰⁰⁻¹⁰⁰ All the words within the numerals seem to me to be superfluous; unless it be said that the Latin of Ficinus has preserved the vestiges of what was originally in the Greek, "Oppositum alterum alteri, nihil fieri oportet, opposito altero jam existente; sed, hoc jam existente, jam esse, præterito illo, præteriisse; futuro, fore; dum vero fit unum oppositum, alterum quoque oppositum, nec præteriisse, nec fore, nec esse diversum est, sed fieri, nec aliter esse." I confess myself however unable to perceive what Plato meant to say; and therefore unable to recover what he wrote.

¹ Here again I am quite at a loss.

² I have bracketed "itself," a word to me at least perfectly unintel-

to be in the act of being both older at the same time and younger than itself. It nearly seems so. But in none of these accidents is there any share for "the one." There is no share. Neither then has it any share of time, nor does it exist in any time. [31.] It does not, indeed, as the reasoning holds. What then, do not the terms "was," and "has been produced," and "was in the act of being," seem to signify a participation in what formerly existed.³ Very much so. And do not the terms "will be," and "will be in the act of being," and "will be generated,"⁶ (signify a participation in time) that is about to be hereafter?⁴ Yes. And do not the terms "is," and "is in the act of being," (signify a participation) in time that is now present?⁵ Entirely so. If then "the one" participates not at all in any time, it never has been, nor has been in the act of being, nor was [ever]⁷ nor⁸ [has it been now generated, nor]⁸ is it in the act of being,

ligible, because *αὐτὸ* is omitted in two excellent MSS., and not acknowledged by Ficinus.

^{3,4,5} In the expressions χρόνου—τοῦ ποτὶ γεγονότος—τοῦ ἔπειτα τοῦ μίλλοντος, and τοῦ νῦν παρόντος, it is strange that Heindorf, who properly objected to τοῦ before μίλλοντος, should not have seen that γεγονότος, and τοῦ μίλλοντος, and τοῦ παρόντος, were the interpretations respectively of τοῦ ποτὶ, and τοῦ ἔπειτα, and τοῦ νῦν. He appears however to have been misled by finding in Thucyd. i. 123, *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων*: to which he might have added i. 130, *ἐς ἔπειτα ἐμελλε πράξειν*. But both passages are equally corrupt, and admit of easy corrections. Hermann, with his usual want of critical sagacity, proposes, on Iph. T. 1234, to read *οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτά που μίλλοντος*, as if the indefinite *που* could be thus inserted between *ἔπειτα* and *μίλλοντος*. The absurdity is however swallowed of course by Stalbaum. Ficinus has "an non futurum nobis designant? Futurum:" which is not sufficiently literal to enable one to see what he found in his MS.

⁶ Instead of *γενηθήσεται*, which is not found, Schleiermacher wished to *γεγενήσεται*, which is a solecism equally. Plato wrote *γεννηθήσεται* here, and again shortly afterwards. Had Stalbaum known this fact, it would have saved him the trouble of writing a long and unsatisfactory note.

⁷ This repetition of *ποτὶ* after *ἦν*, when it had been already introduced before *γίγονεν*, is evidently not from the hand of Plato. In fact, the second *ποτὶ*, and *νῦν*, and *ἔπειτα*, have been probably interpolated. For they are not found in the version of Ficinus—"Si ergo ipsum unum nullo participat tempore, nec fuit unquam nec fit, nec est, neque fiet, neque factum erit, neque erit."

⁸—⁸ The words between the numerals are properly rejected by Ast, whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary; who fancies that *νῦν γίγονεν* here means the present time of an action completed; as if such an idea

nor is, nor will be in the act of being hereafter, nor will be generated, nor will be. It is most true. Is it possible then for any thing to participate in being, except according to some one of these? It is not. In no way then does "the one"⁹ participate in being. It appears not. "The one" therefore in no way is. It seems not. Nor is it then in such a state as to be one; for it would be a being, and participate in being; but, as it seems, the one neither is one, nor is it at all, if one must trust to reasoning of this kind. It seems nearly so. But to that which is not, can there be any thing either for itself or from itself? How can there? Hence there is not for it a name, or discourse, or any science, or perception, or opinion. It appears not. Hence it cannot either be named, or spoken of, or conceived by opinion, or known, nor does it perceive¹⁰ any thing of those really existing. So it seems. Is it possible then for this to be the case respecting "the one?" It seems to me not possible.

[32.] Are you then willing for us to return again from the beginning to our supposition, if by chance any thing shall appear to us, on returning, in a different light? I am very willing. Did we not say then, that¹¹ if "one is," whatever¹² may be the consequences from that supposition, we must admit them. Is it not so? Yes. Consider now from the beginning. If "one is," is it possible for it to be, and yet not participate in being? It is not. Would not being then be a property of "the one," although not the same as "the one?"

could be possibly introduced in a passage, where especial care is taken to mark distinctly the three periods into which all time is divisible—the past, present, and future. Stalbaum was perhaps misled by the words of Proclus, on the *Timæus*, quoted by Thomson—*τὸ γίνεσθαι ποτὶ ἢ νῦν γεγονέναι, ἢ ἰσαυθις ἔσεσθαι*: but it is evident that we must read there—*τὸ γίνεσθαι νῦν, ἢ ποτὶ γεγονέναι, ἢ ἰσαυθις ἔσεσθαι*. For *νῦν* indicates the present, *ποτὶ* the past, and *ἰσαυθις* the future.

⁹ Here, as every where else, Ficinus has "ipsam unum," i. e. *αὐτὸ ἓν*.

¹⁰ Deceived by the preceding passive verbs, Ficinus translated *αἰσθάνεσθαι*—"sentitur," forgetting that *αἰσθάνεσθαι* is a deponent.

¹¹ From "confessi sumus" in Ficinus, Heindorf suggested *ἔφαμεν* for *φαμέν*, as there is here a reference to what had been stated in § 22. Stalbaum however says that though *φαμέν* is constantly used parenthetically, *ἔφαμεν* is never so, or very rarely. Of course he did not see that *ὅτι* had dropt out before *τὸ*—

¹² Heindorf's *ὅποια* for *ποῖα* is indisputably correct, whatever Stalbaum may say to the contrary. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 147, and 306 To the passages there corrected, I could now add many more.

for, ¹³(if it were the same,) ¹³ it ¹⁴ would not be the being of it, ¹⁴ nor would "the one" participate in being; but it would be all one to say "one is," and "one one." But now our supposition is not, "if one (is) one," what must be the consequence, but "if one is." Is it not so? Entirely so. Is it not then that ¹⁵ the term "is" means something different from the term "one?" Necessarily. If then a person summarily asserts that "one is," would this be no other assertion than that the one participates in being. Certainly. Let us say then again, if "one is," what will be the consequence? Consider then, if it is not necessary for this supposition to signify that "one" is existing of such a kind as to possess parts? How? Thus. If the term "it is" is said of "the one being," and "the one" (said) of "the being which is one," and both being and the one are not ¹⁶ the same, ¹⁷ but belong to that same thing which we have supposed to be "the one," ¹⁷ is it not necessary that the whole being one should be it, ¹⁸ but that its parts should be "one" and "being?" It is necessary. [33.] Whether then should we call each of these

¹³⁻¹⁵ The words within lunes are supplied by Ficinus, "alioquin si idem"—

¹⁴⁻¹⁶ I do not believe that another passage can be produced where *ἑκείνος* is thus applied to two different nouns. I know indeed that the same thing is said to take place in the case of *αὐτός*. But all the instances I have noticed in Thucydides and Plato admit of an easy correction. Ficinus has, "non utique illius essentia esset, neque ipsum unum illa participasset." From which it is evident that he omitted, either from his MS. or his own good sense, *ἐκείνη* and *ἐκείνο*: the latter of which is perfectly superfluous, despite the defence of Stalbaum, who says that *τὸ ἐν* is added to *ἐκείνο* as an explanation. But correct writers are not thus wont to put down some words superfluously and then explain them by another. Perhaps Plato wrote, *οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑκοινώνευσεν ἐνὸς οὐσίας, οὐδ' ἂν ἑκοινούτο ἐν ἐκείνης*. For *μετεῖχεν* would be thus the interpretation of *ἑκοινώνευσεν* and *ἑκοινούτο*.

¹⁵ Ast was justly offended with *ὥς*. But he incorrectly wished to read *οὕτως*—*σημαίνειν* for *ὥς*—*σημαῖνον*. Ficinus has, "Nonne ita dicitur tanquam aliud," where "dicitur" was inserted to complete the sense. Stalbaum understands *αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἴσται*. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὅς οὖν ἦν πως ἄλλο*—

¹⁶ This negative is omitted in eight MSS. and by Ficinus, who has "est autem idem essentia et unum"—

¹⁷⁻¹⁸ Ficinus has "eodem existente uno quod supposuimus," as if he had found in his MS. *τοῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐ ὑπεθίμεθα ἐνὸς ὅντος*, without *ἐκείνου*, which is certainly superfluous, or else *τοῦ ἐνὸς* is an interpolation.

¹⁸ In lieu of *αὐτοῦ* Thomson was the first to suggest *αὐτό*: which he got perhaps from Ficinus, "totum quidem unum ens ipsum esse."

parts a part alone? ¹⁹ Or must we call a part a part of the whole? Of the whole.¹⁹ Whatever then is one, is a whole, and possesses a part. Entirely so. What then, ²⁰ of these parts of the one being both "one" and "being," do either desert each the other, so that "one" is wanting to "being," and "being" wanting to "one"? ²⁰ It would not be. Again, each of the parts contains both "one" and "being;" ²¹ and the least part is composed of two parts;²¹ and thus perpetually by the same reasoning, whatever becomes a part possesses these two parts perpetually; for "one" always contains "being," and "being, one;" ²² so that, two things being produced, one never is.²² Entirely so. Would not then "the one" existing thus become an infinite multitude. So it seems.

Proceed still further by this road. By what? We have said that the one participates in "being," so far as it is being. We have said so. And on this account "one being" appears to be "many." It does so. What then? If one itself, which we say participates in being, we receive mentally, alone by itself, and apart from that in which we say it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this very thing be many? I think it will be one. [34.] But let us likewise look to another thing.²³ It is necessary for its "being" to be one thing, and itself another, if "the one" itself is not "be-

¹⁹—¹⁹ The correct arrangement of the speeches as suggested by Heindorf, Ficinus had already given in his version.

²⁰—²⁰ Such is the English for the Latin of Ficinus, "Num hæ partes unius entis, scilicet unum et ens, ita se invicem deserunt, ut ipsi enti unum, et ipsi uni ens desit:" which is certainly more intelligible than the Greek, but not a translation of the words, τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τοῦτων τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος, τὸ τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀρα ἀπολείπεσθον, ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μόριον ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς μόριον: words that Schleiermacher could not understand; and hence he wished, with the approbation of Heindorf, to reject both the μόριον: while Stalbaum would read μοριον with ed. Bas. 2, and in some MSS. But what is gained by the alteration on the ground of either sense or syntax he does not state, nor can I discover.

²¹—²¹ Stalbaum quotes the version of Ficinus, "adeo ut pars quælibet ex duabus saltem particulis constituatur." But there is nothing in the Greek to answer to "quælibet," nor could τὸ ἱλαχιστον be rendered "saltem."

²²—²² I confess I cannot see the syntax in ὥστε ἀνάγκη δὲ αἰ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἐν εἶναι.

²³ So Ficinus renders, "Idωμεν δὲ ἄλλο τι, "Consideremus jam et aliud quiddam," which leads to Ἰδωμεν δὲ δὴ καί—. Heindorf objected to this version, not perceiving that in ἄλλο τι there was a reference to the preceding ἰθὺ δὴ καὶ τῇδε τι.

ing;" but as being one²⁴ it participated in "being." It is necessary. If then "being" is one thing, and "one" another, neither is "one" by its existence as one different from "being," nor "being" by its existence as "being" different from "one;" but they are different from each other²⁵ through that which is different and another.²⁵ Entirely so. So that "the different" is the same neither with "the one" nor with "the being." How can it? What then, if we should select from them, whether if you will "the being" and "the different," or "the being" and "the one," or "the one" and "the different," should we not, in each selection, select certain two things, which it is proper to denominate both? How so? Thus. It is possible to speak of "being." It is. And again, to speak of "one." And this likewise. Are not then either spoken of? Yes. But what, when I say "being," and "one," do I not pronounce both? Entirely so. And if I should say "being" and "different," or "different" and "one," should I not in each of these pronounce both perfectly?²⁶ Yes. But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two? They cannot. And is there any method for each of things, that are two, not to be one? There is not. Of these then, since each two exist together, each would be one. It appears so. [35.] But if each of them is one, and any one whatever is placed together with them, by any kind of union whatever, do not they all become three? Certainly. But are not three odd, and two even? How should they not be? What then, being two, is it not necessary for twice to be? and being three, thrice; since twice one exists in two, and thrice one in three? It is necessary. But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there should be thrice three? How not? But what, if there are three and twice, and there are two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be²⁷ twice

²⁴ Here, by the aid of Ficinus, "sed ut unum essentia participat," Heindorf elicited *ὥς ἐν ὀν οὐσίας* from *ὥς ἐν οὐσίας*, which Stalbaum has unwisely rejected.

²⁵⁻²⁵ Ficinus has "per id quod est ipsum per se alterum et ipsum per se aliud," which points to something else than *τῷ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλῳ*.

²⁶ Such is Taylor's translation of *πανταχῶς*. Perhaps he had in his mind *παντελῶς*: which would be certainly more correct, or rather *πανταχῶς ἐν*, as shown by the following *ὁρθῶς*.

²⁷⁻²⁷ Instead of *τρία καὶ δις εἶναι καὶ δις τρία*, Schleiermacher suggested, what Heindorf and Stalbaum have adopted, *τρία καὶ δις εἶναι καὶ*

three and thrice two?²⁷ Entirely so. Hence, there would be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd. It is so. If then this is the case, do you think that any number is left, which is not necessarily there? By no means. If then "one" exists, it is necessary for number to exist likewise. It is necessary. But if number exists, the many would exist, and an infinite multitude of beings; or is there not a number, infinite in multitude, and participating in "being?" There is, by all means. If then every number participates in "being," would not each part also of number participate in "being?" Yes. "Being" then has been distributed through all things, being many, and stands apart from nothing existing, whether the least or the greatest. Or is it not absurd even to ask this question?²⁸ For how could "being" stand apart from any thing existing? By no means. [36.] "Being" then is cut up into fractions the smallest possible, and the greatest, and existing in every degree,²⁹ and is divided the most of all things,²⁹ and the parts of "being" are infinite. ³⁰Such is the case. Very many, therefore, are its parts. Very many, indeed.³⁰ What then, is there any one of these, which is a part of "being," and yet is not one part? But how can this be? But if it is, I think there must always be a necessity for it, as long as it exists, to be a certain one thing; but that it cannot possibly be nothing. There is a necessity. ³¹"The one," therefore, is present to all (and) each part of "being,"³¹ deficient in neither a less or

δύο τρίς. Taylor perhaps led the way to the right reading by his translation, "thrice two and twice three."

²⁸ Ficinus has "Atque id dubitare absurdum est:" as if he had found in his MS. αἰρεσθαι, read in another MS. likewise. The whole clause was omitted by Taylor.

²⁹⁻³⁰ Of the clause between the numerals και μεμρίσται πάντων μά- λιστα (or as one MS. reads, μίγιστα) the words η μεμρίσται seem to be a gl. for κειρμάτισται, and πάντων μάλιστα for ως οἶοντε—μίγιστα; or else there is some derangement of the text here.

³⁰⁻³¹ Here again there seems to be another interpolation. For all the words between the numerals are perfectly superfluous after the preceding ἴσθι μίρη ἀπείραντα τῆς οὐσίας. Unless it be said that the dialogue ought to be thus arranged, by reading after πανταχῶς ὄντα. Ἐξυ οὕτως. Πλεῖστα ἄρα ἴσθι τὰ μίρη τῆς οὐσίας. Πλεῖστα μίντοι. Καὶ μεμρίσται πάντων μάλιστα, ἃ ἴσθι μίρη αὐτῆς ἀπείραντα. Ὅς οἶον τι.

³¹⁻³² Ficinus has, "Non solum ergo universæ essentialiæ, sed illius etiam singulis partibus unum adest." From whence Heindorf elicited Πρὸς τῷ—παντὶ ἄρα καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῷ—μίρει. He should have suggested Πρὸς

a greater part, or in any thing else. It is so. Is then "one" a whole, existing in many places at the same time? Look into this. I do look, and I see it is impossible. It is divided then, since it is not a whole; for it will not otherwise than in a divided state, be present to all the parts of "being." Certainly. But there is a great necessity for that, which is divisible, to be as many as are the parts. There is a necessity. [37.] We did not then just now say truly, when we said that "being" was distributed into very many parts. For it is not divided into more parts than "one" itself,³² but into parts equal to those of "the one:" for neither is "being" wanting to "the one," nor "the one" to "being;" but being two are always equalized through all things. It appears to be entirely so. "One itself," therefore, having been cut up into fractions by "being," becomes many and infinite in multitude. So it appears. Not only then is "the being"³³ many, but it is likewise necessary for "the one," when distributed by "being," to be many. Entirely so. Moreover, because the parts are parts of a whole, "the one" will be finite according as it is a whole. Or are not the parts included in the whole? Necessarily so. But that which includes would be a bound. How not? "The one" therefore is somehow both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude. It appears so. As it is bounded then, has it not likewise extremes? Of necessity. But what, if it be a whole, would it not have likewise a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one whatever of these be wanting³⁴ to any thing, will that thing be willing to be any longer a whole? It will not. "The one" then, as it seems, would possess a beginning, and end, and a middle. It would. [38.] But the middle is equally distant from the ex-

τε παντι ἀρα ἑκάστω τε—as I have translated. Stalbaum would read, Πρὸς ἅπαντι ἀρα ἑκάστοτε. But ἑκάστοτε, "on every occasion," would be here absurd. For ἑκάστοτε is seldom found except with verbs of speaking.

³² Ficinus has, "ipsum unum," i. e. αὐτοῦ, not τοῦ; or else we must omit τοῦ with three MSS.

³³ Instead of τὸ δὲ ἔν, Thomson would read, from Proclus, τὸ ἐν δὲ. But as δὲ is omitted by many MSS., Stalbaum correctly rejects ἔν—for thus τὸ δὲ and τὸ ἐν are properly opposed to each other.

³⁴ Influenced by the syntax, Ficinus translated τοῦ ἔν as if it were τοῦ ἐνός; but Taylor more correctly omitted those words entirely, and thus perhaps led Schleiermacher to read του ἐν—adopted by Heind., Bekk., and Stalb. But then we ought to read ἐτελέσει αὐτὸ, in lieu of ἐτελέσει ἐν. For thus αὐτὸ would refer to του.

tremes; for it would not otherwise be the middle. It would not. And "the one" being such would, as it appears, participate in a certain figure, either straight or round, or mixed up of both. It would so. Will it then, being such, not exist itself in itself and in another? How? Each of the parts is surely in the whole, nor is any one out of the whole. It is so. But all the parts are surrounded by the whole. Yes. But "the one" is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all. Certainly. Is not then the one the whole? How not? If then all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are the one, and the whole itself and all the parts are surrounded by the whole, "the one" would be surrounded by "the one," and thus "the one" would be already in itself. It appears so. But on the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in any one. For, if it were in all, it would necessarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a portion of all the parts, and the whole is not in this, how can it be³⁵ any longer in all the parts? Not at all. Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser; which is impossible. It is impossible. [39.] But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary for it to be either in some other, or no where? It is necessary. But if no where, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary for it to be in another? Entirely so. So far therefore as "the one" is a whole, it is in another; but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself; and thus "the one" will necessarily be in itself and in another. Necessarily.

But as "the one" is naturally such, is it not necessary for it to be both moved and to stand still? How? It stands still, if it be in itself. For being in one and not departing from this, it will be in the same, through being in itself. It will. But that which is always in the same must somehow necessarily stand still always. Entirely so. What then, must not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily be never in the same? But if it be never in the same, can it

* Instead of *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, acknowledged by "*erit unum*" in Ficinus, Taylor was the first to read tacitly *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, as suggested subsequently by Heindorf, and confirmed by two MSS.

ever stand still; and if it does not stand still, must it not be moved? Certainly. It is necessary therefore for "the one," being always in itself and in another, to be always moved and to stand still. It appears so.

It ought moreover to be the same with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with and different from others, if it suffers what has been (mentioned) before. [40.] How? Every thing somehow is in this state with relation to every thing. It is either the same or different: or if not the same or different, it will be a part of that, to which it is so related, or, it will be with respect to a part a whole. It appears so. Is then "the one" a part of itself? By no means.³⁶ It will not then with respect to a part of itself be a whole, nor with respect to itself a part.³⁶ For it cannot. But is "one" therefore different from "the one?" By no means. It will not then be different from itself. Certainly not. If then it is neither different, nor a whole, nor yet a part, with respect to itself, is it not necessary for it to be the same with itself? It is necessary. What then, is it not necessary for that, which is elsewhere than itself,³⁷ while existing in the same with itself, to be different from itself, if indeed it shall be elsewhere?³⁸ It appears so to me. In this state does "the one" appear to be existing at the same time both in itself and

³⁴⁻³⁶ Such is evidently what the balance of the sentence requires. The Greek is, Οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὂν: which Stalbaum, with Schmidt, says is to be thus taken, Οὐδ' ἄρα αὐτὸ (τὸ ἐν) αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη ὡς πρὸς μέρος, and thus translated, "It will then be neither a whole of itself, as if in relation to a part:" out of which I must leave others to make what sense they can. It is beyond my comprehension. And even were the sense as clear as it is now obscure, the syntax would be inadmissible. For in the expression αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ, those two words must go together; nor could αὐτοῦ ὅλον mean in genuine Greek "a whole of itself;" for the expression ὅλον ὡς μορίον, in § 41, is corrupt, and is there corrected. The proper phrase is in § 44, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ. Plato probably wrote, as I have translated, Οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, οὐδ' ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ἂν. Correctly then has one MS. αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ. Heindorf was near the mark, when he explained πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὂν by οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ἂν εἴη.

³⁷ As ἐν ἑαυτῷ is an adverb it should be opposed to another adverb, and thus united to ἑαυτοῦ, a pronoun.

³⁸ Ficinus has "Si quidem alibi quam ipsummet existat." But the whole clause would thus be only a repetition of what has been just enunciated. I suspect that εἰπερ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶσται is merely an explanation of τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν.

in another. So it seems. In this way then it appears that "the one" will be different from itself. It does so. What then, if any thing³⁹ is different from any thing, will it not be different from that which is different? Necessarily so. But are not all such things, as are not one, different from "the one?" And is not "the one" (different from such things as) are not one? How not? "The one" therefore will be different from the rest. Different. See then, are not "the different" and "the same" contrary to each other. How not? Is the same ever wont to be in the different, or the different in the same? It is not wont. [41.] If therefore the different is never in the same, there is not one of existing things, in which the different exists for any time; for if it existed in any thing during any time whatever, during that time the different would be in the same. Is it not so? It is so. But since it is never in the same, the different would never exist in any of existing things. True. Neither therefore would the different exist in things which are not one, nor in "the one." It would not. Through "the different" therefore the one will not be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one be different from "the one." Not indeed. Nor through themselves will they be different from each other, since they do not participate in "the different." For how can they? But if they are different neither through themselves, nor through "the different," would they not escape entirely from being different from each other? They would escape. But neither do things, which are not one, participate in "the one:" for they would be no longer not one, but in some way one. True. Nor would things, which are not one, be number; for possessing number, they would thus be altogether not one. They would not. But what, can things which are not one be parts of one? Or would not things, which are not one, in this way participate in "the one?" They would participate. If then this is entirely "one," but those not one, "the one" would not be a part of things, which are not one,⁴⁰ nor a whole, as if they were a part;⁴⁰ nor, on the contrary, would things, which

³⁹ Instead of *εἰ τοῦτ' αὖ* two MSS. *εἰ τοῦτ' αὖ*, as suggested by Heindorf. And so Ficinus, "Si quid vero ab aliquo alterum est."

⁴⁰—⁴¹ The Greek in most MSS. is *οὐθ' ὅλον ὥς μορίου*—and (⁴¹—⁴¹) *οὐθ' ὥς μορίῳ τῷ ἐνι*. Now as the two clauses ought evidently to balance each other, Plato probably wrote *ὥς μορίων*, (i. e. *τῶν μὴ ἑν—*) and *ὥς*

are not one, be parts of "the one," nor wholes "as if the one were a part."⁴¹ They will not. [42.] But we have said that things, which are neither parts, nor wholes, nor different from each other, will be the same with each other. We have said so. Shall we then assert that "the one," since it is in this state with respect to things which are not one, is the same with them? Let us say so. "The one" then, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself. It appears very nearly so, at least from this reasoning.

But is it also similar and dissimilar to itself and others? Perhaps so. Since then it appears to be different from the others, the others likewise will be somehow different from it. But what then? Will it not then be different from the others in the same manner as the others from it? And this neither more nor less? For what should it be? If then neither more nor less, it (will be) similarly. Certainly. In the manner then through which "the one"⁴² suffers to become different from the others, and the others similarly from it, in that manner would the one be suffering similarly to the others, and the others (similarly) to the one? How say you? Thus. Do not you apply each name to something? I do; what then? Could you pronounce the same name often or once? I could.⁴³ When therefore you pronounce (a name) once, do you speak of the thing, to which the name belongs; but not, if often? Or, is there not a great necessity for you always to speak of the same thing, whether you pronounce the same name once or often? What then? [43.] Is not "different" a name applied to some thing? Entirely so. When therefore you pronounce it, whether once or often, you do not apply this name to any other thing,⁴⁴

μορίου (i. e. τοῦ ἐνός). Opportunely then does one MS. offer μορίων. And thus we shall get rid of the incorrect expression objected to in § 40.

⁴² Ficinus has "si uni contigit, ut alterum sit ab aliis." For he probably found in his MS. *πίπονθε τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων*. At least τὸ ἐν might easily have dropt out before τῶν.

⁴³ This is a strange answer to a bipartite question. Hence Taylor inserted "once." But that is at variance with the subsequent question of Parmenides. Perhaps Plato wrote *Ἐγὼ γ' ἑκατέρως*, i. e. "I could either way." For *ἑκατέρως* might have been lost through the following *πότῃρον*. Ficini., "vel sæpius vel semel."

⁴⁴ As *ἐπ' ἄλλῃ ὀνομάζειν* and *ἄλλο ὀνομάζειν* are synonymous, it is evident that Plato did not write both here. Correctly then has Ficinus omitted one by rendering "ad aliud quiddam significandum."

but that of which it is the name. Necessarily so. When we say then that "the others" are different from "the one," and "the one" different from "the others," twice pronouncing the name "different," we do not at all apply the expression to any other nature but that of which it is the name. Entirely so. In the way then that "the one" is different from "the others," and "the others" from "the one," "according to the very thing which "the different" has, "the one" would suffer nothing else than what the others do, but just the same:" but that which somehow suffers the same (is) similar. Is it not? Yes. But in the way that "the one" suffers so as to be different from the others, according to that very way" every thing would be similar to every thing; for every thing is different from every thing. It appears so. Moreover the similar is contrary to the dissimilar. It is. Is not "the different" too contrary to "the same?" This also. Moreover this likewise has been made apparent, that "the one" is the same with [and different from] "the others." It has been made apparent. But to be the same with "others" is a contrary suffering to the being different from "the others." Entirely so. As far as it was different, it appeared to be similar. Yes. So far then as it is the same, it will be dissimilar according to its suffering the contrary to that suffering which produces the similar: but did the different produce the similar? Yes. The

"— Such is the English version of Stalbaum's Latin translation of the Greek text, where all previous commentators have been equally in the dark, *κατὰ ταῦτόν τὸ ἕτερον πιπνοθῆναι*, κ. τ. λ. For so Stalbaum has, with Thomson, adopted *τὸ ἕτερον* found in an Oxford MS. of Damascius *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*, and subsequently in one MS. of Plato. But upon what *πιπνοθῆναι* is to depend Stalbaum does not say himself, nor could any one else. The whole passage is desperately corrupt. From the version of Ficinus it would seem as if there was in his MS. a different, though not more intelligible, arrangement of the words.

"Ficin., "secundum hoc idem," i. e. *κατὰ ταῦτο τοῦτο*, found subsequently in a single MS., which I have adopted in lieu of *κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο*.

"Ficinus, "Nonne et ipsum alterum ipsi eidem," which leads to *Ὅτι οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἕτερον αὐτῷ ταύτῳ*. Whatever Stalbaum may say, the article could not be prefixed to *τὸ αὐτὸ*. Identity in Greek is *ταυτότης*, not *τὸ ταυτόν*.

"The words within brackets all the MSS. and Ficinus omit.

"— Ficinus has "simile autem nonne faciebat ipsum alterum," which leads to *ὡμοιον δὲ τι οὐ τὸ ἕτερον*, in lieu of *ὡμοίου δὲ πον τὸ ἕτερον*. For *ὡμοιούν* requires its case. And hence, just before, one would prefer *τῷ ὡμοιούντι τι πάθει* to *τῷ ὡμοιούντι πάθει*. Hence too just afterwards

same therefore will render something dissimilar; or it will not be contrary to the different. So it appears. [44.] "The one" therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to "the others;" so far as it is different it will be similar; but so far as it is the same, dissimilar. ⁴⁹ It has, it seems, such reasoning. ⁴⁹ And it has this likewise. What? So far as it suffers the same, it does not suffer what is of a different kind; and not suffering what is of a different kind, it is not dissimilar; and not being dissimilar, it is similar: but so far as it suffers another thing, it is of a different kind; and being of a different kind, it is dissimilar. You speak the truth. Since then "the one" is both the same with and different from "the others," according to both and each of these cases, it will be similar and dissimilar to "the others." Entirely so. And will it not in a similar manner, since it has appeared to be both different from, and the same with, itself, appear, according to both these, and each, to be similar and dissimilar to itself? Necessarily so.

But consider now how "the one" subsists with respect to touching and not touching itself and "the others." I consider. For "the one" has somehow appeared to be in itself a whole. Right. But is not "the one" in "the others" likewise? Yes. So far then as "the one" is in "the others," it will touch "the others;" but so far as it is in itself, it will be prevented from touching "the others;" but being in itself it will touch itself. So it appears. And thus, indeed, "the one" will both touch itself and "the others." It will touch. But what (will it be) in this view? Must not every thing, which is about to touch any thing, lie close to that, which it is about to touch, and occupy that seat, ⁵⁰ which may be after that seat, in which that may lie,

we must read Ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τι ταῦτόν in lieu of τό ταῦτόν, where the five best MSS. omit τό.

⁴⁹⁻⁴⁹ I cannot understand ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ—καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον. For though τό ἔν might be the nominative to ἔχει, yet οὖν δὴ and καὶ have not the least force here; nor could τοιοῦτον be opposed to τόνδε. Ficin. has, "Talem, ut videtur, rationem habet," omitting γὰρ οὖν δὴ, while in καὶ lies hid ἵσκει.

⁵⁰⁻⁵⁰ Such is the unintelligible version of Stalbaum's text, ταύτην τὴν ἴδραν κατέχον, ἢ ἂν μετ' ἱκείνην ᾗ ἴδραν; ἢ ἂν κείνηται, ἄπταται. But ἴδραν could not be thus repeated, nor could μετ' ἱκείνην thus follow ᾗ, a verb of rest. We meet indeed just after with ἱκείνης μεθ' ἑαυτὸ καίσθαι. But there Plato wrote ἱκείνης ἑαυτῷ, similar to the preceding and following ἱκείνης ἱκείνῃ: while here the words ἢ ἂν μετ' ἱκείνην ᾗ ἴδρα are

which it touches?⁵⁰ It is necessary. "The one," therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to lie close to itself, and occupy the place close to that in which it is. It ought so. [45.] Would not "the one," if it were two, do this, and be in two places at once? But as long as it is one, it will not be wont to do so. It will not. The same necessity therefore belongs to "the one," to be neither two nor to touch itself. The same. But neither will it touch the others. Why? Because we have said, that when any thing is about to touch any thing, which is separate from it, it ought to be placed close to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them. True. Two things therefore at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take place. Certainly. But if a third is added close upon the two terms,⁵¹ there will now be three, but the contacts two. Certainly. And thus one always being added, one contact will be likewise added; and the result is that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers. For by how much the two first things exceeded the contacts,⁵² [so as to be more in number than the contacts,]⁵² by just so much does all the following number exceed the multitude of the contacts. For already hereafter⁵³ one is added to the number, and one contact to the contacts. Right. As many then as are in number the things existing, (by so many,) less by one, are the contacts always. True. If then there is only one thing, and not a pair, there can be no contact. How can there? Have we not said that the other things, different from "the one," are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different? We have. [46.]

evidently the interpretation of τὴν ἐχομένην. For thus the expression τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον τὴν ἐχομένην in the first clause is the counterpart of τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον in the second; and so too by the aid of ἐκείνη ἐν ᾗ αὐτὸ ἐστίν in the second, we may correct the first by reading ἥς, ἐν ᾗ αὐτὸ ἐστίν. The sense would then be, "occupying the seat close upon that which, where should it lie perchance, it would touch."

⁵¹ Heindorf was justly offended with ὄρουν. But incorrectly suggested 'Ἐὰν δὲ δυοῖν ὄρουν—For in this formula the article cannot be omitted. Compare Legg. iii. p. 685, A., p. 692, D., Lysid. p. 220, C., Thucyd. i. 104, which I should have quoted in my Poppe's Prolegom. p. 156, to confirm my correction in Thucyd. i. 36, τούτων δὲ, εἰ περιώψισθ' ἐν, τὰ δύο εἰς ταῦτον ἰλθεῖν. Sauppe happily reads here ὁμόρουν, "contiguous." I prefer παρόντων to ὄρουν—

⁵²—⁵² The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

⁵³ As τὸ λοιπὸν cannot be united to προσγίγνεται, read κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

Number therefore is not in the others, since one is not in them. How can it? The others, therefore, are not one, or two, or "any thing possessing the name of another number."⁵⁴ No. "The one," therefore, is one alone, and could not be two. It appears not. Contact, therefore, is not, when two are not. It is not. "The one" therefore will neither touch "the others," nor will "the others" touch "the one," as there is no contact. Certainly not. On all these accounts, therefore, "the one" will both touch and not touch others and itself. So it appears.

Is it not therefore equal and unequal to itself and "the others?" How? If "the one" were greater or less than "the others," or "the others" greater or less than "the one," would it not follow that by "the one" being one, and "the others" different from "the one," they would be not an atom greater or an atom less than each other, by those very existences? But if, in addition to their being such as they are, each possessed equality, they would be equal to each other. But if "the one" possessed magnitude, and "the others" smallness, or "the one" magnitude, but "the others" smallness, would not that, to whatever species magnitude was present, be the greater; and that, to whatever (species) smallness (was present), be the less. Necessarily so. Are there not therefore these two species, magnitude and smallness? For if they had no existence they surely could never be contrary to each other, and be inherent in things existing. [47.] How should they? If then smallness is inherent in "the one," it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it. It is necessary. But what if it be inherent in the whole? Will it not either be extended on an equality through the whole of "the one," or surround "the one?" Plainly so. If smallness then is inherent on an equality in "the one," will it not be equal to "the one;" but if it surrounds "the one," will it not be greater? How not? Can then smallness be equal to or greater than any thing, and produce the effects of magnitude and equality, but not on itself? It is impossible. Smallness then will not be inherent in the whole of "the one;" but, if at all, in a part. Certainly. Nor

⁵⁴—^M From Taylor's translation of the Greek *οὔτε ἄλλον ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν*, it would seem he wished to read, what the sense requires, *οὔτε ἄλλον ἀριθμοῦ ἔχον τὸ ὄνομα οὐδέν*, in lieu of *ἔχοντα ὄνομα*, I should however prefer *οὔτε ἄλλο ἀριθμοῦ ἔχον τὸ ὄνομα οὐδέν*, i. e. "nor any thing else possessing the name of number"

yet, on the other hand, in the whole part; for if not, it would produce the same effect as in the case of the whole; (for)⁵⁵ it would either be equal to, or greater than, the part in which it is inherent. It is necessary. Smallness then will not be in any thing existing, being inherent in neither a part nor a whole; nor will there be any thing small, except smallness itself. It seems not. ⁵⁶Neither will magnitude be in it. For there would be some other thing greater, and, besides magnitude itself, that in which magnitude is inherent, and this too, although it being not small, which it ought to exceed, if indeed it be great;⁵⁶ but which in this case is impossible, since smallness is not inherent in any thing existing. True. But magnitude itself is not greater than any thing else but smallness itself; nor is smallness less than any thing else but magnitude itself. [48.] It is not. Neither then would "the others" be greater than "the one," nor less, since they possess neither magnitude nor smallness; nor do these two possess any power either of exceeding or of being exceeded with respect to "the one," but only with respect to each other; nor, on the contrary, will "the one" be either greater or less than these two, or "the others," as it possesses neither magnitude nor smallness. So indeed it appears. If then "the one" is neither greater nor less than "the others," is it not necessary for it to neither exceed nor be exceeded by them? It is necessary. Is there not also a great necessity for that, which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, to be on an equality? and if on an equality, to be equal? How not? "The one" therefore will be in this state with respect to itself. Possessing neither magnitude nor smallness in itself, it would neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself; but being on an equality, it would be equal to itself. Entirely so. "The one" therefore will be equal both to itself and "the others." So it appears.

But being itself in itself, it would also be externally about itself; and surrounding itself, it would be greater than itself;

⁵⁵ Ficinus has "quippe." From whence Thomson suggested γὰρ ἰσὴν ἴσται, ἦ—The asyndeton is however supported by Heind. and Stalb.

⁵⁶—⁵⁶ I must leave for others to understand, if they can, all the words between the numerals. Ficinus has, "Sed neque etiam magnitudo inerit; quippe aliud quidquam, præter ipsammet magnitudinem, majus esset, ut puta id, cui inerit magnitudo; veruntamen nihil est parvum, quod quidem superari oportet a magno, si quid magnum sit;" which is not more intelligible than the Greek.

but being surrounded, less than itself; and thus "the one" would be both greater and less than itself. It would so. Is not this also necessary, that there is nothing beyond "the one" and "the others?" How should it be otherwise? But ought not that, which has a being, to be always some where? Yes. And does not that, which exists in another, exist as the less in the greater? For one thing cannot otherwise exist in another. [49.] It cannot. But since there is nothing else apart from "the one" and "the others," and it is necessary for these to be in something, is it not necessary for them to be in one another, ⁵⁷[the others in "the one," and "the one" in the others]; ⁵⁷or that they should be no where? It appears so. Because then "the one" is in "the others," "the others" will be greater than "the one," through surrounding it; and "the one" will be less than "the others," by being surrounded. But because "the others" are in "the one," "the one," by the same reasoning, would be greater than "the others;" and "the others" less than "the one." It appears so. "The one," therefore, is equal to, greater and less, than both itself and others. It seems so. But if it is greater, equal, and less, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and "the others;" and if of measures, also of the parts. How should it not? Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also in number be more and less than itself and "the others;" and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and "the others." How? It would surely be of greater measures than are those things, than which it is greater; and (it would be) of as many parts as measures; and in the same manner, (in the case of those) than which it is less; and similarly (in the case of those) to which it is equal. It is so. Since then "the one" is both greater, less, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more, and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts? How not? If then it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself; but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself. It appears so. [50.] But will not "the one" be in a similar state as regards "the others?" Because it appears to be greater in magnitude than them, is it not necessary for it to be more in number than "the

⁵⁷—⁵⁷ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

others?" and, because less in magnitude, fewer in number? and because equal in magnitude, equal likewise in multitude to "the others?" It is necessary. And thus again, as it seems, "the one" will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and "the others." It will so.

Does "the one," then, participate in time? And is it, and does it become, younger and older, itself than itself and "the others?" And again,⁵⁸ neither younger nor older than itself and the others, although participating of time? How? "To be" is surely its property, since it "is the one." Certainly. But what else is "to be" than a participation in "being" in conjunction with the present? Just as "it was" is a participation in "being" in conjunction with the past, and "it will be" with the future? It is so. It must participate then in time, if it participates in "being." Entirely so. Must it not therefore participate in time while progressing? Certainly. It is always, therefore, in the act of being older than itself, if it proceeds according to time. It is necessary. Do we then remember that the older is (always)⁵⁹ becoming older than that which is becoming younger?⁶⁰ We remember. Would not then "the one," since it is becoming older than itself, become older than itself, while it is thus becoming younger? Necessarily so. It becomes then both younger and older than itself. Certainly. [51.] But is it not then older, when it is in the act of being according to the present time, which is between the "was" and the "will be:" for in proceeding from the "then" to "the hereafter," it will not pass over "the now?" It will not. Will it not then stop in the act of being older, when it arrives at "the now," and is no longer in the act of being, but is already⁶¹ older? For as it proceeds

⁵⁸ Ficinus has "et rursus contra," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ τοὐναντίον αὐτῷ*, or simply *καὶ αὐτῷ*—

⁵⁹ This "always" is from "σæpe" in Ficinus; who perhaps found *δαί* before *τὸ πρεσβύτερον*—

⁶⁰ This proposition was discussed in § 29 and 30.

⁶¹ By no process can *τότ' ἤδη* be thus united, as I long since stated, on Prom. 947. Wherever those words are combined in prose, we may generally read *τότε δὴ*. Sometimes however the correction is not quite so easy; yet even here it is nearer at hand than one would expect to find it. For Ficinus has "nec tum fit, sed est jam senius," which leads to *καὶ οὐ γίγνεται τότ', ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη πρεσβύτερον*. With regard to Prom. 947, I should have corrected *πατρὸς δ' ἀπὸ Κρόνου τό τ', οἷδ' εὖ, παντελῶς κρανθήσεται*: and similarly in Agam. 940, "Ὅταν δὲ τεύχῃ Ζεὺς ἀπ' ὀμφα-

it will never be laid hold of by "the now." For that which is proceeding is in such a state as to touch both "the now" and "the hereafter," leaving hold of "the now," but laying hold of "the hereafter," because it is in the act of being between "the hereafter" and "the now." True. But if it is necessary for whatever is in the act of being not to pass by "the now," when it arrives at that point, it always stops in the act of being, and "is" then whatever it may happen to become. It appears so. "The one," then, when, in becoming older, it arrives at "the now," stops in the act of being, and then "is" older. Entirely so. "Is" it not then older than what it was becoming older? And was it not becoming (older) than itself? Certainly. Now the older is older than the younger. It is. "The one" then is younger than itself, when in becoming older, it arrives at "the now." Of necessity. But "the now" is always present with "the one," through the whole of its being; for it is always "now," as long as it "is." How not? "The one," therefore, always is, and is in the act of being younger and older than itself. So it appears. But "is the one," or is it in the act of being, ⁶² for a time longer than or equal to itself? ⁶³ An equal time. [52.] But that which either is in the act of being, or is for an equal time, has the same age. How not? But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger. It is neither. "The one," therefore, since it is in the act of being, and is for a time equal to itself, neither is nor is in the act of being younger or older than itself. It appears to me not.

But what of "the others?" ⁶³ I have not what to say. But this at least you have to say, that "the others," if they are different things from "the one," ⁶⁴ and not a different thing, are more than "one." For that which is different would be one; but those that are different are more than one, and would possess multitude. They would. But being a multitude

κος πικρᾶς Οἶνον, τότ' ἂν οἷδ' ψυχὸς ἐν δόμοις πῖλιν, quoted by Paley to gainsay my canon. Render, "Then know I upon the house there will be cold."

⁶²⁻⁶³ Ficinus has "Quin etiam longiusne vel brevius tempus est aut fit, quam ipsummet; an potius æquum." From whence Cornarius would supply ἡ ἐλάττω after χρόνον; which Heindorf felt half disposed to adopt; for the flow of the ideas appears thus to be more natural.

⁶³ The genitive τῶν ἄλλων has nothing to depend on. The syntax requires τὰ τῶν ἄλλων—

⁶⁴ Here τοῦ ἑνός depends not on τὰ ἄλλα, but on ἕτερον.

they would participate in a greater number than "the one?" How not? What then? Shall we say that the things more in number are, or have been, generated prior, or the less? The less. The least then is the first. Now is not this "the one?" Certainly. "The one," therefore, was generated the first of all things possessing number: but all "the others" have number, if they are others and not another. They have. But that which was first generated was, I think, prior in existence: but the others are posterior. But such as have been generated posterior, are younger than that which was generated prior; and thus "the others" would be younger than "the one," and "the one" would be older than "the others." It would. But what is this? Could "the one" be generated contrary to its nature? or is this impossible? Impossible. But "the one" has appeared to possess parts; and, if parts, a beginning, an end, and a middle. Yes. Is not then the beginning generated first of all, both of "the one" and of each of "the others;" and after the beginning all "the others," as far as the end? What then? [53.] We will say moreover, that all the others are parts of the whole and of one; but that "the one," together with the end, has been generated one and a whole. We will say so. Now the end, I think, is generated the last of all, but "the one" is naturally generated together with this; so that, if it is necessary for "the one" to be generated not contrary to nature, it would, having been generated together with the end, be naturally generated the last of "the others." It appears so. "The one," therefore, is younger than "the others," but "the others" are older than "the one." So again it appears to me. But what, must not the beginning or any other part whatever of "the one," or of any thing else, if it is a part, and not parts, be necessarily one, [since it is a part]?⁶⁵ Necessarily. "The one," therefore, would be generated together with the first (part), while in the act of being, and together with the second; and is never wanting to any one of the other parts, while in the act of being, until, arriving at the extremity, it becomes one whole, having been left out neither from the middle, nor from the last, nor the first, nor from any other (part) whatever in its generation. True. "The one," therefore, will have the same age with "the others," so that, if it be

⁶⁵ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

not "the one" contrary to its own nature, it would be generated neither prior nor posterior to "the others," but together with them; and according to this reasoning, "the one" will neither be older nor younger than "the others," nor "the others" than "the one;" but, according to the former reasoning, "the one" was both older and younger than "the others," and they in a similar manner than it. Entirely so.

[54.] After this manner, then, "the one" is and has been generated. But what again shall we say of its becoming older and younger than the others, and of the others than "the one;" and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? (As we said) respecting its being, (shall we say) in the same manner respecting its becoming to be? or otherwise? I am not able to say. But I am able (to say) this; that, although one thing is older than another, yet it cannot become still older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was produced; nor, on the other hand, can that which is younger become younger. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing else, always cause them to differ by the same degree as that, by which they were distant at first. How not? "That which is" therefore would never become older or younger than any being,⁶⁶ if it is always different by an equal quantity from it in age: but (this)⁶⁷ is and was older, and that younger; but is not becoming so. True. "The one" likewise will never become either older or younger than "the others," it being so already. Never. But see whether in this way (they) become younger and older.⁶⁸ In what way? The same as that through which "the

⁶⁶ Instead of τοῦ ἐνός ὅντος, Schleiermacher, with whom Heindorf, Bekker, and Stalbaum agree, would read τοῦ ὅντος—One would prefer ὅντος ὁποῦν, i. e. "any being whatever."

⁶⁷ On the omission of τὸ μὲν in the first clause, answering to τὸ δὲ in the second, Heindorf refers to his note on Theætetus, § 96, which Stalbaum has, according to custom, transcribed on Protagor. p. 330, A., Rep. v. p. 451, E. But there, as here, Ficinus probably found the correct reading in his MS., as shown by his version, "hoc quidem senius, illud autem junius."

⁶⁸ As there is nothing to which the plurals πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα can be referred, Heindorf wished to read πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον. But Stalbaum would understand αὐτὰ, i. e. τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Taylor translated "other things," misled by the version of Ficinus: "Sed aspice post-hac, utrum alia quadam ratione et juniora hæc et seniora fiant," where "alia" is the ablative case, not nominative. He should have elicited

one" was made to appear older than "the others," and "the others" (older) than "the one." [55.] What then? Since "the one" is older than "the others," it has been generated during a longer time than "the others." Certainly. Now consider again, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a smaller part? By a smaller. ⁶⁹ Will not then "the one" differ from "the others" by an age as great subsequently as it did at first? but, receiving an equal time with "the others," it will differ always in age less than before. ⁶⁹ Will it not be so? Yes. But would not that, which differs less in age, with respect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those, than which it was before older? Younger. But if that is younger, will not, on the other hand, "the others" be older with respect to "the one" than before? Entirely so. That, therefore, which was generated younger, would be in the act of becoming older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never is older, but is always in the act of becoming older than it; for the one advances to a younger, but the other to an older, state; and on the other hand, that which is older is in the act of becoming younger in the same manner than the younger. For both tending to that which is contrary to themselves, they are in the act of becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But they would not be able to become so. For should they become so, they would no longer be in the act of becoming, but would be (now).⁷⁰ But now they are in the act of becoming younger and older than each other; and "the one" indeed is in the act of becoming younger than "the others,"

rather from "posthac," and "alia," and "hæc," "Ὁρα δ' ἔτι, εἰ ἀλλ' ὁδῷ ταῦτά περὶ βύτερα, although Ficinus found in his MS. *ταῦτα*, "hæc," not *ταῦτά*, "eadem." The sense would then be—"But see further, whether by another road the same things become older and younger."

⁶⁹— This is well explained by Heindorf; who says that this is not, although it seems at first sight to be so, at variance with the preceding assertion in § 54, that if equals be added to unequals, the two quantities will not differ more than they did originally. For here the proposition may be understood by supposing that, if the ages of A and B are respectively 20 and 18 years, A is older than B by $\frac{1}{18}$ of the longer period; but if 4 years be added to each, then A will be older than B by only $\frac{1}{18}$ of the longer period.

⁷⁰ Ficinus, "sed jam essent," which leads to ἀλλ' εἴεν ἂν νῦν· νῦν δὲ—

because it has been made to appear to be older, and to have had a prior generation: but "the others" (have been made to appear to be) older than "the one," because they have had a posterior generation. [56.] According to the same reasoning, "the others" likewise are similarly related with respect to "the one," since they were made to appear to be older and to have had a prior generation. So indeed it appears. So far then as neither becomes younger or older than the other, through their differing by an equal number from each other, "the one" will not become older or younger than "the others," nor the others than "the one." But so far as it is necessary for the prior⁷¹ to differ⁷² by a part ever another⁷² from the posterior, and the posterior from the prior, so far it is necessary for them to become older and younger than each other, and "the others" than "the one," and "the one" than "the others?" Entirely so. On all these accounts then "the one" is, and is in the act of becoming older and younger both than itself and "the others;" and again, it neither is nor is in the act of "becoming" older or younger than itself and "the others." It is perfectly so. But since "the one" participates in time, and in the act of becoming older and younger, is it not necessary for it to participate in "the then," and "the hereafter," and "the now," if it participates in time? It is necessary. "The one," therefore, was, and will be, and is; and has been in the act of becoming, and is in the act of becoming, and will be in the act of becoming. What then? And there would be something for it, and of it, and which was, and is, and will be. Entirely so. [57.] Now there would be the knowledge and opinion and perception of it, if we now⁷³ do all these things⁷³ relating to it. You speak rightly. There is likewise for it a name and a discourse; and it may be named and spoken of:

⁷¹ Ficinus has "differre necesse priora posterioribus:" as if his MS. correctly omitted *γενόμενα* (for which two MSS. read *γινόμενα*) after *τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστίρων*—

^{72—73} Ficinus, "altera semper parte." But I confess I hardly understand *ἄλλῃ δέ μοριῷ*, although I am quite aware of the meaning of *δέ* thus placed between *ἄλλῃ* and *μοριῷ*, after what Scaliger has written on Propertius i. 18, 15. Hudson on Thucyd. iv. 68, Valckenaer on Theocrit. Adonias. p. 197, C., and Elmsley on CEd. C. 1532, who alluded, I suspect, to Barker in Classical Recreations, p. 182, as I stated on Prom. 973.

^{73—73} Namely, know, think, and perceive.

and whatever circumstances of such a kind take place with regard to "the others," take place with regard likewise to "the one." Such is entirely the case.

Let us then speak of the third point. If "the one" is such as we have discussed, is it not necessary, since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating in time, that because it is one, it should participate at one time in "being;" but that because it is not one, it should participate at no time in "being?" It is necessary. Will it then be possible for it not to participate, when it does; or to participate, when it does not? It will not be possible. It participates then at one time, and does not participate at another; for thus alone can it participate and not participate in the same. Right. Is not this then the time when it participates in "being," and again is freed from it? Or how is it possible for it to possess at one time the same thing, and at another time not, unless at some time it both receives and dismisses it? Not otherwise. Do you not call the receiving of "being" by the term to be generated? I do. And to be freed from "being" (by the term) to be destroyed? Entirely so. "The one" then, as it seems, by receiving and dismissing "being," is generated and destroyed. Necessarily so. [58.] But since it is one and many, and is generated and destroyed, when it becomes one, is not the being many destroyed, and when it becomes many, is not the being one destroyed? Entirely so. But, when it becomes one and many, must it not be separated and united? It must. And when it becomes unlike and like, must it not be made like and unlike? Certainly. And when it becomes greater, less, and equal, must it not be increased, and wasted away,⁷⁴ and equalized? It must so. But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it changes into being moved,⁷⁵ it is requisite surely for it to be not in one time.⁷⁵ How should it? But that which stood still before and is afterwards moved, and that which was moved before

⁷⁴ Instead φθίνειν one would have expected ἡλαττοῦσθαι, to answer to ἡλαττον or μειοῦσθαι, just as ἰσοῦσθαι does to ἴσον.

⁷⁵—⁷⁵ The words between the numerals I cannot understand. The train of ideas evidently is, "it is requisite surely for those two things not to exist at one time;" in Greek, διὰ ἧν που αὐτὰ γε μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. Ficinus has "oportet hoc non uno in tempore esse;" He therefore found in his MS. τοῦτο, not αὐτό. Stalbaum however translates μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι, "to be in no time at all."

and afterwards stands still, cannot be thus affected without a change. For how can it? But there is no time, in which any thing can at once be neither moved nor stand still. There is not. But it cannot change without a change. It is probable not. When, therefore, does it change? For it would change, neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, nor while it is in time. It would not. Is there then that strange thing, in which it would be, when it changes? What thing? "The sudden."⁷⁶ ⁷⁷For "the sudden" seems to signify some such thing as ⁷⁷changing from it to either.⁷⁷ For there is no change from standing, while standing; nor a change from motion, while in motion; but that wonderful nature "the sudden" is situated between motion and standing, and is in no time;⁷⁸ and into this and from this that, which is moved, changes for the purpose of standing still; and that which stands, for the purpose of being moved. It nearly appears so. [59.] "The one," therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must change into either; for thus alone would it produce both these effects. But in changing, it changes suddenly; and when it changes, it would be in no time, and would neither stand still nor be moved. It would not. Is then "the one" in this state also with respect to the other changes? and when it changes from being into being destroyed, or from non-being into the act of becoming, does it not then become a medium between certain movements and standings? and then it neither is nor is not, nor is in the act of becoming, nor is destroyed? It appears so. And by

Ficinus strangely translates τὸ ἐξαίφνης, "momentum individuum."

"—" In explanation of these unintelligible words, Heindorf says that ἐκείνου is to be referred to τὸ ἐξαίφνης, as if it were correct Greek to say τὸ ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλον ἐξ ἐκείνου. But to what can εἰς ἐκάτερον be referred? Stalbaum's version is, "The sudden seems to signify this, to turn something from it to either;" which I presume he understands; for if not, he has written a mass of rubbish. The sense required is to this effect, "The sudden seems to signify something of this kind, that by quickly moving it can change a thing that is, from one state to another." In Greek, Τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόυτε τι τοῦτε σημαίνειν, ὡς δὲ κινεῖν μεταβάλλοι ἂν, ὃ ἴστιν, ἰτίρωθεν ἰτίρωσι, as in § 68, μεθίσταται ποθὶν ποί. On the loss or corruption of δέ, see myself on Æsch. Suppl. 901, and Poppo's Prolegom. p. 144, where Poppo should have noticed in his second ed. my restoration of Thucyd. iii. 37, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ δέσει ἀντὶ τῶν ξυνέσει, which I could confirm by a dozen passages.

⁷⁸ Instead of οὐδὲν, Thomson was the first to suggest οὐδένι; for he found in Ficinus "nullo prorsus in tempore." The credit of the restoration is given by Heindorf and Stalbaum to Schleiermacher.

the same reasoning, when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it separated nor united; and in passing from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it made like nor unlike; ⁷⁹and while it passes from small into great, and into equal and the contraries,⁷⁹ it will be neither small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor wasting away, nor equalized. It appears not. But all these accidents "the one" would suffer, if it is. How not?

But must we not consider what it is meet for "the others" to suffer, if "one" exists? We must consider. Shall we state then, if "one" exists, what "the other" must suffer from ⁸⁰"the one?" Let us state. Since then "the others" are different from "the one," they are not "the one:" for otherwise they would not be different from "the one?" Right. Nor yet are "the others" entirely deprived of "the one," but somehow participate in it. In what way? Because "the others," having parts, are different from "the one:" for if they had not parts, they would be entirely one. Right. But parts, we have said,⁸¹ belong to that, which is a whole. We said⁸¹ so. But it is necessary for a whole to be one (composed) of many, of which one the parts are parts: for each of the parts must not be a part of many, but of a whole. How is this? [60.] If any thing should be a part of many, amongst which it is itself, it would surely be both a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these, it will be a part of the others, with the exception of this; and thus it will not be a part of each one; and not being a part of each, it will be a part of not one of the many; and being a part of not one of these (the many), it is impossible for it to be any thing belonging to all those,

"—" Whatever Heindorf and Stalbaum may assert, I cannot believe that Plato expressed himself in so loose a manner, when the very balance of the sentence shows he would have written only *καὶ ἐκ μικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου καὶ ἴσου εἰς τάναντία ἶον*, while the words *οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσοῦμενον* have been evidently interpolated from § 58.

⁸⁰ Ficinus, "*alia ab uno pati*," which would seem to lead to *τὰ ἄλλα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς—πεπονθῆναι*, in lieu of *τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς*. But *τοῦ ἑνὸς* follows here *τὰ ἄλλα*, as in § 63, *τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πεπονθῆναι*.

⁸¹ From "*asseruimus*" twice in Ficinus, Heindorf corrected *ἐραμεν*: for there is an allusion to § 22. Stalbaum however still sticks to *φαμέν*.

of not one of which it is either ⁸²a part, or⁸² any thing else. So it appears. A part, therefore, is neither a part of the many nor of all; but of some one idea and of some one thing, which we call a whole, having become from all one thing complete. ⁸³[Of this a part would be a part].⁸³ Entirely so. If therefore the others have parts, they too would participate in a whole and one. Certainly. One perfect whole then possessing parts, must necessarily be different⁸⁴ from "the one." It is necessary. There is moreover the same reasoning respecting each of the parts: for it is necessary that this⁸⁵ (each part) should participate in "the one." For, if each of these is a part, the very being each signifies surely one thing, separated indeed from others, but existing by itself, if it shall be truly each. Right. But it would participate in "the one," as being evidently something else than "the one;" for (otherwise)⁸⁶ it would not have participated, but would have been "the one itself." But now it is surely impossible for any thing to be "the one," except "the one itself." Impossible. [61.] But it is necessary for both the whole and the part to participate in "the one." ⁸⁷For the whole will be one thing⁸⁷ of which the parts are parts; but on the other hand each (part will be) a part of the whole,⁸⁷ of whatever whole it may be a part.⁸⁸ It is so. Will not then

^{82—82} Ficinus, "vel pars vel aliud quodlibet." He therefore found in his MS. η — η , not $\kappa\alpha\iota$ — $\kappa\alpha\iota$. On the confusion of those words see Bast, Palaeograph. p. 815. Damascius however, quoted by Stalbaum, acknowledges the doubled $\kappa\alpha\iota$; and so he does the $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\alpha\iota$ after $\alpha\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\rho\omicron\nu$, which Heindorf wished to expunge, as it has nothing on which it can depend, and is omitted by Ficinus, either from his MS. or his own good sense. Stalbaum is nevertheless satisfied with the want of syntax.

^{83—83} The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.
⁸⁴ Ficinus, "alia ipsa," as if his MS. had $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$ —

⁸⁵ So Heind., whom Stalb. follows, reads $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ for $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu$. But the best MSS. have $\epsilon\delta\alpha\nu\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$: where $\epsilon\delta\alpha\nu\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ perhaps conceal $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron$. Ficinus acknowledges $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu$ by his "huius unius."

⁸⁶ Ficinus has alone "alioquin haud quaquam participaret."

^{87—87} Heind., whom Stalb. follows, renders, "For one (i. e. the whole) will be some one whole; but the other (i. e. a part) will be some part of the whole." I have translated with Taylor, as if the Greek were $\tau\omicron\ \mu\epsilon\nu\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \omicron\lambda\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\nu\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ —not $\tau\omicron\ \mu\epsilon\nu\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \epsilon\nu\ \omicron\lambda\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$.

⁸⁸ Instead of $\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\alpha\nu\ \tilde{\eta}\ \mu\acute{o}\rho\iota\omicron\nu\ \omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$, Heindorf would read $\delta\ \delta\alpha\nu\ \tilde{\eta}\ \mu\acute{o}\rho\iota\omicron\nu\ \omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$; and so probably found Ficinus in his MS., whose version is "quæcunque pars totius existat." Stalbaum however, with Schmidt, would adopt Schleiermacher's conjecture, $\delta\ \delta\alpha\nu\ \tilde{\eta}\ \mu\acute{o}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ (or rather $\mu\acute{o}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$) $\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$, i. e. "whatever may be a whole of the parts," referring to

those things, which participate in "the one," participate in it as being different from "the one?"⁸⁹ How not? But things different from "the one," will surely be many. For if the things different from "the one" were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. They would. But since the things, which participate in the one part and in the one whole, are more than one, is it not necessary for those very things, which participate in "the one," to be infinite in multitude? How? Let us look at the matter in this way. Being neither one, nor participating in "the one," do they then not participate in it when they do participate? Certainly. Are⁹⁰ not multitudes those in which "the one" is not? Multitudes, certainly. What then, if we should be willing in imagination to take away from these the least quantity we can, must not this quantity so taken away, be a multitude, and not one, since it does not participate in "the one?" It must. To him then, who thus surveys ever the different nature of the species itself by itself, will not as much of it, as we may behold,⁹¹ be infinite in multitude? Entirely so. And moreover, since each part becomes one part,⁹² (the parts)⁹³ have a bound with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts. Perfectly so. It results then, to the things different from "the one," as it seems, that, from "the

p. 147, B. § 4. But ὅλον μορίων, as I have there stated, could not be said in correct Greek.

⁸⁹ Ficinus has "Nonne igitur, cum alia sint, quam unum, uno participant omnia, quæ participant." From whence Stephens wished to read, "Οὐκ οὖν ἑτέρα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνός, τοῦ ἑνός μετίζου τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ." He should have read likewise πάντα τὰ μετέχοντα.

⁹⁰ Ficinus, "Nonne multitudines sunt," which leads to Οὐκ οὖν πλήθη ἴσθι τινά, unless it be said that πλήθη ὄντα is here opposed to the preceding οὐχ ἑν ὄντα. But in that case ἀλλά would have been written, not οὐκ οὖν. Stalbaum explains πλήθη ὄντα by "infinite." But how the same word could mean "multitude" and "infinity," he does not state, nor can I understand.

⁹¹ How this ὁρῶμεν can follow the preceding σκοποῦντι, I must leave for others to explain. Ficinus has, what is far preferable, "Nonne tibi sic semper consideranti—quantumcunque illius inspexeris."

⁹² Cornarius was the first to repeat μόριον, which, though rejected by Heindorf, has been adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from the best MSS.

⁹³ To preserve the balance of the sentence, Heindorf suggested πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τὰ μόρια καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. And so Ficinus, "terminum jam partes invicem et ad totum habent." Stalbaum still sticks to the common reading.

one" and themselves having a communion, something different is produced in themselves, which furnished them indeed a bound with respect to each other, but their own nature would be with respect to themselves infinity.⁹⁴ It appears so. [62.] Thus the things different from "the one," both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate in bound. Entirely so. Are they not therefore similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves? Why? Because, so far as all of them are somehow infinite, according to their own nature, they would all in this way suffer the same. Entirely.⁹⁵ And so far as they all participate in a bound, they would in this way too suffer the same.⁹⁵ But so far as they suffer the being bounded and infinite, ⁹⁶they suffer [these very] accidents, [being accidents] contrary to each other. Certainly. But contrary things are as much as possible dissimilar.⁹⁶ What then? According to each accident they would be similar to themselves and to each other; but according to both they are on both sides⁹⁷ most contrary and dissimilar. It nearly appears so. And thus "the others" themselves⁹⁸ would be similar and dissimilar to themselves and to each other. They would so. And they (would be) the same to, and different from, each other, and be moved and stand still; and we should without difficulty find the things different from "the one," suffering all contrary accidents, since they have been shown to suffer these. You speak rightly.

[63.] Shall we not then dismiss these things as evident, and again consider if "the one" is, whether the others differ-

⁹⁴ Instead of ἀπειρίαν, which, says Stalbaum, depends upon ἐξαι, to be got out of παρίσχε, the five best MSS. read ἀπειρία. Hence Plato evidently wrote ἀπειρία ἂν ᾦν, as I have translated.

⁹⁵⁻⁹⁵ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although duly found in the version of Ficinus.

⁹⁶⁻⁹⁶ Ficinus has "quæ sunt contrariæ passionēs, quam maxime fieri potest, dissimilia sunt," thus showing that there was something wanting in his MS., which has been supplied by others; where however πάθη, ὄντα, and ταῦτα, are all equally superfluous, and hence included here in brackets.

⁹⁷ One good although a modern MS. has ἀμφοτέρω, the conjecture of Heindorf, who understood by it "both themselves and each other."

⁹⁸ Although the best MSS. confirm αὐτά, the conjecture of Schleiermacher, for ταῦτα in Stephens, and ταῦτά, which Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version "eadem," yet I confess I cannot understand it. Perhaps Plato wrote ἅμα τε αὐτοῖς, where τε would precede instead of following αὐτοῖς.

ent from "the one" are not likewise in this state, or after this manner alone? Entirely so. Let us then say again as at the beginning, if "the one" is, what must the things different from "the one" suffer. Let us say it. Is not then "the one" separate from "the others," and are not "the others" separate from "the one?" Why? Because there is nothing else "different" except these, (namely,) that which is different from "the one," and that which is "different" from "the others;" for all is said, when "the one" and "the others" are said. All, indeed. There is nothing else therefore except these, in which, as being the same, "the one" and "the others" would exist. Nothing. "The one" and "the others" are therefore never in the same. They are not. Are they then separate? Yes. We have said moreover that "the truly one" has not any parts. For how can it? Neither therefore will the whole of "the one" nor its parts be in "the others," if it is separate from "the others," and has no parts. How not? In no way then will "the others" participate in "the one," since they participate neither according to a certain part, nor according to the whole. It seems not. By no means then are "the others" "one," nor have they any one in themselves. [64.] They have not. Neither, then, are "the others" many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one; but now the things different from "the one" are neither one nor many, nor a whole nor parts, since they in no respect participate in "the one." Right. "The others" then "are of themselves" neither two nor three, nor one in them, because they are entirely deprived of "the one." So it is. "The others," therefore, are of themselves¹⁰⁰ neither similar nor dissimilar to "the one," nor are similitude and dissimilitude in them. For if they were similar and dissimilar, or¹ possessed in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, the things different from "the one" would possess in themselves two species contrary to each other. So it appears. But it is impossible for those to participate in any two things, which do not participate even in one. Im-

¹⁰⁰— Ficinus, "nec duo nec tria sunt nec unum illis inest." He therefore found in his MS. neither the *αὐτὰ* of other MSS. nor the *ταὐτὰ* of Stephens' text; while he acknowledges *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς*, for which Heindorf suggested *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*, found subsequently in three MSS.

¹ Ficinus, "nec eadem sunt alia uni," i. e. *οὐτὲ ταὐτὰ ἑστὶ καὶ ἑνὶ*.

¹ Instead of *ἢ ἑξοῖ*, which is unintelligible, the four best MSS. have *ἢ*, adopted by Stallbaum.

possible. "The others" therefore are neither similar nor dissimilar, nor both. For, if they were similar or dissimilar, they would participate in one species of the different; and if they were both, they would participate in two contrary species: but this has been shown to be impossible. True. They are therefore neither same nor different, nor moved, nor standing still, nor generated, nor destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, (nor unequal,)² nor do they suffer any thing else of this kind. For, if the others could endure to suffer any such accident, they would participate in one, and two, and three, and in even and odd; in all which it has been shown it is impossible for them to participate; since they are in every way and entirely deprived of "the one." Most true. Hence, then, if "the one" exists, "the one" is all things and nothing, both as regards itself, and as regards "the others" ³in like manner.³ Entirely so.

[65.] Be it so. But if "the one" is not, must we not consider after this what ought to happen? We must consider. What then would be this supposition, if "one is not?" Does it differ from this, "If that, which is not one, is non-existing?" It does differ. Does it differ merely from, or is the saying, "If that which is not one, is non-existing," entirely contrary (to the saying), "If the one is not?" Entirely the contrary. But what, should any one say, if magnitude is not, or if smallness is not, or any thing else of this kind, would he not show in each of these cases that he is speaking of that, which is not, as something different? Entirely so. Would he not therefore now show that he is speaking of that which is not as something different from "the others," when he says "if the one is not;" and do we understand what he is saying? We do understand. In the first place then he speaks of something which may be known; and next of something different from "the others," when he says "one;" whether he adds to it the term of "being" or "not being;" ⁴for that which is said not to be, is known none the less, and that it is different from "the

² How strange that not a single commentator should have seen that οὐδὲ ἄνισα is evidently to be supplied after οὐδὲ ἴσα, to complete the climax of the series of contraries.

³⁻⁴ As there is nothing to which ὡσαύτως can be referred, Heindorf wished to read, what Stalbaum feels half-inclined to adopt, καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα, καὶ τὰλλα ὡσαύτως.

⁴ I am here quite in the dark; and so was Ficinus, as is evident

others :"⁴ is it not so? Necessarily so. Let us then say (as) at the beginning, "If the one is not," what ought to occur. In the first place then this, as it seems, ought to occur to it; that either there should be a knowledge of it, or that nothing of what is said can be known, when any one says, "If one is non-existing." True. (Must not this too happen), either that "the others" are different from it, or that even it cannot be said to be different from "the others?" Entirely so. It has therefore diversity in addition to knowledge. For he does not speak of the diversity of "the others," when he says that "the one" is different from "the others," but of the diversity of "the one." It appears so. And yet the one which is non-existing, participates in "that," and "some," and "this,"⁵ and "these," and every thing of this kind. For neither could "the one" be spoken of, nor things different from "the one," nor would there be any thing for it, or belonging to it, nor could it be called any thing, if it had no share in something, or in the other things of this kind.⁶ Right. [66.] But to be cannot be present to "the one," if it non-exists; though nothing prevents it from participating in the many; nay, it must (participate), if "the one" is that,⁷ and not another thing is not existing.⁷ ⁸ If however it will not be either "the one" nor that, but the discourse about something else, it is meet to say nothing.⁸ But if "the one" is supposed (as) that thing

from his unintelligible version, "*nihilominus cognoscitur, quid non esse dicatur, quodque differens quiddam est ab aliis.*" So too was Heindorf, who wished to read *γινώσκεται, ὡς τι τὸ λεγόμενον*; and so lastly was Stalbaum, who has laid hold of Heindorf's *ὡς*, as a drowning man does of a straw, and with the same unhappy result.

⁴ After *καὶ τοῦτον*, there is in the Greek *καὶ τοῦτω*, answering to "huic" in Ficinus' version. But amongst a mass of genitives dependent on *μείξει*, a dative could not be thus inserted. Hence Heindorf once wished to read *τοῦ τοῦτω*, but was restrained by meeting with something similar in § 71. But that passage is wretchedly corrupt. Taylor more correctly has tacitly omitted *καὶ τοῦτω*.

⁶ Ficinus has "*ceterorum talium.*" He therefore found in his MS not *τοῦτων*, but *τοιούτων*.

⁷ Such is the English version of *καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν*, similar to the Latin of Ficinus, "*nec aliud non est*;" which Stalbaum, I presume, unable to explain, has thought proper to give a paraphrase of it in German. But whether the German is more intelligible than the Greek, Latin, and English, I am unable to state.

⁸ Here again is a passage which, says Stalbaum, Damascius did not understand, and Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Schmidt have vainly at-

and not as another to non-exist, it is necessary for it to participate in that and many other things. Entirely so. Dissimilitude, therefore, is present to it with respect to "the others;" for "the others," being different from "the one," will also be foreign (from it). Certainly. But are not things foreign various? How not? And are not things various dissimilars? Dissimilars. If then they are dissimilars to "the one," it is evident they would be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar. It is evident. There would then be present to "the one" a dissimilitude with respect to which "the others" are dissimilar to it. It seems so. But if there is to it a dissimilitude from "the others," must there not be to it a similitude of itself? How? If there be a dissimilitude of "the one" to "the one," no discourse would take place about a thing of such a kind as "the one;" nor would the supposition be about "the one," but about something different from "the one." Entirely so. But it ought not. Certainly. There ought, then, to be a similitude of itself to "the one." There ought. But neither is "the one" equal to "the others." For, if it were equal, *it would be according to equality, similar to them;* but both these are impossible, if "the one" is not. Impossible. [67.] But since it is not equal to "the others," is it not necessary for "the others" also to be not equal to it? It is necessary. But are not things which are not equal unequal? Certainly. And are not unequals unequal by that which is unequal? How not? "The one," therefore, participates in the inequality, according to which "the others" are unequal to it. It does participate. But magnitude and smallness belong to inequality. They do. Do magnitude and smallness then belong to one of this kind? It nearly appears so. But magnitude and

tempted to emend. Accordingly he proposes to read *εἰ μὲντοι μὴ τὸ ἐν μόνον μὴ μόνον ἴσται*, as if by any process *μόνον* could be corrupted into *μήτ' ἐκείνο*. For this idea however respecting the introduction of *μόνον*, Stalbaum was indebted to "ipsum unum illud duntaxat" in Ficinus, to whom he should have given the honour of the discovery.

•—• Such is Taylor's translation of the version of Ficinus, "jam profecto etiam simile illis secundum æqualitatem existeret;" who therefore found in his MS. *εἴη ἂν ἥδη καὶ ὅμοιον αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότηρα*, not the unintelligible *εἴη τε ἂν ἥδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότηρα*, where *τε* couples nothing, and *ἂν εἴη* is repeated in all the MSS. but the two best. Stalbaum thus explains the words, *εἴη τε ἂν ἥδη, καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη*—"jam affirmante prædicato ornatum esset"—from which the reader is left to draw what conclusion he can.

smallness are always separated from each other. Entirely so. There is then always something between them. Certainly. Can you mention any thing else between these, except equality? Nothing else. To whatever thing therefore there is magnitude and smallness, to this there is equality also as a medium between the two. It appears so. To "the one" then which is non-existing, equality, magnitude, and smallness, as it appears, belong. So it seems. But it ought likewise to participate in a certain way in "being." How so? It ought to be in the state which we have mentioned? for, unless it be in that state, we should not speak the truth in saying that "the one" is not; but if (we speak) the truth, it is evident that we have spoken of things that exist. Is it not so? It is so. But since we assert that we speak the truth, it is necessary for us to assert that we are speaking of things which exist. It is necessary. ⁹ "The one," therefore, which does not exist, as it appears, does exist; for if it should non-exist while non-existing, but remit something of existence with respect to non-existence, it will immediately become existing.⁹ Entirely so. [68.] ¹⁰ It ought therefore to have, as the bond of non-existence, an existence not existing, if it is about to non-exist; just as existence (ought) to have (as a bond of existence) a non-existence existing,¹⁰ in order that it may be perfectly to be.¹¹ For thus especially existence would exist, and non-

⁹—⁹ Of all the words between the numerals, I confess my inability to understand an atom. The reader will therefore be glad perhaps to see Taylor's explanation of this difficult passage, which is equally unintelligible in the Latin of Heindorf, and, I suspect, too in the German of Stalbaum.—Any remission of "being" is attended with "non-being," which is the same with "is not;" and if any thing of "is" be taken away, "is not" is immediately introduced; and so it will immediately become "is not non-being," that is, "it is being."

¹⁰—¹⁰ The balance of the sentences evidently requires, as I have translated, Δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ (i. e. τὸ μὴ ὄν) δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, and τὸ ὄν (δεσμὸν ἔχειν) τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὄν. For thus τὸ μὴ ὄν would be opposed to τὸ ὄν, and τοῦ μὴ εἶναι to τοῦ εἶναι, and τὸ εἶναι to τὸ μὴ εἶναι, and μὴ ὄν to ὄν. The edd. have τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, in the second clause, which I cannot understand; nor could Stalbaum, who proposes to read ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν μὴ ὄν ἔχειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι; or with the omission of ἔχειν entirely.

¹¹ Here again I am quite at a loss. Ficinus has "ut perfecte rursus esse liceat." But as in the Greek words ἵνα τελείως αὐ εἶναι ᾗ, there should be a balance to the subsequent—εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐ τελείως μὴ ἴσται, it is evident that αὐ ἵνα could not be found in the first clause; and even if it

existence not exist,¹² participating (respectively) the former in existence (for the sake) of "being" existing; but in non-existence (for the sake) of "non-being" existing, if it is about to exist completely; the latter (participating) in non-existence (for the sake) of "non-being" not existing; but (participating) in existence for the sake of "being" existing; if non-existence is to non-exist completely.¹² Most truly so. Since then both to existence there is a share of non-existence, and to non-existence a share of existence, is it not necessary for "the one" also, since it does not exist, to participate in existence for the purpose of non-existence? It is necessary. Existence therefore appears to be "the one," if it does not exist. So it seems. And non-existence, if it does not exist. How not? Can any thing then, which is in some state, be not in that state, when it does not change from that state? It cannot. Every thing then of such a kind, which is and is not in such a state, indicates some change. How not? Is change motion? or what shall we call it? It is motion. But has not "the one" appeared to be both "being" and "not-being?" Yes. It appears then to be and not to be in such a state. It seems so. "The non-existing one" appears then to be moved, since it has a change from "being" into "not-being." It appears so. But if it be no where among beings, as it is not, since it is a not-being, it cannot change its place from any where to any where. For it cannot. It will not then be moved by changing its place. For it will not. Neither will it revolve in "the same;" for

could, by no process could εἶναι ᾗ mean "it may be lawful to be." Perhaps Plato wrote ἵνα τελίως ἂν ᾗ τὸ εἶναι: to which would lead αὐτὸ ᾗ εἶναι in one MS. and ἂν εἴη εἶναι in another; for thus τὸ εἶναι would answer to τὸ μὴ ὄν, (or, as it should be read, τὸ μὴ εἶναι,) and ἂν ᾗ to μὴ εἶναι.

¹²⁻¹² By attending here, as before, to the balance of the sentences, I have been able, I trust, to perceive, what nobody else seems to have done, the flow of ideas; which leads to μετέχοντα τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐσίας μὲν, τοῦ εἶναι ὄν ἕνεκα ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν—τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν, τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ, τοῦ εἶναι ὄν: where μὲν is inserted after the first οὐσίας to preserve the antithesis, and ἕνεκα for the syntax; and μὴ is omitted before the concluding ὄν. For the words are thus opposed to each other, τὸ μὴ ὄν, to τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, and οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι ὄν to μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, and μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν to οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι ὄν. With regard to the insertion of ἕνεκα, although that adverb may be omitted before an infinitive, in the case of a negative sentence, it cannot be in the case of a positive one—a distinction first pointed out by Hermann, and supported by myself in Poppe's Prolegom. p. 268.

it will never touch "the same," since the same is "being." But it is impossible for "not-being" to reside in any "being." Impossible. [69.] "The one," therefore, "which is not," cannot revolve in that, in which it is not. It cannot. Neither will "the one" be altered from itself, either into "being" or "not-being:" for our discourse would no longer be concerning the one, if it were altered from itself, but concerning something else. Right. But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in the same, nor changes its place, can it still be moved in any way? How can it? But it is necessary for that, which is unmoved, to be at rest; and for that, which is at rest, to stand still.¹³ It is necessary. As it seems, therefore, "the one" which is not, both stands still and is moved. It appears so. And yet if it be moved, there is a great necessity for it to be altered; for, so far as any thing is moved, it is no longer in the same state that it was, but in a different one. So it is. "The one," therefore, since it is moved, is also altered. Yes. And yet being moved not at all, it would be not at all altered. It would not. So far then as "the one" which is not, is moved, it is altered; but so far as it is not moved, it is not altered. Certainly not. "The one," therefore, which is not, is both altered and not altered. It appears so. But is it not necessary for any thing, when it is altered, to be in the act of being different from what it was before, and to die away from its former state; but for a nature, which is not altered, to be neither in the act of being, nor of dying away? It is necessary. "The one," therefore, which is not, by being altered, is in the act of being, and of dying away; but at the same time, from its not being altered, it is not in the act of being or of dying away. [70.] And thus "the one," which is not, is in the act of being and of dying, and is neither in the act of being nor of dying away. For it is not (otherwise).

But let us again return to the beginning, about to see whether these things will appear to us as they do now, or otherwise. It is necessary. Have we not already said, ¹⁴ "If 'the one' is not, what ought to happen concerning it?" Cer-

¹³ Here, as in § 25, I am unable to see the difference between *ἵσχυριαν* *ἔχειν* and *ἰστέναι*.

¹⁴ Here, as in § 32, Heindorf adopted *ἰσχυριαν* for *ἰστέναι*, from "disseruimus" in Ficinus; and so did Stephens tacitly, no doubt from the same source.

tainly. But when we say "it is not," do we intend any thing else than the absence of "being" from that which we say is not? Nothing else. Whether therefore, when we say that a thing "is not,"¹⁴ do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and that in a certain respect it is?¹⁵ or does the term "is not" simply signify that, what is not, is no where at all, and that it does not in any way participate in "being," if it is not? It signifies this most distinctly. Neither then can that, which is not, be, nor in any other way participate in "being." It cannot. But are the terms "to be generated" and "to be destroyed," any thing else than for one thing to participate in "being," and for another to lose "being?" It is nothing else. The thing therefore to which no atom of "being" is present, can neither receive nor lose it. How can it? "The one" therefore, since it is not at all, can neither possess, be freed from, nor participate in "being," in any manner whatever. This seems reasonable. "The one" which is not, is then neither destroyed nor in the act of being, if it participates not at all in being. It appears not. Neither therefore is it at all altered; for if it thus suffered it would be in the act of being destroyed. True. But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary for it to be not moved? It is necessary. But that, which in no respect is, we will say cannot stand still; for that which stands still ought to be in some (spot) ever the same? In the same;¹⁶ for how not? [71.] Thus then let us say, that "not-being" at no time either stands or is moved. For it does not. Moreover not any of things existing is present to it; for participating in any of things existing¹⁷ it would participate in "being." It is evident

¹⁴—¹⁵ Such is evidently what the train of ideas demands. But in that case the Greek should be, *οὐκ εἶναι τι ὡς φάμεν αὐτὸ, εἶναι δὲ πως, not πως οὐκ εἶναι—πως δὲ εἶναι.* For *πως*, the interrogative, could not thus follow *πότερον*, despite what Heindorf says about the double interrogative, *πως τί*, in Hipp. Maj. § 40.

¹⁶ Heindorf has acutely restored the passage, where Stephens was at a loss; and so too was Ficinus, who consequently omitted the repeated *τῷ αὐτῷ*; which does not however require the preposition inserted by Heindorf; for Stalbaum shows by numerous examples, that a preposition in the answer is to be supplied from the one in the question.

¹⁷ Instead of *τοῦτου μερίχον ὄντος*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ὄντος τοῦ μερίχον*, as shown by his version, "alicujus existentis—particeps." From whence Schleiermacher suggested *τον* for *τούτου*. But as two MSS. offer *ὄντως* for *ὄντος* we may read *τον τῶν ὄντων μερίχον*, in allusion to the *τι τῶν ὄντων*, immediately preceding: where *τον* is due to one MS. Stal-

It has therefore neither magnitude, nor smallness, nor equality. It has not. It has moreover neither similitude nor diversity, either with respect to itself or to others. It appears not. What then, is it possible for it to have the other things, if nothing must be present to it? It is not possible. To it then there are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same nor different. There are not. But what, will there be, respecting a thing that is not, the term "at it," or "to it,"¹⁸ or "of this," or "to this," or "of another," or "to another," or "formerly," or "hereafter," or "now," or "knowledge," or "opinion," or "perception," or "discourse," or "a name," or any thing else belonging to things existing? There will not.¹⁹ A not-one then is in this state. What state? Not being seems to be in no state. In no state.¹⁹

But let us still (again)²⁰ say, if "one" is not, what must "the others" suffer. Let us say. In a certain way "others" must exist themselves; for, if "others" do not exist, there would be nothing²¹ said about "the others." True. But if there is the discourse about "the others," "the others" will be different: or do you not apply to the same thing the word "other" and the word "different?" I do. But we surely say that²² the "different" is different from "different," and "the other" is other than "other?"²² Yes. To "the others," therefore, if there are about to be "others," there is something from which they will be "others." It is necessary. But what would this be? For they will not be different from "the one," since it is not.

baum, however, prefers *τούτου μέχον του δυτος*. He should have suggested *τοιούτου μέχον του δυτος*. For the definite *τούτου του δυτος* could hardly be referred, as he fancies, to the indefinite *τι των δυτων*.

¹⁸ After *ἐκίνω* is inserted *ἢ τὸ τί*. But from the surrounding genitives and datives it is evident that no nominative could be introduced here; and hence I have translated as if the Greek were not *ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ τὸ τούτου*, but *ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ τὸ τούτω*, to which *τούτω* for *τούτου* in one MS. evidently leads. And even if a nominative were admissible, the indefinite *τι* would not be, and still less the interrogative *τί*.

¹⁹⁻¹⁹ Since some of the best MSS. assign *οὐδαμῇ* to Aristotle, I have translated as if the Greek were, *Οὕτως δὲ ἔν δὲ οὐκ ἔχει; Πῶς; Οὐκ ὅν δὲ ἔστι γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν. Οὐδαμῇ*. For thus the answers would be given, as they always are, in the fewest possible words.

²⁰ Ficinus, "Est ne iterum disputandum," which leads to *δ' αὖ* for *δὲ*.

²¹ Instead of *ἀλγοισο* sense and syntax require *ἀλγοισό τι*.

²²⁻²² Others may, but I cannot, understand all between the numerals. I could have understood the passage, had it been to this effect: "The different is different from something, and the other is other than something."

They will not. They are different therefore from each other ; for this alone remains to them, or to be²³ different from nothing. Right. [72.] According to multitudes therefore, each is different from each other ; for they cannot be different according to one, since "one" is not. But each mass of them, as it appears, is infinite in multitude ; even although one should lay hold of that which appears to be the least, ²⁴like a dream in sleep, many appear on a sudden, instead of one seeming to be ; and ²⁴instead of the smallest, a quantity very great as compared with the fractions formed out of it. Most right. Masses of such kind existing,²⁵ others will be mutually different from one another, if "others" are, while "one" is not. Completely so. Will there not then be many masses, each appearing as one, but not being so, since "one" is not ? There will. There will likewise appear to be a number of them, if each is one, while there are many. Entirely so. But the even and odd among them will appear²⁶ not truly, if "one" shall not exist. They will not. But likewise the smallest, as we have said,²⁷ will seem to be in them. But this (the smallest) will appear to be many and²⁸ great, as compared with each of the many and small. How not ? And each mass will be imagined to be equal to many and small quantities ; for it will not appear to change from a greater to a less quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between them ; and this would be a fancied notion of equality. It is likely. Will it not also (appear) to have a bound with respect to another mass, having itself, with respect to itself, neither a beginning, nor a middle, nor an end ? In what way ? Because

²³ Stalbaum says that εἶναι is governed by ἀναγκαῖον understood. He should have suggested τὸ εἶναι ; for thus τὸ εἶναι would be opposed to τοῦτο, and both depend upon λείπεται.

²⁴⁻²⁶ Although Heindorf justly objected to ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ, he unjustly wished to omit ὄναρ, misled by his copy of the version of Ficinus ; which, he says, has simply "velut in somno." But the ed. pr. has "in somno somnium." He should have suggested καὶ, ὥσπερ ὀνειρώττοντι τῷ, i. e. "and like to a person dreaming." The verb ὀνειρώττειν is found seven times at least in Plato.

²⁵ Heindorf correctly saw that ὄντων has dropt out after ὄγκων.

²⁶ Ficinus, "videbitur ;" from whence Thomson suggested φαίνεται for φαίνεται.

²⁷ Heindorf prefers ἔφαμεν to φαμὲν, for Ficinus has "ut dictum est," and there is an allusion to what had been stated a little above.

²⁸ Instead of ὥς, Plato wrote καὶ, as shown by the sentence following.

when a person takes hold by his intellect of some one of these, ²⁹[as being one of these,] ²⁹there will always, prior to the beginning, appear another beginning, and after the end another end will be left behind; but in the middle (there will be) other things more in the middle than the middle; but smaller, on account of their not being able to take hold of each one of them, since "the one" is not. This is most true. [78.] But every thing which a person can lay hold of by his intellect, must, I think, be broken into small pieces; for a mass would be (ever) ³⁰laid hold of (mentally) without a one. Entirely so. But is it not necessary for such a mass to appear to him, who beholds it at a distance and with a dull eye, to be one; but to him who surveys it near and with an acute mind, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, if it is deprived of "the one," not existing. It is most necessary. Thus then each of "the others" ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, if one does not exist, and "the others" (besides) ³¹"the one" do exist. They ought. Will they then appear also to be similars and dissimilars? In what way? Just as objects in a shaded picture appear all to be one to a person standing at a distance, (they will seem) to suffer the same accident, and to be similar. Entirely so. But to him, who approaches nearer, (they will appear) to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the fancied notion of diversity. It is so. It is therefore necessary for the masses to appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves and to each other. Entirely so. And to be the same with, and different from, each other, and to touch and be apart ³²from themselves, and be moved through all possible movements, and standing still every where, and be in the act of being and of destruction,

²⁹⁻³⁰ I cannot understand all within the brackets; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted them. Heindorf says those words refer to ἀρχήν, πέρας μίσην. But if so, to what do αὐτῶν τι refer?

³⁰ Ficinus, "Semper—excipitur." He found therefore in his MS., what three others offer, αἰ λαμβάνοιτο.

³¹ The Greek is ὅλλα δὲ ἐνός, where I cannot discover on what ἐνός depends. Ficinus has "sed alia præter unum sunt," as if he had found in his MS. ὅλλα δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

³² Some one, as appears from Stalbaum's note, wished to read: χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, which is absolutely requisite on account of the other participles. So too in § 74, one would prefer οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρὶς ὄντα, where ὄντα is at present wanting.

and ³³ neither of these, and all of this kind,³³ which it were easy for us to go through, if, though one does not exist, many do exist? Most true.

[74.] Once more then, returning again to the beginning, let us say, "If one is not," but the things different from "the one," what ought to happen. Let us say. "The others" then are not one. How should they be? Nor yet are they many; for in many there would be one likewise. For if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that there would be not even many. True. One therefore not being in the others, the others are neither many nor one. They are not. Nor do they appear to be either one or many. Why not? Because "the others" have not in any way any communication at all with any of the things which are not, nor is any one of the non-existing present to "the others;" for there is no part³⁴ to non-beings. True. Neither therefore is there any opinion about that, which is not in "the others," nor any fancied notion; nor does that "which is not," become in any way the subject of opinion applicable to "the others."³⁵ It does not. If therefore one does not exist, not any of "the others" is conceived in opinion to be one or many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without one. It is impossible. If one therefore does not exist, neither do "the others" exist; nor is one or many conceived by opinion. It seems not. Neither therefore do similars or dissimilars exist. They do not. Nor the same nor different, nor things touching nor apart,³⁶ nor such others, as we have already discussed, as appearing themselves;³⁶

³³⁻³³ As there is nothing on which *μηδέντερά καὶ πάντα του τὰ τοιαῦτα* can depend, Heindorf says he should have expected to find here *πεπονηότας*.

³⁴ Heindorf justly objects to *μέρος*, which, meaning only "a part," has no meaning here. Perhaps Plato wrote *οὐδ' ἓν γὰρ ἀμερές ἐστι*, "for there is not a single atom." Stalbaum would read, with three modern MSS., *οὐδὲ μέρος*, "for not even a part." But this does not get rid of the difficulty started by Heindorf.

³⁵ Instead of *δοξάζεται*—*ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων*, which could be said only of persons, Schleiermacher proposed *ἐπὶ*, adopted by Heindorf and Stalbaum.

³⁶⁻³⁶ In the words within the numerals I cannot discover an atom of meaning; nor, it appears, could Ficinus; whose version is, "neque reliqua quotcunque in superioribus, tanquam quæ ad alia spectare viderentur, enarravimus, jam ad ipsa alia spectaret vel spectare videntur, unum si minime est." From which I willingly leave to others to elicit what he found in his MS., unless he supplied from his own head what he conceived the sense to require.

of these there neither is any one, nor do "the others" appear, if the one does not exist. True. If then we summarily say, that "if one is not, nothing is," shall we not rightly say? Entirely so. Let both this then be asserted by us, and this also, as is reasonable, that whether one is or is not, both itself, and the others, are, with respect to themselves and to each other, all things entirely, and are not, and appear to be, and do not appear. It is most true.

INTRODUCTION TO THE BANQUET.

IF the beauty of a dialogue of Plato is to be estimated by the number of separate Editions to which it has given rise, and by the quantity of Annotations written upon it, the Banquet would be fairly deemed to be second only to the Phædo, if not superior to it. For during the last seventy-four years it has been edited by Fischer, Wolf, Ast, Sommer, Dindorf, Reynders, Rückert, Hommel, twice by Stalbaum and the triumvirate of the Scholars at Zurich; and it has been commented upon by Wyttenbach, Schütz, Bast, Heusde, Thiersch, Orelli, Creuzer, and Voegelin: and to these must be added the pamphlets of Hartmann and C. F. Hermann, (of which I know nothing but the titles,) together with the Academical Dissertations of different Professors and embryo Critics in Germany, and the articles written in various periodicals of that country, devoted wholly or in part to classical literature.

Nor is this all; for during the same period the dialogue has been translated twice into English, thrice into German, and once into French. But even here it has been the misfortune of the philosopher to have his ideas travestied, rather than transferred to modern tongues. Such at least is the case in the miscalled versions of Sydenham and Shelley; the latter of whom has never looked beyond the Latin of Ficinus, reprinted by Bekker from the original edition;

while the former, disdaining to follow as closely a generally faithful guide, has given a paraphrase rather than a translation; and this to such an extent, that more than a third of what he has put down is the mere coinage of his own brain, and not a vestige of it is to be found in the original Greek.

Nor is it amongst the moderns alone that this dialogue has met with a marked attention. For it seems to have been no less a favourite with the Moral Philosophers of the Pagan world, and the Fathers of the Christian Church, and of those too, who, like the Neo-Platonists, occupied the neutral ground between the rising and decaying forms of faith. Of this the edition of Reynders affords abundant proof; who has either collected himself, or found in the notes of Wyttenbach, perhaps all the references to this dialogue to be met with in the series of authors alluded to; and after their united labours in this field, a very scanty gleanings has been left, I suspect, for such as may be disposed to go over the same ground. Far different, however, is the case as regards the verbal difficulties of the text. For there, after all the labours of the learned, I have found not a little to exercise my own ingenuity; and where I have failed, others will, I hope, be led to try their hands; for it is only by such continued efforts that we can expect to recover what has been lost, or to correct what has become corrupted, in one of the most fanciful, and, despite a portion of its matter, happily abhorrent from our finer feelings, one of the most beautiful dialogues of Plato.

With regard to the object which Plato had in view in writing the Banquet, they who are desirous of seeing the conflicting and equally untenable notions of some of the scholars of Germany, must turn to Stalbaum's Prolegomena, p. 35—39, where they will find a sensible rejection of the theory of Schleiermacher; who with a perversity of judgment for which it is difficult to account, considered the Banquet as being closely connected with the Sophist and Statesman, with which it has not an atom in common, instead of being rather a companion to the Phædrus, but written if not in a more chaste, at least a more chastened, style, than that misunderstood rhapsody.

THE BANQUET.

OR, ON LOVE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

APOLLODORUS, FRIEND OF APOLLODORUS, GLAUCO,
ARISTODEMUS, SOCRATES, AGATHO, PAUSANIAS,
ARISTOPHANES, ERYXIMACHUS, PHÆDRUS,
DIOTIMA, ALCIBIADES.

APOLLODORUS.

[1.] ¹ RESPECTING the matters, about which you are inquiring,¹ I think myself to be not unprepared. For I happened yesterday to be coming up to the city from my house at Phalærus;² when one of my acquaintances, who was behind, seeing me at distance, called out to me; and playing upon my name, said, at the same time, Hollo!³ Apollodorus, you Phalærean,⁴ will you not stop? Upon which I stopped, and waited

¹ As nothing is stated at the commencement of the dialogue respecting the persons addressed, one would be inclined to believe that something has been lost.

² Phalærus was a sea-port about twenty stadia or two miles from Athens.

³ On this use of *ὄϊτος*, see Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 476, a.

⁴ The play in the word *Φαληρεὺς*, Ast would explain by an allusion to the word *Φαλαρίς*, or *Φαληρίς*, which was the name of an aquatic bird with a bald pate, in Greek *φαλακρός*, and was here said in reference to the baldness of Apollodorus. Other interpretations are to be found in Stalbaum's note. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὦ Φαληρίς*. For the Schol. on Aristoph. 'Ορν. 565, says, *ὁ δὲ φαληρίς ὄρνις ἐστὶ λιμναῖον εὐπρεπὲς ἱσχημάτισται παρὰ τὸν φάλλον*: where we must evidently read—*ἀπρεπὲς ἱσχημάτισται*—For nothing connected with the *φάλλος* could be *εὐπρεπὲς*. A similar pun was made upon Alcibiades, as shown by Hesychius, 'Ἐπὶ *Φαληνίου* τὸν 'Αλεξιβιάδην φησὶν ὁ 'Αρίσταρχος (read 'Αριστοφάνης) ἐπὶ

for him. He then said, Apollodorus, I was just now looking after you, being desirous of hearing fully about the meeting between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest who were present at the supper, which took place then, when there were⁵ some speeches on the subject of love. For another person narrated a part,⁶ having heard it from Phoenix, the son of Philip; and he said that you knew (all): but that he had it not in his power to state any thing clearly. Do you then tell me; for you have the best right to narrate the conversation of your friend. But first, said he, tell me, were you present yourself at the meeting or not?—It appears, said I, that your informant has by no means given you a clear account, if you suppose that the meeting, about which you are asking, took place recently, so that I could be present at it.—I (thought so), said he.—How, Glauco, (could it be,) said I?—Know you not, that Agatho has not sojourned here for many years?⁷ whereas, since I first passed my time with Socrates, and made it my care each day to know what he said and did, it is not yet three years. Before that time, running about wherever chance led me, and fancying I was doing something, I was more wretched than any being whatever, and not less so than you are now in thinking that you must do every thing rather

Φαληνίου γεγενῆσθαι σκώπτων παρὰ Φάλητα· ἐπ' ἀναισχυντίᾳ γὰρ ὁ Φάλης. The bird was a species of water-wagtail, in Greek *οἰσοπυγίς*, applied, in a similar manner, to a lascivious person. Opportunely then has Hesychius, *Φαληρίς· ὄρνις λιμναῖος, κατὰ τὸ Φάλης* (read *Φάλητος*) *ἐρμᾶτινον καὶ ἀνδρείον*. Of the names of birds, thus given to persons at Athens, Aristophanes has given a list in *Ὀρν.* 1288—1298.

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were *διαπυθίσθαι τὴν—ξυνουσίαν—τῶν τότε—ὅτε περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγοι τινες ἦσαν*—and not *τῶν τότε—περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τινες ἦσαν*. For the *ξυνουσία* was not *περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων*. The *λόγοι* took place merely accidentally at the banquet. Moreover, *τότε* evidently requires its correlative *ὅτε*, which I have inserted before *περὶ*. Lastly, as there were no *λόγοι* called especially *ἐρωτικοί*, by *τῶν ἐρωτικῶν* are meant "things relating to love."

⁶ Since some MSS. read *διηγέτο* *τι*, others *διηγείται*, Plato doubtless wrote *διηγέτο* *τι*, and instead of *καὶ*, which has no meaning here, *πᾶν*, to balance *τι*.

⁷ According to Ritschel, *De Agathonis Vita*, p. 19, quoted by Stalbaum, Agatho retired to the court of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, not later than Ol. 93. 1; but not, I suspect, as the Scholiast, on Aristoph. *Barp.* 85, says, with the view of enjoying the luxurious living to be found there, but of meeting with his friend Euripides, who had been invited thither by Archelaus; whose countrymen thought more highly, than did the Athenians, of the talents of the dramatist.

than philosophize.—Do not scoff, said he, but tell me when the meeting took place.—When we were still children, said I, it was that Agatho won the prize⁸ with the first tragedy, and the day after that in which he and his performers in the Chorus had made the sacrifice for his victory.—It is then, said he, a long time since, it seems; but who was the relater? Was it Socrates himself?—Not Socrates, by Zeus, replied I; but he who told it to Phoenix. It was one Aristodemus,⁹ a Cydathenæan, a man of small size, and who always went without sandals.¹⁰ He was present at the meeting, being, it seems to me, an admirer, the greatest amongst those then living, of Socrates. Nevertheless, I inquired of Socrates himself about some of the things I had heard from him (Aristodemus); and he (Socrates) confessed to all he had reported.—Why then, said he, (Glauco,) do not you tell me? The road to the city is very convenient for persons, as they walk along, to speak and hear.¹¹ Proceeding in this way we entered into conversation together, so that I am now, as I said at the commencement, not quite unprepared. If then I must relate these matters (over again) to you, I must do so.¹² Besides, for in other respects, when I am either making myself, or hearing from others, any discourse on philosophy, I feel, independent of considering myself benefited, a delight beyond all bounds. But when (I hear) some other conversation, and especially yours, who are wealthy, and engaged in money-making, I feel a weariness myself, and pity for you my friends, who fancy you are doing something, while you are in fact doing nothing. But perhaps, on the other hand, you consider me possessed with an evil genius; and I think that you think correctly. I do not however think so of you; but I know it full well.

⁸ It was at the festival of the Lenæa, celebrated in Ol. 90. 4, says Athenæus, v. p. 217, that Agatho obtained the first prize.

⁹ Xenophon, in Mem. Socr. i. 4. 2, informs us, that Aristodemus was surnamed "the Little," and that he was an atheist, until he was taught better by Socrates.

¹⁰ This was done in imitation of his master, Socrates.

¹¹ There is an allusion to the fact of persons walking along a road and entering into conversation in Pseudo-Babr. Fab., which I have restored, what no one else has been able to do, in The Surplice, No. 37, 1846.

¹² Ficinus has, "Quod si iterum vobis recenseri hæc vultis, iterum recensebo," as if he had found in his MS. *εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι αὐθις ταῦτα, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν*.

[2.] *Friend*. You are always the same man, Apollodorus, ever railing at yourself and others, and you seem to me as if you really thought all men, commencing from yourself, to be, with the exception of Socrates, miserable. Now, from whence you acquired the surname of a madman,¹³ I know not;¹⁴ for in your discourses, you are ever in such a mood, and are savage against yourself¹⁵ and all others, Socrates excepted.

Apol. And is it,¹⁶ my dearest friend, evident then that by so thinking of myself, and you, I am mad and talk at random?¹⁷

Friend. It is not worth while, Apollodorus, to dispute about this now. But as to what we have requested, do not do otherwise, but tell us what the speeches were.

Apol. The speeches then were of some such kind as this. But I will rather endeavour to relate, as he (Aristodemus) related to me (all)¹⁸ from the beginning.

For he told me that Socrates, having washed himself and put on his slippers, which he was wont to do very seldom,¹⁹ met him; and that he asked him, whither he was going, after he had made himself so smart; when Socrates told him, he was going to Agatho's to supper; for yesterday (said he) at the sacri-

¹³ Apollodorus was not really mad, but only as violent as a madman in all he did and said. For such is the meaning of *μανικός*, as shown by Stalbaum.

¹⁴ The sense requires, what Bast was the first to remark, "I know very well," in Greek, *εὖ κάτ' οὐδ' ἔγωγε*.

¹⁵ Hommel quotes opportunely from Plautus, "Non sanus satis, Menæchme, qui nunc ipsus maledicas tibi."

¹⁶ Stalbaum says that Apollodorus ironically confesses himself to be mad. But in what word, or words, the irony is to be found, he does not deign to tell us. The sentence is interrogative, as remarked by Hommel, whom Stalbaum should have followed.

¹⁷ On the use of *παπαράειν*, see my note in *Æsch. Prom.* 1092, where, in illustration of my restoration of a fragment of *Æschylus*—*Εἰ δ' οὐ σοφιστής; Μηδ' ἀλλὰ παπαράειν χίλιν*—I should have referred to Troilus and Cressida, iii. 2; "Nell, he is full of harmony. No truly, lady, no; Rude, in good soothe; in good soothe, very rude."

¹⁸ Here again one would prefer *πάν* to *καί*. On the confusion in *καί* and *παί*, see Porson, *Orest.* 614.

¹⁹ Despite this assertion, we are told by *Ælian*, in *Var. Hist.* iv. 18, that Socrates was accused of being nice about his personal appearance. And so perhaps he was, as compared with some of the philosophers, who, in the language of *Aristophanes*, "were for six years unwashed."

fice for the victory, I avoided him, for fear of the crowd; but agreed to be with him to-day. I have therefore made myself smart to go to a handsome man in a handsome manner.²⁰ But how, said he, Aristodemus, have you the disposition to be willing to go with me,²¹ uninvited, to a supper?—And I replied, said (Aristodemus), that I will do as you may command.—Follow me then, said (Socrates), that we may by a change pervert the proverb,²² that

To the feasts of the good will go
The good of their own accord.

Homer, however, nearly seems to have not merely perverted the proverb, but to have done violence to it. For after describing Agamemnon as pre-eminently good in the affairs of war, and Menelaus as “a soft-hearted spearman,” (in *Il.* P. 588,) yet, when Agamemnon had made a sacrifice and was feasting, he has introduced (in *Il.* B. 408) Menelaus as coming to the feast uninvited, an inferior man to the banquet of his betters. On hearing this, said (Aristodemus), Perhaps I too shall run a risk, not Socrates, as you say, but as in Homer, if I, a person of no parts, go to the banquet of a clever man uninvited. Will you then make an apology for bringing me? for, as to myself, I will not confess that I came uninvited, but invited by you.

“²³ We two together going will consult,
The one for the other,”²⁴ what we have to say,

²⁵ Stalbaum conceives, with Hermann and Rost, that ἴν' ἴω could follow *καλλωπισάμην*, contrary to the canon of Dawes. Had he looked to the
δν

readings of the MSS. he would have seen that two offer *καλῶ*, which leads to *Καλῶς τοιμὶ παρὰ καλὸν καλούμενος*, a verse probably of Euripides. At all events Socrates, who was as ugly as Silenus, would scarcely speak of himself as a handsome man, although he might speak of his doing a thing in a handsome manner.

²⁶ In lieu of *ἀν ἵναι*—which could not follow *ἰθὺλιν*, common sense manifestly points to *ἄμ' ἵναι*—a fact that has escaped the notice of every editor, despite the subsequent *Σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένω*.

²⁷ The proverb was originally, as stated by the Scholiast, *Αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ διτλῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἴασιν*, i. e. “To the feasts of the coward will go the brave of their own accord,” and was applied to Hercules when he appeared before Ceyx, as the latter was enjoying a feast. It is alluded to in a fragment of Bacchylides, and of Cratinus and Eupolis, quoted respectively by Athenæus and the Scholiast here.

²⁸—²⁹ In the words within the numerals, *Σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένω πρὸς ὁ τοῦ βουλευσόμεθα*, there is an allusion to Homer, *Il.* K. 224, *Σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένω καὶ τι πρὸς ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν*. From whence, strange to say, Fischer

replied (Socrates). But come, let us be going. [3.] After conversing a little in this way, he said, on they went. But on the way, Socrates, attending to something in his own mind, was left behind in the walk; and that he, (Socrates,) bade him, (Aristodemus,) who was waiting, to go on; but that when he arrived at Agatho's dwelling he found the door open, and there, he said, happened a ludicrous incident. For a servant from within, straightway meeting him, led him to where the rest were reclining (at the table); and that Agatho, on seeing him, said immediately, Aristodemus, you are come very opportunely to sup with us; but if you are come for any other purpose, defer it to another time; for (know that) I was looking about for you yesterday, that I might invite you, but I could not see you. But how are you not bringing Socrates to us?—And I, turning round, said he, saw no where Socrates following me. I stated however that I had come with Socrates, having been invited hither by him to supper.—You did well, said Agatho; but where is he himself?—He was coming behind me just now, said I; and I too wonder where he can be.—Boy, said Agatho to one of his servants, will you not make inquiry for Socrates, and bring him in? but do you, Aristodemus, said he, recline near Eryximachus. ²⁴ And he said that a servant washed him, ²⁴ that he might take his place upon the couch; but that some other of the servants came and brought word, that this ²⁵ Socrates had withdrawn himself, and was standing in the porch of a

was the first to correct $\delta \tau\omicron\upsilon$ for $\delta\delta\omicron\upsilon$, found in all the MSS., and in the version of Ficinus, "in ipso itinere," and still more strangely Wyttenbach, in *Biblioth. Crit.* i. p. 117, rejected the only successful restoration made by Fischer in the whole of Plato.

²⁴⁻²⁵ The old edd. have, *Kai ἐπεὶ ἔφη ἀπονίζων τὸν παῖδα, ἵνα πον καταίκοιτο*: out of which Ficinus was unable to make the least sense; and hence he has given, what the train of ideas seemed to require, "Heus tu, dato huic manibus aquam, ut jam sedeat." Stephens however was the first to suggest that τ lay hid here; from whence Bast, in *Specimen Critic.* p. 10, was led to $\tau \mu\epsilon\tau$, adopted by Bekk., Ast., Stalb. But in the first place, although $\omicron\upsilon$ and $\omicron\iota$ are frequently found in pure Attic Greek, τ never is, except in two doubtful passages, one in § 4, and the other in *Rep.* i. p. 327, A. Secondly, the article could not be thus introduced before *παῖδα*. And, lastly, it is in vain to say with Stalbaum that *πον*, omitted in the majority of MSS., owes its origin to *ἵνα ὅπον*, found in five MSS., as if *ὅπον* would be employed to explain *ἵνα*. There is some deep-seated disorder here, which I could perhaps by a bold conjecture cure.

²⁵ Instead of *οὗτος*, Plato evidently wrote *αὐτός*: and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version, "Socratem ipsum."

neighbouring house; and when I called to him,²⁶ (said the boy,) he refused to come in.—Absurd! said (Agatho), will you not call him? and do not leave him there.—But (Aristodemus) told me, that he said, By no means; but let him alone; for he had such a habit of withdrawing himself. He sometimes stands still, said he, wherever he may happen to be. He will be here presently, as I guess. Do not then disturb him, but let him alone. Nay then, if you think it best, said (Agatho), so we must do. But, slaves, said he, prepare the feast for us the rest. By all means²⁷ put before us what you like; since there is nobody to superintend—an act which I never do myself. Conceiving then myself and the rest here to be invited by you to supper, entertain us so that we may commend you.—[4.] After this, he said, they went to supper; but Socrates had not come in. Agatho, therefore, gave frequent orders to send for Socrates; ²⁸ but he (Aristodemus) would not permit it. That he (Socrates) therefore came, having waited as usual, a not long time,²⁹ but at furthest, when they were in the middle of supper. Agatho then, who hap-

²⁶ Stalbaum, strange to say, still sticks to *καμῶ*, found it seems in not a single MS., and which is intelligible only by inserting, as Sydenham has done, the words "said the boy." The MSS. vary between *καὶ οὐ* and *καὶ σοῦ*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ τοῦ καλοῦντος*, i. e. "and on some one calling."

²⁷ Thiersch, justly offended with *πάντως*, wished to read *ἰστιᾶται πάντα*, with two MSS.; and so Rynders and Ruckert. Stalbaum attempts to defend *πάντως* by passages not in point. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἰστιᾶται πεινῶντας· παρατίθεται οὖν*—For thus, by the mention of hunger, the slaves would know that they were to place an abundance on the table.

²⁸⁻²⁹ Here Stalbaum was the first to introduce *ἢ δὲ οὐκ ἴαν*, found in three MSS., in lieu of *αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἴαν* in some, or *τὸν δὲ οὐκ ἴαν* in others, or *ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἴαν*, adopted by Bekker, from four MSS. Ficinus has evidently abridged the whole passage, either because there was something wanting in his MS., or because he could not make out the syntax. Plato wrote, I suspect, *αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀνίημι*, i. e. "but that Socrates did not give in," and *ἤκειν δ' αὐτὸν οὐ, πολὺν χρόνον, ὥς εἰσθεῖ, διατρίψαντα*, i. e. "and that he now came not, having wasted, as he was wont, some considerable time." This would be at least intelligible, which the Greek at present is not. Bekker, however, would in lieu of *ἢ* read *ἢ*, which is said to be an obsolete form of the nominative of the reciprocal pronoun *οὔ*; nor has he felt the least repugnance to defile the pure Greek of Plato in a way to satisfy Donaldson indeed in *The New Cratylus*, p. 171, but nobody else, that I have heard of. For the smallest particle of common sense would enable any one to see that a reciprocal pronoun could not have a nominative.

pened to be lying on the couch at the lower (end of the table) alone, said, Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourself down by me; in order ²⁹that, by touching you, ²⁹I may enjoy that wise thought, which has occurred to you in the porch. For it is plain that you have found out and possess it; for you would not have previously stood aloof.³⁰—Socrates then, sitting down, observed, It would be well, Agatho, if wisdom were a thing of such a kind, as to flow from the party filled with it, to the one who is less so, when they touch each other; like water in vessels running by means of a thread of wool³¹ from the fuller vessel into the emptier. For if wisdom were in this state, I should value³² highly a reclining near you. For I think I should be filled by you with wisdom abundant and beautiful. For mine would be mean and questionable, being as it were a dream. But yours is brilliant, and has a great

^{29—29} As the words ἀπτόμενος σου are omitted in what are called the four best MSS., they are considered an interpolation by Hommel. It is certainly difficult to understand how Agatho could better enjoy the wisdom of Socrates by touching him than by not touching.

³⁰ The Greek is οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαίσθης, which Ficinus renders "Alioquin non tam diu restitisses." But he thus lost sight of the doubled propositions, *προ* and *απο*. Sydenham has, "For otherwise you would never have desisted from your pursuit." Shelley, "You would not have departed till you had discovered and secured it." And so Stalbaum; who says that we must supply *εἰ μὴ εὖρες αὐτό*, after *προαίσθης*. The sense evidently required is, "You would not have stood apart in a state of doubt;" in Greek, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπορήσας αἰσίσθης.

³¹ De Geel, in *Bibliothec. Crit. Nov. t. ii. p. 274*, was the first to explain the allusion in the words, *διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου*, by showing that if a thread of wool be so placed, that one end of it is in a glass full of water, and the other in an empty one, the water will by a kind of capillary attraction rise from the fuller vessel and fall into the emptier one, until the quantity in each is equal. The same idea seems to have presented itself to Shelley, who thus translates the passage, "Like the water in two chalices, which will flow through a flock of wool from the fuller into the emptier, until both are equal." But De Geel failed to remark, that as *διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου* could not be found in correct Greek, Plato probably wrote *διὰ λινίου ἐρίου*, or even without *διὰ*, if to this passage is to be referred the gl. in Hesych. *Λινίω ἐρίω*. With regard to the preceding sentence, it is alluded to by Plutarch, in *Sympos. ii. p. 818, E.*, ὥσπερ ἐκ πλήρους κύλικος εἰς κενὴν ἀπορροή τις γίγνεται.

³² As the three so-called best MSS. read *τιμῶμεν*, Stalbaum suggested *τιμῶ μὲν*, observing that the apodosis of the sentence might be understood. But after the preceding *εἰ οὕτως ἔχει*, there could be no apodosis, and even if there could, that in correct Greek *τιμᾶσθαι*, not *τιμᾶν*, means "to set a value." Correctly then does he add that "there is need of the alteration."

(hope for an)²³ increase, since already it has shone out from you so vehemently, and became conspicuous the day before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand²³ Greeks, its witnesses. You are saucy, Socrates, said Agatho. But I and you will shortly afterwards try the question touching our wisdom, and Bacchus shall decide the cause, but for the present turn yourself to the supper. Upon this he told me that Socrates reclined himself, and took his supper, and so did the rest, and that they made libations,²⁴ and sung the praises of the god, and (after performing) the other rites,²⁴ they turned themselves to drinking; when Pausanias,²⁵ he said, opened the conversation thus:—

Well then, gentlemen, said he, after what fashion shall we drink the easiest (and best)?²⁶ For my part, I confess to you that I really feel myself not very well from yesterday's de-

²³ Although πολλήν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα would mean "having made a great progress," yet such an idea would be inapplicable in the case of Agatho, whose early success gave the promise of future progress. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, πολλήν ἐλπίδ' ἐς ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα, for ἐλπίδ' ἐς might easily have dropt out before ἐπίδοσιν. Hence, too, we can understand the origin of ἐπίτασιν, found in the margin of a Vienna MS.

²⁴ This number is mentioned not without reason. For Aristophanes says in 'Εκκλ. 1134, there were more than 30,000 citizens; and so does Herodotus in v. 99; and Æschines in Περὶ Παραπρ. p. 316, that there were just as many reputable persons, as Demosthenes at Athens. The number would have been increased, had not Agatho's victory been gained at the Lenææ, the dramatic festival, at which Athenians alone were present, as we learn from Aristoph. 'Αχ. 478, Αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἰσμίν, ἐπὶ τε Ἀθηναίῳ 'στ' ἀγών, Κοῦπωξένοι παρίσιν.

²⁵ The Greek is καὶ ἄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα. But as there is nothing to tell what god is here alluded to, and nothing to govern τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα, opportunely has Athenæus, in v. p. 179, D., ἄπὸ καὶ Πλάτων φυλάσσει κατὰ τὸ Συμπόσιον μετὰ γὰρ τὸ δεῖπνῆσαι σπονδὰς τὴν φησὶν ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸν θεὸν παυνίσαντας τοῖς νομιζομένοις γίρασι. From whence it is easy to see that Plato wrote—καὶ τὸν θεὸν κατανίσαντας καὶ λύσαντας τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα—i. e. "hymning with a pæan the god (Apollo), and paying the other rites." For thus λύσαντας τὰ ἄλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα would be similar to θεοῖς—τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα—ἔωσομεν, in Pseudo-Platon. Alcibiad. ii. p. 151, B., and κατανίσαντες with ἰσπεῖσαντο καὶ ἰκαίανισαν in Xenoph. Sympos. ii. 1.

²⁶ On this Pausanias, who was a lover of Agatho, see Protagor. p. 315, D. § 18.

²⁷ The old edd. ἡδίστα. The MSS. ῥᾶστα. Ficinus unites both—"levius suaviusque." Perhaps Plato wrote here ὡς (for so two MSS.) ῥᾶστα -αὶ ἡδίστα.

bauch, and I have need of some respite, and so I think the most of you have; for you were here yesterday. Consider then in what way we may drink the easiest.³⁷—Aristophanes³⁸ then said, You speak however³⁹ well, Pausanias, on this point, that we should by all means procure for ourselves an easy method in our drinking. For I am one of those, who were thoroughly drenched yesterday.—Upon hearing this, Eryximachus,⁴¹ the son of Acūmēnus, said, Both of you say well: but I want to hear from one of you, how does Agatho bear up with strength in drinking.—I am by no means very strong, said (Agatho).—It would be a god-send, said Eryximachus, for us, both myself, and Aristodemus, and Phædrus,⁴² and these here, if you, the stouter men at the bottle, have on the present occasion flinched. For we are at all times weak. Socrates indeed I put out of the account; for he is all-sufficient on both points,⁴³ so that it matters not to him, whichsoever we may do. Since then none of the persons present seem inclined to drink much wine, I may be perhaps the less disagreeable, if I tell the truth about getting drunk. For from the physician's art, I conceive that this has become a matter quite evident to myself, that drunkenness is for men a very bad thing; and I would neither willingly myself⁴⁴ be willing to drink far on,⁴⁴ nor advise any other person (to do so), especially when still suffering with a head-ache from the night before.—As for me, said Phædrus of Myrrhinous,⁴⁵ taking up the discourse, I am accustomed to attend to you in other

³⁷ The repetition of *ὡς ῥᾶστα* is rather jejune. Ficinus has "levius salubriusque."

³⁸ This was the Comic poet; as shown by § 43, where is quoted a verse from Νεφ. 361.

³⁹ Instead of *τοῦτο μέντοι εὖ λέγεις*, where Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend *μέντοι* by passages not in point, one would prefer *τοῦτ' ἐμὸν γινώσκω, εὖ λέγεις*. For thus *ἐμὸν γινώσκω* is found without *κατὰ*, similar to *γινώσκω γ' ἐμὴν* in Aristoph. *Ἐκκλ.* 349, (372,) *Eip.* 232.

⁴¹ On this Eryximachus, see Protagor. p. 315, C. § 18.

⁴² This Phædrus gave the name to Plato's earliest Dialogue.

⁴³ In lieu of *καὶ ἀμφότερα*, where *καὶ* is unintelligible, Ficinus found *κατ' ἀμφότερα*, as shown by his version, "ad utrumque,"—i. e. "to drink or not."

⁴⁴—"By no process could *ἐκὼν εἶναι*—*ἐθελήσαιμι* be thus found in one sentence; nor could *πάρῳ* be united to *ἐθελήσαιμι* or *πιεῖν*. There is some error here, which I could correct, satisfactorily to myself, but not so perhaps to others.

⁴⁵ Myrrhinous was a pariah belonging to the Pandion tribe at Athens.

respects, and in whatever you say about the physician's art, and so would the rest here, if they are well-advised.⁴⁶—[5.] On hearing this, they all agreed not to make the present meeting a debauch; but to drink thus⁴⁷ as they pleased.—Since then this has been decreed, said Eryximachus, that we are to drink as each one pleases, and that there is to be no compulsion, the next thing I have to propose is, to let the flute-playing damsel, who has just come in, go away and play to herself, or, if she pleases, to the women within; but for us to mix with each other to-day in conversation: and on what kind of conversation I am willing, if you wish it, to explain.—This, they all said, they wished, and bade him explain accordingly.

Hereupon Eryximachus said, The commencement then of my speech is in the style of the Melanippe of Euripides,

The tale I have to tell is not my own,⁴⁸

but from Phædrus here. For Phædrus is on every occasion saying to me, with an air of indignation, Is it not a shocking thing, says he, Eryximachus, for hymns and pæans to be made by poets in honour of some other deities; and yet not one amongst so many poets who have been born,⁴⁹ has ever composed a panegyric upon Love, who is a deity of such an age,⁵⁰ and of such a power? But if, on the other hand, you are willing to look carefully into the utilitarian⁵¹ sophists, (you

⁴⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were *νῦν δ' ἂν, εἰ εὖ βουλευοῖντο, καὶ οἱ λοιποί*: where *ἂν* is due to eight MSS., *εἰ* to Orelli on Isocrat. *Περὶ Ἀντιδοσ.* p. 32, *εὖ* to Bast, *Epist. Crit.* p. 13, and to *βουλευοῖντο* I have been led by *ἂν εὖ βουλευοῦνται*, the conjecture of Winckelmann on Euthydem. p. 140. The old edd. have *νῦν δ' αὖ εὖ βούλονται*. Ficinus, "nunc similiter modo cæteri quoque consentiant."

⁴⁷ Stalbaum asserts that *οὕτως* is spoken *δικτυκῶς*. But how any one could by any gesture show that each of the party was to drink as he liked, he does not, nor could he, explain. Plato wrote *αὕτως*, "of his own will." See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 141.

⁴⁸ The whole verse, of which Plato has quoted only the first half, was *Οὐκ ἔμῳς ὁ μῦθος ἄλλ' ἑμῆς μητρὸς πάρα*, as shown by Dionys. Hal. t. ii. p. 58 and 103. Otherwise one might have elicited *Οὐκ ἔμῳς ὁ μῦθος ἔστιν, ὃν μᾶλλον λέγειν*, as Sydenham partly suggested.

⁴⁹ The introduction of *γεγονότων* is due to the notion that "Poeta nascitur, non fit"—

⁵⁰ This is said with reference to the fiction of Cupid being a child and a god at the same time.

⁵¹ This is the exact rendering of *χρηστούς*: for the Sophists in the

will find that some)⁵² have composed encomiums in prose on Hercules, and other persons, as the best of them, Prodicus,⁵³ has done. This, however, is the less wonderful.⁵⁴ But I have lately met with a little book, by a wise man, in which salt has a wondrous praise for its utility; and upon many other things of such a kind you may see encomiums.⁵⁵

time of Plato were, like the Pantologists of the present day, constantly directing public attention to what was useful in a pecuniary view, and laughing down every other pursuit of a more intellectual character. See my article "On the New School of Superficial Pantology," in *The Church of England Quarterly Review*, vol. i. p. 446—474.

⁵² For the preservation of *εὐρήσεις* we are indebted to Ficinus, who has "Atqui, si vis quærere, invenies profecto Sophistas disertos—laudasse." Hence I suspect that *εὐροις τινας ἄν* has dropt out after *σοφιστῶν*—for *φ* and *ερ* are easily confounded in MSS., as shown by Schow on Hesych., where in *Αἰνόν* the MS. has *ρήμον* for *ρήμερον*. Stalbaum says that *ξυγγράφειν* is governed by *δαιμόν*. But he adds, as if half ashamed of the absurdity, that Ficinus has "invenies sophistas—laudasse," and seems to have read in his MS. *εὐρήσεις*—*ξυγγράφειν*, with *αὐτοῦς* understood.

⁵³ Plato alludes to the dissertation of Prodicus, entitled 'Ὀραί, so much admired, as we learn from Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists*, and from Xenophon in his *Memoirs of Socrates*. The allegorical story of the Judgment of Hercules is related by the last-mentioned writer, although, as he tells us himself, not in the pompous words of the original author, but in his own more simple style. S.

⁵⁴ In defence of *καὶ* after *μᾶλλον*, to which Bast and Thiersch objected, and which is omitted by two MSS., Stalbaum has produced, as usual, passages not in point.

⁵⁵ Tzetzes in *Chiliad*. ii. 385, and Erasmus in the commencement of his "Stultitiæ Laus," and in the letter to Sir Thomas More prefixed to it, has given a list of similar treatises; to some of which Wolf has alluded in his *Prolegomen*. p. xxxv. to the Leptinean oration of Demosthenes; and Wyttenbach on Plutarch *Moral*. t. i. p. 385, ed. Lips., and to the authors quoted by both, may be added Pseudo-Demetr. *Περὶ Ἐργῶν*. § 172. Fronto's Encomium on Smoke and Dust, and Carelessness, published by Maii, who, in p. 361, refers to the praise of Poverty in Xenophon's *Banquet*, iv. 29, and to that of the Gnat, by Dio Chrysostom, who likewise wrote the praise of a parrot, as stated by Synesius; while Fronto, in p. 41, alludes to M. Cæsar's praise of Sleep. Appian's Encomium on Adultery is given by Clemens Romanus, i. p. 665, ed. Coteler.; while amongst the unedited works of Michael Psellus, says Fabricius in *Biblioth. Græc*. T. x. p. 71, are to be found Encomiums on Bugs, Lice, Fleas, and Wine. With regard to the praise of salt, this probably came from the school of Pythagoras. At least in the *Timæus*, p. 60, E., there is the remarkable expression *ἀλῶν—θειοφιλις σῶμα*: while by comparing Clemens Alexandrin. in *Cohortat*. p. 13, Plutarch in *Sympos*. ii. p. 685, E., and *Athen*. viii. p. 359, E., some idea may be formed of the matter contained in the praise of salt; the anonymous author of which was, I suspect, no less a person than Socrates.

⁵⁶(Strange) that about such subjects many should have bestowed great care,⁵⁶ but that not a single person should ever to this day have dared to hymn Love worthily; and thus has a deity so great been neglected. Now, in all this, Phædrus seems to me to speak correctly. I am desirous therefore to bring at the same time my contribution to this subject, and to gratify him; and at the same time it seems to me becoming for the persons here on the present occasion to give glory to the god. If then this seems good to you likewise, there will be a sufficient subject of discussion before us. For I vote that each of us shall speak in praise of Love, an oration, the most beautiful he can, proceeding on the right-hand side; and that Phædrus shall begin, as he is reclining at the top, and is, moreover, the father of the discussion.—Not a single person, Eryximachus, said Socrates, will give a contrary vote.⁵⁷ For neither would I say no, who say that I know nothing else than the matters relating to love; nor would Agatho, nor Pausanias,⁵⁸ nor would, I ween,⁵⁹ Aristophanes, whose whole occupation is relating to Dionysus and Aphrodité;⁶⁰ nor

✓ ⁵⁶—⁵⁶ The Greek is, τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν περὶ πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, where τὸ—ποιήσασθαι is compared with the passages quoted by critics from Aristoph. *Opn.* 5 and 7, *Barp.* 741, *Nep.* 816, Plato *Phædon.* p. 99, B., to prove that τὸ with an infinitive is expressive of astonishment. But in that case, as Stephens was the first to remark, one would have expected ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡμελῆσθαι τὸν θεὸν in the next clause. And so Ficinus has translated, "In his itaque studiose versari, Amorem vero, tantum deum, a nullo adhuc in hunc usque diem pro dignitate laudari, sed usque contemni, cui non gravissimum videtur," as if his MS. had *τινὶ οὐ πάνδεινον εἶναι δοκοῖν αὐν*; words that might have easily dropt out from their similarity to ταῦτα δὲ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι. Be this however as it may, it is evident that τοιούτων could not be separated from περὶ by μὲν, and that the antithesis in *μηδ' ἔνα* requires πολλοὺς, which is requisite likewise before ποιήσασθαι: for in this formula the accusative is and must be found with the verb. And so I have translated. Plato wrote τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων περὶ πολλοὺς σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, where τῶν is due to two MSS.

⁵⁷ The Greek is *ψηφιεῖται*, in allusion to the pebble which was used for voting in public meetings.

⁵⁸ Ficinus has "*nec etiam Agathon et Pausanias adversabuntur.*" For he probably found in his MS., *οὐτ' ἀνταίποιον ἄν*, in lieu of *οὐτε που*, where *που* has no meaning, and rarely, if ever, follows *οὐτε*.

⁵⁹ In defence of οὐδὲ μὴν after οὐτε,—οὐτε, Stalbaum refers to Herbet on Xenophon's *Symposium*, p. 17. He ought rather to have suggested, οὐδ', οἷμ', ἄν, as I have translated.

⁶⁰ Stalbaum appositely refers to Lucian's *Κρονιάδ.* § 34, where Dionysus, Aphrodité, and the Graces are similarly united with the idea of "a feast of reason and a flow of soul."

would any one else of these whom I see here. And yet it is not fair and equal for us who are reclining the lowest down. However, if those who are before us shall speak sufficiently and well, it will be enough for us. Let Phædrus then, with fortune favouring, begin and make a panegyric upon Love. [6.] To this all the rest assented, and bade him do, as Socrates (had said). Of all then which each person said, neither had Aristodemus a perfect recollection, nor have I of all that he told me: but⁶¹ what was said, and by whom, that seemed to be⁶¹ worth remembering on these points, I will detail the speech of each individual.

He told me then, as I say, that Phædrus first began somewhat after this way, and said—Love is a deity mighty and wonderful amongst men and gods, on many other accounts, and not the least as regards his origin. For to be one of the oldest of the gods, is a thing (said he)⁶² of honour. And there is

^{61—61} Misled as usual by his superstitious reverence for what he considers the best MSS., Stalbaum would omit, as they do, *εἶναι* after *ἀξιωμαζόμενον*, as if *ἰδοῖ* could thus stand by itself in any but incorrect Greek. Had he not been misled likewise by Ast, who fancies that *ἀξιωμαζόμενον* is an admissible construction, he might perhaps have seen that Plato wrote, *ἃ δὲ κάλλιστα ἀκούειν ἰδοῖ μοι ἀξιωμαζομενῶτα ῥ' εἶναι*, i. e. "But what seemed to me the most beautiful to hear, and worthy to be remembered:" which makes a somewhat better sense than the rubbish of the received text, *ἃ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὦν ἰδοῖ μοι ἀξιωμαζομενῶτα εἶναι*. For thus *μάλιστα* and *κάλλιστα* are frequently confounded, as shown by Porson on Phæn. 878: and while *κάλλιστ' ἀκούειν* may be compared with *Ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀκούειν—καλὰ* in Soph. Aj. 1209, very luckily has *ἀξιωμαζόμενα* been found in three MSS.; for it leads to *ἀξιωμαζομενῶτα*: and thus *ἰδοῖ—ἀξιωμαζομενῶτα εἶναι* will be similar to *ἰδοῖεν αὐτοῖς παρηγία εἶναι* in Thucyd. i. 72, and a similar union of *δοκεῖν* with a verbal adjective in—*τίος* and *εἶναι* will be found in i. 118, ii. 13, v. 15, vi. 25, vii. 73; in Xenophon, K. A. iv. 4, 14, iv. 5, 1; in Arrian, E. A. ii. 26, 3; in Suidas 'Ἐξαίρετα and Πολιμηγία, and here in § 40, *ἰδοῖ μοι ἐπιθερίον εἶναι*. Sometimes the *εἶναι* is wrongly omitted, as shown by Thucyd. vii. 60, *βουλευτρία ἰδοῖ*. Appian i. p. 67, Schw., *Πύρρῳ πολιμηγία—ἰδοῖ*. Agathias ii. p. 60, *ἀποκορευτρία—αὐτῶ—ἰδοῖ*; and Suidas in 'Ἀπρία, and 'Ἀποκορευτρία. In Thucyd. i. 140, MS. g. has correctly *ἐμβουλευτρία μοι εἶναι* instead of *ὄντα*.

⁶² Bast was the first to object to *ἡ δ' ὅς*, which could not be thus introduced in a direct speech. It is however partially supported by *εἶδος* in Stobæus Physic. p. 154, by the aid of which Crenzer on Plotinus Περὶ Κάλλους, p. 521, proposed to read *τίμιον ὄνειδος*, similar to *καλὸν ὄνειδος* in Soph. Phil. 476, *κάλλιστον ὄνειδος* in Phæn. 828. But such an oxymoron would be here out of place. Accordingly in a Vienna periodical he suggested that *ἡδός* was an abbreviation for *ἡσιόδος*, quoted just after—

a proof of this. For the parents of Love neither exist, nor are said by any individual⁶³ or poet to exist.⁶⁴ Now Hesiod says, (in Theogon. 116,)

Chaos was first produced; Earth rose the next,
Wide-bosomed, a firm seat for all; then Love—

⁶⁵ the poet says that next after Chaos were born these two, Earth and Love.⁶⁶ And Parmenides says of ⁶⁶ Generation, that it ⁶⁶

Plann'd that of all the gods Love should be first.⁶⁷

Acusilaus too agrees with Hesiod. Thus on many sides it is confessed that Love is among the most ancient (of things). And being the most ancient,⁶⁷ he is the cause to us of the greatest good.⁶⁷ For to a person⁶⁸ being now young,⁶⁸ I cannot men-

wards. He should have proposed *τίμιον ἴδος*, "a seat of honour." Timæus has *Ἐδος τὸ ἀγαλμα καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἵδονται*. See Heindorf on Phædon. p. 111, B.

⁶³ Both Hemsterhuis on Lucian Necom. p. 484, and Ruhnken on Longin. § 34. I understand from *ιδιώτης*, "a prose writer," as opposed to a poet. But in Greek *λόγιος* is a prose writer.

⁶⁴ This is not quite true to the letter, as may be seen in the learned, ingenious, and elegant "Diatrise in Euripid." of Valckenaer, p. 154—161.

^{65—66} As all the words within the numerals are omitted by Stobæus, Heyne, in *Memoires de l'Academ. Paris*, t. i. p. 377, wished to expunge them, conceiving they had been interpolated from Aristot. *Metaphys.* 3, 4, καὶ γάρ οὗτος (ὁ Παρμενίδης) κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντός γένεσιν, Πρώτιστον μὲν, φησὶν, Ἐρωτα θεῶν μητίσαστο πάντων. But Hommel more correctly rejects only, φησὶ μετὰ—Ἐρωτα; unless it be said that from Ἐρος φησὶν μετὰ is to be elicited Ἐρος καὶ Ὀρφεὺς ὅτι μετὰ. For we thus obtain an additional testimony to the truth of the theory, and can now understand, better than before, why Plato should speak shortly afterwards of the number of the witnesses.

^{66—68} Hermann, as stated by Koch in his Preface to *Additament. in Timæi Lex.* p. xii., quoted by Stalbaum, was the first to see that *Γένεσις* was personified by Parmenides. But he did not see that *ὄν* had dropt out between *λίγει* and *πρώτιστον*, which even Stalbaum has stumbled upon; and still less that, as Simplicius on Aristot. *Physic.* p. 127, testifies to Parmenides holding that there was θεῶν αἰτίαν δαίμονα ἐν μίσῳ πάντων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ, Plato probably wrote, Παρμενίδης δὲ αἰτίαν τὴν Γένεσιν λίγει ὅτι Πρώτιστον μὲν Ἐρωτα θεῶν μητίσαστο πάντων, Δαίμονα δ' ἐν μίσῳ πάντων, ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ.

^{67—68} In the words *Πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὢν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἰτιός ἐστιν*, lies hid, I suspect, a verse of Parmenides, *Πρεσβύτατος δ' ἀγαθῶν νῦν αἰτιός ἐστι μεγίστων*.

^{68—69} In the words *εὐθύς νῦν ὄντι* there is a corruption which I could easily correct, if this were the place for a lengthened discussion.

tion what is a greater good than a useful lover, or ⁶⁹ to a lover than an object of affection. For that, which should lead persons who are to live correctly through the whole of life, neither consanguinity ⁷⁰ is able to produce in us, nor honours, nor wealth, nor any thing else, so well as love; ⁷¹ I mean some such thing as ⁷¹ the shame for base acts, and the love of glory for honourable deeds. For without these (two) it is not possible for a state or individual to accomplish any thing great or honourable. I assert therefore that he, who loves, if he is found committing any base act, or suffering one from any body, and failing through cowardice to revenge himself, would not be in so much pain, when seen by his father and friends or any one else, as by the object of his affection. In the very same manner, we see that the party loved is vehemently ashamed before the parties loving, if discovered doing any dishonourable act. If then there could be any contrivance to form a city or an army of persons loving and loved, it is not possible for them to regulate ⁷² their own country better ⁷³ than by abstaining from every thing base, and having a desire to be honoured by one another ⁷³ (for what is noble); ⁷³ and fighting side by side, such persons, although few in number, would conquer, so to say, the whole world. For a lover would less endure to be seen by his beloved, when deserting his post, or throwing away his arms, than by all the others; and in preference to this, ⁷⁴ either to leave behind his beloved (when

⁶⁹ Hommel reads *ἢ* for *καὶ*, to balance the sentence.

⁷⁰ In lieu of *συγγένεια*, Wyttenbach, in *Epist. Crit.* p. 9, suggested *εὐγένεια*. But Ast refers to *Rep.* vi. p. 491, C., *κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια*. But there Reynders would read *εὐγένεια*, similar to *οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτος οὔτε κάλλος οὔτε εὐγένεια* in Musonius.

^{71—71} As two things are mentioned, *αἰσχύνη* and *φιλοτιμία*, it is evident that Plato wrote, *λίγω δὴ δύο τῷ τούτῳ*, not *λίγω δὲ δὴ τι τοῦτο*—and just before, not *δ' χρῆ*, but *ἀ χρῆ*, and just after, *τούτοις* instead of *τούτων*. The passages produced by Ast in defence of *λίγω δὲ δὴ τι τοῦτο* are not in point.

^{72—72} Stalbaum says, that after *τὴν ταυτῶν* is to be understood *παλιν*. But Ficinus has, what is better suited to the train of thought—"fortiter agerent administrarentque singula."

^{73—73} Ficinus has, what is evidently required by the balance of the sentences—"dum per verecundiam a turpibus abstinere, et ad honesta, quasi quadam emulatione contenderent." From which Ast was led to read *καὶ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, similar to *ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν*, a little above.

^{74—74} Instead of *καὶ μὴν ἐγκαταλείπειν γε τὰ παιδικὰ*, where *καὶ μὴν*

he has fallen,) ⁷⁴ or not to assist him when in danger, he would rather die many deaths. There is not a man so much of a coward as that Love would not divinely inspire him to deeds of valour, and make him equal to the very best by birth. [7.] And in good truth, what Homer says, ⁷⁵ that a god did into some heroes breathe a spirit, this, from himself produced, does Love to (all) ⁷⁶ lovers furnish. Moreover, to die (for another) ⁷⁷ lovers alone are ready, not only men, but women too. Of this Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, affords a sufficient proof amongst the Hellenes in behalf of this reasoning, in being alone willing to die for her husband, although his father and mother were then living; whom she so much excelled in affection through love as to prove them to be aliens (in blood) to their own son, and relations only in name. And having done this deed so noble, she was thought by not only men, but the gods likewise, to have effected that, although many had achieved many and noble acts, to only some, ⁷⁸ to be easily counted, did the gods grant this as a gift, for the soul to return from Hades; but ⁷⁹ they sent her back, struck with admiration of the deed. Thus do even the gods especially honour the zeal bestowed on Love and valour. But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, did the gods send back from Hades with his object unaccomplished, by showing him the phantom merely of his

—*γῆ* and *ἐν* before *καταλιπεῖν* are equally unintelligible, I have translated, as if the Greek were—*ἡ κείμενον καταλιπεῖν αὐτοῦ τὰ παιδικά*: for *κείμενον* is properly opposed to the subsequent *κινδυνεύοντι*, and both are united to *τὰ παιδικά*, as in Phædrus, p. 239, A., et 240, A. With regard to the introduction of *κείμενον*, they who remember the battle in the Iliad over the fallen body of Patroclus, will see at once that it is the very word here required to complete the sense.

⁷⁵ The passages alluded to are, Il. K. 482, and O. 262, where the heroes are respectively Diomed and Hector.

⁷⁶ To balance the preceding *ἐνίοις*, Orelli on Isocrat. *Περὶ Ἀντιδοσ.* p. 325, corrected *τοῖς* into *πᾶσιν*.

⁷⁷ Ficinus has alone "*pro alio mori amantes soli*," what the sense requires. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γ' ἰρωμένων—οἱ ἰρώντες*.

⁷⁸ The whole list of those who, after dying, were said to have come back to earth, is confined to Eurydice, Alcestis, and Sisyphus.

⁷⁹ The *ἀλλὰ* here is so manifestly absurd, that one would have expected even Stalbaum would not have ventured to defend it. Ficinus has "*continuo*," which would lead to *αὐτίκα*, or rather *αὐτίκα μάλα*. For so those words are constantly united; and we should thus perceive the peculiarity in the fate of Alcestis, who, as we learn from the play of Euripides, was restored to life on the very day of her death.

wife, for whom he went, and not restoring her real self; because he appeared to act the coward, as being a harper, and not daring, like Alcestis, to die for Love, but contriving to go alive to Hades. Hence on this very account did the gods impose on him a punishment, and caused his death to take place at the hands of women. Not so did they honour him, as they did Achilles, the son of Thetis, whom they sent even to the islands of the blest,⁸⁰ because, having heard from his mother, that he would die himself, after he had slain Hector, but that if he slew not Hector, he would return home and die an old man, he dared to prefer, after aiding his lover Patroclus and avenging his fate, not only to die for him, but over him when dead. From whence the gods, being amazingly struck with admiration, honoured him exceedingly, because he had valued so highly the person who had loved him. For Æschylus⁸¹ talks idly, in saying that Achilles was in love with Patroclus; for Achilles was more handsome not only than Patroclus, but all the other heroes, and still beardless, and moreover, as Homer says,⁸² much younger. But in reality the gods honour most the valour, which is shown in behalf of love: they still feel a greater wonder and admiration, and act more kindly, when the person loved has an affection for the lover, than when the lover has for the loved. For the lover is more of a godlike thing than the loved, as being inspired by a god. On this account did (the gods) honour Achilles even more than Alcestis, by sending him to the islands of the blest. Thus then do I assert that Love is the most ancient, and most honoured, and most powerful of the gods, for the attainment of valour and happiness by man both during life and in the grave.

[8.] Some such speech as this, Aristodemus told me, did Phædrus pronounce. But after Phædrus, there were some others, which he did not well remember; and omitting these, he repeated that of Pausanias, who said:—

The subject, Phædrus, does not seem to me to have been fairly set before us, when it was simply proposed to make an

⁸⁰ On the islands of the blest, see Gorg. p. 523, A. § 106, Menex. p. 235, D. § 2, Horat. Epod. 16.

⁸¹ This was doubtless, as Fischer remarks, in the "Myrmidons;" in the fragments of which play there are passages relating to this very point.

⁸² In *Il.* A. 787.

encomium upon Love. This would have been well had there been but one Love; ⁸³but now it is not, for one there is not.⁸³ Since then one there is not, the better way is for it to be stated beforehand which kind of love we ought to praise. I will endeavour then to put the question on a right footing, and to state first what Love we ought to praise; and then to praise in a manner worthy of the god. We all know that without Love Venus is not. If then there were only one Venus, there would have been only one Love. But since there are two, there must be likewise two Loves. And how are there not two,⁸⁴ one the elder, and who had no mother, a daughter of Uranus, (Heaven,) whom we name the celestial; the other, younger, a daughter of Jupiter and Dione, whom we call the vulgar. It is necessary then for the Love who works with the latter Venus to be called the vulgar, but the other, the celestial. All the gods, indeed, we ought to praise; but we must endeavour to state what each has obtained by lot. For every action is in this state; it is itself by itself neither honourable nor base; as for instance, what we are now doing, either drinking, or singing, or discoursing, there is not one of these acts which is good, itself by itself, but it turns out such in the doing. Rightly performed ⁸⁵[according as it may be done]⁸⁵ it is right and honourably; not rightly performed, it is dishonourable. So in the case of loving, not every Love is honourable, and worthy to be highly praised, but that which impels to loving honourably. The one then belonging to the vulgar Venus is a Love truly vulgar, and works out

^{83—83} Ficinus omits all between the numerals; and so does Shelley, who here, as elsewhere, has looked rather to the Latin translation than to the original Greek; which is *νῦν δὲ, οὐ γὰρ ἑστιν εἷς*. But Plato wrote, both here and in *Apolog.* p. 38, B., *νῦν δὲ οὐ· οὐ γὰρ ἑστιν εἷς*. For thus *οὐ* is found at the end of one sentence, and followed by *οὐ* at the commencement of another in *Criton*, p. 46, D. § 6, *τὰς μὲν, τὰς δὲ οὐ οὐδὲ*, or by another vowel, as in *Phædon*, p. 73, B., *ἀπιστῶ—οὐ αὐτὸ δὲ*.

⁸⁴ This distinction between the two kinds of Venus was a part of ancient mythology, as shown by the Banquet of Xenophon, where Socrates says, "Whether there be one Venus only, or two, both celestial and vulgar, I know not; but this I do know, that there are altars and temples and sacrifices to each apart; to the vulgar, such as are rather trivial, to the celestial, such as are more holy. And you may fairly conjecture that the vulgar sends upon us sensual loves; but the celestial, those of the soul and of friendship, and of honourable acts.—S.

^{85—85} The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

whatever may happen; and this it is which inspires the worthless love; and such persons in the first place love women not less than boys; and next, of such as they love, (they love) the bodies rather than the minds; ⁸⁶and then of persons the most silly that can be, ⁸⁶through their looking only to the act of enjoyment, and disregarding the doing so honourably or not. And hence it results that they do whatever they may have in their power, ⁸⁷whether good or the reverse. ⁸⁸For there is even from the younger deity much than from the other, and partaking of the female and male in its generation. ⁸⁸But that from the celestial Venus, ⁸⁹in the first place, not partaking of the female, but only of the male, [and this is the love of boys]: next of the elder, and a not sharing in lust; ⁸⁹and hence they who are inspired by this love, turn

⁸⁶—⁸⁶ Instead of the nonsensical Greek *ἐπειτα, ὥς ἂν δύνωνται, ἀνοητάων*, Ficinus has, what the sense manifestly requires, “et sine mente homines potius quam prudentes,” which Shelley has adopted. To soften the absurdity in *ὥς ἂν δύνωνται*, Sydenham translates, “the silliest creatures they can light on,” which would be in Greek *ὡς ἂν δύνωνται εὐρίην, τῶν ἀνοητάων*: while Schütz suggested, what has been found subsequently in two MSS., *ἀνοητάως*, adopted originally by Stalbaum, despite the sensible remark of Ast, that it was at variance with the chain of thought.

⁸⁷ In lieu of *τύχῳσι*, which could not be thus applied, I have translated as if the Greek were *γ' ἔχῳσι*.

⁸⁸—⁸⁸ The Greek for this mass of nonsense is, “*Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς θεοῦ νεωτέρας τε οὐσης πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἐτίρας καὶ μετεχούσης ἐν τῇ γενέσει καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος*”: where, says Stalbaum, *πολὺ* is to be referred to *νεωτέρας*, for *πολὺ* thus follows the comparative elsewhere in Plato. But it could not do so after the intervention of two words, *τε οὐσης*. And even if it could, the point at issue has nothing to do with the age of the two kinds of Venus respectively. The passage has evidently been tampered with, as shown by two MSS. omitting *καὶ*, and one reading *ἀρεος* for *ἄρρενος*. Ficinus has “Affectus enim hujus modi a Venere illa juniore et utriusque sexus in generatione particeps profuit:” who has thus omitted *καὶ* and *πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἐτίρας*.

⁸⁹—⁸⁹ Here again is a mass of nonsense, which Ast and Stalbaum have indeed been able to swallow; but Wolf and Schütz more correctly rejected the words between brackets as a manifest interpolation; while Ruckert as correctly objected to *πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετεχούσης*, which would require *οὐσης* after *πρεσβυτέρας*, to say nothing of *ὁ δὲ* thus standing without its logical copula, in the shape of a verb. In the place of all this rubbish how clear is the language of Ficinus, “Amor autem, qui cœlestem sequitur Venerem, quæ non fœminei, sed masculi tantum sexus in generatione est particeps ipse quoque genus respicit masculinum; deinde quoniam antiquioris Veneris pudicæque est comes, et ipse petulantis

themselves to the male, feeling an affection for that which is naturally of greater strength and possesses more of mind. [9.] And any one would in the boy-love itself discover those sincerely impelled by this passion. For they do not love boys, but (youths),⁹⁰ when they are beginning to possess mind.

⁹¹ Now this is near the time of their obtaining a beard.⁹¹ But they who begin from this date to love, are, I think, prepared, as if about to associate through the whole of life together, and to live in common, ⁹²and not, after having obtained an object in an hour of imprudence, through cheating him as a youth, to go away, laughing at him, and to run to another one.⁹² There ought then to be a law not to love a boy, in order that much care may not be wasted upon an uncertainty; for it is uncertain to what end may come that relating to boys, whether of vice or virtue, as regards the body or soul. Such a law do men of virtue indeed lay down, themselves for themselves, of their own accord; but we ought to compel in some such way as this those vulgar lovers; just as we compel them, as far as we can, not to fall in love with free-born women. For it is such lovers as these who give rise to the reproach, that, as some dare to say, it is shameful to gratify a lover. Now they say so with a view to lovers of this kind, from witnessing their conduct at once unseasonable and unjust. For certainly no act done decently and lawfully can bring with it justly blame. And indeed the law relating to love in other states is easy to be understood, for it has been defined with simplicity; but that one here, and that at Sparta, are com-

omnis est expers." But that he found in his MS. the Greek words answering to this version may fairly admit of doubt.

⁹⁰ Ficinus has alone "*pueros non amant, sed adolescentes, cum mente valere jam coperint*," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐ γὰρ ἐρωσι παῖδων ἀλλ', ἐπειδὴν ἤδη ἀρχονται νοῦν ἔχειν, νίων*. Bekker has adopted ἀλλ' ἦ from Stephens's conjecture, from which nothing however is gained.

⁹¹—⁹² The words within the numerals Schütz proposed to reject. In their stead Ficinus has a remarkable supplement—"Hujusmodi vero genus exercendæ menti propinquius est, ad eamque exercendam familiaritas inter illos inquitur," as if his MS. had not only, in lieu of *γενειάσκειν*, the reading *γίνει δακρύ*, found in seven MSS., but something else not found there, nor any where else at present. But τὸ *γενειάσκειν*, as Stalbaum observes, answers to *ἡβη χαριστάρη* in Hom. Od. x. 279.

⁹²—⁹³ Here again the version of Ficinus offers a remarkable variation, "*neque amatum decipere, neque ab uno in alterum amandum abire; neque enim pueros adhuc mentis expertes amant, quos deinde exoletos irideant et relinquant*."

plex. For in Elia, and amongst the Bœotians, and wherever there are not persons clever in speaking, the law is laid down simply, that it is honourable to gratify a lover; nor would any one there, either young or old, say that it is disgraceful, in order, I presume, that they who endeavour to persuade over the youths, may not be put to trouble, as being unskilled in speaking. But by those⁹³ in Ionia, and many other places,⁹⁴ [where persons live under the barbarians,]⁹⁴ it is held to be dishonourable. For through their tyrannical governments this, and the love of wisdom and of gymnastic exercises,⁹⁵ (are considered) disgraceful. For it is not, I conceive, to the interest of the rulers that high thoughts should be engendered in their subjects, nor strong friendships formed, nor societies in common; all which⁹⁶ those other things and love especially is wont to introduce. And thus by experience learnt the tyrants here. For the love of Aristogeiton and the firm friendship of Harmodius dissolved their power.⁹⁷ [10.] And thus, wherever it has been held disgraceful to gratify a lover, it has been so laid down through the depravity of the legislators, and the desire of possession in the rulers, and the want of manliness in the ruled; but wherever it is simply enjoined, it is through the listlessness of soul in the legislators. But here the law is placed upon a better footing; although, as I said before, it is not easy to understand it. For to a person considering⁹⁸ that it is reputed more honourable to love openly

⁹³ In lieu of τῆς δ' Ἰωνίας, which Bast and Stalbaum vainly attempt to defend, Ast would read τοῖς δ' Ἰωνίαις. For η and οι are frequently confounded in MSS. as shown in Orest. 1127, and 1694. I should however prefer τοῖς δ' ἀπ' Ἰωνίας, similar to "Pastor ab Amphrýso," in Virgil, and in the other passages quoted by Blomfield on Æsch. S. Th. 259.

⁹⁴ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

⁹⁵ The gymnastic exercises are thus united to philosophy, because it was at the gymnasia that the young men became acquainted with their clever, but frequently profligate instructors, as remarked by Cicero in Tuscul. iv. 33.

⁹⁶ The Greek is ὁ δὲ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποεῖν, where Schleiermacher was the first to object correctly to πάντα. But he incorrectly suggested ταῦτα. He should have proposed, as I have translated, ὁ δὲ πάντα φιλεῖ τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως ἐμποεῖν, similar to the version of Ficinus, "quæ cum ab aliis tum vel maxime ab amore gigni consueverunt," although πάντα is there omitted.

⁹⁷ On the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, see Thucyd. vi. 54, and the authors quoted in the dissertation of Meursius De Peisistrato, § 13.

⁹⁸ As there is nothing to which the dative ἐνθυμηθέντι can be referred,

than secretly, and especially the most nobly born and the best, even though they be uglier than others; and on the other hand, that ⁹⁹the exhortation to a lover from all parties is wonderful, as if he were not doing something disgraceful, and that it appears to be honourable to the party obtaining, but not obtaining disgraceful; and that towards making the attempt to obtain, the law grants a permission to the lover, while doing wonderful ¹⁰⁰acts, to be commended, such acts as, should a person dare to do when pursuing any thing else whatever, and desirous to accomplish it, except this, he would obtain as the fruit of his doings, the greatest reproaches of philosophy.¹ For if with a desire either to obtain money from any one, or an office in the government, or a power of any other kind, a person would be willing to do what lovers do towards their boy-loves, by making supplications, and urgent requests [in their beggings],² and swearing oaths, ³lying down at their doors, and willingly enduring a servitude³ such as not even a slave would endure, he would be

we may adopt *ἐνθυμήθην*, found in three MSS., or read from conjecture *ἐνθυμήθητε*, addressed to the parties present.

^{99, 100} To others I must leave to understand, what I cannot, *θαυμαστή* and *θαυμαστά*. Wyttenbach, according to Reynders, would render *θαυμαστός* "agreeable," a meaning which that word never has nor could have. I could have understood *θεμιστή* and *θεμιστά*, for the whole question is about what may be legally done. Ficinus has "communis omnium cohortatio." For he either did not understand *θαυμαστή*, or his MS. omitted it.

¹ Instead of *φιλοσοφίας*, which Schleiermacher, Bekker, and Hommel would reject as having dropt from the clouds, Creuzer would read *φλυαρίας*, but another scholar, says Stalbaum, *φλυατίας*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὐ φαύλης ἀσοφίας*, i. e. "of not a little folly." Compare Rep. v. p. 457, A., *ἀτελὴ δὴ τοῦ γελοίου οὐ σοφίας δρίπων καρπὸν*: iii. p. 403, *ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφίξοντα*. Or we may read *ἀφιλοσοφίας*, formed from *ἀφιλόσοφος*, found in Phædr. p. 256, C., *ἰδὼν δὲ διαίτη φορτικωτέρῃ τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῃ—χρήσονται*.

² The words *ἐν ταῖς δήσεσιν* are evidently superfluous after *ικεσίας* and *ἀντιβολήσεις*, as shown by Lex. Bekker, Anecd. i. p. 407. *Ἀντιβολήσεις δήσεις καὶ ἱκεσία—πλάτων ἐν Συμπόσιῳ*. What the author really wrote, may be guessed from a celebrated story in Petronius.

³ The Greek is *κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις καὶ ἰθιλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν*. But as there is nothing to govern *κοιμήσεις*, and *ἰθιλοντες* is superfluous after the preceding *ἰθιλοι*, Plato wrote perhaps *κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις καταθλιβόντες δουλείας τε δουλεύειν*, where *τε* would couple *ἰθιλοι ποιεῖν* and *δουλεύειν*. Ficinus either found in his MS. or formed out of his own head something more than is in the Greek text at present—"supplex ore et obtestetur, ad fores noctu jaceat et sedula quadam ob-

stopped from acting in this way both by friends and enemies the latter reproaching him for his fawning and want of spirit, and the former giving him advice, and feeling ashamed on his behalf. But even a grace follows⁴ the lover when doing all this; and he is allowed by the law to do so without reproach, as performing some very honourable act. But the most terrible thing is what the multitude say, that there is to him alone, after swearing an oath, a pardon from the gods for transgressing it. ⁵“For an oath, they say, of Venus is no oath.”⁶ Thus both gods and men give all kinds of licence to the lover, as says the law here. In this way then a person would imagine that in this state it is held a very honourable thing both to love and to be the friend to a lover. [11.] But when we see that parents, after appointing instructors over the loved, do not permit them to have any intercourse with their lovers, and that orders are given to this effect to the instructor, and when their equals in age and companions censure them, if they see any such thing taking place, and when the old folks do not stop the censurers, nor abuse them for speaking not correctly, a person, looking to such acts, would imagine, on the contrary, that love of this kind is here held to be disgraceful. But the case I conceive stands thus. As it was stated at the beginning, (to love) is not a simple thing. Taken itself by itself I conceive it to be⁶ neither honourable nor disgraceful; but if carried on honourably, it is honour-

servantia serviat, et in omnibus obsequatur, quæ servus aliquis nec agere vellet nec etiam cogeretur.” The introduction of *ἐθίλοντες* here is owing to *δουλεύειν ἐθίλοντα—δουλείαν* in § 11.

⁴ I have adopted what every critic, with the Zurich editors, has neglected, the elegant reading *ἔπεται* for *ἔπισσι*, furnished by three capital MSS. For thus *Χάρις ἔπεται* is similar to “subsequitur Pudor” in Tibullus.
ἔπεισ

Another MS. has *ἔπεται*. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 175.

⁵ As in the Greek words *Ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὄρκον οὐ φασιν εἶναι*, there lies hid a Choliambic verse, *Ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ φασιν, ὄρκον οὐκ εἶναι*, I have given a metrical version; unless it be said that Plato wrote *Ἀφροδίσιος γὰρ ὄρκος οὐκ ἔμπονιμος*, a line quoted by Suidas in *Ἀφροδίσιος* and *Ταχυβάμονας*. So Shakspeare—“At lovers' perjuries they say Jove laughs.”

⁶ Although three MSS. omit *εἶναι*, which is without regimen here, I think that *νοοῦμαι* has dropt out after *εἶναι*, and so I have translated. Had Stalbaum been aware that the difficulty lay in *εἶναι*, he would not have followed Bast in rejecting *οὐχ* before *ἀπλοῦν* in the sentence preceding.

able; if disgracefully, disgraceful. Now to gratify a vicious person in a vicious manner is (to carry it on) disgracefully; but (to gratify) a virtuous person in a virtuous manner (is to carry it on) honourably. The vicious lover is he of the vulgar kind, who is in love with the body rather than the mind. For he is not a lasting lover, being in love with a thing which is not lasting; since, with the decaying flower of the body, of which he is enamoured,⁷ he goes away on wing,⁸ putting to shame all his speeches and promises. But he who is enamoured of a virtuous character, abides a lover through life, as being closely united with what is itself abiding. Now these our law is desirous to test well and truly, and (to permit)⁹ persons to gratify some, and to fly from others. On this account therefore it exhorts some to pursue, but others to fly; by appointing itself the judge in a contest, and testing of what kind is the lover, and of what the loved. And thus¹⁰ by this very reason¹⁰ it is held by law to be disgraceful, in the first place, for a person to be captivated quickly; in order that time may intervene, which seems to be of many things the fairest test; in the next place, it is held disgraceful for a person to be caught by considerations of money or political power; whether he crouch on being ill used and do not bear up manfully, or whether, being kindly treated as regards pecuniary and political transactions, he does not feel a contempt. For none of these things appear to be firm and abiding, without a generous friendship being produced from them. [12.] There is left then one only way for our law, if the object in view is to gratify honourably the lover.

⁷ Ficinus has "corporis species, quam cupierat, deflorescit," thus showing that he found in his MS. τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἦρα, ἀνθεὶς λήγοντι, and thus too obviating the change proposed by Sydenham, of λήγοντι into λήγοντος, which even Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt.

⁸ In the words ὥςτ' ἀποπτάμενος, there is an allusion to Hom. *Il.* B. 71, as Sydenham was the first to remark.

⁹ As the law could not of itself gratify one party and fly from another, it is evident that, after διαφεύγειν, ἰάν has dropt out, as it has done in Plato and Thucydides, as I have shown on Criton, § 15, n. 27, and in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 121, and to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more.

^{10—10} To prevent the tautology in Οὕτω δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, I should prefer Οὕτω δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐράσεως, i. e. "after this inquiry," where ἐρασις would answer to the preceding βασιανίζειν. Baiter proposes to omit ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, as if those words had dropt from the clouds.

For our law is, as it was in the case of lovers, that for a person willing to endure any servitude whatever for his beloved youth, it is not an act of fawning nor worthy of reproach. ¹¹ Thus then there is left only one other willing servitude not worthy of reproach; ¹¹ and this is that which relates to virtue. For it is a settled law with us, that whoever wishes to pay court to any one, conceiving that through that person he shall become better as regards wisdom, or any other part of virtue, such voluntary servitude again ¹² is neither disgraceful nor an act of fawning. Now these two laws ought to come to the same point, and both the one relating to the love of youths, and the other relating to philosophy and the other parts of virtue, if indeed it is about to be agreed that it is honourable to gratify a lover. For, when the lover and the beloved youth come together, each having their (respective) laws, the one in ministering to the beloved youth, who is complying, ¹³ would justly minister any thing whatever, and the other (being subservient) to the person making him both wise and good, would on the other hand be justly subservient ¹³ in any thing whatever. For the one being able to make a collision ¹⁴ for the attainment of prudence and the other parts of virtue, and the

^{11—11} I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, the connexion in the train of thought; nor indeed could Schütz or Bast; who wished to make some alterations in the text, by which nothing, as far as I can see, is gained.

¹² Instead of *αὐ*, which has no meaning here, one MS. has *οὖν*, which seems to lead to *μένη*.

^{13—13} I have translated as if the Greek were, *ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιοῦν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετοίη*, and *ὑπουργῶν δικαίως αὐ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργοίη*, in lieu of *ὑπηρετῶν—ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν*—and *δικαίως—ὑπουργεῖν*. For it is evident, from the balance of the sentences, that as *ὑπηρετῶν—ὑπηρετοίη* is found in the former, so ought *ὑπουργῶν—ὑπουργοίη* to be found in the latter; and as there is nothing to govern the infinitives, *ὑπηρετεῖν* and *ὑπουργεῖν*, it is equally evident that Plato wrote *ὑπηρετῶν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετοίη*, and *ὑπουργῶν δικαίως ἂν ὑπουργοίη*—a form of expression similar to *θεὸν ὑμνοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν* below in p. 193, D. § 19. Menex. p. 244, *εἰ τις βούλοιο κατηγορεῖσθαι—ὁρθῶς ἂν κατηγοροίη*, and the host of examples produced by Ast on Legg. iii. p. 682, A. By such easy alterations have I restored both sense and syntax to a passage, where neither is to be seen at present. Baiter too would insert *ὑπουργῶν*, to balance the preceding *ὑπηρετῶν*.

¹⁴ From *ξυμβαλίσθαι*, found in seven MSS., it is easy to elicit *ξυμβολὰς θίσθαι*; where *ξυμβολὰς* is used here to indicate at one and the same time a mental and bodily collision. Stalbaum's German translation of *ξυμβάλλεσθαι* is left for those who can understand that language.

other being desirous to acquire instruction¹⁵ and the other parts of wisdom, then only indeed while these two parties¹⁶ come to the same spot,¹⁶ do (the matters relating to) the two laws fall to the same point, (so that) it is honourable for the boy to gratify a lover? And in this case it is no disgrace to be deceived; ¹⁷but in the others it brings on shame (equally) to the party deceived or not.¹⁷ For if any one for the sake of money gratifies a lover as being wealthy, and is disappointed, and obtains no money, through the lover being found to be poor, the act is not at all the less disgraceful; for such a person seems to lay open his character, and that for the sake of money he would minister in any thing to any person. Now this is not honourable. By parity of reasoning, should any one gratify a person, as if he were virtuous, and with the view of becoming himself better through the friendship of the lover, and be disappointed through his being found to be a bad man, and not possessed of virtue, the disappointment nevertheless is still honourable: for on the other hand, this person too seems to have laid open his character, and that for the sake of virtue, and to be made better, he would be ready to (minister)¹⁸ in every thing to every one. Now this, on the other hand, is of all acts the most honourable. So entirely honourable is it to gratify for the sake of virtue. This is that love, the (co-worker) of the celestial Venus, (himself)¹⁹ celestial, and of great value to both the state and individuals, through compelling, both the lover himself and the party

¹⁵ Schütz was the first to reject εἰς before παιδεύειν. For it could not follow κτᾶσθαι. It came from ἴσσι, which was inserted to prevent the sentence from being taken absolutely.

^{16—16} Ast correctly saw that τούτων is to be referred to the two persons, and not to the laws, as shown by the preceding, ὅταν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν ἱραστής τε καὶ παιδικά: but he did not see that Plato wrote τὰ τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ εἰς ταῦτά ξυμπιπτεῖ, ὥστε τὸ—not τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐν ταῦθα ξυμπιπτεῖ, τὸ—as shown by the preceding τῶ νόμῳ ξυμβαλεῖν εἰς ταῦτα—

^{17—17} Stalbaum would supply τὸ χάρισσασθαι as the nominative to αἰσχύνῃν φέρεῖ. And so Ficinus, "in aliis autem omnibus obsequium hujuscemodi turpe censetur, sive obsequentem fallat opinio sive non fallat." Instead however of πᾶσι, one would prefer ἐκ' ἴσα. Sydenham too has "equally."

¹⁸ The balance of the sentences evidently shows that ὑπουργεῖν has dropt out between παντὶ and προθυμηθείη. For thus ὑπηρετεῖν and ὑπουργεῖν are applied to two different parties a little before. Ficinus has "paratum ad omnia ministeria—toleranda."

¹⁹ Ficinus alone has "cælestis et ipse," as if he had found in his MS. καὶ αὐτοῦ οὐράνιος.

beloved by him, to pay considerable attention to virtue; but all the others belong to the other Venus, the vulgar. Thus much, Phædrus, have I to contribute, said he, on the instant, upon the subject of love.

[13.] On Pausanias pausing,—for the wise teach me to talk thus in parities,²⁰—Aristodemus told me, that Aristophanes should have spoken: but either from repletion, or some other cause, a fit of the hiccups happened to come upon him, and he became unable to speak; and he said to the physician, Eryximachus, who was reclining lower, You are the proper person, Eryximachus, either to stop my hiccups, or to speak in my turn, until I cease from them myself.—To which Eryximachus replied, I will do both. I will speak in your turn, and when your hiccups are gone you shall speak in mine: and while I am speaking, should the hiccups cease, through your keeping yourself without breathing for some time, (it is well,) ²¹ but if not, gargle your throat with water; and if they are very violent, take some such thing as this, with which you can tickle ²² your nose and then sneeze; and when you have done so once or twice the hiccups will cease, ²³ be they ever so violent.—You will not say a word, says Aristophanes, before I do so.—Eryximachus then said—

Since then Pausanias, after setting out so well on the sub-

²⁰ This is Sydenham's version of ἴσα. Ast compares the idea with what is now called alliteration, and aptly refers to Empedocles, p. 532, who wrote the following epitaph on Acron, a physician of Agrigentum in Sicily—*Ἄκρον ἱππὸν Ἄκρων Ἄκραγαντῖνον, παρὸς ἄκρου, Κρύπτει κρημνὸς ἄκρος παριδὸς ἀποράτης*: a couplet that surpasses the single line of Pope, "How high his honour holds his haughty head!" Instead however of ἴσα, which the passages quoted by Stalbaum do not defend, I should prefer *διδάσκουσι γὰρ μ' εὐμνοῦσα*, in English, "may teach them prettinesses." Julian, quoted by Stephens, *Χαρίτων γέμοντα καὶ εὐμνοῦσας*.

²¹ On this ellipse see Koen on Gregor. de Dialect. Attic. § 13.

²² All the MSS. of Plato read *κνήσας*. But Stobæus, in xcvi. p. 542, has *κνήσας*, thus confirming what Sydenham saw the sense required. Bekker however and Stalbaum have adopted *κνήσαιο*, the conjecture of Luzac, De Digamia Socratis, p. 125. But *κνήσας* is here required on account of *τὴν πῖνα*.

²³ So Hippocrates, in Aphorism. vi. 13, and Celsus, l. ii. c. 8, tell us, that "if sneezing comes upon a man in a fit of the hiccups, it puts an end to the disorder." Stahl, however, says, in his Collegium Minus, cas. 53, that the rule was true, where the sneezing was spontaneous, but when procured by art, it was never recommended. But he is there speaking, not of accidental hiccups merely, but of such as accompany fever and other dangerous diseases. S.

ject has ended imperfectly, ²⁴ it seems that I must of necessity ²⁴ endeavour to put the finish to the speech. In distinguishing Love into two kinds, he appears to me to have correctly divided. And that the Love exists not only in the soul of man for beautiful persons, but for many other objects in other beings likewise, in the bodies of all animals as well as in the productions of the earth, and, so to speak, in all existing things I seem to myself to see clearly from my own healing art; and how great [and wonderful] ²⁵ a god is Love, who extends his sway over all, as regards things human and divine. And I will commence with the healing art in order that I may give the highest honours to my own profession. [14.] Now the very nature of our bodies partakes of this twofold love. For health and disease in the body are confessedly different and unlike. Now the unlike longs for and loves the unlike. The love in a healthy body is of one kind; the love in a diseased body is of another. Now it is, as Pausanias just stated, honourable to gratify the good amongst men, but dishonourable the vicious; so in the case of bodies themselves, to gratify the good and healthy parts of each is well and necessary, and this it is from which there is the name of the healing art. But (to gratify) the bad and diseased is disgraceful; and he who would act according to art, must deny the gratification. ²⁶ For medical science, to speak summarily, is the knowledge of the feelings of love in the body relating to repletion and evacuation; ²⁷ and he, who in these appetites can distinguish

²⁴⁻²⁵ This will doubtless appear to some a sufficiently accurate translation of *Δοκτὶ τοῖσιν μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δεῖν ἑμὲ*. But whatever Schaefer and Ast may say, Plato would not have written such a tautology as *ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι* and *δεῖν*. He probably wrote *ἀπερίτερον, οὐ δεῖνόν ἑμὲ*—For thus Eryximachus would naturally say of himself, that being “not skilled in oratory” he would attempt to speak. The error is to be traced to the fact that *δεῖνόν* would be written in MSS. *δεῖν*. See my note on *Æsch. Eum.* Ficinus has briefly “quod deest a me nunc impleri.”

²⁶ Stalbaum rejects *καὶ θαυμαστὸς* omitted in the generality of MSS. They were found however in that of Ficinus, as shown by his version, “magnum quoque atque mirabilem.”

²⁷ According to Hippocrates, *Περὶ Ἱερᾶς Νόσου*, sub. fin., “the physician ought to apply to each disease that, which is the most hostile to it, not that which is friendly: for by the latter it acquires vigour; by the former it decays.” And in *Epidem.* v. 5, 7, he says that “to cure is to act against, not to agree with, a disorder.” S.

²⁸ So Hippocrates, *De Flat.* p. 296, ed. Foes., says that “the healing art consists in the drawing off of what is over-abundant, and the supply-

the right love and wrong, is the best physician; while he who causes a change, so as to obtain one in the place of the other, and knows how to infuse a love into those bodies in which it is not, but ought to be, and how to expel a love which is there, but ought not to be, would be a skilful practitioner. For he should be able to cause things in the body, that are most hostile, to be friendly and to love each other. Now the things most hostile are such as are the most contrary, as cold is to hot, [bitter to sweet,]²⁸ dry to moist, (and)²⁹ all things of that sort. Into these things our ancestor Æsculapius, knowing how to introduce love and concord, as say the poets here,³⁰ and as I believe, put together our art. And the present³¹ art of healing is, as I state, entirely regulated by this very deity. And in like manner³² is the gymnastic art, and agriculture.³³ And it is evident to every one, who gives even a little attention to the subject, that music is in the same state as the others, as Heracleitus perhaps meant to say; for he expresses himself not clearly in his language. For he

ing what is deficient; and that whoever can do these things best, is the best physician." S.

²⁸ As Eryximachus, in § 15, omits all mention of bitter and sweet, Ast, with whom Stalbaum agrees, considers the words within brackets to be interpolated, although there is a similar enumeration of opposites in Lysid. p. 216, A.

²⁹ Ficinus has "*cæteraque hujusmodi.*" From whence Wolf would read *kai πάντα*—But in this formula *kai* is omitted, as shown by Heind. on Gorg. p. 517.

³⁰ The poets alluded to, says Wolf, whom Stalbaum follows, were Agathon and Aristophanes. But in that case Plato would have written, *οἷδε δύο ποιηταί*. Moreover as neither the Tragic nor Comic poet had written a philosophical poem, as Empedocles did on the theory of two antagonistic principles in the Universe, it is evident that neither of them would be here alluded to. Plato wrote, I suspect, *οἱ θεῖοι ποιηταί*, similar to *οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταί*, in Legg. ii. p. 366, B.

³¹ Hommel and Stalbaum vainly attempt to defend ἡ τε οὖν: for they did not see that the sense evidently requires ἡ δὲ οὖν—

³² The object of the medical art is the health of the body; that of the gymnastic, its strength. And as they gain their several ends by favouring what is right in the body, and correcting what is wrong, those arts are analogous the one to the other. S.

³³ The soil bears an analogy to the body; and the different kinds of manure and cultivation are similar to food and medicine. A good soil is improved by a manure homogeneous to it; a bad soil, by an opposite method of cultivation, altering its nature. As regards the metaphor, we even now say that such a soil loves such a manure, and that such a plant loves such a soil, when the nature of the one is fitted to that of the other. S.

says that the one disagreeing with itself,²⁴ is carried on like the harmony of the bow and lyre.²⁵ Now it is very irrational to say that harmony differs (from itself); or that it exists from things that differ: but perhaps he meant to say this; that from a sharp and flat, different originally, (a harmony)²⁶ is produced from their subsequent agreement through the art of musicians. For harmony cannot assuredly consist of sharp and flat sounds, while still disagreeing; because harmony is consonance, and consonance is a kind of agreement; and it is impossible for any agreement to exist between things disa-

²⁴ Pseud-Aristotle, in the treatise *Περί Κόσμου*, quotes from Heraclitus what may serve to illustrate this passage. "You must connect the whole and the not whole; the agreeing and the disagreeing; the consonant and the dissonant; and from all things the one, and from the one all things." T.

²⁵ Although much has been written on this dictum of Heraclitus, *ὥσπερ ἀρμονία τόξον τε καὶ λύρας*, not a single person, as far as I know, has seen that, from the expression in Plutarch ii. p. 369, A., *παλίντονος ἀρμονίῃ κόσμον, ὥσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον*, and in ii. p. 1026, B., *Ἡράκλειτος δὲ παλίντροπον ἀρμονίῃν κόσμον, ὅπως περ λύρης καὶ τόξου*, the dark philosopher wrote *παλίντονος ἀρμονίῃ ὥσπερ τόξου καὶ νευρῆς*: by which he meant that in using a bow, while the stick is pushed from the body of the archer, the string is drawn to it, and thus the two are *παλίντονα*. For Heraclitus had doubtless a recollection of the Homeric *Νευρὴν μὲν μαζῷ πύλασιν τόξω δὲ σιδήρον*, in *Il. Δ. 123*; and so too had Plato in *Rep. iv. p. 439, B.*, where he describes the attitude of an archer—*αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθούνται τε καὶ προσίλκονται—ἄλλη μὲν ἀπωθούσα, ἑτέρα δὲ προσαγομένη*; and so too had Virgil in *Æn. ix. 623*, "*Contendit telum diversa quae brachia ducens*;" and it is by this act that we can understand the phrase *παλίντονα τόξα*, properly explained by Hesychius, *τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερα τρεπόμενα*. As regards the confusion between *νευρᾶς* and *λύρας*, I have written something worth reading in my *Excursus on Plato's Hip. Maj. p. 201*. Should it, however, be said, that from the subsequent mention of sharp and flat notes, there must have been some allusion to a musical instrument, it may be replied, that the word *νευρά*, "a string," which, according as it is longer or shorter, varies the quality of the tone, is equally applicable to the string of the lyre and that of the bow.

²⁶ The word *ἀρμονία*, omitted by all the MSS., has been preserved by Ficinus alone, "*deinde per artem musicam consonantibus harmonia conficitur*." If, however, it is to be omitted, as perhaps it ought, we must alter *ἔπειτα* into *εὖ τὰ ὄντα*, not only that *γίγονεν* may recover its nominative, but that the sentence may be similar to the subsequent—*ὡς—ὁ ῥυθμὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχίως καὶ βραδύως διηνηνεγομένων πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ ὁμολογησάντων, γίγναι*: where *ἔπειτα* is omitted, as it should be, while *εὖ τὰ ὄντα* is supported by *διὰ τῆς ἐναντίου τροπῆς ἡρμόσθαι τὰ ὄντα* in *Diog. Laert. ix. 7*, and *ἐκ μαχομένων καὶ ἐναντίων συνίστη τὰ ὄντα* in *Nicomach. Arithmet., ii. p. 59*, ed. Ast.

greeing, so long as they disagree ; ³⁷ [and on the other hand, it is impossible to fit a thing disagreeing and not agreeing]. ³⁷ So too rhythm ³⁸ is produced from notes quick and slow previously disagreeing, but subsequently agreeing. As there the medical art, so here the musical art, introduces in all these ³⁹ an agreement, by affecting a love of and a concord with each other ; and thus music is the knowledge of amorous (unions) relating to harmony and rhythm. [15.] Now in this combination itself of harmony and rhythm, it is not at all difficult to know thoroughly the amorous (unions) ; for the twofold love exists there not at all. But when it shall be necessary to misuse ⁴⁰ rhythm and harmony, applied to mankind, by a person composing, what is called setting to music, or in making a right use of melodies and measure composed already, which is called instruction, there indeed the thing is very difficult, and requires a skilful practitioner. For here recurs the same reasoning (as before), that we must gratify the well-ordered, and those who would be, but are not as yet, better ordered, and we must guard their love. For this is the honourable, the heavenly, the (co-worker with) the heavenly muse. But the (co-worker with) Polyhymnia is the vulgar love, whom a

^{37—37} The words between brackets are evidently an interpolation or corruption. For as *διαφερόμενον* and *μη ὁμολογούν* mean the same thing, the proposition contains a tautology merely, instead of two things being mentioned different from each other. Moreover, *ἀρμόσαι* would require a dative as well as an accusative to follow it. Ficinus has, "quod vero discrepat neque est concors, concinere nequit,"—which Shelley translates "Between things which are discordant and dissimilar there is then no harmony." But this would be merely a repetition of the preceding remark, that "it is impossible for an agreement to exist between things disagreeing, as long as they disagree."

³⁸ By rhythm is here meant, what is now called in music, the time in which a movement is played, either quick or slow.

³⁹ In lieu of *πᾶσι τοῦτοις*, Ficinus seems to have found something else better suited to the train of thought. For his version is "*quem admodum humoribus medicina concordiam, ita vocibus musica consonantium tribuens.*" Shelley's translation is, "So does medicine, no less than music, establish a concord between the objects of its art, producing a love and agreement between adverse things."

⁴⁰ This introduction of *καταχρῆσθαι*, "to misuse," where the sense requires *χρῆσθαι*, "to use," seems very strange. Ficinus has "*cum ad alios rhythmo et harmonia utendum est,*" as if he had found in his MS. *πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους χρῆσθαι*—where *ἄλλους* was written for *ἀνους*, the abbreviated form of *ἀνθρώπους*. Plato probably wrote *καλῶς χρῆσθαι*, as he has a little below, *ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶς χρῆσθαι*.

person ought with caution⁴¹ to bring to whom he may bring it, in order that men may enjoy⁴² the pleasure from it, and that he may not introduce any intemperance; just as in our own art it is a matter of moment to use correctly the appetites relating to the confectioner's art, so that a person may enjoy the pleasure without detriment to health. Thus, in music, and in medicine, and in all other things, both human and divine, we must, as far as is permissible, watch each of those Loves: for both exist. Since even the constitution of the seasons of the year is full of both these; and when the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, which I mentioned before, meet in opposition to each other, with a well-regulated love, and receive a temperate fitting-together and combination, they come bringing in their train a year of good seasons and health to men, and the rest of⁴³ animals, and plants, and do no injury.⁴⁴ But when the love which is mixed up with ungovernable passion becomes rather violent as regards the seasons of the year, it destroys or injures many things. For from such seasons are wont to be produced plagues and many other unequal⁴⁵ disorders on wild beasts and plants. For hoar-frosts, and hail-storms, and mildews are generated from the excessive and disorderly state of such feelings of love with respect to each other; the knowledge of which, as re-

⁴¹ As there is nothing to which *εὐλαβούμενον* can be referred, I suspect that *δοιδόν* has dropt out after *ὃν δεῖ*—

⁴² As Ficinus has "ut voluptatem quidem homines hauriant," it is evident that he found in his MS. *καρπώσονται*, as required by the preceding *οἷς*, not *καρπώσηται*, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain.

⁴³ Ficinus has "animalibus omnibus." Perhaps Plato wrote *πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις*.

⁴⁴ Instead of *ἡδίστης*, which can hardly follow *ἤκει*, we must read *ἀδικεῖ*—just as we find in the following sentence in some MSS. and Stobæus, *διαφθεῖραι καὶ ἀδικεῖν*. For after *ἰπεῖδαν* with a subjunctive correct Greek requires either the present or future—a fact unknown to Stalbaum; who has rejected *διαφθεῖραι*, furnished by the MSS. which he considers the best, and confirmed by "corrumpit" in Ficinus.

⁴⁵ Stalbaum renders *ἀνόμοια* by "inter se dissimilia ac diversa." But though the disorders might be unlike each other, yet how any effect could be produced by such dissimilarity, he neither does nor could tell. Ficinus has, "aliquæ morbi permulti et varii," which, if not a translation of *ἀνόμοια*, is an error for *virulenti*. For Plato wrote *ἄλλα βία καὶ πολλὰ*, similar to *ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ βία*, in p. 195, C. On the loss and confusion of *βία* I have written something, to which the editors of Thucydides should have attended, in my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 261 and 337, and to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more.

gards the movements of the stars and the seasons of the year, is called astronomy.⁴⁶ Further still, all kinds of sacrifice, and the things over which the diviner's art presides—now these are the reciprocal intercourse between gods and men—are conversant about nothing else than the guardianship and the healing⁴⁷ of Love. For every kind of impiety is wont to be generated, if one does not gratify the well-ordered Love, and honour him, and hold him as the chief,—but serve⁴⁸ rather the other,—in every act relating to parents living and dead, and to the gods,⁴⁹ according as it has been ordained for the divining art to superintend the Loves and to heal them.⁴⁹ And again, the divining art is the artificer, skilled (in promoting) friendship between gods and men, through knowing what things relating to Love amongst mortals tend to justice and impiety (respectively). So various and vast, or rather universal, a power does every kind, to speak in one word, of Love possess. But that which is conversant about the good, and is effected in union with temperance and justice, both towards us and the gods, this is the one that has the greatest power, and procures for us every kind of happiness, so as⁵⁰ to enable us to associate with each other, and to be dear to beings superior to

⁴⁶ On this application of the word astronomy, which was subsequently called astrology, Ast aptly refers to Rep. vii. p. 527, D.

⁴⁷ I confess I cannot understand *ἰασιν*. Ficinus has "curationem." But that is ambiguous, and translated by Shelley, "right government." Plato wrote perhaps here *περὶ Ἐριδος φύλακην τε καὶ ἰασιν*, i. e. "the guarding against and cure of quarrel;" and similarly just above, *ἰριστικῶν* for *ἰρωτικῶν*, and just below, *τὰ τῆς Ἐριδος* for *τοῦς Ἐρωτας*: where there would be an allusion to the doctrine of Empedocles respecting the *Ἐρω*s and *Ἐρι*s of the Universe.

⁴⁸ The Greek is, *ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸν ἔρεπον*—: where Sydenham was the first to reject *περὶ*, which is omitted by Stobæus and one Vienna MS. Ficinus has "sed circa Amorem alterum pervagatur." From whence Sauppe elicited, as stated by Koch on Antonin. Liberal. p. lvii. *ἀλλ' ἀλᾶται περὶ τὸν ἔρεπον*. But no person could be said *ἀλᾶσθαι περὶ τινα* in the sense of attending. I suspect that in *ἀλλὰ περὶ* lies hid *ἀλλὰ λατρεύει*. For Suid. has *Λατρεύω τιμῶ*, and Hesych. *Λατρεύω σίβω*: or we may read, *ἀλλὰ λατρεῖν*, "vehemently pray to." But I prefer the other conjecture.

⁴⁹⁻⁴⁹ Or we may translate, "which it has been ordained by the divining art that the Loves look upon and heal—." But in either case I am equally in the dark. Ficinus has, "hos amores discernere atque curare vaticinii propositum est—," which Shelley translates, "it is the object of divination to distinguish and remedy the effects of these opposite Loves."

⁵⁰ Riickert was the first to find fault with *καὶ*, which he should not have expelled, but have altered into *ὥστε*, to support the syntax.

ourselves, [the gods].⁵¹ It is possible, indeed, that I too, in praising Love, have omitted many things; not, however, intentionally. But if I have left out aught, it is your business, Aristophanes, to fill it up; or, if you have it in your mind to praise the god in any other way,⁵² praise him, now that your hiccups have ceased.

[16.] He said then that Aristophanes, taking up the discourse, observed that—the hiccups had very much⁵³ ceased, not however before the sneezing was applied to them, so that I wonder how a well-ordered part of the body should be in love with such noises and ticklings, such as sneezing is: for when I brought to it a sneezing it immediately ceased entirely.—Upon this said Eryximachus, My good (friend) Aristophanes, consider what you are doing. For being about to speak, you are acting the buffoon,⁵⁴ and compel me to keep a watch over your speech,⁵⁵ lest you say aught to excite a laugh, when you might speak in peace.—To which Aristophanes, with a smile, replied, You have spoken correctly, Eryximachus; and let what I said just now be considered as unsaid. But do not watch me. Since I have a fear of what is about to be said, lest I should say not what will be laughable—for that would be an advantage and indigenous to my muse—but to be laughed down.—Having shot your bolt, Aristophanes, said Eryximachus, think you to escape? But have a care, and so speak, as if about to give an account for it. Perhaps, however, if it seem good to me, I shall dismiss you (unhurt).⁵⁶

⁵¹ The word *θεοῖς* is evidently the interpretation of *τοῖς κρείττοσιν*. See Blomfield on Prom. 935.

⁵² Instead of *εἰ πως ἄλλως*, correct Greek requires *εἰ ἄλλως πως*—similar to *ἄλλῃ γι' ἡ*, a little below.

⁵³ The union of *μάλα* and *ἐπαύσατο* would be admissible here only if the hiccups had greatly subsided. But as they had ceased entirely, instead of *μάλα* we must read *μὰ Δε*—

⁵⁴ This is the correct meaning of *γελωτοποιεῖς*. For Aristophanes had just been alluding in ridicule to the theory of Eryximachus. Ficinus was mistaken in rendering, “*risum contra te moves*.” Shelley, scarcely more correctly, “you predispose us to laughter.”

⁵⁵ *τοῦ λόγου—τοῦ σπαντοῦ* is rendered by Ficinus, “*sermonis tui*.” But that would be, in correct Greek, *τοῦ σοῦ*. But as Eryximachus was evidently sore at being made the butt of Aristophanes, it is quite clear that *τοῦ σπαντοῦ* conceals *τοῦ σοῦ οὐ τλητοῦ*, i. e. “your speech, not to be borne.” Compare Hec. 159, *τὰς οὐ τλαράς*. And hence Aristophanes was led to make an apology in the words—*ἐμοὶ ἔστω ἄροητα τὰ εἰρημμένα*.

⁵⁶ I have inserted “unhurt,” because the train of thought evidently

In good truth, Eryximachus, said Aristophanes, I have it in my mind to speak in some other way than you and Pausanias have spoken. For to me men appear to be utterly insensible of the power of Love. Since, being sensible of it, they would have instituted most important sacred rites, and (built) altars, and made to him the greatest sacrifices;⁵⁷ nor, as now, would any thing of this kind have occurred, at a time when it ought to have occurred the least. For he is, of all the gods, the most friendly to⁵⁸ man, the aider of man, and the healer of those (wounds)⁵⁹ which, being healed, there would be the greatest happiness to the human⁶⁰ race. I will, therefore, endeavour to explain to you his power, and you shall be the teacher of it to others. But you must first learn the nature of man, and what sufferings it has undergone. For our nature of old was not the same as it is now. In the first place, there were three kinds of human beings, not as at present, only two, male and female; but there was also a third common to both of those; the name only of which now remains, it has itself disappeared. It was then [one]⁶¹ man-woman,⁶¹ whose form and name partook of and was common to both the male and the female. But it is now nothing but a name, given by way of reproach. In the next place, the entire form of every individual of the human race was rounded, having the back and sides as in a circle. It had four hands, and legs equal in number to the hands; and two faces upon the circular neck, alike in every way, and one head on both the faces placed opposite,⁶² and four ears, and two kinds

shows that, after *μῖντοι, ἀνατον* has dropt out; a word elsewhere lost and restored by myself to Aristophanes and Demosthenes. See the Glossary appended to my translation of the Midian oration in *Ἀθω*, p. 65. Shelley has here, "I may dismiss you without question."

⁵⁷ There were, however, sacred rites to Love, as shown by Valckenaer in *Diatrib.* c. xi.

⁵⁸⁻⁶⁰ This repetition of *φιλανθρωπότατος—ἀνθρώπων* and *ἀνθρωπιῶν* is extremely inelegant.

⁶⁰ This is Shelley's happy introduction of the very word required here, and which has led me to suggest *τραυμάτων* for *τοῦτων*.

⁶⁰ This *ἐν* Stalbaum still retains, and attempts to explain, although omitted by Stobæus and Eusebius, and many MSS. and Ficinus.

⁶¹ I have coined this word, in lieu of *hermaphrodite*, for the sake of showing its derivation from *ἀνδρ*, "man," and *γυν-η*, "woman."

⁶² Shelley, unable to understand how the faces were placed opposite, has omitted the words *ἐναντίοις κεκείμενοις*, and translated incorrectly the preceding by "one head *between* the two faces," instead of "upon." Unless

of sexual organs, and from these it is easy to conjecture how all the other parts were (doubled).⁶³ They walked, as now, upright, whithersoever they pleased. And when it made haste to run, it did,⁶⁴ in the manner of tumblers, who after turning their legs (upward) in a circle, place them accurately in an upright position,⁶⁴ support itself on its eight limbs,⁶⁵ and afterwards turn itself over quickly in a circle. Now these three and such kinds of beings existed on this account,⁶⁶ because the male kind was the produce originally of the sun, the female of the earth, and that which partook of the other two, of the moon;⁶⁶ for the moon partakes of both the others (the sun and the earth). The bodies thus were round, and the manner of their running was circular, through their being like their parents. [17.] They were terrible in force and strength and had high aspirations, and they made an attempt against the gods; and what Homer (in *Od.* λ. 307) says of Ephialtus and Otus, was told of them likewise; that they attempted to ascend to heaven with the view of attacking the gods. Upon which Jupiter and the other gods consulted together what they should do to them; but they were in a difficulty. They had not the mind to destroy them by making the race to disappear with the thunderbolt, as they did the giants; for then the honours and the holy rites paid them by that race would have been extinct,⁶⁷ nor yet could they suffer them to act wantonly. At length Jupiter, on reflection, said, I seem to myself to have a plan, so that men may exist, and still be stopt by becom-

I am mistaken, Plato wrote ἀπ' ἐναντίας διεκρομένοις, i. e. looking from opposite quarters, like the figure of Janus, described by Ovid.

⁶³ So Sydenham, as if he wished to read καὶ διπλὰ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα instead of καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα.

⁶⁴⁻⁶⁵ Such is the meaning which I think Plato meant to convey; who probably wrote, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβιστῶντες εἰς ὀρθόν, ἄνω τῷ σκέλει περιφερόμενοι κύκλῳ, ἀκριβῶς ἰσθᾶσι, not, as the present text has, εἰς ὀρθόν τῷ σκέλει περιφερόμενοι κυβιστῶσι κύκλῳ, where I have elicited ἄνω, by the aid of "sursum circumferentes," in Ficinus, from εἰς ὀρθὰ ὄντα σκέλη in Stobæus. The whole description will be intelligible to those, who have seen tumblers walking on their hands and feet alternately.

⁶⁶ By the eight limbs are meant the four hands and four feet.

⁶⁷ On this theory Ast refers to Aristot. *Metaphys.* i. 3, 6, *Phys.* i. 6, *De Generat.* i. 3, ii. 3, Cicero. *Academ.* iv. 37, *Tim. Loc.* p. 99, *D. E.*, *Menag.* in *Diogen. L.* p. 74, 317.

⁶⁸ So Orestes in *Æsch. Cho.* 252, prays to Jove not to destroy him, lest he should no longer be able to set up his altar on the days of sacrifice.

ing weaker from their unbridled licentiousness. For now, said he, I will divide each of them into two; and they will at the same time become weaker, and at the same time more useful to us, through their becoming more in number; and they shall walk upright upon two legs; but if they shall think fit to behave licentiously, and are not willing to keep quiet, I will again, said he, divide them, each into two, so that they shall go upon one leg, hopping. So saying, he cut men into two parts, as people cut medlars⁶⁸ when about to pickle them, or as they cut eggs with hairs. But whomsoever he cut, he ordered Apollo⁶⁹ to turn the face and the half of the neck to that part where the section had taken place, in order that the man might, on seeing the cutting off,⁶⁹ be better behaved than before, and he ordered⁷⁰ him to heal the other parts. And he (Apollo) turned the face; and⁷¹ pulling the skin together on every side like a contracted purse,⁷¹ over that which is now called the belly, he did, after making a single orifice, tie up (the skin) at the middle of the belly, now called the navel. He then smoothed the greater part of the remainder of the wrinkles of the skin, and jointed the breast, having an instrument such as shoemakers use when they smooth wrinkles of the leather on the last. But he left a few wrinkles on the belly and navel as a memorial of their original suffering. Now when their nature had been bisected, each half perceived with a longing its other self;⁷² and throwing their arms around each other and becoming entwined, they had a great desire to grow together, but they died through famine and idleness.⁷³ And when one of

⁶⁸ On Ruhnken's elegant and certain emendation, *δα* for *ὠδ*, see his note on *Timæus*, p. 189, while to this passage of Plato Taupon Suid. in *Ταριχεύειν* has referred that in Plutarch *Erot.* ii. p. 770, B., *ὥσπερ ὧν τριχὶ διαρτίζονται τὴν ρυτίαν*, which Hommel acutely conjectures to have been a kind of children's game.

⁶⁹⁻⁷⁰ Whatever others may pretend to do, I certainly cannot understand what Plato meant by this description of the operation.

⁷⁰ This repetition of the verb *ἐκίλευεν* at the end of the sentence is evidently an interpolation.

⁷¹⁻⁷² Here again I confess I do not quite understand the mention of the contracted purse. I suspect there is an allusion to an operation still performed in India, to enable a person to wear an artificial nose; unless it be said that Plato in this fictitious account, to which Julian alludes, in *Epist.* ix. p. 448, C., is caricaturing some theory of the day.

⁷² Instead of *τὸ αὐτοῦ* one would prefer *τὸ ἄλλο αὐτοῦ*, although the common reading is found in Priscian xvii. p. 1100, ed. Putsch.

⁷³ Stalbaum translates *τῆς ἄλλης ἀργίας*, "and moreover by idleness."

these halves died, and the other was left, the surviving half sought another, and was entwined with it, whether it met with the half of a whole woman, (which half we now call a woman,) or with (the half of a whole) man. And thus they were in the act of perishing. [18.] But Jupiter in pity devised another plan, and placed the organs of generation in front,⁷⁴ for ⁷⁵hitherto they had been on the outside, and they begot and bred, not with one another, but with the earth, like grasshoppers. And therefore he changed them⁷⁶ to the front; and by them he caused the generation to be with each other, from the female through the male, on this account, that should a male meet with a female, they might in the embrace at one time generate, and the race be thus propagated; but if at another time a male met with a male, a surfeit might take place from the connexion, and that they might cease and turn themselves to their business, and attend to the other affairs of

But such a sense those words could never bear in correct Greek. In all the passages where ἄλλος is said to be used pleonastically there is some error, which it is not difficult to correct. Thus in Eurip. Med. 298, *Χωρίς γὰρ ἄλλης, ἥς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας, φθόνον πρὸς ἀστῶν ἀλφανοῦσι δυσμενῇ*, we may read *Χωρίς γὰρ ἄτης.—ἥς λάχουσιν, ἀργίας*, as I have stated in the Surplice, No. 11, Feb. 7, 1846, p. 153, where I completed the restoration commenced in Tro. Append. p. 125, B. So too here, since two MSS. read *ὑπὸ τῆς λιμοῦ*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὑπὸ τῆς λίχνου κοίτης παλαιᾶς λαιμαργίας*, i. e. "From the lascivious and hungry longing for their former bed:" where *ὑπὸ κοίτης λαιμαργίας* may be compared with *ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἡδονῆς* in Legg. x. p. 888, A.; while *λίχνου*, which Hesychius explains by *λαιμαργός*, is found in somewhat a similar sense in Eurip. Hipp. 916, *Ἢ γὰρ ποθοῦσα πάντα καρδία κλύειν Κάν τοῖς κακοῖσι λίχνος οὐδ' ἀλίσκεται*: and thus the introduction of *κοίτης παλαιᾶς* carries out the allusion to *παλαιοῦ πάθους*: and the two halves would suffer the fate of Narcissus, who died by constantly viewing in the water the reflexion of his body, with which he had fallen in love.

⁷⁴ Ficinus has alone what the sense requires, "et quæ prius retro erant, ad anteriores partes transtulit;" in Greek, *εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, ἀ ὀπισθεν ἦν γὰρ πρὶν*.

⁷⁵ Here again Ficinus has preserved the vestiges of the right reading in his version, "Antea siquidem, cum ad nates hæc haberent, non invicem sed in terram spargentes semina, cicadarum instar concipiebant, atque generabant."

⁷⁶ Stalbaum says that Sommer properly unites *αὐτῶν* with *εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν*. But as *αὐτῶν* is found in many MSS., as Stephens conjectured, Ast has properly adopted it; and properly too did he object to *τε* after *μετίθης*; but improperly suggest *δε*—for he should have read *τοῖνυν* instead of *τε οὖν*: while in lieu of *οὕτως*, omitted in eleven MSS., one would prefer *εὐ πως*—

life. From this⁷⁷ (period) has been implanted by nature in mankind a mutual love, which is the bringer together of their ancient nature, and which endeavours to make one out of two, and to heal the nature⁷⁸ of man. Each of us then is but the counterpart⁷⁹ of a human creature, as having been cut like the Psettae⁸⁰ from one into two. Hence each one is in search of his counterpart. As many men then as are sections of the form common to men, which was then called Man-Woman, are lovers of women; and from this race are sprung the majority of adulterers: and on the other hand, as many women as are addicted to the love of men, and are adulteresses, are sprung from the same⁸¹ race. But such women as are sections of the female, do not pay much attention to men, but turn themselves rather to women; and from this race are the (Lesbian) courtesans. Such as are sections of the male form, follow the males: and whilst they are young, being fragments of men, they love men and are delighted in being with them; and these are the best of boys and youths, as being the most manly in their disposition. Yet some say, indeed, they are shameless. But in this they say false; for it is not through shamelessness, but through assurance, and a manly temper and manly look, that they embrace what resembles themselves. And of this there is a great proof. For when they are full grown, such alone turn

⁷⁷ There is some error in *ἐκ τούτου*, which is never used for *ἐκ τούτου*. Stalbaum's German version is, "seit so langer Zeit." Plato probably wrote *ἐκ τούτ' ἴσως*, i. e. "perhaps from that time." On the phrase *ἐκ τότε*, see Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 644, ed. Jelf. Shelley has, "From this period," which he got from Ficinus, "ex illo tempore."

⁷⁸ Shelley has, what the sense requires, "and to heal the divided nature of man." This has led me to suggest *σχίσιν* for *φύσιν*, which is extremely inelegant after the preceding *φύσεως*.

⁷⁹ This was the doctrine of Empedocles, as we learn from Aristotle, *Περὶ Φύσεως Ζώων*, i. 18. In the word *σύμβολον* is an allusion to the symbol of friendship cut into two parts, one of which was preserved by the host, and the other by the guest; and when the two were brought together by the two parties or their friends, a recognition of acquaintance took place. See Schol. on Eurip. Med. 6.

⁸⁰ As it is not known what kind of flat-fish is meant by *ψῆττα*, I have left the original word in the text. Sydenham compares it with the polypus. The simile is well put by Plato into the mouth of Aristophanes, who has alluded to the same circumstance in *Lysistr.* 115, *Ἐγὼ δ' ἔκουσ' ἄν, ὥσπερ ἡ ψῆττα, δυνάμει Δοῦναι ἄν ἑμαντήσ παρταμοῦσα θῆμιν*, where I have changed *Ἐγὼ δὲ γ' ἄν, κἀν*—into *Ἐγὼ δ' ἔκουσ' ἄν*—

⁸¹ So Sydenham. As if he wished to read *ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, instead of *ἐκ τούτου*, which is however repeated just afterwards.

out men as regards political affairs: but when they have become men, they feel a love for young persons, and do not turn their thoughts to marriage and child-getting naturally, but are led by the force of custom and law,⁸² although it would be sufficient for them to continue to live unmarried. Altogether then such a person is both a lover of youths and a lover of those who love him, and ever embraces what is from the same race as himself. [19.] Now, whenever⁸³ the lover of youths, and every one else,⁸⁴ meet with that very thing, the half of himself, they are both smitten with a friendship in a wondrous manner, and (attracted)⁸⁴ by an intimacy and love, and are unwilling to be separated from each other for even, so to say, a brief period. And these are they, who continue to live together through life; and yet they could not tell what they wish to take place to themselves from each other; for it does not seem to be sexual intercourse, that the one should, for the sake of that, be delighted with the company of the other, and (seek it) with so much trouble; but the soul of each being evidently desirous of something else, which it is unable to tell, it divines what it wishes, and hints at it.⁸⁵ And if while they are lying down in the same place, Vulcan were to stand over them with his tools in his hand, and ask them "What is it do ye, mortals, desire to take place, the one by the other?" and if, finding them in a difficulty, were he to demand them again, "Do ye desire this, to be as much as possible in the same place with each other, so as never, by night or day, to be apart from each other?"⁸⁶ for if ye long for this, I am willing to melt you down together, and to mould you into the same mass, so that

⁸² There is probably an allusion here to a law at Sparta, which compelled persons under certain circumstances to marry, as we learn from Stobæus, lrv. p. 410, for nothing of the same kind was known at Athens.

^{83—84} Instead of *ὁ παιδεραστής καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς*, Ficinus has "*cujuscunque sexus avidus sit*," which was evidently an abortive attempt made by the translator to supply some words obliterated in his MS., and of which those in the text are an evident corruption. For Plato wrote *καὶ ὁ καλὸς παῖς*—

⁸⁴ Sydenham has introduced the verb "attracted," which has led me to suggest that *ἐλκεσθαι* has dropt out before *οἰκισθῆναι*—which would lead to *καίονθαι*—: Ficinus has "*amicitiæque et familiaritate ardent*."

⁸⁵ In lieu of the single word *ἀνιρρίται*, Ficinus has "*et affectum insitum vestigiis signat obscuris*;" thus translated by Shelley, "and traces obscurely the footsteps of its obscure desire."

ye two may become one,⁸⁶ and as long as ye live, may live both of you in common, as one person; and when ye die, may, having died in common, ⁸⁷remain for ever⁸⁷ in Hades, one (soul) instead of two. See then whether ye desire this, and it is sufficient for you, should ye obtain it." On hearing this not a single person, I know that, would refuse, nor would he appear to wish for any thing else; but (every one)⁸⁸ would in reality conceive he had heard that which he had long ago wished for, and that having come into the company of, and being melted with, his beloved, he would out of two become one. And of this⁸⁹ the cause is, that this was our original nature. We were once whole. To the desire then and pursuit of this whole, the name of Love is given. And we were, as I said, formerly one. But now, for our iniquity, ⁹⁰we have been cut in twain⁹⁰ by the deity, and have been made, like the Arcadians by the Lacedæmonians, to dwell asunder.⁹⁰ There is therefore a fear, that, unless we are well-behaved towards the gods, we shall be again cleft in twain, and go about with our noses split down, as those have, who are modelled on pillars in profile,⁹¹ and become, ⁹²as it were, pebbles cut through

⁸⁶⁻⁸⁸ To this celebrated passage there are allusions in Aristotle, *Polit.* ii. 1, 16, Synesius, *Epist.* p. 151, and the other authors, quoted by Wyttenbach in the notes of Rynders.

⁸⁷⁻⁸⁷ Instead of αὐ—εἶναι, I have translated as if the Greek were δι—μείναι: and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version, "apud inferos unum semper perseveretis." On this wish of friends and lovers to live and die together, it will be sufficient to refer to Eurip. *Iph.* T. 984, Καὶ ζῆν θέλοιμ' ἂν καὶ θανεῖν, λαχὼν γ' ἴσον: and Horace, "Tecum vivere amem, tecum obeam libens."

⁸⁸ On πᾶς, thus obtained from the opposite οὐδὲ εἰς, see Stalbaum.

⁸⁹ Instead of τοῦτο, Bast, with whom Ast agrees, suggested ρούτον.—And so Ficinus, "Hujus causa est."

⁹⁰ The Greek is διωκίσθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. But Ficinus found in his MS. διεσχίσθημεν, as shown by his version—"a deo scissi sumus." I have therefore united the two, διεσχίσθημεν—καὶ καθάπερ—διωκίσθημεν. For in the former verb there is an allusion to the cutting in two, mentioned in § 15, and in the latter to the fact of the Helots, who were originally Arcadians, being compelled to live apart in villages after they had been conquered by the Lacedæmonians. By so slight and obvious a correction have I got rid of the mass of notes written on this passage.

⁹¹ Such is the interpretation of the words κατὰ γραφὴν ἐκτετυπωμένοι given by Hermann in *Programm. De Veter. Græcor. Pictura Parietum*, p. 8, *Opuscul.* where he has reference to Hipparchus on Aratus, i. 6, p.

and rubbed smooth. On this account then,⁹² it is meet to exhort every man to behave in all things piously towards the gods, that we may on the one hand escape from the ills,⁹³ and on the other obtain the good,⁹⁴ to which Love is our guide and general; to whom let no one act in opposition. For he who acts in opposition, is an enemy to the gods. But by becoming friends and being reconciled to the god, we shall, what few of those now living do, find and meet with our beloved, the halves⁹⁴ of ourselves. And let not Eryximachus take me up, and ridicule my speech, as if I meant Pausanias and Agatho. For perhaps they are amongst such, (the fortunate

180, who uses *κατάγραφον* in the sense noticed by Pliny on H. N. xxxv. 34, who says of Cimon the Clenean, "Hic catagrapha invenit, hoc est, obliquas imagines." But in that case the preposition *εἰς* or *κατὰ* should precede *καταγραφὴν*, and *τὸ κατάγραφον* be written instead of *καταγραφὴν*. I am therefore more disposed to adopt Hommel's ingenious alteration—*κατὰ ραφὴν*. For he supposes that figures of human beings were so placed at the corners of the walls of temples, that one half of the face was seen on one side, and the other half on the adjoining side; and they must therefore have appeared with the nose split down.

⁹² The Greek is, *ὥσπερ λίσσαι ἀλλὰ τούτων ἵνεκα*—But *ἀλλὰ* could not thus be used before *τούτων ἵνεκα*, unless there had been something said previously, to which *ἀλλὰ* would indicate the opposite idea. Such however is not the case here. Besides, as *λίσπος* is an adjective, it requires a substantive. Hence I have translated as if the Greek were—*ὥσπερ λίσσαι λάλλαι τούτων οὖν ἵνεκα*—For Hesychius has *λάλλαι λάλλας λέγουσι τὰς παραθαλασσίους καὶ παραποταμίους ψήφους*, i. e. "pebbles found along seas and rivers," which became smooth by the action of the water, and which, when cut lengthways or crossways, present two halves, the counterparts of each other. The same fact is found in the case of Scotch pebbles, when detached from the granite in which they are imbedded. To this restoration of *λάλλαι* I have been led by Ruhnken's very same correction of Theocritus in Hesych. T. i. Auctar., and we can now perceive why Suidas and Hesychius, and the Scholiast here, explain *Λίσποι* by *διαπικρισμένοι ἀστράγαλοι*, or, as Ruhnken correctly reads, *διχα πικρισμένοι*, both in Plato and in the Lexicons that referred to Plato. Timæus has *Λίσποι· οἱ διχα πικρισμένοι*.

⁹³⁻⁹⁴ The Greek is *τὰ μὲν ἐκφύωμεν, τῶν δὲ τύχωμεν*. But as two MSS. offer *φύγωμεν*, it is evident that Plato wrote *τὰ μὲν κακὰ φύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ εὖ τύχωμεν*. For thus *κακὰ* and *εὖ* properly balance each other; while *εὖ* has been lost here, as in the passages corrected by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 154.

⁹⁴ Instead of *ἡμετέροις*, which Ast and Stalbaum vainly attempt to defend, Bast suggested *ἡμιτόμοις*, answering to "dimidium" in Ficinus; and the emendation is adopted by Creuzer in his work on the worship of Dionysus, P. i. p. 169, as stated by Ast.

few,) and are both of them males in nature.⁹⁵ I say then of all in general, both men and women, that the whole of our race would be happy, if we worked out Love perfectly; and if each were to meet with his beloved, having returned⁹⁶ to his original nature. If this then be the best, it necessarily follows, that of the things now present, that which is nearest to this is the best; and that is, to meet with youthful objects of love that are naturally suited to one's ideas. In celebrating then the deity who is the cause of this fitness, we should justly celebrate Love; who both at the present time benefits us the most, by leading us to our own; and for hereafter gives us the greatest hopes, that, if we pay the debt of piety to the gods, he will restore us to our original nature, and, by healing us, render us happy.

[20.] Such, Eryximachus, said he, is my speech, in behalf of Love, of a different kind from yours. As then I requested, do not ridicule it, in order that we may hear what each of the rest will say; or rather what both will; for the rest are only Agatho and Socrates.

He stated then that Eryximachus said, I will be obedient; for the speech has been spoken in a delightful manner; and if I were not conscious that Socrates and Agatho were deeply versed in affairs of Love, I should have greatly feared they would be at a loss for reasons through there having been said so much, and of all kinds. But now I have every confidence. —(This,) said Socrates, (is all very well for you,) Eryximachus; since you have already gone through the ordeal yourself with honour. But if you were, where I am now, or rather perhaps where I shall be, when Agatho shall have spoken his speech cleverly,⁹⁷ you would be in a very great fright, and in every (kind of heart-sinking),⁹⁸ as I am now.—You wish, So-

⁹⁵ To preserve the train of thought, and thus elicit something like sense out of these words, Orelli on Isocrat. de Permutat. p. 330, suggested ἀρρενός ἑνός, i. e. "both from one male."

⁹⁶ Ficinus has "in antiquam naturam—restitutus," which leads to ἀνελθών in lieu of ἀπελθών—

⁹⁷ Ficinus has "scite dixerit," thus uniting εὔ to εἴπω, and not, as all others have done, to καὶ μάλ'.

⁹⁸ Instead of ἐν παντὶ εἰς, which is perfectly unintelligible, even Fischer had the good sense to propose ἐν παντὶ εἰς ἀπορίας ὥστε, to which he was led by "angustiis undique premereris," in Ficinus. Besides

crates, said Agatho, to drug me, in order that I may be confused through thinking that the spectators have a great expectation of my being about to make a clever speech.—I should have been, Agatho, forgetful indeed, if, after witnessing your courage and high spirit, when you came upon the stage with the performers and looking so numerous an audience in the face, you were about to exhibit your compositions without being in the least daunted, I thought you could be now disturbed on account of us, so few in number.—Surely, Socrates, said Agatho, you do not think me so inflated by a theatrical audience,⁹⁹ as not to know that to a man, who has any mind, a few persons of sense are more awful than a multitude of fools.—I should be acting not at all correctly, said Socrates, if I thought there was any thing about you, Agatho, of a boorish nature. But I know very well, that if you met with any whom you considered wise, you would think more of them than of the multitude. But I fear we are not such; for we were there likewise, and made a part of that multitude. But if you had met with other wise men, you would perhaps have felt a shame before them, had you thought you were doing an act really¹⁰⁰ disgraceful. Is it not so? or how say you?—It is true, said Agatho.—But before the multitude, said Socrates, would you not feel a shame, if you thought you were doing any thing base?—Hereupon Phædrus, taking up the discourse, said, If, dear Agatho, you will give Socrates an answer, it will be no manner of concern to him what becomes of any thing whatever here, or if he can only have somebody to converse with, and especially one who is handsome. I confess I do

he perhaps remembered *ἐν παντί ἐγνόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας* in Euthyd. p. 300, C., and *ἐν παντί κατὰ εἴη* in Rep. ix. p. 505, C. But in the former Plato wrote *ἐν παντί τῷ ἀπορίας ἐγνόμην*, and in the latter *ἐν παντί τῷ κατὰ*, as shown by Thucyd. vii. 55, *ἐν παντί δὴ ἀθυμίας*, where I should prefer *ἐν παντί τῷ*, as in Philoct. 174, *ἐν παντί τῷ χρείας*, were it not that Dionys. H. A. R. vi. 70, *ἐν παντί δὴ ἀθυμίας*, seems to support the common reading. Wyttenbach indeed on Plutarch de S. N. V., p. 127, quotes from Xenoph. H. Gr. v. 4, 29, *ἐν παντί ἦσαν μὴ—εἴη*. But it is easy to read here *ἐν παντί τῷ ἀσῆς εἴη*, and there *ἐν παντί τῷ ἀσῆς ἦσαν*: for *ἀσῆ* has been elsewhere lost or corrupted, as I have shown on Æsch. Eum. 116, and I could now show still more.

⁹⁹ Of this passage there is a palpable imitation in Themistius, Or. xxxvi. p. 311, B., and a covert one in Aristænetus, Ep. i. 19.

¹⁰⁰ Instead of *ὄν*, which has no meaning here, Plato wrote, as I have translated, *ὄντως*. Ast wished to expunge *ὄν* entirely; for it is not found in the correlative sentence just afterwards.

with much pleasure hear Socrates conversing: but it is necessary for me to take care of the panegyric upon Love, and to receive¹ a speech from every one of you. But do both of you pay¹ thus your tribute to the god, and then converse. You say well, Phædrus, (said Agatho); and there is nothing to prevent me from beginning my speech. For I shall have frequently the means of conversing again with Socrates.

[21.] I wish in the first place to state how I ought to speak; and I will then so speak.² For all of those who have spoken before me, appear to me to have celebrated not the god, but to felicitate mankind upon the good, of which the god is the cause. But what he is himself, who has bestowed these gifts, not one of them has explained. Now upon each subject of every panegyric, there is only one correct method; and that is, to detail in a rational way of how great things how great a cause is he, respecting whom the discourse may be.³ In this way then it is meet for us to make the encomium upon Love, (by showing,) first, how great he is, and afterwards his gifts. I assert then, that of all the gods (in reality)⁴ blessed, Love is, if it is lawful to say so, and without calling down vengeance, the most blessed of all the gods, and at once⁵ the most beautiful and the best. ⁶But such he is, being the most beautiful.⁶ In the first place, he is, Phædrus, the youngest of the gods. Of this asser-

¹ On the meaning of ἀποδίδεσθαι and ἀποδοῦναι, "to receive" and "pay" a debt, Stalbaum refers to Politic. p. 173, B., and Rep. p. 612, B.

² Ficinus has "postea dicam," which leads to εἰποιμ' ἂν, in lieu of εἰπῶν, which makes nonsense here.

³ Ficinus either found something different in his MS., or formed something out of his own head, which he did not find there. For his version is, "Sic et in præsentia, qualis ipse sit Amor, primum ostendere decet; deinde munera illius exponere."

⁴ Unless I am grievously mistaken, Plato wrote ὄντως ὄντων, for ὄντων by itself would be perfectly useless.

⁵ Although, as Stalbaum shows, αὐτῶν might perhaps stand at the end of a sentence, of which I have my doubts, yet since Stobæus offers here αὐτόν, it is evident that Plato wrote ἅμα τὸν κάλλιστον. For the article could hardly be omitted.

⁶⁻⁶ Such is the literal version of the words, Ἔστι δὲ κάλλιστος ὢν τοῖσδε: which others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote: especially when Ficinus has, "Quod vero pulcherrimus sit, ex eo primum patet—" from which, however, one can easily discover that he did not find in his MS. ὢν τοῖσδε. Perhaps Plato wrote, ἐς δὲ τὸ κάλλος, παῖς ὢν, ποῖος δὲ; i. e. But as regards his beauty, being a boy, of what kind is he?

tion he affords himself a powerful proof, by running away in haste from Old Age, who is quick-footed, it is plain, at least it approaches quicker than is necessary; and which, indeed, Love naturally hates, nor does he come near to it within a great (distance);⁷ but he is ever with the young, and is.⁸ For, as the old proverb rightly has it, "Like always doth approach to like."⁹ Now, though I agree with Phædrus in many other points, I do not agree in this, that Love is older than Saturn and Japetus; but of gods, I affirm, he is the youngest, and is ever young, and that the doings¹⁰ of the olden time, which Hesiod and Parmenides detail, were produced, if indeed they say true, by the power of Necessity, and not Love. For, had Love been with them, there had been no castrations,¹¹ nor bindings,¹² nor those many other acts of violence, but friendship and peace, as now, from the time when Love came to be the ruler of the gods. Thus then he is young, and in addition to being young is a tender being. But he wants a poet, such as Homer was, to express the ten-

⁷ All the MSS. read, οὐδ' ὄντος πολλοῦ. Gesner on Stobæus, lxi. p. 269, was the first to suggest οὐδ' ἔντος, and so too Sydenham: as if χωρίον were understood, which is supplied in Thucyd. ii. 77, ἔντος πολλοῦ χωρίου—πελάσαι. They, however, who know how constantly Plato alludes covertly to Homer, will read ἔντος τοῦ ὁλοῦ οὐδοῦ—similar to ὁλοῦ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ, in Il. Q. 487: and in Axioch. § 9, ἀλλ' οἱ ἐπ' οὐδῶ γήραος, in lieu of ἄλλοι πολυγήρωι: for γήραος οὐδὸν is found there in § 10, and in Plato Rep. i. p. 328, F.

⁸ In lieu of the nonsensical αἰ ἐννεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν, which Ast and Stalbaum vainly, as usual, attempt to defend, Bast once proposed to read, what he afterwards retracted, ἐννεστί τε καὶ αἰ ἔστιν. He should have read, ἐννεστί τε καὶ αἰ ἔσται, "he is and ever will be." On this union of the present and future, compare Thucyd. v. 105, τὸν νόμον—ἔντα—ἔσμενον δι—Olympiodor. in Alcibiad. i. § 11, p. 105, ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. Menander in Stob. xxxviii., Περὶ ἡμετέρας καὶ ποήσεαι καὶ ποῖ—Anstid. H. in Jon. p. 21. Jebb. ὅδε (ὁ Ζεὺς) ἔστι—ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται. The passage of Plutarch in ii. p. 352, A., quoted by Wyttenbach on S. N. V. p. 36, is not in point, παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ἔντα καὶ συνόντα. Winckelmann in Zeitschrift für Alterthumswissenschaft, 1840. p. 1282, would read ἐννεστί καὶ ἔσται.

⁹ The proverb is quoted at length in Lysid., p. 214, A., 'Αἰεὶ τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἀγὼ θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον from Od. xvii. 218. 'Ὅς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον—

¹⁰ Instead of πράγματα, the best MSS., as they are called, offer γράμματα. Plato wrote τὰ πράγματα.

¹¹ To these castrations there is an allusion in Euthyph. § 6.

¹² The binding of Saturn by his son is mentioned by Æsch. in Eum. 627, and Aristoph. in Neph. 898, and Plato in Cratyl. § 45.

derness of the god. Now Homer describes Ate as a goddess, and of a tender frame. At least he speaks of her feet as being tender :

Her feet are tender; not on ground she stalks,
But on the top¹³ of human heads she walks.

The poet then seems to me to show by such a proof her tenderness; because she walks not upon a hard place, but a soft one. And the same proof we shall use respecting Love, that he too is tender. For he neither walks on the ground, nor upon (human) skulls, which in truth are places not very soft; but on the softest of all existing things, he walks and dwells there. For he has fixed his abode in the dispositions and souls of gods and men:¹⁴ and yet not in all souls indiscriminately: but whenever he meets with a soul possessing a harsh disposition, away he goes, and takes up his abode with a tender one. Since, then, he is ever touching with his feet, and in every way the softest parts in the softest persons, he must needs be extremely tender. Thus then he is very young and very tender; and in addition to these qualities he is of a flexible form. For he would not be able to entwine himself around every thing, nor to pass through every soul, at first unperceived, and to go out (again),¹⁵ if he were of a hard substance. And a great proof of his form being in proportion¹⁶ and flexible, is in its gracefulness, which Love confessedly possesses in a manner superior to all. For between Ungracefulness and Love there is always a war. His diet too on flowers points out the beauty of his colour. ¹⁷ For Love does not settle upon a body,

¹³ I have translated as if the Greek were ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀρ' ἦγε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει, and not ἀλλ' ἀρα ἦγε—although instead of ἀρ' ἦγε I should prefer ἀνυξί, for ὑπαλοῖ means here not "tender," but "slim." With regard, however, to my ἀπ', it is put beyond all doubt by Rhianus Fragm. i. 'H δ' Ἀτὴ ἀπαλοῖσι μετατρωχῶσα πόδεσσι Ἀκρης ἐν κεφαλῇσι—ἰφίσταται.

¹⁴ On this sentiment see Valckenaer in Diatrib. Euripid. p. 157.

¹⁵ The antithesis in εἰσιὼν τὸ πρῶτον evidently requires ἐξίων αὐ—

¹⁶ What the idea of proportion has to do with that of flexibility, it is hard to say. The passage was, however, so read by Aristænetus, when describing the σύμμετρα καὶ τρυφερά μίλη of Laïs, in Epist. i. l. Unless I am mistaken, Plato wrote συμμέτρου δὲ ΣΚΩΔΗΚΙ, a word which might easily have dropt out through—ΟΥΔΕΚΑΙ—for of all animals the worm-tribe is the most flexible.

¹⁷—¹⁷ Aristænetus, Ep. ii. l. seems to have found in his MS. of Plato, οὐ πίφκει προσιζάνειν instead of οὐκ ἐνίει.

or any other spot where flowers are not, or where they have fallen off; but wherever is a spot flowery and fragrant, there he settles and fixes his abode.¹⁷ [22.] As regards then the beauty of the god¹⁸ thus much is sufficient; although much still remains.¹⁸ I must speak after this on virtue of Love. Now is the highest (praise); that he does no injury to a god or man, nor by a god or man is he injured. Nor, if he suffers aught, does he suffer by violence; for violence touches not Love; nor if he does aught, does he it with violence;¹⁹ for every one willingly ministers in every thing to Love.²⁰ But whatever one party agrees (to do) of his own accord for another party of his own accord, such acts the laws, that are the rulers in a state, say are justly done. In addition to justice, Love has the greatest share of temperance. For to be superior to pleasures and to passions, is every where confessed to be temperance. But no pleasure is superior to Love. If then they are inferior, they will be Love's subjects; and he will be their master; and being thus superior to pleasures and passions, he will be pre-eminently temperate. Moreover, as regards valour, not Arēs (Mars) himself can stand up against Love.²¹ ²²For it is not Arēs that holds Love, but Love Arēs,

¹⁷⁻¹⁸ Ficinus has, "permulta insuper afferri possent; sed ista sufficient," which would lead to *ἔτι καὶ πολλὰ λείπεται· ἴστω δὲ ταῦθ' ἱκανά*, in lieu of *καὶ ταῦθ' ἱκανά καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ λείπεται*—

¹⁹ Ficinus correctly, "neque vi facit, si quid faciat." He therefore found in his MS. *οὔτε τι ποιῶν ποιῆ βίᾳ*—which is required to balance *βίᾳ πάσχει, εἰ τι πάσχει*. Stalbaum, however, says there is no need of *βίᾳ*, found in Bas. 2, and one MS., and in Stobæus.—But here, as elsewhere, the proverb is true—"Many men of many minds; Many birds of many kinds."

²⁰ In the words *Πᾶς γὰρ ἐκὼν Ἔρωτι πᾶν* (Stob. *πάνθ'*) *ὑπηρετεῖ*, there lies hid an Iambic verse, probably of Agatho himself, *Ἔρωτι γὰρ πᾶς πάνθ' ἐκὼν ὑπηρετεῖ*. So too from the following words, *ἃ δ' ἂν τις ἐκὼν ἐκόντι ὁμολογήσῃ, φασὶν οἱ πόλειως βασιλῆς νόμοι δίκαια εἶναι*, it is easy to elicit the distich, "Ἄ τις δ' ἐκὼν ἐκόντα δρᾷν ἂν ὁμολογήῃ, Βασιλῆς πόλειως, δίκαια φασὶν οἱ νόμοι."

²¹ Blomfield, in *Mus. Crit.* No. 2, p. 144, has aptly compared Soph. *Thyest. Fr. Πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται*. But he did not see that in this passage of Plato there lies hid a distich, probably of Agatho, *Καὶ μὴν ἐς ἀνδρίαν γ' Ἔρωτι, παιδὶ δ' ἂν, Πύκτης ἀνὴρ ὤς, οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται*, where I have introduced *Πύκτης* from Soph. *Trach.* 441, *Ἔρωτι μὲν νῦν ὅστις ἀντανίσταται, Πύκτης ὅπως ἐς χεῖρας, οὐ καλῶς φρονεῖ*: while, to preserve the antithesis, in which Agatho, as we learn from Aristotle, indulged, I have added likewise *παιδὶ δ' ἂν—ἀνὴρ ὤς*—

²² Here again it is easy to elicit another distich of Agatho, from the

(the son,) as the saying is, of Aphrodite²² (Venus). Now he who holds is superior to the party held; and he who is the master of the party more valiant than all the rest, will be the most valiant. Thus then have we spoken of the justice, and temperance, and valour of the god; and it is left (to speak) of his wisdom. As far then as we can, we must endeavour to be in no way wanting. And in the first place, that I too may do honour to my own art, as Eryximachus did to his, the god is so clever a poet, that he is able to make even another person one.

²² For each becomes a poet, though before

He was not musical, when Love touches him.²³

This testimony it is fitting for us to use, (to prove) that the poet Love is excellent for all the creative power connected with the Muse. For that, which one has not, or does not know, he can not either give to another or teach. Moreover who will gainsay (the assertion) that the making of all animals is through the wisdom of Love, by which all living things are generated and produced?²⁴ Then as regards handicraft-skill in arts, know we not that he, whose teacher is the deity, turns out a person of repute and illustrious; but he on whom Love does not lay his hands, remains in obscurity? The art of the archer, and of the physician, and of the prophet, did Apollo invent, ²⁵ under the

words Οὐ γὰρ ἔχει Ἐρωτα Ἀρης, ἀλλ' Ἐρως Ἀρη, Ἀφροδίτης, ὡς λόγος, by reading Ἐχει γὰρ οὐκ Ἀρης Ἐρωτ', Ἀρη δ' Ἐρως, Παιὶς Ἀφροδίτης σμικρὸς ψν, ὡς δὲ λόγος. And hence we may read, Ἀφροδίτης υἱός, ὡς λόγος; and thus obtain the very word required to govern Ἀφροδίτης, which Stalbaum says depends upon Ἐρως, and appeals to Monk on Alc. 50, where there is not a word bearing on the question. From his reference to Od. Θ. 266, Stalbaum seems to think that there is an allusion to the story told by Homer. But the remark of Agatho was of a wider kind, and applicable to the loves of Arēs generally.

²³—²⁴ Here too lies hid another distich of Agathon, Πᾶς γὰρ ποιητὴς γίγνεται, κἂν ᾗ τὸ πρὶν ἄμουσος ἐς πᾶν, οὐ γ' Ἐρως ποθ' ἄνεται, where he imitated his beloved Euripides in Sthenob. Fr. iii. μουσικὴν δ' ἄρα Ἐρως διδάσκει, κἂν ἄμουσος ᾗ τὸ πρὶν—while ἐς πᾶν is similar to the expression in Longinus, § 39, κἂν ἄμουσος ᾗ παντάπασι. With regard to Love making a person a poet, Shakespeare alludes to it, where he speaks of a lover “with his woeful ballad, made to his mistress' eye-brow.”

²⁴ To get rid of the tautology in γίγνεται and φέρεται, we must read, what Plato wrote, φαίνεσθαι, “make their appearance.”

²⁵—²⁶ The edd. have ἐπιθυμίας καὶ Ἐρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος. But ἐπιθυμίας καὶ are here out of place, where the whole question is about the deity called Love. The words ἐπιθυμίας καὶ are a corruption of ἐπιθυμίας ἔνεκα, and should be inserted between καὶ and Μοῦσαι: while

guidance of Love; so that he would be disciple of Love; and (through desire) the Muses (became the inventors) of music, and Hephæstus (Vulcan), of brass-working, and Athena (Minerva), of weaving, and Zeus (Jupiter), of governing gods and men.²⁵ From whence²⁶ then were the affairs of the gods put into order? Through the birth, it is plain, of the love of beauty; for Love does not follow²⁷ ugliness. For previously, as I stated at the commencement, many and terrible things befell, as they say, the gods, through the rule of necessity.²⁸ But when this god was born, through his loving all things of beauty, "to gods and men did all good things arise."²⁹—[23.] Thus, Phædrus, Love appears to me to be, in the first place,³⁰ himself the most beautiful and best; in the next, to be the cause of such like beautiful things³¹ in other beings. And it comes into my mind to speak something in verse, because he it is, who produces

Peace amongst men, upon the sea a calm;
Stillness on winds,³² on joyless bed sweet sleep.³³

after *Μοῦσαι* has dropt out *ἦσαν*, and after *ἀνθρώπων*, *ὑπέραι*. For thus only can we get rid of all the difficulties of the passage, which Ast and Stalbaum have vainly attempted to soften down.

²⁵ In lieu of *ἔθεν*, I have translated as if the Greek were *πόθεν*, and the sentence interrogative instead of being affirmative.

²⁶ The MSS. vary between *ἔστιν*, *ἔνεστιν*, and *ἔπιστιν*, which last leads to *ἔπειτα*, as shown by the version of Ficinus, "deformitatem quippe non sequitur Amor." The very same confusion is found in the Cratylus, § 10, where the Zurich editors have adopted from MS. Bodl. alone *ἔπειτα* for *ἔπιστι*.

²⁷ For, as Prometheus says in Æschylus, "Necessity is greater than Zeus himself." So too Simonides, Fr. 139, *ἀνάγκη εὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται*.

²⁸ Here again is another verse of Agatho, Πάντ' ἀγαθὰ γίγνται θεοῖσι τ' ἀνθρώποις ἅμα.

²⁹ Instead of *πρῶτος*, vainly defended by Stalbaum, one MS. and Stobæus offer *πρῶτον*, absolutely requisite to balance *μετὰ τοῦτο*. Ficinus too "primum—deinde."

³⁰ Instead of *ἄλλων*, which is scarcely intelligible, Plato wrote *καλῶν*, as shown by the preceding *εὐχαιστος*: and so I have translated.

³¹ Hermogenes T. i. p. 321, ed. Walz., *ἀνέμοις* for *ἀνέμων*: and so too four MSS. as required by the preceding *ἀνθρώποις* and *πλάγῃ*.

³² From the variations of MSS. it is probable that Plato wrote, as I have translated, *κοίτῃ θ' ἔπνον ἡδὺν ἀηδαῖ*. On the loss and corruption of *ἔπνον ἡδὺν*, I have given another instance in The Surplice, No. 25, p. 385, for May 16, 1846, by restoring to Apollon. Rh. iii. 763, *ἔπνον δ' ἔχει καὶ τις ὀδύης Ἠδὺν*. Stalbaum says that Dindorf's *κοίτῃ θ' ἔπνον νηκηδῇ* scarcely admits of doubt: for though *νηκηδῇ* has not been hitherto found

It is he who divests us of all feelings of alienation; and fills us with those of intimacy; who establishes all³⁴ meetings such as these, and in festivals, in dances, (and) in sacrifices,³⁵ he becomes the leader; introducing mildness, and banishing a harshness of manners; the friendly giver of good-will, the non-giver of enmity; gracious to the good; looked up to by the wise, admired by the gods; envied by those who have no lot in life, possessed by those who have; the parent of luxury, of tenderness, of elegance, of grace, of desire, and regret; careful of the good, regardless of the bad; in labour, in fear, in wishes, and in speech,³⁶ the pilot, the encourager,³⁷ the bystander, and best saviour:³⁸ of gods and men, taken all together, the ornament; a leader the most beautiful and best;³⁹ in whose train it is the duty of every one to follow, hymning well his praise, and bearing a part in that sweet song which he sings himself when soothing the mind of every god and man.—Let this my speech be offered up, Phædrus, said he, to

in any Greek writer, yet it is sufficiently supported by the analogy of *νηπειθής*. Nor is he altogether displeased with Hommel's *κοίτην ὑπνον τ' ἐνὶ κῆτει*: for Hesychius has *Κῆτος—ἀπορία*. But this is a manifest error for *χῆτος*, as those scholars should have known. Or we might read *κραδίην θ' ὑπνῶν ἐνὶ κῆδει*, i. e. "and bringing to the heart in sadness sleep." For Plato might have had in mind *Od. xvi. 450, Κλαίειν ἱπυρ'* (read *ἀπληστ'*) *Ὀδυσῆα, φίλον πόσειν, ὅφρα οἱ ἔπνον Ἡδὺν ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι βάλε γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη*. Shelley has "repose and sleep in sadness." But the hendyadis would be extremely tame.

³⁴ The text is *πάσας τιθείς ξυνίειναι*: where Hommel objects to *πάσας* and would read *πάντας*. But he still leaves untouched *τιθείς ξυνίειναι*, which could not be said in correct Greek. There is some error, which others may perhaps, but I cannot, satisfactorily correct.

³⁵ Instead of *ἐν θυσίαις*, Stobæus offers *ἐνθυμίας*: which leads to *ἐν θοίαις*, *ἐν θυσίαις*.

³⁶ Schütz was the first to object to *λόγῳ*, for which he proposed to read *μῶγῳ*. But that word is never found in prose, and rarely even in poetry. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἐν χόλῳ*, "in anger."

³⁷ I cannot understand *ἐπιβάτης*, which Ficinus translates "præfectus," which is quite as incorrect as Sydenham's "encourager." For the *ἐπιβάτης* was the name given to the person, who fought on board a vessel, but did not row, answering to "a marine" in the English navy. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὑπασπιστής*, for such a person is required in a case of fear. Hesych. *Υπασπιστής βοηθός*.

³⁸ If I have rightly restored *χόλῳ* for *λόγῳ*, we must read *Ἰσῶρ ἀριστος*, in allusion to *Ἰητρός ἀριστος* in Homer, quoted here in § 38.

³⁹ Although *κάλλιστος* καὶ *ἀριστος* are perpetually united, yet here the repetition of *ἀριστος* is extremely disagreeable. One would expect rather *καὶ χαρίεστατος*, "most agreeable."

Love, partaking, as best I could, in some parts of what is gay, in others of what is grave.

[24.] When Agatho had done speaking, all present, said Aristodemus, roared out (applause), for he had spoken in a manner worthy of himself and the god.—Upon which Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said, Do I appear to you, son of Actimēnus, to have felt just now a fear that was no fear,⁴⁰ when I spoke prophetically, what I asserted lately, that Agatho would speak marvellously well, and that I should be placed in a difficulty?—One portion, replied Eryximachus, you appear to have foretold truly, that Agatho would speak excellently, but the other, that you would be in a difficulty, I do not consider (true). And how, O happy man, said Socrates, am I not likely to be in a difficulty, and any one else too, who is to speak after a speech so full of beauty and variety? ⁴¹In other respects it was not equally admirable,⁴¹ but who, that heard the conclusion, would not have been struck with the beauty⁴² of the nouns and verbs?⁴² For when I consider how unable I shall be to say any thing beautiful approaching to this, I should run away for very shame, had I in any way the power. For the speech put me in mind of Gorgias: so that I suffered what is told in Homer.⁴³ For I feared that Agatho would at last send in his speech the head of that formidable speaker Gorgias against my speech; and, through my inability to say a word, turn me into stone! And I perceived how ridiculous I was then, when I agreed that I would in my turn after you make an encomium upon Love, and asserted that I had some skill in the matter of Love, yet knowing nothing of it, nor how it was necessary to praise any thing whatever. For in my stupidity I thought

⁴⁰ Suidas in 'Αδείας—'Αδείας διδίας διος.

^{41—42} Ficinus has "et cetera quidem, quamvis apte composita non adeo miranda videntur." He therefore found something in his MS. answering to "quamvis apte composita," wanting at present in the Greek.

^{43—44} In thus alluding to the beauty of the nouns and verbs, Socrates is supposed to be speaking ironically in praise of that which he really considered reprehensible. For, unlike the rhetoricians and sophists, he looked rather to the matter of a speech than the manner. There is a similar sneer at fine words merely in the Menexenus, p. 234, C.

⁴⁵ The passage alluded to is in Od. A. 636—

"Then pale fear seized me, lest the Gorgon's head
Should Proserpine of hallowed mien send out,
A prodigy great and terrible, from Hell."

one ought to speak truths respecting each subject praised, and that these were to be the substratum, and that selecting out of these very matters the most beautiful, to put them together in the most becoming manner. And I had a great notion that I should speak well, as knowing well the truths relating to the praising of any thing whatever. But this it seems is not the way to praise correctly, but (we must) attribute to the subject qualities the greatest and the best possible, whether they are such or not; and if the encomiums are untrue, that is an affair quite immaterial. For it was stated before, as it seems, that each of us "should appear to praise Love, and not merely to praise." On this account, I suppose, you turn over every topic and attribute to Love, and assert that he is of such a kind, and the cause of things so great, as to appear the most beautiful and best—to those it is clear who know him not—for he certainly would not (appear so) to those who did know him. And thus the praise becomes fine and pompous. But for my part, I know nothing of this kind of praise; and through not knowing, I agreed to compose myself in my turn a panegyric. "But my tongue only promised, not my mind." And so farewell to it. For I should not be able (to say any thing), not I indeed.⁴⁷ But

⁴⁴—⁴⁴ The words between the numerals I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, as is evident from his equally unintelligible version—"cum propositum sit, quomodo Amor ipse laudetur, immo ut quisque Amorem laudare quam maxime videatur." I could have understood, what Plato probably wrote,—ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν Ἐρωτα ἐγκωμιάσεται, οὐχ ὅπως ἐγκωμιάζειν δοῖται, i. e. "that each of us should praise Love, and not merely be thought to praise him." For thus there would be a proper antithesis between real and seeming praise. On this antithesis I have said something worth reading on Hipp. Maj. § 29, n. 3, and on Philoct. 1271.

⁴⁵—⁴⁵ In the words πάντα λόγον κινῶντες there is an allusion to the proverbial expression πάντα λίθον κινεῖν, as shown by Wytttenbach on Plutarch, S. N. V. p. 83. Here however Ficinus has "universa Amori tribuitis," omitting λόγον κινῶντες. From whence I suspect that Plato wrote πάντα λίθον κινῶντες, πάντα ἀνατίθεται, i. e. "moving every stone, you attribute every thing to Love." For thus we shall recover the object required after the verb ἀνατίθεται.

⁴⁶ In the words ἡ γλῶττα οὖν ὑπίσχετο, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐ, there is an allusion to Eurip. Hippol. 612, Ἡ γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοχ, ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος, translated by Cicero De Offic. iii. 29, "Juravi lingua; mentem injuratum gero," as remarked by Stalbaum, who did not, however, see that, as οὖν is here unintelligible, Plato wrote ἡ γλῶττα μὲν ὑπίσχετο—

⁴⁷ On this repetition of οὐ μὲν τοι after οὐ, Stalbaum refers to Od. Γ

I am ready to speak the truth according to my own notions, if you are willing (to hear), but not by way of comparison with yours, in order that I may not pay the debt of laughter. Do you then, Phædrus, consider, if indeed you are in want at all of such a speech, ⁴⁸(whether you wish)⁴⁹ to hear the truth spoken about Love with such an arrangement of nouns and verbs⁵⁰ as may happen to come (into my mind).⁵¹ [25.] Phædrus then, he said, and the rest requested him to speak in the manner which he thought he ought to speak. Permit me, Phædrus, however, said Socrates, to ask Agatho still some trifling questions; that, ⁵¹after having obtained a confession from him, I may then speak⁵¹ in this way. I permit you, said Phædrus. Question him. Hereupon he said, that Socrates began somewhat after this fashion:

In good truth, friend Agatho, you seem to me to have begun your speech well, in saying that we ought in the first place to set forth what is the nature of Love, and afterwards his doings. With this introduction I am quite delighted. Come, then, touching this Love; since you have gone through the other points in a beautiful and splendid manner, tell me this also. Is Love a being of such a kind as to be (the love) of something or nothing? I do not ask, whether it is of some father or mother;

27, *Ὁ γὰρ ὢν οὐδ*, and Hipp. Maj. p. 292, B., *οὔμοι δοκεῖ—οὐκ*: but *μῦθοι* is not thus introduced, except in the case of a confirmation by another speaker, as I have shown in Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2. There is some error here.

⁴⁸⁻⁴⁹ The words within the numerals have been inserted to complete the sense and syntax, which are both equally neglected in the original; where Plato wrote, I suspect, *πότερον περὶ Ἐρωτος τάληθῃ λεγόμενα ἀρίσκει ἀκούειν*, in lieu of *περὶ Ἐρωτος τάληθῃ λεγόμενα ἀκούειν*. Ficinus, "utrum vobis placeat—audire."

⁵⁰ Instead of *ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θίσει ῥημάτων*, one would have expected *ὀνομάτων δὲ καὶ ῥημάτων θίσει*, similar to *τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων*, a little before. Ficinus, "verborum nominumque—compositione."

⁵¹ As all the MSS. but one read *ὅποια δ' ἂν τις*, Stalbaum suggested *ὅποια δὴ τις*. He should have proposed *ὅποια μοι*, for *μοι* could scarcely be omitted after *ἐπιθεοῦσα*.

⁵¹ Such is the interpretation of Budæus. But Ficinus has "ut confirmatus ab illo loquar." The sense required is, "that, having reflected upon some trifling point, I may speak as is fitting," in Greek, *ἵνα ἀναλογισάμενος περὶ τοῦ οὕτως, ἢ δέ, λέγω*. For though *οὕτως ἤδη* is found here in § 20, and in Phædo, p. 61, D., yet in both these cases the same alteration is requisite. To the recovery of the sense three MSS. have led the way by reading *ἀναλογισάμενος*.

—for the question, whether love is the love of a father or mother, would be ridiculous—but as if I had asked this respecting a father, Is a father a father; and the father of something, or not? In this case you would surely have said, if you wished to answer correctly, that a father is the father of a son or daughter, would you not?—Certainly, said Agatho.—And is not a mother in the same predicament?—To this too Agatho assented.—Answer me still further, said Socrates, to a question a little larger, that you may the better apprehend my meaning. If I had asked, What, then, of a brother—whatever that very thing may be—is he a brother of some person, or not?—(Agatho) said, He is.—Is he not of a brother or a sister?—Agatho assented.—Try then, said (Socrates), to tell me about love. Is it the love of nothing, or of something?—Of something,⁵² by all means, (replied Agatho).—This, therefore,⁵³ said Socrates, keep to yourself, remembering what it is; but tell me so much as this. Does love desire that very thing, of which it is the love, or does it not?—Desires it, certainly.—Whether, when possessing what it desires and loves, does it then desire and love it? or only when not possessing it?—It would seem, he replied, only when not possessing it.—[26.] Instead of seeming,⁵⁴ said Socrates, consider if it be not of necessity thus, that desire desires only that, of which it is in want; and that it does not desire, if it be from want. For to me, Agatho, this seems to be marvellously necessary. But how does it to you?—To me too it seems, replied (Agatho).—You say well, said (Socrates). Would then a big man, being big already, wish to be big? or a man being strong, wish to be strong?—This is, from what has been just now stated, impossible (replied Agatho). For, being so,⁵⁵ he would not

⁵² In lieu of *ἐστίν* we must read *ἐστὶ τινας*, as shown by "Alicujus certe," in Ficinus.

⁵³ Sydenham has, "for the present keep," which is what the sense requires; and so Plato wrote in Greek, *Τοῦτο μὲν ἔα νῦν*, not *Τοῦτο μὲν ῥοιῦν*, where *ῥοιῦν* is unintelligible.

⁵⁴ There is a similar play on the word "seeming," in Hamlet, where to the Queen's inquiry, "Why seems it so particular with thee?" the Prince replies "Seems, Madam; nay, it is. I know not seems." See my note on Cratyl. p. 400, B. § 37.

⁵⁵ Ficinus has "Neque enim indigus esset eorum, quæ in se ipso jam contineret." He therefore found in his MS. not *ὃ γὰρ ἔστω*, but *ὃ γὰρ ἔχων ἦν*, which is far more correct; for *ἔχων* is opposed to *ἐνδεής*, and not *ἔν*, and better chimes in with the preceding *ἔχων*, *οὐκ ἐκτενέει*—*ἢ οὐκ ἔχων*.

be wanting on those points.—You say true, replied Socrates; for, if a person, being already strong, should wish to be strong, and being swift, (wish to be) swift, and (being) healthy, (wish to be) healthy,⁵⁷ one might perhaps imagine⁵⁸ that those who are such, as regards these and such-like points, and possess these, would desire those things which they already possess.⁵⁹ That we may not therefore be deceived, it is for this that I speak. For if you consider the matter, Agatho, (you will see) that they, who possess at present any of those things, must possess them, whether they will or not; and of such a thing, how can any one ever have a desire? But when a person says thus—"I, who am now in health, desire to be in health; and I, who am now wealthy, desire to be wealthy; and I long for those very things, which I possess;" we should say to him thus: "You mean, my man, that you, who now possess wealth, and health, and strength, are desirous to possess those things for the time to come; since at the present time you possess them, whether you will or not." When you say, therefore, thus—"I desire what is present," consider whether you are saying any thing else than this—"I wish that what are now present may be present for the time to come." Would aught else but this be acknowledged?⁶⁰—Agatho agreed that it would not.—⁶⁰Is not this then, said Socrates, to love (to desire)⁶⁰

⁵⁷ After "healthy," Stalbaum fancies that the apodosis is wanting; for he did not perceive that γάρ is a corruption merely for γ' ἄρ'—

⁵⁸—⁵⁸ Instead of the horrible verbiage in the Greek text, ἴσως γάρ ἂν τις ταῦτα οἰθεῖη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ὄντας τε τοιοῦτους καὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα τούτων, ἅπερ ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμῇν—how terse and to the purpose is the translation of Ficinus—"forte quispiam crederet et hos et alios quoslibet ea, quæ habent, appetere," i. e. "perhaps any one would believe that both these, and any others, would desire what they possess."

⁵⁹ Sydenham was the first to bring back ὁμολογοῖν ἂν, found in the three earliest edd. Ficinus too, "Censes hunc hominem—responsurum." Bekk. and Stalbaum, from MSS., ὁμολογοῖ: which would be in Attic Greek ὁμολογοῖν.

⁶⁰—⁶⁰ Such seems to be a part of the meaning required by the context; but even this cannot be got out of the Greek—Οὐκ οὖν τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνων ἐρᾶν δ' οὐκ ἔστιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν. For where there is no syntax, there is no sense. Ficinus has, "Amor profecto, hujusmodi illud respiciat, quod nondum in promptu est nec habetur," as if he had found in his MS. ὁρᾶν, which has been furnished by a solitary one subsequently examined. I have followed Sydenham in part, who supplied "to desire," although I suspect Plato wrote something else, which I could easily restore by the aid of an Æsopic fable.

that which is not at hand to him, and which he does not possess; and that what are now present should be preserved for him for the time to come.—Certainly so, (replied Agatho).—Both this man, therefore, (said Socrates,) and every one else who feels a desire, desires that which lies not at hand, and which is not present, and which he has not, and which he himself is not, and of which he is in want of; such things only are those of which there is the desire and the love.—Certainly, said he.—⁶¹ Come then, said Socrates, let us agree upon what has been said.⁶¹ Is Love any thing else than, in the first place, the love of something? next, of those things of which there is a want?—Clearly (not), replied Agatho.—In addition to these, said Socrates, recollect, of what things you asserted in your speech there was a Love. But, if you wish it, I will remind you. For, I think, you said something like this—"that their affairs were put into order by the gods, through a love of things beautiful: for that of things ugly there could be no love." Did you not say some such thing? I did say so, answered Agatho.—And you spoke reasonably, friend, replied Socrates. Now, if such be the case, would Love be any thing else than the love of beauty, and not of ugliness?—He confessed it.—And has it not been confessed, said Socrates, that a person loves that thing of which he is in want, and which he does not possess?—Yes, said (Agatho).—Love then, (said Socrates,) is in want of, and does not possess, beauty.—It is so of necessity, said (Agatho).—What then, (said Socrates,) do you call that beautiful, to which beauty is wanting, and does not possess it at all?—Certainly not, (replied Agatho).—Do you then, said Socrates, still confess that Love is beautiful, if such be the case?—And Agatho then said, I seem nearly, Socrates, to know nothing of what I then asserted.—And you have, Agatho, spoken fairly, said Socrates. But tell me still one little thing. Do not things good seem to you to be also beautiful?—They do, (said Agatho).—If then, (said Socrates,) Love is in want of

⁶¹—⁶¹ Stalbaum, perceiving the evident absurdity of these words, would render ἀνομολογησώμεθα τὰ σινημένα by "de quibus convenit, paucis repetamus." But there is nothing in the Greek to answer to "paucis," nor to "repetamus," which last he took from Ficinus—"quæ supra dicta repetamus." Plato wrote here, as before, in § 25, ἀναλογισώμεθα κατὰ τὰ σινημένα, i. e. "let us reason according to what has been said."

things beautiful, and if good things are beautiful, Love will be in want of good things likewise.—I am not able, replied (Agatho), to argue against you, Socrates; let then the case be as you say.—You are not able, my beloved Agatho, said Socrates, to argue against the truth: for (to argue) against Socrates is by no means difficult. [27.] And now here I will leave you. But as regards the discourse about Love, which I heard formerly from Diotima of Mantinea,⁶² who was a clever person on these and many other points—for when the Athenians were making sacrifices on account of the plague,⁶³ she effected its being put off for ten years—she it was who instructed even me in Love affairs. The speech then which she spoke I will endeavour to go through before you on the principles agreed upon by myself and Agatho, (relying) as well as I can, myself upon myself.⁶⁴ It is then, Agatho,

⁶² The MSS. vary between *Μαντικής* and *Μαντινικής*. The former was found in the one used by Ficinus, as shown by his version "Fatidica;" the latter is quoted by Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xxiv. § 4, and 7. According to the Scholiast on Aristid. T. p. 468, ed. Dind., she was a priestess of the temple of Zeus Lyceus in Arcadia; while Aristides himself, in the speech against Demosthenes in Mail's Scriptor. Vet. Collect. t. ii. p. 30, describes her *ἡ Μυλίων*: where De Geel in Biblioth. Crit. Nov. t. iv. p. 93, would read, with the approbation of Stalbaum, *Μυλίων*. I conceive, however, that as the talented Aspasia, who is similarly introduced in the Menexenus, was the mistress of Pericles, so Diotima was another of the same profession, and one of the three *λαϊκάστραι* alluded to in Aristoph. Ach. 529, as being the real cause of the Peloponnesian war, just as Helen had been of the Trojan. Maximus Tyrius too seems to have had some such notion; for his words are, *εἰτε Μαντινική εἰτε καὶ Αἰσβία τις ἦν*. And if such be the fact, it is easy to see, that although the ladies of Miletus were quite as notorious as those of Lesbos, yet here one may read in Aristides *ἡ μύλης τῆς*, "from the mill of some:" for to the tread-mill in ancient times disorderly females were sent, as they were lately in England. Proclus indeed on Republ. p. 420, ranks her amongst the Pythagoreans; and so were many of her sex, for reasons it would not be difficult to explain. With regard to her name *Μαντινική*, there is not, I suspect, any allusion to Mantinea—for a female of that town would have been called *Μαντις*—but to the circumstance of her having stayed the plague, and was thus a victor over soothsayers by doing that, which they could not accomplish; and as she was thus god-honoured, her name was properly *Διότιμα Μαντινική*.

⁶³ The plague alluded to is the one so graphically described by Thucydides ii. 47; while with this feat of Diotima may be compared the one attributed to Empedocles, who, from his supposed power over the winds, was called *Πανσάμιος*.

⁶⁴ This is said, because Socrates used to pretend that he had a bad memory.

very meet to declare, first, as you have stated, who Love is, and of what kind, and then his doings. Now it seems to me a thing the most easy to go through the subject, as the stranger went through it, while sifting myself. For I spoke to her in other words, but on nearly such points as Agatho just now did to me, (by saying) that Love was a god of goodness,⁶⁵ and was also (one) of things beautiful.⁶⁶ But she refuted me with the same arguments⁶⁷ as I did this person (Agatho); (by showing) that, according to my own reasoning, Love was neither beautiful nor good. How say you, Diotima? said I. Is Love an ugly and an evil being?—Will you not speak words of good omen? she replied; or do you imagine that every thing which is not beautiful, must of necessity be ugly?—Most certainly.—And is every thing that is not wise, ignorant? Or do you not perceive, there is something between wisdom and ignorance?—What is that?—To think correctly, and without being able to give a reason, know you not, said she, is neither to know—for how can knowledge exist without a reason?⁶⁸—nor yet is it ignorance; for how can that which hits the truth be ignorance?⁶⁹ There is then some such thing as correct opinion between intelligence and ignorance.⁷⁰—You say truly, said I.—Do not then compel what is not beautiful to be ugly; or what is not good to be evil. And thus, since you have confessed that Love is neither good nor beautiful, do not fancy a whit the more that he is ugly and evil; but something, she said, between those two.—However, said I, he is acknowledged by all to be a

⁶⁵ Instead of *μίγας θεός*, Sydenham translated “a deity excellent in goodness,” as if he wished to read, *ἀγαθός θεός*, which Wolf adopted, to chime in with the subsequent *οὔτε καλός*,—*οὔτε ἀγαθός*. Stalbaum, however, without a shadow of reason, or a particle of taste, still sticks to *μίγας*.

⁶⁶ Stalbaum says that *τῶν καλῶν* depends upon *ἔρω*, and that the sense is “the love of things beautiful.” But in that case the subsequent *οὔτε καλός οὔτε ἀγαθός* would be perfectly unconnected with what precedes.

⁶⁷ Ficinus—“iisdem,” which leads to *τοῖς αὐτοῖς* in lieu of *τούτοις τοῖς*.

⁶⁸ So Aristotle in *Ethic. Nicomach.* vi. 6, *μετὰ λόγου ἢ ἐπιστήμης*, quoted by Sydenham.

⁶⁹ By *τοῦ ὄντος* is meant, as Sydenham translated, “the truth.” Stalbaum refers to *Rep.* i. p. 334, E. and *Xenoph. Anab.* iii. 2, 39.

⁷⁰ Stalbaum refers to *Theætet.* p. 190, A. *Phileb.* p. 37, A. *Sophist.* p. 263. *Rep.* v. p. 477, A.; vi. p. 506, C.

god of might.—By all who do not know him, said she, or by those who do likewise?—By all universally. [28.] And she said with a smile, How, Socrates, can he be acknowledged a god of might by those, who say he is no god at all?—Who are they? said I.—You yourself, replied she, are one, and I am one.—How say you this? I replied.⁷¹—Easily, said she. For tell me. Say you not that all the gods are blest and beautiful? or would you dare assert that any one of the gods is not beautiful and blest?—Not I, indeed, by Zeus, said I.—Say you not that those who possess things good and beautiful are happy?—Certainly.—But you have confessed that, through the want of things good and beautiful, Love has a desire for those very things of which he is in want.—I have confessed.—But how can he be a god, who has no share in things beautiful and good?—It seems, by no means.—You see then, said she, that even you do not consider Love as a god.—What then, said I, is Love a mortal?—Least of all.—What then?—As in the case before mentioned, she replied, between a mortal and immortal.—What is this, Diotima?—A great dæmon,⁷² Socrates. For the whole dæmon-kind is between a god⁷³ and mortal.—What power has it, said I?—It interprets for, and transmits to, the gods what is sent from men; and for and to men what (is sent) from the gods; from men, their petitions and sacrifices; from the gods, their commands⁷⁴ and returns for sacrifices;⁷⁴ and being in the middle space between both (gods and men)⁷⁵ it fills up the whole. So that by it all have been bound together into one.⁷⁵ Through them

⁷¹ As *εἶπον* and *ἔφη* could not be thus found united, Ficinus has very opportunely, "Quonam pacto me dixisse hoc asseris," which leads to *Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Πῶς τοῦτό μεράναι λίγεις*, in lieu of *τοῦτο ἔφη*.

⁷² On the subject of dæmons, the mass of authors quoted here by Ast and Stalbaum will give all the information required. According to an Orphic fragment preserved by Clemens Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 724, it would seem that the doctrine promulgated by Diotima emanated from the disciples of the Orphic school.

⁷³ Instead of *θεοῦ* one would prefer *θείου*, to answer to *θνητοῦ*.

⁷⁴ In lieu of these words Ficinus has "sacroque solennes institutiones et ordinem." But *ἀμοιβὰς* was found here by Pollux, who, however, in vi. 187, says that the meaning is uncertain. For *ἀμειβεσθαι*, as applied to the gods, would signify rather "to requite evil" than "to return good."

⁷⁵ Such is evidently what the train of thought requires. The Greek is *συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συνδιδεσθαι*. But as Ficinus has "totum complet, ut universum secum ipso tali vinculo connectatur,"

proceeds every kind of prophecy, and the priestly art relating to sacrifices, and initiations and incantations, and the whole of magic⁷⁶ and sorcery. For a god is not mixed up with man; but through that (middle nature) is carried on all intercourse and converse between gods and men,⁷⁷ whether awake or asleep. Now he who is wise in things of this kind is a dæmon-like man; but he who is wise in any other matter, whether arts or handicrafts, is an operative merely. But these dæmons are many and various, and one of them is Love.—[29.] But, said I, from what father or mother is he?—It is a rather long story, said she, to tell. However, I will relate it. When Venus was born⁷⁸ the gods had a feast, all the rest, and likewise Plenty, the son of Planning. And when they had supped, Poverty came⁷⁹ to beg, as there was good cheer⁷⁹

Orelli, on Isocrat. Περὶ Ἀντιόχου. p. 331, suggested *ἐμπληροῖ τὸ πᾶν, ὥστε αὐτὸ*. But Rynders more correctly, *τὰ ὅλα ἐμπληροῖ, ὥστε αὐτὸ*—For Proclus, on Alcibiad. i. p. 69, has *τὰ τε μίσα τῶν δαιμόνων γίνῃ ἐμπληροῖ τὰ ὅλα καὶ συνδεῖ*. There is, however, still a difficulty in *αὐτὸ αὐτῷ*. For the question is not what the Universe can do towards binding itself with itself, but what the middle dæmon power can. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐμπληροῖ τὰ ὅλα, ὥστε εἰς ἐν πάντα αὐτῷ ἐνδε- δίσθαι*, as I have translated. Stalbaum, however, still sticks to the common text, of which he gives a brief German version. I wish he had expressed his ideas in a longer Latin note.

⁷⁶ Instead of *μαντεῖαν*, which has been already mentioned, Plato evidently wrote *μαγείαν*—*καὶ γοητεῖαν* or *μαγαντεῖαν*, which is united to *ἐποδαῖς* in Legg. xi. p. 933, while *μαγείαν* is found in Alcib. i. p. 122, A.

⁷⁷ By the aid of Proclus on Parmenides, t. iv. p. 60, ed. Cousin, Heusde in Specim. Crit. p. 60, wished to supply, after *ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς θεούς*: for otherwise the gods and not men would be said to be asleep and awake. The idea is rejected point blank by Ast, nor fully adopted by Stalbaum.

⁷⁸ Of the different writers who have alluded to this story, Ast has given a very full list, both ancient and modern, to which Stalbaum adds Damascius Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, p. 302, ed. Kopp., and Reynders says that it was turned into verse by D. Heinsius in Monobibl. Eleg. ix.

⁷⁹—⁷⁹ The Greek is *προσαιήσουσα οἶον δὴ εὐωχίας*. Now, though *οἶον ἐν* might be used as *οἶα δὴ* in Menexen. § 2, yet as the object is wanting after *προσαιήσουσα*, Ficinus has "*mendicatura cibum*," as if he had found in his MS. CITON, which might have dropt out before OION. But the word was, I suspect, *σκύβαλον*. For Suidas has *Σκυβαλίζεται—κυρίως δὲ ἀκύβαλον, κυσὶ βαλόν τι ἐν ᾧ τὰ ταῖς κυσὶ βαλλόμενον ἐν Ἐπιγράμματι*, (Leonid. Alex. 30.) *Οὐδ' ἀπὸ δειπνιδίου γευσόμενος σκυβάλον*. Compare too Phocylid., *Μηδ' ἄλλου παρὰ δαιτὸς ἰδοῖς σκυβάλισμα τραπίζης*. So Ulysses is compared, in Od. xvi. 221, to a person who is *πολλῆς φλῆψι παραστὰς Αἰτίων ἀκόλου*: and so too

there, and she staid about the door. Just then Plenty, intoxicated with nectar,—for as yet wine was not,—went into the garden of Zeus, and being drowsy with liquor, fell asleep. Poverty therefore laid a plot against him, so as to have a child by Plenty, and placed herself down by him, and became pregnant with Love. Hence Love has become the follower of and attendant upon Venus, as having been begotten on the birth-day of that deity, and being also naturally fond of the beautiful and of Aphrodité,⁸⁰ as being beautiful. As Love then is the son of Plenty and of Poverty, he is in this state of fortune. In the first place, he is always poor; and so far from being either tender or fair, as the multitude fancy, he is rough and dirty, and shoeless, and houseless, ever stretched on the bare ground, and bedless, and lying at doors, and in the road under the sky alone; (and) as partaking of his mother's nature, dwelling ever with indigence. On the other hand, taking after his father, he is a plotter against the beautiful and good; courageous and bold, and on the stretch⁸¹ (to act); a skilful hunter, for ever weaving some contrivance; ⁸² eagerly desirous of intellect, and Œdipus in Col. 5, is described as Σμικρὸν μὲν ἑαυτῶν and τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐνι μείον φέρων.

⁸⁰ As there is nothing to which καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης can be referred, it is evident that Plato wrote περὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰ Ἀφροδίτης καλῆς οὐσης. Stalbaum renders, "ac simul naturâ suâ pulchri amans, quum etiam Venus pulchra sit:" which he got from Ficinus, "quinetiam naturâ pulchri desiderio capitur, cum Venus ipsa sit pulchra." But Love does not love the beautiful, because Aphrodité is beautiful; but loves the beautiful Aphrodité, because he loves the beautiful.

⁸¹ Although Themistius, in Or. xiii. p. 162, D., has σύντονος only, yet from Olympiodor. in Alcibiad. i. p. 14, ed. Creuzer, πᾶς γὰρ ἔρωι σύντονος ἴσθι μανία, one might elicit σύντονος ὡς τῇ μανίᾳ. For σύντονος can hardly stand here by itself. On the madness of love, see my note in Bailey's Hermesianax, p. 79, to which I could now add much more.

⁸² I cannot well understand πλείων μηχανὰς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητῆς καὶ ποριμῆς. I could have understood πλείων μηχανὰς φρονήσεως, ὡς Προμηθεὺς τις, καὶ εἰς ἄπορα πόριμος ὢν i. e. "weaving contrivances of intellect, as some Prometheus, and finding a path along the pathless." For so Prometheus is described by Æschylus in v. 59, Διὶ γὰρ εὐρεῖν ἀδὲ ἀμηχάνων πόρους: where, to the passages already quoted, I should have added Eurip. Hippol. Fr. 3, Ἐν τοῖς ἀμηχάνοισιν εὐπορώτατον ἔρωτα. Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xxvi. p. 309, καὶ τὰ ἄπορα αὐτῷ (ἔρωτι) εὐπορώτατα. Theophrast. in Athen. p. 362, F., εὐπόρους Ἐν τοῖς ἀπόροις. Of which the most apposite is Ælian. H. A. iii. 30, σοφώτατος πλείων εὐπόρους ἐξ ἀπέρων μηχανὰς. Themistius, however, has ἐπιθυμητὴν τῆς ἔρωτικῆς, in Or. xiii. p. 163, B.

finding a way for himself;⁸³ acting the philosopher⁸³ through the whole of life; ⁸⁴a clever sorcerer and a drug-employer, and sophist;⁸⁴ and naturally neither an immortal nor a mortal; but at one time in the same day ⁸⁵he blooms and lives, when he is faring well; and at another time he dies;⁸⁵ but revives again⁸⁶ through his father's nature. Whatever is furnished to him, is ever secretly flowing out; so that Love is never either in want or in wealth. He is likewise in a middle place between wisdom and ignorance. For the case is this:—No god philosophizes, or desires to become wise; for they are so; and if there is any other being who is wise, neither does he philosophize. Nor yet are the ignorant philosophers, nor do they desire to become wise. For on this very account,⁸⁷ Ignor-

⁸³ Stalbaum, after Jacobs on Achill. Tat. p. 449, refers to Xenoph. Cyrop. vi. l. 41, τοῦτο πεφιλοσόφηκα μετὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου σοφιστοῦ τοῦ Ἐρωτος. Add Chariton. ii. 4, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἱερῷ φιλοσοφοῦσαν.

⁸⁴ In the words, Δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής, evidently lies hid an Iambic verse. In fact, nearly the whole of this description, like the greater part of the poetical passages in Plato, has been merely put into prose from a lost play, I suspect, of Aristophanes. At least it is easy to elicit the pentastich following: Ἀνδρείος ὦν ἱγής τε σύντονος τ' ὦν Μανία, κύων ὤς, χαρμόνης θήραν ἐπὶ Πίλικων τ' αἰὶ τὰς μηχανὰς φρονήσεως, Ὡς τις Προμηθεὺς, καὶ πόριμος εἰς τάπορ', ὦν Δεινὸς σοφιστής, καὶ γόης, καὶ φαρμακεύς: where I have introduced θήραν ἐπὶ from Themistius, who found in his MS. θερευτῆς δεινὸς τοῦ κάλλους, as shown by his μηχανὰς ἐπὶ τῇ θήρᾳ πεπλεγμένας τοῦ κάλλους.

⁸⁵ The Greek text is θάλλει καὶ ζῇ—by an ὑστερον πρότερον, which Euripides has correctly avoided in Iph. A. 1226, Ζῶσάν τε καὶ θάλλουσιν. It is not, however, quite certain that καὶ (i. e. ἡ) ζῇ is not a gloss for θάλλει. At least, Maximus Tyr. in Dissert. xxiv. p. 297, ed. 2 Davis, has θάλλει μὲν ἔρωις εὐπορῶν, ἀποθνήσκει δὲ ἀπορῶν: and thus luckily supplies ἀπορῶν, which, although requisite for the balance of the sentence, had dropt out before ἀποθνήσκει. If, however, ζῇ is to be retained, we must, for a similar reason, supply likewise φθίνει καὶ between ἀπορῶν and ἀποθνήσκει: for thus ζῇ καὶ θάλλει, ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ, will be the antithesis to ἀπορῶν φθίνει καὶ ἀποθνήσκει, i. e. "when faring ill, he droops and dies."

⁸⁶ With this passage of Plato may be compared the lines of Pope in the Rape of the Lock:

When bold Sir Plume had thrown Clarissa down,
Chloe slept in and kill'd him with a frown.
She smiled, to see the doughty hero slain;
But at her smile the beau revived again.

⁸⁷ The Greek is αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία—Where since αὐτὸ τοῦτο have nothing to depend upon, it is evident that Δι' has dropt out after Α: at the end of γενίσθαι, as it has in Thucydides, as shown by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 116. The preposition, however, was

ance is in a hard case, in that a person,⁸⁸ being neither beautiful, nor good, nor wise, still appears to himself to be all-sufficient. Hence he who fancies himself to be not wanting, does not desire that, of which he fancies he is not in want. —Who then, Diotima, said I, are they who philosophize? if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant?—This, said she, is surely clear even to a child, that they are those between both of these; of whom Love too (is one).⁸⁹ For of the things most beautiful is wisdom. Now Love is conversant with the beautiful. So that it is of necessity for Love to be a lover of wisdom, and for a lover of wisdom to be between the wise and the ignorant. And of this too the cause is in his birth; for he is from a father wise and in abundance, but from a mother unwise and in want. [30.] Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of this dæmon. But, as to whom you fancied to be Love, you have suffered nothing to be wondered at. For you fancied, as it seems to me, making a guess from what you are saying, that Love is the thing loved, and not the loving; and hence, I think, Love appeared to you to be all-beautiful. For the thing loved is in reality beautiful and delicate and perfect and blest. But the thing loving possesses another nature, and such as I have described.—Be it so, stranger lady, said I; for you have spoken well. But if Love be of such a nature, of what advantage is he to mankind?—This, Socrates, said she, I will subsequently endeavour to teach you. Love then is of such a nature, and has been so begotten; and he is, as you assert, the love of things beautiful. Now should any one ask us, What is, O Socrates and Diotima, the Love of things beautiful?—but I will speak more clearly in this way—What does the lover of things beautiful long for?—For them to be his, said I.—This answer, said she, seeks still

wanting in the MS. used by Proclus, who quotes *αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ διὰ τὴν* (thus) *ἀμαθία*. Ficinus has "hoc enim habet ignorantia pessimum," as if he had found in his MS. *αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀμαθίᾳ*, where *ἀμαθία*, first proposed by Sydenham, is furnished by two MSS.

⁸⁸ To preserve the syntax Ast correctly saw that *τινὸς*, which might easily have dropt out after *ὄντα*, is here required.

⁸⁹ The Greek was *ὢν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἔρως*. Bekker, whom Hommel and Stalbaum follow, has edited *αὐ*, from two MSS. But Rückert correctly objects to *αὐ*, as being perfectly absurd. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὢν εἰς*—Ficinus has "e quibus est Amor," omitting both *δὲ* and *καὶ*—

such a question as this. What will there be to that man, who shall possess things beautiful?—To this question I said, I had it not in my power to give an answer very ready at hand.—But, said she, should a person making a change, and putting good in the place of beautiful, inquire of you (by saying), Come (tell me), Socrates, what does the lover of good things long for?—For them to be his, I answered.—And what will there be to a man, who shall possess good things?—This, said I, is more easy to answer: that he will be happy.—(Right,) said she; for by the possession of good things the happy are happy, nor is there any need to ask, Why does he, who wishes to be happy, wish so; but the answer appears to be conclusive.—You say true, I replied.—Now do you conceive, said she, that this wishing and this longing is common to all men, and that all wish for good things to be in their possession always; or how say you?—I think in this way, said I; that it is common to all.—Why then, Socrates, said she, do we not say that all men are in love, if all love the same things, and always? but say (rather),⁹⁰ that some are in love, and some are not?—I too⁹¹ am in a wonderment, said I.—Do not wonder, said she; ⁹²for after we have taken away a certain species of love, we call it love, adding the name of the whole; but as regards the rest, we make an improper use of other names.⁹²—As how, for example? said I.—As this, said she. You know that creation is a thing of extensive meaning. For that which is the cause of any thing coming out of non-existence into existence, is altogether a creation. So that all the operations effected by all the arts, are creations; and all the workers of them are creators.—You say true, said I.—And yet you know, continued she, they are not called creators, but have other names; but from all kinds of creation one portion has been separated, relating to the musical art and to metres;

⁹⁰ After ἀλλὰ I suspect that μάλλον has dropt out, for thus ἀλλὰ μάλλον are constantly opposed to τί οὐ—

⁹¹ This "too" has no meaning here.

⁹² Such is the literal version of the Greek, with which may be compared κατὰ τὴν τὴν εἶδος ἰόντες τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα ἱσχυοῦσιν in § 31 Shelley's translation is—"Wonder not, said Diotima; for we select a particular species of love, and apply to it distinctively the appellation of that which is universal." But he omits the next clause, although found in Ficinus. For he probably saw the want of connexion in the train of thought. There is some error here, which I could without much difficulty correct.

and is called by the name belonging to the whole. For it alone is called poesy (i. e. making);⁹³ and they, who possess this portion of the creative power, are poets (i. e. makers):—You say true, said I.—[31.] Just so it is with Love, said she. Universally all long after good things; and a state of good fortune is to every one a Love⁹⁴ the greatest and deceitful.⁹⁴ But some persons, turning themselves towards him⁹⁵ in many and various ways,⁹⁵ either through money-making, or a love of gymnastic exercises, or of wisdom, are neither (said) to be in love nor are called lovers; while others who⁹⁶ go, and are seriously occupied,⁹⁶ according to one kind of love, have the name of the whole, and love, and are (said) to be in love, and are called lovers.—You are very near the truth, said I.—⁹⁷ There is a story told, she said, that they who are in love are in search of their other half.⁹⁷ But my doctrine is, that a person loves neither the half nor the whole of

⁹³ The word "make" was adopted by Spenser in the sense of "making verses," to answer to the Greek *ποιῶν* in the hackneyed quotation, "Who taught me as I can to make."

⁹⁴⁻⁹⁶ How the universal longing after happiness could be called "deceitful," except in a religious point of view, one cannot understand; unless indeed it be said that Plato was here thinking, not of Love, but Hope, which is called "credula" by Horace; and that, since Hope is the daughter of Desire, what is true of the offspring may be predicated of the parent, just as we say conversely in English, "Like father like son," and was said in Greece, *λοκὸν τίκναι γονεῦσιν*. But even thus Plato would scarcely have united *μίσγος* and *δολερὸς*. Hence Stalbaum now wishes to read *δολερώτατος*: although he once considered the whole clause, *ὁ μίγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς ἔρως πάντι*, as an interpolation. There has been rather an excision of some words and an alteration of others, which only a dashing conjecturist would attempt to restore. Creuzer in a Vienna periodical would read, *ὀρμητικὸς τε καὶ τολμηρὸς ἔρως πάντι*. Hommel—*καὶ κοινὸς*—Shelley translates "the greatest and subtlest;" for he perhaps remembered some of the passages quoted by myself on *Æsch.* Suppl. 1035, where the epithet of deceitful is applied to Love and Venus.

⁹⁷⁻⁹⁸ These words are omitted by Ficinus. The phrase however is in p. 178, A. § 6, and in *Menex.* p. 237, C., *πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ*, and so it should be written here.

⁹⁹⁻¹⁰⁰ Ficinus has simply "contendunt," as if his MS. omitted *ισπουδακότες*. Plato wrote *καὶ ισπουδακότες ἱρωικά, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα ἔχουσι*: where *ἔχουσι* is due to three MSS. and *ἱρωικά* is substituted for *ἱρωά τε*, which, as shown by the balance of the sentence, could not precede *καὶ ἱπῶν καὶ ἱρασταί*, nor could *ισπουδακότες* dispense with its object; and still less could *ἱρωά τε* follow *τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα*.

¹⁰¹⁻¹⁰² Hence it appears that the speech of Aristophanes was founded on some old story. See § 16.

any thing, unless it happens, my friend, to be somehow a good. Since men are willing to have their feet and hands cut off, if their own limbs are deemed to be an evil.⁹⁸ For each person does not hug his own, I fancy, unless he calls good his own property,⁹⁹ but evil the property of another: since there is nothing else of which men are in love, but good alone. How do they seem to you?—By Zeus, said I, to me at least not (otherwise).—May we not then say simply, she replied, that men love the good?—Yea, said I.—What, said she, must we not add that they desire the good to be present to them?—This, said I, must be added.—And not only, she said, to be present, but to be present always?—This too must be added.—There is then, to speak comprehensively, said she, the desire that the good should be present to a person for ever.—You speak most truly, said I.—Since then, said she, there is the love of this, (the good,) of those who pursue it in any manner,¹⁰⁰ and by any act, the eagerness and the stretch for it would be called love. ¹ But can you state what this act would happen to be?¹—I should not however² have wondered, Diotima, said I, at your wisdom, nor have frequented (your school) to learn these very things, (had I been able to tell.)—Well then, said she, I will tell you. The act is of breeding upon a beautiful thing, as

⁹⁸ So Christ said, "If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off."

⁹⁹ I cannot understand *οἰκτιρὸν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ*. The words *καὶ* (i. e. *ἡ*) *ἑαυτοῦ* are from a gl., as shown by the balance of the sentence, where *ἀλλότριον* alone is opposed to *οἰκτιρὸν*. Of this Shelley was perhaps aware; and he has therefore filled out the idea by his version, "Nor do they cherish and embrace that, which may belong to themselves, merely because it is their own; unless indeed any one should choose to say, that what is good is attached to his own nature and is his own, while that which is evil is foreign and accidental."

¹⁰⁰ Although I am aware that a double interrogative is to be found occasionally in Plato, as Heindorf was the first to remark on Hipp. Maj. § 40, yet there I have taken *τιν* and *τινι* in an indefinite sense, despite even the collocation of the pronouns, which ought to follow rather than precede the nouns *τρόπον* and *πράξει*. Diotima did not intend to ask a question, but to state a fact, the groundwork of the subsequent questions.

¹ I confess I cannot understand the words *τί τοῦτο σπυγχνάει τὸ ἔργον*. I could have understood *τί ταῦτα σπυγχνάει ἂν τὸ ἔργον*, i. e. At what act would these (eagerness and stretching) arrive?

² The Greek is, *Ὁ μὲντοι ἂν—ἰθαύμαζον*, without the apodosis to the sentence. But in that case *γὰρ* is used, not *μὲντοι*: which means "however," a meaning here totally out of place. Plato wrote *Ὁ γὰρ μὲν τὸν*, without the name of a deity. See Matth. Gr. Gr. § 281, 2.

regards both the body and soul.—What you are saying, I replied, has need of divination. For I do not understand.—I will speak then, said she, more clearly. All human beings, Socrates, said she, yearn, as regards the body and soul; and when they arrive at maturity our nature longs to beget. But it is unable to beget upon an ugly thing, but only upon a beautiful one. ³For the begetting is through the connexion of a man and woman.³ But this is a god-like act, and this ⁴[the yearning and generation]⁴ is in a mortal animal an immortal act. But these it is impossible to take place in a thing unsuitable. Now what is ugly is ill-suited to every thing that is divine? But what is beautiful is suited. ⁵For Beauty is Fate and Eileithuia, who presides over child-birth.⁵ Hence when what is yearning comes close to what is beautiful, it becomes joyous, and being delighted it pursues itself out and ⁶breeds and begets.⁶ But when

³—The words between the numerals are rejected by Ast and Rückert. Stalbaum defends them by scarcely the shadow of an argument. For he did not perceive that Plato wrote *τίκτειν*—*οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ καλῷ· ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συνουσία ἀποκόσ ἐστι νοῦ, i. e.* for the intercourse between a man and woman is unproductive of mind. In a similar strain the philosopher says in *Rep. vi. p. 496, A.*, that *οἱ ἀνάξιοι παιδεύσεως* are unable *γεννᾶν διανοήματα*; but in *p. 490, B.*, that *ὁ φιλομαθὴς—μυεῖς τῷ ὄντι ὁντως* is able *γεννᾶν νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν*.

⁴—The words within brackets are evidently an explanation of *τοῦτο*.

⁵—How Beauty can be Fate and the goddess who presides over child-birth, called *Ἐλθειθία*, one of the titles of *Athené*, as we learn from Eurip. *Ion*, Stalbaum attempts to explain in a way I cannot understand. I suspect that instead of the unintelligible *Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Ἐλθειθία ἡ καλλόνη ἐστὶ τῇ γενίσει*, Plato wrote the very intelligible *Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Ἐλθειθία καὶ Καλλόνη τρεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ γενίσει εἰσί, i. e.* "Fate then, and Eileithuia, and Beauty, are three powers that preside over generation." For thus *τρεῖς* is perpetually introduced, where three things are mentioned, as I have shown in the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature*, where I have supported the reading furnished by Stobæus, *liv. p. 364*, in *Thucydides v. 9*, *Νομίσαστε τρία εἶναι τοῦ καλῶς πολεμεῖν*, and acknowledged by the Scholiast, *ἐκ τριῶν γίνεται τὸ καλλῶς πολεμεῖν*, by quoting fifty similar passages, and I could now add half as many more.

⁶—The Greek is *τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ*. But as in the corresponding clause there is only one verb, *γεννᾷ*, it is evident that Plato did not write here two with the same meaning. He might however have written here *τίκτει τέκνα γενναῖα*, and afterwards *οὐδ' ἐν γεννᾷ*. For thus *οὐδ' ἐν* is properly opposed to the plural *τέκνα*. It is true that *τῆς γεννήσεως* and *τοῦ τόκου* are found united just below. But there *καὶ τοῦ τόκου* is an evident interpolation, as shown by the subsequent conversation, which turns entirely upon the mention of *γέννησις* alone. So in § 33, *τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ* is to be twice corrected similarly.

it (comes close) to what is ugly, it assumes a sour look, and is vexed ⁷ and coils itself up, and turns away, and unrolls itself,⁷ and does not beget, but restraining the swelling, it takes the matter grievously to heart. Hence to the party yearning and swelling with desire, there is an excessive fluttering of mind respecting the beautiful; on account of its being able to deliver him who has⁸ it from his great agony. But, Socrates, said she, this is not, as you fancied, the love of the beautiful.—Of ⁹ what then is it? said I.—It is the love, replied she, of generation [and of begetting]¹⁰ in a beautiful thing.—Be it so, said I.—By all means, she replied.—But why, said I, of generation?—¹¹ Because generation is a thing ever producing, and immortal, as far as it can be for a mortal. ¹² Now from what has been agreed upon it is necessary to desire immortality with a good, if there is to Love the desire of the good being ever present to himself. It is necessary then from this reasoning, that there is a love likewise of immortality.¹³

[32.] All this did Diotima teach me, when she was discoursing upon love matters. And once upon a time she asked me, What do you imagine, Socrates, to be the cause of that love and desire? Do you not perceive how vehemently all brute animals are affected, when they feel such a desire to breed, both beasts and birds? ¹³ how they are all sick and lovingly disposed,¹³ in the first place, to have a connexion with

⁷⁻⁷ As the idea in *συσπειράται* is the converse of that in *ἀνειλλεται*, both could not have been thus applied to the same thing at the same time. Moreover *ἀποτρίπεται* should follow *σκυθρωπὸν* and *λυπούμενον*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἀποτρίπεται καὶ, ὃ συσπειράται, ἀνειλλεται*, i. e. "and that, which had coiled itself up, is unrolled." The idea is taken from a snake, which, previous to making an attack, coils itself up; but when frightened, unfolds itself, and slinks away. It was not then without reason that two MSS. offer *συνσπείρεται*.

⁸ I cannot understand *τὸν ἔχοντα*. I could have understood *τὸν ἰγυῖοντα*, "about to approach it," similar to the preceding *προσπείλῃ*.

⁹ Instead of *τί μὴν*, which Stalbaum attempts to defend by passages not in point, Stephens suggested *τίνος*, from "cujus" in Ficinus; for the genitive is required by the preceding remark, and subsequent reply of Diotima.

¹⁰ See at n. 2.

¹¹ Ficinus, "Quia Amor sempiternum quiddam est et immortale, quemadmodum in ipso mortali generatio," as if he had found in his MS. *Οὐδὲ αὖτε γένεσις ἐστὶ τι καὶ ἀθάνατον ἔρως, ὡς καὶ ἐν θνητῷ ἡ γέννησις*, at least *ἐν* is read in two MSS.

¹²⁻¹² I must leave for others to perceive the connexion of the reasoning in all the words between the numerals. "Davius sum non Œdipus."

¹³⁻¹³ Ficinus has "toto impetu proferuntur et amoris ardore insa-

each other; and afterwards to rear their offspring; and how ready in their behalf the weakest are to fight against the strongest, and to die for them, and though they are themselves pining away with hunger, ¹⁴they do not faint in doing every thing, so as to bring them up.¹⁴ Human beings indeed, she said, one might fancy, acted thus from reflection, but what reason is there for wild animals to be so lovingly disposed. Can you state?—And I said again that I did not know.—And do you think, said she, ever to become a person of power in questions of love, if you do not understand this?—It is for this very reason, said I, Diotima, as I just now stated, that I come to you, being well aware that I have need of teachers. Do you then tell me the cause both of this and of all the rest relating to questions of love.—If you believe then, said she, that there is naturally the love of that, which we have often confessed, do not wonder. For here, on the same ground as that, the mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be ever and immortal.¹⁵

niunt," which is infinitely more graphic than the lifeless Greek—*νοσοῦντά τε πάντα καὶ ἰρωτικῶς διατιθίμενα*: where *διατιθίμενα* is most inelegantly repeated after *διατίθεσθαι* in the preceding sentence. The passage has evidently been tampered with.

¹⁴—¹⁴ The Greek is, *ὥστ' ἐκείνα ἐκτρέφειν καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ποιοῦντα*, i. e. "So as to bring them up, and are doing every thing else—" But in the formula *πᾶν ποιεῖν* the word *ἄλλο* never is, nor could be found. Hence in lieu of *καὶ ἄλλο*, Plato wrote either, as I have translated, *οὐκ ἀλύει*, a verb peculiarly appropriate here, as may be seen in my note on Philoct. 174, where I should have quoted Perizonius on Ælian. V. H. ix. 5, and Wyttenbach's on Plutarch. de Audiend. Poet. c. v.; or since the neuter plural *ζῶα*, signifying a thing of life, would require a verb plural *ἀλύουσι*, we may read *αἰκάλλει τε*, i. e. "a certain feeling cheats them into the doing every thing so as to bring up their young." For thus we find in Aristoph. Thesm. 870, *'ἄλλ', ἤπερ αἰκάλλει τε καρδίαν ἐμὴν, Μὴ ψευστὸν ᾧ Ζεῦ, τῆσδε ποιήσῃς μ' Ὀπίδος*. For by the slight change of *ψῦσον* into *ψευστὸν*, and of *τῆς ἐπιούσῃς* into *τῆσδε ποιήσῃς μ'*, we get rid of all the rubbish heaped up by the Scholiasts, who did not know that Sophocles wrote likewise in Pelens, *Μὴ ψευστὸν, ὦ Ζεῦ, μὴ μ' ἔλῃς ἀνευ δορός*, not *Μὴ ψῦσον*, in defiance of the language. In the passage of Plato, however, there is, I suspect, an error in *παραινόμενα*. For the effect of hunger is to contract, not extend, the muscles of the body. In fact, *παραινέσθαι* is applied rather to the fulness than emptiness of the stomach, as shown by *ἄλις ἀφύης παρὰίταμαι γὰρ ἰσθίων*, quoted from Aristophanes by Suid. in *Παπαίταμαι ἑξώγκωμα*. One would have expected rather *λιμὴν ἀπορία τε τυρόμενα*, i. e. "wasted with hunger and with want." Ficinus has, "parata sunt fame deficere, modo filios nutrant, et aliud quodlibet audacter aggrediuntur."

¹⁵ In what way *αἰεῖ εἶναι* differs from *ἀθάνατος*, I must leave for others

Now this it effects only by generation ; when it leaves another new thing in the place of the old ; since at the time when each individual animal ¹⁶ is said to live, and to be the same ; ¹⁶ as for instance, a person is called the same from childhood, until he becomes an old man ; and though he never possesses the same things in himself, he is nevertheless called the same person, ¹⁷ being perpetually altered, (by obtaining some new things,) and losing (the old), ¹⁷ as regards the hair and flesh, and bones and blood, and the whole body. And not only as regards the body, but the soul likewise; his manners, morals, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, all these never remain the same to any man ; but some are produced, and some destroyed. And there is something still more strange than this ; since not only are some sciences produced, and some lost by us, but we are never the same, not even as regards sciences in general ; but each single science suffers in a similar way. For what we call to practise oneself is to act, as if a science were about to depart ; and indeed oblivion is the departure of science ; but practice, introducing again a fresh remembrance in the place of the departing one, preserves the science, so that it seems to be the same. In this manner every thing mortal is preserved, not by its being in every respect the same for ever,

to explain. Nor just before do I see how *ἐνταῦθα*, an adverb of time or place, can be opposed to *ἔστιν*, a pronoun relating to a thing or person. Hence, since nearly all the MSS. read *τὸ εἶναι*, perhaps Plato wrote *αἰγιεὶς τι εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατον*, as just before in § 31, *αἰγιεὶς—καὶ ἀθάνατον* : where, to avoid the tautology, I have rendered *αἰγιεὶς* "ever producing."

¹⁶—¹⁶ Such is the barefaced nonsense, which Stalbaum believes Plato wrote, only because he was determined to reject the certain emendation of Hommel—which he has chosen to pass over with a sneer—*ἐν ᾧ ζῆν καλεῖται, καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ*. For Hommel knew, what Stalbaum did not, that *καὶ* is thus added after a repeated word, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 155, 258, and 307, and to the passages there quoted I could now add full thirty more. They however, who are disposed to believe that Plato, whose language is generally as clear as crystal, would render his meaning muddy by an unusual construction, will of course receive Stalbaum's note as a god-send.

¹⁷—¹⁷ In lieu of *ἀλλὰ νῦν αἰὶ γιγνόμενος*, Stephens was near the mark in proposing *ἄλλοιός αἰὶ γενόμενος*. He should have suggested *ἀλλοιούμενος αἰὶ*—So too instead of supplying *τὰ μὲν προσλαμβάνων*, to answer to *τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς*, F. Wolf should have elicited *τὰ μὲν νέ' ἀρνύμενος* from *γιγνόμενος* ; while by the aid of Ficinus' "et vetera exuit," Bast happily restored *τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ ἀπολλύς*. The word *γιγνόμενος* is evidently owing to the subsequent *τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται*.

as the deity is; but by the thing that is departing and growing old, leaving another new thing, such as it was itself. By this contrivance, Socrates, said she, that which is mortal partakes of immortality, both body and all other things.¹⁸ But that which is immortal in another way.¹⁸ Do not then wonder that every thing¹⁹ honours its own offspring. For this earnest attention and love follows²⁰ every thing for the sake of immortality.—[33.]²¹ And I on hearing the discourse was amazed and said,²¹ Be this so, said I,²² thou most wise Diotima; since such is truly the case. And she, like the perfect²³ sophists, replied, Rest assured,²⁴ Socrates. Since, if you are willing to turn your eyes to the love of glory in mankind, you would wonder at your want of reason touching the points on which I have spoken, unless you bear in mind and consider how terribly they are affected²⁵ with the desire to become renowned,

¹⁸⁻¹⁹ This, says Stalbaum, is added to limit the universality of the assertion, "and all other things." But surely Plato would never have presumed to hint at the manner in which an immortal thing is preserved and perpetuated, even if he wanted the wit to perceive that what is immortal would never require any preserving process. To avoid therefore the absurdity, which Stalbaum has admitted into his 2nd edition, although properly rejected in his first, Creuzer in *Lect. Platonic*, at the end of his edition of Plotinus de Pulchritud. p. 528, would read ἀδύνατον, which Ast and Rynders have adopted; for they did not see that Plato wrote ἀθίμιτον δι' ἄλλῃ, i. e. "but unlawful in any other way."

¹⁹ The word πάν here, and shortly afterwards παντι, could hardly stand without ζῶον or θνητόν—

²⁰ Ficinus has "amor inest," which leads to ἔπεισι. The two words are interchanged in Cratylus, § 10.

²¹⁻²² The words between the numerals are omitted by Sydenham, although found in the version of Ficinus.

²² Others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote εἶπον, Εἰεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡ σοφωτάτη, when he might have written εἶπον, Εἰεν, νῆ δ' εἰ, ὡ γύναι σοφωτάτη.

²³ Stalbaum says, that in οἱ τῆλοι σοφισταί there is a covert ridicule of the Sophists. But as Diotima was only a solitary person, she could hardly be compared to many sophists. Plato wrote either γελοῖός τις σοφιστής, or ὁ ἀπ' Ἑλίας σοφιστής, as in the Sophist, § 1, ἐξ Ἑλίας—φιλόσοφον.

²⁴ As there is nothing to which the expression "rest assured" can be applied, Plato probably wrote καὶ, ἢ δ' ἢ—Εὐ ἴσθι, ὅτι ἔφησ' ἐγώ, Σώκρατες, instead of καὶ ἢ, —Εὐ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ—

²⁵ Although δεινῶς διάκεινται might perhaps stand, yet δεινῶς διακαίνονται, "terribly inflamed," would be far more forcible.

²⁸ And fame undying to lay up for ever.²⁸

And for this they are ready to run the risk of all kinds of danger, even still more than for their children, and to expend their substance, and undergo labours of whatsoever kind, and for it to die. Since do you fancy, said she, that Alcestis would have died for Admetus, or Achilles²⁷ have died over the body of Patroclus, or your countryman Codrus to preserve the kingdom for his children,²⁸ ²⁹ had they not thought that of their virtuous deeds the remembrance would never-dying live, as it actually does for ever, which we cherish to this day?²⁹—³⁰ Far from it, said I. But I think, that in behalf of undying virtue, and of a reputation glorious³¹ as this, all men perform all deeds, and so much the more, as they are the more excellent.³⁰ For they have a yearning for immortality.—They then, said she, who have a yearning according to the body, turn themselves rather to women, and are in this way given to love affairs; and by child-getting procure for themselves, as they fancy, immortality and a remembrance

^{28—29} As the Greek words *Καὶ κλῖος ἐς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον ἀθάνατον καταθίσθαι* contain a latent hexameter. I have put the translation into verse. On the peculiar use of *καταθίσθαι*, see Valckenaer on Herodot. vi. 73.

²⁷ The example of Achilles in dying for glory, is brought forward by Aristotle in his well-known hymn to Glory, of which I gave a translation in the Gentleman's Magazine, June, 1833, p. 538.

²⁸ Horace assigns a more noble motive in his "Codrus pro patria non timidus mori."

^{29—30} Here again are some latent hexameters, portions of which Hommel was the first to detect; but he did not perceive that Plato had in mind a distich on Codrus—*Ὀῖστο γὰρ περὶ οὐ τεθηκότες αἰὲν ἵσθαι ἀθάνατον μνήμης ἀρετῆς, ἣν ἴσχομεν ἡμεῖς*.

^{30—31} All the words between the numerals are assigned correctly to Socrates by Ficinus, who saw probably that *οἶμαι* could not be said by Diotima, who would have spoken with more decision, as became an instructress. Ficinus, however, omits *ἔφη*, and so does another MS., for Plato wrote *ἔφην*. We find indeed *οἶμαι* twice a little below, but incorrectly in both places.

³¹ The Greek is *τοιούτης δόξης εὐκλειοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιῶσιν*. But *εὐκλειοῦς* is perfectly useless after *τοσαύτης*. Moreover it should be stated not that men do all things, some of which might be base in themselves, but only such as are honourable. Hence for *εὐκλειοῦς*, three MSS. fortunately read *εὐκλειῶς*, which leads to *εὐ καὶ καλῶς*, a formula perpetual in Plato. See the critics quoted by myself on Prom. 1067. Addend.

and happiness for the time to come.³² ³³ But they (who have a yearning) according to the soul—Are there then, said I, they who yearn in their souls?—Still more (said she) than in their bodies; for which it is fitting for the soul to yearn and to bring forth. What fitting (offspring) is this? Intellect and every other excellence.³³ Of which all poets are the generators, and such handy-craftsmen as are said to be inventive. But the greatest and most beautiful part of intellect is that, which is conversant in the well-ordering of cities and private dwellings, to which is given the name of temperance and justice. With these when any one is teeming ³⁴ from his youth, as being divine in his soul, and when he has arrived at a mature age,³⁴ he longs already ³⁵ to beget and breed;³⁵ ³⁶ and he seeks, I think, even he,³⁶ going about, for the beautiful thing, upon which he may generate: for he never will generate on what is ugly; and thus yearning, he takes to his arms handsome bodies rather than the ugly; but if he meets with a soul beautiful and noble, and finely moulded, he ardently embraces both united; and to such a person he immediately discourses copiously on virtue, and what a virtuous man ought to be, and what pursuits he should follow; and he endeavours

³² In the words *Εἰς τὸν ἑπτα χρόνον πάντα κοριζόμενος* is an evident pentameter, probably accidental.

³³⁻³⁵ All the words between the numerals are commonly assigned to Diotima; and the whole chain of the conversation is so broken, as to defy even the critical powers of Stalbaum to unite the links. For neither he nor any one else has seen that Plato wrote *ἔφη*, ἡ δ' ἡ, ἡ and *τίκτειν*, not *ἔφη*, ἡ and *κύειν*—for *κύειν* could not thus follow *κυῆσαι*, despite the nice distinction of Stalbaum between *κυῆσαι*, “to have a completed conception,” and *κύειν*, “to be in the state of a conception.” But the very clever critic forgot that the idea of a completed act would be expressed by *ἐκυνησιναι*, not *κυῆσαι*.

³⁴⁻³⁶ Ficinus has, “ideoque divinus ætate debita imminente,” as if his MS. had omitted *ἐκ νέου*: and just before, from his “hujusmodi natura,” Fischer elicited *φύσιν* for *ψυχὴν*—Plato probably wrote both—*τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν θεῖος ὢν*—

³⁵⁻³⁶ Here, as in § 31, where the same phrase occurs, I would read *τίκτειν τίνα γενναῖα*, instead of *τίκτειν τε καὶ γενναῖα*, and so too a little afterwards.

³⁶⁻³⁷ The Greek is *Ζητεῖ δὲ, οἶμαι, καὶ οὗτος περιῶν τὸ καλὸν*—Ficinus has “Et idcirco passim vagatur quærantque pulchrum,” omitting *οἶμαι*, which is ill-suited to the magisterial Diotima, and *καὶ*, which has no meaning here. Plato wrote, I suspect, *Ζητεῖ δὲ, δαιμονικώτατος περιῶν*, or *Ζητεῖ δὲ, ὢν μακρώτατος*.

himself to act the teacher; for laying hold, I think,³⁷ of a beautiful thing, and associating with it, he breeds and begets that, with which he has been yearning of old, and has both present and absent borne in recollection; and in common with the other party, he brings up what has been produced; so that such persons have a communion of feeling towards each other much greater than what arises from (other)³⁸ children, and a friendship more firm; inasmuch as they have a joint interest in children more lovely and more immortal.³⁹ Now every one would choose that such children should be born to him rather than those of a human kind. And turning his thoughts to Homer, Hesiod, and the rest of the excellent poets, he would envy⁴⁰ them for having left such an issue of their own, as to obtain for them an undying glory and remembrance. Or, if you prefer it, said she, (see) what children Lycurgus left behind him at Lacedæmon, the saviours of their country,⁴¹ and, so to say, of the whole⁴² of Greece. Amongst yourselves, too, how honoured is Solon, for his begetting the laws! and there are many⁴³ other men elsewhere and in many places amongst both the Greeks and Barbarians, who have shown forth many and noble deeds, and begotten every kind of virtue. And to them many holy rites⁴⁴ have

³⁷ Ficinus again omits *οἶμαι*. Plato probably wrote γὰρ ἱρωμανῆς, a word elsewhere corrupted, as I have shown in Bailey's *Hermesianax*, p. 79, and to the passages quoted there I could now add as many more.

³⁸ Ficinus has "quam mortalium filiorum parentes," which probably led Bast to τῆς τῶν παιδοσπόρων—If the Latin of Ficinus be a truthful version, he must have found τῆς τῶν θνητῶν παίδων τοκίων. But perhaps ἄλλων merely has dropt out before παίδων.

³⁹ This "more immortal" seems a rather strange expression. As if there were degrees in immortality. One would have expected rather "less mortal."

⁴⁰ Ast correctly suggested ζηλοῖη for ζηλῶν, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend.

⁴¹ Instead of τῆς Λακεδαιμόνος Plato wrote τῆς γῆς, of which Λακεδαιμόνος is the interpretation.

⁴² The Greek is ὥς ἐπος εἰπεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Ficinus has "totius pene Græciæ," which leads to καὶ πάσης, ὥς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, τῆς Ἑλλάδος. For ὥς ἐπος εἰπεῖν could not thus stand by itself, as I have shown in my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 218, and I could now add twice as much to what I have there written.

⁴³ Ficinus—"aliique permulti alibi." He therefore found in his MSS. καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ἄλλοθι.

⁴⁴ For a list of mortals worshipped as gods Ast refers to Clemens Alex-

been paid on account of such their progeny; but never to any man on account of his human offspring. [34.] In such mysteries relating to Love even you, Socrates, would perhaps be initiated.⁴⁵ But the consummation,⁴⁶ on account of which the looking-on itself exists, if a person follows the rites correctly, ⁴⁷I know well you would not complete.⁴⁷ However,

andr. Strom. i. 15, and he might have added the same Father's Cohort. p. 24, Athenagoras Legat. p. 2 and 53, ed. Ox., and Theodoret, p. 42.

⁴⁵ This was said designedly by Plato, who knew that Socrates was never initiated and never wished to be; while to rescue the character of Diotima from being a false prophetess, the "perhaps" was introduced.

⁴⁶ To understand this allusion to the Mysteries, Sydenham says that, previous to a person being perfectly initiated, three degrees were to be taken, answering, he might have observed, to the three degrees at the University and in Freemasonry, both to be traced to a common origin in the Mysteries. The first degree was called "purgation," the second "illumination," and the third "a looking-on." The consummation however did not take place until five years after the initiation. Agreeable to this gradation Diotima initiates Socrates into the mysteries of Love; where her confutation of his pretended former notions, but, in reality, of the preceding speeches in this Dialogue, answers to the first step, "purgation." Her instructions as to the true doctrine of Love answer to the second step, "illumination." And the remainder of her discourse alludes to the last step, "a looking-on." But Sydenham seems to have forgotten that, as the initiation was not completed until the Neophyte had become an Ἐπόπτης, "a looker-on," Plato could not have written τὰ δὲ τέλεια καὶ ἱεροκτικά: and still less did Stalbaum perceive that the words ὡν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα could not have reference to what had been already said; for from the passage quoted by himself from § 35, θεώμενος—πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ὢν, it is evident that Plato wrote τὰ δὲ τέλεια, ὡν ἕνεκά γε αὐτὰ τὰ ἱεροκτικά ἵσθιν: and so I have translated; for we thus get at the natural meaning of simple words, out of which Ficinus has made this high-flown sense—"Utrum vero ulterius procedas ac perfecta demum amatoria, quæve sublime spectant, quorum gratia hæc sunt, animadvertas utrum inquam pergere valeas necne, ignoro." According to the Scholiast on Aristoph. Barp. 744, in the Mysteries, the Neophyte was called in the first year, Μύστης; in the second, Ἐφορός; and in the third, Ἐπόπτης. But as Ἐφορός and Ἐπόπτης are synonymous, we must read Κερκνοφόρος, as is evident from Clemens Alex. Cohort. c. ii. 15. For κέρκνος is the name of a hawk or cock, and was the symbol of certain rites practised in the Mysteries, as may be inferred from a line in Aristophanes.

⁴⁷—⁴⁷ The Greek is, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη. But εἰ ἂν εἴη is the extreme of barbarism. The particles εἰ ἂν are never united in prose; and if they could be, they would be followed by a subjunctive, as being synonymous with ἰδόν. Granting, however, the syntax to be correct, the sense is none. Stalbaum, indeed, would supply μνηθῆναι after οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη. How much easier is it to read, οὐκ, οἶδ' εὖ, οἷός τ' ἂν ἀνύσαι: as I have translated.

said she, I will tell you, and not be wanting in a readiness (to instruct you). But do you endeavour to follow me, as long as you are able. He then, said she, who would rightly arrive at this consummation, must begin when young to direct his steps to forms that are beautiful. And if, in the first place, his leader conducts him rightly, he must feel a love for one of them, and there beget conversations full of beauty. In the next place, he must have a due perception that the beauty, which exists in any form whatever, is the brother to that which is in a different form. And if he must pursue⁴⁸ the beauty, which is in a species, ⁴⁹there would be a great want of understanding⁴⁹ not to consider the beauty found in all bodies as one and the same. ⁵⁰And he, who thus considers, must⁵⁰ become a lover of all beautiful forms, ⁵¹and relax the violence (of his love) for a single form, and despise it, and hold it of no moment;⁵¹ and afterwards consider of greater value the beauty existing in the soul, than that existing in the body; so that, if there be a person only reasonably beautiful⁵² in soul, ⁵³and if he bears only a small flower,⁵³ he should be

⁴⁸ Dissatisfied, as every one must be, with the nonsensical *εἰ δὲ διώκειν*—as if the idea of a necessity could be here introduced—*ev. n* Stalbaum proposed to read *εἰ δὴ διώκει*. He should have suggested *εἰ ἴδοι διώκων*, "if he should see in his pursuit."

^{49—49} Although *πολλὴ ἀνοία* might perhaps stand here with *ἔστι* understood, yet one would prefer *πολλὴ ἀν ἀνοία εἶη*—

^{50—50} The Greek is *τοῦτο δὲ ἐννοήσαντα καταστήναι*. Ficinus has "Et qui hoc advertit—evadere debet," from whence Stephens proposed to read *τοῦτο δὲ δεῖ ἐννοήσαντα*—He should have suggested *τοῦτο δὲ δεῖ*. For thus *δεῖον* has been lost or corrupted elsewhere through *δεῖ*, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 157.

^{51—51} Here again it is easy to see that Ficinus found in his MS. a text far superior to the present one—*ἑνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον*: where *τοῦτο* has nothing to which it can be referred, and *καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον* is an insufferable tautology. From both these faults the Latin of Ficinus is free: "Amoris autem erga unum vehementiam hac ratione remittere, utique unius speciem parvi facere," which leads to *ἑνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα ἔρωτός τι χαλάσαι κατὰ φρόνησιν, ἔν τι καλὸν σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον*, i. e. "to relax somewhat of the violence of love for one, and prudently to hold cheap a solitary case of beauty."

⁵² The Greek is *ἱπικῆς ὦν τὴν ψυχὴν*. But the idea of beauty could not be omitted. Plato evidently wrote *ἱπικῶς καλός*—

^{53—53} The Greek is *καὶ ἰὼν σμικρὸν ἀνθος ἔχρ*. Stalbaum would expunge *ἰὼν*. He should have seen that, as *ἀνθος* could not thus stand by itself, the train of thought requires *ἐννοίας καὶ σμικρὸν ἀνθος*, "even a

satisfied to feel a love, and to tend with care, and to give birth to conversations of this kind, full of beauty, and to seek such as will make the young better, in order that he may, on the other hand,⁵⁴ be compelled to behold the beauty existing in the employments of life,⁵⁵ and the regulations of laws, and to see this, that all this has an affinity with itself, in order⁵⁶ that he may consider as of little value the beauty that is around the body; and after these (liberal) employments to lead him⁵⁷ to sciences⁵⁸ in order that he may see again the loveliness of science; and looking upon beauty as being now manifold, he may no longer be the slave of that which exists in one form—⁵⁹as a domestic is contentedly in love with the beauty of a little child, or of a man, or one employment⁵⁹—and become a

small flower of intellect." Ficinus has "quamvis forma corporis aliis quibusdam cedat;" supplying, probably, out of his own head a *lacuna* in his MS.

⁵⁴ Instead of αὐ one would prefer εἰ, "well," or ἀει, "constantly."

⁵⁵ By ἐπιτηδεύματα were meant all the pursuits, bodily and mental, requisite for persons of family, fortune, and of a liberal turn of mind, and not engaged in handicraft trades. S.

⁵⁶ As justly objects to ἵνα repeated. But he did not see that, as Plato wrote καὶ τοῦτο ἰδὼν οὐκ, not ἰδὼν—the ἵνα could not be omitted.

⁵⁷ As there is nothing on which ἀγαγεῖν can depend, Ficinus translated "ducatur." Stalbaum says that τὸν ἡγούμενον is to be supplied. Plato wrote, I suspect, ὁδηγὸν ἔχειν, "to have a way-leader."

⁵⁸ By sciences are meant arithmetic, geometry, music in its theory, and astronomy, all of which were requisite for the study of true philosophy. In these sciences every step is from beauty to beauty; for in every new theorem there is discovered something to attract by its intellectual charm, as the beauty of body does the eye; and thus each different science seems a different and a wider world of beauty. S.

⁵⁹ Such is the literal version of the Greek—ὥσπερ οἰκίτης ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος. Now although domestic servants do in many countries feel a pride in the beauty of the children under their care, yet the circumstance is not of so constant occurrence, as to become the groundwork of an illustration. Correctly then did Hommel object to οἰκίτης, but incorrectly propose ὁ οἰκίτης. For Plato evidently wrote ὁ τοκεὺς, "the begetter;" and as ποιητής was another name for a begetter, as before stated, it is equally evident that we must read ἢ ἀνθρώπινός τις ποιητής ἐπιτηδεύματος ἐνός, i. e. "or some mortal begetter of one studious pursuit," of which the inventor or professor becomes the slave; the very expression applied to Garrick by Goldsmith, who called him "the slave of his art." So too ambitious persons are said to be "the slaves of glory." Even "philosophus," according to St. Hieronym. Epist. p. 585, was "gloria—vile—mancipium:" by the aid of which passage, I corrected, in the Gentleman's Magazine, July 1833, p. 34, Thucyd. ii. 42, by reading τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον δοῦλοι

person of no mark, and of contracted notions; but turning himself to the wide sea of beauty, and contemplating the many and beautiful and magnificent discourses, he may⁶⁰ (there) give birth to conceptions in unstinting⁶¹ philosophy, until being there (in philosophy) strengthened and increased,⁶² he shall behold some single science of such a kind that it is conversant with so great and beautiful a thing.⁶³ [35.] But now try, said she, to give me all the attention you can. Whoever then has been instructed thus far in the mysteries of Love, and has beheld in due order and correctly the things of beauty, he will, when he arrives at the consummation of the things of Love, see on a sudden some wondrous sight of natural beauty, for the sake of which all his previous labours have been undertaken. For in the first place, it exists for ever, being neither produced nor destroyed, and neither suffering increase nor decay. In the next place, it is not beautiful only on this side, but ugly on that; nor only at one time, but not so at another; nor as regards one point beautiful, but as regards another ugly; nor as being beautiful in the eyes of some, but ugly in the eyes of others; nor will its beauty be a mere outward appearance, as if it were a face, or hands, or any thing else in which the body participates; nor is it any discourse or science; nor does it exist in any other being, such as an

ἡ δέουσι—"the slaves of glory rather than of fear;" similar to δούλοι τῶν αἰ δόξης, in Thucyd. iii. 38, where Bloomfield quotes from Aristides τῶν χαίρειν αἰ δούλους εἶναι, and from Gregor. Nazianz. δούλοι ὄντες τῶν καλῶν; and he might have added Dionys. Hal. p. 426, who calls Πλάτωνα, δούλον πλεονεξίας.

⁶⁰ By his translation—"præclaros sermones magnificasque animi sensus"—it would seem that Stalbaum wished to read, θεωρῶν πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους, τίς τε μεγαλοπρεπέστατα τὰ διανοήματα. For thus each substantive would have its fitting adjective.

⁶¹ In lieu of ἀφθόνῳ, "unstinting," one MS. has ἀφθόνως, answering to "abunde" in Ficinus; which Ast feels disposed to adopt.

⁶²⁻⁶³ Others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote here κατὰ after θεωρῶν just before, or that ἡ ἐστὶ καλοῦ τοιοῦδε could follow τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, unless it be said that κατὰ means, "he may look down upon," and in that case we must take τοιοῦδε in a depreciating sense. For the meaning would be, "Until being there strengthened and increased, he shall look down with scorn upon such a single science as this, which is conversant about such a thing of beauty forsooth!" Stalbaum indeed fancies that by κατὰ τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην we are to understand, "he may behold the science of beauty itself." But Plato would then have written αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην μίαν, without τοιαύτην, and even without μίαν.

animal; nor in the earth, nor in the heavens, nor ⁶³ in any other part of the universe;⁶³ but it subsists by and with itself, and possesses a form eternally one; while all the other things are beautiful through their participating in this, in some such manner, that whereas the rest are produced and destroyed, it becomes neither greater in aught, nor less, nor is exposed to any state of suffering. And when ascending from these, through rightly loving the young, he begins to have a view of the beautiful, he will have nearly arrived at the consummation. Now this is to march (by oneself)⁶⁴ correctly to the affairs of Love, or to be led by another; beginning from the things of beauty, to keep ascending, for the sake of the beautiful itself, by making use as it were of steps, from one beautiful object to two, and from two to all; and from the beauty of bodies ⁶⁵ (to the beauty of soul; and from the beauty of soul) ⁶⁵ to that of pursuits; from the beauty of pursuits to that of doctrines; until he arrives at length from the beauty of doctrines (generally), to that single one relating to nothing else than beauty in the abstract, ⁶⁶ [and he knows at last what is the beautiful itself.] ⁶⁶ In this state of life, if any where, dear Socrates, said the stranger-prophetess,⁶⁷ should

⁶³—⁶³ From this translation it would seem as if Sydenham wished to read *ἐν τινι τοῦ ὅλου ἄλλω*—

⁶⁴ To preserve the balance of the sentence I have translated as if *αὐτὸν* had dropt out between *ἵνα* and *ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου*. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 254.

⁶⁵—⁶⁵ From the repetition of *τελευτῶν* after *τελευτήσῃ* it is evident that the words within brackets are an interpolation. Stalbaum indeed once felt half disposed to reject *καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων—τελευτήσῃ*, because this is the only passage in Plato where *ἔστ' ἂν* is to be found united to a subjunctive; but he was led to admit the usage from meeting with *γνώ* shortly afterwards. He did not then perceive that the repetition of *μάθημα* suggests another objection to the genuineness of the present text; where Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἕως ἂν ἀπὸ καλῶν τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκείνο τελευτήσῃ, ὃ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα*. Here *καλῶν* has been obtained from *καὶ* read in most of the MSS. and *ἂν* in others; for in this climax the word *καλῶν* is designedly repeated, while *ἕως ἂν* is due to Stalbaum.

⁶⁶—⁶⁶ In the Greek there seems to be here an omission of the words belonging to those included between the brackets, *ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων [ἐπὶ τὰς καλὰς ψυχὰς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ψυχῶν] ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα*. For some such words are plainly necessary to make this recapitulation agree with the account given before. S. It was from this passage that the subsequent philosophers defined Beauty as existing, 1. in the Soul; 2. in the Body; 3. in Morals; and 4. in Arts.

⁶⁷ Sydenham was the first to adopt *μαντική* found in the version of Fi-

a person live, contemplating beauty in the abstract; which should he behold, it will appear to be not in a bit of gold, nor in dress, nor in beautiful boys or youths; with the sight of which you are struck, and are ready both yourself and many others, if it were possible, to look upon your beloved and live with them for ever, and to neither eat nor drink, but⁶⁸ to feast yourselves with the view,⁶⁹ and to be together.⁶⁹ What think you then, said she, would take place, if it were in the power of any person to behold beauty itself, clear as the light, pure and unmixed, but⁷⁰ not polluted with human flesh and colour, and much of other kinds of mortal trash; but be able to view the godlike⁷¹ beautiful in its singleness of form? Think you, said she, that the life of a man would be of little account who looks thither, and beholds it with what he ought,⁷² and is in its company? Perceive you not, said

cinus, as he says. But the ed. pr. omits the Latin words corresponding to the Greek, *ἢ ἢ Μαντινικὴ ξίνη*. They were first introduced into the corrupted copy of that version by Simon Gryneus, as Fischer has duly noticed.

⁶⁸—⁶⁹ Instead of *θεᾶσθαι*, four MSS. offer *θεάσασθαι*, from which it is easy to elicit *θίγα ἰστιάσθαι*: to which I was led by Sydenham's "feasting the eyes," who saw that something was required here to answer to the preceding *ἰσθίειν*. On the metaphorical use of *ἰστιάω* see Ast on Phædr. p. 227, B.

⁷⁰ If *θίγα ἰστιάσθαι* has been correctly restored, it is evident that in *ξυνεῖναι*, which, like *θεᾶσθαι*, is perfectly superfluous after *ὁρῶντες* and *ξυνόντες*, there lies hid some word better suited to the flow of ideas. Perhaps Plato wrote *ξυντιθέναι τὴν δαῖτα*. For *τὴν δαῖτα* might easily have dropt out before *τί δῆτα*: while *ξυντιθέναι τὴν δαῖτα* would allude to the fact of both parties making a joint feast of the same kind. A similar comparison of love to a feast is found in the well-known lines of Shakspeare—

"As if increase of appetite would grow By what it fed on."

⁷¹ Ast justly objected to *ἀλλὰ*, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend by passages not in point. Ficinus has "simplex," which leads at once to *ἀπλοῦν*.

⁷² The Greek is *αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλόν*—But *θεῖον* could not be thus inserted between *αὐτὸ τὸ* and *καλόν*—Nor do I very well understand *μονοειδής*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it; nor could Shelley, who translates it, as Taylor would have done, "monoeidic."

⁷³ The Greek is in some MSS. *καὶ ἐκείνο δὲ θεωμένον καὶ ξυνόντος αὐτῷ*, in others, *ὃ δὲ*, which Ast conjectured and Stalbaum has adopted. But what is the meaning of *ὃ δὲ*, neither Ast nor Stalbaum has thought proper to explain. For most assuredly on the present occasion the idea of any necessity or fitness would be totally irrelevant. Moreover *θεωμένον* could not thus follow *βλέποντος*, nor could *ἐκείνο* and *αὐτῷ* be thus applied to the same thing. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato

she, that there alone will it be in the power of him, who looks upon the beautiful with the eye by which it can be seen, to beget not the shadowy show of virtue—as not coming in contact with shadowy shows—but virtue in reality, as coming in contact with a reality; and that to a person, begetting virtue in reality and bringing her up, it will happen for him to become god-beloved, and, if everman was, immortal.—[36.] Thus, (friend) Phædrus and ye the rest here, spoke Diotima, and I am myself convinced, and being convinced, I am endeavouring to convince the rest, that no one would readily find a better assistant to human nature for the attainment of such a possession than Love. And hence I assert, that every man ought to hold Love in honour; and I do myself pay all honours to the things of Love, and cultivate them particularly, and I exhort others likewise; and both now and ever I celebrate, as far as I can, the power and the excellence of Love.⁷²—Consider then, Phædrus, this speech as having been spoken in praise of Love, if you are so inclined; but if not, giving it

wrote *ἐκείσι βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου δόκνου, οἷα δὲ τὸν φ θεωμένου ὁξὺ καὶ οὐ μόντος αἰτοῦ*, i. e. “of a man looking thitherwards without fear, as the eagle looks with a piercing eye upon the sun without blinking.” The causes of error are to be traced to the corruption of *δόκνου*, and *φ*, (i. e. *ἥλιον*,) and *ὁξὺ*, and *μόντος*, on which I could say or have said something in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 249, Eum. 2, Suppl. 901, and Hippas Maj. § 17, n. 5. With regard to the fact of the eagle being supposed to possess the power of looking upon the sun without being blinded, compare Ecphantus in Stobæus, p. 333, 14, *τὸ κράτιστον ἐν πτανοῖς ζῶον αἰτὸς ἀντωπὸν ἀλίῳ γενόμενον*. Themist. Or. ii. v. 61, Petar.—xx. p. 240, *συχνά γ’ ἰμοῦ ἀπειρω, καθάπερ οἱ αἰτοὶ τῶν νιοτῶν, εἰ δύνатаί μου στίγειν τὰ δμματα καὶ ἀνίχεσθαι τὴν αἰγλήν τῆς ἀληθείας*. The same fact is mentioned by Ælian. Hist. Animal. x. 14, in the case of hawks, *Ὅρῳσιν ἱράκας ὀρνίθων μόνον αἰεὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀκτῖσι τοῦ ἡλίου ῥαδίως*. And hence Moore has used it as an illustration in his Epistle to Lord John Russell’s meditated retirement from public life:

“What thou, with thy genius, thy youth, and thy name,
Thou born of the Russells, whose instinct to run
The accustomed career of their sire is the same,
As the eaglet’s to soar with its eyes to the sun.”

By a similar metaphor Empedocles said, *Ἀνταυγί πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἀταρμύκετοισι προσώποις*: while Epicurus was described, probably by Ælian, quoted by Suid. in *Ἐπικουρος—ἀμβλυώτων τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου αἰγλήν διιλοῦς ὢν*.

⁷² This seems to be the only intelligible rendering in this place of *ἀνδρίαν*, which however I hardly think Plato wrote here, but rather *ἐνιργίαν*.

any other name, and taking it in any other sense, so call it.⁷⁴

[37.] When Socrates had thus spoken, the rest praised the speech; but Aristophanes endeavoured to say something, because Socrates had, when speaking, alluded⁷⁵ to his speech. On a sudden, however, the door of the porch was knocked at and it sent within a loud noise, so that there was heard the voice of revellers, and of a pipe-playing damsel. Upon this Agatho said to the servants, Will you not see to the matter? and if there is any acquaintance, invite him in; but if not, say that we are no longer drinking, and have already left off. Not long afterwards, the voice of Alcibiades, who was very drunk, was heard in the court, bawling very loud, and asking—Where is Agatho? and ordering (a slave) to lead him to Agatho. The flute-player, therefore, and some others of his followers, supported him towards Agatho, and he stood at the door crowned with a garland of ivy and violets, and having very many fillets on his head, and exclaiming, All hail, my friends! Either receive as a fellow-tippler a man very drunk, or let us depart, after crowning Agatho alone, for which purpose we have come. For I was not able, said he, to come yesterday; but I am here now with fillets on my head, that, from my own, I may bind them on the head of the wisest⁷⁶ and the most beautiful person. ⁷⁷If I should say so, will you laugh⁷⁷ at

⁷⁴ Instead of *ὀνόμαζε*, one would expect rather *νόμιζε*, "consider," to answer to the preceding *νόμισον*.

⁷⁵ See § 31.

⁷⁶ Although *σοφωτάτου* here seems to be supported by *σοφοῦ* in p. 174, B. § 2, yet Agatho would hardly be called *σοφώτατος* in the presence of Socrates; to whose wisdom not only had Agatho, in § 4, alluded, but an oracle had said, that he was *Ἀνδρῶν πάντων σοφώτατος*. I suspect that Plato wrote here *ἰσοθεωτάτου*, and in § 2, *ἐπ' ἰσοθείου*. For both men and women, remarkable for their beauty, were said to be equal to the gods; as Polyxena is in *Hecub.* 356, *ἴση θεῶσιν*. So Cicero *Nat. Deor.* i. 79, "*deo pulchrior*."

⁷⁷ The Greek is in some MSS. *κεφαλὴν ἰδὺν εἶπω οὕτως ἀναδήσω, ἄρα καταγέλασθε*—in four others more correctly *κεφαλὴν οὕτως ἀναδήσω, ἰδὺν εἶπω ἄρα*—which Ast has adopted; for he knew that *ἰδὺν εἶπω οὕτως* could not mean "*ut ita dicam*." Stalbaum, however, rejects *ἰδὺν εἶπω οὕτως* as an interpolation. Had he entered into the spirit of the dialogue, he would perhaps have seen that Plato wrote *κεφαλὴν οὕτως ἀναδήσω, θὺν ἰδὺν εἶπω Ἐρωτα, καταγέλασθε*, i. e. "thus bind the head of him, whom should I call Love, you will laugh at me." For thus a reason

me, as being drunk? However, although you may laugh, I well know that I am speaking the truth. But tell me immediately, shall I come in or not on these conditions? Will you drink with me or not? Thereupon all the company was in an uproar, and ordered him to enter and recline on a couch, and Agatho too invited him. And he (Alcibiades) came, led by his attendants; and at the same time taking off the fillets, as if about to bind them (on Agatho), he did not see Socrates, who was before his eyes, but sate down by Agatho, and between him and Socrates: for Socrates had made way for him that he might sit down; and sitting down he embraced Agatho, and bound the fillet on him. Thereupon said Agatho, Slaves, unloose the sandals of Alcibiades, that he may recline as the third among us. By all means, said Alcibiades;⁷⁸ but, who is this third person our fellow-drinker? and at the same time turning round, he beheld Socrates; and on seeing him, he started up, and exclaimed, O Hercules! what is this? What ho Socrates? are you again sitting here in ambush against me, just as you are wont to do, and to appear suddenly, where I least expected you would be. And why are you reclining here? and⁷⁹ not with Aristophanes, or any other person who is, and wishes to be a source of merriment? But you have contrived to sit near the most beautiful of those within.⁸⁰ Then said Socrates, See, Agatho, if you can assist me; for the love of this man here is to me no trifling matter; since from the time when I fell in love with him, I am no longer permitted either to look at, or speak to, any beautiful person;

would be given for the laughter, and Agatho be called by the name applied to a beautiful boy by Martial, "*Sic tu cæcus Amor;*" while of his equally beautiful sister it was said, "*Sic erit illa Venus.*"

⁷⁸ Although persons, when reclining at meals, were accustomed to take off their slippers, as shown by Gataker in *Adversar. Miscell. Post. c. 19*, quoted by Stalbaum, yet, to the command given by Agatho, Alcibiades could scarcely have added *Πάνυ γε*: although he might have said *Πάνυ γε εἴ*, similar to *ἔχει κάλλιστα* in Theocrit. *Id. xv. 3*, which, as remarked by Valckenaer, was a polite manner of expressing a refusal; just as we say in English, "It does very well."

⁷⁹ The Greek is *ὥς*, which Stalbaum renders "*quippe, nam.*" Sydenham "*and,*" as if he wished to read *καί*: and so perhaps Plato wrote. Ficinus has "*potius quam apud Aristophanem—aut—*"

⁸⁰ Instead of *τῶν ἰνδόν* one would prefer *τῶν συνδαιτρων*, answering to "*convivarum*" in Ficinus.

or⁸¹ he is, through jealousy and envy, practising strange devices, and abuses me, and scarcely keeps off his hands? See therefore that he does not do something now, but do you reconcile us; or, should he attempt to do any violence, do you assist me: for I greatly fear the madness of this man, and his strong feeling of love.—But, said Alcibiades, there shall be⁸² no reconciliation between you and me. For I will by and by revenge myself upon you for this. But for the present, Agatho, said he, give me some of the fillets, that I may bind them on the wonderful head of this man, and he may not find fault with me, because I have bound the fillets on you, but not on him, who vanquishes all men in discourse, not only lately as you have done, but at all times, upon all subjects.⁸³ And at the same time, taking some of the fillets, he bound them upon Socrates, and laid himself down. When he had laid himself down, he said, [38.]⁸⁴ Let things be; for you appear to me to be sober; this you must not be allowed, but you must drink;⁸⁵ for so it has been agreed. I therefore elect myself the chairman⁸⁶ until you have drunk enough. But, Agatho, let some one bring a beaker, if there is a large one;

⁸¹ The Greek is *ἡ οὐροί*, where Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain *ῥ*. One would expect rather *ἀπὸ οὐροῦ, καὶς ὥς*, to which *οὐροί* *πρὸς* in MS. Γ. evidently leads. For the sense is, "Like a boy, he is ever jealous."

⁸² Some MSS. read *οὐκ ἔστι*, others *ἐστὶ*. Plato wrote *οὐκ ἔρ' ἔστι*.

⁸³ The Greek is *ἐπειτα—ἀνίδησα*. But *ἐπειτα* could not be thus inserted between *νικῶντα* and *ἀνίδησα*. Stalbaum was misled by the passages produced by Blomfield on Prom. Vinct. 802. He should have suggested, as I have translated, *ἐς πάντα*—For thus *πάντας* and *πάντα* are perpetually united, as I could prove by full twenty passages collected in my MS. notes on Poppo's Prolegom. p. 178.

⁸⁴ This is what has been hitherto palmed off upon the world as the very words of Plato. Ficinus has, however, "Nimium mihi sobrii, convivæ, videmini," and has thus got rid of *Εἰν δὲ*—a formula that could not be found in this place. We might indeed read *Εἴ οὖν δὲ*, where Winckelmann on Euthydem. p. 88, was the first to suggest *οὖν*. But Plato wrote something, I suspect, to this effect—"If then ye are indeed men, as ye seem to me, I must not permit you to be sober; but ye must now drink bumpers." In Greek, *Εἴ οὖν δὲ ἄνδρες ἔσσι—δοκεῖτε γάρ μοι—νήφειν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν ὑμῖν νῦν δ' ἡμῖν μάλα ποτίον*: where *νῦν* has been luckily preserved by one excellent MS., while *ἀλλά* has been changed into *μάλα*.

⁸⁵ On the chairman at wine-parties, see the Commentators on Horace, Od. i. 4, 17, "Quem Venus arbitrum Dicit bibendi."

or rather, there is no need; but bring hither, boy, said he, that wine cooler, which seems⁵⁶ to hold more than eight kotylæ.⁵⁷ Having filled it, he first drank it off himself; and afterwards ordered them to pour out of it for Socrates, and stated at the same time, This stratagem of mine, gentlemen, is of no avail against Socrates; for, let him drink as much as any one may command, he will not be a bit the more intoxicated.⁵⁸ Socrates then, when the boy had poured out the wine, drank it off. And Eryximachus said, What shall we do, Alcibiades? Shall we neither say nor sing over the cup, but drink really like those who are thirsty? To this Alcibiades replied, Hail, Eryximachus! thou best of men, sprung from the best and most temperate of fathers. And hail⁵⁹ thou too, said Eryximachus. But what shall we do? Whatever you may order; for you we must obey. For

A man of physic has 'gainst many others
A worth.⁶⁰

Order then what you will. Hear then, said Eryximachus. Before you came in, it was determined that every one, beginning at the right hand, should in turn make a speech in praise of Love, to the best of his ability. All the rest of us, therefore, have spoken; and it is just, since you have not spoken, but have been drinking, that you too should make a speech; and, when you have spoken, order

⁵⁶ This intransitive sense of *ιδόντα* is, what no editor has remarked, a barbarism. Plato wrote *ὡς ἰδόντος*, "as for a person to see." For a similar syntax, see Kühner Gr. Gr. § 701, ed. Jelf.

⁵⁷ On the measure called "kotyla," nothing appears to be known for a certainty. It answered probably to the old English "magnum." With regard to the custom of asking, as persons were getting drunk, for tumblers, it will be sufficient to refer to Horace—"Tum calices poscit majores," and "Capaciores affer huc, puer, scyphos," and to Aristoph. *Γηενναδ.* Fr. viii., *Ἦν δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἰορτή περιέφερεν δ' ἐν κύελῳ λεπαστήν Παις ταχὺ προσφέρων δ' ἡμῖν ἐνέχευεν σφόδρα κvanoβενθῇ*: for so that fragment ought to be read, as it were easy to show by parallel passages.

⁵⁸ Ficinus has "nec ebrium unquam videbitis," as if he had found in his MS. *ὅ μὴ ποτ' αὐτὸ μέθυσον ἴδῃσι*: similar to *Σώκратη μεθύοντα οὐδαίς πρότερον ἰώρακεν*.

⁵⁹ The Greek is *Καὶ γὰρ σύ* where *γὰρ* is perfectly absurd. Ficinus has more correctly, "Et tu salve," which leads to *Καὶ χαίρει σύ*. So in Eurip. *Orest.* 470, *ὦ χαίρει πρόσβυ—ὦ χαίρει καὶ σύ*: where see Porson.

⁶⁰ This is a line of Homer in *Il.* A. 514.

Socrates to do whatever you please, and he too order the person on his right hand, and so with respect to the rest. Alcibiades then said, You say well, Eryximachus; but it is not fair⁹¹ to compare a drunken man against a sober one in their speeches. But, O happy man, does Socrates persuade you with respect to what he has just now said? Or do you know that every thing is the contrary to what he has said? For he it is, who, when I in his presence praise any one, except himself, whether god or man, will not keep his hands from me. Will you not speak fair words?⁹² said Socrates. By Neptune, said Alcibiades, say nothing against this; for I will praise no other person, while you are present. Do so then, said Eryximachus; if you will, praise Socrates. How say you? rejoined Alcibiades. Does it seem good to you, Eryximachus, that I should do so? Must I fall upon⁹³ this man, and revenge myself before you? Ho, sir, said Socrates, what have you in mind? Will you praise me so as to make me ridiculous?⁹⁴ or what will you do? I will speak the truth. But see whether you will permit me. Nay, said Socrates, I both permit, and command you to speak the truth. ⁹⁵I will do it instantly, said Alcibiades. But however do you act thus;⁹⁶ if

⁹¹ The Greek is μεθύοντα ἀνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν: where, according to Ast and Stalbaum, τῶν is to be supplied before νηφόντων, and τοῦς before λόγους. I have translated, παρὰ νήφοντ' ἐν λόγοις.

⁹² Or we may translate, "Will you not hold your tongue?" For ἐπέφημεῖν has both these meanings.

⁹³ How Alcibiades could inquire, whether he should fall foul upon Socrates, when he had been requested, if he liked, to praise him, I cannot understand. I could have understood it, had he been told to praise or abuse, as he liked best. But in that case, Plato would have written ἐπαίνεσον ἢ κακῶς λέγει. For ἢ κακῶς λέγεις might easily have dropt out before πῶς λέγεις.

⁹⁴ From this bitter sneer it is evident that Socrates preferred the abuse of Alcibiades to his praise.

⁹⁵⁻⁹⁶ The Greek is οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ μῖντοι οὕτως ποιήσον, which Ficinus thus puts into Latin, "Parebo quam libentissime, modo id assequi possim." For he did not understand the phrase οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι: nor did Hommel see how ποιήσον could thus follow οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι: and though Stalbaum translates οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι by "I will immediately make a beginning," he should have produced at least one passage, where φθάνειν is so used, without a participle. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato probably wrote οὐκ ἂν φθονοίμην ἐπαινῶν. For ἐπαινῶν could have dropt out very easily before εἰπεῖν: while in the words καὶ μῖντοι οὕτως ποιήσον lies hid καὶ ἐμαντὸν οὕτως σὲ ποιήσον

I assert any thing not true, lay hold of me while speaking if you will, and say that I am telling a falsehood; for I shall not willingly tell a lie. And do not wonder if I speak as if recollecting one thing after another; for it is not easy for a man in my state to enumerate readily, and in succession, your strange behaviour. [39.] I will then endeavour, gentlemen, to praise Socrates in this way by means of images. He indeed will perhaps imagine that I am turning him into ridicule; but the image will be for the sake of what is true, and not ridiculous.

I say, then, that Socrates is most like the figures of Silenus that are seated in the workshops of statuaries, which the artists have made, holding reeds or flutes; but which, when they are opened down the middle, appear to contain within them statues⁹⁶ of the gods. And I again say, that he resembles the satyr Marsyas.⁹⁷ Now that in your outward form, Socrates, you resemble these things, even you yourself will not deny; but that you resemble them likewise in other points, hear in the next place. You are saucy in deeds; or are you not? For, if you do not acknowledge it, I will bring witnesses to the fact. Are you not also a piper much more wonderful than Marsyas? For⁹⁸ he charmed men through instruments, by a power proceeding from the mouth; and he (charms)⁹⁹ even now, when any one plays his melodies. For what Olympus¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Taylor refers here to the Scholia of Maximus on Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, t. ii. p. 209, where it is said that "the Greeks made statues, without hands or feet, which they called Hermæ, hollow within, but with doors: within these they placed statues of the gods whom they worshipped, but they closed them by the Hermæ externally. Hence these Hermæ appeared to be things of no value; but inwardly they contained the ornaments of the gods themselves." Of these identical Scholia there is a transcript in Etymol. M. Ἀρμάριον, p. 146, 58, while, by the knowledge of this fact, we can understand Æsop, Fab. 128, and the story told by Cornelius Nepos of Hannibal saving some gold by placing it in the statue of a god.

⁹⁷ A celebrated player on the flute, of which he was said to be the inventor; and that having challenged Apollo to a trial of skill as a musician, he was beaten and flayed alive by the god. T.

⁹⁸ Instead of γρ, Stalbaum says one would have expected γάρ, which Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version "enim." Vainly then does Stalbaum attempt to defend γρ.

⁹⁹ This verb is to be got out from the preceding ἡδύα.

¹⁰⁰ Olympus the musician was a disciple of Marsyas. Stalbaum refers to Plato, Legg. iii. p. 677, Pseudo-Plato Minos, p. 318, B., Aristotle Polit. viii. 5, and Plutarch, t. ii. p. 1133.

played, I call the melodies of Marsyas, who taught him. Now his melodies, whether a good male flute-player plays them, or a bad female one, alone¹ cause a person to be spell-bound, and point out, through their being divine, those that stand in need² of the gods and the mysteries; but you in this respect alone differ from him, that you effect the very same thing by naked words without instruments. We therefore, when we hear another person, although a good speaker himself, pronouncing the speeches of others, not a single hearer, so to say, pays any regard to them; but when any one hears you, or your discourses spoken by another, although he is a wretched speaker, yet, whether a woman or a man or a lad is the auditor, we are astonished and spell-bound. I therefore, gentlemen, unless I seemed to be very much in liquor, would tell you upon oath what I have suffered by the discourses of this man, and am suffering even now. For when I hear him, my heart leaps much more than that of the Corybantes;³ and my tears flow forth through his discourses. I see too many others suffering in the very same way. But when I hear Pericles, and other excellent orators, I think indeed that they speak well, but I suffer nothing of this kind; nor is my soul agitated with tumult, nor is it indignant, as if I were in a servile state. But by this Marsyas here I am often so affected, that it appears to me I ought not to live, while I am in such a state. You will not, Socrates, say that this is not true. And even now I feel conscious that, were I willing to lend him my ears, I could not bear it, but should suffer in the very same way. For he would compel⁴ me to confess, that, being yet very deficient, I neglect my own affairs,⁵ but attend to those of the Athenians.⁶ ⁷By violence therefore restraining myself as to my ears,⁷ I depart from him, flying, as it were, from

¹ Stalbaum says that *μόνα* means "very greatly." But in the passages he quotes *μόνος* has its usual meaning, "only."

² Proclus, in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades, says, that the flute was used in the Mysteries, to excite the feelings of the hearers to what was divine. Such therefore, as were excited by the melody of the pipe, may be supposed to stand in need of the gods and mysteries. T.

³ On the Corybantes, see Ruhnken in Timæus Lex. Κορυβαντίαν.

⁴ So Sydenham, as if he wished to read ἀναγκάζει γὰρ ἄν με, instead of ἀναγκάζει γὰρ με.

⁵ Instead of ἔτι, the two oldest MSS. offer τι, which leads to τὰ.

⁶ See Alcibiad. i. p. 259, B.

⁷ The Greek is βίβη οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σιφίωνων, ἐπισχόμενος τὰ

the Syrens, lest I should sit there by him until I grew old. And towards him alone of all men, I suffer that, which no one would think to be in me, to be ashamed of any one. ⁸[But I am abashed before him alone.]⁸ For I feel conscious of my inability to deny that what he exhorts me to do ought not to be done; but when I depart from him, I am (conscious) of being overcome by the honour (I receive) from the multitude. I therefore run away from and avoid him; and when I see him, I am ashamed for what I had consented to do. And often, indeed, I would gladly see him no longer amongst men: and yet again, if this should happen, I well know I should be afflicted still more; so that I know not what to do with this man. And from the melodies indeed of this Satyr in such a manner both I and many others have suffered.

[40.] Hear too from me on other points, how like he is to what I have compared him, and what a wonderful power he possesses. For be well assured, that not one of you knows him; but I will lay him open, since I have begun (to speak.)⁹ You see then that he is ¹⁰disposed in a very amatory manner towards beautiful persons;¹⁰ and that he is always about them and struck with them; but on the other hand, ¹¹he is ignorant of every thing and knows nothing how his figure is. Is not this Silenus-like?¹¹ For he is invested with

ᾤα. But as two excellent MSS. offer *ἐπισπόμενος* in lieu of *ἐπισχόμενος*, it is evident that the text has been tampered with. Plato wrote, I suspect, *βέων οὖν, ὅπερ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Σιρηνῶν ἐπασχεν ἀποσπόμενος, τὰ ᾤα*: where *βέων—τὰ ᾤα* is the splendid emendation of Abresch in *LECTION*. *Aristænet.* p. 147, obtained from Hesych., *βέων τὰ ᾤα ἐπιφύτρων*: for there is a distinct allusion to Ulysses stuffing his ears with wax to prevent his hearing the strains of the Syrens, fraught at once with delight and destruction to those who listened to them, as stated in *Od.* M. 47.

⁸ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

⁹ Ficinus has "*dicere jam incepti*," as if he had found in his MS., what the sense requires, *ἡρξάμην λέγειν*.

¹⁰ The Greek is *ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν*. But the genitive could hardly depend upon the adverb. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐρωτὶ πῶς διακαίεται τῶν καλῶν*, "he is inflamed with the love of things beautiful." The common reading is however found in *Aristænetus*, i. 18.

¹¹ Such is the literal translation of the text, adopted by Schleiermacher, Bekker, and Stalbaum, and which others may, but I cannot understand, for it is a mere tautology to say *οὐδὲν οἶδεν*, after *ἀγνοεῖ πάντα*; besides the ignorance of his figure could be no proof that Socrates was like Silenus. The sense evidently required is, "And although he ac-

this externally like a carved Silenus; but when he is opened inwardly, with temperance how great, think you, fellow-tiplers, is he filled? Know too, that if any person is beautiful, he regards him not, but despises him to such an extent as no one would suppose; nor if he is wealthy, or possesses any other honour amongst those who are considered by the multitude as blessed; but he holds all these possessions to be nothing worth, and that we too are of no account.¹² He passes likewise the whole of life indulging in irony and jests against mankind; but when he is serious and is opened, I know not whether any one (of you)¹³ has seen the images within; but I once saw them, and they appeared to me to be so divine and golden, and all-beautiful and wonderful, that I (thought)¹⁴ I must in a short time do whatever Socrates ordained. Conceiving too that he paid great attention to my beauty, I considered this as a god-send, and a piece of wondrous good fortune for myself,

cuses himself of being ignorant of every thing, still does he know well his own figure, that it is very Silenus-like. This would be in Greek—*καὶ εἰ ἀγνοεῖν πάντα καταυδῶ, εὖ οἶδεν ὅμως τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτὸ Σεληνῶδες σφόδρα ἐστὶ*: which is at least more worthy of the philosopher than that found at present—*καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ Σεληνῶδες σφόδρα γέ*. For by the verb *καταυδῶ*, Alcibiades, or rather Plato himself, meant to show that Socrates accused himself wrongfully of ignorance; for by knowing his own likeness, he proved that he had practised the precept given by the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself," to which Plato has alluded in *Phædr.* § 8, *Phileb.* § 107, *Charmid.* § 26, and *Protag.* § 82.

¹² The majority of MSS. read *καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι λίγω ὑμῖν*, and so did the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version, "nullius nos esse apud eum vobis assero." Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδενός εἶναι ἐν λόγῳ μείον*. Compare *Theætet.* p. 180, E., *ἦττον—ἢ τὸ μηδὲν*: and as regards *ἐν λόγῳ*, the words of the oracle, *οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὐτ' ἐν ἀρεθμῷ*, quoted by Heindorf on *Hipp. Maj.* § 19, Stalbaum too believes the passage to be corrupt, but is unable to correct it; nor could he see that from "Fingit tamen ironicus aliter," in Ficinus, it is easy to elicit *ἀρρωτηνόμενος εἰ ἄλλως*—where *ἄλλως* is not "aliter," but "merely."

¹³ Ficinus has alone preserved the words wanting here. For he has "si quis vestrum," which leads to *εἰ τις ὑμῶν*—

¹⁴ Here again Ficinus found in his MS. the very word required to complete the sense. For his version is, "ut nullo modo fas existimem aliter, quam Socrates præcepit, agere;" from whence it is easy to read, *ὥστε ποιητήριον εἶναι ᾧμην*. For *ᾧμην* might easily have dropt out after *εἶναι*, while as regards the phrase *ποιητήριον εἶναι ᾧμην*, see my note on *Politic.* p. 263, C. § 7. Now that Ficinus followed here his MS. closely may be inferred from finding that he has omitted *ἐν βραχεῖ*, which is wanting in another MS. likewise.

since by gratifying Socrates it would be in my power to hear from him all that he knew. For I prided myself on my beauty marvellously. With these thoughts in my head, although I had previously been never accustomed to be in his company without an attendant, on that occasion I sent the page away and remained with him alone; for I must state the whole truth, and do you give me your attention; and if I am telling a falsehood, do you, Socrates, confute me. I was, gentlemen, alone with him alone; and I thought he would immediately converse with me in the way that lovers are wont to speak to their beloved in private; and¹⁵ I was (highly) delighted (with the expectation).¹⁵ Nothing however of this kind very much¹⁶ took place; but after conversing somewhat¹⁷ and passing the day with me as usual, he went away. Then I challenged him to contend with me in the naked exercises, and I did contend as if about to effect something by this means. He engaged therefore naked, and had a tussel frequently against me, no one being present. But why need I mention this? Nothing more took place. But when I accomplished nothing at all by this means, I determined to attack the man with all my might, nor to let him off; ¹⁸since I had put my hand to the task.¹⁸ But you must now ¹⁹know what is the affair.¹⁹ Accordingly I invited him to supper, artlessly²⁰ laying a plot as a lover does against his

¹⁵—¹⁵ Ficinus has "qua spe valde letabar," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι πολὺ δὴ τι ἔχαιρον*.

¹⁶ Instead of *μάλα*, Plato evidently wrote *μὰ Δία*, an oath, which is, I think, to be restored repeatedly in the place of *μὲν* or *μὴν* δὴ. In a MS. of Plutarch, which I collated thirty years ago, in the Royal Library at Brussels, the same oath has been every where omitted. It would have been good Greek to say, *οὐ μᾶλλον—οὐδ' ἔν*—

¹⁷ Since three MSS. omit *ἄν*, Ast would read *ἄττα*. He should have suggested *τίνα*. Stalbaum vainly attempts to defend *ἄν*.

¹⁸—¹⁸ The words within the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Sydenham.

¹⁹—¹⁹ In lieu of *ἱστίον ἤδη τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα*, Wytttenbach in Biblioth. Crit. i. 1, p. 50, proposed to read *ἱτίον ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα*. He should have suggested *ἱτίον ἤδη ἐπ' αἰστον ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα*, i. e. "I must come now to a matter never yet known." For the article *τὸ* could not be applied to a thing not as yet mentioned. Stalbaum indeed with Ast would render *ἱστίον* "we must explore." But that would be in correct Greek either *σκεπτίον* or *ιστορητίον*. And were the meaning such as they conceive, there could be no need of exploring in a case, where Alcibiades knew all the facts, and was going to tell them.

²⁰ Although *ἀτίχως* might perhaps stand, yet one would prefer *ἐντίχως*, "artfully."

beloved. Even to this he did not quickly give ear. In time, however, he was over-persuaded. But when he came for the first time, he wished, as soon as he had supped, to go away; and I, feeling ashamed, let him go. Having laid however again a plot, after supper I had a conversation with him far into the night; and when he wished to go away, I pretended it was late, and I compelled him to stay. He reposed, therefore, in a couch close to mine, and on which he had supped; and no other person besides us slept in the house. [41.] Thus far in my story it would be well to state to any one; but what is to come, you would not have heard me telling, unless, in the first place, according to the proverb,²¹

Wine, with children, or without,
Does a tale of truth let out;

and in the second place, it seems to me to be unjust in him who comes to praise a person, to leave in obscurity a proud deed of Socrates. Moreover, the suffering of him, who has been bitten by a viper, possesses likewise myself. For they say that the person so suffering is unwilling to tell what it is, except to those who have been bitten, as being alone about to know and to pardon him, should he dare to do and say every thing from excess of pain. ²²I say it then, having been bitten by something still

²¹ In the words of the proverb, *Οἶνος ἀνευ τε παιδων και μετὰ παιδων ἦν ἀληθής*, there lies hid an hexameter, *Οἶνος ἀνευ παιδων ἀρ' ἀληθής και μετὰ παιδων*. According to the Schol. transcribed by Photius and Suidas, there were two proverbs, *Οἶνος ἀλήθεια*, and *Οἶνος και παιδες ἀληθείς*. From these, however, a third seems to have been formed. Respecting the proverb itself, "In vino veritas," Ast refers to the Commentators on Horace, *Od.* iii. 21, 15, *Epist.* i. 5, 16, and to Jacobs on *Antholog.* Gr. i. p. 314.

²² To this inelegantly written period I trust I have restored its original beauty, by translating as if the Greek were, *Αἶγω οὖν δεδηγμένος εἶτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοτέρου—και γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότερον ὃν ἂν τις δεχθεῖη—τὴν καρδίην ἢ ψυχὴν ἢ διὰ αὐτὸ δνομάσαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γε λόγων, οἱ ἔχόν τι ἐχίδνης ἀγριώτερον, νῆον και ψυχὴν μὴ ἀφνοῦς θταν λάβωνται, και ποιῶσι δρᾶν τε και λέγειν οτιοῦν*—in lieu of *Ἐγὼ—τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου και τὸ ἀλγεινότερον—καρδίαν γὰρ ἢ—δνομάσαι πληγεῖς τε και δεχθεῖς ὑπὸ—οἱ ἔχονται—νῆον ψυχῆς και ἢ—ποιῶσι—But, 1. τε couples nothing. 2. Although Stalbaum supposes that the idea of pain is beautifully represented by the figure of speech called *Anacolouthon*, yet the happy idea never occurred to Sophocles; who has never resorted to such a rhetorical artifice, while depicting the excruciating pains that Philoctetes is feigned to feel. 3. After the perfect *δεδηγμένος* most assuredly the aorist *δεχθεῖς* would not have been introduced; and if it could it would not have been united*

more painful. For it is the most painful of all, by which a person can be bitten, in heart or soul, or whatever else it is meet to call it, [bitten and wounded,] namely, by discourses in philosophy; which are wont to give out something more acute than that from the viper, when they (the discourses) lay hold of a young person with a not badly-disposed soul, and cause him to do and say any thing whatever²². And looking, moreover, at the Phædruses, Agathos, Eryximachuses, Pausaniascs, Aristodemuses, Aristophaneses.—²³But why need I say, Socrates himself, and whoever forms the rest (of the company).²³ For all of you have partaken with me of the madness and Bacchic fury of philosophy; and on this account you shall all hear. For you will pardon what was done then, and is said now. But let the domestics, and if there is any other profane and rude person present, place upon their ears²⁴ gates of very great

to its synonyme *πληχθείς*. 4. The verb could not stand thus without its genitive, as even Rost had the sense to see. 5. Although *νίον* might perhaps be united to *ψυχῆς*, yet *ἀφουός* would require the copulative *καί*, improperly omitted in the best MSS. Lastly, after *λάβωνται*, the *καί* would require *ποιῶσι*; for *ποιῶσι* could not be united to *ἔχονται*. With regard to the alterations, 1. *ἐγὼ* and *λίγω* are frequently interchanged; 2. *ἔχόν τι* scarcely differs from *ἔχονται* as regards the letters; while, as regards the sense, some allusion ought to be made to the fact of words pouring out ideas, as vipers do poison; and lastly, *ψυχὴν* is due to a single MS. That Ficinus did not find in his MS. what exists at present in the Greek text is clear enough; but what he did find, is not so clear. Thus much however is certain, that either *πληγείς* or *δηχθείς* was wanting in his MS., and some members of the period transposed, and not a little added. For it is to this effect—"Ego igitur (præ ceteris) astrictus vehementiori (philosophiæ) morsu, qui omnium est acerrimus, et sive cor, sive animum, sive quomodocunque id appellandum sit, saucius (cupiditate) in philosophia sermonum, qui acrius quam vipera (mordent et) occupant, si quando attigerint juvenilem animum, qui non penitus ignarus sit, compelluntque ad quicquid tandem sit, faciendum atque dicendum (nihil intentatum relinquere statui, quo Socratem ad explendam hanc situm mihiq; conjunctissimum facerem);" where to all the words between the limes there is nothing to answer at present in the Greek text. Now that Ficinus introduced all this matter out of his own head, is scarcely credible; for he is generally content to give almost a verbal translation of the original.

²²⁻²³ The Greek is now *Σωκράτης δὲ αὐτὸν τί δαὶ καὶ λίγειν καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι*—it was originally *Σωκράτης δὲ αὐτὸν τόνδε, καὶ ὅσοι εἰσιν, ἄλλοι ἐκὼν λίγωμ' αὖν*, i. e. "and Socrates himself here, and whoever are the rest, I will tell willingly," for we shall thus complete the sentence, at present imperfect.

²⁴ On the Orphic verse—*Φθίγξομαι οἷς θίμης ὥσι θύρας ἐπίθισθε βίβηλοι*, i. e. To whom it is lawful I'll speak; place a door on your ears,

size.²⁵ When therefore the lamp was extinguished, and the servants had gone out, it seemed to me that I ought not to employ words of many meanings towards him, but tell him freely what was in my thoughts. And nudging him I said, Socrates, are you asleep? Not yet, he replied. Do you know then on what I am determined? What is it particularly? said he. You seem to me, said I, the only lover worthy of myself; and yet you appear to feel a dread to have a recollection²⁶ towards me. But, as I am thus affected, I think it very silly for me not to gratify you both in this point, and in any thing else of which you may be in want, whether it be my own property, or that of my friends: for nothing is to me of greater moment than to become the best of men: and for this I think there is no person a more competent assister than yourself; and I should feel a much greater shame before the wise, in not gratifying such a man, than before the²⁷ [many and the]²⁷ unwise by gratifying him. Socrates, having heard me, said, very ironically, and very much after his usual manner, My dear Alcibiades, you seem to be in reality a man of no common mark, if what you say concerning me happens to be true, and there is in me a certain power, through which you can become better. But what boundless beauty could you see in me, and vastly superior to the fine form in yourself, if, on beholding it, you endeavour to have dealings²⁸ with me, and to exchange beauty for beauty. You have surely an idea of possessing more than I do; for you endeavour to obtain the truth of beautiful things instead of the reputation, and you conceive that you will in reality exchange brass for gold.²⁹

ye profane, (for so I tacitly corrected at Prom. 165, the reading *φθιγγεομαι οἷς θίμις ἵστι· θύρας δ' ἐπιθίσθαι, βίβηλοι.* See Ruhnken at Timæus in *Βίβηλοι*.)

²⁵ Why Plato should have alluded to the great size of the gates I must leave for others to explain.

²⁶ Others may, but I cannot, understand *μνησθῆναι*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *μνηθῆναι τὰ πρὸς ἐμὴ*. For that act, similar to those here alluded to, took place in the Mysteries, is shown by Taylor in his Dissertation on the Mysteries, p. 123.

²⁷—²⁷ The words within the brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus, as they interfere with the balance of the sentence.

²⁸ Such seems to be the mercantile meaning of *κοινώσασθαι*.

²⁹ Here is an allusion to Hom. *Il.* Z. 236,

There did Zeus, son of Kronos, take away
His wits from Glaucus; who exchanged his arms
Golden, worth hundred beeves, for brass, worth nine.

But, O blessed man, think better of it, nor let me lie hid from you, as being nothing. The power of intellectual vision begins then to see acutely, when that of the eye loses its acmé.²⁰ You however are still far off from this. And I, having heard him, replied, As regards myself the facts are so; of which not one has been stated otherwise than as I conceive myself. But do you counsel me in what you may consider to be best both for you and me. In this, said he, you say well: for in the time to come let us consult together, and we will do what appears to be the best for us, both with respect to these and other matters. [42.] Having thus heard and²¹ spoken, and sent as it were arrows,²¹ I thought that he was wounded; and I rose up, and not suffering him to speak any more, I wrapped myself round with this garment, (for it was winter,) and lying down under the old cloak of this man, I threw my arms around the truly divine and wonderful man, and lay there the whole night. And in this again, Socrates, you will not say that I am telling a falsehood. But though I acted in this manner, yet he was victorious, and despised, and jeered at, and even insulted my beauty. And yet I fancied it was something, men and judges, for judges you are, of the haughtiness of Socrates. For by the gods and goddesses, rest assured that I rose from Socrates no otherwise than if I had slept with my father, or my elder brother.

²⁰ The same theory is promulgated, if I rightly remember, by Aristotle. Here however there is evidently some error in *λήγειν ἐπιχειρῆν*: which I could perhaps correct, but not without some violence to the text. Ficinus has "cum primum corporis oculus deflorescit."

²¹ The Greek is *καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ὥσπερ βίβλην*. But from the imitation in Aristænetus, Epist. ii. 4, *καὶ, ὥσπερ βίβλην, τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' οὗ*, and the expression in Plato, Phileb. p. 23, *βίβλην ἔχων ἑτέρα τῶν ἐμπροσθεν λόγων*, it is evident that *ὥσπερ βίβλην* could not stand thus by itself. Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' οὗ εὐκτερεῖ βίβλην*, in allusion to the *ἐκία πτερόεντα* of Homer; and the *εὐκτερος* (Vulg. *ἀπτερος*) φάτις in Agam. 267; and *Τοῦτο διαμπερὲς ὡς εὐκτερὸν ἦκε βίβλος*, in Cho.; and in Plato, Theætet. p. 180, A., *ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρίτρας ρηματισκία—ἀποτοξεύοντες*; and in Heliodor. Æthiop. vii. p. 312, *Θεαγένης, ὥσπερ βίβλην, τῷ ῥήματι βληθεὶς*. With regard to the loss or confusion of *ἐπὶ τὸν*, it will be sufficient to refer to Prom. 766, where some MSS. read correctly *μηδ' ἐπὶ τὸν προσμύους* for *μηδὲ πω*—To meet however the objection in *ἐπὶ τὸν*, which could hardly thus follow *ἀκούσας*, Ficinus has "objecissem," as if he has found in his MS. *ἀντειπὼν*: but such I do not believe was the reading there. Shakspeare too has united "words" and "daggers" in his well-known—"These words, like daggers, enter in my ears."

²² What feelings then do you fancy I had after this,²² on reflecting that I had been dishonoured, but yet admiring the nature, and the temperance and fortitude of this man; after I had met with a person such as I never thought I should meet with for prudence and self-control; so that I neither had it in my power to be angry with him, nor though I was deprived of intercourse with him, had I any means of attaching him to myself. For I well knew that he would be on every side more invulnerable to money, than Ajax²³ was to the sword; and that he had escaped me, at the very time when I fancied he would be caught. And thus I was reduced to my wits' ends, and went about, the slave of this man, as no one else was of any other. For not only did all this occur to me formerly, but after this likewise, during a campaign common to both of us, took place against Potidæa, and there we messed together. And here, in the first place, he not only surpassed myself, but all others, in the labours of the field. But when we were left some where, and compelled, as happens in campaigns, to be greatly²⁴ without food, the rest were nothing to him for the power of endurance. On the other hand, at our jollifications, he was the only person who could enjoy them; for though he was generally²⁵ unwilling to drink, yet when forced to do so, he beat all the rest; and what is the most wonderful of all, no one ever saw Socrates intoxicated. But of this it appears to me there will be shortly a confutation. Again, with respect to his endurance in winter, for the winters there are very severe,²⁶ he performed wonders in other ways, and once also when the frost was most bitter,

²²⁻²³ Compare Iph. A. 1162, *Τὴν ἔνδον εἰς σὲ καρδίαν μ' ἔχων δοκίς.*

²³ This allusion to Ajax seems very strange, when the tradition was, that he had destroyed himself, as shown in the play of Sophocles. Plato wrote, I suspect, Ἀχιλλεύς, who, as being invulnerable by a sword, was killed by an arrow from the bow of Paris. The Schol. on Aj. 833, says however that he was invulnerable except under the arm-pit, through his body being covered with the lion's hide, which had belonged to Hercules; and had been perhaps a gift from that hero to Telamon, after they had conjointly taken Troy.

²⁴ In lieu of *ὀπώραν γούν ἀναγκασθήμεν*, where even Stalbaum cannot endure *ὀπώραν* joined to an optative, some MSS. read *ὀπώρα*, while the majority omit *γούν*, and one has *ἀν*. Hence it is easy to read *ὀπώρα δ' αὖ ἄγαν*—where *ἄγαν* is to be united to *δοῦναι*.

²⁵ Instead of *τά τ' ἄλλα καὶ*, which Stalbaum vainly attempts to explain, Plato evidently wrote *καὶ πολλὰ γάρ*, as I have translated.

²⁶ For Potidæa was a town on the frontiers of Thrace.

and all did not go out from their quarters, or if any did so, he clothed himself in wonderfully thick (cloaks),³⁷ had his feet bound and wrapped in felt and sheep-skins, Socrates went out amongst them, wearing just the same clothing as he had been previously accustomed to wear, and marched through the ice without shoes, more easily than others with shoes; and the soldiers had a suspicion that he held them in contempt. [43.] And thus much on these points.

"But what this patient man did do and dare,"³⁸ during the campaign there, it is worth while to hear. For while he was thinking of some question from himself,³⁹ he stood from the dawn investigating it; and, as he did not succeed, he did not desist, but stood still investigating it. It was mid-day, and some persons perceived him, and wondering said, one to the other, that Socrates had been standing from the morning thinking upon something. At length some Ionian soldiers, when it was evening, having supped—for it was then summer—brought out their ground-litters, and partly slept in the cold and partly kept watch, whether he would stand there all night. And he did stand until the dawn appeared and the sun rose; after which he departed, having first offered a prayer to the sun.⁴⁰ And if you are willing (to hear),⁴¹ what he was in battle, must not be passed by.⁴¹ For it is surely just to pay him this tribute. For when the battle took place, in which the generals assigned to myself the prize of superior good conduct, no other man rescued me but he, through his being unwilling to leave me when wounded; and he preserved both my arms and myself. And I indeed at that time urged the commanders to give you, Socrates, the prize of good conduct—and for stating this, you will neither blame me, nor say that I am speaking falsely—but the generals, looking to my rank in life, and wishing to give me those rewards, you were more

³⁷ In *θauμαστὰ δὴ ὄσα* there evidently lie hid *θauμαστὰ δαῖτια*.

³⁸ This is a line of Homer in *Od. Δ. 242*.

³⁹ In lieu of *αὐτόθει*, two MSS. read *αὐτόθεν*.

⁴⁰ Perhaps it would not be difficult to show that the prayer of Socrates was subsequently published, and is still to be found in an Oriental version.

⁴¹ In lieu of *ἐν μάχαις*, Ficinus has "In praeliis quoque qualis fuerit, non est silentio prætereundum," omitting *εἰ δὲ βούλεισθε*. He therefore found in his MS. *οἷος ἦν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις οὐκ ἱστῶν*: where *οὐκ ἱστῶν* might easily have been lost through *ροῦτο*. But as he omits the next clause—*ροῦτο γὰρ εἰ δὲ δίκαιόν γε αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι*—perhaps he introduced the other words to fill up the sense.

eager for me to receive them than for yourself. Further still, gentlemen, it was well worth while to see Socrates when our army retreated from Delium;⁴² for I happened to be present with the cavalry, but Socrates was among the heavy-armed. For when the troops were already scattered, both he and Laches retreated; and I, meeting with and seeing the two, immediately exhorted them to take courage, and said that I would not abandon them. Here then I had a better view of Socrates than at Potidæa; for I was in less fear, because I was on horseback. In the first place then, how greatly did he surpass Laches in his being cautious; and in the next place, he seemed, according to your description, Aristophanes, to carry himself loftily,⁴³ and to throw his eye on one side, to survey quietly both friends and foes; and it was manifest to every one, and even to a person at a distance, that whoever presumed to touch this man, would be very vigorously repulsed. Hence both he and the other departed in safety; for scarcely any one, who thus conducts himself in war, is touched; but the pursuit is of those who turn and run away. [44.] "There are many other things for which a person would have it in his power to praise Socrates wondrously. But of his other pursuits, some one may perhaps speak in this way even about another person;⁴⁴ but to be like not one, either of the ancients or moderns, this is a thing worthy of all wonder. For such as Achilles was, one might conjecture was Brasidas⁴⁵ and others: and again, that, such as Pericles was, were An-

⁴² This event took place in Ol. 89, 1. See Thucyd. iv. 96.

⁴³ The passage of Aristophanes alluded to is in *Nesp.* 361. With regard to the verb *βριθύνεσθαι*, it is said to be derived from *βρίθον*, an aquatic bird, found in marshes, and that walks with its long legs, as if on stilts. From this reference to the very play of Aristophanes where Socrates is made the constant butt of the dramatist, and from the two being thus brought together, as the common friends of Agatho, it has been fairly inferred, that either the dramatist had in reality no ill-will towards Socrates, or that the philosopher was indifferent to what he knew was only a farcical caricature.

⁴⁴—⁴⁵ Here, as in many other places, the Latin of Ficinns differs from the Greek. His version is, "In multis quidem aliis mirifice laudari Socrates potest; sed talia sunt, ut ceteri quoque forsitan nonnulli eandem laudem mereantur." From which, however, it is easy to see that he found in his MS. not *ἄλλου τοιαῦτα*, but *ἄλλου του ταῦτά*, to which *ταῦτα* in two MSS. plainly leads. The pursuits alluded to were, probably, his skill as a sculptor, philosopher, and poet.

⁴⁵ On Brasidas, the Spartan general, and his doings, the reader is referred to Thucydides, who has shown that he was the Nelson of his country. For, like the modern naval hero, the general of his day forced himself into notice despite the opposition of ministers at home, and died in the arms of victory.

tenor and Nestor. And there are others likewise; and the rest⁴⁶ a person might compare after the same manner. But such a strange character as is this man, both in himself and in his discourses, no one will by searching discover any man approaching near to him, either among those living now or in the olden time; unless indeed some one should compare him to no human being, but to what I have mentioned, Silenuses and Satyrs. For I omitted to state this at first, that his discourses too are very like the Silenuses when opened. For should any one be willing to hear the discourses of Socrates, they will appear to be⁴⁷ very ridiculous at first;⁴⁷ with such nouns and verbs do they envelop externally,⁴⁸ as it were, the hide of a Satyr.⁴⁸ For he speaks of panniered asses,⁴⁹ and of copper-smiths, and leather-cutters, and tanners, and he appears to be always saying the same things upon the same subjects;⁵⁰ so that every man who has neither skill nor sense will laugh at his words. But he who beholds his discourses when opened, and gets within them, will, in the first place, find that they alone of (all other)⁵¹ discourses possess an internal meaning; and, in the next place, that they are most divine, and hold the most numerous⁵² images of virtue, and extend to the farthest point, or rather to every thing, which

⁴⁶ The Greek is *αἰεὶ δὲ καὶ ἑταροὶ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κατὰ ταῦτ' ἂν τις ἀπαί- κέχοι*. But Ficinus has "sunt alii quoque, qui hoc modo conferri possunt," which leads to *αἰεὶ δὲ καὶ ἑταροὶ, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις*—The article could not be here introduced before *ἄλλους*.

⁴⁷ As the oldest MSS. omit *πάνν*, and one of the oldest reads *λεῖοι*, it is evident that the text has been corrupted, which I could easily restore; but not without writing a long and learned note.

⁴⁸ The Greek is *Σατύρων ἂν τινα*, where, although his six favourite MSS. omit *ἂν*, Stalbaum would still retain it, misled, as usual, by Hermann on Dissert. "Av, p. 187, who quotes there Eurip. Alcest. 181, and Aristoph. Eq. 1257, neglecting the reading *οὐχι* for *οὐκ ἂν* furnished by Suidas in *Κλίπτης*. Rückert would read *αὐ*, which is quite as unmeaning as Hommel's *αὐτίκα*, in lieu of *ἂν τινα*. How easy was it to suggest, *Σατύρων εἰαν τινα*—

⁴⁹ According to Hesychius, *Καυθήλω* was *δνος* was *μερόε* *δνομα*. But there the learned read *Καυθήλω* *δνος*, as shown by the fragment of Hermippus quoted by Schol. in Aristoph. 'Ορν. 1555. Respecting the fact here alluded to, of Socrates talking of vulgar things, and to low persons, see Ruhnken on Xenoph. M. S. i. 2, 37.

⁵⁰ The same remark is made by Xenophon in M. S. iv. 416, *οὐ μόνον δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν*, says Socrates; and both these passages Cicero had perhaps in mind in *Amicit. § 4*, "Socrates, qui non tum hoc tum illud, ut fit in plerisque, sed idem dicebat semper." Compare too Gorg. p. 490, E., *δεῖ ταῦτὰ λέγειν—περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν*, applied to Socrates.

⁵¹ The Greek is now *μόνου*—*τῶν λόγων*. It was *μόνου* *πάντων τῶν ἄλων*, as shown by "solos aliorum omnium," in Ficinus.

⁵² For *καὶ πλείστ'* one would prefer *καὶ κάλλιστ'*, "the most beautiful."

it is fitting for him to consider, who intends to become a man at once beautiful and good. These then are the reasons, gentlemen, for which I praise Socrates; but on the other hand, for what I blame him, I have mixed up in the recital of the insults he has heaped upon me. Nor has he acted in this manner towards me alone, but also towards Charmides, the son of Glauco, Euthydemus, the son of Diocles, and very many others; whom this man has deceived, as if he were their lover, when, instead of the loving, he is himself the beloved. Hence,⁵³ I caution you, Agatho, not to be deceived by this man; but, taught by my sufferings, to have a care, and not, according to the proverb, By suffering, like a silly person, knowledge gain.⁵⁴

When Alcibiades had thus spoken, there was a (general)⁵⁵ laugh at his freedom of speech, because he appeared to be lovingly disposed towards Socrates; who thereupon observed, You seem to me, Alcibiades, to be sober; for, otherwise, you would not have attempted in so elegant and circuitous a manner to conceal that, for the sake of which you have said all this; and, as if mentioning something of no consequence, you have cleverly placed at the end that you have said all this on this account, namely, to throw discord⁵⁶ between me and Agatho, conceiving that I ought to love you and no other person, and that Agatho ought to be loved by you, and by no one else. But you have not lain hid from me; but this play of yours is plainly a Satyric one and Silenus-like. But, my dear Agatho, let not any thing occur in his favour, but do you prepare yourself so that no one may set you and me at variance. Whereupon said Agatho, You seem indeed, Socrates, to be speaking very nearly the truth, and I conjecture that he

⁵³ The Greek is now "Α δὲ, it was Δι' Α δὲ, as shown by "quamobrem," in Ficinus. On the loss of Δι' before Α see my Poppe's Prolegom. p. 116, where I have by the slightest emendations rescued the character of Thucydides from the charge of writing one thing and meaning another.

⁵⁴ The proverb alluded to is in Hes. *hoy.* 216, καθὰν δὲ τι νήπιος ἴγνη.

⁵⁵ Ficinus has "risum omnibus," as if his MS. read πᾶσιν before ἐνι.

⁵⁶ In διαβάλλειν there is what is called a pregnant sense. For it means, first, to keep apart, as regards a local position, and secondly, as regards a friendly feeling. As this remark was made originally by Wyttenbach, it seems strange that Stalbaum should not have seen the superiority of the

reading preserved in one MS. διαλάβη, and in another διαβάλῃ: where however, after κατεκλίθη, correct syntax would require διαλάβοι, according to the canon of Dawes, despite what Stalbaum may say to the contrary, misled by the subtleties of Hermann.

has been reclining between you and me, that he might keep us apart. There will not, however, occur any thing in his favour from this; for I will come and recline by you. By all means, said Socrates, come hither, and recline below me. O Zeus! said Alcibiades, how greatly again do I suffer from this man! He fancies he must surpass me in every thing; but, O wonderful man, if nothing else, suffer at least Agatho to recline between us. It is impossible, said Socrates: for as you have praised me, it is now necessary for me to praise him, reclining at my right hand. If, therefore, Agatho reclines below you, he will not surely again praise me, before he has been praised by me. Cease, then, thou happy fellow, and do not grudge my being praised by the youth; for I have a great desire to pass an encomium on him. Ho! ho! said Agatho to Alcibiades, there is no reason why I should remain here, but every reason rather that I should change my place, that I may be praised by Socrates. This is, said Alcibiades, as usual. When Socrates is present, it is impossible for any other to share the favours of the beautiful. And now observe how easily he has discovered a persuasive language, so that this youth should recline at his side. After this Agatho rose up, as if about to recline close to Socrates. But on a sudden there came very many revellers to the gates, and, finding them open, in consequence of some one having gone out in an opposite direction, they marched in, and threw themselves on the couches; and the whole place was filled with uproar, and no longer in any order (every one)⁵⁷ was compelled to drink a great quantity of wine. Whereupon Eryximachus and Phædrus, and some others, said Aristodemus, went away,⁵⁸ but that sleep laid hold of him;⁵⁹ and that he slept for a very long time, as the

⁵⁷ As there is nothing to which ἀνγκάζεσθαι can be referred, Sydenham has introduced "every one;" which has led me to suggest πάντα πᾶσιν, in lieu of πᾶσι πᾶσιν. Ficinus has merely, "nec ullus post hæc modus in bibendo servatus."

⁵⁸ Stalbaum remarks correctly, that Eryximachus and Phædrus are properly said to have gone away; for the physician was no friend of intemperance, as stated in p. 176, D. § 4, and Phædrus was, on this point especially, accustomed to follow the example of his medical friend, as he confesses in the same §.

⁵⁹ The best MSS. read ἢ δὲ, others ἔαδε, and one ἐμὶ δὲ, just as we find in p. 175, A. § 3, ἐμὶ in all the MSS., which Stephens first altered into ἢ μιν. But as in Attic Greek the reciprocal pronoun is ἑαυτὸν or αὐτόν, we must here and elsewhere look for some other remedy. Perhaps Plato wrote, εἰς δὲ ἱκνὸν ἕκνον ἑαυτὸν λαβάν, i. e. "sleep laid hold of him at the stove:" where the mention of the stove is very appropriate; for not only were the

nights were long, and rose at daybreak while the cocks were crowing; and on getting up he saw that the rest of the guests were asleep, or⁶⁰ gone; but that Agatho, Aristophanes, and Socrates were still awake, and drinking out of a great bowl, which they kept passing to the right hand,⁶¹ and that Socrates was discoursing with them; but he did not recollect, said Aristodemus, what the discourse was in other respects, as he was not present at the beginning of it, and dozing; but the sum of it, he said, was this, that Socrates was compelling them to admit that it was the province of the same person to know how to write comedy and tragedy, and that he, who was by art a tragic poet, was also a comic one; and that when they had been compelled (to admit) this, they began, as not very well following (the argument),⁶² to doze; and that Aristophanes fell asleep the first, and when it was now day, Agatho; but that Socrates, having put them to sleep, got up and went away; and that⁶³ he, (Aristodemus,) as he was wont, followed; and that he (Socrates) went to the Lyceum,⁶⁴ and, having washed himself as at another time,⁶⁵ passed the rest of the day;⁶⁶ and having thus passed it till evening, he took his rest at home.

nights long, as stated shortly afterwards, but cold likewise. For the Lenææ were celebrated in January.

⁶⁰ In lieu of *kai* Hommel properly suggested *η*. Ficinus has avoided the difficulty in *kai*, for the same persons were assuredly not asleep and gone, by his "*partim dormiebant, partim discesserant*."

⁶¹ On the phrase *πίνειν ἐκιδίξια*, see Casaubon on Athenæus, l. p. 21, B. ⁶² Stalbaum, to supply the ellipse, quotes very opportunely Euthyphr. p. 12, A., οὐχ ἔπομαι τοῖς λεγόμενοις.

⁶³—⁶⁴ As *αὐτός* is omitted in nearly all the MSS., Bekker thinks that Plato wrote here, as in § 4, the obsolete *ἐ*. Ficinus has "*ipso, ut consueverat, comitante*," which confirms *αὐτός*.

⁶⁵ Although *ὥσπερ ἄλλοτε* might perhaps stand, yet one would prefer *ὥσπερ ἱλινύοντα*, "like a dawdler," as having nothing to do. On the gloss or corruption of *ἱλινύειν*, Toup has written with his usual learning, sagacity, and taste, on Suid. t. ii. p. 201. In fact, if some such idea be not introduced, the subsequent *οὕτω* would be scarcely intelligible. But if *ἄλλοτε* be preserved, we must read *αὐτως*, "at leisure," for *οὕτω*.

⁶⁶ Instead of *ἄλλην*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ἄλην*, as shown by his "*totum*." From whence Stephens edited *ὅλην*.

END OF VOL. III.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILEBUS,

OR

THE GREATEST GOOD.

OF this rather long, frequently corrupt, and therefore difficult dialogue, the leading object may be expressed in a very few words. It is to show, that the greatest happiness is to be found, not, as Aristippus, in a lost work, seems to have asserted, in an unlimited indulgence in the pleasures of the body, nor even in those of the mind, as laid down by the school of Pythagoras, but in the temperate enjoyment of both, as being the best suited to the mixed nature of man, made up of matter and of mind.

In allusion to a similar union in a moral point of view of the Epicurean and Religious systems of living, Dr. Dodd, when in prison, wrote the following Epigram :

“Live whilst you live,” the Epicure would say,
“And taste the pleasures of the passing day.”
“Live whilst you live,” the sacred preacher cries,
“And give to God each moment as it flies.”
Lord, in my life let both united be ;
I live to pleasure, if I live to thee.

The unfortunate English divine had, like the more fortunate lyric poet and satirist of Rome, probably learnt, that however pleasant for a time is the Epicurean doctrine, “Carpe diem,” yet it was not the one which could be followed through life, even were the remark of Rochefoucault not founded on truth, that “we do not leave our vices, but they leave us.”

B

With regard to the difficulties of the text, no better proof can be given, than the fact, that Sydenham's translation is merely a paraphrase, in many places so loose, as to preserve little trace of the original; while Stalbaum, who has published two editions of the dialogue, each with an elaborate commentary, has, in the one, expressed opinions the very reverse of what are given in the other.

The reader will therefore have no reason to wonder that I have frequently been tossed in a sea of doubt, and unable to find the haven of certainty.

PHILEBUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS, PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

SEE¹ then, Protarchus,² what is the doctrine which you are about to receive from Philebus,³ and against what reasoning of mine to contend, unless it has been stated according to your mind. Do you wish me to present each question in a summary way?

Prot. By all means.

Soc. Philebus then asserts, that the (chief) good⁴ to all animals is joy, and pleasure, and delight, and whatever else harmonizes with such kind of things. But what I contend for is, that it is not those things, but to be wise, and to understand, and to remember, and whatever is of a kindred nature, both correct opinion, and true reasonings, are better and more acceptable than pleasure to all who are able to partake in them;

¹ From the abrupt commencement of the dialogue one might be led to imagine that something has been lost. But it may be said of Plato, as of Homer, that he is wont to rush, according to the expression of Horace, "in medias res." Compare the similar exordium of the Banquet.

² Of this Protarchus nothing more is known, than that he was a son of Callias, and a pupil of Gorgias, as stated in § 25 and 136.

³ Not only is nothing known of this Philebus, but even the name is so uncommon, that, says Stalbaum, it can scarcely be found except in Alciphron Epist. iii. 50.

⁴ According to the distinction made by Aristotle in *Analyt. Prior. i. 49*, between *ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, one would expect here *τὸ ἀγαθόν* in lieu of *ἀγαθόν*. But Stalb. has shown that the article is sometimes omitted by Plato; of which however I confess I have my doubts.

and that to those who are able to partake, it is of all things the most advantageous (so to partake), and not only to those (already existing), but to those who are to come. Say⁵ we not, Philebus, each of us thus?

Phil. Most assuredly, Socrates.

[2.] *Soc.* Do you then, Protarchus, receive the view thus given of the questions?

Prot. I must receive it. For Philebus, the handsome,⁶ shrinks from speaking.

Soc. By every means then the truth respecting those questions must be arrived at.

Prot. It must indeed.

Soc. Come then, let us in addition to these points agree in this.

Prot. In what?

Soc. That each of us⁷ should endeavour to set forth some habit and disposition⁸ of the soul, which is able to procure for every man a happy life. Is it not so?

Prot. It is so.

Soc. You then assert it is that of rejoicing; we, of thinking rightly.

Prot. Such is the fact.

[3.] *Soc.* But what if there should appear some other (habit) superior to both of these? Should we not, if it appeared more related to pleasure, be both of us vanquished by a life, which possesses those very things firmly; and a life of pleasure would be superior to one of intellect?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. But if (that superior state be more nearly allied⁹) to

⁵ Instead of λέγομεν Ast would read ἐλέγομεν, from "diximus" in Ficinus. Stalb. is content with λέγομεν.

⁶ Although the word καλός is frequently applied as a compliment, either real or pretended, to persons who either were, or fancied themselves to be, handsome, yet here one can hardly perceive its beauty. Ficinus has "Philebus noster," which is far more intelligible.

⁷ Instead of αὐτῶν Sydenham suggested ἡμῶν, answering to "nostrum" in Ficinus. And so the three oldest MSS. But in αὐτῶν something lies hid. *Two MSS. omit both ἡμῶν and αὐτῶν.

⁸ According to Aristotle in Categori. § vi., and Metaphys. iv. 19, by ἔξις is meant a permanent habit, and by διάθεσις a transient disposition of the soul. S.

⁹ Ficinus has, "Sin autem sapientiæ sit propinquior," as if from his MS. Ἀν δὲ γε φρονήσει μάλλον ἐγγυενης, or from his own head.

intellect, a life of intellect would be superior to one of pleasure, and the last would be forced to yield. Say ye that it is so agreed, or how?

Prot. To me, at least,¹⁰ it seems.

[4.] *Soc.* But how seems it to Philebus? What say you?

Phil. To me it seems, and will (always)¹¹ seem, that pleasure is altogether the superior. And you, Protarchus, will be convinced of it yourself.¹²

Prot. Having resigned, Philebus, to myself the debate, you can no longer be the master of what should be yielded to Socrates, and the contrary.

Phil. You say what is true. But, however, I have discharged my duty;¹³ and I here call the goddess herself to witness it.

Prot. We too would be witnesses on these very points, that you have said what you are saying.¹⁴ But now let us endeavour, Socrates, to go through in order what is to follow after this, whether with Philebus¹⁵ being willing, or however he may be willing.¹⁵

[5.] *Soc.* Let us endeavour, (beginning)¹⁶ from the very

¹⁰ In the Greek of this answer, 'Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, Stalbaum is uncertain, whether we ought to read γοῦν or γ' οὖν. But the preceding οὕτως—ἢ πῶς would naturally lead to 'Ἐμοιγ' οὕτως δοκεῖ.

¹¹ Ficini. has "semperque videbitur," adopted by Sydenham. But in the mass of parallel passages quoted by Stalb. the adverb is uniformly omitted.

¹² On the formula αὐτὸς γινώσκει Stalb. refers to his note in Gorg. p. 505, C.

¹³ On the meaning of ἀποσιῶσθαι Stalb. refers to Wyttenbach on Plutarch, p. 489, ed. Ox. = i. 386, Lips., and to Leopold on Plutarch, Numa, § 10, p. 299.

¹⁴ In such expressions as ὡς ταῦτ' ἔλεγες & λέγεις, the pronoun ταῦτα is never introduced, except in modern writers, such as Nicolaus of Damascus in Excerpt. Vales. p. 445, Εἰ—δίδρακα ταῦτα, & δίδρακα: while the same verb is repeated in both clauses, as shown by Abresch and Blomfield on Æsch. Agam. 67, and myself in Cl. Jl. No. xv. p. 144; and to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more.

¹⁵—¹⁶ Stalb. renders μετὰ Φιλήβου ἐκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἀν' ἰθείλῃ by "cum Philebo sive voluerit sive noluerit." But ἐκόντος could not be thus opposed to ὅπως ἀν' ἰθείλῃ. Hence, probably to avoid the tautology, Ficinus translated "cum volente Philebo, vel quomodocunque vis." But ἐκόντος could not be thus applied to Philebus, and ἡ ἰθείλῃς to Protarchus. Plato probably wrote, ἀκόντος, ἢ ὅπως ἀν' ἰθείλῃ, i. e. "unwilling, or however willing in part."

¹⁶ Ficinus has "ab ipsa dea exordientes." Hence Steph. proposed to insert ἀρξάμενοι, which is similarly used elsewhere, as shown by Heusde on

goddess herself, whom this person says is called Aphrodité, but whose truest name is Pleasure.

Prot. Perfectly right.

Soc. The dread, which I always feel as regards the names of the gods, is not after the manner of men; but is beyond even the greatest fear. And now I speak of Aphrodité by whatever name may be agreeable to her. But how various a thing is pleasure I know well; and, as I just now said, we ought to begin from it, by considering upon and seeing into its nature. For one may hear it called simply by one single name. It has assumed however all sorts of forms, and even such as are in a certain manner unlike to one another. For, observe, we say that the intemperate man has pleasure; and the temperate man has pleasure likewise ¹⁷[in being temperate].¹⁷ Again, we say that the thoughtless man is pleased in being full of silly opinions and hopes; and that on the other hand, the thoughtful man is pleased with his thinking wisely. Now, how could any one, who asserts that each of these pleasures are like to each other, not justly appear to be silly?

[6.] *Prot.* These pleasures, Socrates, are indeed from contrary acts; but not in themselves contrary to each other. For how could pleasure not be of all things the most similar to pleasure,¹⁸ this thing itself to itself?¹⁹

Soc. Colour, too, thou happy fellow, differs not from colour, at least in this respect, that it is universally colour. And yet we all know that black, besides being different from white, happens to be also the most opposite to it. So, too, figure is taken singly the same with figure, in the general; but as to its parts, some are the most opposite to others, and some happen to possess an infinite diversity. And many other things we shall find to be thus circumstanced; so that do not you trust

Theætet. p. 171, A. Stalbaum however says that *παραίειν τὸν λόγον* is to be supplied after *πειρασίων*, and *διαλίγεσθαι* before *ἀπὸ*—

¹⁷—¹⁷ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

¹⁸ This was the doctrine of Aristippus, who said *μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς*, "that pleasure does not differ from pleasure." S. On the other hand, Aristotle says in *Ethic. Nicom.* x. 3, quoted by Stalb., *τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν*.

¹⁹ I cannot understand the Greek *τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ*, nor could Salvini, who would read in *Observat. Miscell. Belgic.* v. 2, p. 244, *κατὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ*, similar to *κατὰ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, just afterwards; while Stalbaum prefers *τό γε αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ*, answering to "*quum sit eadem ipsa sibi*" in Ficinus.

to the reasoning, that makes things the most opposite to be one? And I fear that we shall find some pleasures to be quite opposite to others.

[7.] *Prot.* Perhaps so. But how will that injure my argument?

Soc. ²⁰ Because, we will say, you call things, dissimilar in themselves, by another name.²⁰ For you call all pleasant things good. Now that pleasant things are not pleasant, no one disputes. But though the most of them are evil, and (some)²¹ good, as we assert, yet all of them you call good, although confessing them to be dissimilar, when one compels you by reasoning (to do so). By what name then do you call that, which, existing in evil pleasures equally with good, (causes)²² all to be a good?

[8.] *Prot.* How say you, Socrates? Think you that any person, after having laid down that pleasure is the good, will agree with you? or will bear with you, while asserting that ²³ some pleasures are good, but others evil?²³

Soc. But you will at least acknowledge that pleasures are unlike to one another, and some even opposite to others?²³

Prot. By no means, as far as they are pleasures.

Soc. We are now brought back again to the same position, Protarchus. We will say then that a pleasure does not differ

²⁰⁻²² The Greek is "Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἑτέρῳ φήσομεν ὀνόματι: where, since nobody has been able to elicit a satisfactory sense, various alterations have been suggested by De Grou, Heindorf, and Baumgarten Crusius; which, says Stalb., are unnecessary, if we take, with Heindorf on Lysid. p. 45, *ἑτέρῳ ὀνόματι* in the sense of "another, i. e. not its own, name." But as *ἑτερος* is never found in that sense, we must still have recourse to conjecture. For the train of ideas appears to lead to "Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις ταῦτα τὰ ὄντ' ἀνόμοι', ἀ ἑτέρῳ φήσομεν ὀνόματι, "Because you call things really unlike by the same name, which we should call by another." Opportunely then has one MS. *ὄντ' ἀνόμοια*. Stalbaum, in ed. 2, adopts the interpretation of Heindorf, but without being able to support it by a single similar passage.

²¹ Ficinus has "bona quedam," as if his MS. read *καὶ ἀγαθὰ τινα*, what the sense requires, in lieu of *καὶ ἀγαθὰ δι*—Compare § 10, *καὶ ἀνόμοιαι τινες αὐτῶν*.

²² Stalbaum, in ed. 2, has laboured hard to support the construction. For he did not perceive that *θίμενον* had probably dropt out between *ἀγαθὸν* and *εἶναι*, as is evident from *θίμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὰγαθὸν* in the very next speech of Protarchus.

²³⁻²³ This assertion is however made in Gorg. p. 499, C. = § 118, quoted by Stalb. after Heind.

from a pleasure, but that all are alike; and the instances, just now produced, inflict no wound upon us. But we will make an endeavour, and say, what the meanest of speakers and mere novices in argument do.

[9.] *Prot.* What do you mean?

Soc. (I mean,) that if by imitating you, and defending myself, I should dare to assert that the thing the most unlike is of all things the most like to the most unlike, I should say the same as you do; and both of us would appear to be more of novices than is fitting; and the subject of dispute would thus slip away and fall to the ground. Let us therefore back water;²⁴ and perhaps by returning to similitudes,²⁵ we may come to an agreement with each other.

Prot. Say how.

[10.] *Soc.* Suppose me to be questioned by yourself, Pro-tarchus.

Prot. Concerning what?

Pol. Will not intelligence, and science, and mind, and all that I laid down at the commencement, and spoke of as being good, when I was asked what sort of thing was a good, be under the very same circumstances as is your argument?

Prot. How so?

Soc. The sciences, taken together, will seem to be both many, and some of them dissimilar to each other. Now if some are opposite also, should I be worthy of holding a conversation with you, if, fearful of admitting this very point, I should assert that no science was unlike (another) science? For then the very question²⁶ would be, as if it were a mere

²⁴ This is the English phrase in rowing, answering exactly to ἀνακρούεσθαι in Greek; although not applied metaphorically, as the Greek verb κρούω and its compounds are to an argument or discourse; as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegomen. p. 180, and to the passages there quoted I could now add as many more. On the word ἀνακρούεσθαι, in Latin "remis inhibere," Stalbaum refers to J. F. Gronovius, Observat. iv. 26, Valckenaer on Herodot. viii. 84, and Wesseling on Diodor. Sic. t. i. p. 418.

²⁵ In lieu of τὰς ὁμοίας, Sydenham suggests ὁμοιώτητας, or τὰ ὅμοια. For he says that ὁμοίας could agree only with ἡδονάς, about which not a word is said in what follows. Stalbaum understands λαβὰς, supplied in Phædr. p. 236, C., εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας, similar to "easdem in ansas," in Ficinus.

²⁶—²⁸ A similar expression is found in Theætet. p. 164, D.=§ 56. It was applied to such discourses as were brought to no end at all, or to an unsatisfactory one.

tale,²⁶ destroyed, and vanish, and we be saved²⁷ upon some absurdity.²⁸

²⁹ *Prot.* But this ought not to happen, except so far as the being saved. And now with the equality in your assertion and mine I am well pleased. Let then pleasures be many and dissimilar; and let the sciences likewise be many and different.²⁹

[11.] *Soc.* The difference then between your good, Protarchus, and mine, let us not conceal; but, placing them between us, let us venture (to discuss),³⁰ ³¹ if (reasons) on being examined will indicate (any thing),³¹ whether we ought to pronounce pleasure or intellect the chief good, or whether there is any other third thing. For we surely do not now desire to enter into a contest, in order that what I lay down, or what you do, may gain the victory; but we ought both of us to unite in fighting for what is the most true.

Prot. We ought to do so.

[12.] *Soc.* Let us then fix still more firmly this point by means of a mutual agreement.

Prot. What point?

Soc. That, which gives trouble to all persons who are willing, and sometimes to some who are unwilling.

Prot. Speak more clearly.

Soc. I am speaking of that, which has just now fallen by

²⁷ In Legg. i. p. 645, B., the tale is said to be saved, and not the speakers: but in Rep. x. p. 621, B., it is said not only to be saved itself, but to save the speakers likewise.

²⁸ Instead of ἐπι—ἀλογίας, one would prefer ἐπι—οὐ λόγου σχεδίας, "upon some raft of not-reason," similar to ἐπὶ τούτου ὁχοῦμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας, Phædo, p. 85, D., where there is an allusion to the raft on which Ulysses was carried in safety to land, after his vessel had been broken up by a storm. Perhaps however ἀλογίας means "a quibble."

²⁹⁻³⁰ All within the numerals Schütz, in Opuscul. Philolog. p. 127, assigns to Protarchus. And so six MSS., whom Stalb. follows in ed. 2.

³⁰ As there is wanting a verb after τολμῶμεν, Ficinus seems to have introduced "discutere" out of his own head to fill up the sense.

³¹⁻³¹ The Greek is ἂν πῃ ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσωσι, πότερον—where to supply the substantive required by ἐλεγχόμενοι, Winckelmann, in Præf. to this Dialogue, proposes to read ἐλεγχόμενοι οἱ λόγοι.—For ὁ λόγος is perpetually thus united to μηνύει, as may be seen in Ast's Lexicon. He ought however to have elicited τι from πότερον. Stalbaum suggested ἐλεγχόμεναι, referring it to διαφορήτητες understood; of which Schleiermacher and Matthiæ approved. But the substantive could hardly be omitted.

our side, of a nature somehow full of wonders. For that many are one, and one many, is a thing wonderful to be asserted; and it is easy to controvert a person laying down either of these points.

[13.] *Prot.* Do you mean, ³² that when any one says that I, Protarchus, being by nature one, am again many, laying down that the one, and persons opposite to each other, great and little, and heavy and light, are the same, and a thousand other things? ³²

Soc. The wonders, Protarchus, which you have now spoken of, relating to the one and many, have become vulgarized; but by the common agreement, so to say, of all men, it is laid down that it is needless to touch upon such things; since they consider them to be childish and easy (to be seen through), ³³ and great impediments to rational discourses; since not even such things ³⁴ (any one ought to say), ³⁴ when, after having in a

³²⁻³³ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the Greek text; out of which Heusde could not make sense, nor can I. Stalbaum however asserts that the words "Ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον, ἵνα γεγνότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους μέγαν καὶ μικρὸν τιθέμενος, (so the three oldest MSS. in lieu of τιθεμένων,) καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, mean—"When any one says that I, Protarchus, being by nature one, am many, laying down likewise that those many, *into whom I am as it were cut up piece-meal*, are the opposite to themselves, great and little, heavy and light, and what other things are of this kind." But even if there existed in the original, which is not the case, words answering to the English in Italics, still it would be impossible to believe that τοὺς could thus precede ἐμὲ, or the singular μέγαν, μικρὸν, βαρὺν, and κοῦφον thus follow ἐναντίους. Moreover, in this interpretation, no notice whatever is taken of πάλιν, in which not a little of the difficulty lies. Ficinus has "cum quispiam me, verbi causa, Protarchum, unum naturâ genitum, asserit, deinde me rursus multos atque contrarios prædicat, magnum, parvum, gravem, levem eundem hominem, aliaque permulta;" by the aid of which Heusde proposed to read Ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ—πολλοὺς εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν τούτους ἐμὲ, καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλους μέγαν—I should, however, prefer ἐμὲ—εἶναι πολλοὺς καὶ πολλοὺς πάλιν ἐμὲ, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀλλήλους—τὸν αὐτόν.—For thus καὶ πολλοὺς might easily have dropt out between πολλοὺς and πάλιν, and τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀλλήλους be properly opposed to τὸν αὐτόν.

³³ Ficinus has "facilia cognitu," which would lead to ῥᾶδια εἰδέναι. At all events ῥᾶδια could hardly stand here by itself.

³⁴⁻³⁴ The Greek is simply ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, where, says Stalbaum, we must supply δεῖ λέγειν: to which he was perhaps led by finding in Sydenham, "It is now also agreed never to introduce into conversation." But Plato is not wont to omit words requisite for the sense and syntax. I suspect he wrote ἐπεὶ εἰπεῖν τινὰ μὴδὲ τὰ τοιάδε δεῖ. For thus εἰπεῖν τινὰ might have been lost through ἐπεὶ, and δεῖ through δε.

discourse divided the members and parts of each thing, he shall confute the party, who has confessed³⁵ that all these are that³⁶ one, and ridicule him, because he has been compelled to make such monstrous assertions, as that a single one is many and infinite, and many only one.

[14.] *Prot.* Of what other things are you speaking, Socrates, which have not, as being universally agreed upon, become vulgarized, relating to the very same same subject?

Soc. When, young man, a person lays down that the one does not belong to things generated and destroyed,³⁷ as we have lately said.³⁸ For in that case, as we just now stated, it has been agreed that we need not confute a oneness of such a kind. But when a person attempts to lay down a oneness, as in the case of one man, and one ox, one beauty, one goodness, respecting these and such-like onenesses,³⁹ much of attention, together with a division, becomes a controversy.³⁹

Prot. How?

[15.] *Soc.* In the first place, whether a person ought to consider such onenesses as truly existing. In the next place, how it is that these, every one of them being always the same, and never receiving generation or destruction, are, notwithstanding, with the greatest stability⁴⁰ this one. And after this,

³⁵ In lieu of *διομολογησάμενος*, read in all the MSS., and acknowledged by "quis—fatetur" in Ficinus, Schleiermacher adopted what the sense evidently requires, *διομολογησάμενον*, furnished by the two Basil edd. Baumgarten Crusius says, however, that *διομολογεῖσθαι* means, not "to agree," but to "cause to agree:" whom Stalbaum follows in ed. 2, and thus deserts the other scholar, whom he had followed in the 1st.

³⁶ I cannot understand *ἐκεῖνο* after *τὸ ἐν*. One MS. has *ἐκείνῳ*. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὸ Ἑλεατικὸν ἐν*, in allusion to Zeno; as in Phædr. § 97, *τὸν Ἑλεατικὸν—λέγοντα—τὰ αὐτὰ, ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ*.

³⁷ By things generated and destroyed, says Stalbaum, are meant those that are cognizable by the senses; for those, that are cognizable by intellect alone, exist the same for ever, as stated in the *Timæus*, p. 28, A.

³⁸ This is supposed to refer to a previous conversation.

³⁹ Such is the literal version of the Greek *ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρίσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται*, out of which the reader is left to make what sense he can. Schütz, in *Opuscul. Philolog.* p. 134, wished to insert *καὶ* between *σπουδὴ* and *μετὰ*—But neither he nor Stalbaum, who is content with the common text, saw that correct Greek would require *πολλὴ ἡ σπουδὴ*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐν πολλῇ σπουδῇ μεγάλῃ διαιρίσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται*, i. e. 'in the midst of much attention a great controversy arises respecting a division.' For *ΜΕΓΑΛΗ ΔΙ* could easily have been corrupted into *ΜΕΓΑ ΔΙ*.

⁴⁰ Grou, in the notes to his French version, p. 239, was the first to sug-

we must lay down whether (oneness) is dispersed amongst things generated again⁴¹ and infinite, as having become many, or-is a whole itself, from itself apart;⁴² which would appear the most impossible of all, for the same and one to exist in one and in many at the same time. These are the questions relating to such things as⁴³ the one and many,⁴³ and not those, Protarchus, (mentioned by you,) ⁴⁴ are, through their being not well agreed upon, the cause of all difficulty in our path; but, by being properly (agreed upon), they would on the other hand be (the cause) of our easy progress.

Prot. It is necessary, then, for us to labour at this point the first.

Soc. So at least I should say.

Prot. Understand then that all of us⁴⁵ agree with you on these points; and it is best, perhaps, not to stir up just now by interrogations Philebus, who is well put to rest.⁴⁶

[16.] *Soc.* Be it so; but from whence shall one begin, the battle-field for controversy being so wide and various? Shall it be from hence?

Prot. From whence?

Soc. We surely assert, that one and many, being made by reasonings the same, run round⁴⁷ every where according to

great *βεβαύματα* in lieu of *βεβαύματα*; which he probably got from "suaque in unitate firmissimam" in Ficinus. But though *βεβαύματα* is read in nearly all the MSS., yet the language of Ficinus would lead to something else; for it is hard to understand the meaning of *ταύτας—εἶναι μίαν ταύτην*. One would have expected *μίαν αὐτήν*.

⁴¹ Ficinus omits *αὐ*. Perhaps it is meant to follow *μετὰ ταῦτα*.

⁴² Baumgarten Crusius quotes opportunely from Parmenid. p. 131, B. "Ἐν ἄρα ὃν καὶ ταὐτὸ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται; καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ὃν εἶη."

^{43—44} The words within the numerals Schleiermacher once considered to be interpolation, but afterwards to be genuine. Stalbaum, who on his authority had once expunged them, has subsequently restored them.

⁴⁵ Sydenham has introduced, for the sake of perspicuity, the words—"mentioned by you." Perhaps he wished to read *τὰ σά, πάσης*, in lieu of *ἀπάσης*.

⁴⁶ From the words "all of us," it is evident that there were present during the dialogue more than Philebus and Protarchus.

⁴⁷ The earliest allusion to the proverb *Μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον* is in Soph. CEd. C. 510.

⁴⁸ This is a strange expression applied to a mere metaphysical abstraction; although it is repeated in Theætet. p. 207, A., quoted by Baumgarten Crusius.

each of the things made the subject of reasoning always⁴⁸ and formerly and now; and this shall never have an end, nor has it ever had a beginning at the present time. But there is, as it appears to me, some such feeling in us, relating to reasonings themselves,⁴⁹ of an immortal and ageless kind. For when a youth has first tasted it, he is delighted, as having found a treasure of wisdom, and being transported with delight, he tosses about every reasoning; and at one time he rolls it (from this side)⁵⁰ to that, and mixes (all of it)⁵¹ into one; at another unrolling it back again, and separating it into parts, he throws himself first and foremost into a difficulty, and next the person ever nearest⁵² at hand, whether he happens to be younger, or older, or equal in age, sparing neither father nor mother, nor any one else, who will listen, and scarcely the rest of animals, not men alone; since he would spare not even one of the barbarians, could he but find some where an interpreter.

[17.] *Prot.* Do you not, Socrates, see the great number of us, and that we are all young? And are you not afraid that, if you rail at us, we shall, with Philebus, fall upon you all together?⁵³ However, for we understand what you mean, if there is any

⁴⁸ Stalbaum says that *λεγομένων δέ* is the same as *λεγομένων ἑκάστω*, an assertion more easily made than proved. He once proposed to read *λεγομένων εἶναι*. But he subsequently rejected what seems to me the preferable reading. Ficinus has "semper per singula, quæ dicuntur, et nunc et olim undique circumcurrere," as if *δὲ* had been written, in his MS., between *πάντη* and *καθ' ἑκαστον*.

⁴⁹ I cannot understand *αὐτῶν*, which is omitted by Ficinus.

⁵⁰ Stalbaum explains *ἐπὶ θάτερα* by "in alteram partem." But the idea of "another side" would be unintelligible, without a reference to its opposite one. Of this Baumgarten Crusius was aware; and hence he supposed that *τότε δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα* should be inserted, as in *Sophist.* p. 236, B., *χαίρει, τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα, τότε δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἐκύνει*.

⁵¹ The sense evidently requires the insertion of *πάντα*, as opposed to *ἓν*. Instead then of *τότε δὲ πάλιν*, which could not balance *τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *πάντα, καὶ πάλιν*—

⁵² Instead of *δὲ τὸν ἐχόμενον*, the sense manifestly demands *τὸν δὲ ἐχόμενον*—and so we must read in *Rep.* vii. p. 539, B., *τοὺς δὲ πλησίον* instead of *τοὺς πλησίον δὲ*—where there is a similar description of young persons playing with reasonings.

⁵³ There is a similar playful threat in *Phædr.* p. 236, C. § 27; and in Horace, "Cui si concedere nolis Multa—veniat manus, auxilio quæ Sit mihi; nam multo plures sumus," as remarked by Baumg. Crus. Stalb. too refers to *Rep.* i. p. 327, C.

method or contrivance for this confusion to depart⁵⁴ from somehow with a good will, out of the way of our reasoning, and for discovering a road to reasoning better than this, do direct your thoughts to it, and we will to the best of our power follow. For the present debate, Socrates, is not a little matter.

Soc. Indeed it is not, boys, as Philebus calls you. There is and can be no better way (than that) of which I am ever asserted and at a loss.

Prot. What is it? Let it only be mentioned. [18.] *Soc.* That, which to point out is not very difficult, but to make use of is very difficult. For all the things that connected with art, have been ever discovered, have become manifest through it. Consider then the way which I am speaking of.

Prot. Only tell it.

Soc. A gift, as it appears to me, from gods to men, was, through a certain Prometheus, cast down from some quarter by the gods along with a certain⁵⁶ fire the most luminous; and the men of old, being better than us, and dwelling nearer to the gods,

⁵⁴ Ficinus has "ad hanc perturbationem—rejiciendam," as if he had found in his MS. ἀποθεῖν instead of ἀπελθεῖν.

⁵⁵ The Greek is ποθεν ἐκ θεῶν. But by no process could the indefinite ποθεν commence a clause after a parenthetical sentence; nor, if could, would Plato have written θεῶν—δόσις—ἐκ θεῶν. There is some error here, which I will leave for others to correct by the aid of the Scholia of Olympiodorus, and my note on Hipp. Maj. § 46, p. 117.

⁵⁶ Although τιμὴ is supported by Numenius in Euseb. Præp. Evan. xi. p. 539, A., ὁ Πλάτων τὴν σοφίαν ὑπὸ Προμηθεὺς ἔλθειν εἰς ἀνθρώπους μετὰ φανότατον τιμὴς πυρὸς ἔφη, yet it is properly omitted in Julian Or. vi. p. 183, C., and Damascius, quoted by Suidas in Δῶρον, and since Clemens Alex. in Protrep. p. 2, C., has κατὰ γωμῶμεν δὲ ἀνωθεν οὐρανῶν τὴν ἀληθείαν ἅμα φανότατη φρονήσει, it is easy to see that ἔμοι lies hid ἡ ἔννοια; for otherwise the nature of the gift would be known; while ἡ ἔννοια is plainly confirmed by Prom. 441, "Ἐννοίας ἐστὶ καὶ φρενῶν ἐπιηβόλους."

⁵⁷ Baumgarten Crusius considers the words, ἔγγυτίρω θεῶν οἰκοῦν, to be taken from some poet; for they are similar to οἱ θεῶν ἀγγίσπυ (καὶ) Ζηνὸς ἔγγυς in Rep. iii. p. 391, E. He quotes too opportuna Seneca Epist. xc. 44, (Aureæ ætatis homines) alti spiritus fuerunt, et a dicam, a diis recentes;" to which Stalbaum adds Cicero de Legg. 7, "Quoniam antiquitas proxime accedit ad deos, a diis quasi tradita religionem tueri."

have handed down this story,⁵⁸ that, since the beings,⁵⁹ said to be for ever, are produced from one and many, and have in themselves bound and the boundless born with them, we must therefore,⁶⁰ since things have been so arranged, ever lay down the existence of some one idea respecting every thing, and on every occasion seek for it; for being there, we shall find it; and if we lay hold of⁶¹ it, we must after one look for two, if two there are; but if not, three, or some other number; and again, in like manner⁶² each of those that are one;⁶² until at length a person perceives that the one at the beginning is not only one, and many, and infinite, but also how many it is: but that a man should never bring the idea of infinity to multitude, before he shall have fully seen all its⁶³ number, which lies between the infinite and the one; and then having dismissed each one of the all into infinity, we must⁶⁴ bid them

⁵⁸ Stalbaum here, and on Politic. p. 293, C., defends *ταύτην φήμην* without the article *τὴν*, with which Dawes in Miscell. Crit. p. 468, was the first to show that οὐτος could not dispense. In the present case, since many MSS. offer *φήμη*, Plato probably wrote *ταύτ' ἐν φήμῃ*—

⁵⁹ The Greek is *ὄντων τῶν αἰ λεγομένων εἶναι*. But *ὄντων* could not dispense with the article; moreover *τῶν αἰ λεγομένων* would mean, "of things that happen to be ever said." Plato wrote, what the sense and syntax equally demand, *τῶν ὄντων αἰ λεγομένων εἶναι*.

⁶⁰ Stalbaum defends *δεῖν οὖν* after *ὥς—ἐχόντων*—Ficinus has "quum—habeant, oportet nos," which leads to *δεῖ*, found in one MS.; but instead of omitting *οὖν* with Stephens, we must read *ἐννοία*—to answer to *ἡ ἐννοία*, restored just before.

⁶¹ All the MSS. read *μεταλάβωμεν*. But from "comprehendamus" in Ficinus Stephens elicited *καταλάβωμεν*, adopted by Bekker, and by Stalbaum too in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.

⁶²—⁶³ The Greek of this evidently corrupt passage is—*τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον*—where Schütz would read *τὸ ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον*. Schleiermacher, *τῶν ἐνόντων ἐκείνων ἕκαστον*. Ast, *τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἕκαστον*: of which Stalbaum approves in ed. 2, although in ed. 1 he had suggested *τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον*. Lastly, Klitzsche in Observ. Crit. in Phileb. 1841, Zwiccan, has, it seems, suggested *ἐνῶν*, "ones," in lieu of *ἐν ἐκείνων*, with the approbation, he says, of Godfred Hermann. Ficinus has "et quodlibet eorum, quæ sunt unum," which leads, as Stalbaum saw, to *καὶ τῶν ἐν ὄντων ἕκαστον*. Correctly indeed as regards *ἐκείνων*, which has no meaning here. But Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐνὶ κειμένῳ ἕκαστον*, i. e. and each of the parts that lie in one (whole).

⁶⁴ I cannot understand *αὐτοῦ*; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.

⁶⁵ Instead of *τόρε δ' ἥδη*, the three oldest MSS. read *τόρε δὲ δεῖ*, adopted by the Zurich editors. But the continuity of the construction requires *δεῖν*, as Stalbaum has correctly remarked; but he incorrectly prefers *τόρε δ' ἥδη*, not aware that *τόρε ἥδη* could not be joined together, as I have shown on Parmen. § 51, where in Agam. 940, the words *τόρ' ἂν οἷδ' ψυχοῦ* are printed instead of *τόρ', οἷδ', ἂν ψυχοῦ*—

farewell. [19.] The gods then, as I said, have granted us to consider things in this way, and to learn them, and teach them to each other. But the wise men of the present time introduce, as it may happen, one, and many, more quickly and slowly than is fitting, and immediately after the one, infinity, but (all) the intermediate escape them; by which are kept apart the methods of our carrying on with each other disputations in a logical⁶⁵ and contentious manner.

Prot. A part, Socrates, I seem somehow to understand; but of the other part I beg I may hear more clearly what you mean.

Soc. What I mean, Protarchus, will be⁶⁶ evident in the case of letters; and in these, through which you have been taught, accept my meaning.

Prot. How?

Soc. The voice, that issues through the mouth, is surely one, and on the other hand infinite, not only in that of all, but of each.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Now we are skilled (in voice) by neither of these considerations, whether we know that it is infinite or one; but (to know) how many and of what kind are (its parts), this it is which produces in each of us the grammar-art.

Prot. Most true.

[21.] *Soc.* And further, that which produces the music-art, is the very same thing.

Prot. How so?

Soc. (Musical) sound,⁶⁷ ⁶⁸ and the thing according to that art is one in it.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ The Greek is διακεχώρισται—πάλιν. But as πάλιν has no well-defined meaning here, Heusde proposed to read *ἐμπαλιν*, which appears equally unintelligible. Ficinus omits the word entirely, and so does one MS. Plato probably wrote πολὺ—Respecting the two methods of disputation, Stalb. refers to *Sophist*, p. 216, B. 231, E. and 253, C.

⁶⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἴσται*, instead of *ἴστιν*.

⁶⁷ In Greek *φωνή* means a sound proceeding either from the voice or a musical instrument. Hence Plato supposes it to be a common genus, divisible into two species; and so it is laid down by Nicomachus, in *Harmonic. Enchirid.* p. 3, ed. Amst.—Τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ διδασκαλείου δύο ἔφασκον, ὡς ἐνὸς γένους, εἰδὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ μὲν συνεχὲς ἰδίως ὠνόμαζον τὸ δὲ διαστηματικόν. i. e. "The writers of the Pythagorean school say, that of the human voice there are two species, as of one genus. One they call peculiarly continuous, the other separated by intervals." The continuous is used in speaking; and therefore called by Aristoxenus and by Euclid *φωνή λογική*: but the other is used in singing, and hence termed *φωνή μελωδική*. S.

⁶⁸—⁶⁸ Such is the literal version of the received Greek text—καὶ τὸ

Prot. How not?

Soc. And let us suppose two kinds, the grave and the acute, and a third, the homotonous;⁶⁹ or how?

Prot. In this way.

Soc. But by knowing these facts alone you would not be skilled in music; although by not knowing you would be, on these points, worth, so to say, nothing.

Prot. Yes, nothing.

Soc. But, my friend, when you shall have (correctly)⁷⁰ comprehended the intervals of sounds, with respect to their being acute and grave, how many they are in number, and of what kinds, and the limits⁷¹ of the intervals, and how many combinations are produced from them, which our predecessors have remarked and handed down to us, who come after them, by the name of harmonies,⁷² and such other circumstances⁷³ as are in, (and) produced by, the motions of the body, (and in words,⁷⁴) which being measured by numbers, they say

κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τίχην ἰσὶ μία ἐν αὐτῇ; where, although καὶ τὸ are omitted by the three oldest MSS., it is difficult to say how those words could come here, and no less so to explain ἐν αὐτῇ. Ficinus alone has what is perfectly intelligible—"Una quodammodo et in hac arte vox est," thus omitting καὶ τὸ and ἐν αὐτῇ, in which all the difficulty lies.

⁶⁹ Instead of ὁμότονον Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. μεσό-τονον, answering to his version—"tonus medius." One would prefer, however, ἡμίτονον. For the idea of a homotonic sound can have no part here, if it be, as Sydenham asserts, that, which is produced from the string of one instrument having the same degree of tension with the similar string of another, or when two different voices give at the same time musical sounds, neither of which is more acute, or more grave, than the other.

⁷⁰ The word καλῶς has been luckily preserved in two MSS. Compare Pseudo-Plato in Hipparch. p. 227, C., εἰ τις ὁρθῶς λαμβάνει τὸν φιλοκτερεῖν.

⁷¹ Plato in Rep. iv. p. 443, D., speaking of ὑπάτη, "the highest note," νήτη, "the highest," and μέση, "the middle," describes them as τρεῖς ὅροις ἁρμονίας, "the three limits of harmony." S.

⁷² When Plato and Aristotle speak of harmony, in the singular number, they mean what is now called music. But when they speak of harmonies, in the plural, they mean those different modes of harmony, the principal of which were called Doric, Phrygian, and Lydian. S.

⁷³ There is no word in English corresponding to the comprehensive idea expressed by the Greek πάθος, by which, as Sydenham observes, was meant any condition, situation, accident, or circumstance, in or under which any thing was said to be placed, or, as Taylor says, any participated property of any being. I have generally rendered it "circumstances," unless where the idea of a positive suffering was to be conveyed.

⁷⁴ As there is nothing to answer to ἐν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν, Sydenham would insert ἐν τε ῥήμασιν. But one would expect rather ἐν τε ταῖς τοῦ στόματος— For thus σῶμα and στόμα would be properly opposed to each

again⁷⁵ we ought to call them rhythms and metres, and at the same time to consider that we ought to thus look into every thing that is one and many—when (I say⁷⁶) you shall have comprehended all these things, in this manner, then will you have become skilled; and when by considering in this way any other kind whatsoever of being, you shall have comprehended it, you will have thus become intelligent respecting it. But the infinite multitude of, and in, individuals causes you to be infinitely far off⁷⁷ from thinking correctly, and to be⁷⁸ of no account or number,⁷⁹ as you never look to any number in any thing whatever.

[22.] *Prot.* Most beautifully, Philebus, does Socrates appear to me to have spoken in what he has now said.

Phil. And to me likewise the very same thing⁷⁹ (appears). But how has this speech been spoken as regards us, and what does it mean?

Soc. Correctly indeed,⁸⁰ Protarchus, has Philebus proposed this question.

Prot. Very much so; and do you give an answer.

Soc. This I will do, after I have gone through yet a little (more) respecting these very points. For, as we said, that should

other; while a portion of the missing words is still to be seen in *ίόντα*, which is quite superfluous, not to say unintelligible, thus coming before *γινόμενα*. Stalbaum, too, seems to have felt some difficulty; for he says, one would have expected here *τῆς φωνῆς* in lieu of *τοῦ σώματος*.

⁷⁵ I cannot understand *αὐ*, which Bekker and Stalbaum have edited in lieu of *αὐτά*, from the three oldest MSS. Fictus acknowledges neither *αὐτά* nor *αὐ*.

⁷⁶ Since some MSS. read *ὅταν τε*, and others *ὅταν γάρ*, Plato probably wrote *ὅταν*, *λίγω*—for he would thus resume by the verb *λίγω* the thread of the speech, which had been interrupted by a prolix parenthesis.

⁷⁷ From this version it would seem that Sydenham wished to read *ἀκίρον ἐκαστῶ* in lieu of *ἀκίρον ἐκάστοτε*. With regard to the play on *ἀκίρος*, Baumgarten Crusius aptly refers to Timæus, p. 55, C., *τὸ ἀκίρους κόσμον εἶναι λίγων ὄντως ἀκίρου τινοῦ δόγμα*.

⁷⁸—⁷⁹ In this passage, says Baumg. Crus., there is an allusion to the oracle pronounced in ridicule of the people of Megara, who were said to be *οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὐτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ*. See Schol. on Theocrit. Id. xiv. 48.

⁸⁰ I have adopted the reading *ταὐτά γε ταῦτα* suggested by Stalbaum in ed. 1, although rejected in ed. 2.

⁸¹ The Greek is *ὁρθῶς μίνοι*: where, says Stalbaum, *μίνοι* indicates the assent to an assertion. But *μίνοι* could not thus follow *ὁρθῶς*, unless *ὁρθῶς* were found in the speech preceding, as is evident from the passages quoted by Stalbaum here, and myself on Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2, to which I could now add a dozen more. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὁρθῶς, μὲν τὸν*—the usual omission of *θιόν*.

a person lay hold of any one thing whatever, he ought not to look at once upon the nature of the infinite, but upon some number; so, on the other hand, when a man is compelled to lay hold of the infinite,⁸¹ he ought not (to look) at once upon the one, but to a certain number, possessing some multitude of individual things, (and) to think upon it; and to end from all in one. Let us then again lay hold of what I have now said, in the case of letters.

[23.] *Prot.* How?

Soc. From the time when some god, or godlike man, as the story in Egypt goes, by saying it was some Theuth,⁸² first thought upon sound as being without limit,⁸³ the person has been mentioned in history, who⁸³ perceived that in the limitless⁸⁴ there were vocal (letters), not one but more; and again, other (letters) not having a part of the voice, but of some kind of sound;⁸⁵ and that of these also there was a certain number. A third kind of letters he set apart; those which are now called mutes by us.⁸⁶ After this he separated both the

⁸¹ The Greek is *μη ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὐτὰ πλῆθος ἑκάστων ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν*—on which Stalbaum has written, in his two editions, two rather long notes; both of which, I think, he would have omitted, had he seen, what was partially done by Baumgarten Crusius, that *βλέπειν* is to be inserted from the preceding sentence after *μη ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς*, and that Plato probably wrote *ἀριθμὸν πλῆθος ἑκάστων ἔχοντά τι καὶ κατανοεῖν*: and Julian, in *Epistol.* p. 384, A. = 82, A., *κατανοήσας δὲ πῶς τὸ διάφορον τοῦ τρόπου καὶ βλέπων*—not *πρὸς*; for *πῶς* and *πρὸς* are constantly confounded in MSS.

⁸² On this Theuth, the supposed inventor of language, see *Phædr.* p. 274, § 134.

^{83—83} To avoid the *anakolouthon*, I have translated as if Plato had written *ιστόρηται, δὲ—not δὲ πρῶτος*—which Stobæus, however, acknowledges.

⁸⁴ I confess I do not understand *ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ*, unless it be said that there is no limit to the varieties of sound.

⁸⁵ A similar distinction is found in *Cratyl.* p. 424, C., *τὰ φωνήεντα μὲν οὐ, οὐ μὲντοι γὰρ ἀφθόγγα*: which Sydenham might have quoted to defend his proposed reading, *φωνήεντα μὲν οὐ*—obtained from *φωνῆς μὲν ὄντα οὐ* in the margin of Gesner's ed. of Stobæus, *Ecl. Eth.* lxxix. p. 469. Sydenham, however, subsequently saw that as *φωνή* means the clear sound of a vowel, and *φθόγγος* the not-clear sound of a semi-vowel, or, as he should have said, of a consonant, no matter whether a mute or liquid, there was no need of any alteration.

⁸⁶ Respecting the division of the Greek letters into vowels, semi-vowels, and mutes, Stalbaum refers to Dionys. H. *Περὶ Συνθεσ. Ὄνομ.* § 14, p. 166—176, ed. Schæf., and to Sext. *Empir. Adv. Mathem.* § 5.

letters which are without any vocal sound, ⁸⁷ clear or not clear, ^{87 88} as far as each one, ⁸⁸ and the vowels also and those in the middle ⁸⁹ in the same manner, until having comprehended their number, he gave to each one, and to all together, the name of an element. But perceiving that none of us could understand any of them by itself alone, without (learning) them all, he considered this bond between them as being one, and as making all these in a manner but one thing; and to them he applied the name of the grammar-art, calling it so as being one.

Phil. ⁹⁰ These, taken by themselves and in relation to each other, ⁹⁰ Protarchus, I understand more clearly than what was said before. But there is still at present wanting, as before, the very same trifling part of the discourse.

Soc. Is it not this, Philebus? what have these matters to do with the subject?

Phil. Yes. This is the very thing which I and Protarchus are for a long while in search of.

Soc. You are then for a long while, as you say, in search, when you have just now arrived at it.

Phil. How so?

[24.] *Soc.* Was not the question originally between us relating to intellect or pleasure, which was the more eligible?

Phil. How not?

Soc. We admit, however, that each of them is one thing?

Phil. By all means.

Soc. This then does the previous subject demand of us; how is each of them one and many? and how is it that they are not at once infinite; but that each possesses somehow a certain number before it becomes infinite?

⁸⁷⁻⁸⁷ This is perhaps the best way of rendering *ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα*. Sydenham has "perfect or imperfect." Ficinus, "liquidas mutasque."

⁸⁸⁻⁸⁸ I confess I cannot understand *μέχρι ἐνός ἑκάστου*: nor could Sydenham, who has omitted them. Ficinus has literally, "usque ad quodlibet unum."

⁸⁹ By *μῆσα*, says Stalb., are meant those mentioned above, as "not having a part of the voice, but of some kind of sound."

⁹⁰⁻⁹⁰ I have adopted the correction of Schleiermacher, *αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα*, in lieu of *αὐτὰ γε πρὸς ἀλλήλα*, found in the majority of MSS. Ficinus has "videlicet ipsa invicem comparata."

Prot. Into no trivial a question, Philebus, has Socrates thrown us, after having led us, I know not how, a round-about road. And now consider, which of us two shall reply to the question proposed. Perhaps, however, it would be ridiculous in me, who have ⁹¹ stood as a reinforcement to your argument, to order ⁹¹ you again to this business, through my being unable to reply to the present question; but I think it would be much more ridiculous for neither of us to be able. Consider, then, what we are to do. For Socrates seems to interrogate us respecting the (different) kinds of pleasure, whether they do or do not exist; and how many and of what kind they are; and in like manner and touching the same points as regards intellect.

[25.] *Soc.* You speak, son of Callias, most truly. For since we are unable to do this, as regards every thing, as being one, similar, and same, and the contrary, as the past reasoning has pointed out, not one of us would in any matter ever be worth any thing at all.

Prot. Such, Socrates, very nearly seems to be the case. But though it is a fine thing for a prudent person to know all things, yet it seems to be a second step ⁹² for a person not to be ignorant of himself. Why then have I now said this? I will tell you. This conversation, Socrates, you have granted to us all, and have given yourself up to us, for the purpose of deciding what is the greatest good to man. For, after Philebus had said, that it is pleasure, and delight, and joy, and all things of the like nature, you said in opposition to this, that it was not these things, but those which we often willingly call to our recollection; and we are right in so doing, in order that each question, being laid up in our memory, may be put to the test. [26.] You assert then, it seems, that, what is to be spoken ⁹³ of correctly, there is a good, superior to pleasure,

⁹¹ In the words *ὑποστάντα δαίδοχον* and *προσάττειν*, there are military metaphors, which I have adopted in the translation.

⁹² The Greek is *πλοῦς*, "a sailing." Respecting the proverb *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, found in *Phædon*. p. 99, B.; and *Politic.* p. 300, B.; Baumgarten Crusius refers to Gataker on *M. Anton.* ix. 2, and Bergler on *Alciphron* i. p. 352, ed. Wagn., who have said all that is necessary.

⁹³ I cannot understand the words *τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς*; nor could Schütz, who wished to expunge them. I could have understood *τὸ προστυρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς*, i. e. "what is to be discovered truly." Stalbaum, in ed. 1, attributed to Ficinus "quod adjiciendum puto recte," and

in mind, science, intelligence, art, and all things allied to them, which one ought to possess, and not the others. Now these positions being laid down severally on each side, as the subjects of dispute, ⁹⁴we in a jocular way threatened, that we would not suffer you to go home, before, of the questions so defined, a sufficient limit had been reached.⁹⁴ To this you assented, and to these points you gave yourself up to us. We assert then, as children say, that of what has been given fairly, there is no taking away. Forbear then to meet us on what has been now said in this manner.

Soc. In what manner?

[27.] *Prot.* By throwing us into a difficulty, and propounding inquiring questions, to which we should not be able on the instant to give a sufficient answer. For let us not fancy that the present difficulty of us all is a finish (to the inquiry); but if we are unable to do this,⁹⁵ you must do it, for so you promised. Wherefore advise yourself, whether you must distinguish the kinds of pleasure, as of knowledge; or leave them alone, if perchance you are able and willing by some other method to render plain somehow else⁹⁶ the question now in dispute between us.

Soc. Nothing dreadful then need I fear any longer for myself, since you have said this. For the expression, "if you are willing," relieves me from all fear respecting each thing. But, in addition to this, there seems some god, I think, to have given me a recollection of some things.⁹⁷

Prot. How, and of what things?

[28.] *Soc.* Having formerly heard, either in a dream or broad awake, certain sayings respecting pleasure and intel-

finds fault with the version, as not corresponding to the Greek. Had he looked into Bekker's reprint, he would have found "quod recte appellandum erit," similar to "quod recte dicendum sit," in the note of Baumgarten Crusius, which he praises, and has adopted.

"—⁹⁴ As nothing of this kind had been mentioned in the preceding part of the dialogue, Stalbaum says it alludes to something which is feigned to have occurred previously.

⁹⁵ Viz. "to extricate ourselves from the difficulty," as remarked by Stalbaum, who found those words in Sydenham's translation.

⁹⁶ The words πως ἄλλως, clearly superfluous after καθ' ἑαυτὸν τινα τρόπον, are properly omitted by Ficinus. Moreover correct Greek requires ἄλλως πως— Plato wrote, I suspect, παισὶν ἄλλως, i. e. "to children merely."

⁹⁷ Instead of μνήμην τινα, the question of Protarchus evidently leads to μνήμην τινων.

lect, I have them now again present to my mind, that neither of them is of itself the good, but some other third thing, different from them, and better than both. Now if this should appear to us clearly, pleasure is then removed from victory. For the good would no longer be the same with it; or how (say you)?

Prot. Just so.

Soc. We shall have no need then, in my opinion, to distinguish the kinds of pleasure. And the thing itself,⁹⁸ as it progresses, will show itself more clearly.

Prot. Having begun so happily, proceed (with the same success).⁹⁹

Soc. Let us previously agree still upon a few little points.

Prot. What are those?

[29.] *Soc.* Is it necessary for the condition¹⁰⁰ of the good to be perfect or not perfect?

Prot. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.

Soc. What then? Is the good self-sufficient?

Prot. How not? and in this respect it excels all other things existing.

Soc. And this too, I think, it is of all things the most necessary to state about it, that every being that knows of it hunts after it, and desires to catch it, and to have it about itself, and cares for nothing else except such as are brought to perfection in conjunction with good things.

Prot. There is no gainsaying this.

Soc. Let us then consider and judge of the life of pleasure, and that of intellect, viewing them separately.

Prot. How say you?

Soc. In the life of pleasure, let there be no intellect; nor

⁹⁸ All the MSS. read *πρὸς τὸν δ' ἐτι—δείξει*: where it is strange that Stalbaum should not have suggested *πρὸς τὸν δ' αὐτὸ ἐτι—δείξει*, after he had in both edd. referred to the proverb *αὐτὸ δείξει*, and its cognate *δηλοῖ*. He once approved of the correction of Cornarius, *πρὸς τὸν δ' ἐτι ὁ λόγος—δείξει*, which he confirmed by *δείξει δὲ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸν δ' λόγος*, in Legg. vii. p. 812, E.; but in ed. 2, he asserts that *δείξει* can be used for *αὐτὸ δείξει*. But of this I have a very great doubt.

⁹⁹ From this translation I infer that Sydenham wished to read *διαπίπτειν* εἰς, in lieu of *διαπείπειν*. For thus εἰς would balance *κάλλιστα*. Opportunely then has one MS. *διαπείπειν*.

¹⁰⁰ To this passage Aristotle in *Ethic.* x. 2, alludes, as remarked by Baumgarten Crusius.

in that of intellect, pleasure. For, if either¹ of them be the good, it need not want any thing additional from any other quarter. But, if either of them appears to be indigent of aught, this can no longer be the good.

Prot. For how could it?

[30.] *Soc.* Let us then endeavour with you to try them by a touchstone.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. Answer, then.

Prot. Say on.

Soc. Would you, Protarchus, accept the offer to live through the whole of life enjoying pleasures the most exquisite?

Prot. Why not?

Soc. If you possessed this completely, would you not think that you still wanted something else?

Prot. Not at all.

Soc. ² See now, is it not for the things that are wanting in thought, and mind, and reasoning powers, and whatever are the sisters of these, to see not even something? ³

Prot. And why? for I should in a manner possess all things, in possessing joy.

Soc. Living thus continually through life, would you not feel a joy in the most exquisite pleasures?

Prot. Why not?

Soc. Possessing neither mind, nor memory, nor science,

¹ Instead of *πρότερον*, Stephens proposed *πότερον*, suggested by "alterum" in Ficinus: and so the three oldest MSS. But *ὁπότερον*, found in three others, is the more correct reading.

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of the common text—"Ὁρα δὴ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λογιζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ μὴν μηδὲ ὁρᾶν τί; out of which none of the learned have been able to elicit a satisfactory sense. Ficinus has "Adverte itaque, num ipsa sapientia indigeres et intelligentia et convenienti ratiocinatione et aliis, quæcunque horum cognata, annon rei alicujus visu." Now though it is evident he found in his MS. *μὴν μηδὲ ὁρᾶν τί*, yet from his "indigeres," it is equally evident that he applied *δέοντα* to a person, and not to a thing. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote "Ὁρα δὴ, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λογιζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ, μὴν ὁ ἡδὲ ὁρᾶν ἴσται; i. e. "See now, is it possible for things that are wanting in thought, mind, and reasoning powers, and whatever are the sisters of these, to do to you what is pleasant?" To which the answer would be, *Καὶ τί*; "Why (is this)?" Stalbaum, however, Lehrs, and Winckelmann, would read *μὴν μηδὲ ὅναρ τί*, referring to *οὐδὲ ὅναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς* in Theætet. p. 173, D. But the mention of pleasure could hardly be omitted.

nor a true opinion, it is surely necessary for you, in the first place, to be ignorant, whether you had any joy, or not, being void of all intellect.

Prot. It is necessary.

[31.] *Soc.* Being moreover in a similar manner not in possession of memory, there is surely a necessity for you not even to remember that you ever had any joy, or for not even the least memorial to remain of a joy coming upon you on the instant; and not possessing a true opinion, (a necessity) for you to think that, when you are feeling a joy, you do not feel it; and deprived of the reasoning power, to be not even able to calculate that you shall feel a joy in a time to come; and thus you would live the life, not of a man, but of an animal called lungs,³ or of such marine substances as are endued with life, together with an oyster-like body. Are these things so? or can we think otherwise concerning them?⁴

Prot. And how?

Soc. Would, then, such a life be eligible?

Prot. This reasoning, Socrates, has imposed upon me silence altogether for the present.

Soc. Let us not become cowards, but changing⁵ (the view), look upon the life of intellect.

[32.] *Prot.* What kind of life do you mean?

³ The fish called in Greek *πνεύμων* or *πλεύμων*, and in Latin "pulmo," seems to have been little more than a mass of gelatinous matter, with little or no feeling, and belonging to the genus "Mollusca." To this passage of Plato there is an allusion in Plutarch, ii. p. 137, B., οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλ' ὀστρείου τινὸς ζωῇ προσεικός: and in Synesius de Regn. p. 14, D., βίον ζῶντας θαλαστίου πνεύμονος, quoted by Stalbaum after Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. p. 216. Ficinus explains "pleumonis" by "sponge;" which is not an animal, but, like amber, the secretion from some animal.

⁴ Sydenham has thus adopted *περὶ ταῦτα* from ed. Ald. Ficinus found, what all the MSS. offer, *παρὰ ταῦτα*, as shown by his version—"aliter præter ista." But *ἄλλως πως* is a manifest tautology after *παρὰ ταῦτα*. Hence Stalb., in ed. 2, says, "one might suspect that in *ἄλλως πως* lies hid *ἄλλο τι*, especially since the three oldest MSS. omit *πως*: but nevertheless *ἄλλως πως* does not seem to require any proof to support it:" an assertion, with which I at least am not satisfied; for to myself it is evident that Plato wrote *καλῶς πως*—

⁵ Instead of *μεταλαβόντες* one MS. has *μεταβάλλοντες*: from which Bast correctly elicited *μεταβαλόντες*, found in a similar manner below, in § 114, and in Parmenid. p. 128, A., and Sympos. p. 204, F. Stalbaum, however, who, in ed. 1, had adopted *μεταβαλόντες*, has, in ed. 2, returned to *μεταλαβόντες*. Ficinus has "in medium adducentes," as if he found in his MS. *ἐς μέσον βαλόντες*.

Soc. Whether any of us would choose to live, possessing intellect, and mind, and science, and a perfect memory of all things, but partaking of pleasure, neither much nor little; nor, on the other hand, of pain; but being⁶ wholly exempt from all things of such kind.

Prot. To me, Socrates, neither life is eligible; nor would it, I think, ever appear so to any other person.

Soc. What (seems) to you, Protarchus, a life⁷ mixed up with, and common to, both together?⁷

Prot. Do you mean of pleasure, and of mind and intellect?

Soc. In this way; and of such a life am I speaking.

Prot. Every person would certainly prefer such a kind of life to either of those, ⁸ and, moreover, not one this, and another that.⁸

[33.] *Soc.* Perceive we now what is the result of our previous reasoning?

Prot. Perfectly well; that three lives have been placed before us, and that of the two, neither one is self-sufficient or eligible for any one man, or animal.

Soc. Is it not evident then with regard to these, that neither of them possess the good? for (otherwise) it would have been all-sufficient, and perfect, and eligible for all ⁹ plants and

⁶ Stalbaum defends the omission of *ὦν* against the doctrine laid down by Porson on Hecub. 788.

⁷ I cannot believe that Plato wrote *ὁ ξυναμφορέρος—ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμιχθεῖς*, especially since Ficinus has "vita ex ambobus in unum congreredientibus mixta." But what he did write, could not be guessed at except by a bold conjecture.

⁸ All the words within the numerals Sydenham has omitted. For perhaps he did not understand the formula, *οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ*, with which Blomf. on Pers. 807, *οὐ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὐ*, compares in Herodot. i. 138, *οὐ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δὲ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντα*. ii. 37, *οὐκ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντες*. Phocylid. Fr., *Δίριοι κακοί, οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ, Πάντες*. But as Ficinus has "Unusquisque—eliget, neque unus optabit quidem, alius minime, sed omnes pariter expetent," Stephens suspected that something had dropt out. Besides he probably knew that *πᾶς* ought to follow rather than precede *οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ*. Hence one would prefer *Πῶς δὴ τις οὐ τοῦτόν γε αἰρήσεται—οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντες?* Stalbaum once wished to read *Καὶ παῖς δὴπον τοῦτόν γε αἰρήσεται*, comparing *τοῦτο δὲ καὶ παῖς γνοίη* in Euthyd. p. 279, D.

⁹ The Greek is *πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις*, "to all plants and animals." But are plants capable of living a life of sensual pleasure? or brute animals, a life of science and understanding? We are therefore inclined to think that Plato wrote *πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις*: for immediately he subjoins an explanation of his meaning, and limits the word *πᾶσι*, "all," to such only

animals,⁹ that are capable of living ever thus through life. But if any one should prefer other things, than what we do, he would take it contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, not willingly, but through ignorance, or from some unhappy necessity.

Prot. Such seems to be the case.

Soc. That we ought not therefore to consider that goddess of Philebus and the good to be the same, seems to have been stated sufficiently.

[34.] *Phil.* Neither, Socrates, is that intellect of yours the good; but it will somehow have the same charge made against it.

Soc. Mine perhaps, Philebus, may; but not, I think, that intellect which is at the same time both divine and true; but it will be somehow in a different state. However, I do not contend for the prize of victory, in behalf (of the life) of intellect, against the common¹⁰ one. But what we are to do with the second prize, it is meet to see and to consider. For the cause (of the happiness of) the common life, we each assign to be, one of us, intellect, the other, pleasure. And thus neither of these two would be the good. And yet a person might suppose one or other of them to be the cause. Now on this point I would still more earnestly contend against Philebus, that in this mixed life, whatever is the thing, by possessing which that life becomes eligible and good, it is not pleasure, but intellect, which is more allied and similar to it. And according to this reasoning it could not be truly said that pleasure has any share in the first, nor even the second prize; and it is still further from the third prize, if any credit may be given for the present to that intellect of mine.

[35.] *Prot.* It seems to me in good truth, Socrates, that pleasure has fallen (to the ground), struck down, as it were, by your present reasoning; for after fighting for the prize, it lies there (vanquished). But of mind, it seems, it must be

as are endued with reason. S. This idea Stalbaum once felt disposed to adopt; but he afterwards rejected it; for he says that Plato attributes life even to plants in *Tim.* p. 77, C. But this does not answer Sydenham's objection. Perhaps Plato alluded to the sensitive plants of the *Mimosa* kind, the leaves of which when touched immediately curl up. And if so, we must read *καὶ τισὶ φυτοῖς καὶ πᾶσι ζώοις*, i. e. "and to some plants and to all animals."

¹⁰ By common life, says Stalbaum, is meant, as indeed Sydenham had translated, the mixed or middle.

said, that it has prudently laid no claim for the prize; for it would otherwise have suffered the same fate. But pleasure, should it lose also the second prize, would meet altogether with some dishonour from her lovers: for not even to them would she appear any longer to be beautiful.

Soc. Why then is it not better to dismiss her directly, and not to pain her, by bringing to her the most accurate touchstone, and convicting her?

Prot. You are saying nothing, Socrates, to the purpose.

Soc. Is it because I spoke, what is impossible, of giving pain to pleasure?

Prot. Not on that account only, but because you are ignorant¹¹ that none of us will dismiss you, before you have come to the end of these disputes by reasoning.

Soc. Ho! ho! Protarchus; for though the remaining discourse is plentiful, yet scarcely is any part of it very easy now. For it seems that he, who marches out in defence of mind, has need of another stratagem, and must have, as it were, arrows different from those of former reasoning; perhaps, however, some are the same. Is not this requisite?

Prot. How not?

[36.] *Soc.* Let us then endeavour, when laying down the principle, to act with caution.

Prot. Of what principle are you speaking?

Soc. All things existing in the universe let us divide into two, or rather, if you please, into three parts.

Prot. You should state, why so.

Soc. Let us take¹² some of the subjects already mentioned.

Prot. What?

Soc. We said somehow¹³ that of things existing, the deity has exhibited the limitless, and also the limit.

Prot. Very true.

¹¹ Sydenham has "sensible," what the train of thought requires. He therefore would have proposed perhaps to read εὖ γε νοεῖς in lieu of ἀγνοεῖς.

¹² Instead of λάβωμεν, Schleiermacher and Heindorf wished to read, ἀναλάβωμεν, similar to Sydenham's "reassume;" but Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, considered the correction as not admitting of a doubt, has, in ed. 2, defended λάβωμεν by referring to λάβοι above in p. 18, A.—§ 18, and to ληπτίον below in p. 34, D.—§ 68.

¹³ The expression ἐλέγομιν πον is designedly introduced, because in § 18, the assertion had not been actually made in the same words as here.

Soc. Let us then take these two of the species (of things),¹⁴ and for a third, some one composed of those two mixed together. But I am, it seems, to be laughed at as a person sufficiently¹⁵ distinguishing and enumerating things according to their species.

Prot. What say you, my good man?

Soc. It seems again that there is need of a fourth kind.

Prot. Say, what?

Soc. Of the combination of these with each other consider then the cause; and to these three species set me down this for a fourth.

Prot. Will there not be wanting a fifth too, able to produce the separation of something?

Soc. Perhaps there may; but not, I think, at present. However, should there be a want of it, you will pardon me, if I go in pursuit of a fifth [life].¹⁶

[37.] *Prot.* How so?

Soc. Having, in the first place, of these four species, divided¹⁷ the three,¹⁸ let us, after having seen each of two cut into many parts and dispersed, endeavour by collecting again each into one, to understand those two,¹⁹ in what manner each of them is, at the same time, one and many.

¹⁴ The Greek is *τούτων δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν*. But Ficinus has "Has utique species duo illa esse ponamus," from which Stalbaum was led to propose *τούτω* for *τούτων*. But he ought to have read likewise *τὰ εἶδη*, unless he meant *τῶν εἰδῶν* to depend upon the following *τὰ δύο*.

¹⁵ Why Socrates should be laughed at for "sufficiently" distinguishing things according to species, Stalbaum could not understand, nor can I. He therefore proposed, in ed. 1, to read *οὐχ ἱκανῶς*. But in ed. 2, he introduces the idea of "being desirous to distinguish," similar to Sydenham's "pretending to distinguish." Perhaps Plato wrote *οὐκ ἰνδύως*, or *οὐ καλῶς*, instead of *ἱκανῶς*.

¹⁶ In lieu of *βίον*, which Schütz wished to reject entirely, and Stalbaum, in ed. 2, has enclosed in brackets, Schleiermacher happily suggested *τι δν*.

¹⁷ Instead of *διελομένοι*, Ficinus seems, from his version "eligentes," to have found in his MS. *ἐλόμενοι*. Stalbaum too renders *διελομένοι* by "secernamus."

¹⁸⁻¹⁹ Ficinus has "duoque ex tribus sic se habere consideremus ut unusquodque duorum sit multa dividuum insuper atque dispersum, rursusque in unum ducentes, cogitare nitamur," where he either found in his MS., or introduced from his own head, the words marked in Italics. With regard to *δισπασμένον*, which seems to be superfluous after *πολλὰ δισχισμένον*, the "dispersum" in Ficinus would lead to *δισπαρμένον*,

Prot. If you would speak more plainly respecting them, I might perhaps follow you.

Soc. I say then that the two, which I lay before you, are those which I just now (spoke of); one the limitless, and the other limit. Now, that the limitless is in some manner many, I will attempt to show; but let that, which has a limit, wait for us a while.

[38.] *Prot.* It shall wait.¹⁹

Soc. Consider now; for what I order you to consider is a thing difficult and doubtful. Consider it, however. With regard to things hotter and colder, first see if you can conceive any limit to them. Or would not the more and the less, residing in the genera themselves of things, enjoin, so long as they resided there, an end to be not in them? For if there were an end, they are at an end themselves.

Prot. You speak most truly.

Soc. And we say that in the hotter and colder there is the more and the less.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Reason then ever points out to us that the colder and the hotter have no end; and being thus without any end, they are altogether limitless.

[39.] *Prot.* Vehemently so, Socrates.

Soc. Well have you answered, friend Protarchus, and reminded me, that the "vehemently," which you now pronounced, and the "gently," have the same power as the "more" and the "less." For, wherever they reside, they suffer not any thing to be just "so much;"²⁰ but infusing something more vehement than the more gentle into every action, and the contrary, they effect either "the more" or "the less;" but cause the "just so much" to disappear. For, as it was just now stated, if they did not cause the "just so much" to disappear, but permitted both it and "the moderate" to be in the seat of "the more" and "the less," or of "the vehement"

were it not that διόκασται καὶ διόχισται are found just afterwards, as remarked by Stalbaum.

¹⁹ The imperative μέντω evidently requires here Μένει found in one MS., instead of Μένει.

²⁰ From the allusion to the comparatives, perhaps the best translation of τὸ πῶσον, here and elsewhere, would be "the positive." Baumgarten Crusius explains τὸ πῶσον by "a definite measure of quantity," which is equally applicable to the idea of the positive and superlative.

and "the gentle," these very things (would) flow²¹ out of their own place in which they were; for if they admitted the "just so much," "the hotter" and "the colder" would not exist. For "the hotter," and in like manner "the colder," is always advancing forward, and never abides in the same spot; but the "just so much" stops, and ceases to progress.²¹ According then to this reasoning, "the hotter" must be limitless; and so must also be "the colder."

[40.] *Prot.* So indeed, Socrates, it appears. But, as you said, these things are not easy to follow: But subjects spoken of again and again would perhaps show the questioner and the questioned agreeing sufficiently together.

Soc. You say well; and let us try so to do. But for the present, see whether we will receive this as a sign of the nature of the limitless, in order that, by going through all, we may not be prolix.

Prot. What mark do you mean?

Soc. Whatever things appear to us to be growing more or less, or to admit of the vehement, and the gentle, and the too much, and all such attributes, we ought to refer all these to the genus of the limitless, as to one thing, according to the previous remark which we made, that whatever things were torn and cut into parts, we ought to collect, to the best of our power, and put a mark on them as being of some one nature, if you remember.²²

Prot. I remember it.

Soc. Those things then, which do not admit these attributes, but admit their contraries, in the first place, the equal and equality, and, after the equal, the double, and whatever other relation one number bears to another, and one measure to another, by reckoning up all these as relating to limit, should we seem to do right? or how say you?

Prot. Perfectly right, Socrates.

[41.] *Soc.* Be it so. But the third thing, made up of the other two, what idea shall we say it possesses?

Prot. Yourself, as I conceive, will tell me.

²¹ Baumgarten Crusius aptly refers to Aristotle, Categ. 4, οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ πόσον ἐνδύχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, κ. τ. λ.

²² By ἔρπει Stalbaum understands "pereunt." But it rather means "fluebant," as shown by the preposition ἐκ. Besides, there would be an allusion to the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all things flow; while correct Greek requires ἔρπει ταῦτ' ἂν instead of ἔρπει ταῦτα.

Soc. A deity (might); if any of the gods will hearken to my prayers.

Prot. Pray, then, and take a survey.²³

Soc. I do survey: and some deity, Protarchus, seems now to have become favourable to us.

Prot. How say you this? and of what proof do you make use?

Soc. I will tell you plainly:²⁴ but do you follow my reasoning.

Prot. Only speak.

Soc. We mentioned just now the hotter and the colder; did we not?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. To these then add the drier and the moister, the more numerous and the fewer, the swifter and the slower, the larger and the smaller, and whatever things beside that we previously ranked under the one head of a nature, that admits of the more and the less.

Prot. You mean of the limitless.

[42.] **Soc.** Yes: and do you combine into this that which we spoke of next afterward, the genus of limit.

Prot. What genus?

Soc. That, which, when we should just now have brought together (as the genus) of the limit, formed in the same manner, as we brought together the genus of the limitless, we did not bring together. But now perhaps²⁵ you will do the same.²⁵

²³ Here seems to be an allusion to the act of an augur; who, after uttering a prayer, looked towards heaven to see if the god, to whom he had prayed, answered, or not, with a favourable omen.

²⁴ I cannot understand here δῆλον ὅτι, and I have therefore omitted with Ficinus ὅτι. I could have understood δηλῶν εὖ τι, i. e. "well making something plain."

²⁵—²⁵ This is the English for the Latin of Ficinus—"idem ages:" who therefore found in his MS. ταῦτόν δράσεις in lieu of ταῦτόν δράσει: which, I confess, I cannot understand; nor could Stalbaum originally; for in ed. 1, he considered as an interpolation all the words, ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτόν δράσει: τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὲς κακίῃ γενήσεται. But in ed. 2, he says that ταῦτόν δράσει has for its subject something not found indeed in the Greek, but which in Latin is "ipsum genus finiti, cujus nondum subtilior definitio est proposita;" while to show that an idea can be applied to the verb δράν, he refers to the expression, ταῦτόν δὲ οἶμαι δράσαι· ἀν καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν συμβουλήν. Perhaps Plato wrote ἀλλ' ἴσως, εἰ γ' ἐνὶ μοι τοῦτο νῦν δράν, σοί, τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων, καταφανὲς κακίῃ γενήσεται, i. e. "but perhaps, if it is permitted

When both these are brought together, that too will become manifest.

Prot. Of what (genus) are you speaking? and how?

Soc. I speak of that relating to the equal and the double, and whatever else causes things to cease at variance with each other, and by introducing number,²⁶ moulds them into what are symmetrical and harmonize with each other.

Prot. I understand. You seem to me to say that ²⁷if these are combined²⁷ certain productions would somehow arise²⁸ in the case of each.²⁹

Soc. (Yes.) For I seem (to have spoken) correctly.

Prot. Say on then.

Soc. In the case of diseases, does not the right combination of those two produce the state of health?

Prot. Entirely so.

Soc. And in the acute and the grave, the swift also and the slow, all being limitless, do not the very same thing, being introduced, effect at the same time a limit³⁰ and render most perfect all the Muse's art?

me to do this, (to bring together) that (genus) will, when both of these are brought together, become manifest to you." This at least would be intelligible; what can hardly be said of the present Greek text or of any interpretation of it.

²⁶ For, as stated in *Epinom.* p. 978; A., quoted by Baumgarten Crusius, where number is not, there is ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀτακτός, ἀσχήμων, ἀρρυθμός, ἀνάρμοστός τε φορά.

²⁷⁻²⁸ Ficinus has "si ista miscentur." He therefore found in his MS. εἰ μίγνυται ταῦτα, not μίγνός ταῦτα, with which Stalbaum was justly offended in ed. 1, but defends in ed. 2. Heindorf, on *Phædon.* § 59, suggested ἀν μίγνός ταῦτα.

²⁹ Instead of αὐτῶν, omitted by one of the oldest MSS., and in another placed in the margin or inserted by a second hand, the syntax and sense require ἀν πως—as I have translated. Ficinus too has "eventuras," i. e. ἀν—συμβαίνειν.

³⁰ Ficinus "ex eorum singulis," which answers to ἀφ' ἑκάστων, found in one of the oldest MSS. and adopted by the Zurich editors, and which Stalbaum preferred in ed. 1, but has rejected in ed. 2.

³¹ How the limitless and limit being introduced can effect a limit, I cannot understand, nor could Stalbaum; who, in ed. 1, wished to read ἰγγενομένην, and to refer that word to κοινωνία, as Ficinus did in his version, "et ista terminum peperit," omitting however ταῦτα—ταῦτα, which he saw would be then unintelligible. There is some error here. Perhaps Plato wrote, Ἀφ' οὗ ταῦτα ἰγγενομένην πάντα ἄμ' ἐπερασά ἀμυροῦσαστο, i. e. "Has not it, being introduced, caused at the same time all these to be delightful?" where ἄμ' ἐπερασά differ scarcely by a single letter from ἄμα πίρας τε.

Prot. Yes, most beautifully.

Soc. Moreover it being introduced into cold weather and hot, it takes off ³¹ the very much, the too much, and the infinite,³¹ but it effects the moderate and the symmetrical.

Prot. How not?

Soc. And are not produced from them mild seasons, and all whatever is lovely for us, the limitless and those which have a limit being combined together?

Prot. How not?

Soc. A thousand other things I omit to state; as, for instance, together with health, beauty and strength; and in the soul other properties very many and very beautiful.³² [43.] For the goddess herself,³³ O thou handsome Philebus, looking down upon lust, and all manner of vice in all persons, (and)³⁴ (seeing) no limit existing in them of pleasures and their full enjoyment, has laid down a law and order, having a limit. And ³⁵ you said that she would wear down; ³⁵ but I maintain, on the contrary, that she would preserve. But how, Protarchus, does it (now) appear to you?

^{31—31} The Greek is τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον. But the three oldest MSS. read λείον for λίαν. And so perhaps the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is, "id quod multum et minus et infinitum dicitur." Plato wrote, I suspect, τὸ μὲν πλεον καὶ μείον ἀφείλετο, without ἄπειρον, which "the more" and "the less" have been shown to be. Stalbaum defends πολὺ λίαν: but those words, I think, are never thus united.

³² Schütz, in Opuscul. Philolog. p. 138, conceived that something was wanting here. For the mention of the goddess of Pleasure could scarcely thus follow the discussion relating to the combination of the limitless and limit. Stalbaum however, in ed. 2, says, as Sydenham had translated, that the deity alluded to is Aphrodité, which in § 5 Socrates states Philebus had identified with Pleasure, and that the goddess of Beauty is here introduced, with reference to the beauty both of body and soul, which had been just now mentioned.

³³ Instead of ἡ θεός, I should prefer ἡ σὴ θεός, as in § 5.

³⁴ To avoid the want of connexion I have introduced "and;" and I suspect that καὶ has dropt out after Φίληβε, for κ and β are very similar in MSS., as shown by myself at Tro. 935.

^{35—35} The Greek is in some MSS. ἀποκνᾶν ἔφης; in others, ἀποκναῖς; but in one, by a correction, ἀποκναῖσαι, thus confirming the conjecture of Porson, in Miscellan. Critic. p. 265, adopted by Stalbaum, who, in ed. 2, renders the passage, "And you indeed think that the goddess wears down, but I that she preserves." But what is the thing worn down or preserved, he does not distinctly state. More correctly has Sydenham translated, "And this (the law) you said was to impair pleasure, but I, that it was to preserve pleasure." But in that case Plato would have written, as he probably did, ἀποκναῖσαι ἔφης ταῦτα (i. e. νόμον καὶ τάξιν) αὐτήν—not ἀποκναῖσαι ἔφης αὐτήν—

Prot. This, Socrates, is quite to my mind.

[44.] *Soc.* I have mentioned then those three things, if you comprehend.

Prot. I think I do. For one you seem to call the limitless, and one, the second, the limit in all things; but what you mean by the third, I do not very well comprehend.

Soc. Because the multitude, O thou wondrous man, of the generation of the third, has amazed you. And yet the limitless has afforded you many genera; but as they were all of them marked with the seal of the genus of the more and its opposite they appeared one.

Prot. True.

Soc. And yet neither did limit contain many, nor did we bear it ill that it was not by nature one.

Prot. How could we?

Soc. By no means. But do thou say that by the third I mean this one,³⁶ laying down all their progeny, from the measures which have effected together with limit a generation into being.³⁶

Prot. I understand you.

[45.] *Poc.* Now besides these three, we then said we must look for some fourth kind, and that the looking for it was common to us both. See then whether it seems to you necessary for all things, which are produced, to be produced through some cause.

Prot. So it seems to me; for without that (thing),³⁷ how should they be produced?

Soc. The nature then of the thing making differs from the cause in nothing but the name: so that the thing making and the cause may be rightly deemed one.

Prot. Rightly.

³⁶⁻³⁸ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, of which I cannot elicit the meaning. I could have understood, *τιθέντα τὸ τοῦτων ἔκγονον ἄπαν, τὴν γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ πέρας ἀκρυβασμένων αἰτέρων*. i. e. "laying down, as their whole progeny, the generation into being from the measureless working together with the limit:" where *αἰτέρων* would be the synonyme of *ἀκρίτων*.

³⁷ Instead of *τοῦτων*, which Stalbaum in ed. 2 defends, three MSS. read *τοῦτον*, which he had adopted in ed. 1. But neither *τοῦτον* nor *τοῦτων* could agree with *αἰτίας*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *χωρὶς γ' αἰτίου του*—similar to the expression in *Tim.* p. 28, A., *πάν δὲ τὸ γινόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι*. *παντί γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γίνεσθαι οὐκ*.

Soc. So, likewise, the thing made, and the thing produced, we shall find, as just now said, to differ in nothing but the name; or how?

Prot. Just so.

Soc. According to nature, does not the thing making ever lead the way? and the thing made follow it into being?

Prot. Certainly.

[46.] *Soc.* Cause then, and that which is the slave of cause for production, is another thing, and not the same.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Have not the things which are produced, and the things out of which they are all produced, exhibited to us the three genera?

Prot. Clearly.

Soc. ³⁸ The fourth then, which is the artificer of all these, let us call the cause; ³⁸ as it has been sufficiently shown to be different from those.

Prot. Let us call it.

Soc. The four sorts having been now defined, it is well, for the sake of remembering each one, to enumerate them in order.

[47.] *Prot.* How not?

Soc. The first then I call limitless; the second, limit; the third, what is mixed and generated from these; and in saying that the cause of this mixture and this production is the fourth, should I do aught amiss?

Prot. How so?

Soc. Well now, what is the reasoning after this? and with what design have we come to this? Was it not this? We were inquiring whether the second prize was due to Pleasure or Intellect. Was it not so?

Prot. It was so.

Soc. Since then we have thus divided these things, may we not now better form a finished judgment about the first and the second, respecting which we disputed at first.

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. Come now, we laid down, as the conqueror, the combined life of Pleasure and Intellect. Was it not so?

³⁸⁻³⁹ Ficinus has "Omnium autem istorum opificem quantum ponimus causamque vocamus," as if he had found in his MS. *τίθμεν τίταρον καὶ λέγομεν τὴν αἰτίαν*: where *λέγομεν* is found likewise in five MSS.

Prot. It was.

Soc. Do we not perceive then somehow what this life is, and of what genus?

Prot. How not?

Soc. And I think we shall say, that it is a part of the third.

³⁸ For it is not combined with some two,³⁹ but with all the limitless linked by a chain with limit; so that this life, the winner of the victory, may be rightly said to be a part of the third.

Prot. Most rightly.

[48.] *Soc.* Be it so. But that life of yours, Philebus, being pleasant and uncombined, to which of the three can it be rightly said to belong? But before you pronounce, answer me first this question.

Phil. Propose it then.

Soc. Have Pleasure and Pain a limit? or are they amongst the things which admit "the more" and "the less?"

Phil. Assuredly, Socrates, amongst those (that admit) "the more." For Pleasure would not be wholly a good, if it were not by nature limitless with respect to multitude and "the more."

Soc. Nor would Pain, Philebus, be wholly an evil; so that we must think of some thing else than the nature of the limitless, which⁴⁰ is to impart any good to pleasures. Let then this be the issue of the limitless. But to which of the before-mentioned may we, Protarchus and Philebus, refer Intellect, and Science, and Mind, and not be impious? For there seem to me to be no little danger to us, whether we are right or not respecting the present question.

Phil. You magnify, Socrates, that god of yours.

Soc. So do you, my friend, that goddess of yours. The question, however, ought to be answered by us.

[49.] *Prot.* Socrates speaks correctly, Philebus, and we must obey him.

³⁸⁻³⁹ Such is the translation of Stalbaum's text. But in the notes he prefers the correction of Schütz, who suggested *μικρόν ἑκείνο*, similar to the version of Ficinus, "neque enim quod, ex duobus quibusdam mixtum sit, sed quod ex infinitis omnibus a termino nexis." Klitzsche defends *μικρόν ἑκείνός* by arguments, to which Stalbaum replies in the "Additamenta." I confess however I do not understand how *δεδεμένον* by itself could mean "linked by a chain with—"

⁴⁰ The reading *δ*, which Stephens elicited from "quod" in Ficinus has been found only in one MS. instead of *ὥς*.

Phil. Have not you, Protarchus, taken upon yourself to speak on my part?

Prot. Certainly. But in the present case I am nearly⁴¹ at a loss; and I request of you, Socrates, to become yourself a speaker for us, in order that we may not, by a mistake respecting the combatant,⁴² say something contrary to the measure.⁴³

Soc. We must obey, Protarchus. For you enjoin nothing difficult. But when I was magnifying, as Philebus says, (a deity)⁴⁴ by way of a joke, I did in reality confuse you, by asking of what genus were Mind and Science.

Prot. Altogether so, Socrates.

[50.] *Soc.* And yet it was an easy (question). For all the wise, in reality extolling themselves, agree that Mind is to us a king of heaven and earth.⁴⁵ And perhaps they say well. But let us, if you are willing, make our examination of this genus rather more at length.

Prot. Speak as you wish, taking no account of the length, as you will not be disagreeable (to us).

[51.] *Soc.* You have spoken fairly. Let us begin, then, by asking a question in such way as this.

Prot. How?

Soc. Whether shall we say that the power of an irrational (principle) governs all things, and that, which is called the universe, at random, and as may happen? or, on the contrary, as our predecessors asserted,⁴⁶ that Mind and a certain wonderful Intellect, arranges things together, and governs throughout?

Prot. Alike in nothing, Socrates, (are the two tenets). For what you have just now mentioned seems to me to be impious. But, to say that Intellect disposes all things in order, is worthy of our view of the world, and of sun, and the

⁴¹ Sydenham has, "I am much at a loss;" what the sense requires. Hence for *μῖτροι σχεδόν* Plato probably wrote *μῖγα τι σχεδόν*—

⁴² By *ἀγωνιστήν*, says Stalbaum, is meant Intellect, as opposed to Pleasure.

⁴³ Stalbaum quotes opportunely from Horace, "nil extra numerum fecisse modumque Curas."

⁴⁴ This word, absolutely requisite for the sense, is found only in the version of Ficinus—"deum extollens jocando."

⁴⁵ Stalbaum has given, from the notes of Wyttenbach on Phædo, § 11, and of Creuzer on Plotinus *Περὶ Κάλους*, p. 90, a list of the Neo-Platonists, who have referred to this dictum.

⁴⁶ Plato alludes to Anaxagoras. See Valckenaer in *Diatrib.* p. 40, B.

moon, and the stars, and the whole revolution (of heaven);⁴⁷ nor would I ever say, or even think, otherwise respecting them.

[52.] *Soc.* Do you wish then for us to say something in accordance with our predecessors, that such is the case, and for us not merely to think that we ought to speak the sentiments of others without danger to ourselves, but that we should run the risk together, and share in the censure, should a man of mighty power⁴⁸ assert that these things are not in this state, but in that of disorder?

Prot. How should I not wish it?

Soc. Come now, look to the reasoning, which is advancing towards us respecting these matters.

Prot. Only say it.

Soc. The things that surround the nature of all the bodies of animals, (namely,) fire, and water, and air, and earth, we somehow descry, as persons tossed in a storm say (of land), existing in the constitution (of the universe).

Prot. And truly so; for we are really tossed about in our present reasonings.

Soc. Come then, respecting each of those things in⁴⁹ us, conceive some such thing as this.

Prot. What?

[53.] *Soc.* That each of those in us is little and inconsiderable, and is no where and in no manner pure, and possessing a power worthy of its nature. Take them in the case of one (element), and understand the same respecting all. Fire in some manner exists in us, and it exists also in the universe.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Now the fire, which is in us, is weak and inconsiderable; but that which is in the universe is wonderful for its multitude and beauty, and for every power which belongs to fire.

Prot. What you say is very true.

Soc. What then? Is the fire of the universe generated,

"Ficino has "cœlestis circuitus," as if he had found in his MS. *περιφορὰς οὐρανοῦ*, or *οὐρανίας*.

⁴⁸ By this expression, says Stalbaum, is meant one of the Sophists, who are called perpetually *δεινοί* by Plato.

⁴⁹ Ficinus has "circa nos," as if he found in his MS. *περὶ ἡμᾶς*, similar to *περὶ τῆν—φύσιν* just above; but *παρ' ἡμῖν* is repeated in the next sentence, where Ficinus has "apud nos."

and fed, and ruled⁵⁰ by that which we have in us? or, on the contrary, does mine and yours, and that in the rest of animals, receive all these things⁵¹ from it?

Prot. You ask this question, which does not deserve an answer.

Soc. True. For you will say the same, I think, of the earth, which exists here in animals, and of that in the universe; and so will you answer touching all the other things, about which I inquired a little before.

Prot. For who in his senses would ever be seen answering in another way?

[54.] *Soc.* Scarcely not any one whatever. But follow us to what comes next in order. Have we not, looking to all those things just now mentioned, and brought to one point, called them body?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Conceive the same thing then with regard to this, which we call the world. For in the same manner, being composed of the same elements, it would be body.

Prot. You speak most correctly.

Soc. Whether from that body wholly is nourished the body with us, or that body from the one with us? and has it received and does it keep whatever properties we have just now mentioned respecting them?

Prot. And this too is another point, Socrates, not deserving a question.

Soc. What then? Is this deserving? Or how will you say?

Prot. Say what it is.

Soc. Shall we not affirm that the body with us possesses a soul?

Prot. It is evident, we shall affirm it.

Soc. From whence, friend Protarchus, did it obtain it, unless the body of the universe happens to be with a soul, and possessing the same things as this, but in every way more beautiful?

Prot. It is evident, Socrates, from no other source.⁵²

⁵⁰ The Greek is *τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται*. To avoid the *ὑστερον πρότερον* I have translated as if it were *γίγνεται καὶ τρέφεται*.

⁵¹ By "these things" is meant, says Stalbaum, the produced, nourished, and ruled.

⁵² On the doctrine that the human soul is a part of the soul of the uni-

[55.] *Soc.* ⁵³ For we cannot surely, Protarchus, expect that, while there are these four things, limit, the limitless, the combination (of both), and the genus of the cause, amongst all the four, it is permissible for that, which furnishes the soul in us, and makes the body a tabernacle (for it), and, when the body has met with a stumbling-block, cures it by the medical art,⁵³ and on other occasions frames other constitutions, these should be addressed by the name of wisdom, whole and of every kind; but that, while these very same things exist in the whole of heaven, and according to its great parts, and, moreover, while they are lovely and without blemish, in these there should not have been planned the nature of things the most beautiful and held in the highest honour.

Prot. This would indeed have no reason on its side.

[56.] *Soc.* If this then be irrational, we may the better assert, by following that reasoning of ours, that there is, what we have often said, in the universe many a limitless, and a limit sufficient,⁵⁴ and besides these, a cause, not inconsiderable

verse, Stalbaum refers to Xenophon M. S. iv. 3, 14; Cicero De N. D. ii. 6; iii. 11; Tusc. v. 13; De Divinat. i. 49; and Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. ix. 61. Cicero, de Senect. § 21, says it was a tenet of the Pythagoreans, that "ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus," the origin of the "divinæ particula auræ" in Horace.

^{53—54} On this difficult passage Stalbaum wrote, in ed. 1, a rather long note, in which he suggested alterations, repudiated in ed. 2; where he has however failed to unravel the intricacies of the syntax, which must continue to baffle all the exertions of scholars; for neither syntax nor sense can be made out of words evidently defective. To arrive therefore at what Plato probably wrote, I have translated the passage as if the Greek were Οὐ γάρ τί που προσδοκῶμεν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὅτι, ὄντα τὰ τέτταρα ἐν τῷ τούτῳ—σῶμα σκηπὴν ποιοῦν—ιατρικὴν ἀκούμενον καὶ συντιθεῖν, πᾶσαν—in lieu of Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμεν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐν τῷ—σωμασκιαν ἐμποιοῦν—ιατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθεῖν καὶ ἀκούμενον πᾶσαν—where I have adopted Stalbaum's ὄντα, and altered Sydenham's σκήνος into σκηπὴν, for thus σῶμα σκηπὴν ποιοῦν differs by scarcely a letter from σωμασκιαν ἐμποιοῦν; while not only do we get rid of ἐν, which has no meaning here, but recover the usual construction of ποιεῖν with two accusatives. With regard to the body being considered a tabernacle for the soul, Sydenham refers to Tim. Loc. p. 100, A., and 103, C., Ocell. Lucan. in Stob. Ecl. Phys. c. 16, and Æschin. Socrat. iii. 5, to which I will add Etymol. Σκήνος καὶ τὸ σῶμα, παρὰ τὸ σκηνώμα καὶ σκηπὴν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ὅλον οἰκητήριον. Lastly, with regard to προσδοκῶμεν, I was led to it by finding in one MS. πω δοκοῦμεν. For πω and προ and προσ are frequently confounded by the scribes.

⁵⁴ Instead of the unintelligible ἱκανόν, Winckelmann would read καὶ

which puts into order and arranges the years, and seasons, and months,—a cause, which may most justly be called Wisdom and Mind.

Prot. Most justly, indeed.

Soc. Wisdom however and Mind could not exist without Soul.

Prot. By no means.

Soc. You will say then that in the nature of Zeus there is a kingly soul in a kingly mind, through the power of the cause; and that in the other (gods)⁵⁵ there are other beautiful attributes, according as it is agreeable for each to be called.

Prot. Certainly I shall.

[57.] *Soc.* Do not think, Protarchus, that we have spoken this discourse at all in vain. For it fights on the side of those persons of the olden time, who showed that Mind is ever the ruler of the universe.

Prot. It does so very much.

Soc. Besides it has furnished an answer to my inquiry,—that Mind is a relation⁵⁶ of that, which was said to be the cause of all things; for of the four this was one.⁵⁷ For now at length you surely have the answer.

Prot. I have, and very sufficiently. But it lay hid from me that you were giving the answer.

Soc. ⁵⁸For play is sometimes, Protarchus, a remission from serious study.⁵⁸

Prot. Well have you said this.

κοινόν, as in § 55, πέρας καὶ ἀπειρον καὶ κοινόν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος: which Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt.

⁵⁵ Sydenham has thus anticipated Stalbaum in applying ἄλλοις to θεοῖς understood, while Reisig on Soph. Œd. C. 44, Τὰς πάνθ' ὁρώσας Εὐμενίδας ὃ γ' ἐνθάδ' ἂν εἴποι λεῖώς νιν' ἄλλα δ' ἄλλαχού καλά, has aptly referred to this passage of Plato.

⁵⁶ The strange word γενοῦστος, which is acknowledged by Olympiodorus, the Scholiast, Hesych., and Suid., and quoted distinctly from this dialogue by the Etymol. M., Stalbaum conceives Plato to have coined with the view of punning upon νοῦς: for that otherwise he would have written γεννήτης: and he refers to a similar play on the same word in § 152, ἰχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν.

⁵⁷ I have adopted Stalbaum's happy restoration of this passage, in lieu of the common reading, τῶν τεττάρων, ὧν ἦν, where since ὧν is omitted by the three oldest MSS., he suggested τῶν τεττάρων ὃ ἦν.

^{58—58} This apophthegm has been adopted by Aristænetus, Epist. i. 26, where see Boissonade.

[58.] *Soc.* And thus, my friend, of what genus Mind is, and of what power it is possessed, has been now shown tolerably well for the present.

Prot. It has, completely.

Soc. Moreover in like manner the genus of Pleasure has appeared before.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Concerning these two then let us remember this also ; —that Mind is a relation to cause, and is nearly of that genus ; but that Pleasure is both limitless itself, and is of that genus which, of itself, neither has nor ever will have in itself, either a beginning, or a middle, or an end.

Prot. We will remember. How not ?

[59.] *Soc.* Now we ought to consider next, in which genus either of these two exists, and through what circumstance they are produced, when they come into being, first in the case of Pleasure ; (for,) as we previously tried by a touchstone its genus, so, with regard to these points, (we must try) them previously. For, apart from Pain, we should never be able fully to try Pleasure.

Prot. Nay, if we must proceed in this way, let us proceed.

Soc. Does it seem to you, as to me, as regards production ?

Prot. What ?

Soc. Pain and Pleasure appear to me to be produced naturally at the same time as a common genus.

Prot. Remind us, friend Socrates, which of the genera mentioned before, you wish to indicate by the word common.

Soc. This shall be done, O thou wondrous man, to the best of my power.

Prot. You have spoken fairly.

Soc. By common, then, let us understand—that, which we reckoned as the third of the four.

Prot. That which you mentioned after both the limitless and limit ; in which you ranked health, and also, as I think, harmony.

[60.] *Soc.* You have said perfectly right. Now give me all possible attention.

Prot. Only speak.

Soc. I say, then, that whenever the harmony (in the frame) of any animal is loosened, a loosening is made in

its nature, and at that very time the production of pains takes place.⁵⁹

Prot. You say what is very probable.

Soc. But when the harmony is properly fitted, and it returns to its own nature, we must say that pleasure is produced, if it is requisite for arguments on matters of the greatest moment to be despatched as quickly as possible in a few words.

Prot. I think, Socrates, you speak correctly; but let us endeavour to speak of these same things still more clearly.

[61.] *Soc.* Is it not most easy to understand things of common occurrence and seen all around?

Prot. What kind of things?

Soc. Hunger, surely, is a loosening and a pain.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. And by eating, a filling-up is, on the other hand, a pleasure.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Thirst also, again, is a corruption and pain,⁶⁰ and a loosening;⁶⁰ but the power of a liquid, by replenishing the part dried up, is a pleasure. Again, the suffering a preternatural heat, being a separation and dissolving, is a pain: but, on the other hand,⁶¹ according to nature, a giving way and cooling is a pleasure.⁶¹

Prot. Most certainly.

Soc. And the coagulation of animal moisture through cold, contrary to its nature, is a pain: but, on the other hand, a return⁶² to the same (state), according to nature,⁶³ of what had departed and been separated (from it),⁶³ is a pleasure.

⁵⁹ The whole of this argument has been abridged by Nemesius, *De Natur. Homin.* p. 229. Compare likewise *Tim.* p. 64, B. STALB.

^{60—60} The words *καὶ λύσεις* Schleiermacher rejected as being interpolated, with whom Stalbaum agrees. Cousin however defends them, by saying that the negligent style of Plato would perhaps justify their retention, p. 32, A.

^{61—61} The very balance of the sentences proves that Plato did not write what is found in the text at present; to say nothing of the uncertain meaning of *ἀπόδοσις*.

⁶² In lieu of *ὁδός*, the "reditus" in Ficinus leads to *ἀνοδος*.

^{63—63} Ficinus has "contra humido liquescente et in suam redeunte naturam;" which plainly show that he found in his MS. *εἰς τὴν ταυτῶν φύσιν ἀνιόντων*—what Schleiermacher elicited from the reading in Sto-

And, in one word, consider whether the reasoning is in moderation, which says, that when the species, naturally produced with a soul from the limitless and limit, as I previously stated, is corrupted, to it corruption is a pain; but that ⁶⁴the road into their being, and the return back again, is of all a pleasure.⁶⁴

Prot. Be it so; ⁶⁵for it seems to have some stamp (of likelihood).⁶⁵

Soc. Let us then lay down this as one kind of pain and pleasure (as existing) under each of those conditions.

Prot. Let it so lie.

[62.] *Soc.* Lay down now the expectation of the soul itself, regards the nature of these circumstances; one antecedent to pleasures (enjoyed), a matter hoped for, ⁶⁶agreeable and full of confidence; the other, antecedent to pains (endured), a thing of fear and anxiety.⁶⁶

Prot. This is, therefore, a different species of pleasure and pain, independent of the body, and produced through an expectation of the soul herself.

Soc. You have understood the matter rightly. Now in these (feelings), ⁶⁷I think, according to my opinion at least, being each of them, as it seems,⁶⁷ sincere and unmixed, of pain and pleasure, there will be manifest that respecting

bæus, Ecl. Phys. p. 99, εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν. But what he found in lieu of διακρινομένων is not equally plain. For though Bernhardt and Stalbaum assert that τῶν ὑγρῶν is to be supplied from τῆς ὑγρότητος, yet I wish they had produced one passage where τὰ ὑγρά are said διακρίνεσθαι.

⁶⁴⁻⁶⁵ Stalbaum thinks that αὐτῶν, and I presume πάντων likewise, are to be referred to the preceding ἐμψυχον εἶδος.

⁶⁶⁻⁶⁸ Ficinus has "Videtur enim mihi hoc admodum verisimile," which is far more intelligible than the Greek—δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν: where, however, since one MS. offers ἔχειν οὕτω, perhaps Plato wrote τύπον—ἔχειν τοῦ εἰκότος.

⁶⁹⁻⁷⁰ In these balanced sentences there is either one word too much in the first, or one too little in the second. Stalbaum, in his Latin translation of the passage, has, in ed. 2, omitted ἐλπίζομενον: although, in ed. 1, he had stated that one need not wonder at the expression προσδόκημα ἐλπίζομενον.

⁷¹⁻⁷² According to Faehse, there is in the tautology, οἶμαι κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἡμῶν δόξαν—ὡς δοκεῖ, "the negligence of an every-day discourse expressed to the life." Stalbaum in ed. 2, defends it by quoting Sophist, p. 226, D., δοκῶ—κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἡμῶν. Lach. p. 192, C., ἐμοιγε φαίνεται—ὡς ἰγῶμαι. But he neither does, nor could he, I think, pro-

pleasure, whether the whole genus is to be embraced, or this is to be assigned to some genus different from those before-mentioned; but that to pleasure and pain (it is allowable),⁶⁸ like heat and cold, and all other things of this sort, for us to sometimes embrace them, and at other times not to embrace, as being not good in themselves, but admitting only sometimes, and some of them, the nature of the good.

Prot. You say most correctly that it is requisite for the thing now pursued to be caused to go⁶⁹ some where in this road.

[63.] *Soc.* Let us then look together at this part first. Since, if what has been said is really the fact, when those things are being destroyed, there would be⁷⁰ pain, but being preserved, pleasure, let us now consider respecting those which are neither being destroyed, nor being preserved, what condition must there then be to each animal, when such is the case.⁷¹ Give your earnest attention to this point, and tell me, is there not every necessity for every animal at that time to be neither pained nor pleased, either greatly or little?

Prot. There is a necessity.

Soc. There is then some third⁷² disposition of this kind, beside that of being delighted and that of being grieved.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Come then, be ready to remember this (decision). For

duce a single passage to support the tripled repetition of a similar idea. What Plato really wrote, a person, conversant with Greek, might perhaps elicit from the version of Ficinus, "ut mea fert opinio—liquido discernemus."

⁶⁸ Stalbaum says that ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ depend upon συγχωρητίον. Ficinus has "competat, ut interdum amandum sit."

⁶⁹ In lieu of διασπορευθῆναι, Ald. alone has preserved the elegant reading διαθρευθῆναι: which Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt. For Plato thus perpetually employs metaphors derived from hunting, as shown by Wytttenbach in *Epist. Crit.* p. 41, and Creuzer on Proclus and Olympiodor. T. i. p. 177. Of the passages quoted by Stalbaum, the most apposite is in *Tim.* p. 64, B., ταύτη γὰρ μεταδωκεῖν πάντα ὅσα εἰδὼν ἐκινουῦμεν.

⁷⁰ Instead of ἀνασχωζομένων, where the preposition is useless, the three oldest MSS. read ἀν διασχωζομένων: where evidently lies hid—ἀν εἰη, σχωζομένων.

⁷¹ That is, to be neither in a state of destruction nor preservation. STALB.

⁷² On the three states of pleasure, pain, and something intermediate, Stalbaum refers to *Rep.* ix. p. 583, C—E.

towards the verdict respecting pleasure, it will be not a little thing for us to remember it or not. But let us, if you please, go through this point in few words.

Prot. Say, what?

[64.] *Soc.* To a person preferring a life of intellect, you know there is no hinderance to his living in that manner.

Prot. Do you mean in the state of being neither pleased nor pained?

Soc. Yes; for it was stated in our comparison of the lives, that there was no necessity for the person, preferring the life of mind and intellect, to be delighted either much or little.

Prot. It was altogether said so.

Soc. In this way therefore it would be to him. And perhaps it would be by no means out of the way, if that life were of all the most godlike.

Prot. To me at least it seems unlikely that the gods feel neither pleasure nor its opposite.

Soc. It is highly, indeed, unlikely. For each of these things is unseemly. But let us consider further this point afterwards, if it should be to the purpose; and we will apply it towards (winning) the second prize for mind, should we be unable to apply it for (winning) the first.

Prot. You speak most correctly.

[65.] *Soc.* Now that other species of pleasures, which we said is peculiar to the soul herself, is all produced through memory.

Prot. How so?

Soc. What memory is, we ought, it seems, to previously remember:⁷² and prior to memory, what perception is, methinks; if, what relates to these points, is about to become, as is fitting, clear to us.

Prot. How say you?

Soc. Of those circumstances, which are on every occasion surrounding our body, lay down that some are extinguished, before they enter thoroughly the soul, and leave it unscathed; others going through both, bring on them, as it were, a kind of earthquake, peculiar (to each) and common to both.

⁷² The verb ἀναληπτίον, which means, 1. "To take up again bodily," 2. "To take up again mentally," i. e. to remember, Stalbaum conceives to have been introduced here for the sake of a play on the word μνήμη.

Prot. Be it laid down.

Soc. If we should say that those, which do not go through both, lie hid from our soul, but that those which (do go) through both, do not lie hid, should we speak most correctly?

Prot. How not?

Soc. By no means understand that I am speaking of lying hid, as being in that case somehow the production of forgetfulness. For forgetfulness is the departure of memory.⁷⁴ But that has not as yet, in what has been said, been produced. Now of that, which neither is nor has been, it is absurd to say there is any loss. Is it not?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Only then alter the terms.

[66.] *Prot.* How?

Soc. Instead then of (saying that) a thing lies hid from the soul, when it is unscathed by any violent shakings of the body, call that insensibility, which you just now called forgetfulness.⁷⁵

Prot. I understand.

Soc. In the soul and the body, when affected,⁷⁶ in common by one circumstance, being moved also in common, you would not speak wide of the mark by naming that motion a sensation.

Prot. You speak most truly.

[67.] *Soc.* Now then do we not understand, what we mean to call sensation?

Prot. How not?

Soc. And a person saying that memory is a preservation of sensation, would correctly say so in my opinion.

Prot. He would correctly.

Soc. Do we not say that memory differs from recollection?

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. Is it not in this?

Prot. In what?

Soc. When, what the soul has once together with the body

⁷⁴ A similar sentiment is found in the Banquet, p. 208, A. § 32, and Phædo, p. 75, D. § 54.

⁷⁵ Since Protarchus had not as yet mentioned the word *λήθη*, Schleiermacher and Heindorf suggested *ἵνα μὴ λήθην καλῆς*, "that you may not call it forgetfulness."

⁷⁶ Sydenham acutely saw that *γινόμενον* should be corrected into *γινόμενα*. For a neuter plural adjective thus agrees with substantives of different genders in the singular number, like *ψυχὴν* and *σῶμα*.

suffered, this it does itself by itself without the body, as much as possible, recover, we say that it then recollects. Do we not?

Prot. Entirely so.

Soc. Moreover, when the soul, after losing the memory of a thing perceived or learnt, brings it back again, itself by itself, in all these⁷⁸ instances too we speak of recollections, and memories.⁷⁹

Prot. You speak correctly.

Soc. The reason, for which all this has been said, is this.

Prot. What?

Soc. That we may at the same time⁸⁰ understand as clearly as possible⁸¹ the pleasure of the soul apart from that of the body, and, at the same time, desire. For both of these seem likely to be made clear through those.

[68.] *Prot.* Let us then, Socrates, now speak of what is to follow.

Soc. In treating of the generation of pleasure, and of its every form, it is necessary it seems for us to look to many points. For even now we must, it appears, consider,⁸² what desire is, and where it is produced.

Prot. Let us then consider; for we shall lose nothing by it.

Soc. Nay, Protarchus, we shall lose our doubt about them, and this too, after having found what we are in search of.

Prot. You have well defended yourself. Let us then try to discuss what is next in order to these.

Soc. Did we not assert just now, that hunger, and thirst, and many other things of the like kind, were certain desires?

Prot. Yes, strongly.

[69.] *Soc.* Looking, then, to what thing, the same (in all), do we call those differing so much (from one another) by one name?

⁷⁸ Ficinus omits *ξύπαντα*.

⁷⁹ As Plato had just before made a distinction between *ἀνάμνησις* and *μνήμη*, he could not have united them here. This Sydenham saw, and wished to read *ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμης ἀνακτήσεις*. I should prefer simply *ἐν* in lieu of *καὶ*—

⁸⁰ The Greek is *ἵνα μή*, in lieu of which Grou suggested *ἵνα δὴ*, adopted by Sydenham; but Heusde, Heindorf, and Schütz, *ἵνα πῃ*, adopted by Stalbaum. Plato evidently wrote *ἵν' ἅμα*, to balance the subsequent *καὶ ἅμα*—

⁸¹ Instead of *ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἱναργίστατα*, we must either omit *καὶ*, with three MSS., or read *κάλλιστα* from conjecture.

⁸² Ficinus has "et nunc primum videndum," as if he had read *σκεπτικόν* instead of *ληπτικόν*, as remarked by Stalbaum.

Prot. By Zeus, Socrates, it is, perhaps, not easy to say ; it must, however, be told.

Soc. Let us from thence⁸³ take up the inquiry again from the same points.

Prot. From whence ?

Soc. Do we not constantly say that thirst is something ?⁸⁴

Prot. How not ?

Soc. Is not this, to have an emptiness ?

Prot. How not ?

Soc. Is not thirst a desire ?

⁸⁵ *Prot.* Yes, for drink.

Soc. For drink ? or for a repletion from drink ?

Prot. For repletion, I suppose.⁸⁵

Soc. Whoever of us then is emptied, desires, it seems, what is contrary to what he is suffering. For being emptied, he desires to be filled.

Prot. Most clearly so.

[70.] *Soc.* What then, is it possible that the person, who is empty for the first time, should apprehend, from any quarter, either from sense or memory, a filling of that, by which he neither is at the present time affected, nor ever was affected heretofore.

Prot. How can it be ?

Soc. But, however, the person who desires, desires something.

Prot. How not ?

Soc. Now he does not desire that which he is suffering. For he is suffering thirst, and that is emptiness ; but he desires repletion.⁸⁶

⁸³ Ficinus omits *ἐκείθεν*. Perhaps Plato wrote *Ἐκείθεν δὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν*—Stalbaum would defend *Ἐκείθεν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν*, by quoting Euthyd. p. 271, C., *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ποθὲν εἶναι ἐκ Χίου* ; and Phædr. p. 229, B., *ἐν θένδε μὲν ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ*. But after the indefinite *ποθὲν*, assuredly the name of a definite place could not be thus inserted. Both *ἐκ Χίου* and *ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ* are evidently from a gloss.

⁸⁴ Ficinus has “*Dicimusne sitire aliquem*,” which leads to *διψῆν ποῦ λίγυσεν ἰσάρορι τινα*, and hence *κενοῦσθαι* might be read with all the MSS. but one, which offers *κενοῦσθαι*, similar to “*exhaustum esse*,” in Ficinus. Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, had adopted *διψῆν* and *κενοῦσθαι*, in ed. 2 has preferred *διψῆν*—*κενοῦσθαι*.

^{85—86} In the arrangement of the speeches Stalbaum follows Bekker, who had followed some of the MSS.

⁸⁶ This was a Pythagorean doctrine, as stated by Jamblichus in Vit. Pythag. § 205. See Mahne on Aristoxenus, p. 76, quoted by Stalbaum.

Prot. True.

Soc. Something, therefore, of those belonging to the thirsty person, would have a perception in some manner of repletion.

Prot. Necessarily.

Soc. Now the body is unable; for it is suffering emptiness.

Prot. True.

Soc. It is plain then that it is left for the soul to have a perception, by means of memory, of repletion; for by what means could the soul have such perception?

[71.] *Prot.* Nearly by none.

Soc. Learn we then, what follows from this reasoning?

Prot. What?

Soc. This reasoning shows us that desire is not produced from the body.

Prot. How so?

Soc. Because it shows that the endeavour of every animal is opposed to its sufferings.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Now the inclination, leading to a point opposite to the sufferings, indicates somehow the remembrance of things opposite to those sufferings.

Prot. Clearly.

Soc. The reasoning then, having shown that memory leads to the things desired, discovers the general inclination and desire, and the ruling power of the soul in every animal.

Prot. Most correctly.

Soc. The reasoning then proves that by no means does our body thirst, or hunger, or suffer any of such affections.

Prot. Most true.

[72.] *Soc.* Let us further observe likewise this, respecting these very same things. For the reasoning appears desirous of indicating a certain kind of life in those very things.

Prot. In what things? and of what kind of life are you speaking?

Soc. I mean in the being filled, and emptied, and in all the other things, which relate to the preservation and the destruction of animals; and whether one of us, being in either of these states, (at one time)⁸⁷ feels pain and another pleasure, according to the changes (of circumstances).

⁸⁷ On the omission of *τότε μὲν* in the first clause, see Stalbaum.

Prot. I is so.⁸⁸

Soc. But what when a person is in the middle of them?

Prot. How in the middle?

Soc. When on account of a suffering he is pained, and yet has a remembrance of pleasures past,⁸⁹ ⁹⁰ a part indeed of his pain ceases; but pleasant things have not been filled up at that time.⁹⁰ ⁹¹ Shall we affirm, or deny,⁹¹ that he is in the midst of two contrary states?

Prot. Let us affirm it.

Soc. That he is pained or pleased wholly?

Prot. By Zeus, he is afflicted by some double pain; according to the body, by his suffering; according to the soul, by a certain longing from an expectation.

[73.] *Soc.* How, Protarchus, have you spoken of a doubled pain? Is it not, that at one time one of us, being empty, is in the clear hope of being filled? and at another time, on the contrary, is in a hopeless state?

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Does not the person, who hopes to be filled, seem to you to feel a joy through the recollection (of fulness)? and yet, being empty, at the same time to be in pain?

Prot. He must be so.

Soc. At that time, then, man and other animals are at the same time pained and pleased.

Prot. It seems so.

Soc. But what, when a person, being empty, is hopeless of obtaining repletion? will there not be then that doubled state respecting his pains, on which you just now looked, and thought it was simply doubled.

Prot. Most true, Socrates.

[74.] *Soc.* Now of this inquiry into these feelings let us make this use.

⁸⁸ Schleiermacher justly remarks that, as this answer would require a preceding interrogation, there is some error here.

⁸⁹ Ficinus has "voluptatum—præteritarum," which leads to γεγενημένων, in lieu of γιγνομένων in three MSS., and γενομένων in others.

^{90—90} I have translated as if the Greek were παύεται μὲν τι τῆς ἀλγέδονος, πεπληρωται δ' ἡδία μήπω τῷ τότε, not παύου' ἂν τῆς ἀλγέδονος πεπληρωται δὲ μήπω τι τότε. For Ficinus has "cessat quidem tristitia," from whence Stephens elicited παύεται μὲν, adopted by Sydenham, and by Stalbaum too in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.

^{91—91} The words within numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

Prot. What use?

Soc. Shall we say that these pains and pleasures are true, or false? or that some of them are true, and others false?

Prot. But how can pleasures or pains, Socrates, be false?

Soc. How then, Protarchus, could fears be true or false? or expectations, true or not? or opinions, true or false?

Prot. Opinions, I would somehow concede, may be; but I would not the others.

Soc. How say you? We are however⁹² in danger of raising up a disquisition of not a little kind.

Prot. You say true.

Soc. But whether it relates to what has passed by, O son of that⁹³ illustrious father, this must be considered.

[75.] *Prot.* Perhaps it ought.

⁹⁴ *Soc.* It is meet then to bid farewell to the rest of the disquisition,⁹⁵ and to whatever is said beside the purpose.

Prot. True.⁹⁴

Soc. Tell me then, for a wonderment ever continuously seizes

⁹² Instead of *μῆναι* Plato probably wrote *μὰ τὸν*, with *θεὸν* understood, as usual.

⁹³ In lieu of *παῖ κείνου τάνδρως* Sydenham wished to read *κλειτοῦ ἀνδρως*—But *κλειτός* is not found in prose. It would be better to read *κλεινοῦ*—For *κείνος* and *κλεινός* are frequently confounded, as I have shown at Philoct. 261. But as nothing has been said of the father of Protarchus, Plato wrote, I suspect, *παῖ δεινοῦ γ' ἀνδρως*—For *δεινός*, as shown by Stalbaum on p. 29, A. § 52, *δεινός ἀνὴρ*, was applied perpetually to a Sophist, whose son Protarchus was feigned to be; while to show that *δεινός* was spoken ironically, the particle *γε* was properly added. Others perhaps would prefer *οὐκ ἄνουν του ἀνδρως*, i. e. "of some not senseless man;" but *δεινοῦ γ' ἀνδρως* is far superior. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, conceived that *κείνου τοῦ ἀνδρως* was said pointedly and with a ridicule at the person. But *κείνος* is never used except in the sense of praise. Besides, as the father of Protarchus does not appear to have been present, Socrates could not point to him. Stalbaum accordingly cancelled this remark in ed. 2, from which I learn that C. F. Hermann, in a Dissertation on Plato's Republic, p. 31, conceives that *ὦ παῖ κείνου τάνδρως* was a proverbial expression similar to *φίλη κεφαλὴ*. But this novel notion Stalbaum is unwilling to admit; and he therefore prints *ὦ παῖ κείνου*—with the view of avoiding the objection that *κείνος* is never found in Attic prose; nor is *κείνος ὁ ἀνὴρ* in correct Greek, as I have shown in Bailey's *Hermesianax*, p. 78.

⁹⁴ All between the numerals Sydenham has omitted, although duly found both in the Greek and in the Latin of Ficinus.

⁹⁵ On *μῆκος* applied by itself to a lengthy discourse, see Stalb.

me respecting those very doubts, which we have now brought forward.

Prot. How say you?

Soc. Are not (some) pleasures false, but others true?

Prot. How could they be?

Soc. Neither then is there⁹⁶ a dream by night or by day as you hold, nor in fits of madness or silliness is there a person, who thinks he is pleased, when he is pleased not at all; nor on the other hand, thinks he is pained, when he is not pained.

Prot. All of us, Socrates, have conceived that all this is the case.

Soc. But have they done so correctly? Or must we consider whether this has been said correctly or not?

Prot. We must consider, as I would say.

[76.] *Soc.* Let us then define still more clearly what was just now said respecting pleasure and opinion. For it is surely possible for us to hold an opinion?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. And to feel a delight.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Moreover that which is held as an opinion, is something.

Prot. How not?

Soc. And something too that, in which the thing delighted feels a delight.

Prot. Most certainly.

Soc. The thing then that holds an opinion, whether it holds the opinion rightly or not rightly, never loses the reality of holding an opinion.

Prot. For how could it?

Soc. The thing therefore that feels a delight, whether it feels a delight rightly or not rightly, it is evident it will never lose the reality of feeling a delight.

Prot. Certainly; and such is the case.

Soc. In what manner then is opinion wont to be to us

⁹⁶ As the phrase *οὐτ' ὅταν οὐθ' ἕκαστος* is generally used absolutely, Stallbaum wished to expunge *ἑστίν*. On the other hand, Ficinus found something in his MS. wanting at present in the Greek: for his version is—"Neque igitur revera falsove lætari aut tristari dicitur, ut tu ais—" unless he supplied "*lætari aut tristari*" out of his own head.

false and true; but pleasure only true? ⁹⁷ for to hold an opinion and to feel a delight, have both equally received the property of a reality.⁹⁷

Prot. (This) we must consider.

Soc. Is it that falsehood and truth are incident to opinion? and that through them it not only becomes opinion, but also of what kind each opinion is? Say you that we must consider this?

Prot. Yes.

[77.] *Soc.* And in addition to this, whether some things are altogether of certain qualities; but that only pleasure and pain are, what they are, and do not become certain qualities, must we agree upon this point likewise?

Prot. Plainly so.

Soc. But it is not difficult to perceive this, that they too are of certain qualities. For we said of old, that pains and pleasures become great and little, and each of them vehemently so.⁹⁸

Prot. By all means.

Soc. And if to any one of these there be added the quality of evil, shall we not say that opinion has thus become evil, and pleasure likewise evil?

Prot. Why not, Socrates?

[78.] *Soc.* What then, if rectitude, or the opposite to rectitude, is added to any of them, shall we not say, that opinion is right, if it possess rectitude; and say the same of pleasure?

Prot. Necessarily so.

Soc. But if what is held as an opinion be mistaken by us, must we not acknowledge that the opinion is erroneous, and not right,⁹⁹ and not rightly holding an opinion?⁹⁹

⁹⁷—⁹⁷ I have translated as if the Greek were *δοξάζειν γὰρ τὸ ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἴληψε*, instead of *δοξάζειν δὲ ὄντως*—for *δὲ* and *γὰρ* are constantly confounded; and *τὸ*, which is found in one MS. before *δοξάζειν*, has now its proper place before *ὄντως*, and *εἴληψε* now recovers, what it has hitherto wanted, its object.

⁹⁸ Picius has “*magnas et parvas vehementes remissasque fieri.*” From whence Cornarius elicited *μεγάλαι τε καὶ μικραὶ καὶ σφοδραὶ καὶ ἡσυχαιραὶ*, with the decided approbation of Stalbaum in ed. 1, but which he rejects as an interpolation in ed. 2.

⁹⁹—⁹⁹ This is the literal version of the Greek, *οὐδ’ ὁρθῶς δοξάζουσιν*: which is not very clear. Sydenham translates it “and that we are

Prot. For how could we?¹⁰⁰

Soc. But what, if we discover (any) pain or pleasure mistaken about that, in which it is pained, or effected contrariwise, shall we give to it the epithet of right, or good, or any other of honourable appellations?

Prot. It is impossible, if pleasure shall have been mistaken.

[79.] *Soc.* And yet pleasure seems often to be produced in us, accompanied, not with a right opinion, but with a false one.

Prot. How not? And the opinion, Socrates, in that case, and at that time, we say¹ is a false opinion; but the pleasure itself, no man would ever call it false.

Soc. You very readily, Protarchus, support your argument about pleasure on the present occasion.

Prot. (I do) nothing else but say what I hear.

Soc. With us, my friend, makes there no difference the pleasure, accompanied with right opinion and science, and that which is often produced in each of us, accompanied with a false opinion and ignorance.²

[80.] *Prot.* It is probable there is no little difference.

Soc. Let us then come to the view of the difference between them.

Prot. Lead by whatever road it seems good.

Soc. I lead then by this.

Prot. By what?

Soc. We say there is a false opinion, and there is likewise a true one.

Prot. There is.

Soc. Upon them, as we just now said, pleasure and pain oftentimes attend; I mean, upon opinion true and false.

Prot. Certainly so.

not right ourselves in entertaining such an opinion." Ficinus has "Et, si quod opinione comprehenditur, sit fallax, nonne opinionem falsam potius quam rectam vocabimus," from which it is evident that he did not find in his MS. the concluding clause.

¹⁰⁰ I cannot perceive to what *ἀν* in Πῶς γὰρ *ἀν* is to be referred.

¹ Stalbaum would read *λέγομεν* for *ιλέγομεν*. For the question is not about a past act, but a present one.

² Ficinus, by his version "ignorantiam," has alone led to the true reading, *ἀγνοίας*, first elicited by Cornarius, in lieu of the incorrect *ἀνοίας* found in all the MSS.

Soc. From memory and sensation is not opinion³ and the attempt to hold an opinion thoroughly³ produced on every occasion?

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Do we, then, deem it necessary for us to have ourselves thus?

Prot. How?

Soc. Would you say that it often happens to a person looking from a distance, on things not very clearly discerned, to be willing to form a judgment of them?

Prot. I would say so.

[81.] *Soc.* Upon this, would not the person question himself thus?

Prot. How?

Soc. What is that, which appears to be standing under a tree by the cliff there? Does it not seem to you that a person would speak these words to himself, looking at some such things as perchance appeared to him?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Hereupon would not such a person, as if giving an answer, say to himself, speaking conjecturingly, It is a man?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. But carried beside (the truth),⁴ he would perhaps say of⁵ the figure clearly discerned, that it is the work of some shepherds.

³ As the verb διαδοξάζειν is found only in this passage, its meaning has been guessed at by Stalbaum, who translates it by "conjectando discernere," i. e. "to discern by conjecturing:" while Ficinus renders καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἰσχυρεῖν, (or ἰσχυρεῖν, for both words are found in MSS.,) "fitque ut opinione pro arbitrio disseramus." I confess myself at a loss.

⁴ So Stalbaum, with Ast, in ed. 2, understands παρενεχθεῖς. But as at the moment, when the party was thus conversing with himself, he is supposed to be ignorant of the truth, there would be no allusion to it. In ed. 1, his rendering is "he passed by," i. e. "he approached passing by." But he who, after passing by an object, continues to walk on, instead of coming nearer to it, only recedes farther from it. The sense evidently requires προσενεχθεῖς, as proposed, I suspect, by some scholar, against whom he has directed his remark—"Temere tentaveris προσενεχθεῖς." Ficinus has "mutata sententia."

⁵ Since the figure is supposed to be clearly discerned, and to be spoken of distinctly as the work of some shepherds, one would expect that, as shepherds are not generally carvers in wood, something definite would be stated touching the figure carved by such hands. In lieu then of

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. And if any one were present, he would express by his voice to the person present, what he had said to himself, and repeat the very same words; and thus, what we lately termed an opinion, becomes a speech.

[82.] *Prot.* How not?

Soc. But if he were alone, thinking continuously within himself upon this very same thing; he walks on keeping it in his mind sometimes for even a rather long period.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. Well then, does that, which takes place respecting these things, appear to you as it does to me?

Prot. What is it?

Soc. The soul in that case seems to me to resemble some book.⁶

Prot. How?

Soc. The memory coinciding with our sensations, and those affections which are about them, seem to me almost at that time to write in our souls' speeches. And when this suffering⁸ writes what is true, there result from it true opinions, and true speeches are produced within us; but when such a scribe within us writes what is false, there results what is contrary to the truth.

Prot. So it seems entirely to me; and I receive what has been stated.

Soc. Admit likewise, that there is another workman existing at that time within us.

Prot. Who is he?

Soc. A painter, who, after the writer of what has been mentioned, paints of such things the representations in the soul.

Prot. How and when say we this person does⁹ so?

πρωτίῳ Plato wrote, I suspect, *Πανὸς εἶπε*, for the human-like figure, made by shepherds, would be that of their tutelary deity, Pan.

⁶ In like manner Locke compares the mind to a sheet of paper.

⁷ On the phrase *γράφειν ἐν ψυχαῖς*, see Menage on Diog. L. vi. p. 319; Valckenaer on Callimach. Fr. p. 246; Blomfield on Prometh. 814; myself on Æsch. Suppl. 168. Shakspeare has "And thy commandment all alone shall live Within the book and volume of my brain."

⁸ I cannot understand *τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα*. Ficinus has "passionem hujusmodi veram opinionem dicimus," as if his MS. offered *τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα δόξαν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν*.

⁹ In lieu of *αὐ*, which is quite unintelligible, one MS. has *οὖν*, which leads to *δρᾶν*, answering to "agere," in Ficinus.

Soc. (It is) when a person, having taken away from sight, or from any other sense, what have been imagined by and mentioned (to himself), sees somehow within himself the representations of what have been imagined by and spoken (to himself). Or does this not take place within us?

Prot. (It takes place) very much so.

Soc. The representations then of true thoughts and speeches are true; but those of the false are false.

Prot. By all means.

[83.] *Soc.* Now if we have spoken thus far correctly, let us still consider in addition likewise this.

Prot. What?

Soc. Whether it is necessary for us to be affected thus, with respect to things present and past, but not the future.

Prot. With respect to all time in a similar manner.

Soc. Were not the pleasures and pains, felt by the soul alone, asserted before to be such, that they would arise prior to those felt by the body; so that it happens to us to feel antecedently pain and pleasure,¹⁰ about the time about to be produced?¹⁰

Prot. Most true.

Soc. Do then the writings and the pictures, which we laid down a little before, as being produced within us, have regard to the past and present time, but not to the future?

Prot. Very much about the future.¹¹

Soc. Do you strongly assert that all these things are expectations of the future; and that we are, through all life, full of expectations?

Prot. Entirely so.

[84.] *Soc.* Now then, in addition to what has been said, answer this likewise.

Prot. What?

Soc. A man just, and pious, and entirely good, is he not god-loved?

¹⁰⁻¹¹ I can scarcely understand μέλλοντα εἶναι γιγνόμενον. For though εἶναι γιγνόμενον is correct Greek, as shown by Stalbaum, μέλλον is not elsewhere united to those words. Plato wrote, I suspect, περὶ τὸ ἀνὰ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον, i. e. "about the thing produced in the course of time to come," where τὸ ἀνὰ might easily have been lost through τὸν.

¹¹ In lieu of σφόδρα γε, Ficinus has, more correctly, "ad omnia," although σφόδρα seems to be supported by σφόδρα λίγως in the next question of Socrates.

Prot. How not?

Soc. What then, is not a man unjust and entirely wicked, the reverse of the other?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Now every man, as we said just now, is full of many expectations.

Prot. Why not?

Soc. There are speeches within each of us, which we call expectations.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. And phantasies also are painted (in us). ¹²For one often sees a deal of money belonging to himself, and many pleasures in addition to it, and he views himself painted within himself, as highly delighted.¹²

Prot. Why not?

Soc. Of these phantasies, shall we say that the true are painted and placed before the good, for the most part, on account of these persons being god-loved, but the contrary before the bad, for the most part? or shall we deny it?

Prot. We must assert it strongly.

Soc. To wicked men, then, likewise pleasures are present painted within them; but these are of the false kind.

Prot. How not?

[85.] *Soc.* Wicked men, therefore, for the most part delight in false pleasures; but the good, in the true.

Prot. You assert what is most necessary.

Soc. According then to this reasoning, there are in the souls of men false pleasures; imitating however, in a ridiculous way, the true; and similar is the case with pains.

Prot. There are.

Soc. It is possible then for a person, who holds upon every thing an opinion, to hold always an opinion really ¹³ upon things which are not, nor have been, and, sometimes, on such as will never be?

Prot. Certainly.

¹²⁻¹³ Ficinus evidently found in his MS. something superior to the common text. For his version is "Nam cuique licet fingere se cumulum auri maximum possidere, oblectamentisque variis abundantem, omni suavitate perfundi." Here in the Greek, in lieu of ἐκ' αὐτοῦ, one would prefer ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (χρυσοῦ), "from it—"

¹³ In lieu of οὐτως, Sydenham suggested ὅπως, and so three MSS.

Soc. And these are they that effect at that time a false opinion, and the thinking falsely. Is it not?

Prot. Yes, it is.

[86.] *Soc.* Well then, must we not attribute in return to pains and pleasures a state in them the counterpart¹⁴ of that in the others?

Prot. How?

Soc. That it is possible for a person, who feels a delight upon every thing, in any manner whatever, and at random, to feel always really a delight, not only from things which are not, and sometimes from things which never were, but frequently too, and, perhaps, the most frequently, from things which are never about to be?

Prot. This, too, must of necessity be the case.

[87.] *Soc.* Would there not be the same reasoning as regards fears and desires, and all things of that kind, that all such are sometimes false?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, can we say of opinions, that they are evil,¹⁵ [and advantageous,] any otherwise than as being false?¹⁵

Prot. Not otherwise.

Soc. And pleasures, I think, we conceive are bad on no other account, except by their being false.

Prot. It is quite the contrary, Socrates, (to what)¹⁶ you have said. For hardly would any man attribute to falsehood that pains and pleasures are very evil, but that they fall in with wickedness much and of many-kind by some other way.¹⁷

Soc. Of pleasures that are evil, and are such through wicked-

¹⁴ The word in Greek is *ἀντιστροφόν*, in allusion to the *antistrophé* in the chorus of a Greek play, which is the counterpart of the *strophé* in the number of lines, and of the number and kind of syllables in each line.

¹⁵ Stalbaum rejects the words *καὶ χρηστάς* as an interpolation. Ficinus has, "Num opinionones ob aliud bonas vel pravas quam quod veræ et falsæ sint, appellamus?" From whence Cornarius supplied the next sentence, *ἢ ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀληθεῖς*. But more correctly the margin of one MS. has *ἢ ὅτι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς*.

¹⁶ Stalbaum explains *τοῦναντίον εἰρηκας* by "you have said the contrary to what should be said." He did not therefore see that Plato wrote, as I have translated—*Σώκρατες, ἔστ' ἢ εἰρηκας*: for thus *ἢ* follows *τοῦναντίον*, in p. 35, A. § 69, and in the other passages quoted there by Stalbaum.

¹⁷ Ficinus has, "in maximam ac multiplicem pravitatem aliter incidentes." He found therefore in his MS. *μεγάλῃ δὲ καὶ πολλῇ ἄλλως πως συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ*.

ness, we will speak shortly afterwards, if so it seem good to us. But of those that are false and many and oftentimes existing and produced in us in yet another way, we must say a word. For perhaps we shall make use of it for our decisions.

Prot. How not? if indeed they exist.

Soc. And there are such, Protarchus, at least in my opinion. But as long as this doctrine lies by us (unexamined),¹⁸ it is impossible for it to be disproved.

Prot. Fairly (said).

[88.] *Soc.* Let us then stand up, like combatants, against this reasoning.

Prot. Let us come on.

Soc. We said, if we remember, a little while before, that, when what are the so-called desires remain in us, the body is at that time laid hold of by its affections in two ways, and apart from the soul.

Prot. We remember; (for) so it was said.

Soc. The soul therefore was that which desired a condition contrary to that of the body; but that, which imparted any pain or pleasure through any circumstance, was the body.

Prot. It was so.

Soc. Now reckon together what takes place in these.

Prot. Say what.

Soc. It takes place then, when such is the case, that at the same time pains and pleasures lie by each others' side; and that at the same time the sensations respecting these, being contrary, are by the side of each other as has just now appeared.

Prot. It appears so.

[89.] *Soc.* Has not this also been said, and is laid down, as having been agreed upon as before?

Prot. What?

Soc. That pain and pleasure, both of them receive "the more" and "the less;" and that they belong to the limitless.

Prot. It has been said; what then?

¹⁸ Sydenham tacitly introduced "unexamined—" for he saw that without that word the reasoning would be incomplete. One MS. has however preserved a most remarkable reading, although from correction, *ὥς ἂν κίηται ἀνέλεγκτον, ἀδύνατον δὲ πού τις κρίσις ἡμῖν εὖ γίγνεσθαι*—i. e. "as long as it remains disproved, it is surely impossible for our decisions to turn out well." This is the very sense required; while the Greek is in every way worthy of Plato.

Soc. (There is) then¹⁹ some plan for judging of these correctly.

Prot. Where, and how?²⁰

Soc. Does not* the design of our decision respecting them aim at distinguishing them on each occasion by such marks as these, which of them as compared with each other is the greater, and which the less; and which is more and which (less)²¹ intense pain, as compared with pleasure, and pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure?

Prot. Such these things are, and such is the design of our decision.

Soc. Well now, in the case of vision, to see magnitudes far off and near causes the truth to disappear, and makes us to have false opinions. And does not the very same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures?

Prot. Rather much more, Socrates.

Soc. What has happened now is surely contrary to what occurred a little before.

Prot. Of what are you speaking?

Soc. In that case the opinions themselves, being false and true, infected at the same time pains and pleasures with their own state of suffering.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. But now, through being on each occasion changed in position, and viewed far off and near, and at the same time placed by each other, the pleasures appear greater and more intense as compared with the pains; and the pains, on the other hand, compared with the pleasures (appear) the contrary to those.

¹⁹ In lieu of *τις οὖν* we must read *ἔστ' οὖν*. For the indefinite *τις* cannot commence a sentence in correct Greek, although Hermann, on Viger, p. 730, whom Stalbaum has followed, says it can.

²⁰ Instead of *πῇ*, Heindorf and Schleiermacher suggested *ποία*—and so Sydenham—"What way."

* Instead of *εἰ* the MS. of Ficinus had *οὐ*, as shown by his "Nonne—"

²¹ Stalbaum, who in ed. 1 wished to read *καὶ τις ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τις σφοδρτέρα*, and in Var. Lect. *μᾶλλον χαλαρά*, now defends *καὶ μᾶλλον*, thus introduced between *ἐλάττων* and *σφοδρτέρα*. I should prefer *τις μᾶλλον καὶ τις ἥττον*. For these two adverbs are opposed to each other in the passages quoted by himself in ed. 2. Phædo, p. 93, B., *μᾶλλον τε—καὶ πλείων—ἥττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων*. Protagor. p. 356, A., *πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον*. Hipp. Mag. p. 299, D., *μείζων—ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον*.

Prot. For such things to arise through such means, is a matter of necessity.

[90.] *Soc.* As far therefore as each appear greater and less than they really are, if you cut off what each appears to be, but is not, you will neither say that it appears correctly, nor, on the other hand, will you dare to say that the additional part of pain and pleasure is correct and true.

Prot. By no means.

Soc. Next then in order after these we will look, if we can meet with²³ them here, upon pleasures and pains still more false than those, which both appear to be and are in animals.

Prot. Of what are you speaking, and how?

[91.] *Soc.* It has been often said, that when the nature of each thing is being destroyed by mixtures and separations, by repletions and evacuations, by increase and decrease, pains, and aches, and throes, and every thing else that bear such-like names, do happen to be produced.

Prot. Yes, this has been said frequently.

Soc. But that when things return to their natural state, we have received this recovery as a pleasure from ourselves.

Prot. Right.

Soc. But how is it, when none of these things shall have taken place?

Prot. When could this be, Socrates?

Soc. The question, Protarchus, which you have now asked is nothing to the purpose.

Prot. How so?

Soc. Because it does not hinder me from putting again my question to you.

[92.] *Prot.* What question?

Soc. If nothing of this kind, I will say, Protarchus, took place, what must of necessity result to us from it?

Prot. Do you mean when the body is not moved either way?

Soc. Exactly so.

Prot. It is plain, Socrates, that in such case there would be neither pleasure nor any pain at all.

Soc. You have spoken extremely well. But I suppose you mean this, that it is necessary for some of these things to

²³ Ficinus has—"in medium afferamus," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐπ' αὐτὸν* instead of *ἀπ' αὐτὸν*.

happen to us continually, as say the wise. For all things, going upwards and downwards, are in a perpetual²³ flow.

Prot. So they say indeed, and seem to speak not badly.

Soc. For how should they (speak badly), 'not being bad themselves.'²⁴ But from this reasoning, which is rushing against us, I wish to secretly withdraw. I design then to run away by this road; and do you fly with me.

Prot. Say by what road?

[93.] *Soc.* Let us say, then, to these wise men, "Be it so." But do you give an answer to this—Whatever any animal suffers, does it, while suffering, perceive that continually? and neither while growing, or suffering any such (change), are we unconscious of it? or is it quite the reverse? for almost every thing of this kind has lain hid from us.

Prot. Quite the reverse.

Soc. That therefore which was just now said, was said by us not correctly, that all changes, which take place up and down, produce pains or pleasures.

Prot. Why not?²⁵

Soc. In this way the assertion will be better, and less liable to censure.

Prot. How?

Soc. That great changes produce in us pains and pleasures; but the moderate and trifling neither of them at all.

Prot. In this manner it is more correctly said than in the other, Socrates.

Soc. If then these things are so, the life mentioned just now would come back again.

Prot. What life?

Soc. That which we said was without pain and pleasures.

Prot. You speak most truly.

[94.] *Soc.* From hence let us lay down for ourselves three kinds of life, one pleasant, another painful, and one neutral. Or how would you say respecting them?

Prot. Not otherwise myself than in this way, that there are three kinds of life.

²³ On this saying of Heracleitus see Cratyl. p. 402, A. § 42.

²⁴ So in Euthyd. p. 284, E. § 33, τοὺς γοῦν ψυχρὸς ψυχρῶς—φασὶ διαλίγεσθαι. Aristoph. Thesm. 168, 'Ο δ' αὖ θεόγινος ψυχρὸς ὦν ψυχρῶς ποιεῖ.

²⁵ The phrase, τί μὲν, which generally means "why so," is here to be translated "why not," as I have rendered it frequently elsewhere.

Soc. To feel no pain therefore cannot be the same thing as to feel a pleasure.

Prot. How can it?

Soc. When therefore you hear that to live through all life without pain, is the most pleasant of all things, what do you understand that a person²⁶ so saying means?

Prot. Such a person²⁷ seems to me at least to mean that it is a pleasure not to feel a pain.

Soc. Of any three things, whatever you like, existing, lay down, in order that we may adopt the names of things rather pretty, one gold, another silver, and another neither gold nor silver.

Prot. It is so laid down.

Soc. Is it possible for that which is neither, to become either gold or silver?

Prot. (No); for how could it?

Soc. The middle life then being said to be²⁸ pleasant or painful, would not be correctly thought to be so, should any so think it; nor, should any one so speak of it, would it be so spoken of according at least to a correct reasoning.

Prot. (No); for how could it?

[95.] *Soc.* And yet, my friend, we perceive there are those, who thus speak and think.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Do then those persons feel pleasure²⁹ at the time, when they are not pained?

²⁶ The person alluded to was probably Aristippus, who wrote a treatise in defence of Pleasure. But as he and Plato were no friends, the latter seems to have been unwilling to mention his name; and hence we can understand who was meant by δεινοῦ γ' ἀνδρός, in § 74, as I have corrected.

²⁷ I have followed the MS. which alone reads ὁ τοιοῦτος instead of οὔτος.

²⁸ Stalbaum justly objects to λεγόμενος, for it is at variance with the subsequent supposition. Ficinus has avoided the difficulty by his abridged version, "Vita igitur media, si quando suavis vel mæstâ dicitur aut existimatur, nequaquam recte vel existimatur vel dicitur."

²⁹ I think we ought to read χαίρουσιν οὔτοι, instead of χαίρειν οἶονται. For otherwise, in the next sentence, where χαίρειν οἶονται is properly repeated, there would be a tautology. S. So too Schütz, in Opuscul. p. 133, suggested λέγουσι for οἶονται, to answer to φασί in the reply of Proarchus. But Stalbaum says that φασί γούν is to be referred to οἶονται χαίρειν

Prot. So they say.

Soc. They think therefore they are pleased then; for otherwise they would not say so.

Prot. It nearly seems so.

Soc. They have then a false opinion of pleasure, if the natures of the two things, to be not pained and to be pleased, are separate from each other.³⁰

Prot. And different indeed they were.

Soc. Shall we choose then that there are, as (we said) just now, three things, or that only two are to be mentioned, pain, an evil to man, and deliverance from pain, a pleasure, as being the good itself.³¹

[96.] *Prot.* How is it, Socrates, that we are asked this by ourselves at the present time? for I do not understand.

Soc. In fact, Protarchus, you do not understand who are the enemies of Philebus here.

Prot. Whom do you call such?

Soc. They, who are said to be very skilled in natural philosophy, assert that pleasures do not exist at all.

Prot. How so?

Soc. (They say) that all those things, which the partisans of Philebus call pleasures, are but escapes from pain.

Prot. Do you then advise us, Socrates, to hearken to them? or how?

Soc. Not so; but to use them as a kind of diviners; who divine not by any art, but, from the austerity of the not ignoble nature of those, who had a great hate of the power of pleasure, and have held nothing in her to be sound; so that her attraction is merely a witchcraft and not [true] pleasure. In this way then we should use them, especially if we consider their other austerities. But afterwards you shall hear what seem to me to be true pleasures, in order that, after viewing from both accounts her power, we may place ourselves (so as to come) to a decision.

Prot. You speak correctly.

Soc. Let us then go after them, as our allies, along the track of their austerity. For I suppose they assert some

³⁰ Stalbaum quotes very aptly Aristoph. Thesm. 11, Χωρίς γὰρ αὐτοῖν ἔκαρπον ὅτιν ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μὴτ' ἀκούειν μὴθ' ὀρᾶν.

³¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were αὐτὸ ῥάγαθόν, and not αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν—

such thing as this beginning from some point above,²² that, if we wish to know the nature of any species whatever of things, for instance, of the hard, whether by looking to the hardest things, should we thus better understand them as those endued with hardness in the least. Now, Protagoras, you must give an answer, as if to myself, to these matters persons likewise.

[97.] Prot. By all means; and I say to them, that (we must look to the first in magnitude.

Soc. If then we wish to know the genus of pleasure, and what kind of nature it has, we must look not to the least, but to those called the extreme and violent.

Prot. On this point every one would agree with you for the present.

Soc. Do not the pleasures then, which are within reach, and still more²³ the greatest, as we often say, belong to the body?

Prot. (Yes); for how not?

Soc. Are then the pleasures, which exist in, and are generated about, persons in bad health, greater than those about persons in good health? Now let us take care, lest we stumble by answering precipitately.

Prot. How so?

Soc. For perhaps we might say those about persons in good health.

Prot. Probably.

Soc. But what, are not those pleasures the superior, which the strongest desires precede?²⁴

Prot. This indeed is true.

[98.] Soc. But do not both²⁵ they, who are in a fever, and those afflicted with diseases of that kind, thirst more, and shiver more, and suffer more all that persons are wont to

²² The Greek is *πρὸς ἀρχήν*. But in this formula the indefinite *πρὸς* always follows the definite word, as shown by the passages quoted by Heindorf on Phædrus, p. 229, B. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἀπὸθεν* *πρὸς*, found in Gorg. p. 492, D. Legg. vii. p. 798, B.

²³ By reading *καὶ ῥῆα γέ* for *αἰετ καὶ*, we meet the difficulty felt by Stalb. in ed. 1. So *καὶ ῥῆα γέ* in Philoct. 1271.

²⁴ H. Stephens, in Schediasm. Var. ii. p. 26, was the first to read *προσιγνύσκει* instead of *προσιγνύσκει*; which Stalb. in ed. 2, defends, after he had rejected it in ed. 1.

²⁵ Since the majority of the best MSS. read *οἱ* for *οἱ*, it is evident that Plato wrote *οἱ γέ*—

do in the body, and are more conversant with the want ³⁶ of those things, in which, ³⁶ being supplied, they feel a greater pleasure? Or shall we deny all this to be true?

Prot. It appears to be altogether as now stated.³⁷

Soc. What then, should we appear to speak ³⁸ correctly by saying, that, if any one would know what are the greatest pleasures, he must not go and look upon the healthy, but upon the sick? But be careful not to conceive that I am designing to ask you this, whether those in very ill health feel more pleasures than those in good health; but conceive that I am inquiring about the greatness of pleasure, and where (and)³⁹ when the intensity belonging to such a feeling is on every occasion produced. For we are to consider, we say, what is the nature of pleasure, and what they call it, who assert that it does not exist at all.

Prot. But⁴⁰ I nearly follow your argument.

[99.] *Soc.* Perchance, Protarchus, you will show⁴¹ it not

³⁶⁻³⁸ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἰνδεία*—*ᾧν*, not *ἰνδεία*—*καί*. Ficinus has "quo fit, ut magis indigeant, indigentiamque replentes vehementius delectentur;" from which Stephens was led to *ἀποπληροῦμενοι*, adopted by Stalbaum in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.

³⁷ Ficinus has "Ommino, ut dictum est, apparet," which evidently leads to *Πάνν μιν εἶναι, ὅλον ἦν ῥηθὲν, φαίνεται*, in lieu of *Πάνν μιν οὖν νῦν ῥηθὲν φαίνεται*, where Protarchus does not, as he should do, give a decisive opinion. Hence Stephens was led to suggest *ὁρθῶς* before *ῥηθὲν*, as in p. 61, E., *Πάνν μιν οὖν ὁρθῶς*: of which Stalb. approved in ed. 1, but silently rejects in ed. 2.

³⁸ In the formula *ὁρθῶς ἂν φαινόμεθα λέγοντες*, the verb *λέγειν* cannot be omitted, as I have shown on Criton, § 8, n. 10, and to the passages there quoted I could add full twenty more. Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *φρονεῖν φαινόμεθα*, for his version is "sentire videbimur, asserentes."

³⁹ Instead of *ποῦ ποτε*, i. e. "where in the world," I have translated as if the Greek were *ποῦ καὶ πότε*—Stalbaum, in ed. 1, wished to read *οἷόν ποτε*, but he tacitly rejects it in ed. 2.

⁴⁰ In lieu of the unintelligible *ἀλλὰ*, omitted by Ficinus, Plato wrote, I suspect, *καλῶς*.

⁴¹ Here too in *δείξει* scholars are at a loss. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, adopted *δείξει*, the conjecture of Heindorf and Schleiermacher, understanding *αὐτὸ*—But such an ellipse could not be admitted in correct Greek. Of this he was no doubt aware; for in ed. 2 he rejects it, and is half inclined to receive *ὁράσεις*, proposed by some critic not mentioned. Winkelman would read *οὐχ ἦττον ἐξῆς*, referring to p. 29, D., *σχεδὸν—μετὰ τοῦτο ἐξῆς ἰκὺ*: but there *ἐξῆς* belongs to *μετὰ τοῦτο*, not to *ἰκὺ*. I suspect that Plato wrote *οὐχ ἦττον εὖ ἐξῆς*, i. e. "you will be not the less well off." And thus *εὖ* confirms, and is in turn confirmed by, *καλῶς* just before.

the less. For answer me—In a life of riot do you see greater pleasures—I do not mean more in number, but exceeding in intensity and vehemence—than those in a life of temperance? Give your mind to the question, and tell me.

Prot. Nay, but I understand what you mean; and I see the one that is greatly superior. For the saying that has become a proverb, and which exhorts to “nothing too much,” on every occasion restrains somehow the temperate who obey it. But intense pleasure possesses even to madness the race of the silly and riotous, and makes them in bad repute.

Soc. Excellent. For if this be the case, it is evident that the greatest pleasures, and likewise the greatest pains, are produced in some wickedness of the soul and of the body, and not in their virtuous state.

Prot. Certainly.

[100.] *Soc.* Ought then one not to select some of the pleasures, and to consider what condition they had, when we called them the greatest?

Prot. It is necessary.

Soc. Consider now what condition have the pleasures arising from maladies of such a kind.

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. The unseemly; which they, whom we called the austere, thoroughly hate.

Prot. What pleasures?

Soc. For instance, the curing the itch by scratching, and such others of a kind as need no other remedy; for as to this affection, forsooth, what, by the gods, shall we call it, pleasure or pain?

Prot. This, Socrates, seems to be a kind of mixed evil.⁴²

Soc. It was not however for the sake of Philebus that I brought forward this argument; but without these pleasures and those that follow them, unless they were seen, we should have scarcely been able to decide upon the object of the present inquiry.

⁴² This introduction of the idea of evil Stalbaum explains in ed. 2, by saying that Protarchus with some subtlety calls that an evil, which Socrates wished to know whether it was a pleasure or a pain. But in ed. 1, he stated that Protarchus plays on the ambiguity in the word *πάθος*, to which *κακόν* is to be referred; unless indeed it alludes to the idea of the wickedness in the soul and body.

Prot. We must then proceed to such as have an affinity with them.

[101.] *Soc.* Do you mean those, that have some communion by their mixture?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Of these mixtures then, some belonging to the body, are in the bodies alone; others belonging to the soul alone, are in the soul; but those of the soul and body we shall find to be pains mixed with pleasures, called unitedly at one time pleasures, at another time pains.

Prot. How?

Soc. When a person in a restored or decaying state suffers at the same time two contrary affections, (and)⁴³ when shivering warms himself, and sometimes cools himself when heated, seeking, I presume, to enjoy the one and to be relieved from the other, ⁴⁴the so-called sweet mixed with bitter being present with a difficulty of deliverance causes an impatience, and a fierce standing together.⁴⁴

Prot. And very true is what has been now said.

[102.] *Soc.* Are not the mixtures of this kind composed some of pain and pleasure in equal proportion, and others of either ⁴⁵in a greater one?

Prot. How not?

Soc. ⁴⁶Say then that, when the pains are more than the

⁴³ It appears to me that correct Greek demands the insertion of *καί* here; or else we must read *θέρηται* and *ψύχεται* in lieu of *θέρηται* and *ψύχεται*, similar to "calescit" and "refrigescit" in Ficinus.

⁴⁴—⁴⁴ Such is the literal English version of the unintelligible Greek—*τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκὲ μεμιγμένον μετὰ δυσπαλλακτίας παρὸν ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον εὐστασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ*: It appears to me, that *ἕστερον* leads to *πρότερον*: and that the words *τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον γλυκὲ πικρῷ μεμιγμένον* is an entire Iambic verse, and *δυσπαλλακτίας* and *ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ* the ends of two others; and lastly, that some words have dropt out, that should be opposed to *δυσπαλλακτίας*, *ἀγανάκτησιν* and *εὐστασιν*, as read in some MSS., or *εὐντασιν*, in others. For otherwise there will be no proof of the *πικρῷ γλυκὲ μεμιγμένον*. To show however that Ficinus was as much in the dark as others, I will give his version—"quod utique dicitur amaro dulce permixtum cum difficultate rejectiones assistens, molestiam ac deinde ferum congressum conficit."

⁴⁵ Instead of *ἐτέρων*, "others," Ficinus found in his MS. *ἐκατέρων*, what the sense requires, as shown by his version, "ex alterutro excedente."

⁴⁶—⁴⁶ Such is the literal English translation of the Latin version, made

pleasures, those, which have been just now mentioned, belong to the itch and to tinglings. When there is within that, which boils and is inflamed, and a person by rubbing and scratching does not reach it, but only diffuses what is on the surface, then those inflaming the labouring parts, and by that very thing, through the want of remedies, changing to the contrary, at one time they procure immense pleasures, at another, on the contrary, from the internal parts they bring to the pains of the external parts, pleasures mixed with pains, according as a thing inclines this way or that; because things mixed together violently disjoin, or separated violently unite, and at the same time place pains by the side of pleasures.⁴⁶

Prot. Most true.

Soc. Hence, when on the other hand more pleasure is mingled, according to all such things, the slightly-mingled portion of pain⁴⁷ tickles and causes there to be a slight uneasiness:⁴⁷ but, on the other hand,⁴⁸ ⁴⁹the much greater pleasure being infused, puts on the stretch, and sometimes causes to leap, and working out all kinds of colour, all kinds of posture, and all kinds of breathings, it works out every stupor and exclamations accompanied with madness.⁴⁹

Prot. Entirely so.

[103.] *Soc.* And it causes, my friend, a person to say of himself, and another likewise (to say), that, delighted with such pleasures, he is, as it were, dying. And these pleasures

by Stalbaum in his second edition; where he conceives that *φίροντες εἰς πῦρ* does not mean "bringing to a fire," but "producing an inflammation." The passage is very perplexing, and until better MSS. are discovered, we shall perhaps never know what Plato wrote.

^{47—48} Sydenham's freer translation seems to convey, what Plato intended to say—"the smaller quantity of pain creates but a slight uneasiness, and no more than what serves to tickle."

⁴⁸ Instead of *αὐρής* Sydenham was the first to read *αὐ τῆς*—found subsequently in all the MSS., and similar to "iterum" in Ficinus. The emendation is attributed to Schleiermacher by Stalbaum.

^{48—49} Here again Sydenham's vivid paraphrase will give perhaps a better idea of the meaning of this passage, than can be obtained from any literal translation: "The greater excess of pleasure spread throughout convulses the whole frame, and sometimes causes involuntary motion, producing also every change of colour in the countenance, every variety of posture in the limbs, and every different degree of respiration, and within the soul it energizes in transports uttered madly in exclamations."

by all means and for ever is he pursuing, so much the more, as he happens to be more unrestrained, and less prudent; and he calls them the greatest, and reckons him the happiest of men, who lives the most in them.

Prot. You have gone through, Socrates, all that happens to the bulk of mankind, according to their own estimate.

[104.] *Soc.* At least, Protarchus, as regards the pleasures⁵⁰ which are in the common affections of the body alone, those on the superficies and the body having been mingled.⁵⁰ But with regard to those in the soul,⁵¹ the contrary confer with the body,⁵¹ both pain towards pleasure, and pleasure towards pain, so that both come to one mixture; these we have detailed before, as when⁵² (a person), on the other hand, is emptied, he desires repletion,⁵² but being emptied he is pained. To these points we did not then appeal as evidence; but we now say, that in all those cases, infinite in number, where the soul is different from the body, one mixture of pain and pleasure is produced and comes together.

Prot. You appear nearly to speak most correctly.

[105.] *Soc.* There is then among the mixtures of pain and pleasure, still one remaining.

Prot. Of what kind are you speaking?

Soc. The mixture which we said the soul alone oftentimes receives from itself.

Prot. How then do we say the same thing again?⁵³

Soc. Anger, and fear, and desire, and lamentation, and love,

⁵⁰⁻⁵⁰ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "De voluptatibus, quæ in communibus corporis passionibus extrinsecus intrinsecusve miscentur." But in that case the syntax would require *ἡδονῶν—εἰρασθέντων* in lieu of *εἰρασθέντων*.

⁵¹⁻⁵¹ A literal version of an intricate text, that Buttmann, Ast, Winkelman, and Stalbaum have been unable to unravel. They have all suggested different alterations, none of which are perfectly satisfactory. Ficinus has given this version of the passage, "De iis vero, quæ miscentur in anima, contraria quædam ad corpus conjiciuntur, voluptatem scilicet cum dolore, et dolorem cum voluptate in unam mixtionem concurrere," which is quite as unintelligible as the Greek.

⁵²⁻⁵² This is another difficult passage, for which Stalbaum proposes to read, *ὥς ὅταν μὲν πληρῶται τις, χαίρει, ὅταν δ' αὖ κενῶται, πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμῇ*, i. e. "that when a person is filled, he feels delight, but when emptied, he desires repletion."

⁵³ Instead of *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, Ast would read, what Stalbaum considers a specious conjecture, *τοῦτ' αὖ*—Plato doubtless wrote *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, as I have translated.

and emulation, and envy, and all other such passions, do you not lay down these as certain pains of the soul alone?

Prot. I do.

Soc. And shall we not find these very passions fraught with boundless pleasures? Or need we be reminded of that,⁵⁴ which leads a very prudent person to be harsh⁵⁵ [through his passion and rage];⁵⁶

And which than honey dropping is more sweet; (Il. xviii. 107.)

and that in our lamentations and regrets, pleasures have been mixed up with pains?

Prot. No (we need not). But in this way and in no other would these happen to be produced.

[106.] *Soc.* And do you not remember at the representations of tragedies, when persons weep in the midst of joy?⁵⁶

Prot. How not?

Soc. And have you perceived the disposition of your soul during a comedy, how that there a mixture of pain and pleasure is found?

Prot. I do not well comprehend.

Soc. For it is not altogether easy, Protarchus, at such a time, to understand a feeling of this kind in every case.

Prot. To me at least it is not at all easy.

Soc. Let us, however, lay hold of it so much the more, as it is the more obscure, in order that one may be able in other cases to discover more easily the mixture of pain and pleasure.

Prot. Say on.

Soc. The name just now mentioned of envy, will you set it down as a sort of pain in the soul, or how?

Prot. Just so.

Soc. And yet the man who envies will plainly appear to be delighted with the evils of his neighbours.⁵⁷

Prot. Clearly so.

⁵⁴ By reading *ὑπομνήσκισθαι αὐτοῦ* instead of *ὑπομνήσκισθαι τὸ*, we shall restore at once the syntax and sense.

⁵⁵⁻⁵⁶ The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus in ed. pr. But his translation is in this passage much too free to enable the reader to see what he really found in his MS. They were subsequently rejected by Fischer, whom Stalbaum and the Zurich editors have followed.

⁵⁶ There is a similar idea in Æsch. Agam. 261, *Χαρά μ' ὑφέρπει δάκρυν ἱεκαλουμένην*, imitated from the Homeric *Δακρύνει γελάσασα*.

⁵⁷ On the meaning of *οἱ πῆλας*, see Elmsley at Med. 85.

Soc. Now ignorance⁵⁸ is an evil; and so is the condition which we term stupidity.

Prot. How not?

[107.] *Soc.* From hence perceive what is the nature of the ridiculous.

Prot. Do you only tell it.

Soc. A certain depravity is so called, in a few words, after some habit. But of the total depravity, the contrary is that affection, which is mentioned in the inscription at Delphi.

Prot. You mean, Socrates, the "Know thyself."

Soc. I do. And the contrary to that saying would be, it is plain,⁵⁹ if mentioned in any writing,⁵⁹ "Not to know oneself in any respect at all."

Prot. How not?

Soc. Try now, Protarchus, to divide this very thing (self-ignorance) into three kinds.

Prot. How, say you? for I shall not be able (to do it).

Soc. Do you say that I must make this division for the present?

Prot. I say it, and in addition to saying, I request you.

[108.] *Soc.* Is it not necessary then for each of those, who do not know themselves, to be subject to this condition in three ways?

Prot. How?

Soc. First, with respect to property, to fancy themselves wealthier than according to their substance.

Prot. Many persons, truly, there are, who are suffering this.

Soc. Yet more numerous are they, who fancy themselves to be taller and more handsome, and, in all the things excelling, that relate to the body, beyond the real truth itself.⁶⁰

Prot. Very true.

Soc. But the most numerous, I think, have, as regards the third kind of those things in the soul, made a mistake, by fancying themselves rather virtuous, although not being so.

Prot. Greatly so.

⁵⁸ The correct reading ἀγνοια, in lieu of ἀνοια, has been again found in the MS. of Ficinus alone, as shown by his version—"ignorantia."

⁵⁹—The clause λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμματος Beck wished to expunge, as being spurious, whom Stalbaum followed in ed. 1, but in ed. 2 he retains it. Ficinus has "Oppositum huic esset, si forte præciperetur," which leads to εἰ λεγόμενον ἦν ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμματος, i. e. "if it had been told by any writing."

⁶⁰ I have adopted Stephens's αὐτῆς. For I cannot understand αὐτοῖς

Soc. ⁶¹ Among the virtues, is it not wisdom,⁶¹ that the multitude clutch at, through being full of contention, and of a false opinion about wisdom?

Prot. How not?

[109.] *Soc.* Should any one then say that all such feeling is an evil, he would say what is true?

Prot. Perfectly so.

Soc. This then, Protarchus, must still be divided into two parts, if we are about, on beholding that child-like⁶² envy, to see the strange mixture of pleasure and of pain.

Prot. How then shall we cut them, say you?

Soc. All such as foolishly hold this false opinion of themselves, ⁶³ it necessarily happens that upon some of these, as it does in the case of all men in general, strength and power follow; but upon others the reverse.

Prot. It does so necessarily.

[110.] *Soc.* In this way then divide them. For whoever of them are accompanied by weakness, and being such are unable, when laughed at, to revenge themselves, in saying that these are open to ridicule, you will speak the truth. But in calling those, who are able to take their revenge, persons to be dreaded, and powerful, [and hostile,]⁶⁴ you would give to yourself the most correct account of them. For ignorance, accompanied with power, is hostile and base; for it is hurtful to every one, both itself and whatever are its likenesses.⁶⁵ But ignorance, without power, has obtained the rank and nature of what is an object of ridicule.

Prot. You speak most correctly. But in these remarks the mixture of pain and pleasure is not to me very apparent.

⁶¹—⁶¹ In lieu of *τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἅρ' οὐ σοφίας περὶ*, I have adopted *τῶν ἀρετῶν περὶ, ἅρ' οὐ σοφίας*—which Stephens elicited from Ficinus, “Quantum vero ad virtutes animi pertinet, nonne vulgus sapientiam prorsus sibi vendicans—” Stalbaum, indeed, who in ed. I had rejected *περὶ*, now retains it; he thinks that *ἀρετῆς περὶ* is used absolutely, and that *αὐτῆς* is to be understood after *ἀντιχόμενον*.

⁶² I have translated *παίδικόν*, “child-like,” remembering the line of Gray, speaking of children, who “climb the knee, the envied kiss to share”—of their parent on his return home. Sydenham renders it “mirthful,” with reference to the fun in a comedy.

⁶³ After “themselves,” there seems to be something wanting to complete the sense and syntax.

⁶⁴ Stalbaum would reject *καὶ ἰσχυροῦς*, omitted in three MSS., and shortly afterwards Heusde would read *ἰσχυρὰ* for *αἰσχυρά*.

⁶⁵ I cannot, I confess, understand the meaning of *εἰκόνας*.

Soc. Understand then first the force of envy.

Prot. Only tell it.

Soc. There is an unjust pain surely, and an (unjust) pleasure?

Prot. There is so of necessity.

Soc. There is then neither injustice, nor envy, in rejoicing at the ills of our enemies.

Prot. Certainly. How not?

Soc. But sometimes, on beholding the ills of our friends, to feel no pain, but on the contrary,⁶⁶ a pleasure, is not an act of injustice?

Prot. How not?

[111.] *Soc.* Did we not say that ignorance⁶⁷ was an evil to all?

Prot. Correctly so.

Soc. (Shall we say) that the false notion in our friends of their wisdom, and beauty, and of whatever else we mentioned, while stating that they belonged to three kinds, is an object of ridicule when weak, but of hatred when powerful? or shall we deny, what I just now said, that this habit of our friends, when a person possesses it harmless to others, is an object of ridicule?

Prot. Yes, very much.⁶⁸

Soc. And do we not acknowledge this (false notion) to be an evil, as being ignorance?

Prot. Heartily.

Soc. Do we feel pleasure or pain, when we laugh at it?

Prot. It is plain that we feel pleasure.

Soc. Did we not say, that it is envy, which produces in us pleasure at the ills of our friends?

[112.] *Prot.* It must be (envy).

Soc. Our reasoning then shows, that, when we laugh at what is ridiculous in our friends, by mixing delight with envy we mix together pleasure and pain. For envy was acknowledged long ago to be a pain to the soul, but laughing a plea-

⁶⁶ Instead of ἀπ' Sydenham seems to have wished to read αὐ, what the sense requires.

⁶⁷ Here too the correct reading ἀγνοίαν, in lieu of ἀνοίαν, is due to Ficinus; while shortly afterwards I have adopted φῶμεν before ἢ μὴ φῶμεν from one MS. after a correction.

⁶⁸ Instead of πάνυ γε, which I cannot understand, Ficinus has what is perfectly intelligible, "Fatemur sane," answering to "fatemur" in the question; for so he translates φῶμεν.

sure; but in these cases they arise, both of them,⁶⁹ at the same time.

Prot. True.

Soc. Our argument then points out, that in laments and songs of joy,⁷⁰ and not only in dramas, but in the whole tragedy and comedy of life, and in a ten-thousand other cases, pains and pleasures are mingled together.

Prot. It would be impossible, Socrates, for a man not to acknowledge this, were he ever so fond of dispute against an opposite opinion.

[113.] *Soc.* We have proposed (to consider) anger, and regret, and lamentation, and fear and love, and jealousy and envy, and such other passions, in which we said we should find those mixed (feelings), that have been so often mentioned. Did we not?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Do we understand that all, which relates to grief, and envy, and anger, has been now despatched?

Prot. How do we not understand?

[114.] *Soc.* Is there not much yet remaining?

Prot. Yes, very much.

Soc. On what account, principally, do you suppose it was that I explained to you the mixture (of feelings) in a comedy? Was it not from a belief, that it was easy to show the mixture in fear, in love, and in the other (passions)? and that, after you had admitted this to yourself, it would be meet to dismiss me, and by no longer proceeding to the rest, that I might not prolong the argument; but that you might receive, without exception, this doctrine,—that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, and both together likewise, are, in the things affecting them, full of pleasure mingled with pain. Now therefore say whether you will dismiss me, or make it midnight (before I finish). But I imagine that, after speaking a little more, I shall obtain from you my dismissal. For

⁶⁹ Instead of *roûro* Sydenham evidently wished to read *roûrw*, for Ficinus has "hæc."

⁷⁰ In lieu of *τραγωδίας*, which could not be opposed to *θρήνοις*, Orelli proposed *τρυγῳδίας*. But that word, I suspect, is never found in prose, and certainly not in Plato; who probably wrote, as I have translated, *ἰλαρῳδίας*, found in a passage of Aristoxenus, preserved by Athenæus xiv. p. 621. Hermann suggested *ἐν θρήνῳ τε καὶ ἐν τραγωδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ*, which Stalbaum calls an egregious restoration.

of all these things I shall be willing to give you an account to-morrow ; but at present I wish to proceed on my course to what remains towards the decision, which Philebus enjoins.

Prot. Well have you spoken, Socrates ; and as to what remains, go through it in whatever way is agreeable to yourself.

Soc. According to nature, then, after the mixed pleasures, we will proceed in turn by a kind of necessity to the unmixed.

Prot. You have spoken most beautifully.

Soc. These I will endeavour in turn⁷¹ to point out to you. For to those, who assert that all pleasures are but a cessation from pain, I do not altogether give credit. But, as I said before, I make use of these persons as⁷² to the fact,—that some pleasures seem to be, but are by no means so in reality ; and that some others appear to be many and great, but are mixed up with pains, and a cessation from the greatest pains, touching the difficulties of the body and the soul.

[115.] *Prot.* But what pleasures are those, Socrates, which a person, deeming to be true, would rightly think so ?

Soc. Those which relate to what are called beautiful colours, and to figures, and to the generality of odours, and to sounds, and to whatever that possesses wants unperceived, and that without pain yields a repletion perceived, and pleasant,⁷³ (and) unmixed with pain.⁷³

Prot. How, Socrates, speak we thus again of these things ?

Soc. What I am saying is not, indeed, directly obvious. I must therefore try to make it clear. For I will endeavour to speak of the beauty of figures ; not as the majority of persons understand them, such as of animals, and some paintings to the life, but as⁷⁴ reason says, I allude to something straight and

⁷¹ So Stalbaum reads *μεταβαλὼν*, for which some MSS. read *μεταλαβὼν*. Sydenham, "with a little alteration."

⁷² In p. 44, C. § 96, the expression is *μάντισι προσχρήσθαι*. And so Schütz wished to read here in lieu of *μάρτυσι*. The emendation adopted by Stalbaum in ed. 1, is rejected in ed. 2 as specious rather than true. For Socrates, he observes, is speaking figuratively. But the reference to the former passage in the words "as I said before," shows he was speaking not figuratively, but positively.

⁷³⁻⁷³ The Greek is *καὶ ἡδίας καθαρὰς λυπῶν* : where Schleiermacher proposed to read *καὶ καθαρὰς*, similar to "et tristitia vacuas" in Ficinus. But to preserve the balance of the sentences Stalbaum would expunge *καθαρὰς λυπῶν* as a gloss for *ἡδίας*.

⁷⁴ Instead of *ἡσίων ὁ λόγος*, which Ficinus, not understanding, has

round, and the figures formed from them by the turner's lathe, both superficial and solid, and those by the plumb-line and angle-rule, if you understand me. For these, I say, are not beautiful for a particular purpose, as other things are; but are by nature ever beautiful by themselves, and possess certain peculiar pleasures, not at all similar to those from scratchings; and colours possessing this form beautiful and pleasures.⁷⁵ But do we understand? or how?

[117.] *Prot.* I endeavour (to do so), Socrates; but do you endeavour likewise to speak still more clearly.

Soc. I say then that sounds gentle and clear, and sending out one pure strain, are beautiful, not with relation to another strain, but singly by themselves, and that inherent pleasures attend them.

Prot. Such is indeed the fact.

Soc. The kind of pleasures arising from odours is less divine than those; but through pains being not of necessity mixed with them, and their happening⁷⁶ to be produced for us by any means and in any thing, I lay down all this as opposed to those. But, if you observe, these are two kinds of pleasures spoken of.⁷⁷

Prot. I do observe.

Soc. To these then let us still add the pleasures connected with learning; if indeed they seem to us not to have a hunger

omitted, I have translated as if the Greek were ὡς φησιν ὁ λόγος: where ὡς was lost through the preceding λέγω.

⁷⁵—⁷⁶ The Greek is καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς. Ficinus has "colores item eadem ratione, pulchros atque gratos esse," as if he had found in his MS. τρόπον—καὶ ἡδέα without ἔχοντα. From the two united, one might elicit καὶ χρώματα διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τὸν τρόπον ἔχοντα τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς. Schleiermacher suggested καὶ χρώματα δὴ τὸν τοῦτον τὸν τύπον καλὰ καὶ ἔχοντα ἡδονάς. He should have read rather καὶ χρώματα ἅπτα δὴ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὄντα καλὰ καὶ ἔχοντα ἡδονάς. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, conceived that many words had dropt out; but in ed. 2, would supply after ἔχοντα, λέγω καθ' αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι καὶ ἡδονάς οἰκίας ἔχειν.

⁷⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ—τυγχάνειν, not καὶ ὅπῃ—τυγχάνει. For the infinitive is required by συμμείχθαι, and τὸ before ὅπῃ τυγχάνειν, as in p. 28, D., τὸ ὅπῃ ἐτυχεν.

⁷⁷ Instead of λεγομένων, Heindorf suggested λέγομεν τῶν, Schütz, ἐλέγομεν, from "collegimus" in Ficinus, which, adopted by Stalb. in ed. 1, rejected in ed. 2, for he says that ἐστὶ is to be understood after εἶδῃ, and ὑφ' ἡμῶν after λεγομένων.

after learning, nor pains arising at the commencement, through the hunger after learning.

Prot. But⁷⁸ so it seems to me.

[118.] *Soc.* What then if there should be to those, who have been filled⁷⁹ with learning, losses subsequently through forgetfulness, do you perceive any pains in those (losses)?

Prot. Not naturally, but through some reasonings respecting the suffering, when, after being deprived, a person feels a pain through a want.

Soc. At present however, blessed man, we are going through the feelings arising only from nature, independent of any reasonings.

Prot. You are right then, in saying, that, in learning, a forgetfulness frequently takes place, without any pain to us.

Soc. These pleasures, then, of learning, we must say are unmixed with pains. But by no means do they belong to the majority of mankind, but to the very few.

Prot. How must we not say so?

[119.] *Soc.* Since, then, we have tolerably well distinguished between the pure pleasures and those which are almost rightly called impure, let us⁸⁰ [in our account]⁸⁰ attribute to vehement pleasures immoderation; to those that are not so, the contrary moderation; and those that admit⁸¹ the great and the intensely, and contrariwise⁸² (the little and the mildly),⁸² such, let us say, do all of them ever⁸³ belong to the limitless

⁷⁸ I cannot understand ἀλλὰ thus used by itself in a confirmation.

⁷⁹ In lieu of πληρωθεισῶν Schütz suggested πληρωθεῖσιν, adopted by Bekk. and Stalb., Faehse more neatly τι δ' οὐ, — πληρωθεῖς, ὧν ἴαν — γίνονται, καθορᾷ — i. e. "What, does not a person, having been filled with learning, of which should there be subsequently losses —, perceive some pains in those (losses)?"

^{80—80} The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus; who through the whole of this speech found in his MS. readings far superior to any furnished by other MSS.

⁸¹ Instead of γιγνομένας Heindorf was the first to suggest δεχομένας, obtained from the version of Ficinus, "quæ — suscipiunt."

^{82—83} The words within numerals have been preserved by Ficinus alone, from whose version, "intentius, remissius, magnum, parvum, raro, crebro," Heindorf elicited τὰς τὸ μικρὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα, καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὐ καὶ τὸ ἥρεμα, but Schütz, τὰς τὸ σφόδρα αὐ καὶ ἥρεμα, καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν — But the balance of the sentence requires rather τὰς καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ σφόδρα, καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ ἥρεμα αὐ —

^{82—83} The Greek is τοιαύτας τῆς — προσθῶμεν αὐταῖς, where Ste-

genus, namely, the more and the less, borne along through the body and soul ; but that those, which do not admit of these properties, belong to the moderate.

Prot. You speak most correctly, Socrates.

Soc. Still further, in addition to these, we must look thoroughly⁸⁴ subsequently into this belonging to them.

Prot. What?

[120.] *Soc.* What it is meet to say contributes to truth. Is it the pure, and sincere, and sufficient,⁸⁵ or the violent, and the many, and the much?

Prot. What do you mean, Socrates, in asking this?

Soc. That I may omit proving nothing relating to pleasure and knowledge, whether in either of them a part is pure, and a part not pure, in order that each being pure may come to a trial, and enable myself and you and all these here to form a decision more easily.

Prot. Most correctly (said).

Soc. Come then, let us consider in this way respecting all the kinds which we say are pure ; (and)⁸⁶ having first selected some one from among them, look at it thoroughly.

Prot. What then shall we select?

Soc. Let us look, if you will, at the white kind amongst the first.

Prot. By all means.

[121.] *Soc.* How then, and what would be the purity of white? whether, where there is the greatest and most, or where it is the least mixed in that substance, in which there is no portion of any other colour?

Prot. Evidently, where it is the most sincere.

Soc. Rightly (said). Shall we then, Protarchus, not lay

phens was the first to reject *τῆς*, and Stalbaum *προς*, and the latter to adopt *αὐτὰς*, found in a single MS. But it is easier, I think, to alter *τῆς* into *δῆ*, and *προς* into *πως*, and *θῶμεν* into *φῶμεν*, and *αὐτὰς* into *αἱ πάσας*.

⁸⁴ In lieu of *διαθερίον*, Heusde suggested *διαθεαρίον*, found subsequently in a single MS. after correction, and adopted by Stalbaum.

⁸⁵ By introducing *καὶ τὸ ἱκανόν* in this place, instead of the end of the sentence, we not only preserve the balance of the sentence, but get rid of the difficulty, which Stalbaum was the first to see, but unable to overcome.

⁸⁶ We must either insert *καὶ* with Stephens, or omit *διασκοπεῖμεν* with Ficinus ; who has, however, "in medium inducentes."

down this as the truest; and at the same the most beautiful of all whites; but not that, where it is the largest, and most.

Prot. Most correctly.

Soc. If then we should say, that a little of pure white is more white, and more beautiful, and more truly white, than a great quantify of mixed white, we should say what is entirely correct.

Prot. Most correctly.

[122.] *Soc.* Well then, we shall assuredly be not wanting in any such examples in favour of our reasoning respecting pleasure; but it is sufficient⁸⁷ for us to perceive from thence, that in the case of pleasure in general, a portion small in size and little in quantity, yet unmixed with pain, would be more sweet, more true, and more beautiful, than a portion large in size, and great in quantity, ⁸⁸(mixed with pain).⁸⁸

Prot. Greatly so, and quite sufficient is the example.

Soc. But what is one of this kind? Have we not heard respecting pleasure, that it is a thing always generating, and that of pleasure there is no existence at all? For some clever⁸⁹ persons, forsooth, to whom we owe thanks, attempt to point out to us this kind of reasoning.

Prot. What is it?

Soc. Shall I go through it before you, friend Protarchus, and interrogate you?⁹⁰

Prot. Only tell it, and interrogate.

[123.] *Soc.* There are some two things; one itself by itself; the other always desirous of (something)⁹¹ else.

Prot. How say you this?⁹² and of what (are you speaking)?

Soc. The one is by nature most worthy of respect; the other falls short of it.

⁸⁷ Ficinus has "sufficiet." He therefore found in his MS., ἀρκίσι—

⁸⁸ The words within numerals Sydenham first supplied in his English version, and Heindorf in a note the Greek word μεμιγμένης after μεγάλης. And so too Stalbaum in ed. 1, but he rejects the idea in ed. 2.

⁸⁹ In the Greek — κομψοί, i. e. "elegant," in their reasonings and discourses; subtle arguers, or fine logicians; a character which distinguished the school of Zeno the Eleatic. It will presently be seen, that the persons here spoken of philosophized on the principles of the Eleatic sect, and were probably some of Zeno's Athenian disciples. S.

⁹⁰ So Ficinus correctly. Others take the speech positively.

⁹¹ Ficinus has "alterum—quid," which leads to ἄλλον του instead of ἄλλον—

⁹² The oldest MS. correctly reads τοῦτο for τοῦτω—

Prot. Speak a little more clearly.

Soc. We have beheld young persons beautiful and good, and seen their admirers.

Prot. Often.

Soc. Similar then to these two seek two others, ⁹² according to all those things, which we say is the third to another. ⁹³

Prot. State more plainly, Socrates, what you mean.

Soc. It is nothing subtle, Protarchus. But our present argument is playing with us; and says, that of things existing one thing is ever for the sake of something; and the other, for the sake of which there is on every occasion produced that, which is produced always for the sake of something.

[124.] *Prot.* I scarcely understand you, ⁹⁴ through the being said oftentimes. ⁹⁴

Soc. Perhaps, however, we shall better understand, boy, as the reasoning proceeds.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Let us now take these two different things.

Prot. Of what kinds?

Soc. The generating of all things is one kind; the existence, another.

Prot. I acknowledge these two, existence and generating.

Soc. Most correctly. Now, which of these shall we say is for the sake of which? Shall we say, generating is for the sake of existence, or existence for the sake of generating?

[125.] *Prot.* Are you now inquiring whether that, which is called existence, is what it is for the sake of generating?

Soc. I appear so.

⁹²⁻⁹³ The Greek is κατὰ πάντα δὲα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἰρίον. Stalbaum and Cousin say, that Schleiermacher has well expressed the passage in German; which means, according to Cousin, that "the relation, which one thing bears to another, is a third thing opposite to the two things." But the relation neither is nor could be opposite to any thing but a counter-relation. Had there been indeed an allusion to a geometrical ratio, I could have understood the expression "a third to another," or rather "to either," in Greek ἑκαρίον, as a mean between the two quantities mentioned. But at present I am quite in the dark; and so too Protarchus is feigned to be; for he bids Socrates state more clearly what he means.

⁹⁴⁻⁹⁴ The Greek is διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι: which I cannot understand. I could have understood διὰ τὸ τι ποικίλως πλεχθῆναι, i. e. "through something having been subtly woven;" where there would be a proper reference to the preceding ποικίλον.

Prot. By the gods, ⁹⁶would you be asking me in addition? ⁹⁶

Soc. I mean, Protarchus, something of this kind. Would you say that ship-building exists for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship-building? and whatever things there are of the like kind, Protarchus, I mean by this very (question).

Prot. Why then, Socrates, do you not give an answer to it yourself?

Soc. There is no reason why not. Do you however take a share with me in the discourse.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. I say then, that, for the sake of generating, medicines, ⁹⁶and all instruments, and all matter is placed by the side of all; but that each act of generating is for the sake of some individual existence, one for one kind and another for another; but that generating taken universally is for the sake of existence taken universally.

Prot. Most clearly.

[126.] *Soc.* Pleasure then, if it be a generating, will of necessity be for the sake of some existence.

Prot. How not?

Soc. ⁹⁷Now that, for the sake of which the thing generated for the sake of something would be always generated, is in the portion of the good; but that which is generated for the

⁹⁶—⁹⁶ This is the literal version of the Greek, ἀρ' ἂν ἐπανερωτῆς με. But, as Stalbaum says in ed. 1, Protarchus would be a simpleton to inquire merely of Socrates, whether he was asking a question. Accordingly he proposed to read, Ποῖον ἀρ' ἐπανερωτῆς με: for which, in ed. 2, he substitutes τί, πρὸς θεῶν, ἀρ' αὖ ἐπανερωτῆς με. But ἀρα could not thus commence a clause after the parenthetic πρὸς θεῶν. Other critics too, and among them Schleiermacher, Ast, Baiter, and Sauppe, have tried their hands at corrections, which are equally unsatisfactory to Stalbaum and myself. Plato wrote, I suspect, Πρὸς θεῶν, ἀρα παῖδ' ὄντ' ἐρωτῆς με; i. e. "By the gods, are you asking me, as if I were a child?" For thus there would be not only an allusion to Socrates, addressing Protarchus just before as a boy, but to the expression in Sophist. § 58, μῦθον—διηγείσθαι, παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν, ἡμῖν. Gorg. p. 499, B., καὶ ἐμοί, ὥσπερ παιδί, χρῆ. Prometh. 1022, Ἐκπετρόμησας δῆθεν, ὡς παῖδ' ὄντ', ἐμὶ: Agam. 278, Παιδὸς νίας ὡς κάρτ' ἐμωμήσω φρένας. Theognis, Ἄλλ' ὥσπερ μικρὸν παῖδα λόγοις μ' ἀπατῆς.

⁹⁷ I scarcely understand φάρμακα by itself. I could have understood φθορᾶς φάρμακα, i. e. "remedies against decay."

for a person to be neither pleased nor pained, but to have thoughts the purest possible.

[128.] *Prot.* Much absurdity, as it seems, Socrates, would result, should any one lay down that pleasure is a good.⁹⁹

Soc. Much ; since¹⁰⁰ let us discourse still in this way:

Prot. In what?

Soc. How is it not absurd for nothing good or beautiful to exist, neither in the body nor in many other things, except in the soul, and there only pleasure ; and that neither fortitude, nor temperance, nor mind, nor any of the good things, which the soul has obtained by lot, should exist of that kind ?¹ And still in addition to this, that the person not delighted, but in pain, should be compelled to say that he is then wicked, when he is in pain, although he be the best of all men ; and on the other hand, that the person delighted excels in virtue so much the more, as he is the more delighted then,² when he is delighted.²

Prot. All these suppositions, Socrates, are absurdities, the greatest possible.

[129.] *Soc.* Let us then not endeavour to make an examination of pleasure at all ; nor appear to be, as it were, very chary of mind and science ; but let us spiritedly strike every thing all round, if perchance it gives a cracked sound,³ until coming to the view of that, which is naturally the most free from a flaw, we may use it for our decision, suited alike both to the truest parts of these and of pleasure likewise.

⁹⁹ One would expect rather *τάγαθόν*, i. e. the good."

¹⁰⁰ This "since" is absurd ; although *ἔπει* is acknowledged by Ficinus' version "quandoquidem ;" but as he adds "et hoc præterea ratione ostendere licet," it is evident he did not find in his MS. *λέγωμεν*, but *λέγουσιν ἔτι*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὡ παῖ*, as in § 124.

¹ I cannot understand *τοιούτων* here.

² The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus—"At eum contra, qui voluptatibus delinitur, quo magis gestit, eo virtute præstantiorem dicere." They seem however to be required, although not easy to understand, to preserve the balance of the sentence ; where *τὸν μὴ χαίροντα* is opposed to *χαίροντα*, and *ἀλγοῦντα* to *χαίρει*, and *κακὸν* to *διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετὴν*, and *ὅταν ἀλγῇ* to *ὅταν χαίρῃ*. But as there is nothing to balance *κἀν ᾧ ἀριστος πάντως*, Plato perhaps wrote *διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τότε, ὅταν χαίρῃ κάκιστος ὡς*, i. e. "excels in virtue then, when he is delighted, although he is the most wicked."

³ I have adopted, in lieu of the scarcely intelligible *ἔχει*, the more correct *ἔχει*, suggested by Steinbrüchel in Mus. Turicens. t. ii. p. 334, and Wyttienbach on Plutarch, t. ii. p. 64, D. Despite, however, the array of

Prot. Rightly (said).

Soc. Is there not, I think,⁴ one part of the sciences relating⁵ to learning in general, connected with handicraft trades, and another with instruction and nurture?

Prot. It is so.

[130.] *Soc.* Now in the manual arts,⁶ let us consider, first, whether there is⁷ one part more closely connected with science, and another part less so; and whether it is meet to reckon the former as the most pure,⁸ but the latter as the most impure.⁹

Prot. It is meet.

Soc. We must therefore take the leading arts apart from each individual one.¹⁰

Prot. What arts? and how?

Soc. As if a person should, for example, separate from all arts arithmetic, and mensuration, and weighing, the remainder of each would become, so to say, inconsiderable.

Prot. Inconsiderable indeed.

Soc. For after these there would be left for those only to conjecture, and to exercise the senses by experience and practice, who by making use of the power of guessing, which the many call art, have worked out¹¹ their strength by assiduity and labour.

parallel passages produced in the note of Stalbaum, he says that the correction is very elegant, but not necessary.

⁴ There is some error in *οἶμαι*. For no person in asking a question could say, "I think;" although he might say, "think you." Ficinus omits *οἶμαι* entirely.

⁵ This is the correct meaning of *μαθήματα* here, as remarked by Stalbaum.

⁶ Instead of *χειροτεχνικαῖς* Sydenham suggested *χειροτεχνίας*: of which Stalbaum disapproves at the very moment when he quotes Rep. ix. p. 590, B., *βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία*, which seems to give some support to Sydenham.

⁷ In lieu of *ἐν* Sydenham suggested *ἐστὶ*, which Stalbaum attributes to Schleiermacher.

^{8, 9} Stalbaum reads *καθαρώτατα* and *ἀκαθαρτότερα*, with the majority of MSS. and Ficinus. But the balance of the sentence requires the same degree of comparison in both clauses. I have therefore adopted *καθαρώτατα* and *ἀκαθαρτότατα*. Sydenham has "more pure—more impure."

¹⁰ So Stalbaum in ed. 2, rejecting the correction of Stephens, *ἐκάστην* for *ἐκάστων*, which he had adopted in ed. 1.

¹¹ I cannot understand *ἀπειργασμένους* found in nearly all the MSS. For *ἀπειργάζεσθαι* never means "adipisci" or "nancisci," as translated by

Prot. You say what is most necessarily (true).

[131.] *Soc.* ¹²In the first place, (is not) the musical art full (of conjecture), while adapting the harmony not by (a fixed) measure, but by practice? and of it taken universally (do not) hautboy-playing (and harp-playing) hunt out the measure suited to each by the aid of (a mouth-piece and) string through guessing merely, so that it has a great deal mixed, which is not very certain, and only a little, that is sure.¹³

Prot. Very true.

Soc. Moreover we shall find that the medical, and agricultural, and naval, and military arts are in a similar condition.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. But the art of building (we shall find), I think, making use of very many measures and instruments; which,¹³ giving to it great accuracy, make it more scientific than the majority of arts.

Prot. How so?

Soc. So too in ship-building, and house-building, and in many other works of carpentry. For in these, I think, (the art) uses the straight rule, and the turning-lathe, and the compass, and the plumb-line, and the marking-line, and the level properly formed.

Prot. You say very correctly, Socrates.

Ficinus and Stalbaum respectively. I have therefore adopted ἀπειρασμένους—

¹²—¹³ On this most difficult, because corrupt, passage, Stalbaum has written a long note in ed. 1, and another still longer in ed. 2. From the two I have selected what seemed to me to be the nearest to the truth. Instead therefore of μεστή—πρῶτον οὐ μέτρω ἀλλὰ μελίτης στοχασμῷ, the text was perhaps μεστή—στοχασμοῦ—οὐ μέτρω—where μεστή—στοχασμοῦ, suggested by Stalbaum and adopted by Winckelmann, is confirmed by p. 62, B. § 148, μουσικὴν—ἣν ὀλίγον ἐμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν στοχάσεως—μιστήν. Next, in lieu of ξύμπασα αὐτῆς, the sense requires συμπάσης αὐτῆς—For the whole of music was confined to the hautboy and harp; and hence after αὐλητικῇ, Stalbaum approves of καὶ κιθαριστικῇ, found in one MS. after correction: and as two instruments are alluded to, it is evident that besides χορδή, which is a part of the harp, there is required a word to express a part of the hautboy; and hence φορβείας has probably dropt out before χορδῆς: while to complete the syntax, ἴσων may be inserted between θηρεύουσαι and ὥστε.

¹³ I have adopted Heindorf's & for rd, obtained perhaps from "quibus" in Ficinus, or "which" in Sydenham. The reading was received by Stalbaum in ed. 1, but is rejected in ed. 2.

[132.] *Soc.* Let us then place the arts so called into two kinds ; some following music, (and) possessing in their works a less share of accuracy ; others, building, possessing a larger share.

Prot. Let them be so placed.

Soc. And of these arts, that those are the most accurate which we lately said were the prime (or leading).

Prot. You seem to me to be speaking of arithmetic, and those other arts, which together with it you mentioned just now.

Soc. Just so. But, Protarchus, must we not say that each of these, again, is twofold ? or how ?

Prot. What arts do you mean ?

Soc. Must we not say, in the first place, that the arithmetic of the many is of one kind, but that of philosophers another ?

Prot. By dividing in what way, can a person lay down the one and the other ?

Soc. The boundary, Protarchus, is not trifling. For of the things relating to number, the many calculate by unequal units ; as two armies, two oxen, two things the smallest, or two the greatest of all things. But philosophers could not follow them, unless a person should lay down an unit, differing in no respect from each of the units in ten thousand.¹⁴

Prot. Indeed you say very correctly that there is no little difference amongst those, who occupy themselves in arithmetic ; so as to make it reasonable that there are two kinds.

[133.] *Soc.* And what of calculation in trade, and of mensuration in building ? ¹⁵(Do these differ) ¹⁵from the geometry and the calculations made by students in philosophy ? Shall we say that each of them is one art ? or shall we set down each as two ?

Prot. Following out the preceding remarks, I should, according to my vote, lay down that each of these is two.

Soc. Correctly so. But do you understand for what reason we have brought forward these matters between us ?

¹⁴ Such is the reading adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from the four oldest MSS. The others offer *μορίων*, similar to "partium" in Ficinus.

¹⁵⁻¹⁵ Stephens was the first to remark, that *διαφίσει* was wanting to support the syntax and sense ; for which Stalbaum in ed. 1 suggested *διαφίπουσα*. But in ed. 2 he thinks that Plato had in mind *διαφίσει*, but omitted to put it down.

Prot. Perhaps I do. But I would wish yourself to lay open the question just asked.

Soc. To me at least then this reasoning seems no less, than when we commenced detailing it ¹⁶by seeking something ¹⁶the counterpart to pleasures, to have reached ¹⁷to that point, where it is possible to consider what science is more pure than another science, as (one) pleasure (was more so than another) pleasure.

Prot. This at least is very clear, that it attempted those things for the sake of these.

[134.] *Soc.* What then, has it discovered, ¹⁸in what has gone before, that over others ¹⁹one art is clearer than another, and one less clear than another?

Prot. Entirely.

Soc. And has not in these instances the reasoning, after speaking of some art, of the same name (as another), led to the opinion of both being one; and does it not then inquire, as if being two, their clearness and purity, whether the opinion of those who philosophize, or those who do not, is the more accurate respecting them?

¹⁶—¹⁶ In lieu of ζητῶν Stephens suggested ζήτησιν. He should have proposed ζητοῦντε, applied to the two speakers. For ζητεῖν is thus perpetually said of persons engaged in a mental inquiry, as shown by Stalbaum; who in ed. 1 correctly saw that τι had dropt out after ἀντίστροφον.

¹⁷ Although Schleiermacher, whom Bekker and Stalbaum in ed. 1 followed, acutely perceived that Plato wrote προβεβηκέναι, and not προβεβληκέναι, yet he did not perceive that ἐνταῦθα would require ἵνα, lying hid in the tail of προβεβηκέναι: and as one MS. offers σκοπεῖν from correction for σκοπῶν, it is evident we must read ἵνα σκοπεῖν πάρεστι τις—instead of σκοπῶν ἅρ' ἐστὶ τις—, as I have translated. The version of Ficinus would lead us to believe that his MS. was different from any other since discovered. For it runs thus, "Disputatio postra, quæ jamdiu proportionem quandam æqua divisionis conversione voluptatis respondentem quærit, dum indagat, num sit scientia quædam alia scientia prior, quemadmodum voluptate voluptas."

¹⁸ The Greek is in some MSS. ἀνευρίσκει, in others ἀνευρίσκειν, but in one from correction ἀνευρήκει: while Ficinus has "reperitum est." From hence it is easy to restore ἀνεύρηκε, namely, ὁ λόγος.

¹⁹ I cannot understand ἐπ' ἄλλοις, which Stalbaum translates "over other things;" Ficinus, "in alia re." But the balance of the sentence in the next clause, ἄλλην ἄλλης, proves that ἄλλης ἄλλην, found here in some MSS., is the correct reading, while in ἐπ' lies hid ἐπὶ—

Prot. And it appears to me to make this inquiry very correctly.²⁰

Soc. What answer then, Protarchus, shall we give it?

[135.] *Prot.* To a wonderful extent of difference have we, Socrates, arrived, touching a clear view of the sciences.

Soc. We shall therefore answer more easily.

Prot. How not? And let it be said, that these (leading)²¹ arts differ greatly from the others; and that from these themselves differ those, which engage the exertions of persons philosophizing really with accuracy and truth on the subject of measures and numbers.

Soc. Let this be according to your views; and trusting to you, let us boldly give an answer to those, who are terrible in tearing²² arguments to pieces.

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. That there are two kinds of arithmetic, and two of mensuration, and many others of the same kind, following these and possessing this duality, but having one name in common.

Prot. Let us, Socrates, with good luck give to those, whom you say are terrible, that very answer.

[136.] *Soc.* Do we then affirm, that these sciences are the most accurate.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. But the dialectic power, Protarchus, would repudiate us, if we preferred any other science to hers.

Prot. Whom must we call by that name?

Soc. Plainly, Protarchus, her, who perceives all the (knowledge)²³ just now mentioned. For I am entirely of opinion, that all persons, to whom even a small particle of mind has been apportioned, must deem the knowledge, which relates to

²⁰ Instead of *μάλα* the sense requires *μάλ' εὖ*. Compare § 132, *καὶ μάλα γ' εὖ λέγεις*.

²¹ Stalbaum with Sydenham understands by *αὗται*, "the leading arts," remarking at the same time, that this use of the pronoun is rather harsh. Perhaps Plato wrote *αἱ πρώται*, as in § 132, *ἀς—πρώτας εἰπομεν*.

²² With *λόγων ὀλέην* Stalbaum compares *τοὺς λόγους ἔλας*, in Theætet. § 126.

²³ Ficinus has "quæ omnem modo inductam peritiam noscit:" who thus found in his MS. the word *πιστήμην*, wanting to complete the sense and syntax.

the really existing,²⁴ and that which is ever by nature according to the same, to be by far the most true notion. But what and how would you, Protarchus, decide?

Prot. I have often, Socrates, heard from Gorgias on each occasion, that the art of persuasion excels by much all other arts. For it would make all things its slaves willingly, and not by violence; and therefore it would be of all arts by far the best. Now I should not be willing to lay down what is opposed to you or him.

[137.] *Soc.* You seem to me to say that, having wished for arms, you are ashamed of having deserted them.

Prot. Let these matters be in the place, where it seems good to you.

Soc. Am I the cause of your not correctly understanding?

Prot. What?

Soc. I did not, friend Protarchus, inquire this—what art or what science is superior to all, by its being²⁵ the greatest, and best, and benefiting us the most; but what is that, which looks upon the clear, the accurate, and the most true, although it may be little and benefit but little. This it is which we are now seeking. Look to it. For you will not become hateful to Gorgias, if you allow his art to be of use²⁶ to the ruling of mankind,²⁶ ²⁷but, what I just now said, to the busy occupation,²⁷ as I then said respecting white, that if there be a little but pure, it excels a large quantity that is not such, by the very circumstance of its being the most true. And now, having thought greatly upon this, and reasoned about it sufficiently, and look-

²⁴ As Plato never elsewhere has τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως, but always τὸ ὄντως ὄν, we must read so here, as I have translated.

²⁵ The infinitive εἶναι, which Stephens first perceived to be wanting here, has been found in a single MS. after correction. It was adopted by Stalbaum in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2, because he did not see that ὡφελοῦσα could be easily changed into ὡφελῆσαι, what εἶναι would require. In defence of τῷ—ὡφελοῦσα Stalbaum produces some passages collected by Poppo in Prolegom. p. 150, and himself, all of which I have shown, or could show, to be corrupt.

^{26—27} I have translated, as if the Greek were πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῦ τοῦς ἀνθρώπους κρατεῖν, and not πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν. For Gorgias prided himself upon the power he possessed, and professed to teach, of ruling mankind by the art of persuasion.

^{27—27} The words within numerals I cannot understand, nor could Stalbaum; nor Ficinus, whose version is, "Nihil enim Gorgiam lacesces, si ejus arti utilitatis laudem præstantiamque concedas, ei vero, quam ipse modo narravi, facultati veritatis præcellentiam tribuas."

ing to neither the utility of sciences nor to their high repute, but, if there be any power inherent in our soul to love the truth, and for its sake to do every thing,²⁸ of this let us speak; and having thoroughly searched out the purity of mind and intellect, let us seek whether we can say that in all probability we possess this, or any other power more powerful than this.²⁸

[138.] *Prot.* Nay, I do consider, and I think it is difficult to admit that any other science or art lays hold of truth more than this.

Soc. Have you said what you have said now, after perceiving something of this kind, that the majority of arts, and such as busy themselves about matters here, make use in the first place of opinions, and with the mind on the stretch²⁹ are in search of what relates to opinions; and if a person³⁰ thinks fit to pry into the phenomena of Nature, you know that through life he merely searches into the matters relating to this world, how it has been produced, and in what way it suffers, and in what way it acts. Shall we say this, or how?

Prot. Thus.

Soc. Such a person then has undertaken this study, not about the things which exist always, but about those that are in the course of being, and will be, and have been.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. What clearness then can we say exists in truths the most exact respecting those things, not one of which has possessed ever, or will possess, or possesses at present, the state of sameness?

Prot. How can we?

²⁸⁻²⁹ Such is the literal version of the Greek; of which Stalbaum has, in ed. 1, given a paraphrase, omitted in ed. 2. Ficinus has "hanc diximus perscrutantes puritate mentis et sapientiæ, considerandum an probabile sit a disserendine scientia maxime possideri, vel aliam potius hac præstantiorem ista perquirere:" by the aid of which it would perhaps be not difficult to recover what Plato wrote.

²⁹ So Grou and Heusde; whose conjecture of *ἐννεραιμίνως* for *ἐννεραιμίνως* has been found in one MS. after correction. Stalbaum however defends *ἐννεραιμίνως*, and explains it, "in a compact body," like a troop of soldiers. Ficinus has "ex instituto." But though, as Cicero says, there is a kind of union amongst all arts, yet philosophical studies are pursued separately, but with an intensity of thought.

³⁰ The persons here alluded to, called by Aristotle *οἱ φυσικοὶ*, "naturalists," were probably Anaxagoras and Archelaus. See Xenophon in *Mem.* S. i. 1, 11. S.

Soc. How then respecting things, which do not possess any stability whatever, can there be any thing stable in us?

Prot. By no means, I imagine.

Soc. Nor is there mind, nor any knowledge possessing the greatest truth respecting them.

Prot. It is probable there is not?

[139.] *Soc.* We ought then, both you and I, to leave and bid farewell frequently to Gorgias and Philebus, and in our reasoning to appeal to this as a testimony.

Prot. What?

Soc. That there either is respecting those matters the stable, and the pure, and the true, and what we lately called the immaculate, as regards the things, which have the property of existing ever in the same manner, and similarly perfectly unmixed; or secondly,³¹ whatever has the most affinity with them; but that of all the rest we must speak as secondary and subsequent.

Prot. You speak most truly.

Soc. With respect then to things of this kind, is it not most just to give the most beautiful names to things the most beautiful?

Prot. It is at least reasonable.

Soc. Are not mind and intellect and wisdom the names which a person would hold in the highest honour?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. These then, after having been formed accurately, may be correctly given to the notions conversant about the things really existing.

Prot. Perfectly.

Soc. And the things, which I formerly brought for our decision, are not other than these names.

[140.] *Prot.* How not, Socrates?

³¹ The Greek is *δεύτερος*, which Schleiermacher says agrees with *πλοῦς* understood. But such an ellipse would be here inadmissible. For whenever Plato uses that proverbial expression, he always introduces, what could not be omitted, the substantive. We might indeed read here *ἡ ὁ δεύτερος πόρος*—for *πόρος* might easily have dropt out after—*τερος*. But as Ficinus has “quod secundo loco,” Stephens suggested *δεύτερον*, taken separately or united to *ἐκείνων*. Two MSS. offer *δευτέρως*. But in that case we must read *δευτέρως μάλιστα ἐκείνων ὃ τι ἐστὶ ξυγγενές*, as in Tim. p. 58, B., *μάλιστα—δευτέρως*.

Soc. Be it so. If then a person were to say that, what relates to intellect and pleasure, touching their mutual mixture, is placed before us, as before workmen, from which or in which they must fabricate something, he would make a comparison suitable to our discourse.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Must we not in the next place attempt to mix them?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Would it not be best to mention beforehand, and call to remembrance things of this kind?

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. Those we have mentioned before. For the proverb seems to be well, ³² "Twice and thrice what is well to turn over" ³³ in our discourse is meet.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Come then, by Zeus; for I think that what has been stated previously, was said in this wise.

Prot. How?

[141.] *Soc.* Philebus affirms that pleasure has been established as the proper aim for all animals, and that all persons ought to aim at it; that this very thing is to all universally the good; and that the two terms "good" and "pleasant" have been correctly assigned to one thing and to one nature. But Socrates denies this; and (says) that in the first place the things are, like the terms, two; and secondly, that the good and the pleasant possess a nature different from each other; and that intellect partakes in a share of the good more than pleasure does. Is not this now, and was it not then, stated so, Protarchus?

Prot. Strongly so.

Soc. And was not this (agreed upon) then, and should we not agree upon it now?

Prot. What?

Soc. That the nature of the good differs from the rest of things in this?

[142.] *Prot.* In what?

Soc. That whatever animal possesses it for ever, perfectly,

³²⁻³³ There is an allusion to the same proverb, but in different words, in Gorg. p. 498, E., Legg. xii. p. 957, A., and the other passages quoted by Stalbaum.

and under all circumstances of time and place, such a being has no want of any thing beside, but has what is sufficient and most complete. Is it not so?

Prot. It is so.

Soc. Have we then not endeavoured in this discourse, by placing each apart from each as regards the life of each, (to leave)³³ pleasure unmixed with intellect, and in like manner intellect possessing not the smallest particle of pleasure?

Prot. It is so.

Soc. Did either of those (lives) seem to us at that time to be sufficient for any person?

Prot. How could it?

[143.] *Soc.* But if at that time we were carried in any respect beside the mark, let any person whatever, taking up again the subject, say what is more correct, laying down that memory, and intellect, and science, and correct opinion belong to the very same species, and considering whether any one would without those choose that any thing whatever should happen to him, much less pleasure; be it the greatest in quantity and most intense in kind, provided he had neither a true conception of being delighted, nor knew at all by what things he was affected, nor had a recollection of the circumstance for any period whatever. And let him say³⁴ the same respecting intellect likewise, whether any one would choose without all pleasures, or³⁵ even the least, to possess intellect, rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without intellect, rather than with some intellect.

Prot. There is no one,³⁶ Socrates. And there is no need to ask these questions frequently.

[144.] *Soc.* Neither one of these then would be the perfect, and all-eligible, and consummate good.

Prot. For how could it?

³³ To preserve the sense and syntax we must insert *ἴαν*, which might have easily dropt out before *ἄμικτον*. On the loss or confusion of *ἴαν* see my notes on *Crito*, § 15, n. 27.

³⁴ Instead of *λίγῃς* the three oldest MSS. offer *λίγῳ*. From the two *Stalbaum*, in ed. 1, elicited *λαγέτω*, similar to *εἰπάτω*, towards the commencement of this speech. But in ed. 2, he prefers *λίγῃς*.

³⁵ Instead of *καὶ* the sense requires *ἢ καὶ*—

³⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were, what the sense requires, *ὅτι ἴσθιν εἰς, Σώκρατες*, instead of—*ὦ Σώκρατες*.

we are, ⁴³ and these being mixed together, are sufficient to make a straight line? ⁴⁴ Or do we still want something, and not of such a kind?

THEA. If we want we must act thus.

SOC. Let there be then a man having a notion of straightness, and knowing what it is, and having a language whereby he can declare, and thinking thoroughly in like manner about every thing else in existence.

THEA. Let there be such a person.

SOC. Will now this man have a sufficiency of science by knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine sphere, and, while ignorant of the sphere, and of the circles made of wood, ⁴⁵ as he makes a bed ⁴⁶ or builds, and in other things similarly of straight-lines and circles?

THEA. Ridiculous we should call ⁴⁷ our position here, Socrates, if it existed only in the sciences relating to things divine.

SOC. How say you? Alas we throw and mix together in common the art neither sound nor pure of the false straight-line and measure and chisel, ⁴⁸ and mix them with the other impurities?

THEA. Yes: for it is necessary, ⁴⁹ if any of us is about on such occasions to find the way home.

SOC. And music too, which we said a little before was wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and imitation?

⁴³ To complete the sense I have translated as if the Greek were ἀπ' ἑαυτοῦ, not αὐτοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, and ἀναγκαῖον, not ἀναγκαῖον, found often.

in one MS. derived from the various reading ἀναγκαῖον.

⁴⁴ The Greek is ἀπὸ τοῦ καὶ χυαίνοντες. But the train of thought leads evidently to ἀπὸ τοῦ κατεχόμενον, as I have translated.

⁴⁵ Every writer, who has written on this passage, confesses that κατέχευαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους is a corruption. I suspect that Plato wrote κατέχευαι καὶ τέχνην—as shown by δοῖναι κατέχευαι καὶ τέχνην ἡρακλείδῃ in Eurip. Here, 945, κατέχευαι τέχνην in Tro. 814, and in Sophocl. Περσέων Πρ., τέχνην κατέχευαι, πῆχυν, διαβήτην καὶ στάθμην, evidently said of the building of Troy. Of these builders' instruments, the κατέχευαι, διαβήτην, and στάθμην have been mentioned in §131. The τέχνην was the mason's chisel. See Pollux, vii. 118, and 125.

⁴⁶ So Sydenham; as if he wished to read λέγομεν ἄν for λέγομεν.

⁴⁷ Here again we must read τέχνην for τέχνην.

⁴⁸ Unless I do not understand Plato's meaning here.

Prot. To me it seems necessary, if our life is to be in any manner whatever a life.

Soc. Are you then willing, like a door-keeper, jostled and forced by a throng of people, to yield and throw open the doors, and suffer all the sciences to rush in, and to be mixed together⁵² the wanting (in purity)⁵² with the pure.

Prot. I cannot perceive, Socrates, how any one would be hurt by receiving all the other sciences, if possessing already the leading.

Soc. Let me then admit them all to come pouring into the receptacle of Homer's⁵³ poetical mingling of the waters in a valley.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. They are admitted. And let us now return to the font of pleasure.⁵⁴ For when we thought of mixing them together, the portions of the true had not been produced; but, from our love of all science, we sent them in a crowd to the same spot, and even before the pleasures.

Prot. You speak most truly.

Soc. It is now time for us to consult about the pleasures; whether we should let them all come thronging in, or whether we should admit those, that are true, the first.

Prot. It makes a great difference in point of safety, to let in first the true.

Soc. Let these then be admitted. But what after this? Must we not, if some are necessary, mix together these as we did those?⁵⁵

Prot. Why not? at least the necessary, surely.

[150.] *Soc.* But if, as we held it harmless and useful to know through life all the arts, we now assert⁵⁶ the same of pleasures likewise, we must mix them all together, if indeed

⁵²⁻⁵³ That Plato wrote *ἰνδυσσίστην* as opposed to *καθαρά*, I much doubt. Ficinus has "cum pura passim deteriore."

⁵⁴ Il. iv. 452.

⁵⁵ After observing in ed. 1, that there was something wanting here, as Heindorf likewise suspected, Stalbaum, in ed. 2, says that all will be sound, if we correct *ἰξεγνήθη* into *ἰξεγίνεθ'* ἡμῖν, and render *ἰξεγίνετο* "it was lawful:" but that verb never has such a meaning.

⁵⁶ Instead of *ἰστέ* one MS. has *ἰκείναυς*: which leads to *ἰκείνας*, answering to *πάντας*.

⁵⁷ One MS. reads *λέγουμεν* for *λέγωμεν*, as Stalbaum suggested in ed. 1.

it is conducive to us and harmless for all to enjoy all kinds of pleasures through life.

Prot. How shall we say then on these very points? and how act?

Soc. It is not proper, Protarchus, to ask us this question; but the pleasures themselves, and intellect, by inquiring respecting each other,⁵⁷ some such thing as this.

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. Ye friends, whether we must call you Pleasures, or by any other name whatever, would ye choose to dwell with all Intellect, or without Intellect? To this I think it is most necessary to say thus.

Prot. How?

[151.] *Soc.* That, as was said before, for any pure⁵⁸ kind to be alone and deserted, it is neither very possible nor useful. We deem it however that the best of all kinds should, one above others,⁵⁹ dwell with us;—that one, which is able⁶⁰ to know both all the rest⁶¹ and itself likewise, and at the same time each of us as perfectly as possible.⁶¹

Prot. And well have ye now answered, we will say to them.

Soc. Correctly so. After this then we must inquire of Intellect and Mind. Have ye any need of Pleasure in your mixture? ⁶²[we will say on the other hand, interrogating Mind and Intellect].⁶² What pleasures? they would perhaps reply.

Prot. Probably.

[152.] *Soc.* To such a question our language would be this. Beside those true pleasures, we will say, do ye further want

⁵⁷ I cannot understand ἀλλήλων περί: nor could Ficinus, who has omitted these words. For the pleasures and intellect did not inquire of each other, but both were interrogated by Socrates.

⁵⁸ Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, had with Ficinus rejected εὐλακρινές, retains it in ed. 2.

⁵⁹ On the phrase ἐν ἀνθ' ἑνός, see Stalb.

⁶⁰ I have translated, as if the Greek were not τὸ τοῦ γινώσκαι, which I cannot understand, but τὸ γ' οἶον γινώσκαι, where οἶον means "able," as we often find in Xenophon.

^{61—61} The Greek is καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῶν—ἰκάσθην—where Heusde was the first to see that the mention of knowing itself was required. I have translated, therefore, as if the text were καὶ αὐτὸ, ἅμα τε ἡμῶν—ἰκάσθην.

^{62—62} The words within brackets are evidently superfluous. They are properly omitted by Ficinus; although his version here is too unlike the Greek to be safely trusted.

pleasures the greatest and most intense to dwell with you? How, Socrates, they would say, should we want those, which give a thousand hinderances to us by disturbing the souls, where we dwell with maddening pleasures,⁶³ and do not permit us to exist, and entirely spoil our children, there born, by introducing for the most part carelessness through forgetfulness? But the other pleasures, of which you have spoken, the true and the pure, do thou consider as nearly related to us; and beside these, such as are accompanied with health and sobriety, and such also as are in the train of all Virtue in general, as if of a goddess, and every where follow her, all these do thou mix⁶⁴ (with us). But those that always accompany folly, and the rest of depravity, it is a great absurdity for a man to mix with Intellect, who desires to see a mixture⁶⁵ the most beautiful, and the least disturbed, and to try to learn from it what good is naturally, not only in man, but in the universe; and to divine what is the idea (of good) itself. Shall we not say that Mind has, in answering thus, spoken prudently, and with self-possession, in behalf of itself and memory, and right opinion?

Prot. By all means.

[153.] *Soc.* And this moreover is necessary, for not a single thing could ever otherwise exist.

Prot. What is that?

Soc. That, with which we cannot mix truth, could never be in existence truly, nor ever have been.

Prot. For how could it?

Soc. By no means. But if any thing further be yet wanting for the mixture, do you and Philebus mention it. For to me our present reasoning appears, like some incorporeal world⁶⁶ about to rule correctly over an animated body, to have been worked out.

⁶³ Stalbaum, objecting justly to *αι ηδοναι—ταπαρρουνσαι δια ηδονας*, wishes, in ed. 2, to read *επιθυμιας*. Ficinus has "furiosæ" simply, as if he had found in his MS. *μανικως* without *ηδονας*.

⁶⁴ The Greek is *μηνύντας δ'*, which Heusde ingeniously altered into *μηνυ-τας δ'*—

⁶⁵ As *μιξιν και κρᾶσιν* is an insufferable tautology, it is evident that *μιξιν και* or *ηγουν*, (as may be seen in Bast's Palæograph. p. 893, appended to Schäfer's ed. of Gregorius on Dialects,) is the interpretation of *κρᾶσιν*.

⁶⁶ Instead of *κόσμος* one would have expected *θεος*: for reasoning may be compared to a deity, but not to a world. But perhaps *κόσμος* means here the "order," that regulates the world, not the world itself.

Prot. And to me say, Socrates, it has seemed thus.

[154.] *Soc.* Should we then, in saying that we are now standing at the very vestibule of the good, and the residence of a thing of such a kind, correctly perhaps in a certain manner say so?

Prot. To me at least it seems so.

Soc. What then would appear to us to be in this mixture the thing most valuable, and especially the cause of such a disposition being agreeable to all? For after having seen this, we will subsequently consider whether to pleasure or to mind it adheres the closer;⁶⁷ and the more intimately, in the constitution of the universe.

Prot. Right. For this will⁶⁸ conduce the most to our decision.

Soc. And there is, indeed, no difficulty in discovering the cause of mixture in general, through which it is worth every thing or nothing.

Prot. How say you?

Soc. No man is surely ignorant of this.

Prot. Of what?

[155.] *Soc.* That every mixture, whatever it be, and whatever its quantity,⁶⁹ if it does not meet with measure and a symmetrical nature, does of necessity destroy both the ingredients and itself. ⁷⁰ For there exists not a tempering, but a certain unmixed bringing together, (and) confused truly of this kind on every occasion in reality to those who possess it.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ In lieu of προσφύεις τε, Heusde suggested προσφύεσθαι, similar to "cognatus ac propius" in Ficinus.

⁶⁸ Instead of ἐστὶ, Cornarius proposed ἔσται, obtained from "conferet" in Ficinus.

⁶⁹ The Greek is ὅπως οὖν, "however it be made." But the meaning is this, that every right and good mixture must be made "in one certain measure." Plato probably wrote not ὅπως οὖν but ὅπως οὖν. So Sydenham; who got the idea from "quæcunque et qualiscunque," in Ficinus. But Stalbaum says that ὅπως οὖν is to be connected with the preceding μὴ τυχοῦσα. But this I think the very collocation of the words prevents.

⁷⁰⁻⁷⁰ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where the words are strangely thrown out of their proper places. How much clearer is the version of Ficinus—"Neque enim temperies hæc est, sed, tanquam in-temperatus quidam passim fortuitusque concursus nobis accidere solet." Perhaps Plato wrote, Οὐδε γὰρ κράσις ἀληθής ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ὄντως, ἀλλὰ τις ἀκρίτως ζυμπεφορημένη, ἐκάστοτε τοῖς κεκτημένοις ζυμφορά. i. e. For such a mixture becomes not in reality a true one, but having been brought together indiscriminately, it is on every occasion a calamity

Prot. Most truly so.

Soc. The power then of the good has fled from us into the nature of the beautiful. For surely every where moderation and symmetry happen to be a beauty and a virtue.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Now we have said that truth also was an ingredient in the mixture.

Prot. Entirely so,

Soc. If then we are not able to hunt out the good in one form, yet, taking it in three together, beauty, and symmetry, and truth,⁷¹ let us say that we can most justly consider these⁷² as one cause of the ingredients in the mixture, and that through this, as being good, the mixture is itself produced of such a kind.

Prot. Most truly indeed.

[156.] *Soc.* Now then, Protarchus, any person whatever would be a competent judge respecting pleasure and intellect, as to which of the two is more closely allied to the greatest good, and in higher honour both amongst men and gods.

Prot. (The decision) is clear indeed; yet it is better to go through it in our discourse.

Soc. Let us then compare each of the three severally with pleasure and with intellect. For we are to see to which of the two we must assign each of the three as being the nearer related.

Prot. Are you speaking of beauty, and truth, and moderation?

Soc. Yes. Now lay hold in the first place, Protarchus, of truth; and having laid hold of it, look at the three, mind, and truth, and pleasure; and after waiting a considerable time, answer to yourself, whether pleasure or mind is nearer related to truth.

[157.] *Prot.* What need is there of time? for I think they differ greatly. For of all things pleasure is the greatest brag to those who possess it." Respecting the union of ἀληθείης ὄντως, see Stalbaum in ed. 2.

⁷¹ Proclus, in Theol. Plat. p. 140, observes, "that Iamblichus appears to have bounded the intelligible in the three monads, symmetry, truth, and beauty; and through these to have unfolded the intelligible gods in the Platonic theology." T.

⁷² Instead of ταῦτα Stalbaum, in ed. 2, says that one would have expected ταῦτα, applied to beauty, symmetry, and truth; but that no change is to be made. The expression, however, of οὐκ ἔν would be otherwise unintelligible.

Soc. Be it so. If then a person were to say that, what relates to intellect and pleasure, touching their mutual mixture, is placed before us, as before workmen, from which or in which they must fabricate something, he would make a comparison suitable to our discourse.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Must we not in the next place attempt to mix them?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Would it not be best to mention beforehand, and call to remembrance things of this kind?

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. Those we have mentioned before. For the proverb seems to be well, ³² "Twice and thrice what is well to turn over" ³³ in our discourse is meet.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Come then, by Zeus; for I think that what has been stated previously, was said in this wise.

Prot. How?

[141.] *Soc.* Philebus affirms that pleasure has been established as the proper aim for all animals, and that all persons ought to aim at it; that this very thing is to all universally the good; and that the two terms "good" and "pleasant" have been correctly assigned to one thing and to one nature. But Socrates denies this; and (says) that in the first place the things are, like the terms, two; and secondly, that the good and the pleasant possess a nature different from each other; and that intellect partakes in a share of the good more than pleasure does. Is not this now, and was it not then, stated so, Protarchus?

Prot. Strongly so.

Soc. And was not this (agreed upon) then, and should we not agree upon it now?

Prot. What?

Soc. That the nature of the good differs from the rest of things in this?

[142.] *Prot.* In what?

Soc. That whatever animal possesses it for ever, perfectly,

³²⁻³³ There is an allusion to the same proverb, but in different words, in Gorg. p. 498, E., Legg. xii. p. 957, A., and the other passages quoted by Stalbaum.

and under all circumstances of time and place, such a being has no want of any thing beside, but has what is sufficient and most complete. Is it not so?

Prot. It is so.

Soc. Have we then not endeavoured in this discourse, by placing each apart from each as regards the life of each, (to leave)³³ pleasure unmixed with intellect, and in like manner intellect possessing not the smallest particle of pleasure?

Prot. It is so.

Soc. Did either of those (lives) seem to us at that time to be sufficient for any person?

Prot. How could it?

[143.] *Soc.* But if at that time we were carried in any respect beside the mark, let any person whatever, taking up again the subject, say what is more correct, laying down that memory, and intellect, and science, and correct opinion belong to the very same species, and considering whether any one would without those choose that any thing whatever should happen to him, much less pleasure; be it the greatest in quantity and most intense in kind, provided he had neither a true conception of being delighted, nor knew at all by what things he was affected, nor had a recollection of the circumstance for any period whatever. And let him say³⁴ the same respecting intellect likewise, whether any one would choose without all pleasures, or³⁵ even the least, to possess intellect, rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without intellect, rather than with some intellect.

Prot. There is no one,³⁶ Socrates. And there is no need to ask these questions frequently.

[144.] *Soc.* Neither one of these then would be the perfect, and all-eligible, and consummate good.

Prot. For how could it?

³³ To preserve the sense and syntax we must insert *ἴαν*, which might have easily dropt out before *ἄμικρον*. On the loss or confusion of *ἴαν* see my notes on *Crito*, § 15, n. 27.

³⁴ Instead of *λίγῃ* the three oldest MSS. offer *λίγῳ*. From the two *Stalbaum*, in ed. 1, elicited *λεγίτω*, similar to *εἰπάρω*, towards the commencement of this speech. But in ed. 2, he prefers *λίγῃ*.

³⁵ Instead of *καί* the sense requires *ἢ καί*—

³⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were, what the sense requires, *ὅτι ἴσθιν εἰς, Σώκρατες*, instead of—*ὦ Σώκρατες*.

Soc. This good then we must comprehend clearly, or at least some form of it, in order that we may have something to give the second prize.

Prot. You speak most correctly.

Soc. Have we not taken then some kind of road to the good?

Prot. What road?

Soc. As if a person in search of another should first hear of his dwelling ³⁷ [where he resides], ³⁷ he would surely have something great towards the discovery of the person sought.

Prot. How not?

Soc. And now a reasoning has pointed out to us, as at the commencement, not to seek the good in the unmixed life, but in the mixed one.

Prot. Entirely so.

Soc. There is moreover a hope that the thing sought for will be more conspicuous in the mixed than in the not mixed.

Prot. Much more.

[145.] *Soc.* Let us then, Protarchus, make a mixing after praying to the gods; ³⁸ whether Dionysus, or Hephæstus, ³⁹ or whatever else of the gods, ⁴⁰ has obtained by lot the honour ⁴⁰ (of presiding over) the mixing.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. And now, to us, as it were to butlers, stand (two) ⁴¹ fonts; the one of pleasure ⁴² a person might guess to be of

³⁷⁻³⁷ The words within brackets are evidently superfluous. Instead of ἵνα, ed. Bas. 2, has in the text ὅπου, and one MS. ὅπου over ἵνα: which leads to ἀπ' οἰκίρου, "from a domestic," in lieu of ὅπου οἰκεῖ.

³⁸ Here is an allusion to the custom of making a libation and uttering a prayer to the gods at a banquet before the first cup was tasted.

³⁹ According to Stalbaum, Hephæstus is here alluded to, because he is represented by Homer in Il. i. 595, as acting the part of a butler to the gods.

⁴⁰⁻⁴⁰ This has reference to the myth, that the gods had obtained their respective powers by casting lots.

⁴¹ I have inserted "two." For the Greek was, doubtless, κρῆναι ὡ μίλιτος: where κ is one form in MSS. of β, and would mean "two."

⁴² Pleasure is compared to honey, says Olympiodorus, because it possesses sweetness and the ecstatic. And hence the Pythagorean saying, that souls fall into generation through honey (διὸ καὶ Πυθαγόρειος λόγος, διὰ μίλιτος πίπτειν εἰς γένεσιν τὰς ψυχὰς). But intellect is compared to water, because it is sober. T.

honey; but that of intellect, hard and healthful, sober and wineless, to be of water; which let us be ready to mix together in the best manner we can.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Come then (and say) whether by mingling all pleasure with all intellect we may in the ⁴³best way obtain the doing it well.⁴³

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. But it is not safe. But how we may make a mixing with less danger, I seem to myself to be able to put out a notion.

Prot. Say what.

[146.] *Soc.* ⁴⁴There was formerly, as we truly thought, one pleasure more pure than another; and one art more accurate than another.⁴⁴

Prot. Undoubtedly so.

Soc. One science too differs from another; one in looking to things that are produced and perish; another to things which are neither produced nor perish, but exist with the properties of the same, the similar, and the eternal. And looking to the truth, we deemed this science to be more true than the other.

Prot. Very correctly so.

Soc. If then, in the first place, after having mixed together the truest particles of each, when we look upon them, (shall

⁴³⁻⁴⁴ The Greek is τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστ' ἐπιτύχοιμεν, where Wyttenbach on Phædo, § 65, says that τοῦ καλῶς is put for τοῦ καλοῦ: while Stalbaum says that μινύναι is to be supplied after καλῶς. In accordance with his own notes on p. 18, A., 20, A., 62, A., he might have suggested δρᾶν ἂν, and κάλλιστα instead of μάλιστα. For there would thus be a play on καλῶς and κάλλιστα.

⁴⁴⁻⁴⁵ The Greek is Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς ὥς οἴομεθα μᾶλλον ἐτίρας ἄλλη καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα. Here Schleiermacher was the first to object to ἀληθῶς and to suggest ἀληθής. But, as Stalbaum observes, pleasures were not said to be truer so much as purer than one another; and hence the Zurich editors wrongly rejected μᾶλλον with the three oldest MSS. Nor can ἀκριβεστέρα be translated "sincerior," as Ficinus has done. Moreover, although Stalbaum has shown that καὶ δὴ καὶ are perpetually united, yet they never are, nor could be, where two sentences are, as here, balanced. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τότε, ὥς ἀληθῶς οἴομεθα, μᾶλλον εὐκρινῆς δὴ, καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα: where τότε is still seen in Ficinus, "in superioribus;" and we can now perceive from whence he got his "sincerior." For εὐκρινῆς is the word constantly used before in that sense.

we say,)⁴⁶ that these, being mixed together, are sufficient to enable us to work out⁴⁶ the most desirable life? or do we still want something, and not of such a kind?

Prot. To me it seems we must act thus.

[147.] *Soc.* Let there be then a man having a notion of justice itself, and knowing what it is, and having a language following upon his notions, and thinking thoroughly in like manner upon every thing else in existence.

Prot. Let there be such a person.

Soc. Will now this man have a sufficiency of science by knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine sphere itself, while, ignorant of the sphere, and of the circles made by man, ⁴⁷he is making a bad use⁴⁷ in building, and in other things similarly, of straight-rules and circles.⁴⁸

Prot. Ridiculous we should call⁴⁹ our position here, Socrates, if it existed only in the sciences relating to things divine.

Soc. How say you? Must we throw and mix together in common the art neither stable nor pure of the false straight-rule and mason's chisel,⁵⁰ and mix them with the other ingredients?

Prot. Yes; for it is necessary, ⁵¹if any of us is about on each occasion to find the way home.⁵¹

[148.] *Soc.* And music too, which we said a little before was wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and imitation?

^{46, 48} To complete the sense I have translated as if the Greek were ἀρ' ἰροῦμεν, not simply ἀρα, and ἀπεργάσασθαι, not ἀπεργασάμεθα, found
σθαι

in one MS. derived from the various reading ἀπεργασάμενα.

^{47, 49} The Greek is ἀγνοῶν καὶ χρεόμενος. But the train of thought leads evidently to ἀγνοῶν ἢν καταχρῶμενος, as I have translated.

⁵⁰ Every scholar, who has written on this passage, confesses that κανόνι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις is a corruption. I suspect that Plato wrote κανόνι καὶ κύκοις—as shown by Φοίνικι κανόνι καὶ κύκοις ἡρμοσμένα in Eurip. Herc. 945, κανόνων κυκλίσματα in Tro. 814, and in Sophocl. Πριάμου Fr., Τύκοι, κανὼν, πῆχυς, διαβήτης καὶ στάθμη, evidently said of the building of Troy. Of these builders' instruments, the κανὼν, διαβήτης, and στάθμη have been mentioned in §131. The κύκος was the mason's chisel. See Pollux, vii. 118, and 125.

⁴⁸ So Sydenham; as if he wished to read λέγομεν ἂν for λέγομεν.

⁵⁰ Here again we must read κύκω for κύκλω.

^{51, 51} I confess I do not understand Plato's meaning here.

Prot. To me it seems necessary, if our life is to be in any manner whatever a life.

Soc. Are you then willing, like a door-keeper, jostled and forced by a throng of people, to yield and throw open the doors, and suffer all the sciences to rush in, and to be mixed together⁵² the wanting (in purity)⁵³ with the pure.

Prot. I cannot perceive, Socrates, how any one would be hurt by receiving all the other sciences, if possessing already the leading.

Soc. Let me then admit them all to come pouring into the receptacle of Homer's⁵⁴ poetical mingling of the waters in a valley.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. They are admitted. And let us now return to the font of pleasure.⁵⁴ For when we thought of mixing them together, the portions of the true had not been produced; but, from our love of all science, we sent them in a crowd to the same spot, and even before the pleasures.

Prot. You speak most truly.

Soc. It is now time for us to consult about the pleasures; whether we should let them all come thronging in, or whether we should admit those, that are true, the first.

Prot. It makes a great difference in point of safety, to let in first the true.

Soc. Let these then be admitted. But what after this? Must we not, if some are necessary, mix together these as we did those?⁵⁵

Prot. Why not? at least the necessary, surely.

[150.] **Soc.** But if, as we held it harmless and useful to know through life all the arts, we now assert⁵⁶ the same of pleasures likewise, we must mix them all together, if indeed

⁵²— That Plato wrote *ἑνδοξάσαν* as opposed to *καθαρά*, I much doubt. Ficinus has "cum pura passim deteriore."

⁵³ Il. iv. 452.

⁵⁴ After observing in ed. 1, that there was something wanting here, as Heindorf likewise suspected, Stalbaum, in ed. 2, says that all will be sound, if we correct *ἐξεγνήθη* into *ἐξεγίνεθ' ἡμῖν*, and render *ἐξεγίνετο* "it was lawful:" but that verb never has such a meaning.

⁵⁵ Instead of *ἐκεί* one MS. has *ἐκείνας*: which leads to *ἐκείνας*, answering to *ταύτας*.

⁵⁶ One MS. reads *λίγουμεν* for *λίγωμεν*, as Stalbaum suggested in ed. 1.

it is conducive to us and harmless for all to enjoy all kinds of pleasures through life.

Prot. How shall we say then on these very points? and how act?

Soc. It is not proper, Protarchus, to ask us this question; but the pleasures themselves, and intellect, by inquiring respecting each other,⁵⁷ some such thing as this.

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. Ye friends, whether we must call you Pleasures, or by any other name whatever, would ye choose to dwell with all Intellect, or without Intellect? To this I think it is most necessary to say thus.

Prot. How?

[151.] *Soc.* That, as was said before, for any pure⁵⁸ kind to be alone and deserted, it is neither very possible nor useful. We deem it however that the best of all kinds should, one above others,⁵⁹ dwell with us;—that one, which is able⁶⁰ to know both all the rest⁶¹ and itself likewise, and at the same time each of us as perfectly as possible.⁶¹

Prot. And well have ye now answered, we will say to them.

Soc. Correctly so. After this then we must inquire of Intellect and Mind. Have ye any need of Pleasure in your mixture? ⁶²[we will say on the other hand, interrogating Mind and Intellect].⁶² What pleasures? they would perhaps reply.

Prot. Probably.

[152.] *Soc.* To such a question our language would be this. Beside those true pleasures, we will say, do ye further want

⁵⁷ I cannot understand ἀλλήλων πῆρι: nor could Ficinus, who has omitted these words. For the pleasures and intellect did not inquire of each other, but both were interrogated by Socrates.

⁵⁸ Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, had with Ficinus rejected εὐλαρινέες, retains it in ed. 2.

⁵⁹ On the phrase ἐν ἀνθ' ἑνός, see Stalb.

⁶⁰ I have translated, as if the Greek were not τὸ τοῦ γινώσκειν, which I cannot understand, but τό γ' οἷον γινώσκειν, where οἷον means "able," as we often find in Xenophon.

^{61—61} The Greek is καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῶν—ἐκείνην—where Heusde was the first to see that the mention of knowing itself was required. I have translated, therefore, as if the text were καὶ αὐτὸ, ἅμα τε ἡμῶν—ἐκείνην.

^{62—62} The words within brackets are evidently superfluous. They are properly omitted by Ficinus; although his version here is too unlike the Greek to be safely trusted.

pleasures the greatest and most intense to dwell with you? How, Socrates, they would say, should we want those, which give a thousand hinderances to us by disturbing the souls, where we dwell with maddening pleasures,⁶³ and do not permit us to exist, and entirely spoil our children, there born, by introducing for the most part carelessness through forgetfulness? But the other pleasures, of which you have spoken, the true and the pure, do thou consider as nearly related to us; and beside these, such as are accompanied with health and sobriety, and such also as are in the train of all Virtue in general, as if of a goddess, and every where follow her, all these do thou mix⁶⁴ (with us). But those that always accompany folly, and the rest of depravity, it is a great absurdity for a man to mix with Intellect, who desires to see a mixture⁶⁵ the most beautiful, and the least disturbed, and to try to learn from it what good is naturally, not only in man, but in the universe; and to divine what is the idea (of good) itself. Shall we not say that Mind has, in answering thus, spoken prudently, and with self-possession, in behalf of itself and memory, and right opinion?

Prot. By all means.

[153.] *Soc.* And this moreover is necessary, for not a single thing could ever otherwise exist.

Prot. What is that?

Soc. That, with which we cannot mix truth, could never be in existence truly, nor ever have been.

Prot. For how could it?

Soc. By no means. But if any thing further be yet wanting for the mixture, do you and Philebus mention it. For to me our present reasoning appears, like some incorporeal world⁶⁶ about to rule correctly over an animated body, to have been worked out.

⁶³ Stalbaum, objecting justly to *αἱ ἡδοναὶ—ταράττονται διὰ ἡδονάς*, wishes, in ed. 2, to read *ἐκθυμίας*. Ficinus has "furiosæ" simply, as if he had found in his MS. *μανικῶς* without *ἡδονάς*.

⁶⁴ The Greek is *μὲννύντας δ'*, which Heusde ingeniously altered into *μὲννν τας δ'*—

⁶⁵ As *μῖξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν* is an insufferable tautology, it is evident that *μῖξιν καὶ* or *ἤγουν*, (as may be seen in Bast's *Palæograph.* p. 893, appended to Schæfer's ed. of Gregorius on Dialects,) is the interpretation of *κρᾶσιν*.

⁶⁶ Instead of *κόσμος* one would have expected *θεός*: for reasoning may be compared to a deity, but not to a world. But perhaps *κόσμος* means here the "order," that regulates the world, not the world itself.

Prot. And to me say, Socrates, it has seemed thus.

[154.] *Soc.* Should we then, in saying that we are now standing at the very vestibule of the good, and the residence of a thing of such a kind, correctly perhaps in a certain manner say so?

Prot. To me at least it seems so.

Soc. What then would appear to us to be in this mixture the thing most valuable, and especially the cause of such a disposition being agreeable to all? For after having seen this, we will subsequently consider whether to pleasure or to mind it adheres the closer;⁶⁷ and the more intimately, in the constitution of the universe.

Prot. Right. For this will⁶⁸ conduce the most to our decision.

Soc. And there is, indeed, no difficulty in discovering the cause of mixture in general, through which it is worth every thing or nothing.

Prot. How say you?

Soc. No man is surely ignorant of this.

Prot. Of what?

[155.] *Soc.* That every mixture, whatever it be, and whatever its quantity,⁶⁹ if it does not meet with measure and a symmetrical nature, does of necessity destroy both the ingredients and itself. ⁷⁰ For there exists not a tempering, but a certain unmixed bringing together, (and) confused truly of this kind on every occasion in reality to those who possess it.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ In lieu of *προσφύει* *τε*, Heusde suggested *προσφύεσθαι*, similar to "cognatus ac propius" in Ficinus.

⁶⁸ Instead of *ἔστι*, Cornarius proposed *ἔσται*, obtained from "conferet" in Ficinus.

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⁷⁰—⁷¹ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where the words are strangely thrown out of their proper places. How much clearer is the version of Ficinus—"Neque enim temperies hæc est, sed, tanquam in-temperatus quidam passim fortuitusque concursus nobis accidere solet." Perhaps Plato wrote, *Οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις ἀληθὴς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ὄντως, ἀλλὰ τις ἀκρίτως ἐνμειφομένη, ἐκαστοῖς τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἐνμφορά*. i. e. For such a mixture becomes not in reality a true one, but having been brought together indiscriminately, it is on every occasion a calamity

Prot. Most truly so.

Soc. The power then of the good has fled from us into the nature of the beautiful. For surely every where moderation and symmetry happen to be a beauty and a virtue.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Now we have said that truth also was an ingredient in the mixture.

Prot. Entirely so,

Soc. If then we are not able to hunt out the good in one form, yet, taking it in three together, beauty, and symmetry, and truth,⁷¹ let us say that we can most justly consider these ⁷² as one cause of the ingredients in the mixture, and that through this, as being good, the mixture is itself produced of such a kind.

Prot. Most truly indeed.

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Prot. (The decision) is clear indeed; yet it is better to go through it in our discourse.

Soc. Let us then compare each of the three severally with pleasure and with intellect. For we are to see to which of the two we must assign each of the three as being the nearer related.

Prot. Are you speaking of beauty, and truth, and moderation?

Soc. Yes. Now lay hold in the first place, Protarchus, of truth; and having laid hold of it, look at the three, mind, and truth, and pleasure; and after waiting a considerable time, answer to yourself, whether pleasure or mind is nearer related to truth.

[157.] *Prot.* What need is there of time? for I think they differ greatly. For of all things pleasure is the greatest brag to those who possess it." Respecting the union of ἀληθὲς ὄντως, see Stalbaum in ed. 2.

⁷¹ Proclus, in Theol. Plat. p. 140, observes, "that Iamblichus appears to have bounded the intelligible in the three monads, symmetry, truth, and beauty; and through these to have unfolded the intelligible gods in the Platonic theology." T.

⁷² Instead of τούτο Stalbaum, in ed. 2, says that one would have expected ταῦτα, applied to beauty, symmetry, and truth; but that no change is to be made. The expression, however, of οἷον ἔν would be otherwise unintelligible.

gart; and as the saying is, in the pleasures of Venus, which seem to be the greatest, even perjury has obtained pardon from the gods;⁷³ since pleasures, like children, possess not the least particle of mind. But mind is either the same thing as truth, or of all things the most like to it,⁷⁴ [and the most truthful.]⁷⁴

Soc. Consider then after this in the same manner⁷⁵ moderation, whether pleasure possesses more of it than intellect, or intellect more of it than pleasure.

Prot. And this inquiry too which you have proposed, is easy to be considered. For I imagine no person will find any thing more immoderate than pleasure and extravagant joy; nor a single thing of more moderation than mind and intellect.

Soc. You have spoken well. But however still mention the third thing. Has mind partaken of beauty more than any kind of pleasure, so that mind is more beautiful than pleasure, or the reverse?

[158.] *Prot.* Has then, Socrates, any man in a day-dream or night-dream seen or imagined that intellect and mind is in any matter or in any manner a thing that has been,⁷⁶ or is, or will be unhandsome?

Soc. Right.

Prot. But whenever we see any person whatever delighted with pleasures, and those too the greatest, and behold the ridiculous, or what is the most disgraceful of all things, following upon them, we are ashamed ourselves, and by putting them out of sight, conceal them by giving them, as far as possible, to night and darkness, all such things as not being fit for the light to look on.

Soc. To all then and every where⁷⁷ Protarchus, you will declare, sending by messengers (to the absent),⁷⁸ and speak-

⁷³ On the verse alluded to here, and partly quoted in Sympos. § 10, Stalbaum refers to several critical scholars. It was Ἀφροδίτης γὰρ ἕρκος οὐκ ἐμπούνιμος.

⁷⁴—⁷⁴ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

⁷⁵ In lieu of ὡς οὕτως, Cornarius first suggested ὡσαύτως. And so the three oldest MSS. and Eusebius.

⁷⁶ Instead of γινόμενον, Eusebius quotes γένόμενον, adopted by Stalbaum. Plato wrote γεγενημένον, answering to "fuisse" in Ficinus.

⁷⁷ Instead of πάντη, Eusebius offers παντί, and Ficinus "cunctis," from which Stalbaum elicited πᾶσι. Plato, I suspect, wrote πᾶσι πάντη ὁῦν: for these words are constantly thus united.

⁷⁸ The balance of the sentence shows that τοῖς ἀποῦσι has dropt out before καὶ παροῦσι.

ing to those present, that pleasure is a possession, neither the first nor the second in worth, but that the first relates to moderation, and that the moderate and seasonable, and all that it is meet to consider as such, have ⁷⁹obtained the eternal nature.⁷⁹

Prot. It appears so from what has been said already.

[159.] *Soc.* And that the second relates to symmetry and beauty, the perfect and the sufficient, and whatever else is of that family.

Prot. So it seems.

Soc. In placing, as my divination (says), mind and intellect the third, you would not greatly pass by the truth.

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. And are not the fourth those things, which we assigned to the soul herself, called sciences and arts, and right opinions? ⁸⁰that these are the fourth in addition to those three; ⁸⁰ if, indeed, they are more nearly related to the good than to pleasure.

Prot. Perhaps.

Soc. That the fifth are what we laid down as pleasures, having defined them as painless, and denominated them pure; and following not ⁸¹the knowledge of the soul, but its sensations.

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc.

Of the song the order in the sixth race close,⁸²

says Orpheus. And our discourse seems to be now closed

⁷⁹—⁷⁹ Ficinus has "sempiternam vocem approbationem dixisse putandum." He therefore found in his MS. *εἰρησθαί*, which Grou corrected into *ἡρῆσθαι*, found in the three oldest MSS. Moreover Stalbaum, in ed. 1, could not understand *αἰδίων φύσιν*, nor can I, as applied to moderation. Some MSS. offer *φάσιν*, answering to "vocem laudationemque" in Ficinus. Others omit *φύσιν* entirely. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὴν αἰδίου δόξης ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν*. On the phrase *αἰδίου δόξης*, see my note on Cratylus, § 26, n. 73.

⁸⁰—⁸⁰ I can discover no syntax in *ταῦτα εἶναι—τίτραπεα, εἰ*. I could in *ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι—τίτραπεα δέ, εἰ*—

⁸¹ By reading *οὐ ταῖς* in lieu of *αὐτῆς* and *ἐπιστήμας* with one MS. after correction, we get rid of all the difficulty. Sydenham proposed to expunge *ἐπιστήμας*, and so after him Schleiermacher, whom Stalbaum has followed in ed. 2, after rejecting in ed. 1, the words *τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς* likewise.

⁸² This verse is quoted in Plutarch, t. ii. p. 391, from this passage of Plato. It was evidently taken from a Cosmogony, where man was feigned to be created the last.

with the sixth decision. After this, nothing remains for us but to affix⁸³ a head, as it were, to what has been said.

Prot. It is fit that we should.

[160.] *Soc.* Come, then, let us proceed in calling upon the same reason, as if it were the third cup to the saviour god, to bear witness.

Prot. What?

Soc. Philebus has laid down that the good was wholly and entirely a pleasure.

Prot. ⁸⁴The third you have, it seems, Socrates, said, just now, ought to resume the original argument.⁸⁴

Soc. Yes. But let us hear what follows. I, having seen thoroughly what I have just now gone through, and disliking the doctrine not of Philebus only, but of other thousands frequently,⁸⁵ asserted, that mind was a thing far better, and better⁸⁶ for the life of man than pleasure.

Prot. That is the fact.

Soc. But then, suspecting that there were many other things, I stated that if something⁸⁷ should appear better than both of those, I would combat for the second prize, in behalf of mind against pleasure; and that pleasure would be deprived of the second prize.

Prot. So you said.

⁸³ From Sydenham's "to affix," obtained from "adhibeamus" in Ficinus, Stalbaum was perhaps led to read *ἐπιθεῖναι* for *ἀποδοῦναι*: while instead of *κεφαλὴν*, I wish MSS. had offered *κολοφῶνα*, similar to *κολοφῶν ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ ῥηθίνῃ*, in Legg. ii. p. 674, C., and *κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθεῖς τῇ σοφίᾳ*, in Euthyd. p. 301, E. § 71, where see my note.

⁸⁴⁻⁸⁵ I do not quite understand this. One MS. has after correction *τὸ τὸν*, which seems to confirm the conjecture of Stalbaum, who suggested *τὸ* for *τὸν*—

⁸⁶ I cannot understand *πολλάκις* thus placed between *ἄλλων* and *μυρίων*. Perhaps Plato wrote *καὶ καλῶν παλλακίδων μυρίων*, "many thousand beautiful courtesans." There are no doubt those, who would translate *πολλάκις μυρίων*, "many times ten thousand." But as *μυρίων* is the definite number for the indefinite, it would not require the addition. On the other hand, the mention of *παλλακίδες* is properly introduced, for such persons are especially the votaries of pleasure.

⁸⁷ I must leave for others to explain the difference between *βέλτιον* and *ἀμεινον*.

⁸⁸ Stephens first elicited *τῆ* from "aliquid" in Ficinus for *τὸ*, and so the three oldest MSS.

Soc. Afterwards it very sufficiently appeared that neither of these were⁸⁸ sufficient.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. By this reasoning then both mind and pleasure were dismissed from being either of them the good itself, being deprived of self-sufficiency, and the power belonging to the sufficient and perfect.

Prot. Very right.

Soc. But when a third was discovered, superior to either of those two, mind appeared a thousand-fold nearer related and more closely adhering to the form of the conqueror than pleasure did.

Prot. How not?

Soc. The fifth⁸⁹ then would be, according to the decision, which the reasoning has declared, the power of pleasure.

Prot. So it appears.

Soc. But the first place I would not yield up, not if all the bulls and horses,⁹⁰ and all wild beasts whatever should assert it, to the pursuit of pleasure;⁹¹ trusting to whom, just as augurs

⁸⁸ Instead of *ἐφάνη* Eusebius offers *ἀνεφάνη*: which leads to *εἶναι ἐφάνη*.

⁸⁹ An error has infected all the editions of Plato in this place. For they all read *πῆμpton*, "fifth," instead of *ἕκτον*, "sixth." Now the fifth rank was before assigned solely to the pure pleasures. The sixth and last rank, therefore, remains to pleasure; which according to Philebus was the chief good—pleasure in general, at random from any quarter, or, in Plato's own words, p. 40, *κατάπαν, ὁπωσοῦν, καὶ εἰκὴ χαίρειν*. The very next sentence of Socrates shows, beyond all doubt, that sensual pleasure is here meant.—S. The error might have easily arisen from confounding ε with ς.

⁹⁰ Porphyry, *Περὶ Ἀποχῆς Ἐμψύχων*, iii. 1, says that "to certain persons, who were disputing whether pleasure was the ultimate end of man, Socrates observed, that, were all the swine and goats in the world to join in applauding the advocate for pleasure, he would never be persuaded that human happiness consisted in being pleased, so long as mind excelled and prevailed in all things." If Porphyry alluded to this passage in Plato, he would seem to have found in his copy *ὅς τε καὶ τράγοι* instead of *βόες καὶ ἵπποι*. S.

⁹¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐκ ἐφάνη ἂν, οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες—θηρία φῶσι*, and not *οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες—φῶσι*. The error seems to be of older date than the time of Eusebius; who quotes *οὐκ ἂν πάντες—φῶσι*: where however lies hid *οὐκ ἐφάνη ἂν πάντες*—Respecting the corruption of *ἔαν* in its moods and tenses, I have written in *Class Journal*, No. 44, p. 376, No. 52, p. 367, on Plato's *Criton*, § 15, n. 27.

do to birds, the multitude decide that pleasures are most for living well; and think that the loves of wild are a stronger evidence, than the sayings of those who spoken prophetically on every occasion in the Museology.⁹²

Prot. That the greatest truth has been spoken Socrates, we all now assert.

Soc. Now then ye dismiss me.

Prot. There is, Socrates, still a little left. For surely not march off before us; and I will put you in what is left unsaid.⁹⁴

⁹² This seems to have been a poem called *Μοῦσα Φιλόσοφος*, v. Euthyphron, to which there is an allusion in Cratyl. § 57.

⁹³ There is some error here, which I have pointed out and corrected in Hipp. Maj. § 49, n. 6.

⁹⁴ As a specimen of the ingenious trifling of the Neo-Platonists it is worth while presenting the reader with the following extract from Olympiodorus, as translated by Taylor; who evidently met with more full than the one at Nuremburg, from which Stalbaum first gave the Greek text. "To the question why this dialogue is without beginning and an end, Olympiodorus replies—'Shall we say that the good is uncircumscribed, and has neither beginning nor end? But it may be said, that on the contrary it is necessary the good should have a beginning and end; a beginning of such a kind, that there be another beginning prior to it, and an end, beyond which there is no other end. Perhaps, therefore, it is better to say with our predecessors that the mixt life has an end, and such a one as is adapted to all animals, so that the dialogue is very properly without a beginning, for the purpose of indicating that there is a certain good beyond that which it investigates. And again, for the same reason, it is without an end; for there is another end more ancient than its end.'" T.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CHARMIDES,

ON

TEMPERANCE.

IN this dialogue, which Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher have denied to be Plato's for reasons, that have failed to convince Ochmann and Stalbaum, the object is to disprove what some of the Sophists had asserted in favour of the value of Temperance, which was considered one of the four cardinal virtues. By this, however, the philosophers of Greece did not understand, as we do, the abstinence from corporeal pleasures merely, and especially those relating to eating and drinking, but a steady self-control in the indulgence of all the feelings and habits, which it is the business of a sensible education to introduce; and hence, according to Xenophon, in *M. S.* iii. 9. 4, Socrates is said to have not distinguished it from wisdom.

But though it is defined in *The Banquet*, p. 196, C. § 22, as being the mastery over pleasure and desire, yet on the present occasion, instead of giving himself a definition, Socrates is represented as evading the difficulty of a definition, and being content to show, that Temperance did not consist in what others fancied it did.

Of the speakers one is Critias, the admirer and teacher of Charmides. Now as Socrates seems to have been ever anxious to withdraw young persons from all connexion with those, from whom they frequently derived more harm than good, he enters into a conversation with Critias, and carries it on in such a way as evidently to

wound the self-love of the individual, who fancied himself to be, and was so considered by others, a man of no little talent. And as he had probably conducted himself in a similar manner upon other occasions, it was only natural for the person, who had been once a friend of Socrates, to become his enemy; for it has been remarked by more than one observer of human nature, that

No hate's so strong, as what from dead love springs.

CHARMIDES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, CHÆREPHO, CRITIAS, CHARMIDES.

[1.] THE day before yesterday I came in the evening from the army at Potidæa, and pleased, like a person who had returned after a long period, I went to my usual haunts for passing the time; and I entered the wrestling-place of Taureas,¹ which is opposite to the temple, close by the portico of the court of the Archon-king.² Here I fell in with very many persons, some unknown to me, but the greater part my acquaintances. As soon as they saw me entering unexpectedly, immediately from different sides they tendered at a distance their greetings. But Chærepho, as if he were mad,³ leaping from the midst of them, ran towards me, and taking me by the hand said, How, Socrates, were you saved from the battle? For a short time before we (the Athenians) came away, there was an engagement at Potidæa,⁴ of which those present here have just now heard.—And I answering him, said, Thus, as you see.—[2.] Indeed, said he, it was reported here, that it was a hard-fought battle, and that many of our acquaintances had fallen in it.—And you were told, said I, what is very much the truth.—But, said he, were you in the engagement?

¹ The Taureas alluded was probably the person mentioned by Demosthenes in the *Midian Orat.* p. 562, D. ed. R., as having been struck, when he was a Choregus, by Alcibiades.

² This was the second Archon.

³ On Chærepho's violence of temper, see *Apolog.* p. 21, A. § 5.

⁴ To this battle, which took place in Ol. 87. 3, Thucydides alludes in ii. 58, but attributes the great loss of the troops rather to the plague than to the battle.

—I was.—Sit down here, said he, and tell us about it, for we have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the same time leading me along, he seated me near Critias, the son of Callæchrus. On sitting down then, I saluted Critias and the rest, and, according as any one asked me, related what took place in the army. And some asked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of such matters, I, in return, made inquiries about affairs here, as regards philosophy, what was its state at present; and respecting the young men, whether they had been remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. [3.] Critias then, looking towards the door, and perceiving some young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, said, It appears to me, Socrates, with regard to beautiful youths, that you will know something on the instant. For those, who are now entering, are the forerunners and lovers of one, who is thought to be the most beautiful⁵ of all at the present time. And it appears to me, that, having advanced, he is already near.—But who, said I, is he, and of whom the son?—You surely know, said he—although he was not yet grown up before you went away—Charmides, the son of our uncle Glauco, and my cousin.—I know him indeed, by Zeus, said I; for he was not then to be despised, although but a boy; but now I think he must be almost a young man.—You will immediately know, said he, of what age, and what kind he is. And as he was thus speaking, Charmides entered.—And I, my friend, had no rule to go by; for with regard to handsome youths, I am a white rule;⁶ since nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. [4.] But he then appeared to me to be an object of wonder, both for his size and beauty;⁷ and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him; so astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers also followed among those, who were behind him. And as to the men like us indeed, this was less wonderful; but I also paid attention to the youths, (and saw)

⁵ Ficin. has "honestissimus et speciosissimus," as if he had found in his MS. *καλλίστου και ἀρίστου*—answering to *καλὸς και ἀγαθός* in § 5.

⁶ The rule alluded to was a string rubbed with a piece of red chalk, which, when applied to white marble, left a mark sufficiently distinct to work by; but if with white chalk, as it left none sufficiently discernible, it failed to answer the purpose of a rule.

⁷ Ficin.—"Corporis proceritate et egragia indole."

that none of them turned their eyes elsewhere than on him, not even the smallest among them, but all looked upon him, as on a statue. And Chæropho calling me, said, What does the youth appear to you, Socrates? Is he not very beautiful?—Surpassingly, I replied.—And yet, said he, if he were to undress, he would appear to be faceless, so very beautiful is his form. And in this all the rest agreed with Chæropho. And by Hercules, I replied, you speak of a man not to be conquered, if only one small thing still happens to be his.—What is that? said Critias.—[5.] If in his soul, said I, he should happen to be well formed; and it is surely becoming, Critias, for him to be so, as being one of your family.—And he is, said he, very beautiful and good [in this respect].⁸—Why then, said I, do we not strip off this very thing of his, and look upon it prior to his (external) form? For since he is of such an age, he will in every respect be willing to discourse.⁹—Very much so, said Critias; since he is a philosopher, and, as it seems both to others and himself,¹⁰ very poetic.¹¹—This beauty, friend Critias, I replied, descends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon.¹² But why do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me? For it would be no disgrace for us to discourse with him, even if he were younger than he is, in the presence of yourself, who art his tutor and cousin.—[6.] You speak well, said he; and we will call him. And at the same time turning to his attendant, Call, says he, Charmides, and tell him that I wish to bring him in contact with a physician, touching the

* By the words *kai taûta*, Heindorf understands the soul. But as *καλός* *kai* *ἀγαθός* include the ideas of beauty bodily and mental, the words *kai taûta* are superfluous; unless it be said that Plato wrote *πάννυ καλός* *kai* *κατὰ ταῦτα*: of which *ἀγαθός* would be the interpretation.

⁸ This reasoning is rather inconclusive. For a person might be beautiful both in body and in mind, and yet feel no desire to hold a conversation. A similar difficulty exists in the word *τηλικούτος*, whether it is translated "of such an age," or "of such a size."

⁹ Instead of *ἐαυτῷ*, Groen van Prinsterer, in *Prosopograph. Platonic.* p. 214, would read *ἐμαυτῷ*, "to myself."

¹¹ Why Critias should fancy that Charmides would be willing to converse, because he was both a philosopher and poet, it is not very easy to understand. Such persons would rather be desirous to express their ideas in writings than by word of mouth.

¹² According to Proclus on *Timæus*, p. 25, this second Critias was the grandson of the first, who was the nephew of Solon.

weakness of which he lately spoke to me.—Critias then said to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his head when he rises in the morning. What then should hinder you from pretending to him, that you know of a cure for the head?—Nothing, I replied; let him only come.—And come he shall, said he. Which was indeed the case; for he came, and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his neighbour, till of those that were seated at the extremity, one we forced to rise up, and another to fall sideways on the ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. [7.]

¹³ Then, however, friend, I was perplexed, and the former confidence which I had felt, that I could easily discourse with Charmides, was cut down. But afterwards, on Critias telling him that I was the person who knew of a cure, he fixed his eyes upon me in a perplexing manner, and brought himself near as if to ask a question. Then all that were in the place of exercise, immediately gathered round us; and when, my noble fellow, I looked within his cloak, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myself; and I thought that Cydias¹⁴ was most wise in amatory affairs; who, when speaking of a beautiful boy, and giving a hint to another, said,

¹⁵ “Beware, when coming in the face of lion,
To take a portion of the flesh of fawn.”¹⁶

For I seemed to have been caught by an animal of this kind.¹³ However, on Charmides asking me whether I knew of a remedy for the disorder in his head, with difficulty I replied, that I did know.—What is it? said he.—[8.] It is a certain

^{12—13} All within the numerals are omitted in the ed. l of Ficinus.

¹⁴ This is the reading adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from nearly all the MSS., in lieu of *Kprias*. For the same poet is mentioned, as Bernhardt was the first to remark, by Plutarch and the Scholiast on Aristophanes.

^{15—16} Hemsterhuis on Lucian, Dialog. Mort. viii., was the first to remark, that there is an allusion here to some well-known story; with whom Ast agrees in Act. Seminar. Reg. et Societat. Philolog. Lips. t. i. p. 255, who says that *μοίραν αἰετῶναι κρεῖων* means “to take a portion of the prey;” not as Heindorf translated, “to be torn into pieces of flesh,” which Stalbaum adopts; for one party saw that the genius of the language required one interpretation, and the train of thought the other. The fact is, there is something wanting here to unite the language with the thought correctly.

leaf, I replied, and a certain incantation in addition to the medicine, which if any one chanted and used at the same time as the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no use without the incantation.—And he said, I will write down the incantation from you.—I replied, Will you do this, whether you persuade me or not?—Upon this he said, laughing, I will, if I persuade you, Socrates.—Be it so, I replied; and do you accurately know my name?—Unless I am doing wrong, said he; for there is no small talk about you amongst those of my age; and I can remember, too, that you associated with Critias when I was a boy.—You say well, I replied. For I will now tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation is. But just now I was doubtful after what manner I should show you its power. For this incantation is such, Charmides, that it is able to make not only the head sound; but, as perhaps you have already heard from clever physicians, when any one comes to them with a pain in their eyes, who say that they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is necessary for them at the same time to attend to the head, if the eyes are to be in a good state, and, on the other hand, that it would be great stupidity to think of attending to the head alone without the whole body. [9.] In consequence of this very reasoning, they turn themselves to the whole body, and by diet (and regimen) endeavour to attend to and cure the part together with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus speak, and that this is the case?—Entirely so, he replied.—Does it then appear to you that it has been well said; and do you admit their doctrine?—The most of all things, said he.—And I, on hearing him express his praise, took courage, and my confidence was again a little excited and I revived; and such then, I said, Charmides, is the power of this incantation; and I learnt it there during the expedition, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis,¹⁶ who are said to render men even immortal. This Thracian said that “the Greek physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now assert. But our king Zamolxis,” said he, “being a god, says that, as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper

¹⁶ On Zamolxis see Valckenaer on Herodot. iv. 94, and Sturz on Hellenicus, p. 64, quoted by Stalbaum.

is that the body without the soul: and that this was the reason—
 and why many doctors except the Greek physicians, because
 they are ignorant of the wisdom in which medicine ought to flower
 first. For when this is not the case, it is impossible for any
 part to be well. [11] For all things," said he, "proceed from three
 soul, both the great and small in the body and to the whole man,
 and flow from thence, as from the head in the eyes; and that
 it is therefore necessary to attend to that point first, and espe-
 cially if the parts of the head and the rest of the body are to be
 in a good state." And he said, that happy youth, "that the
 soul was cured by certain incantations; and that these in-
 cantations were beautiful poems; and that such temperance
 was generated in the soul, which, when generated and pre-
 sent, can easily impart health both to the head and to the
 rest of the body." Having then taught me the medicine and
 the incantations, "Let me," said he, "persuade you to cure his
 head with this medicine, who shall not have first presented
 his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the
 fault, said he, of the present time respecting men is this, that
 certain persons endeavour to become physicians without a
 knowledge of either temperance or health." [12] And
 he very earnestly exhorted me that no person should be so
 rich, or noble, or beautiful, as to persuade me to act otherwise.
 I therefore—for I swore to him that I would obey him, and
 since I must—will obey him. And indeed if you are willing,
 according to the injunctions of the stranger, to present your
 soul first for me to enchant by the incantations of the Thra-
 cian, I will administer also the medicine to your head; but if
 not, I cannot do any thing whatever for you, friend Char-
 mides.—Crinias therefore, on hearing me speak thus, observed,
 This weakness in his head, Socrates, will be a godsend¹³ to
 the youth, if he shall be compelled to become through his head
 better in his intellect likewise. I assure you moreover that
 Charmides is thought to surpass all his equals, not only in his

¹² Instead of *ἑσπερ*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ἑσπερ*.
 For his version is "similiter." I certainly cannot understand *ἑσπερ*.

¹³ The words within brackets Heusde, with whom Bekker agrees,
 was the first to reject as an interpretation of *ἑσπερ*: and they are
 omitted in one MS. On the other hand, Ficinus omits *ἑσπερ*.

¹⁴ Such is the best translation of *ἑσπερ*, by which was meant literally
 any thing of value found in the road, of which Hermes was the tutelary
 deity. See *The Banquet*, p. 176, C. § 4.

form, but in that very thing for which you say you have an incantation. Now you mean temperance. Is it not so?—Entirely so, I replied.—Know then, said he, that he appears to be by far the most temperate of those living at present; and that as regard all other points he is, as far as his age goes, inferior to none.—[12.] And it is just, I replied, Charmides, that you should excel the others in all such points as these. For I do not think that any one of those here could readily show two families among the Athenians uniting in the same race, who could probably produce a more beautiful and excellent offspring than those from whom you are sprung. For your family on the father's side, that of Critias the son of Dropides, has been handed to us as being celebrated by Anacreon and Solon, and many other poets, for its excelling in beauty, and virtue, and the rest of what is called²⁰ good fortune. And on his mother's side again in like manner. For not one of those that dwell on the continent (of Asia) is said to have been thought a man of greater beauty and size than your uncle²¹ Pyrilampes, as often as he went as an ambassador to the great king (of Persia), or to any one else on the continent; and indeed the whole of his family on this side is in nothing inferior to that on the other. It is likely then that, sprung from such persons, you should be the first in all things. Hence, with respect to your visible form, ²²you appear, thou dear son of Glauco, to me to disgrace none of your ancestors;²² and if, according to the assertion of this person here, you are sufficiently endued by nature as regards temperance and the other virtues, ²³your mother, dear Charmides, has brought you forth blessed indeed.²³ [13.] The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias here asserts, and you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the

²⁰ Ficinus omits *λεγομένη*, a word apparently unnecessary.

²¹ According to Pollux, iii. 22, the word *θείος*, which generally means an uncle on the father's side, is sometimes applied to one on the mother's.

^{22—23} In lieu of *οὐδένα τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν*, the two best MSS. (Bodl. and Vienn.) offer a most remarkable reading, *οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑπερβεβληκίναι*. Plato probably united the two, by adding, after *ὑπερβεβληκίναι*, *οὐδὲ νῦν σὲ τὰ τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν*, i. e. "not one of those before you has surpassed you in any thing, nor do you now bring disgrace upon the deeds of your ancestors." The error is to be traced to the repetition of *οὐδένα* and *οὐδὲ νῦν*.

^{22—23} Here is an allusion to Hom. Il. iv. 399; Od. iii. 95; iv. 25, as remarked by Heindorf.

incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris,²⁴ but the medicine for the head should be immediately given you. But if you seem to be still in any respect wanting in these things, we must have the incantation before giving the medicine. Do you then tell me yourself whether you agree with this here (Critias), and affirm that you participate sufficiently in temperance, or whether you are deficient. Hereupon Charmides, blushing, appeared in the first place to be still more beautiful—for bashfulness was suited to his age—and in the next, he answered me not without spirit. For, said he, It was not easy at present either to confess to or deny what was asked: for, said he, if I say that I am not temperate, it would be absurd for me to state so against myself, and at the same time I should show that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others, to whom I appear to be temperate: but if, on the other hand, I say that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.—[14.] To this I replied, You appear to me, Charmides, to say what is reasonable; and it seems we should consider in common whether you possess or not that, which I am asking about, that you may neither be compelled to say what you do not wish, nor I, on the other hand, turn myself without due consideration to the medical art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I am willing to consider this matter together with you; but if it is not, to leave it alone.—Nay, but it is, said he, the most agreeable to me of all things; so that for this matter at least do you consider it in whatever manner appears to you to be the better.—In this way then, I replied, the inquiry respecting it seems to me to be the best, if temperance is present with you, for it is evident that you have some opinion about it; for it is surely necessary that if it is really inherent in you, it must furnish some sensation of itself, from which you would have an opinion respecting it, what it is, and of what kind a thing is temperance. Or do you not think so?—He replied, I do think so.—And could you not surely tell me, said I, since you know how to speak Greek,

²⁴ Respecting this Abaris, see Herodot. iv. 6. He is fabled to have received an arrow from Apollo, by the aid of which he was enabled to find his way through countries he had never before traversed. The arrow is supposed by Salverté to have been a kind of mariner's needle, that always pointed to the north.

what you think of it, and what it appears to you?—Perhaps so, said he.—That we may therefore conjecture, whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, said I, what say you is temperance according to your opinion? [15.] And at first, indeed, he was shy and not altogether willing to answer. Afterwards, however, he said, that temperance appeared to consist in doing all things orderly and quietly, both in walking and discoursing in the public ways, and acting similarly in every thing else; and, in short, said he, a certain quietness appears to be what you are asking about.—²⁵ Are you then speaking correctly? ²⁵ said I. At least, Charmides, persons say that the quiet are temperate. But let us see if they say any thing to the purpose. For, tell me, is not temperance one of the things beautiful?—He replied, Entirely so.—Whether then in a grammar-school is it more beautiful²⁶ to write letters of the same size²⁷ swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in reading, swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in playing on the harp, rapidly, and in wrestling, briskly, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—And is there not the like in boxing, and contests where boxing and wrestling are united?—Entirely so.—And in running and leaping, and all other actions of the body, do not those that take place briskly and rapidly belong to the beautiful, and those that are done²⁸ slowly, with difficulty,²⁸ and quietly, to the not beautiful?—It appears so.—It appears then to us, I replied, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and most brisk, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?—Entirely so.—[16.] But temperance was something beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.—It seems so, said he.—What then, I replied, is a facility in learning more beautiful than a difficulty?—It is.—But a facility in learning, I said, is to learn swiftly;

²⁵⁻²⁶ Here is some error in the words Ἀρ' οὖν—εὖ λέγεις, which Heindorf wished to correct by writing Ἀρ' οὖν—But ἀρα, the indefinite particle, could not commence a sentence.

²⁶ In lieu of κάλλιστον, Stephens suggested κάλλιον from “pulchrius” in Ficinus, which Heindorf and Bekker have adopted; but Heusde and Stalbaum prefer the other.

²⁷ Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, explains ὅμοια by “similar to the copy set by the writing-master.”

²⁸⁻²⁹ In the Greek βραδίως μόγεις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ, Heindorf proposes to expunge βραδίως; but Stalbaum, μόγεις. Ficin. “ignave remissione.”

and a difficulty in learning is to learn quietly and²⁹ slowly.—It is.—And is it not more beautiful to reach another swiftly and vehemently, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—What then, is it more beautiful³⁰ to recollect and to remember things quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly?—He replied, Vehemently and rapidly.—And is not sagacity a certain steadiness, and not a quickness of the soul?—True.—To understand then what is meant in the school of the grammarian, harpist, and every where else, not in the most quiet, but in the most rapid manner, is the most beautiful.—Yes.—Moreover in the investigations of the soul, and in deliberating, not he, who is the most quiet, as I think, and deliberates and discovers a thing with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and rapidly.—It is so, said he.—[17.] Hence all things, I replied, relating to the soul and the body, and such as are performed with quickness and briskness, appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed with slowness and quietness.—It appears so, said he.—Temperance then will not be quietness, nor will a temperate life be a quiet one, at least from this reasoning; since a temperate one ought to be beautiful. For one of two things must take place, that either never, or very rarely, have quiet actions in life been shown to be more beautiful than such as are swift and strenuous. If then, my friend, not fewer actions, as quiet as possible, happen to be more beautiful than such as are vehement and rapid, not even on this ground would temperance consist at all the more in acting quietly, than vehemently and rapidly, either in walking or in speaking, or in any thing else; nor would a quiet [orderly]³¹ life be more temperate than the unquiet one; since by our reasoning, temperance has been laid down as one of things beautiful; and things swift have appeared to be no less beautiful than things quiet.—You appear to me, Socrates, he replied, to have spoken correctly.—[18.]

²⁹ The balance of the sentence requires the omission of ἡσυχῇ καί.

³⁰⁻³¹ The difference between ἀναμνησέσθαι and μνησθαι, is not very perceptible.

³¹ The Greek is ἡσυχίος βίος κόσμιος. Ficinus, "neque vita quieta quam inquieta decentior esset et temperantior," as if he had found in his MS. ἡσυχίος βίος τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου κοσμιώτερος καὶ σωφρονέστερος ἂν εἴη. Heindorf, in ed. 1, proposed to cut out κόσμιος, but in ed. 2 ἡσυχίος. Stalbaum, with Schleiermacher and Schaefer on Gregor. de Dialect. p. 1002, considers κόσμιος to be the intrusive word.

Again, therefore, I said, Charmides, be still more attentive, and looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person temperance, when present, causes you to be, and being what sort of a thing itself, it would accomplish this. Reasoning, therefore, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a manly manner, what it appears to you.—And he, stopping a while, considering the matter thoroughly with himself, said,³² in a very manly manner, Temperance then seems to me to make a man ashamed and bashful: and temperance to be what shame is.—Be it so, I replied. But did you not just now acknowledge that temperance is something beautiful?—Entirely so, said he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men?—Yes.—Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?—It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful, but good.—It appears so to me.—What then, I replied, will you not believe that Homer speaks well, when he says, (Od. xvii. 347,)

Shame ill accompanies a man in need?

I do, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not good, and good.—It appears so.—But temperance is good; since it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no means bad.—The case appears to me to be as you say.—Temperance, therefore, will not be shame, if it happens to be a good thing, while shame is not in any respect more a good thing than a bad one.—[19.] It appears to me, Socrates, said he, that this is rightly asserted. But consider this, what seems to you on the subject of temperance. For I have just now recollected what I had heard some one saying, that temperance is to manage one's own affairs.³³ Consider, therefore, this, whether he, who says so, appears to you to have spoken correctly.—Thou vile youth! I replied, you have heard this from Critias, or from some other of the sophists.—It seems, said Critias, from some other person; for he did not from me.—But what difference does it make, Socrates, replied Charmides, from whom I heard it?—None at all, said I. For we are not to consider this, who said it, but whether it is said

³² The words *kai πάντ' ἀνδρικῶς* ought to follow *ἔφη*, as I have translated, not precede *πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος*, as is evident from the command of Socrates, *εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρικῶς*.

³³ The same definition is given in Tim. p. 72, A., quoted by Stalbaum.

—I was.—Sit down here, said he, and tell us about it, for we have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the same time leading me along, he seated me near Critias, the son of Callæchrus. On sitting down then, I saluted Critias and the rest, and, according as any one asked me, related what took place in the army. And some asked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of such matters, I, in return, made inquiries about affairs here, as regards philosophy, what was its state at present; and respecting the young men, whether they had been remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. [3.] Critias then, looking towards the door, and perceiving some young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, said, It appears to me, Socrates, with regard to beautiful youths, that you will know something on the instant. For those, who are now entering, are the forerunners and lovers of one, who is thought to be the most beautiful⁵ of all at the present time. And it appears to me, that, having advanced, he is already near.—But who, said I, is he, and of whom the son?—You surely know, said he—although he was not yet grown up before you went away—Charmides, the son of our uncle Glauco, and my cousin.—I know him indeed, by Zeus, said I; for he was not then to be despised, although but a boy; but now I think he must be almost a young man.—You will immediately know, said he, of what age, and what kind he is. And as he was thus speaking, Charmides entered.—And I, my friend, had no rule to go by; for with regard to handsome youths, I am a white rule;⁶ since nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. [4.] But he then appeared to me to be an object of wonder, both for his size and beauty;⁷ and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him; so astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers also followed among those, who were behind him. And as to the men like us indeed, this was less wonderful; but I also paid attention to the youths, (and saw)

⁵ Ficin. has "honestissimus et speciosissimus," as if he had found in his MS. *καλλίστον καὶ ἀρίστον*—answering to *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός* in § 5.

⁶ The rule alluded to was a string rubbed with a piece of red chalk, which, when applied to white marble, left a mark sufficiently distinct to work by; but if with white chalk, as it left none sufficiently discernible, it failed to answer the purpose of a rule.

⁷ Ficin.—"Corporis proceritate et egregia indole."

that none of them turned their eyes elsewhere than on him, not even the smallest among them, but all looked upon him, as on a statue. And Chæropho calling me, said, What does the youth appear to you, Socrates? Is he not very beautiful?—Surpassingly, I replied.—And yet, said he, if he were to undress, he would appear to be faceless, so very beautiful is his form. And in this all the rest agreed with Chæropho. And by Hercules, I replied, you speak of a man not to be conquered, if only one small thing still happens to be his.—What is that? said Critias.—[5.] If in his soul, said I, he should happen to be well formed; and it is surely becoming, Critias, for him to be so, as being one of your family.—And he is, said he, very beautiful and good [in this respect].⁸—Why then, said I, do we not strip off this very thing of his, and look upon it prior to his (external) form? For since he is of such an age, he will in every respect be willing to discourse.⁹—Very much so, said Critias; since he is a philosopher, and, as it seems both to others and himself,¹⁰ very poetic.¹¹—This beauty, friend Critias, I replied, descends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon.¹² But why do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me? For it would be no disgrace for us to discourse with him, even if he were younger than he is, in the presence of yourself, who art his tutor and cousin.—[6.] You speak well, said he; and we will call him. And at the same time turning to his attendant, Call, says he, Charmides, and tell him that I wish to bring him in contact with a physician, touching the

⁸ By the words *καὶ τὰ ἄλλα*, Heindorf understands the soul. But as *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός* include the ideas of beauty bodily and mental, the words *καὶ τὰ ἄλλα* are superfluous; unless it be said that Plato wrote *πάντ* *καλὸς καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα*: of which *ἀγαθός* would be the interpretation.

⁹ This reasoning is rather inconclusive. For a person might be beautiful both in body and in mind, and yet feel no desire to hold a conversation. A similar difficulty exists in the word *τηλικούτος*, whether it is translated "of such an age," or "of such a size."

¹⁰ Instead of *ἐαυτῷ*, Groen van Prinsterer, in *Prosopograph. Platonic.* p. 214, would read *ἐμυαυτῷ*, "to myself."

¹¹ Why Critias should fancy that Charmides would be willing to converse, because he was both a philosopher and poet, it is not very easy to understand. Such persons would rather be desirous to express their ideas in writings than by word of mouth.

¹² According to Proclus on *Timæus*, p. 25, this second Critias was the grandson of the first, who was the nephew of Solon.

weakness of which he lately spoke to me.—Critias then said to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his head when he rises in the morning. What then should hinder you from pretending to him, that you know of a cure for the head?—Nothing, I replied; let him only come.—And come he shall, said he. Which was indeed the case; for he came, and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his neighbour, till of those that were seated at the extremity, one we forced to rise up, and another to fall sideways on the ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. [7.]

¹² Then, however, friend, I was perplexed, and the former confidence which I had felt, that I could easily discourse with Charmides, was cut down. But afterwards, on Critias telling him that I was the person who knew of a cure, he fixed his eyes upon me in a perplexing manner, and brought himself near as if to ask a question. Then all that were in the place of exercise, immediately gathered round us; and when, my noble fellow, I looked within his cloak, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myself; and I thought that Cydrias¹⁴ was most wise in amatory affairs; who, when speaking of a beautiful boy, and giving a hint to another, said,

¹³ “Beware, when coming in the face of lion,
To take a portion of the flesh of fawn.”¹⁵

For I seemed to have been caught by an animal of this kind.¹³ However, on Charmides asking me whether I knew of a remedy for the disorder in his head, with difficulty I replied, that I did know.—What is it? said he.—[8.] It is a certain

¹²—¹³ All within the numerals are omitted in the ed. l of Ficinus.

¹⁴ This is the reading adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from nearly all the MSS., in lieu of *Kpitiav*. For the same poet is mentioned, as Bernhardt was the first to remark, by Plutarch and the Scholiast on Aristophanes.

¹⁵—¹⁶ Hemsterhuis on Lucian, Dialog. Mort. viii., was the first to remark, that there is an allusion here to some well-known story; with whom Ast agrees in Act. Seminar. Reg. et Societat. Philolog. Lips. t. i. p. 255, who says that *μοῖραν αἰεῖσθαι κρεῶν* means “to take a portion of the prey;” not as Heindorf translated, “to be torn into pieces of flesh,” which Stalbaum adopts; for one party saw that the genius of the language required one interpretation, and the train of thought the other. The fact is, there is something wanting here to unite the language with the thought correctly.

leaf, I replied, and a certain incantation in addition to the medicine, which if any one chanted and used at the same time as the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no use without the incantation.—And he said, I will write down the incantation from you.—I replied, Will you do this, whether you persuade me or not?—Upon this he said, laughing, I will, if I persuade you, Socrates.—Be it so, I replied; and do you accurately know my name?—Unless I am doing wrong, said he; for there is no small talk about you amongst those of my age; and I can remember, too, that you associated with Critias when I was a boy.—You say well, I replied. For I will now tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation is. But just now I was doubtful after what manner I should show you its power. For this incantation is such, Charmides, that it is able to make not only the head sound; but, as perhaps you have already heard from clever physicians, when any one comes to them with a pain in their eyes, who say that they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is necessary for them at the same time to attend to the head, if the eyes are to be in a good state, and, on the other hand, that it would be great stupidity to think of attending to the head alone without the whole body. [9.] In consequence of this very reasoning, they turn themselves to the whole body, and by diet (and regimen) endeavour to attend to and cure the part together with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus speak, and that this is the case?—Entirely so, he replied.—Does it then appear to you that it has been well said; and do you admit their doctrine?—The most of all things, said he.—And I, on hearing him express his praise, took courage, and my confidence was again a little excited and I revived; and such then, I said, Charmides, is the power of this incantation; and I learnt it there during the expedition, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis,¹⁶ who are said to render men even immortal. This Thracian said that “the Greek physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now assert. But our king Zamolxis,” said he, “being a god, says that, as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper

¹⁶ On Zamolxis see Valckenaer on Herodot. iv. 94, and Sturz on Hellenicus, p. 64, quoted by Stalbaum.

to cure the body without the soul; and that this was the reason why many diseases escape the Greek physicians, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid; for when this is not in a good state, it is impossible for a part to be well. [10.] For all things," said he, "proceed from the soul, both the good and bad, to the body and to the whole man, and flow from thence, as¹⁷ from the head to the eyes; and that it is therefore requisite to attend to that point first, and especially if the parts of the head and the rest of the body are to be in a good state." And he said, thou happy youth, "that the soul was cured by certain incantations; and that these incantations were beautiful reasons; and that such temperance was generated in the soul, which, when generated and present, can easily impart health both to the head and to the rest of the body." Having then taught me the medicine and the incantations, "Let none," said he, "persuade you to cure his head with this medicine, who shall not have first presented his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, said he, of the present time respecting men is this, that certain persons endeavour to become physicians without a knowledge of either [temperance or health]."¹⁸ [11.] And he very earnestly enjoined me that no person should be so rich, or noble, or beautiful as to persuade me to act otherwise. I therefore—for I swore to him that I would obey him, and hence I must—will obey him. And indeed if you are willing, according to the injunctions of the stranger, to present your soul first for me to enchant by the incantations of the Thracian, I will administer also the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot do any thing whatever for you, friend Charmides.—Critias therefore, on hearing me speak thus, observed, This weakness in his head, Socrates, will be a godsend¹⁹ to the youth, if he shall be compelled to become through his head better in his intellect likewise. I assure you moreover that Charmides is thought to surpass all his equals, not only in his

¹⁷ Instead of *ἀνωκερ*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ἀνωκερως*. For his version is "similiter." I certainly cannot understand *ἀνωκερ*.

¹⁸ The words within brackets Heusde, with whom Bekker agrees, was the first to reject as an interpretation of *ἐκείνου*: and they are omitted in one MS. On the other hand, Ficinus omits *ἐκείνου*.

¹⁹ Such is the best translation of *ἑρμῆος*, by which was meant literally any thing of value found in the road, of which Hermes was the tutelary deity. See *The Banquet*, p. 176, C. § 4.

form, but in that very thing for which you say you have an incantation. Now you mean temperance. Is it not so?—Entirely so, I replied.—Know then, said he, that he appears to be by far the most temperate of those living at present; and that as regard all other points he is, as far as his age goes, inferior to none.—[12.] And it is just, I replied, Charmides, that you should excel the others in all such points as these. For I do not think that any one of those here could readily show two families among the Athenians uniting in the same race, who could probably produce a more beautiful and excellent offspring than those from whom you are sprung. For your family on the father's side, that of Critias the son of Dropides, has been handed to us as being celebrated by Anacreon and Solon, and many other poets, for its excelling in beauty, and virtue, and the rest of what is called²⁰ good fortune. And on his mother's side again in like manner. For not one of those that dwell on the continent (of Asia) is said to have been thought a man of greater beauty and size than your uncle²¹ Pyrilampes, as often as he went as an ambassador to the great king (of Persia), or to any one else on the continent; and indeed the whole of his family on this side is in nothing inferior to that on the other. It is likely then that, sprung from such persons, you should be the first in all things. Hence, with respect to your visible form, ²²you appear, thou dear son of Glauco, to me to disgrace none of your ancestors;²² and if, according to the assertion of this person here, you are sufficiently endued by nature as regards temperance and the other virtues, ²³your mother, dear Charmides, has brought you forth blessed indeed.²³ [13.] The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias here asserts, and you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the

²⁰ Ficinus omits *λεγομένη*, a word apparently unnecessary.

²¹ According to Pollux, iii. 22, the word *θείος*, which generally means an uncle on the father's side, is sometimes applied to one on the mother's.

²²⁻²³ In lieu of *οὐδένα τῶν προγόνων κατασχύνειν*, the two best MSS. (Bodl. and Vienn.) offer a most remarkable reading, *οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν εὐδελίᾳ ὑπερβεβληκέναι*. Plato probably united the two, by adding, after *ὑπερβεβληκέναι*, *οὐδὲ νῦν σὲ τὰ τῶν προγόνων κατασχύνειν*, i. e. "not one of those before you has surpassed you in any thing, nor do you now bring disgrace upon the deeds of your ancestors." The error is to be traced to the repetition of *οὐδένα* and *οὐδὲ νῦν*.

²³⁻²⁴ Here is an allusion to Hom. Il. iv. 399; Od. iii. 95; iv. 25, as remarked by Heindorf.

incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris,²⁴ but the medicine for the head should be immediately given you. But if you seem to be still in any respect wanting in these things, we must have the incantation before giving the medicine. Do you then tell me yourself whether you agree with this here (Critias), and affirm that you participate sufficiently in temperance, or whether you are deficient. Here-upon Charmides, blushing, appeared in the first place to be still more beautiful—for bashfulness was suited to his age—and in the next, he answered me not without spirit. For, said he, It was not easy at present either to confess to or deny what was asked: for, said he, if I say that I am not temperate, it would be absurd for me to state so against myself, and at the same time I should show that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others, to whom I appear to be temperate: but if, on the other hand, I say that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.—[14.] To this I replied, You appear to me, Charmides, to say what is reasonable; and it seems we should consider in common whether you possess or not that, which I am asking about, that you may neither be compelled to say what you do not wish, nor I, on the other hand, turn myself without due consideration to the medical art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I am willing to consider this matter together with you; but if it is not, to leave it alone.—Nay, but it is, said he, the most agreeable to me of all things; so that for this matter at least do you consider it in whatever manner appears to you to be the better.—In this way then, I replied, the inquiry respecting it seems to me to be the best, if temperance is present with you, for it is evident that you have some opinion about it; for it is surely necessary that if it is really inherent in you, it must furnish some sensation of itself, from which you would have an opinion respecting it, what it is, and of what kind a thing is temperance. Or do you not think so?—He replied, I do think so.—And could you not surely tell me, said I, since you know how to speak Greek,

²⁴ Respecting this Abaris, see Herodot. iv. 6. He is fabled to have received an arrow from Apollo, by the aid of which he was enabled to find his way through countries he had never before traversed. The arrow is supposed by Salverté to have been a kind of mariner's needle, that always pointed to the north.

what you think of it, and what it appears to you?—Perhaps so, said he.—That we may therefore conjecture, whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, said I, what say you is temperance according to your opinion? [15.] And at first, indeed, he was shy and not altogether willing to answer. Afterwards, however, he said, that temperance appeared to consist in doing all things orderly and quietly, both in walking and discoursing in the public ways, and acting similarly in every thing else; and, in short, said he, a certain quietness appears to be what you are asking about.—²⁵ Are you then speaking correctly? ²⁵ said I. At least, Charmides, persons say that the quiet are temperate. But let us see if they say any thing to the purpose. For, tell me, is not temperance one of the things beautiful?—He replied, Entirely so.—Whether then in a grammar-school is it more beautiful²⁶ to write letters of the same size²⁷ swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in reading, swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in playing on the harp, rapidly, and in wrestling, briskly, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—And is there not the like in boxing, and contests where boxing and wrestling are united?—Entirely so.—And in running and leaping, and all other actions of the body, do not those that take place briskly and rapidly belong to the beautiful, and those that are done²⁸ slowly, with difficulty,²⁸ and quietly, to the not beautiful?—It appears so.—It appears then to us, I replied, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and most brisk, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?—Entirely so.—[16.] But temperance was something beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.—It seems so, said he.—What then, I replied, is a facility in learning more beautiful than a difficulty?—It is.—But a facility in learning, I said, is to learn swiftly;

²⁵⁻²⁶ Here is some error in the words Ἀρ' οὖν—εὖ λέγεις, which Heindorf wished to correct by writing Ἀρ' οὖν—But ἀρα, the indefinite particle, could not commence a sentence.

²⁶ In lieu of κάλλιστον, Stephens suggested κάλλιον from “pulchrius” in Ficinus, which Heindorf and Bekker have adopted; but Heusde and Stalbaum prefer the other.

²⁷ Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, explains ὁμοία by “similar to the copy set by the writing-master.”

²⁸⁻²⁸ In the Greek βραδίως μόγις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ, Heindorf proposes to expunge βραδίως; but Stalbaum, μόγις. Ficin. “ignave remissione.”

and a difficulty in learning is to learn [quietly and]²⁹ slowly.—It is.—And is it not more beautiful to teach another swiftly and vehemently, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—What then, is it more beautiful³⁰ to recollect and to remember³⁰ things quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly?—He replied, Vehemently and rapidly.—And is not sagacity a certain swiftness, and not a quietness of the soul?—True.—To understand then what is meant in the school of the grammarian, harpest, and every where else, not in the most quiet, but in the most rapid manner, is the most beautiful.—Yes.—Moreover in the investigations of the soul, and in deliberating, not he, who is the most quiet, as I think, and deliberates and discovers a thing with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and rapidly.—It is so, said he.—[17.] Hence all things, I replied, relating to the soul and the body, and such as are performed with quickness and briskness, appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed with slowness and quietness.—It appears so, said he.—Temperance then will not be quietness, nor will a temperate life be a quiet one, at least from this reasoning; since a temperate one ought to be beautiful. For one of two things must take place, that either never, or very rarely, have quiet actions in life been shown to be more beautiful than such as are swift and strenuous. If then, my friend, not fewer actions, as quiet as possible, happen to be more beautiful than such as are vehement and rapid, not even on this ground would temperance consist at all the more in acting quietly, than vehemently and rapidly, either in walking or in speaking, or in any thing else; nor would a quiet [orderly]³¹ life be more temperate than the unquiet one; since by our reasoning, temperance has been laid down as one of things beautiful; and things swift have appeared to be no less beautiful than things quiet.—You appear to me, Socrates, he replied, to have spoken correctly.—[18.]

²⁹ The balance of the sentence requires the omission of *ἡσυχῇ καί*.

³⁰—³⁰ The difference between *ἀναμνησέσθαι* and *μνησέσθαι*, is not very perceptible.

³¹ The Greek is *ἡσυχίος βίος κόσμιος*. Ficinus, "neque vita quieta quam inquieti decentior esset et temperantior," as if he had found in his MS. *ἡσυχίος βίος τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου κοσμιώτερος καὶ σωφρονιώτερος ἂν εἴη*. Heindorf, in ed. 1, proposed to cut out *κόσμιος*, but in ed. 2 *ἡσυχίος*. Stalbaum, with Schleiermacher and Schäfer on Gregor. de Dialect. p. 1002, considers *κόσμιος* to be the intrusive word.

Again, therefore, I said, Charmides, be still more attentive, and looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person temperance, when present, causes you to be, and being what sort of a thing itself, it would accomplish this. Reasoning, therefore, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a manly manner, what it appears to you.—And he, stopping a while, considering the matter thoroughly with himself, said,³² in a very manly manner, Temperance then seems to me to make a man ashamed and bashful: and temperance to be what shame is.—Be it so, I replied. But did you not just now acknowledge that temperance is something beautiful?—Entirely so, said he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men?—Yes.—Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?—It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful, but good.—It appears so to me.—What then, I replied, will you not believe that Homer speaks well, when he says, (Od. xvii. 347,)

Shame ill accompanies a man in need?

I do, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not good, and good.—It appears so.—But temperance is good; since it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no means bad.—The case appears to me to be as you say.—Temperance, therefore, will not be shame, if it happens to be a good thing, while shame is not in any respect more a good thing than a bad one.—[19.] It appears to me, Socrates, said he, that this is rightly asserted. But consider this, what seems to you on the subject of temperance. For I have just now recollected what I had heard some one saying, that temperance is to manage one's own affairs.³³ Consider, therefore, this, whether he, who says so, appears to you to have spoken correctly.—Thou vile youth! I replied, you have heard this from Critias, or from some other of the sophists.—It seems, said Critias, from some other person; for he did not from me.—But what difference does it make, Socrates, replied Charmides, from whom I heard it?—None at all, said I. For we are not to consider this, who said it, but whether it is said

³² The words *καὶ πάντῃ ἀνδρικῶς* ought to follow *ἔφη*, as I have translated, not precede *πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος*, as is evident from the command of Socrates, *εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρικῶς*.

³³ The same definition is given in Tim. p. 72, A., quoted by Stalbaum.

correctly or not.—Now you speak nonsense, he replied.—By Zeus, I do not. But if we discover how this thing signifies, I shall wonder: for it is similar to a certain enigma.—[It what enigma? said he. Because, I replied, the person, who said that temperance is to manage one's own affairs, did not mean what his words expressed. Or do you think that the teacher of letters does nothing when he writes or reads?—I think he does something, said he.—30.] Does the teacher of letters, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to instruct you boys? And are ye not wiser to write the names of your enemies than of your friends?—No less, said he.—When, therefore, ye were doing this, were ye basely employed, and not temperate?—By no means.—And moreover, were ye not doing your own business, if to write and to read is to do something? It certainly is. And besides, my friend, to heal, and to build, and to weave, and to effect by any art whatever any of the works belonging to arts, is surely to do something.—Entirely so.—What then, I replied, would that city appear to you to be well regulated through a law commanding each person to weave and wash his own garment, and to be the cobbler of his own shoes, and make, ²⁴ an oil-press, and carry-comb, and every thing according to the same reasoning, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to [work and] ²⁵ manage his own affairs?—It would not appear to me so, he replied.—However, said I, a city temperately regulated would be well regulated.—How not? he replied.—For a man, therefore, to do such things as these, and to manage his own affairs, would not be temperance.—It appears not.—[21.] He, therefore, who said, that to manage one's own business is temperance, spoke, as I just now observed, obscurely; for he was surely not so stupid ²⁶ (that his meaning should be the same as his words).²⁶ Or did you, Charmides, hear some silly person as—

^{24, 25} According to Heindorf, the verb *ποιεῖν* is to be got out of *σκηνοποιεῖν*. But as shortly afterwards we meet with *ὑπαλάττειν τε καὶ ὑπάρρειν*, two verbs perfectly synonymous, it is evident, to myself at least, that *ὑπαλάττειν τε* has lost its original place after *σκηνοποιεῖν*.

²⁶—²⁶ The words between the numerals, absolutely requisite for the sense, have been preserved in the version of Ficinus alone, "ut idem ejus fuerit sensus, qui et verborum sensus." Stalbaum says that we are to understand after "so stupid," "as to think that temperance consists in managing one's own affairs."

sert this?—By no means, said he; since he appeared to be very wise.—More than any thing, therefore, as it seems to me, he proposed this enigma, because it is difficult to know what is the transacting one's own affairs.—Perhaps so, said he.—Can you then tell me, what it is to transact one's own affairs?—By Zeus, said he, I do not know. But perhaps there is nothing to hinder the person, who said this, from not knowing what he meant. And as he said this, he slightly smiled and looked at Critias. And it was now evident that Critias, who had been for some while in an agony, and stimulated by ambition in the presence of Charmides and those there, and who had with difficulty contained himself, was then no longer able to do so. And it appeared³⁷ to me more than ever, that what I suspected was true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance from Critias. [22.] Charmides, therefore, being willing not to support himself the reason for the reply, but that the other (Critias) should do so, and urged him on himself,³⁸ showed as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure; but appeared to me to be angry with Charmides, as a poet is with an actor who exhibits his poems badly; so that, looking at him, he said, Think you thus, Charmides, that, if you do not know what he meant, who said, that temperance is to manage one's own affairs, he did not know?—And I said, It is, Critias, thou best of men, no wonder that Charmides, who is but a youth, should not know; but it is surely likely for you to know, both on account of your age and attention to the subject. If then you agree that temperance is, what this person asserts, and will take up from him the conversation, I shall with greater pleasure consider with you whether what has been said is true or not.—Nay, I do agree, said he, entirely, and accept the conversation.—And you do well, said I. But tell me, do you admit what I was just now asking, that all artists do something?—I do.—Do they appear to you to do

³⁷ From "visum est," the version of Ficinus, and his own "videbatur," Cornarius seems to have wished to read *ἰδόκει* for *δοκεῖ*. Compare *καὶ ἐμοὶ ἰδόκει ὑπεραγωνιᾶν*, in Euthyd. p. 300, C., and *καὶ ἐμοὶ ἰδόκει—ἀγωνιᾶν* in Protag. p. 333, F. The present passage is imitated by Heliodorus in *Æthiop.* ii. 18, as remarked by Boissonade on Philostratus Heroic. p. 605.

³⁸ I cannot understand *αὐτὸν ἐκείνον*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted the clause *ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκείνον*. I could have understood *ὑπεκίνει ἐκείνον καὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξεληλεγμένος εἶη*, i. e. "urged the other on, and showed that he himself had been confuted."

only their own business, or the business of others likewise?—Of others likewise.—[23.] Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do their own business?—What should prevent them? said he.—Not myself, I replied, at all; but see whether there be not a hindrance to him, who, after having laid down that temperance is to transact one's own affairs, afterwards says, that nothing prevents those who transact the affairs of others from being temperate likewise.—For where, ³⁰ said he, have I confessed that they, who transact the affairs of others, are temperate, like those, who I confessed make (something)?³⁰—Tell me, said I, do you not say that to "make" a thing and to do is the same thing?—Not I indeed, said he, nor "to work" the same as "to make," for I have learned (so) from Hesiod, who says, "No work is a disgrace."³¹—Think you, then, that if he had called by the terms of "to work" and "to make," such acts as you were just now speaking of, he would have said that there was no disgrace to a person being ³² "a cobbler, or a seller of pickled fish, or of one who sits at a brothel?"³¹—You must not think so, Socrates: but he I think did consider "a making" as something different from "action" and "working;" and that "making" is a disgrace, when it does not take place in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no "work" is ever a disgrace. For things which are made beautiful and useful, he called "works," and "makings" of this kind workings and doings. [24.] You must say too that he considered such things (good)³³ alone as belong to home; but every thing hurtful, as foreign. Hence, you must think that Hesiod, and every other sensible person, calls him, who transacts his own

³⁰⁻³² I have adopted *ποῦ*, "where," instead of *σέυ*, "surely," and *ἦ* for *ἦ*, suggested by Morgenstern in *Miscellan. Crit. Hildesiensis*. i. p. 91, and introduced *τι* before *ποιούντας*. Ficinus has "an et eos, qui faciunt," as if he had found in his MS. *ἦ καὶ*—

³¹ The Greek in the *Works and Days*, v. 309, is *ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν δυνεύος*. But there, as remarked by Heindorf, *ἔργον* does not mean "work" generally, but only specifically "farming-work;" nor does *οὐδὲν* belong to *ἔργον*, but to *δυνεύος*.

³²⁻³³ The three trades alluded to were considered the lowest at Athens. On the meaning of *οἶκημα*, applied, by an euphemism, to a brothel, see Harpocration, Pollux, and Hesychius.

³⁴ Stalbaum explains *τὰ τοιαῦτα* by the preceding *τὰ καλῶς καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα*. But the balance of the sentence indicates that *ἀγαθὰ* has dropt out after *ἡγίσθαι*; to say nothing of the subsequent remark of Socrates, *ὅτι τὰ οἰκία τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοῖται*.

affairs, temperate.—As soon, Critias, as you began to speak, I perceived almost, that you called things belonging to home, a person's own by the name of good, and "the making" of things good, actions. For I have heard Prodicus, when speaking of terms, make some ten thousand distinctions; and I will allow you to lay down every term as you please; but do you only clearly state, to what you would refer the term, of which you may be speaking. Now therefore again from the beginning define more clearly. Do you say that temperance is the "doing," or the "making," or in whatever manner you choose to call it, of good things?—I do, said he.—He therefore is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.—He replied, Does it not, thou best of men, appear so to you?—Dismiss this question, said I: for let us not consider what appears to me, but what you are saying now.—[25.] Nay, said he, I do not assert that he is temperate, who does not do good but evil,⁴³ but that he is temperate, who does good and not evil.⁴³ For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the practice of things good. And perhaps there is nothing to prevent you from speaking the truth. But nevertheless I should wonder, if you thought that persons who conduct themselves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.—But I do not think so, said he.—Was it not, said I, asserted by you a little before, that there is nothing to prevent artists, who make on the other hand⁴⁴ things belonging to others, from being temperate?—It was so asserted by me, said he; but what then?—Nothing. But tell me, does any physician appear to you, while making a person to be in health, to do what is useful both to himself, and to him whom he cures?—To me he does.—Does not he, then, who acts thus, do what is fitting?—Yes.—And is not he temperate, who does what is fitting?—He is temperate.—Is it not then fitting for a physician to know when he is curing usefully, and when not? and for each artist to know, when he will derive a benefit from the work which he is doing, and when not?—Perhaps not, said he.—

⁴³⁻⁴⁵ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and consequently by Taylor.

⁴⁴ I cannot understand αὐ here, nor could Heindorf, who thinks it was owing to καὶ—I suspect that Plato wrote καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, instead of καὶ αὐ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.

to cure the body without the soul; and that this was the reason why many diseases escape the Greek physicians, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid; for when this is not in a good state, it is impossible for a part to be well. [10.] For all things," said he, "proceed from the soul, both the good and bad, to the body and to the whole man, and flow from thence, as¹⁷ from the head to the eyes; and that it is therefore requisite to attend to that point first, and especially if the parts of the head and the rest of the body are to be in a good state." And he said, thou happy youth, "that the soul was cured by certain incantations; and that these incantations were beautiful reasons; and that such temperance was generated in the soul, which, when generated and present, can easily impart health both to the head and to the rest of the body." Having then taught me the medicine and the incantations, "Let none," said he, "persuade you to cure his head with this medicine, who shall not have first presented his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, said he, of the present time respecting men is this, that certain persons endeavour to become physicians without a knowledge of either [temperance or health]."¹⁸ [11.] And he very earnestly enjoined me that no person should be so rich, or noble, or beautiful as to persuade me to act otherwise. I therefore—for I swore to him that I would obey him, and hence I must—will obey him. And indeed if you are willing, according to the injunctions of the stranger, to present your soul first for me to enchant by the incantations of the Thracian, I will administer also the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot do any thing whatever for you, friend Charmides.—Critias therefore, on hearing me speak thus, observed, This weakness in his head, Socrates, will be a godsend¹⁹ to the youth, if he shall be compelled to become through his head better in his intellect likewise. I assure you moreover that Charmides is thought to surpass all his equals, not only in his

¹⁷ Instead of *σωψ*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *σωατρω*. For his version is "similiter." I certainly cannot understand *σωψ*.

¹⁸ The words within brackets Heusde, with whom Bekker agrees, was the first to reject as an interpretation of *ἐκρίνον*: and they are omitted in one MS. On the other hand, Ficinus omits *ἐκρίνον*.

¹⁹ Such is the best translation of *ἑρμῆος*, by which was meant literally any thing of value found in the road, of which Hermes was the tutelary deity. See The Banquet, p. 176, C. § 4.

form, but in that very thing for which you say you have an incantation. Now you mean temperance. Is it not so?—Entirely so, I replied.—Know then, said he, that he appears to be by far the most temperate of those living at present; and that as regard all other points he is, as far as his age goes, inferior to none.—[12.] And it is just, I replied, Charmides, that you should excel the others in all such points as these. For I do not think that any one of those here could readily show two families among the Athenians uniting in the same race, who could probably produce a more beautiful and excellent offspring than those from whom you are sprung. For your family on the father's side, that of Critias the son of Dropides, has been handed to us as being celebrated by Anacreon and Solon, and many other poets, for its excelling in beauty, and virtue, and the rest of what is called²⁰ good fortune. And on his mother's side again in like manner. For not one of those that dwell on the continent (of Asia) is said to have been thought a man of greater beauty and size than your uncle²¹ Pylilampes, as often as he went as an ambassador to the great king (of Persia), or to any one else on the continent; and indeed the whole of his family on this side is in nothing inferior to that on the other. It is likely then that, sprung from such persons, you should be the first in all things. Hence, with respect to your visible form, ²²you appear, thou dear son of Glauco, to me to disgrace none of your ancestors;²² and if, according to the assertion of this person here, you are sufficiently endued by nature as regards temperance and the other virtues, ²³your mother, dear Charmides, has brought you forth blessed indeed.²³ [13.] The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias here asserts, and you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the

²⁰ Ficinus omits *λεγομένην*, a word apparently unnecessary.

²¹ According to Pollux, iii. 22, the word *θεῖος*, which generally means an uncle on the father's side, is sometimes applied to one on the mother's.

^{22—23} In lieu of *οὐδένα τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν*, the two best MSS. (Bodl. and Vienn.) offer a most remarkable reading, *οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑπερβεβληκέναι*. Plato probably united the two, by adding, after *ὑπερβεβληκέναι*, *οὐδὲ νῦν σὲ τὰ τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν*, i. e. "not one of those before you has surpassed you in any thing, nor do you now bring disgrace upon the deeds of your ancestors." The error is to be traced to the repetition of *οὐδένα* and *οὐδὲ νῦν*.

^{23—24} Here is an allusion to Hom. Il. iv. 399; Od. iii. 95; iv. 25, as remarked by Heindorf.

incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris,²⁴ but the medicine for the head should be immediately given you. But if you seem to be still in any respect wanting in these things, we must have the incantation before giving the medicine. Do you then tell me yourself whether you agree with this here (Critias), and affirm that you participate sufficiently in temperance, or whether you are deficient. Hereupon Charmides, blushing, appeared in the first place to be still more beautiful—for bashfulness was suited to his age—and in the next, he answered me not without spirit. For, said he, It was not easy at present either to confess to or deny what was asked: for, said he, if I say that I am not temperate, it would be absurd for me to state so against myself, and at the same time I should show that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others, to whom I appear to be temperate: but if, on the other hand, I say that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.—[14.] To this I replied, You appear to me, Charmides, to say what is reasonable; and it seems we should consider in common whether you possess or not that, which I am asking about, that you may neither be compelled to say what you do not wish, nor I, on the other hand, turn myself without due consideration to the medical art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I am willing to consider this matter together with you; but if it is not, to leave it alone.—Nay, but it is, said he, the most agreeable to me of all things; so that for this matter at least do you consider it in whatever manner appears to you to be the better.—In this way then, I replied, the inquiry respecting it seems to me to be the best, if temperance is present with you, for it is evident that you have some opinion about it; for it is surely necessary that if it is really inherent in you, it must furnish some sensation of itself, from which you would have an opinion respecting it, what it is, and of what kind a thing is temperance. Or do you not think so?—He replied, I do think so.—And could you not surely tell me, said I, since you know how to speak Greek,

²⁴ Respecting this Abaris, see Herodot. iv. 6. He is fabled to have received an arrow from Apollo, by the aid of which he was enabled to find his way through countries he had never before traversed. The arrow is supposed by Salverte to have been a kind of mariner's needle, that always pointed to the north.

what you think of it, and what it appears to you?—Perhaps so, said he.—That we may therefore conjecture, whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, said I, what say you is temperance according to your opinion? [15.] And at first, indeed, he was shy and not altogether willing to answer. Afterwards, however, he said, that temperance appeared to consist in doing all things orderly and quietly, both in walking and discoursing in the public ways, and acting similarly in every thing else; and, in short, said he, a certain quietness appears to be what you are asking about.—²⁵ Are you then speaking correctly? ²⁵ said I. At least, Charmides, persons say that the quiet are temperate. But let us see if they say any thing to the purpose. For, tell me, is not temperance one of the things beautiful?—He replied, Entirely so.—Whether then in a grammar-school is it more beautiful²⁶ to write letters of the same size²⁷ swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in reading, swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in playing on the harp, rapidly, and in wrestling, briskly, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—And is there not the like in boxing, and contests where boxing and wrestling are united?—Entirely so.—And in running and leaping, and all other actions of the body, do not those that take place briskly and rapidly belong to the beautiful, and those that are done²⁸ slowly, with difficulty,²⁸ and quietly, to the not beautiful?—It appears so.—It appears then to us, I replied, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and most brisk, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?—Entirely so.—[16.] But temperance was something beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.—It seems so, said he.—What then, I replied, is a facility in learning more beautiful than a difficulty?—It is.—But a facility in learning, I said, is to learn swiftly;

²⁵⁻²⁶ Here is some error in the words Ἀρ' οὖν—εὖ λέγεις, which Heindorf wished to correct by writing Ἀρ' οὖν.—But ἀρα, the indefinite particle, could not commence a sentence.

²⁶ In lieu of κάλλιστον, Stephens suggested κάλλιον from “pulchrius” in Ficinus, which Heindorf and Bekker have adopted; but Heusde and Stalbaum prefer the other.

²⁷ Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, explains ὅμοια by “similar to the copy set by the writing-master.”

²⁸⁻²⁹ In the Greek βραδίως μόγις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ, Heindorf proposes to expunge βραδίως: but Stalbaum, μόγις. Ficin. “ignave remissione.”

—I was.—Sit down here, said he, and tell us about it, for we have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the same time leading me along, he seated me near Critias, the son of Callæchrus. On sitting down then, I saluted Critias and the rest, and, according as any one asked me, related what took place in the army. And some asked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of such matters, I, in return, made inquiries about affairs here, as regards philosophy, what was its state at present; and respecting the young men, whether they had been remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. [3.] Critias then, looking towards the door, and perceiving some young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, said, It appears to me, Socrates, with regard to beautiful youths, that you will know something on the instant. For those, who are now entering, are the forerunners and lovers of one, who is thought to be the most beautiful⁵ of all at the present time. And it appears to me, that, having advanced, he is already near.—But who, said I, is he, and of whom the son?—You surely know, said he—although he was not yet grown up before you went away—Charmides, the son of our uncle Glauco, and my cousin.—I know him indeed, by Zeus, said I; for he was not then to be despised, although but a boy; but now I think he must be almost a young man.—You will immediately know, said he, of what age, and what kind he is. And as he was thus speaking, Charmides entered.—And I, my friend, had no rule to go by; for with regard to handsome youths, I am a white rule;⁶ since nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. [4.] But he then appeared to me to be an object of wonder, both for his size and beauty;⁷ and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him; so astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers also followed among those, who were behind him. And as to the men like us indeed, this was less wonderful; but I also paid attention to the youths, (and saw)

⁵ Ficin. has "honestissimus et speciosissimus," as if he had found in his MS. *καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου*—answering to *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός* in §. 5.

⁶ The rule alluded to was a string rubbed with a piece of red chalk, which, when applied to white marble, left a mark sufficiently distinct to work by; but if with white chalk, as it left none sufficiently discernible, it failed to answer the purpose of a rule.

⁷ Ficin.—"Corporis proceritate et egregia indole."

that none of them turned their eyes elsewhere than on him, not even the smallest among them, but all looked upon him, as on a statue. And Chæropho calling me, said, What does the youth appear to you, Socrates? Is he not very beautiful?—Surpassingly, I replied.—And yet, said he, if he were to undress, he would appear to be faceless, so very beautiful is his form. And in this all the rest agreed with Chæropho. And by Hercules, I replied, you speak of a man not to be conquered, if only one small thing still happens to be his.—What is that? said Critias.—[5.] If in his soul, said I, he should happen to be well formed; and it is surely becoming, Critias, for him to be so, as being one of your family.—And he is, said he, very beautiful and good [in this respect].⁸—Why then, said I, do we not strip off this very thing of his, and look upon it prior to his (external) form? For since he is of such an age, he will in every respect be willing to discourse.⁹—Very much so, said Critias; since he is a philosopher, and, as it seems both to others and himself,¹⁰ very poetic.¹¹—This beauty, friend Critias, I replied, descends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon.¹² But why do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me? For it would be no disgrace for us to discourse with him, even if he were younger than he is, in the presence of yourself, who art his tutor and cousin.—[6.] You speak well, said he; and we will call him. And at the same time turning to his attendant, Call, says he, Charmides, and tell him that I wish to bring him in contact with a physician, touching the

* By the words *kai taûta*, Heindorf understands the soul. But as *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός* include the ideas of beauty bodily and mental, the words *kai taûta* are superfluous; unless it be said that Plato wrote *πάνυ καλὸς καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα*: of which *ἀγαθός* would be the interpretation.

⁸ This reasoning is rather inconclusive. For a person might be beautiful both in body and in mind, and yet feel no desire to hold a conversation. A similar difficulty exists in the word *τηλικούτος*, whether it is translated "of such an age," or "of such a size."

⁹ Instead of *ἱκανῶς*, Groen van Prinsterer, in *Prosopograph. Platonic.* p. 214, would read *ἑμυρῶς*, "to myself."

¹¹ Why Critias should fancy that Charmides would be willing to converse, because he was both a philosopher and poet, it is not very easy to understand. Such persons would rather be desirous to express their ideas in writings than by word of mouth.

¹² According to Proclus on *Timæus*, p. 25, this second Critias was the grandson of the first, who was the nephew of Solon.

weakness of which he lately spoke to me.—Critias then said to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his head when he rises in the morning. What then should hinder you from pretending to him, that you know of a cure for the head?—Nothing, I replied; let him only come.—And come he shall, said he. Which was indeed the case; for he came, and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his neighbour, till of those that were seated at the extremity, one we forced to rise up, and another to fall sideways on the ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. [7.]

¹³ Then, however, friend, I was perplexed, and the former confidence which I had felt, that I could easily discourse with Charmides, was cut down. But afterwards, on Critias telling him that I was the person who knew of a cure, he fixed his eyes upon me in a perplexing manner, and brought himself near as if to ask a question. Then all that were in the place of exercise, immediately gathered round us; and when, my noble fellow, I looked within his cloak, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myself; and I thought that Cydias¹⁴ was most wise in amatory affairs; who, when speaking of a beautiful boy, and giving a hint to another, said,

¹⁵ “Beware, when coming in the face of lion,
To take a portion of the flesh of fawn.” ¹⁶

For I seemed to have been caught by an animal of this kind.¹³ However, on Charmides asking me whether I knew of a remedy for the disorder in his head, with difficulty I replied, that I did know.—What is it? said he.—[8.] It is a certain

^{13—15} All within the numerals are omitted in the ed. l of Ficinus.

¹⁴ This is the reading adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from nearly all the MSS., in lieu of *Kprias*. For the same poet is mentioned, as Bernhardt was the first to remark, by Plutarch and the Scholiast on Aristophanes.

^{15—16} Hemsterhuis on Lucian, Dialog. Mort. viii., was the first to remark, that there is an allusion here to some well-known story; with whom Ast agrees in Act. Seminar. Reg. et Societat. Philolog. Lips. t. i. p. 255, who says that *μοῖραν αἰεῖσθαι κρεῶν* means “to take a portion of the prey;” not as Heindorf translated, “to be torn into pieces of flesh,” which Stalbaum adopts; for one party saw that the genius of the language required one interpretation, and the train of thought the other. The fact is, there is something wanting here to unite the language with the thought correctly.

leaf, I replied, and a certain incantation in addition to the medicine, which if any one chanted and used at the same time as the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no use without the incantation.—And he said, I will write down the incantation from you.—I replied, Will you do this, whether you persuade me or not?—Upon this he said, laughing, I will, if I persuade you, Socrates.—Be it so, I replied; and do you accurately know my name?—Unless I am doing wrong, said he; for there is no small talk about you amongst those of my age; and I can remember, too, that you associated with Critias when I was a boy.—You say well, I replied. For I will now tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation is. But just now I was doubtful after what manner I should show you its power. For this incantation is such, Charmides, that it is able to make not only the head sound; but, as perhaps you have already heard from clever physicians, when any one comes to them with a pain in their eyes, who say that they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is necessary for them at the same time to attend to the head, if the eyes are to be in a good state, and, on the other hand, that it would be great stupidity to think of attending to the head alone without the whole body. [9.] In consequence of this very reasoning, they turn themselves to the whole body, and by diet (and regimen) endeavour to attend to and cure the part together with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus speak, and that this is the case?—Entirely so, he replied.—Does it then appear to you that it has been well said; and do you admit their doctrine?—The most of all things, said he.—And I, on hearing him express his praise, took courage, and my confidence was again a little excited and I revived; and such then, I said, Charmides, is the power of this incantation; and I learnt it there during the expedition, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis,¹⁶ who are said to render men even immortal. This Thracian said that “the Greek physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now assert. But our king Zamolxis,” said he, “being a god, says that, as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper

¹⁶ On Zamolxis see Valckenær on Herodot. iv. 94, and Sturz on Hellenicus, p. 64, quoted by Stalbaum.

to cure the body without the soul; and that this was the reason why many diseases escape the Greek physicians, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid; for when this is not in a good state, it is impossible for a part to be well. [10.] For all things," said he, "proceed from the soul, both the good and bad, to the body and to the whole man, and flow from thence, as¹⁷ from the head to the eyes; and that it is therefore requisite to attend to that point first, and especially if the parts of the head and the rest of the body are to be in a good state." And he said, thou happy youth, "that the soul was cured by certain incantations; and that these incantations were beautiful reasons; and that such temperance was generated in the soul, which, when generated and present, can easily impart health both to the head and to the rest of the body." Having then taught me the medicine and the incantations, "Let none," said he, "persuade you to cure his head with this medicine, who shall not have first presented his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, said he, of the present time respecting men is this, that certain persons endeavour to become physicians without a knowledge of either [temperance or health]." ¹⁸ [11.] And he very earnestly enjoined me that no person should be so rich, or noble, or beautiful as to persuade me to act otherwise. I therefore—for I swore to him that I would obey him, and hence I must—will obey him. And indeed if you are willing, according to the injunctions of the stranger, to present your soul first for me to enchant by the incantations of the Thracian, I will administer also the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot do any thing whatever for you, friend Charmides.—Critias therefore, on hearing me speak thus, observed, This weakness in his head, Socrates, will be a godsend¹⁹ to the youth, if he shall be compelled to become through his head better in his intellect likewise. I assure you moreover that Charmides is thought to surpass all his equals, not only in his

¹⁷ Instead of *ῥοπή*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ῥοπή*. For his version is "similiter." I certainly cannot understand *ῥοπή*.

¹⁸ The words within brackets Heusde, with whom Bekker agrees, was the first to reject as an interpretation of *ἐκάρπov*: and they are omitted in one MS. On the other hand, Ficinus omits *ἐκάρπov*.

¹⁹ Such is the best translation of *ἑρμαῖον*, by which was meant literally any thing of value found in the road, of which Hermes was the tutelary deity. See *The Banquet*, p. 176, C. § 4.

form, but in that very thing for which you say you have an incantation. Now you mean temperance. Is it not so?—Entirely so, I replied.—Know then, said he, that he appears to be by far the most temperate of those living at present; and that as regard all other points he is, as far as his age goes, inferior to none.—[12.] And it is just, I replied, Charmides, that you should excel the others in all such points as these. For I do not think that any one of those here could readily show two families among the Athenians uniting in the same race, who could probably produce a more beautiful and excellent offspring than those from whom you are sprung. For your family on the father's side, that of Critias the son of Dropides, has been handed to us as being celebrated by Anacreon and Solon, and many other poets, for its excelling in beauty, and virtue, and the rest of what is called²⁰ good fortune. And on his mother's side again in like manner. For not one of those that dwell on the continent (of Asia) is said to have been thought a man of greater beauty and size than your uncle²¹ Pyrilampes, as often as he went as an ambassador to the great king (of Persia), or to any one else on the continent; and indeed the whole of his family on this side is in nothing inferior to that on the other. It is likely then that, sprung from such persons, you should be the first in all things. Hence, with respect to your visible form, ²²you appear, thou dear son of Glauco, to me to disgrace none of your ancestors;²² and if, according to the assertion of this person here, you are sufficiently endued by nature as regards temperance and the other virtues, ²³your mother, dear Charmides, has brought you forth blessed indeed.²³ [13.] The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias here asserts, and you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the

²⁰ Ficinus omits λεγομένη, a word apparently unnecessary.

²¹ According to Pollux, iii. 22, the word θείος, which generally means an uncle on the father's side, is sometimes applied to one on the mother's.

^{22—23} In lieu of οὐδένα τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν, the two best MSS. (Bodl. and Vienn.) offer a most remarkable reading, οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑπερβεβληκέναι. Plato probably united the two, by adding, after ὑπερβεβληκέναι, οὐδὲ νῦν σὲ τὰ τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν, i. e. "not one of those before you has surpassed you in any thing, nor do you now bring disgrace upon the deeds of your ancestors." The error is to be traced to the repetition of οὐδένα and οὐδὲ νῦν.

^{22—23} Here is an allusion to Hom. Il. iv. 399; Od. iii. 95; iv. 25, as remarked by Heindorf.

incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris,²⁴ but the medicine for the head should be immediately given you. But if you seem to be still in any respect wanting in these things, we must have the incantation before giving the medicine. Do you then tell me yourself whether you agree with this here (Critias), and affirm that you participate sufficiently in temperance, or whether you are deficient. Here-upon Charmides, blushing, appeared in the first place to be still more beautiful—for bashfulness was suited to his age—and in the next, he answered me not without spirit. For, said he, It was not easy at present either to confess to or deny what was asked: for, said he, if I say that I am not temperate, it would be absurd for me to state so against myself, and at the same time I should show that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others, to whom I appear to be temperate: but if, on the other hand, I say that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.—[14.] To this I replied, You appear to me, Charmides, to say what is reasonable; and it seems we should consider in common whether you possess or not that, which I am asking about, that you may neither be compelled to say what you do not wish, nor I, on the other hand, turn myself without due consideration to the medical art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I am willing to consider this matter together with you; but if it is not, to leave it alone.—Nay, but it is, said he, the most agreeable to me of all things; so that for this matter at least do you consider it in whatever manner appears to you to be the better.—In this way then, I replied, the inquiry respecting it seems to me to be the best, if temperance is present with you, for it is evident that you have some opinion about it; for it is surely necessary that if it is really inherent in you, it must furnish some sensation of itself, from which you would have an opinion respecting it, what it is, and of what kind a thing is temperance. Or do you not think so?—He replied, I do think so.—And could you not surely tell me, said I, since you know how to speak Greek,

²⁴ Respecting this Abaris, see Herodot. iv. 6. He is fabled to have received an arrow from Apollo, by the aid of which he was enabled to find his way through countries he had never before traversed. The arrow is supposed by Salverté to have been a kind of mariner's needle, that always pointed to the north.

what you think of it, and what it appears to you?—Perhaps so, said he.—That we may therefore conjecture, whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, said I, what say you is temperance according to your opinion? [15.] And at first, indeed, he was shy and not altogether willing to answer. Afterwards, however, he said, that temperance appeared to consist in doing all things orderly and quietly, both in walking and discoursing in the public ways, and acting similarly in every thing else; and, in short, said he, a certain quietness appears to be what you are asking about.—²⁵ Are you then speaking correctly? ²⁵ said I. At least, Charmides, persons say that the quiet are temperate. But let us see if they say any thing to the purpose. For, tell me, is not temperance one of the things beautiful?—He replied, Entirely so.—Whether then in a grammar-school is it more beautiful²⁶ to write letters of the same size²⁷ swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in reading, swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in playing on the harp, rapidly, and in wrestling, briskly, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—And is there not the like in boxing, and contests where boxing and wrestling are united?—Entirely so.—And in running and leaping, and all other actions of the body, do not those that take place briskly and rapidly belong to the beautiful, and those that are done²⁸ slowly, with difficulty,²⁸ and quietly, to the not beautiful?—It appears so.—It appears then to us, I replied, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and most brisk, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?—Entirely so.—[16.] But temperance was something beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.—It seems so, said he.—What then, I replied, is a facility in learning more beautiful than a difficulty?—It is.—But a facility in learning, I said, is to learn swiftly;

²⁵⁻²⁶ Here is some error in the words Ἀρ' οὐν—εὖ λέγεις, which Heindorf wished to correct by writing Ἀρ' οὐν—But ἀρα, the indefinite particle, could not commence a sentence.

²⁶ In lieu of κάλλιστον, Stephens suggested κάλλιον from “pulchrius” in Ficinus, which Heindorf and Bekker have adopted; but Heusde and Stalbaum prefer the other.

²⁷ Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, explains ὁμοία by “similar to the copy set by the writing-master.”

²⁸⁻²⁸ In the Greek βραδίως μόγεις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ, Heindorf proposes to expunge βραδίως; but Stalbaum, μόγεις. Ficin. “ignave remissione.”

and a difficulty in learning is to learn [quietly and—It is.—And is it not more beautiful to teach and vehemently, than quietly and slowly?—You then, is it more beautiful ³⁰ to recollect and to things quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly, Vehemently and rapidly.—And is not sagacity acuteness, and not a quietness of the soul?—I understand then what is meant in the school of the Pythagorean, harpist, and every where else, not in the quiet but in the most rapid manner, is the most beautiful. Moreover in the investigations of the soul, and in doing so, not he, who is the most quiet, as I think, and delicate, who discovers a thing with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but who does this most easily and rapidly.—It is so, [17.] Hence all things, I replied, relating to the soul, and such as are performed with quickness and rapidity, appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed with slowness and quietness.—It appears so, said he.—Then will not be quietness, nor will a temperate life be the more beautiful one, at least from this reasoning; since a temperate life is to be beautiful. For one of two things must take place, either never, or very rarely, have quiet actions been shown to be more beautiful than such as are swift and vigorous. If then, my friend, not fewer actions, as quiet ones, happen to be more beautiful than such as are rapid and rapid, not even on this ground would temperance consist at all the more in acting quietly, than vehemently and rapidly, either in walking or in speaking, or in any other action, nor would a quiet [orderly] ³¹ life be more temperate than an unquiet one; since by our reasoning, temperance has been set down as one of things beautiful; and things swift and vigorous have appeared to be no less beautiful than things quiet.—I replied, to me, Socrates, he replied, to have spoken correctly.

²⁹ The balance of the sentence requires the omission of *ἡ*.

^{30—30} The difference between *ἀναμνήσκεσθαι* and *μνησθαι* is very perceptible.

³¹ The Greek is *ἡσύχιος βίος κόσμιος*. Ficinus, "nequam inquieta decentior esset et temperantior," as if he had read *MS. ἡσύχιος βίος τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου κοσμιώτερος καὶ σωφρονέστερος*. Heindorf, in ed. 1, proposed to cut out *κόσμιος*, but in ed. 2, Stalbaum, with Schleiermacher and Schæfer on Gregor. d. 1002, considers *κόσμιος* to be the intrusive word.

Again, therefore, I said, Charmides, be still more attentive, and looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person temperance, when present, causes you to be, and being what sort of a thing itself, it would accomplish this. Reasoning, therefore, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a manly manner, what it appears to you.—And he, stopping a while, considering the matter thoroughly with himself, said,³² in a very manly manner, Temperance then seems to me to make a man ashamed and bashful: and temperance to be what shame is.—Be it so, I replied. But did you not just now acknowledge that temperance is something beautiful?—Entirely so, said he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men?—Yes.—Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?—It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful, but good.—It appears so to me.—What then, I replied, will you not believe that Homer speaks well, when he says, (Od. xvii. 347,)

Shame ill accompanies a man in need?

I do, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not good, and good.—It appears so.—But temperance is good; since it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no means bad.—The case appears to me to be as you say.—Temperance, therefore, will not be shame, if it happens to be a good thing, while shame is not in any respect more a good thing than a bad one.—[19.] It appears to me, Socrates, said he, that this is rightly asserted. But consider this, what seems to you on the subject of temperance. For I have just now recollected what I had heard some one saying, that temperance is to manage one's own affairs.³³ Consider, therefore, this, whether he, who says so, appears to you to have spoken correctly.—Thou vile youth! I replied, you have heard this from Critias, or from some other of the sophists.—It seems, said Critias, from some other person; for he did not from me.—But what difference does it make, Socrates, replied Charmides, from whom I heard it?—None at all, said I. For we are not to consider this, who said it, but whether it is said

³² The words *καὶ πάντῃ ἀνδρικῶς* ought to follow *ἔφη*, as I have translated, not precede *πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος*, as is evident from the command of Socrates, *εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρικῶς*.

³³ The same definition is given in Tim. p. 72, A., quoted by Stalbaum.

correctly or not.—Now you speak correctly, he replied.—By Zeus, I do, said I. But if we discover how this thing subsists, I shall wonder: for it is similar to a certain enigma.—On what account? said he. Because, I replied, the person, who said that temperance is to manage one's own affairs, did not mean what his words expressed. Or do you think that the teacher of letters does nothing when he writes or reads?—I think (he does something), said he.—[20.] Does the teacher of letters, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to instruct you boys? And are ye not wont to write no less the names of your enemies than of your friends?—No less, said he.—When, therefore, ye were doing this, were ye busily employed, and not temperate?—By no means.—And, moreover, were ye not doing your own business, if to write, and to read, is to do something? It certainly is. And besides, my friend, to heal, and to build, and to weave, and to effect by any art whatever any of the works belonging to arts, is surely to do something.—Entirely so.—What then, I replied, would that city appear to you to be well regulated through a law commanding each person to weave and wash his own garment, and to be the cobbler of his own shoes, and (make)²⁴ an oil-cruze, and curry-comb, and every thing according to the same reasoning, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to [work and]²⁵ manage his own affairs?—It would not appear to me so, he replied.—However, said I, a city temperately regulated would be well regulated.—How not? he replied.—For a man, therefore, to do such things as these, and to manage his own affairs, would not be temperance.—It appears not.—[21.] He, therefore, who said, that to manage one's own business is temperance, spoke, as I just now observed, obscurely; for he was surely not so stupid²⁶ (that his meaning should be the same as his words).²⁶ Or did you, Charmides, hear some silly person as—

^{24, 25} According to Heindorf, the verb *ποιεῖν* is to be got out of *σκευοποιεῖν*. But as shortly afterwards we meet with *ἐργάζεσθαι τε καὶ πρᾶττεν*, two verbs perfectly synonymous, it is evident, to myself at least, that *ἐργάζεσθαι τε* has lost its original place after *σκευοποιεῖν*.

^{26, 26} The words between the numerals, absolutely requisite for the sense, have been preserved in the version of Ficinus alone, "ut idem ejus fuerit sensus, qui et verborum sensus." Stalbaum says that we are to understand after "so stupid," "as to think that temperance consists in managing one's own affairs."

sert this?—By no means, said he; since he appeared to be very wise.—More than any thing, therefore, as it seems to me, he proposed this enigma, because it is difficult to know what is the transacting one's own affairs.—Perhaps so, said he.—Can you then tell me, what it is to transact one's own affairs?—By Zeus, said he, I do not know. But perhaps there is nothing to hinder the person, who said this, from not knowing what he meant. And as he said this, he slightly smiled and looked at Critias. And it was now evident that Critias, who had been for some while in an agony, and stimulated by ambition in the presence of Charmides and those there, and who had with difficulty contained himself, was then no longer able to do so. And it appeared³⁷ to me more than ever, that what I suspected was true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance from Critias. [22.] Charmides, therefore, being willing not to support himself the reason for the reply, but that the other (Critias) should do so, and urged him on himself,³⁸ showed as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure; but appeared to me to be angry with Charmides, as a poet is with an actor who exhibits his poems badly; so that, looking at him, he said, Think you thus, Charmides, that, if you do not know what he meant, who said, that temperance is to manage one's own affairs, he did not know?—And I said, It is, Critias, thou best of men, no wonder that Charmides, who is but a youth, should not know; but it is surely likely for you to know, both on account of your age and attention to the subject. If then you agree that temperance is, what this person asserts, and will take up from him the conversation, I shall with greater pleasure consider with you whether what has been said is true or not.—Nay, I do agree, said he, entirely, and accept the conversation.—And you do well, said I. But tell me, do you admit what I was just now asking, that all artists do something?—I do.—Do they appear to you to do

³⁷ From "visum est," the version of Ficinus, and his own "videbatur," Cornarius seems to have wished to read *ἰδόκει* for *δοκεῖ*. Compare *καὶ ἡμοὶ ἰδόκει ὑπεραγωνιᾶν*, in Euthyd. p. 300, C., and *καὶ ἡμοὶ ἰδόκει—ἀγωνιᾶν* in Protag. p. 333, F. The present passage is imitated by Heliodorus in *Æthiop.* ii. 18, as remarked by Boissonade on Philostratus *Heroic.* p. 605.

³⁸ I cannot understand *αὐτὸν ἐκείνον*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted the clause *ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκείνον*. I could have understood *ὑπεκίνει ἐκείνον καὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξεληλεγμένος εἶη*, i. e. "urged the other on, and showed that he himself had been confuted."

only their own business, or the business of others likewise? —Of others likewise.—[23.] Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do their own business?—What should prevent them? said he.—Not myself, I replied, at all; but see whether there be not a hindrance to him, who, after having laid down that temperance is to transact one's own affairs, afterwards says, that nothing prevents those who transact the affairs of others from being temperate likewise.—For where, ³⁹said he, have I confessed that they, who transact the affairs of others, are temperate, like those, who I confessed make (something)? ³⁹—Tell me, said I, do you not say that to "make" a thing and to do is the same thing?—Not I indeed, said he, nor "to work" the same as "to make," for I have learned (so) from Hesiod, who says, "No work is a disgrace."⁴⁰—Think you, then, that if he had called by the terms of "to work" and "to make," such acts as you were just now speaking of, he would have said that there was no disgrace to a person being ⁴¹a cobbler, or a seller of pickled fish, or of one who sits at a brothel?⁴¹—You must not think so, Socrates: but he I think did consider "a making" as something different from "action" and "working;" and that "making" is a disgrace, when it does not take place in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no "work" is ever a disgrace. For things which are made beautiful and useful, he called "works," and "makings" of this kind workings and doings. [24.] You must say too that he considered such things (good)⁴² alone as belong to home; but every thing hurtful, as foreign. Hence, you must think that Hesiod, and every other sensible person, calls him, who transacts his own

³⁹—³⁹ I have adopted *ποῦ*, "where," instead of *που*, "surely," and *ἦ* for *ἦ*, suggested by Morgenstern in *Miscellan. Crit. Hildesiensis*. i. p. 91, and introduced *τι* before *ποιούντας*. Ficinus has "an et eos, qui faciunt," as if he had found in his MS. *ἦ καὶ*—

⁴⁰ The Greek in the *Works and Days*, v. 309, is "Ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν δνειδος. But there, as remarked by Heindorf, *ἔργον* does not mean "work" generally, but only specifically "farming-work;" nor does *οὐδὲν* belong to *ἔργον*, but to *δνειδος*.

⁴¹—⁴¹ The three trades alluded to were considered the lowest at Athens. On the meaning of *οἶκημα*, applied, by an euphemism, to a brothel, see Harpocration, Pollux, and Hesychius.

⁴² Stalbaum explains *τὰ τοιαῦτα* by the preceding *τὰ παλῶς καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα*. But the balance of the sentence indicates that *ἀγαθὰ* has dropped out after *ἡγείσθαι*; to say nothing of the subsequent remark of Socrates, *ὅτι τὰ οἰκίᾳ τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοῖς*.

affairs, temperate.—As soon, Critias, as you began to speak, I perceived almost, that you called things belonging to home, a person's own by the name of good, and "the making" of things good, actions. For I have heard Prodicus, when speaking of terms, make some ten thousand distinctions; and I will allow you to lay down every term as you please; but do you only clearly state, to what you would refer the term, of which you may be speaking. Now therefore again from the beginning define more clearly. Do you say that temperance is the "doing," or the "making," or in whatever manner you choose to call it, of good things?—I do, said he.—He therefore is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.—He replied, Does it not, thou best of men, appear so to you?—Dismiss this question, said I: for let us not consider what appears to me, but what you are saying now.—[25.] Nay, said he, I do not assert that he is temperate, who does not do good but evil,⁴³ but that he is temperate, who does good and not evil.⁴³ For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the practice of things good. And perhaps there is nothing to prevent you from speaking the truth. But nevertheless I should wonder, if you thought that persons who conduct themselves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.—But I do not think so, said he.—Was it not, said I, asserted by you a little before, that there is nothing to prevent artists, who make on the other hand⁴⁴ things belonging to others, from being temperate?—It was so asserted by me, said he; but what then?—Nothing. But tell me, does any physician appear to you, while making a person to be in health, to do what is useful both to himself, and to him whom he cures?—To me he does.—Does not he, then, who acts thus, do what is fitting?—Yes.—And is not he temperate, who does what is fitting?—He is temperate.—Is it not then fitting for a physician to know when he is curing usefully, and when not? and for each artist to know, when he will derive a benefit from the work which he is doing, and when not?—Perhaps not, said he.—

⁴³⁻⁴³ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and consequently by Taylor.

⁴⁴ I cannot understand αὐ here, nor could Heindorf, who thinks it was owing to *kai*—I suspect that Plato wrote *kai τὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων*, instead of *καὶ αὐ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων*.

Sometimes then, I replied, when a physician acts usefully or hurtfully, he does not know himself how he is acting; although, according to your doctrine, when he acts usefully, he acts temperately; or did you not say so?—I did.—[26.] Does it not then seem, I replied, that sometimes, when he acts usefully, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is ignorant himself that he is temperate?—But this, said he, Socrates, could never take place; yet if you think that this necessarily results from what I have admitted above, I would rather retract some of those assertions; nor should I be ashamed to confess ⁴³ that I have improperly asserted something, ⁴⁵ rather than admit that the man, who is ignorant of himself, is temperate. For I almost assert, that to know oneself is temperance; and I agree with him who placed the precept upon the temple at Delphi, as being an address from the god to the comers, instead of "hail!" Since this last [to hail] ⁴⁶ is not a correct address, nor should we exhort each other to this, but to be temperate. [27.] Thus the god addresses those coming to the temple, in a manner somewhat different to what men do; as he had in his mind, it appears to me, who put up the inscription; ⁴⁷ and he says to the person coming nothing else than "be temperate;" but, as being a prophet, he expresses it more enigmatically. For "Know thyself," and "Be temperate," is the same thing, as both the writings and myself assert. ⁴⁸ But perhaps some one may think it to be different; which appears to me to have been the case with those, who placed the subsequent inscriptions, "Nothing too much," ⁴⁹ and "A surety is near to calamity." ⁵⁰ For they

⁴³⁻⁴⁵ The Greek is *ὅτι μὴ οὐκ*, where Bekker would read *ὅτι δὴ*—But *μὴ οὐ* thus follows *ἀναριθμεῖται* in Phædo, p. 87, A., and Meno, p. 89, D. He might have suggested *τό τε* for *ὅτι*. For thus *τὸ μὴ οὐ* are perpetually found between two verbs. According to Stalbaum, there is here a confusion of two constructions, one of which would require *ὅτι*, and the other reject it.

⁴⁶ The words *τοῦ χαίρειν* are evidently an explanation of *τοῦρου*: or else we must read with one MS. *τοῦ, χαίρε*, as just above, *ἀντι τοῦ, χαίρε*.

⁴⁷ I cannot understand *ὡς διανοούμενος ἀνέθηκεν ὁ ἀναθεῖς*. I could have understood *ὡς διανοούμενος ἦν ὁ ἀναθεῖς*. Ficinus has "ut sensit ille, qui inscripsit."

⁴⁸ Ficinus has "ut literæ testantur, egoque interpretor," which is evidently more elegant.

^{49, 50} The authors of these apophthegms respectively are not known for certain. See Menage on Diogen. Laert. i. 41.

thought that "Know thyself" was a bit of advice, and not an address from the god for the sake of the comers; and then, that they might put up bits of advice not less useful, they put up these inscriptions. Now the reason, Socrates, for the sake of which I am saying all these things, is this—(that) I give up to you all that has been said before; for perhaps you have spoken more correctly about them; and perhaps, too, I; and there is, of what we have said, nothing very clear. But now I am willing to give you the reason for this, if you do not concede, that temperance is to know oneself. [28.] But, Critias, said I, you come against me, as if I asserted that I had a knowledge of what I am asking about,⁵¹ and if I wish, having agreed with you.⁵¹ But this is not the case. For I am seeking with you continually what is placed before us, through being myself ignorant. Hence, after having considered, I am willing to say whether I agree or not. But do you stop, till I have considered.—Consider then, said he.—I do consider, said I.—For if to know a thing is temperance, it is evident that temperance would be some science, and of some thing. Or would it not?—⁵²It is, he replied, and of itself.⁵²—Is not then medical science, said I, the science of that which is healthy?—Entirely so.—If then, said I, you should ask me, for what is the medical science of that, which is healthy, useful to us, and what does it effect, I should reply, that it is of no small utility, because it effects for us health, a beautiful work. Do you admit this?—I do admit it.—And if then you should ask me, what work does

⁵¹⁻⁵² The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, who perceived, no doubt, that they were unintelligible. The Greek is, *καὶ, ἴαν δὴ βούλωμαι, ὁμολογήσαντος σοί*—But the idea of the future in *ἴαν βούλωμαι* is at variance with the idea of the past in *ὁμολογήσαντος*. Ficinus has "offersque mihi te, si voluero, concessurum," as if he had found in his MS. *ὁμολογήσοντα σὲ δίδως*. But that Critias was certainly not likely to do. Heusde suggested *ὁμολογήσοντος σοί*, which Stalbaum is disposed to adopt. But the consent of Socrates, to be of any value, ought to be the result of his reason, not of his will. Instead then of *δὴ*, which has no meaning here, I would read *μή*—i. e. "and even if I do not wish it"—and, with Heusde, *ὁμολογήσοντος σοί*—"about to agree with you."

⁵²⁻⁵³ The Greek is "ἔστιν ὡς ἑφ' ἑαυτοῦ γε in one MS. But in all the rest *ὡς* is omitted. Ficinus has "Est utique sui ipsius videlicet," without *ἑφ'*. But as the question is twofold, so ought to be the reply. Plato wrote *ἔστι τις, ἑφ' ἑαυτοῦ γε*—as Taylor has translated.

house-building, which is the science of house-building, effect, I should say, dwellings; and (I should reply) in a similar manner with respect to other arts. [29.] Since then, Critias, you say that temperance is the science of itself, you must, when asked, be able to tell in behalf of temperance, what beautiful work does temperance, being the science of itself, effect, and which deserves to be mentioned. Come then, tell me.—Nay but, Socrates, said he, you do not make the inquiry correctly. For temperance is not naturally similar to the other sciences, nor are the other sciences similar, some to some, and others to others. But you make your inquiry, as if they were similar. For tell me, said he, what work is there in the calculating or geometric art, which is of the like nature with a dwelling, the work of the house-building art? or with that of a garment, the work of the weaving art? and in other works of such a kind, many of which any one would be able to show, as belonging to many arts? Can you in these show me any such work? You will not be able.—You speak the truth, said I. But this I can show, of what thing each of these sciences is the science, and which is something different from the science itself. Thus, for instance; the calculating science is the science of the even and the odd, how they are situated as regards multitude, with respect to themselves and to each other. Is it not?—Entirely so, he replied.—Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from the calculating science?—How not?—Moreover, the weighing science is that relating to a heavier and lighter weight; now the heavy and the light are different from the weighing science itself. Do you agree to this?—I do.—[30.] Tell me then, of what is temperance the science, and which is different from temperance itself?—This is that very thing, Socrates, said he, to which⁵³ you have arrived by seeking in what point does temperance differ from all (the other)⁵⁴ sciences: but you are seeking after some similitude in it to other sciences. This, however, is not the case. For all the other sciences are sciences of another thing, but not of themselves; but this alone is both the science of other sciences and of itself likewise. And these things ought to be far from lying hid from you.

⁵³ Instead of ἐπ' αὐτὸ, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. δ—For his version is "quod queris—" Cornarius has "ad idem—redis," which would lead to ἐπὶ ταῦτῳ—

⁵⁴ Ficinus alone has "omnibus aliis;" in Greek πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων.

But I think you are doing the very thing, which you just now said you were not doing: for you are attempting to confute me, after leaving alone that, about which is our discourse.—What are you doing, said I, by your thinking that if I should confute you as much as possible, I should do it on any other account, than for the sake of thoroughly searching out what I mean myself; as I am fearful lest, whilst I think I know something, I am unconsciously knowing nothing? And now I say I am doing this, while considering the argument, principally indeed for my own sake, but perhaps also for the sake of the rest of our friends. Or do you not think it is a good, common for nearly all men, that each thing should become apparent in what state it is?—Very much so, Socrates, said he.—[31.] Boldly then, said I, O give, thou blessed man, an answer when asked, how the matter appears to you, and leave, whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted, to go hang;⁵⁵ but giving your attention to the reasoning itself, consider whither it will go, when confuted.—I shall do so, he replied: for you appear to me to speak with moderation.—Tell me then, said I, what do you mean on the question of temperance?—I mean then, he replied, that this alone, of all other sciences, is both the science of itself and of the other sciences. Will it then, said I, be the science of ignorance, since it is of science?—Entirely so.—The temperate man therefore alone will know himself, and be able to examine what it is he happens to know, and what he does not; and in like manner he will be able to look into the rest of things, what it is that a person knows, and thinks (he knows),⁵⁶ if indeed he knows,⁵⁶ and what on the other hand he thinks he knows, but does not know; but no other person (will be able).⁵⁷ And this then is to be temperate; and it is temperance, and the knowledge of oneself, to know what one knows, and what one does not know. Are these the things you assert?—They are, he replied.—[32.]

⁵⁵ This is the nearest English equivalent to *τα χαίρειν*.

⁵⁶ These words, simple as they are, I confess I hardly understand. The very balance of the sentences proves that they are not in their place.

⁵⁷ Ficinus alone has "poterit," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐδεὶς οἶός τε*. Stalbaum translates *τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδεὶς*—"just as no one of the rest of mankind." But there is nothing to answer to "just as," and if there were, it would destroy the antithesis between *μόνος*, just before, and *τῶν ἄλλων οὐδ' εἷς*, here.

Again then, said I, let us consider the third point⁵⁸ from the beginning, as if it were (the cup) to the saviour deity. In the first place, whether it is possible or not to know, with respect to what a person knows, and does not know, that he does know, and does not know; and, in the next place, if this be ever so completely possible, what will be the utility of it, to us, who know it.—It is requisite, said he, to consider this.—Come then, Critias, said I, and consider whether you are more able to find a way on these points than myself. For I am in doubt, and where I am in doubt I will tell you.—By all means, said he.—⁵⁹ The following consequence then will ensue,⁵⁹ I replied, if there be, what you just now asserted, some one science, which is the science of nothing else than itself and the rest of the sciences, and of ignorance besides.—Entirely so.—See then, my friend, how absurdly we have endeavoured to argue. For if you consider this very same thing in other matters, it will, I think, appear to you to be impossible.—[33.] How and where?—In these. For consider, whether it appears to you that a seeing power exists, which is not the seeing power of those things, which are the objects of the rest of seeing powers, but is the seeing power of itself and the rest of seeing powers, and similarly of not seeing powers; and though it is a seeing power, it does not see any colour, but (sees) itself and the rest of the seeing powers. Does it appear to you that there is such a seeing power as this?—By Zeus, it does not to me at least. What then (say you) to the hearing power, which does not hear any sound, but hears itself, and the rest of the hearing powers, and the non-hearing power besides?—Nor yet this.—To speak briefly then, consider with respect to all the senses, whether it appears to you that there is any sense, which perceives other senses and itself, but perceives none of those things which the other senses perceive.—

⁵⁸ I have translated as if the Greek were τὸ τρίτον, ὥσπερ τῷ Σωτῆρι, not τὸ τρίτον τῷ Σωτῆρι ὥσπερ.—For the third cup given to the saviour-god, as shown at Philib. p. 66, D. § 160, is compared with the third inquiry, as remarked by Heindorf; for the first was whether temperance consisted in managing one's own affairs; the second, whether it consisted in self-knowledge; and the third is now to be mooted.

⁵⁹—⁶⁰ Such is Taylor's English version of the Latin translation of Finus, "sequentur hæc—" which was introduced to render intelligible the Greek, "Ἄλλο τι οὐν—πάντα ταῦτα" ἂν εἴη; literally, "Would all these things be any thing else?" I think, however, the passage is corrupt.

It does not appear to me at least.—But does it appear to you that there is any desire, which is the desire of no pleasure, but is the desire of itself and of the rest of desires?—It does not.—Nor, as I think, is there any will, which wills no good, but wills itself alone and the rest of wills.—There is not.—But would you say that there is a love of such a kind, as to be the love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itself and the rest of loves?—Not I, said he.—Have you ever conceived that there is any fear, which fears itself and the rest of fears, but fears nothing fearful?—I have not conceived, said he.—[34.] And (have you conceived) any fancy, which fancies fancies and itself, but which forms no fancy respecting those things, which are the subjects of the rest of fancies?—By no means.—But we say, as it seems, that there is a science of such a kind, as to be the science of no learning, but the science of itself and the rest of sciences.—We do say so.—⁶⁰ Would it not be strange⁶⁰ if there were (such a science)? For let us not strenuously assert that there is not, but consider if there be.—Right.—Come then, there is this science, the science of something; and it does possess some such power, as to be the science of something. Is it so?—Entirely so.—For we also say that the greater possesses some such power, as to be greater than something?—It does so possess.—Is it not then greater than something less, if it is (greater)?—Of necessity.—If therefore we should find something greater, which is greater than the greater and than itself, but which is not greater than any of those things than which the rest of things are greater, it would surely be in this situation, that if it is greater than itself, it would be also less than itself?—Of this there is, Socrates, a great necessity, said he.—[35.] If therefore there is any thing which is the double of the rest of doubles and of itself, it will be the double of the rest of doubles and of itself, in consequence of its being the half; for nothing can be the double of any thing else than of the half.—True.—But being more than itself, will it not also be less than itself? and being heavier, be lighter than itself? and being older, be younger than itself? and similarly as regards all other properties? For whatever has a power of its own with respect to itself, will it not possess likewise that existence, to which that power is re-

⁶⁰— I have translated as if the Greek were *Οὐκ οὐν ἂν ἄτοκον εἴη, εἰ ἄρα*—not *Οὐκ οὐν ἄτοκον, εἰ ἄρα*—

lated? I mean some such thing as this. For instance, we say that hearing is nothing else than a hearing of sound.—Is it not so?—Yes.—If therefore it could hear itself, would it not hear itself, as having a voice? For otherwise it would not hear.—This is perfectly necessary.—The sight too, thou best of men, if it could itself see itself, must necessarily have some colour. For sight would never be able to see any thing colourless.—It would not.—You see therefore, Critias, that the matters we have gone through, appear to us to be, some of them, altogether impossible; and of others it is greatly disbelieved that they could have a power of their own with respect to themselves. For as regards magnitudes, multitudes, and things of this kind, it is perfectly impossible. Or is it not?—Entirely so.—[36. Again,⁶¹ [that hearing (hears itself), and sight (sees itself), and]⁶¹ that motion moves itself, and heat burns (itself), and all other such like assertions, would bring disbelief to some, but to some perhaps not. There is then, my friend, a need of some great man to draw sufficiently a distinction through all things on this point, whether of existing things not one [except science]⁶² has naturally a power of its own with respect to itself, but with respect to another thing, or that some have, and some not: and again, if there are certain things, which (have a power) with respect to themselves, whether amongst these is the science, which we say is temperance. For I do not believe myself to be sufficient to draw such a distinction. Hence I am not able to affirm positively, whether it is possible for this to take place, that there is a science, of science; nor, if there is, will I admit that temperance is that science, until I have considered whether, being such, it would be useful to us, or not. For I divine that temperance is something useful and good. Do you then, son of Callæschrus,—since you lay down that temperance is this science of a science, and likewise of a not-science,—show in the first place this; that what I have just now mentioned [it] is possible⁶³ [for you to show];⁶³ and in the next place, in addition to its being possible, show that it is

⁶¹—⁶¹ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation. For the question relating to hearing and sight has been already discussed.

⁶² The words *πλην επιστήμης* were first rejected as an interpolation by Schleiermacher, whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed.

⁶³—⁶³ Ficinus has—"Ostende primum possibile hoc esse, quod supra

useful; and thus perhaps you will satisfy me that you are correctly speaking about temperance, what it is.—[37.] On Critias hearing this, and seeing that I was in doubt, he did, as they do, who, through looking in the face of those, who are gaping, are affected in the very same way; and he seemed to me to be compelled by my doubting to be seized with a doubt himself. However, being in great repute on every occasion, he felt a shame before those who were present; and was neither willing to concede that he was unable to draw the distinction on points that I had proposed to him, nor did he say any thing clearly, but concealed his perplexity. But, said I,—in order that the discourse might proceed—if it seems good to you, Critias, let us now concede this, that it is possible for a science of a science to exist. But let us consider again whether it is or not in this way. Come then, if it is in the highest degree possible, in what way is it the more possible to know what a person does know, and what he does not? For we surely said that this is to know oneself, and to be temperate. Or did we not?—[38.] Entirely so, he replied; and this happens in a certain respect to be the case, Socrates. For if any one possesses the science, which knows itself, he will be such as that is which he possesses. Just as when any one possesses swiftness, he is swift; and when beauty, is beautiful; and when knowledge, is knowing. So too when any one possesses the knowledge, that knows itself, he will surely then become knowing himself.—To this I replied, I do not doubt that when any one possesses that, which knows itself, he will be then knowing himself; but, what necessity is there for the person who possesses this knowledge, to know what he knows, and what he does not know?—Because, Socrates, this⁶⁴ is the same with that.—Perhaps so, I replied; but I am near to being always similar (to myself).⁶⁵ For I do not well⁶⁶ understand⁶⁷ how it is the same thing for a person to know, what he

dicebam;” whence Heindorf was led to reject ἀποδείξαι σε, whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed. The fact is that ἀποδείξαι is a various reading for ἐνδείξαι.

⁶⁴ Instead of τὸ αὐτὸ, Cornarius proposed τοῦτο, from Ficinus’ “hoc.”

⁶⁵ After ὁμοιος Heindorf supplies ἐμavτῷ. He should have read αἰ ἐμοὶ ὁμοιος; and in Sympos. p. 173, D. § 2, ‘Αἰ ὁμοιος σοι, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρ’, εἰ, similar to “dispar sibi” in Horace; as I ought to have mentioned on that passage.

⁶⁶ In lieu of αὖ Plato evidently wrote εἴ—

knows, and to know what he does not know.⁶⁷—How do you mean? said he.—Thus, I replied. Since there is a science of science, will it be able to draw a distinction more than this; that of these things this is a science, and that is ignorance?—It will not; but thus far alone.—Is the science, then, and ignorance of that, which is healthful, the same with the science and ignorance of that, which is just?—By no means; but the one is, I think, a medical, and the other a political science; but this is nothing else than a science.—How not?—[39.] He therefore who does not know the healthy and the just, but knows only a science, as alone possessing a science of this, that he knows something, and that he possesses a certain science, would probably have a knowledge respecting both himself and the other things. Is it not so?—Yes.—But how will he by this science know what he knows? For he knows the healthful by medical science, and not by temperance; and the harmonical by musical science, and not by temperance; and house-building by house-building science, and not by temperance; and so in every thing else. Is it not so?—So it appears.—But how by temperance, if it is only a science of sciences, will he know that it knows the salubrious, or house-building?—By no means.—The person then ignorant of this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.—So it seems.—To know then what he knows and what he does not know, will not be to be temperate, nor will it be temperance, but, as it seems, only that he knows, and that he does not know.—It nearly appears so.—Nor will this person be able to examine another, who professes to know something, whether he knows, or does not, what he says he knows; but as it seems he will only know thus much, that he possesses a certain science, but of what thing, temperance will not cause him to know.—It does not appear it will.—[40.] Neither then will he be able to distinguish one who pretends to be a physician, but is not, from one who is a true physician; nor any one else of those who are skilled or who are not. But let us view it from these points. If a temperate man, or any other person, intends to distinguish the true and false physician, will he not act in this way? He will not discourse with him respecting the medical science; for, as we have said, a

⁶⁷—⁶⁷ Stalbaum, who once differed from Schleiermacher, who conceived this passage to be corrupt, now agrees with him.

physician attends to nothing but the healthy and the diseased,⁶⁸ (the salubrious and the noxious).⁶⁸ Is it not so?—It is.—But of science he knows nothing; for this we have attributed to temperance alone.—Yes.—The physician therefore will not know any thing of the medical art, since the medical art is a science.—True.—And the temperate man will know, that the physician possesses a certain science; ⁶⁹but some one else will look into the science of the physician, what it is, and of what things; which is then laid open, when it is known of what things it is the science.⁶⁹ Or is not each science defined by this, by not only being a science, but by being what, and of what things?—Yes.—And the medical science has been defined to be different from the rest of sciences by its being the science of the healthy and diseased.—It is.—[41.] Is it not therefore necessary, for the person wishing to consider the medical science, to view it in the things in which it is? For it is surely not (to be considered)⁷⁰ in things external, in which it is not.—Certainly not.—He therefore who considers rightly, will consider a physician, so far as he is a physician, in things healthy and diseased.—So it seems.—In what is thus⁷¹ either said or done, he (will be) considering whether what is said is said truly, and what is done is done correctly?—It is neces-

⁶⁸⁻⁶⁹ The words within numerals have been preserved by Ficinus alone in his version, "salubreque et noxium."

⁶⁸⁻⁶⁹ Such is the English of the Latin of Ficinus. The text by Bekker is *ἐπιχειρῶν δὲ δὴ πείραν, λαβεῖν, ἥ τις ἴσθιν ἄλλο τι σκίψεται ὠντινων*: where *ἐπιχειρῶν* is due to two MSS. This has been twice adopted by Stalbaum, and translated each time in a different manner. So too Heindorf has in his two editions made two different attempts to restore the original; while Ast has made a third. Perhaps Plato wrote—*ιατρόν, οὗ ἐπιχειρῶν δὴ τὴν ἱμπερίαν λαβεῖν, ἥ τις ἴσθιν, ἄλλος τις σκίψεται τῷ τινων εἶναι*, i. e. "whose skill some other person, endeavouring to comprehend what it is, will have a view of it by its being (the skill) in some things—" where *ἄλλος* is due to "alius," in Ficinus, adopted by Heindorf; while *ὠντινων*, which being without accents or breathings, in MS. Bodl. gives the usual proof of a corruption, has been changed into *τῷ τινων εἶναι*, found in the very next sentence; where however we must read *ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ὥρισται ἐκάστη ἐπιστήμη τῷ μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τίς τινων τ' εἶναι*, as I have translated, instead of *ἐπιστήμη, μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς τῷ τινων εἶναι*, which I cannot understand.

⁷⁰ Ficinus has "querenda videtur," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐ γὰρ δήπου σκεπτικόν*, not *οὐ γὰρ δήπου* merely.

⁷¹ Heindorf, justly objecting to *τοῖς οὕτως*, properly suggested *τοῖς τοιούτοις*, i. e. "in things of this kind."

sary.—But could any one without medical science be able to follow either method?—Certainly not.—Nor yet can any other person, as it seems, but the physician, nor truly⁷³ the temperate man. For he would be a physician in addition to temperance.⁷³—So it is.—More than all, if temperance is merely the science of a science, and of ignorance, it will be able to distinguish neither the physician, who knows his art, nor him, who does not; the person who pretends to be, and him, who thinks he is (a physician); nor any other person, who knows any thing whatever, except a fellow-artist, as is the case with other operatives.—It appears so, said he.—[42.] What utility then, Critias, shall we derive from temperance, if it is of such a kind? For if, as we laid down at the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know—the former because he knows, and the latter because he does not know—and if he were able to consider respecting another person affected in the very same manner, there would, we assert, be some vast utility to us in being temperate. For both we, who possess temperance, and all the rest that were governed by us, would have passed through life without fault; for we should neither ourselves have endeavoured to do any thing, which we did not know, but finding out those who did know, we should have handed over those things to them; nor should we have permitted to the rest of those, whom we commanded, to do any thing else than what by doing they would do well; now this would be that, of which they possessed a knowledge. And thus a family governed by temperance, would be about to be well governed, and a state (correctly) administered, and every thing else, over which temperance rules. For error being taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it is necessary for the persons thus situated to act honourably and well, and for those who act well, to be happy. [43.] Were we not, Critias, speaking⁷⁴ in this manner about temperance, saying how great a good it is to know what one

⁷³ Stalbaum has written an elaborate note about οὐρε δὴ thus following οὐρε. I wish it had occurred to him to suggest οὐρ', οὐδ' εὐ: for οὐδ' εὐ would thus be properly opposed to ὡς εἶκε.

⁷⁴ The introduction of τῇ σωφροσύνῃ, instead of τῷ σώφρονι, seems very strange.

⁷⁵ Heindorf objecting to the version of Ficinus, "dicebamus," says that "diceremus," in Cornarius, is more correct. But then αὖ would be required; and so it would to answer to Stalbaum's "dicturi eramus."

does know, and what one does not know?—Entirely so, he replied.—But now, said I, you see that no such science has appeared to us any where.—I see it, he replied.—Has not therefore, said I, temperance, which we have now found to be that, which knows both science and ignorance, this good, that he who possesses it, will easily learn whatever else he may attempt to learn, and all things will appear in a clearer point of view to him, inasmuch as he is looking upon the science, which relates to each thing he may learn? And will he not examine other persons better respecting what he may learn? And must not they, who examine others without this, do it in a more weak and trifling manner? Are these, my friend, the things we enjoy through temperance? and do we look to something greater, and seek for it to be greater than it is?—Perhaps, said he, this would be the case.—Perhaps so, I replied; but perhaps too we have sought after nothing useful. [44.] And I conjecture so, because certain absurdities distinctly present themselves to me respecting temperance, if it be of such a nature. For let us see, if you please, admitting that it is possible for science to know,⁷⁵ and, what we laid down at the beginning, that temperance is to know what it does know, and what it does not know, let us not take this away, but concede it; and having conceded all these points, let us still better consider, if being such it will benefit us at all. For what we just now said, that temperance would, if it were of such a nature, be a great good, by regulating families and states, appears to me, Critias, to have been not correctly conceded.—How so, he replied.—Because, said I, we too easily conceded that it would be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed those things which we knew, and committed those, which we did not know, to persons who did know.—Did we not then, said he, rightly concede?—To me, I replied, we did not appear so.—You are speaking, Socrates, said he, really absurdly.—By the dog,⁷⁶ said I, so it appears to me. And just now, looking to these points, I said, that they seemed to me to be absurd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly considered

⁷⁵ Heusde acutely saw that there was some error here; and by comparing p. 169, D. § 37, he wished to read γινίσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης δυνατόν εἶναι. He ought rather to have suggested ἐπιστάσθαι τι δι' ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης, i. e. "to know something through the science of a science."

⁷⁶ On this Socratic oath see my note on Hipp. Maj. § 18, n. 1.

them. [45.] For in reality, if temperance be ever so much of such a nature, it does not appear evident to me, what good it will effect for us.—How is this? said he; speak, that we may also know what you mean.—I fancy, I replied, that I am trifling; nevertheless it is necessary to consider that, which presents itself to our view, and not carelessly to pass it by, if any one takes the least thought of himself.—You speak well, said he.—Hear then, I replied, my dream, (no matter) whether it has passed through the gate of ⁷⁷horn or ivory.⁷⁷ For if temperance ruled us ever so much, would it not, being such as we have now defined it, be acted upon according to the sciences; and neither would he, who boasts to be a pilot when he is not, deceive us; nor would a physician, or a general of an army, or any other person, who pretends to know that, which he does not know, lie hid from us. But from this state of things something else would happen to us; for our bodies would be more healthy than at present, and we should be preserved, when in danger at sea and in war; and all our utensils and garments, and all our shoes, and all the necessaries (of life), all things else, would be made more scientifically through our employing true artists. [46.] And if you are willing, let us grant that prophecy is the science of that, which is to be; and that temperance, presiding over it, turns away the boastful diviners, but appoints over us the true prophets of things to come. Furnished then in this way, the human race would, I concede, act and live scientifically. For temperance being our guard, it would not permit ignorance to interfere and cooperate with us. But that, by acting scientifically, we should do well and be happy, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to understand.—But, he replied, you will not however easily find any other method of doing well, if you despise the doing a thing scientifically.—Instruct me then still a little, said I, of what scientific doing are you speaking? Is it that of leather-cutting?—By Zeus, it is not.—Is it that of brass-work?—By no means.—But is it that of working in wool, or wood, or any such things?—It is not.—[47.] We do then, I replied, no longer persist in the assertion, that he is happy, who lives scientifically. For

⁷⁷—⁷⁷ Macrobius in *Somn. Scip.* c. 3, has preserved a fanciful explanation given by Porphyry of the fiction in Homer, *Od.* xix. 562, relating to the two gates of dreams, which the admirers of the Neo-Platonic school will do well to consult.

those artists, although living scientifically, are confessed by you to be not happy; ⁷⁸ but you seem to me to separate the happy man from them, when they possess a science of certain things.⁷⁸ And perhaps you call (happy) the diviner, whom I just now mentioned, who knows all that is to be. Do you mean this, or any other person?—Both this, said he, and another.—What other? I replied. You surely do not speak of the person, who knows, in addition to future events, every thing past and present, and is ignorant of nothing; for let us admit that there is such a man, you will not say, I think, that any one lives more scientifically than he at least does.—Certainly not.—But this also I desiderate—Which of the sciences makes him happy? Or do all the sciences equally produce this effect?—By no means equally, said he.—But which the most? Is it that, by which he knows some of things present, past, and to come? Is it that, by (which he knows) the science of back-gammon?⁷⁹—What back-gammon? he replied.—But is it that, by which (he knows) the calculating science?—By no means.—But is it that, by which (he knows) things healthful.—Rather so, said he?—[48.] ⁸⁰ But is it, said I, that, of which I am speaking especially, by which (he knows) what?⁸⁰—By which (he knows) good and evil.—O thou vile man, I replied; ⁸¹ who for some while hast been drawing me round in a circle, concealing from me, that to live scientifically was not the causing,⁸¹ to do well and to be happy, nor belonging

⁷⁸⁻⁷⁸ This is the English of Stalbaum's Latin version, to which he seems to have been led by finding in Ficinus—"At forte e multis inscienter viventibus unum quendam certa ex scientia scienter viventem beatum determinas;" who must have met with something very superior to the common Greek text, which is literally, "but concerning some living scientifically you seem to me to set apart the happy."

⁷⁹ As in the game called *παιρία*, mention is made both of pebbles, or dice, and of lines, it was probably something like the modern back-gammon.

⁸⁰⁻⁸⁰ The Greek is 'Ἐστίν δ', ἣν λέγω μάλιστα, ἣν δ' ἰγώ, ᾗ τί; out of which both Heindorf and Stalbaum have failed to make a satisfactory sense and syntax. Ficinus, "Illa vero, quam dico maxime, quā quid norim." Perhaps Plato wrote 'Ἐστίν δ' οὐν λέγ' εὖ μάλιστα, ἣν δ' ἰγώ, ᾗ τί; i. e. "Do you then state in the best way, said I, that, by which (he knows) what?" where *ἔστιν* is due to two MSS.

⁸¹⁻⁸¹ Here again the version of Ficinus differs greatly from, and is in some respects superior to, the Greek—"jamdiu me clam circulo reflectis retrahisque ad id, ut beatum vivere non sit secundum universas scientias vivere; immo secundum unam quendam boni malive scientiam."

to all the other sciences, but to one (science) alone, relating to good and evil. Since,⁸³ Critias, if you were willing to take away this last science from the other sciences, the physician's science will no less cause one to be healthy; and that of the shoe-maker, to be shod; and that of the weaver, to be clad; and (no less) the pilot's science prevent one from losing one's life at sea, and the general's science in war?—No less, said he.—But, friend Critias, by this science being absent, it will be no longer left for each of those (other sciences) to turn out well and usefully.—You speak the truth.—But this science, as it seems, is not temperance, but that, the work of which is to benefit us: for it is not the science of sciences and ignorances, but that of good and evil. So that if this be useful, temperance would be something else than⁸³ useful.—[49.] What then, said he, would not temperance be useful? For if temperance is as much as possible a science of sciences, and presides over the other sciences, it will surely benefit us by ruling over that science which relates to the good.—But will temperance, I replied, cause us to be in health, and not the medical science? And will this perform the rest of the works of the arts, and not the rest, each its own work? Or did we not some time since testify that temperance is a science of science, and ignorance alone, but of nothing else? Is it not so?—So it appears.—It is not then the worker of health.—Clearly not.—For health is the work of another art. Is it not?—Of another.—Nor is it, my friend, of utility; for we attributed this very work to another art. Did we not?—Entirely so.—How then will temperance be beneficial, since it is the worker of no utility?—By no means, Socrates, as it seems.—Do you not see then, Critias, that I felt very properly some time since a fear, and justly blamed myself, because I could descry nothing useful about temperance? For that which is confessed to be the most beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be useless, if there were any thing useful in myself towards making a search correctly. [50.] But now,⁸⁴ for we are vanquished on every side, and unable to discover for what purpose the name-

⁸³ In lieu of the unintelligible *ἐπεὶ*, Heindorf proposes to read *εἰπε*—

⁸³ Schleiermacher acutely supplied for the sense the *ἦ*, wanting in al. the MSS.

⁸⁴ On this aposiopesis see Heusde and Heindorf.

founder⁸⁵ assigned to temperance this very name. And yet we have conceded many things that did not result (correctly)⁸⁶ from the reasoning. For we conceded, that there is a science of sciences, although the reasoning neither permits nor asserts this; and on the other hand, we conceded that we know by this science the works of the other sciences—the reasoning permitting not even this—in order that the temperate man might be one, who has a knowledge of what he knows, because he knows, and of those which he does not know, because he does not know. This indeed we conceded very liberally, without ever considering that it is impossible for a person to know in any way whatever what he does not know at all. ⁸⁷ For our concession says that he knows those things, because he does not know them.⁸⁷ And yet as I think there is nothing which would appear more absurd than this. The inquiry however, having met with us so very easy tempered and by no means morose, is not a bit more able to discover the truth; but has rather laughed at it so much, that, what we formerly conceded to be temperance, and, after moulding it into some shape, laid it down to be, this it has very saucily shown to us as being of no use. [51.] On my own account then I am less indignant; but for your sake, Charmides, I am, said I, very indignant, if you, so beautiful in body, and most temperate to boot in mind; derive no advantage from this temperance, and if it does not by its presence bring to you any benefit during life. But I am still more indignant for the sake of the incantation, which I learned from

⁸⁵ Instead of νομοθίτης, Heindorf suggested ὀνοματοθίτης, similar to "nominum auctor" in Ficinus. The reading has been subsequently found in five MSS., and though adopted here by Stalbaum, it has been uniformly rejected by him in the Cratylus. From this allusion to etymology, one might suspect that this dialogue preceded the Cratylus, where the idea of uniting etymological with philosophical inquiries is more fully developed.

⁸⁶ I suspect εἰ has dropped out before ἐν—

⁸⁷—⁸⁷ This is the literal version of the Greek—ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε φησὶν αὐτὰ εἶδέναι ἢ ἡμέτερα ὁμολογία: which Heindorf renders "Dedimus enim eum de iis scire se ea nescire," which I cannot understand. Stalbaum's version is "Concessimus enim eum scire nescire se illa, quæ nesciat," i. e. "We have conceded that he knows he does not know what he does not know." But neither scholar has taken any notice of ὅτι, while both seem to have wished to read ὅτι γὰρ ἃ οὐκ οἶδε φησὶν αὐτὸν εἶδέναι. Ficinus has "In hoc autem concessimus, videlicet aliquem ignorantem aliqua, quod non cognoscat, cognoscere," who thus took ὅτι as a pronoun, not ὅτι as a conjunction, and omitted αὐτὰ, for which one MS. offers

αὐτὸς.

the Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have learnt it with so much labour. I do not then⁸⁸ [very much then]⁸⁸ think that this is the case, but that I am a bad searcher; since (I consider) temperance to be a great good, and that, if you possess it, you are blessed indeed. But see whether you do possess it, and do not require at all the incantation. For if you do possess it, I would rather advise you to think me a trifler, and incompetent to search out any thing whatever by a course of reasoning, and yourself so much the happier, as you are the more temperate.—But by Zeus, Socrates, said Charmides, I do not know whether I possess it, or not. For how can I know that, which not even you can discover what it is, as you say yourself? I am not however much persuaded by you; and I consider myself, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation; and no business of mine hinders me from being daily enchanted by you; until you shall say that I have had enough.—[52.] Be it so, said Critias. But, Charmides, if you act thus, it will be a proof to me at least that you are temperate, if you will give yourself up to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not desert him for any thing, either great or small.—(Consider me,) said he, as about to follow and not to desert him. For I should act in a fearful manner, if I did not obey you, my tutor, nor do as you bid me.—Nay then, said Critias, I do bid you.—I shall therefore do so, said Charmides, beginning from this very very day.—But what, said I, are ye two deliberating to do?—Nothing, said Charmides: we have ceased to deliberate.⁸⁹—Will you then, said I, use violence, and not grant me a previous inquiry?—(Consider me) as about to use violence, said he, since Critias commands me. Do you therefore take counsel about what you are to do.—But no consultation, said I, is left for me: for not one man will be able to oppose you, when endeavouring to do any thing yourself and forcing him.—Do not you then oppose me, said he.—I shall not indeed, said I, oppose you.

⁸⁸⁻⁸⁸ The words within brackets Stalbaum rejects as arising from an error in transcription. In the Greek letters *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* lies *hid* *πάνυ ἀνεμιαῖα*: where *ἀνεμιαῖα*, literally “wind-heavy,” is applied first to what are called “wind-eggs,” in which there is no chicken; and secondly, to arguments that have no reason in them. The word is used by Plato in *Theætet.* p. 151, E., 161, A., and 210, B.

⁸⁹ The perfect passive is used here as in *Criton*, p. 46, A., *οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι ἔτι ὧρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευῆσθαι*, and means “to cease to do.” So in *Eurip. Hippol.* 1457, *Κεκαρτίρηται τάμυ*—is the reply to *καρτίρει*: and so too in *Virgil*, “*Fuimus Troes.*”

INTRODUCTION TO THE LACHES,

OR

ON FORTITUDE.

As Plato had in the Charmides discussed the question relating to Temperance, one of the cardinal virtues, so in the Laches he has taken for his subject another, with the view of showing that it is equally difficult to give a definition of Fortitude. Like the Charmides too this dialogue has been rejected by Ast as a spurious production, fathered upon Plato, for reasons which Stalbaum asserts are not of the least weight; and who correctly remarks that there is such a similarity between the manner of the two dialogues, as to show that they must have been written by the same hand; and hence, until the Charmides can be proved to be not genuine, it is needless to inquire into the authorship of the Laches. For though there is some discrepancy in the view here taken of Fortitude, and what is stated in the Republic, iii. p. 386, and iv. p. 427—430, yet that, says Stalbaum, may be accounted for on the supposition that in this dialogue we have the opinion of Plato, when he began his career as a philosophical writer, but in the more elaborate work the result of his matured reflection. Schleiermacher indeed conceives that the Laches was a kind of supplement to the Protagoras. But as it wants the subtlety to be found there, Stalbaum is disposed to believe that it preceded rather than followed that dialogue.

Be however the author who he may—and I confess I can see no reason for doubting its genuineness—the dialogue alludes to some

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curious circumstances not mentioned elsewhere, and which could hardly be known except to a person contemporary with Plato; who shows towards the end of the dialogue that the theory, which he was contending against, emanated from the school of Damon, the Pythagorean, of whom it would seem from the Protagoras, § 20, and Alcibiad. i. § 30, he had not so high an opinion as Pericles and others had.

LACHES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS,¹ MELESIAS,² NICIAS,³ LACHES,⁴ AND THE SONS
OF LYSIMACHUS AND MELESIAS, AND SOCRATES.

LYSIMACHUS.

[1.] You have seen, Nicias and Laches, the man fighting in armour;⁵ but on what account I and Melesias here invited you to see him with us, we did not then tell you; but now we will mention it; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you. There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind; and if any one consults with them, they will not say what they think; but making a guess about the views of the persons consulting them, they speak what is contrary to their own opinion. Thinking however that you are sufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you would state simply what you think, we have thus taken you as our associates in the consultation respecting the matters we are about to communicate. Now the question, about which I have made this lengthy pre-

¹ A son of Aristides the Just.

² A son of Thucydides, one of the political opponents of Pericles.

³ A general of the Athenians, who, after a victorious career, perished at last in the Sicilian expedition.

⁴ An Athenian admiral, mentioned by Thucydides as a contemporary of Nicias.

⁵ Dacier thought that this fighting in armour was an exercise similar to what is taught in fencing schools. It was more probably like the riding schools for the cavalry, where the soldiers are taught the sword exercise. According to Athenæus, iv. p. 154, E., the person who first taught this fighting in armour was one Demeas of Mantinea.

face is this. These are our sons. That youth, the son of Melesias here, is called Thucydides, bearing his grandfather's name; and this one here, Aristides, is mine, and bears my father's name; for we call him Aristides. It has been determined therefore by us to pay all the attention to them in our power, and not to act as the many do who, when their children become lads,* suffer them to do as they please, but to begin already to take care of them as far as we can. Knowing then that you also have children, we have thought that there has been a care respecting them to you, if to any one else, how they might become the best by being attended to. If however you have not frequently paid attention to this matter, we will now remind you, that you ought not to neglect it; and we call upon you to take upon yourselves, in common with us, the charge of your sons. But from whence we have so determined, it is requisite for you, Nicias and Laches, to hear, although the narration be rather long.

[2.] I and Melesias here take our meals together, and these lads have their food at our side. As I stated then at the commencement of the discourse, we shall speak freely to you. For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful feats of our fathers, which they did both in war and peace, while they were administering the affairs of our allies and of the state here. But neither of us have to relate deeds of our own. For this we feel, in the presence of these youths, a shame, and we find fault with our fathers because they permitted us to live the life of rakes when we became lads, and they were busily employed about the affairs of others. These very things we point out to these youths, and tell them that if they neglect themselves, and do not obey us, they will be in disrepute; but that, if they pay attention to themselves, they will perhaps be worthy of the name they bear. They say indeed they will obey us; but we are considering, by learning what and pursuing it steadily they will become the best of men. Now some one has introduced to us this kind

* The original *παῖδια* seems to correspond to the English "lads." For according to the anonymous Greek interpreter of Ptolemy's books *De Judiciis*, p. 166, the seven ages of man are *βρίφος, παῖς, μειράκιον, νέος, ἀνὴρ, πρεσβύτερος, γέρον*, i. e. "infant, boy, lad, youth, man, elderly man, old man;" T. who might have referred to Solon Epigr., 14, the counterpart of Shakspeare's Seven Ages.

of instruction, and said that it would be well for a young person to learn to fight in armour; and he praised the party whom you have just now seen exhibiting, and invited us to see him likewise. We determined then that it was requisite for us to come ourselves, and take you along with us to the sight, in order that you might not only be fellow-spectators, but fellow-counsellors and co-partners, if you were willing, in the matter relating to the care to be paid to children. These are the subjects on which we wish to communicate with you. It is now, therefore, your part to advise about this kind of instruction, whether it appears they ought to learn it or not, and about the rest, if indeed you are able to praise any kind of discipline or study for a young man, and to state what you will do touching this matter in common.

[3.] *Nic.* For myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your notion, and am prepared to do this in common, and so I think is Laches here.

Lac. You think with truth, Nicias. And what Lysimachus has just now said about his father, and the father of Melesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs. For there nearly happens to them, what he says, both with respect to their children and the rest of private concerns, that they are considered of little account and treated negligently. On these points, therefore, Lysimachus, you have spoken correctly. But I marvel that you should call upon us to be fellow-counsellors about the education of youth, and not call upon Socrates here, who is, in the first place, of the same demus;⁷ and secondly, has ever his haunts there, where there is any thing connected with the points you are in search of, relating to young persons, either of instruction or an honourable pursuit.

Lys. How say you, Laches? Does Socrates here make any thing of this kind his study?

Lac. Very much so, Lysimachus.

Nic. I too can assert this not less than Laches. For he lately introduced a stranger to me, as the instructor of my son in music, Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, a man most deserving of favour, not only for his skill in music, but in other

⁷ By "demus" is meant a parish, being a part of what would be called in the city of London "a ward," as I have shown in the Glossary to my translation of the Midian oration of Demosthenes, p. 83.

respects which what you will for young men such as these to pass their time with.

Lys. No longer, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, do I and my friends it may have any acquaintance with younger persons, inasmuch as we for the most part pass the time with our family on account of our period of life. But if, son of Sophroniscus,⁸ you have any thing to advise for the good of mine⁹ your fellow-citizens, you ought to communicate it: and you are justified in doing so: for you happen to be a friend of your father's side: for I and your father were always associates and friends: and he ended his days before he had any difference with me: and some recollection came round me as these persons were speaking: for these lads, while talking with each other at home, made frequent mention of Socrates, and very much praised him: but I never have asked them whether they spoke of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me now, *children*, is this the Socrates of whom you so often made mention?

Sons of Mai and Lys. Yes father, it is the same.

Lys. It is well by *Juno*, Socrates, that you give a support¹⁰ to your father, who was the best of men, in other respects, and this too, that your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

Lac. And moreover, Lysimachus, do not omit the acts of the man; for I have elsewhere beheld him, not only giving a support to his father, but to his country likewise. For, in the flight from Delium,¹¹ he retired along with me; and I tell you, that if the rest had been willing to be such (as he was), our city would have stood erect, nor would so great a disaster have befallen it.

[5.] *Lys.* This, Socrates, is indeed honourable praise, with which you are extolled by men worthy to be believed, and (to be praised)¹² for those very things, for which they praise you. Rest

⁸ I have preserved the Latinized name as being better known than *Heré*.

⁹ By "this" Lysimachus means himself.

¹⁰ With the idea contained in the verb ὀρθεῖν may be compared the expression in Eurip. *Iph. T.* 57, Στῆλοι γὰρ οἴκων παῖδες εἶσιν ἄρσενες.

¹¹ To the courageous conduct of Socrates allusion is likewise made in *The Banquet*, § 43.

¹² Ficinus has what the sense evidently requires, "qui in iisdem laudandi et ipsi sunt, in quibus te laudant," having no doubt found in his MS. καὶ εἰς ταῦτά, εἰς ἃ οὗτοι σ' ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἐπαινέσθαι. Ast there-

assured, then, that in hearing this, I am right glad that you are in high repute; and do you consider me amongst those the most kindly disposed towards you. You should therefore have been the first to visit me, and to believe me your familiar friend, as it was just for you to be. Now therefore, from this very day, since we have recognised each other, do not do otherwise, but be with me, and become the acquaintance of myself and these youngsters, in order that you may preserve our friendship. You then will do this, and we will again recall it to your memory. But with respect to the matters about which we commenced, what say you? What, does it appear to you that this instruction is suited to lads, or not?¹³ [the learning to fight in armour.]¹³

Soc. Nay then about these matters, Lysimachus, I will endeavour to advise, if I am able; and moreover to do all that you invite me to. It seems however to me to be the most just for myself, as being the younger, and the less experienced in these matters, to hear first what these persons say, and learn from them. And if I have any thing to say contrary to what has been stated by them, then indeed to teach and persuade both you and them. But, Nicias, why do not¹⁴ one of you speak the first?¹⁴

[6.] *Nic.* There is nothing to prevent it, Socrates; for it appears to me that this kind of instruction is on many accounts useful for youths. For it is well to pass the time not in another place and in the pursuits, in which young men are wont to make for themselves an occupation, when they are at leisure, but in this, from whence they necessarily have the body in a better condition; for it is not inferior to any of the gymnastic exercises, nor has it less labour; and at the same time both the exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a liberally educated man. For where we are the combatants in

fore justly finds fault with the Greek *καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἃ οὗτοι ἐκαινοῦσαν*: which Stalbaum however would defend. Heusde too saw that *ἐκαινέσθαι* had dropt out; but he incorrectly wished to insert *καὶ ἐκαινέσθαι* after *πιστεύεσθαι*.

¹³—¹³ The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of *τὸ μάθημα*.

¹⁴—¹⁴ The MSS. vary between *πρότερος*, and *πότερος*, and *ὀπότερος*. Plato wrote either *λέγει πρότερος ὀπότερος*, or else *λέγεις πρότερος*, similar to "*ipse prior loqueris*"—in Ficinus: which Stalbaum once approved of, but subsequently rejected.

them. [45.] For in reality, if temperance be ever so much of such a nature, it does not appear evident to me, what good it will effect for us.—How is this? said he; speak, that we may also know what you mean.—I fancy, I replied, that I am trifling; nevertheless it is necessary to consider, that, which presents itself to our view, and not carelessly to pass it by, if any one takes the least thought of himself.—You speak well, said he.—Hear then, I replied, my dream, (no matter) whether it has passed through the gate of ⁷⁷horn or ivory.⁷⁷ For if temperance ruled us ever so much, would it not, being such as we have now defined it, be acted upon according to the sciences; and neither would he, who boasts to be a pilot when he is not, deceive us; nor would a physician, or a general of an army, or any other person, who pretends to know that, which he does not know, lie hid from us. But from this state of things something else would happen to us; for our bodies would be more healthy than at present, and we should be preserved, when in danger at sea and in war; and all our utensils and garments, and all our shoes, and all the necessaries (of life), all things else, would be made more scientifically through our employing true artists. [46.] And if you are willing, let us grant that prophecy is the science of that, which is to be; and that temperance, presiding over it, turns away the boastful diviners, but appoints over us the true prophets of things to come. Furnished then in this way, the human race would, I concede, act and live scientifically. For temperance being our guard, it would not permit ignorance to interfere and cooperate with us. But that, by acting scientifically, we should do well and be happy, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to understand.—But, he replied, you will not however easily find any other method of doing well, if you despise the doing a thing scientifically.—Instruct me then still a little, said I, of what scientific doing are you speaking? Is it that of leather-cutting?—By Zeus, it is not.—Is it that of brass-work?—By no means.—But is it that of working in wool, or wood, or any such things?—It is not.—[47.] We do then, I replied, no longer persist in the assertion, that he is happy, who lives scientifically. For

⁷⁷—⁷⁷ Macrobius in Somn. Scip. c. 3, has preserved a fanciful explanation given by Porphyry of the fiction in Homer, Od. xix. 562, relating to the two gates of dreams, which the admirers of the Neo-Platonic school will do well to consult.

those artists, although living scientifically, are confessed by you to be not happy; ⁷⁸ but you seem to me to separate the happy man from them, when they possess a science of certain things.⁷⁸ And perhaps you call (happy) the diviner, whom I just now mentioned, who knows all that is to be. Do you mean this, or any other person?—Both this, said he, and another.—What other? I replied. You surely do not speak of the person, who knows, in addition to future events, every thing past and present, and is ignorant of nothing; for let us admit that there is such a man, you will not say, I think, that any one lives more scientifically than he at least does.—Certainly not.—But this also I desiderate—Which of the sciences makes him happy? Or do all the sciences equally produce this effect?—By no means equally, said he.—But which the most? Is it that, by which he knows some of things present, past, and to come? Is it that, by (which he knows) the science of back-gammon?⁷⁹—What back-gammon? he replied.—But is it that, by which (he knows) the calculating science?—By no means.—But is it that, by which (he knows) things healthful.—Rather so, said he?—[48.] ⁸⁰ But is it, said I, that, of which I am speaking especially, by which (he knows) what?⁸⁰—By which (he knows) good and evil.—O thou vile man, I replied; ⁸¹ who for some while hast been drawing me round in a circle, concealing from me, that to live scientifically was not the causing,⁸¹ to do well and to be happy, nor belonging

⁷⁸⁻⁷⁹ This is the English of Stalbaum's Latin version, to which he seems to have been led by finding in Ficinus—"At forte e multis inscien-
 enter viventibus unum quendam certa ex scientia scien-ter viventem
 beatum determinas;" who must have met with something very superior
 to the common Greek text, which is literally, "but concerning some liv-
 ing scientifically you seem to me to set apart the happy."

⁷⁹ As in the game called *περρεία*, mention is made both of pebbles, or
 dice, and of lines, it was probably something like the modern back-
 gammon.

⁸⁰⁻⁸⁰ The Greek is 'Εκείνη δ', ἣν λέγω μάλιστα, ἣν ὁ ἐγὼ, ᾗ τί; out of
 which both Heindorf and Stalbaum have failed to make a satisfactory
 sense and syntax. Ficinus, "Illa vero, quam dico maxime, quâ quid
 norim." Perhaps Plato wrote 'Εκείνην δ' οὖν λέγ' εὖ μάλιστα, ἣν ὁ ἐγὼ,
 ᾗ τί; i. e. "Do you then state in the best way, said I, that, by which (he
 knows) what?" where *ἐκείνην* is due to two MSS.

⁸¹⁻⁸¹ Here again the version of Ficinus differs greatly from, and is
 in some respects superior to, the Greek—"jamdiu me clam circulo reflectis
 retrahisque ad id, ut beatum vivere non sit secundum universas scientias
 vivere; immo secundum unam quendam boni malive scientiam."

to all the other sciences, but to one (science) alone, relating to good and evil. Since,⁸² Critias, if you were willing to take away this last science from the other sciences, the physician's science will no less cause one to be healthy; and that of the shoe-maker, to be shod; and that of the weaver, to be clad; and (no less) the pilot's science prevent one from losing one's life at sea, and the general's science in war?—No less, said he.—But, friend Critias, by this science being absent, it will be no longer left for each of those (other sciences) to turn out well and usefully.—You speak the truth.—But this science, as it seems, is not temperance, but that, the work of which is to benefit us: for it is not the science of sciences and ignorances, but that of good and evil. So that if this be useful, temperance would be something else than⁸³ useful.—[49.] What then, said he, would not temperance be useful? For if temperance is as much as possible a science of sciences, and presides over the other sciences; it will surely benefit us by ruling over that science which relates to the good.—But will temperance, I replied, cause us to be in health, and not the medical science? And will this perform the rest of the works of the arts, and not the rest, each its own work? Or did we not some time since testify that temperance is a science of science, and ignorance alone, but of nothing else? Is it not so?—So it appears.—It is not then the worker of health.—Clearly not.—For health is the work of another art. Is it not?—Of another.—Nor is it, my friend, of utility; for we attributed this very work to another art. Did we not?—Entirely so.—How then will temperance be beneficial, since it is the worker of no utility?—By no means, Socrates, as it seems.—Do you not see then, Critias, that I felt very properly some time since a fear, and justly blamed myself, because I could descry nothing useful about temperance? For that which is confessed to be the most beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be useless, if there were any thing useful in myself towards making a search correctly. [50.] But now,⁸⁴ for we are vanquished on every side, and unable to discover for what purpose the name-

⁸² In lieu of the unintelligible ἐπει, Heindorf proposes to read εἰπε—

⁸³ Schleiermacher acutely supplied for the sense the ἦ, wanting in al. the MSS.

⁸⁴ On this aposiopesis see Heusde and Heindorf.

founder⁸⁵ assigned to temperance this very name. And yet we have conceded many things that did not result (correctly)⁸⁶ from the reasoning. For we conceded, that there is a science of sciences, although the reasoning neither permits nor asserts this; and on the other hand, we conceded that we know by this science the works of the other sciences—the reasoning permitting not even this—in order that the temperate man might be one, who has a knowledge of what he knows, because he knows, and of those which he does not know, because he does not know. This indeed we conceded very liberally, without ever considering that it is impossible for a person to know in any way whatever what he does not know at all. ⁸⁷ For our concession says that he knows those things, because he does not know them.⁸⁷ And yet as I think there is nothing which would appear more absurd than this. The inquiry however, having met with us so very easy tempered and by no means morose, is not a bit more able to discover the truth; but has rather laughed at it so much, that, what we formerly conceded to be temperance, and, after moulding it into some shape, laid it down to be, this it has very saucily shown to us as being of no use. [51.] On my own account then I am less indignant; but for your sake, Charmides, I am, said I, very indignant, if you, so beautiful in body, and most temperate to boot in mind, derive no advantage from this temperance, and if it does not by its presence bring to you any benefit during life. But I am still more indignant for the sake of the incantation, which I learned from

⁸⁵ Instead of νομοθέτης, Heindorf suggested ὀνοματοθέτης, similar to "nominum auctor" in Ficinus. The reading has been subsequently found in five MSS., and though adopted here by Stalbaum, it has been uniformly rejected by him in the Cratylus. From this allusion to etymology, one might suspect that this dialogue preceded the Cratylus, where the idea of uniting etymological with philosophical inquiries is more fully developed.

⁸⁶ I suspect εἰ has dropped out before ἐν—

⁸⁷—⁸⁷ This is the literal version of the Greek—ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε φησὶν αὐτὰ εἶδέναι ἢ ἡμέτερα ὁμολογία: which Heindorf renders "Dedimus enim eum de iis scire se ea nescire," which I cannot understand. Stalbaum's version is "Concessimus enim eum scire nescire se illa, quæ nesciat," i. e. "We have conceded that he knows he does not know what he does not know." But neither scholar has taken any notice of ὅτι, while both seem to have wished to read ὅτι γὰρ ἃ οὐκ οἶδε φησὶν αὐτὸν εἶδέναι. Ficinus has "In hoc autem concessimus, videlicet aliquem ignorantem aliqua, quod non cognoscat, cognoscere," who thus took ὅτι as a pronoun, not ὅτι as a conjunction, and omitted αὐτὰ, for which one MS. offers

αὐτὸς.

the Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have learnt it with so much labour. I do not then⁸⁸ [very much then]⁸⁸ think that this is the case, but that I am a bad searcher; since (I consider) temperance to be a great good, and that, if you possess it, you are blessed indeed. But see whether you do possess it, and do not require at all the incantation. For if you do possess it, I would rather advise you to think me a trifle, and incompetent to search out any thing whatever by a course of reasoning, and yourself so much the happier, as you are the more temperate.—But by Zeus, Socrates, said Charmides, I do not know whether I possess it, or not. For how can I know that, which not even you can discover what it is, as you say yourself? I am not however much persuaded by you; and I consider myself, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation; and no business of mine hinders me from being daily enchanted by you, until you shall say that I have had enough.—[52.] Be it so, said Critias. But, Charmides, if you act thus, it will be a proof to me at least that you are temperate, if you will give yourself up to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not desert him for any thing, either great or small.—(Consider me,) said he, as about to follow and not to desert him. For I should act in a fearful manner, if I did not obey you, my tutor, nor do as you bid me.—Nay then, said Critias, I do bid you.—I shall therefore do so, said Charmides, beginning from this very very day.—But what, said I, are ye two deliberating to do?—Nothing, said Charmides: we have ceased to deliberate.⁸⁹—Will you then, said I, use violence, and not grant me a previous inquiry?—(Consider me) as about to use violence, said he, since Critias commands me. Do you therefore take counsel about what you are to do.—But no consultation, said I, is left for me: for not one man will be able to oppose you, when endeavouring to do any thing yourself and forcing him.—Do not you then oppose me, said he.—I shall not indeed, said I, oppose you.

⁸⁸⁻⁸⁹ The words within brackets Stalbaum rejects as arising from an error in transcription. In the Greek letters πάντων μὲν οὖν lies *hid* πάντων ἀνεμιαῖα: where ἀνεμιαῖα, literally “wind-heavy,” is applied first to what are called “wind-eggs,” in which there is no chicken; and secondly, to arguments that have no reason in them. The word is used by Plato in *Theætet.* p. 151, E., 161, A., and 210, B.

⁸⁹ The perfect passive is used here as in *Criton*, p. 46, A., οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι ἐτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευῆσθαι, and means “to cease to do.” So in *Eurip. Hippol.* 1457, *Κεκαρτίρηται τὰμὺδ*—is the reply to *καρτέρει*: and so too in *Virgil*, “*Fuimus Troes.*”

INTRODUCTION TO THE LACHES,

OR

ON FORTITUDE.

As Plato had in the Charmides discussed the question relating to Temperance, one of the cardinal virtues, so in the Laches he has taken for his subject another, with the view of showing that it is equally difficult to give a definition of Fortitude. Like the Charmides too this dialogue has been rejected by Ast as a spurious production, fathered upon Plato, for reasons which Stalbaum asserts are not of the least weight; and who correctly remarks that there is such a similarity between the manner of the two dialogues, as to show that they must have been written by the same hand; and hence, until the Charmides can be proved to be not genuine, it is needless to inquire into the authorship of the Laches. For though there is some discrepancy in the view here taken of Fortitude, and what is stated in the Republic, iii. p. 386, and iv. p. 427—430, yet that, says Stalbaum, may be accounted for on the supposition that in this dialogue we have the opinion of Plato, when he began his career as a philosophical writer, but in the more elaborate work the result of his matured reflection. Schleiermacher indeed conceives that the Laches was a kind of supplement to the Protagoras. But as it wants the subtlety to be found there, Stalbaum is disposed to believe that it preceded rather than followed that dialogue.

Be however the author who he may—and I confess I can see no reason for doubting its genuineness—the dialogue alludes to some

curious circumstances not mentioned elsewhere, and which could hardly be known except to a person contemporary with Plato; who shows towards the end of the dialogue that the theory, which he was contending against, emanated from the school of Damon, the Pythagorean, of whom it would seem from the Protagoras, § 20, and Alcibiad. i. § 30, he had not so high an opinion as Pericles and others had.

LACHES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS,¹ MELESIAS,² NICIAS,³ LACHES,⁴ AND THE SONS
OF LYSIMACHUS AND MELESIAS, AND SOCRATES.

LYSIMACHUS.

[1.] You have seen, Nicias and Laches, the man fighting in armour;⁵ but on what account I and Melesias here invited you to see him with us, we did not then tell you; but now we will mention it; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you. There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind; and if any one consults with them, they will not say what they think; but making a guess about the views of the persons consulting them, they speak what is contrary to their own opinion. Thinking however that you are sufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you would state simply what you think, we have thus taken you as our associates in the consultation respecting the matters we are about to communicate. Now the question, about which I have made this lengthy pre-

¹ A son of Aristides the Just.

² A son of Thucydides, one of the political opponents of Pericles.

³ A general of the Athenians, who, after a victorious career, perished at last in the Sicilian expedition.

⁴ An Athenian admiral, mentioned by Thucydides as a contemporary of Nicias.

⁵ Dacier thought that this fighting in armour was an exercise similar to what is taught in fencing schools. It was more probably like the riding schools for the cavalry, where the soldiers are taught the sword exercise. According to Athenæus, iv. p. 154, E., the person who first taught this fighting in armour was one Demeas of Mantinea.

face is this. These are our sons. That Melesias here, is called Thucydides, bearing name; and this one here, Aristides, is mine other's name; for we call him Aristides. It has therefore by us to pay all the attention to them and not to act as the many do who, when they come lads,⁶ suffer them to do as they please, and to take care of them as far as we can. But if you also have children, we have thought that it might be better care respecting them to you, if to any one else, might become the best by being attended to by you. For you have not frequently paid attention to them, and now remind you, that you ought not to neglect them, but call upon you to take upon yourselves, in the charge of your sons. But from when the matter is terminated, it is requisite for you, Nicias and I, although the narration be rather long.

[2.] I and Melesias here take our meals with the lads have their food at our side. As I have commenced the discourse, we shall say no more. For both of us are able to relate to the youths the feats of our fathers, which they did both while they were administering the affairs of the state here. But neither of us have to relate of our own. For this we feel, in the presence of the youths, a shame, and we find fault with our fathers who permitted us to live the life of rakes when we were they were busily employed about the affairs of the state. The very things we point out to these youths, and say if they neglect themselves, and do not obey us, will in disrepute; but that, if they pay attention to us, they will perhaps be worthy of the name of men. I say indeed they will obey us; but we are not learning what and pursuing it steadily the best of men. Now some one has introduced

⁶ The original *μετράκια* seems to correspond to the seven ages of man. For according to the anonymous Greek interpreter of De Judiciis, p. 166, the seven ages of man are *βρέφος, ἄνθρωπος, πρεσβύτης, γέρων*, i. e. "infant, boy, lad, man, old man;" T. who might have referred to the counterpart of Shakspeare's Seven Ages.

of instruction, and said that it would be well for a young person to learn to fight in armour; and he praised the party whom you have just now seen exhibiting, and invited us to see him likewise. We determined then that it was requisite for us to come ourselves, and take you along with us to the sight, in order that you might not only be fellow-spectators, but fellow-counsellors and co-partners, if you were willing, in the matter relating to the care to be paid to children. These are the subjects on which we wish to communicate with you. It is now, therefore, your part to advise about this kind of instruction, whether it appears they ought to learn it or not, and about the rest, if indeed you are able to praise any kind of discipline or study for a young man, and to state what you will do touching this matter in common.

[3.] *Nic.* For myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your notion, and am prepared to do this in common, and so I think is Laches here.

Lac. You think with truth, Nicias. And what Lysimachus has just now said about his father, and the father of Melesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs. For there nearly happens to them, what he says, both with respect to their children and the rest of private concerns, that they are considered of little account and treated negligently. On these points, therefore, Lysimachus, you have spoken correctly. But I marvel that you should call upon us to be fellow-counsellors about the education of youth, and not call upon Socrates here, who is, in the first place, of the same *demus*; ⁷ and secondly, has ever his haunts there, where there is any thing connected with the points you are in search of, relating to young persons, either of instruction or an honourable pursuit.

Lys. How say you, Laches? Does Socrates here make any thing of this kind his study?

Lac. Very much so, Lysimachus.

Nic. I too can assert this not less than Laches. For he lately introduced a stranger to me, as the instructor of my son in music, Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, a man most deserving of favour, not only for his skill in music, but in other

⁷ By "*demus*" is meant a parish, being a part of what would be called in the city of London "*a ward*," as I have shown in the Glossary to my translation of the Midian oration of Demosthenes, p. 83.

respects worth what you will for young men such as these to pass their time with.

[4.] *Lys.* No longer, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, do I and my equals in age have any acquaintance with younger persons, inasmuch as we for the most part pass the time with our family on account of our period of life. But if, son of Sophroniscus,⁸ you have any thing to advise for the good of this⁹ your fellow-wardsman, you ought to communicate it: and you are justified (in doing so); for you happen to be a friend on your father's side; for I and your father were always associates and friends; and he ended his days before he had any difference with me: and some recollection came round me as these persons were speaking; for these lads, while talking with each other at home, made frequent mention of Socrates, and very much praised him; but I never have asked them whether they spoke of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me now, children, is this the Socrates of whom you so often made mention?

Sons of Mel. and Lys. Yes, father, it is the same.

Lys. It is well, by Juno, Socrates, that you give a support¹⁰ to your father, who was the best of men, in other respects, and this too, that your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

Lac. And, moreover, Lysimachus, do not omit the acts of the man; for I have elsewhere beheld him, not only giving a support to his father, but to his country likewise. For, in the flight from Delium,¹¹ he retired along with me; and I tell you, that if the rest had been willing to be such (as he was), our city would have stood erect, nor would so great a disaster have befallen it.

[5.] *Lys.* This, Socrates, is indeed honourable praise, with which you are extolled by men worthy to be believed, and (to be praised)¹² for those very things, for which they praise you. Rest

⁸ I have preserved the Latinized name as being better known than Heré.

⁹ By "this" Lysimachus means himself.

¹⁰ With the idea contained in the verb ὀρθοῦν may be compared the expression in Eurip. Iph. T. 57, Στῦλοι γὰρ οἴκων παῖδες εἰσιν ἄρσενες.

¹¹ To the courageous conduct of Socrates allusion is likewise made in The Banquet, § 43.

¹² Ficinus has what the sense evidently requires, "qui in iisdem laudandi et ipsi sunt, in quibus te laudant," having no doubt found in his MS. καὶ εἰς ταῦτά, εἰς ἃ οὗτοι σ' ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἐπαινέσθαι. Ast there-

assured, then, that in hearing this, I am right glad that you are in high repute; and do you consider me amongst those the most kindly disposed towards you. You should therefore have been the first to visit me, and to believe me your familiar friend, as it was just for you to be. Now therefore, from this very day, since we have recognised each other, do not do otherwise, but be with me, and become the acquaintance of myself and these youngsters, in order that you may preserve our friendship. You then will do this, and we will again recall it to your memory. But with respect to the matters about which we commenced, what say you? What, does it appear to you that this instruction is suited to lads, or not?¹³ [the learning to fight in armour.]¹³

Soc. Nay then about these matters, Lysimachus, I will endeavour to advise, if I am able; and moreover to do all that you invite me to. It seems however to me to be the most just for myself, as being the younger, and the less experienced in these matters, to hear first what these persons say, and learn from them. And if I have any thing to say contrary to what has been stated by them, then indeed to teach and persuade both you and them. But, Nicias, why do not¹⁴ one of you speak the first?¹⁴

[6.] *Nic.* There is nothing to prevent it, Socrates; for it appears to me that this kind of instruction is on many accounts useful for youths. For it is well to pass the time not in another place and in the pursuits, in which young men are wont to make for themselves an occupation, when they are at leisure, but in this, from whence they necessarily have the body in a better condition; for it is not inferior to any of the gymnastic exercises, nor has it less labour; and at the same time both the exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a liberally educated man. For where we are the combatants in

fore justly finds fault with the Greek *καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἃ οὗτοι ἐπαινοῦσιν*: which Stalbaum however would defend. Heusde too saw that *ἐπαινέσθαι* had dropt out; but he incorrectly wished to insert *καὶ ἐπαινέσθαι* after *πιστεύεσθαι*.

^{13—13} The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of τὸ μάθημα.

^{14—14} The MSS. vary between *πρότερος*, and *πότερος*, and *ὀπότερος*. Plato wrote either *λέγει πρότερος ὀπότερος*, or else *λέγεις πρότερος*, similar to "ipse prior loqueris"—in Ficinus: which Stalbaum once approved of, but subsequently rejected.

a contest, and in those (exercises) in which a contest is proposed to us, they alone contend who are exercised in these very instruments relating to war. In the next place, this instruction will be of advantage in battle itself, when it is necessary to fight in a rank with many others. But it is the most useful, when the ranks are broken, and when it is necessary in single combat either in pursuit to attack a person defending himself, or in flight to defend oneself, while another is making an attack. For he who is skilled in this art, will suffer nothing at the hands of one, and, perhaps, not at the hands of many; but will every where through this come off the best. And still further, a thing of this kind incites to the desire of another honourable kind of instruction. For every one who has learnt to fight in armour, will also desire the instruction respecting the arrangements of an army; and having obtained this, he will, through the love of honour in these points, press forward to every thing connected with generalship. And ¹⁵it is already evident¹⁵ that he will attend to all instructions and studies connected with them, both honourable and well worth while for a man to learn and attend to, and to which this instruction has been the leader. And we will add to this, a no trifling addition, that this very science will make every man in no small degree more daring and brave in battle ¹⁶than he was before.¹⁶ Nor let us hold it in dishonour to say, although it may appear to any one a rather small matter, that it gives a man a graceful bearing, where a man should appear the most graceful;¹⁷ and where through this graceful bearing he will at the same time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me then, Lysimachus, it appears that, as I have said, we ought to teach young men these things; and I have stated why it appears so. But if Laches has any thing to say contrary to this, I shall hear him with pleasure.

[7.] *Lac.* It is difficult, Nicias, to assert respecting any

¹⁵—¹⁶ Heusde, justly offended with ἡδὲ δηλον, proposed to read τί δὲ δηλοῦν, i. e. "why need one show." Perhaps Plato wrote καὶ, ἃ ἡδὲ Δήλιον, i. e. "and what Delium knew"—For the very spot, where the Athenians lost the day through their want of discipline, would be properly appealed to as a witness to the truth of the present remarks.

¹⁶—¹⁷ This is Taylor's correct translation of αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, united to a comparative, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 452.

¹⁷ I have adopted εὐσχημονίστατον, found in two MSS. and similar to "maxime aptum"—in Ficinus.

instruction whatever, that one ought not to learn it; for it appears to be good to know all things; and especially this science of arms; if it is a thing to be learnt, as those say who teach it, and such as Nicias speaks of, one ought to learn; but if it is not a thing to be learnt, and those are deceiving us who promise to teach it, or if, being a thing to be learnt, it is not of much worth, why should one learn it? this I say concerning it, through looking to these points, that, if it were of any value, I think it would not have lain hid from the Lacedæmonians, who have no other care in life than to seek and study that, by which they may surpass others in war. Now if this art were concealed from them, yet this fact would not have been concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæmonians do, the most of all the Greeks, pay attention to things of this kind; and by them he would be honoured for it, and beyond¹⁸ all others he would make the most money, just as a tragic poet is honoured by us. For he, who thinks that he composes tragedies well, does not go about to other cities at a distance from, and in a circle round, Attica, and make an exhibition there; but he straightway comes hither, and exhibits himself to the people here, for a very good reason. But I see that the persons who fight in armour, consider Lacedæmon as sacred ground, not to be trodden; and do not walk upon it even on tip-toe; but they go round it, and rather exhibit themselves to all, and especially to those who would acknowledge that many are before them in warlike matters. [8.] In the next place, Lysimachus, I have been acquainted with not a few of these men during the work itself, and I have seen what kind of men they are. And we may form a judgment of them from this circumstance. For, as if with a fixed design, not one of those, who has applied himself to the science of arms, has ever become illustrious in war; although in all other cases men have become celebrated from among those, who have paid attention to each science. But these men, as it seems, have been, as compared with the rest, in this respect so very unfortunate. For this very same Stesileus, whom you beheld together with me exhibiting himself in so great a crowd,¹⁹ and saying the great

¹⁸ Instead of *παρὰ*, correct Greek requires *πέρα*—

¹⁹—¹⁹ The words within numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus.

things in truth²⁰ which he said of himself,¹⁹ I have seen him truly displaying himself elsewhere, in a far better manner, though unwillingly. For when the ship, on which he was aboard as a marine, fell upon a merchant vessel, he fought with a spear headed with a scythe, a weapon as different²¹ (from other weapons)²¹ as he was himself from the rest²² (of the combatants.)²² Other particulars respecting the man do not deserve to be related; but how his plan of the spear in addition to the scythe turned out²³ (must not be passed over in silence);²³ for while he was fighting, (the weapon) became somehow entangled in the tackling of the (enemy's) ship; Steasileus therefore pulled in order to disengage it, but he was not able to effect his purpose; and the one ship passed by the other. In the mean time he followed the course of the ship holding by his spear. But when the enemy's ship had sheered off, and was drawing him in, as he was still holding by his spear, he let the spear down towards his hands, until he had only hold of it by the stump. Hereupon there arose a laughter and shout from those on board the merchant vessel, at the figure he made; and some one having pelted him with a stone that fell just at his feet, he threw himself from the spear upon the deck. And then indeed they who were in the trireme were no longer able to restrain their laughter on seeing the spear headed with a scythe hanging from the ship. [9.] Perhaps therefore this art may be of some use, as Nicias says; such however are the circumstances which I met with myself.²⁴ Hence, what I said at first, if it be a thing to be learnt, it possesses but little utility; and if it be not, and persons say and pretend it is a thing to be learnt, it is not worth while to

²⁰ Stalbaum endeavours, I think, unsuccessfully to defend *ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὡς ἀληθῶς*.

²¹—²¹ Ficinus has alone preserved the words requisite for the sense in his version, "instrumentum—ab aliis longe diversum."

²²—²² The words within numerals Taylor added to complete the sense. Plato probably wrote, not *διαφέρων*, but *δορυφόρων*; thus making a distinction between *δορυδρίπανον* and *δῶρον*.

²³—²³ Here again we are indebted to Ficinus for a supplement necessary for the sense. His version is, "Hoc tamen non erit silentio prætereundum." Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀποσβῆναι* οὐ χρῆ between *ἀπέβη* and *μαχόμενον*.

²⁴ Jacobs supposes that the story alluded to took place when Laches was the admiral of the fleet sent to Sicily, as stated by Thucydides, iii. 90.

endeavour to learn it. For it appears to me, that if any one being a coward should think he ought to learn it, and through it become more bold, it would become only more apparent what he is; but if a brave man (learnt it), he would through being watched by every one have to endure, if he erred but little, calumnies of a grievous kind. For the pretension to this science is exposed to envy; so that unless he surpasses others in valour to a wonderful degree, it is not possible for him, who asserts that he possesses this science, to avoid becoming ridiculous. Of such value, Lysimachus, does the pursuit of this kind of instruction appear to be to myself. But it is requisite, as I said at first, not to let this Socrates go away, but to request him to give his opinion as to the view in which the matter appears to him.

[10.] *Lys.* And I do indeed request you, Socrates: for it appears to me that the consultation requires a person to decide. For had these agreed, there would have been no need of such a person. But now—for you see that Laches has given an opposite (vote)²⁵ to Nicias—it will be well to hear from you with which of the men you are a fellow-voter.

Soc. What then, Lysimachus, are you about to make use of that, which the majority of us shall praise?

Lys. What else, Socrates, can any one do?

Soc. And will you too, Melesias, act in this manner? And if the consultation were about the contending art for your son, ²⁶what he ought to practise,²⁶ would you rather obey the many than one, who happened to have been instructed under a skilful teacher, and had practised himself.

Mel. It is reasonable, Socrates, (to obey) him.

Soc. You would therefore obey him rather than us four?

Mel. Perhaps so.

Soc. For that which is about to be judged correctly ought, I think, to be judged by science, and not by a multitude.

Mel. How not?

Soc. It is meet therefore to consider now this very thing in the first place, whether any one of us is an artist in the matter about which we are consulting, or not. And if any of us is, we should obey him, although he is but one, and dismiss

²⁵ After *ivavriav* supply *ψηφον*.

²⁶—²⁶ The words within numerals are omitted by both Ficinus, and Taylor.

the rest. But if not, we must seek some other person. Or, do you and Lysimachus think that a hazard is run respecting a trifling thing, and not respecting that very possession, which is the greatest of all belonging to you? For by the sons being good, or the contrary, the whole of their father's house will be regulated in such a manner, as the children may turn out.

Mel. You speak the truth.

Soc. One must therefore have much forethought on this point.

Mel. Certainly.

Soc. How then, what I just now stated, should we have considered, if we had wished to inquire which of us is most expert in the contending art? ²⁷Is not he, who had learned and studied, and to whom there had been good teachers of this very thing?²⁷

Mel. To me at least it appears so.

Soc. And prior to this, ²⁸(should we not have considered) what the thing is, ²⁸of which we are seeking the teachers?

Mel. How say you?

Soc. In this way, perhaps, it will be more manifest. [11.] It does not seem to me to have been conceded by us at first, ²⁹what is the thing about which we are consulting and considering, ²⁹which of us is (the most)³⁰ skilled, and for the sake of this has taken masters, and which of us is not.

Nic. Were we not considering, ³¹Socrates, about fighting in armour, whether it was proper lads should learn it or not?

Soc. Entirely so, Nicias. But when any one considers about a remedy for the eyes, whether it ought to be applied or not, whether think you should the consultation be about the remedy, or about the eyes.

²⁷—²⁷ Stephens alone has seen that the sentence is incomplete; which is thus supplied by Ficinus—"nonne eum perscrutati essemus, qui et didicit et exercuit, cui videlicet idonei hujus rei præceptores exstiterint."

²⁸—²⁸ Before *τινος ὄντος τούτου*, Stalbaum would supply, as Taylor had done already, *ἔσκοπούμεν αὐν*: but he prefers, in lieu of *οὐ ζητούμεν*, to read *ἐζητούμεν*.

²⁹—²⁹ Ficinus has more tersely, "quid illud sit, in quo perquirimus—" ³⁰Taylor has adopted the superlative from "peritissimus" in Ficinus.

³¹ Ficinus—"quærebamus"—which leads to *ἔσκοπούμεν* for *σκοποῦμεν*.

Nic. About the eyes.

Soc. Hence too when any one is considering about a bridle for a horse, whether it should be applied or not, and when, he will then consult about the horse, and not about the bridle.

Nic. True.

Soc. In one word then, when any one is considering any thing for the sake of any thing, his consultation is about that thing for the sake of which he is considering, and not about that, which³³ he was seeking for the sake of something else.³³

Nic. Necessarily so.

Soc. It is necessary therefore to consider whether the fellow-counsellor is skilled in that thing, for the sake of which³⁴ we are considering what we are considering.³⁴

Mel. Very much so.

Soc. Are we not saying then, that we are inquiring about a thing to be learnt for the sake of the soul of the young man?

Nic. Yes.

Soc. Whether then any one of us is skilled in the art of attending to the soul, and is able to well perform this attendance, and who has had good teachers, must be considered.

Lac. What then, Socrates, have you never seen persons become more skilful in some things without teachers than with them?

Soc. I have, Laches; to whom however you would not be willing to trust, if they said they were good artists, unless they could show you some well-finished work of their art, both one and many.

Nic. What you say is true.

[12.] *Soc.* And for us too, Laches and Nicias, it is requisite, since Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to a con-

³³ To Cornarius is due δ for οὔ—

³³ Thus the horse is that, for the sake of which a man considers about a bridle; but the bridle is that, which is sought, for the sake of the horse. T.

³⁴⁻³⁴ Bekker has properly adopted σκοποῦμεν ἃ σκοποῦμεν, the emendation of Matthiæ in Gr. Gr. § 558, for σκοποῦμενοι σκοποῦμεν, unsuccessfully defended by Stalbaum. For though σκοπεῖσθαι and σκοπεῖν are used by Plato indiscriminately, yet they could not be found thus united, where the perpetual phrase, like σκοποῦμεν ἃ σκοποῦμεν, is required.

sultation with them respecting their sons, through their being desirous that their souls should become the best possible, that we, if we say we have had masters, should show who they were, who ³⁵in the first place³⁵ being themselves good teachers, and having attended to the souls of many youths, appear in the next place to have instructed us likewise. Or, if any one of us shall say that he has had no teacher, he ought at least to be able to speak of his own works, and to show what Athenians or foreigners, what slaves or freemen, have become good confessedly through him. But if neither of these is in our power, we must be ordered³⁶ to seek after others, and not run the risk in the case of the sons of persons our friends, of incurring the greatest blame from their nearest relatives for doing them a mischief. Now with respect to myself, I am the first to say, Lysimachus and Melesias, that I have had no teacher in this matter; although, beginning from my youth, I have felt a desire for such a thing. But I am not able to pay the sophists their fees, who alone profess themselves able to make me a man beautiful in body and mind; and by myself even now I am unable to discover the art. If however Nicias or Laches have either discovered or learned it, I should not wonder; for they have a more money-power than myself, so as to be able to learn from others; and they are at the same time older, so that they may have already discovered it (themselves.)³⁷ And they appear to me to be able to instruct a (grown) man; for they would never have so fearlessly expressed their opinions about pursuits good and bad for a young person, unless they believed they had a sufficient knowledge of them. Now as to the other things, I do indeed believe them; but I have wondered that they differ from each other. [13.] Hence, as Laches just now bade you not dismiss but interrogate me, so now I make a request in turn for you not to dismiss Laches and Nicias, but to interrogate them; at the same time telling them, that Socrates says he has no knowledge of the thing, nor is he competent to decide which of you speaks the truth; for he is neither the in-

³⁵⁻³⁵ The Greek is *αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι*. Ficinus has "qui et ipsi primum," from which Bekker obtained ο, and Stephens "primum."

³⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were *κελευστί' ἡμῖν*, not *κελεύειν*.

³⁷ The very antithesis in *παρ' ἄλλων* proves that *αὐτοὶ* has dropt out after *ὥστε*. Compare just below *μαθόντε παρὰ τοῦ—ἡ αὐτῷ ἐξευρόντε*.

³⁸ Ficinus omits *ἀνθρωπον*.

ventor nor the teacher of any thing relating to such matters. But do you, Laches and Nicias, one or the other, tell us what man you have met with most skilled in the bringing up of youth; and whether you have learnt from any one, or discovered yourselves; and, if you have learnt, who was the teacher to each of you, and what others are their fellow-artists, in order that if amidst the affairs of the city you have no leisure, we may go to them, and induce, either by gifts or caresses, or both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may not become depraved, and a disgrace to their ancestors. But if you yourselves are the discoverers of such a thing, give us an instance of what other persons you have had the care, and whom from being depraved you have made beautiful and good. For if you will now begin to give instruction for the first time, you must reflect that the risk is run not in the case of a Carian,³⁹ but in that of your own sons, and the sons of your friends; and truly will it happen to you, according to the proverb, for a pottery to be in a tub.⁴⁰ State then which of these matters ye say or deny is in our power and suited to you. This, Lysimachus, inquire of them, and do not let them off.

[14.] *Lys.* Socrates seems, my friends, to me to speak well. But whether it is agreeable to you to be interrogated about such matters, and to give reasons,⁴¹ it is meet for you, Nicias and Laches, to know; for to myself and Melesias here it will clearly be very agreeable, if you are willing to go through in a discussion all that Socrates may ask. For at the commencement I began speaking from that point, that we had invited you to a consultation on this account, because we thought, as was likely, that you had paid attention to these things, espe-

³⁹ Of the low estimation in which the Carians were held, the earliest proof is found in Homer; while the Scholiast here quotes numerous passages from different authors where the proverb is found. To the other references given by Spanheim on Julian. Cæsar. p. 105, ed. Heusinger, and Valckenaer on Herodot. v. 66, Jacobs adds Cicero pro Flacco, § 27. The modern medical phrase is "Experimentum in vili corpore."

⁴⁰ This proverb, found likewise in Gorg. p. 514, E. § 149, was applied to those, who attempt to do great things before they can do little; or, as said of children, who endeavour to run, before they can walk.

⁴¹ Stalbaum translates λόγον by "answer." But that meaning is not supported by the passages he quotes from Phædo, p. 78, D. For there λόγον is "a reason:" and so it is here, as shown by διδόντες καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον, a little below.

cially since your sons, as well as ours, are arrived at an age to be instructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, speak, and consider the affair in common with Socrates, giving and receiving reasons from each other: for he says this very properly, that we are now consulting about the most important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it appears to you that we ought to act thus.

Nic. You seem to me, Lysimachus, to know in good truth Socrates only from his father, and not to have associated with him yourself; unless, perhaps, when he was a boy, he came near you, while following his father, amongst his wardsmen, or in a temple, or some other congregation of the people; but since he has grown older, it is evident that you have never fallen in with him.

Lys. Why say you this especially, Nicias?

[15.] *Nic.* You seem to me not to know that for him, who happens to be near to Socrates, through a conversation, as if through a family alliance, ⁴²[and approaches towards him by conversing,] ⁴³it is a matter of necessity that, even if he shall have previously begun to converse about any thing else, he will not cease to be led about by the person here during the conversation, until he falls into giving an account of himself, in what manner he lives now, and what is the life he has previously lived. And when he shall have so fallen, Socrates will not dismiss him, until he has tried, as by a touchstone, all these points well and truly. But I am accustomed to him, and I know that it is necessary for me to suffer thus at his hands; and I further know well that I shall suffer now. For I am delighted, Lysimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no bad thing to be reminded of what we have done or are doing not correctly; and that for the subsequent period of life it is necessary for the person to be more thoughtful, who does not fly from such an examination, but is willing and thinks it worth while, according to the saying of Solon, ⁴³to learn as long as he lives, and by not imagining that age itself will come

⁴²⁻⁴³ The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of the preceding ἐγγύτατα—λόγῳ. Schleiermacher proposed to cut out ὥσπερ γίνεαι: with whom Stalbaum at first agreed, but subsequently considered the text perfectly sound.

⁴³ The saying was, Ἀεὶ γηράσκω πολλά διδασκόμενος.

bringing intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is neither unusual nor unpleasant to be tested by Socrates. But I have for some time known almost that our discourse, as Socrates is present, would not be about the lads, but about ourselves. Hence, as I said before, nothing as regards myself prevents me from passing the time in discourse with Socrates in the manner he wishes. But see how Laches here is disposed about a thing of this kind.

[16.] *Lac.* With respect to conversations, Nicias, my state is simple, or, if you will, is not simple, but double; for to a person I should appear to be now a lover of talk, but again a hater. For when I hear a man talking about virtue, or concerning wisdom, if he be truly a man, and worthy the arguments which he uses, I am delighted beyond all bounds, perceiving at the same time both the speaker and what is spoken, how they become and suit each other. And, really, such a man appears to me to be a musician, who composes the most beautiful harmony, not through⁴³ the lyre, or instruments of play, but by living in reality⁴⁴ correctly, after having skilfully⁴⁴ made⁴⁵ his life to accord by words to deeds like⁴⁶ the Dorian strain, but not the Ionic, nor I conceive the Phrygian or Lydian,⁴⁶ but that which alone is the Hellenic. Such a man, therefore, when he speaks, makes me to be glad, and to appear to any one whatever a lover of talk, with such avidity do I receive what is spoken by him. But he, who acts in a manner contrary to this man, gives me pain; and by how much the better he seems to speak, by so much the more does he (pain me), and make me on the other hand to appear a hater of talk. Of the discourses of Socrates I have not yet, indeed, had any experience; but of his deeds, as it seems, I have formerly had a

⁴³ I have translated as if the Greek were *ὁ ΔΙΑ ΔΥραν*, and not *ὁ ΔΥραν*.

⁴⁴⁻⁴⁴ Here too, where the whole question is connected with what is done skilfully or not, the undefined *ἀρετῶς* could not be introduced in the place of the defined *ἐντίχως*. Stalbaum, who once approved of the correction made by Cornarius, afterwards preferred the one suggested by Heusde, and eventually proposed himself a third.

⁴⁵ Here again, by merely changing *ἡρμοσμένος* *ὁ* into *ἐν εἰργασμένιος*, I have, I trust, restored the very words of Plato, who most assuredly never repeated the same verb *ἡρμοσμένος* in two consecutive sentences.

⁴⁶⁻⁴⁶ The Ionic harmony was effeminate; the Lydian, doleful; the Phrygian, vehement; but the Dorian, grave; and it was on this account preferred by Plato to all the rest. See Rep. iii. p. 398, E. T.

trial, and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful words and all liberty of speech. If then he possesses these properties, I agree with the party here; and I shall with the greatest pleasure be examined by such a person; nor shall I feel annoyed at being a learner. But though I assent to the saying of Solon, I will add just one thing, for I wish to be taught many things as I grow old, but by the good alone. Let this then be granted, that the teacher is himself a good man, that I may not appear hard to learn, when I learn without pleasure. But whether the teacher be younger, or not as yet in repute, or possesses any thing else of such a kind, I take no thought. I state then, as it were by the crier, to you, Socrates, that you may teach and confute me in whatever point you please; ⁴⁷and to learn on the other hand what I know; ⁴⁷ for so you are laid up in my thoughts, from the day in which you were my companion in danger, ⁴⁸ and gave such a proof of your virtue, as it is meet for man to give, who is about ⁴⁹ to give it justly. ⁴⁹ Say then whatever you please, and take no account of our age.

[17.] *Soc.* We cannot then blame, as it seems, your feelings, as being not ready to consult and investigate with us conjointly.

Lys. This then is our business, Socrates. For I put you down as one of us. Do you therefore consider, instead of me, in behalf of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them; and do you by conversing consult for them. For, through my age, I have forgotten the majority of things which I had intended to ask them; and moreover, I do not very well remember what I hear, if any other conversation intervenes. Do you therefore speak about, and discuss among yourselves, the things which we have laid before you; and I shall afterwards hear (the result); and having heard, I will, with Melesias here, do whatever shall seem good to you.

Soc. We must, Nicias and Laches, obey Lysimachus and

⁴⁷⁻⁴⁷ Taylor, perceiving no doubt the absurdity of the clause within the numerals, tacitly omitted them. Plato, in lieu of *μαρθάνειν αὐ*, probably wrote *ἀναμαρθάνειν*, "to unlearn:" which, as we know from Horace, old persons are very unwilling to do.

⁴⁸ The fact alluded to is mentioned in The Banquet, § 43.

⁴⁹⁻⁴⁹ This I cannot understand. Ficinus has "*quisquis juste periculum est facturus*," as if he had found in his MS. *δικαίως κινδυνεύσειν*. The sense requires *δικαίως διδάσκειν*. For Laches had said just before that a teacher ought to be a virtuous person.

Melesias. The points then, which we just now endeavoured to consider, (namely,) who had been our teachers in such kind of instruction, or what other persons we had made better, it will not be improper, perhaps, to examine amongst ourselves. But I think that a consideration of this kind tends to the same point,⁵⁰ and would be almost and more from a beginning.⁵⁰ For if we happen to know respecting any thing, that, when it is present to any thing, it renders that thing better, to which it is present; and, moreover, (if) we are able to cause that thing to be present to the other,⁵¹ respecting which we may be the fellow-counsellors,⁵¹ so that a person might acquire it in the easiest and best manner—Perhaps you do not understand what I am saying; but in this way you will more easily understand it. If we happen to know that the sense of sight, when present to the eyes, makes those eyes to which it is present better; and, moreover, if we are able to cause the sense of sight to be present to the eyes, it is evident that we know what the sense of sight is, respecting which we may be the fellow-counsellors, so that a person may acquire it in the easiest and best manner. For if we did not know this very thing, what the sense of sight is, or what that of hearing is, we should be not at all⁵² counsellors or physicians worthy of any account, respecting either the eyes or the ears, and as regards the manner in which a person might acquire in the best manner the sense of hearing or of sight.

Lys. You speak the truth, Socrates.

Soc. Do not then these persons, Laches, now invite us to consult with them respecting the manner by which virtue, being present to the souls of their sons, may make them better?

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. Ought there not then to be at hand the power, namely, to know what virtue is? For if we do not know at all what virtue happens to be; in what way can we become fellow-counsellors to any one, so that he may in the best manner acquire it?

Lac. In no way, it appears to me, Socrates.

⁵⁰—⁵⁰ This I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus; whose version is “et altius repetetur,” which cannot answer to *σχεδόν δὲ καὶ μάλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ εἶναι*. Taylor’s translation is equally wide of the Greek—“or nearly it will be something which rather flows from a principle.”

⁵¹—⁵¹ The words within the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

⁵² Literally, “at leisure.” On *συχολῶ* thus used, see the commentators on Soph. CEd. T. 434.

Soc. Say we then, Laches, that we know what it is?

Lac. Yes, we say so.

Soc. What we know then, cannot we also tell, what it is?

Lac. How not?

[18.] *Soc.* Let us not, however, thou best of men, speculate forthwith about the whole of virtue—for that perhaps would be a rather great undertaking; but let us first see about a certain part of it, if we are sufficiently able to know it; and thus,⁵⁴ it is probable, the speculation will be more easy to us.

Lac. Let us do so, Socrates, since you wish it.

Soc. Which of the parts of virtue then shall we select? Or is it not evident that it is that, to which the instruction in arms seems to tend? Now it seems to the many to tend to fortitude. Is it not so?

Lac. It seems very much so.

Soc. Let us then in the first place, Laches, endeavour to state what fortitude is; and in the next place, we will consider by what means it can be present to young men so far as it is possible for it to be present by study and instruction. But do you endeavour to state what fortitude is.

Lac. By Zeus, Socrates, it is not difficult to state. For if any one is willing to remain in his place, and defend himself from the enemy, and does not fly, rest assured that he would be a brave man.

Soc. You speak well, Laches; but perhaps from not speaking clearly myself, I am the cause of your not answering what I intended to ask, but something else.

Lac. How say you this, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as you say, is one who, remaining in his place, fights with the foe.

Lac. So I say.

Soc. And I also. But what on the other hand is he, who, while flying,⁵⁵ fights with the foe, and does not remain in his place?

Lac. How flying?

Soc. Just as the Scythians surely are said to fight, no less

⁵⁴ Ficinus has "in hunc modum," as if he had found in his MS., οὕτως, ὡς τὸ εἰδός, not merely ὡς τὸ εἰδός—

⁵⁵ Jacobs refers to Horace, Od. i. 35, 9, "Scythas et versis animosum equis Parthum."

while flying than pursuing. And Homer some where, praising the horses of Æneas, says, (Il. v. 225,)

Hither and thither swiftly to pursue
And fly they know ;

and for this very thing he praises Æneas himself, and calls him, through his skill in flying, "in flight expert."

Lac. And very properly, Socrates: for he is there speaking of chariots; but you are speaking about the Scythian cavalry; for so they fight; but the heavy-armed infantry of Greece (fight) as I say.

Soc. Except perhaps the Lacedæmonians, Laches. For they say that the Lacedæmonians, when they engaged with the Gerrophori at Plataea,⁵⁶ were not willing to remain and fight against them, but fled;⁵⁷ but when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and thus won the battle.

Lac. You speak the truth.

[19.] *Soc.* ⁵⁸ This then I meant as the reason for saying),⁵⁸ that I was the cause of your not answering correctly, because I did not put the question correctly. For wishing to ask you not only about those, who are brave amongst the heavy-armed, but also about those in the cavalry, and in every form of war, and not only about those brave in battle, but also those in the dangers of the sea, and such as act a manly part in diseases, in poverty, and in political affairs, and still further, not only such as bear themselves bravely up against pain or fear, but also bear themselves up against desires or pleasures, both by remaining, or turning their backs—for there are surely some men, Laches, brave in things of this kind likewise.

Lac. And very much so, Socrates.

⁵⁶ These were some Persian troops, who carried bucklers made of osiers and willows united, probably not unlike the targets, at which persons shoot with a bow and arrows.

⁵⁷ This anecdote is not told elsewhere; although mention is made by Herodotus, in ix. 61, of an engagement, where a Lacedæmonian corps failed to make an impression on a body of Persian troops, who were protected by their so-called bucklers.

^{58—58} This seems to be what Plato meant to say. But the Greek is merely *Τούτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἔλεγον*. Perhaps it was *τούτο τοίνυν τὸ αἴτιον ἐν ἔλεγον λέγων*. Ficinus has "Merito ergo dicebam?"

Soc. All these, therefore, are brave; but some of them possess fortitude in pleasures, others in pains, others in desires, and others in fears; and others, I think, possess timidity in these very same things.

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. What then is each of these? This is what I was asking. Try then again to tell me, in the first place, what is that fortitude, which is the same in all these. Or do you not yet understand what I mean?

Lac. Not very well.

[20.] *Soc.* But I will speak in this way; just as if I had asked, What is the swiftness, which happens to be present with us in running, in playing on the harp, and in speaking, and in learning, and in many other things, and we nearly possess that, about which it is worth while to say any thing, in the acts of the hands or feet, or mouth or voice, or mind. Or do not you also say so?

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one should ask me—What, Socrates, do you call that, which you denominate swiftness in all things? I should say to him, that I call by the name of swiftness that power, which accomplishes many things in a short time, as regards the voice, and running, and all other things.

Lac. And you would say rightly.

Soc. Do you then endeavour, Laches, in like manner, to define fortitude. What is that power, which is the same in pleasure and in pain, and in all the things in which we just now said it is, and is afterwards⁵⁹ called fortitude.

Lac. It appears then to me to be a certain endurance of the soul, if one must speak of that, which exists connected with fortitude taken universally.

Soc. And this must be, if we are to reply to the question asked by ourselves. This then appears to me, that you do not consider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. And I too infer it from hence; for I nearly know, Laches, that you think fortitude to belong to the things which are very beautiful.

⁵⁹ I cannot understand *ἔπειτα*; nor could Ficinus, whose version is "fortitudinem per singula nominari,"—which leads to *εἰς πάντα*—similar to *εἰς ἀπαντα* in § 21, or *εἰς ἕκαστα*. They, however, who wish for a long but unsatisfactory defence of *ἔπειτα*, may turn to the note of Engelhardt.

Lac. Rest assured that it does belong to things the most beautiful.

Soc. Is not, therefore, that endurance, which subsists in conjunction with prudence, beautiful and good?

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. But what of that endurance, which subsists with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and evil-working?

Lac. Yes.

Soc. Do you then say that a thing of this kind is beautiful, though it is evil-working and hurtful?

Lac. This, Socrates, (would be) not just.

Soc. You do not then acknowledge such an endurance as this to be fortitude, since it is not beautiful; but fortitude is beautiful.

Lac. You say true.

Soc. Prudent endurance therefore, according to your assertion, would be fortitude.

Lac. So it seems.

[21.] *Soc.* Let us see then in what it is prudent; or whether it is prudent in all things both great and small. Thus, for instance, if some one endures to spend his money prudently, knowing that, by thus spending it, he should obtain more, would you call him a brave man?

Lac. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. Or if some one, being a physician, while his son or any one else is attacked with an inflammation in the lungs, and requests him to give something to eat or drink, should be inflexible and persist (in denying. Is this fortitude?)

Lac. Not even this at all.

Soc. But in the case of war, where a man is enduring and willing to fight, and reasoning prudently with himself, through knowing that others will give him assistance, or that he shall fight against foes fewer and of less account than those on his own side, and, further still, that he has the advantage of the ground, would you say that this man, enduring with such like prudence and preparation, is braver than him in the opposite army, who is willing to stand his ground and endure?

Lac. The man in the opposing army seems to me, Socrates, to be the braver.

Soc. And yet the endurance of the latter is more imprudent than that of the former.

Lac. You say true.

Soc. And will you say that the man, who endures in a cavalry engagement, with a knowledge of horses, is less brave than him, who endures without science?

Lac. To me at least it appears that he is.

Soc. And he too, who with the art of a slinger, or archer, or of any other kind, is enduring?

Lac. Entirely so.

[22.] *Soc.* And will you say, that such as are willing to descend into a tank, and there to endure swimming, although not skilled in that exercise, or in any thing else of that kind, are braver than those who are skilled in them?

Lac. What else, Socrates, could one say?

Soc. Nothing, if indeed he think so.

Lac. But I do indeed think so.

Soc. And yet, Laches, such persons encounter danger and endure more imprudently than those, who do this with art.

Lac. So they appear.

Soc. Did not then unseemly and imprudent boldness and endurance formerly appear to us to be hurtful likewise?

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. But fortitude was acknowledged to be something beautiful.

Lac. It was acknowledged.

Soc. But now on the other hand we say that the unseemly thing, namely, imprudent endurance, is fortitude.

Lac. We seem so.

Soc. Do we then appear to you to speak well?

Lac. By Zeus, Socrates, not to me.

Soc. In your own language, then, Laches, you and I are not Dorically harmonized; for our works do not accord with our words. For some one, as it seems, would say in deed that we have a share of fortitude; but he would not say in word, as I think, if he should hear us now discoursing.

Lac. You speak most truly.

[23.] *Soc.* What then, does it appear to you to be beautiful for us to be in this condition?

Lac. By no means.

Soc. Are you willing then for us to yield to what we said, to this extent?

Lac. To what extent, and to what assertion?

Soc. To that which orders us to endure. If then you are willing, let us persist in the inquiry, and endure, lest fortitude itself should deride us for not bravely searching it out; if, perchance,⁶⁰ endurance itself is fortitude,

Lac. I indeed, Socrates, am prepared not to previously stand aloof, although I am unaccustomed to such like conversations. But a certain love of contention against what has been said has laid hold of me, and I am truly indignant that I am so unable to tell what I have in my mind. For I seem to myself to conceive what fortitude is; but I know not how it has just now escaped me, so that I cannot comprehend it in words and say what it is.

Soc. But ought not a good huntsman, my friend, to keep running in pursuit, and not to give up.

Lac. By all means.

Soc. Are you then willing for us to invite Nicias also to the hunting, if perchance he is at all more ready to find a path than we are?

Lac. I am willing; for how not?

[24.] *Soc.* Come then, Nicias, and if you possess any power, assist your friends, tossed, as it were, in a storm of words and in doubt; for you see how pathless are our affairs. Do you then state what you think fortitude is, and free us from this doubt, and confirm by reason what you conceive it to be.

Nic. You appear to me, Socrates, for some time past, not to have well defined fortitude; for of that, which I have heard you correctly asserting, you make no use.

Soc. What is that, Nicias?

Nic. I have often heard you asserting that each of us is good, as regards the things in which he is wise, but bad, as regards those of which he is ignorant.

Soc. By Zeus, Nicias, you speak the truth.

Nic. If, therefore, the brave is a good man, he is clearly a wise man.

Soc. Do you hear, Laches?

Lac. I do; but I do not very well understand what he means.

* Heusde after Abresch in Dilucid. Thucyd. p. 174, renders πολλάκις by "perchance." But how the word, which means literally an act frequently done, can be applied to one rarely done, I cannot understand. The notion has however been frequently adopted by Stalbaum.

Soc. But I seem to understand; and the man seems to me to call fortitude a certain wisdom.

Lac. What kind of wisdom, Socrates?

Soc. Why do you not ask this of him?

Lac. I do.

Soc. Come then, Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom fortitude would be according to your reasoning; for it is surely not that belonging to the hantboy.

Nic. By no means.

Soc. Nor yet that belonging to the harp.

Nic. Certainly not.

Soc. But what is it then, or of what is it the science?

Lac. You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates; and let him tell us what he says wisdom is.

Nic. I say then, Laches, that it is the science relating to things of dread and daring, both in war and in all other things.

Lac. How absurdly, Socrates, he talks!

Soc. Looking to what do you say this, Laches?

Lac. To what? Wisdom is surely separate from fortitude.

Soc. Nicias does not say so.

Lac. He does not, by Zeus; and therefore he is a trifler.

Soc. Let us then teach, but not revile him.

Nic. It is not so. But Laches seems to me, Socrates, to be desirous for me likewise to appear to say nothing to the purpose, because he too appeared just now to be such a kind of person.

[25.] *Lac.* Entirely so, Nicias; and I will endeavour to show this. For you do say nothing (to the purpose); since, for example, in diseases do not physicians know things of dread? Or do brave men seem to you to know this? Or do you call physicians brave men?

Nic. By no means.

Lac. Neither do you give that name, I think, to husbandmen, although they know things of dread in agriculture; and all other artificers know things of dread and daring in their own arts; and yet they are not in any respect the more brave for this.

Soc. What, Nicias, does Laches appear to you to say? He appears, however, to say⁶¹ something.

⁶¹ Instead of *μῆντοι*, I should prefer *ἐμμοιγε*, on account of the antithesis in *Nicia*.

Nic. He does indeed say something, and yet not what is true.

Soc. How so?

Nic. Because he thinks that physicians know something more about the sick than the being able⁶² to say that a thing is healthful or unhealthful. Now they do know only so much as this. But whether to be well is a thing of dread to any one rather than to be ill, think you, Laches, that physicians know this? Or do you not think that it is better for many not to recover from disease than to recover? For tell me this. Do you say that it is better for all men to live, and that it is not better for many to die?

Lac. I think that the latter is the case.

Nic. To those then, to whom it is an advantage to die, do you think the same things are dreadful, as to those to whom it is (an advantage) to live?

Lac. Not I.

[26.] *Nic.* But do you grant physicians to know this, or to any other artificer beside the man, who knows what are things of dread,⁶³ and what are not,⁶³ whom I call a brave man?

Soc. Do you understand, Laches, what he says?

Lac. I do; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave men: for who else knows to whom it is better to live than to die? And yet, Nicias, do you acknowledge yourself to be a prophet,⁶⁴ or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?

Nic. What then, do you think it belongs to a prophet to know things of dread and daring?

Lac. I do; for to whom else does it?

Nic. Much more, thou best of men, to him of whom I was speaking; since it is necessary for a prophet to know merely the signs of future events, whether there will be to any one death, or disease, or the loss of property, or victory, or defeat, either in battle or in any other contest. But which of these

⁶² Such is Taylor's translation, as if he read with Stephens, *οἷοί τε αἶψα*, and thus met the difficulty which Stalbaum seems to find here. Stephens suggested likewise *οἷόν τι*—

^{63—64} The words between the numerals Bekker first restored from four MSS. They were in the MS. of Ficinus likewise, as shown by his version, "metuenda et non metuenda."

⁶⁴ This is rather a hard hit at Nicias; who, as we know from Thucydides, Aristophanes, and Plutarch, placed no little confidence in diviners.

things it is better for any one to suffer or not to suffer, how does it belong to a prophet, more than to any other person, to judge of?

Lac. I do not understand, Socrates, what he means to say. For he does not show whom he calls brave, either a prophet, or a physician, or any other person, unless he says that this brave person is a certain god. To me then Nicias appears to be unwilling to ingenuously confess that he is saying nothing to the purpose; but he turns himself upwards and downwards, concealing his perplexity; and both you and I would have been able to turn ourselves in this way, had we wished not to appear to contradict ourselves. If, indeed, our speeches had been in a court of justice, he would have had some reason to act in this manner; but now in such a conference as this, why should you vainly deck yourself with empty words?

Soc. For no reason, as it appears to me, Laches. But let us see, lest Nicias thinks he is saying something to the purpose, and does not assert this merely for the sake of talking. Let us then inquire of him more clearly what he means; and if it shall appear that he says any thing pertinent, let us assent to him; if not, we will teach him better.

[27.] *Lac.* Do you then, Socrates, if you will, question him; for I have questioned him enough.

Soc. Nothing prevents me, for the questioning will be in common, both on my account and yours.

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. Tell me then, Nicias—for I and Laches unite in the speech—do you say that fortitude is the science of things of dread and daring?

Nic. I do.

Soc. But it does not belong to every man to know this; since neither a physician nor a prophet knows it, nor will a man be brave, unless he acquires this science. Did you not say so?

Nic. I do.

Soc. According to the proverb⁶⁵ then, in reality every sow would not know this, nor would it become valiant.

Nic. It does not seem to me it would.

⁶⁵ The proverb—"This e'en a sow would know"—was applied to those who could, although ever so stupid, still learn.

Soc. It is then evident, Nicias, that you do not believe that even the Cromyonian sow⁶⁶ was brave. I do not say this in jest; but I think it is necessary for him, who asserts this, to admit that no wild beast is brave; or to grant that any wild beast, a lion, or a leopard, or any boar, is so wise, as to be born to know⁶⁷ what few men, through the difficulty of knowing, do. But he who lays down fortitude to be, what you lay it down, must necessarily say that a lion and a stag and a bull and an ape, are similarly formed by nature with respect to fortitude.

[28.] *Lac.* By the gods, Socrates, you speak well; and do you, Nicias, truly answer us. Do you say that these wild beasts, which we all of us acknowledge to be brave, are wiser than we are? or, in opposition to all, dare you to call them not brave?

Nic. Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beast or any thing else brave, which through ignorance⁶⁸ has no fear of things of dread, but (I call it) fearless and stupid. Or, do you think, that I call children brave, who through ignorance, fear nothing? But I am of opinion, "the fearless" is not the same with "the brave." For, I think, that of fortitude and forethought very few have a share; but of confidence and boldness, and fearlessness, together with the want of forethought, very many men and women and boys and wild beasts have. Those acts therefore which you and the many call courageous, I call rash,⁶⁹ but the brave are the prudent, about whom I am now speaking.

Lac. Behold, Socrates, how well this man bedecks himself, as he thinks, with fine words; for those, whom all men ac-

⁶⁶ The sow of Cromyon, a village in the Corinthian territory, which the animal laid waste, was killed by Theseus, as we learn from Ovid. *Metam.* vii. Plutarch, in *Gryll.* ii. p. 987, has preserved an hexameter taken from a poem on that subject—*Θησεί Πράγματα πόλλ' ἔτι θηλὸν κείσχειν θηρίον οὔσα.*

⁶⁷ Instead of *φάναι*, which Stalbaum would defend by passages hardly in point, Plato wrote, as I have translated, *πεφύκιναι*, as shown by the subsequent *πεφύκιναι*.

⁶⁸ The reading of *ἀγνοίας* has been hitherto found only in the MS. used by Ficinus, as shown by his version, "propter ignorantiam." All the rest have *ἀνοίας*.

⁶⁹ To this passage has been referred the expression of Cicero *De Offic.* i. 19, "Animus paratus ad periculum—audaciæ potius nomen habent quam fortitudinis."

knowledge to be brave, he endeavours to deprive of this honour.

Nic. Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I say that you and Lamachus⁷⁰ are wise, if you are brave, and many others of the Athenians likewise.

Lac. Against this I will say nothing; although I could say something, lest you should say that I am in reality an Aixōnean.⁷¹

Soc. Say nothing, Laches; for you seem to me to have not at all⁷² perceived that Nicias here received this wisdom from our friend Damon; and Damon is very intimate with Prodicus,⁷³ who appears indeed to distinguish the best of the sophists' such kind of terms.

Lac. For it becomes a sophist, Socrates, to be ingenious on such kind of subjects, rather than the man, whom the city thinks fit to place in a post of pre-eminence.

Soc. It does, thou blessed man, indeed become him, who presides over things of the greatest consequence, to have the greatest share of wisdom. But it appears to me a thing worthy of consideration, with a view to what does Nicias thus define fortitude.

[29.] *Lac.* Consider, Socrates, this yourself.

Soc. This I intend to do, thou best of men. Do not, however, imagine that I shall dismiss you from your share in the conversation; but do you apply your mind, and ponder with me upon what has been stated.

Lac. Let it be so, if it seems to you to be necessary.

Soc. Nay, but it does seem. And do you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning. You know that⁷⁴ [at the begin-

⁷⁰ Lamachus was one of the three generals of the Athenians united in command with Nicias and Alcibiades, in the Sicilian expedition, where he was killed. Of his answering to his name, which means, "Great-Fighter," a proof is furnished in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes.

⁷¹ From hence it would seem that Laches was of the ward of Aixōnes, the people of which were noted for their evil-speaking. A similar character has been given to the locality of Billingsgate in London.

⁷² Instead of οὐδὲ μὴ, which is defended by Hermann, with whom Stalbaum agrees, Jacobs on Athenæus, *Indic.* p. 393, correctly suggested οὐ δαμῆ.

⁷³ To the attention paid by Prodicus to the different meaning of names Plato has made frequent allusion.

⁷⁴ The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation.

ning of our conference]⁷⁴ we considered fortitude as a part of virtue.⁷⁵

Nic. Entirely so.

Soc. Did not you answer also, that it was a part, there being likewise other parts, which, taken together, are called virtue?

Nic. How not?

Soc. Are you then speaking of the same⁷⁶ parts as I am? For in addition to fortitude, I call temperance, and justice, and certain other things of such kind, (parts of virtue). Do not you too?

Nic. Entirely so.

Soc. Hold,⁷⁷ then. For in these we agree. But let us consider about things of dread and daring, that you may not think some of them one thing, and we another. What then we consider such, we will state; and do you, if you do not agree with us, instruct us. We consider then those to be things of dread, which occasion fear; but those to be things of daring, which do not occasion fear. Now neither evils past, nor present, occasion fear; but those which are expected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does it not appear so to you, Laches, likewise?

Lac. Very much so, Socrates.

Soc. You hear then, Nicias, our assertions, that future evils are things of dread; but future things, either not evil or good, are things of daring. On these points say you in this way or in another?

Nic. In this.

Soc. But do you call the science of these things fortitude?

Nic. I do.

[30.] *Soc.* Let us then still further consider, whether, on the third point, you think with us.

Nic. What is that?

Soc. I will tell you. For it appears to me and to Laches

⁷⁴ Compare The Statesman, § 44, p. 306, B., ἀνδρίαν—μέρος ἐν ἀρετῇ εἶναι.

⁷⁵ Ficinus has "eadem, quas ego, partes." He therefore found in his MS. *raṭrà*, not *raūra*.

⁷⁷ Hermann on Viger. n. 252, renders Ἐγὼ, "keep your mind upon what we have said." Heindorf on Gorg. § 35, and Protag. § 96, "Stop here." I have translated, "Hold," as in Shakspeare: "Lay on, Macduff; And damned be he, who first cries, 'Hold, enough.'"

here, that of whatever things there is a science, there is not one science of a thing past, ⁷⁸(so as) to know ⁷⁸how it has been, another of things present, (to know) how they are, and another (to know) how that, which has not yet been, may be and will be in the most beautiful manner; but the science is the same. For instance, with respect to healthiness at all times, there is no other than medical science, which, being one, sees what is, and has been, and will be healthy, and how it will be so. And with respect to things constantly ⁷⁹growing out of the earth, agriculture is in a similar state. So too, in warlike concerns, you yourselves would testify that the science of a general thinks beforehand in the most beautiful manner of other things and of what is about to be; nor does it think it ought to be subservient to the prophet's art, but to rule over it, as knowing better what does and will take place in war. And the law enjoins this; not that the prophet shall rule over the general, but the general over the prophet. Shall we say so, Laches?

Lac. We will say so.

Soc. What then, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same science has a knowledge of the same things, future, and present, and past?

Nic. I do; for so it appears to me, Socrates.

[31.] *Soc.* Is not then fortitude, as thou, the best of men, sayest, the science of things of dread and daring?

Nic. It is.

Soc. But things of dread and daring have been confessed to relate, the latter to future good, the former to future evil.

Nic. Entirely so.

Soc. But the same science is relating to the same things, and to ⁸⁰[those about to be], ⁸⁰and existing in every way.

⁷⁸⁻⁷⁹ The Greek is *εἰδέναι* simply, without any thing to govern it; and hence probably it was omitted by Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὅστις εἰδέναι*: for *ὅστις* might easily have dropt out after *γεγονότος*.

⁷⁹ Instead of *αὐ*, the balance of the sentence requires *αἰ*, to answer to the preceding *εἰς πάντας τοὺς χρόνους*.

⁸⁰⁻⁸¹ The words within brackets are evidently a partial interpolation; but which was more full in the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version, "earundem rerum, præteritarum præsentiumque et futurarum," who however omits *καὶ πάντως ἔχόντων*. On the other hand, Stalbaum was the first to reject *καὶ πάντως ἔχόντων*, in the next speech of Socrates.

Nic. It is so.

Soc. Fortitude, then, is not the science of things of dread and daring alone; for it not only has a knowledge of future good and evil, but also of things present and past, [and existing in every way] like the other sciences.

Nic. So it seems.

Soc. You have therefore, Nicias, given us in your answer some third part nearly of fortitude. And yet we asked you what the whole of fortitude is. And now, as it seems, according to your (former)⁸¹ assertion, fortitude is not only the science of things of dread and daring, but, as your present reasoning on the other hand (shows), fortitude would be that which nearly relates to all things good and evil, and⁸² existing in every way.⁸³ ⁸³ To change again thus,⁸³ or how say you, Nicias?

Nic. To me, Socrates, it seems good.

Soc. Does then such a person as this appear to you, blessed man, to be deficient at all in virtue, if he knows every good, and how in every point they are, and will be, and have been, and every evil in the same manner? And do you think that he is wanting in temperance, or justice, or holiness, to whom alone it belongs in matters relating to gods and men to practise caution touching the things of dread and not, and to obtain for himself what is good by knowing how to associate in a proper manner (with others)?

Nic. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

[32.] *Soc.* That then which is now, Nicias, adduced by you, would not be a part of virtue, but virtue in general.

Nic. So it seems.

Soc. And yet we said that fortitude is one of the parts of virtue.

⁸¹ The antithesis in *νῦν αὖ* just afterwards requires us to read here *κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον ὁδὸν λόγον*, not merely *τὸν ὁδόν*—

⁸²⁻⁸³ Ficinus has more fully, "omniumque simpliciter quomodolibet sese habentium."

⁸³⁻⁸³ This I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is, "Sicne modo an aliter judicas, Nicias." Stalbaum however, after Engelhardt, says that in the Greek, *ὁὔτως αὖ μεταρτίζεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις*, the infinitive depends upon *λέγεις*, i. e. "Say you that you change your mind thus, or how?" But he forgot that to a bipartite question there could not be a single answer.

Nic. We said so.

Soc. But that which is now said, does not appear to be so.

Nic. It seems not.

Soc. We have not therefore, Nicias, discovered what fortitude is.

Nic. We do not appear (to have done so).

Lac. And yet I thought, friend Nicias, that you would have discovered it, since you had a contempt for myself, when I answered Socrates; and I had very great hope that you would discover it by the wisdom, which has come from Damon.

Nic. It is an excellent thing indeed, Laches, for you to think it a matter of no moment, that just now you appeared to know nothing about fortitude, and that you are looking to this, whether I shall appear to be another such (ignorant person); and it will be, as it seems, of no consequence for you together with myself to know nothing of things, which it is fitting for a man to have a knowledge of, who thinks himself something. You therefore appear to me to act in reality after the general manner of men, in looking⁸⁴ not to yourself, but to others. I think, however, on the points which he have spoken about, there has been said something in reason; and, if any thing has not been stated sufficiently, it shall be afterwards set to rights, with the assistance both of Damon, whom you somehow fancy you are ridiculing—and this too, although you have never seen him—and of others also; and, when I shall have fortified these assertions, I will instruct you too without grudging; for you appear to me to be in very great need of instruction.

Lac. You are, Nicias, wise indeed; but, however, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to bid farewell to you and me concerning the education of youth; but not to dismiss this Socrates, as I said from the first: for I would do the very same thing, if my children were of a proper age.

Nic. I too agree with you in this, to seek no other person, if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care; since most gladly would I intrust Niceratus⁸⁵ to him, if he is willing; but when I put him in mind at all on this subject,

⁸⁴ I have followed Schleiermacher, who reads βλέπων for βλέπειν: which Stalbaum would defend by quoting Sympos. p. 180, D. But there it is easy to alter φράσαι into φράσας.

⁸⁵ This Niceratus is said to have been subsequently killed by the thirty tyrants. Demosthenes alludes to another in Midian, p. 567, R.

He recommends others to me, and is unwilling to (do aught) himself. But see, Lysimachus, whether Socrates will hearken more to you.

[33.] *Lys.* This at least, Nicias, is just; since I should be willing to do many things for him, which I would not be very willing to do for many others. How say you then, Socrates? Will you hearken to me and make an effort with us for these lads to become the very best.

Soc. It would certainly be a dreadful thing, Lysimachus, not to be willing ⁸⁶ to make an effort for any to become the best. ⁸⁶ If, therefore, in the conversations just now held, I have appeared to know something, but these not to know, it would be just to invite me especially to this employment; but now (not); for we are all similarly in a doubt. Why then should any one select any of us? To me indeed it seems that (he should select) none. And since this is the case, consider whether I appear to advise you rightly. Now, men, I say it is requisite—for there will be a carrying out into public of our discourse—that we should all of us in common inquire, in the first place, after the best master for ourselves—for we need one—and in the next place for these lads, sparing neither money nor any thing else; but to let ourselves be in the condition we now are, I do not advise. And if any one ridicules us, because at this time of life we think proper to frequent a school, it seems to me that it will be meet to bring forward Homer in our defence, who says, (in *Od.* xvii. 34,)

“ Shame ill is present to a man in need.”

We therefore, bidding a person go hang, if he says a word against us, let us take care in common of ourselves and the lads.

Lys. To me indeed, Socrates, what you say is very agreeable; and by how much the older I am, by so much the more willing am I to learn together with the youths. Do you then act in this way. Come to-morrow morning early to my house, and do not do otherwise, in order that we may consult about these very things. For the present let us break up the meeting.

Soc. This, Lysimachus, I will do; and, god willing, I will come to you to-morrow morning.

⁸⁶—⁸⁶ The words within numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

INTRODUCTION TO THE MENEXENUS.

ALTHOUGH it is generally a matter of little moment, how the dialogues of Plato follow each other, yet it is not without a purpose that I have placed the Menexenus after the Laches. For while in the one there is a discussion on Fortitude considered abstractedly, in the other are to be found convincing proofs of the manner in which the Athenians conducted themselves, when their Fortitude was put to the severest test, during their wars abroad, and dissensions at home; and when, like some states of modern times, they met, after a series of victories, with signal reverses, and found their very capital in the hands of their enemies, and a new form of government imposed upon them by the victors.

The object of the dialogue, or rather of the oration contained in it, is to celebrate the country, and the deeds of those who were to be honoured by a public funeral, after they had fallen in the fight that took place near Nemea, according to Xenophon in *H. Gr.* iv. 2, 8, and to which Demosthenes alludes in *Leptin.* § 41, as the great battle near Corinth.

But as that event occurred after the death of Socrates, Plato has, it would seem with the view of showing that the whole is a fiction, put the speech into the mouth of his master, and feigned, as in the case of Diotima in the *Banquet*, that the philosopher had been the pupil of Aspasia, and merely repeated what he had learnt as a lesson from her.

With regard to the details of a public funeral at Athens, it will be sufficient to refer to Thucydides ii. 34., who has there attributed to Pericles what he had written, no doubt, himself, just as Plato has done in the case of Socrates.

According to Dionysius, the Athenians commenced the practice

of pronouncing funeral orations at the close of the Persian invasion under Xerxes: and if any reliance is to be placed on Philostratus, Gorgias wrote the one spoken over those who had fallen at Salamis. And it was perhaps with the view of showing himself, if not superior, at least equal, to that celebrated Sophist, that Plato was induced to compose his own speech; from the perusal of which Cicero was led to declare, that had the philosopher chosen to become a pleader, his style would have been at once fluent and grave.

Despite however the testimony of the Roman orator, who has on various occasions alluded to this speech, and translated even a portion of it, Schleiermacher, with whom Ast and Goettling on Aristotle's *Polit.* ii. 6, p. 328, agree, has ventured to call in question its genuineness by arguments, to which Loers has in his edition given a full and, as I conceive, a satisfactory reply. But as the discussion is too long, even if it were requisite, for insertion here, it will be sufficient to state, that, as the dialogue is twice referred to by Aristotle, if it be not Plato's, it must be the production of some unknown writer, who, living between the time of Plato and Aristotle, was clever enough to imitate so completely the style of a man generally considered inimitable, as to deceive not only his most ardent admirer Cicero, but his perpetual opponent Aristotle.

With respect to one of the grounds on which the accusation of spuriousness rests, that Plato has made some statements at variance with the truth of history, Stalbaum acutely observes that such a step was doubtless taken designedly; for Plato would otherwise have failed to preserve the correctness of his ridicule of the orators; who, with the view of tickling the ears of their audience, were guilty of similar aberrations from the strict line of truth, as seems to have been proved by Cæcilius in his lost work, mentioned by Suidas, *Περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἱστορίαν ἢ κατὰ ἱστορίαν εἰρημίων τοῖς ῥήτορας*—"On the statements made by the orators according to history, or contrary to it."

The first translation of the dialogue into English was by Gilbert West, in 1749, which Taylor says he has followed, except where it was not sufficiently close. The second was by myself anonymously, printed at Cambridge in 1835, to which I added a few notes on the Greek text. A portion of it was translated likewise by Mitchell in the *Quarterly Review*, No. 54, p. 399; and the commencement of it, up to the speech itself, by Shelley, is given in his posthumous *Essays and Letters*, Ed. Lond. 1845.

MENEXENUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND MENEXENUS.

SOCRATES.

[1.] FROM the Forum,¹ or from whence,² Menexenus?³

Men. From the Forum, Socrates, and from the Council-Hall.⁴

Soc. What business had you especially at the Council-Hall? Or is it indeed evident that you deem yourself to have finished your course of learning and philosophy,⁵ and as being now all-sufficient,⁶ you think of turning yourself to matters of greater moment, and to become, O wonderful man, a ruler at your age over us your elders,⁷ so that your family may never fail in supplying us⁸ with some person as a guardian?⁹

¹ Although "Forum" is a Latin rather than an English word, yet it has become almost naturalized, as answering the best to the Greek *ἀγορά*.

² This ellipse of *ἐλ*, is similar to that of "es," in Horace, "Unde et quo, Catius?"

³ Of this Menexenus nothing more is known than that he was a friend of the Ctesippus mentioned in the Euthydemus, and very captious in argument, and that both of them visited Socrates when in prison. See *Lysis*, p. 206, D., 211, B., and *Phædo*, p. 59, B.

⁴ The Council-Hall was near the Forum, as stated by Pseudo-Plutarch in ii. p. 842.

⁵ By *παίδευσις καὶ φιλοσοφία* were meant all that a youth or man had learnt, or ought to know.

⁶ A similar sarcasm is in Clitophon, p. 407, B., directed against those, who, having gone through the education of a youth, fancy themselves to be quite sufficient for the duties of a life of virtue.

⁷ Melitus is similarly sneered at in Euthyphr. p. 3, A. § 1.

⁸ According to Lucretius in i. 43, "Memmi clara propago," seems "nunquam communi deesse saluti."

⁹ The sneer in the word *ἐπιμελητής* will be best understood by a passage

Men. If you, Socrates, will permit it, and advise me how to rule, I should be ready to do so; but if otherwise, not. However I went just now to the Council-Hall, on hearing that the Council were about to select¹⁰ the party who is to speak (an oration) over the dead. For you know they are about to ordain a public funeral.

Soc. (I know it) very well. And whom have they selected?

Men. Not one. But they have put it off till to-morrow. I think, however, Archinus¹¹ or Dion will be selected.

[2.] *Soc.* In good truth, Menexenus, it appears on many accounts to be very nearly a beautiful thing to fall in battle.¹² For if a person dies so, although poor, he meets with a fine and gorgeous burial, and with praise, if he be a person of no mark,¹³ from men at once clever, and not extolling at random; but who, having had their speeches prepared for a long time, eulogise so very beautifully that, by saying what is and is not to the purpose upon each point, and making a beautiful tissue of words, they bewitch our very souls, pouring forth in every way encomiums upon the state, and upon those who have died during the war, and upon all¹⁴ [our ancestors],¹⁴ who have lived before us, and¹⁵ [bestowing praise]¹⁵ upon us ourselves, who are still living, so that I feel myself, Menexenus, vastly ennobled in being praised by them, and I stand constantly on tip-toe,¹⁶ and am charmed; fancying that I have be-

in Aristophanes *Plut.* 908, Πῶς οὖν δειλὴς ἢ πόθεν, μηδὲν ποιῶν; Τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἐμ' ἐπιμηλητῆς πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἰδίων πάντων. Σὺ; τί παθὼν; Βούλομαι.

¹⁰ According to Demosthenes, *Περὶ Στεφάν.* p. 321, the people at large, and not the Council alone, selected the speaker.

¹¹ On this Archinus see Valesius on Harpocration, p. 253. Photius, on *Bibliothec. cod.* 240, says that Isocrates introduced into his Panegyric much from a funeral oration of Archinus; while Dionysius *Halic.* p. 1027, ed. R., asserts that Plato imitated those two orators.

¹² So Horace, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori."

¹³ Compare Cicero *Pro Quinctio*, § 15, "Mors honesta turpem vitam exornat:" and Shakspeare, *Henry V.*, "For he, who sheds this day his blood with us, Shall be my brother, be he ne'er so vile."

^{14—15} The words within brackets, τοὺς προγόνους, are evidently an interpolation of τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν. In like manner προγόνων has been inserted after τῶν ἀνωθεν ἐνι in § 5.

^{15—16} The word ἐκπαινούντες is perfectly unnecessary after the preceding ἐγκωμάζοντες.

¹⁶ I have adopted αἰσιχόμενος for ἀπρώμενος, the splendid restora-

come on the instant ¹⁷taller, and nobler, and handsomer (than before); ¹⁷ and as is wont, ever some strangers accompany me, and are fellow-hearers; to whom I appear to be immediately a greater object of respect. For they too seem to be affected in the same way as I am, both towards myself and the rest of the state, being persuaded by the speaker that it is more worthy of wonder than before. And this feeling of self-importance remains with me for more than three days; so greatly does the speech and even the tone of the orator ring in and sink into my ears, that scarcely on the fourth or fifth day do I recollect myself, and perceive where upon earth I am; and for awhile fancy myself only not living in the isles of the blessed.¹⁸ So clever are our orators!

[3.] *Men.* You are always, Socrates, making fun with the orators. For the present however I think the person selected will have no easy task, for the choice is made altogether on a sudden, so that the orator will be compelled to speak perhaps off-hand.

Soc. How so, my good (friend)? The speeches of each of these are ready prepared. Besides it is not difficult to speak

tion of Valckenaer on Callimach. p. 244, who refers to § 20, where αλω-
πειραι is used in a sense not very dissimilar. With regard to the idea,
compare Eurip. Ion, 1180, ἐν δ' ἄκροισι βᾶς ποσίν. El. 845, ὄνυχας ἐπ'
ἄκρους στάς. Soph. Aj. 1239, Ὑψήλ' ἐκόμπεις κάπ' ἄκρων ὠδοιπόρους:
where Musgrave quotes Libanius, i. p. 326, ἐπ' ἄκρων πορεύεσθαι δακ-
τύλων: and Aristoph. Ἀχ. 581, κάπειδ' τοῦτό τις εἶποι, Εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς
στεφάνους ἐπ' ἄκρων τῶν πυγιδίων ἐκάθησθε: where the Scholiast ob-
serves that οἱ ἐπαίνων εἰς ἑαυτοὺς γινόμενων ἀκούοντες εἰώθασιν τὴν πυγὴν,
τῆς καθίδρας ἐξαίρειν. Compare too Lucillius, Sat. viii. "Gallinaceu
quum victor se gallus in hostem Sustulit in digitos, primoresque erigit
ungues:" and Virgil, "Constitit in digitos arrectus." But the most
apposite passages are in Shakspeare, Henry V., "He that outlives this
day, and comes safe home, Shall stand on tip-toe, when this day is
named." So too in Troilus and Cressida, "'Tis he, I ken the manner of
his gait; He rises on the toe; that spirit of his In aspiration lifts him
from the earth." Stalbaum defends ἀπροώμνος by translating ἴστηκα,
"I stand astonished." But such is the meaning of ἐξίστηκα alone,
which is found here in a solitary MS.

¹⁷—¹⁷ This is well put into the mouth of Socrates, who was of small
stature, ignoble birth, and ugly face.

¹⁸ This idea Plato got from Aristophanes in Σφηκ. 640, ὥστ' ἔγωγ'
ἡξάνομην ἀκούων, κἀν μακάρων δικάζειν αὐτὸς ἰδοῦσα νήσοις, ἡδόμενος
ἄλγοντι: while Plato himself was probably in the mind of Milton, who
says in Comus—"Who, as they sang, would take the prison'd soul, And
lap it in Elysium."

off-hand upon such topics. But if it were requisite to speak well of the Athenians amongst Peloponnesians, or of Peloponnesians amongst Athenians, there would be need of a good speaker to persuade (others) and gain (for himself) renown. But when a man enters upon such a contest before those whom he is praising, it seems not a great thing to speak well.

Men. Do you think it is not, Socrates?

Soc. It is not, by Zeus.

Men. Do you think that you would be able to speak yourself, if it were requisite, and the Council were to select you?

Soc. It would, Menexenus, be nothing wonderful, if even I were able to speak, whose teacher happens to be a woman by no means contemptible in oratory; but who has made many other persons good speakers, and, one superior to (all)¹⁹ the Greeks, Pericles,²⁰ the son of Xanthippus.

Men. Who is she? Or (rather), it is plain that you mean Aspasia.²¹

Soc. I do mean her; and Connus too,²² the son of Metrobius. For these two are my masters, he in music, and she in oratory. Now that a man thus educated should be a skilful speaker is nothing wonderful; since even he, who has been worse educated than myself, ²³[having learnt]²³ music from Lamprus,²⁴ and oratory from Antipho²⁵ of Rhamnous,²⁶ would be able to gain a reputation by praising Athenians, at least in the presence of Athenians.

[4.] *Men.* And what would you have to say, were it requisite to speak?

Soc. Myself perhaps nothing from myself. But only yes-

¹⁹ Ficinus alone has "Græcorum omnium."

²⁰ Respecting the oratorical powers of Pericles, see the commentators on Phædrus, p. 269, E., Aristoph. Ach. 476, Eupolis *Δήμους* Fr. vii., and Quintilian x. 1, 82.

²¹ For an account of this remarkable woman see the commentators on Xenophon, M. S. ii. 6, Aristoph. Ach. 472, Maxim. Tyr. xxiv. and xxviii., and Harpocration in *Ἀσπασία*.

²² Connus is again mentioned in Euthyd. p. 272, C., as the music-master of Socrates.

²³ The word *παίδευσις* is evidently unnecessary after *ἐκπαίδευσθαι*.

²⁴ Of Lamprus little is known except what is to be gathered from C. Nepos in Epaminond. § 2, Plutarch ii. p. 1142, and Athenæus ii. p. 44.

²⁵ Respecting this orator, see Ruhnken's "Dissertat. de Antiphonte." According to Thucydides viii. 68, "he was the best to think upon a question, and, what he had thought upon, to express."

²⁶ This was one of the wards of Athens.

terday I heard Aspasia going through a funeral oration on these very persons. For she had heard what you tell me, that the Athenians were going to choose the person to speak. And then she went through partly on the instant what it would be proper to say, and partly what she had formerly thought of, when it seems she was composing the funeral oration that Pericles pronounced,²⁷ and was glueing together some scraps from that.

Men. Could you remember what she said?

Soc. Unless I do her wrong. At least I learnt it from her, and I almost received some cuffs, because I was forgetting it.

Men. Why then do you not repeat it?

Soc. (I fear) my mistress may be offended, if I make her discourse public.²⁸

Men. (Fear) not, Socrates, at all; but tell it, and you will gratify me greatly, whether you choose to call it the speech of Aspasia, or of any one else; only speak it.

Soc. But you will perhaps laugh at me, if I, an elderly man, appear to be still acting the boy.

Men. Not at all, Socrates: but do speak it by all means.

[5.] *Soc.* Since then I must gratify you,²⁹ so as even, should you order me, to undress myself and dance,³⁰ I will gratify you; since we are alone.³¹ Listen then; for she spoke, commencing, as I think, with the mention of the dead themselves in this manner.

As regards our acts, these here have received all the honours due to them; and after receiving them, are now proceeding on their fated road, having been sent onward by the state in

²⁷ To this passage is to be traced the notion of Synesius, that the funeral oration put into the mouth of Pericles by Thucydides, ii. 35, was the production of Aspasia.

²⁸ On this use of ἐκρίπειν, see Fischer on Xenophon K. II., vi. 1, 5, τοῦτο ἐρόλησσε ἐξενεγκεῖν. The Latin word is "efferre." Cicero de Orator. § 24, "Petamque a vobis ne has meas ineptias efferatis." There is an allusion here to the secrets of the Mysteries. See Lucian in Νεκρομαχ. § 2.

²⁹ This is said because Socrates feigned himself to be unable to resist the charms of beauty in young persons. Compare Meno, § 9.

³⁰ On the dancing of Socrates see Lucian Περὶ Ὀρχησ. § 25, and Xenophon, M. S., quoted by Athenæus i. p. 21.

³¹ This formula is found in Aristoph. Thesm. 472, and in Plato, Parmen. p. 137, A.

common, and individually by their families and friends. But as regards our words, the honour still left undone the law enjoins us to pay to the men; and it is meet to do so. For of deeds performed nobly the remembrance by a well-spoken speech is an honour paid to those, who have acted, from those who hear. There is need then of such a discourse, as shall praise sufficiently the dead, and kindly advise the living, by exhorting the descendants and brethren of the dead to imitate their valour, and by comforting their fathers and their mothers, and whoever of their ancestors more remote are still alive. How then shall such an oration present itself? Or from whence shall we rightly begin to praise those brave men, who, when living, delighted their friends with their valour, and bartered their death for the safety of those who survive.

To me it seems that we must praise them on the ground of their nature, as they were by nature good. Now they were good by being sprung from the good.³² Let us then celebrate, in the first place, their noble birth; in the second, their nurture and education; and afterwards let us show forth their conduct, in practice, how they proved it to be honourable and worthy of those³³ (advantages). [6.] In the first place, the commencement of their nobility was in the birth of their ancestors, not being in-comers, nor exhibiting their descendants as foreign settlers in the land, ³⁴[themselves coming from elsewhere,]³⁴ but sprung from the earth,³⁵ and dwelling and living in their own country really; (and) nursed, not like other nations, by a step-mother,³⁶ but a parent, the very land which they inhabited, and in which they now lie dead; in the

³² So Horace, "Fortes creantur fortibus."

³³ Although *τούτων* might perhaps refer to "birth, nurture, and education," one would prefer *ταυτῶν*, as in Thucyd. vi. 40, *πόλις ἥδε—ἀμυνεῖται ἀξίως αὐτῆς*.

³⁴⁻³⁵ To the words *ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων* Dionysius was the first to object. They are perfectly useless after *ἐπηλυς*.

³⁶ On the boast of the Athenians, who called themselves *Ἀυτόχθονες*, and wore, as the symbol of their birth, a grasshopper in their hair, see Herodot. vii. 161, Thucyd. i. 2, and other subsequent writers. The story is disbelieved by Livy, in i. 8, "natam e terra sibi prolem ementiebantur;" and Macrobi. Somn. Sup. i. 2; and is ridiculed by Lucian in Philopseus.

³⁶ A similar distinction between a mother and step-mother, as applied to a country, is found in Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 760, ed. R., Velleius Pat. ii. 5, and Petronius, quoted by Gottleber.

places³⁷ of the mother which begat and nursed them, and received them (again) beneath her.³⁸ Most just then is it to celebrate first the mother herself; for thus at the same time it results that the noble birth of these here is made their adornment.

[7.] And worthy is this land to be praised by all men, and not by ourselves alone, on many other grounds, but on this the first and greatest, that she has the good fortune to be loved by the gods. And to this my assertion the quarrel of the gods,³⁹ who contended for her, and their decision, bear testimony. Whom then the gods have praised, how is it not just for her to be praised by all mankind? Her second praise would be justly this, that at the very time when the whole earth sent up and produced animals of all kinds, both wild beasts and cattle, this land of ours was seen to be unprolific of, and free from, savage beasts; and of all animals selected and produced man, who surpasses all the others in intellect, and alone acknowledges Justice and the Gods.⁴⁰ Now of this assertion there is a great proof in that this land has produced the ancestors of these men, and ours also. Now every

³⁷ In lieu of τόποις, Ficinus has "visceribus;" which led West to translate "bosom," and myself to read κόλποις: which is put beyond all doubt by the Epigram in Demosth. *Περὶ Στεφάν.* § 289, *Γαῖα δὲ πατρὶς ἔχ' ἐν κόλποις τῶν πλείστα καμόντων Σώματα.* Erycius Epigr. 12, *Χθὼν μὲ καὶ ἡ κόλποις ὕστατα δεξαμένη.* Epigr. Inc. 544, *Γαῖα μὲν ἐν κόλποις κρύπτει τόδε σῶμα Πλάτωνος.* Chrysostom. Homil. vi. p. 80, E., *ἡ κοινὴ πάντων ἡμῶν μήτηρ τοὺς κόλπους ἀπλώσασα.* Meleager Epigr., *Γᾶ—τὰν πανόδυτον Ἑρέμα σοῖς κόλποις, μάτερ, ἐναγκαλίσαι.* So too in the Latin Epitaph on Publ. Scipio, "Quare libens te in gremium recepit Terra;" and Pliny, H. N. ii. 63, "Terræ propter eximia merita cognomen inditum maternæ venerationis—Quæ nos nascentes excipit; natos alit; editos (read, 'adultos') sustinet; novissime complexa gremio—ut mater operiens."

³⁸ This is the correct explanation of ὑποδεξαμένης, as seen by Schleiermacher; who might have quoted Æsch. Cho. 127, *Καὶ γαῖαν αὐτὴν, ἥ τὰ πάντα τίκτεται, θρέψασά τ' αὐτὴς τῶνδε κύμα λαμβάνει:* and Eurip. Suppl. 536, *Καὶ πάντα γῆν θρέψασαν αὐτ' αὐτὴ δεῖ λαβεῖν:* from whence it is plain that αὐτὴ has dropt out between καὶ and ὑποδεξαμένην. Loers, however, and Stalbaum, explain ὑποδέχεσθαι by "suscipere," "to take up." But such a meaning is applicable only to a person taking up the children deserted by their parents.

³⁹ On this contest between Athéné and Poseidon, see Ovid. Metam. vi. 70.

⁴⁰ So Cicero Legg. ii. 8, "Nullum est animal præter hominem, quod habeat notitiam dei."

thing that brings forth, possesses food fitted for that which it may bring forth; by which fact is clearly shown what woman is really the mother, and who is not, but merely a supposititious one, should she not possess the fountain⁴¹ of nourishment for the child. This very sufficient proof does our land and mother afford of her having produced men; for at that time she alone and first brought forth the corn of wheat and barley,⁴² as the food of man, and by which the human race is nourished in the best and easiest⁴³ manner, as having in reality produced that very animal. And such proofs it is fitting to receive rather in favour of the earth than of the woman. For the earth did not in conceiving and producing imitate woman, but woman imitated the earth; neither did this land enviously withhold these her fruits, but distributed them to others. In the next place, she sent up for her offspring the olive, an assistance in toil;⁴⁴ and after she had nourished and reared them up to manhood, she introduced to them gods⁴⁵ for their rulers and teachers, whose names it is fitting upon such an occasion⁴⁶ to omit. For we know who have given the materials for life, by teaching us first⁴⁷ the arts requisite for our daily subsistence, and instructed us in the acquirement and the use of arms for the protection of our country.

[8.] Thus born, and educated, lived the ancestors of these persons, after having framed a polity, which it is well to bring in a few words to your recollection. For a polity is the nurse of men; a good one of good men, and the contrary of bad. It is necessary then to show, that our ancestors were brought up under a good polity, through which both they became good, and those also who are now; amongst whom

⁴¹ This expression Plato adopted perhaps from *πηγάς—μόσχων* in Eurip. *Iph. T.* 162.

⁴² This story is repeated by Lucretius, vi. 1.

⁴³ To avoid perhaps an hendyadis, Ficinus has "commodissime." Plato wrote, I suspect, *κάλλιστα καὶ ῥᾶστα*, not *καὶ ἀριστα*—

⁴⁴ So in Protag. p. 334, B., *τὸ ἐλαιον—σώματι ἀρωγόν*.

⁴⁵ The gods alluded to are Athéné, Ares, and Hephæstos, as shown by Legg. p. 920, D.

⁴⁶ During a funeral; as is shown by Demosthenes in Timocrat, *τῆς δὲ (Σεμίλης) υἱὸν ὄντα οὐ πρόπον ἵσθιν ἐπὶ τοῦδε τοῦ τάφου ὀνομάζειν*.

⁴⁷ The word *πρώτους*, which is an evident corruption, is omitted by Ficinus.

the dead here happen to be a part. The same polity was then, as it now is, an aristocracy; under which we still live as citizens, and for the most part (have done so) from that time to this. One person calls it a democracy, another by another name, such as he pleases. But it is in truth ⁴⁸ a government by the best, combined with a good opinion of the people.⁴⁹ For kings have ever existed with us, at one time hereditary, at another elected,⁵⁰ but the people possessing for the most part the power of the state, has delegated the offices and government to those, who were successively deemed to be the best; and no man has ever been excluded from the want of influence or wealth,⁵⁰ or his ignorance of his parentage,⁵¹ nor held in honour for the contrary qualities, as is done in other cities; but there was only one limitation; that he, who was deemed to be wise and good, should possess the power and office. Now the cause of this polity is the equality of birth. For other states are made up of men of every country, and of unequal conditions; so that their polities, as well tyrannies as oligarchies, are of unequal character. They therefore live, some considering each other as slaves, and some as masters. But we and ours, born all brethren, from one mother, consider ourselves neither the slaves nor the lords of each other; but that the equality of our births, according to nature, compel us to seek an equality of government, according to law, and to yield to each other upon no other ground, except the reputation of valour and of mind. [9.] Hence it is that the fathers of these men, and ours also, and themselves too, being thus nurtured in all freedom, and nobly born, have exhibited before all men many and glorious deeds, both in private and public, deeming it their duty to fight for freedom and in behalf of Greeks even against Greeks, and against

⁴⁸⁻⁴⁹ Such seems to be the meaning of the words μετ' εὐδοξίας πλή-
θος, ἀριστοκρατία. Compare Thucyd. ii. 65, ἐγίνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δη-
μοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου (or rather ἀρίστου) ἀνδρός ἀρχή;
and Aristotle Polit. iii. 3, εἰ τις ἐστίν, ἣν καλοῦμεν ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἐν ᾗ
κατ'ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν.

⁵⁰ This alludes to the second Archon, called Βασιλεὺς, "king."

⁵¹ The same fact is mentioned by Thucyd. ii. 37. According to Plu-
tarch, Aristides was the person, who got a law passed to enable the
Archons to be selected from the poorer people, as well as the richer.

⁵² To such ignorance Juvenal alludes—"Vos humiles, inquis, vulgi pars
ultima nostri, Quorum nemo queat patriam monstrare parentis."

barbarians in defence of Greeks combined. But how when Eumolpus and the Amazons⁵² brought an army against the country, and enemies even still before them, they defended themselves, and how they defended the Argives against the Cadmeans,⁵³ and the Heracleidæ against the Argives,⁵⁴ the time is too short to relate worthily; and poets too have already hymned sufficiently their valour in verse, and pointed it out to all; and should we now attempt to adorn the same subject in a prose discourse, we should perhaps appear to be only second to them. For such reasons then it seems right to pass over these matters, especially since they have received their due. But such acts, as no poet has yet thrown round⁵⁵ them a renown suited to their worth, and which are still in remembrance, all these it seems I ought by praising to call to mind, and by introducing them to others make them a subject for songs and other kind of poetry in a manner becoming the actors. Now of those to which I am alluding, the chief are these. When the Persians were taking the lead in Asia and attempting to enslave Europe, the children of this soil and our forefathers arrested their course; whom it is both just and necessary to remember first and to praise their valour. He however who would praise it properly, ought to have been born in word,⁵⁶ and lived an eye-witness at that very period,

⁵² Valckenaer on Eurip. Phœn. 541, observes that Plato has been here guilty of an anachronism. For the Amazons invaded Attica not in the time of Eumolpus, but of Theseus, by whom they were conquered; whereas it was against Erechtheus that Eumolpus was engaged in war, as stated by Thucydides, ii. 15. Isocrates has taken especial care to avoid the anachronism in Panegyr. § 19, Ἠλθον εἰς τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν Θράκες μὲν μετ' Εὐμόλπου τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος, Σκύθαι δὲ μετ' Ἀμαζόνων, τῶν Ἀρεως θυγατέρων, οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον: who has however in § 18 alluded to the story of the Amazons, which Strabo, in xi. p. 770, considers to be merely a fable.

⁵³ The story alluded to is told briefly by Herodotus, ix. 27, and by Isocrates, in Panegyr. § 15, and rather differently in Panathen. p. 524. For the length of time doubtless made it difficult to arrive at the truth.

⁵⁴ On this story see the Heracleidæ of Euripides.

⁵⁵ The Greek is λαβών: which I altered many years ago into βαλὼν.—For the poet does not “receive,” but “confer” glory, as shown by “Dignum laude virum Musa vetat mori.” And though one would expect περιβαλὼν, as in Isocrat. Archidam. § 44, ἀσχύνας ἡμᾶς περιβαλεῖν, yet the preposition is omitted in λύπην—βαλεῖς in Soph. Phil. 67, and βαλεῖς χαρὰν in Eurip. Ion, 751.

⁵⁶ In lieu of λόγῳ, omitted by Ficinus, Stephens suggested λέγω, with which may be compared φημι in § 10, and λέγω in § 12.

when the whole of Asia was subject to its then third monarch. The first of these was Cyrus ; who after effecting the freedom of the Persians, his countrymen, did through his high spirit reduce the Medes his (former) masters to slavery, and became the ruler of the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt. His son (Cambyses) subdued Egypt, and as much of Libya as it was possible to march against. The third, Darius, made Scythia the boundary of his empire by land, and by his fleet commanded the sea and islands, so that no one presumed to be his opponent. The very thoughts of all men were enslaved ; so many, and great, and warlike nations did the Persian power reduce to subjection.

[10.] Now Darius having accused us and the Eretrians of plotting against Sardis,⁵⁷ made it a pretence for sending an army of five hundred thousand men⁵⁸ ⁵⁹ in ships and transports, and a fleet⁵⁹ of three hundred sail, and ordered Datis, their commander, to return and bring back the Eretrians and Athenians captive, if he wished to keep his own head on. Datis sailing to Eretria against a people, who amongst the Greeks of that time were in the highest repute for the affairs of war, and not few in number, got these very men into his power in three days ;⁶⁰ and that none might escape, he searched through the whole country after this fashion. His troops having marched to the boundaries of Eretria, and extending themselves from sea to sea, they joined their hands, and thus went through the country, that they might be able to say to the king, that not a person had escaped. With the same design they sailed down from Eretria to Marathon, as being an easy thing for them to unite in the same fate the Athenians with the Eretrians, and to carry them off. During these transactions, some of which were done and others attempted, none of the Greeks gave any assistance to the Eretrians ; nor, except the Lacedæmonians, to the Athenians ; and they did not arrive till the day after the battle.⁶¹ All the rest, struck with terror, and

⁵⁷ See Herodotus, v. 101.

⁵⁸ Cornelius Nepos says there were only 200,000 foot and 10,000 horse. Pausanias and Valerius Max. 300,000 foot.

⁵⁹—⁶⁰ This repetition of *ἐν ταῖς πλοίοις καὶ ναυσὶ, ναῦς δὲ τριακοσίας*, does not look like Plato's style; to say nothing of *πλοῖα* in the sense of "transports." The passage is evidently corrupt.

⁶⁰ Herodotus, in vi. 101, says in seven days.

⁶¹ For according to Herodotus, in vi. 106, they were detained at home

contented with their present safety, kept
 Now a person living at that period would
 men of valour they were, who at Marathon
 strength of the Barbarians and punished the
 and first erected trophies over the Barbarian
 leaders and teachers to the rest (of Greeks)
 of Persia was not invincible, and that all w
 bers must yield to valour. I say then tha
 the fathers, not only of our bodies, but of th
 of ourselves and of all together on this con
 looking upon that exploit did the Greeks da
 sequent battles for their own preservation, a
 pupils of those at Marathon. [11.] To the
 in reason assign the first honours; and the se
 fought and conquered in the sea-fights at S
 misium. Now of the deeds of those men,
 much to tell, both as to what masses of troo
 sea and land, they stood up against, and h
 them. But that, which seems to me to be t
 will bring to your recollection; because the
 deeds that followed upon those of Marath
 Marathon only proved thus much to the Gr
 possible for a few of them to repel many o
 but by sea it was still uncertain. For the
 reputation of being invincible at sea, throug
 in numbers, and wealth, and skill, and stren
 was this deed worthy of praise on the part
 then fought at sea; inasmuch as they dispel
 which the Greeks had been fast bound, and
 longer to fear a multitude of ships and men
 from those, who fought at Marathon and
 other Greeks were taught; and by learning
 on land, and from the other at sea, they be
 to feel no fear of the Barbarians. The acti
 the third, I assert, in number and in valour

by a sacred festival; while the Scholiast says here
 vented from marching, because the moon was not at

⁶² In lieu of *τοῖς ἄλλοις*, the train of ideas *ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις* "Ελλησι, as just afterwards *τοὺς ἄλλους* "Ελλησι

⁶³ By "this continent" is meant Greece. Witho
 it would have meant Asia.

(for)⁶⁴ the safety of Greece; in which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians had a common share. Now this the greatest and most difficult exploit did they all assist;⁶⁵ and for this their valour they are both now celebrated by us, and will be by those hereafter in the time to come. Subsequent to this, many states of Greece still sided with the Barbarian; and the king himself was reported to have a design of making an attempt once more upon the Greeks.

[12.] It is just then for us to bear in remembrance those, who to the exploits of their forefathers put the finish in our deliverance, by clearing themselves from, and driving away, the whole Barbarian power from the sea. Now these were they, who fought in the naval battle at Eurymedon,⁶⁶ and they, who were in the expedition to Cyprus,⁶⁷ and who sailed to Egypt,⁶⁸ and to many other places. Of these we ought to have a recollection, and to acknowledge our thanks to them; because they caused the king⁶⁹ to fear for, and to attend to, his own safety, and not to be plotting for the destruction of the Greeks. Now (the whole of)⁷⁰ this war was endured to the end⁷¹ by the whole power of the state in behalf of ourselves and others, speaking a common language, in opposition to the Barbarians. But when peace⁷² was made, and the city held in honour, there fell, as is wont, upon the successful, first rivalry from men, and after rivalry envy, which placed

⁶⁴ As there is nothing on which τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σωτηρίας can depend, Ficinus seems to have introduced "causam" after "salutis Græciæ" out of his own head; unless he found in his MS. περί after σωτηρίας.

⁶⁵ The Greek is ἡμῶν, to which Gottleber was the first to object, and in lieu of it he suggested ἡνυσαν, what Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt. Bekker has edited ἡμῶν, found in five MSS. Perhaps Plato wrote ἐπίμειναν, i. e. "endure."

⁶⁶ This took place in Ol. lxxviii. 3, B. C. 466. Thucydides, in i. 100, says that the Athenians took thirty triremes, and destroyed in all about two hundred vessels.

⁶⁷ On these combined expeditions, see Thucyd. i. 94 and 104, and Diodor. Sic. xi. p. 459, ed. Wess.

⁶⁸ "The king" of Persia.

⁶⁹ Before πάσῃ, Stalbaum ingeniously conjectures that πᾶς has dropt out.

⁷¹ With διηνικήθη ὁ πόλεμος compare "bella exhausta" in Virgil.

⁷² This is generally supposed to be the peace made by Cimon with the Persians, to which there is an allusion in Isocrates, Aristides, and Plutarch. Some, however, of the scholars of Germany have asserted that no such peace was ever made.

this city, although unwilling, in a state of hostility with the Greeks. [13.] Hereupon a war breaking out, the Athenians came in collision with the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra, and fought in defence of the liberties of Bœotia; and as the battle was undecisive,⁷² the action afterwards⁷³ brought matters to a decided issue. For some went away, leaving the Bœotians,⁷⁴ whom they had been assisting; while our troops, after obtaining a victory, on the third day,⁷⁵ at CEnophyta, justly brought back those, who had been unjustly driven out. These then were the first after the Persian war, who, in behalf of liberty, gave their assistance to Greeks against Greeks; and being men of bravery, they freed those whom they were assisting; and, held in honour by the state, were buried in this cemetery here the first. After this, a great war arose, and all the Greeks brought an army against us, ravaged our country, and unworthily repaid the obligation they owed to the state. But our troops, after defeating them in a sea-fight, and taking the Lacedæmonian⁷⁶ leaders prisoners in the island of Sphagia,⁷⁷ did, when it was in their power to destroy, spare and give them up, and made a peace, conceiving that in a war with a fellow-tribe⁷⁸ one ought to carry on the contest only to the point of victory, and not, through the resentment of a particular state, to destroy the common interest of Greece; but against the Barbarians to war even to utter destruction. Fitting then is it to praise such men, who after being engaged in that war, now lie buried here; because they showed that,

⁷² Thucydides says, in i. 108, that the victory was on the side of the Lacedæmonians.

⁷³ This alludes to the battle of CEnophyta, where the Athenians gained the day.

⁷⁴ Bekker would expunge *Βοιωτῶς* entirely. For the Lacedæmonians assisted the Thebans, and not the Bœotians.

⁷⁵ According to Thucydides, it was the sixty-second day. Hence in lieu of *τρίτη*, Clinton, in *Fest. Hellenic.* p. 256, proposed to read *τρίτη* ξ', i. e. "sixty-third."

⁷⁶ As not only the leaders of the Lacedæmonians were taken prisoners, but their whole army likewise, Stalbaum says we must either read with two MSS. *ἡγεμόνας καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους* or *ἡγεμόνας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους*—

⁷⁷ This island near Pylus is more commonly called *Σφακτηρία*—and so read seven MSS. at least.

⁷⁸ How the Athenians and Lacedæmonians could be called *τὸ ὁμόφυλον*, I cannot understand. The sense requires rather *τὸ ὁμόφωνον*—as in § 12.

if any one doubted whether in the former war against the Barbarians some others were (or not) superior to the Athenians, he doubted without reason. For they there proved, when Greece was in a state of dissension, their superiority in war, by their getting into their hands even those, who had stood forward in defence of the other Greeks, and by defeating single-handed those, with whom formerly they had conjointly overcome the Barbarians. [14.] After this peace,⁷⁹ there was a third war, unexpected and terrible, in which many brave men fell, who lie buried here; and many too about Sicily, after they had erected very many ⁸⁰trophies in behalf of the liberty of the Leontines, to assist whom in accordance with their oaths⁸¹ they sailed to those regions; but when, through the length of the voyage, the state was in difficulties, and unable to minister to their wants, their hearts failed them, and they were unsuccessful; ⁸²of whose temperate conduct and valour their enemies and antagonists have poured forth greater praise than have friends on the conduct of the others.⁸² Many likewise (fell) in the Hellespont,⁸³ after having taken all the ships of the enemy in one day, and gaining many other

⁷⁹ This peace of one year is mentioned by Thucyd. iv. 117.

⁸⁰ These, says Stalbaum, were the victories at Myle and Syracuse, mentioned by Thucydides and Diodorus. But they were too few in number to be called *πλεῖστα*. I suspect however that Plato wrote *κάλλιστα*—For though not many, they were still most honourable.

⁸¹ This refers to the fact stated by Thucyd. in iii. 86, and vi. 19.

⁸²⁻⁸³ Loers and Stalbaum agree in rejecting all the words between the numerals as an interpolation. I trust however I restored the author to himself, in my edition of the Greek text, by simply altering *ἔχουσι* into *χίονσι*—where *χίον* is applied to praise, as “fundere” is to “laudes” by Lucretius. The origin of the metaphor is to be traced to Homer; who has in *Od. A. 432*, *ἀλσχος ἔχουσι*: in *Od. E. 38*, *ἰλεγχίην κατέχοντας*: in *Od. X. 469*, *κατ’ οὐκείδα χεῖαν*. So too Æschylus—*εὐκραῖα χεούσας* in *Suppl. 631*, and *Εὐδοίαν—χίονεν* in *Glauc. Fr.* Pindar likewise in *Pyth. x. 86*, *ὅπα—προχέοντων*: in *Isthm. viii. 128*, *Θρήνον—ἔχεναν*, after the Homeric *χίει πολύγηρυν ἀοιδήν*: from whence Fritzsche has happily corrected *ἰάν χίων* for *ἰαχίων* in *Ced. T. 1222*. With regard to the sentiment, compare Suidas in *Κράτερος—Κράτιστος δ’ ἄρ’ οὗτος, δρου τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔργα καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τῷ ἱπαινῷ συμφωνούσης ἔχει*. With respect to τοῖς ἄλλοις, the allusion is to the Lacedæmonians, who had assisted the Syracusans, but had probably given offence by the austerity of their manners to the more luxurious inhabitants of Sicily.

⁸³ Engelhardt refers this to the naval engagement at Cyzicum, (a. c. 410,) mentioned by Xenophon, *Hellen. i. 1*, 18.

victories. But what I said as to the terrible and unexpected nature of the war, by that I mean, that the other Greeks carried to such an extent their feeling of animosity to this state, as to dare to make overtures by an embassy to the king of Persia,⁸⁴ their greatest foe, and to bring in again for their particular interests that person against the Greeks, whom they had, in common with us, driven out, and to collect an allied army of all⁸⁵ the Greeks and Barbarians against this city. Upon which occasion the strength and valour of the state became very conspicuous. For when our enemies fancied it to be already beaten down in war, and had intercepted⁸⁶ our ships at Mitylene, then did these men, confessedly the bravest, go in person on board the vessels, and giving assistance with sixty sail, gained a victory⁸⁷ over the enemy, and delivered their own friends; but meeting with unmerited misfortune in not having their bodies picked up at sea,^{88 89} they lie where they ought not.⁸⁹ These it is our duty ever to remember and to praise. For by their valour we were victorious, not in that engagement only, but through the rest of the war; for through them the state gained the reputation, that it would not be beaten down in war,⁹⁰ not even by all men (combined).

⁸⁴ This was Darius Nothus; whose name is not mentioned by Thucydides in viii. 18, where the terms of the alliance are given.

⁸⁵ As the Athenians were themselves Greeks, the word πάντας would include them too amongst the others. Perhaps Plato wrote ἐπιόντας—For it was not sufficient merely to collect an army; but it should be stated likewise that the troops marched against the city; and it was to fill up this idea that Ficinus translated “ad hanc urbem obsidendam colligere.”

⁸⁶ By the Spartan admiral Callicratidas. See Xenophon Hellen. i. 6, 24.

⁸⁷ This was gained B. C. 406, near Arginusæ, a small island between Lesbos and the continent. Above seventy triremes were taken or destroyed, and of the ten Lacedæmonian vessels only one escaped.

⁸⁸ As the bodies were not recovered, they were left without the rites of burial, which the Greeks held to be a great misfortune; and hence, for their neglect, the Athenian commanders were tried, and six of them executed.

^{89 89} The Greek is κείναι ἐνθάδε. But as the bodies were not picked up at all, they could not be lying at Athens. Hence Wesseling wished to read οὐ κείναι ἐνθάδε: in lieu of which I suggested, sixteen years ago, κείναι, ἐνθ' οὐ δεῖ, as I have translated. To meet the difficulty, Stalbaum considers the words οὐκ ἀναιρεθέντες ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης an interpolation.

⁹⁰ This could hardly be said with truth in the face of the victory gained by

And the reputation was founded in truth. We have been beaten by our dissensions, not by others. By them at least we are even now unsubdued. But we have subdued ourselves, and (in turn) have been subdued. After these transactions a calm ensuing, and peace made⁹¹ with all the others, a domestic war⁹² was carried on in such a manner, that were it fated for men to fall into dissensions, every person would pray that his country might be no otherwise in disorder. For how delightedly and familiarly did the people of the Piræus, and those of the city, mingle with each other! And contrary to the expectations of the other Greeks, with how much moderation⁹³ did they lay aside their hostility against those at Eleusis! And for all these acts there was no other cause than their real consanguinity, producing a firm friendship and clanship, not in words, but deeds.

[15.] It is meet then to hold in remembrance those too who died in that war by each other's hands, and to reconcile them, as we best can, by offering prayers and sacrifices on these occasions to the deities,⁹⁴ who now have them in their power, forasmuch as we ourselves are also reconciled. For not through malice and hatred did they lay hands upon each other, but through their evil fortune. And of these facts we are ourselves the living witnesses; for, being of the same family with them, we have forgiven each other for what we have done and suffered. After this the city had rest, and enjoyed a profound peace, pardoning the Barbarians, who, having been ill enough⁹⁵ treated by this state,

Lysander at Ægos-Potamos, and which led to the occupation of Athens itself by the successful Spartan commander—events on which Plato has very cleverly said nothing.

⁹¹ This alludes to the peace made with Lysander, by which the Athenians were forced to destroy the long walls that united the city with the sea.

⁹² This refers to the period, when Thrasybulus acted against the thirty so-called tyrants, appointed by Lysander to govern the city.

⁹³ Of the moderation shown by the people towards the partisans of the thirty tyrants who had retired to Eleusis, Cornel. Nep. in Thrasybul. § 2, gives a remarkable proof, by stating that when the peace was made, it was agreed that no one but the thirty tyrants should suffer in person or in purse.

⁹⁴ The deities were the powers below. Compare Eurip. Alc. 257.

⁹⁵ Bekker would omit *ικανῶς* after *κακῶς*. But Engelhardt, with whom Stalbaum agrees, defends it, as being balanced by *οὐκ ἱκανῶς*.

defended themselves not insufficiently; but she felt a resentment against the Greeks, when she remembered what a return they had made, after they had been well treated by her, by uniting with the Barbarians, and depriving us of the very fleet, which had formerly saved them, and by pulling down our walls, by which⁹⁶ we had prevented their own from falling. The city then having determined not to assist Greeks, enslaved by each other or the Barbarians, remained thus.⁹⁷ While then we were in this mood, the Lacedæmonians, fancying that we, the aiders of freedom, were fallen, and that now was the time for them to enslave the rest, attempted to do so. [16.] But what need is there to be prolix? For I should speak of subsequent events that are not of old date,⁹⁸ nor before the time of many men still living.⁹⁹ For we know that, to obtain the aid of this city, there came terror-struck the leading men amongst the Greeks, Argives, and Bœotians, and Corinthians; and, what was the greatest miracle⁹⁹ of all, how even the king came into such a difficulty, as to think there was no safety from any other quarter than from this very city, which he had¹⁰⁰ previously, with great eagerness,¹⁰⁰ attempted to destroy. And indeed, should any one wish to accuse the state on just grounds, he would rightly accuse her by stating this alone; that she is ever too full of pity, and the hand-maid of the weaker party. For at that very time she was not able to be firm, and to keep to her resolution, of not assisting those, when in the act of being enslaved, who had injured her own citizens:¹ but she was bent from her purpose, and did give assist-

⁹⁶ In lieu of ἀνθ' ὧν Ficinus found in his MS. ὑφ' ὧν, as shown by his "quibus." Boissonade however, on Nicetas, p. 322, defends ἀνθ' ὧν, and says it is put for ἀνθ' οὐ.

⁹⁷ Instead of οὕτως, I have suggested αὐτως, "at leisure." Compare Hom. Il. A. 133, αὐτὰρ ἐμ' αὐτως ἦσθαι δεινόμενον.

⁹⁸⁻⁹⁹ The MSS. vary between οὐδὲ πρὸ πολλῶν ἐτῶν and οὐδὲ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. Heindorf on Gorg. p. 448, A. § 3, suggested οὐδὲ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. Bekker, οὐδ' ἐπ' ἄλλων—By uniting the readings of the MSS., I elicited, sixteen years ago, οὐδὲ πρὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ ὄντων, as I have translated.

¹⁰⁰ This is the best rendering of θεῖον, by which was meant a thing sent by a divine power, or was the work of one.

¹⁰⁰⁻¹⁰⁰ In lieu of προθύμως, Stalbaum has adopted πρόσθεν from two MSS. Plato probably wrote both, as I have translated.

¹ The pronouns σφᾶς αὐτοῦς are to be referred to πολῖτας, which is to be obtained from πόλις.

ance; and by such aid so delivered them from slavery, that they were free men, until they again made themselves slaves. She did not however dare to assist the king, through a feeling of reverence for the trophies of Marathon, and Salamis, and Plataea; but, by permitting merely the exiles² and volunteers to assist, she did confessedly preserve him; and after building her walls and fleets, and undertaking a war, when compelled to do so, she carried on hostilities with the Lacedæmonians for the protection of the people of Paros.³

[17.] The king however being afraid of the city, when he saw the Lacedæmonians declining a war by sea, and desirous to withdraw himself, made a demand⁴ for the Greek colonists on the continent, whom the Lacedæmonians had previously consented to give up,⁵ if he were to join with us and our allies in war; conceiving that, as we should not comply with it, there would be a pretence for withdrawing himself. In the case of the other allies he was deceived; for the Corinthians, and Argives, and Bœotians, were willing to give them up,⁶ and entered into a treaty, and confirmed it by oaths, ⁷[to give up the Greeks on the continent,]⁷ if he would furnish the money supplies. But we alone did not dare to give them up, nor to be a party to the oaths. To such an extent was carried the noble and liberal conduct of the state, at once solid and

² This alludes to Conon, who, after the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Ægos-Potamos, fled to Euagoras, the ruler of Salamis in Cyprus; by whom other exiles from Greece and Athens especially were favourably received, as we learn from Isocrates in Euag. p. 302.

³ Of the war undertaken by the Athenians in defence of the Parians nothing is told elsewhere. Krüger, in *Histor. Philolog. Studien*. p. 225, would read 'Ποδίων', referring to Xenophon *Hellen.* iv. 8, 20—25, and Diodor. xiv. 94—97. Bentham thinks the allusion is to a naval victory, gained by Chabrias over the Lacedæmonians between Naxos and Paros, as mentioned by Xenophon, *Hellen.* v., and Diodorus, xv.

⁴ See Thucyd. viii. 56.

⁵ This was actually done subsequently at the peace of Antalcidas. See Xenophon *Hellen.* v. 1. But the chronological order of events which Plato has generally followed; makes such an allusion to be here out of place.

⁶ Schoenborn conceives that Plato alludes to the bribery, of which the Corinthians, Argives, and Bœotians were guilty, when, as stated by Xenophon in *Hellen.* iii. 5, Timocrates the Rhodian was sent by Tithraustes to purchase a confederacy against the Lacedæmonians; in which the Athenians joined indeed, but with clean hands.

⁷— The words within brackets are evidently superfluous.

sound, and naturally a hater of Barbarians, through our being of pure Greek blood, with no mixture of Barbarian. For neither the ⁸ Pelopæes, Cadmuses, Egyptuses, Danauses,⁹ and many others, Barbarians by birth, but Greeks by law, are dwelling with us; but we are very Greeks; not a mixed Barbarian breed; and hence the genuine hatred of a foreign nature has been instilled into the state. Designedly,⁹ then, we were again¹⁰ left alone, from our unwillingness to do a deed disgraceful and unholy by giving up Greeks to Barbarians. Returning then to the same condition as when we were formerly beaten down in war, we did, with a god's assistance, lay down hostilities more successfully than at that period. For we were freed from it, possessing ships, and walls, and our own colonies; and so too,¹¹ contentedly, were our enemies freed from it. We lost, however, in this war some brave men, who met with a difficult country¹² in Corinth, and with treachery at Lechæum. Brave, too, were those, who freed the king, and drove the Lacedæmonians from the sea.¹³ These are the men I am bringing to your recollection; and such as these it becomes all of you to join in praising and investing with honours.

[18.] Such were the exploits of the men who lie buried here, and of the rest, who have died for the state. But though many and honourable are the deeds already related, still many more and more honourable are those, that have been left (untold); for many days and nights would not suffice¹⁴ for him,

⁸ On the use of these plural proper names Loers quotes Theæt. p. 169, B., Ἡρακλῆες τε καὶ Θησίες. Add Phædr. p. 229, D., Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάδων. Lucian, in Micyll., Κίεροπας—ἡ Σισύφους ἡ Τηλείφους. So Shakspeare, "I think there be six Richmonds in the field:" and Milton, "Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimeras dire."

⁹ In lieu of ὁμῶς, which I cannot understand, Plato wrote, I suspect, as I have here translated, ἐννόως.

¹⁰ It is not easy to state what was the previous occasion.

¹¹ Instead of οὕτως, the sense requires, as I have translated, ὡσαύτως.

¹² This difficulty of the country may be inferred from Xenophon, in Hellen. iv. 4, who states, moreover, that by the treachery of Pasimeles and Alcamenes, Praxilas was admitted into Lechæum, a harbour in the bay of Corinth.

¹³ These were the troops, military and naval, under Conon, as shown by Xenophon in Hellen. iv. 8.

¹⁴ So Cicero, "Dies me deficiat, si, quæ dici possint, coner exprimere." Athen. xi. p. 506, ἐπιλίποι μ' ἂν ἡμέρα, quoted by Gottleber; who might have added Hom. Od. A. 327, Πάσας δ' οὐκ ἄρ' ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι—Πρὶν γάρ κεν καὶ νύξ φθεῖρ' ἀμβροτος.

who should go through them all. It is the duty then of every man to bear those deeds in mind; and, as in battle, to exhort the offspring of such men not to leave the ranks¹⁵ of their ancestors, nor, yielding to cowardice, to retire rearwards. And I do myself both now exhort you, the children of brave men, and shall hereafter, wherever I may meet with any of you, remind and exhort you to be ever ready to be the bravest of men. But for the present, I feel justified in telling you what the fathers of these men enjoined me to proclaim to their survivors, if they themselves suffered aught, when they had determined to encounter danger. I will tell you then what I heard¹⁶ from them, and what, if they possessed the power, they would now gladly say to you themselves, as I conjecture from what they said then. Imagine, then, you hear them speaking what I now relate as their messenger. These were their words.

[19.] O children! that ye are indeed the offspring of courageous fathers the present deed itself declares. For when it was in our power to live with dishonour, we chose to die with honour, rather than bring you and those after you into disgrace, and shame our own fathers and all our ancestors,¹⁷ conceiving that to him, who dishonours his family, life is no life; and that to such a fellow there is no man or god upon earth a friend, while (living),¹⁸ nor under it, when dead. It behoves you then to keep these our words in remembrance; and if you practise any thing else, to practise it with valour, well knowing that, deficient in this, all other possessions and pursuits are base and wrong. For neither does wealth bring honour¹⁹ to him, who possesses it with a want of manliness, since such a one is rich for another and not for himself; nor do beauty and strength of body, when they dwell with the coward and the knave, appear becoming, but unbecoming

¹⁵ Compare Herodot. vii. 10; ix. 48, Thucyd. ii. 87, and Demosth. Ol. iii.

¹⁶ As Plato does not state when, where, or how he heard the subsequent speech of the dead, there is probably some error in *ἐκείνων*.

¹⁷ There is a similar sentiment in Homer, *Il. Z. 209*, *Μηδὲ γένος πατέρων ἀλσχύνεμεν*.

¹⁸ To preserve the balance of the sentence, *ὄντι* must be inserted between *οὗτι* and *ἐπὶ*—

¹⁹ So I have translated to prevent the repetition of *κάλλος*. For Plato wrote, I suspect; *πλοῦτος καλὸν φέρει τι*—

(rather), and make the possessor more conspicuous, and show off his cowardice. Moreover, all knowledge, when separated from justice and the other (parts) of virtue, appears to be knavery²⁰ and not wisdom. On this account then endeavour to have, as the first and last aim, through all time and by all means, every readiness to surpass to the utmost ourselves and ancestors in glory. For if not, rest assured that, should we conquer you in valour, the victory brings disgrace upon us; but defeat, if we are defeated, a state of blessedness. Now we shall be vanquished the most, and you obtain the victory, if you prepare yourselves not to abuse the glory of your ancestors, nor to expend it wastefully; being convinced that, for a person who thinks himself to be something, there is nothing more disgraceful, than to exhibit himself as held in honour, not on his own account, but the renown of his forefathers.²¹ For hereditary honour²² is to descendants a treasure honourable and magnificent. But to use up the treasure of riches and renown, and from the want of one's own wealth and good repute, ²³not to hand it down to posterity is an act both disgraceful and unmanly.²³ Should you then pursue these objects, you will come to us as friends to friends, whenever your destined fate shall bring you below; but if you disregard them and become debased, not one of us will receive you kindly. Thus much let it be told to our children. [20.] But our fathers and mothers, that are surviving,²⁴ it is very meet to soothe into the supporting as easily as possible their calamity, should any such happen to arise, and not to lament with them—for they do not need any thing to pain them—for their present misfortune is sufficient to produce

²⁰ So Cicero, *Offic.* i. 19, "Scientia, quæ est remota a justitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda."

²¹ Instead of *προγόνων*, two MSS. and ed. Bas. 2, offer *πρωτόνων*; answering to "superiorum" in Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἐπίων*, as opposed to *ἰσχυρόν*—So Juvenal in vii. 70, "miserum est aliorum incumbere famæ."

²² Cicero *Offic.* i. 23, "Optima hæreditas a patribus traditur liberis—gloria virtutis."

^{23—24} A similar sentiment is to be found in Thucyd. i. 71, ii. 62, and Arist. *Polit.* v. 11.

²⁴ Instead of *οἱς εἰσὶ*, where there is no syntax, one MS. has *οἱοι εἰσὶ*, which leads to *ἄσοι οἷοι εἰσὶ*—

that—but to heal and mitigate their sorrow, by reminding them, that the gods have hearkened to what they especially prayed for. ²⁵ Since they did not pray for their children to be immortal, but to be brave and renowned, ²⁵ both of which, the greatest of all blessings, they have obtained; although it is not easy for every thing to turn out in the case of a mortal in this life according to his wishes. By bearing too their misfortunes like men, they will be thought to be in reality the parents of manly children, and to be such themselves; whereas by giving way they will raise a suspicion that they are none of ours, or that the persons who praise us are telling an untruth; neither of which things ought to be; but they ought rather to be themselves our eulogizers, exhibiting by their acts ²⁶ themselves as seeming to be in reality ²⁶ the fathers, men of men. ²⁷ For the old proverb, “Nothing too much,” ²⁸ seems to be well said; and in fact is well said. ²⁹ For by what person so ever all that leads to happiness, or nearly so, is made to depend upon himself, and not upon others, by whose well or ill doing his own acts are compelled to waver, by such a one has the best preparation been made for living (well). ³⁰ This is the man of moderation; ³¹ this the man of courage and prudence; ³¹ and this is he, who, whether his property and children exist or are destroyed, will best obey the proverb; for through trusting to himself, he will be seen to indulge neither in joy nor sorrow overmuch. ²⁹ Such men do we hold, and wish, and assert our relatives to be; and such we now exhibit ourselves, by not feeling too much of reluctance, nor

^{25—26} So Xenophon, on hearing of the death of his son, said, “I have prayed to the gods not for my son to be immortal, but to be brave,”—as we learn from Plutarch. Hence Addison makes Cato say, on a similar occasion, “The gods be thanked; my boy has done his duty.”

^{25—26} The Greek is αὐτοὺς φαινόμενους τῇ ὄντι πατέρας ὄντας—where Engelhardt alone has seen that φαινόμενους and ὄντας could not be thus united. Plato wrote, I suspect—αὐτοὺς, οὐ τοὺς φαινόμενους, τῇ δὲ ὄντι—i. e. “themselves not the seeming, but being in reality—” Compare Aristoph. Ach. 416, Εἶναι μὲν, ὅσπερ εἶμι, φαίνεσθαι δὲ μὴ.

²⁷ On this collocation of words see Heusde Specim. Crit. p. 129.

²⁸ The same proverb is alluded to in Charmid. § 27.

^{29—30} The whole of this passage is translated by Cicero in Tuscul. v. 12, and alluded to in part in Epist. Famil. v. 13.

³⁰ Between ζῆν and οὕτως I suspect εὖ has dropped.

^{31—31} To these three virtues Cicero, De Invent. ii. 53, adds justice; and the four together are called the cardinal virtues.

too much of fear, should it be needful to die on the instant.³² We entreat then both our fathers and mothers to pass the remainder of their lives in adopting the very same sentiment ; and to be assured that they will gratify us the most by not lamenting and bewailing us ; and that if the dead have any feeling³³ for the living, they will be the least agreeable to us by disfiguring³⁴ themselves and bearing ill their misfortunes, but that they will please us the most by supporting them lightly and with moderation. For our state is about to have³⁵ an end, which is the most honourable among men ; so that it is becoming rather to glorify than to lament it. By acting then as guardians and nurses to our wives and children, and by turning their minds to such employments, they will in the best way become forgetful of their misfortune, and lead a life more honourable and more correct, and more agreeable to us. Such does it suffice to tell our relatives from us. But we would exhort the state to be the guardian of our parents and children, by giving to the youth of the latter a well-regulated education, and to the old age of the former a worthy support ; although we are well assured, that even if we did not so exhort, there would be taken a sufficient care.

[21.] Such then, ye children and parents of the dead, did they enjoin us to tell you ; and I have, with the greatest readiness possible, told you their message. And I do myself beseech some of you to imitate your relatives, and others to feel a confidence in yourselves, that we are all, in our private and public capacities, about to support the old age of some, and to be the guardians of others, wherever each one may meet with any of them. And surely ye know yourselves the carefulness

³² This sentiment is strangely put into the mouth of those already dead. Instead then of *εἰ δεῖ τελευτᾶν*, one would have expected *εἰ δεῖ δις τελευτᾶν*, "if it were needful to die twice." See myself on *Crito*, § 6, n. 4, and the Commentators on "*bis patiar mori*" in *Horace*.

³³ A similar sentiment is to be found in *Isocrates Euagor.* p. 368, *Plataic.* § 24, *Lycurgus in Leocrat.* § 136, *Hyperides*, quoted by *Stobæus*, p. 618, *Galen. Protrept.* § 7, and *Sulpicius in Cicero. Epist. Famil.* iv. 5.

³⁴ This alludes to the custom of women especially, disfiguring their persons, and beating their breasts, and tearing their hair, under the influence of excessive grief for the death of those dear to them.

³⁵ The future *ἔξει* seems strangely said of those, who had arrived already at the end of their life. The sense requires rather *ἔχει*—

of the state, how that by laying down laws³⁶ respecting those who have died in war, it takes charge of their parents and children; and how it has been enjoined upon the magistracy, that is the greatest,³⁷ to watch over them especially, above all the other citizens, so that the fathers and mothers of such may receive no injury; while it brings up together³⁸ the children, through its great desire that their orphanhood may be as little conspicuous as possible; since it stands in the place of a father to them, while they are still children; and when they come to man's estate, sends them to their own homes,³⁹ having first dressed them in a complete suit of armour, thus pointing out and reminding them of the pursuits of their fathers, and giving them the instruments of their fathers' valour; and at the same time, by way of a good omen, (bidding them)⁴⁰ commence their return to the paternal hearth, about to command⁴¹ with strength, as having been decked in arms. The dead too it never fails to honour, by performing each year the established rites for all in common, which have taken place, as is fitting,⁴² individually for each; and in addition to this, by appointing games both gymnastic and equestrian, and of all kinds of poetry; and by standing really in the place of an heir and son to the dead, and in that of a father to children, and in that of a guardian to parents and such-like relatives, it takes upon itself all care of all for all time. Keeping then these things in mind, you ought to bear

³⁶ According to Aristotle, in *Polit.* ii. 6, the law at Athens was the imitation of a similar one first introduced at Miletus by Hippodamus.

³⁷ That is the first Archon, according to Meier, *De Lite Attica*, p. 44. But Pseud-Ulpian, in *Demosthen.* *Timocrat.* p. 445, says it was the third Archon, called Πολίμαρχος.

³⁸ This was in the Orphan-House, situated in the Acropolis, as may be inferred from the *Meno*, p. 89, B., τῶν νίων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις ἀν παραλαβόντες ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν Ἀκροπόλει, ἵνα, — ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο. The fact is alluded to in *Thucyd.* ii. 46, but the place is not mentioned; and so it is in a fragment, probably of Ælian, quoted by *Suidas* in Ἀμύνασθαι.

³⁹ As the pronoun σφίτερας is reflective, it cannot be applied with propriety to the homes of the youths. Æschines, in *Ctesiph.* § 154, has more correctly ἀφίησι τρίπεςθαι, ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν.

⁴⁰ Ficinus has alone, what the sense requires, "jubet."

⁴¹ I cannot understand ἀρξοντα. I could have understood πράξοντα τι, "about to do something."

⁴² The Greek is ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ ἰδία · where Bekker would expunge the second ἰδία; which I would alter into οἷα δεῖ, as I have translated.

your calamity more lightly; for thus you will be the most dear to the dead and living, and most ready to give and to receive comfort. And now do you and all the rest, having in common, according to custom, wept fully the dead, depart.

[22.] Such, Menexenus, is the speech of Aspasia of Miletus.

Men. By Zeus, Socrates, you proclaim Aspasia to be a happy person, if, being a woman, she is able to compose such speeches as these.

Soc. If you do not credit it, follow me, and you shall hear her speak it herself.

Men. I have often, Socrates, met with her, and know what kind of woman she is.

Soc. What then, do you not admire her, and owe you no thanks to her for this oration?

Men. I owe indeed, Socrates, many thanks either to her or to him, whoever was the person who told it you; and before all others, to him who has now spoken it.

Soc. All will be well; but see that you do not say a word against me, in order that I may hereafter tell you many and beautiful discourses on state affairs.

Men. Be full of confidence. I will say nothing. Do you only tell them.

Soc. So shall it be.

INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MAJOR.

Of all the dialogues of Plato, the *Hippias Major* is perhaps the one best calculated to give a correct idea of the easy and playful manner, in which Socrates, who confessed he knew nothing, was accustomed to confute those, who pretended to know every thing. But it is to be lamented that Plato should have done here, as elsewhere, an injury to the cause he was espousing, by not keeping strictly to the line of truth. For, as remarked by Ast, Hippias the wise is represented as a very silly person; since such alone would think of giving the absurd definitions of beauty put into the mouth of Hippias. But in this very conduct of the writer, we have an internal proof in favour of the genuineness of the dialogue, which some have called in question. For in consequence of similar misrepresentations, Gorgias called him "the modern Archilochus;" and even Socrates himself, after hearing the *Lysias*, exclaimed, "Ye gods, what lies this young man tells." It is possible, however, that Hippias had in reality given some definitions of beauty, similar to those which are here attributed to him, but which were wanting in the precision of language, that alone gives value to a definition. For unless this had been the case, the whole of the ridicule would have been like the dart of Priam, "telum imbelli, sine ictu."

Hence too I was led to suggest, that in the examples of beauty selected by Plato, there was a parody of those which Hippias had given, with the view of showing, what Sydenham was the first to remark, that the Sophists intended to exhibit a gradation in four different forms of beauty, of which the first was rational; the second irrational; the third affecting the mind, through the medium

of the body; and the last affecting the body alone: and thus while the speculative philosophers defined Beauty as existing, first, in the Mind; secondly, in the Body; thirdly, in Morals; and lastly, in Arts; the practical philosopher, Socrates, said, as shown by Xenophon, in *M. S.* iii. 8. 4—10, and iv. 6. 9, that Beauty consisted in utility and the fitness of things to their proposed ends; but that of Beauty in the abstract we know nothing, as remarked by Plato in the *Parmenides*, p. 134, C.

With regard to the theories of modern metaphysicians, viewed either abstractedly, or with reference to objects of Nature and Art, the inquisitive reader may turn to Burke "On the Sublime and Beautiful;" and Payne Knight's "Principles of Taste;" and Alison's "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste."

To the editions of this dialogue by Heindorf and Stalbaum, is to be added my own, published anonymously in 1831, under the title of "Plato's Four Dialogues, the *Crito*, *Hippias*, *Alcibiades*, and *Sisyphus*, with English Notes;" to which I have referred in difficult and doubtful passages, or where the Notes were too long or too learned to be given here entire, or even to be abridged without detriment to their utility.

HIPPIAS MAJOR.¹

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPIAS.

SOCRATES.

[1.] Ο ΤΗΟΥ, the handsome² and clever³ Hippias, after how long a time⁴ hast thou now again⁵ arrived at Athens!

Hip. I have had no leisure time, Socrates. For when Elis wants to transact any business with any other⁶ state, she always comes to me the first, selecting me as an ambassador from the

¹ This dialogue is called "major," to distinguish it from another shorter one called "minor." It is feigned, as remarked by Stalbaum, to have taken place, probably when Hippias, according to Xenophon, in *M. S.* iv. 4, 5, had, on his return to Athens after a long absence, a conversation with Socrates.

² Sydenham refers the appellation of *καλός* to the beauty of Hippias' apparel, mentioned in § 25, *Hipp. Min.*, p. 568, B., and *Ælian. Var. Histor.* xii. 32; but Heindorf says it was merely a common form of address. It seems however never to have been adopted except towards those, who were remarkable for the beauty of their person or dress.

³ Heindorf says that by *σοφός* is meant a sophist. But as Socrates held the sophists in little estimation, he would rather address Hippias by the name of "wise;" and thus ironically put him even above Pythagoras, who was content to call himself *φιλόσοφος*, "a lover of wisdom," rather than *σοφός*, positively "wise."

⁴ Heind. properly remarks that *ὥς χρόνῳ* means "after a long interval." Ficinus has incorrectly, "*raro*."

⁵ Ficinus, unable to understand *ἡμῖν*, has omitted it altogether. Perhaps it conceals *αὐτῶν*, as I have translated:

⁶ The Greek is *τινα τῶν πόλεων*. Ficinus has "*externis gentibus*," as if he had found in his MS. either *τιν' ἀλλοδαπῶν πόλεων*, or *τιν' ἄλλων πόλεων*—

sound, and naturally a hater of Barbarians, through our being of pure Greek blood, with no mixture of Barbarian. For neither the ⁸ Pelopseas, Cadmuses, Ægyptuses, Danauses,⁸ and many others, Barbarians by birth, but Greeks by law, are dwelling with us; but we are very Greeks; not a mixed Barbarian breed; and hence the genuine hatred of a foreign nature has been instilled into the state. Designedly,⁹ then, we were again¹⁰ left alone, from our unwillingness to do a deed disgraceful and unholy by giving up Greeks to Barbarians. Returning then to the same condition as when we were formerly beaten down in war, we did, with a god's assistance, lay down hostilities more successfully than at that period. For we were freed from it, possessing ships, and walls, and our own colonies; and so too,¹¹ contentedly, were our enemies freed from it. We lost, however, in this war some brave men, who met with a difficult country¹² in Corinth, and with treachery at Lechæum. Brave, too, were those, who freed the king, and drove the Lacedæmonians from the sea.¹³ These are the men I am bringing to your recollection; and such as these it becomes all of you to join in praising and investing with honours.

[18.] Such were the exploits of the men who lie buried here, and of the rest, who have died for the state. But though many and honourable are the deeds already related, still many more and more honourable are those, that have been left (untold); for many days and nights would not suffice¹⁴ for him,

⁸—⁸ On the use of these plural proper names Loers quotes Thesæt. p. 169, B., Ἡρακλῆες τε καὶ Θησίεις. Add Phædr. p. 229, D., Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων. Lucian, in Micyll., Κίτροπας—ἡ Σισύφους ἢ Τηλείφους. So Shakspeare, "I think there be six Richmonds in the field:" and Milton, "Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimeras dire."

⁹ In lieu of ὅμως, which I cannot understand, Plato wrote, I suspect, as I have here translated, ἐννόως.

¹⁰ It is not easy to state what was the previous occasion.

¹¹ Instead of οὕτως, the sense requires, as I have translated, ὡσαύτως.

¹² This difficulty of the country may be inferred from Xenophon, in Hellen. iv. 4, who states, moreover, that by the treachery of Pasimeles and Alcamenes, Praxilas was admitted into Lechæum, a harbour in the bay of Corinth.

¹³ These were the troops, military and naval, under Conon, as shown by Xenophon in Hellen. iv. 8.

¹⁴ So Cicero, "Dies me deficiat, si, quæ dici possint, coner exprimere." Athen. xi. p. 506, ἐπιλίποι μ' ἂν ἡμέρα, quoted by Gottleber; who might have added Hom. Od. A. 327, Πάσας δ' οὐκ ἄρ' ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι—Πρὶν γάρ κεν καὶ νύξ φθῇτ' ἄμβροτος.

who should go through them all. It is the duty then of every man to bear those deeds in mind; and, as in battle, to exhort the offspring of such men not to leave the ranks¹⁵ of their ancestors, nor, yielding to cowardice, to retire rearwards. And I do myself both now exhort you, the children of brave men, and shall hereafter, wherever I may meet with any of you, remind and exhort you to be ever ready to be the bravest of men. But for the present, I feel justified in telling you what the fathers of these men enjoined me to proclaim to their survivors, if they themselves suffered aught, when they had determined to encounter danger. I will tell you then what I heard¹⁶ from them, and what, if they possessed the power, they would now gladly say to you themselves, as I conjecture from what they said then. Imagine, then, you hear them speaking what I now relate as their messenger. These were their words.

[19.] O children! that ye are indeed the offspring of courageous fathers the present deed itself declares. For when it was in our power to live with dishonour, we chose to die with honour, rather than bring you and those after you into disgrace, and shame our own fathers and all our ancestors,¹⁷ conceiving that to him, who dishonours his family, life is no life; and that to such a fellow there is no man or god upon earth a friend, while (living),¹⁸ nor under it, when dead. It behoves you then to keep these our words in remembrance; and if you practise any thing else, to practise it with valour, well knowing that, deficient in this, all other possessions and pursuits are base and wrong. For neither does wealth bring honour¹⁹ to him, who possesses it with a want of manliness, since such a one is rich for another and not for himself; nor do beauty and strength of body, when they dwell with the coward and the knave, appear becoming, but unbecoming

¹⁵ Compare Herodot. vii. 10; ix. 48, Thucyd. ii. 87, and Demosth. Ol. iii.

¹⁶ As Plato does not state when, where, or how he heard the subsequent speech of the dead, there is probably some error in *ἐκείνων*.

¹⁷ There is a similar sentiment in Homer, Il. Z. 209, *Μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχύνεμεν*.

¹⁸ To preserve the balance of the sentence, *ὄντι* must be inserted between *οὗτε* and *ἐπὶ*—

¹⁹ So I have translated to prevent the repetition of *κάλλος*. For Plato wrote, I suspect; *πλοῦτος καλὸν φέρει τι*—

(rather), and make the possessor more conspicuous, and show off his cowardice. Moreover, all knowledge, when separated from justice and the other (parts) of virtue, appears to be knavery²⁰ and not wisdom. On this account then endeavour to have, as the first and last aim, through all time and by all means, every readiness to surpass to the utmost ourselves and ancestors in glory. For if not, rest assured that, should we conquer you in valour, the victory brings disgrace upon us; but defeat, if we are defeated, a state of blessedness. Now we shall be vanquished the most, and you obtain the victory, if you prepare yourselves not to abuse the glory of your ancestors, nor to expend it wastefully; being convinced that, for a person who thinks himself to be something, there is nothing more disgraceful, than to exhibit himself as held in honour, not on his own account, but the renown of his forefathers.²¹ For hereditary honour²² is to descendants a treasure honourable and magnificent. But to use up the treasure of riches and renown, and from the want of one's own wealth and good repute, ²³not to hand it down to posterity is an act both disgraceful and unmanly.²³ Should you then pursue these objects, you will come to us as friends to friends, whenever your destined fate shall bring you below; but if you disregard them and become debased, not one of us will receive you kindly. Thus much let it be told to our children. [20.] But our fathers and mothers, that are surviving,²⁴ it is very meet to soothe into the supporting as easily as possible their calamity, should any such happen to arise, and not to lament with them—for they do not need any thing to pain them—for their present misfortune is sufficient to produce

²⁰ So Cicero, *Offic.* i. 19, "Scientia, quæ est remota a justitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda."

²¹ Instead of *προγόνων*, two MSS. and ed. Bas. 2, offer *πρωτόνων*; answering to "superiorum" in Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἐπίων*, as opposed to *ἐαυτὸν*—So Juvenal in vii. 70, "miserum est aliorum incumbere famæ."

²² Cicero *Offic.* i. 23, "Optima hæreditas a patribus traditur liberis—gloria virtutis."

²³—²⁴ A similar sentiment is to be found in Thucyd. i. 71, ii. 62, and Arist. *Polit.* v. 11.

²⁴ Instead of *οἱς εἰσι*, where there is no syntax, one MS. has *οἱοι εἰσι*, which leads to *δοσοι οἱοι εἰσι*—

that—but to heal and mitigate their sorrow, by reminding them, that the gods have hearkened to what they especially prayed for. ²⁵ Since they did not pray for their children to be immortal, but to be brave and renowned, ²⁵ both of which, the greatest of all blessings, they have obtained; although it is not easy for every thing to turn out in the case of a mortal in this life according to his wishes. By bearing too their misfortunes like men, they will be thought to be in reality the parents of manly children, and to be such themselves; whereas by giving way they will raise a suspicion that they are none of ours, or that the persons who praise us are telling an untruth; neither of which things ought to be; but they ought rather to be themselves our eulogizers, exhibiting by their acts ²⁶ themselves as seeming to be in reality ²⁶ the fathers, men of men. ²⁷ For the old proverb, “Nothing too much,” ²⁸ seems to be well said; and in fact is well said. ²⁹ For by what person so ever all that leads to happiness, or nearly so, is made to depend upon himself, and not upon others, by whose well or ill doing his own acts are compelled to waver, by such a one has the best preparation been made for living (well). ³⁰ This is the man of moderation; ³¹ this the man of courage and prudence; ³¹ and this is he, who, whether his property and children exist or are destroyed, will best obey the proverb; for through trusting to himself, he will be seen to indulge neither in joy nor sorrow overmuch. ²⁹ Such men do we hold, and wish, and assert our relatives to be; and such we now exhibit ourselves, by not feeling too much of reluctance, nor

^{25—26} So Xenophon, on hearing of the death of his son, said, “I have prayed to the gods not for my son to be immortal, but to be brave,”—as we learn from Plutarch. Hence Addison makes Cato say, on a similar occasion, “The gods be thanked; my boy has done his duty.”

^{26—28} The Greek is αὐτοὺς φαίνομένους τῷ ὄντι πατέρας ὄντας—where Engelhardt alone has seen that φαίνομένους and ὄντας could not be thus united. Plato wrote, I suspect—αὐτοὺς, οὐ τοὺς φαίνομένους, τῷ δὲ ὄντι—i. e. “themselves not the seeming, but being in reality—” Compare Aristoph. Ach. 416, Εἶναι μὲν, ὅσπερ εἶμι, φαίνεσθαι δὲ μὴ.

²⁷ On this collocation of words see Heusde Specim. Crit. p. 129.

²⁸ The same proverb is alluded to in Charmid. § 27.

^{29—30} The whole of this passage is translated by Cicero in Tuscul. v. 12, and alluded to in part in Epist. Famil. v. 13.

³⁰ Between ζῆν and οὐτως I suspect εὖ has dropt.

^{31—31} To these three virtues Cicero, De Invent. ii. 53, adds justice; and the four together are called the cardinal virtues.

too much of fear, should it be needful to die on the instant.³² We entreat then both our fathers and mothers to pass the remainder of their lives in adopting the very same sentiment; and to be assured that they will gratify us the most by not lamenting and bewailing us; and that if the dead have any feeling³³ for the living, they will be the least agreeable to us by disfiguring³⁴ themselves and bearing ill their misfortunes, but that they will please us the most by supporting them lightly and with moderation. For our state is about to have³⁵ an end, which is the most honourable among men; so that it is becoming rather to glorify than to lament it. By acting then as guardians and nurses to our wives and children, and by turning their minds to such employments, they will in the best way become forgetful of their misfortune, and lead a life more honourable and more correct, and more agreeable to us. Such does it suffice to tell our relatives from us. But we would exhort the state to be the guardian of our parents and children, by giving to the youth of the latter a well-regulated education, and to the old age of the former a worthy support; although we are well assured, that even if we did not so exhort, there would be taken a sufficient care.

[21.] Such then, ye children and parents of the dead, did they enjoin us to tell you; and I have, with the greatest readiness possible, told you their message. And I do myself beseech some of you to imitate your relatives, and others to feel a confidence in yourselves, that we are all, in our private and public capacities, about to support the old age of some, and to be the guardians of others, wherever each one may meet with any of them. And surely ye know yourselves the carefulness

³² This sentiment is strangely put into the mouth of those already dead. Instead then of *εἰ δεῖ τελευτᾶν*, one would have expected *εἰ δεῖ δις τελευτᾶν*, "if it were needful to die twice." See myself on *Crito*, § 6, n. 4, and the Commentators on "bis patiar mori" in *Horace*.

³³ A similar sentiment is to be found in *Isocrates Euagor*. p. 368, *Plataic*. § 24, *Lycurgus in Leocrat*. § 136, *Hyperides*, quoted by *Stobæus*, p. 618, *Galen. Protrept*. § 7, and *Sulpicius in Ciceron. Epist. Famil. iv. 5*.

³⁴ This alludes to the custom of women especially, disfiguring their persons, and beating their breasts, and tearing their hair, under the influence of excessive grief for the death of those dear to them.

³⁵ The future *ἔξει* seems strangely said of those, who had arrived already at the end of their life. The sense requires rather *ἔχει*—

of the state, how that by laying down laws³⁶ respecting those who have died in war, it takes charge of their parents and children; and how it has been enjoined upon the magistracy, that is the greatest,³⁷ to watch over them especially, above all the other citizens, so that the fathers and mothers of such may receive no injury; while it brings up together³⁸ the children, through its great desire that their orphanhood may be as little conspicuous as possible; since it stands in the place of a father to them, while they are still children; and when they come to man's estate, sends them to their own homes,³⁹ having first dressed them in a complete suit of armour, thus pointing out and reminding them of the pursuits of their fathers, and giving them the instruments of their fathers' valour; and at the same time, by way of a good omen, (bidding them)⁴⁰ commence their return to the paternal hearth, about to command⁴¹ with strength, as having been decked in arms. The dead too it never fails to honour, by performing each year the established rites for all in common, which have taken place, as is fitting,⁴² individually for each; and in addition to this, by appointing games both gymnastic and equestrian, and of all kinds of poetry; and by standing really in the place of an heir and son to the dead, and in that of a father to children, and in that of a guardian to parents and such-like relatives, it takes upon itself all care of all for all time. Keeping then these things in mind, you ought to bear

³⁶ According to Aristotle, in *Polit.* ii. 6, the law at Athens was the imitation of a similar one first introduced at Miletus by Hippodamus.

³⁷ That is the first Archon, according to Meier, *De Lite Attica*, p. 44. But Pseud-Ulpian, in Demosthen. *Timocrat.* p. 445, says it was the third Archon, called Πολέμαρχος.

³⁸ This was in the Orphan-House, situated in the Acropolis, as may be inferred from the *Meno*, p. 89, B., τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν Ἀκροπόλει, ἵνα, — ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι ἐγίγνοντο. The fact is alluded to in *Thucyd.* ii. 46, but the place is not mentioned; and so it is in a fragment, probably of Ælian, quoted by Suidas in Ἀμύνασθαι.

³⁹ As the pronoun σφέτερας is reflective, it cannot be applied with propriety to the homes of the youths. Æschines, in *Ctesiph.* § 154, has more correctly ἀφίησι τρέψεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν.

⁴⁰ Ficinus has alone, what the sense requires, "jubet."

⁴¹ I cannot understand ἀρξονται. I could have understood πράξοντά τε, "about to do something."

⁴² The Greek is ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ ἰδία · where Bekker would expunge the second ἰδία; which I would alter into οἷα δεῖ, as I have translated.

your calamity more lightly; for thus you will be the most dear to the dead and living, and most ready to give and to receive comfort. And now do you and all the rest, having in common, according to custom, wept fully the dead, depart.

[22.] Such, Menexenus, is the speech of Aspasia of Miletus.

Men. By Zeus, Socrates, you proclaim Aspasia to be a happy person, if, being a woman, she is able to compose such speeches as these.

Soc. If you do not credit it, follow me, and you shall hear her speak it herself.

Men. I have often, Socrates, met with her, and know what kind of woman she is.

Soc. What then, do you not admire her, and owe you no thanks to her for this oration?

Men. I owe indeed, Socrates, many thanks either to her or to him, whoever was the person who told it you; and before all others, to him who has now spoken it.

Soc. All will be well; but see that you do not say a word against me, in order that I may hereafter tell you many and beautiful discourses on state affairs.

Men. Be full of confidence. I will say nothing. Do you only tell them.

Soc. So shall it be.

INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MAJOR.

Of all the dialogues of Plato, the *Hippias Major* is perhaps the one best calculated to give a correct idea of the easy and playful manner, in which Socrates, who confessed he knew nothing, was accustomed to confute those, who pretended to know every thing. But it is to be lamented that Plato should have done here, as elsewhere, an injury to the cause he was espousing, by not keeping strictly to the line of truth. For, as remarked by Ast, Hippias the wise is represented as a very silly person; since such alone would think of giving the absurd definitions of beauty put into the mouth of Hippias. But in this very conduct of the writer, we have an internal proof in favour of the genuineness of the dialogue, which some have called in question. For in consequence of similar misrepresentations, Gorgias called him "the modern Archilochus;" and even Socrates himself, after hearing the *Lysias*, exclaimed, "Ye gods, what lies this young man tells." It is possible, however, that Hippias had in reality given some definitions of beauty, similar to those which are here attributed to him, but which were wanting in the precision of language, that alone gives value to a definition. For unless this had been the case, the whole of the ridicule would have been like the dart of Priam, "telum imbelles, sine ictu."

Hence too I was led to suggest, that in the examples of beauty selected by Plato, there was a parody of those which Hippias had given, with the view of showing, what Sydenham was the first to remark, that the Sophists intended to exhibit a gradation in four different forms of beauty, of which the first was rational; the second irrational; the third affecting the mind, through the medium

of the body; and the last affecting the body alone: and thus while the speculative philosophers defined Beauty as existing, first, in the Mind; secondly, in the Body; thirdly, in Morals; and lastly, in Arts; the practical philosopher, Socrates, said, as shown by Xenophon, in *M. S.* iii. 8. 4—10, and iv. 6. 9, that Beauty consisted in utility and the fitness of things to their proposed ends; but that of Beauty in the abstract we know nothing, as remarked by Plato in the *Parmenides*, p. 134, C.

With regard to the theories of modern metaphysicians, viewed either abstractedly, or with reference to objects of Nature and Art, the inquisitive reader may turn to Burke "On the Sublime and Beautiful;" and Payne Knight's "Principles of Taste;" and Alison's "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste."

To the editions of this dialogue by Heindorf and Stalbaum, is to be added my own, published anonymously in 1831, under the title of "Plato's Four Dialogues, the *Crito*, *Hippias*, *Alcibiades*, and *Sisyphus*, with English Notes;" to which I have referred in difficult and doubtful passages, or where the Notes were too long or too learned to be given here entire, or even to be abridged without detriment to their utility.

HIPPIAS MAJOR.¹

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPIAS.

SOCRATES.

[1.] Ο ΤΗΟΥ, the handsome² and clever³ Hippias, after how long a time⁴ hast thou now again⁵ arrived at Athens!

Hip. I have had no leisure time, Socrates. For when Elis wants to transact any business with any other⁶ state, she always comes to me the first, selecting me as an ambassador from the

¹ This dialogue is called "major," to distinguish it from another shorter one called "minor." It is feigned, as remarked by Stalbaum, to have taken place, probably when Hippias, according to Xenophon, in *M. S.* iv. 4, 5, had, on his return to Athens after a long absence, a conversation with Socrates.

² Sydenham refers the appellation of *καλός* to the beauty of Hippias' apparel, mentioned in § 25, *Hipp. Min.*, p. 568, B., and *Ælian. Var. Histor.* xii. 32; but Heindorf says it was merely a common form of address. It seems however never to have been adopted except towards those, who were remarkable for the beauty of their person or dress.

³ Heindorf says that by *σοφός* is meant a sophist. But as Socrates held the sophists in little estimation, he would rather address Hippias by the name of "wise;" and thus ironically put him even above Pythagoras, who was content to call himself *φιλόσοφος*, "a lover of wisdom," rather than *σοφός*, positively "wise."

⁴ Heind. properly remarks that *ὥς χρόνῳ* means "after a long interval." Ficinus has incorrectly, "raro."

⁵ Ficinus, unable to understand *ἤμῃν*, has omitted it altogether. Perhaps it conceals *αὖ νῦν*, as I have translated:

⁶ The Greek is *τινα τῶν πόλεων*. Ficinus has "externis gentibus," as if he had found in his MS. either *τιν' ἀλλοδαπῶν πόλεων*, or *τιν' ἄλλων πόλεων*—

citizens, from her conceiving that I am the most competent to be a judge of the arguments urged by each of the states, and to report upon them. Hence I have often gone to other cities as an ambassador, but most frequently and on points the most in number and of greatest importance to Lacedæmon. Hence it is why, as regards your question, I do not often come to these parts.

[2.] Soc. This it is,⁷ Hippias, to be a person truly wise and accomplished. For, as a private individual, you are able to obtain no little money from young men, and to impart more benefit than you receive; and as a public man are able⁸ to do your own state good service, as he should do, who would not be held in contempt, but be in good repute with the many. But, Hippias, what is the reason why those men of the olden time, whose names are so renowned for wisdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and Thales of Miletus, and his disciples,⁹ and those who come after, down to Anaxagoras, appear all, or most of them, to have kept aloof¹⁰ from public affairs?

Hip. What else, Socrates, can you suppose than that they were unable or not sufficiently fit to reach by their intellect to both subjects, public and private?

[3.] Soc. Shall we then, by Zeus, affirm, that as the other arts have improved, and the operatives of former times were of no mark as compared with those of the present, so the art of you, sophists, has improved likewise; and that those of the ancients, who were engaged in the study of wisdom, were persons of no mark in comparison with you?

Hip. You speak perfectly correctly.

⁷ Ficinus omits *μύρον*, which he could not understand; nor can I. Perhaps Plato wrote *μὲν τὸν*—with the usual ellipse of *θεῖον*, or *κύνα*—

⁸ The repeated *ικανός* is omitted by Ficinus. One MS. has *ικανώς*: which would lead to *διανεώς*, "perpetually," found in § 48.

⁹ Both Sydenham here, and Matthiæ in Gr. Gr., § 583, and Stalbaum, take the expression *τῶν ἀμφοτέρων*—*Θαλήν* as applied to Thales and his disciples; Heindorf, to Thales alone.

¹⁰ Cicero however says, De Rep. i. 7, "Eos septem, quos Græci sapientes nominaverunt, omnes pœne video in media republica esse versatos:" where "omnes pœne" answers to *πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοί* in Plato. So too De Oratore iii. 34, "Septem fuisse dicuntur—sapientes—hi omnes, præter Milesium Thalen civitatibus suis præfuerunt." See likewise Ælian Var. Hist. iii. 17, where it is stated that all the philosophers of antiquity took a part in public affairs.

Soc. If then, Hippias, were Bias to come now to life again, he would be exposed to ridicule, as compared with you; just as our modern statuaries assert that Dædalus, were he alive to execute such works as those from which he gained his great name, would become ridiculous.

Hip. It is as you say, Socrates. I am however accustomed myself to praise highly the men of the olden time, or even our immediate predecessors before,¹¹ and more than the moderns, acting with a feeling of caution as regards the envy of the living, and of fear as regards the anger of the dead.¹²

Soc. Correctly, Hippias, as it seems to me, are you¹³ thinking upon and considering¹³ the matter. And I too can testify that you are speaking the truth, and that your art has in reality improved in enabling you to transact public affairs conjointly with private. [4.] For Gorgias,¹⁴ the great sophist of Leontium, came hither on an embassy¹⁵ from his country, as being the man most competent among the Leontines to transact public affairs, and was thought to speak the best before the people here; and at the same time, by making a display of his powers in pri-

¹¹ Instead of *πρωτότερον*, I formerly suggested *πρωτίως*, which the sense requires; and so I have translated.

¹² This alludes to one of Solon's laws mentioned by Plutarch, i. p. 89, E., *Μὴ λέγειν κακῶς τὸν τεθνηκότα*, "not to speak ill of the dead." But this sentiment was of much earlier antiquity, as appears from Homer, *Od.* xxii. 412, *Οὐχ ὕσιον φθιμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχεράσθαι*, i. e. "It is unholy o'er dead men to boast;" and Archilochus, *Fragm.* 18, *Οὐ γὰρ ἰσθλὰ κατθανοῦσι κερομεῖν ἐπ' ἀνδράσι*, i. e. "For against dead men it is not good heart-cutting taunts to say." This respect for the dead arose partly from the notion that the ghosts of the departed had a power to hurt the living, by haunting them. Hence Dido thus threatens Æneas, (*iv.* 386,) "Omnibus umbra locis adero: dabis, improbe, penas." S.

¹³ Apparently to avoid the tautology in *νομίζων τε καὶ διανοούμενος*. Ficinus has "et sentire et loqui;" unless it be said that he found in his MS. *διαλεγόμενος*. But as thirteen MSS. read *ὀνομάζων*, and one *ὀνομάζονται* without *τε*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὰ νομιζόμενα εἰ διανοούμενος*, i. e. "you are thinking upon what has been established by law."

¹⁴ The character of Gorgias is painted by Plato at full length in a dialogue inscribed with his name. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to observe, that Gorgias was by profession, like Hippias, an orator as well as sophist, and set up teaching both philosophy and the art of rhetoric. S.

¹⁵ The object of the embassy was to obtain the assistance of the Athenians in behalf of the people of Leontium against those of Syracuse, as we learn from Diodorus Sic. xii. 53; and Pausanias v. 17. HEIND.

vate, and associating with young men, he gained¹⁶ and carried away great sums of money from this city. Or, if you wish for another instance, our friend,¹⁷ Prodicus himself, has frequently come hither in a public capacity from elsewhere:¹⁸ but on arriving the last time, not long since, [publicly]¹⁹ from Cora, and speaking before the Council, he was held in high repute; and by making a display of his powers in private, and associating with young men, he gained a wonderful heap of money.²⁰ But of these ancient sages, not one ever thought proper to demand money by way of a fee for making a display of their wisdom before persons of all climes. Such simpletons²¹ were they, and so completely did it escape them, that money was a thing of great value. Whereas each of the preceding²² made more money from his wisdom, than has any operative²³ in whatever trade you will; and even prior to these did Protagoras.

[5.] *Hyp.* You know nothing, Socrates, about these beautiful²⁴ things; for if you knew how much money I have made, you would be amazed. The other instances I pass by. But having gone once to Sicily, while Protagoras was residing

¹⁶ The price, which Gorgias demanded from each of his scholars, was 100 minæ, equal to £322 18s. 4d. S.

¹⁷ Socrates calls himself here the friend of Prodicus, as he does in *Protar.* p. 311, A., *Meno*, p. 96, D., and *Cratyl.* p. 384, § 2. HAJER.

¹⁸ The antithesis in *ἐκ Κόρας* evidently requires *ἀλλοθεν*, an adverb of place, not *ἀλλοτε*, of time.

¹⁹ This repeated *δημοσίᾳ* is an evident interpolation.

²⁰ The price paid by each of his auditors was fifty *δράχμας*, or £1 12s. 3d. See *Plat.* in *Cratyl.* p. 384, and *Aristot. Rhet.* l. iii. c. 14. S.

²¹ Such a simpleton too was Socrates himself, who gave instruction gratis, as we learn from Xenophon.

²² In Greek *οὗτος*, like "hic" in Latin, generally refers to the persons last mentioned; but here it must be applied to the more remote, like "ille."

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there in high repute and rather advanced in years, I did, although much younger, gain in a very short time more than 150 minæ:²⁵ nay, from Inycum, a very small town, I took above 20.²⁶ This, when I arrived home, I carried and gave²⁷ to my father, so that it struck him and the rest of the citizens with wonder and astonishment. And I almost think I have made more money than any two sophists together, whom you choose to name.

[6.] Soc. You bring forward, Hippias, truly a good and great proof, both of your own wisdom, and of the men of the present day, how superior they are as compared with those of the olden time. For of your predecessors, down to Anaxagoras,²⁸ great is proclaimed the folly, according to your statement. For to Anaxagoras, they say, happened the very opposite to what has befallen you. For of the great wealth left him he took no care, and lost it all; in so silly a manner did he act the sophist. And of the other ancient sages other stories of a similar kind are told. You seem then to produce this as a good proof of the wisdom of the moderns, as compared with the ancients. And many indeed agree with you, that²⁹ the wise man should be wise for himself especially;²⁹ and of such a person this is the one³⁰ definition—He who can make the most money. [7.] Let this then suffice. And now tell

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me from which of the cities, whither you went, did you gain the greatest money? Is it not plain it was from Sparta, whither you went the oftener?

Hip. Not, by Zeus, from thence, Socrates.

Soc. How say you? The least then?

Hip. Never any thing at all.

Soc. A monstrous and marvellous account you are giving, Hippias. But tell me, has not that wisdom of yours the power to make those ³¹ who associate with you and learn it ³¹ better as regards virtue.

Hip. Yes, very much so, Socrates.

Soc. Were you then able to make the sons of the Inycians better, but unable to make the sons of the Spartans?

Hip. Far from it. ³²

Soc. Are the Siciliotes desirous of becoming better, but the Spartans not?

Hip. The Lacedæmonians are, Socrates, very (desirous)?

Soc. Was it then from their want of money that they shunned your society?

Hip. By no means; for they have enough of it.

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their children? For surely they did not grudge their sons becoming as virtuous as possible.

Hip. I do not think they felt any grudge.

Soc. In good truth Lacedæmon is a well-regulated city.

Hip. How not?

Soc. Now in well-regulated cities virtue is most highly prized.

Hip. Certainly.

[9.] *Soc.* And to impart this to another you know the best of all men.

Hip. By much so, Socrates.

Soc. Now would not the man, who could best impart the art of horsemanship, be the most honoured, and acquire the most wealth in Thessaly,³³ or wherever else in Greece³⁴ this art is cultivated the most?

Hip. It is likely.

Soc. Will he then, who can impart instruction of the greatest value with respect to virtue, be honoured the most, and make the most money if he wishes it, not at Lacedæmon and any other of the well-regulated states in Greece, but in Sicily³⁵ rather, as you think, my friend, or at Inycum? Shall we, Hippias, give credit to this? for if you command, I must (do so).

Hip. It is not, Socrates, the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians to disturb their laws, nor to educate their children³⁶ contrary to established usages.

Soc. How say you? Think you³⁷ that it is the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians not to act correctly, but to do wrong?

Hip. I would not say so, Socrates.

Soc. Would they not do right then to educate their sons in the better way, and not in the worse?

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³⁵ On the luxury of the Sicilians Sydenham refers to the Greek proverb, Σικελικὴ γράπειζα in Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 404, D., and the "Siculæ dapes" in Horace.

³⁶ Instead of νέους the two best MSS. have νειῖς, similar to "filios," in Ficinus.

³⁷ The two best MSS. have preserved οἷα, wanting in all the rest.

them to give a foreign education. Since, rest assured that if any one else ever took away money from thence by teaching, I should have taken by much the most. For they delight greatly³⁸ in listening to me, and give me praise. ³⁹ But what I am saying is not law.³⁹

Soc. Say you, Hippias, that the law is an injury or a benefit to a state?

Hip. It is enacted, I presume, for a benefit; but sometimes the law, when improperly enacted, does an injury.

Soc. What then, do not they who enact a law, lay it down as the greatest good to a state? For without law it is impossible to live in a state of good government.

Hip. You speak the truth.

Soc. When, therefore, they who undertake to frame laws, fail in procuring a good, they have missed ⁴⁰ what is lawful and law.⁴⁰ Or how say you?

Hip. Accurately speaking, Socrates, such is the case; but men are not used to give that name.⁴¹

Soc. Do you mean, Hippias, those, who know the truth, or who do not know it?

Hip. I mean the many.

Soc. Are the many then those, who know the truth?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. But surely they, who do know it, do in reality conceive that what is to all men more beneficial is more agreeable to law than what is less beneficial. Or do not you grant this?

Hip. I grant that (they do hold so) in reality.

Soc. ⁴² Do not (things) exist, and are in the state,⁴² as those, who are knowing, conceive?

Hip. Undoubtedly.

[11.] *Soc.* Now it is, as you assert, more beneficial for the

³⁸ In lieu of χαίρουσι γούν, where γούν is useless, I have translated as if the Greek were χαίρουσ' ἀγαν—

³⁹⁻³⁹ Such is the literal version of the Greek ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω οὐ νόμος. By comparing however Protag. § 80, it would not be difficult to recover what Plato probably wrote.

⁴⁰⁻⁴⁰ I cannot understand νομίμου καὶ νόμου— The natural train of ideas would lead to, "they fail in that, for which laws are laid down"—

⁴¹ Here again I am at a loss, unless we read νομίζουσιν, "to think," in lieu of ὀνομάζουσιν, "to name," as I suggested long ago.

⁴²⁻⁴² The Greek is, Οὐκ οὖν ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἔχει οὕτως. To avoid the tautology I suggested Οὐκ οὖν ἂν ἔστι γὰρ, ἔχει οὕτως. Stalb. has edited ἔστι γὰρ, from the two best MSS.

Lacedæmonians to receive a foreign education under yourself, than after the system of their own country.

Hip. And I assert the truth.

Soc. Because what is more beneficial is more conformable to law. And this, Hippias, do you say?

Hip. I have so said.

Soc. According then to your reasoning, it is more conformable to law for the sons of the Lacedæmonians to be instructed by Hippias, and less so by their fathers, if perchance they shall in reality be more benefited under you.

Hip. And benefited they would be, Socrates.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians then act contrary to law, in not giving you their gold, and committing their sons to your care.

Hip. In this I agree with you: for you seem to produce an argument in my favour, and there is no need for me to oppose it.

Soc. We find then, my friend, the Lacedæmonians to act contrary to law, and this too in matters of the greatest moment; they who are thought to be most observant of law. And yet, by the gods, did they praise you, and were delighted at hearing—what? Or is it not evident that the subjects were those which you know the best, relating to the stars and celestial events?⁴³

Hip. Not at all. Such subjects they cannot endure.

Soc. But they delight in hearing something about geometry.

Hip. Not at all; for many of them know not, so to say, even how to reckon.

[12.] *Soc.* They are then far from enduring you, while making a display on the keeping of accounts.⁴⁴

Hip. Very far indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. But the subjects then were those, in which you can the most accurately of (all⁴⁵) men draw distinctions, respecting the powers of letters and syllables, and rhythms and harmonies.

Hip. What harmonies, or letters, my good man?

Soc. What then are the subjects, which they gladly hear

⁴³ The Greek is *πράθη*. Ficinus has "progressus."

⁴⁴ Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *λογισμῶν*, has "ratiocinationes computationesque;" and hence Sydenham, "of numbers and accounts."

⁴⁵ Ficinus alone has "omnium hominum—"

from you, and commend? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find them.

Hip. Respecting the genealogies,⁴⁶ Socrates, of their heroes and men, and settlements (of tribes), (and)⁴⁷ how cities were founded of old, and, in a word, to every thing relating to archæology, they listen with the greatest pleasure; so that I was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for their sakes, and to practise myself well on those points.

Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the Lacedæmonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who could reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For otherwise you would have had some trouble in learning the list.

Hip. How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names only once, I can repeat them from memory.

[13.] *Soc.* You speak the truth; but I did not bear in mind that you had a system of mnemonics;⁴⁸ so that I understand⁴⁹ why, reasonably enough, the Lacedæmonians are pleased with you, as being a person who knows many things, and they make use of you, as children do of old women, to tell them pretty stories.

Hip. And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high repute there by going through a lecture upon the honourable pursuits to which a young person should devote himself. For I have by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject,⁵⁰ well put together in other respects, and in the words.⁵⁰ The form and

⁴⁶ There is an article by Osann in the *Rheinische Museum* for 1843, p. 495—501, on the archæological writings of Hippias.

⁴⁷ I suspect ὥς has dropt out after καὶ—

⁴⁸ According to Pseudo-Plato in *Hipp. M.*, in p. 368, D., the sophist had, like Simonides, cultivated the art of memory; which, before the invention of printing, was necessary for every one who aspired to be a pantologist.

⁴⁹ The Greek is ὥστ' ἔννοῶ—which seems rather strange after οὐκ ἐνενόησα. Ficinus has “jam intelligo”—which leads to εἰς τὸ νῦν δ' ἔννοῶ—

⁵⁰ The Greek is καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακειμένος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι. But διακειμένος could hardly follow συγκείμενος; and if it could, it would not be united to the dative ὀνόμασι. Besides, it is not easy to say, to what ἄλλως can be referred, as opposed to ὀνόμασι. Ficinus has “verborum elegantia pellet”—from which I formerly elicited εὖ διακοσμούμενος; but I would now prefer διασκευασμένος, similar to λόγοι παρεσκευασμένοι in Menex. p. 235, D., while in καὶ ἄλλως and καὶ τοῖς lie hid, I suspect, καὶ Λυσίου—καλλίστοις ὀνόμασι. For thus Lysias would be praised here ironically, as he is in the Phædrus.

commencement of the discourse is something of this kind.—“After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus inquired of Nestor what were the honourable pursuits a young man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent precepts laid down by law.” [14.] Of this dissertation⁵¹ I made a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in the school of Philostratus.⁵² For so has Eudicus, the son of Apēmantus, requested. See then that you are present yourself, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be competent to decide upon what is then said.

Soc. This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at present answer me a short question relating to it.⁵³ For you have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person, has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations, thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beautiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, “From whence do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful, and what ugly?”⁵⁴ Come then, tell me,⁵⁴ if you can say a word, what is the beautiful?” And I, through my want of wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him with propriety. [15.] So, quitting his company, I grew angry with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I would hear (his opinion) and learn it; and after studying

⁵¹ According to Philostratus in the life of Hippias, p. 495, the dissertation was in the form of a dialogue. Its title was Τρωικά or Ἡρωικά—For these two words are constantly confounded, as remarked by G. C. Lewis in Cl. Jl. No. 76, p. 277, and No. 78, p. 190. So too in Schol. Od. A. 546, instead of ὑπὸ ὀπότερου τῶν Τρώων, Bentley would read Ἡρώων in his letter to Davies, first published in the Monthly Review, vol. xiv. p. 202.

⁵² I have adopted Φιλοστράτου, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of Φειδοστράτου—a word that seems scarcely compounded correctly. On the other hand, the Philostratus here mentioned is probably the same as the person nicknamed Κυναλώπηξ by Aristophanes in Ἰππ. 1066.

⁵³ As there is nothing to which αὐτοῦ can be referred, Plato wrote, I suspect, περὶ γὰρ του, “about something.”

⁵⁴—“The Greek is—Ἐπεὶ φέρει ἔχους ἀν σιπῆν—But ἔπει, “since,” has no meaning here. I have translated, as if the words were—Εἰπ’ οὖν, φέρ’, εἰ ἔχους ἀνσιπῆν.

vate, and associating with young men, he gained¹⁶ and carried away great sums of money from this city. Or, if you wish for (another) instance, our friend,¹⁷ Prodicus himself, has frequently come hither in a public capacity from elsewhere:¹⁸ but on arriving the last time, not long since, [publicly]¹⁹ from Ceos, and speaking before the Council, he was held in high repute; and by making a display of his powers in private, and associating with young men, he gained a wonderful heap of money.²⁰ But of those ancient sages, not one ever thought proper to demand money by way of a fee for making a display of their wisdom before persons of all climes. Such simpletons²¹ were they, and so completely did it escape them, that money was a thing of great value. Whereas each of the preceding²² made more money from his wisdom, than has any operative²³ in whatever trade you will; and even prior to these did Protagoras.

[5.] *Hip.* You know nothing, Socrates, about these beautiful²⁴ things; for if you knew how much money I have made, you would be amazed. The other instances I pass by. But having gone once to Sicily, while Protagoras was residing

¹⁶ The price, which Gorgias demanded from each of his scholars, was 100 minæ, equal to £322 18s. 4d. S.

¹⁷ Socrates calls himself here the friend of Prodicus, as he does in *Protag.* p. 311, *A.*, *Meno.* p. 96, *D.*, and *Cratyl.* p. 384, § 2. HEIND.

¹⁸ The antithesis in *ἐκ Κίω* evidently requires *ἄλλοθεν*, an adverb of place, not *ἄλλοτε*, of time.

¹⁹ This repeated *δημοσίᾳ* is an evident interpolation.

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³³ See Meno, § 1. S.

³⁴ As there is nothing on which τῆς Ἑλλάδος can depend, I have translated as if the Greek were ἡ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλοθι—not τῆς Ἑλλάδος—καὶ ἀλλοθι.

³⁵ On the luxury of the Sicilians Sydenham refers to the Greek proverb, Σικελικὴ τράπεζα in Plato, Legg. iii. p. 404, D., and the "Siculus dapes" in Horace.

³⁶ Instead of νέους the two best MSS. have νείετς, similar to "filios," in Ficinus.

³⁷ The two best MSS. have preserved οἶε, wanting in all the rest.

them to give a foreign education. Since, rest assured that if any one else ever took away money from thence by teaching, I should have taken by much the most. For they delight greatly³⁸ in listening to me, and give me praise.³⁹ But what I am saying is not law.³⁹

Soc. Say you, Hippias, that the law is an injury or a benefit to a state?

Hip. It is enacted, I presume, for a benefit; but sometimes the law, when improperly enacted, does an injury.

Soc. What then, do not they who enact a law, lay it down as the greatest good to a state? For without law it is impossible to live in a state of good government.

Hip. You speak the truth.

Soc. When, therefore, they who undertake to frame laws, fail in procuring a good, they have missed⁴⁰ what is lawful and law.⁴⁰ Or how say you?

Hip. Accurately speaking, Socrates, such is the case; but men are not used to give that name.⁴¹

Soc. Do you mean, Hippias, those, who know the truth, or who do not know it?

Hip. I mean the many.

Soc. Are the many then those, who know the truth?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. But surely they, who do know it, do in reality conceive that what is to all men more beneficial is more agreeable to law than what is less beneficial. Or do not you grant this?

Hip. I grant that (they do hold so) in reality.

*Soc.*⁴² Do not (things) exist, and are in the state,⁴² as those, who are knowing, conceive?

Hip. Undoubtedly.

[11.] *Soc.* Now it is, as you assert, more beneficial for the

³⁸ In lieu of *χαίρουσι γούν*, where *γούν* is useless, I have translated as if the Greek were *χαίρουσι ἄγαν*—

³⁹⁻⁴⁰ Such is the literal version of the Greek *ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω οὐ νόμος*. By comparing however Protag. § 80, it would not be difficult to recover what Plato probably wrote.

⁴⁰⁻⁴¹ I cannot understand *νομίμων καὶ νόμον*— The natural train of ideas would lead to, "they fail in that, for which laws are laid down"—

⁴¹ Here again I am at a loss, unless we read *νομίζουσιν*, "to think," in lieu of *ὀνομάζουσιν*, "to name," as I suggested long ago.

⁴²⁻⁴³ The Greek is, *ὅτι οὐν ἔστι γε καὶ ἔχει οὕτως*. To avoid the tautology I suggested *ὅτι οὐν ἔστι γε, ἔχει οὕτως*. Stalb. has edited *ἔστι γε*, from the two best MSS.

Lacedæmonians to receive a foreign education under yourself, than after the system of their own country.

Hip. And I assert the truth.

Soc. Because what is more beneficial is more conformable to law. And this, Hippias, do you say?

Hip. I have so said.

Soc. According then to your reasoning, it is more conformable to law for the sons of the Lacedæmonians to be instructed by Hippias, and less so by their fathers, if perchance they shall in reality be more benefited under you.

Hip. And benefited they would be, Socrates.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians then act contrary to law, in not giving you their gold, and committing their sons to your care.

Hip. In this I agree with you : for you seem to produce an argument in my favour, and there is no need for me to oppose it.

Soc. We find then, my friend, the Lacedæmonians to act contrary to law, and this too in matters of the greatest moment ; they who are thought to be most observant of law. And yet, by the gods, did they praise you, and were delighted at hearing—what ? Or is it not evident that the subjects were those which you know the best, relating to the stars and celestial events ?⁴³

Hip. Not at all. Such subjects they cannot endure.

Soc. But they delight in hearing something about geometry.

Hip. Not at all ; for many of them know not, so to say, even how to reckon.

[12.] *Soc.* They are then far from enduring you, while making a display on the keeping of accounts.⁴⁴

Hip. Very far indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. But the subjects then were those, in which you can the most accurately of (all⁴⁵) men draw distinctions, respecting the powers of letters and syllables, and rhythms and harmonies.

Hip. What harmonies, or letters, my good man ?

Soc. What then are the subjects, which they gladly hear

⁴³ The Greek is *πάθη*. Ficinus has "progressus."

⁴⁴ Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *λογισμῶν*, has "ratiocinationes computationesque ;" and hence Sydenham, "of numbers and accounts."

⁴⁵ Ficinus alone has "omnium hominum—"

from you, and command? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find them.

Hip. Respecting the genealogies,⁴⁶ Socrates, of their heroes and men, and settlements (of tribes), (and)⁴⁷ how cities were founded of old, and, in a word, to every thing relating to archaeology, they listen with the greatest pleasure; so that I was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for their sakes, and to practise myself well on those points.

Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the Lacedæmonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who could reckon up our archives from the time of Solon. For otherwise you would have had some trouble in learning the list.

Hip. How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names only once, I can repeat them from memory.

[13.] Soc. You speak the truth; but I did not bear in mind that you had a system of mnemonics;⁴⁸ so that I understand⁴⁹ why, reasonably enough, the Lacedæmonians are pleased with you, as being a person who knows many things, and they make use of you, as children do of old women, to tell them pretty stories.

Hip. And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high repute there by going through a lecture upon the honourable pursuits to which a young person should devote himself. For I have by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject,⁵⁰ well put together in other respects, and in the words.⁵¹ The form and

⁴⁶ There is an article by Osann in the *Rheinische Museum* for 1843, p. 495—501, on the archaeological writings of Hippias.

⁴⁷ I suspect *εἰς* has dropt out after *καὶ*—

⁴⁸ According to Pseudo-Plato in *Hipp. M.*, in p. 368, D., the sophist had, like Simonides, cultivated the art of memory; which, before the invention of printing, was necessary for every one who aspired to be a pantologist.

⁴⁹ The Greek is *οὐκ ἔννοον*—which seems rather strange after *οὐκ ἔννοον*. Ficinus has “jam intelligo”—which leads to *εἰς τὸ οὖν δ' ἔννοον*—

⁵⁰ The Greek is *καὶ ἄλλως εἰ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς δνόμασι*. But *διακείμενος* could hardly follow *συγκείμενος*; and if it could, it would not be united to the dative *δνόμασι*. Besides, it is not easy to say, to what *ἄλλως* can be referred, as opposed to *δνόμασι*. Ficinus has “verborum elegantia pellet”—from which I formerly elicited *εἰ διακοσμούμενος*; but I would now prefer *διοικητασμίνο*, similar to *λόγοι παρεσκευασμένοι* in Menex. p. 235, D., while in *καὶ ἄλλως* and *καὶ τοῖς* lie hid, I suspect, *καὶ Ἀσίου—καλλίστοις δνόμασι*. For thus Lysias would be praised here ironically, as he is in the Phædrus.

commencement of the discourse is something of this kind.—

“After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus inquired of Nestor what were the honourable pursuits a young man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent precepts laid down by law.” [14.] Of this dissertation⁵¹ I made a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in the school of Philostratus.⁵² For so has Eudicus, the son of Apēmantus, requested. See then that you are present yourself, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be competent to decide upon what is then said.

Soc. This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at present answer me a short question relating to it.⁵³ For you have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person, has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations, thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beautiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, “From whence do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful, and what ugly?”⁵⁴ Come then, tell me,⁵⁴ if you can say a word, what is the beautiful?” And I, through my want of wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him with propriety. [15.] So, quitting his company, I grew angry with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I would hear (his opinion) and learn it; and after studying

⁵¹ According to Philostratus in the life of Hippias, p. 495, the dissertation was in the form of a dialogue. Its title was *Τρωικά* or *Ἡρωικά*—For these two words are constantly confounded, as remarked by G. C. Lewis in Cl. Jl. No. 76, p. 277, and No. 78, p. 190. So too in Schol. Od. A. 546, instead of *ὑπὸ ὀπορίου τῶν Τρώων*, Bentley would read *Ἡρώων* in his letter to Davies, first published in the Monthly Review, vol. xiv. p. 202.

⁵² I have adopted *Φιλοστράτου*, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of *Φειδοστράτου*—a word that seems scarcely compounded correctly. On the other hand, the Philostratus here mentioned is probably the same as the person nicknamed *Κυναλώπηξ* by Aristophanes in *Ἰππ.* 1066.

⁵³ As there is nothing to which *αὐτοῦ* can be referred, Plato wrote, I suspect, *περί γὰρ του*, “about something.”

⁵⁴—⁵⁴ The Greek is—*Ἐπεὶ φέρεῖ ἔχους ἀν εἰπεῖν*—But *εἰπεῖν*, “since,” has no meaning here. I have translated, as if the words were—*Εἰπ’ οὖν, φίρ’, εἰ ἔχους ἀναιπεῖν*.

it thoroughly, that I would return to my questioner, and fight out again the matter with him. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come opportunely; and do you instruct me sufficiently what is beauty in the abstract, and endeavour to give me as accurately as possible your answers; in order that I may not be confuted a second time, and pay the penalty of a laugh against myself. For assuredly you know it quite clearly, and it would be but a mite of the learning, with which you are conversant on so many⁵⁵ points.

Hip. By Zeus, a mite indeed, Socrates; and, so to say, of no value at all.

Soc. Easily then shall I learn it; and no one will hereafter confute me.

[16.] *Hip.* Not one indeed. For otherwise mean would be my profession, and suited to a common person.

Soc. By Juno, Hippias, you speak bravely, if we shall get the man into our clutches. ⁵⁶ But shall I be any hindrance by imitating him, if I lay hold of your arguments, while answering me, in order that you may exercise me the most. For I am nearly skilful in laying hold (of arguments).⁵⁶ If then it makes no difference to you, I am willing to lay hold of them, in order that I may learn⁵⁷ with greater strength.

Hip. Take hold then: for, as I said just now, the question is not a great one; and I will teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, so that not a single person will be ever able to confute you.

Soc. Ye gods,⁵⁸ how bravely you talk! But come, since you bid me, I will become him, and, as well as I can, try to question you. Now, if you shall give the lecture you men-

⁵⁵ To avoid the incorrect Greek in ὧν σὺ τῶν πολλῶν, we must read ὧν σὺ οὕτω πολλῶν— The critics quoted by Stalbaum neither do, nor pretend to, defend this union of the relative pronoun with the definite article.

⁵⁶—⁵⁶ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. But how Socrates could, by imitating the nameless saucy fellow, be any hindrance to Hippias, I cannot understand.

⁵⁷ In lieu of μάθω, which I cannot understand, I have suggested μυχθῶ. For the idea of "mingling in fight" here correctly coincides with the preceding ἀναμαχοῦμενος. Others perhaps would prefer ἰπρωμενίστηρον με θῶ, i. e. "make myself of greater strength."

⁵⁸ Instead of φεῦ, which never, I think, precedes ὥς εὖ λέγεις, I have translated as if the Greek were ὦ θεοί.

tion, upon beautiful pursuits, he will, after hearing it, when you have ceased speaking, inquire about nothing else except about the beautiful—for such a habit he has—and he will say, “Art not, (say) thou stranger from Elis, the just just through justness?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning you.

Hip. I answer,⁵⁹ through justness.

[17.] *Soc.* There is then such a thing as justness?

Hip. Clearly so.

Soc. Are not then the wise wise through wisdom? and all that is good good through goodness?

Hip. How not?

Soc. By those things existing really; for it is not surely by their non-existing.

Hip. By their existing really.

Soc. Are not all things, that are beautiful, beautiful through beauty?

Hip. Yes, through beauty.

Soc. By such a thing existing?

Hip. By its existing. For what should it be?

Soc. Tell me now, stranger, he will say, what is this beauty?

Hip. Does he, who asks this question, want to know what is a beautiful thing?

Soc. I think not, Hippias: but what is beauty.

Hip. How does this differ from that?

Soc. Seems there to you no (difference)?

Hip. There is not any difference.

Soc. But, however,⁶⁰ it is evident that you know better.

⁵⁹ I have adopted ἀποκρίνομαι, found in one MS., in lieu of ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Ficinus omits the word entirely.

⁶⁰ The Greek is Ἄλλὰ μὲντοι δῆλον, where I cannot understand μὲντοι: nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is “Constat autem.” Hence I suggested, many years ago, Ἄλλὰ μύοντι τῷ, “But to any one blinking,” an expression similar to the Latin, “conniventibus oculis,” and to the English, “with half an eye.” The phrase in Aristoph. Plut. 49, is δῆλον τυφλῷ, quoted by the Schol. on Plato, Sophist. p. 241, D., φαίνεται καὶ, τὸ λεγόμενον δὲ, τυφλῷ: and is found in Rep. iii. p. 465, D., and viii. p. 550, D. With regard to the verb μύειν, which Plato has used in Sophist. p. 239, E., δόξει τοι μύειν ἢ πα- ἀπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὁμματα, and elsewhere, see Creuzer on Plotinus, Περὶ Κάλλους, p. 357.

Consider, however, good sir, the question (well).⁶¹ For he asks you, not what is a beautiful thing, but what is beauty.

Hip. I understand you, good sir. And I will answer his question, "What is beauty?" nor shall I ever be confuted.⁶² For rest assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.⁶³

[18.] Sac. By the dog,⁶⁴ you have answered, Hippias, beautifully and gloriously.⁶⁵ Shall I then, when I answer thus, have answered the question correctly? and shall I never be refuted?

Hip. For how could you be refuted, Socrates, on that point which seems correct to all the world; and where all who hear you will testify in your favour that you are speaking properly?

Sac. Be it so then, by all means. But come, Hippias, let me consider again with myself what you are saying. For the man will question me in some such manner as this: "Come, Socrates, answer me, "if beauty exists in the abstract, all

And to the passages there quoted add Lucian in Rhetor. Præcept. § 11, *αὐτὸν μὲν οὐκ—αἰσίου τις*. Shakspeare says in Lear, "A man may see how this world goes with no eyes."

⁶¹ After αἰσίου, it is pretty evident that αὐτὸν has dropt out.

⁶² By comparing the expression of Socrates, *οὐ μή ποτε ἡλεγχθῶ*, it is quite certain that Hippias said *οὐ μή ποτε ἡλεγχθῆς*.

⁶³ Ficinus has "*virginem pulchram ipsum pulchrum esse*," as if his MS. read *παρθένος καλὴ τὸ καλόν*, not *παρθένος καλὴ καλόν*.

⁶⁴ This was one of the oaths adopted by Socrates; another was, "by the plane-tree," as in Phædrus, p. 236, D., and the third was, "by the goose," as we learn from the Scholiast on Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 521. To these might be added "the goat," as appears from Tertullian Apolog. 14, quoted by Gottleber on Phædo, p. 99, A. "Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deorum, quercum et hircum et canem dejerabat." Of the different reasons assigned for such strange forms of adjuration an account is to be found in the notes of Menage on Diogen. Laert. p. 92. But as none of them are satisfactory, the truth remains to be still found, if worth the search, elsewhere.

⁶⁵ The Greek is *εὐδόξως*: which is never, I believe, thus connected with the idea of an answer. I suggested long ago *οὐ λοξῶς*, i. e. "not obliquely," referring to Suidas, *Λοξά' σκόλια, καμπύλα, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας γινόμενα*: and to Lucian, Vit. Auct. § 14, *ὥσπερ ὁ Λοξίας οὐδὲν ἀποσαφείς*. Dialog. Deor. xvi. § 1, *Λοξά—πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἀποκρινομενος*. Alexandr. § 10, *ἀμφιβόλους καὶ λοξοὺς χρησμούς συγγραῶν*: and I will now add in Jov. Confut. § 14, *λοξὰ καὶ ἱπαμφοτερίζοντα*. See too Boissonad. in Eunap. p. 162, and 564.

⁶⁶—⁶⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek text. But the train of thought requires, "Come now, Socrates, and answer me this correctly. All

these things which you say are beautiful, would these be beautiful?"⁶¹ And I will then say that, "if a beautiful maiden be a beautiful thing, through which the things would be beautiful."⁶⁷

Hip. Think you then that he will still attempt to confute you, (by asserting) that what you say is beautiful, is not so? or that, should he attempt it, he will not be laughed down?

Soc. That he will, thou wondrous man, I am well assured; but whether, after making the attempt, he will be laughed down, the thing itself will show. However,⁶⁸ I wish to tell you what he will say.

Hip. Tell it then.

[19.] *Soc.* What a sweet⁶⁹ creature, Socrates! he will say, you are. Is not a beautiful mare, which even a god has praised in an oracle,⁷⁰ a beautiful thing? What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we say aught else than that⁷¹ the

the things which you say are beautiful, if there be such a thing as beauty in the abstract, would they not be beautiful?" This in Greek would be "Ἰθι μοι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίναι τοῦτ' ἐγώ. Τὰ πάντα, δ' φῆς καλὰ εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐ ταῦτ' ἄν εἴη καλὰ; Ficinus however has "Age, responde mihi, Socrates, Quid est ipsum pulchrum? quod si sit, hæc omnia, quæ pulchra dicuntur, per ipsum pulchra sunt," which it is uncertain whether he did or did not find in his MS. Sydenham however was led from thence to suspect that δι' ὃ had dropt out between τὸ καλόν and ταῦτ' ἄν—and so was Schleiermacher after him.

⁶⁷—⁶⁷ The Greek is 'Εγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ, ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἐστὶ, δι' ὃ ταῦτ' ἄν εἴη καλὰ. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge the word εἰ before παρθένος, and to read ὅτι παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἐστὶ, κ. τ. λ. S. Heindorf says we must omit εἰ, or all the words after καλόν. But the train of argument leads to something of this kind—"If there be such a thing as a beautiful maiden, there must be the beautiful, by which all the things beautiful would exist"—in Greek, Εἰ παρθένος καλὸν ἐστὶ, ἔστι τὸ καλόν, δι' ὃ πάντ' ἄν εἴη καλὰ, as I stated many years ago.

⁶⁸ The origin of this proverb is told by the Scholiast on Theætet. p. 200, E., who says, that when some person was going to cross a river, he asked his guide whether it was deep; to which the latter replied, "The event itself will show."

⁶⁹ Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 132, says that γλυκὺς and ἡδύς were used ironically as a polite way of calling a person a simpleton.

⁷⁰ The oracle alluded to has been preserved entire by the Schol. on Theocritus, Id. xiv. 48, and by Tzetzes, in Chil. ix. 291, and x. 330, and partially by Euseb. Præp. Evang. v. 29. For when the people of Megara had inquired of the god to whom the palm of superiority was to be assigned, they were told, amongst other things, that the mares of Thrace, or, as Tzetzes testifies, of Thessaly, were the best.

⁷¹ The Greek is τὴν ἵππον καλὴν εἶναι τὴν γε καλὴν. And so

me from which of the cities, whither you went, did you gain the greatest money? Is it not plain it was from Sparta, whither you went the oftenest?

Hip. Not, by Zeus, from thence, Socrates.

Soc. How say you? The least then?

Hip. Never any thing at all.

Soc. A monstrous and marvellous account you are giving, Hippias. But tell me, has not that wisdom of yours the power to make those ³¹ who associate with you and learn it ³¹ better as regards virtue.

Hip. Yes, very much so, Socrates.

Soc. Were you then able to make the sons of the Inycians better, but unable to make the sons of the Spartans?

Hip. Far from it.³²

Soc. Are the Siciliotes desirous of becoming better, but the Spartans not?

Hip. The Lacedæmonians are, Socrates, very (desirous)?

Soc. Was it then from their want of money that they shunned your society?

Hip. By no means; for they have enough of it.

[8.] *Soc.* What then could it be, that although they were desirous of virtue, and had money, and you were able to benefit them to the greatest extent, they did not send you away loaded with wealth? Was it that the Lacedæmonians can educate their sons better than you? Shall we say this? and do you concede it is so?

Hip. By no manner of means.

Soc. Were you then unable to persuade the young men at Lacedæmon, that by associating with you they would make a greater progress in virtue than by associating with their own people? Or were you unable to persuade their fathers that they ought to hand over their children to you rather than take that care upon themselves, if they had any regard for

³¹⁻³¹ The Greek is τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῇ καὶ μαθάνοντας—I have translated as if it were τοὺς σοὶ συνόντας καὶ αὐτὴν μαθάνοντας. For thus σοὶ συνόντας is similar to συνὼν τοῖς νίοις twice in § 4, and to σοὶ—συνόντες in § 8.

³² To a bipartite question there could not be a single answer. There is a lacuna here, to be supplied from Suidas, Πολλοὺ δὲ δῖω καὶ λέγειν σιωπῶν: where, if we read γε for καὶ, we shall have an expression similar to οὐκ ἂν φαίην ἔγωγε in § 9, explained by σιωπῶν.

their children? For surely they did not grudge their sons becoming as virtuous as possible.

Hip. I do not think they felt any grudge.

Soc. In good truth Lacedæmon is a well-regulated city.

Hip. How not?

Soc. Now in well-regulated cities virtue is most highly prized.

Hip. Certainly.

[9.] *Soc.* And to impart this to another you know the best of all men.

Hip. By much so, Socrates.

Soc. Now would not the man, who could best impart the art of horsemanship, be the most honoured, and acquire the most wealth in Thessaly,³³ or wherever else in Greece³⁴ this art is cultivated the most?

Hip. It is likely.

Soc. Will he then, who can impart instruction of the greatest value with respect to virtue, be honoured the most, and make the most money if he wishes it, not at Lacedæmon and any other of the well-regulated states in Greece, but in Sicily³⁵ rather, as you think, my friend, or at Inycum? Shall we, Hippias, give credit to this? for if you command, I must (do so).

Hip. It is not, Socrates, the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians to disturb their laws, nor to educate their children³⁶ contrary to established usages.

Soc. How say you? Think you³⁷ that it is the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians not to act correctly, but to do wrong?

Hip. I would not say so, Socrates.

Soc. Would they not do right then to educate their sons in the better way, and not in the worse?

[10.] *Hip.* (They would do) right; but it is not lawful for

³³ See Meno, § 1. S.

³⁴ As there is nothing on which τῆς Ἑλλάδος can depend, I have translated as if the Greek were ἡ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλοθι—not τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ ἀλλοθι.

³⁵ On the luxury of the Sicilians Sydenham refers to the Greek proverb, Σικελικὴ γράκειζα in Plato, Legg. iii. p. 404, D., and the "Siculæ dapes" in Horace.

³⁶ Instead of νίους the two best MSS. have νείς, similar to "filios," in Ficinus.

³⁷ The two best MSS. have preserved οἷα, wanting in all the rest.

them to give a foreign education. Since, rest assured if any one else ever took away money from thence by theft I should have taken by much the most. For they greatly³⁸ in listening to me, and give me praise. what I am saying is not law.³⁹

Soc. Say you, Hippias, that the law is an injury, not a benefit to a state?

Hip. It is enacted, I presume, for a benefit; but sometimes the law, when improperly enacted, does an injury.

Soc. What then, do not they who enact a law, lay claim to the greatest good to a state? For without law it is impossible to live in a state of good government.

Hip. You speak the truth.

Soc. When, therefore, they who undertake to frame laws fail in procuring a good, they have missed⁴⁰ what is best, and law.⁴¹ Or how say you?

Hip. Accurately speaking, Socrates, such is the case, but men are not used to give that name.⁴¹

Soc. Do you mean, Hippias, those, who know the truth, and who do not know it?

Hip. I mean the many.

Soc. Are the many then those, who know the truth?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. But surely they, who do know it, do in reality know that what is to all men more beneficial is more agreeable to law than what is less beneficial. Or do not you grant that?

Hip. I grant that (they do hold so) in reality.

Soc.⁴² Do not (things) exist, and are in the state,⁴² who are knowing, conceive?

Hip. Undoubtedly.

[11.] Soc. Now it is, as you assert, more beneficial

³⁸ In lieu of χαίρουσι γούν, where γούν is useless, I have translated if the Greek were χαίρουσ' ἄγαν—

^{39—39} Such is the literal version of the Greek ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω. By comparing however Protag. § 80, it would not be difficult to see what Plato probably wrote.

^{40—40} I cannot understand νομίμων καὶ νόμων— The natural idea would lead to, "they fail in that, for which laws are laid down."

⁴¹ Here again I am at a loss, unless we read νομίζεω, "to name," in lieu of ὀνομάζειν, "to name," as I suggested long ago.

^{42—42} The Greek is, Οὐκ οὖν ἔστι γε καὶ ἔχει οὕτως. To avoid tautology I suggested Οὐκ οὖν ἂν ἔστι γε, ἔχει οὕτως. Stalbb. has ἔστι τε, from the two best MSS.

Lacedæmonians to receive a foreign education under yourself, than after the system of their own country.

Hip. And I assert the truth.

Soc. Because what is more beneficial is more conformable to law. And this, Hippias, do you say?

Hip. I have so said.

Soc. According then to your reasoning, it is more conformable to law for the sons of the Lacedæmonians to be instructed by Hippias, and less so by their fathers, if perchance they shall in reality be more benefited under you.

Hip. And benefited they would be, Socrates.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians then act contrary to law, in not giving you their gold, and committing their sons to your care.

Hip. In this I agree with you : for you seem to produce an argument in my favour, and there is no need for me to oppose it.

Soc. We find then, my friend, the Lacedæmonians to act contrary to law, and this too in matters of the greatest moment ; they who are thought to be most observant of law. And yet, by the gods, did they praise you, and were delighted at hearing—what ? Or is it not evident that the subjects were those which you know the best, relating to the stars and celestial events ?⁴³

Hip. Not at all. Such subjects they cannot endure.

Soc. But they delight in hearing something about geometry.

Hip. Not at all ; for many of them know not, so to say, even how to reckon.

[12.] *Soc.* They are then far from enduring you, while making a display on the keeping of accounts.⁴⁴

Hip. Very far indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. But the subjects then were those, in which you can the most accurately of (all⁴⁵) men draw distinctions, respecting the powers of letters and syllables, and rhythms and harmonies.

Hip. What harmonies, or letters, my good man ?

Soc. What then are the subjects, which they gladly hear

⁴³ The Greek is *πάθη*. Ficinus has "progressus."

⁴⁴ Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *λογισμῶν*, has "ratiocinationes computationesque ;" and hence Sydenham, "of numbers and accounts."

⁴⁵ Ficinus alone has "omnium hominum—"

from you, and commend? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find them.

Hip. Respecting the genealogies,⁴⁶ Socrates, of their heroes and men, and settlements (of tribes), (and)⁴⁷ how cities were founded of old, and, in a word, to every thing relating to archæology, they listen with the greatest pleasure; so that I was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for their sakes, and to practise myself well on those points.

Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the Lacedæmonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who could reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For otherwise you would have had some trouble in learning the list.

Hip. How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names only once, I can repeat them from memory.

[13.] *Soc.* You speak the truth; but I did not bear in mind that you had a system of mnemonics;⁴⁸ so that I understand⁴⁹ why, reasonably enough, the Lacedæmonians are pleased with you, as being a person who knows many things, and they make use of you, as children do of old women, to tell them pretty stories.

Hip. And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high repute there by going through a lecture upon the honourable pursuits to which a young person should devote himself. For I have by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject,⁵⁰ well put together in other respects, and in the words.⁵⁰ The form and

⁴⁶ There is an article by Osann in the *Rheinische Museum* for 1843, p. 495—501, on the archæological writings of Hippias.

⁴⁷ I suspect ὥς has dropt out after καί—

⁴⁸ According to Pseudo-Plato in *Hipp. M.*, in p. 368, D., the sophist had, like Simonides, cultivated the art of memory; which, before the invention of printing, was necessary for every one who aspired to be a pantologist.

⁴⁹ The Greek is ὥστ' ἔννοω—which seems rather strange after οὐκ ἔνευόησα. Ficinus has “jam intelligo”—which leads to εἰς τὸ νῦν δ' ἔννοω—

⁵⁰—⁵⁰ The Greek is καὶ ἄλλως ἐν διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι. But διακείμενος could hardly follow συγκείμενος; and if it could, it would not be united to the dative ὀνόμασι. Besides, it is not easy to say, to what ἄλλως can be referred, as opposed to ὀνόμασι. Ficinus has “verborum elegantia pellet”—from which I formerly elicited ἐν διακοσμούμενος; but I would now prefer διασκευασμένος, similar to λόγοι παρισκηνασμένοι in Menex. p. 235, D., while in καὶ ἄλλως and καὶ τοῖς lie hid, I suspect, καὶ Λυσίου—καλλίστοις ὀνόμασι. For thus Lysias would be praised here ironically, as he is in the *Phædrus*.

commencement of the discourse is something of this kind.—“After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus inquired of Nestor what were the honourable pursuits a young man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent precepts laid down by law.” [14.] Of this dissertation⁵¹ I made a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in the school of Philostratus.⁵² For so has Eudicus, the son of Apēmantus, requested. See then that you are present yourself, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be competent to decide upon what is then said.

Soc. This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at present answer me a short question relating to it.⁵³ For you have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person, has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations, thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beautiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, “From whence do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful, and what ugly?”⁵⁴ Come then, tell me,⁵⁴ if you can say a word, what is the beautiful?” And I, through my want of wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him with propriety. [15.] So, quitting his company, I grew angry with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I would hear (his opinion) and learn it; and after studying

⁵¹ According to Philostratus in the life of Hippias, p. 495, the dissertation was in the form of a dialogue. Its title was *Τρωικά* or *Ἡρώικα*—For these two words are constantly confounded, as remarked by G. C. Lewis in *Cl. Jl.* No. 76, p. 277, and No. 78, p. 190. So too in *Schol. Od. A.* 546, instead of *ὑπὸ ὀπορίου τῶν Τρώων*, Bentley would read *Ἡρώων* in his letter to Davies, first published in the *Monthly Review*, vol. xiv. p. 202.

⁵² I have adopted *Φιλοστράτου*, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of *Φειδοστράτου*—a word that seems scarcely compounded correctly. On the other hand, the Philostratus here mentioned is probably the same as the person nicknamed *Κυναλώπηξ* by Aristophanes in *Ἰππ.* 1066.

⁵³ As there is nothing to which *αὐτοῦ* can be referred, Plato wrote, I suspect, *περὶ γὰρ του*, “about something.”

⁵⁴—⁵⁴ The Greek is—*Ἐπεὶ φέρεται ἔχεις ἀν εἰπεῖν*—But *ἔπει*, “since,” has no meaning here. I have translated, as if the words were—*Ἐπ’ οὖν, φέρ’*, *εἰ ἔχεις ἀνείπειν*.

it thoroughly, that I would return to my questioner, and fight out again the matter with him. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come opportunely; and do you instruct me sufficiently what is beauty in the abstract, and endeavour to give me as accurately as possible your answers; in order that I may not be confuted a second time, and pay the penalty of a laugh against myself. For assuredly you know it quite clearly, and it would be but a mite of the learning, with which you are conversant on so many⁵⁵ points.

Hip. By Zeus, a mite indeed, Socrates; and, so to say, of no value at all.

Soc. Easily then shall I learn it; and no one will hereafter confute me.

[16.] *Hip.* Not one indeed. For otherwise mean would be my profession, and suited to a common person.

Soc. By Juno, Hippias, you speak bravely, if we shall get the man into our clutches. ⁵⁶ But shall I be any hindrance by imitating him, if I lay hold of your arguments, while answering me, in order that you may exercise me the most. For I am nearly skilful in laying hold (of arguments).⁵⁶ If then it makes no difference to you, I am willing to lay hold of them, in order that I may learn⁵⁷ with greater strength.

Hip. Take hold then: for, as I said just now, the question is not a great one; and I will teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, so that not a single person will be ever able to confute you.

Soc. Ye gods,⁵⁸ how bravely you talk! But come, since you bid me, I will become him, and, as well as I can, try to question you. Now, if you shall give the lecture you men-

⁵⁵ To avoid the incorrect Greek in ὅν ἐδ ῥῶν πολλῶν, we must read ὅν ἐδ εἴρω πολλῶν— The critics quoted by Stalbaum neither do, nor pretend to, defend this union of the relative pronoun with the definite article.

⁵⁶—⁵⁷ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. But how Socrates could, by imitating the nameless saucy fellow, be any hindrance to Hippias, I cannot understand.

⁵⁷ In lieu of μάθω, which I cannot understand, I have suggested μυχθῶ. For the idea of "mingling in fight" here correctly coincides with the preceding ἀναμαχούμενος. Others perhaps would prefer ἱππομαχίστερον με θῶ, i. e. "make myself of greater strength."

⁵⁸ Instead of φεῦ, which never, I think, precedes ὥς ἐδ λίγαις, I have translated as if the Greek were ὦ θεοί.

tion, upon beautiful pursuits, he will, after hearing it, when you have ceased speaking, inquire about nothing else except about the beautiful—for such a habit he has—and he will say, “Art not, (say) thou stranger from Elis, the just just through justness?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning you.

Hip. I answer,⁵⁹ through justness.

[17.] *Soc.* There is then such a thing as justness?

Hip. Clearly so.

Soc. Are not then the wise wise through wisdom? and all that is good good through goodness?

Hip. How not?

Soc. By those things existing really; for it is not surely by their non-existing.

Hip. By their existing really.

Soc. Are not all things, that are beautiful, beautiful through beauty?

Hip. Yes, through beauty.

Soc. By such a thing existing?

Hip. By its existing. For what should it be?

Soc. Tell me now, stranger, he will say, what is this beauty?

Hip. Does he, who asks this question, want to know what is a beautiful thing?

Soc. I think not, Hippias: but what is beauty.

Hip. How does this differ from that?

Soc. Seems there to you no (difference)?

Hip. There is not any difference.

Soc. But, however,⁶⁰ it is evident that you know better.

⁵⁹ I have adopted ἀποκρίνομαι, found in one MS., in lieu of ἀποκρίνομαι. Ficinus omits the word entirely.

⁶⁰ The Greek is ἄλλὰ μίνοι δῆλον, where I cannot understand μίνοι: nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is “Constat autem.” Hence I suggested, many years ago, ἄλλὰ μύοντι τῷ, “But to any one blinking, an expression similar to the Latin, “conniventibus oculis,” and to the English, “with half an eye.” The phrase in Aristoph. Plut. 49, is δῆλον τυφλῷ, quoted by the Schol. on Plato, Sophist, p. 241, D., φαίνεται καὶ, τὸ λεγόμενον δῆ, τυφλῷ: and is found in Rep. iii. p. 465, D., and viii. p. 550, D. With regard to the verb μύειν, which Plato has used in Sophist. p. 239, E., δόξει τοι μύειν ἢ παῖ ἀπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν δμματα, and elsewhere, see Creuzer on Plotinus, Περὶ Κάλλους, p. 357.

Consider, however, good sir, the question (well).⁶¹ For he asks you, not what is a beautiful thing, but what is beauty.

Hip. I understand you, good sir. And I will answer his question, "What is beauty?" nor shall I ever be confuted.⁶² For rest assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.⁶³

[18.] *Soc.* By the dog,⁶⁴ you have answered, Hippias, beautifully and gloriously.⁶⁵ Shall I then, when I answer thus, have answered the question correctly? and shall I never be refuted?

Hip. For how could you be refuted, Socrates, on that point which seems correct to all the world; and where all who hear you will testify in your favour that you are speaking properly?

Soc. Be it so then, by all means. But come, Hippias, let me consider again with myself what you are saying. For the man will question me in some such manner as this: "Come, Socrates, answer me, ⁶⁶if beauty exists in the abstract, all

And to the passages there quoted add Lucian in *Rhetor. Præcept.* § 11, *κάν μύοντι—εἰποι τις*. Shakspeare says in *Lear*, "A man may see how this world goes with no eyes."

⁶¹ After *ἄθρει*, it is pretty evident that *εὖ* has dropt out.

⁶² By comparing the expression of Socrates, *οὐ μή ποτε ἡλεγχθῶ*, it is quite certain that Hippias said *οὐ μή ποτε ἡλεγχθῆς*.

⁶³ Ficinus has "*virginem pulchram ipsum pulchrum esse*," as if his MS. read *παρθένος καλὴ τὸ καλόν*, not *παρθένος καλὴ καλόν*.

⁶⁴ This was one of the oaths adopted by Socrates; another was, "by the plane-tree," as in *Phædrus*, p. 236, D., and the third was, "by the goose," as we learn from the Scholiast on *Aristoph. 'Ορν.* 521. To these might be added "the goat," as appears from *Tertullian Apolog.* 14, quoted by *Gottleber* on *Phædo*, p. 99, A. "Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deorum, quercum et hircum et canem dejerabat." Of the different reasons assigned for such strange forms of adjuration an account is to be found in the notes of *Menage* on *Diogen. Laert.* p. 92. But as none of them are satisfactory, the truth remains to be still found, if worth the search, elsewhere.

⁶⁵ The Greek is *εὐδόξως*: which is never, I believe, thus connected with the idea of an answer. I suggested long ago *οὐ λοξῶς*, i. e. "not obliquely," referring to *Suidas*, *Λοξά' σκόλια, καμπύλα, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας γινόμενα*: and to *Lucian*, *Vit. Auct.* § 14, *ὥσπερ ὁ Λοξίας οὐδὲν ἀποσαφείς*. *Dialog. Deor.* xvi. § 1, *Λοξά—πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἀποκρινομενος*. *Alexandr.* § 10, *ἀμφιβόλους καὶ λοξοὺς χρησμοὺς συγγραφήν*: and I will now add in *Jov. Confut.* § 14, *Λοξά καὶ ἐκαμφοτερίζοντα*. See too *Boissonad.* in *Eunap.* p. 162, and 564.

⁶⁶—⁶⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek text. But the train of thought requires, "Come now, Socrates, and answer me this correctly. All

those things which you say are beautiful, would these be beautiful?"⁶⁵ And I will then say that, ⁶⁷if a beautiful maiden be a beautiful thing, through which the things would be beautiful."⁶⁷

Hip. Think you then that he will still attempt to confute you, (by asserting) that what you say is beautiful, is not so? or that, should he attempt it, he will not be laughed down?

Soc. That he will, thou wondrous man, I am well assured; but whether, after making the attempt, he will be laughed down, the thing itself will show. However,⁶⁸ I wish to tell you what he will say.

Hip. Tell it then.

[19.] *Soc.* What a sweet⁶⁹ creature, Socrates! he will say, you are. Is not a beautiful mare, which even a god has praised in an oracle,⁷⁰ a beautiful thing? What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we say aught else than that ⁷¹the

the things which you say are beautiful, if there be such a thing as beauty in the abstract, would they not be beautiful?" This in Greek would be "Ἰθι μοι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι τοῦτ' ἐγώ. Τὰ πάντα, ἃ φης καλὰ εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐ ταῦτ' ἀν εἶη καλὰ; Ficinus however has "Age, responde mihi, Socrates, Quid est ipsum pulchrum? quod si sit, hæc omnia, quæ pulchra dicuntur, per ipsum pulchra sunt," which it is uncertain whether he did or did not find in his MS. Sydenham however was led from thence to suspect that δὲ ὅ had dropt out between τὸ καλόν and ταῦτ' ἀν—and so was Schleiermacher after him.

⁶⁷—⁶⁷ The Greek is 'Εγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἐστὶ, δὲ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀν εἶη καλὰ. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge the word εἰ before παρθένος, and to read ὅτι παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἐστὶ, κ. τ. λ. S. Heindorf says we must omit εἰ, or all the words after καλόν. But the train of argument leads to something of this kind—"If there be such a thing as a beautiful maiden, there must be the beautiful, by which all the things beautiful would exist"—in Greek, Εἰ παρθένος καλὸν ἐστὶ, ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, δὲ δὲ πάντα ἀν εἶη καλὰ, as I stated many years ago.

⁶⁸ The origin of this proverb is told by the Scholiast on Theætet. p. 200, E., who says, that when some person was going to cross a river, he asked his guide whether it was deep; to which the latter replied, "The event itself will show."

⁶⁹ Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 132, says that γλυκὺς and ἡδύς were used ironically as a polite way of calling a person a simpleton.

⁷⁰ The oracle alluded to has been preserved entire by the Schol. on Theocritus, Id. xiv. 48, and by Tzetzes, in Chil. ix. 291, and x. 330, and partially by Euseb. Præp. Evang. v. 29. For when the people of Megara had inquired of the god to whom the palm of superiority was to be assigned, they were told, amongst other things, that the mares of Thrace, or, as Tzetzes testifies, of Thessaly, were the best.

⁷¹ The Greek is τὴν ἵππον καλὴν εἶναι τὴν γε καλὴν. And so

me from which of the cities, whither you went, did you gain the greatest money? Is it not plain it was from Sparta, whither you went the oftenest?

Hip. Not, by Zeus, from thence, Socrates.

Soc. How say you? The least then?

Hip. Never any thing at all.

Soc. A monstrous and marvellous account you are giving, Hippias. But tell me, has not that wisdom of yours the power to make those ³¹ who associate with you and learn it ³¹ better as regards virtue.

Hip. Yes, very much so, Socrates.

Soc. Were you then able to make the sons of the Inycians better, but unable to make the sons of the Spartans?

Hip. Far from it.³²

Soc. Are the Siciliotes desirous of becoming better, but the Spartans not?

Hip. The Lacedæmonians are, Socrates, very (desirous)?

Soc. Was it then from their want of money that they shunned your society?

Hip. By no means; for they have enough of it.

[8.] *Soc.* What then could it be, that although they were desirous of virtue, and had money, and you were able to benefit them to the greatest extent, they did not send you away loaded with wealth? Was it that the Lacedæmonians can educate their sons better than you? Shall we say this? and do you concede it is so?

Hip. By no manner of means.

Soc. Were you then unable to persuade the young men at Lacedæmon, that by associating with you they would make a greater progress in virtue than by associating with their own people? Or were you unable to persuade their fathers that they ought to hand over their children to you rather than take that care upon themselves, if they had any regard for

³¹⁻³¹ The Greek is *τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῇ καὶ μαθάνοντας*—I have translated as if it were *τοὺς σοὶ συνόντας καὶ αὐτὴν μαθάνοντας*. For thus *σοὶ συνόντας* is similar to *συνὼν τοῖς νίοις* twice in § 4, and to *σοὶ—συνόντες* in § 8.

³² To a bipartite question there could not be a single answer. There is a lacuna here, to be supplied from Suidas, *Πολλοὺ δὴ δῖω καὶ λίγειν σιωπῶ*: where, if we read *γε* for *καὶ*, we shall have an expression similar to *οὐκ ἂν φαίην ἔγωγε* in § 9, explained by *σιωπῶ*.

their children? For surely they did not grudge their sons becoming as virtuous as possible.

Hip. I do not think they felt any grudge.

Soc. In good truth Lacedæmon is a well-regulated city.

Hip. How not?

Soc. Now in well-regulated cities virtue is most highly prized.

Hip. Certainly.

[9.] *Soc.* And to impart this to another you know the best of all men.

Hip. By much so, Socrates.

Soc. Now would not the man, who could best impart the art of horsemanship, be the most honoured, and acquire the most wealth in Thessaly,³³ or wherever else in Greece³⁴ this art is cultivated the most?

Hip. It is likely.

Soc. Will he then, who can impart instruction of the greatest value with respect to virtue, be honoured the most, and make the most money if he wishes it, not at Lacedæmon and any other of the well-regulated states in Greece, but in Sicily³⁵ rather, as you think, my friend, or at Inycum? Shall we, Hippias, give credit to this? for if you command, I must (do so).

Hip. It is not, Socrates, the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians to disturb their laws, nor to educate their children³⁶ contrary to established usages.

Soc. How say you? Think you³⁷ that it is the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians not to act correctly, but to do wrong?

Hip. I would not say so, Socrates.

Soc. Would they not do right then to educate their sons in the better way, and not in the worse?

[10.] *Hip.* (They would do) right; but it is not lawful for

³³ See Meno, § 1. S.

³⁴ As there is nothing on which τῆς Ἑλλάδος can depend, I have translated as if the Greek were ἡ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλοθι—not τῆς Ἑλλάδος—καὶ ἀλλοθι.

³⁵ On the luxury of the Sicilians Sydenham refers to the Greek proverb, Σικελικὴ τράπεζα in Plato, Legg. iii. p. 404, D., and the "Siculæ dapes" in Horace.

³⁶ Instead of νιους the two best MSS. have υἱς, similar to "filios," in Ficinus.

³⁷ The two best MSS. have preserved οἷα, wanting in all the rest.

them to give a foreign education. Since, rest assured that if any one else ever took away money from thence by teaching, I should have taken by much the most. For they delight greatly³⁸ in listening to me, and give me praise.³⁹ But what I am saying is not law.³⁹

Soc. Say you, Hippias, that the law is an injury or a benefit to a state?

Hip. It is enacted, I presume, for a benefit; but sometimes the law, when improperly enacted, does an injury.

Soc. What then, do not they who enact a law, lay it down as the greatest good to a state? For without law it is impossible to live in a state of good government.

Hip. You speak the truth.

Soc. When, therefore, they who undertake to frame laws, fail in procuring a good, they have missed⁴⁰ what is lawful and law.⁴⁰ Or how say you?

Hip. Accurately speaking, Socrates, such is the case; but men are not used to give that name.⁴¹

Soc. Do you mean, Hippias, those, who know the truth, or who do not know it?

Hip. I mean the many.

Soc. Are the many then those, who know the truth?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. But surely they, who do know it, do in reality conceive that what is to all men more beneficial is more agreeable to law than what is less beneficial. Or do not you grant this?

Hip. I grant that (they do hold so) in reality.

*Soc.*⁴² Do not (things) exist, and are in the state,⁴² as those, who are knowing, conceive?

Hip. Undoubtedly.

[11.] *Soc.* Now it is, as you assert, more beneficial for the

³⁸ In lieu of *χαίρουσι γούν*, where *γούν* is useless, I have translated as if the Greek were *χαίρουσ' ἄγαν*—

^{39—39} Such is the literal version of the Greek *ἀλλ' ὃ λίγω οὐ νόμος*. By comparing however Protag. § 80, it would not be difficult to recover what Plato probably wrote.

^{40—40} I cannot understand *νομίμων καὶ νόμον*— The natural train of ideas would lead to, "they fail in that, for which laws are laid down"—

⁴¹ Here again I am at a loss, unless we read *νομίζεῖν*, "to think," in lieu of *ὀνομάζειν*, "to name," as I suggested long ago.

^{42—42} The Greek is, *ὅτι οὐν ἔστι γε καὶ ἔχει οὕτως*. To avoid the tautology I suggested *ὅτι οὐν ἂν ἔστι γε, ἔχει οὕτως*. Stalb. has edited *ἔστι γε*, from the two best MSS.

Lacedæmonians to receive a foreign education under yourself, than after the system of their own country.

Hip. And I assert the truth.

Soc. Because what is more beneficial is more conformable to law. And this, Hippias, do you say?

Hip. I have so said.

Soc. According then to your reasoning, it is more conformable to law for the sons of the Lacedæmonians to be instructed by Hippias, and less so by their fathers, if perchance they shall in reality be more benefited under you.

Hip. And benefited they would be, Socrates.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians then act contrary to law, in not giving you their gold, and committing their sons to your care.

Hip. In this I agree with you: for you seem to produce an argument in my favour, and there is no need for me to oppose it.

Soc. We find then, my friend, the Lacedæmonians to act contrary to law, and this too in matters of the greatest moment; they who are thought to be most observant of law. And yet, by the gods, did they praise you, and were delighted at hearing—what? Or is it not evident that the subjects were those which you know the best, relating to the stars and celestial events?⁴³

Hip. Not at all. Such subjects they cannot endure.

Soc. But they delight in hearing something about geometry.

Hip. Not at all; for many of them know not, so to say, even how to reckon.

[12.] *Soc.* They are then far from enduring you, while making a display on the keeping of accounts.⁴⁴

Hip. Very far indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. But the subjects then were those, in which you can the most accurately of (all⁴⁵) men draw distinctions, respecting the powers of letters and syllables, and rhythms and harmonies.

Hip. What harmonies, or letters, my good man?

Soc. What then are the subjects, which they gladly hear

⁴³ The Greek is *πάθη*. Ficinus has "progressus."

⁴⁴ Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *λογισμῶν*, has "ratiocinationes computationesque;" and hence Sydenham, "of numbers and accounts."

⁴⁵ Ficinus alone has "omnium hominum—"

from you, and commend? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find them.

Hip. Respecting the genealogies,⁴⁶ Socrates, of their heroes and men, and settlements (of tribes), (and)⁴⁷ how cities were founded of old, and, in a word, to every thing relating to archæology, they listen with the greatest pleasure; so that I was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for their sakes, and to practise myself well on those points.

Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the Lacedæmonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who could reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For otherwise you would have had some trouble in learning the list.

Hip. How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names only once, I can repeat them from memory.

[13.] *Soc.* You speak the truth; but I did not bear in mind that you had a system of mnemonics;⁴⁸ so that I understand⁴⁹ why, reasonably enough, the Lacedæmonians are pleased with you, as being a person who knows many things, and they make use of you, as children do of old women, to tell them pretty stories.

Hip. And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high repute there by going through a lecture upon the honourable pursuits to which a young person should devote himself. For I have by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject,⁵⁰ well put together in other respects, and in the words.⁵⁰ The form and

⁴⁶ There is an article by Osann in the *Rheinische Museum* for 1843, p. 495—501, on the archæological writings of Hippias.

⁴⁷ I suspect ὥς has dropt out after καί—

⁴⁸ According to Pseudo-Plato in *Hipp. M.*, in p. 368, D., the sophist had, like Simonides, cultivated the art of memory; which, before the invention of printing, was necessary for every one who aspired to be a pantologist.

⁴⁹ The Greek is ὥστ' ἐννοῶ—which seems rather strange after οὐκ ἐννόησα. Ficinus has “jam intelligo”—which leads to εἰς τὸ νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ—

⁵⁰ The Greek is καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι. But διακείμενος could hardly follow συγκείμενος: and if it could, it would not be united to the dative ὀνόμασι. Besides, it is not easy to say, to what ἄλλως can be referred, as opposed to ὀνόμασι. Ficinus has “verborum elegantia pellet”—from which I formerly elicited εὖ διακοσμούμενος: but I would now prefer δισκευασμένος, similar to λόγοι παρεσκευασμένοι in *Menex.* p. 235, D., while in καὶ ἄλλως and καὶ τοῖς lie hid, I suspect, καὶ Ἀσίου—καλλίστοις ὀνόμασι. For thus Lysias would be praised here ironically, as he is in the *Phædrus*.

commencement of the discourse is something of this kind.—“After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus inquired of Nestor what were the honourable pursuits a young man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent precepts laid down by law.” [14.] Of this dissertation⁵¹ I made a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in the school of Philostratus.⁵² For so has Eudicus, the son of Apēmantus, requested. See then that you are present yourself, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be competent to decide upon what is then said.

Soc. This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at present answer me a short question relating to it.⁵³ For you have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations, thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beautiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, “From whence do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful, and what ugly?”⁵⁴ Come then, tell me,⁵⁴ if you can say a word, what is the beautiful?” And I, through my want of wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him with propriety. [15.] So, quitting his company, I grew angry with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I would hear (his opinion) and learn it; and after studying

⁵¹ According to Philostratus in the life of Hippias, p. 495, the dissertation was in the form of a dialogue. Its title was *Τρωικά* or *Ἡρωικά*—For these two words are constantly confounded, as remarked by G. C. Lewis in *Cl. Jl.* No. 76, p. 277, and No. 78, p. 190. So too in *Schol. Od. A.* 546, instead of *ὑπὸ ὀποτέρου τῶν Τρώων*, Bentley would read *Ἡρώων* in his letter to Davies, first published in the *Monthly Review*, vol. xiv. p. 202.

⁵² I have adopted *Φιλοστράτου*, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of *Φειδοστράτου*—a word that seems scarcely compounded correctly. On the other hand, the Philostratus here mentioned is probably the same as the person nicknamed *Κυναλώπηξ* by Aristophanes in *Ἰππ.* 1066.

⁵³ As there is nothing to which *αὐτοῦ* can be referred, Plato wrote, I suspect, *περί γέ του*, “about something.”

⁵⁴ The Greek is—*Ἐπεὶ φέροις εἶναι εἰπεῖν*—But *εἶπει*, “since,” has no meaning here. I have translated, as if the words were—*Εἰπ' οὖν, φέρ', εἰ εἶχαις ἀνεῖπειν*.

it thoroughly, that I would return to my questioner, and fight out again the matter with him. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come opportunely; and do you instruct me sufficiently what is beauty in the abstract, and endeavour to give me as accurately as possible your answers; in order that I may not be confuted a second time, and pay the penalty of a laugh against myself. For assuredly you know it quite clearly, and it would be but a mite of the learning, with which you are conversant on so many⁵⁵ points.

Hip. By Zeus, a mite indeed, Socrates; and, so to say, of no value at all.

Soc. Easily then shall I learn it; and no one will hereafter confute me.

[16.] *Hip.* Not one indeed. For otherwise mean would be my profession, and suited to a common person.

Soc. By Juno, Hippias, you speak bravely, if we shall get the man into our clutches. ⁵⁶ But shall I be any hindrance by imitating him, if I lay hold of your arguments, while answering me, in order that you may exercise me the most. For I am nearly skilful in laying hold (of arguments).⁵⁶ If then it makes no difference to you, I am willing to lay hold of them, in order that I may learn⁵⁷ with greater strength.

Hip. Take hold then: for, as I said just now, the question is not a great one; and I will teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, so that not a single person will be ever able to confute you.

Soc. Ye gods,⁵⁸ how bravely you talk! But come, since you bid me, I will become him, and, as well as I can, try to question you. Now, if you shall give the lecture you men-

⁵⁵ To avoid the incorrect Greek in ὧν σὲ τῶν πολλῶν, we must read ὧν σὲ οὕτω πολλῶν— The critics quoted by Stalbaum neither do, nor pretend to, defend this union of the relative pronoun with the definite article.

⁵⁶⁻⁵⁸ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. But how Socrates could, by imitating the nameless saucy fellow, be any hindrance to Hippias, I cannot understand.

⁵⁷ In lieu of μάθω, which I cannot understand, I have suggested μυχθῶ. For the idea of "mingling in fight" here correctly coincides with the preceding ἀναμαχοῦμενος. Others perhaps would prefer ἔρρωμενίστερον με θῶ, i. e. "make myself of greater strength."

⁵⁸ Instead of φεῦ, which never, I think, precedes ὥς εὖ λέγεις, I have translated as if the Greek were ὦ θεοί.

tion, upon beautiful pursuits, he will, after hearing it, when you have ceased speaking, inquire about nothing else except about the beautiful—for such a habit he has—and he will say, “Art not, (say) thou stranger from Elis, the just just through justness?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning you.

Hip. I answer,⁵⁹ through justness.

[17.] *Soc.* There is then such a thing as justness?

Hip. Clearly so.

Soc. Are not then the wise wise through wisdom? and all that is good good through goodness?

Hip. How not?

Soc. By those things existing really; for it is not surely by their non-existing.

Hip. By their existing really.

Soc. Are not all things, that are beautiful, beautiful through beauty?

Hip. Yes, through beauty.

Soc. By such a thing existing?

Hip. By its existing. For what should it be?

Soc. Tell me now, stranger, he will say, what is this beauty?

Hip. Does he, who asks this question, want to know what is a beautiful thing?

Soc. I think not, Hippias: but what is beauty.

Hip. How does this differ from that?

Soc. Seems there to you no (difference)?

Hip. There is not any difference.

Soc. But, however,⁶⁰ it is evident that you know better.

⁵⁹ I have adopted ἀποκρίνομαι, found in one MS., in lieu of ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Ficinus omits the word entirely.

⁶⁰ The Greek is Ἄλλὰ μίντοι δῆλον, where I cannot understand μίντοι: nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is “Constat autem.” Hence I suggested, many years ago, Ἄλλὰ μύοντι τῷ, “But to any one blinking,” an expression similar to the Latin, “conniventibus oculis,” and to the English, “with half an eye.” The phrase in Aristoph. Plut. 49, is δῆλον τυφλῷ, quoted by the Schol. on Plato, Sophist. p. 241, D., φαίνεται καὶ, τὸ λεγόμενον δῆ, τυφλῷ: and is found in Rep. iii. p. 465, D., and viii. p. 550, D. With regard to the verb μύειν, which Plato has used in Sophist. p. 239, E., δόξει τοι μύειν ἢ παρ’ ἀπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὁμματα, and elsewhere, see Creuzer on Plotinus, Περὶ Κάλους, p. 357.

Consider, however, good sir, the question (well).⁶¹ For he asks you, not what is a beautiful thing, but what is beauty.

Hip. I understand you, good sir. And I will answer his question, "What is beauty?" nor shall I ever be confuted.⁶² For rest assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.⁶³

[18.] *Soc.* By the dog,⁶⁴ you have answered, Hippias, beautifully and gloriously.⁶⁵ Shall I then, when I answer thus, have answered the question correctly? and shall I never be refuted?

Hip. For how could you be refuted, Socrates, on that point which seems correct to all the world; and where all who hear you will testify in your favour that you are speaking properly?

Soc. Be it so then, by all means. But come, Hippias, let me consider again with myself what you are saying. For the man will question me in some such manner as this: "Come, Socrates, answer me, ⁶⁶if beauty exists in the abstract, all

And to the passages there quoted add Lucian in *Rhetor. Præcept.* § 11, *ἐὰν μύοντι—εἰποι τις*. Shakspeare says in *Lear*, "A man may see how this world goes with no eyes."

⁶¹ After *ἄθρει*, it is pretty evident that *εὖ* has dropt out.

⁶² By comparing the expression of Socrates, *οὐ μὴ ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ*, it is quite certain that Hippias said *οὐ μὴ ποτε ἐλεγχθῆς*.

⁶³ Ficinus has "*virginem pulchram ipsum pulchrum esse*," as if his MS. read *παρθένος καλὴ τὸ καλόν*, not *παρθένος καλὴ καλόν*.

⁶⁴ This was one of the oaths adopted by Socrates; another was, "by the plane-tree," as in *Phædrus*, p. 236, D., and the third was, "by the goose," as we learn from the Scholiast on *Aristoph. 'Ορν.* 521. To these might be added "the goat," as appears from *Tertullian Apolog.* 14, quoted by *Gottleber* on *Phædo*, p. 99, A. "*Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deorum, quercum et hircum et canem dejerabat.*" Of the different reasons assigned for such strange forms of adjuration an account is to be found in the notes of *Menage* on *Diogen. Laert.* p. 92. But as none of them are satisfactory, the truth remains to be still found, if worth the search, elsewhere.

⁶⁵ The Greek is *εὐδόξως*: which is never, I believe, thus connected with the idea of an answer. I suggested long ago *οὐ λοξῶς*, i. e. "not obliquely," referring to *Suidas*, *Λοξά: σκόλια, καμπύλα, ὅτε ἐξ εὐθείας γινόμενα*: and to *Lucian*, *Vit. Auct.* § 14, *ὥσπερ ὁ Λοξίας οὐδὲν ἀποσαφείς*. *Dialog. Deor.* xvi. § 1, *Λοξά—πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἀποκρινόμενος*. *Alexandr.* § 10, *ἀμφιβόλους καὶ λοξοὺς χρησμούς συγγραῖων*: and I will now add in *Jov. Confut.* § 14, *λοξὰ καὶ ἐκαμφοτερίζοντα*. See too *Boissonad.* in *Eunap.* p. 162, and 564.

⁶⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek text. But the train of thought requires, "Come now, Socrates, and answer me this correctly. All

these things which you say are beautiful, would these be beautiful?"⁶¹ And I will then say that, ⁶⁷if a beautiful maiden be a beautiful thing, through which the things would be beautiful."⁶⁷

Hip. Think you then that he will still attempt to confute you, (by asserting) that what you say is beautiful, is not so? or that, should he attempt it, he will not be laughed down?

Soc. That he will, thou wondrous man, I am well assured; but whether, after making the attempt, he will be laughed down, the thing itself will show. However,⁶⁸ I wish to tell you what he will say.

Hip. Tell it then.

[19.] *Soc.* What a sweet⁶⁹ creature, Socrates! he will say, you are. Is not a beautiful mare, which even a god has praised in an oracle,⁷⁰ a beautiful thing? What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we say aught else than that ⁷¹the

the things which you say are beautiful, if there be such a thing as beauty in the abstract, would they not be beautiful?" This in Greek would be "Ἰθι μοι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίναι τοῦτ' ἐγώ. Τὰ πάντα, δ' φησὶ καλὰ εἶναι, εἴ τι ἔστι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐ ταῦτ' ἀν εἰη καλὰ; Ficinus however has "Age, responde mihi, Socrates, Quid est ipsum pulchrum? quod si sit, hæc omnia, quæ pulchra dicuntur, per ipsum pulchra sunt," which it is uncertain whether he did or did not find in his MS. Sydenham however was led from thence to suspect that δὲ δ' had dropt out between τὸ καλόν and ταῦτ' ἀν—and so was Schleiermacher after him.

⁶⁷—⁶⁷ The Greek is Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἱρῶ, ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλόν ἔστι, δὲ δ' ταῦτ' ἀν εἰη καλὰ. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge the word εἰ before παρθένος, and to read ὅτι παρθένος καλὴ καλόν ἔστι, κ. τ. λ. S. Heindorf says we must omit εἰ, or all the words after καλόν. But the train of argument leads to something of this kind—"If there be such a thing as a beautiful maiden, there must be the beautiful, by which all the things beautiful would exist"—in Greek, Εἰ παρθένος καλόν ἔστι, ἔστι τὸ καλόν, δὲ δ' πάντ' ἀν εἰη καλὰ, as I stated many years ago.

⁶⁸ The origin of this proverb is told by the Scholiast on Theætet. p. 200, E., who says, that when some person was going to cross a river, he asked his guide whether it was deep; to which the latter replied, "The event itself will show."

⁶⁹ Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 132, says that γλυκὺς and ἡδύς were used ironically as a polite way of calling a person a simpleton.

⁷⁰ The oracle alluded to has been preserved entire by the Schol. on Theocritus, Id. xiv. 48, and by Tzetzes, in Chil. ix. 291, and x. 330, and partially by Euseb. Præp. Evang. v. 29. For when the people of Megara had inquired of the god to whom the palm of superiority was to be assigned, they were told, amongst other things, that the mares of Thrace, or, as Tzetzes testifies, of Thessaly, were the best.

⁷¹ The Greek is τὴν ἵππον καλὴν εἶναι τὴν γε καλὴν. And so

mare is beautiful? at least the beautiful.⁷¹ For how should we dare to deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

Hip. You speak, Socrates, what is true,⁷² especially since the god rightly said it;⁷³ for with us there are mares very beautiful.⁷³

Soc. Be it so, he will say; but what, is not a beautiful lyre a beautiful thing? Shall we allow it, Hippias?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And after this he will say—as, guessing from his usual manner, I nearly know full well—My excellent fellow, is not a beautiful soup-dish a beautiful thing?

Hip. Who is this man, Socrates? What an uneducated fellow! who thus presumes to express himself in words so low in an affair so solemn.

Soc. Such is the fellow, Hippias, not a fine gentleman, but a man of the mob, who cares for nothing but truth. He must however have an answer; ⁷⁴and I appear speaking for him ⁷⁴—

Ficinus, "*Pulchram equam nonne pulchram esse.*" This, says Heindorf, might stand; but *καλὸν εἶναι*, suggested by Cornarius, is preferable. He did not however perceive that, as the article could not be thus repeated, it must be omitted before *ἴππων*; nor that *γε Θεσσαλὴν* lie hid in *γε καλὴν*, to answer to the Thessalian mare, mentioned in the oracle, according to Tzetzes; and hence just before in lieu of *θήλεια* one would prefer *Θεσσαλῆ*, as I remarked many years ago.

⁷²⁻⁷³ Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I confess I cannot understand. For Socrates did not say what was true, because the oracle spoke truth; nor did the oracle speak truth, because there were beautiful mares in Elis. What Hippias meant to say is, that, as the oracle had spoken of the beauty of mares, it had spoken of what an Elean, who was a judge of such matters, would confess to be beautiful. Plato therefore wrote perhaps, as I suggested many years ago,—*ἰεῖροι καὶ, δ ὁρθῶς ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν, εἶπον δὲ αὐτός*, "since, what the god has correctly said, I would have said myself;" a sentiment that exhibits the vanity of Hippias in a marked manner, as he thus puts himself upon an equality with the god.

⁷³ As the chariot-races in the Olympic games were run in the country of Elis, the people there had an opportunity of seeing the best horses, and of becoming, like persons living at Newmarket and Doncaster in England, the best judges of horse-flesh; while from the number of prizes gained by mares, it was found that the female was better suited than the male for a long race, as remarked by Servius on Virgil, *Georg. i. 59*.

⁷⁴⁻⁷⁶ The Greek is *καὶ ἔγωγε προαποφαίνομαι*: which would mean "I give my opinion the first," as shown by *Ὁ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην* in *Protag. p. 340, A.* Ficinus has "*Præfabor.*" But this could be said only if Socrates were going to reply, not to put a question. Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ λέγων γε πρὸ αὐτοῦ φαίνομαι*, as I partly suggested many years ago, when I should have quoted *Alcest. 336, πρὸ τούτων—λέγειν*.

If the soup-dish be made by a skilful potter, smooth and round, and well baked, like some of the beautiful soup-dishes with two handles, containing six choes,⁷⁵ very beautiful,⁷⁶ if he inquires about such a soup-dish, we must confess it to be beautiful. For how could we say that what is beautiful, is not beautiful?

Hip. Not at all, Socrates.

Soc. Is not a beautiful soup-dish then, he will say, a beautiful thing? Answer.

[20.] *Hip.* But, Socrates, the case is, I think, this; even such a vessel, when beautifully made, is a beautiful thing. But this taken as a whole does not deserve to be considered as beautiful, as compared with a mare, and a maiden, and the other things of beauty.

Soc. Be it so. I understand you, Hippias, that we must thus reply to the person who puts such a question. You are ignorant, my man, that correct is the saying of Heracleitus, That the most beautiful ape, as compared with another kind,⁷⁷ is ugly; and that the most beautiful of soup-dishes is ugly as compared with the maiden-kind; as says Hippias the wise. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hip. You have answered, Socrates, quite correctly.

Soc. Hear then—for I know well he will say after this—What then, Socrates, should any one compare maiden-kind

⁷⁵ According to Arbuthnot's computation, the Attic χοῦς contained three quarts. S.

⁷⁶ This repetition of *πάγκαλαι* after the preceding *τῶν καλῶν*, justly gave offence to a friend of Heindorf. But he did not see, as I remarked many years ago, that in *τῶν καλῶν* lies hid perhaps *τῶν Σικελῶν*—for Eubulus, quoted by Athenæus, i. p. 28, C., mentions *Σικελικὰ βατάνια*.

⁷⁷ The Greek is *ἄλλῃ γίνοι*. But we ought to read *ἀνθρωπίνῃ γίνοι*, as is evident from what is quoted presently after from the same Heracleitus, *ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανείται*. For however dark his writings were, there is no reason to think he wrote absurdly. The absurdity is owing to the transcribers, who instead of *ἀνῶ*, an abbreviated form for *ἀνθρωπίνῃ*, wrote *ἄλλῃ*. S. This correction, or rather *ἀνθρωπείῃ*, which is more after Plato's manner, appears to be indubitable; for we have thus a climax of ideas—"The most beautiful monkey is ugly, as compared with a man: and the man most wise, as compared with a god." HEIND., who, in ed. 2, prefers *ἀνθρώπων*, as Bekker does likewise. But a single monkey would scarcely be compared with the whole race of man. The true reading is probably *ἀνῶ ἐνὶ γῆ*, i. e. "to even a single man." On a similar allusion to the monkey, see my note on The Statesman, § 9, p. 205.

them to give a foreign education. Since, rest assured that if any one else ever took away money from thence by teaching, I should have taken by much the most. For they delight greatly³⁸ in listening to me, and give me praise.³⁹ But what I am saying is not law.³⁹

Soc. Say you, Hippias, that the law is an injury or a benefit to a state?

Hip. It is enacted, I presume, for a benefit; but sometimes the law, when improperly enacted, does an injury.

Soc. What then, do not they who enact a law, lay it down as the greatest good to a state? For without law it is impossible to live in a state of good government.

Hip. You speak the truth.

Soc. When, therefore, they who undertake to frame laws, fail in procuring a good, they have missed⁴⁰ what is lawful and law.⁴⁰ Or how say you?

Hip. Accurately speaking, Socrates, such is the case; but men are not used to give that name.⁴¹

Soc. Do you mean, Hippias, those, who know the truth, or who do not know it?

Hip. I mean the many.

Soc. Are the many then those, who know the truth?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. But surely they, who do know it, do in reality conceive that what is to all men more beneficial is more agreeable to law than what is less beneficial. Or do not you grant this?

Hip. I grant that (they do hold so) in reality.

*Soc.*⁴² Do not (things) exist, and are in the state,⁴² as those, who are knowing, conceive?

Hip. Undoubtedly.

[11.] *Soc.* Now it is, as you assert, more beneficial for the

³⁸ In lieu of *χαίρουσι γούν*, where *γούν* is useless, I have translated as if the Greek were *χαίρουσι' αγαυ*—

^{39—39} Such is the literal version of the Greek *ἀλλ' ὃ λίγω οὐ νόμος*. By comparing however Protag. § 80, it would not be difficult to recover what Plato probably wrote.

^{40—40} I cannot understand *νομίμων καὶ νόμον*—The natural train of ideas would lead to, "they fail in that, for which laws are laid down"—

⁴¹ Here again I am at a loss, unless we read *νομίζουσιν*, "to think," in lieu of *ὀνομάζουσιν*, "to name," as I suggested long ago.

^{42—42} The Greek is, *ὅτι οὐν ἔστι γε καὶ ἔχει οὕτως*. To avoid the tautology I suggested *ὅτι οὐν ἔστι γε, ἔχει οὕτως*. Stalb. has edited *ἔστι τε*, from the two best MSS.

Lacedæmonians to receive a foreign education under yourself, than after the system of their own country.

Hip. And I assert the truth.

Soc. Because what is more beneficial is more conformable to law. And this, Hippias, do you say?

Hip. I have so said.

Soc. According then to your reasoning, it is more conformable to law for the sons of the Lacedæmonians to be instructed by Hippias, and less so by their fathers, if perchance they shall in reality be more benefited under you.

Hip. And benefited they would be, Socrates.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians then act contrary to law, in not giving you their gold, and committing their sons to your care.

Hip. In this I agree with you: for you seem to produce an argument in my favour, and there is no need for me to oppose it.

Soc. We find then, my friend, the Lacedæmonians to act contrary to law, and this too in matters of the greatest moment; they who are thought to be most observant of law. And yet, by the gods, did they praise you, and were delighted at hearing—what? Or is it not evident that the subjects were those which you know the best, relating to the stars and celestial events?⁴³

Hip. Not at all. Such subjects they cannot endure.

Soc. But they delight in hearing something about geometry.

Hip. Not at all; for many of them know not, so to say, even how to reckon.

[12.] *Soc.* They are then far from enduring you, while making a display on the keeping of accounts.⁴⁴

Hip. Very far indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. But the subjects then were those, in which you can the most accurately of (all⁴⁵) men draw distinctions, respecting the powers of letters and syllables, and rhythms and harmonies.

Hip. What harmonies, or letters, my good man?

Soc. What then are the subjects, which they gladly hear

⁴³ The Greek is *πράθη*. Ficinus has "progressus."

⁴⁴ Ficinus, uncertain how to translate *λογισμῶν*, has "ratiocinationes computationesque;" and hence Sydenham, "of numbers and accounts."

⁴⁵ Ficinus alone has "omnium hominum—"

from you, and commend? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find them.

Hip. Respecting the genealogies,⁴⁶ Socrates, of their heroes and men, and settlements (of tribes), (and)⁴⁷ how cities were founded of old, and, in a word, to every thing relating to archæology, they listen with the greatest pleasure; so that I was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for their sakes, and to practise myself well on those points.

Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the Lacedæmonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who could reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For otherwise you would have had some trouble in learning the list.

Hip. How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names only once, I can repeat them from memory.

[13.] *Soc.* You speak the truth; but I did not bear in mind that you had a system of mnemonics;⁴⁸ so that I understand⁴⁹ why, reasonably enough, the Lacedæmonians are pleased with you, as being a person who knows many things, and they make use of you, as children do of old women, to tell them pretty stories.

Hip. And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high repute there by going through a lecture upon the honourable pursuits to which a young person should devote himself. For I have by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject,⁵⁰ well put together in other respects, and in the words.⁵⁰ The form and

⁴⁶ There is an article by Osann in the *Rheinische Museum* for 1843, p. 495—501, on the archæological writings of Hippias.

⁴⁷ I suspect ὥς has dropt out after καί—

⁴⁸ According to Pseudo-Plato in *Hipp. M.*, in p. 368, D., the sophist had, like Simonides, cultivated the art of memory; which, before the invention of printing, was necessary for every one who aspired to be a pantologist.

⁴⁹ The Greek is ὥστ' ἐννοῶ—which seems rather strange after οὐκ ἐνενόησα. Ficinus has “jam intelligo”—which leads to εἰς τὸ νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ—

⁵⁰ The Greek is καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακειμένος καὶ τοῖς δνόμασι. But διακειμένος could hardly follow συγκεείμενος: and if it could, it would not be united to the dative δνόμασι. Besides, it is not easy to say, to what ἄλλως can be referred, as opposed to δνόμασι. Ficinus has “verborum elegantia pcellet”—from which I formerly elicited εὖ διακοσμούμενος: but I would now prefer διεσκευασμένος, similar to λόγοι παρεσκευασμένοι in *Menex.* p. 235, D., while in καὶ ἄλλως and καὶ τοῖς lie hid, I suspect, καὶ Λυσίου—καλλίστοις δνόμασι. For thus Lysias would be praised here ironically, as he is in the *Phædrus*.

commencement of the discourse is something of this kind.—“After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus inquired of Nestor what were the honourable pursuits a young man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent precepts laid down by law.” [14.] Of this dissertation⁵¹ I made a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in the school of Philostratus.⁵² For so has Eudicus, the son of Apēmantus, requested. See then that you are present yourself, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be competent to decide upon what is then said.

Soc. This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at present answer me a short question relating to it.⁵³ For you have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person, has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations, thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beautiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, “From whence do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful, and what ugly?”⁵⁴ Come then, tell me,⁵⁴ if you can say a word, what is the beautiful?” And I, through my want of wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him with propriety. [15.] So, quitting his company, I grew angry with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I would hear (his opinion) and learn it; and after studying

⁵¹ According to Philostratus in the life of Hippias, p. 495, the dissertation was in the form of a dialogue. Its title was *Τρωικὴ* or *Ἡρωικὴ*—For these two words are constantly confounded, as remarked by G. C. Lewis in Cl. Jl. No. 76, p. 277, and No. 78, p. 190. So too in Schol. Od. A. 546, instead of *ὑπὸ ὁποτέρου τῶν Τρώων*, Bentley would read *Ἡρώων* in his letter to Davies, first published in the Monthly Review, vol. xiv. p. 202.

⁵² I have adopted *Φιλοστράτου*, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of *Φειδοστράτου*—a word that seems scarcely compounded correctly. On the other hand, the Philostratus here mentioned is probably the same as the person nicknamed *Κυναλώπηξ* by Aristophanes in *Ἰππ.* 1066.

⁵³ As there is nothing to which *αὐτοῦ* can be referred, Plato wrote, I suspect, *περί γέ του*, “about something.”

⁵⁴—The Greek is—*Ἐπεὶ φέρεῖ ἔχους ἀν εἰπεῖν*—But *ἔπει*, “since,” has no meaning here. I have translated, as if the words were—*Εἰπ’ οὖν, φέρε’, εἰ ἔχους ἀνεπείν*.

it thoroughly, that I would return to my questioner, and fight out again the matter with him. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come opportunely; and do you instruct me sufficiently what is beauty in the abstract, and endeavour to give me as accurately as possible your answers; in order that I may not be confuted a second time, and pay the penalty of a laugh against myself. For assuredly you know it quite clearly, and it would be but a mite of the learning, with which you are conversant on so many⁵⁴ points.

Hip. By Zeus, a mite indeed, Socrates; and, so to say, of no value at all.

Soc. Easily then shall I learn it; and no one will hereafter confute me.

[16.] *Hip.* Not one indeed. For otherwise mean would be my profession, and suited to a common person.

Soc. By Juno, Hippias, you speak bravely, if we shall get the man into our clutches. ⁵⁵ But shall I be any hindrance by imitating him, if I lay hold of your arguments, while answering me, in order that you may exercise me the most. For I am nearly skilful in laying hold (of arguments).⁵⁶ If then it makes no difference to you, I am willing to lay hold of them, in order that I may learn⁵⁷ with greater strength.

Hip. Take hold then: for, as I said just now, the question is not a great one; and I will teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, so that not a single person will be ever able to confute you.

Soc. Ye gods,⁵⁸ how bravely you talk! But come, since you bid me, I will become him, and, as well as I can, try to question you. Now, if you shall give the lecture you men-

⁵⁴ To avoid the incorrect Greek in ὧν σὸ τῶν πολλῶν, we must read ὧν σὸ ὅσων πολλῶν— The critics quoted by Stalbaum neither do, nor pretend to, defend this union of the relative pronoun with the definite article.

⁵⁵⁻⁵⁶ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. But how Socrates could, by imitating the nameless saucy fellow, be any hindrance to Hippias, I cannot understand.

⁵⁷ In lieu of μάθω, which I cannot understand, I have suggested μυχθῶ. For the idea of "mingling in fight" here correctly coincides with the preceding ἀναμαχούμενος. Others perhaps would prefer ἰπρωμενίστερον με θῶ, i. e. "make myself of greater strength."

⁵⁸ Instead of φεῦ, which never, I think, precedes ὡς εἰ λέγεις, I have translated as if the Greek were ὦ θεοί.

tion, upon beautiful pursuits, he will, after hearing it, when you have ceased speaking, inquire about nothing else except about the beautiful—for such a habit he has—and he will say, “Art not, (say) thou stranger from Elis, the just just through justness?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning you.

Hip. I answer,⁵⁹ through justness.

[17.] *Soc.* There is then such a thing as justness?

Hip. Clearly so.

Soc. Are not then the wise wise through wisdom? and all that is good good through goodness?

Hip. How not?

Soc. By those things existing really; for it is not surely by their non-existing.

Hip. By their existing really.

Soc. Are not all things, that are beautiful, beautiful through beauty?

Hip. Yes, through beauty.

Soc. By such a thing existing?

Hip. By its existing. For what should it be?

Soc. Tell me now, stranger, he will say, what is this beauty?

Hip. Does he, who asks this question, want to know what is a beautiful thing?

Soc. I think not, Hippias: but what is beauty.

Hip. How does this differ from that?

Soc. Seems there to you no (difference)?

Hip. There is not any difference.

Soc. But, however,⁶⁰ it is evident that you know better.

⁵⁹ I have adopted ἀποκρίνομαι, found in one MS., in lieu of ἀποκρίνομαι. Ficinus omits the word entirely.

⁶⁰ The Greek is Ἄλλὰ μέντοι δῆλον, where I cannot understand μέντοι: nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is “Constat autem.” Hence I suggested, many years ago, Ἄλλὰ μόνον τῷ, “But to any one blinking,” an expression similar to the Latin, “conviventibus oculis,” and to the English, “with half an eye.” The phrase in Aristoph. Plut. 49, is δῆλον τυφλῷ, quoted by the Schol. on Plato, Sophist. p. 241, D., φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δῆ, τυφλῷ: and is found in Rep. iii. p. 465, D., and viii. p. 550, D. With regard to the verb οὐκ εἶχεν ὁμαρα, and elsewhere, see Creuzer on Plotinus, Περὶ Κάλλους, p. 357.

Consider, however, good sir, the question (well).⁶¹ For he asks you, not what is a beautiful thing, but what is beauty.

Hipp. I understand you, good sir. And I will answer his question, "What is beauty?" nor shall I ever be confuted.⁶² For rest assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.⁶³

[13.] Soc. By the dog,⁶⁴ you have answered, Hippias, beautifully and gloriously.⁶⁵ Shall I then, when I answer thus, have answered the question correctly? and shall I never be refuted?

Hipp. For how could you be refuted, Socrates, on that point which seems correct to all the world; and where all who hear you will testify in your favour that you are speaking properly?

Soc. Be it so then, by all means. But come, Hippias, let me consider again with myself what you are saying. For the man will question me in some such manner as this: "Come, Socrates, answer me, ⁶⁶if beauty exists in the abstract, all

And to the passages there quoted add Lucian in Rhetor. Præcept. § 11, *αὐτὸν μόνον—εἶναι τὸν*. Shakspeare says in Lear, "A man may see how this world goes with no eyes."

⁶¹ After *αἴθερ*, it is pretty evident that *εἰ* has dropt out.

⁶² By comparing the expression of Socrates, *εἰ μὴ ποτε ἀλεγχθῶ*, it is quite certain that Hippias said *εἰ μὴ ποτε ἀλεγχθῆς*.

⁶³ Ficinus has "*virginem pulchram ipsum pulchrum esse*," as if his MS. read *καλὸς καλὴ καλόν*, not *καλός καλὴ καλόν*.

⁶⁴ This was one of the oaths adopted by Socrates; another was, "by the plane-tree," as in Phædrus, p. 236, D., and the third was, "by the goose," as we learn from the Scholiast on Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 521. To these might be added "the goat," as appears from Tertullian Apolog. 14, quoted by Gottleber on Phædo, p. 99, A. "*Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deorum, quercum et hircum et canem dejerabat.*" Of the different reasons assigned for such strange forms of adjuration an account is to be found in the notes of Menage on Diogen. Laert. p. 92. But as none of them are satisfactory, the truth remains to be still found, if worth the search, elsewhere.

⁶⁵ The Greek is *εὐδόξως*: which is never, I believe, thus connected with the idea of an answer. I suggested long ago *οὐ λοξῶς*, i. e. "not obliquely," referring to Suidas, *Λοξά: σκόλια, καμπύλα, οὐκ ἐξ ἐνθείας γινόμενα*: and to Lucian, Vit. Auct. § 14, *ὥσπερ ὁ Λοξίας οὐδὲν ἀποσπᾷ*. Dialog. Deor. xvi. § 1, *Λοξά—πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἀποκρινόμενος*. Alexandr. § 10, *ἀμφιβάλους καὶ λοξοὺς χρησμούς συγγράφων*: and I will now add in Jov. Confut. § 14, *λοξὰ καὶ ἐκαμφοτερίζοντα*. See too Boissonad. in Eunap. p. 162, and 564.

⁶⁶— Such is the literal version of the Greek text. But the train of thought requires, "Come now, Socrates, and answer me this correctly. All

these things which you say are beautiful, would these be beautiful?"⁶⁵ And I will then say that, ⁶⁷if a beautiful maiden be a beautiful thing, through which the things would be beautiful."⁶⁷

Hip. Think you then that he will still attempt to confute you, (by asserting) that what you say is beautiful, is not so? or that, should he attempt it, he will not be laughed down?

Soc. That he will, thou wondrous man, I am well assured; but whether, after making the attempt, he will be laughed down, the thing itself will show. However,⁶⁸ I wish to tell you what he will say.

Hip. Tell it then.

[19.] *Soc.* What a sweet⁶⁹ creature, Socrates! he will say, you are. Is not a beautiful mare, which even a god has praised in an oracle,⁷⁰ a beautiful thing? What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we say aught else than that ⁷¹the

the things which you say are beautiful, if there be such a thing as beauty in the abstract, would they not be beautiful?" This in Greek would be "Ἰθι μοι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι τοῦτ' εὔ. Τὰ πάντα, δ φῆς καλὰ εἶναι, εἴ τι ἔστι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλὰ; Ficinus however has "Age, responde mihi, Socrates, Quid est ipsum pulchrum? quod si sit, hæc omnia, quæ pulchra dicuntur, per ipsum pulchra sunt," which it is uncertain whether he did or did not find in his MS. Sydenham however was led from thence to suspect that δι' ὃ had dropt out between τὸ καλόν and ταῦτ' ἂν—and so was Schleiermacher after him.

"—⁶⁷ The Greek is Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἱρώ, ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλόν ἔστι, δι' ὃ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλὰ. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge the word εἰ before παρθένος, and to read ὅτι παρθένος καλὴ καλόν ἔστι, κ. τ. λ. S. Heindorf says we must omit εἰ, or all the words after καλόν. But the train of argument leads to something of this kind—"If there be such a thing as a beautiful maiden, there must be the beautiful, by which all the things beautiful would exist"—in Greek, Εἰ παρθένος καλὴ ἔστι, ἔστι τὸ καλόν, δι' ὃ πάντα ἂν εἴη καλὰ, as I stated many years ago.

⁶⁸ The origin of this proverb is told by the Scholiast on Theætet. p. 200, E., who says, that when some person was going to cross a river, he asked his guide whether it was deep; to which the latter replied, "The event itself will show."

⁶⁹ Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 132, says that γλυκὺς and ἡδὺς were used ironically as a polite way of calling a person a simpleton.

⁷⁰ The oracle alluded to has been preserved entire by the Schol. on Theocritus, Id. xiv. 48, and by Tzetzes, in Chil. ix. 291, and x. 330, and partially by Euseb. Præp. Evang. v. 29. For when the people of Megara had inquired of the god to whom the palm of superiority was to be assigned, they were told, amongst other things, that the mares of Thrace, or, as Tzetzes testifies, of Thessaly, were the best.

⁷¹ "The Greek is τὴν ἵππον καλὴν εἶναι τὴν γε καλὴν. And so

mare is beautiful? at least the beautiful.⁷¹ For h
we dare to deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

Hip. You speak, Socrates, what is true,⁷² especial
god rightly said it;⁷² for with us there are mares very l

Soc. Be it so, he will say; but what, is not a bea
a beautiful thing? Shall we allow it, Hippias?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And after this he will say—as, guessing
usual manner, I nearly know full well—My excell
is not a beautiful soup-dish a beautiful thing?

Hip. Who is this man, Socrates? What an u
fellow! who thus presumes to express himself in
low in an affair so solemn.

Soc. Such is the fellow, Hippias, not a fine gent
a man of the mob, who cares for nothing but truth.
however have an answer; ⁷⁴and I appear speaking f

Ficinus, "*Pulchram equam nonne pulchram esse.*" This, sa
might stand; but *καλὸν εἶναι*, suggested by Cornarius, is pre
did not however perceive that, as the article could not be th
it must be omitted before *ἵππον*; nor that *γε Θεσσαλὴν* lie i
λὴν, to answer to the Thessalian mare, mentioned in the or
ing to Tzetzes; and hence just before in lieu of *θήλεια* one
Θεσσαλὴ, as I remarked many years ago.

^{72—73} Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I con
understand. For Socrates did not say what was true, becau
spoke truth; nor did the oracle speak truth, because there
tiful mares in Elis. What Hippias meant to say is, that, a
had spoken of the beauty of mares, it had spoken of what an
was a judge of such matters, would confess to be beautiful.
fore wrote perhaps, as I suggested many years ago,—*ἐπεὶ τοι*
ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν, εἶπον ἂν αὐτός, "since, what the god has corn
would have said myself;" a sentiment that exhibits the vanity
in a marked manner, as he thus puts himself upon an equal
god.

⁷³ As the chariot-races in the Olympic games were run in
of Elis, the people there had an opportunity of seeing the
and of becoming, like persons living at Newmarket and I
England, the best judges of horse-flesh; while from the num
gained by mares, it was found that the female was better sui
male for a long race, as remarked by Servius on Virgil, Geor

^{74—74} The Greek is *καὶ ἔγωγε προαποφαίνομαι*: which wou
give my opinion the first," as shown by Ὁ Πρόδικε, *προαπόφ*
γνώμην in Protag. p. 340, A. Ficinus has "*Præfabor.*" B
be said only if Socrates were going to reply, not to put a ques
wrote, I suspect, *καὶ λέγων γε πρὸ αὐτοῦ φαίνομαι*, as I part
many years ago, when I should have quoted Alcest. 336, π
λέγειν.

If the soup-dish be made by a skilful potter, smooth and round, and well baked, like some of the beautiful soup-dishes with two handles, containing six choes,⁷⁵ very beautiful,⁷⁶ if he inquires about such a soup-dish, we must confess it to be beautiful. For how could we say that what is beautiful, is not beautiful?

Hip. Not at all, Socrates.

Soc. Is not a beautiful soup-dish then, he will say, a beautiful thing? Answer.

[20.] *Hip.* But, Socrates, the case is, I think, this; even such a vessel, when beautifully made, is a beautiful thing. But this taken as a whole does not deserve to be considered as beautiful, as compared with a mare, and a maiden, and the other things of beauty.

Soc. Be it so. I understand you, Hippias, that we must thus reply to the person who puts such a question. You are ignorant, my man, that correct is the saying of Heracleitus, That the most beautiful ape, as compared with another kind,⁷⁷ is ugly; and that the most beautiful of soup-dishes is ugly as compared with the maiden-kind; as says Hippias the wise. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hip. You have answered, Socrates, quite correctly.

Soc. Hear then—for I know well he will say after this—What then, Socrates, should any one compare maiden-kind

⁷⁵ According to Arbuthnot's computation, the Attic χοῦς contained three quarts. S.

⁷⁶ This repetition of *πάγκαλαι* after the preceding *τῶν καλῶν*, justly gave offence to a friend of Heindorf. But he did not see, as I remarked many years ago, that in *τῶν καλῶν* lies hid perhaps *τῶν Σικελῶν*—for Eubulus, quoted by Athenæus, i. p. 28, C., mentions *Σικελικά βατάνια*.

⁷⁷ The Greek is *ἄλλῳ γίνεαι*. But we ought to read *ἀνθρωπίνῳ γίνεαι*, as is evident from what is quoted presently after from the same Heracleitus, *ἀνθρώπων δὲ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φαίνεται*. For however dark his writings were, there is no reason to think he wrote absurdly. The absurdity is owing to the transcribers, who instead of *ἀνθρ*, an abbreviated form for *ἀνθρωπίνῳ*, wrote *ἄλλῳ*. S. This correction, or rather *ἀνθρωπείῳ*, which is more after Plato's manner, appears to be indubitable; for we have thus a climax of ideas—"The most beautiful monkey is ugly, as compared with a man: and the man most wise, as compared with a god." HEIND., who, in ed. 2, prefers *ἀνθρώπων*, as Bekker does likewise. But a single monkey would scarcely be compared with the whole race of man. The true reading is probably *ἀνθρ ἐνὶ γε*, i. e. "to even a single man." On a similar allusion to the monkey, see my note on The Statesman, § 9, p. 205.

with god-kind, would he not be in the same case, as a maiden-kind was compared to the soup-dish kind? not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? [21.] not Heracleitus, whom⁷⁸ you bring forward,⁷⁸ say⁷⁹ the same thing,⁷⁹ that the wisest of men, when compared with god, appears an ape in wisdom and beauty, and even else?⁸⁰ Shall we confess, Hippias, the most beautiful is ugly as compared with the god-kind?⁸¹

Hip. Yes; for who, Socrates, would gainsay this?

Soc. Should however we confess this, he will laugh at you. Do you then remember, Socrates, what you wanted to say? I shall reply, I do; (it was this,) What is beauty in the abstract? Whereupon he will rejoin—When you are asked about beauty in the abstract, you answer (by me)⁸² that which happens to be, as you say yourself, not more beautiful than ugly.⁸² So, it seems, I shall say. Or what would your friend, do you advise me to say?

Hip. This (I advise) you; ⁸³ For that the human is compared with the gods, is not beautiful,⁸³ he will say to you.

Soc. If I had asked you at the outset, he will say, you

^{78—78} Here is evidently a slip on the part of Plato. For, as by Sydenham, it was not Hippias, but Socrates himself, who has put forward the dictum of Heracleitus; unless we are to understand Heindorf, that the reference to Heracleitus must be supposed to be by the fictitious speaker, and not by Socrates. But this is at variance with the preceding narrative. There is some disorder here which might perhaps be able to cure; but the remedy, I am afraid, is considered too violent.

^{79—79} As "this very same thing" is different from the preceding, we must read *τοιούτων τι ἐπιλέγει*, "says in addition something as this," in lieu of *ταύτων τοῦτο λέγει*.

⁸⁰ In this apophthegm of Heracleitus is to be found the original idea in Pope—

Superior beings, when of late they saw
A mortal man unfold all nature's law,
Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,
And showed a Newton, as we show an ape. S.

⁸¹ To avoid the impropriety of a single maiden being compared with the race of the gods, it is easy to read *πρὸς θεάν γ' ὁμοίως*, i. e. "as compared with a goddess," instead of *πρὸς θεῶν γένος*—

^{82—82} i. e. "that which is beautiful or ugly according to its own nature."

^{83—83} This I do not very well understand. For in the preceding mention of Socrates by the fictitious person, nothing is said of a comparison of beauty or not, as compared with the gods.

thing beautiful and ugly, had you answered me as you have done just now, would you not⁸⁴ have answered correctly? And still⁸⁵ does it seem to you that the beautiful itself, by which every thing else is decorated, and looks beautiful; whenever that species (of beauty) is present to it, is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?

[22.] *Hip.* If this, Socrates, he is seeking, it is of all things the easiest for me⁸⁶ to tell him in answer what is that beauty, by which all other things are decorated, and by which being present they appear beautiful. ⁸⁷The man is the greatest simpleton, and knows nothing about beautiful chatelets.⁸⁷ For if you tell him in answer, that the beautiful about which he is inquiring, is nothing else than gold; he will be in a difficulty, and not attempt to confute you. For we all surely know that wherever gold is present to a thing, how ugly soever it may have seemed before, it will appear beautiful, when it is decorated at least with gold.

Soc. You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how difficult he is, and admitting nothing easily.

Hip. What matters it, Socrates? For what is correctly asserted he must admit; or, not admitting it, be laughed at.

Soc. And yet he will not only not admit this answer, thou best of men; but he will treat me with derision, and say, O thou, puffed up with conceit, thinkest thou that Phidias was a bad workman? And I shall reply, I think so by no manner of means.

Hip. And you will answer rightly, Socrates.

[23.] *Soc.* Rightly indeed. Hereupon when I have con-

⁸⁴ Ficinus; displeased perhaps, as Heindorf was, with the interrogation, omits ἀπα οὐκ—while to meet the difficulty Ast would read ἀπ' οὐν—But ἀπ' οὐν always, I think, begins a sentence. Plato wrote, I suspect, μὴδ' αὖτε οὐκ ἂν τι ἐκίπιοι' οὐν, i. e. "you would have been correctly judged to be still a stripling." See § 31, n. 17.

⁸⁵ Instead of ἐν, the two best MSS. read ἐν. The sense seems to require, "But tell me, child," in Greek εἰπέ δέ, καί, which differs but little from ἐν δέ καί—For it would thus be seen that Socrates was in the eye of the fictitious person, not even a stripling, but only a child. On the confusion of καί and καί see Porson Orest. 614.

⁸⁶ In lieu of μύητοι, Plato wrote ἱποὶ ἐνιστοι, as I guess.

⁸⁷ Instead of κρημάρων, five MSS. offer ἱπποκρημάρων: which led me to suspect many years ago, as I still do now, the existence of a lacuna. At all events the words between the numerals would be said better by Socrates, who knew the fictitious person, than by Hippias, who did not.

from you, and commend? Tell me yourself, since I find them.

Hip. Respecting the genealogies,⁴⁶ Socrates, of their and men, and settlements (of tribes), (and)⁴⁷ how cities founded of old, and, in a word, to every thing relating chæology, they listen with the greatest pleasure; so was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for sakes, and to practise myself well on those points.

Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the dæmonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For wise you would have had some trouble in learning the

Hip. How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names once, I can repeat them from memory.

[13.] *Soc.* You speak the truth; but I did not mind that you had a system of mnemonics;⁴⁸ so that I understand⁴⁹ why, reasonably enough, the Lacedæmonians pleased with you, as being a person who knows many, and they make use of you, as children do of old women, tell them pretty stories.

Hip. And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high there by going through a lecture upon the honourable path to which a young person should devote himself. For by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject,⁵⁰ was together in other respects, and in the words.⁵⁰ The fo

⁴⁶ There is an article by Osann in the *Rheinische Museum* p. 495—501, on the archæological writings of Hippias.

⁴⁷ I suspect ὧς has dropt out after καὶ—

⁴⁸ According to Pseudo-Plato in *Hipp. M.*, in p. 368, D., the sophist like Simonides, cultivated the art of memory; which, before the invention of printing, was necessary for every one who aspired to be a poet or a logist.

⁴⁹ The Greek is ὥστ' ἐννοῶ—which seems rather strange and ἐνενόησα. Ficinus has “jam intelligo”—which leads to εἰς τὸ ἐννοῶ—

^{50—50} The Greek is καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι διακείμενος could hardly follow συγκείμενος; and if it could, it would be united to the dative ὀνόμασι. Besides, it is not easy to say, ἄλλως can be referred, as opposed to ὀνόμασι. Ficinus has “v. elegantia pellet”—from which I formerly elicited εὖ διακοσμούμενος. I would now prefer διεσκευασμένος, similar to λόγοι παρεσκευασμένοι. *Menex.* p. 235, D., while in καὶ ἄλλως and καὶ τοῖς lie hid, I suspect Ἀυσίου—καλλίστοις ὀνόμασι. For thus Lysias would be praised ironically, as he is in the *Phædrus*.

commencement of the discourse is something of this kind.—“After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus inquired of Nestor what were the honourable pursuits a young man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent precepts laid down by law.” [14.] Of this dissertation⁵¹ I made a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in the school of Philostratus.⁵² For so has Eudicus, the son of Apēmantus, requested. See then that you are present yourself, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be competent to decide upon what is then said.

Soc. This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at present answer me a short question relating to it.⁵³ For you have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person, has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations, thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beautiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, “From whence do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful, and what ugly?”⁵⁴ Come then, tell me,⁵⁴ if you can say a word, what is the beautiful?” And I, through my want of wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him with propriety. [15.] So, quitting his company, I grew angry with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I would hear (his opinion) and learn it; and after studying

⁵¹ According to Philostratus in the life of Hippias, p. 495, the dissertation was in the form of a dialogue. Its title was *Τρωικά* or *Ἡρωικά*—For these two words are constantly confounded, as remarked by G. C. Lewis in Cl. Jl. No. 76, p. 277, and No. 78, p. 190. So too in Schol. Od. A. 546, instead of *ὑπὸ ὁμοτίμου τῶν Τρώων*, Bentley would read *Ἡρώων* in his letter to Davies, first published in the Monthly Review, vol. xiv. p. 202.

⁵² I have adopted *Φιλοστράτου*, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of *Φειδοστράτου*—a word that seems scarcely compounded correctly. On the other hand, the Philostratus here mentioned is probably the same as the person nicknamed *Κυνναλώπηξ* by Aristophanes in *Ἰππ.* 1066.

⁵³ As there is nothing to which *αὐτοῦ* can be referred, Plato wrote, I suspect, *περί γέ του*, “about something.”

⁵⁴—⁵⁴ The Greek is—*Ἐπεὶ φέρεται ἔχεις ἀν εἰπεῖν*—But *ἐπεὶ*, “since,” has no meaning here. I have translated, as if the words were—*Ἐπ’ οὖν, φέρεται, εἰ ἔχεις ἀντιπεῖν*.

it thoroughly, that I would return to my questioner, and fight out again the matter with him. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come opportunely; and do you instruct me sufficiently what is beauty in the abstract, and endeavour to give me as accurately as possible your answers; in order that I may not be confuted a second time, and pay the penalty of a laugh against myself. For assuredly you know it quite clearly, and it would be but a mite of the learning, with which you are conversant on so many⁵⁵ points.

Hip. By Zeus, a mite indeed, Socrates; and, so to say, of no value at all.

Soc. Easily then shall I learn it; and no one will hereafter confute me.

[16.] *Hip.* Not one indeed. For otherwise mean would be my profession, and suited to a common person.

Soc. By Juno, Hippias, you speak bravely, if we shall get the man into our clutches. ⁵⁶ But shall I be any hindrance by imitating him, if I lay hold of your arguments, while answering me, in order that you may exercise me the most. For I am nearly skilful in laying hold (of arguments).⁵⁶ If then it makes no difference to you, I am willing to lay hold of them, in order that I may learn⁵⁷ with greater strength.

Hip. Take hold then: for, as I said just now, the question is not a great one; and I will teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, so that not a single person will be ever able to confute you.

Soc. Ye gods,⁵⁸ how bravely you talk! But come, since you bid me, I will become him, and, as well as I can, try to question you. Now, if you shall give the lecture you men-

⁵⁵ To avoid the incorrect Greek in ὦν σὺ τῶν πολλῶν, we must read ὦν σὺ οὕτω πολλῶν— The critics quoted by Stalbaum neither do, nor pretend to, defend this union of the relative pronoun with the definite article.

⁵⁶⁻⁵⁸ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. But how Socrates could, by imitating the nameless saucy fellow, be any hindrance to Hippias, I cannot understand.

⁵⁷ In lieu of μάθω, which I cannot understand, I have suggested μιχθῶ. For the idea of "mingling in fight" here correctly coincides with the preceding ἀναμαχοῦμενος. Others perhaps would prefer ἱπρωμνίστηκεν με θῶ, i. e. "make myself of greater strength."

⁵⁸ Instead of φεῦ, which never, I think, precedes ὡς εὖ λέγεις, I have translated as if the Greek were ὦ θεοί.

tion, upon beautiful pursuits, he will, after hearing it, when you have ceased speaking, inquire about nothing else except about the beautiful—for such a habit he has—and he will say, “Art not, (say) thou stranger from Elis, the just just through justness?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning you.

Hip. I answer,⁵⁹ through justness.

[17.] *Soc.* There is then such a thing as justness?

Hip. Clearly so.

Soc. Are not then the wise wise through wisdom? and all that is good good through goodness?

Hip. How not?

Soc. By those things existing really; for it is not surely by their non-existing.

Hip. By their existing really.

Soc. Are not all things, that are beautiful, beautiful through beauty?

Hip. Yes, through beauty.

Soc. By such a thing existing?

Hip. By its existing. For what should it be?

Soc. Tell me now, stranger, he will say, what is this beauty?

Hip. Does he, who asks this question, want to know what is a beautiful thing?

Soc. I think not, Hippias: but what is beauty.

Hip. How does this differ from that?

Soc. Seems there to you no (difference)?

Hip. There is not any difference.

Soc. But, however,⁶⁰ it is evident that you know better.

⁵⁹ I have adopted ἀποκρίνομαι, found in one MS., in lieu of ἀποκρίνομαι. Ficinus omits the word entirely.

⁶⁰ The Greek is ἅλλὰ μίντοι δῆλον, where I cannot understand μίντοι: nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is “Constat autem.” Hence I suggested, many years ago, ἅλλὰ μόντι τῷ, “But to any one blinking, an expression similar to the Latin, “conniventibus oculis,” and to the English, “with half an eye.” The phrase in Aristoph. Plut. 49, is δῆλον τυφλῷ, quoted by the Schol. on Plato, Sophist. p. 241, D., φαίνεται καὶ, τὸ λεγόμενον δῆ, τυφλῷ: and is found in Rep. iii. p. 465, D., and viii. p. 550, D. With regard to the verb μένιν, which Plato has used in Sophist. p. 239, E., δόξει τοι μένιν ἢ παῖ ἀπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὁμματα, and elsewhere, see Creuzer on Plotinus, Περὶ Κάλλους, p. 357.

Consider, however, good sir, the question (well).⁶¹ For he asks you, not what is a beautiful thing, but what is beauty.

Hip. I understand you, good sir. And I will answer his question, "What is beauty?" nor shall I ever be confuted.⁶² For rest assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.⁶³

[18.] *Soc.* By the dog,⁶⁴ you have answered, Hippias, beautifully and gloriously.⁶⁵ Shall I then, when I answer thus, have answered the question correctly? and shall I never be refuted?

Hip. For how could you be refuted, Socrates, on that point which seems correct to all the world; and where all who hear you will testify in your favour that you are speaking properly?

Soc. Be it so then, by all means. But come, Hippias, let me consider again with myself what you are saying. For the man will question me in some such manner as this: "Come, Socrates, answer me, ⁶⁶if beauty exists in the abstract, all

And to the passages there quoted add Lucian in *Rhetor. Præcept.* § 11, *κάν μύοντι—σίποι τις*. Shakspeare says in *Lear*, "A man may see how this world goes with no eyes."

⁶¹ After *ἀθρει*, it is pretty evident that *εἰ* has dropt out.

⁶² By comparing the expression of Socrates, *οὐ μή ποτε ἡλεγχθῶ*, it is quite certain that Hippias said *οὐ μή ποτε ἡλεγχθῆς*.

⁶³ Ficinus has "*virginem pulchram ipsum pulchrum esse*," as if his MS. read *παρθένος καλὴ τὸ καλόν*, not *παρθένος καλὴ καλόν*.

⁶⁴ This was one of the oaths adopted by Socrates; another was, "by the plane-tree," as in *Phædrus*, p. 236, D., and the third was, "by the goose," as we learn from the Scholiast on *Aristoph. 'Ορν.* 521. To these might be added "the goat," as appears from *Tertullian Apolog.* 14, quoted by *Gottleber* on *Phædo*, p. 99, A. "*Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deorum, quercum et hircum et canem dejerabat.*" Of the different reasons assigned for such strange forms of adjuration an account is to be found in the notes of *Menage* on *Diogen. Laert.* p. 92. But as none of them are satisfactory, the truth remains to be still found, if worth the search, elsewhere.

⁶⁵ The Greek is *εὐδόξως*: which is never, I believe, thus connected with the idea of an answer. I suggested long ago *οὐ λοξῶς*, i. e. "not obliquely," referring to *Suidas*, *Λοξά: σκόλια, καμπύλα, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας γινόμενα*: and to *Lucian*, *Vit. Auct.* § 14, *ὥσπερ ὁ Λοξίας οὐδὲν ἀποσαφείς*. *Dialog. Deor.* xvi. § 1, *Λοξά—πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἀποκρινόμενος*. *Alexandr.* § 10, *ἀμφιβόλους καὶ λοξούς χρησμούς συγγράφων*: and I will now add in *Jov. Confut.* § 14, *λοξὰ καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα*. See too *Boissonad.* in *Eunap.* p. 162, and 564.

⁶⁶—⁶⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek text. But the train of thought requires, "Come now, Socrates, and answer me this correctly. All

these things which you say are beautiful, would these be beautiful?"⁶⁵ And I will then say that, ⁶⁷if a beautiful maiden be a beautiful thing, through which the things would be beautiful."⁶⁷

Hip. Think you then that he will still attempt to confute you, (by asserting) that what you say is beautiful, is not so? or that, should he attempt it, he will not be laughed down?

Soc. That he will, thou wondrous man, I am well assured; but whether, after making the attempt, he will be laughed down, the thing itself will show. However,⁶⁸ I wish to tell you what he will say.

Hip. Tell it then.

[19.] *Soc.* What a sweet⁶⁹ creature, Socrates! he will say, you are. Is not a beautiful mare, which even a god has praised in an oracle,⁷⁰ a beautiful thing? What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we say aught else than that ⁷¹the

the things which you say are beautiful, if there be such a thing as beauty in the abstract, would they not be beautiful?" This in Greek would be "Ἰθί μοι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίναι τοῦτ' εὖ. τὰ πάντα, ἃ φης καλὰ εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλὰ; Ficinus however has "Age, responde mihi, Socrates, Quid est ipsum pulchrum? quod si sit, hæc omnia, quæ pulchra dicuntur, per ipsum pulchra sunt," which it is uncertain whether he did or did not find in his MS. Sydenham however was led from thence to suspect that δι' ὃ had dropt out between τὸ καλόν and ταῦτ' ἂν—and so was Schleiermacher after him.

⁶⁵—⁶⁷ The Greek is Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἱρῶ, ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἐστὶ, δι' ὃ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλὰ. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge the word εἰ before παρθένος, and to read ὅτι παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἐστὶ, κ. τ. λ. S. Heindorf says we must omit εἰ, or all the words after καλόν. But the train of argument leads to something of this kind—"If there be such a thing as a beautiful maiden, there must be the beautiful, by which all the things beautiful would exist"—in Greek, Εἰ παρθένος καλὸν ἐστὶ, ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, δι' ὃ πάντ' ἂν εἴη καλὰ, as I stated many years ago.

⁶⁸ The origin of this proverb is told by the Scholiast on Theætet. p. 200, E., who says, that when some person was going to cross a river, he asked his guide whether it was deep; to which the latter replied, "The event itself will show."

⁶⁹ Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 132, says that γλυκὺς and ἡδὺς were used ironically as a polite way of calling a person a simpleton.

⁷⁰ The oracle alluded to has been preserved entire by the Schol. on Theocritus, Id. xiv. 48, and by Tzetzes, in Chil. ix. 291, and x. 330, and partially by Euseb. Præp. Evang. v. 29. For when the people of Megara had inquired of the god to whom the palm of superiority was to be assigned, they were told, amongst other things, that the mares of Thrace, or, as Tzetzes testifies, of Thessaly, were the best.

⁷¹ "The Greek is τὴν ἵππον καλὴν εἶναι τὴν γε καλὴν. And so

mare is beautiful? at least the beautiful.⁷¹ For how dare we deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

Hip. You speak, Socrates, what is true,⁷² especially god rightly said it;⁷³ for with us there are mares very beautiful.

Soc. Be it so, he will say; but what, is not a beautiful thing? Shall we allow it, Hippias?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And after this he will say—as, guessing in usual manner, I nearly know full well—My excellence is not a beautiful soup-dish a beautiful thing?

Hip. Who is this man, Socrates? What an unbecoming fellow! who thus presumes to express himself in so low an affair so solemn.

Soc. Such is the fellow, Hippias, not a fine gentleman a man of the mob, who cares for nothing but truth. However, I have an answer;⁷⁴ and I appear speaking for

Ficinus, "*Pulchram equam nonne pulchram esse.*" This, say, might stand; but *καλὸν εἶναι*, suggested by Cornarius, is preferred, did not however perceive that, as the article could not be thus, it must be omitted before *ἵππον*; nor that *γε Θεσσαλήν* lie hid, *λήν*, to answer to the Thessalian mare, mentioned in the oracle to Tzetzes; and hence just before in lieu of *θήλεια* one would say *Θεσσαλή*, as I remarked many years ago.

^{72—73} Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I confess I do not understand. For Socrates did not say what was true, because he spoke truth; nor did the oracle speak truth, because there were no beautiful mares in Elis. What Hippias meant to say is, that, as he had spoken of the beauty of mares, it had spoken of what an excellent judge was a judge of such matters, would confess to be beautiful. Porphyry wrote perhaps, as I suggested many years ago, —*ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν, εἶπον δὲ αὐτός*, "since, what the god has corrected, would have said myself;" a sentiment that exhibits the vanity of man in a marked manner, as he thus puts himself upon an equality with god.

⁷³ As the chariot-races in the Olympic games were run in the plain of Elis, the people there had an opportunity of seeing the best horses and of becoming, like persons living at Newmarket and Doncaster in England, the best judges of horse-flesh; while from the number of mares gained by mares, it was found that the female was better suited to the male for a long race, as remarked by Servius on Virgil, Georg. 3.

^{74—74} The Greek is *καὶ ἐγὼ γε προαποφαίνομαι*: which would give my opinion the first," as shown by *Ὁ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι γνώμην* in Protag. p. 340, A. Ficinus has "*Præfabor.*" But he should be said only if Socrates were going to reply, not to put a question. I wrote, I suspect, *καὶ λέγων γε πρὸ αὐτοῦ φαίνομαι*, as I partly did many years ago, when I should have quoted Alcest. 336, *πρὸ λέγειν*,

If the soup-dish be made by a skilful potter, smooth and round, and well baked, like some of the beautiful soup-dishes with two handles, containing six choes,⁷⁵ very beautiful,⁷⁶ if he inquires about such a soup-dish, we must confess it to be beautiful. For how could we say that what is beautiful, is not beautiful?

Hip. Not at all, Socrates.

Soc. Is not a beautiful soup-dish then, he will say, a beautiful thing? Answer.

[20.] *Hip.* But, Socrates, the case is, I think, this; even such a vessel, when beautifully made, is a beautiful thing. But this taken as a whole does not deserve to be considered as beautiful, as compared with a mare, and a maiden, and the other things of beauty.

Soc. Be it so. I understand you, Hippias, that we must thus reply to the person who puts such a question. You are ignorant, my man, that correct is the saying of Heracleitus, That the most beautiful ape, as compared with another kind,⁷⁷ is ugly; and that the most beautiful of soup-dishes is ugly as compared with the maiden-kind; as says Hippias the wise. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hip. You have answered, Socrates, quite correctly.

Soc. Hear then—for I know well he will say after this—What then, Socrates, should any one compare maiden-kind

⁷⁵ According to Arbuthnot's computation, the Attic χοῦς contained three quarts. S.

⁷⁶ This repetition of πάγκαλαι after the preceding τῶν καλῶν, justly gave offence to a friend of Heindorf. But he did not see, as I remarked many years ago, that in τῶν καλῶν lies hid perhaps τῶν Σικελῶν—for Eubulus, quoted by Athenæus, i. p. 28, C., mentions Σικελικά βατάνια.

⁷⁷ The Greek is ἄλλω γίνεαι. But we ought to read ἀνθρωπίνῳ γίνεαι, as is evident from what is quoted presently after from the same Heracleitus, ἀνθρώπων δὲ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανίται. For however dark his writings were, there is no reason to think he wrote absurdly. The absurdity is owing to the transcribers, who instead of ἀνῶ, an abbreviated form for ἀνθρωπίνῳ, wrote ἄλλω. S. This correction, or rather ἀνθρωπείῳ, which is more after Plato's manner, appears to be indubitable; for we have thus a climax of ideas—"The most beautiful monkey is ugly, as compared with a man: and the man most wise, as compared with a god." HEIND., who, in ed. 2, prefers ἀνθρώπων, as Bekker does likewise. But a single monkey would scarcely be compared with the whole race of man. The true reading is probably ἀνῶ ἐνὶ γῆ, i. e. "to even a single man." On a similar allusion to the monkey, see my note on The Statesman, § 9, p. 205.

with god-kind, would he not be in the same case, as when the maiden-kind was compared to the soup-dish kind? Would not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? [21.] Or does not Heracleitus, whom⁷⁸ you bring forward,⁷⁸ say⁷⁹ this very same thing,⁷⁹ that the wisest of men, when compared with a god, appears an ape in wisdom and beauty, and every thing else?⁸⁰ Shall we confess, Hippias, the most beautiful maiden is ugly as compared with the god-kind?⁸¹

Hip. Yes; for who, Socrates, would gainsay this at least?

Soc. Should however we confess this, he will laugh and say, Do you then remember, Socrates, what you was asked? I shall reply, I do; (it was this,) What is beauty in the abstract? Whereupon he will rejoin—When you are asked about beauty in the abstract, you answer (by mentioning)⁸² that which happens to be, as you say yourself, not more beautiful than ugly.⁸² So, it seems, I shall say. Or what else, my friend, do you advise me to say?

Hip. This (I advise) you; ⁸³For that the human kind, as compared with the gods, is not beautiful,⁸³ he will say the truth.

Soc. If I had asked you at the outset, he will say, what is a

^{78—79} Here is evidently a slip on the part of Plato. For, as remarked by Sydenham, it was not Hippias, but Socrates himself, who had brought forward the dictum of Heracleitus; unless we are to understand with Heindorf, that the reference to Heracleitus must be supposed to be made by the fictitious speaker, and not by Socrates. But this is at variance with the preceding narrative. There is some disorder here, which I might perhaps be able to cure; but the remedy, I am afraid, would be considered too violent.

^{79—79} As "this very same thing" is different from the preceding dictum, we must read *τοιούτων τι ἐπιλέγει*, "says in addition some such thing as this," in lieu of *ταῦτον τοῦτο λέγει*.

⁸⁰ In this apophthegm of Heracleitus is to be found the original of the idea in Pope—

Superior beings, when of late they saw
A mortal man unfold all nature's law,
Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,
And showed a Newton, as we show an ape. S.

⁸¹ To avoid the impropriety of a single maiden being compared with the race of the gods, it is easy to read *πρὸς θεάν γ' ὁμοίως*, i. e. "similarly as compared with a goddess," instead of *πρὸς θεῶν γένος*—

^{82—82} i. e. "that which is beautiful or ugly according as it may happen."

^{83—83} This I do not very well understand. For in the preceding questioning of Socrates by the fictitious person, nothing is said of a man being beautiful or not, as compared with the gods.

thing beautiful and ugly, had you answered me as you have done just now, would you not⁸⁴ have answered correctly? And still⁸⁵ does it seem to you that the beautiful itself, by which every thing else is decorated, and looks beautiful; whenever that species (of beauty) is present to it, is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?

[22.] *Hip.* If this, Socrates, he is seeking, it is of all things the easiest for me⁸⁶ to tell him in answer what is that beauty, by which all other things are decorated, and by which being present they appear beautiful. ⁸⁷The man is the greatest simpleton, and knows nothing about beautiful chateaux.⁸⁷ For if you tell him in answer, that the beautiful about which he is inquiring, is nothing else than gold; he will be in a difficulty, and not attempt to confute you. For we all surely know that wherever gold is present to a thing, how ugly soever it may have seemed before, it will appear beautiful, when it is decorated at least with gold.

Soc. You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how difficult he is, and admitting nothing easily.

Hip. What matters it, Socrates? For what is correctly asserted he must admit; or, not admitting it, be laughed at.

Soc. And yet he will not only not admit this answer, thou best of men; but he will treat me with derision, and say, O thou, puffed up with conceit, thinkest thou that Phidias was a bad workman? And I shall reply, I think so by no manner of means.

Hip. And you will answer rightly, Socrates.

[23.] *Soc.* Rightly indeed. Hereupon when I have con-

⁸⁴ Ficinus; displeased perhaps, as Heindorf was, with the interrogation, omits ἀπα οὐκ—while to meet the difficulty Ast would read ἀπ' οὖν—But ἀπ' οὖν always, I think, begins a sentence. Plato wrote, I suspect, μὴδ' αὖτε οὐκ ἂν τι ἐκίχησ' οὖν, i. e. "you would have been correctly judged to be still a stripling." See § 31, n. 17.

⁸⁵ Instead of ἐνι, the two best MSS. read ὅτι. The sense seems to require, "But tell me, child," in Greek ἐνι δὲ, καὶ, which differs but little from ἐνι δὲ καὶ—For it would thus be seen that Socrates was in the eye of the fictitious person, not even a stripling, but only a child. On the confusion of καὶ and καί see Porson Orest. 614.

⁸⁶ In lieu of μίνοι, Plato wrote ἐμοί ἐνισσι, as I guess.

⁸⁷—⁸⁷ Instead of κτημάτων, five MSS. offer ἐρωτημάτων: which led me to suspect many years ago, as I still do now, the existence of a lacuna. At all events the words between the numerals would be said better by Socrates, who knew the fictitious person, than by Hippias, who did not.

fessed that Phidias was a good workman, he will say, Do you imagine then that Phidias was ignorant of that, which you call the beautiful?—Why (say you) this especially? I shall reply.—Because, he will rejoin, if⁸⁸ Phidias has made the eyes of Athéné not of gold, nor yet the rest of her face, nor the feet, nor even the hands—since a thing of gold⁸⁹ would have looked the most beautiful—but (not) of ivory,⁹⁰ it is evident that he erred in this through ignorance, not knowing that gold is that, which makes all things beautiful, wherever it is present. When he says this, what answer, Hippias, shall we give him?

Hip. The answer is not difficult. For we will say that he acted rightly; for ivory is, I presume, beautiful likewise.

Soc. Why then, he will rejoin, did he not make the middle part of the eyes of ivory, but of stone? having found in the stone a similarity as great as was possible to ivory. Or is a beautiful stone a beautiful thing? Shall we say so, Hippias?⁹¹

Hip. We will say so, if it be becoming.

Soc. But, where it is unbecoming, it is ugly. Shall I confess it, or not?

Hip. Confess; at least when it (the stone) is not becoming.

[24.] *Soc.* What then, he will say; do not ivory and gold, thou wiseacre, when they are becoming, cause things to appear beautiful; but when not, ugly? Shall we deny this, or acknowledge the man to be in the right?

Hip. We must acknowledge this, at least, that whatever is becoming to any individual thing, causes it to appear beautiful.

Soc. When then, he will say, some one shall have cooked the beautiful soup-dish, of which we have been speaking, full

⁸⁸ To avoid the difficulty in the text, of which Heindorf justly complains, I have translated as if *ei* had dropt out after *ipsi*.

⁸⁹ Kühner, in Gr. Gr., says that χρυσούν is to be referred to πρόσωπον. But one noun could not be thus selected out of five, to all of which the same epithet is equally applicable. Plato wrote, I suspect, εἴπερ χρυσούν γίγεται δὴ—and ἀλλ' ἐλεφάντινον οὐ, as I have translated.

⁹⁰ All the other parts, not here mentioned, were of massive gold; as we collect from Pliny's Nat. Hist. xxxvi. 6. S. Respecting this statue, see Junius Catalog. Art. Veter. p. 157, and Davis on Cicero Tusc. i. 15. HEIND. To this union of gold, ivory, and marble, Virgil alludes in Æn. i. 593, "Quale manus addunt ebor decus, aut ubi flavo Argentum Pariusve lapis circumdatur auro."

⁹¹ The sense requires, "Shall we say it, or not?" in Greek, φήσομεν ἢ οὐ;

of beautiful porridge,⁹² whether does a ladle of gold become it, or one of fig-tree wood?⁹³

Hip. By Hercules! of what kind of fellow, Socrates, are you speaking? Will you not tell me who he is?

Soc. No; for you would not know him, should I tell you his name.⁹⁴

Hip. But I know already that he is some ignorant fellow.

Soc. He is a man of much thought, Hippias. But, however, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles becomes the porridge and the soup-dish? Or is it clearly the one of fig-tree wood; for this makes the porridge of a pleasanter flavour; and at the same time, my friend, it would not by breaking the soup-dish let the porridge run out, and extinguish the fire, and cause the guests, just about to feast on it, to be without a very noble dish.⁹⁵ But all this the one of gold would do.

⁹² According to Athenæus, ix. p. 406, the Athenians were wont to bring to table the very vessels in which the more exquisite soups were cooked. The material of such vessels was a kind of porcelain, and their form not unlike our tureens. The composition of some of their soups is to be found in Athenæus and Apicius Cælius, v. 3. S.

⁹³ The Greek is *σικίνη*; but we ought rather to read *σικαμίνη*; for the wood of the fig-tree was so unfit for any use, that Horace calls it "inutile," useless; whereas the wood of the sycamore-tree, *σικάμινος*, is said by Theophrastus to be *ξύλον πρὸς πολλὰ χρήσιμον*, Hist. Plant. iv. 2. S. "But," asks Heindorf, "is the wood of the fig-tree unfit for making a soup-ladle? On the contrary, on account of its softness, and, as Plato says, its sweet smell, I believe it was most useful. At all events a wood of the least value ought to be mentioned, as opposed to gold." But so far from the mention of any wood being requisite here, it is evident, from the words *οὐκ ἂν συντρίψασα τὴν χύτραν*, that the soup-stirring instrument was made of something that would not readily break the vessel. What Plato really wrote and meant, is detailed in the Excursus on *Χύτρα*, appended to my anonymous edition of "The Four Dialogues of Plato."

⁹⁴ "How could Socrates be sure of that? Hippias might still have known the man, if he really existed. There is probably here an obliterated allusion to Homer's *Οὔτις*, the name assumed by Ulysses, when he deceived Polyphemus. If so, Plato would have written *Οὐ γὰρ ἂν γνῶις, εἰ σοι εἶποιμι Οὔτιν τοῦνομα*, i. e. No; for you would not know him if I were to tell his name, No-man." Such was the note I printed many years ago. And I will now add that the same word, *Οὔτις*, has been corrupted likewise in Alcibiad. ii. § 23, and is there restored by myself.

⁹⁵ Ficinus renders *δψου πάνυ γενναίου* by "obsouio pretioso." But as such is not the meaning of *γενναῖος* elsewhere, I still adhere to the opinion I have ever entertained, that the reading *γενναίου* is corrupt, although it seems similar to *γενναῖα σῦκα* in Legg, p. 844, E., and may be compared with *γενναῖον κρίας* in Aristoph. 'Ιππ. 455.

So that it seems to me, we ought to say that the one of fig-tree wood is more becoming than the one of gold; unless indeed you say otherwise.

[25.] *Hip.* It is indeed, Socrates, more becoming. But, for my part, I would not converse with a fellow, who asked such questions as these.

Soc. And rightly so, my friend; for it would not become you to be polluted with such dirty words, you in a dress so beautiful,⁹⁶ and with such beautiful sandals, and in such high repute amongst all the Greeks for wisdom. But for me, it is nothing to mix myself up with the dirt of the man. Teach me then beforehand; and for my sake give a reply. For the man will say, If the ladle of fig-tree wood be indeed more becoming than the one of gold, is it not more beautiful? especially since you have confessed that the becoming is more beautiful than the unbecoming. Shall we confess that the ladle of fig-tree wood is more beautiful than the one of gold?

Hip. Do you wish me, Socrates, to say that, by saying which, I think,⁹⁷ you will free yourself from his much talking?

Soc. By all means; but not before you tell me which of the two ladles, that we have been speaking of, is the (more)⁹⁸ becoming and more beautiful.

[26.] *Hip.* Well then, if you will, tell him in answer, that it is the one made from the fig-tree.

Soc. Now say what you was just about to say. For in this answer, by which I assert that gold is the beautiful, gold⁹⁹ will not, as it seems to me, appear to be at all a thing more beautiful than fig-tree wood. But what do you now say is the beautiful?

⁹⁶ The dress in which Hippias appeared at the Olympic games, is related by Plato in *Hipp. Min.* p. 368, B., who says that Hippias had made himself every thing he then wore. *Ælian* too, *Var. Hist.* xii. 32, tells us, that whenever the sophist appeared abroad he wore a scarlet dress; where Kuhn refers to *Apuleius Florid.* ii. S.

⁹⁷ As the infinitive εἶναι has nothing to depend upon, it is probably a corruption of οἶμαι.

⁹⁸ Ficinus has "decentiorem," as if he had found in his MS. μᾶλλον before πρέπονσαν, to answer to καλλίω.

⁹⁹ But the last assertion was, not that gold, but that the becoming was the beautiful. There is therefore probably some error here.

Hip. I will tell you. For you seem to me to seek to answer a question of this kind—what is that beauty, which at no time and in no place will appear ugly to any one.

Soc. By all means, Hippias. And now you understand me perfectly well.

Hip. Listen then. For rest assured, that if any man has any thing to say against this, I will say that I know¹⁰⁰ nothing whatever.

Soc. By the gods, then, tell it as quickly as possible.

Hip. I assert then, that it is at all times, and to all persons, and in all places, the most beautiful thing for a man, in wealth, health,¹ and in honour amongst Greeks, and having reached old age, and having laid his deceased parents handsomely in the grave, to be buried himself by his own children in a handsome and splendid manner.

Soc. Capital! Hippias. How wondrous well, and gorgeously, and how worthy of yourself, have you spoken! and by Juno I am delighted with you for the good-will with which, as far as you can, you assist me. But we do not as yet² reach the man's mind.² But he will laugh the most at us, rest assured.

[27.] *Hip.* Truly a silly laugh, Socrates. For when he shall have nothing to say against this, and merely laugh, he

¹⁰⁰ Instead of *ἰπαινεῖν*, acknowledged by "laudaturum" in Ficinus, Cornarius and Muretus suggested *ἰκαται*, subsequently confirmed by two MSS.

¹ This mention of health is rather strange in a passage where a man is said to be buried; unless by *ὑγιαίνοντι* is to be understood, sound in mind, rather than in body.

² So Stalbaum renders *τοῦ ἀνδρός οὐ τυγχάνομεν*. But the fictitious person had explained himself so clearly, that Socrates had no reason to make such an assertion. Ficinus has "virum nondum comprehendimus," which is similar to Stalbaum's version, if "comprehendimus" is to be taken in a mental sense; but if in a bodily one, it seems still more strange; for the man was not going to run away. Sydenham's version is, "We reach not the point." But *τοῦ ἀνδρός* could not mean "a point." I suggested many years ago, what I still adhere to, *τοῦ ἀνδρός οὐ τι ἱγχνάνοιμ' ἂν*, i. e. "I shall not grin at the man." For there is thus a proper antithesis between *τοῦ ἀνδρός ἱγχνάνοιμ' ἂν* and *ἡμῶν καταγελάσεται*, as in Protag. p. 357, D., *νῦν δέ, ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελάτῃ, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσειθε*. With regard to *ἱγχνάνειν*, it is found at least five times in Aristophanes, and once in a fragment probably of Ælian, quoted by Suidas in *Μέλιτος*.

will laugh at himself, and be the laughing-stock of (all)³ who are present.

Soc. Such perhaps will be the case ; perhaps, however, after such an answer, there will be a danger, as I prophesy, of his not merely laughing at me.

Hip. What then ?

Soc. That, should he happen to have a staff in his hand, unless I escape from him by flight, he will endeavour to reach me with a smart blow.

Hip. How say you ? Is the man a master of yours ? and will he not, for having done so, be brought to trial, and pay damages ? Or is your state not under the laws of justice, and permits the citizens to beat each other unjustly ?

Soc. By no manner of means does it permit them.

Hip. Will he then not suffer punishment, for striking you unjustly ?

Soc. I think not, Hippias ; not at all ; if I gave such an answer ; but justly, as it seems to me.

Hip. It seems then so to me, Socrates ; especially since you are of that opinion yourself.

Soc. Shall I then state why I think I should be justly beaten, on giving such an answer ? Or will you too beat⁴ me without a trial ? or will you receive a reason ?

Hip. It would be hard indeed, Socrates, if I did not receive it. But how say you ?

[28.] *Soc.* I will speak to you in the same manner as I did just now, when imitating that person, in order that I may not say to you, what he will to me, words both harsh and producing an angry feeling. For rest assured he will say, Tell me, Socrates, do you think a person would receive blows unjustly, who should chaunt such a long rigmarole, little in unison with, and far distant from, the question proposed ?—How so ? I shall reply. How ? he will rejoin ; cannot you remember that I asked you what is the beauty, that enables⁵ every thing, to which it is present, to become beautiful, be it stone, or wood, or man, or god, or any act, or any science.

³ Ficinus alone has "omnium—"

⁴ This "beat" seems strange ; as if Hippias were likely to do, what he had reprobated in the case of the fictitious personage.

⁵ Instead of *ὑπάρχει*, Ficinus found in his MS. *παρίχει*, what the sense requires, as shown by his version, "efficient."

For I am asking, man, what is beauty in the abstract; and yet **I** am no more able to bawl⁶ any thing into you, than if you were lying by my side a stone, and this too a mill-stone,⁷ without ears and brains. Now, Hippias, would not you be annoyed, if I, in a fright, were to say after this (abuse), Nay, it was Hippias who said that this was the beautiful; although I asked him, as you do me, what is the beautiful to all persons and things, and at all times?—What say you? will you not be annoyed if I say so?

[29.] *Hip.* I am quite certain, Socrates, that what I said is the beautiful in every case, will appear so.

Soc. But will it be so? he will say; for surely the beautiful must always be beautiful.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. And always was so, he will say.

Hip. It was.

Soc. Did the Elean stranger assert, he will say, that it was a beautiful thing for Achilles to be buried after his progenitors, and for his grandfather Æacus, and the others born of the gods, and even the gods themselves?

Hip. What is this! ⁸ Hurl him to the blessed (land)! ⁸ Such questions as these of the fellow, Socrates, are not to be spoken even, as being of ill omen.

Soc. How so? It is surely no very ill-omened speech,

* Ficinus has, "tu vero non magis audisti"—as if he did not know the meaning of *γεγωνεῖν*, which is rarely found except in poetry; for the prosaic word is *γεγωνίσκειν*, found in Thucyd. vii. 76. See Heringa, *Observ. Crit.* p. 64.

⁷ The Greek is *καὶ οὗτος μύλιας*. But a mill-stone, as I remarked many years ago, is no more able to hear than any other stone. Plato wrote *ἡ καὶ ὄνος τις μύλιας*: where *ὄνος μύλιας* means "an ass working at a mill," that becomes deaf and more stupid than other asses by the noise of the mill. There is too a kind of pun in *λίθος* and *ὄνος*—a word by which the upper or lower mill-stone (for Helladius differs from other lexicographers in this respect) was designated. Compare Soph. *Ced. T.* 379, *τυφλὸς γὰρ ὦτα, τὸν τε νοῦν γὰρ ὁμματ' εἰ*.

⁸ Of the different explanations given of this proverb, the one most simple is that by Timæus; who says that as the dead were called "the blessed," the land of the dead or blessed would be the grave. A similar expression was *εἰς ὀλβίαν*, explained by Photius, *εἰς μακαρίαν*. The Schol. on Aristoph. *Ἰππ.* 1148, compares *βαλλ' εἰς μακαρίαν* with *Ἀπ' εἰς μακαρίαν*, and *Ἐπ' εἰς μακαρίαν*. Sydenham prefers the novel interpretation suggested by Erasmus in *Adag.* ii. l. 98, and which, he says, Schottus has given as his own in *Schol. on Zenob.* p. 42.

when one person asks a question, (for the other⁹) to say—Such is the fact.

Hip. Perhaps so.

Soc. Perhaps then you are the man, he will say, who asserts that it is a beautiful thing for every person, and at all times, to be buried by his descendants, and to bury his parents. Now was not Hercules one of the all? and those too whom we have just now mentioned?

Hip. But I did not say it was so for the gods.

Soc. Nor for the heroes, as it seems.

Hip. Nor for such as were children of the gods.

Soc. But for such only as were not.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. According to your reasoning then, it seems, that amongst the heroes it was a grievous and unholy thing for Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus; but to Pelops, and to the others so born,¹⁰ it was a beautiful thing.

Hip. So it seems to me.

[30.] *Soc.* It seems then to you, he will say, what you have lately denied, that to some persons and at some times, it is not a beautiful thing after burying¹¹ their progenitors to be buried by their progeny; and further, as it seems, that this cannot take place to all, and be a beautiful thing. So that this very thing is in the same case as those before, namely, the maiden and the soup-dish: and still more ridiculously, to some it is a beautiful thing, but to others it is not beautiful: and even today, he will say, you are unable, Socrates, to answer the question, touching the beautiful, what it is. In these or such-like terms will he reproach me justly, should I answer him in this manner. For very nearly after this fashion, Hippias, does he for the most part converse. Sometimes, however, as

⁹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἱπομίνου ἱρίπου ἱρίπον φάναι*, not *ἱπρωμίνου ἱρίπου φάναι*: where *ἱπομίνου* is due to the Bipont editor, who elicited that reading from "percontante" in Ficinus; while *ἱρίπον*, evidently required by *ἱρίπου*, might easily have been lost when following its correlative.

¹⁰ By *οὕτω γεγονόσι* Heindorf understands those born of mortal parents, but *οὕτω* could not have such a meaning. Besides, there is nothing to which *τοῖς ἄλλοις* can be referred. Perhaps Plato wrote *τοῖς ἄλλοις πως ἀπό του*—i. e. "for those born in any other way from some one—"

¹¹ The Greek is *θάψαντι*, which is without regimen. The syntax requires *θάψασι* to agree with *ἐνίοις*.

if in pity for my want of skill and learning, he proposes a problem, and asks if such a thing as this seems to be the beautiful;¹² or he (talks) upon any other subject which he happens to have heard, and about which there is a talk.

Hip. How say you, Socrates, this?

[31.] *Soc.* I will tell you.—Thou godlike Socrates, says he, do cease to give such answers and on such grounds; for they are very silly, and easily confuted. But consider now, whether the beautiful¹³ be something of that kind, which we just now touched upon in the answer, when we said of gold, that where it is becoming it is beautiful; but where not, it is not so, and of all the rest likewise, to which the becoming may be present. On the becoming then itself, and on its nature, do you reflect becomingly,¹⁴ whether this happens to be the beautiful. Now, I am accustomed in such matters to assent on every occasion. For I know not what to object.¹⁵ But does it seem to you that the becoming is the beautiful?¹⁶

Hip. Assuredly, completely so, Socrates.

Soc. Let us reflect;¹⁷ lest we be cheated like children merely.¹⁷

Hip. It is meet to reflect.

Soc. Observe then. Do we call the becoming that which, by its presence, causes each of those things, to which it may be present, to appear beautiful? or that which causes them to be so really?¹⁸ Or neither of these?

¹² On this difficulty see the note in my edition.

¹³ Ficinus has "ipsum pulchrum," in Greek τὸ καλόν, not καλόν—

¹⁴ By omitting τοῦ with the two best MSS., and reading πρίποντος for πρεπόντως, I have restored a play upon the words τὸ πρίπον—πρεπόντως σκόπει. See at Phileb. § 57, n. 56. Add Gorg. p. 475, καλῶς ὀρίζει—ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

¹⁵ Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "quid objiciam." He therefore found in his MS. ὅτι ἀντιλέγω, not ὅτι λέγω.

¹⁶ Here again Ficinus has correctly, "ipsum pulchrum," in Greek τὸ καλόν, not καλόν.

¹⁷ The Greek, μή πη ἄρα ἐξαπατώμεθα. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ σκοπεῖν. Now although πη ἄρα might be defended, the subsequently ἀλλὰ could not. Plato wrote, as I remarked many years ago, μὴ παιδάρια ἐξαπατώμεθα ἄλλως. Χρὴ σκοπεῖν. For παιδάρια ἄλλως mean "children merely." Compare Protag. p. 342, E., ὥστε φαίνεσθαι—παιδὸς μὴδὲν βελτίω: where Heindorf quotes Theæt. p. 177, C., ὥστε παιδων μὴδὲν διαφέρειν. Add Crito, § 10, παιδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες. So μειράκιον has been before corrupted into ἄρα οὐκ ἂν, as I have shown in § 21, n. 84.

¹⁸ A gross blunder, unnoticed by all the translators, has corrupted

Hip. It appears so to me.

Soc. Whether¹⁸ that which causes things to appear beautiful? as when a person puts on clothes or shoes, which fit him, he looks more beautiful, although he is a laughing-stock.¹⁹ [32.] Now, if the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, the becoming must be a deception with regard to the beautiful; and it would not be that, which we are seeking, Hippias. For we are in search of that, by which all things beautiful are beautiful; as in the case of the surpassing,²⁰ by which all things are great.²¹ [For by this all things are great,]²¹ and though they may not appear so, yet, if they do surpass, they must of necessity be great. So we say of the beautiful, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear to be so or not. Now this cannot be the becoming. For the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, as your reasoning (says), and does not suffer them to appear as they are. But, as I said just now, that which causes them to be really beautiful, whether they appear so or not, this we must endeavour to tell what it is; for this we are seeking, if we are seeking the beautiful.

Hip. But the becoming, Socrates, causes by its presence things both to be and to appear beautiful.

Soc. It is impossible then for things really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful; at least when that is present, which causes them to appear so.

Hip. It is impossible.

the Greek text in *οὐδέτερα*, instead of which we ought to read *ἀμφοτέρα*. S. This alteration, says Heindorf, is of no value, although it is confirmed by § 32; while to avoid the incongruity of a single answer to a tripartite question, he suggests a new arrangement of the speeches; and so too does Stalbaum by reading, ΙΠΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρα. ΣΩ. ἀρ' ὃ ποιεῖ—φαίνεται. ΙΠΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν. But this does not meet the difficulty in *οὐδέτερα*. Perhaps Plato wrote, what I partly suggested many years ago, ἡ ὁδὸς ἐτέρα τούτων ἦν, i. e. Or is there a road different from these?

¹⁸ Ficinus, doubtless perceiving the incongruity here of *γελοῖος*, translated, perhaps designedly, "deformis." I once thought that Plato wrote *καὶ ἡ γελοῖος κολοῖδος*, in allusion to the Æsopic story of the daw with borrowed feathers. But I now think that Ficinus found his MS. *κολοβός*, i. e. "dwarfish" or "mutilated."

²⁰ Sydenham, justly objecting to *τῷ ὑπερέχοντι*, would read *τὸ ὑπερέχον* *τι*. But as *τι* is unnecessary, he should have proposed likewise *ᾧστε*—For thus *ᾧστε* *καὶ* would be united to *ἀνάγκην* (not *ἀνάγκη*) *εἶναι*—

²¹ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[33.] *Soc.* Shall we then, Hippias, confess that all things really beautiful, both institutions and pursuits truly beautiful, are reputed to be beautiful, and appear so always to all men? Or,²³ (must we say) quite the contrary, that they are unknown, and that dissension and contest take place respecting these points most of all, both amongst individuals privately and publicly amongst states?

Hip. In this way²³ rather, Socrates, that they are unknown.

Soc. This would not (have been unknown)²⁴ ²⁵ if the appearing to be beautiful had been added to the reality:²⁵ and added it would have been, had the becoming been the beautiful, and had caused things not only to be beautiful, but to appear so likewise: so that the becoming, if it were that, which causes things to be beautiful, would be that beauty in the abstract, of which we are in search, and not which causes things to appear beautiful. But if, on the other hand, the becoming merely causes things to appear only beautiful, it cannot be the beautiful, of which we are in search; for this causes them to be so really. Now to cause things to appear to be beautiful, and to be really so, is not in the power of the same thing, nor of any thing else whatever. Let us then choose, whether you think the becoming causes things to appear beautiful, or to be so really.

Hip. I think, Socrates, to appear so.

Soc. Alas! gone and fled away from us, Hippias, has the knowledge of what the beautiful is; especially since the becoming has been seen to be a thing different from the beautiful.

Hip. So, by Zeus, it has, Socrates, and to me at least very unexpectedly.²⁶

[34.] *Soc.* But let us not, my friend, give up seeking²⁷ for

²³ The two best MSS. read *διαλίγεσθαι* instead of *ἀγνοεῖσθαι*: from which, many years ago, I elicited *δεῖ λίσγειν, ἀγνοεῖσθαι*, as I have here translated.

²⁴ In lieu of *οὕτω*, correct Greek would require *Τοῦτο*—

²⁵ Ficinus supplies the ellipse by his “*ignoraretur*—”

²⁶⁻²⁷ So Sydenham translates the Latin of Ficinus, “*si, ut pulchra sunt, ita pulchra etiam apparerent,*” as if he had found in his MS. *εἰ γέ που καὶ τὸ φαίνεσθαι καλοῖς οὖσιν αὐτοῖς προσῆν*, not *εἰ γέ που τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς προσῆν*.

²⁸ I have adopted *ἀσκόπως*, found in three MSS., in lieu of *ἀτόπως*. Compare *ἀσκήτως* in § 48.

²⁷ In *μύντοι* lies hid, I suspect, *ματεύοντε*, as I have translated.

it. For I have still some hope that what the beautiful is will appear again.²⁸

Hip. Altogether assuredly,²⁹ Socrates: for it is not difficult to find. At least I know well that, were I to retire into solitude for a little time and commune with myself, I should describe it to you more accurately than accuracy itself.³⁰

Soc. Hold! Hippias, talk not so big—you see what trouble it has given us already—lest it should grow angry³¹ with us, and run away still further than before. And yet I am saying nothing to the purpose; for you will, I think, easily find it out, when you come to be alone. And do, by the gods,³² find it out in my presence; but if you are willing, seek it as now with me.³³ And if we find it, it will be the best of all; but, if we do not, I shall be content, I think, with my misfortune; while you going away will find it easily. But if we find it now, depend upon it, I shall not trouble you by inquiring what that was, which you had discovered by yourself.³³ For the present consider it, if it seems to you to be the beau-

²⁸ In lieu of ἐκφανήσεσθαι, the train of ideas leads to αὐτὸ φανήσεσθαι. On the confusion of ἐκ and αὐ, see at Prometh. 229.

²⁹ The formula πάντως δήπου, expressive of an assent given from a thorough conviction, could not be introduced here in answer to the expression of a hope merely. Hence I still abide by my original conjecture, πάντως ζῆ ἑλπίς, similar to Ἄρης θύελλαι ζῶσιν in Æsch. Ag. 792, and in Suidas Ζεὶ κύτρεα ζῆ φιλία, i. e. Where boils the pot, There friendship's hot.

³⁰ The Greek is τῆς ἀπάσης. But in this formula, where a personification takes place, the language requires αὐτῆς τῆς—See Porson on Hec. 779, and myself on Æsch. Eum. 865. To the passages there quoted I could now add many more.

³¹ This is rather a violent prosopopœia. Beauty in the abstract could hardly be said to put itself into a passion. From the Greek words ὄρνιθι ἡμῖν I long ago elicited ὄρνις ὡς εἰς θάμνον, "like a bird into a bush," and compared Rep. iv. p. 432, B., where Justice is feigned to fly like a hunted animal εἰς θάμνον.

^{32—33} These words are strangely put together. "Find it—if you will—seek it with me." But if Hippias found it, he need not seek for it with Socrates. The words should have been, "Find it—but, failing, be willing to seek it with me," in Greek, εἴθευσι εἰ δὲ μὴ, βούλου—συνζητεῖν. There is moreover a difficulty in ὥσπερ νῦν, for which Ficinus found in his MS. ὡς πρὶν, καὶ αὐτὸ, as shown by his version, "ut hactenus, sic deinceps."

^{33—33} I cannot understand αὐτὸ—Heindorf explains it by ἑαυτοῦ. But that is, to myself at least, equally unintelligible. For both αὐτὸ and ἑαυτοῦ are applied to something already spoken of; whereas Socrates is about to enter upon a new subject. The sense required is evidently to

tiful. I say that it is. But keep your eye on me,³³ and give me all your attention, that I may not say any thing silly. Let then that which is useful, be for us the beautiful. And this I say from thinking on these points. The eyes, we say, are beautiful, not when they seem to be such, but are unable to see, but when they are able and useful for seeing. Is it not so?

Hip. It is.

[35.] *Soc.* Say we not then of the whole body thus, that one part of it is beautiful for running, another for wrestling? and further, that all the animal kind, as a beautiful³⁴ horse, and a cock, and a quail, and all utensils, and vehicles, for land and sea, [ships and triremes,]³⁵ and all instruments both for music and the other arts, and pursuits and laws, and nearly every thing we call beautiful, are in the same position; and looking to each of them, in what way it has been born, made, or laid down,³⁶ we speak of a thing which is useful, as being beautiful in what it is useful, and for what it is useful, and when it is useful; but another thing, which is entirely useless, we call not beautiful. Does it not so seem to you, Hippias?

Hip. To me it does.

Soc. Correctly then do we now say, that the useful happens to be more than all beautiful.

Hip. Correctly, Socrates.

Soc. Now is not each thing, which is able to effect any thing, useful, so far as it is able? but that, which is unable, useless?

Hip. Entirely so.

[36.] *Soc.* Power then is beautiful, and want of power is not beautiful.

Hip. Very much so. And the rest of things, Socrates,

this effect, "Do you then consider well, whether the beautiful seems to you to be, what I say it is; and what I shall say, do you look into thoroughly—" But whether Plato really wrote so, is another question.

³³ Instead of *καλὸν*, which is here out of place, I suggested many years ago, *καὶ κυνίδιον*. For Plutarch combines the same four animals in ii. p. 471, E., *κύνας—καὶ ἵππους καὶ ὄρνυγας καὶ ἀλεκτρούνας*—quoted by Heind. on Lys. p. 211, E., *ὄρνυγα ἢ ἀλεκτρούνα—ἢ ἵππον ἢ κύνα*.

³⁴ The words *πλοῖά τε καὶ τριήρεις* are evidently an interpretation of *δχήματα—τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ*. Plato had probably a recollection of *θαλασσοπλάγκτα—ναυτίλων δχήματα* in Prometh. 477.

³⁵ Unless *κίται* be said here in reference to the *ἰσιτηδεύματα* and *νόμοι*, one would prefer *ἀπόκειται*, "are appropriated."

it. For I have still some hope that what the beautiful is will appear again.²⁸

Hip. Altogether assuredly,²⁹ Socrates: for it is not difficult to find. At least I know well that, were I to retire into solitude for a little time and commune with myself, I should describe it to you more accurately than accuracy itself.³⁰

Soc. Hold! Hippias, talk not so big—you see what trouble it has given us already—lest it should grow angry³¹ with us, and run away still further than before. And yet I am saying nothing to the purpose; for you will, I think, easily find it out, when you come to be alone. And do, by the gods,³² find it out in my presence; but if you are willing, seek it as now with me.³³ And if we find it, it will be the best of all; but, if we do not, I shall be content, I think, with my misfortune; while you going away will find it easily. But if we find it now, depend upon it, I shall not trouble you by inquiring what that was, which you had discovered by yourself.³³ For the present consider it, if it seems to you to be the beau-

²⁸ In lieu of *ἐφανήσεσθαι*, the train of ideas leads to *αὐ φανήσεσθαι*. On the confusion of *εκ* and *αυ*, see at Prometh. 229.

²⁹ The formula *πάντως δήπου*, expressive of an assent given from a thorough conviction, could not be introduced here in answer to the expression of a hope merely. Hence I still abide by my original conjecture, *πάντως ζῆ ἰλις*, similar to *Ἄρης θέλλαι ζῶσιν* in *Æsch. Ag. 792*, and in *Suidas Ζεῖ χύτρα ζῆ φιλία*, i. e. Where boils the pot, There friendship's hot.

³⁰ The Greek is *τῆς ἀπάσης*. But in this formula, where a personification takes place, the language requires *αὐτῆς τῆς*—See Porson on *Hec. 779*, and myself on *Æsch. Eum. 865*. To the passages there quoted I could now add many more.

³¹ This is rather a violent *prosopopœia*. Beauty in the abstract could hardly be said to put itself into a passion. From the Greek words *ὄρνισθιν ἡμῖν* I long ago elicited *ὄρνις ὡς εἰς θαμνόν*, "like a bird into a bush," and compared *Rep. iv. p. 432, B.*, where Justice is feigned to fly like a hunted animal *εἰς θάμνον*.

^{32—33} These words are strangely put together. "Find it—if you will—seek it with me." But if Hippias found it, he need not seek for it with Socrates. The words should have been, "Find it—but, failing, be willing to seek it with me," in Greek, *ἔξευρε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, βούλου—σζητᾶν*. There is moreover a difficulty in *ὥσπερ νῦν*, for which Ficinus found in his MS. *ὡς πρὶν, καὶ αὐ*, as shown by his version, "ut hactenus, sic deinceps."

^{33—33} I cannot understand *αὐτὸ*—Heindorf explains it by *ἔειπνο*. But that is, to myself at least, equally unintelligible. For both *αὐτὸ* and *ἔειπνο* are applied to something already spoken of; whereas Socrates is about to enter upon a new subject. The sense required is evidently to

tiful. I say that it is. But keep your eye on me,³³ and give me all your attention, that I may not say any thing silly. Let then that which is useful, be for us the beautiful. And this I say from thinking on these points. The eyes, we say, are beautiful, not when they seem to be such, but are unable to see, but when they are able and useful for seeing. Is it not so?

Hip. It is.

[35.] *Soc.* Say we not then of the whole body thus, that one part of it is beautiful for running, another for wrestling? and further, that all the animal kind, as a beautiful³⁴ horse, and a cock, and a quail, and all utensils, and vehicles, for land and sea, [ships and triremes,]³⁵ and all instruments both for music and the other arts, and pursuits and laws, and nearly every thing we call beautiful, are in the same position; and looking to each of them, in what way it has been born, made, or laid down,³⁶ we speak of a thing which is useful, as being beautiful in what it is useful, and for what it is useful, and when it is useful; but another thing, which is entirely useless, we call not beautiful. Does it not so seem to you, Hippias?

Hip. To me it does.

Soc. Correctly then do we now say, that the useful happens to be more than all beautiful.

Hip. Correctly, Socrates.

Soc. Now is not each thing, which is able to effect any thing, useful, so far as it is able? but that, which is unable, useless?

Hip. Entirely so.

[36.] *Soc.* Power then is beautiful, and want of power is not beautiful.

Hip. Very much so. And the rest of things, Socrates,

this effect, "Do you then consider well, whether the beautiful seems to you to be, what I say it is; and what I shall say, do you look into thoroughly—" But whether Plato really wrote so, is another question.

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³⁵ The words *πλοῖα τε καὶ τριήρεις* are evidently an interpretation of *ὀχήματα—τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ*. Plato had probably a recollection of *Θαλασσοπλάγκτα—ναυτίλων ὀχήματα* in Prometh. 477.

³⁶ Unless *κίται* be said here in reference to the *ἐπιτηδεύματα* and *νόμοι*, one would prefer *ἀπόκειται*, "are appropriated."

testify in our favour that such is the case, but particularly as regards matters of state. For of all things it is the most beautiful for a person to be powerful in state-affairs, and in his own city; but to be powerless, the least so.

Soc. You say well. By the gods then, Hippias, is not wisdom on this account the most beautiful of all things, and ignorance the least so?

Hip. What else³⁷ do you think, Socrates?

Soc. Softly, my dear friend; since I have a fear about what I am saying.

Hip. What do you fear, Socrates? For your reasoning has proceeded very beautifully at present.

Soc. I wish it had. But do you consider this with me. Could a person do any thing, of which he knows nothing, and for which he has no power?

Hip. By no means. For how could he do that, for which he has no power?

Soc. Are then they, who err, and act wrong, and do a thing unwillingly, ³⁸ other than those, who³⁹ would not have so acted, unless they had possessed the power?

Hip. It is evident.

[37.] *Soc.* But, however, they who are powerful are powerful through power; for assuredly it is not through want of power.

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. All then, who do any thing, are able to do what they do.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And all men, beginning from boyhood, do many more evil things than good, and err unwillingly.

Hip. The fact is so.

Soc. What then, shall we say that this power and these means, however useful they may be for the doing evil, are beautiful? or do they want much of being so?

Hip. (They want) much,³⁹ in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. The powerful then and the useful, Hippias, are not, it seems, the beautiful.

³⁷ I have translated, as if the Greek were 'ἄλλο τι οἶσι, not 'ἄλλα τι οἶσι.

³⁸⁻³⁹ The Greek is ἄλλο τι οὐτοί, εἰ—which I long ago corrected, as the sense requires, into ἄλλο τι οὐτοί ἢ οἶ, εἰ—

³⁹ After δαί at the end of the question, has dropt out δαί in the commencement of the answer.

Hip. If⁴⁰ indeed, Socrates, it has power to do good, or is useful for things of that kind.

Soc. Away then has fled⁴¹ that thing, at once the powerful and the useful, as being⁴² without exception beautiful. Now this was that very thing, Hippias, which our soul⁴³ meant to say, that the beautiful consists in utility and the power to produce some good.

Hip. So it seems to me.

Soc. Now this is the advantageous. Is it not?

Hip. It is.

[38.] *Soc.* Thus then beautiful bodies, and beautiful institutions, and wisdom, and all these things we just now mentioned, are beautiful, because advantageous.

Hip. Evidently so.

Soc. The advantageous then appears to be, Hippias, to us, the beautiful.

Hip. Entirely so, Socrates.

Soc. But the advantageous is that, which effects a good.

Hip. It is.

Soc. Now that, which effects, is nothing else than a cause. Is it not?

Hip. It is so.

Soc. The beautiful therefore is a cause of the good.

Hip. It is so.

Soc. Now the cause, Hippias,⁴⁴ and that of which it is the cause, are different.⁴⁵ For the cause cannot surely be a

⁴⁰ Instead of "If," the sense requires "Unless." In Greek not *ἐάν*, but *ἀν μή*, as I remarked long ago.

⁴¹ In *τοίνυν* lies *ἡδὲ πρᾶμενον*. Compare Legg. iii. p. 686, A., *ταῦτα δὴ τὰ μέγιστα—διέπτει*: and *οἷχεται ἀποπτάμενος* in Sympos. p. 183, E.

⁴² This use of *εἶναι* after *οἷχεται* seems scarcely correct Greek.

⁴³ Although the power of speech is given to the soul in Sympos. p. 192, D., *ἡ ψυχὴ—δύναται εἰπεῖν*, and in Soph. Antig. 227, *ψυχὴ—ἡῦδα*: yet as nothing has been said of the soul, unless we adopt the reading of the two best MSS. in § 34, of *ψυχῇ* for *τύχῃ*, but a great deal about *χύτρα*, it is evident, as I remarked long ago, that Plato wrote here *χύτρα*, and there *χύτρα*.

⁴⁴ The Greek is *καὶ οὐδὲν αἴτιον ὃ τὸ αἴτιον*, i. e. "and that, of which the cause is a cause." But the sense requires, "and that of which it is the cause;" in Greek, *καὶ οὐδὲν ὃ τὸ αἴτιον*. Correctly then has Ficinus, "Aliud vero est causa; aliud id, cujus causa est."

⁴⁵ The Greek is *τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον αἴτιον αἴτιον*. But Ficinus, "causa ipsius causæ causa:" from whence Sydenham, "the cause—the cause of

cause of a cause.⁴⁵ Consider it in this way. Did not the cause appear to be a maker?

Hip. Clearly.

Soc. That, which is made by the maker, is nothing else but the produced; but is not itself the maker.

Hip. Such is the fact.

Soc. The produced then is one thing, and the producer is another.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. ⁴⁶The producer then is not the cause of itself,⁴⁶ but of that, which is produced by it.

Hip. Entirely so.

Soc. If then the beautiful is the cause of a good, such a good must be produced by the beautiful; and for this reason, as it seems, we attend to intelligence, and all other beautiful things, because their work and issue are worthy of attention, as being the good; and from what we are discovering, the beautiful is near to being in the form (as it were)⁴⁷ of a father to the good.

Hip. Entirely so. For you speak beautifully, Socrates.

[39.] *Soc.* Say I not this too beautifully, that neither is the father the son, nor is the son the father?

Hip. Beautifully indeed.

Soc. Nor is the cause the thing produced; nor is, on the other hand, the thing produced the cause.

Hip. You say what is true.

Soc. By Zeus then, thou best of men, neither is the beautiful the good, nor is the good the beautiful. Or does it seem to you from what has been said, that it is possible?

itself," as if he wished to read *αὐτοῦ* in lieu of *αἰτίου*. But the train of thought requires, "that, of which there is a cause, cannot be itself a cause;" in Greek, *Ὅτι γὰρ πᾶσι, ὅπου γ' ἔστιν αἰτίον τι, αὐτὸ τὸ αἰτίον ἂν εἴη*: where *ὅπου* for *οὐτινος* has been, as usual, the cause of error; as I showed in my note printed many years ago, to which I will here refer the inquisitive reader.

⁴⁶—⁴⁶ The Greek is *Ὅτι ἄρα τὸ γ' αἰτίον αἰτίον αἰτίου ἔστιν*. But this is at variance with the chain of argument, which requires a reference to the producer. Plato could have written only *Ὅτι ἄρα τὸ γε ποιοῦν αἰτίον αὐτοῦ ἔστιν*, as I stated long ago, and have here translated.

⁴⁷ In *τινός εἰ λόγα*, found in the two best MSS., lies hid *τινός ἐκείνῃ*, as I remarked long ago.

Hip. By Zeus, it appears to me not possible.

Soc. Does it then please us, and are we willing to assert, that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful?

Hip. By Zeus, it does not please me at all.

Soc. And, by Zeus, Hippias, to me too it pleases the least of all the assertions we have made.

Hip. And reasonably so.

Soc. The assertion then, which just now appeared the most correct of all, that the advantageous and the useful and the powerful to do some good, was the beautiful, runs the risk of not being so; but if possible, of being more ridiculous than the first (mentioned), in which we conceived the maiden, and each of the things before mentioned, to be the beautiful.

Hip. It seems so, indeed.

[40.] *Soc.* And I too, Hippias, have no longer where to turn myself, but am at a loss. Have you any thing to say?

Hip. Not at least for the present. But, as I said just now, I know well that on reflection I shall find it out.

Soc. But, through my eagerness to know, I seem to myself unable to wait your delay. ⁴⁸ For after being somewhat in doubt, ⁴⁸ I think I have just now found out a way. For consider, if we call that beautiful, which causes us to be delighted, —I do not mean all pleasures,—but that which arises through the hearing and the sight, ⁴⁹ how and for what could we contend? ⁴⁹ For surely beautiful men, Hippias, and embroidery of all kinds, and pictures of animals, and earthenware, do, when they are beautiful, delight us, while we look upon them; ⁵⁰ and so likewise do beautiful sounds, ⁵⁰ and music in general, and conversations, and story-telling produce the very same effect. So that should we say in reply to that swaggering

⁴⁸⁻⁴⁹ The Greek is *kai γάρ οὖν δὴ τε καὶ*—an accumulation of particles, which defy an exact translation. Plato probably wrote *Kai γάρ ἀπορῶν δὴ τε*, as I have translated.

⁵⁰⁻⁵¹ The Greek is *πῶς τί ἄρ' ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα*. To avoid the doubled interrogatives Sydenham suggested *πῶς γάρ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα*; or *πρὸς τί γάρ*—"For what purpose should we contend about it?"—But Heindorf, defends the two interrogatives by quoting five similar passages from Plato alone. I suspect however we ought to read *πῶς τε καὶ πρὸς τί*—as I have translated. See my note on *Æsch. Suppl.* 927, where to the passages already quoted I could add as many more.

⁵²⁻⁵³ The Greek is *kai oi φθογγοὶ οἱ καλοὶ*—But the balance of the sentence requires—*kai oi φθογγοὶ αὐ καλοὶ* to answer to—*οἱ καλοὶ ἄνθρωποι*.

follow—My man of mettle, the beautiful is that, which produces pleasure through the hearing, and the sight—think you that we should restrain him from his swaggering?

Hip. What the beautiful is seems, Socrates, to me at least, to be well defined.

[41.] *Soc.* What then shall we say, Hippias, that pursuits⁵¹ and institutions being pleasant through the hearing, or through the sight, are beautiful? or have they some other kind (of beauty)?

Hip. These beautiful things will, perhaps, Socrates, lie hid from the man.

Soc. (But)⁵² by the dog, not from the person, Hippias, before whom I should be the most ashamed to trifle, and to pretend to say something to the purpose, when I was saying nothing.

Hip. Who is he?

Soc. The son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer me to⁵³ say off-hand⁵³ what has not been investigated, than to speak, as if I knew what I did not know.

Hip. To myself too it appears, since you have mentioned it, that the case is different as regards institutions.

Soc. Softly, Hippias. For we have fallen into the very same difficulty respecting the beautiful, as we were in just now; and we are in danger of conceiving ourselves to be in a pretty⁵⁴ easy road.

⁵¹ After *ἡμιπρόσωπα* is inserted *τὰ καλὰ*, at variance with the language and logic. On the other hand, *τὰ καλὰ* have dropt out in the answer of Hippias, where instead of *καὶ* we must read *τὰ καλὰ δὲ*—and so I have translated.

⁵² "Before *μὰ* is manifestly required *ἀλλὰ*: for otherwise Socrates would seem to indicate that he was himself the fictitious person. On the other hand, to the remark of Hippias, 'This will perhaps lie hid from the man,' Socrates would well reply, 'But not from the person before whom I should be the most ashamed to talk nonsense.'" Such was the note I printed many years ago, knowing that AAAA might easily have been lost before MA. And thus we are relieved from the necessity of considering with Schleiermacher, whom Stalbaum follows, the question of Hippias and the reply of Socrates, as interpolations. Of this passage Cicero had perhaps a recollection when he wrote, "Hunc autem esse unum hominem ex omnibus, quo præsente, ego ineptus esse minime vellem." *De Orator.* § 24.

⁵³—⁵³ Pichinus has "facile judicarem," as if his MS. read *κρίνειν*, not *λέγειν*.

⁵⁴ The Greek is *οἰσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἶναι*. But *ἄλλῃ εὐπορίᾳ* could not be opposed to *ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπορίᾳ*. Heindorf once considered

Hip. How say you so, Socrates?

Soc. I will state what to me ⁵⁵ appears to be beautiful, if indeed I am saying any to the purpose. That which relates to institutions and pursuits would perhaps appear to be not removed from the sensations which arise through the hearing and sight. But let us abide awhile by the definition, that what is through those senses pleasant, is beautiful, without bringing before us the question relating to institutions. [42.] Now should the man I mentioned, or any one else, ask us—Why have ye, Hippias and Socrates, separated from the pleasant in general that species of it, in which ye say consists the beautiful, and yet deny that what relates to the other sensations (connected with) ⁵⁶ food and drink and sexual intercourse, and all the rest of such a kind, are beautiful? Or do ye assert that (these) ⁵⁷ are not pleasant, and that there are no pleasures at all in such sensations, nor in any thing else except seeing and hearing? What shall we say, Hippias?

Hip. We will say by all means, Socrates, that in the other things likewise there are very great pleasures.

Soc. Why then, he will say, do ye take away from (these) ⁵⁸ pleasures, really existing no less than those, their very name, and deprive them of the property of being beautiful? Because, we will say, there is not one, who would not laugh at us, were we to say that to eat is not a pleasant, but a beautiful thing, and to smell sweet not a pleasant thing, but beautiful. [43.] But with regard to sexual intercourse, all would surely admit ⁵⁹ that it is to us a thing the most pleasant; but it is meet so to carry it on, if a person will do it, as that no

εὐπορία an interpolation; but subsequently interpreted *ἐν ἄλλῃ τινι* by "rursus in alia." But that would be *ἐν ἄλλῃ αὐτῇ*, or rather without *ἄλλῃ*: for which I would now read *καλῇ*, with a play on the word *καλῇ*, just as in *πρεπόντως* in § 31. Ficinus has "dum putamus quiddam certi nos habere," and thus avoids all the difficulties of the text.

⁵⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἃ γ' ἐμοὶ καλὰ φαίνεσθαι*, not *ὃ γὰρ μοι καταφαίνεται*. See the reasons for the change in my edition.

⁵⁶ To avoid the strange expression *αἰσθήσεως σίτων*, we may insert *ἔναικα* between *ποτῶν* and *καὶ*—

⁵⁷ Ficinus has "dulcia hæc," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐδὲ τὰδε ἡδία οὐδὲ*—

⁵⁸ Before *ἡδονὰς* the antithesis in *ἐκείνας* requires *τάσδε*—

⁵⁹ Instead of *μάχοιντο*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀνίχοιντο*, while *ἡμῖν* depends upon *ἡδιστον*—

one see him; since it is a deed the most disgraceful to behold.⁵⁹ On our saying this, Hippias, he will perhaps remark,—I now perceive that you have been of old ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to men. Now I did not ask what seems to be beautiful to the multitude, but what is so in reality. Whereupon we shall, I presume, state in reply, that we asserted that this part of the pleasant, arising from the sight and hearing, was a beautiful thing. ⁶⁰But have you it in your power to use the reasoning for any thing?⁶¹ Or shall we, Hippias, say any thing else?

Hip. Against what has been urged, Socrates, it is necessary to say no other than this.

Soc. Truly do ye say well, he will reply. If then the pleasure, coming through the sight and hearing, be a beautiful thing, that which does not happen to be a part of such⁶¹ pleasant sensations, it is clear cannot be beautiful. Shall we confess it?

Hip. Yes.

[44.] *Soc.* Is then that which is pleasurable, he will say, through the sight, pleasurable through the sight and hearing (conjointly)?⁶² Or that which is pleasurable through the hearing, pleasurable through the hearing and the sight (conjointly)?⁶³ By no means, we shall answer, would that which exists through either, exist through both; for this you seem to us to say; whereas we assert, that each of these pleasurable things would be beautiful, taken by themselves and both together. Should we not answer thus?

⁵⁹ Shakespeare—"He loved the deed of darkness; but he blushed To own it." Compare Phileb. p. 66, A. § 158. Plutarch Sympos. ii. p. 654, B.; Cicero de Offic. i. 35; Pythagor. Fr. p. 710, ed. Gale.

⁶⁰ This is the literal version of the Greek, 'ἄλλ' ἔχεις τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, whose version is, "Tu vero, Hippias, quo te vertis?" as if he had found in his MS. 'ἄλλ' ἔχεις δ, τι χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, similar to δ, τι χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ in Crito, § 4. But the balance of the sentence requires τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, to answer to μὴ ἄλλα—ἢ ταῦτα in the reply of Hippias. Compare Demosth. p. 590, ed. Wolf., ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἔχω τι χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτου μάρτυσι, quoted by Zeune on Viger. p. 323.

⁶¹ The Greek is δ μὴ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ἐν τῶν ἡδέων. But Ficinus has "quod per alium sensum delectat," from which Stephens would elicit τούτῳ. He should have suggested τούτων—as I have translated.

^{62, 63} The word ἄμ' has twice dropt out between ἴστιν and ἡδύ.

Hip. By all means.

Soc. ⁶⁴Does then, he will say, any pleasure whatever differ from any other pleasure whatever in this, namely, in being a pleasure? For (I ask not) whether any pleasure is greater or less, or more or less; but whether any one differs by this very thing, in one of the pleasures being a pleasure, but the other not a pleasure. Does it not seem so to us?

Hip. For it does not seem so.⁶⁴

Soc. For some other reason then, he will say, than because they are pleasures, have ye selected these from all the rest; and having some such view with regard to both, that they differ in some respect from the rest, did ye not, looking to this, say that they are beautiful? For seeing is surely not a beautiful thing on this account, that it is through seeing. For, if this were the reason of its being beautiful, the other pleasure ⁶⁵[that through hearing]⁶⁵ would not be beautiful, ⁶⁶as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of seeing.⁶⁶ Shall we say, you speak the truth?

Hip. We will.

[45.] *Soc.* Nor, on the other hand, is the pleasure through the hearing beautiful on this account, that it is through hearing. For then that through seeing would not be beautiful, ⁶⁷as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of hearing.⁶⁷ Shall we say, Hippias, that the man, in speaking so, speaks correctly?

Hip. Yes, correctly.

Soc. But both, he will rejoin, are beautiful, as you assert. For so we say.

⁶⁴⁻⁶⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is manifestly corrupt.

⁶⁵⁻⁶⁵ The words within brackets, ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς, are evidently an explanation of ἱρία.

⁶⁶⁻⁶⁶ So Sydenham; thus adopting the correction of Cornarius, οὐκ οὐσα ἱρί γε, which was suggested, probably, by the version of Ficinus, "cum per visum nequaquam efficiatur." The Greek is, καλή· οὐκ οὖν ἔστι γε δι' ὁψεως ἡδονή: from whence it is easy to elicit, as I did many years ago, what the sense requires, καλή· ἢ οὐ κοινόν ἐστὶ τι τῇ τε δι' ὁψεως ἡδονῇ, i. e. "to which there is nothing in common with the pleasure of sight:" and a similar correction is requisite in § 45, where a similar idea occurs.

⁶⁷⁻⁶⁷ See the preceding note.

Hip. We do.

Soc. They have then something in common and the same, which causes them to be beautiful, and which belongs to both conjointly, and severally to each. For otherwise they would not be beautiful conjointly and severally. Give to me a reply, as if to him.

Hip. I answer, that it appears to me as you say.

Soc. If then these pleasures, taken conjointly, are affected by any circumstance, but not so, if taken separately, they could not, at least under that circumstance, be beautiful.

Hip. How could it be possible, Socrates, that when neither are affected by any circumstance whatever, that both should be affected by that ⁶⁸[by which neither is affected]? ⁶⁸

Soc. You think it is impossible.

Hip. ⁶⁹Yes; for a great want of acquaintance with the nature of those things would possess me, and of speaking the present speeches. ⁶⁹

[46.] *Soc.* (You speak) pleasantly, Hippias. ⁷⁰ For I am in danger equally of fancying I see something so circumstanced, as you aver to be impossible; but yet I see nothing (clearly). ⁷¹

Hip. You are in no danger, Socrates; but you very readily look aside. ⁷²

⁶⁸⁻⁶⁹ The words within brackets are an evident interpolation, and were properly omitted by Ficinus in his version, "ut, quod neutra illarum patitur, ambæ perpetiantur." Nor is this the only error here. For in one of the best MSS. are found the remains of the following words, which ought to close the next speech of Hippias: *Εἰ γὰρ ἕκασται, δὴλον ὅτι καὶ ἀμφοτέραι πεπονθυῖαι ἂν εἴεν*, i. e. For if each had been so circumstanced, it is evident both would have been.

⁶⁹⁻⁷⁰ Such is the literal version of the Greek; for which I think I have suggested something more worthy of Plato in my edition.

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⁷¹ The Greek is *ὁρῶ δὲ οὐδὲν*. Perhaps δ' εἰ should be read for δὲ. Compare Eurip. Phœn. 165, *Ὅρῶ δ' ἤτ' οὐ σαφῶς ὁρῶ δὲ πῶς*. Heracl. 495, *λείγει μὲν οὐ σαφῶς, λείγει δὲ πῶς*.

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Hip. No one will know better than yourself, Socrates, whether I am playing with you or not, if you will only endeavour to tell me, what are those things that have presented themselves to you. For you will be seen to say nothing to the purpose. For you will never find that both of us have been affected by circumstances together, by which neither you nor I have been separately.

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[47.] *Hip.* You appear to me, Socrates, to exhibit in your answers again⁷⁶ still greater wonders than when you answered before. For just consider, if both of us were just, would not each of us be so? or if each unjust, would not both be so? if both were in health, would not each be so? or if each were wearied, or wounded, or struck, or were affected in any other way whatever, would not both of us be affected in the

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same⁷⁷ way? Still further, if both of us happened to be made of gold, or silver, or ivory, or if you will, well-born, or wise, or held in honour, or old, or [young],⁷⁸ or in any state you will, incident to man, is there not a great necessity for each to be so?

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[48.] *Hip.* But neither do you, Socrates, consider things as wholes, nor do they, with whom you are wont to converse. For taking separately the beautiful and each of things existing, you discuss it in your discourses, cutting it into fractions; and hence things of great size, and of continuous⁷⁹ length escape your observation. And to such an extent have they escaped you now, that you conceive there is something, either circumstance or being, which, as regards two things taken jointly, does exist, but does not, as regards them taken singly; or on the other hand, does exist, as regards each, taken singly, but not as regards both, taken jointly. So illogically, and inconsiderately, and sillily, and unreflectingly, do you conduct yourselves.

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⁸⁰ The proverb in Greek was—*Ζῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὥς θέλομεν ἀλλ’ ὥς δυνάμεθα*, translated by Terence, “Ut quimus, aiunt; quando, ut volumus, non licet.”

⁸¹ I confess I cannot perceive here the requisite train of thought.

nitions. Since even now, ⁸² before I had been thus admonished by you how sillily we conduct ourselves, shall I give ⁸³ you still a plainer proof, by stating what were our thoughts upon those points? or shall I not?

Hip. You will speak to one who knows already, Socrates. For I am conversant with each one of those who are engaged in disputations, and how they are situated. Still, if it is more agreeable to yourself, say on.

Soc. To me indeed it will be more agreeable. For we were, thou best of men, so silly before you said so of us, as to conceive with regard to myself and you, that each of us was one person, and that both could not be what each was; for we are not one, but two persons. Such a simpleton was I! [49.] But now we have been taught the contrary, that if both together are two persons, each of us also is of necessity two; and that if each of us be one, it is necessary for both of us to be one. For by a continuous argument (respecting) being, ⁸³ it is not possible, according to Hippias, for it to be otherwise; but now having been persuaded by you, that whatever both of two things are, this too each of them is, I sit down here.⁸⁴ But first remind⁸⁵ me, Hippias, whether you and I are one, you and I together; or you are two, and I two.

Hip. What mean you, Socrates?

Soc. What I say. For I am afraid to speak plainly to you,⁸⁶ because you are harsh with me, whenever you seem to yourself ⁸⁷ to speak something to the purpose.⁸⁷ But

^{82—82} This is rather strange language, "Before I had—shall I." There is some error here. Perhaps Plato—*ἵν' ἂν τὸ πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ ταῦτ' εὖ νοουθετηθῇναι φανῶ*, i. e. "in order that I may be shown to have been properly admonished thus by you."

⁸³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας*. But Sydenham's, though less literal, is more intelligible, "by reason of the continuity of being."

⁸⁴ Between *ἐνθάδε* and *κάθημαι* has dropt out, I suspect, *κάνθων*, "a pannier'd ass." The word is found in Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 179, and *Εἰρ.* 81, while its synonyme *ὄνος* is seen in the proverb alluded to in Plato *Theætet.* p. 146, A., *ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν καὶ δεῖ ἂν αἰεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθιθεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος*.

⁸⁵ Instead of *ὑπόμνησον*, which can hardly suit with *πότερον*, I suggested long ago *ὑπομνήνυσον*, similar to "memora," in Ficinus.

⁸⁶ In lieu of *σε* Heindorf suggested *σοί*, answering to "coram te," in Ficinus.

^{87—87} But this could be no reason for Hippias having a harsh feeling towards Socrates. What Plato probably wrote may be seen in my edition.

fellow—My man of mettle, the beautiful is that, which produces pleasure through the hearing, and the sight—think you that we should restrain him from his swaggering?

Hip. What the beautiful is seems, Socrates, to me at least, to be well defined.

[41.] *Soc.* What then shall we say, Hippias, that pursuits⁵¹ and institutions being pleasant through the hearing, or through the sight, are beautiful? or have they some other kind (of beauty)?

Hip. These beautiful things will, perhaps, Socrates, lie hid from the man.

Soc. (But)⁵² by the dog, not from the person, Hippias, before whom I should be the most ashamed to trifle, and to pretend to say something to the purpose, when I was saying nothing.

Hip. Who is he?

Soc. The son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer me to⁵³ say off-hand⁵³ what has not been investigated, than to speak, as if I knew what I did not know.

Hip. To myself too it appears, since you have mentioned it, that the case is different as regards institutions.

Soc. Softly, Hippias. For we have fallen into the very same difficulty respecting the beautiful, as we were in just now; and we are in danger of conceiving ourselves to be in a pretty⁵⁴ easy road.

⁵¹ After *ἐπιτηδεύματα* is inserted *τὰ καλὰ*, at variance with the language and logic. On the other hand, *τὰ καλὰ* have dropt out in the answer of Hippias, where instead of *κἀν* we must read *τὰ καλὰ δὲ*—and so I have translated.

⁵² "Before *μὲν* is manifestly required: *ἀλλὰ*: for otherwise Socrates would seem to indicate that he was himself the fictitious person. On the other hand, to the remark of Hippias, 'This will perhaps lie hid from the man,' Socrates would well reply, 'But not from the person before whom I should be the most ashamed to talk nonsense.'" Such was the note I printed many years ago, knowing that *AAAA* might easily have been lost before *MA*. And thus we are relieved from the necessity of considering with Schleiermacher, whom Stalbaum follows, the question of Hippias and the reply of Socrates, as interpolations. Of this passage Cicero had perhaps a recollection when he wrote, "Hunc autem esse unum hominem ex omnibus, quo præsente, ego ineptus esse minime vellem." *De Orator.* § 24.

^{53—53} Ficinus has "facile judicarem," as if his MS. read *κρίνειν*, not *λέγειν*.

⁵⁴ The Greek is *οἰεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινι εὐπορίᾳ εἶναι*. But *ἄλλῃ εὐπορίᾳ* could not be opposed to *ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπορίᾳ*. Heindorf once considered

Hip. How say you so, Socrates?

Soc. I will state what to me ⁵⁵ appears to be beautiful, ⁵⁶ if indeed I am saying any to the purpose. That which relates to institutions and pursuits would perhaps appear to be not removed from the sensations which arise through the hearing and sight. But let us abide awhile by the definition, that what is through those senses pleasant, is beautiful, without bringing before us the question relating to institutions. [42.] Now should the man I mentioned, or any one else, ask us—Why have ye, Hippias and Socrates, separated from the pleasant in general that species of it, in which ye say consists the beautiful, and yet deny that what relates to the other sensations (connected with) ⁵⁶ food and drink and sexual intercourse, and all the rest of such a kind, are beautiful? Or do ye assert that (these) ⁵⁷ are not pleasant, and that there are no pleasures at all in such sensations, nor in any thing else except seeing and hearing? What shall we say, Hippias?

Hip. We will say by all means, Socrates, that in the other things likewise there are very great pleasures.

Soc. Why then, he will say, do ye take away from (these) ⁵⁸ pleasures, really existing no less than those, their very name, and deprive them of the property of being beautiful? Because, we will say, there is not one, who would not laugh at us, were we to say that to eat is not a pleasant, but a beautiful thing, and to smell sweet not a pleasant thing, but beautiful. [43.] But with regard to sexual intercourse, all would surely admit ⁵⁹ that it is to us a thing the most pleasant; but it is meet so to carry it on, if a person will do it, as that no

εὐπορία an interpolation; but subsequently interpreted *ἐν ἄλλῃ τινι* by "rursus in alia." But that would be *ἐν ἄλλῃ αὐτῇ*, or rather without *ἄλλῃ*: for which I would now read *καλῶ*, with a play on the word *καλῶ*, just as in *πρεπόντως* in § 31. Ficinus has "dum putamus quiddam certi nos habere," and thus avoids all the difficulties of the text.

⁵⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἃ γ' ἐμοὶ καλὰ φαίνονται*, not *ὃ γὰρ μοι καταφαίνεται*. See the reasons for the change in my edition.

⁵⁶ To avoid the strange expression *αἰσθήσεις σίτων*, we may insert *ἐνεκα* between *ποτῶν* and *καὶ*—

⁵⁷ Ficinus has "dulcia hæc," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐδὲ τὰδε ἡδία οὐδὲ*—

⁵⁸ Before *ἡδονὰς* the antithesis in *ἐκείνας* requires *τάσδε*—

⁵⁹ Instead of *μάχονται*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀνίχονται*, while *ἡμῖν* depends upon *ἡδιστον*—

one see him; since it is a deed the most disgraceful to behold.⁵⁹ On our saying this, Hippias, he will perhaps remark,—I now perceive that you have been of old ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to men. Now I did not ask what seems to be beautiful to the multitude, but what is so in reality. Whereupon we shall, I presume, state in reply, that we asserted that this part of the pleasant, arising from the sight and hearing, was a beautiful thing. ⁶⁰But have you it in your power to use the reasoning for any thing?⁶⁰ Or shall we, Hippias, say any thing else?

Hip. Against what has been urged, Socrates, it is necessary to say no other than this.

Soc. Truly do ye say well, he will reply. If then the pleasure, coming through the sight and hearing, be a beautiful thing, that which does not happen to be a part of such⁶¹ pleasant sensations, it is clear cannot be beautiful. Shall we confess it?

Hip. Yes.

[44.] *Soc.* Is then that which is pleasurable, he will say, through the sight, pleasurable through the sight and hearing (conjointly)?⁶² Or that which is pleasurable through the hearing, pleasurable through the hearing and the sight (conjointly)?⁶³ By no means, we shall answer, would that which exists through either, exist through both; for this you seem to us to say; whereas we assert, that each of these pleasurable things would be beautiful, taken by themselves and both together. Should we not answer thus?

⁵⁹ Shakspeare—"He loved the deed of darkness; but he blushed To own it." Compare Phileb. p. 66, A. § 158. Plutarch Sympos. ii. p. 654, B.; Cicero de Offic. i. 35; Pythagor. Fr. p. 710, ed. Gale.

⁶⁰—⁶⁰ This is the literal version of the Greek, 'ἄλλ' ἔχεις τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ; which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, whose version is, "Tu vero, Hippias, quo te vertis?" as if he had found in his MS. 'ἄλλ' ἔχεις δ, τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, similar to δ, τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ in Crito, § 4. But the balance of the sentence requires τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, to answer to μὴ ἄλλα—ἢ ταῦτα in the reply of Hippias. Compare Demosth. p. 590, ed. Wolf, ἰγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἔχω τι χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτου μάρτυσι, quoted by Zeune on Viger. p. 323.

⁶¹ The Greek is δ μὴ τοῦτο τυγχάνει δν τῶν ἡδίων. But Ficinus has "quod per alium sensum delectat," from which Stephens would elicit τούτῳ. He should have suggested τούτων—as I have translated.

^{62, 63} The word αἴμα has twice dropt out between ἴστω and ἡδὺ.

Hip. By all means.

Soc. ⁶⁴ Does then, he will say, any pleasure whatever differ from any other pleasure whatever in this, namely, in being a pleasure? For (I ask not) whether any pleasure is greater or less, or more or less; but whether any one differs by this very thing, in one of the pleasures being a pleasure, but the other not a pleasure. Does it not seem so to us?

Hip. For it does not seem so.⁶⁴

Soc. For some other reason then, he will say, than because they are pleasures, have ye selected these from all the rest; and having some such view with regard to both, that they differ in some respect from the rest, did ye not, looking to this, say that they are beautiful? For seeing is surely not a beautiful thing on this account, that it is through seeing. For, if this were the reason of its being beautiful, the other pleasure ⁶⁵ [that through hearing] ⁶⁵ would not be beautiful, ⁶⁶ as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of seeing.⁶⁶ Shall we say, you speak the truth?

Hip. We will.

[45.] *Soc.* Nor, on the other hand, is the pleasure through the hearing beautiful on this account, that it is through hearing. For then that through seeing would not be beautiful, ⁶⁷ as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of hearing.⁶⁷ Shall we say, Hippias, that the man, in speaking so, speaks correctly?

Hip. Yes, correctly.

Soc. But both, he will rejoin, are beautiful, as you assert. For so we say.

^{64—64} Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is manifestly corrupt.

^{65—65} The words within brackets, ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς, are evidently an explanation of ἱρίπα.

^{66—66} So Sydenham; thus adopting the correction of Cornarius, οὐκ οὐσα ἱρί γε, which was suggested, probably, by the version of Ficinus, "cum per visum nequaquam efficiatur." The Greek is, καλή· οὐκ οὖν ἱστί γε δι' ὁψαὺς ἡδονή: from whence it is easy to elicit, as I did many years ago, what the sense requires, καλή· ἢ οὐ κοινόν ἱστί τι τῇ τε δι' ὁψαὺς ἡδονῇ, i. e. "to which there is nothing in common with the pleasure of sight:" and a similar correction is requisite in § 45, where a similar idea occurs.

^{67—67} See the preceding note.

Hip. We do.

Soc. They have then something in common and the same, which causes them to be beautiful, and which belongs to both conjointly, and severally to each. For otherwise they would not be beautiful conjointly and severally. Give to me a reply, as if to him.

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Soc. You think it is impossible.

Hip. ⁶⁷Yes; for a great want of acquaintance with the nature of those things would possess me, and of speaking the present speeches. ⁶⁸

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Soc. Most assuredly.

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⁸⁰ The proverb in Greek was—*Ζῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὥς θέλομεν ἀλλ’ ὥς δυνάμεθα*, translated by Terence, “Ut quimus, aiunt; quando, ut volumus, non licet.”

⁸¹ I confess I cannot perceive here the requisite train of thought.

nitions. Since even now, ⁸² before I had been thus admonished by you how sillily we conduct ourselves, shall I give ⁸³ you still a plainer proof, by stating what were our thoughts upon those points? or shall I not?

Hip. You will speak to one who knows already, Socrates. For I am conversant with each one of those who are engaged in disputations, and how they are situated. Still, if it is more agreeable to yourself, say on.

Soc. To me indeed it will be more agreeable. For we were, thou best of men, so silly before you said so of us, as to conceive with regard to myself and you, that each of us was one person, and that both could not be what each was; for we are not one, but two persons. Such a simpleton was I! [49.] But now we have been taught the contrary, that if both together are two persons, each of us also is of necessity two; and that if each of us be one, it is necessary for both of us to be one. For by a continuous argument (respecting) being, ⁸³ it is not possible, according to Hippias, for it to be otherwise; but now having been persuaded by you, that whatever both of two things are, this too each of them is, I sit down here. ⁸⁴ But first remind ⁸⁵ me, Hippias, whether you and I are one, you and I together; or you are two, and I two.

Hip. What mean you, Socrates?

Soc. What I say. For I am afraid to speak plainly to you, ⁸⁶ because you are harsh with me, whenever you seem to yourself ⁸⁷ to speak something to the purpose. ⁸⁷ But

⁸²⁻⁸³ This is rather strange language, "Before I had—shall I." There is some error here. Perhaps Plato—*ἵν' ἂν τὸ πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ ταῦτ' εὖ νοουμένηθῇναι φανῶ*, i. e. "in order that I may be shown to have been properly admonished thus by you."

⁸³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας*. But Sydenham's, though less literal, is more intelligible, "by reason of the continuity of being."

⁸⁴ Between *ἐνθάδε* and *κάθημαι* has dropt out, I suspect, *κάνθων*, "a pannier'd ass." The word is found in Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 179, and *Εἰρ.* 81, while its synonyme *ὄνος* is seen in the proverb alluded to in Plato *Theætet.* p. 146, A., *ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν καὶ θεὸς ἂν αἰεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος*.

⁸⁵ Instead of *ὑπόμνησον*, which can hardly suit with *πότερον*, I suggested long ago *ὑπομνήσσον*, similar to "memora," in Ficinus.

⁸⁶ In lieu of *σε* Heindorf suggested *σοι*, answering to "coram te," in Ficinus.

⁸⁷⁻⁸⁷ But this could be no reason for Hippias having a harsh feeling towards Socrates. What Plato probably wrote may be seen in my edition.

however tell me, is not each of us one? and so affected as to be one?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. If then each of us be one, each of us must be also odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

Hip. I think it is.

Soc. Are we then both odd, being two?

Hip. This, Socrates, could not be.

Soc. But both together are even. Is it not so?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Now, because both together are even, is each of us on this account even?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. It is not then necessary, as you said just now, that what we both are together, we should be singly; and that, what each is, we should both be.

Hip. Not in these cases, but in those I spoke of before.

[50.] *Soc.* These are sufficient, Hippias; for we must be content with these, since it appears that some things are so, but others not. For I stated, if you remember, at the point from whence this conversation diverged,⁸⁸ that the pleasures through the sight, and through hearing, could not be beautiful in that, by which each happened to be affected (singly) and not both (jointly), or both (jointly) and not each (singly), but by what they were affected jointly and singly. And hence you admitted that both together and each singly were beautiful. On this account then I conceived that, by the existence which follows upon both, they ought, if both were beautiful, to be themselves⁸⁹ beautiful; but not by the existence wanting to the other.⁹⁰ And I think so still. But tell me, as if at the beginning (of our inquiry), if the pleasure through the sight and that through hearing are beautiful, both (jointly) and each (singly), does not that, which makes them so, follow on both (jointly) and each (singly).

Hip. Certainly.

⁸⁸ The MSS. vary between *ἀλλήθως*, *ἀλλήλως*, and *ἀλλήθως*. Plato wrote, as I have translated, *ἐπ' ἀλλήλως*.

⁸⁹ Instead of *αὐτὰ* the train of thought evidently requires *ἑαυτὰ*, "each."

⁹⁰ In lieu of *ἑαυτὰ*, Sydenham correctly suggested *ἐκάστω*. Stalbaum translates *ἑαυτὰ* "alterutrum." But such is not its meaning in correct Greek.

Soc. Is it then because each singly is a pleasure, and both too jointly, that they are beautiful? Or on this account alone,⁹¹ because all the other pleasures would be in no respect less beautiful? For, if you remember, the latter were shown to be pleasures no less than the former.

Hip. I remember it well.

[51.] *Soc.* But because these are through the sight and hearing, on that account it was asserted they were beautiful.

Hip. It was so asserted.

Soc. See now, whether I speak the truth. It was stated, as my memory serves me, not that the pleasurable of every kind was beautiful; but such as was through the sight and hearing.

Hip. It is true.

Soc. Does not this circumstance then attend on both taken together? but not on each taken singly? ⁹²For by no means does each of them, as was said before, exist through both, but both through both, and each not.⁹² Is it so?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Each of them is not beautiful through that which does not attend each. For the both does not attend upon (the) either.⁹³ So that we can by the hypothesis call both beautiful, but we cannot (call) either so. Or how say we? Is it not of necessity so?

Hip. So it appears.

[52.] *Soc.* Shall we then say that both are beautiful, but deny that each is so?

Hip. What is to prevent it?

Soc. This seems to me, my friend, to prevent it; ⁹⁴because there were to us some things so appertaining to each, that, if they appertained to both, (they would appertain)⁹⁴ likewise

⁹¹ Instead of *μὲν*, which has no meaning here, Plato doubtless wrote *μόνον*—

⁹²—⁹³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is evidently corrupt.

⁹³ Before *ἐκαστῶν* the article *τῶν* has dropt. Compare § 52, *τὸ ἐκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων*.

⁹⁴—⁹⁴ Ficinus has—"ut, si ambobus adsunt, adsint et singulis"—thus showing that he found supplied in his MS. the very words requisite for the sense and syntax—*εἴπερ—ἐπιγίγνυντο, ἐπιγίγνυντ' ἄν*—

to each; and, if to each,⁹⁵ to both likewise—all such you went through.⁹⁶ Is it not so?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. ⁹⁶But what I went through, (were) not so; of which was itself the each and the both.⁹⁶ Is it so?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Of what kind then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you? whether, as you asserted, that if I and you are strong, both are so; and if I and you are just, both are so; and if both, so too is each; and similarly, if I and you are beautiful, both are so; and if both, so too is each? Or is there nothing to prevent it; as (in the case of numbers, where) some things taken together being even, may be, when taken ⁹⁸singly, odd, and perhaps even:⁹⁷ or, when each, being taken separately, is perhaps irrational, but taken both together may be rational, or perhaps irrational,⁹⁸ and there are other things of this kind infinite in number, which I said presented themselves to me. [53.] Now, on which side do you place the beautiful? On that, as it appears to me, or to yourself. For it appears to me a great absurdity, for both of us to be beautiful, yet each of us not so; or for each to be beautiful, yet both not so; or as regards any other thing whatever of such a kind. Do you choose (to say)⁹⁹ in this way or that?

Hip. In this way, Socrates.

Soc. And you do wisely, Hippias, in order that we may be freed from a further search. For, if any of these things is the beautiful, the pleasurable, which comes through the sight and hearing, would no longer be the beautiful; for (the plea-

⁹⁵⁻⁹⁶ The error in these words is corrected in the notes to my edition.

⁹⁶⁻⁹⁸ To point out all the difficulties in the words between the numerals, and how they might be overcome, would require a longer note than is suited to this place.

⁹⁷ For instance, the two odd numbers, seven and three, together make the even number, ten; and the two even numbers, six and four, make the very same number. S.

⁹⁸⁻⁹⁹ "Surd." quantities are called in Greek ἀρρητα or ἄλογα, and in Latin "irrationales." To illustrate this passage Heindorf justly says that $\sqrt{3}$ and $\sqrt{6}$ are ἀρρητα; but $\sqrt{3} + \sqrt{6}$ is ρητόν. Sydenham, he observes, translated ρητόν and ἀρρητα by "commensurable and incommensurable;" but that would be in Greek σύμμετρα and ἀσύμμετρα.

⁹⁹ Instead of αἰσεί, the two best MSS. read ἰσεί, which leads to αἰσεί ἰσείν—

surable)¹ that comes through the sight and hearing, causes both, taken together, to be beautiful; but not either singly. This however cannot be, as I and you, Hippias, have agreed.

Hip. We have agreed.

Soc. It is impossible then for that, which is pleasurable through the sight and hearing, to be the beautiful; since a thing being produced as beautiful exhibits something of the impossible.

Hip. Such is the case.

Soc. Say then again from the beginning, he will say, since you have erred in this, what, say you, is that beauty, which (attends) upon both these pleasures, for the sake of which you honoured them before the others, and called them beautiful? [54.] To me, Hippias, there seems a necessity to say, that these are of all pleasures the most harmless,² and the best, taken together and singly. Or have you to state any thing else, by which they are different from other pleasures?

Hip. By no means: for they are in reality the best.

Soc. This then, he will say, do you now assert the beautiful to be, namely, pleasure that is advantageous? So it seems, I shall answer. But what you?

Hip. I too (the same).

Soc. Is not then, he will say, the advantageous that, which is the efficient of good? Now the efficient, as shown lately, is a thing different from the effect; and the reasoning has now ³come to you to the former reasoning;³ for neither would the good be a beautiful thing, nor would the beautiful be a good thing; since each of these ⁴is something else.⁴ This we shall more than all assert, if, Hippias, we are of sound mind. For it is surely not just not to agree with him, who speaks correctly.

¹ The word ἡδὺς has probably dropt out between τὸ and δι', as is shown by the train of thought.

² What are here called ἀσινίσταται are described as ἀβλαβεῖς in Rep. ii: p. 257, D., and καθαρὰι in Phileb. p. 66, C.

³ Ficinus has "relabimur," in Greek ἀνήκει: while in ἡκεῖ ὁμῖν lies hid ἡκεῖ κυκλοῦμενος, as in English, "reasoning in a circle."

⁴ This is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has what the sense requires, "each of these being different from the other."

one see him; since it is a deed the most disgraceful to behold.⁵⁹ On our saying this, Hippias, he will perhaps remark,—I now perceive that you have been of old ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to men. Now I did not ask what seems to be beautiful to the multitude, but what is so in reality. Whereupon we shall, I presume, state in reply, that we asserted that this part of the pleasant, arising from the sight and hearing, was a beautiful thing. ⁶⁰But have you it in your power to use the reasoning for any thing?⁶⁰ Or shall we, Hippias, say any thing else?

Hip. Against what has been urged, Socrates, it is necessary to say no other than this.

Soc. Truly do ye say well, he will reply. If then the pleasure, coming through the sight and hearing, be a beautiful thing, that which does not happen to be a part of such⁶¹ pleasant sensations, it is clear cannot be beautiful. Shall we confess it?

Hip. Yes.

[44.] *Soc.* Is then that which is pleasurable, he will say, through the sight, pleasurable through the sight and hearing (conjointly)?⁶² Or that which is pleasurable through the hearing, pleasurable through the hearing and the sight (conjointly)?⁶³ By no means, we shall answer, would that which exists through either, exist through both; for this you seem to us to say; whereas we assert, that each of these pleasurable things would be beautiful, taken by themselves and both together. Should we not answer thus?

⁵⁹ Shakspeare—"He loved the deed of darkness; but he blushed To own it." Compare Phileb. p. 66, A. § 158. Plutarch Sympos. ii. p. 654, B.; Cicero de Offic. i. 35; Pythagor. Fr. p. 710, ed. Gale.

^{60, 61} This is the literal version of the Greek, ἅλλ' ἔχεις τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, whose version is, "Tu vero, Hippias, quò te vertis?" as if he had found in his MS. ἅλλ' ἔχεις δ, τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, similar to δ, τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ in Crito, § 4. But the balance of the sentence requires τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, to answer to μὴ ἀλλὰ—ἢ ταῦτα in the reply of Hippias. Compare Demosth. p. 590, ed. Wolf, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἔχω τι χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτου μάρτυσι, quoted by Zeune on Viger. p. 323.

⁶² The Greek is δ μὴ τοῦτο τυχάνει δν τῶν ἡδίων. But Ficinus has "quod per alium sensum delectat," from which Stephens would elicit τούτῳ. He should have suggested τούτων—as I have translated.

⁶³ The word ἀμ' has twice dropt out between ἴστω and ἡδὺ.

Hip. By all means.

Soc. ⁶⁴ Does then, he will say, any pleasure whatever differ from any other pleasure whatever in this, namely, in being a pleasure? For (I ask not) whether any pleasure is greater or less, or more or less; but whether any one differs by this very thing, in one of the pleasures being a pleasure, but the other not a pleasure. Does it not seem so to us?

Hip. For it does not seem so.⁶⁴

Soc. For some other reason then, he will say, than because they are pleasures, have ye selected these from all the rest; and having some such view with regard to both, that they differ in some respect from the rest, did ye not, looking to this, say that they are beautiful? For seeing is surely not a beautiful thing on this account, that it is through seeing. For, if this were the reason of its being beautiful, the other pleasure ⁶⁵ [that through hearing] ⁶⁵ would not be beautiful, ⁶⁶ as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of seeing.⁶⁶ Shall we say, you speak the truth?

Hip. We will.

[45.] *Soc.* Nor, on the other hand, is the pleasure through the hearing beautiful on this account, that it is through hearing. For then that through seeing would not be beautiful, ⁶⁷ as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of hearing.⁶⁷ Shall we say, Hippias, that the man, in speaking so, speaks correctly?

Hip. Yes, correctly.

Soc. But both, he will rejoin, are beautiful, as you assert. For so we say.

^{64—64} Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is manifestly corrupt.

^{65—65} The words within brackets, ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς, are evidently an explanation of ἑρίπα.

^{66—66} So Sydenham; thus adopting the correction of Cornarius, οὐκ οὐσα ἑρί γε, which was suggested, probably, by the version of Ficinus, "cum per visum nequaquam efficiatur." The Greek is, καλή· οὐκ οὖν ἔστι γε δι' ὁψews ἡδονή: from whence it is easy to elicit, as I did many years ago, what the sense requires, καλή· ἢ οὐ κοινόν ἐστὶ τι τῇ τε δι' ὁψews ἡδονῇ, i. e. "to which there is nothing in common with the pleasure of sight:" and a similar correction is requisite in § 45, where a similar idea occurs.

^{67—67} See the preceding note.

Hip. We do.

Soc. They have then something in common and the same, which causes them to be beautiful, and which belongs to both conjointly, and severally to each. For otherwise they would not be beautiful conjointly and severally. Give to me a reply, as if to him.

Hip. I answer, that it appears to me as you say.

Soc. If then these pleasures, taken conjointly, are affected by any circumstance, but not so, if taken separately, they could not, at least under that circumstance, be beautiful.

Hip. How could it be possible, Socrates, that when neither are affected by any circumstance whatever, that both should be affected by that ⁶⁶[by which neither is affected] ? ⁶⁸

Soc. You think it is impossible.

Hip. ⁶⁹Yes; for a great want of acquaintance with the nature of those things would possess me, and of speaking the present speeches. ⁶⁹

[46.] *Soc.* (You speak) pleasantly, Hippias. ⁷⁰ For I am in danger equally of fancying I see something so circumstanced, as you aver to be impossible; but yet I see nothing (clearly). ⁷¹

Hip. You are in no danger, Socrates; but you very readily look aside. ⁷²

⁶⁶⁻⁶⁸ The words within brackets are an evident interpolation, and were properly omitted by Ficinus in his version, "ut, quod neutra illarum patitur, ambæ perpetiantur." Nor is this the only error here. For in one of the best MSS. are found the remains of the following words, which ought to close the next speech of Hippias: *Εἰ γὰρ ἕκασται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀμφοτέραι πεπονθυῖαι ἀν εἰεν*, i. e. For if each had been so circumstanced, it is evident both would have been.

⁶⁹⁻⁷⁰ Such is the literal version of the Greek; for which I think I have suggested something more worthy of Plato in my edition.

⁷¹ After *ἡδέως γε*, there is either an accidental omission or a grammatical ellipse of *λέγει*: while in *ἡδέως* there is perhaps a play on the words closely connected with the things conveying the sensation of pleasure. On a similar play see § 31 and § 41.

⁷² The Greek is *ὁρῶ δὲ οὐδέν*. Perhaps *δ' εἰ* should be read for *δὲ*. Compare Eurip. Phœn. 165, *Ὅρῶ δ' ἤτ' οὐ σαφῶς ὁρῶ δὲ πως*. Heracl. 495, *λέγει μὲν οὐ σαφῶς, λέγει δὲ πως*.

⁷³ Here again I have restored in my edition what Plato probably wrote. Stalbaum's version is, "you purposely neglect the true reason;" but *ἰτοίμως* does not mean "purposely;" nor is there any thing in the Greek to answer to "true reason."

Soc. ⁷³ And yet many things of such a kind appear to me before my soul.⁷³ But I distrust them; because they do not present themselves to you, who have made the most money of all now famed for wisdom, but only to myself, who have never made any. And I have an idea, my friend, that you are playing with me, ⁷⁴ and are willingly deceiving me; such strong and so many.⁷⁴

Hip. No one will know better than yourself, Socrates, whether I am playing with you or not, if you will only endeavour to tell me, what are those things that have presented themselves to you. For you will be seen to say nothing to the purpose. For you will never find that both of us have been affected by circumstances together, by which neither you nor I have been separately.

Soc. How say you, Hippias? But perhaps you are speaking something to the purpose, and I do not understand it. Do you then hear from me what I wish to state more clearly.⁷⁵ For it appears to me, that what neither I have been under the circumstance of being, nor am, nor, on the other hand, what you are under such a circumstance, it is possible for both to be; and on the other hand, that other things, which both of us are under the circumstance of being, neither of us are.⁷⁵

[47.] *Hip.* You appear to me, Socrates, to exhibit in your answers again⁷⁶ still greater wonders than when you answered before. For just consider, if both of us were just, would not each of us be so? or if each unjust, would not both be so? if both were in health, would not each be so? or if each were wearied, or wounded, or struck, or were affected in any other way whatever, would not both of us be affected in the

⁷³⁻⁷⁵ and ⁷⁴⁻⁷⁶ On both of these passages I must again refer the reader to the notes in my edition. For they are too long, and perhaps too learned, for the present work; especially as I could now add not a little to confirm the views there brought forward.

⁷⁶⁻⁷⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek, with which Stalbaum, in ed. 2, is satisfied; although, in ed. 1, he had transcribed Heindorf's note, who saw with Sydenham that there was something wrong here. But they do not appear to have seen that the train of ideas was originally something to this effect: "For it appears to me that, what neither I nor you have suffered, and what neither I am nor you are, this it is possible for both of us to suffer and to be; and on the other hand, what both of us have suffered and are, for neither of us to have suffered and to be."

⁷⁸ Instead of αὐ Sydenham would read οὐν, antithetical to ὀλίγον πρότερον.

same⁷⁷ way? Still further, if both of us happened to be made of gold, or silver, or ivory, or if you will, well-born, or wise, or held in honour, or old, or [young],⁷⁸ or in any state you will, incident to man, is there not a great necessity for each to be so?

Soc. Most assuredly.

[48.] *Hip.* But neither do you, Socrates, consider things as wholes, nor do they, with whom you are wont to converse. For taking separately the beautiful and each of things existing, you discuss it in your discourses, cutting it into fractions; and hence things of great size, and of continuous⁷⁹ length escape your observation. And to such an extent have they escaped you now, that you conceive there is something, either circumstance or being, which, as regards two things taken jointly, does exist, but does not, as regards them taken singly; or on the other hand, does exist, as regards each, taken singly, but not as regards both, taken jointly. So illogically, and inconsiderately, and sillily, and unreflectingly, do you conduct yourselves.

Soc. Such is our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man wishes, say the persons using every where the proverb,⁸⁰ but what he can. But⁸¹ you are always assisting us with your admo-

⁷⁷ The Greek is *εὐθὺς*—But “idem,” in Ficinus, leads to *ταὐτὸ*—

⁷⁸ “The words *ἡ νῆος* are omitted by three MSS. correctly; for neither Socrates nor Hippias were young when the dialogue is supposed to have taken place. Should it however be said that the qualities, thus brought forward as examples, have been taken at random, it may be replied that Plato is not wont to speak without some definite design. In the words *χρυσοί, ἀργυροί*, and *ἐλεφάντινοι* there is an allusion to the subjects discussed in § 23; while in the words *γενναῖοι, σοφοί, τίμιοι, γέροντες*, Hippias alludes to himself as being of a good family, wise, honoured, and aged.” Such is the note I wrote many years ago. But instead of rejecting *ἡ νῆος* entirely, I would now consider *γέροντες νῆος* as an explanation of *ἡμογέροντες*, restored again to Plato in *Euthyd.* p. 272, § 3, by myself in Poppo’s *Prolegom.* p. 219.

⁷⁹ “In considering any subject, Plato is wont to speak of it in general terms, and then to divide it into its several species; and after distinguishing each species by its peculiar character, to arrive at the real nature of the thing in question.” So remarks Sydenham; who might have referred for a notable instance of this method, to the Sophist and Statesman throughout, but more especially the latter, p. 258, B. § 2.

⁸⁰ The proverb in Greek was—*Ζῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὥς θέλομεν ἀλλ’ ὥς δυνάμεθα*, translated by Terence, “Ut quimus, aiunt; quando, ut volumus, non licet.”

⁸¹ I confess I cannot perceive here the requisite train of thought.

nitions. Since even now, ⁸² before I had been thus admonished by you how sillily we conduct ourselves, shall I give ⁸² you still a plainer proof, by stating what were our thoughts upon those points? or shall I not?

Hip. You will speak to one who knows already, Socrates. For I am conversant with each one of those who are engaged in disputations, and how they are situated. Still, if it is more agreeable to yourself, say on.

Soc. To me indeed it will be more agreeable. For we were, thou best of men, so silly before you said so of us, as to conceive with regard to myself and you, that each of us was one person, and that both could not be what each was; for we are not one, but two persons. Such a simpleton was I! [49.] But now we have been taught the contrary, that if both together are two persons, each of us also is of necessity two; and that if each of us be one, it is necessary for both of us to be one. For by a continuous argument (respecting) being, ⁸³ it is not possible, according to Hippias, for it to be otherwise; but now having been persuaded by you, that whatever both of two things are, this too each of them is, I sit down here. ⁸⁴ But first remind ⁸⁵ me, Hippias, whether you and I are one, you and I together; or you are two, and I two.

Hip. What mean you, Socrates?

Soc. What I say. For I am afraid to speak plainly to you, ⁸⁶ because you are harsh with me, whenever you seem to yourself ⁸⁷ to speak something to the purpose. ⁸⁷ But

⁸²⁻⁸³ This is rather strange language, "Before I had—shall I." There is some error here. Perhaps Plato—*ἵν' ἂν τὸ πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ ταῦτ' εὖ νοουθῆρηθῇ* φανῶ, i. e. "in order that I may be shown to have been properly admonished thus by you."

⁸³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας*. But Sydenham's, though less literal, is more intelligible, "by reason of the continuity of being."

⁸⁴ Between *ἐνθάδε* and *κάθημαι* has dropt out, I suspect, *κάνθων*, "a pannier'd ass." The word is found in Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 179, and *Εἰρ.* 81, while its synonyme *ὄνος* is seen in the proverb alluded to in Plato *Theæt.* p. 146, A., *ὃ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν καὶ θεῶν ἂν ἀσι ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθιδέεται, ὡς περ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος*.

⁸⁵ Instead of *ὑπόμνησον*, which can hardly suit with *πότερον*, I suggested long ago *ὑπομήνυσον*, similar to "memora," in Ficinus.

⁸⁶ In lieu of *σε* Heindorf suggested *σοί*, answering to "coram te," in Ficinus.

⁸⁷⁻⁸⁷ But this could be no reason for Hippias having a harsh feeling towards Socrates. What Plato probably wrote may be seen in my edition.

however tell me, is not each of us one? and so affected as to be one?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. If then each of us be one, each of us must be also odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

Hip. I think it is.

Soc. Are we then both odd, being two?

Hip. This, Socrates, could not be.

Soc. But both together are even. Is it not so?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Now, because both together are even, is each of us on this account even?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. It is not then necessary, as you said just now, that what we both are together, we should be singly; and that, what each is, we should both be.

Hip. Not in these cases, but in those I spoke of before.

[50.] *Soc.* These are sufficient, Hippias; for we must be content with these, since it appears that some things are so, but others not. For I stated, if you remember, at the point from whence this conversation diverged,⁸⁸ that the pleasures through the sight, and through hearing, could not be beautiful in that, by which each happened to be affected (singly) and not both (jointly), or both (jointly) and not each (singly), but by what they were affected jointly and singly. And hence you admitted that both together and each singly were beautiful. On this account then I conceived that, by the existence which follows upon both, they ought, if both were beautiful, to be themselves⁸⁹ beautiful; but not by the existence wanting to the other.⁹⁰ And I think so still. But tell me, as if at the beginning (of our inquiry), if the pleasure through the sight and that through hearing are beautiful, both (jointly) and each (singly), does not that, which makes them so, follow on both (jointly) and each (singly).

Hip. Certainly.

⁸⁸ The MSS. vary between *ἐλίσθη*, *ἐλίσθη*, and *ἐλίσθη*. Plato wrote, as I have translated, *ἐπλάγχθη*.

⁸⁹ Instead of *αὐτὰ* the train of thought evidently requires *ἑαυτὰ*, "each."

⁹⁰ In lieu of *ἑαυτὰ*, Sydenham correctly suggested *ἑκάτερα*. Stalbaum translates *ἑαυτὰ* "alterutrum." But such is not its meaning in correct Greek.

Soc. Is it then because each singly is a pleasure, and both too jointly, that they are beautiful? Or on this account alone,⁹¹ because all the other pleasures would be in no respect less beautiful? For, if you remember, the latter were shown to be pleasures no less than the former.

Hip. I remember it well.

[51.] *Soc.* But because these are through the sight and hearing, on that account it was asserted they were beautiful.

Hip. It was so asserted.

Soc. See now, whether I speak the truth. It was stated, as my memory serves me, not that the pleasurable of every kind was beautiful; but such as was through the sight and hearing.

Hip. It is true.

Soc. Does not this circumstance then attend on both taken together? but not on each taken singly? ⁹² For by no means does each of them, as was said before, exist through both, but both through both, and each not.⁹² Is it so?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Each of them is not beautiful through that which does not attend each. For the both does not attend upon (the) either.⁹³ So that we can by the hypothesis call both beautiful, but we cannot (call) either so. Or how say we? Is it not of necessity so?

Hip. So it appears.

[52.] *Soc.* Shall we then say that both are beautiful, but deny that each is so?

Hip. What is to prevent it?

Soc. This seems to me, my friend, to prevent it; ⁹⁴ because there were to us some things so appertaining to each, that, if they appertained to both, (they would appertain)⁹⁴ likewise

⁹¹ Instead of *μὲν*, which has no meaning here, Plato doubtless wrote *μόνον*—

⁹²⁻⁹³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is evidently corrupt.

⁹³ Before *ἐκάρτεω* the article *τῷ* has dropt. Compare § 52, *τὸ ἐκάρτεον καὶ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων*.

⁹⁴⁻⁹⁴ Ficinus has—"ut, si ambobus adsunt, adsint et singulis"—thus showing that he found supplied in his MS. the very words requisite for the sense and syntax—*εἴπερ—ἐπιγίγνυντο, ἐπιγίγνυντ' ἀν—*

to each; and, if to each,⁹⁵ to both likewise—all such you went through.⁹⁶ Is it not so?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. ⁹⁶ But what I went through, (were) not so; of which was itself the each and the both.⁹⁶ Is it so?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Of what kind then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you? whether, as you asserted, that if I and you are strong, both are so; and if I and you are just, both are so; and if both, so too is each; and similarly, if I and you are beautiful, both are so; and if both, so too is each? Or is there nothing to prevent it; as (in the case of numbers, where) some things taken together being even, may be, when taken ⁹⁶ singly, odd, and perhaps even:⁹⁷ or, when each, being taken separately, is perhaps irrational, but taken both together may be rational, or perhaps irrational,⁹⁸ and there are other things of this kind infinite in number, which I said presented themselves to me. [53.] Now, on which side do you place the beautiful? On that, as it appears to me, or to yourself. For it appears to me a great absurdity, for both of us to be beautiful, yet each of us not so; or for each to be beautiful, yet both not so; or as regards any other thing whatever of such a kind. Do you choose (to say)⁹⁹ in this way or that?

Hip. In this way, Socrates.

Soc. And you do wisely, Hippias, in order that we may be freed from a further search. For, if any of these things is the beautiful, the pleasurable, which comes through the sight and hearing, would no longer be the beautiful; for (the plea-

⁹⁵⁻⁹⁶ The error in these words is corrected in the notes to my edition.

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⁹⁷ For instance, the two odd numbers, seven and three, together make the even number, ten; and the two even numbers, six and four, make the very same number. S.

⁹⁸⁻⁹⁹ "Surd" quantities are called in Greek ἀρρητα or ἀλογα, and in Latin "irrationales." To illustrate this passage Heindorf justly says that $\sqrt{3}$ and $\sqrt{6}$ are ἀρρητα; but $\sqrt{3+6}$ is ρητόν. Sydenham, he observes, translated ῥητά and ἀρρητα by "commensurable and incommensurable;" but that would be in Greek σύμμετρα and ἀσύμμετρα.

⁹⁹ Instead of αἰπεῖ, the two best MSS. read ἱπεῖ, which leads to αἰπεῖ ἱπεῖν—

surable)¹ that comes through the sight and hearing, causes both, taken together, to be beautiful; but not either singly. This however cannot be, as I and you, Hippias, have agreed.

Hip. We have agreed.

Soc. It is impossible then for that, which is pleasurable through the sight and hearing, to be the beautiful; since a thing being produced as beautiful exhibits something of the impossible.

Hip. Such is the case.

Soc. Say then again from the beginning, he will say, since you have erred in this, what, say you, is that beauty, which (attends) upon both these pleasures, for the sake of which you honoured them before the others, and called them beautiful? [54.] To me, Hippias, there seems a necessity to say, that these are of all pleasures the most harmless,² and the best, taken together and singly. Or have you to state any thing else, by which they are different from other pleasures?

Hip. By no means: for they are in reality the best.

Soc. This then, he will say, do you now assert the beautiful to be, namely, pleasure that is advantageous? So it seems, I shall answer. But what you?

Hip. I too (the same).

Soc. Is not then, he will say, the advantageous that, which is the efficient of good? Now the efficient, as shown lately, is a thing different from the effect; and the reasoning has now³ come to you to the former reasoning;³ for neither would the good be a beautiful thing, nor would the beautiful be a good thing; since each of these⁴ is something else.⁴ This we shall more than all assert, if, Hippias, we are of sound mind. For it is surely not just not to agree with him, who speaks correctly.

¹ The word ἡδὺ has probably dropt out between τὸ and δι', as is shown by the train of thought.

² What are here called ἀσινίσταται are described as ἀβλαβεῖς in Rep. ii: p. 257, D., and καθαρὰι in Phileb. p. 66, C.

³ Ficinus has "relabimur," in Greek ἀνήκει: while in ἡκεῖ ὅμιν lies hid ἡκεῖ ἐνελούμενος, as in English, "reasoning in a circle."

⁴ This is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has what the sense requires, "each of these being different from the other."

[55.] *Hip.* But what, Socrates, do you conceive to be all this, taken together? They are the parings and snippings, as I said just now, of reasonings, separated into little bits. But that is a thing both beautiful and of great worth, to be able to put together well and beautifully a speech before a court of justice, or the Council-Hall, or any other official tribunal, before whom the speech may be addressed; and after producing conviction, to depart, carrying off not the least, but the greatest, of prizes, in the preservation of oneself and one's own property, and that of one's friends. These then you ought to lay hold of, and to bid adieu to such petty disputes, in order that you may not seem to be a simpleton, by taking, as just now, trifles and inanities in hand.

Soc. You, my dear Hippias, are a happy man; for you know what pursuits a simpleton⁵ should follow, and have followed them, as you say, sufficiently.⁶ But the misfortune of an evil genius, as it seems, lays hold of me, who am wandering continually and in doubt. For when I make a display of my doubts before you wise men, I am ever bespattered with dirt by you⁷ when I make a display. [56.] For ye tell me⁷ what you tell me now, that I busy myself about matters foolish, trivial, and worthless. But when, on the other hand, convinced by you, I say as ye do, that it is by far the best thing to be able to put together well and beautifully a speech, and to go through it before a court of justice, or any other concourse of people, I hear myself ill spoken of in all ways, both by some others here, but especially from that person, who is always confuting me; for he happens to be my nearest of kin, and lives in the same house.⁸ Whenever then I enter

⁵ As Hippias called Socrates ἀνόητον, I suspect he returned the compliment by calling Hippias ἄνουν, which would be easily altered into ἀνόν, the usual abbreviation in MSS. for ἀνθρώπον.

⁶ Instead of ἱκανῶς, Plato no doubt wrote, οὐ κενῶς, in allusion to the money that Hippias said, in § 5, he made by his lectures.

⁷— There are several errors in the words between the numerals.

⁸ Stalbaum justly remarks, that Socrates here discovers himself to be the fictitious person so frequently alluded to. Hence we must read, ἐγγύτατα γίνους καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ οἰκῇ ἄν: where οἶκος means not only the house for the body, but for the soul likewise; for such the body was supposed to be. See at Phileb. § 54, n. 52. Add Etymol. M. Σῶμα οἰοῖται δῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς.

my dwelling ⁹[at home],⁹ and he hears me talking in this way, he asks me if I do not feel a shame in presuming to converse about beautiful pursuits, after I have been so clearly convicted, that on the subject of the beautiful I do not know what it is in the abstract. And how then, says he, will you know, who has put together a beautiful speech or not, or (done) any other (beautiful) act, while knowing nothing of the beautiful? and when you are in such a situation, think you it is better for you to live than to die? Thus it has happened, as I told you, for me to hear myself ill-spoken of, and reproached by you, and to be abused by him. But, perhaps I must endure all this; for nothing is out of place, if only I am benefited; and benefited, Hippias, I think I am by my intercourse with both of you. For I seem to myself to understand what the proverb¹⁰ means, "difficult are the beautiful."

⁹— The word *οἰκᾶς* is an evident interpretation of *εἰς ἑαυτοῦ*.

¹⁰ To this proverb Plato has alluded in *Rep.* iv. p. 435, C., vi. p. 497, D., and *Cratyl.* p. 384, A. § 2. But as *καλὰ* in the proverb means elsewhere "honourable," but here "beautiful," Socrates advisedly says he *seems* to understand, that which was otherwise plain enough.

same⁷⁷ way? Still further, if both of us happened to be made of gold, or silver, or ivory, or if you will, well-born, or wise, or held in honour, or old, or [young],⁷⁸ or in any state you will, incident to man, is there not a great necessity for each to be so?

Soc. Most assuredly.

[48.] *Hip.* But neither do you, Socrates, consider things as wholes, nor do they, with whom you are wont to converse. For taking separately the beautiful and each of things existing, you discuss it in your discourses, cutting it into fractions; and hence things of great size, and of continuous⁷⁹ length escape your observation. And to such an extent have they escaped you now, that you conceive there is something, either circumstance or being, which, as regards two things taken jointly, does exist, but does not, as regards them taken singly; or on the other hand, does exist, as regards each, taken singly, but not as regards both, taken jointly. So illogically, and inconsiderately, and sillily, and unreflectingly, do you conduct yourselves.

Soc. Such is our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man wishes, say the persons using every where the proverb,⁸⁰ but what he can. But⁸¹ you are always assisting us with your admo-

⁷⁷ The Greek is τοῦτο—But “idem,” in Ficinus, leads to ταὐτό—

⁷⁸ “The words ἡ νέοι are omitted by three MSS. correctly; for neither Socrates nor Hippias were young when the dialogue is supposed to have taken place. Should it however be said that the qualities, thus brought forward as examples, have been taken at random, it may be replied that Plato is not wont to speak without some definite design. In the words χρυσοί, ἀργυροί, and ἐλεφάντινοι there is an allusion to the subjects discussed in § 23; while in the words γένναῖοι, σοφοί, τίμιοι, γέροντες, Hippias alludes to himself as being of a good family, wise, honoured, and aged.” Such is the note I wrote many years ago. But instead of rejecting ἡ νέοι entirely, I would now consider γέροντες νέοι as an explanation of ὁμογέροντες, restored again to Plato in Euthyd. p. 272, § 3, by myself in Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 219.

⁷⁹ “In considering any subject, Plato is wont to speak of it in general terms, and then to divide it into its several species; and after distinguishing each species by its peculiar character, to arrive at the real nature of the thing in question.” So remarks Sydenham; who might have referred for a notable instance of this method, to the Sophist and Statesman throughout, but more especially the latter, p. 258, B. § 2.

⁸⁰ The proverb in Greek was—Ζῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὥς θέλομεν ἀλλ’ ὥς δυνάμεθα, translated by Terence, “Ut quimus, aiunt; quando, ut volumus, non licet.”

⁸¹ I confess I cannot perceive here the requisite train of thought.

nitions. Since even now, ⁸² before I had been thus admonished by you how sillily we conduct ourselves, shall I give ⁸² you still a plainer proof, by stating what were our thoughts upon those points? or shall I not?

Hip. You will speak to one who knows already, Socrates. For I am conversant with each one of those who are engaged in disputations, and how they are situated. Still, if it is more agreeable to yourself, say on.

Soc. To me indeed it will be more agreeable. For we were, thou best of men, so silly before you said so of us, as to conceive with regard to myself and you, that each of us was one person, and that both could not be what each was; for we are not one, but two persons. Such a simpleton was I! [49.] But now we have been taught the contrary, that if both together are two persons, each of us also is of necessity two; and that if each of us be one, it is necessary for both of us to be one. For by a continuous argument (respecting) being, ⁸³ it is not possible, according to Hippias, for it to be otherwise; but now having been persuaded by you, that whatever both of two things are, this too each of them is, I sit down here.⁸⁴ But first remind⁸⁵ me, Hippias, whether you and I are one, you and I together; or you are two, and I two.

Hip. What mean you, Socrates?

Soc. What I say. For I am afraid to speak plainly to you,⁸⁶ because you are harsh with me, whenever you seem to yourself ⁸⁷ to speak something to the purpose.⁸⁷ But

⁸²⁻⁸³ This is rather strange language, "Before I had—shall I." There is some error here. Perhaps Plato—*ἵν' ἂν τὸ πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ ταῦτ' εὖ νοουθετηθῇναι φανῶ*, i. e. "in order that I may be shown to have been properly admonished thus by you."

⁸³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας*. But Sydenham's, though less literal, is more intelligible, "by reason of the continuity of being."

⁸⁴ Between *ἐνθάδε* and *κάθημαι* has dropt out, I suspect, *κάνθων*, "a pannier'd ass." The word is found in Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 179, and *Εἰρ.* 81, while its synonyme *ὄνος* is seen in the proverb alluded to in Plato *Theætet.* p. 146, A., *ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτὸν καὶ θεὸς ἂν αἰεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθιδέϊται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος*.

⁸⁵ Instead of *ὑπόμνησον*, which can hardly suit with *πότερον*, I suggested long ago *ὑπομήνυσον*, similar to "memora," in Ficinus.

⁸⁶ In lieu of *σε* Heindorf suggested *σοι*, answering to "coram te," in Ficinus.

⁸⁷⁻⁸⁷ But this could be no reason for Hippias having a harsh feeling towards Socrates. What Plato probably wrote may be seen in my edition.

however tell me, is not each of us one? and so affected as to be one?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. If then each of us be one, each of us must be also odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

Hip. I think it is.

Soc. Are we then both odd, being two?

Hip. This, Socrates, could not be.

Soc. But both together are even. Is it not so?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Now, because both together are even, is each of us on this account even?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. It is not then necessary, as you said just now, that what we both are together, we should be singly; and that, what each is, we should both be.

Hip. Not in these cases, but in those I spoke of before.

[50.] *Soc.* These are sufficient, Hippias; for we must be content with these, since it appears that some things are so, but others not. For I stated, if you remember, at the point from whence this conversation diverged,⁸⁸ that the pleasures through the sight, and through hearing, could not be beautiful in that, by which each happened to be affected (singly) and not both (jointly), or both (jointly) and not each (singly), but by what they were affected jointly and singly. And hence you admitted that both together and each singly were beautiful. On this account then I conceived that, by the existence which follows upon both, they ought, if both were beautiful, to be themselves⁸⁹ beautiful; but not by the existence wanting to the other.⁹⁰ And I think so still. But tell me, as if at the beginning (of our inquiry), if the pleasure through the sight and that through hearing are beautiful, both (jointly) and each (singly), does not that, which makes them so, follow on both (jointly) and each (singly).

Hip. Certainly.

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Soc. Is it then because each singly is a pleasure, and both too jointly, that they are beautiful? Or on this account alone,⁹¹ because all the other pleasures would be in no respect less beautiful? For, if you remember, the latter were shown to be pleasures no less than the former.

Hip. I remember it well.

[51.] *Soc.* But because these are through the sight and hearing, on that account it was asserted they were beautiful.

Hip. It was so asserted.

Soc. See now, whether I speak the truth. It was stated, as my memory serves me, not that the pleasurable of every kind was beautiful; but such as was through the sight and hearing.

Hip. It is true.

Soc. Does not this circumstance then attend on both taken together? but not on each taken singly? ⁹² For by no means does each of them, as was said before, exist through both, but both through both, and each not.⁹² Is it so?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Each of them is not beautiful through that which does not attend each. For the both does not attend upon (the) either.⁹³ So that we can by the hypothesis call both beautiful, but we cannot (call) either so. Or how say we? Is it not of necessity so?

Hip. So it appears.

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Hip. What is to prevent it?

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to each; and, if to each,⁹⁵ to both likewise—all such you went through.⁹⁶ Is it not so?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. ⁹⁶But what I went through, (were) not so; of which was itself the each and the both.⁹⁶ Is it so?

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Soc. Of what kind then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you? whether, as you asserted, that if I and you are strong, both are so; and if I and you are just, both are so; and if both, so too is each; and similarly, if I and you are beautiful, both are so; and if both, so too is each? Or is there nothing to prevent it; as (in the case of numbers, where) some things taken together being even, may be, when taken⁹⁷ singly, odd, and perhaps even:⁹⁷ or, when each, being taken separately, is perhaps irrational, but taken both together may be rational, or perhaps irrational,⁹⁸ and there are other things of this kind infinite in number, which I said presented themselves to me. [53.] Now, on which side do you place the beautiful? On that, as it appears to me, or to yourself. For it appears to me a great absurdity, for both of us to be beautiful, yet each of us not so; or for each to be beautiful, yet both not so; or as regards any other thing whatever of such a kind. Do you choose (to say)⁹⁹ in this way or that?

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⁷— There are several errors in the words between the numerals.

⁸ Stalbaum justly remarks, that Socrates here discovers himself to be the fictitious person so frequently alluded to. Hence we must read, ἑγγύτατα γίνους καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἴκῳ ἄν: where οἶκος means not only the house for the body, but for the soul likewise; for such the body was supposed to be. See at *Phileb.* § 54, n. 52. Add *Etymol. M.* Σῶμα· οἶονεῖ δῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς.

my dwelling ⁹[at home],⁹ and he hears me talking in this way, he asks me if I do not feel a shame in presuming to converse about beautiful pursuits, after I have been so clearly convicted, that on the subject of the beautiful I do not know what it is in the abstract. And how then, says he, will you know, who has put together a beautiful speech or not, or (done) any other (beautiful) act, while knowing nothing of the beautiful? and when you are in such a situation, think you it is better for you to live than to die? Thus it has happened, as I told you, for me to hear myself ill-spoken of, and reproached by you, and to be abused by him. But, perhaps I must endure all this; for nothing is out of place, if only I am benefited; and benefited, Hippias, I think I am by my intercourse with both of you. For I seem to myself to understand what the proverb¹⁰ means, "difficult are the beautiful."

⁹— The word *oikade* is an evident interpretation of *εἰς ἑμαυτὸν*.

¹⁰ To this proverb Plato has alluded in Rep. iv. p. 435, C., vi. p. 497, D., and Cratyl. p. 384, A. § 2. But as *καλὰ* in the proverb means elsewhere "honourable," but here "beautiful," Socrates advisedly says he seems to understand, that which was otherwise plain enough.

INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MINOR.

AFTER showing, in the *Hippias Major*, that the very person, who had written and spoken on "the beautiful," had very confused ideas on that question taken in detail, and knew nothing at all of it when considered abstractedly, Plato has, in the *Hippias Minor*, represented Socrates as pursuing with no less keenness, though with scarcely equal vigour, the same unhappy Sophist, at the very moment when he was thought by his admirers to have made a more than ordinarily brilliant display of his intellectual powers.

Schleiermacher and Ast have condemned this dialogue as spurious; though of the reasons which have led them to this conclusion, I know nothing; nor can I imagine even what they are. They do not appear, however, to have been very convincing; for they have been called in question by Socher, and rejected by Stalbaum. For both these scholars knew, what Sydenham was the first to remark, that Aristotle has alluded, covertly, as usual, to a paralogism introduced into this dialogue; and that Cicero obtained from the same source his knowledge of some circumstances in the life of Hippias, which it is not likely he found elsewhere. And hence it is fair to infer, as I stated in the Introduction to the *Menexenus*, where something similar occurs, that, if the dialogue were not written by Plato himself, it must be the production of one, who could imitate his style so completely, as to evade detection, till more than two thousand years had elapsed after the commission of the forgery. Winckelmann however conceives that the *Hippias Minor* was written by Antisthenes, to whom has been attributed the *Second Alcibiades*; while Zeller, in his "*Platonische Studien*," Tübing. 1839, agrees with Schleiermacher in considering it as not a genuine production of Plato.

HIPPIAS MINOR.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

EUDICUS.

[1.] WHY, Socrates, are you so silent, after Hippias has made such a display? and why do you not either join in the praise of what has been said, or confute it, if he seems to you to have spoken any thing not correctly; especially since we are left by ourselves, we, who would lay an especial claim to share in an exercise relating to philosophy.

Soc. There are indeed, Eudicus, some things, which I would gladly inquire of Hippias, touching the points, of which he has just now been treating, relating to Homer. For I have heard from your father Apēmantus, that the Iliad of Homer is a more beautiful poem than the Odyssey; and so much the more beautiful, as Achilles is a better man than Ulysses; for each of those poems, he said, was composed, one in honour of Ulysses, and the other in that of Achilles. If then it is agreeable to Hippias, I would gladly inquire on this very point, what he thinks of those two persons, and which of them he says was the better man; especially since he has exhibited a great variety of other matter, relating to other poets, and to Homer likewise.

[2.] *Eud.* Nay, it is evident that Hippias will not grudge you an answer, if you ask him a question. If Socrates puts a question to you, Hippias, will you give him an answer; or how will you act?

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I now to fly from a question put by Socrates—I, who, when I go from my home at Elis up to Olympia to the general meeting of the Greeks, at the period of the Olympic games, constantly offer myself at the temple to speak upon any point that any person may wish, relating to the subject which has been prepared for my display, and to give a reply to any one upon any question he may put.

Soc. Your case, Hippias, is a happy one indeed, if at each Olympic festival you arrive at the temple, so full of hope touching the cleverness connected with the soul. For I should marvel much, if any one of those engaged in bodily contests came thither to contend in the body with so little fear, and with so much confidence, as you say you do, in the case of intellect.

Hip. With reason, Socrates, is such my case. For, from the time when I began to contend at Olympia, I have never met with a person my superior in any thing.

[3.] *Soc.* A beautiful offering, Hippias, do you proclaim your reputation for wisdom¹ to be to both the Elean state and your own parents likewise. But what were you saying to us about Achilles and Ulysses? Which of the two said you was the better man, and for what? For when many were within, and you were making the display, I missed what was said by you; for I feared to put a question, because the crowd was great, and lest I might by asking be an impediment to the display. But as we are now fewer in number, and Eudicus here commands me to ask, state clearly, and instruct us, what you said about those two men, and how you drew a distinction between them.

Hip. Nay, Socrates, I am willing to go through more clearly than I did then, what I said about those men, and others too. I assert then, that Homer has made Achilles the bravest of those who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Ulysses the most versatile.

Soc. Ho! ho! Hippias! will you grant me some such favour as this? not to laugh at me, if I apprehend with difficulty what is said, and ask you frequent questions; and do you endeavour to answer me in a mild and good-tempered manner.

Hip. (I will do so), for it would be, Socrates, a disgraceful thing if I, who instruct others on these very points, and deem

¹ Ficin. omits *τῆς σοφίας*—

myself worthy to receive money on that very account, should, when I am interrogated by you, not show pardon towards you nor answer mildly.

[4.] *Soc.* You speak very fairly. For when you said that Achilles was represented as the bravest, I seemed to understand what you meant; and (so I did) when (you said) that Nestor was the wisest; but when you said that the poet had represented Ulysses as the most versatile, by this, to tell the truth, I did not thoroughly know what you meant. Tell me then, if I can better understand from this way. Is not Achilles represented by Homer as being versatile?

Hip. The least of all, Socrates, but the most simple. Since in "The Supplications,"² when he represents Achilles and Ulysses conversing with each other, Achilles says to Ulysses,

Son of Laertes, progeny of Jove,
Ulysses, full of many plans, 'tis meet
Curtly a speech to say, as I will do,
And to an end I think it will be brought.
Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
Another says. What I say, will be done.

Now in these verses he delineates clearly the habit of each hero; how that Achilles was truthful and simple, but Ulysses versatile and false. For he represents Achilles as speaking these verses to Ulysses.

Soc. Now indeed, Hippias, I am near to understanding what you mean by versatile. For you call, it seems, such a person false.

Hip. Exactly so, Socrates. And such a person has Homer represented Ulysses in many places both of the Iliad and Odyssey.

Soc. By Homer then, it seems, the man of truth was considered as one character, and the man of falsehood another; but not (both)³ the same.

Hip. How should they not, Socrates?

Soc. And are you too of the same opinion, Hippias?

² The books of Homer are quoted by ancient authors with reference to their subjects, not, as now, by their number. See at Cratylus, § 95. The passage here alluded to is in ix. 308.

³ Ficinus has "neque utrumque eundem esse," as if he had found in his MS. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμφοτέρους.

Hip. Most certainly. For it would be a terrible thing if I were not.

[5.] *Soc.* Homer, then, let us dismiss; since it is impossible to inquire of what he was thinking, when he composed those verses. But as you appear to take upon yourself his cause, and, what you assert that Homer meant, seems to you likewise, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.

Hip. So it shall be. Ask then briefly any question you like.

Soc. By men of falsehood do you mean such, as are unable to do a certain act, as persons labouring under sickness, or such as are able.

Hip. I mean such as are very able (to do) many other things, and likewise to put upon persons a deceit.

Soc. The versatile then it seems, according to your account, are men able to do something. Are they not?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is it through silliness and want of intellect that they are versatile and deceivers? or through knavery and a certain kind of intellect?

Hip. Through knavery the most of all, and intellect.

Soc. They are then men of intellect, it seems.

Hip. They are, by Zeus, very much so.

Soc. Since they are men of intellect, are they ignorant of what they are doing? or do they know it?

Hip. They know it very well. And through this they act wickedly.

Soc. Knowing then what they know, are they untaught, or wise?

Hip. Wise on this very point, to deceive.

[6.] *Soc.* Hold now; let us recollect what you have said. You assert that men of falsehood are men of power, and intellect, and knowledge, and wisdom, on those points where they are men of falsehood.

Hip. I assert it.

Soc. And that men of truth and men of falsehood are different, and opposed to each other.

Hip. This I assert.

Soc. Come then, amongst the men of power and wisdom, some, it seems, are men of falsehood, according to your account.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. When you say that men of falsehood are men of power and wisdom as regards those very things,⁴ do you mean that they are able to be false, if they wish it? or unable as regards those things, in which they are false?

Hip. That they are able.

Soc. To sum up the whole then, have men of falsehood the wisdom and power to be false?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. The man, therefore, who is unable, or has not been taught (to be false), cannot be a man of falsehood.

Hip. Such is the case.

Soc. Each person then, who is able to do what he wishes at the time when he wishes, is a person of power. I am not speaking of a person, prevented by some disease or any other thing of that kind; but, I mean, (that he is able,) as you are, whenever you wish, to write my name. Do you not call the person who is in this state, a person of power?

Hip. I do.

[7.] *Soc.* Tell me now, Hippias, are you not skilled in numbers and accounts?

Hip. Most especially, Socrates.

Soc. Were a person then to ask you, "What number is thrice seven hundred," you could, if you would, say of all persons the quickest and truest respecting it.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Is it because you are the man of the greatest power and wisdom on those points?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Are you merely the man of the greatest wisdom and power? or are you the best⁵ likewise with respect to those points, in which you are of the greatest power and wisdom?

Hip. The best assuredly, Socrates.

Soc. You would therefore, upon these subjects, speak the truth with the greatest power possible. Is it not so?

Hip. I think so.

Soc. But what, are you not equally able to speak untruths upon the very same subject? Answer me now, Hippias, as

⁴ Namely, of falsehood, says Stalbaum. Ficinus has "ad eadem," in Greek *εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα*—

⁵ By "best" Sydenham understands "the most veracious."

you did before, nobly and with a high bearing. If then a person were to ask you, "How many are thrice seven hundred?" whether would you be false the most, and say always and according to the same circumstance what is false, if you wished to be false, and never at any time to give a true answer? Or would a person unskilled in accounts be better able than yourself, if so inclined, to be false? Would not the person unskilled, although desirous of being false, frequently speak the truth unwillingly, by accident, through his knowing nothing? But you, being wise on those points, could, if you were inclined to be false, be ever and according to the same circumstances false.

Hip. Yes; the case is as you state it.

Soc. Whether then is the person, who is false upon other points, not so in the case of numbers? nor would he be false in numbers?

Hip. By Zeus, in numbers too.

[8.] *Soc.* Let us then, Hippias, suppose that there is a certain person false upon the subject of numbers and accounts.

Hip. Well.

Soc. Now what kind of person must he be? Must he not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, possess, if he intends to be false, the power to be false? for it was, if you remember, said by you, that he who wants the power to be false would never be false.

Hip. I remember; it was said so.

Soc. Were you not just now shown to possess the greatest power to be false in the case of accounts?

Hip. Yes; and this too was said.

Soc. And do you not possess the greatest power to speak the truth relating to accounts?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. The same person then possesses the greatest power to say what is false and true relating to accounts. ⁶Now he who is the best on such subjects is the accountant.⁶

⁶ The words between the numerals were considered an interpolation by Bekker. But Stalbaum says that to *ἀγαθός* in this speech of Socrates there is an allusion in the subsequent one of the same speaker; while he compares *ἀγαθός*—*ὁ λογιστικός* with "bonos rationatores" in Cicero De Offic. i. 18.

Hip. It is so.

Soc. Who else then, Hippias, is the man of falsehood⁷ with regard to accounts, than the good (accountant)? for he is the person of power, and he too of truth.

Hip. So it appears.

Soc. You see then that the same person is on these points both false and true; and that he, who is true, is not a better man than he, who is false: for surely he is the same, and has not, as you just now fancied, qualities the most opposite.

Hip. It appears so in this case at least.

Soc. Are you willing then for us to consider the question on another ground?

Hip. [Otherwise],⁸ if you wish it.

[9.] *Soc.* Are not you skilled in geometry likewise?

Hip. Yes, I am.

Soc. What then, is it not so in geometry likewise? Is not the same person, who has the greatest power to be false and to speak the truth respecting diagrams, the geometrician?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is there any other, who is good at diagrams?

Hip. No other.

Soc. The good and clever geometrician then has the greatest power in both ways. And, if there be any one else, who is false on the subject of diagrams, it would be the good one: for he has the power; whereas the bad (geometrician) wants the power to be false: so that he, who wants the power, could not be false, as has been admitted already.

Hip. It is so.

Soc. Let us now consider further the third instance, that of an astronomer; in which science you conceive yourself still

⁷ Aristotle, in *Metaphys.* v. 29, observes that there is here a paralogism; for by *ψευδής*, "a man of falsehood," is meant a man *δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι*, "capable of telling a falsehood;" whereas the word properly signifies a man apt to speak falsities through choice, and with the intention to deceive, and to beget in others false notions of things. Aristotle however does not condemn Plato, whose name is not mentioned, as guilty of arguing unfairly; but appeals to this passage as a singular instance of the improper use of the term *ψευδής*, "false." S.

⁸ Bekker, with whom Stalbaum agrees, would expunge *ἄλλως*, omitted by Ficinus; whose version is, "ut lubet;" but Graser, in *Adversar.* p. 99, would retain it. We might perhaps read *ἄλλοθι*, to answer to the preceding *ἄλλοθι*.

more skilled than in those (mentioned) before. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Do not the very same things hold good in astronomy?

Hip. It is probable, Socrates.

Soc. In astronomy likewise, if there be any one else who is false, the good astronomer will be the man of falsehood, as having the power to be false; for it cannot be the man, who wants the power; for he is unskilled.

Hip. It appears so.

Soc. The same person therefore in astronomy likewise will be the man of truth and falsehood.

Hip. It seems so.

[10.] Soc. Come then, Hippias, and consider freely in this manner through all sciences, whether the case be otherwise than this. Now you are of all men the most skilled in every way in the greatest number of arts,⁹ as I once heard you boasting, when you were detailing your abundant and enviable wisdom in the market-place by the tables of the usurers.¹⁰ For you said you once went to Olympia, having as the work of your own hands all that you wore about your body:¹¹ first, the ring which you had on your finger—for you began with that—was your own work, proving your skill in cutting rings; and you had another¹² seal of your own workmanship, and a strigil,¹³

* The origin of this universal knowledge in arts and sciences, Sydenham conceives is to be traced to the fact mentioned by Iamblichus in his life of Pythagoras, that Hippias was for a short time a disciple of Agesidamus, a Pythagorean philosopher of Metapontum in Lucania; who taught that the perfect man was *αὐτάρκης*, "self-sufficient." But instead of the mental self-sufficiency, which his master had in mind, Hippias conceived that the doctrine had reference to all the conveniences, and even the ornaments of life, and that the philosopher should know and practise the arts and sciences by which he might become self-sufficient, and attain a resemblance to the deity; for, according to Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. i., "to want nothing is peculiar to the divine nature; and to have the fewest wants is to approach the nearest to it." S.

⁹ Such is Stalbaum's interpretation of *ἐν ταῖς τραπέζαις*. But I would refer it rather to the tables, which mountebanks made use of to exhibit the tricks of their trade.

¹¹ From this passage Cicero drew the facts mentioned in his *De Orator.* iii. 32.

¹² Instead of *καὶ ἄλλην* I should prefer *καὶ καλὴν*—

¹³ This was an instrument used by the Greeks to scrape the skin, and similar to the modern flesh-brush (or rather, curry-comb). After using

and an unguent-box, which you had made yourself; moreover the shoes you then had on, you said you had cut out yourself and made; and that you had woven the upper and the under cloak which you then wore. But what seemed the strangest thing to all, and a proof of the greatest cleverness, was—when you stated that the belt which you wore round your vest—and it was of the costly kind made in Persia—you had plaited yourself; and in addition to all this, you came there bringing your own poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, and many and various compositions in prose; and that in the arts, which I have just now mentioned, you had reached a pre-eminence in skill above all the rest, and in accuracy on points of rhythm and harmony, and grammar; and in addition to these (you spoke of) many other things, as I appear to myself to remember. But I had like to have forgotten, it seems, your art of memory, in which you deem yourself to shine the most; and, I presume, I have forgotten very many others. [11.] But what I mean is this—Do you, turning your eye upon your own (arts)—and they are quite enough—and upon those of others, tell me—if perchance you can discover from what has been acknowledged by myself and you—where is the man of falsehood and the man of truth apart and not the same? Consider the matter in any kind you please, of wisdom, or knavery, or whatever else you delight to call it; and you will never find it, my friend; for it does not exist; but (if it does), do you mention it.

Hip. I am not able, Socrates, thus on the instant, at least.

Soc. Nor will you, as I think, ever be able. If then I am speaking what is true, do you remember, Hippias, what results from the reasoning?

Hip. I do not very well understand, Socrates, what you mean.

Soc. For you do not perhaps at present make use of your art of memory. For it is evident that you think there is no need of it. But I will remind you. You know that you said

the strigil, they took a bath, and afterwards anointed themselves, especially about their joints, with some perfumed oil. Thus the skin was cleansed, the blood put into circulation, and the joints made supple and pliant. S. The practice has been introduced from the East into England, under the name of "shampooing." Stalbaum refers to Persius v. 136, "I, puer, et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer;" and says that Boeckh, in his *Domest. Oeconom.* Athen. ii. p. 330, explains στλεγγίς by "a comb."

Achilles was a man of truth, but Ulysses a man of falsehood, and versatile.

Hip. I did so.

Soc. But you now perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falsehood have been proved to be the same person; so that, if Ulysses is a man of falsehood, he becomes no less a man of truth: and if Achilles is a man of truth, he (becomes) likewise a man of falsehood; and the men do not differ from, nor are they opposite to, each other, but are similar.

Hip. You are always, Socrates, weaving some discourses of this kind, and, cutting off that portion of the argument which is the most difficult, you lay hold of it in the way of something minute;¹³ but you do not grapple with the question as a whole, respecting which the debate happens to be. For even now, if you wished it, I could show from many proofs in a satisfactory speech, that Homer has represented Achilles as a man of greater bravery than Ulysses, and free from falsehood, but the latter as crafty, and frequently false, and worse than Achilles. And do you, if you will, place (your) reasonings opposite (to mine), (to prove) the other is the better man; and (thus) the persons here will the better know, which of us is the better speaker.

[12.] *Soc.* I have no doubt, Hippias, of your being cleverer than myself. But I am ever accustomed, when any one says any thing, to give my attention—especially when the speaker seems to be a clever person—as being desirous of learning what he is speaking about, and ask him questions, and I think over the question again, and I put together what has been said, in order that I may understand it. But if the speaker appears to me to be a person of no mark, I neither ask him any questions, nor give myself any thought about what he has been talking. Now by this you may know what persons I consider to be clever. For you will find me solicitous about what has been said by such¹⁴ a person, and making inquiries of him, in order that I may be benefited by learning. Since even

¹³ The same complaint is made by the Sophist in *Hipp. Maj.* p. 301, A. § 48, and p. 304, A. § 55.

¹⁴ Instead of *ροῦρον* Ficinus has "illorum," as if he had found in his MS. *ροῦρων*. Sydenham prefers *ροιοῦρον*—

now I have been thinking, while you were speaking, that, in the verses, which you just now recited to show that Achilles was speaking, as if he were a cheat, to Ulysses, something appeared to me to be strange; if, what you assert, is the truth, that the versatile Ulysses no where appears to be a man of falsehood, while Achilles appears to be versatile according to your expression; at least he tells a falsehood. For Achilles having spoken those very words, which you have just now recited,

Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
Another says—

he states shortly afterwards, that he would not be dissuaded (from his purpose) by either Ulysses or Agamemnon; nor would he stay at all in the Trojan land; but he says,

To-morrow, after paying holy rites
To Zeus and all the gods, I will my ships
Load well, and drag them to the deep; and then
Thou'lt see, if such thy wish, and such thy care,
At dawn of day my vessels sailing o'er
The Hellespont fish-feeding, and my sailors
Eager to ply the oar; and should the voyage
Prosperous the god, for shaking earth renowned,
Grant, fertile Phthia reach I the third day:

and still before this he says, while abusing Agamemnon, (in IL. i. 169,)

But now I'll go to Phthia; since 'tis far
Better to homeward wend with ships, ¹⁵ whose sterns
Are rounded; ¹⁵ nor, myself dishonour'd thus,
Think I, that here thou'lt yearly riches gain.

Now though he had said this at one time in the face of the whole army, and at another to his friends, he no where appears to have made any preparations, or even an attempt, towards dragging down his vessels to the sea, as being about to sail homeward, but very ¹⁶ nobly deemed it a little thing to tell the truth.¹⁶ I therefore, Hippias, proposed at the beginning the question, as I was in doubt which of these two had been repre-

^{15—15} Such is the conventional version of *νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν*. But as *κορωνή* is a kind of an aquatic bird, it seems more natural to understand by *ναυσὶ κορωνίσιν*, "ships" shaped like a sea-fowl.

^{16—16} Perhaps Horace had in mind this passage of Plato, when he wrote his "Splendide mendax."

Hip. Most certainly. For it would be a terrible thing if I were not.

[5.] *Soc.* Homer, then, let us dismiss; since it is impossible to inquire of what he was thinking, when he composed those verses. But as you appear to take upon yourself his cause, and, what you assert that Homer meant, seems to you likewise, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.

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Soc. They are then men of intellect, it seems.

Hip. They are, by Zeus, very much so.

Soc. Since they are men of intellect, are they ignorant of what they are doing? or do they know it?

Hip. They know it very well. And through this they act wickedly.

Soc. Knowing then what they know, are they untaught, or wise?

Hip. Wise on this very point, to deceive.

[6.] *Soc.* Hold now; let us recollect what you have said. You assert that men of falsehood are men of power, and intellect, and knowledge, and wisdom, on those points where they are men of falsehood.

Hip. I assert it.

Soc. And that men of truth and men of falsehood are different, and opposed to each other.

Hip. This I assert.

Soc. Come then, amongst the men of power and wisdom, some, it seems, are men of falsehood, according to your account.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. When you say that men of falsehood are men of power and wisdom as regards those very things,⁴ do you mean that they are able to be false, if they wish it? or unable as regards those things, in which they are false?

Hip. That they are able.

Soc. To sum up the whole then, have men of falsehood the wisdom and power to be false?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. The man, therefore, who is unable, or has not been taught (to be false), cannot be a man of falsehood.

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Soc. Each person then, who is able to do what he wishes at the time when he wishes, is a person of power. I am not speaking of a person, prevented by some disease or any other thing of that kind; but, I mean, (that he is able,) as you are, whenever you wish, to write my name. Do you not call the person who is in this state, a person of power?

Hip. I do.

[7.] *Soc.* Tell me now, Hippias, are you not skilled in numbers and accounts?

Hip. Most especially, Socrates.

Soc. Were a person then to ask you, "What number is thrice seven hundred," you could, if you would, say of all persons the quickest and truest respecting it.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Is it because you are the man of the greatest power and wisdom on those points?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Are you merely the man of the greatest wisdom and power? or are you the best⁵ likewise with respect to those points, in which you are of the greatest power and wisdom?

Hip. The best assuredly, Socrates.

Soc. You would therefore, upon these subjects, speak the truth with the greatest power possible. Is it not so?

Hip. I think so.

Soc. But what, are you not equally able to speak untruths upon the very same subject? Answer me now, Hippias, as

⁴ Namely, of falsehood, says Stalbaum. Ficinus has "ad eadem," in Greek *εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα*—

⁵ By "best" Sydenham understands "the most veracious."

you did before, nobly and with a high bearing. If then a person were to ask you, "How many are thrice seven hundred?" whether would you be false the most, and say always and according to the same circumstance what is false, if you wished to be false, and never at any time to give a true answer? Or would a person unskilled in accounts be better able than yourself, if so inclined, to be false? Would not the person unskilled, although desirous of being false, frequently speak the truth unwillingly, by accident, through his knowing nothing? But you, being wise on those points, could, if you were inclined to be false, be ever and according to the same circumstances false.

Hip. Yes; the case is as you state it.

Soc. Whether then is the person, who is false upon other points, not so in the case of numbers? nor would he be false in numbers?

Hip. By Zeus, in numbers too.

[8.] *Soc.* Let us then, Hippias, suppose that there is a certain person false upon the subject of numbers and accounts.

Hip. Well.

Soc. Now what kind of person must he be? Must he not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, possess, if he intends to be false, the power to be false? for it was, if you remember, said by you, that he who wants the power to be false would never be false.

Hip. I remember; it was said so.

Soc. Were you not just now shown to possess the greatest power to be false in the case of accounts?

Hip. Yes; and this too was said.

Soc. And do you not possess the greatest power to speak the truth relating to accounts?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. The same person then possesses the greatest power to say what is false and true relating to accounts. ⁶Now he who is the best on such subjects is the accountant.⁶

⁶⁻⁶ The words between the numerals were considered an interpolation by Bekker. But Stalbaum says that to ἀγαθός in this speech of Socrates there is an allusion in the subsequent one of the same speaker; while he compares ἀγαθός—ὁ λογιστικός with "bonos rationatores" in Cicero De Offic. i. 18.

Hip. It is so.

Soc. Who else then, Hippias, is the man of falsehood⁷ with regard to accounts, than the good (accountant)? for he is the person of power, and he too of truth.

Hip. So it appears.

Soc. You see then that the same person is on these points both false and true; and that he, who is true, is not a better man than he, who is false: for surely he is the same, and has not, as you just now fancied, qualities the most opposite.

Hip. It appears so in this case at least.

Soc. Are you willing then for us to consider the question on another ground?

Hip. [Otherwise],⁸ if you wish it.

[9.] *Soc.* Are not you skilled in geometry likewise?

Hip. Yes, I am.

Soc. What then, is it not so in geometry likewise? Is not the same person, who has the greatest power to be false and to speak the truth respecting diagrams, the geometrician?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is there any other, who is good at diagrams?

Hip. No other.

Soc. The good and clever geometrician then has the greatest power in both ways. And, if there be any one else, who is false on the subject of diagrams, it would be the good one: for he has the power; whereas the bad (geometrician) wants the power to be false: so that he, who wants the power, could not be false, as has been admitted already.

Hip. It is so.

Soc. Let us now consider further the third instance, that of an astronomer; in which science you conceive yourself still

⁷ Aristotle, in *Metaphys.* v. 29, observes that there is here a paralogism; for by *ψευδής*, "a man of falsehood," is meant a man *δυνάμενος ψεύδασθαι*, "capable of telling a falsehood;" whereas the word properly signifies a man apt to speak falsities through choice, and with the intention to deceive, and to beget in others false notions of things. Aristotle however does not condemn Plato, whose name is not mentioned, as guilty of arguing unfairly; but appeals to this passage as a singular instance of the improper use of the term *ψευδής*, "false." S.

⁸ Bekker, with whom Stalbaum agrees, would expunge *ἄλλως*, omitted by Ficinus; whose version is, "ut lubet;" but Graser, in *Adversar.* p. 99, would retain it. We might perhaps read *ἄλλοθι*, to answer to the preceding *ἄλλοθι*.

more skilled than in those (mentioned) before. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Do not the very same things hold good in astronomy?

Hip. It is probable, Socrates.

Soc. In astronomy likewise, if there be any one else who is false, the good astronomer will be the man of falsehood, as having the power to be false; for it cannot be the man, who wants the power; for he is unskilled.

Hip. It appears so.

Soc. The same person therefore in astronomy likewise will be the man of truth and falsehood.

Hip. It seems so.

[10.] *Soc.* Come then, Hippias, and consider freely in this manner through all sciences, whether the case be otherwise than this. Now you are of all men the most skilled in every way in the greatest number of arts,⁹ as I once heard you boasting, when you were detailing your abundant and enviable wisdom in the market-place by the tables of the usurers.¹⁰ For you said you once went to Olympia, having as the work of your own hands all that you wore about your body:¹¹ first, the ring which you had on your finger—for you began with that—was your own work, proving your skill in cutting rings; and you had another¹² seal of your own workmanship, and a strigil,¹³

* The origin of this universal knowledge in arts and sciences, Sydenham conceives is to be traced to the fact mentioned by Iamblichus in his life of Pythagoras, that Hippias was for a short time a disciple of Agesidamus, a Pythagorean philosopher of Metapontum in Lucania; who taught that the perfect man was *αὐτάρκης*, "self-sufficient." But instead of the mental self-sufficiency, which his master had in mind, Hippias conceived that the doctrine had reference to all the conveniences, and even the ornaments of life, and that the philosopher should know and practise the arts and sciences by which he might become self-sufficient, and attain a resemblance to the deity; for, according to Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. i., "to want nothing is peculiar to the divine nature; and to have the fewest wants is to approach the nearest to it." S.

¹⁰ Such is Stalbaum's interpretation of *ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις*. But I would refer it rather to the tables, which mountebanks made use of to exhibit the tricks of their trade.

¹¹ From this passage Cicero drew the facts mentioned in his *De Orator.* iii. 32.

¹² Instead of *καὶ ἄλλην* I should prefer *καὶ καλὴν*—

¹³ This was an instrument used by the Greeks to scrape the skin, and similar to the modern flesh-brush (or rather, curry-comb). After using

and an unguent-box, which you had made yourself; moreover the shoes you then had on, you said you had cut out yourself and made; and that you had woven the upper and the under cloak which you then wore. But what seemed the strangest thing to all, and a proof of the greatest cleverness, was—when you stated that the belt which you wore round your vest—and it was of the costly kind made in Persia—you had plaited yourself; and in addition to all this, you came there bringing your own poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, and many and various compositions in prose; and that in the arts, which I have just now mentioned, you had reached a pre-eminence in skill above all the rest, and in accuracy on points of rhythm and harmony, and grammar; and in addition to these (you spoke of) many other things, as I appear to myself to remember. But I had like to have forgotten, it seems, your art of memory, in which you deem yourself to shine the most; and, I presume, I have forgotten very many others. [11.] But what I mean is this—Do you, turning your eye upon your own (arts)—and they are quite enough—and upon those of others, tell me—if perchance you can discover from what has been acknowledged by myself and you—where is the man of falsehood and the man of truth apart and not the same? Consider the matter in any kind you please, of wisdom, or knavery, or whatever else you delight to call it; and you will never find it, my friend; for it does not exist; but (if it does), do you mention it.

Hip. I am not able, Socrates, thus on the instant, at least.

Soc. Nor will you, as I think, ever be able. If then I am speaking what is true, do you remember, Hippias, what results from the reasoning?

Hip. I do not very well understand, Socrates, what you mean.

Soc. For you do not perhaps at present make use of your art of memory. For it is evident that you think there is no need of it. But I will remind you. You know that you said

the strigil, they took a bath, and afterwards anointed themselves, especially about their joints, with some perfumed oil. Thus the skin was cleansed, the blood put into circulation, and the joints made supple and pliant. S. The practice has been introduced from the East into England, under the name of "shampooing." Stalbaum refers to Persius v. 136, "I, puer, et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer;" and says that Boeckh, in his *Domest. Œconom.* Athen. ii. p. 330, explains *στλεγγίς* by "a comb."

Achilles was a man of truth, but Ulysses a man of falsehood, and versatile.

Hip. I did so.

Soc. But you now perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falsehood have been proved to be the same person; so that, if Ulysses is a man of falsehood, he becomes no less a man of truth: and if Achilles is a man of truth, he (becomes) likewise a man of falsehood; and the men do not differ from, nor are they opposite to, each other, but are similar.

Hip. You are always, Socrates, weaving some discourses of this kind, and, cutting off that portion of the argument which is the most difficult, you lay hold of it in the way of something minute;¹³ but you do not grapple with the question as a whole, respecting which the debate happens to be. For even now, if you wished it, I could show from many proofs in a satisfactory speech, that Homer has represented Achilles as a man of greater bravery than Ulysses, and free from falsehood, but the latter as crafty, and frequently false, and worse than Achilles. And do you, if you will, place (your) reasonings opposite (to mine), (to prove) the other is the better man; and (thus) the persons here will the better know, which of us is the better speaker.

[12.] *Soc.* I have no doubt, Hippias, of your being cleverer than myself. But I am ever accustomed, when any one says any thing, to give my attention—especially when the speaker seems to be a clever person—as being desirous of learning what he is speaking about, and ask him questions, and I think over the question again, and I put together what has been said, in order that I may understand it. But if the speaker appears to me to be a person of no mark, I neither ask him any questions, nor give myself any thought about what he has been talking. Now by this you may know what persons I consider to be clever. For you will find me solicitous about what has been said by such¹⁴ a person, and making inquiries of him, in order that I may be benefited by learning. Since even

¹³ The same complaint is made by the Sophist in *Hipp. Maj.* p. 301, A. § 48, and p. 304, A. § 55.

¹⁴ Instead of *ροῦρον* Ficinus has "*illorum*," as if he had found in his MS. *ροῦρων*. Sydenham prefers *ροιοῦρον*—

now I have been thinking, while you were speaking, that, in the verses, which you just now recited to show that Achilles was speaking, as if he were a cheat, to Ulysses, something appeared to me to be strange; if, what you assert, is the truth, that the versatile Ulysses no where appears to be a man of falsehood, while Achilles appears to be versatile according to your expression; at least he tells a falsehood. For Achilles having spoken those very words, which you have just now recited,

Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
Another says—

he states shortly afterwards, that he would not be dissuaded (from his purpose) by either Ulysses or Agamemnon; nor would he stay at all in the Trojan land; but he says,

To-morrow, after paying holy rites
To Zeus and all the gods, I will my ships
Load well, and drag them to the deep; and then
Thou'lt see, if such thy wish, and such thy care,
At dawn of day my vessels sailing o'er
The Hellespont fish-feeding, and my sailors
Eager to ply the oar; and should the voyage
Prosperous the god, for shaking earth renowned,
Grant, fertile Phthia reach I the third day:

and still before this he says, while abusing Agamemnon, (in II. i. 169,)

But now I'll go to Phthia; since 'tis far
Better to homeward wend with ships, ¹⁵ whose sterns
Are rounded; ¹⁵ nor, myself dishonour'd thus,
Think I, that here thou'lt yearly riches gain.

Now though he had said this at one time in the face of the whole army, and at another to his friends, he no where appears to have made any preparations, or even an attempt, towards dragging down his vessels to the sea, as being about to sail homeward, but very ¹⁶ nobly deemed it a little thing to tell the truth.¹⁶ I therefore, Hippias, proposed at the beginning the question, as I was in doubt which of these two had been repre-

^{15—15} Such is the conventional version of *νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν*. But as *κορωνή* is a kind of an aquatic bird, it seems more natural to understand by *νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν*, "ships" shaped like a sea-fowl.

^{16—16} Perhaps Horace had in mind this passage of Plato, when he wrote his "Splendide mendax."

sented by the poet as the better man ; and deeming both to be very good, it was difficult to decide which was the better, as regards falsehood and truth, and every other virtue ; for in that point likewise both seemed to be nearly on a par.

[13.] *Hip.* You do not consider the matter, Socrates, correctly. For, though Achilles tells a falsehood, he appears to do so not with any fixed design, but against his inclination ; as he was compelled, by the distresses of the army, to remain and give his assistance. But what Ulysses says falsely, is willingly and with a design.

Soc. My dearest Hippias, you are deceiving me, and are yourself imitating Ulysses.

Hip. By no means, Socrates. But what are you saying, and for what purpose ?

Soc. Because you assert that Achilles told a falsehood not designedly—he, who was such a juggler, and in addition to his vain-boasting, a plotter, as Homer has represented, that he appears to have a higher notion of himself than of Ulysses to such an extent, with regard to lying hid from him while vain-boasting, as to dare in his presence to contradict himself. And lie hid he did from Ulysses. At least Ulysses does not appear to have said any thing to him, as (not)¹⁷ perceiving that Achilles had said what was false.

Hip. What is this that you are speaking of, Socrates ?

Soc. Know you not that, on saying afterwards¹⁸ to Ulysses, that he would set sail in the morning, he says to Ajax, on the other hand, no such thing, but tells him a quite different story.

Hip. Where ?

Soc. Where he says, (Il. ix. 646,)

For of the blood-stain'd war I'll take no thought,
'Till god-like Hector, thoughtful Priam's son,
Shall reach of Myrmidons the tents and ships,
And, Argives slaying, set the fleet on fire.
But round my tent and dark ship Hector coming,
And eager for the fight, I guess, will stop.

¹⁷ Ficinus has "utpote qui mendacium non advertit," what the sense evidently requires. Stephens therefore proposed to insert *μη* after *ως*, which both Sydenham and Beck have adopted.

¹⁸ The common reading was *υστερον η̃ ως*, out of which as Ficinus could make nothing, he omitted the words *υστερον η̃*—while Stephens thought there was something wanting here. Bekker has edited from the priority of MSS. *υστερον πως*—

[14.] Now do you imagine, Hippias, that the son of Thetis and the pupil of the most clever Chiron was so forgetful, as that, after previously abusing with the extreme of abuse those, who speak what they do not mean, he would immediately say to Ulysses that he would sail away, and then to Ajax, that he would remain, and this too without a fixed design, or holding Ulysses to be a simpleton,¹⁹ and that he should get the better of him by this very trickery and speaking falsely?

Hip. It does not, Socrates, seem so at least to me. But being dissuaded on these points by his own easy temper, he spoke to Ajax in a different manner to what he had done to Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks truth, speaks always with a fixed design, and so too, when he speaks a falsehood.

Soc. Ulysses then is a better man, it seems, than Achilles.

Hip. Surely, Socrates, the least of all.

Soc. Why, were not they, who speak false willingly, proved to be better²⁰ than those (who do so) unwillingly?

Hip. But how, Socrates, can they, who do an injury willingly, and plot against a person willingly, and do mischief, be better men than those, who do so unwillingly; to the latter of whom it seems that pardon is greatly due, should any one unconsciously do an injury, or tell a falsehood, or do any other wrong. And even the laws are surely more severe against those, who do evil and tell falsehoods wilfully, than against those, who act so unwillingly.

[15.] *Soc.* You see, Hippias, that I spoke the truth in saying how pressing I am in regard to putting questions to the clever. And yet I run the risk of possessing this solitary good, the rest that I possess being trifling. For in what manner things are, I am at fault; nor do I know where they are. And of this there is evidence sufficient for myself. For whenever I

¹⁹ The Greek ἀπχαῖος is used similarly in Euthyd. p. 295, C., and Aristoph. Plut. 323.

²⁰ This is another instance, similar to the one noticed by Aristotle, of an argument founded on the ambiguity of an expression. For the truth of the position contended for, has indeed been proved; but Plato applies it in this place to morals, of which it has not been proved, but the direct contrary insinuated. S. We may quote in illustration of the ambiguity of the word "good," the passage in Shakspeare's Merchant of Venice, where on *Shylock* saying that "Antonio is a good man," *Bassanio* asks, "Have you heard any imputation to the contrary?" to which the Jew replies, "No, no; my meaning, in saying that he is a good man, is to have you understand me that he is sufficient."

am in the company of any of you in high repute for your cleverness, and for whom all the Greeks are witnesses of your wisdom, I appear as one knowing nothing; for scarcely on a single point, so to speak, am I of the same opinion with you. And what greater proof can there be of a man's want of instruction, than when he differs from men of wisdom? Yet I have this one wonderful good, which is my preservation; for I am not ashamed to learn; but I make inquiries, and ask questions, and am very thankful to the person, who gives me an answer; nor do I ever deprive any one of the thanks (I owe). For I never deny that I have learnt a thing, by pretending that what I have learnt was a discovery of my own; but I pass encomium upon the person, who has taught me, as being a clever man, by showing forth what I learnt from him. And now I do not agree with what you assert, but differ very greatly. And this, I know well, takes place through myself; because I am such as I am, that I may not speak too highly of myself. To me, Hippias, every thing appears the contrary to what you say. They then who hurt (other) persons, and do an injury, and speak falsehoods, and deceive, and commit a fault willingly, (appear to me)²¹ to be better men than those, (who act so) unwillingly. Sometimes, however, I am of a contrary opinion; and my mind wanders on these points, evidently through my knowing nothing. But at present there has come around me, as it were, the periodical return of my disorder; and they, who commit an error willingly, seem to me to be better than those, who commit it unwillingly. And for this my present state of mind I blame the previous discussion as the cause; so that for the present it appears that they, who do each of these things unwillingly, are more wicked than those who do them willingly. Do then indulge me, nor grudge to heal the disorder of my mind. For you will do me a much greater good by causing my mind to cease from its ignorance, than my body from disease.²² If however you wish to speak a lengthened speech, I tell you beforehand, that you will effect no cure; for I cannot follow you.

²¹ Stalbaum says that *δοκοῦσι* is to be supplied here from the preceding *δοκῶ*, referring very appositely to Apolog. p. 25, B.

²² So Macbeth, in Shakspeare, after inquiring of the Doctor, whether he cannot minister to a mind diseased, and hearing that therein the patient must minister to himself, rejoins, "Throw physic to the dogs; I'll none of it."

But if you are willing, as lately, to answer my questions, you will benefit greatly myself; nor do I think you will receive any harm. Justly then do I call upon you, son of Apēmantus; for you have urged me to converse with Hippias; and now if Hippias is unwilling to give an answer, do you intercede with him in my behalf.

Eud. There will be, I think, Socrates, no need for my intercession with Hippias. For nothing of such a kind has been previously stated by him; but rather that he never shrunk from the question of any man. Is it not so, Hippias? Was not this what you said?

Hip. I did say so, Eudicus. But Socrates is always making a confusion in the arguments; and he is like to a person who is doing wrong.

[16.] *Soc.* My very good Hippias, I do it not willingly—for I should then be a clever and terrible fellow according to your account—but unwillingly, so that do you pardon me; for pardon, you say, is due to him who does wrong unwillingly.

Eud. Nay, Hippias, do not act otherwise; but for the sake of me, and of your own words previously spoken, give an answer to whatever Socrates shall ask.

Hip. Well, at your entreaty, I will give an answer. Ask, then, what you like.

[16.] *Soc.* Truly, Hippias, I am very desirous to consider thoroughly what has been just now mentioned—Which are the better men, they, who err willingly or unwillingly. Now to this inquiry I think we shall arrive by the most direct road thus—and do you give an answer. Do you speak of a runner as being good?²²

Hip. I do.

Soc. And (of one as being) bad?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is not he, who runs well, good? and bad he, who runs badly?

Hip. Yes.

²² In the instances selected by Plato, the four first relate to the acts that depend upon the structure of the body, such as running, wrestling, dancing, and singing. To perform these exercises properly, there are requisite agility, strength, gracefulness, and a musical voice; all of which arise respectively from the elasticity of the fibres, the firmness in the fabric of the bones, the plianthness in the joints, and the expansion and contraction of the lungs and larynx. S.

you did before, nobly and with a high bearing. If then a person were to ask you, "How many are thrice seven hundred?" whether would you be false the most, and say always and according to the same circumstance what is false, if you wished to be false, and never at any time to give a true answer? Or would a person unskilled in accounts be better able than yourself, if so inclined, to be false? Would not the person unskilled, although desirous of being false, frequently speak the truth unwillingly, by accident, through his knowing nothing? But you, being wise on those points, could, if you were inclined to be false, be ever and according to the same circumstances false.

Hip. Yes; the case is as you state it.

Soc. Whether then is the person, who is false upon other points, not so in the case of numbers? nor would he be false in numbers?

Hip. By Zeus, in numbers too.

[8.] *Soc.* Let us then, Hippias, suppose that there is a certain person false upon the subject of numbers and accounts.

Hip. Well.

Soc. Now what kind of person must he be? Must he not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, possess, if he intends to be false, the power to be false? for it was, if you remember, said by you, that he who wants the power to be false would never be false.

Hip. I remember; it was said so.

Soc. Were you not just now shown to possess the greatest power to be false in the case of accounts?

Hip. Yes; and this too was said.

Soc. And do you not possess the greatest power to speak the truth relating to accounts?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. The same person then possesses the greatest power to say what is false and true relating to accounts. ⁶Now he who is the best on such subjects is the accountant.⁶

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Hip. It is so.

Soc. Who else then, Hippias, is the man of falsehood⁷ with regard to accounts, than the good (accountant)? for he is the person of power, and he too of truth.

Hip. So it appears.

Soc. You see then that the same person is on these points both false and true; and that he, who is true, is not a better man than he, who is false: for surely he is the same, and has not, as you just now fancied, qualities the most opposite.

Hip. It appears so in this case at least.

Soc. Are you willing then for us to consider the question on another ground?

Hip. [Otherwise],⁸ if you wish it.

[9.] *Soc.* Are not you skilled in geometry likewise?

Hip. Yes, I am.

Soc. What then, is it not so in geometry likewise? Is not the same person, who has the greatest power to be false and to speak the truth respecting diagrams, the geometrician?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is there any other, who is good at diagrams?

Hip. No other.

Soc. The good and clever geometrician then has the greatest power in both ways. And, if there be any one else, who is false on the subject of diagrams, it would be the good one: for he has the power; whereas the bad (geometrician) wants the power to be false: so that he, who wants the power, could not be false, as has been admitted already.

Hip. It is so.

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more skilled than in those (mentioned) before. Is it not so, Hippias?

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Hip. It is probable, Socrates.

Soc. In astronomy likewise, if there be any one else who is false, the good astronomer will be the man of falsehood, as having the power to be false; for it cannot be the man, who wants the power; for he is unskilled.

Hip. It appears so.

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[10.] *Soc.* Come then, Hippias, and consider freely in this manner through all sciences, whether the case be otherwise than this. Now you are of all men the most skilled in every way in the greatest number of arts,⁹ as I once heard you boasting, when you were detailing your abundant and enviable wisdom in the market-place by the tables of the usurers.¹⁰ For you said you once went to Olympia, having as the work of your own hands all that you wore about your body:¹¹ first, the ring which you had on your finger—for you began with that—was your own work, proving your skill in cutting rings; and you had another¹² seal of your own workmanship, and a strigil,¹³

* The origin of this universal knowledge in arts and sciences, Sydenham conceives is to be traced to the fact mentioned by Iamblichus in his life of Pythagoras, that Hippias was for a short time a disciple of Agesidamus, a Pythagorean philosopher of Metapontum in Lucania; who taught that the perfect man was *αὐτάρκης*, "self-sufficient." But instead of the mental self-sufficiency, which his master had in mind, Hippias conceived that the doctrine had reference to all the conveniences, and even the ornaments of life, and that the philosopher should know and practise the arts and sciences by which he might become self-sufficient, and attain a resemblance to the deity; for, according to Socrates in Xenophon, *Mem.* i., "to want nothing is peculiar to the divine nature; and to have the fewest wants is to approach the nearest to it." S.

¹⁰ Such is Stalbaum's interpretation of *ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις*. But I would refer it rather to the tables, which mountebanks made use of to exhibit the tricks of their trade.

¹¹ From this passage Cicero drew the facts mentioned in his *De Orator.* iii. 32.

¹² Instead of *καὶ ἄλλην* I should prefer *καὶ καλὴν*—

¹³ This was an instrument used by the Greeks to scrape the skin, and similar to the modern flesh-brush (or rather, curry-comb). After using

and an unguent-box, which you had made yourself; moreover the shoes you then had on, you said you had cut out yourself and made; and that you had woven the upper and the under cloak which you then wore. But what seemed the strangest thing to all, and a proof of the greatest cleverness, was—when you stated that the belt which you wore round your vest—and it was of the costly kind made in Persia—you had plaited yourself; and in addition to all this, you came there bringing your own poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, and many and various compositions in prose; and that in the arts, which I have just now mentioned, you had reached a pre-eminence in skill above all the rest, and in accuracy on points of rhythm and harmony, and grammar; and in addition to these (you spoke of) many other things, as I appear to myself to remember. But I had like to have forgotten, it seems, your art of memory, in which you deem yourself to shine the most; and, I presume, I have forgotten very many others. [11.] But what I mean is this—Do you, turning your eye upon your own (arts)—and they are quite enough—and upon those of others, tell me—if perchance you can discover from what has been acknowledged by myself and you—where is the man of falsehood and the man of truth apart and not the same? Consider the matter in any kind you please, of wisdom, or knavery, or whatever else you delight to call it; and you will never find it, my friend; for it does not exist; but (if it does), do you mention it.

Hip. I am not able, Socrates, thus on the instant, at least.

Soc. Nor will you, as I think, ever be able. If then I am speaking what is true, do you remember, Hippias, what results from the reasoning?

Hip. I do not very well understand, Socrates, what you mean.

Soc. For you do not perhaps at present make use of your art of memory. For it is evident that you think there is no need of it. But I will remind you. You know that you said

the strigil, they took a bath, and afterwards anointed themselves, especially about their joints, with some perfumed oil. Thus the skin was cleansed, the blood put into circulation, and the joints made supple and pliant. S. The practice has been introduced from the East into England, under the name of "shampooing." Stalbaum refers to Persius v. 136, "I, puer, et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer;" and says that Boeckh, in his *Domest. Œconom.* Athen. ii. p. 330, explains *στλεγγίς* by "a comb."

Achilles was a man of truth, but Ulysses a man of falsehood, and versatile.

Hip. I did so.

Soc. But you now perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falsehood have been proved to be the same person; so that, if Ulysses is a man of falsehood, he becomes no less a man of truth: and if Achilles is a man of truth, he (becomes) likewise a man of falsehood; and the men do not differ from, nor are they opposite to, each other, but are similar.

Hip. You are always, Socrates, weaving some discourses of this kind, and, cutting off that portion of the argument which is the most difficult, you lay hold of it in the way of something minute;¹³ but you do not grapple with the question as a whole, respecting which the debate happens to be. For even now, if you wished it, I could show from many proofs in a satisfactory speech, that Homer has represented Achilles as a man of greater bravery than Ulysses, and free from falsehood, but the latter as crafty, and frequently false, and worse than Achilles. And do you, if you will, place (your) reasonings opposite (to mine), (to prove) the other is the better man; and (thus) the persons here will the better know, which of us is the better speaker.

[12.] *Soc.* I have no doubt, Hippias, of your being cleverer than myself. But I am ever accustomed, when any one says any thing, to give my attention—especially when the speaker seems to be a clever person—as being desirous of learning what he is speaking about, and ask him questions, and I think over the question again, and I put together what has been said, in order that I may understand it. But if the speaker appears to me to be a person of no mark, I neither ask him any questions, nor give myself any thought about what he has been talking. Now by this you may know what persons I consider to be clever. For you will find me solicitous about what has been said by such¹⁴ a person, and making inquiries of him, in order that I may be benefited by learning. Since even

¹³ The same complaint is made by the Sophist in *Hipp. Maj.* p. 301, A. § 48, and p. 304, A. § 55.

¹⁴ Instead of *ροῦρον* Ficinus has "illorum," as if he had found in his MS. *ροῦρων*. Sydenham prefers *ροῖούρον*—

now I have been thinking, while you were speaking, that, in the verses, which you just now recited to show that Achilles was speaking, as if he were a cheat, to Ulysses, something appeared to me to be strange; if, what you assert, is the truth, that the versatile Ulysses no where appears to be a man of falsehood, while Achilles appears to be versatile according to your expression; at least he tells a falsehood. For Achilles having spoken those very words, which you have just now recited,

Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
Another says—

he states shortly afterwards, that he would not be dissuaded (from his purpose) by either Ulysses or Agamemnon; nor would he stay at all in the Trojan land; but he says,

To-morrow, after paying holy rites
To Zeus and all the gods, I will my ships
Load well, and drag them to the deep; and then
Thou'lt see, if such thy wish, and such thy care,
At dawn of day my vessels sailing o'er
The Hellespont fish-feeding, and my sailors
Eager to ply the oar; and should the voyage
Prosperous the god, for shaking earth renowned,
Grant, fertile Phthia reach I the third day:

and still before this he says, while abusing Agamemnon, (in *Il. i. 169*.)

But now I'll go to Phthia; since 'tis far
Better to homeward wend with ships, ¹⁵ whose sterns
Are rounded; ¹⁶ nor, myself dishonour'd thus,
Think I, that here thou'lt yearly riches gain.

Now though he had said this at one time in the face of the whole army, and at another to his friends, he no where appears to have made any preparations, or even an attempt, towards dragging down his vessels to the sea, as being about to sail homeward, but very ¹⁶ nobly deemed it a little thing to tell the truth.¹⁶ I therefore, Hippias, proposed at the beginning the question, as I was in doubt which of these two had been repre-

^{15—16} Such is the conventional version of *νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν*. But as *κορωνή* is a kind of an aquatic bird, it seems more natural to understand by *νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν*, "ships" shaped like a sea-fowl.

^{16—16} Perhaps Horace had in mind this passage of Plato, when he wrote his "Splendide mendax."

sented by the poet as the better man ; and deeming both to be very good, it was difficult to decide which was the better, as regards falsehood and truth, and every other virtue ; for in that point likewise both seemed to be nearly on a par.

[13.] *Hip.* You do not consider the matter, Socrates, correctly. For, though Achilles tells a falsehood, he appears to do so not with any fixed design, but against his inclination ; as he was compelled, by the distresses of the army, to remain and give his assistance. But what Ulysses says falsely, is willingly and with a design.

Soc. My dearest Hippias, you are deceiving me, and are yourself imitating Ulysses.

Hip. By no means, Socrates. But what are you saying, and for what purpose ?

Soc. Because you assert that Achilles told a falsehood not designedly—he, who was such a juggler, and in addition to his vain-boasting, a plotter, as Homer has represented, that he appears to have a higher notion of himself than of Ulysses to such an extent, with regard to lying hid from him while vain-boasting, as to dare in his presence to contradict himself. And lie hid he did from Ulysses. At least Ulysses does not appear to have said any thing to him, as (not)¹⁷ perceiving that Achilles had said what was false.

Hip. What is this that you are speaking of, Socrates ?

Soc. Know you not that, on saying afterwards¹⁸ to Ulysses, that he would set sail in the morning, he says to Ajax, on the other hand, no such thing, but tells him a quite different story.

Hip. Where ?

Soc. Where he says, (Il. ix. 646,)

For of the blood-stain'd war I'll take no thought,
Till god-like Hector, thoughtful Priam's son,
Shall reach of Myrmidons the tents and ships,
And, Argives slaying, set the fleet on fire.
But round my tent and dark ship Hector coming,
And eager for the fight, I guess, will stop.

¹⁷ Ficinus has "utpote qui mendacium non advertit," what the sense evidently requires. Stephens therefore proposed to insert $\mu\eta$ after $\omega\varsigma$, which both Sydenham and Beck have adopted.

¹⁸ The common reading was $\psi\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\omicron\nu \eta \omega\varsigma$, out of which as Ficinus could make nothing, he omitted the words $\psi\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\omicron\nu \eta$ —while Stephens thought there was something wanting here. Bekker has edited from the majority of MSS. $\psi\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\omicron\nu \pi\omega\varsigma$ —

[14.] Now do you imagine, Hippias, that the son of Thetis and the pupil of the most clever Chiron was so forgetful, as that, after previously abusing with the extreme of abuse those, who speak what they do not mean, he would immediately say to Ulysses that he would sail away, and then to Ajax, that he would remain, and this too without a fixed design, or holding Ulysses to be a simpleton,¹⁹ and that he should get the better of him by this very trickery and speaking falsely?

Hip. It does not, Socrates, seem so at least to me. But being dissuaded on these points by his own easy temper, he spoke to Ajax in a different manner to what he had done to Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks truth, speaks always with a fixed design, and so too, when he speaks a falsehood.

Soc. Ulysses then is a better man, it seems, than Achilles.

Hip. Surely, Socrates, the least of all.

Soc. Why, were not they, who speak false willingly, proved to be better²⁰ than those (who do so) unwillingly?

Hip. But how, Socrates, can they, who do an injury willingly, and plot against a person willingly, and do mischief, be better men than those, who do so unwillingly; to the latter of whom it seems that pardon is greatly due, should any one unconsciously do an injury, or tell a falsehood, or do any other wrong. And even the laws are surely more severe against those, who do evil and tell falsehoods wilfully, than against those, who act so unwillingly.

[15.] *Soc.* You see, Hippias, that I spoke the truth in saying how pressing I am in regard to putting questions to the clever. And yet I run the risk of possessing this solitary good, the rest that I possess being trifling. For in what manner things are, I am at fault; nor do I know where they are. And of this there is evidence sufficient for myself. For whenever I

¹⁹ The Greek ἀρχαῖος is used similarly in Euthyd. p. 295, C., and Aristoph. Plut. 323.

²⁰ This is another instance, similar to the one noticed by Aristotle, of an argument founded on the ambiguity of an expression. For the truth of the position contended for, has indeed been proved; but Plato applies it in this place to morals, of which it has not been proved, but the direct contrary insinuated. S. We may quote in illustration of the ambiguity of the word "good," the passage in Shakspeare's Merchant of Venice, where on *Shylock* saying that "Antonio is a good man," *Bassanio* asks, "Have you heard any imputation to the contrary?" to which the Jew replies, "No, no; my meaning, in saying that he is a good man, is to have you understand me that he is sufficient."

am in the company of any of you in high repute for your cleverness, and for whom all the Greeks are witnesses of your wisdom, I appear as one knowing nothing; for scarcely on a single point, so to speak, am I of the same opinion with you. And what greater proof can there be of a man's want of instruction, than when he differs from men of wisdom? Yet I have this one wonderful good, which is my preservation; for I am not ashamed to learn; but I make inquiries, and ask questions, and am very thankful to the person, who gives me an answer; nor do I ever deprive any one of the thanks (I owe). For I never deny that I have learnt a thing, by pretending that what I have learnt was a discovery of my own; but I pass encomium upon the person, who has taught me, as being a clever man, by showing forth what I learnt from him. And now I do not agree with what you assert, but differ very greatly. And this, I know well, takes place through myself; because I am such as I am, that I may not speak too highly of myself. To me, Hippias, every thing appears the contrary to what you say. They then who hurt (other) persons, and do an injury, and speak falsehoods, and deceive, and commit a fault willingly, (appear to me)²¹ to be better men than those, (who act so) unwillingly. Sometimes, however, I am of a contrary opinion; and my mind wanders on these points, evidently through my knowing nothing. But at present there has come around me, as it were, the periodical return of my disorder; and they, who commit an error willingly, seem to me to be better than those, who commit it unwillingly. And for this my present state of mind I blame the previous discussion as the cause; so that for the present it appears that they, who do each of these things unwillingly, are more wicked than those who do them willingly. Do then indulge me, nor grudge to heal the disorder of my mind. For you will do me a much greater good by causing my mind to cease from its ignorance, than my body from disease.²² If however you wish to speak a lengthened speech, I tell you beforehand, that you will effect no cure; for I cannot follow you.

²¹ Stalbaum says that *δοκούει* is to be supplied here from the preceding *δοκῶ*, referring very appositely to Apolog. p. 25, B.

²² So Macbeth, in Shakspeare, after inquiring of the Doctor, whether he cannot minister to a mind diseased, and hearing that therein the patient must minister to himself, rejoins, "Throw physic to the dogs; I'll none of it."

But if you are willing, as lately, to answer my questions, you will benefit greatly myself; nor do I think you will receive any harm. Justly then do I call upon you, son of Apēmantus; for you have urged me to converse with Hippias; and now if Hippias is unwilling to give an answer, do you intercede with him in my behalf.

Eud. There will be, I think, Socrates, no need for my intercession with Hippias. For nothing of such a kind has been previously stated by him; but rather that he never shrunk from the question of any man. Is it not so, Hippias? Was not this what you said?

Hip. I did say so, Eudicus. But Socrates is always making a confusion in the arguments; and he is like to a person who is doing wrong.

[16.] *Soc.* My very good Hippias, I do it not willingly—for I should then be a clever and terrible fellow according to your account—but unwillingly, so that do you pardon me; for pardon, you say, is due to him who does wrong unwillingly.

Eud. Nay, Hippias, do not act otherwise; but for the sake of me, and of your own words previously spoken, give an answer to whatever Socrates shall ask.

Hip. Well, at your entreaty, I will give an answer. Ask, then, what you like.

[16.] *Soc.* Truly, Hippias, I am very desirous to consider thoroughly what has been just now mentioned—Which are the better men, they, who err willingly or unwillingly. Now to this inquiry I think we shall arrive by the most direct road thus—and do you give an answer. Do you speak of a runner as being good?²²

Hip. I do.

Soc. And (of one as being) bad?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is not he, who runs well, good? and bad he, who runs badly?

Hip. Yes.

²² In the instances selected by Plato, the four first relate to the acts that depend upon the structure of the body, such as running, wrestling, dancing, and singing. To perform these exercises properly, there are requisite agility, strength, gracefulness, and a musical voice; all of which arise respectively from the elasticity of the fibres, the firmness in the fabric of the bones, the pliancy in the joints, and the expansion and contraction of the lungs and larynx. S.

Soc. Does not he, who runs slow, run badly? but well he, who (runs) quick?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. In a race then, and in running, swiftness is a good thing; slowness a bad thing.

Hip. What else should it be?

Soc. Which then is the better runner? he who willingly runs slow, or unwillingly?

Hip. He (who runs so) willingly.

Soc. Is not to run to do something?

Hip. It is to do (something).

Soc. And, if to do, is it not to perform some act?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. He then, who runs ill, performs in a race an act bad [and unseemly].²³

Hip. Yes, bad; for how not?

Soc. Now he who runs badly, runs, you say, slowly.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. The good runner then performs willingly this bad act, [and the unseemly]:²⁴ but the bad runner (does so) unwillingly.

Hip. It seems so.

Soc. In a race then, he who performs bad actions unwillingly, is worse than he (who does so) willingly.

Hip. Yes, in a race.

Soc. And how is it in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler? he who falls willingly, or unwillingly?

Hip. Probably he who falls willingly.

Soc. Now in wrestling, is it worse and more unseemly to fall, or to throw down?

Hip. To fall.

Soc. In wrestling then likewise, he who performs willingly bad and unseemly acts, is a better wrestler than he who (does so) unwillingly?

Hip. It is probable.

Soc. What then is the case in all the other uses of the body? Is not he, who is (stronger and)²⁵ better in his body; able to

^{23, 24} The words within brackets are shown by the answer of Hippias to be an interpolation; and the same observation applies, for the same reason, to *kai tò alexpōn*, just afterwards. They owe their origin to *alexion*, a little below.

²⁵ From the words of Ficinus, "Nonne qui corpore robustior atque

perform acts both strong or weak, and unseemly and beautiful? So that when one performs acts, which as regards the body are bad, he, who is better in body, performs them willingly, but he, who is worse, unwillingly?

Hip. It is probably so as regards at least the strength of the body.

Soc. And what as regards a good conformation of the body, Hippias? Does it not belong to the better body, to perform willingly gestures unseemly, and bad; but to the worse, (to do so) unwillingly? or how does it seem to you?

Hip. In this way.

Soc. A bad conformation then, when voluntary, is on the side of virtue; when involuntary, on that of vice.

Hip. So it seems.

Soc. And what say you as to the voice? Which do you say is the better? that which sings out of tune willingly, or unwillingly?

Hip. That which does so unwillingly.

Soc. And (you say) the more wretched voice is that, which (sings out of tune) unwillingly.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Would you choose to possess things²⁶ that are good or bad?

Hip. Those that are good.

Soc. Would you then choose to have your feet lame willingly, or unwillingly?

Hip. Willingly.

Soc. Is not lameness in the feet a depravity and a bad conformation?

aptior est," Heusde saw acutely that his MS. read, what the train of thought requires,—*οὐχ ὁ ἰσχυρότερος καὶ βελτίων τὸ σῶμα*—

²⁶ Plato's five next instances are taken from those parts of the body which are the immediate servants of the mind: 1. The outward instruments of motion, such as the feet, by which the will of the mind is executed; 2. The outward organs of sensation, through which the mind perceives outward things; 3. That immediate source of motion and sensation, the brain; to which Plato applies the metaphor of a rudder, that steers the body as the mind pleases; 4. Those inward instruments of motion and sensations, the nerves; which he compares to the strings of musical instruments, braced up or let down by the passions of the soul, and vibrating as they are touched by sensations from without or from within; and lastly, the organs of speech, signified by musical wind-instruments, through which the mind expresses what is passing within itself. S.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And is not indistinct vision a depravity in the eyes?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Which sort of eyes now would you choose to possess? and with which to live? Those, with which a person willingly sees indistinctly or squints, or unwillingly?

Hip. Those with which (he does so) willingly.

Soc. Of the things, then, which are your own, you deem those, that perform depraved actions willingly, better than those, that (do so) unwillingly.

Hip. In things of such kind I do.

Soc. One reasoning then embraces all such things, as the ears, and nose, and mouth, and all the senses, namely, that those, which perform what is bad unwillingly, ought not to be possessed, as being bad, but that those, which (do so) willingly, ought to be possessed, as being good.

Hip. So it seems to me.

Soc. What then as regards instruments, with which is it better to be familiar? those, with which a man performs badly willingly, or those, with which he (performs so) unwillingly. Is a rudder, for example, the better, with which a person shall unwillingly steer badly, or that, with which (he shall do so) willingly?

Hip. That, with which (he shall do so) willingly.

Soc. Is it not so with the bow and lyre, and hautboy, and the rest of instruments?

Hip. You say the truth.

[17.] *Soc.* What then,²⁷ is it better to have a horse of such a spirit as that one may unwillingly ride him badly, or (such as one may ride him so) willingly?

Hip. Such (as one may ride him so) willingly.

Soc. Such a spirit then is the better.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. With the better spirit of the horse a man would per-

²⁷ From the just frame of the body, Plato proceeds to describe the other parts of *ἐφύστα*, "a good natural disposition," which he holds to be the necessary foundation of virtue. He begins accordingly with the passions, which, in the Platonic system, were *ἐπιθυμία*, "desire," and *θυμὸς*, "anger." The first of these kinds is under the emblem of a horse, and the latter under that of a dog: for although both these animals are irrational, they are still manageable by and serviceable to man, when their powers and feelings are regulated by his reason. S.

form the mischievous acts belonging to such a spirit willingly, but unwillingly (the similar acts belonging to the worse).

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. And is it not so with respect to a dog? and all other animals?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. What then, as regards the talent of an archer? Is it better to possess that, which misses the mark willingly, or that, which (does so) unwillingly?

Hip. That, which (does so) willingly.

Soc. Such a talent then is the better for the archer's art?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And the talent then, which errs unwillingly, is worse than that, which (does so) willingly.

Hip. Yes, in the case of the archer's art.

Soc. And how is it in the medical art? Is not the talent, which causes willingly mischiefs to bodies more like the medical art?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Such a talent then, in such an art, is better than that, which is not ²⁸ [like the medical art].²⁸

Hip. It is better.

Soc. And how in the case of the talent devoted to playing on the harp and hautboy, and all the other things relating to arts and sciences? Is not that the better talent, which willingly performs what is bad and disgraceful and commits errors, while the worse (does so) unwillingly?

Hip. It appears so.

Soc. And moreover we should certainly choose to have the possession of slaves with such talents, as would commit faults willingly, rather than such (as would do so) unwillingly, as (the former) is better for these things.²⁹

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. What then, would we not desire to have our own soul the best possible?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Will it then not be better, if it did evil willingly, than if it did so unwillingly?

²⁸⁻²⁹ The words within brackets Schleiermacher was the first to reject as an interpolation. For he saw they were omitted in the version of Ficinus—"peritior est quam illa, quæ per ignorantiam peccat."

²⁹ Ficinus has—"ad hæc opera meliores," which would lead to εἰς τὰ ἔργα, i. e. "for their works."

Hip. It would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if they, who do an injury willingly, were better than those, who (do so) unwillingly.

Soc. And yet from what has been said it appears so.

Hip. But not so to myself at least.

[18.] *Soc.* To you, I thought, it had appeared so. Answer me then again—Is not honesty either a kind of power, or knowledge, or both? Is it not necessary that honesty should be one of these?

Hip. It is.

Soc. If honesty then be a kind of power in the mind, the more powerful the mind the more honest it is. For, my very good man, the mind of such a kind, has surely been shown to be the better.

Hip. It did so appear.

Soc. What then if it is knowledge? Is not the wiser mind the more honest, but the less instructed the more dishonest?

Hip. Yes.³⁰

Soc. What if it is both? Is not the mind, which possesses both knowledge and power, the more honest; but the more uninstructed (and powerless)³¹ the more dishonest? Is it not necessary for such to be the case?

Hip. So it appears.

Soc. Was not the mind of greater power and wisdom shown to be the better, and more able to perform both beautiful and disgraceful doings, relating to every kind of action?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. When therefore it performs the disgraceful, it does so willingly, through its power, and its knowledge. Now these, either both or either, appear to belong to honesty.

Hip. Probably.

Soc. Now, to do injustice is to do ill; but not to do injustice (is to do) well.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. The mind then which is the more powerful and better,

³⁰ This answer of Hippias, first restored by Heusde from the version of Ficinus, has been subsequently found in two MSS. from a correction.

³¹ To preserve the balance of the sentences, Sydenham proposed to insert *kai adunatēria* after *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία*, but Heusde, *kai dothenēria*—and while Stalbaum would read *ἡ δὲ μὴ* instead of *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία*, Beck considered the words *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία* as interpolated from what had gone before.

when it does injustice does it willingly; but the worse (does so) unwillingly.

Hip. So it seems.

Soc. Is not he, who possesses a good mind, a good man; and he (who possesses) a bad one, a bad man?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. It belongs then to the good man, to do injustice willingly, but to the bad man, unwillingly; since the good man possesses a good mind.

Hip. This moreover is so.

Soc. The man therefore who errs, and does things disgraceful and dishonest, willingly, if there be such a man, Hippias, can be no other than the good man.

Hip. I know not, Socrates, how to agree with you in this.

Soc. Nor I with myself, Hippias. It must however of necessity appear so to us at present, from the course of the reasoning. But, as I said before, upon these points, I wander up and down, nor do things ever appear to me in the same light. Now that myself or any other unskilled individual should be wandering thus, is not at all to be wondered at. But if you, the wise, wander also, this will be to us a dreadful thing indeed; since we shall never cease from our wanderings, not even by coming to you.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ION.

IN placing the *Ion* next to the *Hippias Minor* I have followed the example of Stalbaum, who doubtless perceived a marked similarity in the two dialogues. For while in the one the pretensions of Hippias are exposed, after he had made a display of his talents as a lecturer upon Homer, in the other the scarcely less clever Ion of Ephesus is similarly treated, previous to the exhibition he was about to make as a Rhapsodist at the approaching Panathenaic festival at Athens, after he had recently gained at Epidaurus the first prize of victory in a similar professional contest.

As regards the object of the dialogue, it may be briefly stated that it is intended to prove, that as a poet is born and not made, so is a poet's interpreter—for partly such was the Rhapsodist of old—and that all which art can do is to slightly improve the talents, given by what Plato calls "a divine allotment."

With respect to the conflicting opinions, promulgated by different scholars of Germany touching the matter, manner, and genuineness of the dialogue, Stalbaum refers to Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, Nitzsch, and Wiegand. Of these it seems that Schleiermacher considers it a kind of supplement to the *Phædrus*, and that only a portion of it was really written by Plato; while Ast rejects the whole as a spurious production—an opinion which not one of the other critics appears disposed to adopt. For as Xenophon testifies that Socrates considered the Rhapsodists to be the silliest of men, it was surely very natural for Plato to feel a desire to embody the ideas of his master in a dialogue; where, while every honour is paid

to Homer, none is given to those, who presumed in the case of the "tale divine of Troy," and its sequel the wanderings of Ulysses,

"To scent the lily, and to paint the rose."

As Stalbaum laments that it has not been his good fortune to obtain a sight of Sydenham's translation reprinted by Taylor, which Müller has praised so highly, and of the notes, which the same editor has frequently put into Latin, I have introduced in an abridged form some of the latter; and should have occasionally adopted a portion of the former, had it been as literal as is required by the nature of this work; and a similar observation is applicable to the translation by Shelley, published in his Posthumous Essays, Letters, Translations, &c. Lond. 1840. There is likewise a French translation of the *Ion* by L' Abbé Arnaud in *Mémoires de L' Académie des Inscriptions*, t. xxxix. p. 249—278, which Stalbaum says he never saw; and he therefore did not know that the French translator has proposed to supply what he considers to be a *lacuna* in § 4, by reading, Οὐκοῦν ἐπιῶδαν λάβη τις καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ὑπεννοῦν ἔλθην, ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκίψεως περὶ ἱκίνης τέχνης ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ἀπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν, in lieu of τῆς σκίψεως ἐστὶ περὶ ἀπασῶν—

ION.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND ION.

SOCRATES.

[1.] HAIL¹ to thee, Ion; from whence have you come to sojourn with us² for the present? Is it from your home at Ephesus?

Ion. By no means, Socrates, but from Epidaurus, from the feast of Æsculapius.³

Soc. Do the Epidaurians too⁴ ordain a contest of rhapsodists,⁵ in honour of the god?

Ion. They do; and other kinds of the muse's art likewise.

¹ In Greek χαίρειν was used both by persons meeting or leaving each other. The latter more commonly; but the former is found in Theocrit. Id. xiv. 1, quoted by Nitzsch.

² Stalbaum says that ἡμῖν is here, as elsewhere in Plato, a form of familiar address.

³ Æsculapius, the god of physic, was the tutelary deity of Epidaurus, now called "Epidavra."

⁴ This is said because the most celebrated contests of the Rhapsodists took place at Athens during the Panathenaic festival.

⁵ The rhapsodists were a kind of itinerant minstrels, similar to the Troubadours of the middle ages; who strung together and sung portions chiefly of the Homeric poems. They wore a particular dress of scarlet or purple—the latter to represent the colour of the sea, the former of blood—while they were chanting portions of the Odyssey and Iliad respectively; and when they had a contest, the victor gained a lamb as the prize; as we learn from Eustathius, l. A. According to Xenophon in M. S. iv. 2, Socrates said they knew Homer indeed accurately enough, but were in other respects great simpletons; and so after him does Maximus Tyr. in Dissertat. xxiii.

Soc. 'What then? did you contend?

Ion. I do not deny it.

Soc. And how did you contend?⁶

Ion. We carried off, Socrates, the first of the prizes.

Soc. You say well, come then, in order that we two may win at the Panathenæa.⁷

Ion. And this will be if a god is willing.

Soc. Often have I indeed, Ion, been envious of the art of you rhapsodists. For that both your body⁸ is decorated (so as) to be always becoming to your art, and to appear the most beautiful,⁹ and at the same time that it is necessary for you to be conversant with many other excellent poets, and especially Homer, the best and most divine of all, and to learn thoroughly his meaning, not his words merely, is indeed a thing to be envied. For a man would never be a (good)¹⁰ rhapsodist, unless he understood what was said by the poet; for a rhapsodist ought to be an interpreter to the audience of the meaning of the poet; but this it is impossible to do well, without knowing what the poet means. Now worthy is all this to be envied.

⁶—The Greek is *τί οὖν ἡγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν; καὶ πῶς τι ἡγωνίσω*. But one MS. has *τί οὖν ἡγωνίζων τέ τι ἡμῖν*. But as *ἡμῖν* is perfectly unintelligible, I have translated as if the Greek were *τί οὖν; ἡγωνίζου τι; Οὐ τι ἀναίνομαι*. *Καὶ πῶς σὺ γ' ἡγωνίσω*; Stalbaum too conceives there is some deep-seated disorder here, and proposes therefore to omit *τι ἡγωνίσω*: while Ficinus felt himself no less at a loss, as shown by his version. "*Soc.* Contende ergo nobiscum. *Ion.* Quamobrem tecum contendam? Primus, O Socrates, præmiis potiti sumus." Shelley has, "*Soc.* And in which did you contend? And what was the success of your efforts?"

⁷ This was an annual festival kept at Athens in honour of Athéné. In every fifth year it was celebrated with more than ordinary pomp; and was then called the Great Panathenæa, to distinguish it from those held in the intermediate periods, termed the Less. It was just previous to the greater festival, probably, that Ion came to Athens. For says Lycurgus in his speech against Leocrates, c. xxvi. p. 223, ed. Taylor, (= 209, R.) "Your ancestors conceived Homer to be so useful a poet as to make a law, that in every fifth year of the Panathenæa his poems alone should be recited by the rhapsodists:" and a similar account is given in the dialogue called Hipparchus, transcribed almost verbatim by Ælian in V. H. viii. 2. S.

⁸ After *κεκοσμησθαι* it is evident that *ὥστε* has dropt out.

⁹ In lieu of *καλλίστοις*, which is without regimen, one MS. has *καλλιστοῦ*, which leads directly to *κάλλιστον*—

¹⁰ Sydenham had inserted "good," confirmed subsequently by a MS. at Venice.

Ion. You say, Socrates, what is true. At least this very portion of my art has given me the greatest trouble. I fancy however I can speak most beautifully about Homer, so that neither Metrodorus¹¹ of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus¹² of Thasus, nor Glaucō,¹³ nor any one else, of those who have ever existed, had it in their power to express so many and such beautiful sentiments as I can do, relating to Homer.

Soc. You speak beautifully, Ion. For it is evident that you will not grudge me an exhibition (of your talent).

Ion. Indeed, Socrates, it is well worth your hearing how well I have set off Homer; so that, I conceive, I am worthy to be crowned by the Homeridæ¹⁴ with a golden crown.

[2.] *Soc.* I will make for myself still a leisure time to hear you. But for the present, answer me thus much. Are you skilled on the subject of Homer alone, or of Hesiod and Archilochus likewise?

Ion. By no means; on the subject of Homer alone. This seems to be enough for me.

Soc. But there is that, about which Homer and Hesiod say the same things.

Ion. There are, I think, many such.

Soc. Respecting these, can you better explain what Homer says than what Hesiod does?

¹¹ We are told by Diogenes Laert. ii. 3, that Metrodorus wrote a treatise on the physiology of Homer, where, as it would seem from Tatian in *Δόγ. πρὸς Ἑλλήν.* he explained Homer's theology from the various operations and phenomena of nature: and thus gave a rational account of the poet's mythology, in lieu of the literal sense, in which it was received by the vulgar. S.

¹² Stesimbrotus is mentioned with honour by Socrates himself in Xenophon's Symposium, as a master in explaining Homer; and his abilities are contrasted with the ignorance of the rhapsodists. According to Plutarch, he was exactly of the same age with Cimon. S.

¹³ Although a Glaucō of Tarsus is mentioned by an old Greek scholiast upon Homer in the Medicean library, quoted by Holsten. de Vita et Scriptis Porphyrii, c. vii., yet, as he seems to have been a grammarian of a much later age, we are inclined to read Γλαῦκος. For Glaucos of Rhegium flourished about this time, and wrote a treatise *Περὶ Ποιητῶν*, as we are informed by Plutarch, t. ii. p. 833, C., or *Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν τε καὶ μουσικῶν*, as stated in t. ii. 1132, E. So Sydenham. Nitzsch however refers to Aristotle Poet. § 25, where mention is made of one Glaucōn.

¹⁴ By the Homeridæ are meant here, as in Phædr. p. 252, B., and Rep. x. p. 599, F., quoted by Müller, the admirers of Homer, as Sydenham had translated.

Ion. Equally, Socrates, respecting those, where they say the same.

Soc. But how, where they do not say the same? For instance, Homer and Hesiod say something about the prophetic art.

Ion. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, whatever those two poets say about the prophetic art, either agreeing or disagreeing, could you explain better, or one of the clever prophets?

Ion. One of the prophets.

Soc. But if you were a prophet, would you not know, if you were able to give an explanation where they agree, to explain likewise where they disagree?

Ion. - It is evident I should.

Soc. How then are you skilled as regards Homer, but not as regards Hesiod, or any other of the poets? Does Homer speak of other things than what other poets have, taken all together? Has he not gone through the greater part of subjects relating to war, and to the intercourse with each other of men, good and bad, and unskilful and practised in arts, and relating to the gods, as having an intercourse, such as they have, with one another and with human beings; and to such as relate to celestial events and those in Hades, and the birth of gods and heroes. Are not these the subjects, relating to which Homer has composed his poetry?

Ion. You say, Socrates, what is true.

Soc. Well then, and do not the rest of the poets (write) about these very things?

Ion. They do, Socrates; but they have not composed their poetry as Homer has his.

Soc. What then, in a worse way?

Ion. Very much so.

Soc. But Homer in a better?

Ion. Better indeed, by Zeus.

[3.] *Soc.* Now, thou dear head,¹⁵ Ion, when many persons are speaking about numbers, and one of them speaks the best, assuredly some person will know who speaks correctly.

Ion. I admit it.

¹⁵ On this Platonic formula, imitated from the Homeric *Τεῦκρε, φῶλη κεφάλη*, Stalbaum refers to Phædr. p. 264, B., Gorg. p. 513, C., and Euthyd. p. 293, E.

Soc. Will it be the same as he, who (knows) likewise those speaking incorrectly, or some one else?

Ion. The same person, certainly.

Soc. And is it not he, who knows the science of arithmetic?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. What then, when many persons are speaking about wholesome food, of what kinds they are, and one speaks the best, will one person know that he, who speaks the best, does speak the best, and another (know) that he, (who speaks) worse, (does speak) worse, or will the same person (know both)?

Ion. The same person, clearly.

Soc. Who is he? What is his name?

Ion. Physician.

Soc. Let us say then universally, that, when many are speaking upon the same subject, the same person will always know who speaks correctly and who incorrectly. For¹⁶ if a person shall not know the party speaking incorrectly, it is evident that he will not (know) the party speaking correctly, at least upon the same subject.

Ion. Just so.

Soc. The same person then will be skilled respecting both.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Did not you say that Homer, and the rest of the poets, amongst whom there are both Hesiod and Archilochus, write about the same things, though not in the same manner? but that the one does so well, the others worse?

Ion. And I said what is true.

Soc. If then you know the party who speaks well, you will know those likewise, who speak worse, that they do speak worse?

Ion. It is probable.

Soc. In saying then, thou best of men, that Ion is clever on the subject of Homer and all the other poets, we shall not err; since he acknowledges himself that the same person is a competent judge of all such as speak upon the same subjects, and that nearly all poets take the same subjects for their poetry.

¹⁶ So Sydenham, as if he wished to read *kai γὰρ* in lieu of *ἤ*—Ficinus has "et—"

Ion. What can be then the reason, Socrates, that whenever any one is discoursing upon any other poet, I pay no attention, and am unable to contribute any thing whatever (to the discussion) worth mentioning, and really begin to nod; but when any one brings Homer to my recollection, I am immediately awake, and give my mind to the subject, and am at no loss what to say.

Soc. It is not difficult, my friend, to guess the reason of this. For it is clear to every one that you are unable to speak¹⁷ about Homer by art or science. For if you were able by art, you would be able to speak about all the other poets; for the whole is surely poetry. Or is it not?

Ion. It is.

[4.] *Soc.* When a man shall have laid hold of any other art whatever as a whole,¹⁷ is there not the same method of viewing it (as) all the arts? Why I say this, do you, *Ion*, request to hear from me?

Ion. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I do; for I delight to hear you wise men.

Soc. I would wish, *Ion*, that you were saying what is true; but you surely are the wise men, you the rhapsodists and performers,¹⁸ and those whose poems you recite; whereas I speak nothing but the simple truth,¹⁹ as becomes a mere unskilled person. Since the question, which I just now asked you, see

¹⁷ After *ἄλλῃν*, Ficinus seems to have found something supplied in his MS., wanting in all the rest, to answer to his version—"æque de omnibus, quæ sub arte sunt, judicat." Sydenham, however, conceived they were inserted by Ficinus himself, to preserve the justness of the reasoning, and he therefore proposed to read *περὶ πάντων τῶν τεχνούμενων*. For the question is not about arts, but artists. Shelley's version is, "The same mode of consideration must be admitted with respect to all arts, which are severally one and entire," omitting the clause at the commencement.

¹⁸ Plato here, and in *Rep.* ii. p. 373, B., and iii. p. 295, A., joins the rhapsodists with performers, as cognate artists. For according to Eustathius, p. 5, 18, Bas., the rhapsodists used frequently to recite in a somewhat dramatic manner. Hence in the Dionysia, or dramatic entertainments, the rhapsodists had anciently a share; and one of the festival days was called *ἑορτὴ τῶν ῥαψωδῶν*, as we learn from Athenæus, v. p. 275. Hesychius therefore well explains *ῥαψωδοὶ*, "rhapsodists," by *ὑποκριταὶ ἐπῶν*, "actors of epic poems." S.

¹⁹ Stalbaum says, that in lieu of *τὰ ἀληθῆ*, one would have expected a word in Greek to answer to the Latin "vulgaria," and "omnibus nota." Perhaps he would have preferred *τὰ ἐνύθη*, similar to *εὐθηεις λέγει, ὁ τοῦτο λέγων*, in Phædon, p. 87, C.

how trifling it is, and suited to an unskilled person, and for every man to know, namely, that, which I spoke of as presenting the same view, when a person lays hold of the whole of any art. ²⁰ Let us then lay hold in our discourse of painting; for ²⁰ it is an art (whole in itself), is it not?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Are there not, and have been, many painters good and bad?

Ion. Very many.

Soc. Now then, did you ever see any person who, as regards Polygnotus, ²¹ the son of Aglaophon, is skilled in showing what he paints well and what ill, but is unable to do so as regards other painters? and whenever any exhibits the works of those other painters, grows drowsy, and is at a loss, and has not what to contribute to (the conversation); but when it is necessary to declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any other painter you please, immediately wakes up and gives all attention, and is at no loss what to say?

Ion. Not at all, by Zeus.

Soc. Well then, in the statuary's art, did you ever see any one who, as regards Dædalus, ²² the son of Metion, or Epeius, the son to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other single statuary, was skilled in explaining what each had executed well, but as regards the other statuaries, was at a loss, grew drowsy, as having nothing to say?

Ion. No, by Zeus, I never knew such a person as this.

Soc. Nor, as I think, in the case of playing on the hautboy

^{20—20} I have adopted Stalbaum's version of λάβωμον γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ, words that had given no little trouble to previous translators and editors, and which Shelley entirely omits. To complete, however, the sense, it was requisite to suppose that the author wrote δὲ—γραφικὴν ἢ γὰρ, not γὰρ—γραφικὴ γὰρ—

²¹ This artist was, in the days of Socrates, called the Homer of painters. He was the first to express the manners and passions by attitudes, and a change of countenance, and to give a flattering likeness; and, amongst other improvements, invented the method of showing the skin through transparent drapery. See Aristotle, Polit. viii. 5, and Poet. ii. and vi., Pliny's Nat. Hist. xxxv. 9, and Ælian's Var. Hist. iv. 3. S.

²² Plato has purposely chosen three statuaries, famous in three different styles of art, when he is proving the sameness of the principle in passing judgment upon different poets. For Dædalus was celebrated for his self-moving statues, mentioned in the Meno, p. 97, D. § 39; Epeius, for the Trojan horse of a stupendous size; and Theodorus, for the minuteness of his works. See Pliny's Nat. Hist. xxxiv. 8. S.

or harp, and in singing to the harp, and in the recitations of the rhapsodists, you never saw a man who, as regards Olympus,²³ or Thamyris, or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsodist of Ithaca,²³ is a skilful interpreter, but as regards Ion the Ephesian, is at a loss and unable to give an opinion whether Ion does well or not as a rhapsodist.

Ion. I have nothing to say against you upon that point, Socrates, but of this I am conscious to myself, that as regards Homer I speak the best of all men, and am least at a loss, and every body else says that I do speak well, but not, as regards the rest. Consider then why is this.

[5.] *Soc.* I do consider, Ion, and I commence showing you how this seems to me. This faculty of speaking well about Homer is not an art, as I said just now, but a divine power, which moves you, like that in the stone, which Euripides²⁴ calls the Magnesian, but the common people Heracleian. For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but imparts a power to the rings, so that they are able to do the very same things as the stone does, and to attract other rings, and sometimes a very long series of iron rings,²⁵ hung (as in a chain),²⁶ one

²³⁻²³ These four persons severally excelled in the four arts just before mentioned. According to Plutarch and Maximus Tyr. Diss. xxiv., Olympus played on the αὐλός, Thamyris on the κιθάρα, as stated by Hom. Il. ii. 600, but without the accompaniment of his voice, as we learn from Pliny; Orpheus was κιθαρωδός, playing and singing together; while Phemius recited poems of the epic kind, touching his lyre at the same time, as appears from Hom. Od. i. 153. S.

²⁴ The passage of Euripides has been preserved by Photius and Suidas in Ἡρακλείαν λίθον, both of whom probably derived their information from the lost Scholia on this passage. It is a fragment of the Cœneus—*τὰς βροτῶν γνώμας σκοπῶν—ὥστε Μαγνήτις λίθος τὴν δόξαν ἔλκει καὶ μάλιστα πάλιν*—where Sydenham would supply ὅδ' before ὥστε, but Stalbaum δέ—According to Aristotle Περὶ Ψυχῆς i. 2, Thales was the first to apply the attractive property of the magnet in the way of a philosophical illustration; while a poetical account of the manner, in which five rings hang together, is given by Lucretius, vi. 910, who, says Gesner on the "Magnes" of Claudian, merely followed Plato.

²⁵ Sydenham has thus adopted "ferreorum annulorum" in Serranus' version. For neither of them could understand *σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων*. Nor could Shelley, who has, "a long chain of rings and other iron substances." But the whole question is about iron rings alone.

²⁶ Sydenham seems to have added this, with the view of showing that the iron rings were not united in the inside, as rings generally are, but merely touched each other on the outside, as appears partly from Lucretius—"Unus (annulus) ubi ex uno dependet subter adhærens;" but

from another; but from that stone depends the power in all of them. Thus too does the Muse herself move men divinely inspired, and through them thus inspired, a chain hangs together of others inspired divinely likewise. For all the good epic poets compose all their beautiful poems, not by art,²⁷ but by being divinely inspired and possessed (by the Muse); and so too the good lyric poets, just as the Corybantes²⁸ dance, not being in their sound senses,²⁹ compose their beautiful lyrical poems, when they are not in their sound senses; but when they go on according to the harmony and rhythm, they become mad, possessed (by a god), as are the priestesses of Bacchus, (who,) possessed by a god, draw from rivers honey and milk;³⁰ but are unable to do so, when in their senses; and the soul of the lyric poets does that, which they say they do. For assuredly they say to us,³¹ that (drawing) from fountains flowing with honey, and gather-

more fully from S. Augustine De Civit. Dei xx. 4, quoted by Kirchmann De Annulis, C. 15, p. 97, as remarked by Müller. The words of the Latin father are too remarkable to be omitted here. "Magnetem lapidem novimus mirabilem ferri esse raptorem. Quod cum primum vidi, vehementer inhorruui. Quippe cernebam a lapide ferreum anulum raptum atque suspensum; deinde cum tamquam ferro, quod rapuerat, vim dedisset suam communemque fecisset, idem annulus admotus est alteri, eumque suspendit atque, ut ille prior lapidi, sic alter annulus priori annulo cohærebat. Accessit eodem modo tertius; accessit et quartus. Jamque sibi per mutua connexis circulis non implicatorum intrinsecus sed extrinsecus adhærentium quasi catena pependerat annulorum."

²⁷ Plato however, in the Phædrus, does not exclude art entirely, but considers it only as the handmaid of inspiration. S.

²⁸ On the followers of Demeter, called Corybantes, and their doings, see the authors quoted by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 163, and the commentators on Crito, § 17.

²⁹ After ὀρχοῦνται follow αὐτῶ καὶ οἱ μελοποιοί, words evidently interpolated.

³⁰ According to Euripides the honey and milk were obtained from the ground and trees, not from streams. But Sydenham aptly refers to Aristides, T. ii. p. 20, Jebb, who quotes a passage from Æschines, a disciple of Socrates, so as to lead to the belief that this dialogue was written by that philosopher. The words are, "The Bacchantes, when they become inspired, draw honey and milk from wells, out of which the rest of persons are not even able to draw water."

³¹—³¹ The Greek is ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρῦτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν, ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται. Ficinus has more fully, "a fontibus, quibus mel scaturit, haurientes, et a Musarum viridariis collibusque decerpentes carmina, ad nos transferunt, quemadmodum mel ex floribus apes," as if he had found in his MS., ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρῦτων ἀρυτόμενοι καὶ ἐκ—δρεπόμενοι ἀνθη, τὰ μελη—

ing (flowers) from the gardens and glades of the Muses, they bring us their songs, as bees do (their honey),³¹ and are ever³² too on the wing. And they tell us too what is true. For a poet is a thing light,³³ and with wings, and sacred,³⁴ and unable to compose poetry until he becomes inspired,³⁵ and is out of his sober senses, and his imagination is no longer under his control. For so long as a person is in complete possession of it, he is unable to compose verses or to speak oracularly. Hence as they compose not by art,³⁶ they say many beautiful things relating to their subjects, as you do about Homer; but each is able to compose that alone through a divine allotment, to which the Muse has impelled them, one to dithyrambs,³⁷ another to panegyrics,³⁸ another to hyporchemata,³⁹ another to epic verse, and another to iambic; but in the other kinds each makes no figure; for they do not compose by art, but through a divine power; since if they knew how to speak by art upon one subject correctly, they would (be able to do so) upon all others. And on this account a deity has deprived them of their senses, and employs them as his ministers, and oracle-singers, and divine prophets, in order that when we

ὥσπερ μέλι αἱ μέλιτται, and so I have translated. Sydenham was the first to see that μέλι had dropt out here, quoting very opportunely from Horace—"Ego, apud Matinæ More modoque, Grata carpentis thyma per laborem Plurimum, circa nemus uvidique Tiburis ripas operosa parvus Carmina fingo." With regard to the comparison between flowers and songs, it is sufficient to refer to Valckenaer on Eurip. Hippol. 73.

³¹ Instead of οὕτω the author wrote, I suspect, αἰ ποτε—

³² On the use of χρῆμα the commentators refer to Aristoph. Lys. 678, Theocrit. Id. xv. 83, and Valckenaer on Phæn. 206.

³⁴ Why bees were considered sacred is shown by Virgil in G. iv. 150; while poets were held so, as being under the protection of Apollo.

³⁵ Cicero de Oratore ii. 46, Sæpe audiui poetam bonum neminem, id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt, sine inflammatione animorum existere posse."

³⁶ A similar doctrine is promulgated, in Apolog. p. 22, C. where poets are mentioned as here with oracle-singers. For it seems that at different oracular shrines poets were kept to put the answers of the prophetic deity into verse, as we learn from Strabo, p. 642, A.

³⁷ The author probably alludes to the lost dithyrambs of Pindar.

³⁸ Of the nature of the panegyrics a faint idea may be formed from the lifeless hymns of Callimachus, whom Ovid has so happily described by his "Quamvis ingenio non valet, arte valet."

³⁹ The hyporchemata were poems composed to accompany a dance unconnected with the drama. The great writer of them was Pratinas, a fragment of whose poetry has been preserved by Athenæus, xv. p. 617.

hear them, we may know it is not they to whom sense is not present, who speak what is valuable, but the god himself who speaks, and through them addresses us.⁴⁰ And of this assertion Tynnichus⁴¹ the Chalcidian affords the greatest proof; who never composed any other poem, which any one would think worth remembering, but the Pæan, which every body sings, of almost all hymns the most excellent, and as he himself states,

"An invention of artless Muses."⁴²

For in him most especially does the god seem to me to point out to us, that we are not to doubt about those beautiful poems being not human but divine, and the work not of men but of gods; and that poets are nothing else but interpreters of the gods,⁴³ possessed by whatever deity they may happen to be. And in pointing out this, the deity has through a poet the most indifferent sung a melody the most beautiful. Or do I not seem to you, Ion, to say what is true?

Ion. To me at least you do. For you somehow, Socrates, touch my very soul by your arguments; and the good poets seem to me, by a divine allotment, to be in this way to us the interpreters of the gods.

[6.] *Soc.* Now do not you rhapsodists interpret, on the other hand, the writings of the poets?

Ion. And this too you truly assert.

Soc. Do you not then become the interpreters of interpreters?

Ion. By all means.

Soc. Mind now, Ion, and tell me this; and do not conceal

⁴⁰ So Cicero de Divinat. i., "Deus inclusus corpore humano jam, non Cassandra, loquitur." S.

⁴¹ Of this Tynnichus no mention has been found except in a fragment of Ptolomæus Hephæstion, preserved by Photius in Biblioth. p. 485, and in an anecdote related by Porphyry. Περὶ Ἀποχῆς i. 18, where Æschylus is reported as bearing testimony to his excellence as an old writer of Pæans, a kind of hymn in honour of Apollo. MUELLER.

⁴² The Greek is ἀρίχως εὐρημά τι μουσῶν. But it is evident, that Plato, in citing this verse, means by ἀρίχως, "artlessly," or, as Cornarius renders it in Latin, "sine arte:" so Sydenham; who should have suggested ἀρίχων, as I have translated. The verse is an Anapæstic Paræmiac. Stalbaum refers to Fritzche in Quæst. Lucian. p. 128, where passages are quoted not in point.

⁴³ So Orpheus is called "sacer, interpresque deorum," by Horace, Art. Poet. 391. S.

whatever I shall ask about. Whenever you are spouting well any verses, and astonishing your audience the most, or when you are reciting how Ulysses,⁴⁴ leaping on the threshold (of his house), appeared manifest to the suitors, and poured out his arrows before their feet; or how Achilles rushed against Hector; or tell any of the tales of pity relating to Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam; at such times are you quite in your senses, or beside yourself?⁴⁵ and does not your soul fancy itself carried away in a state of ecstasy by the deeds you are telling, whether they occur at Ithaca or Troy, ⁴⁶or how-ever else the verses may be.⁴⁶

Ion. How clear a proof have you, Socrates, produced! For so I will say, concealing nothing. For when I am reciting any tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears; ⁴⁷but when any thing of horror, my hairs stand erect through fear, and my heart leaps.⁴⁷

Soc. What shall we say then, Ion? that the man is in his sound senses, when, decked in a many-tissued garb, and with a crown of gold, he bursts into tears at festivals and feasts, without having lost any of those (ornaments)? or feels a fear when he is standing in the midst of twenty thousand men, all friendly to him, and no one is stripping him or doing him an injury?

Ion. He is not, by Zeus, to confess the truth, Socrates.

[7.] *Soc.* Know you that you (rhapsodists) produce this very same effect upon the majority of your spectators.

Ion. I know it very well. For I am constantly looking down from my standing-place above upon those, who are weeping, or looking fiercely,⁴⁸ or astonished, in unison with

⁴⁴ The passages alluded to are Od. xxii. 2; Il. xxii. 311, and 405, and 437..

⁴⁵ So Cicero says of Æsop the actor, in *Divinat.* i. 37, "Vidi—in Æsopo tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut eum vis quædam abstraxisse a sensu mentis videretur." S.

^{46—48} The Greek is ἡ ὁρὴς ἀν καὶ τὰ ἔπη ἔχῃ. But Ficinus has "seu quocunque alio carmina rapiant te," translated by Shelley, "or wherever else the poem transports you." Ficinus, no doubt, found in his MS. ἡ ὁρὴς ὅ' ἀν τὰ ἔπη ἄχῃ.

^{47—48} Stalbaum quotes *Sympos.* p. 215, E. § 39, ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἰσχυραί, and refers to Abresch on *Aristænet.* ii. 5, Boissonad. on *Eunap.* p. 257, and Jacobs on *Achill. Tat.* p. 833.

⁴⁸ This is the literal meaning of δεινόν. But why the audience 'ld look so, I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, Sydenham, or

what is narrated. For indeed I must pay a great attention to them, in order that, if I set them weeping, I may laugh on receiving their money; but if laughing, that I may weep myself on losing their cash.

Soc. Know you not, then, that this spectator (of yours)⁴⁹ is the last of the rings, which, I said, receive their power from one another by means of the Heracleian stone? The middle ring are you the rhapsodist and the actor; but the first ring is the poet himself. By means of all these does the god draw, wherever it pleases him, the souls of men,⁵⁰ having suspended from each other the power.⁵⁰ And, as if from that stone, there is suspended a very numerous series of chorus-singers and dancers, and under-masters,⁵¹ hang the rings depending from the Muse, hanging sideways.⁵² But from one Muse one of the poets hangs; another from another.⁵³ And this we call by the expression "he is possessed;" for the (meaning) is very similar; since he is held fast.⁵³ From these first rings some

Shelley, who have translated respectively—"graviter," and, "as if horror seized them," and, "with eyes fixed earnestly on me."

⁴⁹ So Sydenham, as if he wished to read *ὁ σὸς* instead of *οὗτος*.

⁵⁰⁻⁵¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *ἀνακρεμαννὸς ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν*. The sense requires, "having imparted the power of hanging from each other."

⁵¹ The hindmost rows of the chorus sang an under part, and had peculiar masters of their own to teach it them, called under-masters. S. Ficinus has "discipuli." But *ὑποδιδάσκαλος* is a word acknowledged by J. Pollux, iv. 106.

⁵² Why the rings should be said to hang sideways, I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. some words properly transposed; for his version is, "series longa dependet, qua e latere gradatim nectuntur hi, qui in choro saltant, et præceptores atque discipuli; hujusque catenæ a Musa annuli suspenduntur." But there too "a latere" is equally unintelligible.

⁵³⁻⁵³ "The Greek is *ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται· τὸ δὲ ἴσθι παραπλήσιον ἔχεται γάρ*: which is itself unintelligible, and is thus unintelligibly rendered by Ficinus; "Vocamus autem id nos occupari, (altered by Gryneus into 'mente capi,') quod quidem ille proximum est: teneatur enim:" and by Cornarius thus; "Hoc vero 'corripitur' nominamus, quod consimile est: hæret enim"—whom Bembo follows, omitting however *ἔχεται γάρ*. The passage will become quite clear by reading *ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἴσθι, παραπλήσιον ἔχεται*: or, what is preferable, by reading *ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται· τὸ δὲ ἴσθι, παραπλήσιον ἔχεται· ἔχεται γάρ*. The omission of a word, where it is thus repeated, is a common fault in manuscripts. So Sydenham; whom Müller felt half disposed to follow. Stalbaum thus translates the passage (in English)—"We call this *κατέχεται*, which comes near to that, which we said,

of the poets hang, some from one, and others from others, and become inspired by them; some, for instance, Orpheus, others by Musæus; but the majority⁵⁴ are inspired by Homer, and held fast by him.⁵⁴ Of this number, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer. Hence when any one sings the verses of any other poet, you fall asleep, and are at a loss what to say: but when any one recites a strain of that poet, you wake up immediately, and your soul dances (with joy),⁵⁵ and you are at no loss what to say; for you say, what you say, about Homer, not from art or science, but from a divine allotment, and through being possessed. (For)⁵⁶ the Corybantes have an acute perception of such music only, as belongs to the god by whom they are possessed, and are not wanting either in gestures or words, adapted to that melody; but care not for any other music. So you, Ion, when any one makes mention of Homer, are not at a loss, but are at a loss (when mention is made) of other poets. And this is the reason of that, about which you were asking, why as regards Homer you are not at a loss, but are so as regards other poets; because you are not by art, but by a divine allotment, a skilful panegyrist of Homer.

Ion. You say well, Socrates. I should, however, wonder if you can speak so well as to convince me that I panegyryze Homer through being possessed and mad. Nor, as I fancy, should I appear so to you, if you were to hear me speaking about Homer.

[8.] *Soc.* And willing I am indeed to hear you; but not before you shall have answered me this. On which of the subjects about which Homer speaks, do you speak well? For surely it is not about all.

Ion. Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing but what (I speak well about).

Soc. Surely you do not (speak) about those, of which you happen to know nothing, but which Homer mentions.

Ion. And what are those, which Homer mentions, but which I do not know?

that he was suspended from a god, for he is held by him, if he *καίχεται*—and wonders that Sydenham and Müller should have laboured so hard in explaining the passage.

⁵⁴—⁵⁴ From this passage it is evident why *καίχεται* and *ἔχεται* are said just before to be very similar in meaning.

⁵⁵ In *Æsch. Cho.* 156, the expression is *ὀρχεῖται φόβῳ*.

⁵⁶ Ficinus has “et—” but *γὰρ* has probably dropt out after *ὥστερ*—

Soc. Does not Homer speak much and often of 'arts; for instance, the art of chariot-driving? If I can remember the verses, I will repeat them to you.

Ion. I will recite them; for I remember them.

Soc. Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, when advising him to be careful respecting the turning in the chariot-race, run in honour of Patroclus.

Ion. His words are these (in *Il.* xxiii. 335—340):

Thyself upon the polish'd chariot bend
To the left gently; but the right-hand horse
With goad and voice urge on, and somewhat yield,
Holding the reins; but let the left-hand steed
Come near the turn-post grazing, which almost
Of wheel well-made, let the nut seem to doubt
If it reach not; but stone to touch avoid.

Soc. It is enough. Now whether Homer does or does not, Ion, correctly express himself in these words, who would know the better, a physician or a charioteer?

Ion. A charioteer, undoubtedly.

Soc. Whether because he possesses that art, or for some other reason?

Ion. For no other than that (he possesses) the art.

Soc. Has not to each of the arts this been granted by the deity, to be able to know a work? for what we know by the pilot's art, we shall not know by the physician's.

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor what (we know) by the physician's art, (shall we know) by the builder's art.

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. Is it not thus then as regards all the arts, that what we know by one art, we shall not know by another? But answer me this previous to that. Do not you admit that there is one art of one kind, and another art of another kind?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Do not you make use of the same proof as I do, that when there is a science, one of some things, and another of other things, I call one by one name, and the other by another; and do not you (call them) so?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. For surely ⁵⁷if of the same things there were some science, ⁵⁷why should we call one by one name, and another

^{57—57} This I cannot understand.

by another, when it would be possible to know the same things from both? as, for instance, I know that these fingers are five in number; and you know it, respecting them, the same as I do. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the same art of arithmetic that both you and I know the same things, or by another art, you would surely say, by the same art.

Ion. Yes.

[9.] *Soc.* The question then, which I was lately about to ask you, answer me now. Whether does it seem so to you, as regards all the arts, in this way, that it is necessary for the same art to know the things; and for a different art (to know) not the same things? but whether, if (the art) be different, it is necessary for it to know different things?

Ion. It seems to me, Socrates, in this way.

Soc. He therefore, who has not any art, will not be able to know what is said or done well, relating to that art.

Ion. You speak the truth.

Soc. As regards the verses, then, which you repeated, will you, or a charioteer, better know whether Homer says well or not?

Ion. A charioteer.

Soc. For you are a rhapsodist, but not a charioteer.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Now the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a charioteer.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. If the science be different, it is conversant likewise about different things.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Well then, when Homer relates how Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, gave to Machaon, when he was wounded, a potion to drink,⁵⁸ he says, composed

⁵⁸ Of Pramnian wine; and into it she grates,
With brazen grater, cheese from goat's milk made,
And for the potion onion as a relish;⁵⁹

to know thoroughly and well whether Homer says this cor-

⁵⁸ After *πίνειν δίδωσι* the words *καὶ λέγει πρὸς οὗτως*, which could not be inserted between *δραν λέγει* and *φησιν*, Ficinus has properly omitted.

⁵⁹—⁶⁰ In this quotation from Homer the author has brought together some verses separated from each other by an interval of nine lines. See Il. xi. 630 and 639. To the same passage Plato refers in Rep. iii. p. 406, A.

rectly or not, does it belong to the physician's, or the rhapsodist's art?

Ion. To the physician's.

Soc. Well then, where Homer (in *Il.* xxiv. 80) says,

She to the bottom went, just like the lead,
Which near the horn of bull, in meadows living,
(Is placed upon the line,) and rushes eager,
To fish, on raw flesh feeding, bringing fate—⁶⁰

shall we say that it belongs to the fisher's rather than to the rhapsodist's art, to decide on what he says, and whether correctly or not?

Ion. It is evident, Socrates, to the fisher's art.

[10.] *Soc.* Consider now, ⁶¹ you asking, if you asked me, ⁶¹ Since then, Socrates, you discover what it is fitting for each of these arts to decide upon in Homer, come, find me out, what as relating to the business of a prophet and the prophet's art, are the things which it is fitting for him to be able to know thoroughly, whether the poet has done well or ill—consider how easily and truly I could reply. For Homer, in the *Odyssey*, speaks frequently on the subject. For instance, where Theoclymenus the prophet, one of the race of Melampus, ⁶² says to the suitors—

⁶⁰ Why by doom fated suffer ye this ill?
Involved in the gloom of night are faces, heads,
And nether limbs; and ⁶³ burns the loud lament ⁶³
Fiercely, and cheeks with many tears are wet.
Of ghosts the porch is full, and full the hall,
To Erebus in darkness rushing; and the sun
From heaven is lost, and luckless mists come on. ⁶⁴

⁶⁰ I have adopted *κῆρα*, found in Homer, in lieu of its interpretation *πῆμα*, read here in all the MSS. but one. On the other hand, *ἐμμεσανία* here is far more elegant than *ἐμβεβανία*, read in the common text; which has arisen merely from the perpetual confusion of *α* (*β*) and *μ*.

^{61—61} Such is the literal version of the Greek—*σοῦ ἱπομῖνον, εἰ ἔποιό με*, where *εἰ ἔποιό* is evidently the interpretation of *σοῦ ἱπομῖνον*. Ficinus has—"Si præterea me interrogares," as if his MS. omitted *σοῦ ἱπομῖνον*.

⁶² See *Od.* xv. 225.

^{63—63} On the mixed metaphor in *οἰμωγῇ δίδῃ* see my note on *Æsch.* *Prom.* And to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more. The most apposite is "clamore incendunt cælum" in *Virgil*.

^{64—64} See *Od.* xx. 351—357, where however between the 4th and 5th verse is another, omitted here—"And walls and handsome rooms be-smear'd with blood."

And often too in the *Iliad*, for example in the fight near the mound-wall (of the Greeks). For there too he says (*Il. xii. 200—207*):

To them, while eager to pass on, an eagle,
High-flying bird, appear'd upon the left,
And the army check'd. For in its claws it bore
A snake, of size enormous, with blood stain'd,
Alive, and gasping, but of fight not yet
Regardless. For on twisting round, it bit
The breast of the bird, that held it, near the neck;
Who, smarting with the pain, let go its hold,
And sent it to the ground; and midst the throng
It fell; and the bird with the wind screaming flew.⁶⁵

These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it belongs to the prophet to consider, and to judge of?

Ion. Yes, if you say what is true, Socrates.

Soc. And you too, *Ion*, speak the truth, in this. Come then, and, as I have selected for you from the *Odyssey*, and the *Iliad*, such passages as belong to the prophet, and the physician, and the fisherman, so do you select for me, since you are better versed in Homer than I am, such passages, *Ion*, as belong to the rhapsodist, and to the rhapsodist's art; which it is fitting for the rhapsodist to consider and judge of, (better than) other men.

Ion. ⁶⁶ I say, Socrates, all things.⁶⁶

Soc. You did not, *Ion*, say all. Or are you so forgetful? And yet it ill becomes a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be forgetful.

Ion. Of what then am I forgetful?

Soc. Do you not remember, you said that the rhapsodist's art is different from that of the charioteer?

Ion. I do remember it.

Soc. And did not you confess too, that, being different, it would know things different?

Ion. Yes, I did.

⁶⁵ I have adopted *πίρρο*, found in one MS., in lieu of *ῥίρρο*.—For a bird does not follow the wind, but flies with it; and especially when wounded; for it is then unable to make use of any muscular exertion, nor is it necessary when it is flying with the wind.

⁶⁶—⁶⁶ This I cannot understand, nor could Müller; unless *Ion* meant to generalize the assertion, which Socrates had confined to the art of the rhapsodist alone.

[11.] *Soc.* According to your own account then, the rhapsodist's art will not know all things, nor even the rhapsodist himself.

Ion. Except, perhaps, Socrates, things of such a kind.

Soc. By things of such a kind you mean such as belong nearly to all the other arts. Now what will (the rhapsodist) know, if (he knows) not all things.

Ion. He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to speak, and what for a woman; and what for a slave, and what for a freeman; and what for him, who is commanded, and for him, who commands.

Soc. Do you mean that the rhapsodist will know better than the steersman, what it is proper for the commander of a ship, tost in a storm at sea, to say?

Ion. No. This at least the steersman (will know) better.⁶⁷

Soc. But what it is proper for a person governing a sick person to say, will the rhapsodist know better than the physician?

Ion. Not in this case.

Soc. But what is it proper for a slave, you say.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. For example, do you assert that, what it is fitting for a slave, who tends cattle, to say, when pacifying⁶⁸ cows that are in a savage state, the rhapsodist will know, but not the herdsman?

Ion. Not I indeed.

Soc. But what it is proper for a woman engaged in wool-work to say about working in wool?

Ion. No.

Soc. But he will know what it is proper for an army-leader to say, when exhorting the soldiers?

Ion. Yes. For such things the rhapsodist will know.

Soc. What then, is the rhapsodist's art that of an army-leader?

Ion. I should know⁶⁹ what it is fitting for an army-leader to say.

⁶⁷ The Greek is Οὐκ ἄλλὰ δὲ—But one MS. has Οὐκ ἄλλιον δὲ—Ficinus, "Non; sed gubernator melius hoc percipiet," whom I have followed.

⁶⁸ Nitzsch aptly refers to *Politic.* p. 268, A. § 11.

⁶⁹ Instead of γνοίην γοῦν ἄρ'—Sydenham suggested, γνοίην γοῦν ἄν, and so Bekker from MSS. Ficinus has "Intelligerem equidem, si opus esset."

Soc. Because you have, perhaps, the art of a general, Ion. For if you happened to be skilled in horsemanship and in harp-playing at the same time, you would have known those, who manage⁷⁰ horses well and ill. Now if I had asked you—By which of those arts, Ion, do you know those who manage horses well? Is it by that through which you are a horseman, or by that through which you are a harpist? what answer would you make me?

Ion. I should (answer), By that through which I am a horseman.

Soc. If then you knew thoroughly those who play well the harp, would you not confess that you knew them by that art, through which you are a harpist, but not through that, by which you are a horseman?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Since then you know the things relating to armies,⁷¹ do you know them by the art, through which you are a general, or by that, through which you are an excellent rhapsodist?

Ion. There seems to me no difference.

Soc. How say you that there is no difference? Say you that the art of the rhapsodist and of the general is one? Or are they two?

Ion. They seem to me at least to be one.

Soc. ⁷²Whoever then is a good rhapsodist, he happens to be likewise a good general.⁷²

Ion. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. And whoever happens to be a good general, is a good rhapsodist too.

Ion. This, I think, on the other hand does not seem to be true.

⁷⁰ As *ἐπράττειν* is a verb deponent, it is evident that *τοὺς* has dropt out after *ἵππους*, similar to *τοὺς εὖ ἐπράττοντας ἵππους*, in the very next sentence.

⁷¹ Instead of *στρατηγικά*, Ficinus evidently found in his MS. *στρατηγικά*, as shown by his version, "quæ ad imperatorem spectant," adopted by Sydenham.

⁷²⁻⁷³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has what is preferable—"Whoever then happens to be a good rhapsodist, the same must be also a good general"—where "must be" has been obtained from "erit," in Ficinus. Sydenham's tacit alteration is supported by the next remark of Socrates.

Soc. But the other does seem so, ⁷³[that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.] ⁷³

Ion. Certainly.

Soc. Now are not you a rhapsodist, the best of the Greeks?

Ion. Very much, Socrates.

Soc. And are you also, Ion, a general, the best of all Greeks?

Ion. Be well assured, Socrates (of this); for I have learnt⁷⁴ that too from Homer.

[12.] *Soc.* Why then by the gods, Ion, do you, since you are amongst the Greeks the best, both as a general and a rhapsodist, go about acting the part of a rhapsodist before the Greeks, and not of a general. Does there seem to you a great need of a rhapsodist, crowned with a golden crown, but none of a general?

Ion. Yes. For our city, Socrates, is governed, and our forces commanded by your people, and there is no need of a general. But your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, would not choose me for a general; for ye (both) conceive yourselves to be competent for that.

Soc. Know you not, Ion, O best of men, Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Ion. Who is he?

Soc. He whom the Athenians have often selected as their general, although a foreigner, and Phanosthenes too⁷⁵ of Andros, and Heraclides⁷⁶ of Clazomenæ, whom this state, although they are foreigners, appoints to the command of armies and other offices in the government, through their having shown themselves men worthy of notice.⁷⁷ And will she not choose

⁷³⁻⁷⁵ The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of *ἴστω*.

⁷⁴ So Sydenham from Ficinus, "hæc enim in Homeri scriptis didici? who doubtless found in his MS. *ἴμαθον* in lieu of *μαθών*: which may, however, be united to *εἰ* in the question of Socrates.

⁷⁵ As this Phanosthenes was sent against his countrymen to Andros by the Athenians, according to Xenophon in H. Gr. i. 5, 18, about Ol. 93. 2, Ast conceives that this dialogue was written shortly after that event.

⁷⁶ Both Heraclides and Apollodorus are mentioned by Ælian in Var. Hist. xiv. 5, who however drew all his information from this passage, as remarked by Perizonius.

⁷⁷ This praise Athenæus, in xi. p. 506, A., considers to be ironical, and hence he infers that Plato was not content to speak ill of poets alone,

Ion of Ephesus as her general, honour him should he seem worthy of notice? What, are not you Ephesians Athenians of old?⁷⁸ and is not Ephesus a city inferior to none? But as to yourself, Ion, if indeed you say truly, that you are able by art and science to praise Homer, you are doing wrong in that, after professing that you know many fine things, relating to Homer, and saying that you would make a display, you are cheating me, and want much from making it; so that, although I have been for a long time earnestly making the request, you are unwilling to mention those things, in which you are so skilled; but you really become, like Proteus, of many forms,⁷⁹ turning yourself topsy turvy, until at last you escape me, and start up a general, in order that you may not show how great you are in the wisdom relating to Homer. If then you really are an artist, such as I just now spoke of, and after promising to make a display relating to Homer, you deceive me, you are an unjust man; but if you are not an artist, but are, by a divine allotment, inspired by Homer, and although you know nothing, are saying many fine things about the poet, as I have stated respecting you, you are doing no wrong. Choose then, whether you wish to be deemed by us a man unjust, or divine.

Ion. Great is the difference, Socrates; for it is much better to be deemed divine.

Soc. Now this better thing, Ion, is in your power (to obtain) at our hands, to be divine, and a praiser of Homer, but not from art.

but of the Athenian people for the conduct they adopted to the persons here mentioned.

⁷⁸ Ephesus was colonized by some Athenian emigrants under the command of a son of Codrus. See Ruhnken on Velleius Patere. i. 4.

⁷⁹ On the changes of form, which Proteus could assume, it will be sufficient to refer to Hom. Od. iv. 455, Virgil, G. iv., and the commentators on Plato, Euthyph. p. 15, D., *ὅς ποτε ὁ Πρωτεὺς—εἰς πλείονας ἀνὰ καὶ κἄτα*

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ALCIBIADES.

SINGULAR, says Stalbaum, has been the fate of the dialogue that passes under the name of the First Alcibiades. For after it had been held in the highest honour by a long line of admirers, amongst the Neo-Platonists of the olden time, attempts have been made during the last half-century by Schleiermacher and Ast to displace it from its former pedestal. So many and such gross faults, relating to the matter and manner, say those two scholars, are to be found in the dialogue, as to lead to the conclusion of its being quite unworthy of its reputed author. On the other hand, Socher and Stalbaum are of opinion that not a single substantial reason can be assigned for doubting its genuineness; and with the latter I confess I am disposed to agree; and shall continue to do so, until some definite rules are laid down to enable us to assert that the men, who passed their whole lives in the study of the philosophers of antiquity, were cheated by a shadow, and unable, like the people of Cuma, in the *Æsopo-Socratic* fable, to discover the long ears of an asinine imitator, peeping out of the lion's hide of the original genius.

Be however the author who he may, the dialogue itself is well worth the perusal of those, who, like Alcibiades, pride themselves on the union of natural and artificial advantages; and of others too, under less favourable circumstances, who fancy themselves fit to appear in public life, and competent to direct the affairs of a state, without having previously undergone that mental training, which alone enables a person to govern first himself, and then his fellow-men. And happy would it have been for his native Athens, and indeed for the whole of Greece, and other countries, had Alcibiades

of the poets hang, some from one, and others from others, and become inspired by them; some, for instance, Orpheus, others by Musæus; but the majority⁵⁴ are inspired by Homer, and held fast by him.⁵⁴ Of this number, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer. Hence when any one sings the verses of any other poet, you fall asleep, and are at a loss what to say: but when any one recites a strain of that poet, you wake up immediately, and your soul dances (with joy),⁵⁵ and you are at no loss what to say; for you say, what you say, about Homer, not from art or science, but from a divine allotment, and through being possessed. (For)⁵⁶ the Corybantes have an acute perception of such music only, as belongs to the god by whom they are possessed, and are not wanting either in gestures or words, adapted to that melody; but care not for any other music. So you, Ion, when any one makes mention of Homer, are not at a loss, but are at a loss (when mention is made) of other poets. And this is the reason of that, about which you were asking, why as regards Homer you are not at a loss, but are so as regards other poets; because you are not by art, but by a divine allotment, a skilful panegyrist of Homer.

Ion. You say well, Socrates. I should, however, wonder if you can speak so well as to convince me that I panegyryze Homer through being possessed and mad. Nor, as I fancy, should I appear so to you, if you were to hear me speaking about Homer.

[8.] *Soc.* And willing I am indeed to hear you; but not before you shall have answered me this. On which of the subjects about which Homer speaks, do you speak well? For surely it is not about all.

Ion. Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing but what (I speak well about).

Soc. Surely you do not (speak) about those, of which you happen to know nothing, but which Homer mentions.

Ion. And what are those, which Homer mentions, but which I do not know?

that he was suspended from a god, for he is held by him, if he *καρίχεται* "—and wonders that Sydenham and Müller should have laboured so hard in explaining the passage.

⁵⁴—⁵⁴ From this passage it is evident why *καρίχεται* and *ἔχεται* are said just before to be very similar in meaning.

⁵⁵ In *Æsch. Cho.* 156, the expression is *ὀρχεῖται πόβῳ*.

⁵⁶ Ficinus has "et—" but *γὰρ* has probably dropt out after *ὥστε*—

Soc. Does not Homer speak much and often of 'arts; for instance, the art of chariot-driving? If I can remember the verses, I will repeat them to you.

Ion. I will recite them; for I remember them.

Soc. Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, when advising him to be careful respecting the turning in the chariot-race, run in honour of Patroclus.

Ion. His words are these (in *Il.* xxiii. 335—340):

Thyself upon the polish'd chariot bend
To the left gently; but the right-hand horse
With goad and voice urge on, and somewhat yield,
Holding the reins; but let the left-hand steed
Come near the turn-post grazing, which almost
Of wheel well-made, let the nut seem to doubt
If it reach not; but stone to touch avoid.

Soc. It is enough. Now whether Homer does or does not, Ion, correctly express 'himself in these words, who would know the better, a physician or a charioteer?

Ion. A charioteer, undoubtedly.

Soc. Whether because he possesses that art, or for some other reason?

Ion. For no other than that (he possesses) the art.

Soc. Has not to each of the arts this been granted by the deity, to be able to know a work? for what we know by the pilot's art, we shall not know by the physician's.

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor what (we know) by the physician's art, (shall we know) by the builder's art.

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. Is it not thus then as regards all the arts, that what we know by one art, we shall not know by another? But answer me this previous to that. Do not you admit that there is one art of one kind, and another art of another kind?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Do not you make use of the same proof as I do, that when there is a science, one of some things, and another of other 'things, I call one by one name, and the other by another; and do not you (call them) so?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. For surely ⁵⁷if of the same things there were some science, ⁵⁷why should we call one by one name, and another

^{57—57} This I cannot understand.

by another, when it would be possible to know the same things from both? as, for instance, I know that these fingers are five in number; and you know it, respecting them, the same as I do. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the same art of arithmetic that both you and I know the same things, or by another art, you would surely say, by the same art.

Ion. Yes.

[9.] *Soc.* The question then, which I was lately about to ask you, answer me now. Whether does it seem so to you, as regards all the arts, in this way, that it is necessary for the same art to know the things; and for a different art (to know) not the same things? but whether, if (the art) be different, it is necessary for it to know different things?

Ion. It seems to me, Socrates, in this way.

Soc. He therefore, who has not any art, will not be able to know what is said or done well, relating to that art.

Ion. You speak the truth.

Soc. As regards the verses, then, which you repeated, will you, or a charioteer, better know whether Homer says well or not?

Ion. A charioteer.

Soc. For you are a rhapsodist, but not a charioteer.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Now the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a charioteer.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. If the science be different, it is conversant likewise about different things.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Well then, when Homer relates how Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, gave to Machaon, when he was wounded, a potion to drink,⁵⁸ he says, composed

⁵⁸ Of Pramnian wine; and into it she grates,
With brazen grater, cheese from goat's milk made,
And for the potion onion as a relish;⁵⁹

to know thoroughly and well whether Homer says this cor-

⁵⁸ After *πίνειν δίδωσι* the words *καὶ λίγει πῶς οὕτως*, which could not be inserted between *δραν λίγη* and *ψησιν*, Ficinus has properly omitted.

⁵⁹—⁶⁰ In this quotation from Homer the author has brought together some verses separated from each other by an interval of nine lines. See II. xi. 630 and 639. To the same passage Plato refers in Rep. iii. p. 406, A.

rectly or not, does it belong to the physician's, or the rhapsodist's art?

Ion. To the physician's.

Soc. Well then, where Homer (in *Il.* xxiv. 80) says,

She to the bottom went, just like the lead,
Which near the horn of bull, in meadows living,
(Is placed upon the line,) and rushes eager,
To fish, on raw flesh feeding, bringing fate—⁶⁰

shall we say that it belongs to the fisher's rather than to the rhapsodist's art, to decide on what he says, and whether correctly or not?

Ion. It is evident, Socrates, to the fisher's art.

[10.] *Soc.* Consider now, ⁶¹ you asking, if you asked me, ⁶¹ Since then, Socrates, you discover what it is fitting for each of these arts to decide upon in Homer, come, find me out, what as relating to the business of a prophet and the prophet's art, are the things which it is fitting for him to be able to know thoroughly, whether the poet has done well or ill—consider how easily and truly I could reply. For Homer, in the *Odyssey*, speaks frequently on the subject. For instance, where Theoclymenus the prophet, one of the race of Melampus, ⁶² says to the suitors—

⁶⁰ Why by doom fated suffer ye this ill?
Involved in the gloom of night are faces, heads,
And nether limbs; and ⁶³ burns the loud lament ⁶³
Fiercely, and cheeks with many tears are wet.
Of ghosts the porch is full, and full the hall,
To Erebus in darkness rushing; and the sun
From heaven is lost, and luckless mists come on.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ I have adopted *κῆρα*, found in Homer, in lieu of its interpretation *πῆμα*, read here in all the MSS. but one. On the other hand, *ἱμμεμανία* here is far more elegant than *ἱμμεβανία*, read in the common text; which has arisen merely from the perpetual confusion of α (*β*) and μ.

⁶¹—⁶¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek—*σοῦ ἐρομένον, εἰ ἔποιό μ*, where *εἰ ἔποιό* is evidently the interpretation of *σοῦ ἐρομένον*. Ficinus has—"Si præterea me interrogares," as if his MS. omitted *σοῦ ἐρομένον*.

⁶² See *Od.* xv. 225.

⁶³—⁶³ On the mixed metaphor in *οἱ μωγῇ δίδῃς* see my note on *Æsch.* *Prom.* And to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more. The most apposite is "clamore incendunt cælum" in *Virgil*.

⁶⁴—⁶⁴ See *Od.* xx. 351—357, where however between the 4th and 5th verse is another, omitted here—"And walls and handsome rooms besmeared with blood."

And often too in the *Iliad*, for example in the fight near the mound-wall (of the Greeks). For there too he says (*Il.* xii. 200—207):

To them, while eager to pass on, an eagle,
High-flying bird, appear'd upon the left,
And the army check'd. For in its claws it bore
A snake, of size enormous, with blood stain'd,
Alive, and gasping, but of fight not yet
Regardless. For on twisting round, it bit
The breast of the bird, that held it, near the neck;
Who, smarting with the pain, let go its hold,
And sent it to the ground; and midst the throng
It fell; and the bird with the wind screaming flew.⁶⁵

These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it belongs to the prophet to consider, and to judge of?

Ion. Yes, if you say what is true, Socrates.

Soc. And you too, *Ion*, speak the truth, in this. Come then, and, as I have selected for you from the *Odyssey*, and the *Iliad*, such passages as belong to the prophet, and the physician, and the fisherman, so do you select for me, since you are better versed in Homer than I am, such passages, *Ion*, as belong to the rhapsodist, and to the rhapsodist's art; which it is fitting for the rhapsodist to consider and judge of, (better than) other men.

Ion. ⁶⁶ I say, Socrates, all things.⁶⁶

Soc. You did not, *Ion*, say all. Or are you so forgetful? And yet it ill becomes a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be forgetful.

Ion. Of what then am I forgetful?

Soc. Do you not remember, you said that the rhapsodist's art is different from that of the charioteer?

Ion. I do remember it.

Soc. And did not you confess too, that, being different, it would know things different?

Ion. Yes, I did.

⁶⁵ I have adopted *πέρεο*, found in one MS., in lieu of *ῥεο*.—For a bird does not follow the wind, but flies with it; and especially when wounded; for it is then unable to make use of any muscular exertion, nor is it necessary when it is flying with the wind.

⁶⁶—⁶⁶ This I cannot understand, nor could Müller; unless *Ion* meant to generalize the assertion, which Socrates had confined to the art of the rhapsodist alone.

[11.] *Soc.* According to your own account then, the rhapsodist's art will not know all things, nor even the rhapsodist himself.

Ion. Except, perhaps, Socrates, things of such a kind.

Soc. By things of such a kind you mean such as belong nearly to all the other arts. Now what will (the rhapsodist), know, if (he knows) not all things.

Ion. He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to speak, and what for a woman; and what for a slave, and what for a freeman; and what for him, who is commanded, and for him, who commands.

Soc. Do you mean that the rhapsodist will know better than the steersman, what it is proper for the commander of a ship, tost in a storm at sea, to say?

Ion. No. This at least the steersman (will know) better.⁶⁷

Soc. But what it is proper for a person governing a sick person to say, will the rhapsodist know better than the physician?

Ion. Not in this case.

Soc. But what is it proper for a slave, you say.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. For example, do you assert that, what it is fitting for a slave, who tends cattle, to say, when pacifying⁶⁸ cows that are in a savage state, the rhapsodist will know, but not the herdsman?

Ion. Not I indeed.

Soc. But what it is proper for a woman engaged in wool-work to say about working in wool?

Ion. No.

Soc. But he will know what it is proper for an army-leader to say, when exhorting the soldiers?

Ion. Yes. For such things the rhapsodist will know.

Soc. What then, is the rhapsodist's art that of an army-leader?

Ion. I should know⁶⁹ what it is fitting for an army-leader to say.

⁶⁷ The Greek is Οὐκ ἀλλὰ δ—But one MS. has Οὐ· κάλλιον δ—Ficinus, "Non; sed gubernator melius hoc percipiet," whom I have followed.

⁶⁸ Nitzsch aptly refers to *Politic.* p. 268, A. § 11.

⁶⁹ Instead of γνοίην γούν ἄρ'—Sydenham suggested, γνοίην γούν ἄν, and so Bekker from MSS. Ficinus has "Intelligerem equidem, si opus esset."

Soc. Because you have, perhaps, the art of a general, Ion. For if you happened to be skilled in horsemanship and in harp-playing at the same time, you would have known those, who manage⁷⁰ horses well and ill. Now if I had asked you—By which of those arts, Ion, do you know those who manage horses well? Is it by that through which you are a horseman, or by that through which you are a harpist? what answer would you make me?

Ion. I should (answer), By that through which I am a horseman.

Soc. If then you knew thoroughly those who play well the harp, would you not confess that you knew them by that art, through which you are a harpist, but not through that, by which you are a horseman?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Since then you know the things relating to armies,⁷¹ do you know them by the art, through which you are a general, or by that, through which you are an excellent rhapsodist?

Ion. There seems to me no difference.

Soc. How say you that there is no difference? Say you that the art of the rhapsodist and of the general is one? Or are they two?

Ion. They seem to me at least to be one.

Soc. ⁷²Whoever then is a good rhapsodist, he happens to be likewise a good general.⁷²

Ion. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. And whoever happens to be a good general, is a good rhapsodist too.

Ion. This, I think, on the other hand does not seem to be true.

⁷⁰ As *ἰππάζεσθαι* is a verb deponent, it is evident that *ροῦς* has dropt out after *ἵππους*, similar to *ροῦς εὖ ἰππάζομενους ἵππους*, in the very next sentence.

⁷¹ Instead of *στρατιωρικῇ*, Ficinus evidently found in his MS. *στρατηγικῇ*, as shown by his version, "quæ ad imperatorem spectant," adopted by Sydenham.

⁷²⁻⁷³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has what is preferable—"Whoever then happens to be a good rhapsodist, the same must be also a good general"—where "must be" has been obtained from "erit," in Ficinus. Sydenham's tacit alteration is supported by the next remark of Socrates.

Soc. But the other does seem so, ⁷³[that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.] ⁷³

Ion. Certainly.

Soc. Now are not you a rhapsodist, the best of the Greeks?

Ion. Very much, Socrates.

Soc. And are you also, Ion, a general, the best of all Greeks?

Ion. Be well assured, Socrates (of this); for I have learnt ⁷⁴that too from Homer.

[12.] *Soc.* Why then by the gods, Ion, do you, since you are amongst the Greeks the best, both as a general and a rhapsodist, go about acting the part of a rhapsodist before the Greeks, and not of a general. Does there seem to you a great need of a rhapsodist, crowned with a golden crown, but none of a general?

Ion. Yes. For our city, Socrates, is governed, and our forces commanded by your people, and there is no need of a general. But your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, would not choose me for a general; for ye (both) conceive yourselves to be competent for that.

Soc. Know you not, Ion, O best of men, Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Ion. Who is he?

Soc. He whom the Athenians have often selected as their general, although a foreigner, and Phanosthenes too ⁷⁵ of Andros, and Heraclides ⁷⁶ of Clazomenæ, whom this state, although they are foreigners, appoints to the command of armies and other offices in the government, through their having shown themselves men worthy of notice. ⁷⁷ And will she not choose

⁷³⁻⁷⁵ The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of *ἰσχυρο*.

⁷⁴ So Sydenham from Ficinus, "hæc enim in Homeri scriptis didici? who doubtless found in his MS. *ἔμαθον* in lieu of *μαθών*: which may, however, be united to *εἰ* in the question of Socrates.

⁷⁵ As this Phanosthenes was sent against his countrymen to Andros by the Athenians, according to Xenophon in *H. Gr.* i. 5, 18, about Ol. 93. 2, Ast conceives that this dialogue was written shortly after that event.

⁷⁶ Both Heraclides and Apollodorus are mentioned by Ælian in *Var. Hist.* xiv. 5, who however drew all his information from this passage, as remarked by Perizonius.

⁷⁷ This praise Athenæus, in xi. p. 506, A., considers to be ironical, and hence he infers that Plato was not content to speak ill of poets alone,

Ion of Ephesus as her general, honour him should he seem worthy of notice? What, are not you Ephesians Athenians of old?⁷⁸ and is not Ephesus a city inferior to none? But as to yourself, Ion, if indeed you say truly, that you are able by art and science to praise Homer, you are doing wrong in that, after professing that you know many fine things, relating to Homer, and saying that you would make a display, you are cheating me, and want much from making it; so that, although I have been for a long time earnestly making the request, you are unwilling to mention those things, in which you are so skilled; but you really become, like Proteus, of many forms,⁷⁹ turning yourself topsy turvy, until at last you escape me, and start up a general, in order that you may not show how great you are in the wisdom relating to Homer. If then you really are an artist, such as I just now spoke of, and after promising to make a display relating to Homer, you deceive me, you are an unjust man; but if you are not an artist, but are, by a divine allotment, inspired by Homer, and although you know nothing, are saying many fine things about the poet, as I have stated respecting you, you are doing no wrong. Choose then, whether you wish to be deemed by us a man unjust, or divine.

Ion. Great is the difference, Socrates; for it is much better to be deemed divine.

Soc. Now this better thing, Ion, is in your power (to obtain) at our hands, to be divine, and a praiser of Homer, but not from art.

but of the Athenian people for the conduct they adopted to the persons here mentioned.

⁷⁸ Ephesus was colonized by some Athenian emigrants under the command of a son of Codrus. See Ruhnken on Velleius Paterc. i. 4.

⁷⁹ On the changes of form, which Proteus could assume, it will be sufficient to refer to Hom. Od. iv. 455, Virgil, G. iv., and the commentators on Plato, Euthyph. p. 15, D., ὡς περὶ ὁ Πρωτεύς—στρεφόμενος ἀνὰ καὶ κάραι

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ALCIBIADES.

SINGULAR, says Stalbaum, has been the fate of the dialogue that passes under the name of the First Alcibiades. For after it had been held in the highest honour by a long line of admirers, amongst the Neo-Platonists of the olden time, attempts have been made during the last half-century by Schleiermacher and Ast to displace it from its former pedestal. So many and such gross faults, relating to the matter and manner, say those two scholars, are to be found in the dialogue, as to lead to the conclusion of its being quite unworthy of its reputed author. On the other hand, Socher and Stalbaum are of opinion that not a single substantial reason can be assigned for doubting its genuineness; and with the latter I confess I am disposed to agree; and shall continue to do so, until some definite rules are laid down to enable us to assert that the men, who passed their whole lives in the study of the philosophers of antiquity, were cheated by a shadow, and unable, like the people of Cuma, in the *Æsopo-Socratic* fable, to discover the long ears of an asinine imitator, peeping out of the lion's hide of the original genius.

Be however the author who he may, the dialogue itself is well worth the perusal of those, who, like Alcibiades, pride themselves on the union of natural and artificial advantages; and of others too, under less favourable circumstances, who fancy themselves fit to appear in public life, and competent to direct the affairs of a state, without having previously undergone that mental training, which alone enables a person to govern first himself, and then his fellow-men. And happy would it have been for his native Athens, and indeed for the whole of Greece, and other countries, had Alcibiades

been as ready to practise the precepts of philosophy, as he was to listen to them. For we learn from Xenophon, that, so long as he was a follower of Socrates, his conduct was as praiseworthy, as it was the reverse when, after leaving the pacific ocean of philosophy, he embarked on the stormy sea of politics, in which he eventually lost his character, his fortune, and his life.

THE
FIRST ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES.

[1.] You feel some wonder, I think, son of Clinias, that I, who was the first of your admirers, am now, when all the rest have ceased to be so, the only one who has not withdrawn himself; and that, while the others were plaguing you with their conversation, I did for so many years never speak a word to you. For this behaviour of mine the reason is to be found not in any obstacle arising from man, but from a dæmon, of whose power you shall hear hereafter. But as it no longer offers any opposition, I have come to you now; and I am in good hopes that for the future likewise it will be no impediment. By reflecting, however, during the interval, I nearly thoroughly understand what is your position with respect to your admirers. For though they were many, and men who thought highly of themselves, yet there is not one, who has not gone away from you, through their being surpassed by you in self-conceit.¹ Now the reason for your thinking so highly of yourself I am desirous of detailing. You assert then, that you are in nothing inferior to any man. For what is your own, beginning from the body and ending in the mind, is so great, as to stand in need of nothing. [2.] In the first place, you fancy yourself to be

¹ According to Plutarch, the strongest of the passions in Alcibiades, although all were strong, was a love of pre-eminence in every thing. Ælian too, Var. Hist. iv. 16, represents him in a similar light. S.

very handsome,² and of a great size. And in this it is evident to every one, who can see, that you are not mistaken. In the next place, you are of a family the most youth-like³ in your own city, which is the greatest of any in Greece; and that you have friends here, and relations on your father's side, very numerous and very powerful, ready, if need be, to assist you; and those too on your mother's side are neither inferior nor fewer. But greater than all I have mentioned taken together, is the influence you possess through Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian to yourself and brother; (that Pericles) who is able to do what he pleases, not only in this city, but through all Greece, and with many and mighty clans of Barbarians. And I will add too, that you are one of the wealthy; although, on this point, you seem to me to value yourself the least. Boasting yourself then highly on all these advantages, you have acted the lord over your admirers; and they, feeling their inferiority, have become your slaves. And of this you are very sensible; and hence I know full well, that you feel a wonder at what I have in my thoughts, in that I do not withdraw myself, and what is the hope I entertain in remaining, when all the rest have gone away.

[3.] *Alc.* Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that you have anticipated me a little. For I really had it in my mind to come to you previously, and to ask you these very questions—What can you possibly mean, and looking to what hope are you plaguing me, and, wherever I am, are perpetually present yourself? For I do in truth wonder what your business can be with me; and I should very gladly hear.

Soc. You will hear me then, as is likely, very readily, if, as you say, you are really desirous of knowing what I have in my thoughts. I speak then as to one 'who will hear, and stay.'⁴

² That Alcibiades, says Proclus, was of large size and of great beauty is evident from his being called the general object of love in the whole of Greece; and from the saying of Antisthenes, that, if Achilles were not such as Alcibiades is, he was not in reality beautiful; and from the fact of Hermæ being modelled after him. T.

³ By *νεανικωτάτου* Stalbaum understands "the most brave," or "most manly." Ficinus has "nobilissimo"—what the sense requires. Plato wrote, I suspect, *μεγακλειστάτου*—in allusion to Megaclees, whose daughter, Deinomache, was the mother of Alcibiades.

⁴ Ficinus has avoided the *ὑστερον πρότερον* by translating, as Plato probably wrote, "expectanti et auscultaturo."

Alc. Entirely so. Speak then.

Soc. But mark, for it will be a thing not of wonder, if, as I begin with difficulty, I should with difficulty likewise make an end.

Alc. Speak, my good man, for I will listen.

Soc. Speak then I must; and though it is a hard task for an admirer to address himself to him, who is not inferior to his admirers, yet I must dare to speak my mind. [4.] If, Alcibiades, I had seen you satisfied with the advantages which I have just now detailed, and that you conceived you ought to pass your life amongst them, I should long since have withdrawn myself from all the love I bear; at least so I persuade myself. But I will now convict you of having other thoughts relating to yourself; and by so doing you will know, how I have continued keeping my attention directed towards you. For you appear to me such that, if any god were to say to you, "Are you willing, Alcibiades, to live possessing what you now do, or to die instantly, unless you are permitted to possess things still greater?" you would prefer to die. But in what kind of hope are you now living? I will unfold. (For⁵) you conceive that, if you were to come rather quickly before a meeting of the Athenian people—and this will take place within a few days—you will be able to show that you are worthy of being honoured in a way that neither Pericles nor any one else of those, who have ever existed, (was worthy); and after you have shown this, that you will possess the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the man of the greatest influence here, you will be so amongst the rest of the Greeks; and not only amongst the Greeks, but amongst the Barbarians likewise, as many as inhabit the same continent with us.⁶ And further, if the very same god were to say to you that—It is necessary⁷ for you to be the master here in Europe, but that it will not be allowed you to pass over into Asia, nor to concern yourself with affairs there—it appears to me that you would not even on these terms be willing to live, unless you could fill the mouths, so to say, of all men with your name and

⁵ Ficinus—"Putas enim," which leads to ἡγῆϊ γάρ—

⁶ By these are meant the Macedonians, Thracians, and others. For otherwise οἱ βάρβαροι would mean the Asiatics.

⁷ Since Ficinus has—"si deus—concesserit," it is probable that he found in his MS. not δέι, but διδοί, or δώγ.

power; and you would deem, I fancy, that no man ever lived, except Cyrus and Xerxes, worth mentioning. Now, that you do entertain such hopes I know full well, and speak not from conjecture merely. [5.] Perhaps, you will say, as being convinced that I am speaking the truth—What has all this to do with the reason, which you said you would tell, why you have not withdrawn yourself from me? I will tell you then, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. That to all these thoughts of yours a finish should be put, is impossible without my help; so great power do, I think, I possess with regard to your affairs and to yourself to boot. Hence I have long ago thought that the god⁸ did not permit me to converse with you; for whom I have waited, until he should permit. For as you have a hope of ⁹being able to show before the state that you are worth every thing to it, and after having shown it, that there is nothing that you will not be able to do forthwith,⁹ so do I have a hope that I shall possess the greatest power over you, after having shown that I am worth every thing to you;¹⁰ and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor any one else, is able to procure you the power you desire, except myself, with the assistance, however, of the god. While therefore you were rather young, and before you were filled with these hopes, the god, it seems to me, would not permit me to discourse with you, lest I should converse in vain; but, now he has permitted; for now you will hearken to me.

[6.] *Alc.* Much more unreasonable, Socrates, do you appear to me now, since you have begun to speak, than when you followed me in silence: and yet you were at that time very much a person of such kind to ¹¹look upon. Whether I have such thoughts, or not, you, it seems, know with certainty; so that were I to deny it, the denial would not avail me to persuade you an atom the more. Let it then be so. But if I have such thoughts ever so much, can you tell me

⁸ That is, the demon of Socrates. T.

⁹ Since all the words between the numerals are wanting in the three oldest MSS., Buttman was the first to reject them as an interpolation from § 4, and his idea is adopted by Schleiermacher and Stalbaum.

¹⁰ Sydenham was the first to remark that *εἰ*, requisite to preserve the balance of the sentences, had dropt out; which the three oldest MSS. have subsequently supplied.

¹¹ By "such a kind," is meant "unreasonable."

how they will be accomplished through you ; but without your help they never can be ?

Soc. Do you ask me, whether I am able to make a long harangue, such as you are accustomed to hear ? For if so, such is not my ability. But yet I should be able, I think, to show you, that such is the case, if you are willing to do me only one small piece of service.

Alc. If you mean some service not difficult, I am willing.

Soc. Does it seem to you difficult to give answers to questions ?

Alc. Not difficult at all.

Soc. Answer then.

Alc. Ask.

Soc. Shall I ask you then as having the thoughts, which I say you are thinking of ?

Alc. Be it so, if you will ; in order that I may know what you will say.

[7.] *Soc.* Well then. You have it in your mind, as I said, to go and consult with the Athenians within not a long time. If then, when you were just about to mount the platform, I were to lay hold of you, and to say—"Since the Athenians are thinking, Alcibiades, about deliberating upon some matter, are you rising up to give them advice ? Is it, since¹² about what you know better than they do ?" What answer would you make ?

Alc. I would assuredly answer—About what I know better than they do.

Soc. On those subjects, then, which you happen to know, you are a good counsellor ?

Alc. How not ?

Soc. Do you know those things only, which you have learnt from others, or found out yourself ?

Alc. What other things are there ?

Soc. Is it then possible that you should ever have learnt, or found out, any thing, which you were not willing to learn, or to search out by yourself ?

Alc. It is not.

Soc. What then, have you ever been willing to search out or learn what you thought you knew ?

¹² Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to understand ἀρ' ἐπειδὴ, has omitted ἐπειδὴ entirely. Stephens, too, was equally in the dark. Plato wrote, I suspect, ἀρὰ σπεύδεις—i. e. Do you hasten (to advise) ?—

Soc. Because you have, perhaps, the art of a general, Ion. For if you happened to be skilled in horsemanship and in harp-playing at the same time, you would have known those, who manage⁷⁰ horses well and ill. Now if I had asked you—By which of those arts, Ion, do you know those who manage horses well? Is it by that through which you are a horseman, or by that through which you are a harpist? what answer would you make me?

Ion. I should (answer), By that through which I am a horseman.

Soc. If then you knew thoroughly those who play well the harp, would you not confess that you knew them by that art, through which you are a harpist, but not through that, by which you are a horseman?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Since then you know the things relating to armies,⁷¹ do you know them by the art, through which you are a general, or by that, through which you are an excellent rhapsodist?

Ion. There seems to me no difference.

Soc. How say you that there is no difference? Say you that the art of the rhapsodist and of the general is one? Or are they two?

Ion. They seem to me at least to be one.

Soc. ⁷²Whoever then is a good rhapsodist, he happens to be likewise a good general.⁷²

Ion. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. And whoever happens to be a good general, is a good rhapsodist too.

Ion. This, I think, on the other hand does not seem to be true.

⁷⁰ As *ἐπράττειν* is a verb deponent, it is evident that *τοὺς* has dropt out after *ἵππους*, similar to *τοὺς ἐν ἱππαζομένοις ἵππους*, in the very next sentence.

⁷¹ Instead of *στρατιωτικῇ*, Ficinus evidently found in his MS. *στρατηγικῇ*, as shown by his version, "quæ ad imperatorem spectant," adopted by Sydenham.

⁷² Such is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has what is preferable—"Whoever then happens to be a good rhapsodist, the same must be also a good general"—where "must be" has been obtained from "erit," in Ficinus. Sydenham's tacit alteration is supported by the next remark of Socrates.

Soc. But the other does seem so, ⁷³[that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.] ⁷³

Ion. Certainly.

Soc. Now are not you a rhapsodist, the best of the Greeks?

Ion. Very much, Socrates.

Soc. And are you also, Ion, a general, the best of all Greeks?

Ion. Be well assured, Socrates (of this); for I have learnt ⁷⁴that too from Homer.

[12.] *Soc.* Why then by the gods, Ion, do you, since you are amongst the Greeks the best, both as a general and a rhapsodist, go about acting the part of a rhapsodist before the Greeks, and not of a general. Does there seem to you a great need of a rhapsodist, crowned with a golden crown, but none of a general?

Ion. Yes. For our city, Socrates, is governed, and our forces commanded by your people, and there is no need of a general. But your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, would not choose me for a general; for ye (both) conceive yourselves to be competent for that.

Soc. Know you not, Ion, O best of men, Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Ion. Who is he?

Soc. He whom the Athenians have often selected as their general, although a foreigner, and Phanosthenes too ⁷⁵of Andros, and Heraclides ⁷⁶of Clazomenæ, whom this state, although they are foreigners, appoints to the command of armies and other offices in the government, through their having shown themselves men worthy of notice. ⁷⁷And will she not choose

⁷³⁻⁷⁵ The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of *ἰσχυρο*.

⁷⁴ So Sydenham from Ficinus, "hæc enim in Homeri scriptis didici? who doubtless found in his MS. *ἔμαθον* in lieu of *μαθών*: which may, however, be united to *εἰ* in the question of Socrates.

⁷⁵ As this Phanosthenes was sent against his countrymen to Andros by the Athenians, according to Xenophon in *H. Gr.* i. 5, 18, about Ol. 93. 2, Ast conceives that this dialogue was written shortly after that event.

⁷⁶ Both Heraclides and Apollodorus are mentioned by Ælian in *Var. Hist.* xiv. 5, who however drew all his information from this passage, as remarked by Perizonius.

⁷⁷ This praise Athenæus, in xi. p. 506, A., considers to be ironical, and hence he infers that Plato was not content to speak ill of poets alone,

Ion of Ephesus as her general, honour him should he seem worthy of notice? What, are not you Ephesians Athenians of old?⁷⁸ and is not Ephesus a city inferior to none? But as to yourself, Ion, if indeed you say truly, that you are able by art and science to praise Homer, you are doing wrong in that, after professing that you know many fine things, relating to Homer, and saying that you would make a display, you are cheating me, and want much from making it; so that, although I have been for a long time earnestly making the request, you are unwilling to mention those things, in which you are so skilled; but you really become, like Proteus, of many forms,⁷⁹ turning yourself topsy turvy, until at last you escape me, and start up a general, in order that you may not show how great you are in the wisdom relating to Homer. If then you really are an artist, such as I just now spoke of, and after promising to make a display relating to Homer, you deceive me, you are an unjust man; but if you are not an artist, but are, by a divine allotment, inspired by Homer, and although you know nothing, are saying many fine things about the poet, as I have stated respecting you, you are doing no wrong. Choose then, whether you wish to be deemed by us a man unjust, or divine.

Ion. Great is the difference, Socrates; for it is much better to be deemed divine.

Soc. Now this better thing, Ion, is in your power (to obtain) at our hands, to be divine, and a praiser of Homer, but not from art.

but of the Athenian people for the conduct they adopted to the persons here mentioned.

⁷⁸ Ephesus was colonized by some Athenian emigrants under the command of a son of Codrus. See Ruhnken on Velleius Patere. i. 4.

⁷⁹ On the changes of form, which Proteus could assume, it will be sufficient to refer to Hom. Od. iv. 455, Virgil, G. iv., and the commentators on Plato, Euthyph. p. 15, D., ὡς περ ὁ Πρωτεύς—στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ALCIBIADES.

SINGULAR, says Stalbaum, has been the fate of the dialogue that passes under the name of the First Alcibiades. For after it had been held in the highest honour by a long line of admirers, amongst the Neo-Platonists of the olden time, attempts have been made during the last half-century by Schleiermacher and Ast to displace it from its former pedestal. So many and such gross faults, relating to the matter and manner, say those two scholars, are to be found in the dialogue, as to lead to the conclusion of its being quite unworthy of its reputed author. On the other hand, Socher and Stalbaum are of opinion that not a single substantial reason can be assigned for doubting its genuineness; and with the latter I confess I am disposed to agree; and shall continue to do so, until some definite rules are laid down to enable us to assert that the men, who passed their whole lives in the study of the philosophers of antiquity, were cheated by a shadow, and unable, like the people of Cuma, in the *Æsopo-Socratic* fable, to discover the long ears of an asinine imitator, peeping out of the lion's hide of the original genius.

Be however the author who he may, the dialogue itself is well worth the perusal of those, who, like Alcibiades, pride themselves on the union of natural and artificial advantages; and of others too, under less favourable circumstances, who fancy themselves fit to appear in public life, and competent to direct the affairs of a state, without having previously undergone that mental training, which alone enables a person to govern first himself, and then his fellow-men. And happy would it have been for his native Athens, and indeed for the whole of Greece, and other countries, had Alcibiades

been as ready to practise the precepts of philosophy, as he was to listen to them. For we learn from Xenophon, that, so long as he was a follower of Socrates, his conduct was as praiseworthy, as it was the reverse when, after leaving the pacific ocean of philosophy, he embarked on the stormy sea of politics, in which he eventually lost his character, his fortune, and his life.

THE
FIRST ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES.

[1.] You feel some wonder, I think, son of Clinias, that I, who was the first of your admirers, am now, when all the rest have ceased to be so, the only one who has not withdrawn himself; and that, while the others were plaguing you with their conversation, I did for so many years never speak a word to you. For this behaviour of mine the reason is to be found not in any obstacle arising from man, but from a dæmon, of whose power you shall hear hereafter. But as it no longer offers any opposition, I have come to you now; and I am in good hopes that for the future likewise it will be no impediment. By reflecting, however, during the interval, I nearly thoroughly understand what is your position with respect to your admirers. For though they were many, and men who thought highly of themselves, yet there is not one, who has not gone away from you, through their being surpassed by you in self-conceit.¹ Now the reason for your thinking so highly of yourself I am desirous of detailing. You assert then, that you are in nothing inferior to any man. For what is your own, beginning from the body and ending in the mind, is so great, as to stand in need of nothing. [2.] In the first place, you fancy yourself to be

¹ According to Plutarch, the strongest of the passions in Alcibiades, although all were strong, was a love of pre-eminence in every thing. *Ælian* too, *Var. Hist.* iv. 16, represents him in a similar light. S.

very handsome,² and of a great size. And in this it is evident to every one, who can see, that you are not mistaken. In the next place, you are of a family the most youth-like³ in your own city, which is the greatest of any in Greece; and that you have friends here, and relations on your father's side, very numerous and very powerful, ready, if need be, to assist you; and those too on your mother's side are neither inferior nor fewer. But greater than all I have mentioned taken together, is the influence you possess through Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian to yourself and brother; (that Pericles) who is able to do what he pleases, not only in this city, but through all Greece, and with many and mighty clans of Barbarians. And I will add too, that you are one of the wealthy; although, on this point, you seem to me to value yourself the least. Boasting yourself then highly on all these advantages, you have acted the lord over your admirers; and they, feeling their inferiority, have become your slaves. And of this you are very sensible; and hence I know full well, that you feel a wonder at what I have in my thoughts, in that I do not withdraw myself, and what is the hope I entertain in remaining, when all the rest have gone away.

[3.] *Alc.* Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that you have anticipated me a little. For I really had it in my mind to come to you previously, and to ask you these very questions—What can you possibly mean, and looking to what hope are you plaguing me, and, wherever I am, are perpetually present yourself? For I do in truth wonder what your business can be with me; and I should very gladly hear.

Soc. You will hear me then, as is likely, very readily, if, as you say, you are really desirous of knowing what I have in my thoughts. I speak then as to one 'who will hear, and stay.'⁴

² That Alcibiades, says Proclus, was of large size and of great beauty is evident from his being called the general object of love in the whole of Greece; and from the saying of Antisthenes, that, if Achilles were not such as Alcibiades is, he was not in reality beautiful; and from the fact of Hermæ being modelled after him. T.

³ By νεανιωτάτου Stalbaum understands "the most brave," or "most manly." Ficinus has "nobilissimo"—what the sense requires. Plato wrote, I suspect, μεγαλειστάτου—in allusion to Megaclees, whose daughter, Deinomache, was the mother of Alcibiades.

⁴ Ficinus has avoided the ὑστερον πρότερον by translating, as Plato probably wrote, "expectanti et auscultaturo."

Alc. Entirely so. Speak then.

Soc. But mark, for it will be a thing not of wonder, if, as I begin with difficulty, I should with difficulty likewise make an end.

Alc. Speak, my good man, for I will listen.

Soc. Speak then I must; and though it is a hard task for an admirer to address himself to him, who is not inferior to his admirers, yet I must dare to speak my mind. [4.] If, Alcibiades, I had seen you satisfied with the advantages which I have just now detailed, and that you conceived you ought to pass your life amongst them, I should long since have withdrawn myself from all the love I bear; at least so I persuade myself. But I will now convict you of having other thoughts relating to yourself; and by so doing you will know, how I have continued keeping my attention directed towards you. For you appear to me such that, if any god were to say to you, "Are you willing, Alcibiades, to live possessing what you now do, or to die instantly, unless you are permitted to possess things still greater?" you would prefer to die. But in what kind of hope are you now living? I will unfold. (For⁵) you conceive that, if you were to come rather quickly before a meeting of the Athenian people—and this will take place within a few days—you will be able to show that you are worthy of being honoured in a way that neither Pericles nor any one else of those, who have ever existed, (was worthy); and after you have shown this, that you will possess the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the man of the greatest influence here, you will be so amongst the rest of the Greeks; and not only amongst the Greeks, but amongst the Barbarians likewise, as many as inhabit the same continent with us.⁶ And further, if the very same god were to say to you that—It is necessary⁷ for you to be the master here in Europe, but that it will not be allowed you to pass over into Asia, nor to concern yourself with affairs there—it appears to me that you would not even on these terms be willing to live, unless you could fill the mouths, so to say, of all men with your name and

⁵ Ficinus—"Putas enim," which leads to ἡγῆ γὰρ—

⁶ By these are meant the Macedonians, Thracians, and others. For otherwise οἱ βαρβάρου would mean the Asiatics.

⁷ Since Ficinus has—"si deus—concesserit," it is probable that he found in his MS. not δεῖ, but δίδοι, or δώγ.

power; and you would deem, I fancy, that no man ever lived, except Cyrus and Xerxes, worth mentioning. Now, that you do entertain such hopes I know full well, and speak not from conjecture merely. [5.] Perhaps, you will say, as being convinced that I am speaking the truth—What has all this to do with the reason, which you said you would tell, why you have not withdrawn yourself from me? I will tell you then, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. That to all these thoughts of yours a finish should be put, is impossible without my help; so great power do, I think, I possess with regard to your affairs and to yourself to boot. Hence I have long ago thought that the god⁸ did not permit me to converse with you; for whom I have waited, until he should permit. For as you have a hope of ⁹being able to show before the state that you are worth every thing to it, and after having shown it, that there is nothing that you will not be able to do forthwith,⁹ so do I have a hope that I shall possess the greatest power over you, after having shown that I am worth every thing to you;¹⁰ and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor any one else, is able to procure you the power you desire, except myself, with the assistance, however, of the god. While therefore you were rather young, and before you were filled with these hopes, the god, it seems to me, would not permit me to discourse with you, lest I should converse in vain; but, now he has permitted; for now you will hearken to me.

[6.] *Alc.* Much more unreasonable, Socrates, do you appear to me now, since you have begun to speak, than when you followed me in silence: and yet you were at that time very much a person of such kind to ¹¹look upon. Whether I have such thoughts, or not, you, it seems, know with certainty; so that were I, to deny it, the denial would not avail me to persuade you an atom the more. Let it then be so. But if I have such thoughts ever so much, can you tell me

⁸ That is, the dæmon of Socrates. T.

⁹ Since all the words between the numerals are wanting in the three oldest MSS., Buttmann was the first to reject them as an interpolation from § 4, and his idea is adopted by Schleiermacher and Stalbaum.

¹⁰ Sydenham was the first to remark that σοι, requisite to preserve the balance of the sentences, had dropt out; which the three oldest MSS. have subsequently supplied.

¹¹ By "such a kind," is meant "unreasonable."

how they will be accomplished through you ; but without your help they never can be ?

Soc. Do you ask me, whether I am able to make a long harangue, such as you are accustomed to hear ? For if so, such is not my ability. But yet I should be able, I think, to show you, that such is the case, if you are willing to do me only one small piece of service.

Alc. If you mean some service not difficult, I am willing.

Soc. Does it seem to you difficult to give answers to questions ?

Alc. Not difficult at all.

Soc. Answer then.

Alc. Ask.

Soc. Shall I ask you then as having the thoughts, which I say you are thinking of ?

Alc. Be it so, if you will ; in order that I may know what you will say.

[7.] *Soc.* Well then. You have it in your mind, as I said, to go and consult with the Athenians within not a long time. If then, when you were just about to mount the platform, I were to lay hold of you, and to say—"Since the Athenians are thinking, Alcibiades, about deliberating upon some matter, are you rising up to give them advice ? Is it, since¹² about what you know better than they do ?" What answer would you make ?

Alc. I would assuredly answer—About what I know better than they do.

Soc. On those subjects, then, which you happen to know, you are a good counsellor ?

Alc. How not ?

Soc. Do you know those things only, which you have learnt from others, or found out yourself ?

Alc. What other things are there ?

Soc. Is it then possible that you should ever have learnt, or found out, any thing, which you were not willing to learn, or to search out by yourself ?

Alc. It is not.

Soc. What then, have you ever been willing to search out or learn what you thought you knew ?

¹² Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to understand ἀπ' ἑκείνης, has omitted ἑκείνη entirely. Stephens, too, was equally in the dark. Plato wrote, I suspect, ἀπα σπεύδεις—i. e. Do you hasten (to advise) ?—

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. What you now happen to know, was there a time, when you did not think you knew?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. Now, what you have learnt, I know pretty nearly. But if any thing has escaped me, do you mention it. To the best of my memory, you have learnt assuredly grammar, and to play on the harp, and to wrestle: for to play on the hautboy, you were not willing to learn.¹³ These things are what you know; unless peradventure you have learnt something else secretly. And yet I think that you neither by day or night¹⁴ went out from within.¹⁴

Alc. I have never gone to the school of other masters than of these.

[8.] *Soc.* When therefore the Athenians are deliberating about grammar, and how they are to write correctly, at that time will you rise up to give them advice?

Alc. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. But when (they are debating) about striking (the strings of) the lyre?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. But on the subject of wrestling they are not wont to deliberate in a public assembly.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. When then they are deliberating about what? For assuredly it cannot be, when the subject is about house-building:

Alc. No, certainly.

Soc. For a house-builder would advise them better than you could.

Alc. True.

Soc. Nor yet is it, when they are deliberating about divination.

¹³ According to Plutarch, Alcibiades considered the playing on the hautboy to be very ungraceful, as it distorted the muscles of the face; and could not, like playing on the lyre, be accompanied by the voice. See, too, A. Gellius, xv. 17. So Sydenham; who did not see that Plutarch has probably preserved the words *ὡς δῆθεν ἀνελευθέρου ἔργον εἶναι*, which he found in his MS. of Plato.

¹⁴—¹⁴ Ficinus has, what the sense requires and is adopted by Sydenham, "exisse te domo nos latentem," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐξῶν μ' ἀλαθεῖς εἶναι*, instead of *ἐξῶν ἐνδοθεῖν*.

Alc. No.

Soc. For a diviner would do so better than you.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And that too, whether he be a short man or a tall one; whether handsome or ugly; and whether of a noble or ignoble family.

Alc. How not?

Soc. For advice upon each subject belongs, I conceive, to a person who knows it, and not to a man of wealth.

Alc. How not?

Soc. And whether the man, who gives advice, be rich or poor, it will make no difference to the Athenians, when they are deliberating about the health of those in the city; but they will seek for a physician to be their counsellor.

Alc. And reasonably so.

[9.] *Soc.* When they are inquiring into what subject, will you rise up, and after rising up, give them advice?

Alc. When they are inquiring, Socrates, into the state of their affairs.

Soc. Do you mean about building a fleet? and what kind of vessels it is requisite should be built?

Alc. No such thing, Socrates.

Soc. Because you are ignorant, I think, in the art of ship-building. Is this or any thing else the reason?

Alc. There is no other than this.¹⁵

Soc. But when they are consulting about what affairs of their own do you mean?

Alc. When they are deliberating, Socrates, about war or peace; or any other affairs of state.

Soc. Do you mean when they are deliberating with whom it is requisite to make peace, and against whom to engage in war, and in what way?

Alc. Just so.

Soc. Now is it not requisite (to do so) with whom it is better (to do so)?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And at that time, when it is better?

Alc. By all means.

Soc. And for so long a time, as it is better?

¹⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐκ ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦτο*, instead of *οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο*. See at § 29.

Alc. Just so.

Soc. If then the Athenians were deliberating with whom it was requisite to wrestle and with whom to come to close quarters, and in what way, would you give better advice than the exercise-master?

Alc. The exercise-master assuredly.

Soc. Can you tell me now, by looking to what would the exercise-master give advice, with whom it is meet to wrestle closely, and with whom it is not? and at what time, and in what manner? I mean something of this kind. Is it meet to wrestle closely with those persons, with whom it is better (to do so)? or is it not?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Whether to such an extent as it is better?

Alc. To such an extent.

Soc. And at the time too when it is better?

Alc. By all means.

[10.] *Soc.* Moreover, a singer ought sometimes to play the harp, and to move (his feet) according to the tune.

Alc. Just so.

Soc. Ought he not (to do so) at the time when it is better (to do so)?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And to such an extent as it is better?

Alc. So I say.

Soc. Well then, since you make use of the term better in both cases, namely in playing the harp according to the tune, and in close wrestling, what do you call "the better" in playing the harp, as I call the better in wrestling by the term gymnastical? what do you call that?

Alc. I do not understand.

Soc. Try then to imitate me. For I have assuredly answered¹⁶ you, (it is that) which, under all circumstances, is correct. Now that is correct, which is done according to art. Is it not?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Now is not the art gymnastic?

Alc. How not?

¹⁶ Instead of ἀπεκρίναμην, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἀποκρίναμην ἂν, as shown by his version, "responderem." Ast, however, Buttmann, and Stalbaum, all are content with ἀπεκρίναμην: which I confess I do not understand.

Soc. And I said, that the better in wrestling is gymnastical.

Alc. You said so.

Soc. And was it not well (said)?

Alc. It seems so to me at least.

Soc. Come then, and say—for it would surely become you too to discourse correctly—in the first place, What is the art, to which belong the playing on the harp, the singing, and the moving (the feet) correctly. By what name is the whole of this art called? Are you not able to tell?

Alc. Indeed I am not.

[11.] *Soc.* Try in this way then. Who are the goddesses to whom the art belongs?

Alc. Mean you, Socrates, the Muses?

Soc. I do. Consider now, what appellation has the art derived from their name?

Alc. You appear to me to mean musical.

Soc. Yes, I meant so. What then is that, which is performed rightly according to this art? Just as I told you, that what was performed rightly according to art, was gymnastical. So what do you say is similarly in this case? How is it to be performed?

Alc. Musically, I think.

Soc. You say well. Come then—What do you term the better in the expressions, “the warring better,” and “in enjoying peace (better)?” just as there¹⁷ you made use in each case of the term better,¹⁸ (in one)¹⁹ as being more musical, in the other as more gymnastical. Try now in these cases likewise to state what is “the better.”

Alc. I cannot tell at all.

Soc. But surely it is a disgraceful thing, should any one,²⁰ while you were giving advice respecting the kinds of food, and saying,²⁰ that this is better than that, both as regards the

¹⁷ Instead of *ἑκεί*, which seems to have been interpolated from the preceding *ἑκεί*, one MS. has *καί*, which leads to *ὥσπερ γε καί*—Ficinus avoids the difficulty by his version, “in superioribus—”

¹⁸ In lieu of *τῷ ἀμείνονι*, three MSS. and Proclus offer *τὸ ἀμεινον*, and thus confirm the conjecture of Cornarius.

¹⁹ Ficinus has “in uno quidem, quod magis musicum,” as if he had found in his MS., before *ὅτι*, *ἐπὶ τῷ μὲν*, to answer to *ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ*. Ast, however, Buttmann, and Stalbaum, are content with the ellipse of *ἐπὶ τῷ μὲν* in the first clause of the two balanced sentences.

^{20—20} I have translated as if the Greek were *συμβουλευόντα περὶ*

present time and quantity, inquire of you, "What do you mean, Alcibiades, by 'the better?'" that you should, on these subjects, be able to tell him that it was the more wholesome—and this, too, although you do not profess to be a physician—but that on a subject, of which you profess to have a knowledge, and, after rising up, you will give advice, as if you knew it, you are not, when questioned, ashamed, as you seem to be, if you are unable to say any thing? Or does this appear to be not disgraceful?

Alc. Very much so.

[12.] *Soc.* Consider now, and be ready to state—To what point tends "the better" in enjoying peace, and in warring with those with whom it is meet?

Alc. But though I do consider, I am unable to imagine (what it is).

Soc. Know you not, when we make war, that²¹ after accusing each other of some suffering, we proceed to hostilities, and ²²by what calling it we proceed?

Alc. I do. (It is) by our being deceived, or treated with violence, or deprived of something.

Soc. Hold. How are they suffering in each of these points? Endeavour to state what is the difference, this way or that.

Alc. By the expression "this way," do you mean, Socrates, "justly" or "unjustly?"

Soc. This very thing.

Alc. And yet this is a difference wholly and entirely.

Soc. Well then, with whom shall you advise the Athenians to war? with those, who do what is unjust, or with those, who do what is just?

Alc. You are asking a hard question. For even if any man conceives that it is needful to war with such, as do what is right, he would not confess it.

Soc. For this, it seems, is not lawful.

σιτίων καὶ λίγοντα ὅτι, instead of λίγοντα καὶ συμβουλευόντα περὶ σιτίων ὅτι—

²¹ I have translated as if the Greek were ὅτι τι—πάθημα, instead of ὅ, τι—πάθημα.

²² The words between the numerals I cannot understand; to say nothing of the repetition of ἐρχόμεθα. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "et quomodo nuncupamus illud, quo ad bellum incitatur."

Alc. By no means is it so; nor does it seem to be honourable.

[13.] *Soc.* ²³With a view then to these points, and to what is just,²³ you will make your speeches.

Alc. It is necessary (to do so).

Soc. Does then the term "better," ²⁴about which I asked you just now, relating to the going to war or not, and with whom it is meet (to do so), and with whom not, and at what time, and when not, happen to be any thing else than²⁵ the term "more just?" or does it not?

Alc. It appears (to be nothing else).

Soc. How then, my dear Alcibiades, does it lie hid from yourself, that you are ignorant of this? or have you lain hid from me, while learning, and frequenting the school of a master, who has taught you to distinguish between what is the more just, and what is the less just? Now who is he? Tell me, in order that you may introduce me too, as a frequenter (of his school).

Alc. You are bantering, Socrates.

Soc. Not so, by the guardian-god of friendship²⁶ to both myself and you, whom I would the least of all invoke²⁷ as witness to a falsehood? If then you have (any master), tell me who he is.

Alc. But what if I have not? Think you that I could by no other means have a knowledge of what is just, and what is unjust?

Soc. I think (you would), if you had discovered it yourself.

Alc. Do you conceive then I could not have discovered it?

Soc. You (would have done so) perfectly, had you sought for it.

Alc. Think you, then, that I have not sought for it?

²³⁻²⁵ The Greek is *ἵπὸς ταῦτ' ἀπα καὶ σὺ τὸ δίκαιον*—where Sydenham has suggested the simple correction, which I have adopted, *σὺ καὶ*—for by *ταῦτα* are meant, he says, the lawful and the honourable.

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Soc. I (think you would), if you had thought you did not know it.

Alc. Was there not a time, when I was²⁸ in that state?

[14.] **Soc.** You speak correctly. Can you then mention the time when you did not think you knew what is just, and what is unjust? Come, (tell me,) were you making the search last year, and did you think then, or did you not, that you knew them? Answer truly now, that our conversation may not be in vain.

Alc. Nay, I did at that time think I knew.

Soc. And did you not (think) so during the third, fourth, and fifth year (preceding)?

Alc. I did.

Soc. But previously you were a boy.

Alc. True.

Soc. And even then, I know full well, that you thought you knew.

Alc. How do you know it well?

Soc. Often have I heard you, when you were a boy at school, and in other places, when you were playing at marbles, or any other game, speaking, as if you had no doubt respecting what is just and unjust, but proclaiming loudly and boldly about any of the boys who happened to be there, that he was a knave, and not just. Say I not what is true?

Alc. But, Socrates, what else was I to do, when any one did me an act of injustice?

Soc. Right. But if you happened at that time to be ignorant whether you were injured or not, would you have said,²⁹ What were you to do?

Alc. But, by Zeus, I was not ignorant; but I clearly knew that I was injured.

[15.] **Soc.** You thought then, it seems, when you were a mere boy, that you knew what is just and unjust?

Alc. I (did think) so; and knew it too.

Soc. At what time did you discover it? for certainly it was not when you merely thought you knew.

²⁸ From the version of Ficinus, "cum sic me haberem," Sydenham was the first to reject *οὕς* between *ὄρε* and *εἶλον*. And so Ast and others, with nearly all the MSS.

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Alc. Certainly not then.

Soc. At what time then did you think you did not know? Reflect; for ³⁰that time you will never find.³⁰

Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, I am not able to tell.

Soc. You did not then know by finding it yourself.

Alc. It seems I did not.

Soc. But you stated however just now, that you knew, even without learning. But if you neither discovered it nor learnt it, how or whence did you know it?

Alc. But perhaps I did not answer you correctly by saying that I knew by discovering it myself. ³¹ But the case is this. I learnt it, I presume, as others do.³¹

Soc. We are now come again to the same point. From whom (did you learn it)? Tell me.

Alc. From the people.

Soc. In referring it to the people, you fly to no good instructors.

Alc. Why so? Are not they capable of teaching?

Soc. Not even the game of back-gammon (correctly) or not. [16.] And yet I think that these subjects are of less importance than those relating to what is just. Do not you think so too?

Alc. I do.

Soc. Are they then unable to teach some things of less importance, and some things of more?

Alc. I think so; at least they are able to teach many things of more importance than playing at back-gammon.

Soc. What things are these?

Alc. I learnt, for instance, from them to speak the Greek language; nor could I name my teacher on that subject, but I refer to those very persons, who you say are not good teachers.

Soc. But, my noble sir, on this subject, indeed, the people are good teachers, and may be justly praised for their power of instructing.

³⁰⁻³² This seems a rather strange assertion. For if Alcibiades could never find the time, there was no need of Socrates telling him to reflect. Instead of *ot* Plato probably wrote *πῶ*—On the interchange of those two words, see Porson on Eurip. Hec. 300.

³³⁻³⁴ This arrangement of the speeches was first suggested by Buttmann, and has been adopted by Stalbaum.

Alc. Why so?

Soc. Because on these subjects they possess what it is necessary for good teachers to possess.

Alc. What mean you by this?

Soc. Know you not, that it is necessary for those who are to teach any thing, in the first place to know it themselves? Must they not?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And (must) not they, who know it, agree together, and not differ?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But would you say that they know the subjects in which they differ?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Of such things, then, how can they be good teachers?

Alc. By no means.

[17.] *Soc.* Well then, do the people appear to you to differ as to what is stone and wood? And should you inquire of any one, do they not (all)²² agree in the same opinion? and when they wish to take up a stone, or a piece of wood, do they not all rush to the same kind of things? and similarly (understand) all things of such kind? For I very nearly learn that you mean by this the knowing how to use the Greek language? Is it not so?

Alc. It is.

Soc. On these subjects, then, as we have said, do not persons individually agree with each other and themselves? and publicly the states (of Greece) do not have a difference with each other, by some of them meaning one thing, and others a different thing (by the same words).

Alc. They do not.

Soc. On these subjects, then, they would reasonably be good teachers.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. If then we wished to cause a person to have a knowledge on these points, we should do right in sending him for such instruction to the people?

Alc. Perfectly so.

Soc. But what if we wished that person to know not only

²² Ficinus has alone preserved this word, so necessary for the sense.

of what kind are men and of what are horses, but what kind of horses are fit for the race, and what are not, are the people competent to teach this?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. And is this for you a sufficient proof that they do not know and are not correct²³ teachers on these points, because they do not agree with each other on these points?

Alc. To me at least it is.

Soc. And what, if we wished that person to know not only of what kind men are, but what are healthy and unhealthy, would the many be competent teachers for us?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. And it would be a proof to you that they are bad teachers on these points, if you saw them disagreeing.

Alc. It would.

[18.] *Soc.* What then, do the many seem to you to agree, themselves with themselves, or with each other, respecting persons and acts, just and unjust?

Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, the least of all.

Soc. What then, that they differ the most on these points?

Alc. Very much indeed.

Soc. You have never, I suppose, seen or heard of men, differing so violently, about things wholesome and not, as on that account to fight and kill one another?

Alc. Never.

Soc. But upon questions of justice and injustice, ²⁴(how bitterly they differ)²⁴ I know well; and if you have not seen it, you have at least heard from many others, and from Homer; for you have heard of both the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*.

Alc. Entirely, Socrates.

Soc. Are not then those poems concerning a difference as to what is just and unjust?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And did not the battles and the deaths take place amongst the Greeks and the other²⁵ Trojans, and amongst the wooers of Penelope, and Ulysses, on account of this very difference?

²³ As the word *ερίγγων* is found only once even in Homer, and never elsewhere in Attic poetry, much less in prose, it is probably a corruption; which it would not be difficult to correct.

²⁴⁻²⁵ The words between the numerals are due to the version of Ficinus alone, "quam acriter dissentiant—"

²⁶ According to some scholars, *ἄλλος* is used pleonastically, without

Alc. You speak what is true.

Soc. And I conceive that to the Athenians, Lacedæmonians, and Boeotians who perished at Tanagra,³⁶ and to those, who afterwards³⁷ met in arms at Coronea, when³⁷ Clinias your father ended his career, a difference upon no other question than what relates to justice and injustice, caused³⁸ the deaths and battles.³⁹ Is it not so?

Alc. You are in the right.

Soc. Shall we say then that those persons had a knowledge on the question about which they differed with such vehemence, as by their contending with each other to inflict upon themselves the extreme (of mischief)?³⁹

Alc. It appears not.

[19.] *Soc.* Do you not then refer to teachers of such a kind, as you confess yourself to know nothing?

Alc. I seem (to do so).

Soc. How then is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust on questions, about which so vague are your ideas, and which you appear to have neither learnt from another, nor to have discovered yourself?

Alc. From what you say, it is not likely.

Soc. See you again this, that you have not spoken, Alcibiades, correctly?

Alc. What is it?

Soc. In that you stated that I said so.

Alc. What, did not you say that I know nothing of what is just and unjust?

Soc. Not I, indeed.

Alc. But did I (say it)?

Soc. Yes.

Alc. How so?

any definite meaning. But here, instead of ἄλλως, Plato wrote, I suspect, ἑτέρως, of which τῶς was the explanation. Respecting the loss or corruption of ἑτέρως, see my note on Crito, § 14, n. 18.

³⁶ On this battle see Thucyd. i. 108, Diodor. Sic. xi. 81.

³⁷ I have adopted the reading preserved by Proclus alone, ἐν Κορωνείᾳ συμβᾶσθαι ἑταί, in lieu of ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, ἐν οἷς— On the battle of Coronea, see Thucyd. i. 113.

³⁸ As the deaths would follow, not precede, the battles, Plato adopted perhaps this ὅσους πρότερον to avoid the repetition of the collocation αἱ μάχαι καὶ οἱ θάνατοι, found just above.

³⁹ Here again Proclus has alone preserved the words τῶν κατῶν, wanting in all the MSS. of Plato.

Soc. You will see it in this way, should I ask you about one and two, which is the greater number, you will say that two is.

Alc. I shall.

Soc. By how much.

Alc. By one.

Soc. Which of us then is the person who says that two is more than one by one?

Alc. It is I.

Soc. Did not I ask the question, and did not you answer it?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. On these points, then, who appears to assert? Is it I who ask, or thou who answerest?

Alc. I.

Soc. What then, were I to ask how many (and what)⁴⁰ are the letters in "Socrates," and you were to state, which of us (would be) the teller?

Alc. Myself.

Soc. Come then, tell me in one word, whenever a question and answer take place, who is it that asserts? he who asks, or he who answers?

Alc. He who answers, Socrates, as it seems to me.

Soc. Now through the whole of the conversation⁴¹ was not I the party asking?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And you the party answering?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, which of us two said what was asserted?

Alc. From what has been admitted, Socrates, I appear to be the party.

[20.] *Soc.* Has it not been said that Alcibiades, the handsome son of Clinias, knew nothing about what is just and unjust, but thought (he knew); and that he was about to go to a public meeting to give the Athenians advice upon questions of which he knew nothing? Is it not so?

⁴⁰ I have adopted Schleiermacher's *πόσα καὶ ποῖα*, supported by the parallel passage in Xenoph. M. S. iv. 4, 7, *ὅλον περὶ γραμμάτων, ἴαν τις ἰσηταί σε, πόσα καὶ ποῖα Σωκράτους ἴσθιν*: and so Buttmann in ed. 2, although he had rejected it in ed. 1.

⁴¹ Although the three oldest MSS. offer *τοῦ λόγου* after *διὰ παντός*, yet Buttmann, with whom Stalbaum agrees, would supply *χρόνου*, similar to "semper" in Ficinus.

present time and quantity, inquire of you, "What do you mean, Alcibiades, by 'the better?'" that you should, on these subjects, be able to tell him that it was the more wholesome—and this, too, although you do not profess to be a physician—but that on a subject, of which you profess to have a knowledge, and, after rising up, you will give advice, as if you knew it, you are not, when questioned, ashamed, as you seem to be, if you are unable to say anything? Or does this appear to be not disgraceful?

Alc. Very much so.

[12.] *Soc.* Consider now, and be ready to state—To what point tends "the better" in enjoying peace, and in warring with those with whom it is meet?

Alc. But though I do consider, I am unable to imagine (what it is).

Soc. Know you not, when we make war, that²¹ after accusing each other of some suffering, we proceed to hostilities, and ²²by what calling it we proceed?²²

Alc. I do. (It is) by our being deceived, or treated with violence, or deprived of something.

Soc. Hold. How are they suffering in each of these points? Endeavour to state what is the difference, this way or that.

Alc. By the expression "this way," do you mean, Socrates, "justly" or "unjustly?"

Soc. This very thing.

Alc. And yet this is a difference wholly and entirely.

Soc. Well then, with whom shall you advise the Athenians to war? with those, who do what is unjust, or with those, who do what is just?

Alc. You are asking a hard question. For even if any man conceives that it is needful to war with such, as do what is right, he would not confess it.

Soc. For this, it seems, is not lawful.

σιτίων καὶ λίγοντα ὅτι, instead of λίγοντα καὶ συμβουλευόντα περὶ σιτίων ὅτι—

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Alc. By no means is it so; nor does it seem to be honourable.

[13.] *Soc.* ²³With a view then to these points, and to what is just, ²³you will make your speeches.

Alc. It is necessary (to do so).

Soc. Does then the term "better," ²⁴about which I asked you just now, relating to the going to war or not, and with whom it is meet (to do so), and with whom not, and at what time, and when not, happen to be any thing else than ²⁵the term "more just?" or does it not?

Alc. It appears (to be nothing else).

Soc. How then, my dear Alcibiades, does it lie hid from yourself, that you are ignorant of this? or have you lain hid from me, while learning, and frequenting the school of a master, who has taught you to distinguish between what is the more just, and what is the less just? Now who is he? Tell me, in order that you may introduce me too, as a frequenter (of his school).

Alc. You are bantering, Socrates.

Soc. Not so, by the guardian-god of friendship ²⁶to both myself and you, whom I would the least of all invoke ²⁷as witness to a falsehood? If then you have (any master), tell me who he is.

Alc. But what if I have not? Think you that I could by no other means have a knowledge of what is just, and what is unjust?

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Alc. Do you conceive then I could not have discovered it?

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Alc. Was there not a time, when I was²⁸ in that state?

[14.] *Soc.* You speak correctly. Can you then mention the time when you did not think you knew what is just, and what is unjust? Come, (tell me,) were you making the search last year, and did you think then, or did you not, that you knew them? Answer truly now, that our conversation may not be in vain.

Alc. Nay, I did at that time think I knew.

Soc. And did you not (think) so during the third, fourth, and fifth year (preceding)?

Alc. I did.

Soc. But previously you were a boy.

Alc. True.

Soc. And even then, I know full well, that you thought you knew.

Alc. How do you know it well?

Soc. Often have I heard you, when you were a boy at school, and in other places, when you were playing at marbles, or any other game, speaking, as if you had no doubt respecting what is just and unjust, but proclaiming loudly and boldly about any of the boys who happened to be there, that he was a knave, and not just. Say I not what is true?

Alc. But, Socrates, what else was I to do, when any one did me an act of injustice?

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Alc. But, by Zeus, I was not ignorant; but I clearly knew that I was injured.

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Alc. Certainly not then.

Soc. At what time then did you think you did not know? Reflect; for ³⁰that time you will never find.³⁰

Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, I am not able to tell.

Soc. You did not then know by finding it yourself.

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Soc. But you stated however just now, that you knew, even without learning. But if you neither discovered it nor learnt it, how or whence did you know it?

Alc. But perhaps I did not answer you correctly by saying that I knew by discovering it myself. ³¹ But the case is this. I learnt it, I presume, as others do.³¹

Soc. We are now come again to the same point. From whom (did you learn it)? Tell me.

Alc. From the people.

Soc. In referring it to the people, you fly to no good instructors.

Alc. Why so? Are not they capable of teaching?

Soc. Not even the game of back-gammon (correctly) or not. [16.] And yet I think that these subjects are of less importance than those relating to what is just. Do not you think so too?

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Alc. Why so?

Soc. Because on those subjects they possess what it is necessary for good teachers to possess.

Alc. What mean you by this?

Soc. Know you not, that it is necessary for those who are to teach any thing, in the first place to know it themselves? Must they not?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And (must) not they, who know it, agree together, and not differ?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But would you say that they know the subjects in which they differ?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Of such things, then, how can they be good teachers?

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[17.] *Soc.* Well then, do the people appear to you to differ as to what is stone and wood? And should you inquire of any one, do they not (all)³² agree in the same opinion? and when they wish to take up a stone, or a piece of wood, do they not all rush to the same kind of things? and similarly (understand) all things of such kind? For I very nearly learn that you mean by this the knowing how to use the Greek language? Is it not so?

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of what kind are men and of what are horses, but what kind of horses are fit for the race, and what are not, are the people competent to teach this?

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Soc. And is this for you a sufficient proof that they do not know and are not correct ³³ teachers on these points, because they do not agree with each other on these points?

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Soc. And what, if we wished that person to know not only of what kind men are, but what are healthy and unhealthy, would the many be competent teachers for us?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. And it would be a proof to you that they are bad teachers on these points, if you saw them disagreeing.

Alc. It would.

[18.] *Soc.* What then, do the many seem to you to agree, themselves with themselves, or with each other, respecting persons and acts, just and unjust?

Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, the least of all.

Soc. What then, that they differ the most on these points?

Alc. Very much indeed.

Soc. You have never, I suppose, seen or heard of men, differing so violently, about things wholesome and not, as on that account to fight and kill one another?

Alc. Never.

Soc. But upon questions of justice and injustice, ³⁴ (how bitterly they differ) ³⁴ I know well; and if you have not seen it, you have at least heard from many others, and from Homer; for you have heard of both the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*.

Alc. Entirely, Socrates.

Soc. Are not then those poems concerning a difference as to what is just and unjust?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And did not the battles and the deaths take place amongst the Greeks and the other ³⁵ Trojans, and amongst the wooers of Penelope, and Ulysses, on account of this very difference?

³³ As the word *κρήγνον* is found only once even in Homer, and never elsewhere in Attic poetry, much less in prose, it is probably a corruption; which it would not be difficult to correct.

³⁴⁻³⁵ The words between the numerals are due to the version of Ficinus alone, "quam acriter dissentiant—"

³⁶ According to some scholars, *ἄλλος* is used pleonastically, without

Alc. You speak what is true.

Soc. And I conceive that to the Athenians, Lacedæmonians, and Bœotians who perished at Tanagra,³⁶ and to those, who afterwards³⁷ met in arms at Coronea, when³⁷ Clinias your father ended his career, a difference upon no other question than what relates to justice and injustice, caused³⁸ the deaths and battles.³⁸ Is it not so?

Alc. You are in the right.

Soc. Shall we say then that those persons had a knowledge on the question about which they differed with such vehemence, as by their contending with each other to inflict upon themselves the extreme (of mischief)?³⁹

Alc. It appears not.

[19.] *Soc.* Do you not then refer to teachers of such a kind, as you confess yourself to know nothing?

Alc. I seem (to do so).

Soc. How then is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust on questions, about which so vague are your ideas, and which you appear to have neither learnt from another, nor to have discovered yourself?

Alc. From what you say, it is not likely.

Soc. See you again this, that you have not spoken, Alcibiades, correctly?

Alc. What is it?

Soc. In that you stated that I said so.

Alc. What, did not you say that I know nothing of what is just and unjust?

Soc. Not I, indeed.

Alc. But did I (say it)?

Soc. Yes.

Alc. How so?

any definite meaning. But here, instead of ἄλλοις, Plato wrote, I suspect, Ἰλιῦσι, of which Τρωσι was the explanation. Respecting the loss or corruption of Ἰλιῦσι, see my note on Crito, § 14, n. 18.

³⁶ On this battle see Thucyd. i. 108, Diodor. Sic. xi. 81.

³⁷⁻³⁷ I have adopted the reading preserved by Proclus alone, ἐν Κορωνείᾳ συμβᾶσιν ὄντι, in lieu of ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, ἐν οἷς— On the battle of Coronea, see Thucyd. i. 113.

³⁸⁻³⁸ As the deaths would follow, not precede, the battles, Plato adopted perhaps this ὕστερον πρότερον to avoid the repetition of the collocation αἱ μάχαι καὶ οἱ θάνατοι, found just above.

³⁹ Here again Proclus has alone preserved the words τῶν κατῶν, wanting in all the MSS. of Plato.

Soc. You will see it in this way, should I ask you about one and two, which is the greater number, you will say that two is.

Alc. I shall.

Soc. By how much.

Alc. By one.

Soc. Which of us then is the person who says that two is more than one by one?

Alc. It is I.

Soc. Did not I ask the question, and did not you answer it?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. On these points, then, who appears to assert? Is it I who ask, or thou who answerest?

Alc. I.

Soc. What then, were I to ask how many (and what)⁴⁰ are the letters in "Socrates," and you were to state, which of us (would be) the teller?

Alc. Myself.

Soc. Come then, tell me in one word, whenever a question and answer take place, who is it that asserts? he who asks, or he who answers?

Alc. He who answers, Socrates, as it seems to me.

Soc. Now through the whole of the conversation⁴¹ was not I the party asking?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And you the party answering?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, which of us two said what was asserted?

Alc. From what has been admitted, Socrates, I appear to be the party.

[20.] *Soc.* Has it not been said that Alcibiades, the handsome son of Clinias, knew nothing about what is just and unjust, but thought (he knew); and that he was about to go to a public meeting to give the Athenians advice upon questions of which he knew nothing? Is it not so?

⁴⁰ I have adopted Schleiermacher's *πόσα καὶ ποῖα*, supported by the parallel passage in Xenoph. M. S. iv. 4, 7, *ὅλον περὶ γραμμάτων, ἅν τις ἔρηται σε, πόσα καὶ ποῖα Σωκράτους ἴσθιν*: and so Buttmann in ed. 2, although he had rejected it in ed. 1.

⁴¹ Although the three oldest MSS. offer *τοῦ λόγου* after *διὰ παντός*, yet Buttmann, with whom Stalbaum agrees, would supply *χρόνου*, similar to "semper" in Ficinus.

Alc. So it appears.

Soc. The saying then of Euripides has come to pass, Alcibiades. You seem very nearly to have heard this ⁴² from yourself, and not from me.⁴³ For it is not I, who say this, but yourself; and vainly do you lay the blame on me. ⁴³ And indeed you speak correctly. For mad is the endeavour, O best of men, which you have in your thoughts of attempting to teach what you do not know and have neglected to learn.⁴³

Alc. I conceive, Socrates, that the Athenians, and the other Greeks, seldom deliberate whether things are more just or unjust; for these things they think are plain enough. Dismissing then (the consideration) of such points, they look to what will be most conducive to those who act. For I imagine that justice and interest are not the same things; since to many it has conduced to their interest to have done things very unjust, while to others there has been no advantage in having acted with justice.

[21.] *Soc.* Then if justice happens to be a thing ever so much of one kind, and interest of another, do you not surely think you know what is a man's interest, and why it is so?

Alc. What prevents me, Socrates? unless you ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it myself.

Soc. What is this you are doing? If you say any thing not correctly, and it happens to be possible to prove it so by the same arguments as before, you fancy forsooth that you ought to hear something fresh, and other arguments; as if the former had been worn out like dresses, and you could no longer put them on, unless one should bring you a proof⁴⁴.

⁴²⁻⁴³ Muretus, in Var. Lect. v. 20, was the first to remark that Plato alluded to σοῦ ράδ', οὐκ ἐμοῦ κλέεις, in Hippol. 352.

⁴³⁻⁴⁴ I have adopted with Stalbaum the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Buttmann; to which he was led by the version of Ficinus, and a remark of Proclus.

⁴⁴ In lieu of *τεκμήριον*, Cornarius suggested *σκενάριον*; while Ast, with whom Buttmann agrees, would expel the word as an interpolation, especially as it is not acknowledged by Ficinus. On the other hand, Nurnberger and Stalbaum conceive that there is a kind of mixed metaphor, partly correct, and partly incorrect. Unless I am greatly mistaken, in *τεκμήριον* lies hid τὸ τεκμηρίου μηχανόμενον, by which was meant what we call the staple of flax or wool drawn out, as shown by Hesych., Μη-ρυνόμενον ἱερυνόμενον: while, as regards the metaphor, it may be compared with the passage quoted by Porson in his Letters to Travis, "To draw out the thread of verbosity finer than the staple of the argument."

clear and without a stain. But bidding farewell to the quick sallies of your speech, I will nevertheless ask you from whence have you learnt, and how do you know, what is to a person's interest, and who was your teacher? and all the former points I now put in a single question. For it is evident that you will come to the same point; nor will you be able to show either that, by having discovered it, you know what is to a person's interest, or that you have learnt it. [22.] But since you give yourself airs, and would not pleasantly have a taste of the same argument again, I bid farewell to the question, whether you do or do not know what is for the interest of the Athenians. But whether justice and interest are the same, or different, why have you not shown, by putting, if you wish it, questions to me, as I did to you? or, if (you had rather) go through the subject in a speech at your discretion.

Alc. But I know not, Socrates, if I should be able to go through it before you.

Soc. But, my good friend, suppose me to be the assembly and people. For there it will be necessary for you to persuade every individual. Is it not so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Does it not belong, then, to the same person to be able to persuade each individual, and many met together, about what he knows? just as a teacher of grammar is wont⁴⁵ to persuade one and many on the question of letters.

Alc. True.

Soc. And will not on the question of numbers the same person persuade both one and many?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And will not he, who knows, be an arithmetician?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And are not you likewise able to persuade many on those points, on which you (persuade) one?

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. But these subjects it is plain are what you know.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Does then the person in a meeting like this differ from the orator before the people in any thing else, than that the

⁴⁵ I have adopted *ἐπειθε* from many MSS. in lieu of *πειθε*. For the imperfect is sometimes used to convey the idea of a custom.

one endeavours to persuade persons collected together, but the other persons taken singly.

Alc. It appears nearly so.

23.] *Soc.* Come then, since it appears that it belongs to the same person to persuade many and one, practise your skill on myself, and endeavour to prove that what is just is sometimes not to a person's interest.

Alc. You are very saucy, Socrates.

Soc. And I am now from my sauciness about to persuade you the very contrary to what you are unwilling (to persuade) me.

Alc. Say on.

Soc. Do you only answer the questions asked.

Alc. Not so; but do you say yourself.

Soc. Why so? Do you not wish to be persuaded as much as possible?

Alc. By all means.

Soc. Would you not, if you said that such was the case, be entirely persuaded of it?

Alc. So it seems to me.

Soc. Answer then; and if you do not hear from yourself that what is just is to a person's interest, do not believe any one else who says so.

Alc. Not at all. But I must answer. For I do not think I shall come to any hurt.

Soc. For you are like a diviner.⁴⁶ Tell me then. Say you that of things, that are just, some are to a person's interest, and some not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. What then, that some of them are beautiful, and some not?

Alc. Why ask you this?

Soc. Whether⁴⁷ has any one seemed to you to act basely indeed, but justly?

Alc. Not to me at least.

Soc. But (you think) that all actions that are just are honourable?

⁴⁶ To indicate a sneer Dobree, in *Adversar.* i. p. 153, suggested *μαρτυροῦς γ' ἂν*—in lieu of *μαρτυροῦς γὰρ*—

⁴⁷ Since *εἰ* is never used in a direct interrogation, we must, says Stalbaum, supply *ἴσως*.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But what, as to actions, that are honourable? Whether are all good, or some are so and some not?

Alc. I indeed, Socrates, conceive that some honourable actions are evil.

Soc. And that some base actions are good?

Alc. Yes.

[24.] *Soc.* Do you mean such actions as these? For instance, many men by aiding in battle a friend or relation have received wounds and died; whilst others, by not aiding when they ought, have come off safe and sound.

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. Such aid⁴⁸ then you call honourable with respect to their endeavour to save those whom they ought. Now this is fortitude, is it not?

Alc. It is.

Soc. But (you call it) evil with respect to the death and wounds.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is not fortitude one thing, and death another?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. To aid a friend then is not honourable and evil in the same respect?

Alc. It appears it is not.

Soc. Consider now, whether it be not good so far as it is honourable, as in the present case. For, with respect to fortitude, you acknowledged that such aid is an honourable act. Consider then this very thing, namely fortitude, whether it be a good or an evil; and consider it in this way. Which would you choose to have, good things or evil?

Alc. Good things.

Soc. And would not (you choose) the best things the most?

Alc. (Yes).⁴⁹

Soc. And would you not choose to be deprived of them the least?

Alc. How not?

⁴⁸ Stalbaum here refers the reader to Xenoph. M. S. iii. 8. 5—7, as exhibiting sentiments of Socrates very similar to those put into his mouth by Plato.

⁴⁹ Between *μάλιστα* and *καὶ* Dobree, in *Adversar.* i. p. 155, proposed to insert *AA. καὶ*: which Stalbaum has approved of, and I have adopted.

Soc. How say you then of fortitude? at what price would you choose to be deprived of it?

Alc. I would not accept even of life to be a coward.

Soc. To you, then, it seems that cowardice is the extreme of evil.

Alc. It does, at least to me.

Soc. On a par, as it seems, with death.

Alc. So I say.

[25.] *Soc.* Are not life and fortitude the most opposite to death and cowardice?

Alc. They are.

Soc. And would you choose to have those the most, and these the least?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is it because you deem those the best of things, and these the worst?

Alc. For this very reason.⁵⁰

Soc. To aid, then, our friends in war, in so far as it is honourable, with regard to the working out a good action, namely, that of fortitude, you call an honourable thing.

Alc. Yes, I appear (to do so).

Soc. But with regard to the working out an evil action, namely, that of death, (you call it) an evil thing.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is it not then just to denominate every action thus? If, in so far as it works out an evil, you call it evil, ought it not to be called good, in so far as it works out a good?

Alc. It seems so to me.

Soc. In so far, then, as it is good, is it not honourable? but in so far as it is evil, (is it not) base?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. In saying then that the aiding our friends in a war is honourable indeed, but yet evil, you speak in not a different way than if you called⁵¹ it good indeed, but yet evil.

⁵⁰ Stobæus, in ix. p. 123, reads πάντ' γε: and adds, ΣΟΚ. ἐν τοῖς ἀπείροισι ἀγαθὸν οὐδ' ἡγρὶ ἀνδρίαν εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς κακίοις θάνατον. ΔΔ. ἐγχευε: which Buttmann considers to be genuine; but Stalbaum an interpolation.

⁵¹ Instead of προσίπτε, Etwall and Sydenham suggested προσείπτε, similar to "dixisses" in Ficinus; and so three MSS. collated subsequently. The restoration is attributed to Wolf by Buttmann and Stalbaum.

Alc. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak the truth.

Soc. Nothing then which is honourable, so far as it is honourable, is an evil; nor is any thing which is base, so far as it is base, a good.

Alc. Evidently it is not.

[26.] *Soc.* Consider now further in this way. Whoever acts honourably does he not act well too?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And are not they, who act well, fortunate?⁵²

Alc. How not?

Soc. And are they not happy through the possession of good things?

Alc. Most certainly.

Soc. And they possess these good things by acting well.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. To do well then is a good?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And is the doing well an honourable thing also?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Therefore the same thing has again been shown to us to be both honourable and good?

Alc. It seems so.

Soc. Whatever then we shall find to be an honourable thing, we shall find it to be a good thing likewise,⁵³ according to this reasoning at least.

Alc. It must be so.

Soc. What then, do good things conduce to one's interest, or not?

Alc. They do.

Soc. Do you remember now how we agreed about things that are just?

Alc. I suppose (you mean) that they, who do what is just, must of necessity do what is honourable.

⁵² The whole of the argument following turns, as remarked by Stalbaum, upon the ambiguity of the expression εὖ πράττειν, which means either "to act well towards another," or "to do well oneself." There is a similar ambiguity in Charmid. p. 17. 2, A. § 42, where see Heindorf. Nurnberger refers to Aristot. Eth. iv. τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταύτην ἐπολαμβάνουσι τῇ εὐδαιμονίῃ.

⁵³ Instead of καλὸν τε καὶ—Sydenham was the first to propose καλὸν, καὶ—suggested by "idem quoque bonum" in Ficinus. The restoration, confirmed by MSS. and Olympiodorus, is attributed to Schneider by Stalbaum.

Soc. And that they, (who do) what is honourable, (do) what is good?

Alc. We did.

Soc. And that good things conduce to one's interest?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Things then that are just, Alcibiades, conduce to one's interest.

Alc. It seems so.

Soc. Well then, are not you the asserter of this, and I the questioner?

Alc. I appear so, as it seems.

Soc. If then a person rises up to give advice to the people either of Athens or Peparethus,⁵⁴ conceiving that he knows what is just and unjust, and should say that what is just is sometimes an evil, would you not laugh at him? since you too happen yourself to be the person asserting, that the same things are both just and conducive to one's interest.

[27.] *Alc.* Now, by the gods, Socrates, I know not what to say; but I am really like a man in an absurd position. For while you are asking questions, at one time I am of one opinion, and at another time of another.

Soc. Are you then ignorant, my friend, what condition you are in?

Alc. Entirely.

Soc. Think you, then, that if a person were to ask you, Have you two eyes or three? and two hands or four? or put any other question of such a kind, you would give one answer at one time, and another at another time? or always the same?

Alc. I have indeed some fear for myself; but I think I should give the same answer.

Soc. Is not the reason, because you know?

Alc. I think so.

Soc. Of matters then, where you give contrary answers unwillingly, it is evident that you know nothing.

⁵⁴ Of this island, now called Piperi, one of the Cyclades, and near to Scyrus, the earliest notice is found in Soph. Phil. 551, where it is described as *εὐβορεῦς*, and *εὐβορεῖς* by Heraclides of Pontus. Its wine was however of an inferior quality, as we learn from Athenæus, i. p. 29, F. The place is here mentioned as being of little note, and therefore properly opposed to the better-known Athens.

Alc. Probably so.

Soc. Do you not say that about things just and unjust, honourable and base, good and evil, to one's interest and not, you waver in your answer? Is it not then evident, that through your not knowing these subjects, you waver respecting them?

Alc. (It is plain) to myself at least.

[28.] *Soc.* Is not then this the case? When a man does not know a thing, must not his mind waver respecting it?

Alc. How not?

Soc. Well then, do you know by what means you can mount up to heaven?

Alc. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. Does your opinion waver on this subject?

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. Do you know the reason? Or shall I tell it?

Alc. Tell it.

Soc. It is, my friend, because, not knowing, you do not think you know.

Alc. How say you this?

Soc. Do you, in common (with me), look (at the matter). About the questions, which you do not know, and are convinced you do not know, do you waver? For instance, in preparing sauces, you surely know that you know nothing.

Alc. Perfectly.

Soc. Do you then form any opinion respecting them, how it is necessary to prepare them, and then waver (in your opinions)? or do you commit them to the person who does know?

Alc. In this way (I act).

Soc. And what, if you were sailing in a vessel, would you form any opinion, whether it was necessary to bring the rudder inwards or outwards, and waver as a person knowing nothing? Or would you commit it to the pilot, and keep yourself quiet?

Alc. (I should commit it) to the pilot.

Soc. In matters then of which you are ignorant, you do not waver, at least if you know that you know nothing.

Alc. I do not seem (to do so).

[29.] *Soc.* Do you perceive then, that errors in acting arise through this very ignorance, namely, in a person thinking he knows, when he does not know.

Alc. How say you this again?

Soc. Whenever we think we know what we are doing, then we surely endeavour to do it.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But when persons think they do not know, then they hand over the matters to others.

Alc. How not?

Soc. Such then of those, who do not know, live free from mistakes through their committing the management of such matters to others.

Alc. True.

Soc. Who then are they, who make mistakes? for certainly they are not the knowing.

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Since then they are neither the knowing, nor those of the ignorant, who know that they are ignorant, are any other persons left than those who are ignorant, but fancy that they are knowing?

Alc. None other than these.⁵⁴

Soc. This very ignorance, then, is the cause of their evils,⁵⁵ and an absence of learning worthy of reproach.⁵⁶

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. When therefore it relates to things of greatest moment, is it not then the most mischievous and disgraceful?

Alc. Yes, the most so.

Soc. Well then, can you mention things of greater moment than the just, and honourable, and good, and conducing to one's interest?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Do you not say that upon these subjects you waver?

Alc. I do.

Soc. But if you are wavering, is it not evident from the previous (reasoning), that not only you are ignorant of subjects of the greatest moment, but that you think that, although not knowing, you do know them?

Alc. I seem to be nearly so.

⁵⁴ So Sydenham; as if he wished to read *Οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οὗτοι*, instead of *Οὐκ ἄλλ' οὗτοι*. Ficinus has, "Non alii, sed isti," i. e. *Οὐκ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' οὗτοι*.

⁵⁵⁻⁵⁶ The words between the numerals are scarcely suited to the train of argument.

[30.] *Soc.* Ho, ho! Alcibiades! In what a state are you suffering! such as I am loth to name; but however, since we are alone, it must be mentioned. You are dwelling, O best of men, in a state of ignorance, the most disgraceful; since the reasoning brings a charge ⁵⁶ against you, and you are bearing witness against yourself, ⁵⁶ in that you are rushing to affairs of state, before you have been taught (at all).⁵⁷ But this not you alone have suffered, but the majority likewise of those, who manage the affairs of the state, except a few, and perhaps your guardian Pericles.

Alc. He, however, is reported, Socrates, to have become wise, not from himself, but through his intercourse with many wise men, and Pythocleides ⁵⁸ and Anaxagoras; ⁵⁹ and even at his time of life he is, on this very account, intimate with Damon.

Soc. What then, have you ever seen a person wise in any thing, and yet unable to make another person wise in the same things as himself; for instance, he, who taught you grammar, was clever himself, and he has made you so, and whomsoever he wished of other persons likewise. Is it not so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And will not you too, who have learnt from him, be able (to teach) another?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And as a harp-master, and a teacher of gymnastic exercises, in like manner?

Alc. Perfectly.

[31.] *Soc.* This then is assuredly a fair proof that they, who know any thing whatever, do really know it, when they

⁵⁶—⁵⁶ I have adopted *καταμαρτυρεῖ*, preserved here by Olympiodorus, as a various reading for *κατηγορεῖ*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ, καὶ καταμαρτυρεῖ σὺ αὐτοῦ*.

⁵⁷ I have translated, as if *τι* had dropt out before *παιδευθῆναι*.

⁵⁸ According to the Scholiast, Pythocleides was a Pythagorean, whose disciple was Agathocles, the teacher of Lamprocles, of whom Damon was the pupil. He is called a Cean in Protagor. p. 316, E. § 20. The object of the sect was to teach moral and political truths under the mask of musical science. Of the nature of their political tenets some idea may be formed by knowing, as related by Plutarch in Pericles, § 4, that Damon was expelled from Athens as a meddler in state affairs, and a friend to arbitrary power. S.

⁵⁹ On Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Pericles in astronomy and natural philosophy, see Valckenaer in Diatrib. p. 34.

are able to produce ⁶⁰ another person knowing it likewise.⁶⁰

Alc. So it seems to me.

Soc. Well then, can you mention any one whom Pericles has made clever, beginning with his own sons?

Alc. But what, if the sons⁶¹ of Pericles were silly fellows, Socrates?

Soc. Clinias, then, your brother?

Alc. Why should you mention Clinias,⁶² a man out of his senses?

Soc. Since then Clinias is a madman, and the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, what reason shall we assign in the case of yourself, for his overlooking you, when you are in such a state?

Alc. I am, I fancy, myself the cause, by not giving my mind (to him).

Soc. But of the other Athenians or foreigners, mention either a slave or a freeman, who can show a reason for his having become wiser through his intercourse with Pericles; as I can mention Pythodorus⁶³ the son of Isolochus, and Callias⁶⁴ the son of Calliades through Zeno; to whom each of them paid a hundred minæ,⁶⁵ and thus became clever and in high repute.

Alc. By Zeus, I cannot.

[32.] *Soc.* Be it so. What then do you intend respecting yourself? whether to leave yourself as you now are, or to pay some regard to yourself?

Alc. ⁶⁶Let the consultation, Socrates, be common to both.⁶⁶

⁶⁰⁻⁶¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek *ἄλλον—ἐπιστάμενον*. But Ficinus has more correctly "alium quoque doctum ab ipsis," i. e. "another person taught by them."

⁶¹ These were Paralus and Xanthippus; see Meno, § 33; both of whom were carried off by the plague, during the life-time of their father, as we learn from Xenophon, M. S. iii. 5.

⁶² On this Clinias see Protagor. p. 320, A. § 29.

⁶³ This is the party at whose house Plato lays the scene of the Parmenides.—S.

⁶⁴ This Callias commanded the army sent by the Athenians for the recovery of Potidæa; but was slain in the first battle before that city. See Thucydides, i. 61—63. S.

⁶⁵ In English money, £322 18s. 4d., the same sum that Protagoras and Gorgias demanded for their instructions in sophistry. S.

⁶⁶ In lieu of *κοινῇ βουλῇ ὡς Σώκρατες*, where the dative is without

For ⁶⁷I have something⁶⁷ in my mind, while you are speaking, and agree to it. For they who manage the affairs of the state, seem, except a few, to be uneducated.

Soc. And what then?

Alc. If they had been educated, it would have been requisite for the person attempting to be their antagonist, to go against them, as if they were prize-fighters, after having learnt and practised (the science). But now, since they proceed to state affairs raw and undisciplined, what need is there for a person to exercise himself, and by learning to give himself any trouble? For I well know, that by my natural abilities, I shall be very much their superior.

Soc. Ho! ho! thou best of men, what a mighty speech is this thou hast spoken. How unworthy of your personal qualities, and of the other advantages belonging to you!

Alc. What especially (do you mean), Socrates, and why do you say this?

Soc. I feel greatly hurt in behalf of yourself, and of the love I bear you.

Alc. How so?

Soc. In that you think there is a fitting contest for yourself against the men here.

Alc. Against whom then?

Soc. This forsooth is a question for him to ask, who fancies himself to be a high-minded man!

Alc. How say you? Is not my contest with these very persons?

[33.] *Soc.* If you had any thought of steering a trireme about to engage in a sea-fight, would it be sufficient for you to be superior to your fellow-sailors in the art of steering? or would you think that this ought to be at hand, and you would look to those in reality your antagonists, but not as you now do to your fellow-combatants? to whom it is assuredly⁶⁸ meet

regimen; I have translated as if the Greek were *κοινή βουλή ἴστω, Σώκρατες*, similar to *ἴστω κοινή βουλή* in *Crito*, p. 49, D. § 10, and *κοινή γὰρ ἴσται ἢ πύστις* in *Lach.* § 27.

⁶⁷—⁶⁷ The Greek is *καίτοι ἐννοῶ*, where Stephens proposed to read *καί τι ἐννοῶ*. He might have suggested *καί γὰρ τι*—similar to “*etenim*” in *Ficinus*. *Stalbaum* indeed says that *ἐννοῶ* is united to the genitive *εἰπόντος σου*, in *Rep.* ii. p. 370. But there, as here, it is the genitive absolute.

⁶⁸ Instead of *δεῖ* in *Ald.* and *Steph.* the two *Basil* edd. have *δὲ*, adopted

for you to be so much the superior, that they ought never to deem themselves fit to contend against (you),⁶⁹ but, through their being held in little esteem, to contend merely with you against the enemy; if indeed you are thinking of exhibiting any exploit in reality honourable, and worthy of yourself and of your country.

Alc. Of such an act I am indeed thinking.

Soc. Is it then very worthy of you to rest contented, if you are a better man than your fellow-soldiers merely,⁷⁰ and not to look to the leaders of your opponents,⁷¹ considering if perchance you shall become somewhat better than they, and exercising yourself in reflecting upon the things relating to them.⁷¹

Alc. Who are the persons, of whom you are speaking, Socrates?

Soc. Know you not, that the state is constantly at war with the Lacedæmonians, and the great king?⁷²

Alc. True.

Soc. If then you have it in your mind to be the leader of this state, would you not think rightly in thinking that you will have to contend against the kings of Lacedæmon and Persia?

Alc. You are very near to speaking the truth?

[34.] *Soc.* Nay, but, my good man, must you not look to Midias, the quail-feeder,⁷³ and others of that kind, who attempt

by Sydenham, suggested by Heusde, and subsequently found in nearly all the MSS.

⁶⁹ In *συναγωνιζέσθαι*, found in three MSS., lies hid *οἱ ἀνταγωνιζέσθαι*, required by the balance of the sentence, as Schleiermacher was the first to perceive.

⁷⁰ Instead of *στρατιωτῶν*, Sydenham suggested *συστρατιωτῶν*, to answer to *συναγωνιστῶν* just before.

⁷¹ The Greek is *ὅποτε ἐκείνων βελτίων γίγονας σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσκοῦντα πρὸς ἐκείνους*: where Sydenham was the first to suggest *ὅπως* for *ὅποτε*. Stalbaum also would read *ὅπως ἂν*, and adopt *γίνοιο*, found in three MSS. But *ὅπως ἂν* could not be united to an optative. Heindorf proposed *ὅπη τε—γίνοιο*. But the optative could have reference only to a past act. Plato wrote, I suspect, *εἰ ποτε, ἐκείνων βελτίων τι γενήσεται, σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσκοῦντα τὰ πρὸς ἐκείνους*, as I have translated.

⁷² Such was the title of the king of Persia. See at Meno, § 11.

⁷³ What cock-fighting was once in England, quail-fighting was at Athens; for small as the bird is, it is, like the male partridge and robin, very pugnacious. According to Pollux, the birds were placed in a circular pit, and the one that drove his opponent out of the circle was considered

to manage the affairs of the state, and still wear, as the women would say, the slave-like cut of hair⁷⁴ in their souls, through their want of a liberal education; nor having as yet thrown it off, but acting still the part of barbarians,⁷⁵ they have come to the city, to fawn upon, and not to rule it. ⁷⁶Ought you then to look to these men, of whom I am speaking, and to disregard yourself,⁷⁶ and neither to learn what is closely connected with learning, when you are about to enter into a contest so great, nor to practise what requires practice, and, after being furnished with every kind of preparation, to proceed thus to the affairs of state?

Alc. Indeed, Socrates, you seem to me to say what is true. I fancy, however, that the Lacedæmonian generals and the king of Persia differ in nothing from other persons.

Soc. But consider, thou best of men, of what kind is this fancy of yours.

Alc. With respect to what?

Soc. In the first place, whether you fancy you would take the more care of yourself, when feeling a fear, and fancying them to be formidable, or not?

Alc. It is evident, if I fancied them formidable.

the conqueror; this was called *ὄρνυγομαχία*: but the *ὄρνυγοκοπία* consisted in striking with the finger the head of the bird, or plucking from it a feather; and the one that endured the torture without flinching, won the sum staked by their respective owners. To this kind of sport Midias was so addicted as to be called by the name of the bird, as we learn from Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 1297.

⁷⁴ According to Olympiodorus, whose Scholium was first published by Casaubon on Persius, v. 116, *Παροιμία ἴστι γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλευθερουμένων δοῦλων καὶ ἐπιμενόντων ἐν τῇ δουλοπρεπείᾳ*, (not *δουλείᾳ*, as it is absurdly printed,) *ὅτι ἔχεις τὴν ἀνδραποδῶδη τρίχα ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, τοῦτ' ἴστιν, ἐπὶ τὴν δουλικὴν ἔξιν* (printed *τρίχα*, which is explaining *idem per idem*) *ἔχεις*. "The women had a saying, which they used to slaves made free, but still retaining the manners which belonged to slaves—You wear your slavish hair on your head still—that is, You still retain your slavish habits." It was applied, it seems, by the Athenian ladies, to men whom they saw ill-bred and illiterate. So Sydenham; who might have quoted Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 911, *ἔπειτα τῇδὶ* (vulg. *δῆτα*) *δοῦλος ὦν κόμην ἔχεις*, to prove that slaves were not permitted to wear their hair hanging down.

⁷⁵ It would seem from hence that the family of Midias was of foreign extraction.

^{76—76} By taking, with Sydenham, the sentence interrogatively, we get rid of the necessity of expelling *δὲ*, with Stephens and Bekker, or of changing it into *δὴ*, as suggested by Etwall and Buttmann.

Soc. Do you fancy then that you would sustain any injury by taking care of yourself?

Alc. Not at all; but be benefited even greatly.

Soc. This fancy then of yours has this one evil of so great a kind.

Alc. You say the truth.

[35.] *Soc.* Consider then if there be not probably a second, namely, that it is false.

Alc. How so?

Soc. Whether is it probable that the better natures⁷⁷ are produced from noble races, or not?⁷⁸

Alc. It is evident, from the noble.

Soc. And (is it not probable that) the well-born, if they are brought up well, will thus become perfect in virtue?

Alc. Necessarily so.

Soc. Let us consider then in comparing our condition with theirs, whether the kings of Lacedæmon and of Persia appear to be sprung from inferior races. Now know we not that the former are descendants of Hercules, and the latter of Achæmenes?⁷⁹ and that both the family of Hercules, and that of Achæmenes, are carried up to Perseus the son of Jupiter?⁸⁰

Alc. And my family, Socrates, (is carried up) to Eurysaces; and that of Eurysaces⁸¹ to Zeus.

Soc. And mine, my noble Alcibiades, is to Dædalus, and his to Vulcan, the son of Zeus.⁸² But in the families of the

⁷⁷ Instead of *φῆσεις*, found in only one MS., the rest have *φύσεις*: which Sydenham elicited before Heusde from "naturas" in Ficinus.

⁷⁸ So Aristotle in *Polit.* iii. 8, *Βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων εὐγενεῖα γὰρ ἴσθιν ἀπρὸ γένους*. "It is reasonable for the better persons to come from the better. For to be well-born is the virtue of a race." So Horace too says, "*Fortes creantur fortibus*." S. See *Menexen.* § 5, and *Cratyl.* § 24.

⁷⁹ On this Achæmenes, see *Herodot.* vii. 11, and 150, and the Commentators on *Horace*, *Od.* iii. 1, 44; *Epod.* xiii. 12.

⁸⁰ As Hercules, says Sydenham, was never supposed to be descended from Perseus, it is evident that the passage is corrupt. He would therefore insert *εἰς τὸν Δία* after *τὸ δὲ Ἡρακλίου τὸ γένος*—a suggestion which, strange to say, has been overlooked by every subsequent scholar.

⁸¹ This Eurysaces was the son of Ajax, by whom he was so called, from being the heir to the broad shield of the hero of Salamis.

⁸² With this ridicule of the folly of tracing back a long line of ancestors, may be compared something similar in a mediæval Latin *jeu d'esprit*, under the title of "*Solyman and Marcolfus*:" which it were easy to prove was written originally by Socrates in Greek.

other parties, beginning from themselves, are kings sprung from kings carried up to Zeus; some of Argos and Lacedæmon, and the others of Persia for ever, and often of all Asia, as they are at present: whereas we and our fathers are only private individuals. If then it were requisite to exhibit your ancestors in the person of Eurysaces, and Salamis as your country, or Ægina as that of the still more remote Æacus, of what ridicule do you fancy you would not have to pay the debt in the presence of Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes? [36.] Consider besides, whether we are not inferior both in the pride of birth, and in the rest of our bringing up. Know you not how great are the advantages attendant upon the kings of Lacedæmon? whose wives are watched in public by the Ephori,⁸³ in order that as far as possible,⁸⁴ no king may be secretly begotten except by one of the family of the Heracleidæ; while the Persian king is so greatly our superior, that not a single person has the least suspicion that a king can be born from any other than a king.⁸⁵ The consort, therefore, of the king is under no guard but that imposed by her own fears. Further, when the eldest son is born to him, who is then the ruler, all those in the (palace) of the king over whom he rules, have a feast, and subsequently at another period the whole of Asia makes a sacrifice and feast, on the birth-day of the king. But when we were born, Alcibiades, "our very neighbours even little knew it," as the comic poet⁸⁶ says. After this the child is brought up, not by some nurse at a little price, but by the eunuchs,⁸⁷ who are considered the best about the

⁸³ These were five in number, and formed the privy council of the state at home; while the kings had little power, except at the head of an army on foreign service.

⁸⁴ This limitation is designedly introduced in a conversation with Alcibiades; who was reported, despite the watch kept by the Ephori, to have prevailed, by the present of 4000 gold Darics, over the virtue of Timæa, the wife of Agis, and to have had a son by her, called Leotychidas, as we learn from Plutarch.

⁸⁵ Such is what the sense requires; but it can hardly be obtained from the Greek *ἐξ αὐτοῦ*.

⁸⁶ According to the Scholiast and Olympiodorus, the comic poet was the namesake of the philosopher; and the verse was, *Ἐμοῦ γαμοῦντος δ', οὐδὲ γέινω ἦσθ' ἔοικε*, as Dacier elicited from Plutarch in Phocion, § 30, with which has been compared the expression in Cicero, Cat. ii. 10, "corruant; sed ita, ut non modo civitas, sed ne vicini quidem proximi sentiant."

⁸⁷ We learn from Herodotus, that eunuchs were highly valued at the

king's person; on whom the duty is imposed of taking care of the royal infant in other matters, and of contriving how he may become as handsome as possible in his person, by moulding his limbs,⁸⁰ and making them straight; and they who do this (well⁸⁰) are held in great honour. [37.] When the young princes are seven years old, they are placed upon horseback, and frequent the schools of the riding-masters, and commence going a hunting. At fourteen years of age they, who are called the royal preceptors, take the boy under their care. Now these are chosen out from such as are deemed the most excellent of the Persians, men in the prime of life, four in number, excelling (severally) in wisdom, justice, temperance, and fortitude. The first of these instructs the youth in the learning of the Magi⁸¹ according to Zoroaster,⁸¹ the son of Oromazes,⁸²—now by this learning is meant the worship of the gods,⁸³—and likewise in the art of kingly government. The person, excelling in justice, (teaches him) to be true in words and deeds through the whole of life. He who excels in temperance, to be governed by not a single pleasure of any kind, in order that he may acquire the habits of a freeman, and be really a king, by governing first his own appetites, instead of being their slave. But the person who excels in fortitude, makes him fearless and intrepid, since he, who fears, is a slave. But, over you,

court of Persia, and purchased at a great price, on account of their reputation for fidelity in all things committed to their trust. S.

⁸⁰ According to Olympiodorus, the nose was made aquiline, as being the mark of a kingly mind.

⁸¹ So Sydenham; as if he wished to read *ταὺτ' εὖ δρῶντες* in lieu of *ταῦτα δρῶντες*.

⁸² On the learning of the Magi, see Hemsterhuis on Lucian. *Necyom.* § 6. It was perhaps from this passage of Plato that Cicero asserted in *Divinat. i.*, that no person could be a king in Persia, "*qui non ante Magorum disciplinam scientiamque perceperit.*"

⁸³ Who Zoroaster was, and when he lived, is unknown. According to Oriental scholars, the word means "star-gazer." Hence one might be led to conjecture that Z is "the," *ὦπο*, "see," and *αστρ*, "star." In *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, t. xxxix. p. 689 and foll., there is an elaborate account of the religion introduced into Persia by Zoroaster.

⁸⁴ According to Plutarch, in *Isis and Osiris*, p. 369, *Ὀρομάζης* was the name given by the Persians to the author of all good.

⁸⁵ See Porphyry *Περὶ Ἀποχῆς*, iv. p. 165, and Apuleius in *Apolog.* p. 290, ed. Elmenh., quoted by Stalbaum.

Alcibiades, Pericles appointed as a preceptor, Zopyrus of Thrace, who was, through old age, the most useless of his domestics. I could recount to you the rest of the bringing up and instruction of your antagonists, if it were not a work of time; and moreover, these are sufficient to show all the rest that follow after them. But of your birth, Alcibiades, and nurture, and instruction, or any thing else whatever, there is a care to not one, so to say, of the Athenians; unless there happens to be some admirer of you. But if on the other hand you would turn your eyes to the wealth of the Persian kings, and their luxurious living and apparel, and the trailing of the trains of their dresses,⁹⁴ and the anointing of themselves with perfumes, and the multitude of their retinue and servants, and the rest of their delicate living, you would be ashamed of yourself, on perceiving how greatly you fall short of them. [38.] And if, on the other hand, you would turn your eyes to the temperance and orderly conduct of the Lacedæmonians, their easy deportment and mildness of disposition, and high-mindedness, and regularity, and manly bearing, and endurance under suffering, and their love of labour, and of contending, and of honour, you would deem yourself a child in all these points. But if you turn your thoughts at all to your wealth, and fancy that on this point you are something, let not this be left unsaid by us, if perchance you are sensible in what rank you stand. If you are willing then to look to the wealth of the Lacedæmonians, you will know that the lands here fall far short of those there. For the land which they possess in their own country, and in Messenia, is such, that not one of those here would contend (to be inferior),⁹⁵ either in quantity or quality, or in the possession of slaves of other kinds,⁹⁶ and of those called Helotes,⁹⁷ and of

⁹⁴ This was considered a mark of pride or effeminacy, in which not only Alcibiades indulged himself, but his son likewise. See Wyttenbach on Plutarch, S. N. V. p. 28.

⁹⁵ Buttmann was the first to remark, that something had dropt out here; for he found in the version of Ficinus, "nemo utique dubitaret, quin—nostros exsuperet." But he did not see that *ἐλαττωῦσθαι* had probably dropt out between *τῶδε* and *πλήθει*.

⁹⁶ By these were meant such as were acquired by purchase. S.

⁹⁷ The Helotes, properly so called, were descended from the ancient inhabitants of Helos, a maritime town in Laconia, near the mouth of the river Eurotas. On the town being taken by the Heraclidæ, the Helotes were compelled to till the lands of their Dorian conquerors, as their vas-

horses, and such other cattle as pasture in Messenia. [39.] But to all this I bid a farewell. But as to gold and silver, there is not so much amongst all the Greeks, as there is at Lacedæmon in private hands. For already during many generations the metals have been coming thither from all the Greeks, and often too from the Barbarians;⁹⁸ but there is no going out to any place;⁹⁹ but really, according to the fable of Æsop, where¹⁰⁰ the fox speaks to the lion, the impressions of coined money at Lacedæmon, as it enters thither, one may see plainly marked,¹ but no where of its going out; so that it is easy

sals; and, in lieu of the produce, to pay a fixed rent to their masters, not unlike the tenants in villinage under the feudal laws in after times. To the like hard conditions did the Lacedæmonians subsequently subject the conquered Messenians, who were often comprehended under the same name, as appears from Pausanias, iii. 21, and Thucydides, i. 101, where the Scholiast states, that the Lacedæmonians διὰ τὸ αἰ διαφόρους εἶναι Εἰλώταις, (for so we ought to read, in lieu of the absurd ἀλλήλοις,) were wont to call their other slaves by the same name. S.

⁹⁸ Instead of ἐκ τῶν, one would prefer ἐκ τινων, to balance ἀπάντων—

⁹⁹ As the Lacedæmonians were prohibited by law from using any coined money, of gold, silver, or copper, they adopted as the circulating medium pieces of iron of a conical shape, and so peculiarly tempered as to be of no other use. But as such money had no real value elsewhere, and only a nominal one in Laconia, it would not pass elsewhere in exchange for merchandise. On the other hand, all the corn produced and cattle bred in the fertile fields and fine pastures of Messenia, all the copper and iron dug out of the rich mountains of Laconia, and manufactured by the Helotes, and which was not wanted at home, was sent abroad and paid for in gold and silver; which money was either deposited in the temple at Delphi, or intrusted to the custody of their neighbours, the Arcadians, as shown by Athenæus, vi. p. 233; or much of it buried, (as silver is said to be at Pekin,) or concealed in secret places, an instance of which is recorded by Plutarch in his life of Lysander. So Sydenham. Ast refers to Xenoph. Rep. Laced. vii. 6, xiv. 3; and Stalbaum to Cragius de Rep. Laced. iii. 10, and Boeckh. Œconom. Athen. i. p. 32, ii. p. 138.

¹⁰⁰ Instead of δν, for which Buttmann suggested ὅπερ, similar to "quem-admodum" in Ficinus, Boissonade on Babr. Fab. 103, where the whole fable has, with the exception of a single line, been luckily preserved in the Athos MS., proposes οὐ, which has led me to ἴν; while from the passage in Plato it is easy to see that Socrates, who was the author of the fable, closed it with these verses spoken by the fox. Σὺς ζῆθι, φησιν εἰ δ' ἀπιμι, συγγνώμη. Πολλῶν γὰρ ἰχθῶν θηρίων ἔμ' ἤκαλλ' οὐ. Ὅν εισιόντων τὰ γε γεγραμμέν' ἦν δῆλα. Τῶν δ' εἰσιόντων οὐκ ἔχεις, ὃ μοι δείξεις. The omission of the verse was owing to the similarity in Ὅν εισιόντων and Τῶν εἰσιόντων.

¹ In lieu of τετραμμένα, which is superfluous after εισιόντος, I have adopted γεγραμμένα, found in the three oldest MSS., unless it be said that both lead to τερριμμένα, similar to "trita in pulvere" in Ficinus.

to know well that of (all)² the Grecians the richest in gold and silver are the people there, and of them (the richest³ is) their king. For from sources of that kind the largest and most frequent receipts go to the kings; and still further, the royal tribute, which the Lacedæmonians pay to their kings, is not a trifle. But though the wealth of the Lacedæmonians is great, as compared with that of the Greeks, yet as compared with that of the Persians, and their king, it is nothing. [40.] For I once heard a person⁴ worthy of credit, one of those who went up to the king, who stated that he passed along a large and fertile territory for nearly a day's journey, which the inhabitants called the Queen's Girdle;⁵ that there was another called the (Queen's) Veil; and that many other fair and fruitful countries were appropriated to provide the Queen's apparel; and that each of those countries had its name from the part of the apparel (it furnished). So that I think, if any person were to tell Amastris, the mother of the (reigning) king, and the consort formerly of Xerxes, that the son of Dinomache had in mind to array himself against her son, and that (Dinomache's) whole attire was worth perhaps fifty minæ,⁶ supposing it to be of the most costly kind,⁷ and that her son possessed in Ercheia⁸ not even three hundred plethra⁹

To the same fable there is an allusion in Horace, Epist. i. l. 73, "*Olim quod vulpes ægroto cauta leoni Respondit, referam; quia me vestigia terrent Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum.*"

² Sydenham has thus adopted "*omnium*," found in Ficinus, and "*the richest*," from his "*pecuniosissimus*."

³ This is supposed by Olympiodorus and the Scholiast to be Xenophon; who says in Anab. i. Δ. 9, that the villages, in which they encamped, had been appropriated for the girdle of Parysatis (the queen). A similar account is given by Diodor. Sic. i. p. 62, where Wesseling refers to Cicero in Verr. iii. 33.

⁴ There was the same custom in ancient Egypt, as stated by Herodotus, ii. 98, where the city of Anthylla was assigned to supply the queen-consort with shoes and slippers. S.

⁵ Equal to £161 9s. 2d. English money. S.

⁷ Meaning the most costly among such as were worn by Grecian women. S. But the Greek words *εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ*, omitted by Ficinus, mean rather, "if taken at the very highest value."

⁸ Ercheia was a ward of the tribe of Ægeus. See Harpocration in *Ἐρχεῖαν*.

⁹ A Greek *πλῆθρον* contained 10,000 square feet; an English acre contains 4840 square feet. Hence the estate of Alcibiades contained about 619 English acres. S.

of land, she would wonder to what could Alcibiades be trusting, so as to have in mind to contend with Artaxerxes ; and she would, I think, say, it is impossible for this man to make the attempt through trusting to nothing else than his carefulness and wisdom ; for these are the only things worth mention amongst the Greeks. [41.] Since if she heard, that this same Alcibiades is making so great an attempt,¹⁰ being in the first place, not yet twenty years of age, and in the next place, that he is utterly un instructed ; and besides this, (that)¹¹ when his admirer told him he ought first to acquire knowledge, and to pay attention to himself, and after some practice to go in this way, when he was about to contend with the king, he would not do so, but said that he was all-sufficient as he was, then, she would, I think, be astonished, and ask, What is the thing in which the youth puts his trust ? If then we were to say that (he trusts) to his beauty and size and family and wealth, and to the natural faculties of his mind, she would think us, Alcibiades, out of our senses, when she reflected upon the advantages of such a kind on their side. And I think too that Lampido,¹² the daughter of Leotychidas, and the wife of Archidamus, and the mother of Agis, all of whom became kings, would wonder, when she reflected upon the advantages on their side, that you should have a mind to contend with her son, while you have been brought up so ill. And now do you not think it a shameful thing, that the wives of our enemies should consider more prudently for us, than we do for ourselves, what sort of persons we ought to be to attack them. But do you, O blessed one, be persuaded by me and the inscription at Delphi, "Know thyself ;" since such are your antagonists, and not those whom you fancy, and to whom you would never be superior by any thing else except application and skill ; in which, if you are deficient, you will fail in that renown amongst the Greeks and Barbarians, of which you appear to me to have such a desire as no other person has of any thing else.

[42.] *Alc.* To what then, Socrates, must I apply myself ?

¹⁰ Picinus has "certamen tantum inire," which leads to *ροσούρον* *ἐπιχρησέν* instead of *νῦν ἐπιχρησέν*.

¹¹ So Sydenham ; as if he wished to insert *ὅτι* between *ρούρους* and *ροῦ*—

¹² The word in Herodot. vi. 71 is Lampito.

Can you inform me? for you seem to me to say what is especially correct.

Soc. Yes, I can. But ¹³let there be a joint consultation ¹³ respecting the means of our becoming the best. For I do not say that, as regards you, there is a necessity for instruction, but not as regards myself; for there is no difference between you and me, except in one thing.

Alc. What is that?

Soc. My guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, who is yours.

Alc. And who is yours, O Socrates?

Soc. A deity, Alcibiades, who did not suffer me to converse with you before to-day; and trusting to whom I assert that your favourable appearance ¹⁴ (in life) will arise through no one else than myself.

Alc. You are in jest, Socrates.

Soc. Perhaps so. I am speaking, however, the truth, (in saying) that we are in need of application, ¹⁵ if not more than all men, ¹⁵ yet very much so.

Alc. (In saying) that I (am in need of it), you do not say what is false.

Soc. Nor that I myself am so.

Alc. What then must we do?

Soc. We must not hesitate, my friend, nor act a soft part.

Alc. It is by no means, Socrates, becoming to do so.

[43.] *Soc.* Indeed it does not; but we must consider in common. Now tell me. We say that we wish to become as excellent as possible. Do we not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. In what quality?

Alc. Plainly in what men are good.

Soc. Good in what?

Alc. Evidently in performing acts.

¹³—¹⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were κοινή βουλή ἴστω, Σώκρατες, not κοινῇ βουλῇ, ὃ Σώκρατες, to avoid the juxta-position of two datives, βουλῇ, φ— See above, § 32, and at Laches, § 27.

(¹⁴ Schleiermacher remarks that the present is the only passage in Plato where ἐπιφάνεια is found in this sense.

¹⁵—¹⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were εἰ μὴ μᾶλλον ἢ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, and not μᾶλλον μὲν (one MS. δὲ) πάντες ἄνθρωποι: which Buttmann could not understand, nor can I.

Soc. What acts? Of horsemanship?¹⁶

Alc. Surely not.

Soc. For then we should go to jockies.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Do you then mean naval affairs?

Alc. No.

Soc. For then we should go to nautical men.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. What affairs then? and who are the doers?

Alc. Such as the Athenians do, who are men of honour and goodness.

Soc. By men of honour and goodness, do you mean those with mind or without it?

Alc. With mind.

Soc. In whatever, then, each is a man of mind, in that is he good likewise?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But in whatever he is without a mind, in that is he bad likewise?

Alc. How not?

Soc. Is not a shoemaker a man of mind, as regards the making of shoes?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. In this respect then is he good?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But as regards the making of garments, is not the shoemaker without mind?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. In this respect then he is bad.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. By this reasoning then the same man is both bad and good.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. Would you say then that the good men are also bad?

Alc. Surely not.

[44.] *Soc.* Whom then do you mean by the good?

Alc. I mean such as are able to rule in the state.

Soc. Not the horses, surely?

¹⁶ This allusion to horsemanship is made advisedly. For Alcibiades was fond of that amusement, as may be inferred from Aristophanes, who has drawn his character in the *Clouds*, under the name of Pheidippides.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. But men?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Men, who are sick?

Alc. No.

Soc. Those on a voyage?

Alc. No.

Soc. Those harvesting?

Alc. No.

Soc. Those who are doing nothing? or those who are doing something?

Alc. I mean, who are doing something?

Soc. What? Endeavour to show to me clearly.

Alc. Those (I mean) who ¹⁷ come in contact with, and make use of each other,¹⁷ as we do, who are living in cities.

Soc. You mean then of persons using each other, (so as)¹⁸ to rule.

Alc. I do.

Soc. Do you mean of boatswains,¹⁹ who make use of rowers?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. For this ability to do so belongs to the steersman.

Alc. True.


Soc. Do you then mean of men (able) to rule hautboy-players, and by leading the song [to men],²⁰ and making use of ballet-dancers?

¹⁷—¹⁷ The Greek is τῶν καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις: where Sydenham was the first to object to ἑαυτοῖς, for which he proposed to read ἀλλήλοις, similar to συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, a little below. But ἀλλήλοις could not be thus repeated. We must therefore retain ἑαυτοῖς in the sense of ἀλλήλοις, as in Hesych. and Suid., 'ἑαυτοῖς' ἀλλήλους: and read ἀλλήλοις for ἀνοις in the next speech of Socrates; and so I have translated.

¹⁸ As ἀρχειν has nothing to govern it, Stephens proposed to supply δυναμίνους from the preceding τοὺς δυναμίνους—ἀρχειν. But the reference would be too remote. Ast and Stalbaum however have adopted the idea; the latter of whom thus renders the whole speech: "Do you mean those, who are able to rule men, by using the labour of men." Ficinus has "Nunquid imperare eos dicis hominibus, qui hominibus utuntur," i. e. "Say you then that those rule men, who make use of them?" which is perfectly intelligible indeed, but not a translation of the Greek.

¹⁹ This is the correct nautical word in English for κελυστήης in Greek, and "hortator" in Latin.

²⁰ Sydenham, unable to understand ἀνθρώποις by itself, translated, "to other men." But the train of argument requires its rejection entirely.



ministered and preserved? I would have said—When health is present, and disease absent. Do not you think thus?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if you had asked me again—By (the presence or absence) of what, (are administered the better and preserved) the eyes? I would have answered in like manner—By sight being present, and blindness absent. So likewise the ears, when deafness is absent, and hearing present, are the better, and better taken care of.

Alc. Certainly.

[46.] *Soc.* What then is the state? By the presence and absence of what does it become better, and is better ²⁵ [attended to and] ²⁵ administered.

Alc. It seems to me, Socrates, when friendship exists to them ²⁶ with each other, and hate and dissension are absent.

Soc. By friendship do you mean the thinking alike, or not alike?

Alc. The thinking alike.²⁷

Soc. Now by what science do states think alike respecting numbers?

Alc. Through the science of arithmetic.

Soc. Well then, and do not individuals too through the same (science)?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And does not each person (think alike) with himself too?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Now, through what science does each person think alike with himself about a span and a cubit, which of the two is the greater? Is it not through the science of mensuration?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And do not individuals with each other, and states likewise?

Alc. Yes.

²⁵⁻²⁶ The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus.

²⁶ According to Stephens, whom Buttmann and Stalbaum follow, *αὐτοῖς* agrees with *πολλοῖς*, which is to be got out of *πόλις*. But Ficinus found, no doubt, in his MS. *ἀλλοῖς*, as shown by his version, "inter cives." On the confusion of *ἀλλοῖς* and *αὐτοῖς*, see Markland on Eurip. Suppl. 365.

²⁷ So Sallust, "Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitia est."

Soc. And about weights? Is it not in like manner?

Alc. I say so.

Soc. But the thinking alike, of which you are speaking, what is it, and about what? and what is the science that furnishes it? And is it the same in the case of a state, and an individual, as regards both himself and another person?

Alc. Probably it is.

Soc. What is it then? Do not be faint-hearted in giving an answer, but be ready to speak out.

Alc. ²⁹ I suppose I may say that friendship and thinking alike is ³⁰ that, by which a father and a mother think alike, in loving their son, and a brother with his brother, and a man with his wife.

[47.] **Soc.** Do you then, Alcibiades, suppose that a man can think alike with his wife on the subject of weaving, he, who does not know, with her, who does?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Nor ought he either. For this knowledge belongs to women.³¹

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. What then, can a woman think alike with a man on the subject of shield-warfare, when she has never learnt it?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. For this you would perhaps say belongs to men.³²

Alc. I would.

Soc. Some kinds of knowledge then belong to women, and some to men, according to your account.

Alc. How not?

Soc. On these subjects then there is no thinking alike amongst women and men.

Alc. There is not.

²⁹⁻³⁰ The Greek is Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι φίλιαν τε λίσγειν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν. But as Socrates had asked about ὁμόνοια, and not φιλία, it is evident that φίλιαν τε is out of place here. On the other hand, as he had told Alcibiades not to be faint-hearted, but to speak out, it is probable that Plato wrote—οἶμαι ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ γε—λίσγειν, i. e. "I think I may safely—assert." Moreover as οἶμαι—λίσγειν, cannot mean, as Buttman explains it, the same as λίσγω, we may adopt εἶναι λίσγειν, found in one MS., and similar to "reor—esse—" in Ficinus, or rather λίσγειν εἶναι, for thus καὶ would be a remnant of εἶναι.

³¹ Compare Hom. *Il.* *Z.* 490, where Hector tells Andromache to go into the house, and to attend to her business of the loom and distaff.

³² Compare Hom. *Il.* *Z.* 492, πόλεμος δ' ἀνδρῶσσι μέλει.

Soc. Neither then is there any friendship, if friendship be a thinking alike.

Alc. It appears not.

Soc. So far then as wives attend to their own business, they are not beloved by their husbands.

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. Neither are husbands (beloved) by their wives, so far as (they attend to) their own business.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. Neither are states (well)³¹ administered in this way,³² when every one attends to his own business.

Alc. I think so, Socrates.

Soc. How say you, when friendship is not present, through the existence of which we said that states were well administered, but otherwise not?

Alc. But friendship seems to me to exist to them on this very account, because every one attends to his own business.

[48.] *Soc.* It did not (seem so to you) just now. How then do you now state the reverse? Does friendship exist, while a thinking alike does not exist? Or is it possible for a thinking alike to exist on subjects, which some do know and others do not?

Alc. It is not possible.

Soc. Do persons act justly or unjustly, when each attends to his own business?

Alc. Justly. How not?

Soc. When the citizens in a state act justly, is not friendship produced amongst each other?

Alc. It appears to me necessary, Socrates.

Soc. What kind of friendship then, or thinking alike, do you mean, respecting which it is meet for us to be wise and of good counsel, in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn what it is, or in what things it exists. For at one time it seems to exist in the same things, and at another time not, according to your account of it.

Alc. Now by the gods, Socrates, I do not know myself

³¹ From "optime" in Ficinus, Sydenham was the first to suggest *av* in lieu of *av*, confirmed by Olympiodorus. So too Heusde, Schleiermacher, and Ast.

³² Instead of *raôry*, omitted in one MS., Ficinus found in his *rots*, as shown by his version, "tunc."

what I mean: but I am in danger of having been unconsciously for a long time in a shameful state.

Soc. But now you ought to take courage. For if you had perceived you were so suffering at the age of fifty, it would have been difficult for you to take care of yourself. But you are now at the very time of life, in which it is meet for you to perceive it.

Alc. What then must I do, Socrates, now that I perceive it?

Soc. Answer to what I ask, Alcibiades. And if you do so, you and I god willing, will be in a better state, if one may trust to my prophetic powers.

Alc. Such will be the result, as far as it depends on my answering.

Soc. Come then (say).—What is it to take care of oneself?—in order that we may not be unconsciously, as we often²² are, not taking care of ourselves, although fancying we are—and when does a man do so? When he is taking care of what belongs to him, is he then taking care of himself?

Alc. To me, at least, it appears so.

Soc. What then, when does a man take care of his feet? Is it when he is taking care of the things belonging to his feet?

Alc. I do not understand.

Soc.²³ Do you call by a name something belonging to the hand? as, for instance, a ring? Would you say that it belongs to any other (part) of a man than his finger?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. And (does) not a shoe (belong) to the foot in like manner?

Alc. Yes.²⁴

Soc. When we are taking care of shoes, are we then taking care of feet?

Alc. I do not, Socrates, very well understand.

²² Here, as elsewhere, Buttmann would render *παλλάκις* "perchance," on the authority of the passages quoted by Heindorf on *Phædo*, § 11. And so too Stalbaum.

²³⁻²⁴ After *Nai*, Stobæus supplies, in p. 178, as remarked by Gottleber, ΣΟΚ. *Kai ipátia kai στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος*; AAK. *Nai*: which Buttmann considers to be genuine; and so did T. Taylor in the *Cl. Jl.* No. 41, p. 141, but Stalbaum an interpolation.

Soc. Well then, Alcibiades, do you call by any name the taking a correct care of any thing whatever?

Alc. I do.

Soc. When then a person makes any thing better, call you that a correct care?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. What then is the art, that makes shoes better?

Alc. The shoemaker's.

Soc. By the shoemaker's art then we take care of shoes.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And (do we take care) of a foot by the shoemaker's art, or by that by which we make the feet better?

Alc. By this last art.

Soc. And (we make) better the feet not by the art, by which (we do) the rest of the body?

Alc. So it seems, at least to me.

Soc. And is not this the gymnastic art?

Alc. Especially so.

Soc. By the gymnastic art then we take care of the foot, but by the shoemaker's art that, which belongs to the foot.

Alc. Exactly so.

Soc. And by the gymnastic art (we take care) of the hands, but by the art of engraving rings, of what belongs to the hand.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And by the gymnastic art (we take care) of the body, but by the art of the weaver and other arts, what belongs to the body.

Alc. Entirely so.

[50.] *Soc.* By one art then we take care of each thing, but by another what belongs to it.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. You are not then taking care of yourself, when you are taking care of what belongs to yourself.

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. For the art, it seems, is not the same, by which one takes care of himself, and of what belongs to himself.

Alc. So it appears.

Soc. Now then, by what kind of art can we take care of ourselves?

Alc. I cannot tell.

Soc. So much, however, has been agreed upon, that it is not the art, by which we render better any thing whatever belonging to us, but that, by which (we render so) ourselves.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. Could we have ever known what art would make a shoe better, if we knew not what a shoe was?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. Neither what art makes better finger-rings, if ignorant, (could we have known) what a finger-ring was.

Alc. True.

Soc. Well then, can we ever know what art makes a man³⁵ better, if we are ignorant what we are ourselves?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. Does it then happen to be an easy thing to know oneself? and was he a person of mean abilities, who put up that inscription in the temple at Pytho?³⁶ or is it a difficult thing, and not for every one (to discover)?

Alc. To me indeed, Socrates, it has often seemed to be (an easy thing³⁷), for every one (to discover), and often too, a thing very difficult.

Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it be easy or not, with respect to us, the case is this. Had we known it, we should perhaps have known to take care of ourselves; but not knowing, we can never (do so).

Alc. Such is the case.

[51.] *Soc.* Come then, by what means can a thing be discovered what it is by itself? For so we might thus perhaps find what we are ourselves; but being in ignorance on that point, we are unable (to know ourselves).

Alc. You speak correctly.

Soc. Attend now, by Zeus. With whom are you conversing now? Is it not³⁸ with myself?

³⁵ Instead of *αὐτὸν* Ficinus found *ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς* in his MS., as shown by his version, "nos ipsos."

³⁶ Pytho was another name for Delphi. The Scholiast here quotes a distich, which Meineke on Menander, p. 576, ed. 1, attributes to Ion the tragic writer: "To know thyself is in word nothing great; And a god only knows it well in deed."

³⁷ Ficinus alone has—"facile hoc," as the balance of the sentence requires.

³⁸ Instead of *ἄλλῳ τινι ᾧ ἐμοί*, Sydenham suggested *ἄλλοι τι ἢ ἐμοί*, on account of the affirmative answer *Ναί*: and so all the MSS. but one.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And am I not conversing with you?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. It is Socrates then who is conversing and arguing?

Alc. Quite true.

Soc. And Alcibiades who is listening?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is it not by a discourse that Socrates is conversing?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And is not the same thing to converse and to use a discourse?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But is not the person, who uses a thing, different from the thing, which he uses?

Alc. How do you mean?

Soc. As a shoemaker, for instance, cuts leather with (a semicircular) knife, and (a straight) knife, and other tools.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is not then the shoemaker, who cuts and uses (tools), one, but the tools, which he uses, another?

Alc. How not?

Soc. Would not in like manner the instruments on which a harp-player plays, and the harp-player himself, be different?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. This, then, I was lately asking, whether the person, who uses a thing, seems to you always to be different from the thing, which he uses.

Alc. He seems so.

Soc. What then shall we say of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his tools only, or with his hands likewise?

Alc. With his hands likewise.

Soc. He uses them too.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And does he not use his eyes too, when he is cutting leather?

Alc. He does.

Soc. Now we are agreed, that the person, who uses, is different from what he uses.

Bekker omits η , because when $\delta\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\epsilon$ is used interrogatively, the η is not expressed. Buttman and Stalbaum, prefer $\delta\lambda\lambda\omega\tau\omega\eta$, furnished by Stobæus, despite the objection of Sydenham.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. The shoemaker, then, and the harp-player, are different from the hands and eyes with which they work.

Alc. It is apparent.

Soc. And does not a man use also his whole body.

Alc. Certainly.

— *Soc.* Now the thing using is different from what it uses.

Alc. True.

— *Soc.* A man therefore is a being different from his body.

Alc. It seems so.

[52.] *Soc.* What sort of being then is a man?

Alc. I cannot tell.

Soc. But you can (tell) that it is some being making a use of its body.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Does any other being make use of its body but the soul?

Alc. None other.

— *Soc.* And does it not so do by ruling (the body)?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. I suppose moreover that no man would ever think otherwise than this.

Alc. Than what?

Soc. That the man was one of three things.

Alc. What things?

— *Soc.* Soul, or body, ³⁹ or a whole, itself formed of both. ⁴⁰

Alc. How not?

Soc. Now have we agreed that the being, which rules the body, is a man.

Alc. We have agreed.

Soc. ⁴¹[What being then is a man?] ⁴² Does the body itself govern itself?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. For we said that it was ruled.

Alc. True.

Soc. This then cannot be that, of which we are in search.

³⁹⁻⁴⁰ Instead of ἡ ἐναμφοτέρων τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, Schleiermacher, whom I have followed, elicited ἡ καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ὅλον οὐδὲ, by the aid of Ficinus—"aut totum ipsum ex utrisque compositum."

⁴¹⁻⁴² The words within brackets are wanting in the three oldest MSS. and omitted by Bekker and Stalbaum.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. But does the compound being rule the body? and is this a man?

Alc. Perhaps it is.

Soc. Least of all so. For (of two parties), one not being a joint-ruler, there are no means for both to rule jointly.

Alc. Right.

Soc. Since then neither the body, nor the compound of both, is a man, it remains, I think, either that the being (man) is nothing at all, or, if it be any thing, it results that the man is nothing else than soul.

Alc. It is just so.

[53.] *Soc.* Needs it then be proved to you still more clearly, that the soul is man?

Alc. It needs not, by Zeus: for it seems to me (to be shown) sufficiently.

Soc. If it be proved not accurately, yet moderately so, it is sufficient for us. For we shall then perhaps know accurately, when we shall have discovered, what we just now passed by, through its being a matter of much consideration.

Alc. What is that?

Soc. That which was just now spoken of in some such way as this; that we must first consider the self by itself; but now ⁴¹ instead of "the self by itself," we have been considering the "each" ⁴¹ what it is; and this perhaps will suffice. For we could surely never say that any thing is more the master of ourselves, than the soul.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Is it not then well to think thus; that we are having an intercourse with each, by making use of discourses, ⁴² soul with soul? ⁴²

⁴¹—⁴¹ The Greek is *ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον*: of which Schleiermacher has offered one correction, and Stalbaum two others. I have translated as if the Greek were, *ἀντὶ τοῦ—αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό*, "τὸ ἕκαστον"—to which I have been led by the version of Ficinus, "nunc vero pro eo, quod est ipsum quod ipsum, consideravimus ipsum unumquodque."

⁴²—⁴² The Greek is *τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν*. But as the dative has nothing to govern it, Dobree in *Adversar.* i. p. 156, suggested *τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς ψυχὴν*: with which Stalbaum is dissatisfied; for he saw, no doubt, that the accusative is in a similar predicament. Perhaps Dobree intended *τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῆς ψυχῆς*, remembering Pope's expression, "the intercourse of soul with soul," and the passages quoted on Hippias, § 37, where the soul is said to speak. Add Plato *Epist.* 2, p. 313, A.

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. For this (ability) belongs to the ballet-master.

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. ²¹ But of persons making use of what, do you say it is possible for men to rule men? ²¹

Alc. Of those, I mean, who partake in a polity, and come in contact with each other, (and are able) ²² to rule those in the city.

[45.] *Soc.* What then is this art? As if I were to ask you again, what I did just now—What is the art, which enables (a person) to know how to rule those partaking in a sailing?

Alc. The art of steering.

Soc. And what is the science, that enables (a person) to rule those, who, as was just now said, partake in a song?

Alc. The teaching, as you just now said, of ballet-dancing.

Soc. Well then, and what do you call the science (enabling one to rule) those, who partake in a polity?

Alc. I call it, Socrates, good counsel.

Soc. What, then, does the science of steersman seem to you to be a want of counsel?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. But good counsel.

Alc. So it seems to me, at least.

Soc. For the preservation of those who are sailing.

Alc. You speak correctly.

Soc. But ²³ what you call good counsel, for what is it (good)?

Alc. For the better administering ²³ the commonwealth, and its being saved. ²⁴

Soc. By the presence or absence of what, is it the better administered to and preserved? As, if you had asked me—By the presence or absence of what is the body the better ad-

²¹⁻²¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Stephens, Ast, and Stalbaum all translate differently; but all are as wide of the Greek, as is that of Ficinus, "Quid denique vocas imperare posse hominibus, qui utuntur hominibus."

²² I have translated, as if the Greek were *οἷον τ' ὄντων*, not *τούτων*.

²³⁻²³ I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches found in Ficinus; of which Schleiermacher partially approved.

²⁴ To balance the subsequent *διοικῆσαι καὶ σώζεσθαι*, one would prefer here *διοικισθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι*.

ministered and preserved? I would have said—When health is present, and disease absent. Do not you think thus?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if you had asked me again—By (the presence or absence) of what, (are administered the better and preserved) the eyes? I would have answered in like manner—By sight being present, and blindness absent. So likewise the ears, when deafness is absent, and hearing present, are the better, and better taken care of.

Alc. Certainly.

[46.] *Soc.* What then is the state? By the presence and absence of what does it become better, and is better ²⁵ [attended to and] ²⁵ administered.

Alc. It seems to me, Socrates, when friendship exists to them ²⁶ with each other, and hate and dissension are absent.

Soc. By friendship do you mean the thinking alike, or not alike?

Alc. The thinking alike.²⁷

Soc. Now by what science do states think alike respecting numbers?

Alc. Through the science of arithmetic.

Soc. Well then, and do not individuals too through the same (science)?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And does not each person (think alike) with himself too?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Now, through what science does each person think alike with himself about a span and a cubit, which of the two is the greater? Is it not through the science of mensuration?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And do not individuals with each other, and states likewise?

Alc. Yes.

²⁵⁻²⁶ The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus.

²⁶ According to Stephens, whom Buttmann and Stalbaum follow, *αὐτοῖς* agrees with *πολίταις*, which is to be got out of *πόλις*. But Ficinus found, no doubt, in his MS. *ἀστοῖς*, as shown by his version, "intercives." On the confusion of *ἀστοῖς* and *αὐτοῖς*, see Markland on Eurip. Suppl. 365.

²⁷ So Sallust, "Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitia est."

Soc. And about weights? Is it not in like manner?

Alc. I say so.

Soc. But the thinking alike, of which you are speaking, what is it, and about what? and what is the science that furnishes it? And is it the same in the case of a state, and an individual, as regards both himself and another person?

Alc. Probably it is.

Soc. What is it then? Do not be faint-hearted in giving an answer, but be ready to speak out.

Alc. ²⁸ I suppose I may say that friendship and thinking alike is ²⁹ that, by which a father and a mother think alike, in loving their son, and a brother with his brother, and a man with his wife.

[47.] *Soc.* Do you then, Alcibiades, suppose that a man can think alike with his wife on the subject of weaving, he, who does not know, with her, who does?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Nor ought he either. For this knowledge belongs to women.²⁹

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. What then, can a woman think alike with a man on the subject of shield-warfare, when she has never learnt it?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. For this you would perhaps say belongs to men.³⁰

Alc. I would.

Soc. Some kinds of knowledge then belong to women, and some to men, according to your account.

Alc. How not?

Soc. On these subjects then there is no thinking alike amongst women and men.

Alc. There is not.

²⁸⁻²⁹ The Greek is Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι φιλίαν τε λέγειν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν. But as Socrates had asked about ὁμόνοια, and not φιλία, it is evident that φιλίαν τε is out of place here. On the other hand, as he had told Alcibiades not to be faint-hearted, but to speak out, it is probable that Plato wrote—οἶμαι ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ γε—λέγειν, i. e. "I think I may safely—assert." Moreover as οἶμαι—λέγειν, cannot mean, as Buttman explains it, the same as λέγω, we may adopt εἶναι λέγειν, found in one MS., and similar to "reor—esse—" in Ficinus, or rather λέγειν εἶναι, for thus καὶ would be a remnant of εἶναι.

²⁹ Compare Hom. Il. Z. 490, where Hector tells Andromache to go into the house, and to attend to her business of the loom and distaff.

³⁰ Compare Hom. Il. Z. 492, πόλεμος δ' ἀνδρεσσι μελήσει.

Soc. Neither then is there any friendship, if friendship be a thinking alike.

Alc. It appears not.

Soc. So far then as wives attend to their own business, they are not beloved by their husbands.

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. Neither are husbands (beloved) by their wives, so far as (they attend to) their own business.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. Neither are states (well)³¹ administered in this way,³² when every one attends to his own business.

Alc. I think so, Socrates.

Soc. How say you, when friendship is not present, through the existence of which we said that states were well administered, but otherwise not?

Alc. But friendship seems to me to exist to them on this very account, because every one attends to his own business.

[48.] *Soc.* It did not (seem so to you) just now. How then do you now state the reverse? Does friendship exist, while a thinking alike does not exist? Or is it possible for a thinking alike to exist on subjects, which some do know and others do not?

Alc. It is not possible.

Soc. Do persons act justly or unjustly, when each attends to his own business?

Alc. Justly. How not?

Soc. When the citizens in a state act justly, is not friendship produced amongst each other?

Alc. It appears to me necessary, Socrates.

Soc. What kind of friendship then, or thinking alike, do you mean, respecting which it is meet for us to be wise and of good counsel, in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn what it is, or in what things it exists. For at one time it seems to exist in the same things, and at another time not, according to your account of it.

Alc. Now by the gods, Socrates, I do not know myself

³¹ From "optime" in Ficinus, Sydenham was the first to suggest *εὖ* in lieu of *αὖ*, confirmed by Olympiodorus. So too Heusde, Schleiermacher, and Ast.

³² Instead of *ταύτην*, omitted in one MS., Ficinus found in his *ρόρε*, as shown by his version, "tunc."

what I mean; but I am in danger of having been unconsciously for a long time in a shameful state.

Soc. But now you ought to take courage. For if you had perceived you were so suffering at the age of fifty, it would have been difficult for you to take care of yourself. But you are now at the very time of life, in which it is meet for you to perceive it.

Alc. What then must I do, Socrates, now that I perceive it?

Soc. Answer to what I ask, Alcibiades. And if you do so, you and I, god willing, will be in a better state, if one may trust to my prophetic powers.

Alc. Such will be the result, as far as it depends on my answering.

[49.] *Soc.* Come then, (say,)—What is it to take care of oneself?—in order that we may not be unconsciously, as we often²³ are, not taking care of ourselves, although fancying we are—and when does a man do so? When he is taking care of what belongs to him, is he then taking care of himself?

Alc. To me, at least, it appears so.

Soc. What then, when does a man take care of his feet? Is it when he is taking care of the things belonging to his feet?

Alc. I do not understand.

Soc. ²⁴Do you call by a name something belonging to the hand? as, for instance, a ring? Would you say that it belongs to any other (part) of a man than his finger?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. And (does) not a shoe (belong) to the foot in like manner?

Alc. Yes.²⁴

Soc. When we are taking care of shoes, are we then taking care of feet?

Alc. I do not, Socrates, very well understand.

²³ Here, as elsewhere, Buttman would render *πολλάκις* "perchance," on the authority of the passages quoted by Heindorf on *Phædo*, § 11. And so too Stalbaum.

²⁴—²⁴ After *Nai*, Stobæus supplies, in p. 178, as remarked by Gottleber, ΣΟΚ. Καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος; ΑΔΚ. Ναί: which Buttman considers to be genuine; and so did T. Taylor in the *Cl. Jl.* No. 41, p. 141, but Stalbaum an interpolation.

Soc. Well then, Alcibiades, do you call by any name the taking a correct care of any thing whatever?

Alc. I do.

Soc. When then a person makes any thing better, call you that a correct care?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. What then is the art, that makes shoes better?

Alc. The shoemaker's.

Soc. By the shoemaker's art then we take care of shoes.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And (do we take care) of a foot by the shoemaker's art, or by that by which we make the feet better?

Alc. By this last art.

Soc. And (we make) better the feet not by the art, by which (we do) the rest of the body?

Alc. So it seems, at least to me.

Soc. And is not this the gymnastic art?

Alc. Especially so.

Soc. By the gymnastic art then we take care of the foot, but by the shoemaker's art that, which belongs to the foot.

Alc. Exactly so.

Soc. And by the gymnastic art (we take care) of the hands, but by the art of engraving rings, of what belongs to the hand.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And by the gymnastic art (we take care) of the body, but by the art of the weaver and other arts, what belongs to the body.

Alc. Entirely so.

[50.] *Soc.* By one art then we take care of each thing, but by another what belongs to it.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. You are not then taking care of yourself, when you are taking care of what belongs to yourself.

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. For the art, it seems, is not the same, by which one takes care of himself, and of what belongs to himself.

Alc. So it appears.

Soc. Now then, by what kind of art can we take care of ourselves?

Alc. I cannot tell.

Soc. So much, however, has been agreed upon, that it is not the art, by which we render better any thing whatever belonging to us, but that, by which (we render so) ourselves.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. Could we have ever known what art would make a shoe better, if we knew not what a shoe was?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. Neither what art makes better finger-rings, if ignorant, (could we have known) what a finger-ring was.

Alc. True.

Soc. Well then, can we ever know what art makes a man ³⁵ better, if we are ignorant what we are ourselves?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. Does it then happen to be an easy thing to know oneself? and was he a person of mean abilities, who put up that inscription in the temple at Pytho? ³⁶ or is it a difficult thing, and not for every one (to discover)?

Alc. To me indeed, Socrates, it has often seemed to be (an easy thing ³⁷), for every one (to discover), and often too, a thing very difficult.

Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it be easy or not, with respect to us, the case is this. Had we known it, we should perhaps have known to take care of ourselves; but not knowing, we can never (do so).

Alc. Such is the case.

[51.] **Soc.** Come then, by what means can a thing be discovered what it is by itself? For so we might thus perhaps find what we are ourselves; but being in ignorance on that point, we are unable (to know ourselves).

Alc. You speak correctly.

Soc. Attend now, by Zeus. With whom are you conversing now? Is it not ³⁸ with myself?

³⁵ Instead of *αὐτὸν* Ficinus found *ἑμᾶς αὐτοὺς* in his MS., as shown by his version, "nos ipsos."

³⁶ Pytho was another name for Delphi. The Scholiast here quotes a distich, which Meineke on Menander, p. 576, ed. 1, attributes to Ion the tragic writer: "To know thyself is in word nothing great; And a god only knows it well in deed."

³⁷ Ficinus alone has—"facile hoc," as the balance of the sentence requires.

³⁸ Instead of *ἄλλω τινι ἢ ἐμοί*, Sydenham suggested *ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐμοί*, on account of the affirmative answer *Ναί*: and so all the MSS. but one.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And am I not conversing with you?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. It is Socrates then who is conversing and arguing?

Alc. Quite true.

Soc. And Alcibiades who is listening?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is it not by a discourse that Socrates is conversing?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And is not the same thing to converse and to use a discourse?

Alc. Certainly.

* *Soc.* But is not the person, who uses a thing, different from the thing, which he uses?

Alc. How do you mean?

Soc. As a shoemaker, for instance, cuts leather with (a semicircular) knife, and (a straight) knife, and other tools.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is not then the shoemaker, who cuts and uses (tools), one, but the tools, which he uses, another?

Alc. How not?

Soc. Would not in like manner the instruments on which a harp-player plays, and the harp-player himself, be different?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. This, then, I was lately asking, whether the person, who uses a thing, seems to you always to be different from the thing, which he uses.

Alc. He seems so.

Soc. What then shall we say of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his tools only, or with his hands likewise?

Alc. With his hands likewise.

Soc. He uses them too.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And does he not use his eyes too, when he is cutting leather?

Alc. He does.

Soc. Now we are agreed, that the person, who uses, is different from what he uses.

Bekker omits η , because when $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\iota$ is used interrogatively, the η is not expressed. Buttman and Stalbaum, prefer $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omega\tau\omega\eta$, furnished by Stobæus, despite the objection of Sydenham.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. The shoemaker, then, and the harp-player, are different from the hands and eyes with which they work.

Alc. It is apparent.

Soc. And does not a man use also his whole body.

Alc. Certainly.

— *Soc.* Now the thing using is different from what it uses.

Alc. True.

— *Soc.* A man therefore is a being different from his body.

Alc. It seems so.

[52.] *Soc.* What sort of being then is a man?

Alc. I cannot tell.

Soc. But you can (tell) that it is some being making a use of its body.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Does any other being make use of its body but the soul?

Alc. None other.

— *Soc.* And does it not so do by ruling (the body)?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. I suppose moreover that no man would ever think otherwise than this.

Alc. Than what?

Soc. That the man was one of three things.

Alc. What things?

— *Soc.* Soul, or body, ³⁹ or a whole, itself formed of both.

Alc. How not?

Soc. Now have we agreed that the being, which rules the body, is a man.

Alc. We have agreed.

Soc. ⁴⁰ [What being then is a man?] ⁴⁰ Does the body itself govern itself?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. For we said that it was ruled.

Alc. True.

Soc. This then cannot be that, of which we are in search.

³⁹⁻⁴⁰ Instead of ἡ ξυναμώτερον τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, Schleiermacher, whom I have followed, elicited ἡ καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ὅλον οὐτὸ, by the aid of Ficinus—"aut totum ipsum ex utrisque compositum."

⁴⁰⁻⁴⁰ The words within brackets are wanting in the three oldest MSS. and omitted by Bekker and Stalbaum.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. But does the compound being rule the body? and is this a man?

Alc. Perhaps it is.

Soc. Least of all so. For (of two parties), one not being a joint-ruler, there are no means for both to rule jointly.

Alc. Right.

Soc. Since then neither the body, nor the compound of both, is a man, it remains, I think, either that the being (man) is nothing at all, or, if it be any thing, it results that the man is nothing else than soul.

Alc. It is just so.

[53.] *Soc.* Needs it then be proved to you still more clearly, that the soul is man?

Alc. It needs not, by Zeus: for it seems to me (to be shown) sufficiently.

Soc. If it be proved not accurately, yet moderately so, it is sufficient for us. For we shall then perhaps know accurately, when we shall have discovered, what we just now passed by, through its being a matter of much consideration.

Alc. What is that?

Soc. That which was just now spoken of in some such way as this; that we must first consider the self by itself; but now ⁴¹ instead of "the self by itself," we have been considering the "each" ⁴¹ what it is; and this perhaps will suffice. For we could surely never say that any thing is more the master of ourselves, than the soul.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Is it not then well to think thus; that we are having an intercourse with each, by making use of discourses, ⁴² soul with soul? ⁴²

⁴¹—⁴¹ The Greek is *ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον*: of which Schleiermacher has offered one correction, and Stalbaum two others. I have translated as if the Greek were, *ἀντὶ τοῦ*—"αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ," τὸ "ἕκαστον"—to which I have been led by the version of Ficinus, "nunc vero pro eo, quod est ipsum quod ipsum, consideravimus ipsum unumquodque."

⁴²—⁴² The Greek is *τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν*. But as the dative has nothing to govern it, Dobree in *Adversar.* i. p. 156, suggested *τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς ψυχὴν*: with which Stalbaum is dissatisfied; for he saw, no doubt, that the accusative is in a similar predicament. Perhaps Dobree intended *τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῆς ψυχῆς*, remembering Pope's expression, "the intercourse of soul with soul," and the passages quoted on Hippias, § 37, where the soul is said to speak. Add Plato *Epist.* 2, p. 313, A.

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. This then was what we were saying a little before; that Socrates is conversing with Alcibiades, by using speech, not, as it seems, to your person, but by putting reasons to Alcibiades; now this is his soul.

Alc. So it seems to me at least.

[54.] *Soc.* He then who enjoins a person to know himself, orders us to recognise a soul.

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. ⁴³Whoever then knows only the things belonging to his body, knows the things belonging to himself, but not himself.⁴³

Alc. Just so.

Soc. Not one therefore of the physicians, so far as he is a physician, knows himself; neither does any master of exercises, so far as he is such a master.

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. Husbandmen then, and other workmen, are far from knowing themselves. For these it seems do not (consider)⁴⁴ even what belongs to themselves, but what are still more remote from themselves, according to the arts which they possess. For they know the things belonging to the body, (and) by which it is taken care of.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. If therefore it is temperance⁴⁵ to know oneself, none of these is temperate according to their (respective) arts.

⁴³—⁴⁴ The Greek is *δοτις ἀρα τῶν τοῦ σώματος γινώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν, ἔγνωκεν*. To restore the syntax, Stephens would insert *τι* before *τῶν*, or change *τῶν* into *τὰ*—But this is at variance with the reasoning; which requires the mention of the body itself, and not *τὰ* (or *τι τῶν*) *τοῦ σώματος*, i. e. the things belonging to the body. Le Fevre and Dacier seem to have been well aware of this, and have rightly translated "*son corps*," similar to "*corpus*" in Ficinus. Perhaps he found in his MS. *δοτις ἀρα τὸ αὐτοῦ σῶμα γινώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν, ἔγνωκεν*—similar to his version, "*Quicumque igitur corpus agnoscit, sua quidem non se ipsum novit.*" So Sydenham; and so too Schleiermacher proposed to expel *τῶν*, or to read *δοτις ἀρα τὸ σῶμα ἢ τῶν τοῦ σωματός τι*, where *σωματός τι* is due to Stobæus.

⁴⁴ Ficinus has inserted "*considerant*," but whether from his MS. or not, is uncertain.

⁴⁵ According to a Scholiast, *σωφροσύνη* is here used in the sense of *φρόνησις*, and hence Ficinus rendered it "*prudentia*;" whom Sydenham followed; as do Nurnberger and Stalbaum; who refer respectively to *Enophon* M. S. iii. 9. 4, and Plato *Charmid.* p. 164, D.

Alc. I think they are not.

Soc. On this account then these arts seem to be those of handicrafts, and not the learning fit for a good man.

Alc. Entirely so.

Soc. Again, whoever takes care of his body, takes care of what belongs to him, but not of himself.

Alc. It is nearly so.

Soc. And whoever takes care of his property, (takes care) neither of himself nor of what belongs to him, but of what are still more remote from what belongs to himself.

Alc. So it seems to me at least.

Soc. The money-making man ⁴⁶ does then not do his own business.⁴⁶

Alc. Rightly (said).

[55.] *Soc.* If then a person has become an admirer of the body of Alcibiades, he is not in love with Alcibiades, but with something which belongs to Alcibiades.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. But whoever is in love with you, is (in love with your) soul.

Alc. This appears necessary from the reasoning.

Soc. And hence he, who admires your body, when it ceases to bloom, goes away.

Alc. It seems so.

Soc. But the admirer of the soul does not go away, so long as it goes on to what is better.

Alc. Probably so.

Soc. Am I not then the person not going away, but remaining, when, the body ceasing (to bloom),⁴⁷ the rest have departed?

Alc. And well have you done so, Socrates; and never may you depart.

Soc. Be ready then to be the best possible.

Alc. I will be ready.

Soc. For the case is this. There never has been, it seems, an admirer of Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, nor is there

⁴⁶—⁴⁶ Ficinus, apparently unable to understand τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει, has "suis indulget." Perhaps Plato wrote ἀπ' ἀριστά πράττει, not ἀπ' ἐτι πράττει.

⁴⁷ Sydenham wished to insert ἀνθῶν, as just before λέγει ἀνθοῦν—Ficinus has "senescente corpore—"

now, but ⁴⁸one alone, and he worthy to be loved,⁴⁸ Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phænarete.

Alc. It is true.

Soc. Did you not say that I had been a little beforehand with you when I accosted you; for that you were about to address me first, being desirous to ask me, why I alone do not go away?

Alc. It was so.

Soc. This then is the reason; for I alone am the admirer of you; but the others of what belong to you. Now what belong to you are ceasing to bloom; but you are beginning to be in flower. [56.] If then you are not now spoilt by the Athenian mob, and become ugly, I shall never forsake you. For of this I am most afraid, that you may become a mob-lover, and be spoilt by them. Since many, even virtuous Athenians, have already suffered this fate. For ⁴⁹the mob of the magnanimous Eretheus⁴⁹ has a fair exterior. ⁵⁰But you ought to see it undressed.⁵⁰ Make use therefore of the caution, which I give you.

Alc. What caution?

Soc. In the first place, my friend, exercise yourself,⁵¹ and learn what a person ought to learn, who is proceeding to state affairs; but previously not; in order that you may go to them possessing an antidote, and suffer no grievous harm.

Alc. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak correctly. But endeavour to explain in what way we may take care of ourselves.

Soc. Has not so much been gone through by us already? For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed upon. Indeed we feared lest, if mistaken on that point, we should be unconsciously taking care of something else, and not of ourselves.

Alc. It is so.

⁴⁸⁻⁴⁹ Buttmann acutely saw here an allusion to Μοῦνος ἰὼν ἀγαπητός in Hom. *Il.* B. 305.

⁴⁹⁻⁵⁰ Here, as Gottleber remarked, is an allusion to Δῆμος Ἐρεχθίδος μεγαλήτορος in Hom. *Il.* B. 547.

⁵⁰⁻⁵¹ For it would then appear, to use the words of Horace, "Introrsus turpis, speciosa pelle decorus."

⁵¹ Ficinus has "exue illum—" as if he had found in his MS. γύμνασον—and referred the verb to the people.

Soc. And after this we ought to take care of the soul, and look to it.

Alc. Plainly so.

Soc. And that to others should be handed over the care of our bodies and our property.

Alc. How not?

[57.] *Soc.* In what way then can we know these things the most clearly? For, after we know this, it seems, we shall know ourselves. Now, by the gods, do we not understand the Delphic inscription we just now mentioned, as saying correctly?

Alc. What? What are you thinking of, and what do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you what I suspect this inscription means, and what it advises us (to do). For it nearly seems that its resemblance does not exist every where, but only with reference to the sight.

Alc. How say you thus?

Soc. Do you likewise consider it. If it had said to our eye, as to a man, by way of advice—"Behold yourself—" how and what should we suppose it was advising? Would it not be to look to that, by looking to which the eye might see itself?

Alc. It is evident.

Soc. Let us then consider, by looking to what of things existing we can see both it and ourselves?

Alc. It is evident, Socrates, (by looking at) mirrors, and other things of the like kind.

Soc. You say rightly. And in the eye itself, with which we see, ⁵²is there not something⁵³ of such a kind?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. You have observed then, that the face of him, who looks at the eye of another, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror, which we call the pupil,⁵⁴ being the image⁵⁴ of the person, who looks in it.

⁵² Instead of ἐν ἑαυτῇ τῶν τοιούτων, Ficinus found in his MS. ἐν τῇ τῶν τοιούτων, as is evident from his version, "inest hujusmodi quiddam," which Sydenham adopted, and F. A. Wolf subsequently suggested in *Miscell. Analect.* p. 104.

⁵³ In lieu of κορυφήν, Dacier was the first to adopt κόρην, from "pupillam" in Ficinus; and so the three oldest MSS. and Stobæus. So too Bernard Martin, in *Varr. Lect.* iv. 3, and Viger on *Euseb.* p. 54.

⁵⁴ As the pupil is not the image itself, but only gives the image, it

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking at that, which is the best part of itself, with which it sees, may thus see itself?

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. But if it look at any other part of the man, or at any of things existing, except at that, to which it happens to be like, it will not see itself.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. If then an eye would see itself, it must look at an eye, and to that place of the eye where the virtue of the eye is naturally seated; now this is surely the sight.

Alc. Just so.

[58.] *Soc.* Is't not true then, my dear Alcibiades, that the soul likewise, if it would know itself, must look at soul, and especially at that place of the soul where wisdom,⁵⁵ the virtue of the soul, is inherent, and to that other thing, to which it happens to be like?

Alc. To me at least, Socrates, it seems so.

Soc. Can we mention any property of the soul more divine⁵⁶ than that, about which knowledge and intelligence are conversant?

Alc. We cannot.

Soc. This therefore in the soul resembles the divine nature. And a person looking at this, and recognising all that is divine, both god⁵⁷ and intelligence, would thus know himself the most.⁵⁸

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. And to know oneself, we acknowledge to be wisdom.⁵⁹

Alc. By all means.

is probable that Plato wrote *εἰδωλον διδοῦν τι*, in lieu of *εἰδωλον εἶναι τι*—

⁵⁵ Heusde first proposed to expel *σοφία*, as an interpolation; with whom Ast and Stalbaum feel disposed to agree.

⁵⁶ In lieu of *θειώτερον*, the three oldest MSS. offer *νοειώτερον*, which Buttmann would receive, but Stalbaum reject.

⁵⁷ Instead of *θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, Heusde suggested *σοφίαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, similar to the preceding *τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν*. But Ast, *νοῦν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, referring to Julian, Or. ii. p. 68, D., *νῦ καὶ φρονήσει, φησι (ὁ Πλάτων) καὶ, τὸ ὅλον, τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῷ*.

⁵⁸ I should prefer *κάλλιστα* to *μάλιστα*.

⁵⁹ Here again *σωφροσύνη* is used in the sense of *φρόνησις*, and so is *σώφρονες* a little below for *φρόνιμοι*.

⁶⁰[*Soc.* As mirrors then are more clear, and more pure, and more brilliant, than the mirror in the eye, so the deity is more pure and more brilliant than that, which is the best in our soul.

Alc. It is likely, Socrates.

Soc. Looking therefore at the deity, we should make use of him, as the most beautiful mirror; but (of) things belonging to man, to the virtue of the soul; and shall we not thus especially see and know our very selves?

Alc. Yes.]⁶⁰

Soc. By not knowing ourselves, and not being wise, can we know what of things belonging to us are good and evil?

Alc. How could it be, Socrates?

Soc. For perhaps it appears impossible for him who knows not Alcibiades himself, to know that what belongs to Alcibiades does so belong to Alcibiades.

Alc. It is, by Zeus, impossible.

Soc. Nor that what are our own, are really our own, ⁶¹ unless (he knows) us.⁶¹

Alc. For how should he?

Soc. And if not what are ours, then not what belongs to ours.

Alc. It appears he cannot.

Soc. We did not then rightly admit, as we did just now, that there were some, who know not themselves, and yet (know) what belonged to them, but that others⁶² (do not know) even

^{60—60} "The words within the brackets are quoted by Stobæus, xxi. p. 181, although the omission has not been noticed by any editor of Plato." The original is, Ἀρ', ὥσπερ κάτοπτρα σαφέστερά ἐστι τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐνόπτρου καὶ καθαρώτερά τε καὶ λαμπρότερα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ βελτίστου καθαρώτερόν τε καὶ λαμπρότερον τυγχάνει δν; "Εοικέ γι, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρῶμεθ' ἂν, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν: καὶ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα οὐχ ὀρῶμεν καὶ γινώσκοιμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς; Ναί. The intelligent reader need not, I trust, be told, that, without this beautiful passage, the dialogue is defective in its most essential part." So Taylor. Gesner had, however, already noticed the Supplement, which is likewise found in Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. xi. 27, p. 551. It is rejected by Nurnberger, Schleiermacher, Ast, and Stalbaum; but considered genuine by Gottleber, Wernsdorf, and Buttmann.

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what belongs to them. For it seems, that it is the province of one person, and of one art, to know himself, (and) the things which are his, and what belongs to the things that are his.

Alc. The fact is nearly so.

[59.] *Soc.* And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to himself, would surely be ignorant likewise of what belongs to other men.

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Soc. For by acting justly and prudently both you and the state will act in a manner pleasing to the deity.

Alc. It is likely.

Soc. And by looking, as we said before, at what is divine and bright, ye will do so.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. And, moreover, by looking there,⁶³ ye will behold and know what is your own good.

Alc. True.

Soc. And will ye not then act both rightly and well?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And acting thus I will guarantee that you will be happy.

Alc. For you are a sure guarantee.

Soc. But by acting unjustly and looking to that which is godless and dark, ye will, it is likely, commit acts similar to those things, through your being ignorant of yourselves.

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Soc. For to the party, my dear Alcibiades, who has the power of doing what he pleases, and does not possess a mind, what is there likely to happen, either as a private person, or in the case of a state?⁶⁴ as in the case of a sick person,

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Soc. Is not the better more beautiful likewise?

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Soc. And is not the more beautiful more becoming?⁶⁵

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Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Now vice is a thing becoming only to a slave.

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Alc. Yes.

Soc. Ought we not, friend, to fly from what is becoming to a slave?

Alc. Most especially, Socrates!

Soc. Perceive you then in what state you are? Is it such as becomes a freeman, or not?

Alc. I think I perceive it very strongly.

Soc. Know you then, how you may escape from that, which *ιδίωτε*, translated "to the state, if he governs it:" which has led me to suggest that in *πόλει οἷον* lie hid *πόλειως προστατεύοντι, οἷον*— For thus *προστατεύοντι* would answer to *τυραννεύοντι* in the very next sentence.

⁶⁵ This doctrine is more fully developed in the Hippias Major.

is now around you? (I say this) that we may not apply that name⁶⁶ to a man of honour?

Alc. I do.

Soc. How?

Alc. If you, Socrates, are willing.

Soc. You say not well, Alcibiades!

Alc. But what ought I to say?

Soc. This, "if a god is willing."

Alc. So I say then. And I will add to those words this too; that we shall be in danger, Socrates, of changing characters, I (assuming) yours, and you mine. For it is not possible for me from this day forward not to follow you, as if I were your tutor, and you were my pupil.

Soc. My love then for you, my noble Alcibiades, differs in nothing from that of the stork;⁶⁷ if after having hatched for you a winged love, it shall be administered to in return by this love of yours.

Alc. And such is the case; and I will begin henceforth to pay all attention to what is just.

Soc. I wish you may persevere. But I have a great fear, not indeed through distrusting your natural disposition, but through perceiving the strength⁶⁸ of the city, lest it overcome both me and you.

⁶⁶ i. e. *δουλοπρεπής*. To this passage Cicero is supposed to allude in *Tuscul.* iii. 32, where he states that—"quum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse, nec quidquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis bajulum interesse, quum se Alcibiades affligeret lacrymansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret—" But as Plato says nothing about Alcibiades shedding tears, Cicero must have got the anecdote from some other source; unless it be said that he found here *Δακρύων δοκῶ μοι*—not simply *Δοκῶ μοι*—

⁶⁷ This alludes to the story, that the young stork is wont, during the periodical migrations of the birds, to carry on its back its parent, when unable to fly. The earliest reference to this fable is in *Soph. El.* 1047, and in *Pseudo-Babr. fab.* 13, where the Stork says of itself, *εὐσεβίστατον ζῶων Τὸν ἐμὸν τιθηῶν πατέρα καὶ νοσηλεύω*. For other passages see the note of Ast.

⁶⁸ Sydenham translates *ρώμην*, "torrent," as if he wished to read *ρύμην*, literally, "dragging along," which would be a more vivid expression.

I will state here, what I forgot to do in the Introduction, that Winckelmann agrees with Schleiermacher and Ast, in considering the First Alcibiades not to be a genuine production of Plato; for in *p.* 126, *C.* § 46, the word *σκιθαμῆ* is found, which according to Mœris was an Hellenic word, but *δόχη* the Attic one.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND ALCIBIADES, ON PRAYING.

ALTHOUGH different scholars have arrived at different conclusions respecting the author of the First Alcibiades, yet nearly all appear to admit that the Second was not written by Plato. Clinton indeed, in *Fast. Hellenic.* p. 225, seems to consider it genuine. For he probably did not so much forget, as designedly disregard, the statement made by Athenæus in xi. p. 506, C., that the dialogue had been attributed to Xenophon. It is however quoted as Plato's by *Ælian* V. H. viii. 9, *Priscian*, p. 1148, *Olympiodorus* on *Phileb.* p. 265, and *Thom. Mag.* *Εὔχομαι*. But in the last passage some MSS. rightly read *ὡς ὁ Πλατωνικὸς λόγος Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπιγραφόμενος ἢ περὶ Προσενχής*. It seems moreover to be alluded to by *Juvenal* in x. 346, and *Persius* ii. 61. But *Stalbaum* denies the existence of any such allusion, and conceives that the author was some philosopher of Alexandria, who lived in the second or third century before the Christian æra, and who was not only ignorant of Plato's manner of carrying on a dialogue, but of the purity and peculiarities of the language spoken at Athens, which neither the philosopher himself, nor any of his contemporaries, would have failed to adopt. But as the dialogue has come down to us in rather a corrupt state, as remarked by *Dobree*, and that there is, according to *Stalbaum* himself, scarcely a sentence where something does not occur to offend, it seems hardly fair to lay upon the author all the faults to be found in the dialogue, instead of attributing some to the carelessness of

now, but ⁴⁸one alone, and he worthy to be loved,⁴⁸ Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phænarete.

Alc. It is true.

Soc. Did you not say that I had been a little beforehand with you when I accosted you; for that you were about to address me first, being desirous to ask me, why I alone do not go away?

Alc. It was so.

Soc. This then is the reason; for I alone am the admirer of you; but the others of what belong to you. Now what belong to you are ceasing to bloom; but you are beginning to be in flower. [56.] If then you are not now spoilt by the Athenian mob, and become ugly, I shall never forsake you. For of this I am most afraid, that you may become a mob-lover, and be spoilt by them. Since many, even virtuous Athenians, have already suffered this fate. For ⁴⁹the mob of the magnanimous Erechtheus⁴⁹ has a fair exterior. ⁵⁰But you ought to see it undressed.⁵⁰ Make use therefore of the caution, which I give you.

Alc. What caution?

Soc. In the first place, my friend, exercise yourself,⁵¹ and learn what a person ought to learn, who is proceeding to state affairs; but previously not; in order that you may go to them possessing an antidote, and suffer no grievous harm.

Alc. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak correctly. But endeavour to explain in what way we may take care of ourselves.

Soc. Has not so much been gone through by us already? For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed upon. Indeed we feared lest, if mistaken on that point, we should be unconsciously taking care of something else, and not of ourselves.

Alc. It is so.

^{48—48} Buttmann acutely saw here an allusion to Μοῦνος τὸν ἀγαπητὸς in Hom. *Il.* B. 305.

^{49—49} Here, as Gottleber remarked, is an allusion to Δῆμος Ἐρεχθίδος μεγαλήτορος in Hom. *Il.* B. 547.

^{50—50} For it would then appear, to use the words of Horace, "Intrusus turpis, speciosa pelle decorus."

⁵¹ Ficinus has "exue illum—" as if he had found in his MS. γύμνασον—and referred the verb to the people.

Soc. And after this we ought to take care of the soul, and look to it.

Alc. Plainly so.

Soc. And that to others should be handed over the care of our bodies and our property.

Alc. How not?

[57.] *Soc.* In what way then can we know these things the most clearly? For, after we know this, it seems, we shall know ourselves. Now, by the gods, do we not understand the Delphic inscription we just now mentioned, as saying correctly?

Alc. What? What are you thinking of, and what do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you what I suspect this inscription means, and what it advises us (to do). For it nearly seems that its resemblance does not exist every where, but only with reference to the sight.

Alc. How say you thus?

Soc. Do you likewise consider it. If it had said to our eye, as to a man, by way of advice—"Behold yourself—" how and what should we suppose it was advising? Would it not be to look to that, by looking to which the eye might see itself?

Alc. It is evident.

Soc. Let us then consider, by looking to what of things existing we can see both it and ourselves?

Alc. It is evident, Socrates, (by looking at) mirrors, and other things of the like kind.

Soc. You say rightly. And in the eye itself, with which we see, ⁵²is there not something ⁵²of such a kind?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. You have observed then, that the face of him, who looks at the eye of another, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror, which we call the pupil, ⁵³being the image ⁵⁴of the person, who looks in it.

⁵²⁻⁵³ Instead of *ἐν ἑαυτῇ τῷ τοιούτῳ*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ἐν ἑαυτῇ τῇ τοιούτῳ*, as is evident from his version, "inest hujusmodi quiddam," which Sydenham adopted, and F. A. Wolf subsequently suggested in *Miscell. Analect.* p. 104.

⁵³ In lieu of *κορυφήν*, Dacier was the first to adopt *κόρην*, from "pupillam" in Ficinus; and so the three oldest MSS. and Stobæus. So too Bernard Martin, in *Varr. Lect.* iv. 3, and Viger on *Euseb.* p. 54.

⁵⁴ As the pupil is not the image itself, but only gives the image, it

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking at that, which is the best part of itself, with which it sees, may thus see itself?

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. But if it look at any other part of the man, or at any of things existing, except at that, to which it happens to be like, it will not see itself.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. If then an eye would see itself, it must look at an eye, and to that place of the eye where the virtue of the eye is naturally seated; now this is surely the sight.

Alc. Just so.

[58.] *Soc.* Is it not true then, my dear Alcibiades, that the soul likewise, if it would know itself, must look at soul, and especially at that place of the soul where wisdom,⁵⁵ the virtue of the soul, is inherent, and to that other thing, to which it happens to be like?

Alc. To me at least, Socrates, it seems so.

Soc. Can we mention any property of the soul more divine⁵⁶ than that, about which knowledge and intelligence are conversant?

Alc. We cannot.

Soc. This therefore in the soul resembles the divine nature. And a person looking at this, and recognising all that is divine, both god⁵⁷ and intelligence, would thus know himself the most.⁵⁸

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. And to know oneself, we acknowledge to be wisdom.⁵⁹

Alc. By all means.

is probable that Plato wrote *εἰδωλον διδοῦν τι*, in lieu of *εἰδωλον ὄν τι*—

⁵⁵ Heusde first proposed to expel *σοφία*, as an interpolation; with whom Ast and Stalbaum feel disposed to agree.

⁵⁶ In lieu of *θειώτερον*, the three oldest MSS. offer *νοερώτερον*, which Buttmann would receive, but Stalbaum reject.

⁵⁷ Instead of *θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, Heusde suggested *σοφίαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, similar to the preceding *τὸ εἶδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν*. But Ast, *νοῦν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, referring to Julian, Or. ii. p. 68, D., *νῦ καὶ φρονήσει, φησὶ (ὁ Πλάτων) καὶ, τὸ ὅλον, τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῷ*.

⁵⁸ I should prefer *κάλλιστα* to *μάλιστα*.

⁵⁹ Here again *σωφροσύνη* is used in the sense of *φρόνησις*, and so is *σώφρονες* a little below for *φρόνιμοι*.

⁶⁰[*Soc.* As mirrors then are more clear, and more pure, and more brilliant, than the mirror in the eye, so the deity is more pure and more brilliant than that, which is the best in our soul.

Alc. It is likely, Socrates.

Soc. Looking therefore at the deity, we should make use of him, as the most beautiful mirror; but (of) things belonging to man, to the virtue of the soul; and shall we not thus especially see and know our very selves?

Alc. Yes.]⁶⁰

Soc. By not knowing ourselves, and not being wise, can we know what of things belonging to us are good and evil?

Alc. How could it be, Socrates?

Soc. For perhaps it appears impossible for him who knows not Alcibiades himself, to know that what belongs to Alcibiades does so belong to Alcibiades.

Alc. It is, by Zeus, impossible.

Soc. Nor that what are our own, are really our own, ⁶¹ unless (he knows) us.⁶¹

Alc. For how should he?

Soc. And if not what are ours, then not what belongs to ours.

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Soc. We did not then rightly admit, as we did just now, that there were some, who know not themselves, and yet (know) what belonged to them, but that others⁶² (do not know) even

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Soc. My love then for you, my noble Alcibiades, differs in nothing from that of the stork;⁶⁷ if after having hatched for you a winged love, it shall be administered to in return by this love of yours.

Alc. And such is the case; and I will begin henceforth to pay all attention to what is just.

Soc. I wish you may persevere. But I have a great fear, not indeed through distrusting your natural disposition, but through perceiving the strength⁶⁸ of the city, lest it overcome both me and you.

⁶⁶ i. e. δουλοπρεπής. To this passage Cicero is supposed to allude in *Tuscul.* iii. 32, where he states that—"quum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse, nec quidquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis bajulum interesse, quum se Alcibiades afflicta ret lacrymansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret—" But as Plato says nothing about Alcibiades shedding tears, Cicero must have got the anecdote from some other source; unless it be said that he found here *Δακρύων δοκῶ μοι*—not simply *Δοκῶ μοι*—

⁶⁷ This alludes to the story, that the young stork is wont, during the periodical migrations of the birds, to carry on its back its parent, when unable to fly. The earliest reference to this fable is in *Soph. El.* 1047, and in *Pseudo-Bahr. fab.* 13, where the Stork says of itself, *εὐσεβίσταρον ζῶων Τὸν ἰμὸν τιθηνῶ πατέρα καὶ νοσηλεύω*. For other passages see the note of Ast.

⁶⁸ Sydenham translates *ῥώμην*, "torrent," as if he wished to read *ῥύμην*, literally, "dragging along," which would be a more vivid expression.

I will state here, what I forgot to do in the Introduction, that Winckelmann agrees with Schleiermacher and Ast, in considering the First Alcibiades not to be a genuine production of Plato; for in p. 126, C. § 46, the word *σπιθαμή* is found, which according to Mæris was an Hellenic word, but *δόχμη* the Attic one.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND ALCIBIADES, ON PRAYING.

ALTHOUGH different scholars have arrived at different conclusions respecting the author of the First Alcibiades, yet nearly all appear to admit that the Second was not written by Plato. Clinton indeed, in *Fast. Hellenic.* p. 225, seems to consider it genuine. For he probably did not so much forget, as designedly disregard, the statement made by Athenæus in xi. p. 506, C., that the dialogue had been attributed to Xenophon. It is however quoted as Plato's by Ælian V. H. viii. 9, Priscian, p. 1148, Olympiodorus on *Phileb.* p. 265, and Thom. Mag. *Εὔχομαι*. But in the last passage some MSS. rightly read *ὡς ὁ Πλατωνικὸς λόγος Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπιγραφόμενος ἢ περὶ Προσευχῆς*. It seems moreover to be alluded to by Juvenal in x. 346, and Persius ii. 61. But Stalbaum denies the existence of any such allusion, and conceives that the author was some philosopher of Alexandria, who lived in the second or third century before the Christian æra, and who was not only ignorant of Plato's manner of carrying on a dialogue, but of the purity and peculiarities of the language spoken at Athens, which neither the philosopher himself, nor any of his contemporaries, would have failed to adopt. But as the dialogue has come down to us in rather a corrupt state, as remarked by Dobree, and that there is, according to Stalbaum himself, scarcely a sentence where something does not occur to offend, it seems hardly fair to lay upon the author all the faults to be found in the dialogue, instead of attributing some to the carelessness of

transcribers, and others to the accidents of time. My own opinion is, that as Antisthenes wrote, or rather dressed up, a dialogue under the title of Alcibiades, as we learn by Diogenes Laertius ii. 61, and that the same person spoke ill of the son of Clinias, as stated by Athenæus v. 20; and as we find in this dialogue more frequent allusions to the *Æsopo-Socratic* fables, than are furnished by any dialogue of Plato, or separate work of Xenophon; and that Julian, in *Orat.* vii. p. 390, testifies to the fact that Antisthenes was accustomed, like Xenophon, to have recourse to fables in his philosophical discourses, one may fairly assign to him the authorship of the *Second Alcibiades*; where he has not only represented his master as acting the part of a sensible philosopher, but Alcibiades in that of a mere ordinary man, instead of being, what he fancied he was, the then living sun of Athens and the cynosure of Greece.

With regard to the matter of the dialogue, the folly or inutility of prayer, as practised by the generality of mankind, Gottleber refers to Xenophon's *M. S.* i. 3, where Socrates is said to have prayed the gods simply to give what was good, leaving them to decide, as knowing better than himself, what was or was not for his good. The doctrine was adopted by Marcus Antoninus in v. 7, who says that we must either pray in general terms, or not at all; while the latter alternative was chosen by the philosophers of Cyrene, who, as we learn from Clemens Alexandrinus in *Stromat.* vii. p. 722, asserted the inutility of prayer.

THE
SECOND ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES.

[1.] ARE you going, Alcibiades, to pray to the god?¹

Alc. Just so, Socrates.

Soc. You appear to have a serious look, and to be directing your eyes to the ground, as if thinking upon something.

Alc. Of what should a person be thinking, Socrates?

Soc. Of things, Alcibiades, of the greatest moment, as it seems to myself at least. For come, by Zeus, do you not think, when we happen to pray, either in private or in public, that the gods themselves² sometimes grant some of those prayers, and some not, and to some persons they (nod assent),³ but to some not?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. Does it not seem then to you that there is need of much forethought, in order that a person may not unconsciously pray for great evils for himself, while thinking (he is praying) for good; and that the gods may not happen to be in such a disposition, as to grant whatever he happens to be praying for? just as they say Œdipus did, in praying that his

¹ As the deity is not mentioned, Sydenham and Koeppen suppose it was Zeus, but Gottleber Apollo.

² Buttmann would reject *αἱ τοὶ*, as being perfectly unnecessary. It is however defended by Reinhold Klotz in *Quæst. Crit.* p. 24. I long ago suggested *ἀνθρώποις*, to answer to "malignis" in Juvenal x. 3, "Magnaque numinibus vota exaudita malignis."

³ In lieu of *ἀνθρώποις* Ficinus seems to have found *καταθέουσιν*, as shown by his version, "annuere."

sons might divide their patrimony by the sword;³ (and)⁴ when he might have prayed for his then present evils to be averted, he uttered a curse that others might be superadded; and thereupon both these were brought to pass, and after these others too, many and terrible,⁵ of which what need is there to speak singly?

Alc. But, Socrates, you have spoken of a man who was mad; for who, think you, of sound mind would venture to make such a prayer?

[2.] *Soc.* Does it seem to you, that to be mad is at all the contrary to being in one's senses?

Alc. Perfectly so.

Soc. Do not men seem to you to be senseless and sensible?

Alc. Yes, to be so.

Soc. Come then, let us consider who these are. For that there are men senseless and sensible you have admitted, and others who are mad.

Alc. It has been admitted.

Soc. Moreover, there are some men in a sound state of health?

Alc. There are.

Soc. And are there not others in a bad state of health?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. These are not the same with those?

Alc. They are not.

Soc. Are there not others, who are in neither of those states?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. For every man must of necessity be either in a diseased state or not.

Alc. It seems so to myself at least.

Soc. What then with respect to intellect and non-intellect, have you the same opinion?

Alc. How say you?

³ The curse is described by Euripides in *Phœn.* 70, Ἀρὰς ἀρᾶται καὶ οἷν ἀνέστηντάς τε καὶ οὐδὲν δῶμα διαλαχέειν τόδε: where see Valckenauer.

⁴ Stephens suggested the insertion of καὶ from "cumque," in Ficinus. Buttmann, however, and Hommel on *Sympos.* p. 186, B., and Stalbaum consider it unnecessary.

⁵ For the whole family was destroyed. And hence Juvenal says in x. 7, "Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles."

Soc. Does it seem to you to be necessary⁶ for a man to be sensible or senseless? Or is there some third and middle state, which causes a man to be neither sensible nor senseless?

Alc. There certainly is not.

Soc. It is necessary then for him to be in the one or in the other⁷ of those states.

Alc. So it seems to me at least.

[3.] *Soc.* Do you not remember that you admitted this, that insanity is contrary to being in one's senses?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And that there is no middle or third state, which causes a man to be neither sensible nor senseless?

Alc. I admitted this too.

Soc. But how can two different things be contrary to one thing?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. ⁸To be senseless then, and to be mad, seem to be nearly the same thing.⁸

Alc. They seem so.

Soc. If then we should pronounce that all fools were madmen, we should pronounce rightly, Alcibiades. For example, if some of your equals in age, happen to be senseless, as indeed they are, and some of your elders likewise, ⁹come, by

⁶ The Greek is Δοκεῖ σοὶ οὐδὲν τι εἶναι, "Do you think it possible," &c. But Ficinus has "Opinaris hominem—esse oportere"—as if he had read in his MS. Δοκεῖ σοὶ δεῖν εἶναι, "Do you think that a man ought to be." Both readings interfere equally with the argument, which requires us to read, Δοκεῖ σοὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, as we have translated in English, and Dacier has done similarly in French. S. From whence Buttmann was led to Δοκεῖ σοὶ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. But Wex, in Commentat. de Menon, p. 43, has suggested—δοκεῖς ἄνδρ' (i. e. ἀνθρώπων) ὄντα εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα: Stalbaum, Εἰ δοκεῖ σοὶ μόνον τιν' εἶναι: and Sauppe, Εἰ δοκεῖς οὐχ οὐδὲν τι μὴ εἶναι. The reader is therefore left to take his choice.

⁷ Although ἕτερον is acknowledged by "alterum" in Ficinus, yet correct Greek requires ἑκάτερον, "alterutrum," as I have translated after Sydenham.

⁸ That the Stoics derived from Socrates their celebrated paradox πάντας τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεισθαι, "all fools are mad," is justly observed by Cicero in Tuscul. iii. 5; where Davis refers to this passage in Plato. S. But on the other hand Boeckh was led to believe that this dialogue was written subsequent to the time of Socrates, when the doctrines of the Stoics were more in vogue.

⁹ Ficinus omits the words φέρε πρὸς Διός—

Jove,⁹ do you not think that in this city there are few sensible men, but the majority senseless, whom you call madmen?

Alc. Yes, I do.

Soc. Think you then, that, living under the same state with so many madmen, we should be delighted,¹⁰ or that we should not be buffeted, and pelted, and have long since suffered punishment for, such acts as madmen are wont to commit? But consider, thou blessed man, whether this be the case.

Alc. What then could it be, Socrates? For it appears nearly to be not what I just now fancied.

Soc. Neither does it appear so to myself. But let us look at the matter in some such way as this.

Alc. In what way do you mean?

Soc. I will tell you. [4.] We understand that some men are in bad health; do we not?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Does it seem to you necessary for every man in bad health to have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia?¹¹ Or does it not seem to you that a man, without suffering at all in this way, may be ill in some other disorder? For diseases, we suppose, are of many various kinds, and not these alone.

Alc. I suppose there are.

Soc. Does not every ophthalmia seem to be a disease?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But is every disease ophthalmia?

Alc. Certainly not, it seems to me. Yet still I am at a loss about your meaning.

Soc. If, however, you will give me your attention,¹² by considering the matter, both of us together¹² will peradventure discover it.

Alc. I am giving you, Socrates, all attention, to the best of my power.

Soc. Was it not agreed upon by us, that every ophthalmia was a disease; but every disease was not an ophthalmia?

¹⁰ Stalbaum translates *χαίροντας* "impune"—But that use of the verb *χαίρειν* is found only in a threat.

¹¹ Although "ophthalmia" is a Greek word written merely in English letters, it has now become naturalized to express a peculiar disorder in the eyes.

¹² ¹³ Here is an allusion to Hom. *Il.* K. 224, *Σύν τε δὲ ἱππομήνεω*—from whence *τε* has crept in, where the author wrote *γε*—The same allusion is found likewise in the Banquet, p. 174, D. § 2.

Alc. It was agreed so.

Soc. And it seems to me to have been correctly agreed. For all persons in a fever have a disease; but not all, however, who have a disease, are in a fever; neither have they all I think the gout, nor ophthalmia. Every thing indeed of this kind is a disease; and they, whom we call physicians, say that diseases produce different effects. For all diseases are not alike, nor do they all act similarly, but each according to its own peculiar power; and yet they are all diseases, just as we understand there are in the case of workmen; do we not?

Alc. Certainly.

[5.] *Soc.* Such as shoemakers, carpenters, statuaries, and very many others, whom why need one mention in detail? All these have divided amongst them portions of handicraftship, and yet all are handicraftsmen. They are not, however, carpenters, nor shoemakers, nor statuaries, taken altogether.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Just so have men divided folly amongst them. And those, who have the largest share, we call madmen; but those, who have a less, silly, and thunder-struck.¹³ But if we choose to speak of such in good-omened language, some call them high-spirited, but others simpletons; and others again, harmless and inexperienced, and speechless.¹⁴ You will also find, upon inquiry, many other names. But they all mean non-intellect; although they differ, just as one art has been shown by us (to differ) from another; and one disease from another. Or how does it seem to you?

Alc. To me in this way.

Soc. ¹⁵To the point then (from whence we digressed)¹⁵ let us return back again. For it was proposed, I think, in the

¹³ In Greek, *μυθοννήτους*: for the effect of lightning when attended by thunder, and indeed of all electrical fire, is to stupify, at least for a time, whatever animal it strikes. S.

¹⁴ The Greek is *ἑνεός*, a word properly applied to infants. Of these three epithets, the first alludes to the wholly useless in any affair; the next to the easy to be imposed on; and the last to those who, from the want of ideas, have nothing to say. S. But *ἑνεός* is rather said of a person struck dumb, as shown by Ruhnken on *Timæus*, p. 102.

¹⁵—¹⁶ I have followed Ficinus, "Sed ut redeamus unde digressi sumus," rather than the Greek *Ὁκοῦν ἀπ' ἐκείνου πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν*, where *ἐκείνου* has nothing to which it can be referred.

beginning of our conversation to consider who are the senseless, and sensible. For it was agreed that some such existed. Was it not?

Alc. Yes, it was so agreed.

Soc. Whether then do you understand by the sensible, those who know how to do and say what they ought?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And whom (do you understand) by the senseless? Are they not such as know neither of those things?

Alc. Those very persons.

Soc. Will not those persons then, who know neither of those things, unconsciously say and do what they ought?

Alc. It appears so.

[6.] *Soc.* Now of these very persons, Alcibiades, Œdipus, I said, was one. And you will find many of those living even now, who, though not influenced by anger, as he was, pray for things hurtful to themselves; not fancying them to be so, but good (rather).¹⁶ He indeed, as he did not pray for (good), so neither did he fancy (he was doing so). But some others there are, who have suffered the very contrary to this. For I think that you, if the god to whom you happen to be going should appear to you, and, before you had uttered a prayer, first ask you—"Will it suffice for you to become a despotic king¹⁷ of Athens;" and, if you thought this a trifle,¹⁸ [and no great thing,]¹⁸ should add "and over all the Greeks;" and, if he should see that you fancied you would still have¹⁹ too little, unless he were²⁰ to appoint you king²⁰ of the whole of Europe; and should undertake not this alone, (but) that on this very day, according to your wish, all should perceive that Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, is their autocrat—I think you would walk away exceedingly delighted, as if you had met with the greatest good.

¹⁶ Ficinus has "sed bona potius," as if he had found in his MS. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀγαθά.

¹⁷ The word *τύραννος* every where in Plato signifies a despotic monarch. S.

¹⁸—¹⁸ The words *μή μέγα τι* are evidently an explanation of *φαῦλον*.

¹⁹ Instead of *ἔχειν*, the sense requires either *ἔχειν ἄν* or *ἔξειν*, as I have translated.

²⁰—²⁰ Since in lieu of *ὑποσταίη σοι*, one MS. has *καταστήσῃ σοι*; from the two united I elicited, many years ago, *ἀνακτα καταστήσεις σὲ*, similar to *δεσπότῃ κατιστήσαν* in Isocrates, p. 478, Bekk., and *ἀρχοντας καθιστάναι* in Thucyd. iv. 132.

Alc. I fancy, Socrates, that any one else whatever would do so likewise, if such things were to happen to him.

Soc. You would not, however, be willing that the country of, and absolute dominion over, all the Greeks and Barbarians should be yours in exchange for your life.²¹

Alc. I suppose not; (for why should I?) when I was about to make no use of them.

Soc. What then, if you were about to make a bad and detrimental use of them, you would not (be willing) even in such a case?

Alc. Certainly not.

[7.] *Soc.* You see then that it is not safe to accept at random gifts when offered; nor for a person to pray that things may take place, if he is about to be injured through them, or be totally released from life. Many, too, we could mention, who after having longed for absolute power, and laboured to obtain it, as if about to enjoy some mighty good, have, on account of their tyranny, been plotted against and lost their lives.²² I think, too, that some events, which happened as it were but yesterday,²³ have come to your ears, how that a favourite²⁴ of Archelaus, tyrant of Macedonia, murdered his admirer, through his being as fond of absolute power, as the tyrant was of him, and with the view of becoming the tyrant himself, and a happy man; but that, possessing the power for three or four days, he was in turn plotted against by some of his friends and destroyed. You see, too, of our own fellow-citizens—for this we have not heard from others, but know by being present ourselves—that such as have longed for, and obtained, the command of an army, some are even now exiles from the city, and others have ended their lives; and such, as seemed to have fared the best, have passed

²¹ In Alcibiad. i. p. 105, A. § 4, there is a very similar train of argument. But there the son of Clinias is represented as preferring power to life. From the change in his feelings it is fair to infer that this dialogue relates to a period, when he had become somewhat cooled down by age.

²² The author had probably in view the fate of Peisistratus and Hipparchus.

²³ The phrase *Χθιζά τε καὶ πρωῒζα* is taken from Homer in *Il.* B. 303. In Attic prose Greek it is *χθὲς καὶ πρωῒν*, found in Gorg. p. 470. *BUTTM.*

²⁴ The name of the favourite is *Κραεύας*, in *Ælian* V. H. viii. 9, *Κράρεπος* in Diodorus, lxi. p. 761, but *Κραταῖος* in *Aristot. Polit.* v. 8, 11.

through many trying dangers and terrors²⁵ during the campaign itself;²⁶ and when they have returned to their own country, have suffered from informers a siege not at all inferior to that, which they have endured from foreign foes; so that some of them prayed they had never been at the head of an army, rather than to have borne a command. [8.] Now, if the dangers and toils had tended to their benefit,²⁷ it would have had some reason;²⁸ but now it is quite the reverse. And with respect to children, you will find in the very same manner, how that some persons, after having prayed for them to be born, have, when they are born,²⁹ come into the greatest calamities and sorrows. For some, whose children have been thoroughly wicked, have passed the whole of their lives in sorrow; and some, whose children were well-behaved, have met with the misfortune to be deprived of them, and have come into calamities in no respect less than the others, and, like them, have wished rather that their children had been never born.³⁰ And yet, although these, and many other instances of the like kind, are so very evident to persons, it is rare to find a man who would refuse what is offered, or who, if he is about to obtain it by prayer, would cease to pray for it. Nor would the majority refrain from absolute power, if offered them, or the command of an army, or many other things, which, when present, do more harm than good; but they would, on the contrary,³¹ pray for their possession, should such things happen not to be present to any one. And yet, after waiting a little time, they sometimes recant,³¹ and pray the reverse of what they prayed before. I have therefore my

²⁵ Instead of φόβον, Sydenham would prefer πόνον, as better suited to κινδυνεύει τε καὶ πόνει, just afterwards.

²⁶ I have adopted ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ σπαρτῇ, which Ficinus found in his MS. as shown by his version—"in ipso exercitu."

²⁷⁻²⁸ The Greek is εἶχεν δὲ— But as there is nothing to which the verb can be referred, Ficinus introduced "hoc studium." The author wrote, I suspect, εἶχεν εἶχεν δὲ—"a prayer would have had—"

²⁹ The word ἤδη, which now precedes γενέσθαι, should be united to γενομένων. S.

³⁰ I have omitted here ἢ γενέσθαι with Ficinus; whose version is, "ac prorsus eligerent nunquam se filios genuisse."

³¹ Instead of ἀλλὰ, the sense requires ἀλλ' αὖ—

³¹ Gottleber quotes opportunely Maxim. Tyr. xxx. p. 313, Μίδας—ποιεῖται παλινφθίαν τῆς εὐχῆς.

doubts, that men do in reality accuse the gods unjustly, in saying that their evils come from them; for either by their own crimes or follies, we should say,

They griefs endure beyond their fated share.²²

[9.] And that poet, Alcibiades, was near to being a sensible person, who, when connected with some friends void of understanding, and observing them to do and pray for things which it were better for them (not to have), but which appeared to them (to be good), thought proper to use in common a prayer, which he expresses somehow to this effect—

“Oh, Zeus, our king, whate’er is good vouchsafe
To us, if prayers we offer or do not;
But evil, when we pray thee to avert,²³
Do thou ordain.”²⁴

To me indeed the poet appears to speak correctly and safely. But if you have aught in your mind against this sentiment, do not hold your tongue.

Alc. It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to speak against any thing which is said correctly. But I am thinking on that point, of how many evils to man is ignorance the cause; since, as it seems, through it we are unconsciously doing to ourselves the greatest mischiefs, and, what is the worst, even praying for them; a fact which no one would fancy; but every one would conceive this rather, that he is competent to pray for things the best for himself, and not the worst; for this would in reality be like a curse, and not a prayer.

Soc. But perhaps, O best of men, some one who happens to be wiser than you or I, would say, that we do not speak correctly in blaming thus at random ignorance, unless we add that of some things and to some persons and under certain circumstances, ignorance is a good, as it is to them an evil.

Alc. How say you? Is there any thing whatever, of

²² Here, as Sydenham remarks, is an allusion to Od. I. 32.

²³⁻²⁴ The Greek couplet is found with some slight variations in Antholog. Epigr. Ἀδίσκωρ. 466, ed. Br. The same verses have been lately found likewise in Orion Antholog. Gnomie. and published by Schneidewinn in Conject. Crit. p. 48, as remarked by Sauppe, who refers to Proclus in Platon. Rep. 402, 26, ed. Bas.

²⁴ Instead of κέλεις, which is unintelligible, Ficinus found in his MS. κίλεις, as shown by his version, “abesse jube—”

which it is better for any person whatever, under any circumstances whatever, to be ignorant than to know?

Soc. So it seems to me at least; and does it not to you?

Alc. No, by Zeus.

[10.] Soc. I will not bring a verdict against you on the point of your being willing to do³⁵ to your own mother, what they say Orestes and Alcmaeon did, or whoever else may have happened to act in the same manner as they did.

Alc. Speak, by Zeus, words of good omen, Socrates.

Soc. There is no need, Alcibiades, of your bidding that person to speak words of good omen, who says that you would not be willing to do such a deed, but much rather him, who says the contrary. (But)³⁶ since the deed appears to you to be so dreadful, that it ought not to be mentioned so easily, do you think that Orestes, if he had been a sensible person, and known what it was best for him to do, would have dared to commit any such act?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Nor would, I think, any other man.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc.³⁷ The ignorance therefore of what is best is an evil; and to be ignorant of the best.³⁷

Alc. So it appears, at least to me.

Soc. And to him, and to all other men.

Alc. So I say.

Soc. Let us consider further this too. If it occurred to you on this very instant to think it were a better thing for you to take a dagger, and, going to the house of Pericles, your guardian and your friend, to ask—Is he within—with the intention of killing only him, and no other person, and that the servants should say—He is within.—[11.] I do not assert that

³⁵ Respecting the murder of his mother Clytemnestra by Orestes, it will be sufficient to refer to the Choephoroi of Æschylus, and the Electra of Sophocles, and Euripides; and for that of Alcmaeon, to the Scholia on Hom. Od. xi. 326; Servius on Virgil's Æn. vi. 445; and Apollodorus iii. 6. S. Who might have added the fragments of the Alcmaeon of Euripides, some of which are to be found translated into Latin in Cicero's Academics.

³⁶ I have adopted Buttmann's conjecture, that $\delta\epsilon$ has dropt out after $\delta\eta$. Hommel however, on Sympos. p. 189, D., defends the want of connexion; while Stalbaum would read $\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\tau\alpha$ —

³⁷—³⁷ In the words between the numerals there is a tautology which Gottleber was the first to notice; but it was found in the MS. used by Priscian, who quotes the whole passage in p. 1148

you have an inclination to do any of these things; ²⁸ but if, as I think, it shall seem good to you, what surely nothing prevents, that to him, who is ignorant of what is the best, an opinion has at some time occurred, so that what is even the worst, has been thought at some time to be the best.²⁸ Or does it not seem to you it would be?

Alc. Certainly so.

Soc. If then, upon going within, you should see himself there, but not knowing him, should think he was some other person, would you still venture to kill him?

Alc. No, by Zeus; I do not think I should.

Soc. For you would not (kill) any person, who happened to meet you, but only that very person, whom you wished (to kill). Is it not so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if you made frequent attempts, but were always ignorant of his being Pericles, ²⁹ [whenever you were about to do the deed,] ²⁹ you never would make an attack upon him.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. What then, do you think that Orestes would ever have made an attack upon his mother, if in like manner he had not known her?

Alc. I think he would not.

Soc. For he too had it not in his mind to kill any woman, who might meet him, nor the mother of any person whatever, but his own mother.

Alc. Such is the fact.

Soc. To persons then so situated, and having such fancies, it is better not to know such things.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. Do you then perceive, that of some things, and to some persons, and under some circumstances, ignorance is a good, and not, as it seemed to you just now, an evil?

Alc. It is probable.

^{28—29} Such is the literal translation of the Greek, out of which neither Sydenham nor any one else have been able to make the least sense, except by alterations more or less violent. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "Sed an videatur tibi, quod quidem nihil prohibet, ignorantibus tibi, quid sit optimum, adesse posse interdum opinionem, ut iudices, quod est pessimum, nonnunquam optimum esse."

^{29—29} The words within brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus.

[12.] *Soc.* Further still, if you are willing to consider what is after this, it would perhaps appear to you to be absurd.—⁴⁰

Alc. What especially, Socrates?

Soc. That the possession of (all)⁴¹ other sciences, so to speak, is, unless a person possesses the science⁴² of what is best, very near to being seldom a benefit, but generally hurtful to the person possessing it.⁴³ And consider in this way. Does it not seem to you necessary that, when we are about to do or say any thing, we ought to know, or previously fancy we know, or know in reality, what we are about to say or do rather readily?

Alc. To me at least it seems so.

Soc. Do not then our public speakers, either knowing how to counsel, or fancying they know, give us their counsel on the instant on every occasion, some about war and peace, others, about the building of walls, or furnishing harbours; and, in one word, whatever one state does to another state, or itself by itself, all takes place from the advice of the orators.

Alc. You speak the truth.

Soc. See then what is after this.

⁴⁵ *Alc.* If I am able.

*Soc.*⁴⁵ You surely call persons sensible and senseless.

Alc. I do.

Soc. Do you not (call) the many senseless, but the few sensible?

⁴⁰ Ficinus has "Præterea si volueris—mirabile dictu discutere forte probabile videbitur," which Sydenham adopted; and from whence Buttmann elicited ἀποπον δὲ, ἵσως δὲ σοὶ εἰκὸς δόξειεν εἶναι. Stalbaum once proposed ἵσως δὲ σοὶ τι δόξειεν εἶναι: and so Sydenham before him.

⁴¹ I have adopted the "omnium" of Ficinus. For without that word the limitation of the universality in ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν would be unintelligible. Otherwise we must omit ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, as Ficinus has done.

⁴² Sydenham was the first to perceive that τῆς was required here between ἀνεν and τοῦ, as is evident from § 15, where the assertion is repeated. The correction is attributed to Schleiermacher by Buttmann.

⁴³ Instead of αὐτὸ in all the MSS. but two, which read αὐτὸν, Schneider suggested αὐτὸ, whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed. The credit of the correction is due to Sydenham, who was led to it by comparing § 15. He likewise anticipated αὐτὰς, formerly proposed by Stalbaum.

⁴⁴ Instead of πρῶτον, Ficinus seems to have read in his MS. πρότερον, answering to his "prius." But πρῶτον is found again in § 14.

⁴⁵—⁴⁶ I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Heusde.

Alc. Just so.

Soc. And (you call) both so, with an eye to something.

Alc. Yes.

[13.] *Soc.* Would you call that man sensible, who knows how to give advice, but without (knowing) whether a thing is better, and in what it is better?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor him, I think, who knows war abstractedly, but without (knowing) when it is better, or for how long a time it is better. Is it not so?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Nor if a person knows how to murder another, or to take away his property, or to cause him to be an exile from his country, without (knowing) when it is better, or to whom it is better (to do so).

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. The man, therefore, who possesses any knowledge of such a kind, unless the knowledge also of what is best follows at his side—now this is surely the same as the knowledge of what is beneficial—⁴⁶ Is it not so?

Alc. Certainly it is.

Soc. Shall we say that he is a sensible ⁴⁶ and a competent counsellor both for the state and himself; but that the man ⁴⁷ who does not do so, is the contrary of these? ⁴⁷ Or how seems it to you?

Alc. To me in this way.

Soc. What then, should a person who knows how to ride, or shoot with a bow, or wrestle, or box, or engage in any other kind of combat, or in any thing else which we know by art, by what name will you call him, who knows what takes place the better

⁴⁶⁻⁴⁸ The whole passage between the numerals Ficinus thus translates—*“hunc forte prudentem vocabis. Alc. Hunc ipsum. Soc. Prudentemque ipsum dicemus”*—

⁴⁷⁻⁴⁸ The Greek is *τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιῶντα τὰναντία τούτων*. In lieu of *ποιῶντα*, Sydenham suggested *ὠφελοῦντα*, that is, *ὠφελεῖν πιστάμενον*, or else *τοιούτον*: which last conjecture Stalbaum attributes to Schneider, and once called it “an egregious” one; but he afterwards proposed to omit *ποιῶντα* entirely. I suggested many years ago—*τὸν δὲ μὴ παύοντα τούτων, τὰναντία*—but I should have corrected rather *τὸν δὲ μὴ παύοντά τι τούτων*, similar to *τι τούτων παύειν*, in Theætet. p. 145, D., i. e. “but the person knowing none of these things, the reverse.” Sauppe would read *τὸν δὲ μὴ νοοῦντα*—

according to each art?⁴⁸ (Will you not call him, who knows) according to the equestrian art, an equestrian?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And him (who knows) according to the boxing art, a boxer? but him, according to the hautboy-playing art, a hautboy-player; and in the rest of cases surely analogously to these? Or how otherwise?

Alc. Not otherwise than in this way.

Soc. Does it then seem to you necessary that the person knowing any of these, is a sensible man? Or shall we say that he wants much of being so?

Alc. Much indeed, by Zeus.

[14.] *Soc.* What kind of a commonwealth do you think there would be, composed of good bow-men and hautboy-players, and still more of athletes⁴⁹ and other artists, and of those mixed with such as we have just now mentioned, who know how to war⁵⁰ in the abstract, and to murder in the abstract;⁵⁰ and, moreover, of orators puffed up with the statesman's swell,⁵¹ but all devoid of the knowledge of what is best, and of that, which knows when it is better to make use of each one of those things, and against whom?

Alc. A bad one, Socrates, I think.

Soc. And you would say, I think, when you saw each one of these men full of ambition, and giving the greatest share he has in the commonwealth to that point,

Where he may happen to be best himself,⁵²

⁴⁸ In lieu of *κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην*, Ficinus found in his MS. *κατὰ τέχνην*, as shown by his version—"in arte." Buttmann suggested *καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν τέχνην*, which I have adopted.

⁴⁹ We have no word in English to answer to *ἀθλητής*, by which was meant a person contending in all kinds of bodily exercises.

⁵⁰ Ficinus twice omits *ἀνὰ*—

⁵¹ The cant English word "swell" answers exactly to the Greek *φύσημα*. Stalbaum has given here a facetious anecdote, preserved by Eustathius on *Il. Σ.* p. 1151 = 1205, who states that when Demeas, the son of Diomedes by a female hautboy-player, was acting the swell as an orator, Hyperides stopped him by saying, Will you not be silent, nor swell your cheeks more than your mother did?

⁵² The author alludes to a passage quoted by Plato in *Gorg.* p. 481, E., from the *Antiope* of Euripides; where instead of *τῆς πολιτείας*, is found *ἡμίρας*: and hence in lieu of *πολιτείας* I should prefer *πραγματείας*, especially as Cicero has in *Rep.* i. 22, "Cum in suo quemque opere artificem, qui quidem excellat, nihil aliud cogitare, meditari, curare videam, nisi quo sit in illo genere melior."

I mean that which becomes best according to his own art,⁵³ but of that which is the best for the state, and himself for himself having missed for the most part, as having I think trusted without intellect to opinion.⁵⁴ Since then such is the case, should we not speak correctly in saying that such a commonwealth was full of great disorder and of lawlessness?

Alc. Right indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. Did it not seem to us to be necessary that we ought previously to fancy we know, or to know in reality, what we are about to say or do readily?⁵⁵

Alc. It seems so.

[15.] *Soc.* ⁵⁶ Should then a person do what he knows, or thinks he knows, and there follow that we have ourselves beneficially and profitably both to the state and himself to himself, is not—⁵⁶

Alc. How not?

⁵³ So Sydenham, as if he wished to read *κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην*, instead of *κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην*, "according to art in the abstract," which I cannot understand.

^{54—55} Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where I am now, as I was many years ago, quite in the dark. For I cannot see, nor could Stephens, how *αὐτὸν* can be united to *πόλει* by a copulative conjunction; nor how *αὐτὸν* can be said of the thing meant by *βελτίστου*, nor on what the accusative *δημαρτηκότα* depends; nor, lastly, why there should be any mention made of a person trusting to opinion without intellect; although it is true that there is a reference to this passage in § 15, but there all is as clear as it is here the reverse.

⁵⁶ In § 12, the word is *προχειροτέρως*, where Sauppe prefers *προχείρως*, as read here.

^{56—56} Here again a literal version will best show that it was not without reason that Sydenham wrote a very long note, and closed it with proposing to read *Οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν πράττει τις, ἃ οἶδεν, παρέπηται δὲ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη, ἰδὸκει ἡμῖν λυσιτελοῦντως ἕξειν τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ*, i. e. Should then a person do what he knows, and should the knowledge of what is the best accompany (the act), did it not seem to us that he would be in a condition advantageous to the state and to himself? To these emendations Sydenham was led by finding in Ficinus, "Nonne, si quis agit quidem, quod novit, aut nosse existimat, addit autem scientiam optimi, sequitur ut utiliter agat, et ad se ipsum et ad rem publicam." From whence Buttmann too wished to elicit *παρέπηται δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἐπιστήμη*, referring to § 13, *ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, εἰ μὲν παρέπηται ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὕτη δὲ ἦν ἡ αὐτῇ δῆπου ἥπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου*. With regard to my own refiction of the passage, to which I still adhere, I will refer the reader to my edition of this dialogue.

Jove,⁹ do you not think that in this city there are few sensible men, but the majority senseless, whom you call madmen?

Alc. Yes, I do.

Soc. Think you then, that, living under the same state with so many madmen, we should be delighted,¹⁰ or that we should not be buffeted, and pelted, and have long since suffered punishment for, such acts as madmen are wont to commit? But consider, thou blessed man, whether this be the case.

Alc. What then could it be, Socrates? For it appears nearly to be not what I just now fancied.

Soc. Neither does it appear so to myself. But let us look at the matter in some such way as this.

Alc. In what way do you mean?

Soc. I will tell you. [4.] We understand that some men are in bad health; do we not?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Does it seem to you necessary for every man in bad health to have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia?¹¹ Or does it not seem to you that a man, without suffering at all in this way, may be ill in some other disorder? For diseases, we suppose, are of many various kinds, and not these alone.

Alc. I suppose there are.

Soc. Does not every ophthalmia seem to be a disease?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But is every disease ophthalmia?

Alc. Certainly not, it seems to me. Yet still I am at a loss about your meaning.

Soc. If, however, you will give me your attention,¹² by considering the matter, both of us together¹³ will peradventure discover it.

Alc. I am giving you, Socrates, all attention, to the best of my power.

Soc. Was it not agreed upon by us, that every ophthalmia was a disease; but every disease was not an ophthalmia?

¹⁰ Stalbaum translates *χαίροντας* "impune"—But that use of the verb *χαίρειν* is found only in a threat.

¹¹ Although "ophthalmia" is a Greek word written merely in English letters, it has now become naturalized to express a peculiar disorder in the eyes.

¹²⁻¹³ Here is an allusion to Hom. *Il.* *κ.* 224, *Σύν τε δὲ' ἱρχομένο*—from whence *τε* has crept in, where the author wrote *γέ*—The same allusion is found likewise in the *Banquet*, p. 174, D. § 2.

Alc. It was agreed so.

Soc. And it seems to me to have been correctly agreed. For all persons in a fever have a disease; but not all, however, who have a disease, are in a fever; neither have they all I think the gout, nor ophthalmia. Every thing indeed of this kind is a disease; and they, whom we call physicians, say that diseases produce different effects. For all diseases are not alike, nor do they all act similarly, but each according to its own peculiar power; and yet they are all diseases, just as we understand there are in the case of workmen; do we not?

Alc. Certainly.

[5.] *Soc.* Such as shoemakers, carpenters, statuaries, and very many others, whom why need one mention in detail? All these have divided amongst them portions of handicraftship, and yet all are handicraftsmen. They are not, however, carpenters, nor shoemakers, nor statuaries, taken altogether.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Just so have men divided folly amongst them. And those, who have the largest share, we call madmen; but those, who have a less, silly, and thunder-struck.¹³ But if we choose to speak of such in good-omened language, some call them high-spirited, but others simpletons; and others again, harmless and inexperienced, and speechless.¹⁴ You will also find, upon inquiry, many other names. But they all mean non-intellect; although they differ, just as one art has been shown by us (to differ) from another; and one disease from another. Or how does it seem to you?

Alc. To me in this way.

Soc. ¹⁵To the point then (from whence we digressed)¹⁵ let us return back again. For it was proposed, I think, in the

¹³ In Greek, *μυβροντήρους*: for the effect of lightning when attended by thunder, and indeed of all electrical fire, is to stupify, at least for a time, whatever animal it strikes. S.

¹⁴ The Greek is *ἄνευρος*, a word properly applied to infants. Of these three epithets, the first alludes to the wholly useless in any affair; the next to the easy to be imposed on; and the last to those who, from the want of ideas, have nothing to say. S. But *ἄνευρος* is rather said of a person struck dumb, as shown by Ruhnken on *Timæus*, p. 102.

¹⁵—¹⁵ I have followed Ficinus, "Sed ut redeamus unde digressi sumus," rather than the Greek *Ὀύκοῦν ἀπ' ἐκείνου πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν*, where *ἐκείνου* has nothing to which it can be referred.

beginning of our conversation to consider who are the senseless, and sensible. For it was agreed that some such existed. Was it not?

Alc. Yes, it was so agreed.

Sec. Whether then do you understand by the sensible, those who know how to do and say what they ought?

Alc. I do.

Sec. And whom (do you understand) by the senseless? Are they not such as know neither of those things?

Alc. Those very persons.

Sec. Will not those persons then, who know neither of those things, unconsciously say and do what they ought?

Alc. It appears so.

[6.] *Sec.* Now of these very persons, Alcibiades, Œdipus, I said, was one. And you will find many of those living even now, who, though not influenced by anger, as he was, pray for things hurtful to themselves; not fancying them to be so, but good (rather).¹⁶ He indeed, as he did not pray for (good), so neither did he fancy (he was doing so). But some others there are, who have suffered the very contrary to this. For I think that you, if the god to whom you happen to be going should appear to you, and, before you had uttered a prayer, first ask you—"Will it suffice for you to become a despotic king¹⁷ of Athens;" and, if you thought this a trifle,¹⁸ [and no great thing,]¹⁸ should add "and over all the Greeks;" and, if he should see that you fancied you would still have¹⁹ too little, unless he were²⁰ to appoint you king²⁰ of the whole of Europe; and should undertake not this alone, (but) that on this very day, according to your wish, all should perceive that Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, is their autocrat—I think you would walk away exceedingly delighted, as if you had met with the greatest good.

¹⁶ Ficinus has "*sed bona potius*," as if he had found in his MS. *ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὰ*.

¹⁷ The word *τύραννος* every where in Plato signifies a despotic monarch. S.

^{18—18} The words *μη μίγα τι* are evidently an explanation of *φαῦλον*.

¹⁹ Instead of *ἔχειν*, the sense requires either *ἔχειν ἄν* or *ἔξειν*, as I have translated.

^{20—20} Since in lieu of *ὑποσταίη σοι*, one MS. has *καταστήσει*; from the two united I elicited, many years ago, *ἀνακτα καταστήσεις σέ*, similar to *δισκόται καρίστησαν* in Isocrates, p. 478, Bekk., and *ἀρχοντας καθιστάναι* in Thucyd. iv. 132.

Alc. I fancy, Socrates, that any one else whatever would do so likewise, if such things were to happen to him.

Soc. You would not, however, be willing that the country of, and absolute dominion over, all the Greeks and Barbarians should be yours in exchange for your life.²¹

Alc. I suppose not; (for why should I?) when I was about to make no use of them.

Soc. What then, if you were about to make a bad and detrimental use of them, you would not (be willing) even in such a case?

Alc. Certainly not.

[7.] *Soc.* You see then that it is not safe to accept at random gifts when offered; nor for a person to pray that things may take place, if he is about to be injured through them, or be totally released from life. Many, too, we could mention, who after having longed for absolute power, and laboured to obtain it, as if about to enjoy some mighty good, have, on account of their tyranny, been plotted against and lost their lives.²² I think, too, that some events, which happened as it were but yesterday,²³ have come to your ears, how that a favourite²⁴ of Archelaus, tyrant of Macedonia, murdered his admirer, through his being as fond of absolute power, as the tyrant was of him, and with the view of becoming the tyrant himself, and a happy man; but that, possessing the power for three or four days, he was in turn plotted against by some of his friends and destroyed. You see, too, of our own fellow-citizens—for this we have not heard from others, but know by being present ourselves—that such as have longed for, and obtained, the command of an army, some are even now exiles from the city, and others have ended their lives; and such, as seemed to have fared the best, have passed

²¹ In Alcibiad. i. p. 105, A. § 4, there is a very similar train of argument. But there the son of Clinias is represented as preferring power to life. From the change in his feelings it is fair to infer that this dialogue relates to a period, when he had become somewhat cooled down by age.

²² The author had probably in view the fate of Peisistratus and Hipparchus.

²³ The phrase *Χθιζά τε καὶ πρωῒζά* is taken from Homer in *Il.* B. 303. In Attic prose Greek it is *χθες καὶ πρῶην*, found in Gorg. p. 470. *BUTTM.*

²⁴ The name of the favourite is *Κρατεύας*, in *Ælian* V. H. viii. 9, *Κράτερος* in Diodorus, lxi. p. 761, but *Κραταῖος* in *Aristot. Polit.* v. 8, 11.

through many trying dangers and terrors²⁵ during the campaign itself;²⁶ and when they have returned to their own country, have suffered from informers a siege not at all inferior to that, which they have endured from foreign foes; so that some of them prayed they had never been at the head of an army, rather than to have borne a command. [8.] Now, if the dangers and toils had tended to their benefit,²⁷ it would have had some reason;²⁸ but now it is quite the reverse. And with respect to children, you will find in the very same manner, how that some persons, after having prayed for them to be born, have, when they are born,²⁹ come into the greatest calamities and sorrows. For some, whose children have been thoroughly wicked, have passed the whole of their lives in sorrow; and some, whose children were well-behaved, have met with the misfortune to be deprived of them, and have come into calamities in no respect less than the others, and, like them, have wished rather that their children had been never born.³⁰ And yet, although these, and many other instances of the like kind, are so very evident to persons, it is rare to find a man who would refuse what is offered, or who, if he is about to obtain it by prayer, would cease to pray for it. Nor would the majority refrain from absolute power, if offered them, or the command of an army, or many other things, which, when present, do more harm than good; but they would, on the contrary,³¹ pray for their possession, should such things happen not to be present to any one. And yet, after waiting a little time, they sometimes recant,³¹ and pray the reverse of what they prayed before. I have therefore my

²⁵ Instead of φόβον, Sydenham would prefer πόνον, as better suited to κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι, just afterwards.

²⁶ I have adopted ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ στρατίᾳ, which Ficinus found in his MS. as shown by his version—"in ipso exercitu."

²⁷⁻²⁸ The Greek is εἶχεν δὲν— But as there is nothing to which the verb can be referred, Ficinus introduced "hoc studium." The author wrote, I suspect, εὐχὴ εἶχεν δὲν—"a prayer would have had—"

²⁹ The word ἤδη, which now precedes γενίσθαι, should be united to γινομένων. S.

³⁰ I have omitted here ἢ γενίσθαι with Ficinus; whose version is, "ac prorsus eligerent nunquam se filios genuisse."

³¹ Instead of ἀλλά, the sense requires ἀλλ' αὖ—

³¹ Gottleber quotes opportunely Maxim. Tyr. xxx. p. 313, Μίδας—ποιεῖται παλινφώδιαν τῆς εὐχῆς.

doubts, that men do in reality accuse the gods unjustly, in saying that their evils come from them; for either by their own crimes or follies, we should say,

They griefs endure beyond their fated share.²²

[9.] And that poet, Alcibiades, was near to being a sensible person, who, when connected with some friends void of understanding, and observing them to do and pray for things which it were better for them (not to have), but which appeared to them (to be good), thought proper to use in common a prayer, which he expresses somehow to this effect—

“ Oh, Zeus, our king, whate’er is good vouchsafe
To us, if prayers we offer or do not;
But evil, when we pray thee to avert,²³
Do thou ordain.²⁴

To me indeed the poet appears to speak correctly and safely. But if you have aught in your mind against this sentiment, do not hold your tongue.

Alc. It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to speak against any thing which is said correctly. But I am thinking on that point, of how many evils to man is ignorance the cause; since, as it seems, through it we are unconsciously doing to ourselves the greatest mischiefs, and, what is the worst, even praying for them; a fact which no one would fancy; but every one would conceive this rather, that he is competent to pray for things the best for himself, and not the worst; for this would in reality be like a curse, and not a prayer.

Soc. But perhaps, O best of men, some one who happens to be wiser than you or I, would say, that we do not speak correctly in blaming thus at random ignorance, unless we add that of some things and to some persons and under certain circumstances, ignorance is a good, as it is to them an evil.

Alc. How say you? Is there any thing whatever, of

²² Here, as Sydenham remarks, is an allusion to Od. I. 32.

²³⁻²⁴ The Greek couplet is found with some slight variations in Antholog. Epigr. Ἀδίστορος. 466, ed. Br. The same verses have been lately found likewise in Orion Antholog. Gnom. and published by Schneidewinn in Conject. Crit. p. 48, as remarked by Sauppe, who refers to Proclus in Platon. Rep. 402, 26, ed. Bas.

²⁴ Instead of κελύς, which is unintelligible, Ficinus found in his MS. κίλυσ, as shown by his version, “ abesse jube—”

which it is better for any person whatever, under any circumstances whatever, to be ignorant than to know?

Soc. So it seems to me at least; and does it not to you?

Alc. No, by Zeus.

[10.] *Soc.* I will not bring a verdict against you on the point of your being willing to do³⁵ to your own mother, what they say Orestes and Alcmaeon did, or whoever else may have happened to act in the same manner as they did.

Alc. Speak, by Zeus, words of good omen, Socrates.

Soc. There is no need, Alcibiades, of your bidding that person to speak words of good omen, who says that you would not be willing to do such a deed, but much rather him, who says the contrary. (But)³⁶ since the deed appears to you to be so dreadful, that it ought not to be mentioned so easily, do you think that Orestes, if he had been a sensible person, and known what it was best for him to do, would have dared to commit any such act?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Nor would, I think, any other man.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. ³⁷ The ignorance therefore of what is best is an evil; and to be ignorant of the best.³⁷

Alc. So it appears, at least to me.

Soc. And to him, and to all other men.

Alc. So I say.

Soc. Let us consider further this too. If it occurred to you on this very instant to think it were a better thing for you to take a dagger, and, going to the house of Pericles, your guardian and your friend, to ask—Is he within—with the intention of killing only him, and no other person, and that the servants should say—He is within.—[11.] I do not assert that

³⁵ Respecting the murder of his mother Clytemnestra by Orestes, it will be sufficient to refer to the Choephoroi of Æschylus, and the Electra of Sophocles, and Euripides; and for that of Alcmaeon, to the Scholia on Hom. Od. xi. 326; Servius on Virgil's Æn. vi. 445; and Apollodorus iii. 6. S. Who might have added the fragments of the Alcmaeon of Euripides, some of which are to be found translated into Latin in Cicero's Academics.

³⁶ I have adopted Buttmann's conjecture, that δὲ has dropt out after δῆ. Hommel however, on Sympos. p. 189, D., defends the want of connexion; while Stalbaum would read ἐνταῦθα—

^{37—37} In the words between the numerals there is a tautology which Gottleber was the first to notice; but it was found in the MS. used by Priscian, who quotes the whole passage in p. 1148

you have an inclination to do any of these things; ²⁸ but if, as I think, it shall seem good to you, what surely nothing prevents, that to him, who is ignorant of what is the best, an opinion has at some time occurred, so that what is even the worst, has been thought at some time to be the best.²⁸ Or does it not seem to you it would be?

Alc. Certainly so.

Soc. If then, upon going within, you should see himself there, but not knowing him, should think he was some other person, would you still venture to kill him?

Alc. No, by Zeus; I do not think I should.

Soc. For you would not (kill) any person, who happened to meet you, but only that very person, whom you wished (to kill). Is it not so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if you made frequent attempts, but were always ignorant of his being Pericles, ²⁹ [whenever you were about to do the deed,] ²⁹ you never would make an attack upon him.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. What then, do you think that Orestes would ever have made an attack upon his mother, if in like manner he had not known her?

Alc. I think he would not.

Soc. For he too had it not in his mind to kill any woman, who might meet him, nor the mother of any person whatever, but his own mother.

Alc. Such is the fact.

Soc. To persons then so situated, and having such fancies, it is better not to know such things.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. Do you then perceive, that of some things, and to some persons, and under some circumstances, ignorance is a good, and not, as it seemed to you just now, an evil?

Alc. It is probable.

²⁸⁻²⁹ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, out of which neither Sydenham nor any one else have been able to make the least sense, except by alterations more or less violent. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "Sed an videatur tibi, quod quidem nihil prohibet, ignorantibus tibi, quid sit optimum, adesse posse interdum opinionem, ut iudices, quod est pessimum, nonnunquam optimum esse."

²⁹⁻²⁹ The words within brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus.

[12.] Soc. Further still, if you are willing to consider what is after this, it would perhaps appear to you to be absurd—⁴⁰

Alc. What especially, Socrates?

Soc. That the possession of (all)⁴¹ other sciences, so to speak, is, unless a person possesses the science⁴² of what is best, very near to being seldom a benefit, but generally hurtful to the person possessing it.⁴³ And consider in this way. Does it not seem to you necessary that, when we are about to do or say any thing, we ought to know, or previously fancy we know, or know in reality, what we are about to say or do rather readily?

Alc. To me at least it seems so.

Soc. Do not then our public speakers, either knowing how to counsel, or fancying they know, give us their counsel on the instant on every occasion, some about war and peace, others, about the building of walls, or furnishing harbours; and, in one word, whatever one state does to another state, or itself by itself, all takes place from the advice of the orators.

Alc. You speak the truth.

Soc. See then what is after this.

⁴³ Alc. If I am able.

Soc. ⁴³ You surely call persons sensible and senseless.

Alc. I do.

Soc. Do you not (call) the many senseless, but the few sensible?

⁴⁰ Ficinus has "Præterea si volueris—mirabile dictu discutere forte probabile videbitur," which Sydenham adopted; and from whence Buttmann elicited *ἄραρον ὅν, ἵνα δὲ σοὶ σικὸς δόξαιεν εἶναι*. Stalbaum once proposed *ἵνα δὲ σοὶ τὶ δόξαιεν εἶναι*: and so Sydenham before him.

⁴¹ I have adopted the "omnium" of Ficinus. For without that word the limitation of the universality in *ὅς ἕκαστος εἰστί* would be unintelligible. Otherwise we must omit *ὅς ἕκαστος εἰστί*, as Ficinus has done.

⁴² Sydenham was the first to perceive that *τῆς* was required here between *εἶναι* and *ροῦ*, as is evident from § 15, where the assertion is repeated. The correction is attributed to Schleiermacher by Buttmann.

⁴³ Instead of *αὐτὸ* in all the MSS. but two, which read *αὐτὸν*, Schneider suggested *αὐτὸ*, whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed. The credit of the correction is due to Sydenham, who was led to it by comparing § 15. He likewise anticipated *αὐτὰς*, formerly proposed by Stalbaum.

⁴⁴ Instead of *πρῶτον*, Ficinus seems to have read in his MS. *πρότερον*, answering to his "prius." But *πρῶτον* is found again in § 14.

⁴⁵—⁴⁵ I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Heusde.

Alc. Just so.

Soc. And (you call) both so, with an eye to something.

Alc. Yes.

[13.] *Soc.* Would you call that man sensible, who knows how to give advice, but without (knowing) whether a thing is better, and in what it is better?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor him, I think, who knows war abstractedly, but without (knowing) when it is better, or for how long a time it is better. Is it not so?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Nor if a person knows how to murder another, or to take away his property, or to cause him to be an exile from his country, without (knowing) when it is better, or to whom it is better (to do so).

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. The man, therefore, who possesses any knowledge of such a kind, unless the knowledge also of what is best follows at his side—now this is surely the same as the knowledge of what is beneficial—⁴⁶ Is it not so?

Alc. Certainly it is.

Soc. Shall we say that he is a sensible ⁴⁶ and a competent counsellor both for the state and himself; but that the man ⁴⁷ who does not do so, is the contrary of these? ⁴⁷ Or how seems it to you?

Alc. To me in this way.

Soc. What then, should a person who knows how to ride, or shoot with a bow, or wrestle, or box, or engage in any other kind of combat, or in any thing else which we know by art, by what name will you call him, who knows what takes place the better

⁴⁶—⁴⁶ The whole passage between the numerals Ficinus thus translates—
“hunc forte prudentem vocabis. *Alc.* Hunc ipsum. *Soc.* Prudentemque ipsum dicemus”—

⁴⁷—⁴⁷ The Greek is *τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιοῦντα τὰναντία τούτων*. In lieu of *ποιοῦντα*, Sydenham suggested *ὀφελούντα*, that is, *ὀφελῆν ἐπιστάμενον*, or else *τοιοῦτον*: which last conjecture Stalbaum attributes to Schneider, and once called it “an egregious” one; but he afterwards proposed to omit *ποιοῦντα* entirely. I suggested many years ago—*τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐπαύοντα τούτων, τὰναντία*—but I should have corrected rather *τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐπαύοντά τι τούτων*, similar to *τι τούτων ἐπαύειν*, in Theætet. p. 145, D., i. e. “but the person knowing none of these things, the reverse.” Sauppe would read *τὸν δὲ μὴ νοοῦντα*—

according to each art?⁴⁸ (Will you not call him, who knows) according to the equestrian art, an equestrian?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And him (who knows) according to the boxing art, a boxer? but him, according to the hautboy-playing art, a hautboy-player; and in the rest of cases surely analogously to these? Or how otherwise?

Alc. Not otherwise than in this way.

Soc. Does it then seem to you necessary that the person knowing any of these, is a sensible man? Or shall we say that he wants much of being so?

Alc. Much indeed, by Zeus.

[14.] *Soc.* What kind of a commonwealth do you think there would be, composed of good bow-men and hautboy-players, and still more of athletes⁴⁹ and other artists, and of those mixed with such as we have just now mentioned, who know how to war⁵⁰ in the abstract, and to murder in the abstract;⁵⁰ and, moreover, of orators puffed up with the statesman's swell,⁵¹ but all devoid of the knowledge of what is best, and of that, which knows when it is better to make use of each one of those things, and against whom?

Alc. A bad one, Socrates, I think.

Soc. And you would say, I think, when you saw each one of these men full of ambition, and giving the greatest share he has in the commonwealth to that point,

Where he may happen to be best himself,⁵²

⁴⁸ In lieu of *κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην*, Ficinus found in his MS. *κατὰ τέχνην*, as shown by his version—"in arte." Buttmann suggested *καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν τέχνην*, which I have adopted.

⁴⁹ We have no word in English to answer to *ἀθλητής*, by which was meant a person contending in all kinds of bodily exercises.

⁵⁰ Ficinus twice omits *αὐτὸν*—

⁵¹ The cant English word "swell" answers exactly to the Greek *φύσημα*. Stalbaum has given here a facetious anecdote, preserved by Eustathius on D. S. p. 1151 = 1205, who states that when Demas, the son of Diomedes by a female hautboy-player, was acting the swell as an orator, Hyperides stopped him by saying, Will you not be silent, nor swell your cheeks more than your mother did?

⁵² The author alludes to a passage quoted by Plato in Gorg. p. 481, E., from the Antiope of Euripides; where instead of *τῆς πολιτείας*, is found *ἡμέρας*: and hence in lieu of *πολιτείας* I should prefer *πραγματείας*, especially as Cicero has in Rep. i. 22, "Cum in suo quemque opere artificem, qui quidem excellat, nihil aliud cogitare, meditari, curare videam, nisi quo sit in illo genere melior."

I mean that which becomes best according to his own art,⁵³ but of that which is the best for the state, and himself for himself having missed for the most part, as having I think trusted without intellect to opinion.⁵⁴ Since then such is the case, should we not speak correctly in saying that such a commonwealth was full of great disorder and of lawlessness?

Alc. Right indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. Did it not seem to us to be necessary that we ought previously to fancy we know, or to know in reality, what we are about to say or do readily?⁵⁵

Alc. It seems so.

[15.] *Soc.* ⁵⁶ Should then a person do what he knows, or thinks he knows, and there follow that we have ourselves beneficially and profitably both to the state and himself to himself, is not—⁵⁶

Alc. How not?

⁵³ So Sydenham, as if he wished to read *κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην*, instead of *κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην*, "according to art in the abstract," which I cannot understand.

^{54—54} Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where I am now, as I was many years ago, quite in the dark. For I cannot see, nor could Stephens, how *αὐτὸν* can be united to *πόλει* by a copulative conjunction; nor how *αὐτὸν* can be said of the thing meant by *βελτίστου*, nor on what the accusative *διημαρτηκότα* depends; nor, lastly, why there should be any mention made of a person trusting to opinion without intellect; although it is true that there is a reference to this passage in § 15, but there all is as clear as it is here the reverse.

⁵⁵ In § 12, the word is *προχειροτέρως*, where Sauppe prefers *προχείρως*, as read here.

^{56—56} Here again a literal version will best show that it was not without reason that Sydenham wrote a very long note, and closed it with proposing to read *Οὐκοῦν, κὰν μὲν πράττει τις, ἃ οἶδεν, παρέπηται δὲ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη, ἰδοὺ μὲν λυσιτελοῦντως ἔξιν τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ*, i. e. Should then a person do what he knows, and should the knowledge of what is the best accompany (the act), did it not seem to us that he would be in a condition advantageous to the state and to himself? To these emendations Sydenham was led by finding in Ficinus, "Nonne, si quis agit quidem, quod novit, aut nosse existimat, addit autem scientiam optimi, sequitur ut utiliter agat, et ad se ipsum et ad rem publicam." From whence Buttman too wished to elicit *παρέπηται δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἐπιστήμη*, referring to § 13, *ὅστις ἀρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἴαν μὲν παρέπηται ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὕτη δὲ ἦν ἡ αὐτῇ δέπου ἦπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου*. With regard to my own reflection of the passage, to which I still adhere, I will refer the reader to my edition of this dialogue.

Soc. ⁵⁷ But if (he does) I think the contrary of these, ⁵⁷ there (will be a benefit) neither to the public nor himself.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. What then does it seem to you now? In the like manner, ⁵⁸ or somehow otherwise?

Alc. Not otherwise than this.

Soc. Did you not say that you called the many senseless, but the few sensible?

Alc. I did.

Soc. And do we not say again that the many have missed of what is the best, by having generally, I think, trusted to opinion without intellect?

Alc. We say it.

Soc. It is for the interest then of the many neither to know anything, nor to fancy they know, if they shall be more ready to do what they know, or fancy they know, and by doing so are about ⁵⁹ to be still more injured than benefited.

Alc. You say what is most true.

Soc. ⁶⁰ Do you see then ⁶⁰ that when I said, that the possession of the other sciences is, unless a person possesses the science of what is best, very near to being seldom beneficial, and generally hurtful to the person possessing it, did I not appear to be speaking in reality correctly?

Alc. If not then, yet now it seems so, Socrates.

[16.] *Soc.* It is requisite then for ⁶¹ a state, and a soul that

⁵⁷⁻⁵⁷ The Greek is 'Εάν δι' γ', οἶμαι, τάναντία τούτων— But as the sentence has reference to the preceding remark of Socrates, to express the required sense, we ought to read 'Εάν δ' ἀγνοία (sc. τοῦ ὠφελίμου παρίηται), τάναντία τούτων—i. e. "But if the ignorance of what is useful follows, the contrary of this will happen." So Sydenham; who did not perceive that the ellipse was to be thus supplied—'Εάν δι' γ' (πράττη) τάναντία τούτων, οὔτε τῇ πόλει οὔτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ (λυσιτελούτως ἔξειν)—and hence we can see the necessity of either omitting οἶμαι with Ficinus, or altering it into ἐνὶν, and placing it after αὐτῷ.

⁵⁸ Instead of ὡσαύτως, the οὕτως in the reply requires here likewise οὕτως, answering to "ita" in Ficinus.

⁶⁰ The Greek is βλάπτεσθαι τὰ πλείω μᾶλλον ἢ—But as there is nothing to govern βλάπτεσθαι, Schneider suggested μίλλουσι for μᾶλλον. But, says Stalbaum, ἢ cannot follow τὰ πλείω. We may, therefore, read ἔτι πλείω—and so I have translated, answering to Ficinus, "nocebunt crebrius quam conferent."

⁶⁰⁻⁶⁰ The words ὅπως οὖν ὅτι are properly omitted by Ficinus; for they cannot precede the interrogation at the end of the speech—ἀρ' οὐχί—

⁶¹⁻⁶¹ This union of a state and a soul is a rather strange combina-

is about to live correctly,⁶¹ to cling to this science ; just as a person in sickness does to a physician, or a person about to sail in safety does to a steersman,⁶² by so much as the soul may not previously have a favourable wind, either respecting the possession of property or the strength of body, or any thing else of such a kind,⁶³ by so much the greater errors is it necessary, it seems, to arise from them ; and he who possesses what is called much learning and much art, but is destitute of this very science, and is carried along by each of the others, will he not in reality justly⁶³ encounter a violent storm, inas-much as he is, I think, continuing at sea without a steersman, a time not long life of gods ;⁶³ so that it seems to me that here too suits the sentiment of the poet, which he expresses, while he is bringing a charge against some one that

Trades many knew he; but knew badly all.⁶⁴ .

tion of ideas ; and no less so is the syntax, where the singular *τὴν μίλ-λουσαν* follows *πόλιν* and *ψυχὴν* : while neither the state nor soul can be fairly said "to live correctly." What the author probably wrote may be seen in my edition, together with the reasons for the alterations proposed.

⁶²⁻⁶³ Such is the literal version of a passage, which Dacier said was one of the most difficult in Plato. The first person who appears to have had a glimpse of the right reading, was Sydenham ; who saw that two sentences had been transposed ; and, so after him did Schneider, to whom the credit of the discovery is given by Buttmann, whose conjecture of *λαβρότερον* for *μὴ πρότερον* Sydenham had already anticipated ; while Stalbaum would prefer either Wex's *μὴ πρῶτερον*, or his own *μὴ λειότερον*. In my own edition I stated that the sense was perhaps something to this effect—"For without this knowledge, by how much the more does fortune with a favouring wind urge on a headlong disposition ;" and that the whole passage concealed a fragment of tragedy. Sauppe suggests *ὅσα γὰρ ἂν λαβρότερον ἐπουρίσῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης ἀνευ ταύτης ἢ περι-*—where *τύχης* for *ψυχῆς* is due to Dacier.

⁶³⁻⁶⁴ Here too is another corrupt passage, which has hitherto defied the sagacity of scholars to restore it satisfactorily. And perhaps the same remark will be applied to my own attempt in the edition already referred to. Ficinus has in the concluding clause, "quippe cum absque gubernatore oberret in pelago brevi tempore periturus," to which he was led, I suspect, rather by the sense, than what he found in the MS. before him.

⁶⁴ This verse is taken from a mock-heroic poem, called the "Margites," to which Aristotle refers in *Poet. c. 4*, and *Nichomach. Eth. vi. 7*. Other references are to be found in *Fabricius Biblioth. Græc. l. ii. c. 2, § 24. S.* The poem seems to have been a parody of the *Odyssey*, where Ulysses is represented as the model of wisdom ; while the matter of it was, like the *Batrachomyomachia*, an imitation of, and cento from, Homer. Thus the line, *Πόλλ' ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ' ἠπίστατο πάντα*, is not unlike *πολλά τε ᾗδ' ἢ Μάψ* in *Il. B. 213*, and it would be still more like, if the

Alc. But how, Socrates, does the verse of this poet suit here? For to me it seems to say nothing to the purpose.

Soc. Nay, it is very much to the purpose. But this poet writes enigmatically, and so do nearly all the others. [17.] For the whole of poetry is naturally enigmatical; and it is not for a person who is to be met with any where, to understand it; and in addition to its being such naturally, when it seizes upon a man of a grudging disposition and unwilling to make himself known, but desirous to conceal, as much as possible, his wisdom, it seems to be difficult beyond measure to understand what each of those poets mean. For you cannot, surely, think that Homer, a poet most divine and clever, was ignorant how impossible it is for a person to know a thing badly; for he it is, who says that Margites knew many things, but knew all badly; but he speaks enigmatically, I suppose, by introducing the word "badly" instead of the word "bad,"⁶⁵ and "he knew" instead of "to know." There is then a sentence composed, unshackled by the metre, and it expresses what he meant, that "He knew many trades; but that to know all was to him an evil."⁶⁶ It is evident then, that if to know many things was to him an evil, he himself was some worthless fellow; at least if we must give any credit to the reasonings previously produced.

Alc. And so it seems, Socrates, to me; for I should hardly give credit to other reasonings, if not to these.

Soc. And correctly does it seem so.

⁶⁷ *Alc.* Again it seems to me.⁶⁷

Soc. But come, by Zeus, for you surely see, how great

reading were, as quoted by a Scholiast, Πολλὰ μὲν ᾗδεα ἔργαν, κακῶς δὲ μάλ' ᾗδεα πάντα.

⁶⁵ The Greek is, ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ; but we suspect the right reading to be ἀντὶ τοῦ "κακόν," that is, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος "κακόν," instead of the noun "evil;" as ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι, just after, means ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπαρμύφατον ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, instead of the infinitive "to know." S.

⁶⁶ The whole of this argument is evidently a ridicule of some of the sophists, who were accustomed to draw inferences from isolated passages in Homer, but not without giving them a forced meaning, and one better suited, than the common interpretation, to their own views.

⁶⁷—⁶⁷ The words between the numerals, found in Ficinus, and all the MSS. but one, Stalbaum says are excessively silly, whether they are assigned to Alcibiades, or, as in Ficinus, to Socrates. What the author wrote, may be seen in my edition, together with the reasons requisite to support my views.

and of what kind is the difficulty and doubt, in which you too appear to me to have a share; as you never rest at all in changing your place up and down; ⁶⁸ but what may have seemed especially to you, this to have gone secretly away again, and so seems no longer in a similar manner. ⁶⁹ [18.] Should the god then, to whom you happen to be going, appear to you even now, and ask you, before you had prayed for any thing whatever, whether it would be sufficient for you, if any of those things, mentioned at the beginning, were to take place; or should he leave it to yourself to make a request, how, think you, could you avail yourself of the opportunity? either by accepting any of the things offered, or by praying yourself for something to happen?

Alc. Now, by the gods, Socrates, I should not know what to say in such a case. But it seems to me to be a violent ⁶⁹ thing, and in good truth one of caution, in order that a person may not unconsciously pray for things evil, while fancying them to be good; and then after waiting, as you said, a little time, recant, and pray the reverse to what he did at first.

Soc. Did not then the poet, whom I mentioned at the beginning of the argument, know somewhat more than we do, when he begged ⁷⁰ (of Zeus) to avert terrible things from (us) when praying?

Alc. So it seems to me.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, Alcibiades, having admired this very poet, or having so considered themselves the matter, put up on every occasion in private and in public

⁶⁸⁻⁶⁹ The Greek is ἀλλ ὅπερ ἂν μάλιστα σοὶ δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεύκιναι αὐ καὶ οὐκίτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν. But as there is nothing to govern ἐκδεύκιναι and δοκεῖν, Buttmann suggested ἐκδίδυκεν αὐ, and δοκεῖ, found in a single MS. And as there is some uncertainty about the meaning of ἐκδύνειν, Stalbaum says the author fancied it meant the same as ἀναδύεσθαι, "to retract," in Theætet. p. 135, C., and ἀνάδυσσις, in Euthyd. p. 302, E. There is some error here corrected in my edition.

⁶⁹ The Greek is μάργον, which Buttmann renders "insanum," i. e. "a mad wish." Ficinus has more fully—"insanum quiddam mihi videtur, temere deum precari ac diligenter considerandum—" Dobree, in Adversar. T. ii. p. 393, suggests μέγα ἔργον or μοῦργόν (i. e. μοι ἔργον) τε δοκεῖ—I have proposed οὐ Μαργείτου μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, in allusion to § 17. Ast—μὴν ἔργον—Heindorf μίμμερον, a word found in Hipp. Maj. § 24.

⁷⁰ The verb κεύειν is used here and elsewhere in this dialogue in the sense of requesting. See too Thucyd. ii. 81, 85; iii. 7; iv. 108.

⁷¹ a similar prayer, by requesting the gods to grant them ever⁷² things honourable in addition to what are good;⁷¹ and no one has ever heard them pray for any thing more. Accordingly, up to the passing time, they have been fortunate less than none. And even if it has happened to them to be not fortunate in every thing, it was not on account of this prayer of theirs; but it is for the gods, I presume, to grant what a person happens to pray for, and the reverse. [19.] And I am desirous of telling you something else, which I once heard from certain elderly persons, how that, when differences arose between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, it so happened to our city, that whenever there was a battle, by land or sea, it was unsuccessful, and never able to gain a victory. Thereupon the Athenians, brooking ill their doings, and at a loss for some contrivance to find an escape from their present evils, held a council; and it seemed to them that it would be best to send to Ammon,⁷³ and inquire of him,⁷⁴ and in addition, this too likewise,⁷⁴ on what account do the gods always give the victory to the Lacedæmonians, rather than to us; who, of (all) the Greeks,⁷⁵ bring them sacrifices the most numerous and the most beautiful; and have decorated their temples with offerings such as none else have done; and are wont to make to the gods processions the most costly and the most solemn, each year; and to expend money, such as all the rest of the Greeks never did together; whereas the Lacedæmonians have never paid the least regard to any of these things; but conduct themselves in so slighting a manner towards the gods, as to sacrifice on each occasion animals, maimed even; and in all other matters fall far short of us not a little in honouring the gods, although possessing property not less than our state.

⁷¹⁻⁷² On the prayer *τὰ καλὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγαθῶν*, Lobeck, in *Aglaophamus*, p. 12, refers to Plutarch in *Laconic*. T. 8, p. 253.

⁷³ I have adopted Buttmann's *ἀεὶ* in lieu of *ἀθ*, although I still adhere to the emendation proposed in my edition for the reasons assigned there.

⁷⁴ This allusion to the oracle of Ammon, situated in Africa, is peculiarly appropriate; for we learn from Plutarch i. p. 531, E., that when Alcibiades was exciting the Athenians to engage in the Sicilian expedition, some persons, who had been sent on a holy embassy to Ammon, returned with an oracle, stating that the Athenians would get all the people of Syracuse into their power.

⁷⁵ The words within the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

⁷⁶ So Sydenham; as if he wished to read πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων.—

[20.] When the messenger had thus spoken, and had inquired of the oracle what they ought to do to find a deliverance from their present evils, the prophet made no other answer ;⁷⁶—for it is evident the god did not permit him—but calling (the messengers),⁷⁷ said,—To the Athenians thus saith Ammon.⁷⁸ He saith, that he prefers the good-omened address of the Lacedæmonians before all the sacrifices of (the rest of)⁷⁹ the Greeks.—These words he said, and nothing more. Now it seems to me, that by a good-omened address the god means only that prayer of theirs ; for it is in reality much superior to the prayers of others. For the rest of the Greeks are wont, some of them, after placing (by the altar) oxen with gilded horns,⁸⁰ and others presenting the gods with offerings to be hung up (in temples), to pray for whatever they happen (to desire), whether it be good or evil. The gods therefore, on hearing their impious addresses, accept not their costly processions and sacrifices ; so that there is need of much caution and consideration as to what is to be spoken and not. And you will find in Homer likewise other expressions similar to these. [21.] For he says, that the Trojans, on taken up their night quarters,

The perfect hecatombs to th' Immortals gave,⁸¹

and that the winds carried the savour of the fat to heaven

Sweet-smelling ; but the blessed gods refused

To taste it ; for by them was hated much

The holy Ilion, and Priam too,

And of the careful Priam subjects all :

so that it was of no use for them to sacrifice, or to expend presents in vain,⁸² when they were thus hated by the gods.

⁷⁶ Ficinus, perceiving that *ἄλλο οὐδὲν* would be scarcely intelligible by itself, has given "non multa."

⁷⁷ Instead of *αὐτὸν* I have translated as if the Greek were *τὸν ἄγγελον*.

⁷⁸ On the formula, *τάδε λέγει Ἀμμων*, Gottleber refers to Diodor. xvii. 51, and Buttmann to Arrian vii. p. 305.

⁷⁹ Ficinus has "reliquorum—Græcorum," as if he had found in his MS. *τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων*, not simply *τῶν Ἑλλήνων*.

⁸⁰ Gottleber refers to Plin. H. N. xxxiii. 3, "Deorum honori—auratis cornibus hostiæ—immolabantur." Add from Virgil, "aurata fronte juvencum ;" and Callimachus, *ἰλάφους—κεράων δ' ἀπελάμπετο χρυσός*.

⁸¹ The passage, as here quoted, has been found in none of the MSS. of Homer. Barnes was the first to insert the supplement in its proper place, l. θ. 458.

⁸² Compare Eurip. Tro. 1241, *Οὐκ ἤρεσαν θεοῖς τι, πλὴν οὐμοὶ πόνοι, Τροία τε πόλεων ἱεκρίτον μισουμένη· Μάρτην δ' ἰβουθυτοῦμεν*.

For the divine nature, I conceive, is not such, as to be seduced by presents,⁸³ like a knavish judge.⁸⁴ But we are giving a silly reason, if we think to get the better of the Lacedæmonians in this way. For it would be a dreadful thin indeed, if the gods looked to gifts and sacrifices, and not the soul, should a person happen to be holy and just. Nay, (they look) much more, I think, (to this), than to expensive processions and sacrifices; for which there is nothing to prevent those from having the power to pay each year, either individuals or states, who have sinned greatly against the gods, and greatly too against men. But they, as not receiving bribes, disdain all such things as these, as says the god, and the prophet of the gods. [22.] It seems, then, that justice and prudence are near to being honoured above all things by the gods, and by men too, that have any sense. Now the sensible and the just are none other than such as know what it is meet to do and say both towards gods and men. But I should be glad to hear from you, what are your thoughts upon this subject.

Alc. To myself, Socrates, the matter seems to be in no other way, than it does to you and the god. For it would not be reasonable for me to vote contrary to the god.

Soc. Do you not remember, then, saying that you were much at a loss, lest you should unconsciously be praying for evil things, fancying them to be good?

Alc. I do.

Soc. You see then, that it is not safe for you to go to the god with the view of praying, in order that, should it so happen, he may not hear you speaking impiously, and receive no part of your sacrifice, and you perchance meet with something different. It seems to me, therefore, that it is best to keep quiet. For through your high spirit—for that is the

⁸³ Stalbaum refers to Persius ii. 48, to which he might have added Plato, Legg. iv. p. 601, x. p. 885, D., and Cicero de Legg. ii. 16, "Donis impii ne placare audeant deos."

⁸⁴ I have adopted Gedike's reading, *δικαστήν*, "judge," for *τοκοστήν*, "usurer." The allusion is to an Æsopo-Socratic fable in Latin, which I have given at length in my edition from a MS. in the British Museum. That it was found likewise in Greek is shown by an allusion to it in Plutarch de Solert. Animal. ii. p. 973. B., where lies hid the commencement of a Choliambic fable—*Κουρεύς ποτ' ἔτρεφε θαῦμ' ὅσον τι πολυφώνου Κίττης, τὰ τ' ἀνδρῶν ἦτις εἶχε καὶ θηρῶν Φωνήματ' ἀνταποδιδόναι.*

fairest of names for folly—I think you would not be willing to make use of the Lacedæmonian prayer. It is necessary, therefore, for a man to wait, until he has learnt how he ought to conduct himself towards gods and men.

[23.] *Alc.* But when, Socrates, will that time be? and who is he that will instruct me? for I should be very glad, I think, to see who the man is.

Soc. It is he, of whose care you are the object.⁸⁵ But it seems to me, as Homer (Il. v. 127) says of Minerva, that she removed the mist from before the eyes of Diomede,

That he might clearly see both gods and men;

so must he in the first place remove from your soul the mist, that now happens to be present there, and then apply those things, through which you will be about to know both good and evil. For now you seem to be unable (to do so).

Alc. Let him then remove the mist, or any thing else that he pleases; as I am prepared not to fly from any thing ordered by him, whoever he may be, if I am about to become a better man.

Soc. And yet he has a very wonderful eagerness in your behalf.

Alc. Till that time then it seems to me to be best to put off my sacrifice.

Soc. And rightly it seems so to you. For it is safer than to run so great a risk.

[24.] *Alc.* But how,⁸⁶ Socrates? However, since you seem to me to have given good advice, I will put this garland⁸⁷

⁸⁵ This is usually applied to Socrates, as in Alcibiad. i. p. 122, B. § 37, τῆς δὲ σῆς παιδείας—οὐδενὶ μέλει, εἰ μὴ εἰ τις ἱραστῆς σοῦ τυγχάνει ὦν. But there, as here, the indefinite τις could not be said of a person known positively. To meet this objection, Bekker was led perhaps to adopt here Οὐτός ἐστιν from some MSS., in lieu of Οὗτος τις ἐστιν in others. From which I elicited long ago Οὗτις τις ἐστιν, "There is one No-man," in allusion to the Homeric Οὔτις, which I have restored to Hippias Major, § 24. For Socrates in both places is speaking covertly. And hence too in the first Alcibiades I should have suggested εἰ μὴ Οὔτις, &c.—

⁸⁶ Buttmann justly considers this a strange way of passing from one subject to another. What I suspect the author wrote may be found in my edition.

⁸⁷ Amongst the Greeks, they who went to a temple to pray to a god, carried a garland, which they wore while praying; and hence Socrates knew, on meeting Alcibiades, whither he was going. S.; who might have referred to Eurip. Hippol. 72.

round your (brows);⁸⁸ and to the gods we will then present crowns,⁸⁹ and all the other customary offerings, when I behold that day arrive; and it will in no long time arrive, if they are willing.

Soc. Well, I accept both this, and ⁹⁰I would see myself readily accepting⁹⁰ any thing else given by you. And as Creon, when he sees Tiresias wearing garlands, and hears that he had obtained them as the first-fruits of spoils taken from the enemy, is made by Euripides (in Phœn. 865) to say,

This crown, as a happy omen, have I worn;
For well you know how tempest-tost we lie—

so do I place on myself this opinion⁹¹ on your part as an omen of good. For I seem to myself to be in no less a storm than Creon; and I would gladly be a victor over your admirers.

⁸⁸ So in the Banquet, p. 213, § 37, Alcibiades is represented as putting a chaplet on the head of Socrates. The rite is ridiculed by Aristophanes in 'Ιππ. 1262, where Demus decks the Sausage-maker, after his victory over Cleon, with a crown of sausages, saying, as I corrected on Æsch. Suppl. i. Ἀλλάντις Ζεῦ, σὸν τὸ νικητηριον; i. e. "Thine is the victor's chaplet, Sausage-Zeus."

⁸⁹ Potter, in Archæolog. Græc. ii. 4, infers from this passage that the garlands worn by suppliants during their prayers were, on their leaving the temple, put on the head of the deity who had been addressed; and hence Alcibiades is represented as giving to Socrates the honour he had designed for the image of Jupiter. S.

⁹⁰⁻⁹⁰ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, to whom Stalbaum might have referred; for he says that nothing can be more absurd than the whole clause, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ—ἱμαντὸν—Perhaps the author wrote ἰδοὺς ἄν, "you would see."

⁹¹ In lieu of δόξαν, Büttmann suggested δόσιν, and myself λείξιν, comparing Iph. A. 607, Ὀρνίθα μὲν τόνδ' αἰσιον ποιούμεθα τὸ σὸν τι χρηστὸν καὶ λόγων εὐφημίαν. But perhaps δόξαν means here "glory" or, "reputation."

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAGES.

IN placing in a consecutive order the Theages, Rivals, and Hipparchus, I have followed the arrangement adopted by Stalbaum. For he conceives that they were written, if not by the same hand, at least by a kindred mind, and are all equally unworthy of Plato, despite the attempt made by Socher and Knebel to reverse the judgment of Boeckh, Heindorf, Schleiermacher, and Ast. For though some of the arguments brought forward by the impugnors of the dialogue have been refuted, says Stalbaum, by its defenders, yet there still remains evidence enough to prove its spuriousness. For not only is it in matter and manner at variance with the subject and style adopted by Plato, but it contains likewise such remarkable instances of plagiarisms rather than imitation, as to leave little doubt of the writer being only a Plato in disguise; to say nothing of some peculiarities in language, not to be found in the writings of the philosopher and his contemporaries. The dialogue is, however, reckoned amongst the genuine works of Plato by Diogenes Laertius, iii. 57, on the authority of Thrasyllus, a Platonist of the time of Tiberius, as we learn from Suetonius in Tiberius, § 14, and the Scholiast on Juvenal, vi. 576; and it is quoted as such by Ælian, V. H. viii. 1. While Lamprias, in the list of the works of Plutarch, n. 68, mentions one, "On the Theages of Plato."

According to Stalbaum, Wympensee, in *Diatrib. de Xenocrate*, p. 96, conceived that the author of the dialogue was perhaps the philosopher of Chalcedon. But Stalbaum himself feels disposed to refer it to Antipater, who flourished about A. C. 150, and who was the teacher of Panætius, and the disciple of Diogenes of Babylon,

and who wrote, as appears from Cicero de Divinat. i. 3, a work on the wonderful divinations made by Socrates, of which there are some curious instances given in this dialogue; and as both Cicero, and Plutarch in his treatise, On the Dæmon of Socrates, seem to have made use of the work of Antipater, so probably did the author of this dialogue.

THE THEAGES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

DEMODOCUS, SOCRATES, THEAGES.

DEMODOCUS.

[1.] I WANT, Socrates, to speak with you in private¹ about some matters, if you are at leisure; and if your want of leisure be not very great, for my sake however make leisure.

Soc. Nay, I am at leisure in other respects, and on your account very much so. If then you wish to say any thing, it is in your power (to do so).

Dem. Are you willing then for us to retire out of the way, to the portico of Zeus Eleutherius² hard by?

Soc. If it seems good to you.

Dem. Let us go then, Socrates. All natural productions, growing out of the earth, and other animals as well as man, appear to subsist in nearly the same manner. For to such of us as cultivate the ground it is a thing the most easy in the case of plants, to prepare every thing prior to planting, and even the planting itself. But when what has been planted is in a living state, the care of it becomes great and painful, and difficult. The same thing appears to take place with respect to human beings likewise. I form this conjecture as regards other things from my own affairs. For of this my son, whether one must call it the planting, or the procreating, it is the easiest of all things; but his education is difficult, and I am continually

¹ The word *ἰδιωλογεῖσθαι*, says Stalbaum, is not found elsewhere in pure Greek; and he refers to Suicer in Thesaur. Eccles. i. p. 1434.

² This portico was in the Ceramicus, as shown by Meursius de Ceramic. § 4, quoted by Stalb.

in fear about him. On other points much might be said ; but the desire which now possesses him alarms me very much. It is not indeed an ignoble one, but it is dangerous. For he desires, Socrates, as he says, to become a wise man. I suspect that certain youths of his own age, and of the same ward, have been going down to the city, and repeating certain discourses, and disturbed his mind very much. Of these he is emulous ; and for a long time is giving me great trouble, thinking it fit that I should pay attention to him, and pay money to some of the sophists, who might make him a wise man. For the money indeed I care ¹ less than nothing, but think that, in going whither he is hastening, he is running into no small danger. Hitherto I have by soothing restrained him ; but as I am no longer able (to do so), I think it best to yield to him, lest by frequently associating (with others)² without me, he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpose, that I may place him with some one of those, who are considered to be sophists. Opportunely then for us have you appeared, with whom, as I am about to engage in affairs of this kind, I wished very much to consult. If then you have any advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and needful (to do so).

[2.] Soc. Counsel, Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing.³ If then any other consultation is sacred, this is so, about which you are now considering. For there is not a thing, about which a person may consult, more divine, than about the instruction of himself and of those related to him. In the first place then, let you and I agree together as to what we think that thing is, about which we are consulting ; lest I may not perchance⁴ take it to be one thing, and you another ; and we afterwards perceive,

¹—¹ I have translated as if the Greek were not *καὶ ἑλᾶττον*, but *ἑλᾶττον ἢ μηδὲν*, as in *Theætet.* § 92, *ἦττον—ἢ μηδὲν*. *Æsch. Prom.* 974, *Ἐμοὶ δ' ἑλασσον Ζηνὸς ἢ μηδὲν μέλει*.

² Taylor has adopted "with others," from "*cum aliis*," found in *Ficin.* But *συγγενόμενός τῳ*, "associating with some one," found in all the MSS., is more correct.

³ The Scholiast, who vainly attempts to give a satisfactory account of this proverb, says it was found in the *Amphiaraus* of *Aristophanes* ; while *Zenobius*, *Proverb. Cent.* iv. 40, attributes it to *Epicharmus*. It is found likewise in *Plato Epist.* 5. It was probably a saying, addressed to those who came to consult an oracle.

⁴ On this sense of *πολλάκις*, see at *Alcib.* i. p. 127, E. § 49.

¹ when the conference has proceeded far,¹ that we are an object of ridicule, both I who give, and you who request, advice, in not thinking the same upon any thing.

Dem. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak correctly; and it is meet so to do.

Soc. And speak I do correctly, but not entirely so; since I make a trifling alteration. For I am thinking, that perhaps this youth may not desire that, which we think he desires, but something else; and in that case we shall be still more absurd in consulting about something different. It appears, therefore, to me to be the most correct to begin by inquiring of him what the thing is, which he desires.

Dem. It appears very nearly to be the best to do as you say.

[3.] *Soc.* Tell me then what is the name of this handsome² youth? what must we call him?

Dem. His name, Socrates, is Theages.

Soc. You have given your son, Demodocus, a beautiful and sacred-like name. Tell us, Theages, do you say that you desire to become a wise man? and do you think it fit for this your father to find out the acquaintance of such a person as may make you wise?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Do you call those men wise, who are skilled in that, respecting which they have a knowledge, or those, who have not?

Thea. Those, who have a knowledge.

Soc. What then, has not your father caused you to be instructed, or taught you (himself),³ what others are taught, who are the sons of fathers good and honourable;⁴ for instance, letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?

Thea. Yes, myself.

Soc. Do you think then there is still a want of some knowledge, to which it is proper for your father to pay attention for your sake?

¹—¹ Such is Stalbaum's version of πόρρω τῆς συνουσίας, who quotes opportunely Sympos. p. 217, D., διελεγόμενῃ πόρρω τῶν νύκτων.

² So Taylor, as if he wished to read, what the sense requires, καλῶ in lieu of καλόν—

³ To preserve the difference between διδάσκεισθαι and παιδεύειν, I have inserted "himself." Ficinus has simply "edocuit," omitting καὶ ἐπαιδεύειν, which he probably considered superfluous.

⁴ By καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ are meant what we should call persons both handsome and of polished manners.

Thea. I do.

Soc. What is it? Tell us it, that we may gratify you.

Thea. My father knows it, Socrates; for I have often mentioned it to him. But he designedly says this to you, as if truly he did not know what I desire; for in this and other matters likewise he opposes me, and is unwilling to place me with any one.

[4.] *Soc.* But all that you have hitherto said to him, has been said, as it were, without witnesses. Now therefore make me a witness and state before me what is the wisdom you desire. For come now, if you should desire that wisdom, by which men steer ships, and I should happen to ask you—What is the wisdom, Theages, of which being in want you blame your father, because he is unwilling to place you with a man, through whom you might become wise? what answer would you give me? What would you say this wisdom is? Is it not the pilot's art?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. And if you desired to be wise in that wisdom, by which persons direct¹ chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteer's art?²

Thea. Yes.

Soc. But is the wisdom, of which you have now a desire, nameless, or has it a name?

Thea. I think it has (a name).

Soc. Whether then do you know it, but not its name? Or its name likewise?

Thea. Its name likewise.

Soc. Say then what it is.

Thea. What other name, Socrates, can one say it has, than that of wisdom?

Soc. Is not then the charioteer's art wisdom likewise? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

Thea. It does not.

¹ Schleiermacher objects to the expression κυβερνᾶν τὰ ἄρματα. But though the phrase is not elsewhere found in Plato, the metaphor might fairly be adopted here, just as Æschylus has ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως Οἶακα νεμῶν in S. Th. 2.

² With the whole of this passage compare Alcibiad. i. p. 125, § 44.

Soc. But wisdom?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. For what do we use it? Is it not for that, by which we know how to manage horses when yoked?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Is not then the pilot's art wisdom likewise?

Thea. To me at least it appears so.

Soc. Is it not that, by which we know how to manage ships?

Thea. It is.

Soc. But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous? What by it do we know how to govern?

Thea. By it we know, it seems to me, how to govern men.

Soc. What, sick men?

Thea. No.

Soc. For that wisdom is the physician's art. Is it not?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Is it that then, by which we know how to regulate singers in choirs?

Thea. It is not.

Soc. For this is the musician's art.

Thea. Certainly.

Soc. But is it that, by which we know how to regulate those, who are engaged in gymnastic exercises?

Thea. No.

Soc. For this is the gymnast's art.

Thea. It is.

Soc. Is it that of those, who do what? Be ready to state it to myself, as I have the preceding to you.

Thea. It is that, by which persons (do something) in the city.

Soc. Are there not then in a city persons who are sick?

Thea. Yes. But I am not speaking of these only, but also of the others in the city.

Soc. Do I then understand the art of which you are speaking? For you appear to me to say it is not that, by which we know how to govern mowers, and grape-gatherers, and planters, and sowers, and threshers; for it is the husbandman's art, by which we govern these. Is it not?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Nor are you speaking of that, by which (we govern)

sawyers, and planers, and turners; for does not this belong to the carpenter's art?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. But perhaps you are speaking of that wisdom, by which we govern all these, and husbandmen, and carpenters, and all artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women.

Thea. Of this wisdom, Socrates, I have for a long while ago been wishing to speak.

[5.] *Soc.* Can you say, that Ægisthus, who slew Agamemnon at Argos, had dominion over what you have mentioned, artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women, all taken together, or over some other things?

Thea. No; but over these.

Soc. What then, did not Peleus, the son of Æacus, have dominion over those very kind of persons in Phthia?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. And you have heard that Periander, the son of Cypselus, was a ruler in Corinth.

Thea. Yes.

Soc. And did he not rule over the very kind of persons in his city?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. What then, do you not think that Archelaus,¹ the son of Perdiccas, who was lately² the ruler in Macedonia, had dominion over the same kind of persons?

Thea. I do.

Soc. And over whom do you think that Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, ruled in this city? was it not over these kind of persons?

Thea. How not?

Soc. Can you tell me then, what appellation Bacis,³ and the Sibyl,⁴ and our countryman Amphilytus,⁵ bore?

¹ Of this Archelaus mention is made in Gorg. p. 471, D.

² This "lately" refers to about five years previously.

³ Bacis was a prophet, who, long before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, predicted what would happen. Some of his prophecies are given by Herodotus in viii. 20. He is likewise frequently mentioned by Aristophanes, and in company with Σίβυλλα in Eup. 1119, and 1116. ΔΑΚΙΣΣΑ.

⁴ From the fact of finding the same three oracle-chaunters similarly united by Themistius Or. iii. p. 46, A., where the Sibyl is called "the Erythrean," it has been inferred that the writer had read this dialogue amongst those ascribed to Plato.

⁵ Respecting Amphilytus see Wesseling and Valckenaer on Herod. i. 62

Thea. What else, Socrates, than oracle-chaunters?

Soc. You speak correctly. But endeavour to give me an answer as to what appellation Hippias and Periander bore through the same kind of dominion?

Thea. Tyrants, I think; for what else (could it be)?

Soc. Whoever then desires to have dominion over all the men together in the city, desires this very same dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

Thea. So it appears.

Soc. Do you then say that you desire this dominion?

Thea. It seems so from what I have said.

Soc. O you wicked (youth)! Do you desire to tyrannize over us? And have you for a long time blamed your father, because he did not send you to the school of some tyrant-teacher?¹ And are not you, Demodocus, ashamed of yourself? who, having known a long time ago what this youth desired, and having likewise the power of sending him, where you might have made him that skilful artist in wisdom, of which he is desirous, have, notwithstanding, begrudged him this, and are unwilling to send him? But now, you see—since he has spoken against you before me—let us consult in common, you and I, to whose school we may send him; and through associating with whom he may become a wise tyrant.

Dem. Let us, by Zeus, then, Socrates, consult; for it appears to me that there is need of no despicable counsel in this affair.

Soc. Permit us first, thou good man, to interrogate him sufficiently.

Dem. Interrogate him.

[6.] *Soc.* What then, Theages, if we should make use of Euripides?² For he some where says,

Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise.

If then some one should ask Euripides—In what say you, Euripides, do tyrants become wise by the conversation of the wise? just as if he had said,

¹ In defence of διδασκάλου, which Schleiermacher, with whom Beck agreed, wished to expunge, Stalbaum refers to Lobeck's "Disputat. iii. de Nominibus Adjectivis et Substantivis Ambiguis," p. 12.

² This verse is elsewhere attributed to Sophocles in Ajac. Loc. Fr. but given to Euripides by Plato in Rep. viii. p. 568, A.

Farmers are wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would he have answered? Would he (reply that they are wise) in any thing else than in things pertaining to agriculture?

Thea. In nothing else but those.

Soc. But what, if he had said,

Cooks become wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would he have answered? Would it not have been—In things pertaining to cooking?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Again, if he had said,

Wrestlers are wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? Would he not have said—In things pertaining to wrestling?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. But since he says,

Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise—

upon our asking him—In what say you, Euripides, are they wise? What would be his answer?

Thea. By Zeus, I do not know.

Soc. Are you willing then for me to tell you?

Thea. If you are willing.

Soc. It is that, which Anacreon says Callicrété¹ knew. Or do you not know the song?

Thea. I do.

Soc. What then, do you also desire the conversation of a

¹ This was a virgin who employed herself in teaching politics, as Aspasia, Diotima, and some others, did after her. The verses of Anacreon alluded to are lost. DACIER. Ficinus has, "Callicratem." But that was the name of a man. Bergk in Anacreont. Relliq. p. 264, would read Καλλικρίτην and Καλλικρίτη, found in one MS. I should prefer Χαλικρήτην. For the word χαλικρήτη would mean "wine-mixed," an epithet better suited to the lady by whom Anacreon, the wine-drinker, was instructed. The epithet is applied to σπονδαί, "libations," in Æsch. Fragm. 158. On the other hand, Egeria, the Nymph by whom Numa was instructed, was a water-drinker, as may be inferred from Juvenal, who speaks of a fountain dedicated to her.

man, who happens to be a fellow-artist with Callicrété the daughter of Cyané, and who knows the art of a tyrant, as the poet says she did, in order that you may become a tyrant over us and the city?

Thea. You have for some time, Socrates, been laughing at and playing with me.

Soc. What then, do you say that you do not desire this wisdom, by which you may rule over all the citizens? And doing this, would you be any thing else but a tyrant?

Thea. I would pray, indeed, I fancy, to be a tyrant over all men, or, if not of all, of the greatest part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the same, and perhaps still more, to be a god.¹ But I did not say that I desired this.

[7.] *Soc.* But what then, after all, is this which you desire? Do you not say that you desire to rule over the citizens?

Thea. Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire to rule over the willing, in the same manner as other men of note in the city.

Soc. Do you mean, as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and such as were skilled in state affairs?

Thea. By Zeus, I mean those.

Soc. What then, if you happened to be desirous of becoming wise in horsemanship, by going to whom do you think you would become a skilful horseman? would it be (by going) to others than those skilled in horses?

Thea. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. But (you would go) to those very men, who are skilled in these matters, and who possess horses, and who continually use both their own and many that are the property of others.

Thea. It is evident I should.

Soc. What then, if you wished to become wise in the throwing of darts, think you not that you would become skilled by going to those engaged in the art of dart-throwing, and who possess darts, and continually use many darts, both their own and those belonging to others?

Thea. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in state

¹ Theages here alludes to what Socrates was wont to say, that men should endeavour to become similar to the deity.

affairs, think you that you will become wise by going to any others than those statesmen, who are skilled in state affairs themselves, and who continually make use of their own state and many others, and have an intercourse both with the Greek and Barbarian states? Or do you think, that by associating with certain other persons, but not with these, you will become wise in those things, in which they are wise?

Thea. I have heard the discourses, Socrates, which persons say you have spoken,¹ how that the sons of those very statesmen were in no respect better than the sons of shoemakers: and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I am able to perceive. I should be senseless then, if I thought that any one of these could impart to me his wisdom, when he could not in any respect benefit his own son; if indeed he were able on these points to benefit any person whatever.

Soc. What then, O best of men, would you do, if you had a son, who should give you trouble of this kind, and say that he desired to become a good painter, and blame you, his father, because you were not willing to expend money for the sake of these things, while he was despising painters, the artists in this very matter, and unwilling to learn from them; or if, being desirous to become a piper or harper, he should act in this manner towards pipers or harpers? In what way would you treat him, and whither would you send him, when thus unwilling to learn from those persons?

Thea. By Zeus, I (do not know).²

Soc. Now then, as you are doing these very things to your father, do you wonder at and blame him, if he is in doubt how he shall treat you, and whither send you? For we will place you with whomever of the Athenians you wish, the most skilled³ in state affairs, and who will be with you gratuitously;⁴ and at the same time you will not lose your money, and

¹ Stalbaum here refers to Protag. p. 319, Gorg. p. 518, C., Meno, p. 93, D., and Alcibiad. I. p. 118, C.

² So Taylor, for the sake of the sense, in lieu of "By Zeus, not I."

³ Instead of *καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν*, which are never, I suspect, thus united to an accusative, as *δεινός* and *σοφός* are, Ficinus has simply "præstantissimorum," adopted by Taylor; and though the expression in the text is repeated just below, yet there Ficinus has correctly merely "ex bonis." For Socrates could not be numbered amongst the *καλοὶ*, although he might be amongst the *ἀγαθοὶ*.

⁴ Stalbaum refers to Apolog. p. 19, E., § 4.

likewise be in greater repute with the many than by associating with any one else.

[8.] *Thea.* What then, Socrates, are not you one of the excellent men? For if you are willing to associate with me, it is sufficient, and I seek no other.¹

Soc. Why say you this, Theages?

Dem. He does not, Socrates, speak badly; and at the same time by doing this you will gratify me. Since there is nothing I should consider a greater piece of good luck than for my son to be pleased with your society, and for you to be willing to associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how very much I wish it. I entreat both of you, therefore, you, Socrates, to be willing to associate with him, and you, my son, not to seek to associate with any other than Socrates; and you will thus release me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear for him, lest he should meet with some other person able to corrupt him.

Thea. Do not, father, feel any longer any fear for me, if you can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.

Dem. You speak very well. And after this, the conversation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, so to say in few words, to give up to you both me and mine, and the nearest related, whatever, in short, you may require, if you will take this youth to your bosom, and benefit him as far as you can.

[9.] *Soc.* O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so importunate, if you think that your son can be especially benefited by me. For I do not know any thing about which he, who is endued with intellect, ought to be more anxious, than how his son may become the best of men. But from whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to benefit your son towards his becoming a good citizen, than you are yourself, and from whence he has thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For, in the first place, you are older than I am; and in the next place, you have held many offices, and those the greatest among the Athenians; and you are honoured by the people of the Anagyrusian ward,²

¹ A similar compliment is paid to Socrates in Lach. p. 200, C. § 33.

² According to the Scholiast, this was a ward of the tribe of *Æantis*; but according to Harpocration and Stephen. Byz., of *Eretheus*.

by much the most, and no less so by the rest of the city. ¹ But neither of you can see any one of these things in me; and next, if Theages here despises the society of statesmen, and seeks after certain others who profess themselves able to instruct young men, there is Prodicus of Ceos, and Gorgias the Leontine, and Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that they go to cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of the young men, who are permitted to associate gratuitously with any one of the citizens they please,—they persuade, I say, these to give up those of their own city, and to associate with them, and to put down moreover a considerable sum² of money, and, as a remuneration, to give them thanks besides.¹ Of these, then, it is reasonable for your son and yourself to select some one; but (to select) me it is not reasonable; for I know none of that blessed and beautiful learning, although I wish I did; but I am always somehow asserting that I happen to know, I may say, nothing but a mere trifle relating to matters of love.³ But in that kind of learning I lay claim⁴ to being more skilled than any one man of the past or present time.

[10.] *Thea*. See you, father, how Socrates does not appear to me to be very willing to pass the time with me. For, as to myself, I am ready, if he is willing. But he says this, playing with us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and (others) a little older, who, before they associated with him, were worth nothing; but when they had been with him, in a very little time they appeared to be better than all, to whom they were previously inferior.

Soc. Do you know then, son of Demodocus, how this is?

Thea. Yes, by Zeus, I do; and that, if you are willing, I too shall be able to become such as they are.

Soc. Not so, thou excellent youth; but you are not con-

Stalbaum refers to Boeckh Inscript. Græc. No. 210, and Grotefend De Demis Attic. p. 18.

¹—¹ The whole of this, says Stalbaum, has been taken almost verbatim from Apolog. p. 19, E. § 4.

² Instead of πολλόν, Beck suggested πολὺ, obtained from "multum," in Ficinus.

³ Stalbaum refers to Sympos. p. 177, D. § 5, and Lys. p. 204, B. § 2.

⁴ Here ποιῶμαι is improperly used for προσποιῶμαι, as remarked by Stalbaum.

scious how this occurs; and I will tell you.¹ There is, by a divine allotment, a certain dæmon that has followed me, beginning from childhood. This is a voice, which, when it exists, always signifies to me the abandonment of what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and there is the voice, it dissuades me from that very thing, and it does not suffer me to do it. Of this I will produce you witnesses. You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco. He once happened to communicate to me that he was about to contend for the stadium² at Nemea; and immediately, on his beginning to say, that he meant to contend, there was the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you were speaking to me, there was the voice of the dæmon; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you, that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet, by exercising myself at this time, I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him, what happened to him after this very act of contending. And if you are willing to inquire of Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus,³ what Timarchus said to him, when, being about to die, ⁴he went right against the dæmon,⁴ both he and Euathlus, the runner in the stadium, who received Timarchus when he was an exile, will tell you what he then said.

Thea. What did he say?

Soc. O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates.

¹ Here is another passage transcribed, says Stalbaum correctly, from Apolog. p. 31, D. § 19.

² The stadium was the course appointed for those who contended in the foot-race, as shown by an Æsopo-Socratic fable, quoted by Galen in Protrept. § 13.

³ I suppose this is Timarchus of Chæronæa, who desired to be interred near one of the sons of Socrates, who had died a little before. I could never find any vestige of this history elsewhere. DACIER. Nor has any one since his day been more fortunate.

⁴ The Greek is ἐὐθὺ τοῦ δαίμονιον: which Ficinus has omitted, either from his not understanding those words, or not finding them in his MS. Serranus—"adversus dæmonii mandatum"—of which Ruhnken approves on Timæus, p. 127. But ἐὐθὺ is never said of a single person; only of a place, or many persons. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, correctly observes, that there is some error here.

But why Timarches said this, I will tell you. When Timarches rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemonides, with the view of murdering Nicias the son of Hierocomander, they two alone were cognizant of the plot; and Timarches, as he rose, said to me, What do you say,¹ Socrates? Do you continue drinking; but I must rise up (and go) some where. I will, however, return shortly, if I am successful. And there was the voice. And I said to him, By no means, said I, rise up; for there has been to me the usual daemon signal. Upon this he stayed. And after a slight interval, he was again going away, and said—Socrates, I am going. And there was again the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time, wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose up without saying any thing to me, and escaped unnoticed, having watched me, while I had my attention otherwise engaged; and thus departing he perpetrated the acts, through which he went away about to die. Hence he told his brother, what I have now told you, that he was going to die, through his not believing in me. Further still, you will hear from many respecting the events in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army.² And the things that are past, you may hear from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the daemon signal, if it says any thing to the purpose. For on the departure of Sannio the beautiful³ for the army, there came to me the signal; and he is now gone with Thrasyllus,⁴ to carry on the campaign right through Ephesus and Ionia. And I think

¹ As no mention is made of a previous conversation, it is not easy to understand *Ti liyesq.*

² By comparing this account with that in Thucyd. viii. 1, it would seem that Socrates proved his daemon to be a truer prophet than were the oracle-chaunters, who predicted that the Athenians would gain possession of the whole of Sicily.

³ I have adopted Stalbaum's notion, that *reũ kaloeũ* means the "beautiful," not, as others, from the time of Ficinus, have rendered—"the son of Kalus." For that adjective is never found as a proper name. Besides, we can now better understand why Socrates, who admired handsome young persons, took an interest in his fate.

⁴ The expedition against Ephesus under Thrasyllus, described by Xenophon in Hellen. i. 2. 1, took place in Ol. 92. 4, = 409, A. C., when, as we learn from Plutarch in Alcibiad. t. i. p. 39, § 29, the Athenians were defeated under the walls of the town and a trophy of brass was erected by the conquerors. S.

that he will either die, or that he will meet with an end¹ something near to it. And I very much fear for the rest of the enterprise. [12.] All these things have I said to you, because this power of this dæmon is able to effect every thing with respect to the intercourse of those, who pass their time with me. For it is opposed to many; and it is not possible for those to be benefited by passing their time with me, so that it is not possible for me to live with them. With many, however, it does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not at all benefited by being with me. But they, whom the power of the dæmon assists to the intercourse, are those whom you have noticed; for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of those, who make a proficiency, some have the benefit firm and lasting; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner; but when they separate themselves from me, they again differ in no respect from any person whatever. This did Aristides, the son of Lysimachus and grandson of Aristides, suffer; for, while passing his time with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short period; but afterwards an expedition took place, and he went away, sailing with it. On his return he found Thucydides,² the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides, passing his time with me. Now this Thucydides, the day before, had felt some ill against me during a conversation. Aristides, therefore, after he had seen and saluted me, and other matters had been talked of, observed—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, on some points, and is angry with you, as if he were really something. It is so, said I. What then, said he, does he not know what a slave³ he was before he associated with you? By the gods, said I, it does not seem that he does. But I too, said he, am in a ridiculous situation, Socrates. What is it? said I. It is, said

¹ In lieu of ἔλqν, which is never found in prose Greek, the two oldest MSS. offer γελαν, from which it is easy to elicit τελεῖν, the Attic future for τελέσειν.

² Both Aristides and Thucydides are alluded to in Lach. p. 179, A. § 2, as being the unworthy/scions of a virtuous stock.

³ By comparing Xenophon in M. S. iv. 2. 39, quoted by Stalbaum, it would seem that Euthydemus and Aristides had been shown by Socrates to be no better than slaves, as Alcibiades is in Alcib. i. p. 135, D. § 61; but that, instead of lamenting the fact, they took umbrage at the truth of the language applied to them by their teacher.

he, that, before I sailed away, I was able to converse with any man whatever, and not to appear inferior to any one in argument, so that I sought the society of men the most elegant; but now, on the contrary, I shun any one, whom I perceive to be instructed, so ashamed am I of my own littleness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you were learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true. I never, at any time, learnt any thing from you, as you know. I made, however, a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house, though not in the same room; but more so when I was in the same room with you; and I seemed to myself (to improve) much more when, being in the same room, I looked at you, when you were speaking, than when I looked another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency, when I sat near you and touched you.¹ Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely oozed away. [13.] Of such kind then is, Theages, the intercourse with myself; for, if it is pleasing to the god, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but if not, not. See, then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those, who have a power over the benefit, with which they benefit men, than by me, who (have the power) to do only whatever may happen.

Thea. It appears to me, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, namely, to make a trial of this dæmon by associating together. And, if he is favourable to us, this will be the best; but if not, then let us immediately consult what we shall do, whether we shall associate with some other person, or endeavour to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other method that the diviners may explain.²

Dem. Do not, Socrates, oppose the lad any longer on these points; for Theages speaks well.

Soc. If it appears proper so to act, let us act so.

¹ Stalbaum aptly refers to *Sympos.* p. 175, F. § 4.

² On the technical word *ἐξηγεῖσθαι*, "to explain a religious rite," see Ruhnken on *Timæus*, p. 111.

INTRODUCTION TO THE RIVALS.

THIS is another of the dialogues considered to be spurious by the generality of modern scholars; and even with Thrasyllus, who lived in the time of Augustus, its genuineness was a matter of doubt, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius ix. 37. Sydenham, however, was so impressed with the conviction of its being really the production of its reputed author, as to remark, that although the dialogue is short, it is nevertheless of considerable value, and exhibits "a fair sample of the rich and plentiful repast provided by Plato in his longer productions; and it has this singular beauty, that the figures of the persons brought forwards are sketched in so exact and lively a manner, that painting itself could scarcely surpass it." On the other hand Stalbaum asserts, while confessing that it exhibits a style of writing at once so pure, chaste, and elegant, as to put it on a par with the writings of Plato and Xenophon, that its matter is such as fully to justify its repudiation by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Ast, and others; while as regards the notion that Democritus was perhaps one of the anonymous persons alluded to in the dialogue, Stalbaum says it is too absurd to be entertained for a single moment. For he doubtless remembered, although he says nothing to that effect, that, according to Diogenes Laertius, Demetrius Phalereus had denied that Democritus ever visited Athens.

The title of the dialogue is generally '*Ἐρασταί*, "the Lovers;" and so it is quoted by Olympiodorus. But Proclus calls it '*Ἀντερασταί*, "the Rival Lovers;" and this is the name it ought to bear, as shown by the testimony of competent witnesses, produced by Menage on Diog. L. iii. 5, and his decision has been adopted by all subsequent scholars.

The object of the dialogue is to show, that they, who profess to know just so much of difficult arts and sciences as is suited to a person of liberal education, possess that very kind of knowledge, which to all practical purposes is perfectly useless.

The most recent English translation of this dialogue, as far as I know, is to be found in an anonymous work, published at London in 1827, under the title of "A Narrative of an Excursion from Corfu to Smyrna." Like Shelley, in the case of the Banquet and the Ion, the author has been more anxious to give an elegant than a close translation.

THE RIVALS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, AND TWO ANONYMOUS RIVALS.

SOCRATES.

[1.] I ENTERED the school of Dionysius,¹ the teacher of grammar,² and I saw there those of the young men, who were deemed to be the most remarkable for their personal appearance and the good repute of their fathers, and their admirers likewise. Two of the youths happened to be disputing, but about what I did not very well hear. They appeared however to be disputing about Anaxagoras,³ or Cænopides;⁴ as

¹ This person, according to Diog. L. iii. 5, had been Plato's grammar-master.

² The reading *γραμματιστοῦ* in lieu of *γραμματικοῦ*, first adopted by Forster from a single MS., has been subsequently found in all. By *γραμματικός* was meant "a critical grammarian," not merely "a teacher of the elements of grammar," in Greek *γραμματιστής*, respecting whose office Knebel refers to Protag. p. 325, E.

³ Respecting Anaxagoras, the reader may consult Diogenes Laertius, Stanley's History of Philosophy, and similar classical works.

⁴ Of this Cænopides, Proclus, on Euclid. ii. p. 19. 78 and 87, has made mention, when giving a brief sketch of the rise and progress of geometry. He says that Anaxagoras touched on many questions relating to geometry, and so did Cænopides of Chios; both of whom Plato has mentioned in the Rivals, as having obtained a reputation for learning. After them Hippocrates of Chios, who discovered the squaring of the meniscus, and Theodorus of Cyréné, who was somewhat junior to Anaxagoras, became

they were describing⁵ circles, and imitating by their hands certain inclinations,⁶ with great earnestness. And I, for I was sitting near an admirer of one of the young persons, nudged him with my elbow, and asked—On what were the two youths so earnestly engaged? and I said, Surely it is a subject important and beautiful, on which they have bestowed so serious an attention.—What call you⁷ important and beautiful? said he. They are prating⁸ about things above in the sky, and trifling away their time in philosophizing.—And I, in wonder at such an answer, said—Do you think it, young man, to be a disgraceful thing to philosophize? or why do you speak so harshly?—But another person,⁹ who was a rival admirer (of the youths), and happened to be sitting near, on hearing me asking the question, and the answer, said—It is not for you,¹⁰ Socrates, to ask this man, whether he thinks it disgraceful to philosophize. Know you not that he has spent all his time in being throstled,¹¹ and cramming

conspicuous for their knowledge of the same science; for the squaring of the meniscus is attributed to Hippocrates of Chios, by Simplicius, (on Aristot. Phys. fol. 12,) who has shown how it is to be done geometrically. But as no mention is made of Theodorus by name in this dialogue, Proclus (according to Sydenham) imagined that Theodorus was one of the nameless Rivals.

⁵ To avoid the repetition of *ἐφαινέσθην*, Heusde proposed to read *κύκλους γοῦν γράφοντες σφαίρας*, similar to “*circulos describentes et inflexiones*” in Ficinus, who omits *ἐφαινέσθην*.

⁶ Forster shows, from Diodorus i. § 98, that Ænopides had learnt in Egypt that *τὸν ἡλιακὸν κύκλον λοξὴν ἔχεν τὴν πορείαν*; and that Anaxagoras knew of the inclination of the poles of the earth.

⁷ To avoid the pleonasm in *εἶπε* and *εἶφη*, Sydenham suggested *ὄψς*; but where *ποῖον* is thus used to express surprise, a verb is rarely found, as shown by the mass of passages quoted by Reisig in Conjectan. p. 74; and though *εἶφη* is thus inserted after *ποῖον* in Euthyd. p. 304, E., yet there *εἶπε* is not added likewise.

⁸ On *ἀδολεσχῆν* and *μετεώρων*, see the commentators on Aristoph. Νεφ. 188, Plato Phædon. p. 70, C., Phædr. p. 270, A., Cratyl. p. 401, B., Rep. vi. p. 488, C., and Xenoph. M. S. i. 2, 31.

⁹ According to Diogenes Laert. ix. 37, Thrasyllus fancied this person to be Democritus, the philosopher of Abdera. See in § 2, n. 21 and 29.

¹⁰ In the formula *πρὸς σοῦ*, the verb *ποιεῖς* is not elsewhere found. I have therefore omitted it. Ficinus has correctly “*Non expedit tibi.*”

¹¹ On the verb *τραχηλίζεσθαι*, as applied to wrestlers, Sydenham refers to Lucian's Anacharsis; Stutzmann adds Plutarch in Anton. i. p. 97, B. § 33, *διαλαμβάνων τοὺς νεανίσκους τραχηλίζει*; and Diog. Laert., *ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος κορασίῳ τραχηλίζεται*, quoted by Stephens in Thes. L. Gr.

himself, and sleeping?¹² so that what other answer think you he would give, but that it is disgraceful to philosophize?—Now this person had employed his whole time in mental cultivation,¹³ but the other, whom he abused, in bodily exercises. It seemed then to me that I ought to dismiss the one, who had been interrogated,¹⁴ for he did not pretend even to be skilled in words, but in deeds; and to interrogate thoroughly the other, who pretended to be rather clever, in order that I might, if I could, be benefited by him¹⁵ in knowledge. I said therefore to him, that I had proposed my question in common for all; but if you think¹⁶ you will give a better answer, I put the same question to you as I did to him, Whether you think it honourable to philosophize or not?—Just as we were conversing thus, the two youths, overhearing us, became silent; and ceasing from the dispute, became listeners. Now, what their admirers suffered, I know not; but I was struck with astonishment. For I am always struck so in the case of the young and handsome. One of them, however, seemed to me in no less an agony than myself; and he answered with the air of a person eager for honour.—Should I ever,¹⁷ Socrates, said he, consider it disgraceful to philosophize, I should no longer deem myself a human being; nor, indeed, any one else, so disposed, pointing to his Rival, and speaking with a loud¹⁸ voice, so that the objects of their admiration might hear.—To you, then, said I, it seems honourable to philosophize.—Most highly, replied he.—[2.] What then, said

¹² Plutarch, in Philopœmenes, i. p. 375, C. § 3, and Galen to Thrasybul. c. 37, quoted respectively by Sydenham and Forster, give a similar account of the life of prize-fighters.

¹³ According to Plato, in Rep. ii. p. 246, and Legg. x. p. 795, education was divided into two parts, bodily, *γυμναστική*, and mental, *μουσική*. FORSTER.

¹⁴ In lieu of *ἐρωόμενον* or *ἐρώμενον*, found subsequently in many MSS., Mudge suggested *ἐρωμίονον*, but Schleiermacher *ἐρωτώμενον*, from "quem prius interrogaveram," in Ficinus.

¹⁵ Compare Hipp. Minor, § 12.

¹⁶ Here is a transition from the narrative to the dramatic style. S. There is a remarkable instance of a similar transition in Xenophon in Anab. i. 9. 25.

¹⁷ Instead of *ὁ πόρε*, Ficinus found in his MS. *εἶπορε*, answering to his version, "si quando."

¹⁸ Stutzmann was the first to suggest *μεγάλη*, subsequently found in the four best MSS. Stalbaum, however, is content with *μέγα*, supported by *τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων*, in Protag. p. 310, B.

I; does it seem to you possible for a man to know any thing whatever, whether it is disgraceful or honourable, who does not know at all what that thing is?—No, said he.—Know you then, said I, what it is to philosophize?—Perfectly, said he.—What is it then? said I.—What else, (said he,) than according to the sentiment of Solon? For Solon says somewhere,¹⁹

Even as I grow old, still much I learn.

And it appears to me that the man, who would philosophize, ought to be always learning some one thing at least, when he is either young or old, in order that he may during life learn the greatest number of things.—At first it seemed to me that he had said something to the purpose; but afterwards, on thinking thrice,²⁰ I asked him, whether he considered philosophy to be much learning?—Completely so,²¹ said he.—And do you consider, said I, that philosophy is only honourable? or good likewise?—It is likewise very good, said he.—Do you perceive this to be something peculiar to philosophy? or does it seem to you to be the case in other things likewise? For instance, do you consider a love of gymnastic exercises to be not only honourable but good likewise, or not?—To this²² he said very ironically two things.²³ To this man let it be said, that it is neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honourable and good.—(I then asked him), Do you think that in these exercises the undergoing much toil is a love of exercise?—By all means, said he; just as in philosophizing, I consider that much learning is philosophy.—Do you think then, said I, that the lovers of those exercises desire any thing else than that, which will cause the body to be in a good state?—That very thing, he replied.—Do then, said I, many la-

¹⁹ The same verse is quoted in Lach. p. 188, B., and Rep. vii. p. 536, B.

²⁰ Instead of *πρὸς*, one MS. has *περ*. The two seem to lead to *τρίς*: for thus "tris" is used by Virgil in *Æn.* i. 109, "*Tris Notus—torquet—tris Eurus—urget*:" and *τρίς* in *Æsch.* S. Th. 727.

²¹ From this answer Sydenham was led to believe that Democritus was the speaker. For, according to Clemens Alexandr. in *Strom.* i. p. 357, ed. Potter, he prided himself upon his extensive learning.

²²⁻²³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *μάλα εἰρωνικῶς εἶπε δόξο*, which I cannot understand. For the reply, so far from being ironical, is perfectly straightforward. There is evidently some error here; which it were not difficult perhaps to correct by the aid of *ἰφθ*, read in the three oldest MSS. in lieu of *εἶπε*. Sydenham renders *εἰρωνικῶς* "facetiously;" Knebel, "*suam magnopere dissimulans sententiam*."

bours, cause the body to be in a good state?—Certainly, said he; for how should a person have, from little labour, his body in a good state?—Here I thought it best to call²³ upon the lover of gymnastics, in order that he might assist me through his knowledge of the gymnastic art. And I asked him, Why are you silent, O best of men, while this person is talking thus? Or to you likewise do persons seem to have their bodies in a good state from much labour or little?—²⁴ For my part, Socrates, said he, I thought he had known²⁵ the saying,²⁴ that moderate labour is best for the body.²⁶—²⁷ How so? (said I).—(I speak) not of a man²⁷ sleepless, and foodless, and having his neck not worn down²⁸ and attenuated by care.²⁹ On his saying this the youths were delighted, and burst into a laugh; but the other party blushed.—I then said, What then,

²³ So Sydenham. Ficinus has—"provocandus"—as if he found in his MS. *κληρίος*, in lieu of *κνηρίος*: on which see Heind. at Lys. p. 225, A.

²⁴—²⁴ Ficinus has merely "Equidem, O Socrates, asserere ausim—" For his MS. was either deficient; or else he saw that there was nothing in the shape of a proverb, to which the phrase *τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ* could be referred. Accordingly Knebel would supply *τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν*, to which Plato alludes in Menex. p. 247, E. § 20, and Protag. p. 343, B. 82.

²⁵ After *τοῦτο* Schleiermacher would insert *τοῦτον*—But the disease is seated somewhat deeper.

²⁶ Cornarius quotes opportunely Hippocrates on Epidem. vi. 6, *πόνος, σιτία, ποτά, ὕπνος, ἀποδίσια, πάντα μέτρια*.

²⁷—²⁷ The Greek is, *πόθεν δὴ; οὐχὶ ἄνδρα γε*—Ficinus has, "Unde? inquam; non virum vigilantem dico—" as if he had found in his MS. *πόθεν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ; οὐχὶ ἄνδρα λέγω ἀγρυπνον*—Forster, whom Sydenham follows, would insert *ὁρᾶς* after *οὐχὶ*—Heusde however, who says that the whole passage is wretchedly corrupt, would read—*πόθεν δὲ οὐχὶ; ἄνδρα—εὐστραβῇ*. But *εὐστραβῆς* is found no where else in Greek; nor in the formula *πόθεν*, used either by itself or with *οὐ* in a negative sense, do we meet with *οὐχὶ*. Schleiermacher prefers, ΣΩΚ. *πόθεν δ' οὐχὶ οἱ πολλοί; Ἄνδρα γε*—whom Beck follows in part. But the whole passage still requires correction.

²⁸ All the MSS. but one offer *ἀτριβῇ* in lieu of *ἀστραβῇ*. Ficinus has—"insuetam spinam habentem"—from which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS. Stalbaum translates *ἀτριβῇ τὸν τράχηλον ἔχοντα* by "collum nullis pugnīs committentem."

²⁹ To give additional support to the notion that Democritus is here alluded to, Sydenham refers to the Epistle of Hippocrates, where the philosopher is described as being very pale and wasted in flesh; that he was found with a book which lay [open] on his knees; and that other books lay by him, some on each side; that by turns he wrote, poring over his writing with earnest attention; and by turns rested, pondering very much within himself.

by much the most, and no less so by the rest of the city. ¹ But neither of you can see any one of these things in me; and next, if Theages here despises the society of statesmen, and seeks after certain others who profess themselves able to instruct young men, there is Prodicus of Ceos, and Gorgias the Leontine, and Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that they go to cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of the young men, who are permitted to associate gratuitously with any one of the citizens they please,—they persuade, I say, these to give up those of their own city, and to associate with them, and to put down moreover a considerable sum² of money, and, as a remuneration, to give them thanks besides.¹ Of these, then, it is reasonable for your son and yourself to select some one; but (to select) me it is not reasonable; for I know none of that blessed and beautiful learning, although I wish I did; but I am always somehow asserting that I happen to know, I may say, nothing but a mere trifle relating to matters of love.³ But in that kind of learning I lay claim⁴ to being more skilled than any one man of the past or present time.

[10.] *Thea.* See you, father, how Socrates does not appear to me to be very willing to pass the time with me. For, as to myself, I am ready, if he is willing. But he says this, playing with us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and (others) a little older, who, before they associated with him, were worth nothing; but when they had been with him, in a very little time they appeared to be better than all, to whom they were previously inferior.

Soc. Do you know then, son of Demodocus, how this is?

Thea. Yes, by Zeus, I do; and that, if you are willing, I too shall be able to become such as they are.

Soc. Not so, thou excellent youth; but you are not con-

Stalbaum refers to Boeckh Inscript. Græc. No. 210, and Grotefend De Demis Attic. p. 18.

¹—The whole of this, says Stalbaum, has been taken almost verbatim from Apolog. p. 19, E. § 4.

² Instead of πολὺν, Beck suggested πολὺ, obtained from "multum," in Ficinus.

³ Stalbaum refers to Sympos. p. 177, D. § 5, and Lys. p. 204, B. § 2.

⁴ Here ποιούμεαι is improperly used for προσποιούμεαι, as remarked by Stalbaum.

scious how this occurs; and I will tell you.¹ There is, by a divine allotment, a certain dæmon that has followed me, beginning from childhood. This is a voice, which, when it exists, always signifies to me the abandonment of what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and there is the voice, it dissuades me from that very thing, and it does not suffer me to do it. Of this I will produce you witnesses. You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco. He once happened to communicate to me that he was about to contend for the stadium² at Nemea; and immediately, on his beginning to say, that he meant to contend, there was the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you were speaking to me, there was the voice of the dæmon; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you, that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet, by exercising myself at this time, I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him, what happened to him after this very act of contending. And if you are willing to inquire of Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus,³ what Timarchus said to him, when, being about to die, ⁴he went right against the dæmon,⁴ both he and Euathlus, the runner in the stadium, who received Timarchus when he was an exile, will tell you what he then said.

Thea. What did he say?

Soc. O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates.

¹ Here is another passage transcribed, says Stalbaum correctly, from Apolog. p. 31, D. § 19.

² The stadium was the course appointed for those who contended in the foot-race, as shown by an Æsopo-Socratic fable, quoted by Galen in Protrept. § 13.

³ I suppose this is Timarchus of Chæronæa, who desired to be interred near one of the sons of Socrates, who had died a little before. I could never find any vestige of this history elsewhere. DACIER. Nor has any one since his day been more fortunate.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is *εὐθὺ τοῦ δαίμονιου*: which Ficinus has omitted, either from his not understanding those words, or not finding them in his MS. Serranus—"adversus dæmonii mandatum"—of which Ruhnen approves on Timæus, p. 127. But *εὐθὺ* is never said of a single person; only of a place, or many persons. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, correctly observes, that there is some error here.

But why Timarchus said this, I will tell you. When Timarchus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemonides, with the view of murdering Nicias the son of Heroscomander, they two alone were cognizant of the plot; and Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say,¹ Socrates? Do you continue drinking; but I must rise up (and go) some where. I will, however, return shortly, if I am successful. And there was the voice. And I said to him, By no means, said I, rise up; for there has been to me the usual dæmon signal. Upon this he stayed. And after a slight interval, he was again going away, and said—Socrates, I am going. And there was again the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time, wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose up without saying any thing to me, and escaped unnoticed, having watched me, while I had my attention otherwise engaged; and thus departing he perpetrated the acts, through which he went away about to die. Hence he told his brother, what I have now told you, that he was going to die, through his not believing in me. Further still, you will hear from many respecting the events in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army.² And the things that are past, you may hear from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the dæmon signal, if it says any thing to the purpose. For on the departure of Sannio the beautiful³ for the army, there came to me the signal; and he is now gone with Thrasyllus,⁴ to carry on the campaign right through Ephesus and Ionia. And I think

¹ As no mention is made of a previous conversation, it is not easy to understand τί λέγεις.

² By comparing this account with that in Thucyd. viii. 1, it would seem that Socrates proved his dæmon to be a truer prophet than were the oracle-chaunters, who predicted that the Athenians would gain possession of the whole of Sicily.

³ I have adopted Stalbaum's notion, that τοῦ καλοῦ means the "beautiful," not, as others, from the time of Ficinus, have rendered—"the son of Kalus." For that adjective is never found as a proper name. Besides, we can now better understand why Socrates, who admired handsome young persons, took an interest in his fate.

⁴ The expedition against Ephesus under Thrasyllus, described by Xenophon in Hellen. i. 2. 1, took place in Ol. 92. 4. = 409, A. C., when, as we learn from Plutarch in Alcibiad. t. i. p. 39, § 29, the Athenians were defeated under the walls of the town and a trophy of brass was erected by the conquerors. S.

that he will either die, or that he will meet with an end¹ something near to it. And I very much fear for the rest of the enterprise. [12.] All these things have I said to you, because this power of this dæmon is able to effect every thing with respect to the intercourse of those, who pass their time with me. For it is opposed to many; and it is not possible for those to be benefited by passing their time with me, so that it is not possible for me to live with them. With many, however, it does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not at all benefited by being with me. But they, whom the power of the dæmon assists to the intercourse, are those whom you have noticed; for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of those, who make a proficiency, some have the benefit firm and lasting; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner; but when they separate themselves from me, they again differ in no respect from any person whatever. This did Aristides, the son of Lysimachus and grandson of Aristides, suffer; for, while passing his time with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short period; but afterwards an expedition took place, and he went away, sailing with it. On his return he found Thucydides,² the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides, passing his time with me. Now this Thucydides, the day before, had felt some ill against me during a conversation. Aristides, therefore, after he had seen and saluted me, and other matters had been talked of, observed—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, on some points, and is angry with you, as if he were really something. It is so, said I. What then, said he, does he not know what a slave³ he was before he associated with you? By the gods, said I, it does not seem that he does. But I too, said he, am in a ridiculous situation, Socrates. What is it? said I. It is, said

¹ In lieu of ἔλκειν, which is never found in prose Greek, the two oldest MSS. offer γελαν, from which it is easy to elicit τελεῖν, the Attic future for τελίσκειν.

² Both Aristides and Thucydides are alluded to in Lach. p. 179, A. § 2, as being the unworthy scions of a virtuous stock.

³ By comparing Xenophon in M. S. iv. 2. 39, quoted by Stalbaum, it would seem that Euthydemus and Aristides had been shown by Socrates to be no better than slaves, as Alcibiades is in Alcib. i. p. 135, D. § 61; but that, instead of lamenting the fact, they took umbrage at the truth of the language applied to them by their teacher.

he, that, before I sailed away, I was able to converse with any man whatever, and not to appear inferior to any one in argument, so that I sought the society of men the most elegant; but now, on the contrary, I shun any one, whom I perceive to be instructed, so ashamed am I of my own littleness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you were learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true. I never, at any time, learnt any thing from you, as you know. I made, however, a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house, though not in the same room; but more so when I was in the same room with you; and I seemed to myself (to improve) much more when, being in the same room, I looked at you, when you were speaking, than when I looked another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency, when I sat near you and touched you.¹ Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely oozed away. [13.] Of such kind then is, Theages, the intercourse with myself; for, if it is pleasing to the god, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but if not, not. See, then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those, who have a power over the benefit, with which they benefit men, than by me, who (have the power) to do only whatever may happen.

Thea. It appears to me, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, namely, to make a trial of this dæmon by associating together. And, if he is favourable to us, this will be the best; but if not, then let us immediately consult what we shall do, whether we shall associate with some other person, or endeavour to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other method that the diviners may explain.²

Dem. Do not, Socrates, oppose the lad any longer on these points; for Theages speaks well.

Soc. If it appears proper so to act, let us act so.

¹ Stalbaum aptly refers to *Sympos.* p. 175, F. § 4.

² On the technical word *ἐξηγεῖσθαι*, "to explain a religious rite," see Ruhnken on *Timæus*, p. 111.

INTRODUCTION TO THE RIVALS.

THIS is another of the dialogues considered to be spurious by the generality of modern scholars; and even with Thrasyllus, who lived in the time of Augustus, its genuineness was a matter of doubt, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius ix. 37. Sydenham, however, was so impressed with the conviction of its being really the production of its reputed author, as to remark, that although the dialogue is short, it is nevertheless of considerable value, and exhibits "a fair sample of the rich and plentiful repast provided by Plato in his longer productions; and it has this singular beauty, that the figures of the persons brought forwards are sketched in so exact and lively a manner, that painting itself could scarcely surpass it." On the other hand Stalbaum asserts, while confessing that it exhibits a style of writing at once so pure, chaste, and elegant, as to put it on a par with the writings of Plato and Xenophon, that its matter is such as fully to justify its repudiation by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Ast, and others; while as regards the notion that Democritus was perhaps one of the anonymous persons alluded to in the dialogue, Stalbaum says it is too absurd to be entertained for a single moment. For he doubtless remembered, although he says nothing to that effect, that, according to Diogenes Laertius, Demetrius Phalereus had denied that Democritus ever visited Athens.

The title of the dialogue is generally 'Ερασαι, "the Lovers:" and so it is quoted by Olympiodorus. But Proclus calls it 'Αντε-ρασαι, "the Rival Lovers;" and this is the name it ought to bear, as shown by the testimony of competent witnesses, produced by Menage on Diog. L. iii. 5, and his decision has been adopted by all subsequent scholars.

they were describing⁵ circles, and imitating by their hands certain inclinations,⁶ with great earnestness. And I, for I was sitting near an admirer of one of the young persons, nudged him with my elbow, and asked—On what were the two youths so earnestly engaged? and I said, Surely it is a subject important and beautiful, on which they have bestowed so serious an attention.—What call you⁷ important and beautiful? said he. They are prating⁸ about things above in the sky, and trifling away their time in philosophizing.—And I, in wonder at such an answer, said—Do you think it, young man, to be a disgraceful thing to philosophize? or why do you speak so harshly?—But another person,⁹ who was a rival admirer (of the youths), and happened to be sitting near, on hearing me asking the question, and the answer, said—It is not for you,¹⁰ Socrates, to ask this man, whether he thinks it disgraceful to philosophize. Know you not that he has spent all his time in being throsted,¹¹ and cramming

conspicuous for their knowledge of the same science; for the squaring of the meniscus is attributed to Hippocrates of Chios, by Simplicius, (on Aristot. Phys. fol. 12,) who has shown how it is to be done geometrically. But as no mention is made of Theodorus by name in this dialogue, Proclus (according to Sydenham) imagined that Theodorus was one of the nameless Rivals.

⁵ To avoid the repetition of *φαινίσθην*, Heusde proposed to read *κύκλους γοῦν γράφοντες σφαίρας*, similar to “*circulos describentes et inflexiones*” in Ficinus, who omits *φαινίσθην*.

⁶ Forster shows, from Diodorus i. § 98, that Cænopides had learnt in Egypt that *τὸν ἡλιακὸν κύκλον λοξὴν ἔχειν τὴν πορείαν*; and that Anaxagoras knew of the inclination of the poles of the earth.

⁷ To avoid the pleonasm in *εἶπε* and *ἔφη*, Sydenham suggested *φῆς*; but where *ποῖον* is thus used to express surprise, a verb is rarely found, as shown by the mass of passages quoted by Reisig in Conjectan. p. 74; and though *ἔφη* is thus inserted after *ποῖον* in Euthyd. p. 304, E., yet there *εἶπε* is not added likewise.

⁸ On *ἀδολασχεῖν* and *μετεώρων*, see the commentators on Aristoph. Νεφ. 188, Plato Phædon. p. 70, C., Phædr. p. 270, A., Cratyl. p. 401, B., Rep. vi. p. 488, C., and Xenoph. M. S. i. 2, 31.

⁹ According to Diogenes Laert. ix. 37, Thrasyllus fancied this person to be Democritus, the philosopher of Abdera. See in § 2, n. 21 and 29.

¹⁰ In the formula *πρὸς σοῦ*, the verb *ποιεῖς* is not elsewhere found. I have therefore omitted it. Ficinus has correctly “*Non expedit tibi.*”

¹¹ On the verb *τραχηλίζεσθαι*, as applied to wrestlers, Sydenham refers to Lucian's Anacharsis; Stutzmann adds Plutarch in Anton. i. p. 97, B. § 33, *διαλαμβάνων τοὺς νεανίσκους ἐτραχήλιζε*; and Diog. Laert., *ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος κορασίου τραχηλίζεται*, quoted by Stephens in Thea. L. Gr.

himself, and sleeping?¹² so that what other answer think you he would give, but that it is disgraceful to philosophize?—Now this person had employed his whole time in mental cultivation,¹³ but the other, whom he abused, in bodily exercises. It seemed then to me that I ought to dismiss the one, who had been interrogated,¹⁴ for he did not pretend even to be skilled in words, but in deeds; and to interrogate thoroughly the other, who pretended to be rather clever, in order that I might, if I could, be benefited by him¹⁵ in knowledge. I said therefore to him, that I had proposed my question in common for all; but if you think¹⁶ you will give a better answer, I put the same question to you as I did to him, Whether you think it honourable to philosophize or not?—Just as we were conversing thus, the two youths, overhearing us, became silent; and ceasing from the dispute, became listeners. Now, what their admirers suffered, I know not; but I was struck with astonishment. For I am always struck so in the case of the young and handsome. One of them, however, seemed to me in no less an agony than myself; and he answered with the air of a person eager for honour.—Should I ever,¹⁷ Socrates, said he, consider it disgraceful to philosophize, I should no longer deem myself a human being; nor, indeed, any one else, so disposed, pointing to his Rival, and speaking with a loud¹⁸ voice, so that the objects of their admiration might hear.—To you, then, said I, it seems honourable to philosophize.—Most highly, replied he.—[2.] What then, said

¹² Plutarch, in Philopœmenes, i. p. 375, C. § 3, and Galen to Thrasybul. c. 37, quoted respectively by Sydenham and Forster, give a similar account of the life of prize-fighters.

¹³ According to Plato, in Rep. ii. p. 246, and Legg. x. p. 795, education was divided into two parts, bodily, *γυμναστική*, and mental, *μουσική*. FORSTER.

¹⁴ In lieu of *ἐρώμενον* or *ἐρώμενον*, found subsequently in many MSS., Mudge suggested *ἱππομήνον*, but Schleiermacher *ἐρωτώμενον*, from “quem prius interrogaveram,” in Ficinus.

¹⁵ Compare Hipp. Minor, § 12.

¹⁶ Here is a transition from the narrative to the dramatic style. S. There is a remarkable instance of a similar transition in Xenophon in Anab. i. 9. 25.

¹⁷ Instead of *ὅποτε*, Ficinus found in his MS. *εἴποτε*, answering to his version, “si quando.”

¹⁸ Stutzmann was the first to suggest *μεγάλῃ*, subsequently found in the four best MSS. Stalbaum, however, is content with *μέγα*, supported by *τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων*, in Protag. p. 310, B.

I; does it seem to you possible for a man to know any thing whatever, whether it is disgraceful or honourable, who does not know at all what that thing is?—No, said he.—Know you then, said I, what it is to philosophize?—Perfectly, said he.—What is it then? said I.—What else, (said he,) than according to the sentiment of Solon? For Solon says some where,¹⁹

Even as I grow old, still much I learn.

And it appears to me that the man, who would philosophize, ought to be always learning some one thing at least, when he is either young or old, in order that he may during life learn the greatest number of things.—At first it seemed to me that he had said something to the purpose; but afterwards, on thinking thrice,²⁰ I asked him, whether he considered philosophy to be much learning?—Completely so,²¹ said he.—And do you consider, said I, that philosophy is only honourable? or good likewise?—It is likewise very good, said he.—Do you perceive this to be something peculiar to philosophy? or does it seem to you to be the case in other things likewise? For instance, do you consider a love of gymnastic exercises to be not only honourable but good likewise, or not?—To this²² he said very ironically two things.²³ To this man let it be said, that it is neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honourable and good.—(I then asked him), Do you think that in these exercises the undergoing much toil is a love of exercise?—By all means, said he; just as in philosophizing, I consider that much learning is philosophy.—Do you think then, said I, that the lovers of those exercises desire any thing else than that, which will cause the body to be in a good state?—That very thing, he replied.—Do then, said I, many la-

¹⁹ The same verse is quoted in Lach. p. 188, B., and Rep. vii. p. 536, B.

²⁰ Instead of τρις, one MS. has τετ. The two seem to lead to τρις: for thus "tris" is used by Virgil in *Æn.* i. 109, "Tris Notus—torquet—tris Eurus—urget:" and τρις in *Æsch.* S. Th. 727.

²¹ From this answer Sydenham was led to believe that Democritus was the speaker. For, according to Clemens Alexandr. in *Strom.* i. p. 357, ed. Potter, he prided himself upon his extensive learning.

²²⁻²³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, μάλα ειρωνικῶς εἶπε δὲ, which I cannot understand. For the reply, so far from being ironical, is perfectly straightforward. There is evidently some error here; which it were not difficult perhaps to correct by the aid of ἐφη, read in the three oldest MSS. in lieu of εἶπε. Sydenham renders ειρωνικῶς "facetiously;" Knebel, "suam magnopere dissimulans sententiam."

bours, cause the body to be in a good state?—Certainly, said he; for how should a person have, from little labour, his body in a good state?—Here I thought it best to call²³ upon the lover of gymnastics, in order that he might assist me through his knowledge of the gymnastic art. And I asked him, Why are you silent, O best of men, while this person is talking thus? Or to you likewise do persons seem to have their bodies in a good state from much labour or little?—²⁴ For my part, Socrates, said he, I thought he had known²⁵ the saying,²⁴ that moderate labour is best for the body.²⁶—²⁷ How so? (said I).—(I speak) not of a man²⁷ sleepless, and foodless, and having his neck not worn down²⁸ and attenuated by care.²⁹ On his saying this the youths were delighted, and burst into a laugh; but the other party blushed.—I then said, What then,

²³ So Sydenham. Ficinus has—"provocandus"—as if he found in his MS. *αλητιος*, in lieu of *κνητιος*: on which see Heind. at Lys. p. 225, A.

²⁴⁻²⁶ Ficinus has merely "Equidem, O Socrates, asserere ausim—" For his MS. was either deficient; or else he saw that there was nothing in the shape of a proverb, to which the phrase *τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ* could be referred. Accordingly Knebel would supply *τὸ μὴδὲν ἄγαν*, to which Plato alludes in Menex. p. 247, E. § 20, and Protag. p. 343, B. 82.

²⁵ After *τοῦτο* Schleiermacher would insert *τοῦτον*—But the disease is seated somewhat deeper.

²⁶ Cornarius quotes opportunely Hippocrates on Epidem. vi. 6, *πόνος, σιτία, ποτὶς, ὕπνος, ἀφροδίσια, πάντα μέτρια*.

²⁷⁻²⁹ The Greek is, *πόθεν δὴ; οὐχὶ ἄνδρα γε*—Ficinus has, "Unde? inquam; non virum vigilantem dico—" as if he had found in his MS. *πόθεν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ; οὐχὶ ἄνδρα λίγω ἀγρυπνον*—Forster, whom Sydenham follows, would insert *ὁρᾶς* after *οὐχὶ*—Heusde however, who says that the whole passage is wretchedly corrupt, would read—*πόθεν δὲ οὐχὶ; ἄνδρα—ἐστραβῆ*. But *ἐστραβῆς* is found no where else in Greek; nor in the formula *πόθεν*, used either by itself or with *οὐ* in a negative sense, do we meet with *οὐχὶ*. Schleiermacher prefers, ΣΩΚ. *πόθεν δ' οὐχὶ οἱ πολλοί; Ἄνδρα γε*—whom Beck follows in part. But the whole passage still requires correction.

²⁸ All the MSS. but one offer *ἀτριβῆ* in lieu of *ἀστραβῆ*. Ficinus has—"insuetam spinam habentem"—from which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS. Stalbaum translates *ἀτριβῆ τὸν τράχηλον ἔχοντα* by "collum nullis pugnīs committentem."

²⁹ To give additional support to the notion that Democritus is here alluded to, Sydenham refers to the Epistle of Hippocrates, where the philosopher is described as being very pale and wasted in flesh; that he was found with a book which lay [open] on his knees; and that other books lay by him, some on each side; that by turns he wrote, poring over his writing with earnest attention; and by turns rested, pondering very much within himself.

do you now concede that neither much nor little labour causes human beings to have their bodies in a good state, but only what is moderate? or will you contest with us two?—Against him, said he, I would enter the lists with much pleasure, and I know well that I should be competent to support the proposition I have laid down, if I had laid down one weaker than this; for he is nothing. But against you I beg not to contend in favour of a paradox; and I admit, that not many, but moderate exercises³⁰ procure for men a good habit of body.—And what in the case of food? said I. Is it the moderate, or much?—He admitted it in the case of food.³¹ And thus I compelled him to confess that, in the case of all the other things relating to the body, the moderate is the most beneficial, and not the much or little. ³²[And he confessed the moderate]³² and all this he granted me.—What then, said I, as regards the soul? Of the things applied to it do the moderate or the immoderate benefit it?—The moderate, said he.—Is not learning one of the things applied to the soul?—He admitted it.—Of learning then, the moderate quantity benefits, but not the great.—He assented.—[3.] Of whom then, making an inquiry, should we justly inquire what kind of exercise and of food are moderate for the body? We all three agreed that it is a physician or a master of exercise.³³ And

³⁰ A similar sentiment is attributed to Socrates by Xenophon in M. S. i. 2. 4, as remarked by Sydenham.

³¹ The Greek is *Kai τὰ σιτία ὁμολόγου*. But we must either insert *ὡσαύτως*, or some other word of like import, or else in lieu of *τὰ σιτία* read *τὰ μίρτια*—that the concession here may tally with the two subsequent concessions. S. Schleiermacher, with whom Knebel agrees, considers the whole clause to be superfluous.

³²—³³ The words within the brackets are evidently an interpolation.

³³ “Although *Παιδορπίβης* properly signifies the person who teaches youth their exercises, yet Plato here, and elsewhere, uses the word to signify the *γυμναστής*, ‘gymnastic physician;’ i. e. the person, who knows what exercise is suited for each disease. Such a person was Herodicus; who, says Plato, in Rep. iii. p. 406, A., *παιδορπίβης ὃν ἔμμελε γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικῇ*. But the *παιδορπίβης* and *γυμναστής* afterwards became the same; although in process of time they were different professions. But in the time of Aristotle the knowledge of what sort of exercise was suited to each particular habit of body was attributed to the *παιδορπίβης*, as well as to the *γυμναστής*; which last word we beg leave to read in Aristot. Politic. iv., instead of *γυμναστικός*.” So Sydenham; who refers to Mercurialis De Arte Gymnastica i. 12, and to Faber in Agonist. ii. 6; and he might have added Perizonius on Ælian V. H. ii. 6.

of whom (shall we inquire) about the sowing of seeds? About this, we confessed the husbandman. But inquiring of whom, should we justly inquire respecting the planting and sowing of learning in the soul, how many, and of what kinds of it are moderate? We were here all full of difficulty. Upon which I said, by way of a joke, Since we are all at a loss, are you willing for us to ask these youths here? Or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer (Od. xxi. 285) says the suitors were, who deemed that no one else was fit to stretch the bow.

Since then they now seemed to be dispirited on the question, I endeavoured to view it in another light, and I said—What kinds of learning do we best conjecture those are, which a philosopher ought to learn? since they are not all or many. Whereupon the wiser person, taking up the discourse, observed that the most beautiful kinds of learning, and (the most) becoming, are those by which a person would obtain the highest reputation for philosophy; and that he would obtain the highest, if he seemed to be skilled in all arts;³⁴ and, if not all, at least in as many as possible, and especially those of the greatest account, after having learnt such of them as are fitting for freemen to learn, and are connected with intellect, and not with a handicraft merely.—Do you mean in the same way, said I, as in carpentry? For there you may purchase a tip-top carpenter for five or six minæ;³⁵ but you could not (buy) an architect even for ten thousand drachmas;³⁶ so few of these are to be found amongst all the Greeks. Are you speaking of some such thing?—And he, on hearing, admitted that he was speaking of such a thing.—[4.] I then asked him, if it was not impossible for one person to learn thus³⁷ only two arts, much less, many and great.—Do not understand me, Socrates, said he, as if I were saying that a philosopher ought to know each of the arts accurately, as he does, who makes it his profession; but to be able, as becomes

³⁴ Here is another trait, which Forster and Sydenham apply to Democritus, who had, according to Diogenes Laert. ix. 37, a skill in all kinds of arts; where Sydenham would read *πασῶν* for *πᾶσαν*, to suit better with the words here.

³⁵ Less than £20. For the Attic *μνᾶ* was equal to £3 4s. 7d. English. S.

³⁶ Equal to £322 18s. 4d. For the *μνᾶ* was worth 100 *δράχμαι*. S. It differed from the Roman "libra" by only four drachmæ, as remarked by Stutzmann.

³⁷ After *οὕτω* has dropt *καλῶς*, or something similar.

a person of a liberal education, to follow better than the persons present, what is said by the handicraftsman; and to give his opinion so as to appear, in what is said and done relating to the arts, to have a finer taste, and more knowledge, than those who happen to be present.—Then I—for I was still doubtful what he meant by his speech—said to him, Do I conceive rightly what kind of person you call a philosopher? For you seem to me to speak of a person, such as are the competitors in five kinds of contest, compared with the runner, or the wrestlers.³⁸ For the former fall short of the latter, as regards the contests of the latter, and are second to them; but of all the other competitors, they are the first, and are the victors.³⁹ Some such thing you mean perhaps that the study of philosophy effects in those, who pursue it, in that they fall short of the first prize,⁴⁰ in the intellect relating to the arts, but in attaining the second, they are superior to all the rest; so that he, who has studied philosophy, becomes in every thing a person under the tip-top⁴¹ man. Some such person you seem to me to point out.—You appear to me, Socrates, said he, to understand correctly what relates to a philosopher, in likening him to a competitor in five contests.⁴² For he is really such a man, as not to be a slave to any thing; nor has he laboured upon any one thing with such accuracy, as,

³⁸ Clericus, in *Silv. Philolog.* c. 10. 4, was the first to substitute *παλαιστικῶς* for *παιστικῶς*; and so three MSS. subsequently collated.

³⁹ Forster quotes Longinus, § 34, where Hyperides is stated, from the variety of his talents, to hold the second place amongst the first-rate orators, but the first amongst the second-rate.

⁴⁰ In lieu of *πρώτων*, the antithesis in *δευτερεῖα* requires *πρωτίων*, as I have translated.

⁴¹ According to Stalbaum, *ὑπακρος* is not found elsewhere in Plato. But as Longinus makes use of it in the passage just quoted, it is evident he found it here, and considered it a good Greek word.

⁴² Sydenham gives here in a corrected form a translation of what Diogenes Laertius has, in xi. 37, quoted from Thrasyllus. "If the Rivals be a dialogue of Plato, says Thrasyllus, the anonymous person there introduced as the friend of those, who were disputing about Cænopides and Anaxagoras, must be this Democritus; who, in the conversation he had with Socrates concerning philosophy, there related, says, that a philosopher is like a competitor in five contests. Now he was himself a five-contest competitor in philosophy. For he had cultivated physica, and ethica, and mathematics, and all the common learning of those times, and had some experience in all the arts."

through his attention to that one thing, to be deficient in all the rest, as are handicraftsmen, but he has touched moderately upon all.

[5.] After this reply, I was anxious to know clearly what he meant, and I inquired of him, whether he considered good persons to be useful or useless.—Useful, surely, Socrates, said he.—If then the good are useful, are not the bad useless?—He agreed.—Well then, said I, do you deem philosophers to be useful, or not?—He acknowledged they were useful; and moreover he said, that he deemed them the most useful (of all persons).⁴³—Come now, (said I,) let us see whether you say what is true. How can these second-rate men be of any use to us? For it is plain that the philosopher is inferior to each of those who possess their respective arts.—He acknowledged it.—Come then, said I, if either yourself were unwell, or any of your friends, for whom you have a great regard, would you, being desirous to recover health, introduce that second-rate person, the philosopher, to your family; or take a physician.—Both of them, said he.—Do not say both, I replied; but which in preference, and the first?—No man, said he, would hesitate about this, that (I would take) the physician in preference and first.—What then, in a vessel tost in a storm? To whom would you rather intrust yourself and your property? To a pilot, or to a philosopher?—To a pilot, for my part, said he.—And so, too, in all other affairs; so long as there is a person of skill in a profession, the philosopher is of no use.—It appears so, said he.—The philosopher, therefore, said I, is some useless person; for there are surely persons of skill in (all) professions. But we have agreed that the good are useful, and the wicked useless.—He was forced to own it.—[6.] “What then, said I, shall I ask you about what comes⁴⁴ after this? or is it not rather rude to put a question?—Ask what you please, said he.—I desire nothing else, said I, than to repeat the concessions already made. Now the matter stands thus. We have conceded that philosophy is an honourable thing, and that we are ourselves philosophers; and that philosophers are good; and that the good are useful,

⁴³ Ficinus alone has “omnium.”

⁴⁴—“The Greek is, *τί οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἔρωμαι*; Stephens suggested, *τί οὖν; τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔρωμαι*—which Stalbaum approves of, and I have translated.

and the wicked useless. Again, on the other hand, we have conceded that philosophers are useless, as long as there are persons of skill in any particular profession; and that such persons are existing at all times. For was not all this conceded?—Certainly, said he.—We concede, therefore, agreeably to your own reasoning, that if it be philosophy to be skilled in arts in the manner you state, such⁴⁵ persons are wicked and useless as long as there are artists.⁴⁶ But see, my friend, if the case be so, and that to philosophize is not to attend to arts, nor to busy oneself about many things, nor to be living like a workman, bending over his work,⁴⁷ nor to be learning many things, but something else? Since I thought, it was a reproach for persons, much occupied in arts, to be called operatives.⁴⁸ [7.] But we shall know more clearly by this means, whether I am speaking truly, if you will answer me this. Who know how to punish horses correctly? Whether they, who make them better, or others?—They who (make them) better.—Well then, do not they, who know how to make dogs better, know how to chastise dogs properly?—Yes.—The same art then makes better, and chastises properly.—I agree, said he.—Well then, is the art, which makes better and chastises properly, the same as that which knows the good and the vicious, or is it a different one?—It is, said he, the same.—Are you then willing, said I, to concede this, in the case of human beings likewise, that the art, which makes men better, is that, which chastises properly, and knows the good and the bad?—By all means, said he.—Does not then the art which (applies)

⁴⁵ Instead of *αὐτοὺς*, Heusde would read *αὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους*—I have translated as if the Greek were *τοιούτους*—Knebel says that *αὐτοὺς* agrees with *φιλοσόφους*, to be got out of *φιλοσοφεῖν*.

⁴⁶ I have followed Heusde, who correctly suggested *τεχνῖται* in lieu of *τίχναι*.

⁴⁷ Such is the literal meaning of *κυπτάζειν*.

⁴⁸ In Greek, *βάνανσος* is one who works by means of a furnace. For so Hesychius: *Βανανσία, πᾶσα τέχνη διὰ πυρὸς, κυρίως δὲ ἡ περὶ τὰς καμίνους*. Plato seems to allude to the metallurgic and the chemical experiments of Democritus; whose treatise, *Περὶ τῆς λίθου*, related perhaps to the magnet, or loadstone, which, for its peculiar virtues, was called "the stone;" and it was no doubt through fusion by fire that he converted common stones into precious, and carried on his other chemical experiments. The word, however, seems to comprise all those arts we call mechanical; and the chain of reasoning requires it to be used here with the same latitude. S.


to one (apply) to many too, and that which (applies) to many (apply) to one likewise? And so too as regards horses and all other things?—I confess it, (said he.)—What then is the science, which chastises properly the licentious and the lawless in civil states? Is it not the judicial science?—Yes.—Do you mean by justice⁴⁹ any other science than this?—No other.—Do not then men know the good and the bad by that science, by which they chastise properly?—By that.—And he, who knows one, will know many?—Yes.—And whoever does not know many, (will not know one.)—I confess it.—If then a horse, as being but a horse, knows not good and bad horses, he would not know of which kind he is himself?—I admit it.—And if an ox, being but an ox, knows not good and bad oxen,⁵⁰ he would not know of which kind he is himself?—True, said he.—And so too, in the case of a dog?—He admitted it.—What then, if a man knows not the good men and the bad, would he not be ignorant whether he is good or bad, inasmuch as he too is a man?—He agreed.—Now to be ignorant of oneself, is it to be of sound mind,⁵¹ or not sound?—Not sound.—To know then oneself, is to be of sound mind.—I admit it, said he.—To this then, as it seems, the Delphic inscription exhorts, namely, to exercise a sound mind, and justice.⁵²—It seems so.—And by the very same science we know too how to chastise properly.—I admit it, (said he.)—Is not then justice that, by which we know how to chastise properly? but soundness of mind that, by which we have the skill to know our-

⁴⁹ Stalbaum says that the writer has confounded legal justice with justice in the abstract; or, as we should say in England, law with equity.

⁵⁰ Ficinus has "qui sint boni aut mali boves." From which Bekker wished to insert βούς, wanting in all the MS.

⁵¹ No words are more puzzling to translate than σώφρων and its derivatives. For they are employed in different places in different senses; and there is no word in English answering to them every where. Hence to express their precise meaning, different words must be used in different places. In Homer, σωφροσύνη means prudence, or discretion, as in Od. xxiii. 30. Its true etymology is σώα φρήν, "a sound mind;" and so Porphyry says in Stobæus xxi. p. 185, Gesn., καὶ γὰρ σωφροσύνη σοφροσύνη τις. And so too Plato, in Charmid. p. 164, D., by σωφροσύνη understands "soundness of mind;" and both Xenophon, in M. S. i. 16, and Plato, in Rep., oppose it to μανία, "madness." Most commonly, however, Plato applies it to one of the cardinal virtues. S.

⁵² The same interpretation is given in Charmid. p. 164, D. § 27, and Alcibiad. I. p. 124, A. § 41.



the second prize after all, and be useless, so long as there exists any of the first-rate? Or must he in the first place not commit his household to another person, nor have the second place in that business; but ought himself to chastise after being the judge, if his household is about to be administered correctly.—In this he agreed with me.—⁵⁵ And then, said I,⁵⁵ should his friends submit an award to him, or the state order him to decide upon any thing, or to act the judge, would it not, my friend, be disgraceful for him to appear in such cases to be second or third, and not to take the lead?—So it seems to me. To philosophize therefore, thou best of men, wants much of being great in learning, or the busying oneself about arts.—On my saying this, the wise man, ashamed of what he had before asserted, was silent; but the illiterate person said, it was in that way,⁵⁶ and the rest approved of what had been stated.

^{55—55} In lieu of *ἔπειρά γε δῆπον*, a combination of particles not to be found, I suspect, elsewhere, Stutzmann suggested *ἔπειτα δὲ γ' εἶπον*, similar to—"Atque ego addidi" in Ficinus.

⁵⁶ In *ἔκτινος* there is, I suspect, some error. For many MSS. read *ἔκτινος*. Perhaps the author wrote *ἔφη, εἰ καὶ ἄνους, εἰδέναι*, i. e. "said he knew, although he was a simpleton."

INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPARCHUS.

ALTHOUGH this dialogue is found in the list given by Diogenes Laertius, iii. 50, of the genuine productions of Plato, yet even before the time of Ælian, there was some idea of its being spurious. For after quoting it in V. H. viii. 2, the writer adds, "if it be in reality Plato's." Carrying out this hint, Valckenaer was the first to prove, on Herodotus v. 55, that it was not written by its previously-supposed author; and his decision has been admitted by Wolf in *Prolegom. Homer.* p. cliv., and all the subsequent scholars who have written upon Plato, with the exception of Taylor; who says he "cannot find any thing in its manner or matter, for which its authenticity deserves to be called in question." Boeckh indeed attributes it to Simon the shoemaker, who was a Socratic philosopher, ridiculed probably by Aristophanes, in the *Clouds*; but Stalbaum would bring it down to the time, when schools of rhetoric were in vogue towards the decline of Greek literature, and he considers it inferior to even the *Theages* and *Rivals*, despite the preservation of the anecdote relating to Hipparchus in § 4, who has given the name to the dialogue, and was once thought to have been introduced as a speaker, until, to avoid the anachronism, an unknown friend was substituted in his place.

THE HIPPARCHUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, AND A FRIEND.

SOCRATES.

[1.] WHAT is the love of gain, and who are its lovers?

Fr. They seem to me to be those, who think it worth while to make a gain from what is nothing worth.¹

Soc. Whether then do they seem to, you (to do so), while knowing that the things are of no worth, or not knowing? For if (they do so) not knowing, you call the lovers of gain senseless.

Fr. Nay, I do not call them senseless, but thorough knaves and villains, the slaves of gain, and who know indeed that the things are worthless, from which they dare to make a gain, but yet through their shamelessness they dare to have a love of gain.

Soc. Do you then call a person of this kind a lover of gain? For instance, should a husbandman, while planting, and knowing the plant to be worthless, nevertheless think to make a gain from it when grown up, do you call such a person a lover of gain?

Fr. The lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to make a gain from every thing.

Soc. Do not thus answer me at random, like a person in-

¹ To such persons Horace alludes in his "Rem, si possis, recte; si non, quocunque modo, rem;" so well translated by Coleman—"Get money, if you can with honesty; if not, get money." With regard to the play on the words ἀξίωσιν—ἀξίωv, see at Phileb. § 57, n. 56; § 65, n. 74; Charm. § 49; Hip. Maj. § 41, 45.

jured¹ by some one, but, giving your mind, answer me, as if I were questioning you again from the beginning. Do you not agree with me, that a lover of gain knows the value of that, from which he thinks it worth while to make a gain?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Who then is he, that knows the value of plants, and in what time and place it is worth while to plant them? that we also may introduce something² from the words of the wise, which the clever in law-suits employ for the sake of elegance.

Fr. A husbandman, I think.

Soc. Do you then mean by the expression—It is worth while to make a gain—any thing else than to think that one ought to make a gain?

Fr. I mean this.

Soc. Now do not you, who are so young, endeavour to deceive me, your elder, by answering as you do at present, what you do not think; but tell me truly, do you think that a husbandman exists, who knows it is not worth while to plant a certain plant, and yet fancies he will make a gain³ by such a plant?

Fr. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. What then, think you that a horsedealer, who knows that the food which he gives a horse, is of no worth, does not know that it destroys the horse?

Fr. I do not.

Soc. He does not think then that from such worthless food he will make a gain.

Fr. He does not.

Soc. What then, do you think that a pilot, who has furnished his ship with sails and a rudder of no worth, does not know that he will sustain a damage, and be in danger of perishing himself, and of losing the ship and all it carries?

Fr. I do not.

Soc. He will not think then that he will make a gain by worthless articles.

¹ Stalbaum justly objects to ἡδικομήνοσ. For most assuredly an injured person would give an answer not at random, but with bitterness, or in an unseemly manner. Hence in lieu of εἰκῇ one would prefer δεικῇ—

² This alludes to the play on the words ὥρα and χῶρα, which it is impossible to preserve in a translation.

³ Ficinus has "lucraturum," which leads to κερδανεῖν, or κερδαίνειν ἄν, and similarly all through afterwards.

Fr. He will not.

Soc. But does the general, who knows that his army carries worthless arms, ¹ think he will make a gain, or that he is worthy to make a gain by them? ¹

Fr. By no means.

Soc. But if a hautboy-player possesses a worthless hautboy, or a lyre-player a lyre, or a bowman a bow, or, in short, any other artist or skilled person possesses instruments or any other apparatus of no value, does he think he will make a gain by these?

Fr. It appears he will not.

[2.] *Soc.* Whom then do you call lovers of gain? For surely they are not those, whom we have already mentioned, who, knowing what are things of no value, think they must ² make a gain by them. And thus, O wonderful man, according to what you say, no one is a lover of gain.

Fr. But, Socrates, I mean to say, that those are lovers of gain, who, through insatiable avidity, are perpetually and beyond all measure, greedy after things that are small and worth little or ³ nothing, and thus have a love of gain.

Soc. But surely, thou best of men, they do not know this, that they are worthless; for we have proved against ourselves, that this is impossible.

Fr. So it seems to me.

Soc. If then (they do so) not knowing it, it is evident that, not knowing it, they fancy things of no worth to be of great value.

Fr. It appears so.

Soc. Do not the lovers of gain love gain?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But do you say that gain is contrary to loss?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Is it therefore a good to any one to suffer a loss?

Fr. To no one.

¹ The Greek is *οἶσαι ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαίνειν καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν*. But the phrase is here constantly *οἶσαι κερδαίνειν*, not *ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν*, which was interpolated from § 1.

² One MS. omits *δεῖν*, as in the preceding passages, where the same formula is repeated.

³ I have translated as if the Greek were, *ὀλίγου ἀξία ἢ καὶ οὐδενός*, not merely *ἀξία καὶ*—

Soc. But it is an evil?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Are men then injured by a damage?

Fr. They are injured.

Soc. Is then damage an evil?

Fr. It is.

Soc. But gain is contrary to damage?

Fr. Contrary.

Soc. Gain is therefore a good?

Fr. It is.

Soc. Do you then call those, who love a good, lovers of gain?

Fr. It seems so.

Soc. You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain mad-men. But do you yourself love what is a good, or not love it?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Is there a good which you do not love, but an evil (which you do)?

Fr. By Zeus, there is not.

Soc. But you love all good things equally?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Ask me, if I also do not. For I also shall acknowledge to you, that I love good things. But besides I and you, do not all the rest of men appear to you to love good things, and to hate evil?

Fr. To me it appears so.

Soc. But have we not acknowledged that gain is a good?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. In this way then,¹ all appear (to be) lovers of gain; but that, in which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of gain. By employing then which assertion, would a person not err?

Fr. Should, Socrates, one rightly apprehend what a lover of gain is,² I think it is right to consider him a lover of gain² who earnestly applies himself to, and thinks it worth

¹ Instead of *αὖ* one MS. has *οὖν*, similar to "igitur" in Ficinus. One would prefer *οὖν εἶναι—φαίνονται*.

² So Taylor with Ficinus, "eum, ut puto, lucri cupidum arbitrabitur." The Greek is, *ὁρθῶς δ' ἔστι τοῦτον ἡγείσθαι φιλοκερδήν*. But after *εἰ τις—ὁρθῶς λαμβάνει*, the particle *δὲ* could not thus follow the repeated *ὁρθῶς*. The author wrote perhaps *ὁρθῶς δὲ ἔστι*—

while to make a gain from those things, from which the good do not dare to make a gain.

[3.] *Soc.* But do you not see, O sweetest¹ of men, that we just now acknowledged that to make a gain is to be benefited?

Fr. What then?

Soc. Because this also we previously admitted, that all men always wished for good things.

Fr. We did.

Soc. Do not, then, good men wish to possess every thing gainful, since such things are good?

Fr. But not the things, Socrates, by which they are about to be hurt.

Soc. By "to be hurt" do you mean "to be damaged"? or something else?

Fr. No, but I mean "to be damaged."

Soc. Are persons damaged by gain, or by damage?

Fr. Through both. For they are damaged by damage, and through iniquitous gain.

Soc. Does it then appear to you that any thing useful and good is iniquitous?

Fr. To me it does not.

Soc. Did we not then a little before acknowledge that gain is contrary to damage, which is an evil?

Fr. We did.

Soc. And that being contrary to evil, it is a good?

Fr. We granted this.

[4.] *Soc.* You endeavour then, you see, to deceive me, by designedly asserting the contrary to what we just now granted.

Fr. By Zeus, I do not, Socrates; but you, on the contrary, are deceiving me; and I know not how, in your reasonings you turn things topsy-turvy.

Soc. Speak fair words. For I should not act correctly, if I were not persuaded by a man good and wise.

Fr. Who is he? and why particularly (say you) this?

Soc. My fellow-citizen, and likewise yours, Hipparchus,

¹ Although Plato uses γλυκύς, in Hipp. Maj. p. 288, B. § 9, in an ironical sense, for "a simpleton," as remarked by Ruhnken on Tim. p. 131, yet this, says Stalbaum, is the only place where the superlative is found.

the son of Pisistratus, one of the Philaidæ,¹ and the eldest² and wisest of the sons of Pisistratus; who exhibited many other illustrious acts of wisdom, and was the first who introduced³ into this land the poems of Homer, and compelled the rhapsodists during the Panathenæa to go through them successively⁴ and in order, just as you know they do at present; and having sent for Anacreon, the Teïan, a ship of fifty oars, brought him to this city, and always had about him Simonides of Ceos, having induced him (to stay) by great rewards and gifts. And this he did, wishing to instruct⁵ the citizens, in order that he might rule over them being the best of men; nor thinking, that he ought to begrudge wisdom to any man, as being himself a highly educated person. And when such of the citizens as were living around the town had been educated well, and admired him for his wisdom, he likewise laid down a plan to instruct those in the country; and he set up for them statues of Hermes⁶ along the roads, in the middle of the city and of each of the wards; and afterwards selecting from his wisdom, on points he had partly⁷ learned, and partly discovered himself,⁷ what he deemed to be the cleverest idea, he put them into elegiac verses, and engraved them (on the Hermæ) as his poems, and specimens of wisdom; in order that in the first place the citizens might not wonder at those wise inscriptions (on the temple) at Delphi, "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much," and the rest of that kind, but that they

¹ So Meursius in Pisistratus, § 1, in lieu of Φιλαίδωνος. For the Philaidæ was a ward of the tribe of Ægeus, as stated by the Schol. here and Steph. Byz. in Φιλαίδαι. See likewise Corsini Fast. Attic. i. p. 246; Heringa Observat. p. 236; Spon. p. 38. 9, quoted by Porson in Miscell. Crit. p. 264.

² According to Thucydides in vi. 54, Hippias was the eldest son.

³ This is attributed by other authors to Solon or Pisistratus. See Perizonius on Ælian V. H. viii. 2; Heyne Excurs. ad Il. T. viii. p. 809; Wolf Prolegom. Homer. p. xcix.—cxl..

⁴ On the expression ἐξ ὑποβολῆς or ἐξ ὑπολήψεως, see Wolf Prolegom. Homer. p. cxl., and Hermann Opuscul. T. v. p. 300.

⁵ Instead of παίδειν, four MSS. read παιδεύειν, similar to "instruere" in Ficinus.

⁶ In lieu of "Hermas." Ficinus has, apparently from a Scholium, "columnas sive quadratos lapides," as in Thucyd. vi. 27.

⁷— So Taylor, following Ficinus, "quam partem didicerat, partim ipse invenerat," who perhaps found in his MS. ἦν ἅμα τ' ἔμαθε καὶ ἅμ' αὐτὸς ἐξέυρε, not ἦν τ' ἔμαθε καὶ ἦν αὐτὸς ἐξέυρε.

might deem the words of Hipparchus still wiser; and, in the next place, that passing by them, up and down, they might read them, and have a taste of his wisdom, and come from the fields¹ and be instructed in the remaining branches of learning. And there are two epigrams. In some upon the left-hand sides of each of the Hermæ there is sculptured a ²Hermes, saying that he was standing midway between the city and the ward;² and in others upon the right-hand sides he says:—"This is the memorial³ of Hipparchus. Go on, having just thoughts." There are also many other beautiful poetical descriptions on other Hermæ; and there is this in the Steiriac⁴ road, in which he says—"This is the memorial of Hipparchus. Do not deceive your friend." I would not then have dared to deceive you, being my friend, and disobey so great a man; after whose death, the Athenians were tyrannized over by his brother Hippias; and you have heard from all the old men, that only during those years did there exist a tyranny at Athens, and that during all the other period, the Athenians lived nearly as when Saturn reigned.⁵ But it is said by rather clever persons, that he did not die in the way which the multitude have thought, through the ⁶dishonour done to the sister (of Harmodius) respecting the carrying the sacred basket⁶—for that is a silly reason—but that Harmodius was the bosom friend and pupil of Aristogeiton, who valued himself highly upon ⁷instructing a man,⁷ and fancied that Hipparchus would be his rival. But at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of one of the handsome and nobly-born youths—whose name persons have mentioned, but I do not remember—and that this young

¹ Ficinus has "ex agris et silvis," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν καὶ ὕλῶν*.

² According to Stalbaum, both Boeckh in *Indic. Lect. Berolin.* 1824, and Osann in *Sylog. Inscript.* p. 241, conceived there was an Hexameter likewise, answering to the words given here in prose—*λέγων ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὅτι ἐν μίσῳ τοῦ δαστεος καὶ τοῦ δήμου ἵστηκεν*—from which it is easy to elicit *Δήμου τ' ἐν μίσῳ εἶμ' Ἑρμᾶς καὶ Φάστεος ἱστώς*. To these Hermæ placed by Hipparchus Hesychius alludes in *Ἰκπάρχαιος Ἑρμῆς*.

³ In lieu of *μνῆμα* one would expect here *ῥῆμα*—

⁴ According to the Scholiast and Steph. Byz., Steiria was a ward of the tribe of Pandion.

⁵ So Ovid, "Quam bene vivebant, Saturno rege—"

⁶ The dishonour alluded to is explained by Thucydides vi. 56.

⁷ In the Greek, *καιδεύσαι ἄνθρωπον*, is an error, which it were perhaps not difficult to correct.

person did for a time admire Harmodius and Aristogeiton, as wise men; but afterwards associating with Hipparchus, he despised them; and that they, being very much annoyed at the dishonour, slew Hipparchus.

[5.] *Fr.* You run the risk, Socrates, of either not considering me a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, of not being persuaded by Hipparchus: for I cannot be persuaded that you have not deceived me¹ in I know not what manner,¹ during the discourse.

Soc. But indeed, just as in the game of backgammon,² I am willing to put back whatever part you please of the assertions already made, in order that you may not think you have been deceived. Whether therefore shall I retract this assertion for you, that all men desire good?

Fr. Not for me.

Soc. But that to be damaged, and damage itself, is not an evil?

Fr. Not for me.

Soc. But that gain, and to make a gain, are not contrary to damage, and to be damaged?

Fr. Nor this neither.

Soc. But that to make a gain, as being contrary to evil, is not a good?

Fr. Retract nothing of this kind at all for me.

Soc. It appears to you then, as it seems, that of gain one part is a good, and another an evil.

Fr. Yes, to me.

Soc. I retract therefore this for you. For let it be, that one kind of gain is a good, and another kind an evil; but that gain itself³ is not more good than evil. Is it not so?

Fr. Why do you ask me?

Soc. I will tell you. Is there food good, and bad?

Fr. Yes.

¹—¹ The Greek is οὐκ ὁδ' ἔν τινα μὲντοι τρόπον. But Stalbaum has omitted μὲντοι, not remarking that the author of the dialogue had probably in mind a similar introduction of μὲντοι in the passages quoted by Boissonade on Aristænetus, Epist. ii. 2, and the commentators on Phædr. p. 236, E.

² On the metaphor in περιεῖν see the mass of passages quoted by Valckenaer in a MS. note printed by myself on Æsch. Suppl. 14.

³ I have adopted with Taylor αὐτὸ in Stephens in lieu of αὐτῶν—Ficino has—"nihil tamen magis hoc quam illud lucrum est—" The αὐτῶν came from the next question of Socrates. But there the syntax is different.

Soc. Is therefore one of them more food than the other? or are both of them similarly food? and does the one differ in no respect from the other, so far as each is food, but so far as one is good, and the other bad?

Fr. Just so.¹

Soc. And is it not as regards drink, and all other things which are parts of things existing, that some at least are so circumstanced as to be bad, and others, good; and that they differ not at all from each other, in that they are the same; just as one man is good, and another bad?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But one man is, I suppose, neither more nor less a man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the bad than the good.

Fr. You speak the truth.

Soc. Shall we not then think in like manner respecting gain, that both the good and the bad are similarly gain?

Fr. It is necessary.

Soc. He, therefore, who has a good gain, does not in any respect make a gain more than he, who (has a) bad gain: for neither of these, as we have granted, appears to be more a gain than the other.

Fr. True.

Soc. For to neither of them is the more or the less present.

Fr. It is not.

Soc. But in a thing of this kind, to which neither of these accidents is present, how can any one do, or suffer, more or less?

Fr. It is impossible.

[6.] *Soc.* Since, then, both are similarly gain and gainful, it is requisite that we should still further² consider this—why do you call both of them gain? and what do you see to be in both the same? ³Just as if you had asked me about the recent question,³ why I called both good and bad food similarly

¹ Ficinus has "Est, ut dicis;" for he saw that a single answer, *Nai*, could not be given to a bipartite question.

² Ficinus has "hoc deinceps,"—in Greek τοῦτ' ἔτι, as in Stephens, more correctly than τοῦτι in Bekker, from four MSS.

³—³ The Greek is ὥσπερ ἀνεί δ' οὐ με ἡρώτας, where Stalbaum rejects δ with Ficinus; whose version is "veluti si ipse modo me rogavisses." But perhaps the author wrote, ὥσπερ ἀνεί, δ' ἐγὼ σὲ τὰ νῦν δὴ, σὺ ἔμὲ ἡρώτας. Compare Alcibiad. I. p. 114, B. § 22, ἐρωτῶν ἔμὲ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σὲ. For the reference is to p. 230, A. § 5, as remarked by Stalbaum.

food, I would have said—Because each is a dry aliment of the body, on this account I (called them so). For that this is food, you would surely acknowledge; would you not?

Fr. I would.

Soc. And there will be the same manner of answering respecting drink; that for the moist aliment of the body, whether it is good or bad, the name is drink; and for the rest of things, in like manner. Do you therefore endeavour to imitate me, by answering thus. ¹ When you speak of good gain and bad gain, as being both of them gain, what same thing do you perceive in them, that this too is gain?¹ But if you are not able to answer me in this way,² reflect, while I am speaking. Do you call a gain every acquisition that a person obtains, when he either spends nothing, or when, after spending less, he receives more?

Fr. I seem to myself to call the latter gain.

Soc. Are you therefore speaking of such things as these? If a person after having been feasted and spending nothing, and indulging in good living, should become diseased?

Fr. Not I, by Zeus.

Soc. But if he should obtain health after feasting, would he obtain a gain or damage?

Fr. Gain.

Soc. This then is not a gain, to obtain any acquisition whatever.

Fr. It is not.

Soc. ³ Whether will he, who obtains what is an evil, or at least what is not a good, not obtain a gain?³

Fr. ⁴ It appears so, at least if it be a good.⁴

¹ Ficinus has what is far more intelligible, "Quidnam idem in lucro bono et malo cernis, propter cujus presentiam, utrumque lucrum nominas?" But whether he found in his MS. the Greek answering to his Latin, is another question.

² Instead of αὐτὸς one MS. has οὗτος, which I have adopted to answer to the preceding οὗτος.

³ I have translated into English the Latin version of Stalbaum. The Greek is, ἴαν καὶ τὸν ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἀγαθόν, for which Cornarius would read ἴαν τε καὶ τὸν, ἴαν τε ἀγαθόν, founded on "sive bonum seu malum" in Ficinus.

⁴ Stalbaum observes that the answer ought to have been, "It appears not; but if it be a good." I cannot however understand the limiting clause, "at least, if it be a good;" nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.

Soc. But if (he obtains) an evil, will he not obtain a damage?

Fr. To me it appears so.

Soc. See then how you are again running round to the same point? For gain appears to be a good, but damage an evil.

Fr. I really am at a loss what to say.

Soc. Nor unjustly are you at a loss. But, answer me still further this. If any one after having spent less, obtains more, do you say this is a gain?

Fr. ¹I do not say it is an evil,¹ but if after having spent less of gold or silver money, he receives more.

Soc. I too am about to ask you this. For come, (tell me,) should a person spending half a pound² of gold, receive double this weight of silver, would he obtain a gain or a damage?

Fr. A damage surely, Socrates; for, instead of a value twelve times as much, the silver is only twice as much.

Soc. But yet he has received more. Or is not double more than half?

Fr. But silver is not of (the same)³ value as gold.

Soc. It is requisite then, as it seems, that this, namely, value, be added to gain; for in this case do you not say that the silver, although being more than the gold, is not of equal value? ⁴the gold, although being less, you say, is of equal value.⁴

Fr. Very much so: for such is the fact.

Soc. Value, therefore, is gainful, whether it is small or great; but that which is valueless is gainless.

Fr. Yes.

¹ I confess I cannot perceive the relevancy of this answer; nor the reason of the subsequent limitation, thus introduced by the words ἀλλ' ἰδὲ—

² So Taylor translates σταθμόν. But whether σταθμός in Greek, "libra" in Latin, and "pound" in English, are all of the same weight, I am unable to state. Stalbaum refers to Boeckh in *Œconom. Athen. i.* 30, and to Letronne's "Considerations Generales sur l' Evaluation des Monnaies Grecques et Romaines," Paris, 1817.

³ Instead of Οὐτὶ τῇ ἀξίᾳ, Ficinus found in his MS. Οὐτὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀξίᾳ, as shown by his version, "Non ejusdem dignitatis ac pretii—"

⁴ The Greek is ἀξιον—ἀξιον. But two MSS. offer ἀνάξιον—ἀξιον, which evidently leads to ἀνράξιον—ἀνράξιον, where the first ἀνράξιον answers to "æque æstimandum et dignum" in Ficinus; who properly omits the repeated φῆς εἶναι.

Soc. By "value," do you mean any thing else than what it is worthy to acquire?

Fr. I do not.

Soc. But by the expression "it is worthy to acquire," do you mean the useless, or the useful?

Fr. The useful, certainly.

Soc. The useful, therefore, is a good.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Hence, thou most manly of all men, has not the lucrative come to us again a third or a fourth time, as being an acknowledged good?

Fr. So it seems.

[7.] *Soc.* Do you remember, then, from whence this discourse of ours originated?

Fr. I think I do.

Soc. If you do not, I will remind you. You contended that good men are not willing to make every kind of gain, but of gains the good (alone)¹ but not the iniquitous.

Fr. It did originate from this.

Soc. But has not reason forced us to acknowledge, that all kinds of gain, both small and great, are good?

Fr. It has forced me, Socrates, rather than persuaded.

Soc. But perhaps after this it will also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded, or in whatever manner you may be affected, you agree at least with us, that all kinds of gain are good, both small and great?

Fr. I do agree.

Soc. And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men wish for all things that are good?

Fr. I do.

Soc. But you said that bad men love gain of every kind, both small and great.

Fr. I did say so.

Soc. According to your assertion, then, all men, both good and bad, would be lovers of gain.

Fr. It appears so.

Soc. If then any person reproaches another with being a lover of gain, he does not correctly reproach him; for the very person so reproaching happens to be such a character himself.

¹ I have introduced "alone" from "duntaxat," in Ficinus

INTRODUCTION TO THE MINOS.

IN placing the Minos in juxta-position with the Hipparchus, I have followed the example of Boeckh ; who published in 1810 those two dialogues, together with four others of the Pseudo-Platonic list, under the title of "*Simonis Socratici, ut videtur, Dialogi*," &c., after he had proved in a preceding work, printed in 1806, that the Minos was not written by Plato ; although it had been considered genuine by Bentley, and had been quoted as such by him on Phalaris, t. i. p. 327, ed. Dyce. Nor had Fr. Patricius any suspicion of its spuriousness, who, in his *Discussion. Peripatet.* p. 338, speaks of it as having come down to us in an imperfect state. But according to Stalbaum, so numerous and glaring are the proofs of its being not Plato's, that he is only astonished at the fraud having lain undetected so long ; and similar it would seem are the sentiments of Schleiermacher.

The dialogue is however, says Boeckh, alluded to by Plutarch in *Theseus*, i. p. 7, A., and by Clemens of Alexandria in *Strom.* i. p. 151. 33 ; and ii. p. 158. 13 ; to say nothing of the references made to it by Maximus Tyrius, Servius, Proclus, Stobæus, and Alexander Aphrodisiensis in *Aristot. Elench. Sophist.* fol. 51, b.

According to Boeckh, the author was the shoemaker Simon. For we learn from Diogenes Laertius, that he wrote some short dialogues comprised in one volume, *Περὶ Δικαίου*, and *Περὶ Ἀπερῆς*, and *Περὶ Νόμου*, and *Περὶ Φιλοκέρδους*. Now as amongst the confessedly spurious dialogues there are two on the two subjects first mentioned, Boeckh conceived that those two, together with the two others, the subjects respectively of the Minos and Hipparchus, made up the four alluded to.

But specious as this induction is, it failed to satisfy Stalbaum, who has contested at considerable length the theory of Boeckh, and eventually arrives at the conclusion, that the author of this dialogue was some Alexandrian writer, who lived in the time of the Ptolemies, a period rife with such forgeries; and that, although he might have drawn something from the work of Simon, yet his great storehouse was the acknowledged writings of Plato, which, unable to imitate, he has been content to travesty.

With regard to the divine origin of law, Taylor observes that Zoroaster ascribed the laws he gave the Persians to Oromazes; Hermes Trismegistus, the Egyptian, to Mercury; Minos, the Cretan, to Jupiter; Charondas, of Catana, to Saturn; Lycurgus, the Lacedæmonian, to Apollo; Draco and Solon, of Athens, to Minerva; Numa, the Roman, to Egeria; Zamolxis, the Thracian, to Vesta; and Plato, when he gave laws to the Magnesians and Sicilians, to Jupiter and Apollo.

With respect to the title of the dialogue, it has, like the Hipparchus, obtained its name, not from any of the speakers, but from the person whose doings form the chief subject of it; a fact not known to Boyle, who fancied, as remarked by Bentley, that Minos, the law-giver of Crete, was one of the Interlocutors.

THE MINOS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND A FRIEND.

SOCRATES.

[1.] WHAT thing is law with us?

Fr. Of what kind is the law are you asking about?

Soc. What, is it that law differs from law, according to this very thing, in being law? For consider what I happen to be asking you. For I am asking, as if I should inquire what is gold? and if you should in a similar manner ask me, about what kind of gold am I speaking, I should think you would not rightly ask. For neither does gold differ in any thing from gold, so far as it is gold, nor a stone from a stone, so far as it is a stone. And in like manner, neither does law differ in any thing from law; but all laws are (as laws) the same. For each of them exists similarly (as law); nor is one more, and another less so. I ask you, therefore, this very thing as a whole, what is law? and if you have an answer at hand, state it.

Fr. What else, Socrates, can law be, than the things established by law?

Soc. Does speech too appear to you to be the things which are spoken? or sight, the things which are seen? or hearing, the things which are heard? Or is,¹ (not) speech one thing, and

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were ἡ οὐκ, and not ἡ simply; so that one negative may refer to all the following questions.

the things spoken another? Is (not) sight one thing, and the things seen another? Is (not) hearing one thing, and the things heard another? And is (not) law one thing, and the things established by law another? Does it appear to you in this way? Or how?

Fr. It now appears to be another thing.¹

[2.] *Soc.* Law therefore is not the things established by law.

Fr. It does not appear to me that it is.

Soc. What then can law be? Let us consider it thus. If some one had asked us respecting the things just now spoken of—Since you say that things seen are seen by the sight, by the sight being what, are they seen? we should have answered—by that sense, which through the eyes manifests colours to us. And if he had asked us again—Since things heard are heard by hearing, by the hearing being what, (are they heard)? we should have answered—by a sense, which through the ears manifests sounds to us. In like manner, if he had asked us,—Since things are established by law, by the law being what, are they thus established? Is it by a certain sense, or manifestation, in the same manner as things learnt are learnt by some art rendering them manifest through some discovery? just as things discovered are discovered; as, for instance, things salubrious and noxious are discovered through the medical art; and what the gods have in their thoughts, as the diviners say, through the divining art. ²For art is with us the discovery of things:³ or is it not?

Fr. Entirely so.

[3.] *Soc.* Which of these then may we especially understand law to be?

Fr. Decrees and votes, as it seems to me. For what else

¹ Such is the version of the Greek, "Ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἰφάνη, suggested by Stephens, in lieu of 'Ἄλλ' ὁμοίον νῦν ἰφάνη, and confirmed by two MSS. Ficinus has, "Sicne an aliter videtur? Min. Sic utique,"—as if he had found in his MS. οὕτως ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ; Οὕτως.

²⁻³ Ficinus has, "vaticinium namque rerum talium inventio est," as if he had found in his MS. μαντικὴ γὰρ που ἡμῖν εὕρεσις ἐστὶ τοιούτων τῶν πραγμάτων. But as μαντικῇ has just preceded, perhaps the author wrote αὕτη γὰρ που ἡ τέχνη, not ἡ γὰρ που τέχνη, as found in MSS. Leid. and Tub., which is however adopted by Boeckh and Stalbaum, who retain τῶν, and consider the remark as applicable universally.

can any one say law is? So that it nearly appears that law, about which you were asking, is, taken as a whole, the decree of a state.

Soc. You call, as it seems, law, a state-opinion.

Fr. I do.

Soc. And perhaps you speak well; but perhaps we shall know better in the following manner. You call some persons wise?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Are not then the wise, wise by wisdom?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But what, are the just, just by justice?

Fr. Entirely so.

Soc. Are not then the lawful, lawful by law?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And the lawless, lawless by an absence of law?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And the lawful are just?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But the lawless unjust?

Fr. Unjust.

Soc. Are not justice and law therefore things most beautiful?

Fr. They are.

Soc. And are not injustice and lawlessness the least beautiful?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And does not the former preserve cities and every thing else, but the latter destroy and overturn them?¹

Fr. Yes.

Soc. It is necessary then to consider the law as something beautiful, and to seek it as a good.

Fr. How not?

Soc. Now have we not said that law is a decree of the city?

Fr. We have said so.

Soc. What then, are not some decrees good, and some evil?

Fr. They are.

Soc. Law however is not evil.

Fr. It is not.

¹ Stalbaum compares Euthyph. p. 14, B. § 16. Add Soph. Antig. 669.

Soc. It is not correct then to answer thus simply, that law is a decree of the city.

Fr. It appears to me it is not.

Soc. Nor is it suited to reason¹ for an evil decree to be law.

Fr. Certainly not.

[4.] **Soc.** Law however appears to me too² to be a certain opinion. And since an opinion is not evil, is not this evident, that it is a good one, if law is opinion?

Fr. Yea.

Soc. But what is a good opinion? Is it not a true one?

Fr. Yea.

Soc. Is then a true opinion the discovery of that which is?³

Fr. It is.

Soc. Law therefore would be⁴ the discovery of that which is.

Fr. How then, Socrates, if law is the discovery of that which is, do we not always use the same laws about the same things? since things that are have been discovered by us.

Soc. The law nevertheless would be the discovery of that which is. But if men do not always, as we think,⁵ use the same laws, they are not always able to discover that which law wishes, namely, that which is. But come, let us see if it will hence become evident to us, whether we always use the same laws, or some at one time, and others at another; and if all (use) the same laws, or different persons different laws.

[5.] **Fr.** But this, Socrates, it is not difficult to know, that neither do the same persons always use the same laws,⁶ nor different persons always different laws.⁶ Thus, for example,

¹ On this use of ἀπόρρητον, Stalbaum refers to Plato's Epistol. viii. p. 356, D.

² In lieu of αὐτό μοι, Stephens proposed αὐτῷ μοι, suggested by "mihi quoque" in Ficinus; and so six MSS. subsequently collated.

³ Here, as elsewhere, Ficinus translates τὸ ὄν by "veritas."

⁴ Ficinus has "inventio esse vult." He therefore, found in his MS. βούλεται εἶναι, as read in twelve MSS., in lieu of ἔστιν. On this use of βούλεται in the sense of μέλλει Boeckh refers to various passages, and compares it with a similar usage in θέλει.

⁵ Instead of δοκοῦμεν one MS. has δοκῶ, which would meet the objection started by Stalbaum.

⁶ Ficinus, whom Taylor properly follows, has, what the sense requires, "nec alii semper aliis;" for he doubtless found in his MS. ὅτε ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλοις, in lieu of ὅτε ἄλλοί γε in two MSS. And though γε is read in all the MSS. after ἄλλοι, I confess I do not understand it; nor

it is not a law with us to sacrifice human beings, but it is an unholy act; but the Carthaginians sacrifice them, as being a holy and a lawful act with them; so that some of them sacrifice their sons to Kronos,¹ as perhaps you too have heard; and not only do Barbarians use laws different from ours, but also those fellows in Lycæa,² and the progeny of Athamas,³ what sacrifices do they perform, although they are Greeks! In like manner you surely know by hearsay yourself what laws we formerly used concerning the dead, by cutting the throats of the victims before the dead body was carried out, and sending for the women who collect the bones⁴ of the dead in jars; and those, who still, antecedent to them, buried the dead at home; but we do none of these things. Ten thousand instances of this kind one might mention; for wide is the field of demonstration, that neither do we always have customs in the same manner amongst ourselves, nor do men amongst each other.

Soc. It is by no means wonderful, O best of men, if you are speaking correctly, this has lain hid from me. But as long as you by yourself declare what appears to you in a long discourse, and I again do the same, we shall never, as I think, come to an agreement. But if the inquiry be laid down in common, we shall perhaps think alike. If then you are willing, ask me some question, and consider with me in common. Or, if you wish it, give an answer.

Fr. Nay, I am willing, Socrates, to answer whatever you choose (to ask).

[6.] *Soc.* Come then, do you think that what is just is unjust, and what is unjust is just? Or that what is just is just, and what is unjust is unjust?

did Boeckh, who suggested ἀλλοι τε, adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum; for οὗτε in one clause is followed sometimes by τε simply, not οὗτε, in another.

¹ On this practice see Wesseling on Diodor. Sic. xx. 14.

² This was a town of Arcadia, as shown by Steph. Byz., and probably situated near the mountain Lycæus, where the tutelary deity was worshipped with human sacrifices; to which Plato alludes in Rep. viii. p. 565, D.

³ On the story of Athamas, see Ovid. Met. iv. 467; Fast. vi. 489; and Pausan. ix. 34.

⁴ So Boeckh understands the word ἐγχευριαστροφίας, applied by the Schol. on Aristoph. Σφήκ. 288, to the women who poured libations on the dead from jars.

Fr. I indeed think that what is just is just, and what is unjust is unjust.

Soc. Is it not so held by all persons as it is here?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Among the Persians also?

Fr. And among the Persians too.

Soc. But is it really always so?

Fr. Always.

Soc. Whether are things, that draw the greater weight, thought by us here to be the heavier, but those that draw the less, lighter? or the contrary?

Fr. No; but those that draw the greater weight, are the heavier, and those that draw the less, are lighter.

Soc. Is this the case, therefore, in Carthage and in Lycia?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Things beautiful, as it seems, are every where held to be beautiful, and things ugly to be ugly; but things ugly are not (thought to be) beautiful, nor things beautiful to be ugly.

Fr. It is so.

Soc. In the case of all things, so to say, the things, that exist, are held to be, not the things that do not exist, both with us and with all others.

Fr. It appears so to me.

Soc. He, therefore, who errs in that which is, errs in that which is lawful.

[7.] *Fr.* Thus, Socrates, as you say, the same things always appear lawful both to us and to others. But when I consider, that we never cease altering the laws up and down, I cannot be persuaded.

Soc. For perhaps you do not bear in mind that these things, being put into a changed place,¹ are the same. But look at them thus with me. Have you ever met with any² book relating to the health of the sick?

Fr. I have.

Soc. Do you know then to what art that book belongs?

Fr. I know (it belongs to) the medical art.

Soc. Do you then not call those skilled in these matters physicians?

¹ On the metaphorical use of *περσύνειν*, see at *Æsch.* Suppl. 14.

² Boeckh has acutely seen that *τινι* has dropt out after *ἐν γράμματι*, as shown by "librum aliquem" in Ficinus.

Fr. I do.

Soc. Do then the skilled think the same about the same, or do some think one thing and others another?

Fr. They seem to me to think the same.

Soc. Do then Greeks alone think the same with Greeks about things of which they know? or do Barbarians likewise (do so) with each other, and with Greeks?

Fr. There is a great necessity for both Greeks and Barbarians, who know, to think the same with ¹themselves and each other.¹

Soc. You have answered correctly. Do they not then always (do so)?

Fr. Yes, always.

[8.] *Soc.* Do not physicians also write about health what they think to be (true)?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Things relating to medicine and medical laws are the writings of physicians.

Fr. Things relating to medicine, certainly.

Soc. Are not then the writings relating to agriculture agricultural laws?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Of whom then are the writings and institutes relating to gardening?

Fr. Of gardeners.

Soc. These then are the laws about gardening.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Of those, who know how to manage gardens?

Fr. How not?

Soc. But gardeners possess this knowledge.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And of whom are the writings and institutes relating to the dressing of savoury food?

Fr. Of cooks.

Soc. These, therefore, are the laws of cookery.

Fr. Of cookery.

¹ I have adopted the emendation of Boeckh, αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις, in lieu of αὐτοῖς simply; who aptly compares Alcibiad. I. p. 111, C., ἀλλήλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς, and E., ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις.

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Soc. Of those, as it seems, who know how to manage the dressing of savoury food.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But cooks, as they say, know.

Fr. They do know.

Soc. Be it so. And of whom are the writings and institutes concerning the administration of a state? Are they not of those, who know how to govern states?

Fr. It appears so to me.

Soc. But do any others than statesmen and kings know?

Fr. They alone.¹

[9.] *Soc.* Those writings then relating to a state, which men call laws, are the writings of kings and good men.

Fr. You speak the truth.

Soc. Will then they, who know, write one thing at one time, and another at another, about the same things?

Fr. Certainly not.

Soc. If then we see certain persons doing this at any place whatever, shall we say that those, who do so, are skilled or unskilled?

Fr. Unskilled.

Soc. Shall we then say that what is right is in each case lawful, whether it relate to medicine, or cooking, or gardening?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But that, which is not right, we shall no longer assert to be lawful.

Fr. No longer.

Soc. It therefore becomes lawless.

Fr. Necessarily so.

Soc. Hence, in writings concerning things just and unjust, and, in short, concerning the orderly arrangement of a city, and the manner in which one ought to administer it, that, which is right, is a royal law; ² but that, which is not right, is not a (royal law), because science is wanting: for it is.³

¹ So Taylor, after Ficinus—"Isti soli"—as if he had found in his MS. οὔτοι μόνοι in lieu of Οὔτοι μὲν οὐν.

²⁻³ Such is Taylor's English translation of the Latin of Ficinus—"Non rectum vero nequaquam lex regia, quia scientia deest, esse videtur, quippe cum illegitimum sit."—But the Greek is τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὐ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν ἔστιν γὰρ ἀνομον: i. e. but that, which is not right, does not seem to be a law to those not knowing; for it is lawless.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. We have rightly therefore acknowledged that the law is the invention of that which is.

Fr. So it appears.

[10.] *Soc.* Let us still further consider it in this way likewise. Who is skilled in distributing the seeds to the earth?

Fr. The husbandman.

Soc. Does he then distribute seeds proper for each soil?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. The husbandman therefore is a good distributor of these things, and his laws and distributions in these particulars are right.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And who is a good distributor of pulsations for tunes, and distributes¹ such as are proper? And whose laws are right?

Fr. Those of the piper and the harper.

Soc. He then, who acts most according to law in these things, is, in the greatest degree, a piper.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But who is the best to distribute nutriment to the bodies of men? Is it not he, who (distributes) the proper?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. The distributions therefore and the laws of this man are the best; and he, who acts the most according to law in these things, is the best distributor.

Fr. Entirely so.

Soc. Who is he?

Fr. The training-master.²

Soc. Does he know how to feed³ the flock of the human body³ in the best manner?

Bekker however has inserted from one MS. δ between οὐ and δοκᾷ: which I cannot understand. I could have understood οὐ, εἰ καὶ δοκᾷ —i. e. "is not, even though it seems—"

¹ Boeckh has altered νείμμαι into νίμμαι on the authority of "impertit" in Ficinus; for νείμμαι, he says, could hardly depend upon ἀγαθός.

² Instead of παιδοτριβῆς, the natural train of ideas seems to demand παιδοτρόφος: although it is true, that when young persons were put under the training-master, he did, like the γυμναστής, decide upon the quantity and quality of the food to be given. See *The Rivals*, § 3.

³—³ Stalbaum has well exposed the impropriety of this expression, which seems to have been got from the Statesman.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And who is the best to tend a flock of sheep? What is his name?

Fr. Shepherd.

Soc. The laws therefore of the shepherd are the best for the sheep.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And those of the herdsman for oxen.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And whose laws are the best for the minds of men? Are they not those of a king? Tell me.

Fr. I say so.

[11.] *Soc.* You speak well. Can you therefore tell me, who among the ancients was a good maker of the laws relating to pipes? Perhaps you have him not in your thoughts. Are you then willing that I should remind you?

Fr. By all means.

Soc. Was not Marsyas said to be so, and his loved Olympus the Phrygian.¹

Fr. True.

Soc. The pipe-playing of these men is most divine, and alone excites and shows forth those who are in need² of the gods; and it alone remains to the present time as being divine.

Fr. Such is the case.

Soc. And who amongst the ancient kings is said to have been a good law-maker, and whose institutions remain even now as being divine?

Fr. I do not recollect.

Soc. Do you not know, which of the Greeks are making use of laws the most ancient?

Fr. Are you speaking of the Lacedæmonians, and of Lycurgus the law-giver?

Soc. These institutions, however, are perhaps not three hundred years old, or a little more. But do you know from whence came the best of their laws?

¹ On this allusion to Marsyas and Olympus, Boeckh refers to *Sympos.* p. 215, C. § 39, and *Schol.* on *Aristoph.* *Ιππ.* 9.

² In lieu of *χρησις*, Cornarius suggested *χορηγία*, by which he probably understood the divine dancing, excited by the pipe, called *ἐνθουσιασμός* by Aristotle in *Polit.* viii. 5.

Fr. They say, from Crete.

Soc. Do not they of all the Greeks make use of laws the most ancient?

Fr. Yes.

[12.] *Soc.* Do you know then who among these were good kings? (Were they not) Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa, by whom those laws were made?

Fr. They say, Socrates, that Rhadamanthus was a just man, but that Minos was rustic, morose, and unjust.

Soc. You are telling, O best of men, a tale of Attica, and of tragedy.¹

Fr. What, are not such things told of Minos?

Soc. Not by Homer, at least, and Hesiod; and they are more trust-worthy than all the tragic poets, from whom you have heard what you are saying.

Fr. But what do they say about Minos?

Soc. I will tell you, that you may not, like the many, be guilty of impiety. For there is not any thing more impious than this, nor of what we ought to be more cautious, than of sinning against the gods, either in word or in deed; and next, against divine men. But you ought to take ever a very great care, when you are about to praise or blame any man, that you speak correctly; and for the sake of this, it is meet to learn how to distinguish good and bad men. For the deity feels indignant when any one blames a person similar to himself, or praises one dissimilar; ²for this is the good man.² For think not that stones, and wood, and birds, and serpents are sacred, but that men are not so; for a good man is the most sacred, and a depraved man the most defiled of all things. [13.] Now then, since Homer and Hesiod pass an encomium on Minos, on this account I will speak, in order that you, being a man sprung from a man, may not sin in word against a hero the son of Jupiter. For Homer, (in Od. xix.

¹ Boeckh believes there is an allusion to some plays of Sophocles and Euripides, where Minos and the affairs of Crete were introduced.

² The Greek is *ἐστὶ δ' οὗτος ὁ ἀγαθός*; in lieu of which Boeckh would read *ἐστὶ δ' ὁμοίος ὁ ἀγαθός*, similar to "Dei vero similis est vir bonus" in Ficinus. For he says that *οὗτος* would refer, like "hic" in Latin, to the party last mentioned, but *ἐκείνος*, like "ille," to the one before. Stalbaum however defends the impropriety of the usage of *οὗτος* by referring to Schæfer on Demosth. i. p. 541, and v. p. 322. Perhaps the author wrote here *ἐστὶ δὲ θεῶν ὁμοίος ὁ ἀγαθός*.

174.) speaking of Crete, says, there are many men, and ninety cities in it ;

Amongst them Knossus, a great city, where
Reign'd Minos, who each ninth year converse held
With mighty Zeus.

This then is Homer's praise of Minos, expressed in few words, such as he has not given to even one of his heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist,¹ and that the art itself is all-beautiful, he shows in many other places, and here likewise. For he says that Minos conversed in the ninth year² with Zeus, and went to be instructed by him, as if Zeus were a sophist. That Homer, then, does not bestow the honour of being instructed by Zeus upon any other hero, than Minos, is praise indeed to be wondered at. In the scene of the *Odyssey*, too, relating to the Dead,³ Homer has represented Minos as a judge, and holding a golden sceptre ; but not Rhadamanthus as judging there, or conversing with Zeus any where. On this account I say that Minos is extolled by Homer beyond all other heroes. For to have been instructed merely by Zeus, when he was the son of Zeus, carries with it no excess of praise. [14.] For the verse—He reigned, and each ninth year conversed with Zeus—means that he was the associate of Zeus ; for by *ῥαποι* is meant "discourses," and by *ῥαπιστής*, "an associate in discourse." Hence at each ninth year, Minos went to the cavern of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show forth others ; which, during the preceding period of nine years, he had learnt⁴ from Zeus. There are, however, some who understand by *ῥαπιστής*, "the associate" of Zeus in drinking and sport ; although any one may make use of this as a proof to show that they, who thus understand the word, say nothing

¹ The word is here taken in its original sense, of a person endued with wisdom. See Blomfield on *Prom.* 62.

² Such is the literal version of the Greek *ἐνάρῳ ἔτει*, by which Boeckh understands "during nine years." But according to Valerius Maximus, l. 2, "Minos, Cretensium rex, nono quoque anno in quoddam præaltum et vetusta religione consecratum specus secedere solebat et in eo commoratus, tanquam a Jove, quo se ortum ferebat, traditas sibi leges prærogabat." Hence, as remarked by Stalbaum, the author should have written here *ὁ ἐνάρῳ ἔτους*, as he has done just afterwards.

³ By *Νερύια* is meant what is now called book xi. To the same passage Plato alludes in *Gorg.* p. 526, C.

⁴ Ficinus has "acceperat," who read therefore in his MS. *μεμαθήκει*, subsequently found in others likewise.

to the purpose ; for although both the Greeks and Barbarians are numerous, there are none, who abstain from banquets, and the sport to which wine belongs, except the Cretans, and next the Lacedæmonians, who were instructed by the Cretans. But in Crete this is one of the other¹ laws, which Minos laid down, "not to drink with each other to intoxication." And it is evident, that what he deemed to be beautiful institutions, these he laid down for his own citizens. For Minos did not, like a knave, think one thing, and do another, contrary to what he thought ; but his intercourse with Zeus was, as I assert, through discourses for the attainment of virtue. Hence he laid down those laws for his citizens, through which Crete has been for all time prosperous, and Lacedæmon likewise, from the time when it began to make use of those laws, as being divine. [15.] But Rhadamanthus was indeed a good man ; for he was instructed by Minos. He did not however learn the whole of the royal art, but that part of it, which ministers to the royal, as far as presiding over courts of justice ; from whence he was said to be a good judge. For Minos employed him as a guardian of the laws in the city ; but Talus for those through the rest of Crete. For Talus thrice every year went through the villages in order to preserve the laws in them, and carried with him the laws written in tables of brass ; from whence he was called "brazen." Hesiod too asserts respecting Minos, what is closely related to this. For, having mentioned his name, he says,

Most regal was he of all mortal kings,
And o'er the most of neighbouring people ruled,
Of Zeus the sceptre holding, ²king like him ;²

and he too means by the sceptre of Zeus, nothing else than the instruction of Zeus, by which he regulated Crete.

[16.] *Fr.* On what account then, Socrates, was the report spread against Minos, of his being an unlearned and morose man ?

¹ In lieu of ἄλλων one would prefer παλαιῶν, "old."

² The Greek is τῷ καὶ πόλει βασιλεῦσι : where Boeckh, whom Bekker and Stalbaum follow, suggested πολίων. But πολίων seems scarcely admissible after πλείστον. I have translated, as if Hesiod had written—τοῦ καὶ πίλας ὢν βασιλεῦσι : while the first line of the fragment, found no where else, has been restored to its original metrical form by Boeckh.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CLITOPHO.

THIS dialogue, like some others already mentioned, has been considered spurious. But it was reckoned amongst the genuine by Thrasyllus, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius iii. 50. It is distinctly alluded to by Arrian on Epictetus iii. 22, and Themistius Or. xxvi. p. 320, D., and covertly by Dio Chrysost. Or. xiii. p. 222, D., and Aristides, T. i. p. 78 ; ii. p. 378, as remarked by Ruhnken on Timæus in *Τραγική σκηνή*, and Wyttenbach on Julian, p. 42. It contains a summary of the leading doctrines promulgated by Socrates ; the greater part of which have formed the subject of separate dialogues by Plato and others. Its commencement alone has been preserved ; for the remainder was probably lost by its having been written at the end of the Codex Archetypus, that contained the rest of the existing dialogues of Plato ; for it would thus be exposed to the greatest chance of suffering from damp and the other accidents to which books are liable in the lapse of years : I say the Codex Archetypus ; because it is evident that all the MSS. that have been hitherto collated, are to be traced to such an original ; of which the one used by Ficinus was in a more complete state than any that have been examined by Bekker and others, as may be seen from the notes appended to the dialogue.

CLITOPHO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND CLITOPHO.

SOCRATES.

A CERTAIN person has lately told me that Clitopho,¹ the son of Aristonymus, has been conversing with Lysias, and blaming the passing the time with Socrates, but been praising immoderately the intercourse with Thrasymachus.²

Clit. Whoever he was, Socrates, he has not accurately related to you the conversation I had with Lysias about you. For in some things indeed I did not praise you, but in others I did. But since you are evidently blaming me, although you pretend to care nothing about the matter, I will most willingly go through the conversation myself, especially since we happen to be alone, in order that you may the less imagine that I am ill disposed towards you. For now perhaps you have not heard correctly; so that you appear to be more harshly disposed towards me than is fitting. But if you will grant me the liberty of speech I shall most cheerfully accept it, and am willing to speak.

¹ Of this Clitopho, who is not mentioned elsewhere by Plato, the reader will find all that is known in the useful and learned Onomastic. Aristophan. appended by Holden to his recent edition of the dramatist.

² Of this Thrasymachus, who was a friend and admirer of Gorgias, see particularly Plato in Rep. p. i. p. 336; where his character is delineated in vivid colours. Other passages are quoted by Groen van Prinsterer in Prosopograph. Platon. p. 107—110.

Soc. Nay it would be¹ disgraceful for myself, when you are willing to benefit me, not to bear with you. For it is evident that, when I know in what respect I am better and worse, I shall pursue some things, and avoid others, to the utmost of my power.

Clit. You shall hear then. [2.] For while I am with you, Socrates, I am often astonished on hearing you; and you appear to me, as compared with other men, to speak most beautifully, when, reproving men, you exclaim like a god upon a machine²—"Whither are ye borne along? And—Are ye ignorant, that ye are doing nothing that ye ought, ye, who make every exertion how ye may get money, but neglect your children, to whom ye are to leave it, and the means whereby they may know how to use it justly; and do not find for them teachers of justice, if indeed it can be taught,³ and who, if it is to be made the subject of meditation and exercise, may sufficiently exercise them in it. Nor yet do ye previously attend to yourselves; but, seeing that both ye and your children have learnt sufficiently grammar, and music, and the gymnastic arts, which ye have considered as the perfect discipline of virtue, yet afterwards that ye become no less depraved with respect to riches, why do ye not despise the present mode of education, and seek after those, who will cause you to cease from this illiberal line of life? And yet it is through this neglect of what is right, and indolence, and not through the foot being out of time with the lyre, that brother himself arrays himself against brother, and states against states, and, out of all measure and harmony, are stirring up strife and war upon each other, and do and suffer the extreme of ill. But ye say, that they, who are unjust, are unjust not through the want of instruction, nor through ignorance, but voluntarily;⁴ and again, ye dare to assert that injustice is disgraceful and hateful to the gods. How then can any one voluntarily choose so great an evil? He (does so) ye say, through being conquered by pleasure. Is not this then an involuntary act, since to conquer is a voluntary one? So

¹ Instead of *μήν*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ἀν ἧν*, as shown by his—"esset."

² Upon the expression "Deus ex machina," see the commentators on Horace, A. P. 191, "Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus;" and Ruhnken on Timæus, *Τραγικὴ σκηνὴ*.

³ Compare the Meno, where the question is mooted at length, whether virtue in general, of which justice is a part, can be taught or not.

⁴ This doctrine is discussed at length in the Gorgias.

that reason perfectly convinces us, that to act unjustly is involuntary; and that every man privately, and all cities publicly, ought to pay more attention than they do at present to their conduct."

[3.] When therefore, Socrates, I hear you perpetually speaking so, I am greatly delighted with you, and pay you in a wonderful manner the tribute of praise. And when you say what follows in order upon this, that they, who cultivate their bodies, but neglect their soul,¹ do something different of this kind,¹ in neglecting that which is to govern, but busily attending to what is to be governed;² and when you assert that it is better for him, who does not know how to use a thing, to leave alone the use of it; for³ if a person does not know how to use his eyes or ears, or his whole body, it is better for him not to hear, nor see, nor to use his body for any need, than to use it in any way; and in a similar manner with respect to art. For it is evident (as you say)⁴ that he, who does not know how to use his own lyre, will not (know how to use) that of his neighbour; nor will he, who (knows not how to use) the (lyre) of others, (know how to use) his own, nor any other instrument or chattel whatever; and this your discourse ended beautifully (by inferring),⁵ that for him, who does not know how to use his soul, it is better to be at rest with respect to his soul, and not to live, than to live and act according to his own caprice; but, if there is any necessity for such a person to live, that it is better for him to lead the life of a slave, than of a freeman. For⁶ that this is to deliver

¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, because they were omitted by Ficinus, who probably could not understand them; nor can I. For though *ἑρεπός* is sometimes taken in the sense of *κακός*, as shown by Valckenaer in *Diatrib.* p. 112, C., yet here such a sense would be out of place. The author wrote perhaps *ἀλλότριον*, "strange."

² The middle voice, *ἀρξόμενον*, is to be taken passively. For a mass of middle verbs used similarly see Monk on Eurip. *Hippol.* 1458.

³ Instead of *δή*; two MSS. have *δέ*, i. e. *γάρ*, as shown by the passages quoted by Schæfer in the Index to Porson's Euripides in *Γάρ*.

⁴ Taylor has introduced "as you say" from "ut ipse ais" in Ficinus, to which there is nothing to answer in the Greek.

⁵ Here again Ficinus has "ut inferas;" nothing similar to which is to be found in the Greek.

⁶ After *δικαιοσύνην* in the Greek are two words, *ὥς ἐστι*, omitted by Ficinus, whom I have followed; although they probably contain some hidden error.

the rudder of the mind, like that of a ship, to another, who has learnt the art of governing men; which, Socrates, you have often called the statesman's art, and said it is the same as that of the judge and justice. [4.] To these, and many other and very beautiful reasonings, in which it is asserted that virtue can be taught,¹ and that a person ought above all things to pay attention to himself, I have scarcely at any time said a word in opposition, nor do I think that I shall ever say. For I deem them to be very exhortatory and useful, and really awakening us, as if we were asleep. I have therefore given my mind to them, as one about to hear what is to follow; and I have asked at first, not yourself, Socrates, but your equals in age, or fellow-thinkers, or friends, or in whatever name one must call the (party)² thus disposed towards you. For among them, I have first of all asked those, who are thought by you to be something, by inquiring what would be the discourse after this; and laying down a subject³ after your manner, I have said to them—How are we to receive for the present, O best of men, the exhortation of Socrates to virtue? as being merely a word,⁴ but that it is not in our power to follow it up in deed, and to comprehend it thoroughly? And will this be our employment through the whole of life, to exhort those who have not been exhorted as yet? ⁵and for them (to exhort) others?⁵ Or is it requisite for us after this to inquire of Socrates and each other, since we confess that this should be done, what is to come next? How, say we,⁶ ought we to begin the discipline relating to justice? As if some one had exhorted us to pay attention to the body, on perceiving that we, like boys, had no notion that the care of the body belongs to the gymnastic

¹ This Socrates never asserted; at least if any reliance is to be placed on the *Meno*.

² I have translated as if γένος or φύλον had dropt out after τὸ τοιοῦτον—

³ Instead of ῥέπειν, Ficinus seems to have found τέρειν in his MS. For his version is "questionem exposui."

⁴ The Greek is ὡς ὄντος μόνον τούτου. But though τούτου might be referred to προτροπῆς, yet the subsequent πρᾶγμα plainly shows that the author wrote, as I have translated, ὡς ὀνόματος ὄντος μόνον γ' αὐτοῦ. For ὄνομα and ἔργον are thus perpetually opposed to each other. See Porson on *Phæn.* 512.

⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

⁶ Ficinus omits φάμεν, which is here quite unnecessary.

and medical arts, and afterwards reproached us by saying, that it was disgraceful to pay every attention to wheat and barley, and vines, and such other things as we labour to obtain for the sake of the body, but that we search after no art or device, so that the body may be rendered in the best condition, and this too when there is such an art. If then we inquired of the person so exhorting us—Do you say there are such arts as these? perhaps he would say, There are the gymnastic and medical arts.¹ And what now, we said, is the art that relates to the virtue of the soul? Let it be mentioned.¹ [5.]² But he, who seemed to be of the greatest strength for giving an answer to these questions, said to myself, that the very art, which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other than justice. And on my saying—Tell me not merely the name of the art,³ but explain it further in this way.³ There is an art called the medical. By this two things are effected; one, that physicians are always forming other physicians in addition to those already existing; the other, to effect health. Now of these one is no longer an art, but the work of the art, which teaches and is taught, which we call health. And in the case of carpentry, there is the building and the art; one the effect, and the other the teaching. So too of justice, one part is to make persons just, as each (of the arts mentioned) above (makes) artists. But what shall we say is the other work, which a just man is able to do for us? State it. One person⁴ has, I think, said in answer to us, that it is “the conducive;” another, that it is “the becoming;” another, that it is “the useful;” and another, that it is “the profitable.” But I rejoined by saying, that these very names exist in each of the arts, namely, to act rightly, profitably, usefully, and the like. But that, to which all these tend, each art will state itself. Thus, the art of carpentry will say, that “the right,”

¹ Ficus has what is very different from the Greek—“eodem pacto nunc, quam artem circa animæ virtutem versari censeamus, respondeat, quisquis peritissimus horum sibi videtur;” which Taylor has adopted, with the exception of the concluding clause.

² Instead of *αὐτῶν*, two MSS. offer *αὐτῷ*, which leads to *αὐτῷ*, as I have translated.

³ The Greek is simply *ἀλλ' ὅδε*.—But Ficus has more fully—“sed ulterius sic exponas;” which I have adopted.

⁴ Instead of *οὗτος*, Ficus found *ἄλλος*, as shown by his “Respondit alius—”

"the beautiful," "the becoming," (tend to this,) that wooden furniture may be (aptly)¹ made; which is not art, (but the work of art).² Let in like manner be mentioned the work of justice. [6.] At last one of your friends, Socrates, who appeared to speak most elegantly, answered me, that this was the work peculiar to justice, which does not belong to any other science, namely, to cause a friendship amongst states. But he, on the other hand, on being interrogated, said that friendship was a good, and by no means an evil. But on being asked about the friendships³ of boys and of wild animals, for by that name we call (their attachments), he did not admit that they are friendships; for it happened that such (friendships) of theirs⁴ were for the greater part hurtful rather than advantageous; and that those, who call them so, call them falsely; but that friendship existing really and truly was most clearly an union of sentiment.⁵ But on being asked whether he meant by an union of sentiment, an agreement in opinion or science, he repudiated the agreement in opinion; for many and hurtful agreements in opinion are compelled to take place amongst men; but he conceded that friendship was entirely a good, and the work of justice; so that he said, an agreement in sentiment was the same as science really existing, but not opinion. But when we were at this part of our discourse, the parties present being in a state of doubt⁶ were competent to find fault with him,⁶ and to say, that the reasoning had run round to the point first mooted; and they affirmed that the medical art is a certain agreement in sentiment; and so are all the other arts; and that they are able to state about what they are conversant; but that the art called by you justice, or

¹ Taylor has here followed Ficinus, whose "apte" is not seen in the Greek.

² Here again Ficinus supplies what the train of thought requires, but is wanting in the Greek, "sed artis opus."

³ The word in Æschylus Prom. 501, is *σφιγγήθρα*. On the feelings felt by animals for each other, see the commentators on Virgil, G. iii. 517, "arator Mærentem abjungens fraterna morte juvencum."

⁴ In lieu of *αὐτῶν*, two MSS. offer *αὐτῶν*, which I have adopted.

⁵ So Sallust, "Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum est firma amicitia." Compare Polit. p. 311, B., 351, D., and Alcib. I. p. 127, A., *εἰπερ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν*.

⁶ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, because they are not found in the version of Ficinus; while in lieu of *καὶ οἱ ἦσαν*, the oldest MS. offers a remarkable various reading in *ἐπεχείρησαν*—

an agreement in sentiment, it had escaped them as to whither it tends, and that it is not manifest what is its work. At last I inquired of yourself, Socrates, upon these points; and you told me that it is the work of justice to injure enemies, and benefit friends; but afterwards it appeared to you, that the just man will never injure any one, but will act to the advantage of every one in all things. [7.] Having endured this not once, nor even twice, but for a length of time, and being urgent with you, Socrates, I was tired out; thinking, indeed, that you effected in the best manner of all men, the exhortation to the study of virtue; but that¹ one of two things (must take place),¹ either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further—which might happen in the case of any other art—as, for instance, that he who is not a pilot, may exercise himself in praising the pilot's art, as a thing of great value to man; and similarly in the case of other arts—so a person may perhaps apply the same remark on the subject of justice to yourself, as not having a greater knowledge than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful manner. ²Such however is not my (opinion), but (as I say),² one of two things (take place); either that you do not know (what justice is), or that you are unwilling to impart (the knowledge of it) to me. On this account then, I think I shall go to Thrasyarchus, and wherever else I can, as being in doubt, ³(and where I hope I shall be freed from doubts; nor should I betake myself elsewhere,)³ if you were willing to finish your exhortatory discourses to me. Now, for instance, if I had been exhorted on the subject of the gymnastic art, that I ought not to neglect the body, you would state to me what comes next after the exhortation-speech, what is the nature of my body, and what attention it requires. And let

¹ Taylor has adopted what he found in the Latin of Ficinus, "*e duobus alterutrum necesse est;*" which would be in Greek, *duoiv δὲ δὲ θάρσπον εἶναι*, not simply *duoiv δὲ θάρσπον*—

² I have followed Ficinus, who has supplied what was necessary to unite the unconnected members of the sentence, "*Ego autem non sic existimo; e duobus enim alterum inquam.*"

³ All the words within the numerals are to be found only in the Latin of Ficinus, "*speraveroque a dubitationibus liberari; neque vero alio me conferrem.*" Something similar to which must have been read in his MS., for it is hardly possible to believe that he supplied them himself to complete the sense.

this be done at present. Lay it down then that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous to pay attention to other things, but to neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labour in other things; and imagine that I have really¹ spoken upon all other points, next in order to those, which I have just now gone through. I beg of you not to act in any respect otherwise, that I may not (hereafter),² as at present, partly praise you before Lysias and the rest, and blame you likewise in part. For I will say, Socrates, that you are worth every thing to the man, who is not yet exhorted; but to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment to his arriving at the end of virtue, and becoming happy.

¹ I have adopted *ἔντα* from one MS. in lieu of *εὖτα*.

² Ficinus has "*quemadmodum nunc ita et posthac*;" what the balance of the sentence evidently requires. He found, I suspect, in his MS., *ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὖτις, καθάπερ νῦν*—

INTRODUCTION TO THE EPISTLES.

THE last portion of the works of Plato, that have been considered by some scholars to be spurious, and genuine by others, are the Epistles. These, according to Diogenes Laertius, iii. 61, were thirteen in number; and just so many have been found in different MSS., and addressed to the parties mentioned by Diogenes, with the exception of the 10th and 11th; which, he says, were written respectively to Aristodemus and Leodamas, instead of Aristodorus and Laodamas, as found at present—a discrepancy evidently arising from a literal variation merely.

Out of the whole number, all but 1, 10, 11, 12, have been quoted distinctly, or covertly alluded to, by different writers, commencing with Cicero, and ending with some of the Greek fathers. One, however, the 12th, addressed to Archytas, is reported in some MSS. to be spurious; although Diogenes, in viii. 79, states it was written in answer to the letter there preserved from Archytas to Plato.

As scarcely any thing has been written upon the Epistles, with the exception of the notes of Stephens, based for the most part on the version of Ficinus, I have been compelled to say more than I should otherwise have done, with the view of directing attention to passages, where, from the corruptions in the text, I have been unable to see my way clearly.

THE

EPISTLES OF PLATO.

EPISTLE I.¹

DION TO DIONYSIUS—PROSPERITY.²

WHILE I was passing so long a time with you and administering the affairs of your kingdom the most faithfully³ of all, who took in hand your interests,⁴ I had to endure calumnies really grievous. For I know that nothing of a rather cruel kind you ever thought proper to do with my consent. And of this all, who have taken a part in the state with yourself, are my witnesses, with many of whom I have been engaged in a contest, after I had freed them from no trifling calamities. And when in possession of the sole power, I had often preserved for you the state, I have been sent away in a more ignominious manner than it became you to drive out a beggar, and you have ordered me to sail away, after I had resided with you for such a length of time. With regard to my future conduct, I shall consult my interest, somewhat more like a human being ;

¹ Although this Epistle appears to have been written by Dion, it is ascribed to Plato in nearly all the MSS. but the one used by Ficinus. The whole of the superscription is however omitted in one MS., and the word *Πλάτων* alone in another.

² On the address *εὐ πράττειν*, adopted by Plato, see Epist. iii. and the elaborate notes of Menage on Diog. L. iii. 61.

³ I have adopted *πεπιστευμένος*, in lieu of *πεπιστευμένος*, as suggested by the Bipont editor.

⁴ Such seems to be the meaning of *τὰς ὠφελείας ὑμῶν λαμβανόντων*. But *λαμβάνειν* is not, I suspect, to be found elsewhere in this sense. Ficinus has "*utilitates vestras captantibus*."

Nor fertile furrows of the earth's wide plain
Such self-sufficient power e'er obtain,
As of good men the mind, that thinks the same.¹

Fare thee well, and know that thou hast erred thus much as regards us, in order that you may conduct yourself better towards others.

EPISTLE II.

PLATO TO DIONYSIUS - PROSPERITY.

I HAVE heard from Archedemus, that you think that not only I ought to keep quiet myself, but my familiar friends likewise, on matters relating to yourself, and neither do or say any thing to your disparagement; but that you make an exception in the case of Dion. Now this assertion, that Dion is to be excepted, signifies that I have no power over my connexions. For if I had a power, as well over others as you and Dion, a greater good would be the result both to all of you and the rest of the Greeks, as I assert. But now I am great through rendering myself a follower of the dictates of my reason. And this I say, because Cratistolus and Polyxenus have not given you sound information; for one of them asserted, says common report, that he had heard at Olympia of many of my associates having spoken ill of you. But perhaps he heard more acutely than I did. ² For such a thing I have not heard.³ But it is requisite, as it seems to me, for you to act thus for the future, whenever any one says any thing about any one of us, by sending a letter to inquire of myself; for I shall neither be afraid or ashamed to tell the truth. But to you and me such is the state of circumstances with regard to each other that we are neither of us unknown to any one, so to say, of the Greeks; nor is our intercourse passed over in silence; nor let it be concealed from you, that it will not be

¹ From the word *ὁμοφράδμων* it is fair to infer that *φίλων τε* have dropt out after *ἀγαθῶν*, for, as Sallust says, "Idem velle atque idem nolle est —amicitia;" and a similar sentiment is to be found in Pseudo-Plato, Clitoph. § 6, and the passages quoted there.

² The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

passed over in silence in the time to come ; so many have obtained a knowledge of it, as having been neither little nor quietly carried on. But why do I say this ? I will now tell you, beginning from events far back.

Intellect and great power naturally tend to the same ; and these two always pursue, and seek after, and unite with each other. In the next place, men are delighted to speak about these subjects themselves, and to hear about them from others in their private conversations, or in the writings of poets. Thus for example, when persons discourse about Hiero, and Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, they are delighted in bringing forward the intercourse of Simonides with these men, and what he did and said to them ; and they are accustomed to celebrate together Periander of Corinth, and Thales of Miletus ; and Pericles, and Anaxagoras ; and Croesus, and Solon, as being men of wisdom, and Cyrus, a person of power. Poets too, in imitation of this, bring together Creon and Tiresias, Polydus and Minos, Agamemnon and Nestor, Ulysses and Palamedes ; and, as it appears to me, for the same reason, the first men brought together Prometheus and Zeus ; and they sing of some of these, as having a difference, and others a friendship with each other ; and again, of some as having at one time a difference, and at another friendship ; and having similar feelings on some points, and different upon others. Now all these things I mention, as being willing to show that men will not be silent respecting us, when we are dead ; so that we ought to pay an attention to them. For we must, as it seems, pay some regard even to the time to come ; especially since it happens that the most slave-like persons do by a kind of nature, neglect it entirely ; but persons of a more elegant mind do every thing in order that they may be spoken well of hereafter. And this I consider an argument that the dead have a certain perception¹ of things here. For the most excellent minds divine that this is so, but the most depraved deny it. Now the divinations of god-like men are of greater weight than of those who are not so. And I conceive that if it were permitted for those persons of a former age, to whom I am alluding, to correct aught in their intercourse, they would earnestly endeavour that better things be said of them, than

¹ This doctrine is laid down only hesitatingly in Menexen. § 20.

at present. This however it is still permitted us to say, god willing, that if any thing has been done not correctly during our former intercourse, either in word or deed, we may correct it. For on the subject of philosophy I assert that a true opinion will be formed of us; a better one if we are persons of worth, but the contrary, if we are worthless. And indeed, if we pay attention to this, we shall not do any thing more pious; nor any thing more impious, if we neglect it. But how this ought to take place, and how it is just, I will explain.

When I came to Sicily, I had the reputation of excelling very much in philosophy; and I wished on my arrival at Syracuse to have you a witness in my favour, in order¹ that philosophy might be honoured by the multitude. But this did not turn out prosperously.² I do not however assign that as the reason which the many would say, but because you appeared unwilling to put implicit confidence in me; but willing to send me away and to send for others, and to inquire what my business was, by this, as it seems, distrusting me. And they, who were proclaiming loudly these matters, were many, affirming that you had a contempt for myself, and were seriously applying yourself to other things. Such were the reports at that time bruited abroad.

Now hear what after this it is just to do, in order that I may reply to your question, how you and I ought to conduct ourselves to each other. If then you have a contempt for philosophy, bid farewell to it. But if you have heard from another, or discovered³ yourself any thing more excellent³ than what you have from me, honour it. But if what (you have heard) from me please you, then must you honour highly myself likewise. Now, therefore, as from the beginning, do you lead and I will follow. For being honoured by you, I will honour you (in return); but not being honoured, I shall keep quiet. Further still, if by honouring me, you

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were—*οἱ μοι, ἵνα δῇ*—not *σε, ἵνα δῇ μοι*—where *μοι* has no meaning.

² Why *εὐαγής* is thus rendered by Ficinus and Ast, I cannot understand. The word is learnedly illustrated by Hemsterhuis in a note printed by Gaisford on Markland's Eurip. Suppl. 662.

³ I have adopted, in lieu of *βελτίονα εὐρηκάς*—*ἐκείνα* from one MS. *βέλτιον εὐρηκάς τι*, and *ἐκείνο*, similar to "Si quid novisti rectius istius" in Horace.

take the lead in this,¹ you will seem to honour philosophy; and that very thing,² which you are considering even otherwise,³ will bring you the reputation of being considered by the multitude a philosopher. But by honouring you, when not honouring me, I should seem to be admiring and pursuing wealth; but this we know has a name dishonourable amongst all men; and, to sum up, by your honouring me, there will be an ornament to both of us; but by my (honouring) you, a disgrace to both. And thus much on these matters.

But the little sphere³ does not answer; and this Archidemus will show you, when he arrives. Moreover, you must explain to him very distinctly respecting the matter, which is far more honourable and divine than this, and respecting which you sent as being in doubt. For you say, according to his report, that there has not been a sufficient demonstration respecting the nature of the first. I must speak to you by enigmas,⁴ in order that, should the tablet meet with any accident in its folds by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand.⁴ For such is the case.

"As regards the king of all, all things are his,⁵ and all are for his sake, and he is the cause of all that is beautiful. But about a second are the secondary things; and about a third the third. Now the soul of man is eager to learn respecting these things of what kind they are, looking to what is allied to itself, none of which it possesses sufficiently. ⁶But respecting the king (himself)⁶ and those of which I have spoken, there is nothing of this kind. But of that, which is after this, does the soul speak. But of what kind, son of Dionysius and Doris, is your inquiry

¹ I cannot understand *τούτου*: nor could Ficinus; whose version is—"honorare prius me cæperis." Perhaps Plato wrote, *αὐτὸς* or *οὗτος*—

² Here again I am at a loss, and so was Ficinus. For he has—"quod tu imprimis cupiebas."

³ What this little sphere was is uncertain. Perhaps it was a kind of orrery. T. See Epist. 13.

⁴ In the Greek words between the numerals lies hid a tragic distich, "Ἴν' ἂν τι δόλος ἐν πτυχαῖς κόντου δια' Ἡ γῆς πάθος, μὴ γινῶ τὸ γράμμα τις τυχών: as may be inferred from Eurip. *Iph. T.* 1744, ed. Monk.

⁵ I have followed one MS. that reads *πάντ' ἐκείνου ἔστι*, instead of *πάντ' ἔστι καὶ ἐκείνου*—

⁶ Ficinus has—"sed in rege ipso et in his," as if he had found in his MS. *τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως αὐτοῦ*—in lieu of *τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως πρίν*—

concerning what is the cause of all things evil.¹ Or rather, is it not a kind of labour-throes on this point, which are produced in the soul, and which if a person does not take away from it, (the soul) will never meet with truth existing in reality.

And you told me that you had thought of this in the garden under the laurel trees, and that it was your discovery. And I said, that if this appeared to you to be the case, you had freed me from a long discussion. I said however that I had never met with any other person, who had discovered it, but that it had been a great source of trouble to myself. But perhaps you have heard this from some one; but accidentally impelled in this direction by a divine allotment,² you have not kept firm hold of the demonstrations on this point, and pinned them down;³ but you are dashing on, at one time in this way, and at another in a different way, to what is the object of fancy; but such it is not. Nor has this occurred to you alone; but be well assured, that no one, when he first hears me, is otherwise affected than thus⁴ in the beginning.⁴ And one having more trouble, and another less, are with difficulty liberated from it; but nearly all of them have of it not a little. Such then having been, and is still the case, we have in my opinion nearly discovered that, about which you sent to me, namely, how we ought to be affected towards each other. For since you are testing (my doctrines) by associating with other persons, and⁵ placing them by the side of those (promulgated) by others, and (considering)⁶

¹ In lieu of *κακῶν*, Proclus, in Theolog. Platon. ii. 4, p. 103, offers *καλῶν*, adopted by Taylor; and so one MS. collated by Bekker. The other however is the preferable reading. Unless it be said that Plato wrote both, *καλῶν τε καὶ κακῶν*. For Dionysius, like many philosophers before and after his time, was puzzled with the origin and continuance of evil, introduced by one or more powers, the authors of all good.

² The expression *θεία μοῖρα* would now be applied to what we call "genius," or "gift of nature."

³ So I have translated *κατίδησας*. Ficinus has "protulisti," which would lead to *κατίδειξας*—

⁴ Ficinus omits *κατ' ἀρχάς*, probably deeming them superfluous after *πρῶτον ἀκούσαντι*. Perhaps Plato wrote *κατὰ παραχάς*, "by some confusion."

⁵ The Greek is *παραθεώμενος*. But there is, I suspect, no such compound in Greek. Ficinus has "cum—comparaveris," from which Faehse was led to *παραθίμενος*, which I have adopted, and translated as if *θεώμενος* had dropped out before *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*.

"the beautiful," "the becoming," (tend to this,) that wooden furniture may be (aptly)¹ made; which is not art, (but the work of art).² Let in like manner be mentioned the work of justice. [6.] At last one of your friends, Socrates, who appeared to speak most elegantly, answered me, that this was the work peculiar to justice, which does not belong to any other science, namely, to cause a friendship amongst states. But he, on the other hand, on being interrogated, said that friendship was a good, and by no means an evil. But on being asked about the friendships³ of boys and of wild animals, for by that name we call (their attachments), he did not admit that they are friendships; for it happened that such (friendships) of theirs⁴ were for the greater part hurtful rather than advantageous; and that those, who call them so, call them falsely; but that friendship existing really and truly was most clearly an union of sentiment.⁵ But on being asked whether he meant by an union of sentiment, an agreement in opinion or science, he repudiated the agreement in opinion; for many and hurtful agreements in opinion are compelled to take place amongst men; but he conceded that friendship was entirely a good, and the work of justice; so that he said, an agreement in sentiment was the same as science really existing, but not opinion. But when we were at this part of our discourse, the parties present being in a state of doubt⁶ were competent to find fault with him,⁶ and to say, that the reasoning had run round to the point first mooted; and they affirmed that the medical art is a certain agreement in sentiment; and so are all the other arts; and that they are able to state about what they are conversant; but that the art called by you justice, or

¹ Taylor has here followed Ficinus, whose "apte" is not seen in the Greek.

² Here again Ficinus supplies what the train of thought requires, but is wanting in the Greek, "sed artis opus."

³ The word in Æschylus Prom. 501, is *στίργηθρα*. On the feelings felt by animals for each other, see the commentators on Virgil, G. iii. 517, "arator Mœrentem abjungens fraterna morte juvencum."

⁴ In lieu of *αὐτῶν*, two MSS. offer *αὐτῶν*, which I have adopted.

⁵ So Sallust, "Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum est firma amicitia." Compare Polit. p. 311, B., 351, D., and Alcib. I. p. 127, A., *ἐπερ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν*.

⁶ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, because they are not found in the version of Ficinus; while in lieu of *καὶ οἱ ἦσαν*, the oldest MS. offers a remarkable various reading in *ἐπεχειρήσαν*—

an agreement in sentiment, it had escaped them as to whither it tends, and that it is not manifest what is its work. At last I inquired of yourself, Socrates, upon these points; and you told me that it is the work of justice to injure enemies, and benefit friends; but afterwards it appeared to you, that the just man will never injure any one, but will act to the advantage of every one in all things. [7.] Having endured this not once, nor even twice, but for a length of time, and being urgent with you, Socrates, I was tired out; thinking, indeed, that you effected in the best manner of all men, the exhortation to the study of virtue; but that¹ one of two things (must take place),¹ either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further—which might happen in the case of any other art—as, for instance, that he who is not a pilot, may exercise himself in praising the pilot's art, as a thing of great value to man; and similarly in the case of other arts—so a person may perhaps apply the same remark on the subject of justice to yourself, as not having a greater knowledge than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful manner. ²Such however is not my (opinion), but (as I say),² one of two things (take place); either that you do not know (what justice is), or that you are unwilling to impart (the knowledge of it) to me. On this account then, I think I shall go to Thrasyarchus, and wherever else I can, as being in doubt, ³(and where I hope I shall be freed from doubts; nor should I betake myself elsewhere,)³ if you were willing to finish your exhortatory discourses to me. Now, for instance, if I had been exhorted on the subject of the gymnastic art, that I ought not to neglect the body, you would state to me what comes next after the exhortation-speech, what is the nature of my body, and what attention it requires. And let

¹ Taylor has adopted what he found in the Latin of Ficinus, "e duobus alterutrum necesse est;" which would be in Greek, *duoiv δὲ δὲ θάρσιν ἢ ναί*, not simply *duoiv δὲ θάρσιν*—

² I have followed Ficinus, who has supplied what was necessary to unite the unconnected members of the sentence, "Ego autem non sic existimo; e duobus enim alterum inquam."

³ All the words within the numerals are to be found only in the Latin of Ficinus, "speraveroque a dubitationibus liberari; neque vero alio me conferrem—" Something similar to which must have been read in his MS., for it is hardly possible to believe that he supplied them himself to complete the sense.

this be done at present. Lay it down then that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous to pay attention to other things, but to neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labour in other things; and imagine that I have really¹ spoken upon all other points, next in order to those, which I have just now gone through. I beg of you not to act in any respect otherwise, that I may not (hereafter),² as at present, partly praise you before Lysias and the rest, and blame you likewise in part. For I will say, Socrates, that you are worth every thing to the man, who is not yet exhorted; but to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment to his arriving at the end of virtue, and becoming happy.

¹ I have adopted *ὅντως* from one MS. in lieu of *οὕτως*.

² Ficinus has "*quemadmodum nunc ita et posthac*;" what the balance of the sentence evidently requires. He found, I suspect, in his MS., *ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὐθις, καθάπερ νῦν*—

INTRODUCTION TO THE EPISTLES.

THE last portion of the works of Plato, that have been considered by some scholars to be spurious, and genuine by others, are the Epistles. These, according to Diogenes Laertius, iii. 61, were thirteen in number; and just so many have been found in different MSS., and addressed to the parties mentioned by Diogenes, with the exception of the 10th and 11th; which, he says, were written respectively to Aristodemus and Leodamas, instead of Aristodorus and Laodamas, as found at present—a discrepancy evidently arising from a literal variation merely.

Out of the whole number, all but 1, 10, 11, 12, have been quoted distinctly, or covertly alluded to, by different writers, commencing with Cicero, and ending with some of the Greek fathers. One, however, the 12th, addressed to Archytas, is reported in some MSS. to be spurious; although Diogenes, in viii. 79, states it was written in answer to the letter there preserved from Archytas to Plato.

As scarcely any thing has been written upon the Epistles, with the exception of the notes of Stephens, based for the most part on the version of Ficinus, I have been compelled to say more than I should otherwise have done, with the view of directing attention to passages, where, from the corruptions in the text, I have been unable to see my way clearly.

THE
EPISTLES OF PLATO.

EPISTLE I.¹

DION TO DIONYSIUS—PROSPERITY.²

WHILE I was passing so long a time with you and administering the affairs of your kingdom the most faithfully³ of all, who took in hand your interests,⁴ I had to endure calumnies really grievous. For I know that nothing of a rather cruel kind you ever thought proper to do with my consent. And of this all, who have taken a part in the state with yourself, are my witnesses, with many of whom I have been engaged in a contest, after I had freed them from no trifling calamities. And when in possession of the sole power, I had often preserved for you the state, I have been sent away in a more ignominious manner than it became you to drive out a beggar, and you have ordered me to sail away, after I had resided with you for such a length of time. With regard to my future conduct, I shall consult my interest, somewhat more like a human being;

¹ Although this Epistle appears to have been written by Dion, it is ascribed to Plato in nearly all the MSS. but the one used by Ficinus. The whole of the superscription is however omitted in one MS., and the word *Πλάτων* alone in another.

² On the address *εὐ πρᾶττεν*, adopted by Plato, see Epist. iii. and the elaborate notes of Menage on Diog. L. iii. 61.

³ I have adopted *πιστευμένως*, in lieu of *πιστευμένος*, as suggested by the Bipont editor.

⁴ Such seems to be the meaning of *τὰς ὠφελείας ὑμῶν λαμβανόντων*. But *λαμβάνειν* is not, I suspect, to be found elsewhere in this sense. Ficinus has “*utilitates vestras captantibus*.”

¹ While you,
A tyrant of that kind, shall live alone.¹

As to the splendid gold, which you gave for my departure, Baccheius, the bearer of this epistle, brings it back; for it was neither sufficient for my travelling expenses, nor useful for the rest of life, and it would bring the greatest disgrace upon you as the giver, and not much less upon me, as the receiver. But it evidently makes no difference to you, either to give or receive as much gold as this; so that after getting it again, prove by it your attention to some other of your associates, as you did to me. For you have paid sufficiently an attention to me. And now one may mention opportunely the sentiment of Euripides, that

² When thy affairs shall otherwise fall out,
Thou'lt pray that such a man were standing by thee.³

But I wish to remind you, that the majority of other tragic poets, when they introduce a tyrant, dying at the hands of any one, make him call out,

By friends deserted, do I hapless perish;⁴

but no one represents a tyrant perishing through the want of gold. To those too, who possess any mind, that piece of poetry is thought to be not ill said,

Not glittering gold, 'mongst men⁵ most rare
During a life of hapless care,
Nor steel⁶ nor couch⁷ with silver dight,
By mortals⁸ valued, strike the sight,

¹ In the words *ὁ δὲ Τοιοῦτος ὢν τύραννος οἰήσεις μόνος*, there is evidently a dramatic fragment, as I have translated; and so there is in the preceding words, *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—ἀπανθρωπότατον*, which it would require no great talent to elicit.

² In *λαμπρόν* there is a latent irony, and so too in the subsequent *ικανῶς*.

³ In this distich, as detected by Barnes, I have with Stephens adopted *ἄλλως*, the correction of Cornarius, in lieu of *ἄλλων*.

⁴ Compare the sentiment in Gray,

“Deserted at his utmost need,
By friends his former bounty fed,”

when alluding to the death of Richard the Second.

⁵ One MS. has *ἐν θνατοῖς*, which seems preferable to *ἐν θνατῷ* or *ἐν θνατῶν* in the other.

⁶ Taylor translated *ἀδάμας* by “diamond,” an error into which some other scholars have fallen.

⁷ I have adopted *κλίνα*, found in one MS., in lieu of *κλίνας*.

⁸ Here too I have adopted *ἀνθρώπων*, from the margin of one MS., instead of *ἀνθρώπον*.

Nor fertile furrows of the earth's wide plain
Such self-sufficient power e'er obtain,
As of good men the mind, that thinks the same.¹

Fare thee well, and know that thou hast erred thus much as regards us, in order that you may conduct yourself better towards others.

EPISTLE II.

PLATO TO DIONYSIUS - PROSPERITY.

I HAVE heard from Archedemus, that you think that not only I ought to keep quiet myself, but my familiar friends likewise, on matters relating to yourself, and neither do or say any thing to your disparagement; but that you make an exception in the case of Dion. Now this assertion, that Dion is to be excepted, signifies that I have no power over my connexions. For if I had a power, as well over others as you and Dion, a greater good would be the result both to all of you and the rest of the Greeks, as I assert. But now I am great through rendering myself a follower of the dictates of my reason. And this I say, because Cratistolus and Polyxenus have not given you sound information; for one of them asserted, says common report, that he had heard at Olympia of many of my associates having spoken ill of you. But perhaps he heard more acutely than I did. ²For such a thing I have not heard.³ But it is requisite, as it seems to me, for you to act thus for the future, whenever any one says any thing about any one of us, by sending a letter to inquire of myself; for I shall neither be afraid or ashamed to tell the truth. But to you and me such is the state of circumstances with regard to each other that we are neither of us unknown to any one, so to say, of the Greeks; nor is our intercourse passed over in silence; nor let it be concealed from you, that it will not be

¹ From the word *ὁμοφράδμων* it is fair to infer that *φίλων τε* have dropt out after *ἀγαθῶν*, for, as Sallust says, "Idem velle atque idem nolle est —amicitia;" and a similar sentiment is to be found in Pseudo-Plato, Clitoph. § 6, and the passages quoted there.

² The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

the rudder of the mind, like that of a ship, to another, who has learnt the art of governing men; which, Socrates, you have often called the statesman's art, and said it is the same as that of the judge and justice. [4.] To these, and many other and very beautiful reasonings, in which it is asserted that virtue can be taught,¹ and that a person ought above all things to pay attention to himself, I have scarcely at any time said a word in opposition, nor do I think that I shall ever say. For I deem them to be very exhortatory and useful, and really awakening us, as if we were asleep. I have therefore given my mind to them, as one about to hear what is to follow; and I have asked at first, not yourself, Socrates, but your equals in age, or fellow-thinkers, or friends, or in whatever name one must call the (party)² thus disposed towards you. For among them, I have first of all asked those, who are thought by you to be something, by inquiring what would be the discourse after this; and laying down a subject³ after your manner, I have said to them—How are we to receive for the present, O best of men, the exhortation of Socrates to virtue? as being merely a word,⁴ but that it is not in our power to follow it up in deed, and to comprehend it thoroughly? And will this be our employment through the whole of life, to exhort those who have not been exhorted as yet? ⁵and for them (to exhort) others?⁶ Or is it requisite for us after this to inquire of Socrates and each other, since we confess that this should be done, what is to come next? How, say we,⁶ ought we to begin the discipline relating to justice? As if some one had exhorted us to pay attention to the body, on perceiving that we, like boys, had no notion that the care of the body belongs to the gymnastic

¹ This Socrates never asserted; at least if any reliance is to be placed on the *Meno*.

² I have translated as if γένος or φύλον had dropt out after τὸ τοιοῦτον—

³ Instead of τρόπον, Ficinus seems to have found τόπον in his MS. For his version is "questionem exposui."

⁴ The Greek is ὡς ὄνομα μόνον τούτου. But though τούτου might be referred to προτροπῆς, yet the subsequent πράγματι plainly shows that the author wrote, as I have translated, ὡς ὀνόματος ὄντος μόνον γ' αὐτοῦ. For ὄνομα and ἔργον are thus perpetually opposed to each other. See Porson on *Phæn.* 512.

⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

⁶ Ficinus omits φάμεν, which is here quite unnecessary.

and medical arts, and afterwards reproached us by saying, that it was disgraceful to pay every attention to wheat and barley, and vines, and such other things as we labour to obtain for the sake of the body, but that we search after no art or device, so that the body may be rendered in the best condition, and this too when there is such an art. If then we inquired of the person so exhorting us—Do you say there are such arts as these? perhaps he would say, There are the gymnastic and medical arts. ¹ And what now, we said, is the art that relates to the virtue of the soul? Let it be mentioned. ¹ [5.] ² But he, who seemed to be of the greatest strength for giving an answer to these questions, said to myself, that the very art, which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other than justice. And on my saying—Tell me not merely the name of the art, ³ but explain it further in this way. ³ There is an art called the medical. By this two things are effected; one, that physicians are always forming other physicians in addition to those already existing; the other, to effect health. Now of these one is no longer an art, but the work of the art, which teaches and is taught, which we call health. And in the case of carpentry, there is the building and the art; one the effect, and the other the teaching. So too of justice, one part is to make persons just, as each (of the arts mentioned) above (makes) artists. But what shall we say is the other work, which a just man is able to do for us? State it. One person ⁴ has, I think, said in answer to us, that it is “the conducive;” another, that it is “the becoming;” another, that it, is “the useful;” and another, that it is “the profitable.” But I rejoined by saying, that these very names exist in each of the arts, namely, to act rightly, profitably, usefully, and the like. But that, to which all these tend, each art will state itself. Thus, the art of carpentry will say, that “the right,”

¹ Ficinus has what is very different from the Greek—“eodem pacto nunc, quam artem circa animæ virtutem versari censeamus, respondeat, quisquis peritissimus horum sibi videtur;” which Taylor has adopted, with the exception of the concluding clause.

² Instead of *αὐτῶν*, two MSS. offer *αὐτῷ*, which leads to *αὐτῷ*, as I have translated.

³ The Greek is simply *ἀλλ' ὥδε*.—But Ficinus has more fully—“sed ulterius sic exponas;” which I have adopted.

⁴ Instead of *οὗτος*, Ficinus found *ἄλλος*, as shown by his “Respondit alius—”

"the beautiful," "the becoming," (tend to this,) that wooden furniture may be (aptly)¹ made; which is not art, (but the work of art).² Let in like manner be mentioned the work of justice. [6.] At last one of your friends, Socrates, who appeared to speak most elegantly, answered me, that this was the work peculiar to justice, which does not belong to any other science, namely, to cause a friendship amongst states. But he, on the other hand, on being interrogated, said that friendship was a good, and by no means an evil. But on being asked about the friendships³ of boys and of wild animals, for by that name we call (their attachments), he did not admit that they are friendships; for it happened that such (friendships) of theirs⁴ were for the greater part hurtful rather than advantageous; and that those, who call them so, call them falsely; but that friendship existing really and truly was most clearly an union of sentiment.⁵ But on being asked whether he meant by an union of sentiment, an agreement in opinion or science, he repudiated the agreement in opinion; for many and hurtful agreements in opinion are compelled to take place amongst men; but he conceded that friendship was entirely a good, and the work of justice; so that he said, an agreement in sentiment was the same as science really existing, but not opinion. But when we were at this part of our discourse, the parties present being in a state of doubt⁶ were competent to find fault with him,⁶ and to say, that the reasoning had run round to the point first mooted; and they affirmed that the medical art is a certain agreement in sentiment; and so are all the other arts; and that they are able to state about what they are conversant; but that the art called by you justice, or

¹ Taylor has here followed Ficinus, whose "apte" is not seen in the Greek.

² Here again Ficinus supplies what the train of thought requires, but is wanting in the Greek, "sed artis opus."

³ The word in Æschylus Prom. 501, is *σπρίγηθρα*. On the feelings felt by animals for each other, see the commentators on Virgil, G. iii. 517, "arator Mœrentem abjungens fraterna morte juvenum."

⁴ In lieu of *αὐτῶν*, two MSS. offer *αὐτῶν*, which I have adopted.

⁵ So Sallust, "Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum est firma amicitia." Compare Polit. p. 311, B., 351, D., and Alcib. I. p. 127, A., *εἰπερ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν*.

⁶ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, because they are not found in the version of Ficinus; while in lieu of *καὶ τοὶ ἦσαν*, the oldest MS. offers a remarkable various reading in *ἐπεχίρησαν*—

an agreement in sentiment, it had escaped them as to whither it tends, and that it is not manifest what is its work. At last I inquired of yourself, Socrates, upon these points; and you told me that it is the work of justice to injure enemies, and benefit friends; but afterwards it appeared to you, that the just man will never injure any one, but will act to the advantage of every one in all things. [7.] Having endured this not once, nor even twice, but for a length of time, and being urgent with you, Socrates, I was tired out; thinking, indeed, that you effected in the best manner of all men, the exhortation to the study of virtue; but that¹ one of two things (must take place),¹ either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further—which might happen in the case of any other art—as, for instance, that he who is not a pilot, may exercise himself in praising the pilot's art, as a thing of great value to man; and similarly in the case of other arts—so a person may perhaps apply the same remark on the subject of justice to yourself, as not having a greater knowledge than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful manner. ²Such however is not my (opinion), but (as I say),² one of two things (take place); either that you do not know (what justice is), or that you are unwilling to impart (the knowledge of it) to me. On this account then, I think I shall go to Thrasymachus, and wherever else I can, as being in doubt, ³(and where I hope I shall be freed from doubts; nor should I betake myself elsewhere,)³ if you were willing to finish your exhortatory discourses to me. Now, for instance, if I had been exhorted on the subject of the gymnastic art, that I ought not to neglect the body, you would state to me what comes next after the exhortation-speech, what is the nature of my body, and what attention it requires. And let

¹ Taylor has adopted what he found in the Latin of Ficinus, "e duobus alterutrum necesse est;" which would be in Greek, *duoiv δὲ δέσιν θάρσπον εἶναι*, not simply *duoiv δὲ θάρσπον*—

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this be done at present. Lay it down then that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous to pay attention to other things, but to neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labour in other things; and imagine that I have really¹ spoken upon all other points, next in order to those, which I have just now gone through. I beg of you not to act in any respect otherwise, that I may not (hereafter),² as at present, partly praise you before Lysias and the rest, and blame you likewise in part. For I will say, Socrates, that you are worth every thing to the man, who is not yet exhorted; but to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment to his arriving at the end of virtue, and becoming happy.

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THE last portion of the works of Plato, that have been considered by some scholars to be spurious, and genuine by others, are the Epistles. These, according to Diogenes Laertius, iii. 61, were thirteen in number; and just so many have been found in different MSS., and addressed to the parties mentioned by Diogenes, with the exception of the 10th and 11th; which, he says, were written respectively to Aristodemus and Leodamas, instead of Aristodorus and Laodamas, as found at present—a discrepancy evidently arising from a literal variation merely.

Out of the whole number, all but 1, 10, 11, 12, have been quoted distinctly, or covertly alluded to, by different writers, commencing with Cicero, and ending with some of the Greek fathers. One, however, the 12th, addressed to Archytas, is reported in some MSS. to be spurious; although Diogenes, in viii. 79, states it was written in answer to the letter there preserved from Archytas to Plato.

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THE

EPISTLES OF PLATO.

EPISTLE I.¹

DION TO DIONISIUS—PROSPERITY.²

WHILE I was passing so long a time with you and administering the affairs of your kingdom the most faithfully³ of all, who took in hand your interests,⁴ I had to endure calumnies really grievous. For I know that nothing of a rather cruel kind you ever thought proper to do with my consent. And of this all, who have taken a part in the state with yourself, are my witnesses, with many of whom I have been engaged in a contest, after I had freed them from no trifling calamities. And when in possession of the sole power, I had often preserved for you the state, I have been sent away in a more ignominious manner than it became you to drive out a beggar, and you have ordered me to sail away, after I had resided with you for such a length of time. With regard to my future conduct, I shall consult my interest, somewhat more like a human being;

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² On the address *εὐπράρτιον*, adopted by Plato, see Epist. iii. and the elaborate notes of Menage on Diog. L. iii. 61.

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⁴ Such seems to be the meaning of *τὰς ὠφελείας ὑμῶν λαμβανόντων*. But *λαμβάνειν* is not, I suspect, to be found elsewhere in this sense. Ficinus has "*utilitates vestras captantibus*."

¹ While you,
A tyrant of that kind, shall live alone.¹

As to the splendid gold, which you gave for my departure, Baccheius, the bearer of this epistle, brings it back; for it was neither sufficient for my travelling expenses, nor useful for the rest of life, and it would bring the greatest disgrace upon you as the giver, and not much less upon me, as the receiver. But it evidently makes no difference to you, either to give or receive as much gold as this; so that after getting it again, prove by it your attention to some other of your associates, as you did to me. For you have paid sufficiently an attention to me. And now one may mention opportunely the sentiment of Euripides, that

² When thy affairs shall otherwise fall out,
Thou'lt pray that such a man were standing by thee.²

But I wish to remind you, that the majority of other tragic poets, when they introduce a tyrant, dying at the hands of any one, make him call out,

By friends deserted, do I hapless perish;³

but no one represents a tyrant perishing through the want of gold. To those too, who possess any mind, that piece of poetry is thought to be not ill said,

Not glittering gold, 'mongst men⁴ most rare
During a life of hapless care,
Nor steel⁵ nor couch⁶ with silver dight,
By mortals⁷ valued, strike the sight,

^{1—1} In the words *οὐ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὢν τύραννος οὐδέ τις μόνος*, there is evidently a dramatic fragment, as I have translated; and so there is in the preceding words, *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—ἀπανθρωπότερον*, which it would require no great talent to elicit.

² In *λαμπρὸν* there is a latent irony, and so too in the subsequent *καυῶς*.

^{3—3} In this distich, as detected by Barnes, I have with Stephens adopted *ἄλλως*, the correction of Cornarius, in lieu of *ἄλλων*.

⁴ Compare the sentiment in Gray,

“Deserted at his utmost need,
By friends his former bounty fed,”

when alluding to the death of Richard the Second.

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Nor fertile furrows of the earth's wide plain
Such self-sufficient power e'er obtain,
As of good men the mind, that thinks the same.¹

Fare thee well, and know that thou hast erred thus much as regards us, in order that you may conduct yourself better towards others.

EPISTLE II

PLATO TO DIONYSIUS - PROSPERITY.

I HAVE heard from Archedemus, that you think that not only I ought to keep quiet myself, but my familiar friends likewise, on matters relating to yourself, and neither do or say any thing to your disparagement; but that you make an exception in the case of Dion. Now this assertion, that Dion is to be excepted, signifies that I have no power over my connexions. For if I had a power, as well over others as you and Dion, a greater good would be the result both to all of you and the rest of the Greeks, as I assert. But now I am great through rendering myself a follower of the dictates of my reason. And this I say, because Cratistolus and Polyxenus have not given you sound information; for one of them asserted, says common report, that he had heard at Olympia of many of my associates having spoken ill of you. But perhaps he heard more acutely than I did. ²For such a thing I have not heard.³ But it is requisite, as it seems to me, for you to act thus for the future, whenever any one says any thing about any one of us, by sending a letter to inquire of myself; for I shall neither be afraid or ashamed to tell the truth. But to you and me such is the state of circumstances with regard to each other that we are neither of us unknown to any one, so to say, of the Greeks; nor is our intercourse passed over in silence; nor let it be concealed from you, that it will not be

¹ From the word *ὁμοφράδμων* it is fair to infer that *φίλων τε* have dropt out after *ἀγαθῶν*, for, as Sallust says, "Idem velle atque idem nolle est —amicitia;" and a similar sentiment is to be found in Pseudo-Plato, Clitoph. § 6, and the passages quoted there.

² The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

passed over in silence in the time to come ; so many have obtained a knowledge of it, as having been neither little nor quietly carried on. But why do I say this ? I will now tell you, beginning from events far back :

Intellect and great power naturally tend to the same ; and these two always pursue, and seek after, and unite with each other. In the next place, men are delighted to speak about these subjects themselves ; and to hear about them from others in their private conversations, or in the writings of poets. Thus for example, when persons discourse about Hiero, and Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, they are delighted in bringing forward the intercourse of Simonides with these men, and what he did and said to them ; and they are accustomed to celebrate together Periander of Corinth, and Thales of Miletus ; and Pericles, and Anaxagoras ; and Croesus, and Solon, as being men of wisdom, and Cyrus, a person of power. Poets too, in imitation of this, bring together Creon and Tiresias, Polydus and Minos, Agamemnon and Nestor, Ulysses and Palamedes ; and, as it appears to me, for the same reason, the first men brought together Prometheus and Zeus ; and they sing of some of these, as having a difference, and others a friendship with each other ; and again, of some as having at one time a difference, and at another friendship ; and having similar feelings on some points, and different upon others. Now all these things I mention, as being willing to show that men will not be silent respecting us, when we are dead ; so that we ought to pay an attention to them. For we must, as it seems, pay some regard even to the time to come ; especially since it happens that the most slave-like persons do by a kind of nature, neglect it entirely ; but persons of a more elegant mind do every thing in order that they may be spoken well of hereafter. And this I consider an argument that the dead have a certain perception¹ of things here. For the most excellent minds divine that this is so, but the most depraved deny it. Now the divinations of god-like men are of greater weight than of those who are not so. And I conceive that if it were permitted for those persons of a former age, to whom I am alluding, to correct aught in their intercourse, they would earnestly endeavour that better things be said of them, than

¹ This doctrine is laid down only hesitatingly in Menexen. § 20.

at present. This however it is still permitted us to say, god willing, that if any thing has been done not correctly during our former intercourse, either in word or deed, we may correct it. For on the subject of philosophy I assert that a true opinion will be formed of us; a better one if we are persons of worth, but the contrary, if we are worthless. And indeed, if we pay attention to this, we shall not do any thing more pious; nor any thing more impious, if we neglect it. But how this ought to take place, and how it is just, I will explain.

When I came to Sicily, I had the reputation of excelling very much in philosophy; and I wished on my arrival at Syracuse to have you a witness in my favour, in order¹ that philosophy might be honoured by the multitude. But this did not turn out prosperously.² I do not however assign that as the reason which the many would say, but because you appeared unwilling to put implicit confidence in me; but willing to send me away and to send for others, and to inquire what my business was, by this, as it seems, distrusting me. And they, who were proclaiming loudly these matters, were many, affirming that you had a contempt for myself, and were seriously applying yourself to other things. Such were the reports at that time bruited abroad.

Now hear what after this it is just to do, in order that I may reply to your question, how you and I ought to conduct ourselves to each other. If then you have a contempt for philosophy, bid farewell to it. But if you have heard from another, or discovered³ yourself any thing more excellent³ than what you have from me, honour it. But if what (you have heard) from me please you, then must you honour highly myself likewise. Now, therefore, as from the beginning, do you lead and I will follow. For being honoured by you, I will honour you (in return); but not being honoured, I shall keep quiet. Further still, if by honouring me, you

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were—*οἱ μοι, ἵνα δῇ*—not *σε, ἵνα δῇ μοι*—where *μοι* has no meaning.

² Why *εὐαγέας* is thus rendered by Picinus and Ast, I cannot understand. The word is learnedly illustrated by Hemsterhuis in a note printed by Gaisford on Markland's Eurip. Suppl. 662.

³—³ I have adopted, in lieu of *βελτίονα εὐρηκας*—*ἐκεῖνα* from one MS. *βέλτιον εὐρηκας τι*, and *ἐκεῖνο*, similar to "*Si quid novisti rectius istius*" in Horace.

take the lead in this,¹ you will seem to honour philosophy; and that very thing,² which you are considering even otherwise,³ will bring you the reputation of being considered by the multitude a philosopher. But by honouring you, when not honouring me, I should seem to be admiring and pursuing wealth; but this we know has a name dishonourable amongst all men; and, to sum up, by your honouring me, there will be an ornament to both of us; but by my (honouring) you, a disgrace to both. And thus much on these matters.

But the little sphere³ does not answer; and this Archidemus will show you, when he arrives. Moreover, you must explain to him very distinctly respecting the matter, which is far more honourable and divine than this, and respecting which you sent as being in doubt. For you say, according to his report, that there has not been a sufficient demonstration respecting the nature of the first. I must speak to you by enigmas,⁴ in order that, should the tablet meet with any accident in its folds by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand.⁴ For such is the case.

"As regards the king of all, all things are his,⁵ and all are for his sake, and he is the cause of all that is beautiful. But about a second are the secondary things; and about a third the third. Now the soul of man is eager to learn respecting these things of what kind they are, looking to what is allied to itself, none of which it possesses sufficiently. ⁶But respecting the king (himself)⁶ and those of which I have spoken, there is nothing of this kind. But of that, which is after this, does the soul speak. But of what kind, son of Dionysius and Doris, is your inquiry

¹ I cannot understand *τούτου*: nor could Ficinus; whose version is—"honorare prius me caperis." Perhaps Plato wrote, *αὐτὸς* or *οὕτω*—

² Here again I am at a loss, and so was Ficinus. For he has—"quod tu imprimis cupiebas."

³ What this little sphere was is uncertain. Perhaps it was a kind of orrery. T. See Epist. 13.

⁴ In the Greek words between the numerals lies hid a tragic distich, "Ἴν' ἂν τι δέλφος ἐν πτυχαῖς πόντου δία ἥ γῆς πάθῃ, μὴ γινῶ τὸ γράμμα τις τυχών: as may be inferred from Eurip. Iph. T. 1744, ed. Monk.

⁵ I have followed one MS. that reads *πάντ' ἐκείνου ἔστι*, instead of *πάντ' ἔστι καὶ ἐκείνου*—

⁶ Ficinus has—"sed in rege ipso et in his," as if he had found in his MS. *τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως αὐτοῦ*—in lieu of *τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως πέρι*—

concerning what is the cause of all things evil.¹ Or rather, is it not a kind of labour-throes on this point, which are produced in the soul, and which if a person does not take away from it, (the soul) will never meet with truth existing in reality.

And you told me that you had thought of this in the garden under the laurel trees, and that it was your discovery. And I said, that if this appeared to you to be the case, you had freed me from a long discussion. I said however that I had never met with any other person, who had discovered it, but that it had been a great source of trouble to myself. But perhaps you have heard this from some one; but accidentally impelled in this direction by a divine allotment,² you have not kept firm hold of the demonstrations on this point, and pinned them down;³ but you are dashing on, at one time in this way, and at another in a different way, to what is the object of fancy; but such it is not. Nor has this occurred to you alone; but be well assured, that no one, when he first hears me, is otherwise affected than thus ⁴in the beginning.⁴ And one having more trouble, and another less, are with difficulty liberated from it; but nearly all of them have of it not a little. Such then having been, and is still the case, we have in my opinion nearly discovered that, about which you sent to me, namely, how we ought to be affected towards each other. For since you are testing (my doctrines) by associating with other persons, and ⁵placing them by the side of those (promulgated) by others, and (considering)⁵

¹ In lieu of *κακῶν*, Proclus, in Theolog. Platon. ii. 4, p. 103, offers *καλῶν*, adopted by Taylor; and so one MS. collated by Bekker. The other however is the preferable reading. Unless it be said that Plato wrote both, *καλῶν τε καὶ κακῶν*. For Dionysius, like many philosophers before and after his time, was puzzled with the origin and continuance of evil, introduced by one or more powers, the authors of all good.

² The expression *θεῖα μοῖρα* would now be applied to what we call "genius," or "gift of nature."

³ So I have translated *καρίδηςας*. Ficinus has "protulisti," which would lead to *καρίδειξας*—

⁴ Ficinus omits *κατ' ἀρχάς*, probably deeming them superfluous after *πρῶτον ἀκούσαντι*. Perhaps Plato wrote *κατὰ παραχάς*, "by some confusion."

⁵ The Greek is *παράθιμενος*. But there is, I suspect, no such compound in Greek. Ficinus has "cum—comparaveris," from which Faehse was led to *παράθιμενος*, which I have adopted, and translated as if *θιῶμενος* had dropped out before *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*.

them by themselves, ¹they will, if the touchstone be true, still stick to you, and you will be at home with them and us.¹ How then shall these things, and all we have spoken of, not take place?

You have therefore done well in having sent Archedemus; and hereafter, when he shall have reached you, and told you my message, other doubts will perhaps lay hold of you. If then you take counsel of yourself properly, you will send Archedemus to me again; and he, like a travelling trader, will return again to you. And if you do this twice or thrice, and test sufficiently what is sent from me, I shall wonder, if your former doubts be not very different from what they are now. Act then thus boldly; for neither will you send, nor Archedemus act the part of a travelling trader, in a manner more beautiful or more acceptable to the deity, than by a trading of this kind. Be careful, however, that these things do not fall peradventure among men devoid of instruction; for, as it appears to me, there are scarcely any doctrines² which will appear more ridiculous to the multitude than these; nor on the other hand any more wonderful, and producing a greater enthusiasm in those who are well disposed. But when they are often mentioned, and continually heard, and this for many years, they are scarcely at length, and with great labour, purified like gold.

³But hear what is wonderful there;³ for even a good many persons have heard these things, who are able to learn and

¹—¹ Ficinus, apparently not understanding the meaning of *προσφύσσειν*, has thus given the general sense of the passage—"modo rectum examen peregeris, consentientem nobis te et nostris præbebis;" which Taylor was content to translate literally into English. With regard to *οἰκίος*, the phrase "at home" keeps closer to the Greek than its usual version, "a familiar friend."

² The Greek is *ἀκούσματα*, literally "hearings." For previous to the invention of printing, the philosophers of old promulgated their principles partly by writing, but more frequently by word of mouth, before persons who listened to their intellectual "displays," as they were then called; but which would now be called "lectures," a word that means literally "readings," and is applied sometimes to discourses spoken even extempore.

³ The Greek is *ὃ δὲ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοῦ γίγνεται, ἀκούσον*: where I cannot understand *αὐτοῦ*. Ficinus has "Nam, quod in hac re mirabile contingere consuevit, id audi." One MS. omits *αὐτοῦ*. Perhaps Plato wrote *εἰ τι*—

able to remember, and after testing every thing in every way, to come to a decision, being already old men, and who have heard these things for not less than thirty years; and who asserted lately that, what formerly appeared to them to be the least worthy of belief, now appears the most so, and perfectly clear; but what was most worthy of belief then, is the very reverse now. Directing therefore your mind to this, be careful lest it repent you of what has now unworthily fallen from you. Now the greatest guard in this case is in not writing but learning; for what is written, it cannot be but that it will get abroad. On this account, then, I have never at any time written any thing about them; nor is there any composition of Plato (by name), nor will there be; but what has now¹ been said belong to Socrates, who was, even when young, a handsome person.¹ Fare thee well, and be persuaded by me; and, after frequently reading this epistle, burn it. And thus much on these matters.

With respect to Polyxenus, you have wondered that I did not send him to you. But I say now, as of old, respecting Lycophron, and the others who are with you, that, both naturally, and from the method of your discourse, you very much excel them in the art of speaking; nor is any one of them confuted willingly, as some suppose, but unwillingly; and you appear indeed to have treated them with great moderation, and to have bestowed upon them (honourable)² presents. So much

¹—¹ The Greek is τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα Σωκράτους ἐστὶ καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος. But Julian in Orat. vi. p. 189, A., quotes φερόμενα, which, says Wytttenbach in Epist. Crit. p. 16, answers better to ἀποφερόμεναι ἐρωτήσεως, in Theætet. p. 148, E. But how Socrates could be said to be at any period of life “a handsome man,” I cannot understand. For he was not only the reverse, but even prided himself on being so. Wytttenbach indeed asserts that the expression καλὸς καὶ νέος is well suited to Socrates, as being ἐρωτικός. But a person may easily be ἐρωτικός without being at the same time καλὸς καὶ νέος. As however the passage is quoted in its present form by Aristides, T. ii. p. 288, and Stobæus cix. p. 355, it seems hazardous to suggest any alteration; else one would suspect that Plato wrote τὰ δὲ νῦν φερόμενα διὰ Σωκράτους ἐστ’ οὐκ ἄνου, καὶ νέου γεγονότος, λεγόμενα, i. e. “but what has now been published is spoken through the mouth of Socrates, who was, even when young, no fool.” To obviate probably the difficulty in καλοῦ, Ficinus translated it “virtute claruit.”

² Ficinus has “et honestis eos muneribus prosecutus,” as if he had found in his MS. καὶ καλῶς δεδωρῆσθαι.

on these matters, which for such matters is much. But if you make use of Philistion at all, make a great use of him; and, if you can, lend Speusippus (something),¹ and send him away. Speusippus too stands in need of you. And Philistion too promised me, that he would very willingly come to Athens if you would dismiss him. You have likewise done well in dismissing him² from the stone quarries. But trifling is the request both respecting his domestics, and Hegesippus, the son of Ariston; for you sent word to me, that if any one injured either him or them, and you knew of it, you would not overlook it. And of Lysiclides it is worth while to speak the truth; for he alone of those, who came from Sicily to Athens, has caused no change as regards our intercourse with each other, but ever continues to say something good, and what is for the best respecting what has occurred.

EPISTLE III.

³PLATO TO DIONYSIUS.³

HAVING put in a letter "all hail," can I have truly found the best address?⁴ or rather⁵ by writing, according to my

¹ Ficinus, not aware that *χρῆσον* comes from *χράω*, "I lend," translates "Speusippi opere utere," whom Taylor has followed as usual. It is evident however that *τι* has dropt out after *Σπενσίππῳ*. For Plato meant to say, that without some assistance in the shape of a loan, Speusippus could not leave Syracuse.

² After *τὸν* Stephens suspected that *Φιλόξενον* has dropt out, or the name of some other person.

³ I have adopted, what Ficinus seems to have found in his MS., as remarked by Stephens.

⁴ With the idea contained in these words may be compared the expression in Eurip. Med. 663, *Μήδεια, χαῖρε· τοῦδε γὰρ τοῦ φρομίῳ Κάλλιον οὐδεὶς οἶδε*.

⁵ The Greek is *ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν γράφων εὖ πράττειν ὥσπερ εἶωθα ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς τοὺς φίλους προσαγορεύειν*. But Ficinus has "an quemadmodum ego solitus sum scribere ad amicos, bene agere," thus omitting the words *κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν* and *ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς*. On the other hand Menage, on Diog. L. iii. 61, rejects *ὥσπερ εἶωθα* as an interpretation of *κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν γράφοιμ' ἂν*, "εὖ

custom, "Prosperity," as I am accustomed to address friends in my letters.⁵ For you, as they who went on a sacred embassy¹ related, addressed the god at Delphi, by this very flattering expression, and wrote, as they say,

Hail, and preserve the tyrant's pleasant life.

But I would exhort not even a man, much less a deity, by an invocation, to do this; not a deity, because I should give a command contrary to his nature, since the deity is seated far from pleasure and pain; nor a man, because pleasure frequently begets mischief,² and pain produces² in the soul indocility, and forgetfulness, and silliness, and insolence. And thus much let it be said by me on the subject of the address; and do you, after having read this, receive it as you are willing to receive it.

Not a few report, that you stated to certain persons sent to you, that, when I heard you saying that you were about to establish Grecian cities in Sicily, and to relieve the people of Syracuse by changing the government from an absolute to a limited monarchy, I prevented you from doing³ so; although, as you assert, you were very eager on the matter; but that now I have taught Dion to do the very same thing himself; and that, according to your notions, we are depriving you of your power. You indeed know whether you are benefited by such assertions. You are however injuring me by stating the contrary to what really occurred; for I have been sufficiently prejudiced by Philistides and many others in the eyes of the hired troops and the mob of Syracuse, through my remaining in the Acropolis; while they without (I think)⁴ would, had any error taken place, have turned it all against myself, by assert-

πράττειν," *ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πρὸς φίλους προσαγορεύων*, i. e. or rather shall I write according to my custom "Prosperity," while addressing friends in my letters.

¹ On the word *θεωρεῖν* see Blomfield's *Prom.* 118.

² I have translated as if the Greek were *γεννᾷ, καὶ λύπη*, not *καὶ λύπη γεννᾷ*. For thus while pleasure begets mischief (to the body), pain affects the soul in a similar manner.

³ In lieu of *ἔρα*, Ficinus found in his MS. *δρᾶν*, as shown by his "*ne faceres*."

⁴ Stephens was the first to remark that there is nothing to govern *τοῦς ἐξωθεν*: to preserve therefore the syntax, I have translated as if *οἶμαι* had dropt out after *ἐξωθεν*, and *ἂν* after *τρίπειν*.

ing (tenaciously)¹ that you were persuaded in all things by me. But you knew yourself most clearly, that of my own accord I meddled very little with politics, except at first, when I thought I might do something beneficial, and that I was moderately engaged in some other trifling matters, and upon the Proœms of the Laws, with the exception of what you and some one else have written as an addition; for I hear that some persons after you have been tampering with them.² Each portion will however be plain to those, who are able to distinguish my manner. But, as I just now said, I do not stand in need of calumny before the Syracusans, and certain others, if you can persuade them (by speaking) in this way; but I am much more in want of an apology against the former calumny, and that, which has now been produced after it, both greater and more violent.

Against these two (calumnies) therefore, it is necessary for me to make a two-fold apology (by saying), in the first place, that I properly avoided taking a share with you in the affairs of the city; and in the second place, that ³I know it was not my advice, as you have asserted, that exhorted you, nor³ was I an impediment to you, when about to establish the Grecian cities. Hear then first the commencement of those matters, about which I have spoken the first.

I came to Syracuse invited by yourself and Dion, who had already passed an ordeal with me, and had been of old my guest; and who was of the middle and staid period of life—(men) of whom there is altogether a need to such as possess

¹ The Greek is in some MSS. *οὐ φάσκοντας τίνας*, where Stephens would omit *τίνας*, not found in Ficinus, nor in three other MSS. One however has *σε τίνας φάσκοντας*, which leads to *ἀπενὶς φάσκοντας σε*, where *ἀπενὶς* is a Platonic word, found in Rep. vii. p. 547, E., *ἀπενεῖς ἀνδράς*, and explained by Suidas, *συνεχίς—ἀγαν ἰσχυρῶς*: while Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 53, has given some instances of its loss and corruption.

² If after the laws of Plato had been thus tampered with, the author himself never put forth an unadulterated edition, it will be difficult, despite what he says in the next sentence, always to separate the genuine from the spurious matter.

³ The Greek is *οὐκ ἔμην ταύτην εἰρηκας συμβουλήν οὐδε διακώλυσιν μίλλοντι* in some MSS., but in others *διακωλύσειν*, and in one *διδασκαλίαν*. Ficinus has “*meum illud consilium non fuisse, quod tu ais, ut suaderem tibi*—” From whence I have elicited *οὐκ ἔμην ταύτην, ἣν εἰρηκας, συμβουλήν εἶναι οἶδα διακελεύουσιν οὐδὲ*—where *διακελεύουσιν*, is confirmed by *κελεύων* in p. 319, B.

even a little intellect, when they are about to consult about affairs such as yours were then; while you were very young, and had great inexperience on those points, in which it behoved you to have been skilled, and you were perfectly unknown to me. After this, some man, or god, or fortune, did in conjunction with yourself drive out Dion, and you were left alone. Think you then at that time I would have held any communion with you on affairs of state, when I had lost a sensible partner? and when I saw a senseless person was left with many and wicked men, not ruling in reality, but fancying himself to be a ruler, although he was ruled over by men of such a kind? Under these circumstances, what ought I to have done? ¹Is it not of necessity, from what occurred afterwards,¹ just what I did do? To bid farewell to state affairs, and to be cautious of the calumnies arising from envy, and to endeavour to make all of you, although separated and at variance, friends as much as possible to each other. And of this you are the witness, that in bringing this about I never abated a jot. And though with some difficulty, it was nevertheless agreed that I should sail homewards, since a war detained you; but that, when peace took place, I and Dion should come to Syracuse again, and that you should invite us. Such were the circumstances that occurred, touching my first sojourn at Syracuse, and of my safe return home.

On peace being made, you invited me a second time; not, however, according to the agreement; but you wrote to me to come alone; and said that you would send for Dion afterwards. On this account I did not come, and displeased Dion; for he thought it would be better to come and hearken to you. In a year after this a trireme arrived, and letters from yourself; and the language of the letter began (by saying), that if I would come, the affairs of Dion should be settled according to my mind; but the contrary, if I did not come. I am ashamed to say, how many letters then came both from you and others through you from Italy and Sicily, to myself and to such as were my relations and acquaintances, all of them exhorting me to go, and begging me by all means to yield to your request. It seemed therefore good to all, beginning from Dion, that I should set sail, and not act the coward.² And

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

² Compare Epist. 7, p. 329, B., *καταμαλθακισθεὶς καὶ ἀποδειλιῶν*.

yet I put forward before them my period of life; and I strenuously urged with respect to yourself, that you would be unable to defend me against those calumniating us, and wishing us to become free. For I saw then, and I see now, that the great and over-swollen property of private persons and almost monarchs, that the greater they are, the more do they nourish calumniators many and mighty, and who associate for the sake of pleasure, together with mischief of a shameful kind; an evil greater than which neither does wealth produce, nor the influence of any other power. Bidding, however, farewell to all these ideas, I came, after thoroughly reflecting, that not one of my friends would have to accuse me, in that through my negligence, their interests had been, when they might have been safe, destroyed. On my arrival—for surely you know all that occurred thereupon—I thought it right, according to the compact made in your letters, that you should in the first place bring back Dion and restore him to your familiar intercourse; such familiar intercourse, I mean, as that, by which,¹ if you had been persuaded by me, something better, than what has taken place, would have happened to yourself, and Syracuse, and the rest of the Greeks, at least as my opinion divines. And then I thought it right that the relations of Dion should have his property, and that those, whom you know² did divide it, should not have divided it. Moreover I thought that what was customary should be sent to him each year, and rather more, and not less, be sent on account of my being present. But succeeding in none of these demands, I determined to depart. After this, however, you persuaded me to remain a year, by saying that you would sell³ all the property of Dion, and send one half to Corinth, and leave the residue to his son. I could relate many other things, not one of which, after promising, you have performed; but, on account of their multitude, I will cut them short. For after you had sold all the property of Dion, without having per-

¹ In lieu of *ἦν*, which has nothing to govern it, the sense and syntax require *ᾗ*; and just afterwards, *βέλτιον τι τῷ—τοῦ*, in lieu of *βέλτιον τῷ—τοῦ*.

² Instead of *εἶδα*, Ficinus seems to have found some other word in his MS.; for his version is "præfeceras—"

³ Ficinus, disregarding the difference in meaning between *ἀποδοῦναι* and *ἀποδοθεῖν*, renders *ἀποδομενός* by "redditurum;" and he is followed, as usual, by Taylor.

sued him to that step, although you said you would not do so, without first persuading him, you have put, O wonderful man, a most glorious¹ finish² to all your promises. For you discovered a plan neither honourable, nor clever, nor just, nor advantageous, to frighten me, as being ignorant of what had taken place at that time, in order that I might not require the money to be sent. For when you were intending to banish Heraclides, an act that did not seem just to the Syracusans, or to myself, and on that I did, together with Theodotus and Euribius, request you not to do so, you laid hold of this as a sufficient pretext, and said that I had evidently been for some time past caring nothing for you, but only for Dion, and his friends and relatives; and that since Theodotus and Heraclides are now calumniated, as being the relatives of Dion, I am devising in every way for them not to suffer punishment. And thus much on the subject of the intercourse between you and myself on state affairs. And if you have seen any estrangement in me towards yourself, think it only reasonable for all this to have happened in this way, and do not wonder at it; for to any one possessing any intellect, I should justly appear to be a knave, if I were induced by the greatness of your power, to betray an old friend and guest, when doing badly through you, and being, so to say, not inferior to yourself, and to prefer you, when committing an act of injustice, and to do whatever you ordered, for the sake, it is evident, of money; for no other reason would any one have assigned for this change in me, if changed I had been. But these events, occurring in this way, have through yourself produced a kind of wolf-friendship,³ and a want of cordiality between you and me.

¹ Literally, "most youth-like." Compare *νιανικός φόβος* in Eurip. Hipp. 1204, which is explained by "vehement." I suspect, however, that *νιανικώτατον* here conceals some corruption, as *νιανικωτάτου* does in Alcib. I. § 2, where I have suggested *μεγαλειστότου*, in allusion to the grandfather of Alcibiades on his mother's side.

² Literally, "Colophon"—On the meaning of the metaphor, see at Euthyd. § 71.

³ This is, I suspect, an allusion to an Æsopo-Socratic fable, in which a shepherd forms a friendship with a wolf; who, after being taught to carry off the sheep of other owners, feasts on those of its own friend. Something similar is still extant in MS. Flor., in No. 105. Ficinus, not aware of this circumstance, has translated, "succensendi"—Gataker, however, on Marc. Antonin. xi. 15 says the allu-

The discourse has now come nearly ¹to the point, connected ¹with what has just now occurred, and for which I said I must in the second place apologize. Attend therefore diligently, and consider whether I appear to you to tell a falsehood, and not the truth. For I assert that you did, when Archedemus and Aristocritus were present in the garden, about twenty days before my departure homewards from Syracuse, find fault with me on the points you have just now mentioned, how that I was more concerned for Heraclides, and all the rest, than for you. And you likewise asked me in their presence, whether I remembered that on my first coming to Syracuse, I exhorted you to establish the Grecian cities. And I acknowledged that I did remember; and, even now, it appears to me that it is best (to do so). I must likewise relate, Dionysius, what was said at that time after this. For I asked you whether I advised you (to do) this alone, or something else besides this. But you answered me in a very angry and insulting manner, as you thought; and on this account the insult of that period has become ²a day-dream, instead of a night one.² For ³you said laughing in not a feigned manner, if I remembered, that you had exhorted me, after I had been instructed, to do all these things or not.³ I replied, that you had very properly reminded me. You then said—Was it after being instructed in geometry? or how? After this I did not say what it came into my mind to say, through

sion is to *Æsop. Fab. 237*, and would read here *ἀκοινωνήσις*, in lieu of *ἀκοινωνία*, which he says is not a correct Greek word; while the other is found in Aristotle, *Polit. ii. 3*, and in the letter of Cornelius, bishop of Rome, preserved by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl. vi. 43*, *τὴν ἀκοινωνήσιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ λυκοφιλίαν*. Gataker quotes likewise Menander, *Fr. Inc. 203*, *Λυκοφιλοὶ μὲν εἰσιν αἱ διαλλαγαί*.

¹ The Greek is *εἰς λόγον—λόγος—ξυνεχής*. But Ficinus has "opportune sermo," omitting entirely *ξυνεχής τῷ νῦν δὴ γενομένῳ*. Hence Stephens supposed that Ficinus found in his MS. *εἰς καλὸν* in lieu of *εἰς λόγον*. I have translated as if the Greek were *εἰς τόπον—λόγος—ξυνεχῇ*—to which I was led by finding *ξυνεχεῖς*, i. e. *ξυνεχῆς*, in one MS. On the loss of *τόπον* I have spoken elsewhere.

² i. e. "a true vision instead of a false one." On the expression *ὑπάρ' ἀντ' ὁσιπάρως*, see at *Phileb. § 75*.

³ This I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is "Rogasti autem me—si bene quid memini—an ista præcepissem tibi quasi docto an non;" but whether he found the Greek in his MS. corresponding to the Latin may be fairly doubted. There is evidently something wrong here, which better MSS. alone will enable us to correct.

the fear that, on account of a trifling word, the sailing-away, which I expected, 'would be in a narrow instead of a wide space.¹ This then is for the sake of all what has been said by me.² Do not calumniate me by saying that I did not permit you to colonize the Grecian cities, subverted by the Barbarians, and to assist the Syracusans by your changing to a limited monarchy instead of an absolute one. For you cannot state any falsehood against me, which is less suited to myself than this.

If there appeared to be any where a sufficient power of deciding, I could give in addition to these, arguments still clearer, (to prove) that I exhorted you to act in this way, but that you were unwilling to do so. And in truth it is not difficult to show clearly, that had this been done, it would have been the best for yourself, the Syracusans, and all the Siceliotes.³ If then you deny you have said so, after you had so said, I have a right of action against you. But if you confess you did (say so), consider after this that Stesichorus was a wise man, and imitating his recantation,⁴ betake yourself from a false assertion to a true one.

EPISTLE IV.

PLATO TO DION OF SYRACUSE—PROSPERITY.

I THINK that my readiness with respect to events as they occur, is apparent at all times, and that I give much of a serious attention to their being brought to pass for the sake of nothing

¹—¹ The words *Μή μοι στενός γίνουτ' ἀντ' εὐρυχωρίας* evidently conceal an iambic verse, *Μή μοι γίνουτ' ἀντ' εὐρυχωρίας στενός*, which eventually became a proverb amongst the sea-faring Athenians; who knew, as the English do, that there is little danger as long as there is plenty of sea-room; and that it is only in a strait, or in shallow water, that a sailor feels any fear.

² Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "*cæterum ad illud jam redeamus, quo tendunt hæc omnia.*"

³ The indigenous inhabitants of Sicily were called *Σικελοί*: the foreigners, who settled there, *Σικελιώται*.

⁴ To the same recantation of Stesichorus there is an allusion in the *Phædrus*, § 44. See Blomfield in *Stesichor. Fragm. 5*, in the *Museum Criticum*, T. i. p. 263.

The discourse has now come nearly ¹to the point, connected ¹with what has just now occurred, and for which I said I must in the second place apologize. Attend therefore diligently, and consider whether I appear to you to tell a falsehood, and not the truth. For I assert that you did, when Archedemus and Aristocritus were present in the garden, about twenty days before my departure homewards from Syracuse, find fault with me on the points you have just now mentioned, how that I was more concerned for Heraclides, and all the rest, than for you. And you likewise asked me in their presence, whether I remembered that on my first coming to Syracuse, I exhorted you to establish the Grecian cities. And I acknowledged that I did remember; and, even now, it appears to me that it is best (to do so). I must likewise relate, Dionysius, what was said at that time after this. For I asked you whether I advised you (to do) this alone, or something else besides this. But you answered me in a very angry and insulting manner, as you thought; and on this account the insult of that period has become ²a day-dream, instead of a night one. ²For ³you said laughing in not a feigned manner, if I remembered, that you had exhorted me, after I had been instructed, to do all these things or not. ³I replied, that you had very properly reminded me. You then said—Was it after being instructed in geometry? or how? After this I did not say what it came into my mind to say, through

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EPISTLE IV.

PLATO TO DION OF SYRACUSE—PROSPERITY.

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¹—¹ The words *Μή μοι στενός γίνουι' ἀντ' εὐρυχωρίας* evidently conceal an Iambic verse, *Μή μοι γίνουι' ἀντ' εὐρυχωρίας στενός*, which eventually became a proverb amongst the sea-faring Athenians; who knew, as the English do, that there is little danger as long as there is plenty of sea-room; and that it is only in a strait, or in shallow water, that a sailor feels any fear.

² Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "*cæterum ad illud jam redeamus, quo tendunt hæc omnia.*"

³ The indigenous inhabitants of Sicily were called *Σικελοί*: the foreigners, who settled there, *Σικελιώται*.

⁴ To the same recantation of Stesichorus there is an allusion in the Phædrus, § 44. See Blomfield in Stesichor. Fragm. 5, in the Museum Criticum, T. i. p. 263.

else rather than a love of honour in the case of things honourable. For I consider it just, that they, who are in good truth worthy men, and who act in this manner, should obtain the renown due to them. At present, matters are, to speak with god's will, doing well; but in those that relate to the future there is the greatest contest. For to excel in fortitude, swiftness, and strength, would seem to be in the power of some others;¹ but to excel all the others in truth, justice, magnificence, and the graceful bearing relating to all these, any one would agree to honour in reason those, who establish their claim to qualities such as these. Now then what I am saying is manifest. But at the same time we ought to remind ourselves, that it is proper² to excel the rest of men, whom you know more than boys.³ Hence we ought to become manifest, as being such as we say; especially since, so to say, with god's will, it will be easy: for to others it has happened that it was necessary for them to have wandered in many a place,⁴ if they were about to be known.⁵ But that which is now existing about you is such, so that persons from the whole of the inhabited (earth), if one may speak in rather an arrogant style, are looking to one spot, and in that spot to yourself especially. Since then you are beheld by all men, prepare to exhibit yourself, as that celebrated Lyncurgus of the olden time, and Cyrus, and if there is any one else, who has ever been thought to excel in moral and political (virtues); especially since many, and indeed nearly all here say, there is a great expectation that, when Dionysius is taken off, affairs will be in a ruinous state, through the ambition of yourself, and Heraclides, and Theodotus, and others of your acquaintances.

Let then, the most of all, such a person not exist. But if he should exist, do you appear as a healer,⁶ and ye will proceed

¹ I confess I hardly understand here *ἐτέρων τινων*.

²⁻³ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I cannot understand; nor could, I suspect, Ficinus, whose version is, "oportere nos, ut te non latet, plus ab aliis quam viros a pueros differre—" unless it be said that he found in his MS., as remarked by Stephens, *προσέκει πλέον ἢ παιδων ἀνδρας, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, ὥς οἶσα δῆπου*.

⁴⁻⁵ The Greek is *εἰ μᾶλλονσι γνωσθῆναι*. Ficinus has "ad id consequendum."

⁶ Such is the translation of the Greek. But Ficinus has "ut res in melius deducantur," as if he had found in his MS. *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἀνελθοι πᾶν*, not *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἐλθοιτ' ἂν*. One MS. subsequently collated reads *βέλτιον*.

on to what is best.⁴ It appears perhaps to you ridiculous for me to mention these things, because you are yourself not ignorant of them. But I see that in the theatres the combatants are incited by children, to say nothing of their friends, whom one might suppose would through a kind feeling cheer them on with earnestness. Now then do you enter the contest, and send me word by a letter if you require at all my assistance. Affairs are here very nearly as when you were present. Inform me too what has been done, or what you are now doing; for though we hear many things, we know nothing. And now letters from Theodotus and Heraclides have come to Lacedæmon and Ægina. But we, as has been stated, although we hear many things¹ about those here,¹ know nothing. Bear in mind that you seem to some to be less attentive than is fitting. Let it therefore not escape you, that by pleasing men it is possible to do (something); but that austerity has its dwelling in a desert. May good fortune be thine.

EPISTLE V.

DION² TO PERDICCAS—PROSPERITY.

I HAVE advised Euphræus, as you enjoined in your letter, to occupy himself about all³ that is a care to you. And I am justified in giving you advice, suited to a host, and what is

¹—¹ The words *περὶ τῶν τῶδε*, which are at variance with the train of ideas, are omitted in five MSS. Ficinus has what is at least intelligible—"audientes multa de rebus vestris nihil aperte percipimus." Perhaps the author of this letter wrote *παρὰ τῶν τῶδε*—i. e. from persons here.

² Taylor has here tacitly followed the earlier editions, where this letter is ascribed to Dion; and in the *Classical Journal*, No. 60, p. 305, he says that, from the mention of Plato in it, the writer must have been some other person. It is however quoted as Plato's by Cicero in *Epistol. ad Divers.* i. 9; but that, says Stephens, might have happened, not because Cicero conceived Plato to be the writer, but because it alluded to something said in his person.

³ Instead of *ταῦτα*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were *πάντα*.

called holy,¹ respecting the other things² of which you may speak,³ and how you ought for the present to make use of Euphræus. For the man is useful in many ways, but mostly so in that, where you are through your time of life deficient, and through there not being many counsellors of the young on that point. Now there is a voice from each form of polity, as it were from certain animals; one from a democracy, another from an oligarchy, and another again from a monarchy. Very many persons assert that they understand these voices. But, except a few, they are very far from understanding them. Whichever then of these polities speaks with its own voice, both to gods and men, and produces actions, correspondent to its voice, it flourishes ever, and is preserved; but when it imitates another voice, it is destroyed. For this point then Euphræus will be useful to you in no small degree, although he is possessed of fortitude in other things likewise; for I hope that he will discover the reasons for a monarchy not less than those who are in your employment. If then you make use of him for this purpose, you will be benefited yourself, and greatly benefit him.

But if any one on hearing this, should say, Plato, as it seems, professed indeed to know what is conducive to a democracy; but though he might have spoken amongst the people, and given them the best advice, yet he never got up and addressed them. To this it may be said, that Plato was born late in his paternal land, and that he came amongst a people, already grown rather old,³ and accustomed by those prior to him do many things contrary to his advice; for he would have consulted most willingly for its good, as for that of his own father, had he not thought he should vainly expose himself to danger. And I think he would do the same thing (with respect to)⁴

¹ On the expression *ἐπὶ συμβουλῇ*, see at Theag. p. 122, A. § 2. From the union of *ἐνικτὴν καὶ ἱερὰν*, it would seem as if the advice were called "holy" from its being given and received by persons connected by the sacred bonds of hospitality.

²—³ The words *ὣν δὲν φράζης* are rightly omitted by Ficinus; unless it be said that the author wrote *ὣν αἰετὶ φράζεις*.

³ If Cicero's quotation is to be depended on—"quum offendisset (Plato) populum Atheniensem prope jam desipientem senectute," it would lead to *ὑπὸ γῆρας κρονικώτερον* in lieu of *πρεσβύτερον*.

⁴ Ficinus alone found in his MS., as remarked by Stephens, the preposition *περί* requisite for the syntax; as shown by his version, "circa meum consilium."

my advice; for if we should appear to be incurable, he will bid a long farewell to us, and will abstain from advising either me or mine. May good fortune be thine.

EPISTLE VI.

PLATO TO HERMIAS, ERASTUS, AND CORISCUS.—PROSPERITY.

It appears to me, that some god has kindly and abundantly procured for you good fortune, if you will only receive it properly. For you live neighbours to each other, and have need to benefit each other in the greatest degree. To Hermias, (I say) that neither a multitude of horses, nor of any other alliance¹ for war, nor of gold present to him, would be of greater power for every emergency, than of friends, who are firm and possess a sound moral conduct. But to Erastus and Coriscus I say, although I am an old man, that besides the beautiful wisdom, relating to species, there is a need of that wisdom, which possesses a guardian and defensive power against the base and unjust; for they are inexperienced through their having passed much of their life with us, who are men of moderation and without guile. On this account I have said, that they stand in need of those two² things, in order that they may not be compelled to neglect true wisdom, and pay more attention than is proper to human and necessary³ wisdom. But Hermias appears to me to have received this power⁴ from nature, which is not yet cognate,⁴ and from art through experience. What then do I say? To you, Hermias, do I, having made a greater trial of Erastus and Coris-

¹ In lieu of πολέμικης συμμαχίας, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. πολεμικῆς παρασκευῆς—for his version is “belli apparatus—”

² I have adopted Taylor’s “those two;”—the Greek was probably τούτοις προσδεῖν δυοῖν, not simply τούτων προσδεῖν—

³ Coray in a note on Levesque’s Thucydides iv. 117, would read μὴ ἀναγκαίως—

⁴ Such is Taylor’s translation of φύσει, ὅσα μήπω ἐγγεγονότι, as if a masculine participle could agree with a noun feminine. Ficinus, unable, as I am, to understand the parenthetical clause, has omitted it by translating “natura usque et arte,” neglecting likewise δι’ ἐμπειρίας.

cus than you have, assert, indicate, and testify, that you will not easily find habits more worthy of confidence than those of your neighbours. I advise you, therefore, to hold to yourself by every honest means men of such kind, nor to consider it an act of secondary moment. And on the other hand I advise Erastus and Coriscus to stick close to Hermias, and to endeavour, by such grapplings¹ with each other to arrive at one common bond of friendship. But if any one of you shall determine to dissolve this (union), for human affairs are not altogether stable, send hither to me and my friends² an accusing letter of blame.³ For I think that the reasons sent by those here, (and based) on justice and a feeling of respect, will, unless the rupture happens to have been very great, weld⁴ and bind you together better, than any incantation,⁴ into your pre-existing friendship and communion; by which,⁵ if all, both we and you, philosophize as far as we are able, and it is permitted to each, what has now been oracularly delivered will be ratified. But I will not say the same,⁶ should we not act in this manner; for I divine a good omen, and I say, that if a god is willing, you⁷ will do all good deeds.

It is requisite for you to read this letter all three together; but if not, two in common,⁸ as often as you can, (and) as it is

¹ I have adopted this word, remembering the expression in Shakespeare,

"Grapple him to thine heart with hooks of steel."

²⁻³ Ficinus has "accusatoriam delinquentis epistolam," translated literally by Taylor, "an epistle containing an accusation of the delinquent." Did Ficinus find in his MS. τοῦ μεμφθέντος κατηγορον ἐπιστολήν, in lieu of μομφῆς κατηγορον ἐπιστολήν?

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were συμφυῆσαι, not συμφῦσαι, remembering the expression in Sympos. p. 192, D., συντῆξαι καὶ συμφυῆσαι. The Latin word answering to συμφυῆσαι, and used similarly in a metaphorical sense, is "conflare." Ficinus omits συμφῦσαι, it being probably unintelligible to him.

⁴ Compare Hippol. Eurip. 478, Εἰσὶν δ' ἐκφῶσαι καὶ λόγοι θελκτήριοι—

⁵ Instead of ἦν, which is without regimen, two MSS. read ἦ—From the two I have elicited ᾗ—

⁶ In lieu of τοῦ, one MS. had τοῦτο, which evidently leads to ταῦτο — Ficinus has "nihil equidem præfabor," translated by Taylor, "I will not relate the consequences."

⁷ Ficinus found in his MS. ὑμᾶς, confirmed by another subsequently collated, instead of ἡμᾶς.

⁸ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. They are not only unnecessary, but present an insufferable tautology.

possible,¹ and to make use of a compact, and a decisive law, which is indeed a just thing, and at the same time [taking an oath]¹ with attention, not devoid of taste,² and amusement,³ the sister⁴ of attention, and swearing by the god, who is the ruler of all things present and future, and by the father (and) lord of the ruler and cause, whom, if we philosophize truly, we shall all clearly know, as far as is possible for men under a good genius.⁵

EPISTLE VII.

PLATO TO THE KINDRED AND FRIENDS OF DION—PROSPERITY.

YE have written to me, that I ought to think your sentiments⁶ are the same as those which Dion held; and, moreover, you exhort me to make a common cause, as far as I can, in word and deed. If ye have the same opinion and desires with him I agree to unite with you; but if not, to take frequent counsel with myself. Now what his sentiments and desires were, I can tell pretty nearly, not by conjecture, but by having known them clearly.

For when I came originally to Syracuse, being then nearly forty years old, Dion was of the age that Hipparinus is now; and the opinion he then held, he has still continued to hold, namely, that the Syracusans ought to be free and live according to the best laws. So that it is by no means wonderful, if some god has caused the latter to agree in the same opinion with the former on the subject of a polity. But what was the method of producing this, is a thing not unworthy for the young

¹ I cannot understand *ἐπομύντας* here. It seems to have come from the end of the sentence, where one MS. omits it.

² This is the only version I can give here of *μη ἀμούσῳ*.

³ To this passage Wyttenbach, in *Epist. Critic.*, p. 14, says Lucian alluded in *Amor.*, p. 455, *σπουδῇν—καὶ παιδιὰν εὐμουσον*.

⁴ On the metaphorical use of *ἀδελφός* see Ruhnken on *Tim.* p. 2, and Blomfield on *Æsch. S. Th.* 343.

⁵ Such I presume is the meaning here of *εὐδαιμόνων*.

⁶ Ficinus has “*eandem mentem in republica esse vobis conservandam*,” as if he had found something in his MS., wanting at present in all the rest.

and not young to hear; and I will endeavour to relate it to you from the beginning; for the present events offer the opportunity.

When I was a young man, I was affected as the many are. I thought, if I became quickly my own master, to betake myself immediately to the public affairs of the state. Now some such circumstances as these fell out relating to state affairs. Of the polity existing at that time, when it was abused by many, a change took place; and over the change one and fifty men presided as governors, eleven in the city, and ten in the Piræus; and each of these had a jurisdiction about the Agora,¹ and whatever else it was necessary to regulate in the cities,² while thirty of them were invested with supreme authority. Some of these happened to be my relatives and acquaintances; and they forthwith invited me (to attend) to state-affairs, as being a suitable pursuit. And how I was affected is, on account of my youth, not at all wonderful. For I thought that they would, by leading the city from an unjust mode of living to a just one,³ administer it in the way it was meet;³ so that I diligently gave my mind to what they did. But when I saw these men proving in a short time that the previous form of government had been (as it were) gold,⁴ and that they committed other acts (unjustly),⁵ and sent my friend Socrates, advanced in years, whom I am not ashamed to say was nearly the most righteous man of those then living, together with certain others,⁶ against one of the citizens,

¹ This probably alludes to the office called *Ἀγορανόμος*, or "controller of the market," of which there were five for the Piræus, as stated by Harpocration on the authority of Aristotle.

² By the cities are meant the towns in Attica, that, like cities and boroughs in England, had previously their own municipal officers.

³ The Greek is *διοικῆσαι δὴ*—But Ficinus has "*debere convertere*," as if he had found in his MS. *διοικῆσαι δεῖν*. From the two I have elicited *ἡ δέον*—

⁴ In lieu of *χρυσὴν*, Hemsterhuis on Lucian *Necyomant.* § 4, would read *χρυσὸν*: and so two MSS. subsequently collated; for that is the perpetual word in this expression. Boissonade however on Eunapius, p. 483, and Stalbaum here, are content with *χρυσὴν*.

⁵ I have followed the version of Ficinus—"et alia multa injuste fecerunt." The Greek is simply *τὰ τε ἄλλα*—

⁶ By these "certain others" are meant the "tipstiffs," or "policemen," as they would be called in England; but whose name at Athens was *ροτόραι*, from the bow and arrows they carried, or *Σκύθαι*, from their native country.

and to bring him by force, in order that he might be executed, so that he (Socrates) might have a share in their deeds, whether he wished it or not, and that he did not comply, but ran the risk of suffering every thing, rather than take any part in their impious acts—all this when I saw, and other similar acts of no trifling kind, I felt indignant, and withdrew myself from the evil men of that period.

Not long after this, the power of the thirty fell by a revolution, together with the whole of the then existing form of government. Again, therefore, but somewhat more slowly, did a desire still drag me on to engage in public and political affairs. Now in these, as being in a troubled state, many things took place, at which any one might be indignant; nor was it wonderful, that in revolutions the punishment of hostile factions should have been rather severe in the case of some; although they who returned acted with considerable clemency.¹ But by some chance some of those in power brought before a court of justice our friend Socrates, laying upon him an accusation the most unholy, and belonging the least of all to Socrates. For some brought him to trial, and others gave their vote against him, and destroyed the man, who had been unwilling to share in the unholy act of a removal relating to one of his then exiled² friends,³ when the exiles themselves were unfortunate.³ On reflecting then upon these matters, and on the persons who managed political affairs, and on the laws and customs, the more I considered them, and I advanced in years, by so much the more difficult did it appear to me to administer correctly state affairs. For it is not possible to do so without friends and faithful associates; whom, existing at that time, it was not easy to find—for our city was then no longer administered according to the manners and institutions of our fathers—and it was impossible to acquire new with any facility; while the written laws and customs were corrupted,⁴ and (unholiness) was increasing to a degree how wonderful!⁴

¹ According to C. Nepos in Thrasybulus, § 2, only the thirty tyrants themselves suffered.

² So Ficinus renders *φευγόντων*. But perhaps the word means here, "put on their trial." For *φεύγων* is thus opposed to *διώκων*, "the pursuer," in Scottish law-phrase.

³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. For he could not very well understand them; nor can I.

⁴ The words *καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος ὅστις* are omitted by Ficinus,

So that I, who had been at first full of ardour towards engaging in affairs of state, did, upon looking at these things and seeing them carried along in every way and on every side, become giddy; but not so as to withdraw from considering how at any time something¹ better might take place respecting these very matters, and likewise the whole form of government, but to be wisely² waiting continually for opportunities of acting. ³At last I perceived³ that all states existing at present were badly governed. For what relates to their laws is nearly in an incurable state, without some wonderful arrangement in conjunction with fortune. I was therefore compelled to say, in praise of true philosophy, that through it we are enabled to perceive all that is just as regards the state and individuals; and ⁴hence that the human race will never cease from ills, until the race of those, who philosophize correctly and truthfully, shall come to political power, or persons of power in states shall, by a certain divine allotment, philosophize really.⁴

Holding these sentiments I arrived in Italy and Sicily,⁵ when I first came there.⁵ But on my arrival, the life, which is there called happy, pleased me at no time or manner; (a life) full of the tables prepared by Italiotes and Syracusans; and where one is filled twice a day; and never lies alone by night, and (has) such other pursuits as follow a life of this kind. For from these habits, no man under heaven, having such pursuits from his youth, would ever become prudent,⁶ not even if he were

because, I suspect, he could not understand them; nor could I have done so, had I not seen that τὸ ἀνόσιον was to be restored probably after θαυμαστὸν ὄσον. With this use of ὄσον after an adjective compare οὐπάριον ὄσον in Aristoph. *Bacch.* 78.

¹ The Greek is ἀμεινον ἀν γίγνοιτο. But Ficinus has "melius quid eveniret." He therefore found in his MS. ἀμεινον ἀν τι γίγνοιτο.

² I have adopted εἰ, found in one MS., in lieu of αὐ—

³ Ficinus has "tandem vero compertum est mihi," as if he had found in his MS. τελευτῶν δὲ ἐνόησα instead of τελευτῶντα δὲ νοῆσαι—

⁴ On this celebrated doctrine of Plato, which is repeated in different words in *Rep.* v. p. 473, D., § 18, it will be sufficient to refer to Ruhnken on Rutilius Lupus, p. 21.

⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

⁶ The Greek is οὐχ οὕτω θαυμαστῇ φύσει κριθήσεται, where I cannot understand οὐχ οὕτω, nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; whose version is "quamvis natura mirabili sit," which has led me to οὐδ' εἰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεῶν θαυμαστῇ φύσει κριθήσεται.

mixed up with a wondrous nature by some god;⁶ ¹ but to become temperate it will never be his care.¹ And the same thing may be said respecting the remaining portion of virtue. Nor will any state rest quietly according to any laws whatever, while men conceive that it is proper to waste every thing on excesses, and deem that they ought to be idle in every thing except good living and drinking, and the laboured exertions made for sexual intercourse. But it is necessary for such states never to cease changing their tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies, and for the powerful in them not to endure even the name of a polity just and with equal laws.

With these and the above-mentioned sentiments I passed over to Syracuse; perhaps through an accident of fortune; at least it seems that by the planning of some superior being a beginning was laid of the doings, that have lately taken place relating to Dion and of those too relating to Syracuse, and, there is a fear, to still more persons, if you do not yield to me, when giving advice a second time. How then do I assert that my journey to Sicily was the beginning of all the then doings? For while associating with Dion, then a young man, and pointing out to him by words that, what seemed good to me would be the best for mankind, and counselling him so to act, I was nearly ignorant that I was unconsciously planning in some manner the dissolution of a tyranny. For Dion being very docile, both with respect to other things, and the reasons urged by me, he heard so quickly and attentively, as not one ever did of the young men whom I had fallen in with; and he was desirous of passing the remainder of his life in a manner superior to the majority of the Italiotes and Siceliotes,² by loving virtue ³ rather than pleasure³ and the rest of luxuries;

¹—¹ Here again Ficinus has led the way to the truth by his version, "*temperatus esse certe nunquam curabit.*" For the Greek is at present *σώφρων δὲ οὐδ' ἂν μelleσαι ποτὶ γενεσθαι*. But it was originally, I suspect, *σώφρων δὲ οὐδὲν μέλλου ποτὶ γενίσθαι*: where *μέλλου* is supported by *μέλλου* in two MSS.

² By the "Siceliotes" were meant foreigners settled in Sicily; the name of the natives was "Sicilians," in Greek *Σικελοί*.

³—³ Such is Taylor's version of *περὶ πλείονος* in Greek, and of "*potius quam*" in Ficinus. But until a parallel passage is produced of *περὶ πλείονος* thus used in the sense of *πλείον* or *μᾶλλον*, I shall continue to believe that Plato wrote *ἀρετὴν περὶ τοῦ λυσιονος*—"a virtue relating to something better than pleasure—"

and hence he lived rather odious to those, who passed their lives according to tyrannical institutions, until the death of Dionysius occurred. Subsequently, however, he perceived that the sentiments, which he held under the influence of correct reasoning, did not exist in him alone, but in some others; not numerous indeed, but amongst some, one of whom he thought would be probably Dionysius (the younger),¹ if the gods assisted; and should this take place, that both his own life, and that of the other Syracusans, would turn out to be beyond all measure happy. He thought, moreover, that I ought by all means to come as quickly as possible to Syracuse, to take part in these doings; for he remembered how our mutual intercourse had easily worked him up to the desire of a life the most beautiful and best; which if he could but accomplish, as he was attempting to do, in the case of Dionysius, he had great hopes that he could, without slaughter and death, and the evils which have now taken place, make, in the whole of the country, life to be happy and rational.

With these correct sentiments Dion persuaded Dionysius to send for me; and he himself requested me by all means to come as quickly as possible, before certain other persons, associating with Dionysius, should turn him aside to a life different from the best. ²But it is necessary to relate what he requested, although² it is a rather long story. What opportunity, said he, shall we wait for, greater than that through a certain divine fortune? and giving a statement of their command over Italy and Sicily, and of his own power in it, and of the youth of Dionysius, and of the desire he felt so vehemently for philosophy and instruction, and saying how his cousins and kindred were to be easily exhorted to the reasoning and mode of life ever laid down by myself, and that they were most competent to exhort Dionysius, so that now, if

¹ Taylor has introduced this word from "junioem" in Ficinus, although wanting in the Greek; while he has omitted "if the gods assisted," duly found in the "Diis bene juvantibus" of Ficinus.

² The Greek is λέγων δὲ τὰς ἐδεῖτο, εἰ, where Stephens suggested ἐδεῖτο, ἃ καὶ, and translated, "His dictis addebat preces, quas longum esset commemorare;" to which he was led by finding in Ficinus "cohortationem insuper precibus longam adjunxit." I have translated as if the Greek were λέγειν δὲ τὰς, ἃ ἐδεῖτο, δεῖ, εἰ, to which Taylor led me by translating, "It is necessary to relate—"

ever, all the hope would be fulfilled of the same persons becoming philosophers and rulers of mighty states. Such then and many others of a like kind were his exhortations. But a fear still possessed my mind, as to how, perchance, the conduct of the young men would turn out; for the passions of such persons are hasty, and are often borne along in a direction contrary to themselves. I knew, however, that Dion was naturally of a steady disposition and of a moderate age. Hence, while I was considering and doubting¹ whether I ought to go, or how,¹ the balance inclined² that I ought (to go). For if perchance any one should attempt to give effect to my ideas upon laws and a form of government, I ought to attempt it now. For by persuading only one person, I should work out every good. With these ideas and confidence, and not from what some imagined, I set sail from home; feeling for myself the greatest shame, lest I should seem to myself to be altogether mere talk,³ and never willing to lay hold of any thing to be done; and run the risk of betraying first the hospitality and friendship of Dion, exposed in reality to no small dangers; and should he suffer aught,⁴ or, being driven out by Dionysius and his other enemies, fly to us, and, making an inquiry,⁵ say—"I am come to you, Plato, an exile; but I am neither in want of cavalry nor of heavy-armed soldiers to ward off my enemies, but of words and persuasion; by which I know you are especially able to turn young persons to what is good and just, and to place them on each occasion on terms of friendship and fellowship with each other; through the want of which on your part I have now left Syracuse, and am present here. What relates to myself indeed will bring upon you less disgrace; but the philosophy, which you are always praising, and which you

¹— Ficinus has "utrum eundem parendumque foret, necne," answering to *πότερον εἴη πορευτήριον καὶ ὑπακουστήριον ἢ ὅ* in Ald., which, as regards *ἢ ὅ*, is preferable here to *ἢ πῶς*. For the question is not about the manner of going, but of going or not.

² The verb *ἔπεισε* is here used impersonally.

³ Compare Eurip. Herc. F. 111, where old men are called *ἔρεα μόνον*, "words merely."

⁴ In *εἰ πάθῃ τι* is the usual euphemism for "should he perish."

⁵ I cannot understand *ἀνέρωτο*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it; unless it refers to the question feigned to be put subsequently by Dionysius.

say is held¹ in dishonour by the rest² of mankind, how is it not now betrayed by you together with myself, as far as depends upon you? If, indeed, we had been inhabitants of Megara, you would surely have come to me as an assistant for what I had called you, or I should have considered you the meanest of men. But now, excusing yourself by the length of the journey,³ and the danger of the voyage, and the greatness of the trouble,³ think you that you shall avoid perchance the charge of cowardice? It will be far from this."

To language like this, what would have been a becoming answer? ⁴There is none. But⁴ I came with reason and justice, as much as it is possible for a man, having left my own pursuits, which were not unbecoming, under a tyranny, which was neither suited to my discourses nor myself. But by my coming I liberated myself (from any charge), and exhibited myself to be unreprieved by Zeus, who presides over hospitality and the allotment of philosophy, which would have been exposed to reproach, had I acted an effeminate part, and through cowardice shared in disgrace and shame. On my arrival then—for there is no need to be prolix—I found all the affairs of Dionysius full of sedition and calumnies on the part of a tyranny respecting Dion. I defended Dion, therefore, to the utmost of my power; but I was able to do but little. But nearly in the fourth month after my arrival, Dionysius accused Dion of plotting against his power, and putting him on board a small vessel, sent him out with dishonour. Whereupon all of us, who were the friends of Dion, were fearful lest he should accuse and punish some one of us as an accomplice in the plot of Dion. And a report went abroad at Syracuse, that I had been put to death by Dionysius, as being forsooth

¹ In lieu of *φείσεσθαι*, Plato wrote either *φθίψεσθαι*, "wanders," or *στρίψεσθαι*, "tost about."

² The phrase in Plato is perpetually *τῶν ἄλλων*. Hence for *λείπων* I should prefer *ἄλόγων*, "irrational—"

³ The Greek is *καὶ τὸ μέγιστος δὴ τοῦ πλοῦ καὶ τοῦ πόνου*. But Ficinus has "*periculumque navigationis atque labores*," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦ πλοῦ καὶ τοὺς πόνους*. The three genitives however require each its own distinctive noun. Compare *κίνδυνοι καὶ πόνοι* in Alcib. II. p. 142, B.

⁴ The Greek is *οὐκ ἴστιν ἄλλ' ἦλθον*. Plato wrote *οὐκ ἴστιν ἄλλη ἢ ἦλθον*, i. e. There is no other than that I came—

the cause of all that happened at that time. But on perceiving that we were all thus¹ disposed, and dreading lest something of greater consequence should arise from our fear, he received all of us most kindly into his favour, consoled me, and exhorted me to be of good cheer, and requested me by all means to stay; for there would be an advantage to him from my not flying away, but from my remaining; and on this account he pretended to make an urgent request. We know however that the requests of tyrants are mingled with necessity. By a contrivance, therefore, he prevented my sailing-away. For taking me to the Acropolis, he made me reside there; from whence no ship-master could carry me off, not through Dionysius forbidding it merely, but unless Dionysius himself sent a person with an order, commanding him to lead me out. Nor was there any foreign trader, nor even one of those having jurisdiction over the departures² from the country, who would have overlooked my going away alone; but he would immediately have laid hold of me and brought me back again to Dionysius; especially since it had been already bruited abroad contrary to what had been done before, that Dionysius was again holding Plato to his arms in a wonderful manner. And indeed this was the case, for it is necessary to speak the truth. He did indeed hold me to his arms, ever as time went on, more (and more) in respect to the intercourse³ of my manner and habits. But he wished me to praise him more than Dion, and to hold him as a friend in a far greater degree than the other; and for such an end he made wonderful efforts. But the way by which this might have taken place in the best manner, if it took place at all, ⁴he omitted; for he shrunk⁴ to become familiar and to associate with me, by ⁵hearing and learning⁵

¹ By "thus" is meant, "in a state of alarm."

² From this it would appear that there was at Syracuse an office, where passports were given to those leaving the country with the permission of the government, who had the power of issuing, what in England would be called a writ "ne exeat regno."

³ Ficinus has here what is more intelligible, "et gaudebat moribus nostris et consuetudine." Perhaps Plato wrote *κατὰ τὴν—σύνεσιν*, "according to his knowledge—"

⁴ The Greek is in some MSS. *ᾤκνει ὡς δὴ*, in others *ᾤκνει ἱσως δὴ*. But as Ficinus has "neglexit; hæc enim fuerat—" he probably found in his MS., what the sense requires, *ἔλασε ᾤκνει γὰρ*—

⁵ Ficinus has avoided the *ἑσπερον πρότερον* in *μανθάνων και*

discourses on philosophy, through the fear lest, (according)¹ to the language of calumniators, he should be shackled, and Dion administer all affairs. However I endured every thing, keeping to the original sentiments, with which I arrived, if by any means he should come to the desire of a philosophic life. But he, by his pulling in a contrary direction, obtained the victory. In this way then happened to turn out the first period of my sojourning and pursuits in Sicily. After this I went away and came back again, through Dionysius having sent for me with all earnestness. But on what account (I came),² and what I did, as being reasonable and just, I will, having first advised you what you ought to do, after what has just now taken place, subsequently relate in detail, for the sake of those who are inquiring with what view I came a second time to Sicily; and that deeds of no moment may not happen to be mentioned as deeds of moment.

³ I say then something what I ought to say.³ For the party, who gives advice to a sick man and to one who uses a diet improper for good health,⁴ it is especially necessary in the first place to change the mode of living, and to recommend to the patient, willing to comply, the other things that are proper;⁵ but if he is unwilling, I consider that he, who retires from advising such a person, acts like a man and a physician; but that he, who stays, like a person unmanly and devoid of art. The same is the case of a state, whether its master be one or many. If, while the government is proceeding in a right road according to the constitution, it takes counsel about what is conducive to its interest, it is the part of a man with mind to give to such parties

δεύων by translating "in audiendis addiscendisque," whom I have with Taylor followed.

¹ The Greek is φοβούμενος τοὺς—λόγους μή πη— But Ficinus has "timens ne, quemadmodum asserabant calumniatores"—He therefore found, I suspect, in his MS. φοβούμενος, κατὰ τοὺς—λόγους, μή πη—

² Ficinus has alone what the sense requires, "quam vero ob causam rursus accesserim," as if his MS. read ὡν δὲ ἵνα ἀνῆλθον.

³⁻⁴ The Greek is λέγω δὲ τὰδε· ἰγώ. But as there is no verb to which ἰγώ can be referred, I have translated as if the Greek were λέγω δὲ τι, ὃ δεῖ λέγειν. The verb supplied by Ficinus is "reor."

⁴ In lieu of ἄλλο τι, which Ficinus has omitted as unintelligible, and Stephens attempted to correct by reading, what Stalbaum approves of, ἄλλα τι καὶ ὅτι, Plato wrote, I suspect, μάλιστα, as I have translated.

⁵ The sense manifestly requires ἀ, or γ, δεῖ in lieu of ἦδη.

advice; but in the case of those, who are proceeding entirely out of a straightforward polity, and not at all willing to walk in its steps, and who proclaim to the adviser to leave alone the form of government, and not to disturb it—since, if he does disturb it, he shall suffer death—and at the same time exhort him to minister to their wishes and passions, and to advise in what way these may for all time to come be gratified,¹ I should consider the person, who endures to give such advice, unmanly; but him, who does not endure, a man.

Holding then such sentiments, whenever any one consults with myself about any thing of the greatest moment relating to his life, such as the acquisition of wealth, or the care² of his body or soul, I readily advise with him, if he appears to me to live day by day in an orderly manner, or is willing to be persuaded by me when giving advice, nor do I desist, as if I have gone through merely a formal rite.³ But if either he does not consult me at all, or is evidently not about to follow my advice, I do not go self-called to such a person to counsel him, nor would I do so by compulsion, even if he were my son. But I would give advice to a slave, and force him, even unwilling, (to follow it.) I should however think it not holy to force my father or mother, unless they were, through disease, afflicted with silliness. But if persons are living an established mode of life, pleasing to themselves, but not to me, I should not, when admonishing them in vain, dislike them, nor yet by flattering, minister to them, and afford them the means of gratifying their desires, which if I were to embrace, I should not wish to live. With the same sentiments respecting a state a prudent man ought to live, and speak out, if it appears to him not to have a good form of government, (and) if he is about not to speak in vain, nor to lose his life by speaking; but never to apply violence⁴ to his country on account of⁴ a change in the form of government, unless it cannot become the best without

¹ In lieu of γίγνονται the train of thought leads to γανύονται—

² Ficinus has “corporis vel animi purgationem,” as if he had found in his MS. καθάρσεως, instead of ἐπιμέλειαν, which would lead to ἡ περὶ σώματος ἐπιμέλειας ἡ ψυχῆς καθάρσεως.

³ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows as usual, has “non prius desino, quam initium pro viribus usque ad finem perduxerim.” On the use and meaning of ἀποσιῶσθαι, see Ast on Legg. vi. p. 752, D.

⁴ The Greek is παρπιδι. But one MS. has παρπιδι διὰ, which evidently leads to παρπιδι διὰ—

the banishment and slaughter of persons ; but leading a quiet life, to pray for the good both of himself and of the state.

In this very manner I would advise you (to act); and so did I together with Dion advise Dionysius ¹ to live day by day, so that in the first place ¹ he might be about to become the master of himself, and acquire faithful friends and associates, in order that he might not suffer what his father did ; who, after he had got possession of many and great cities in Sicily, which had been laid waste by the Barbarians, was not able to establish and preserve in each of them forms of government, faithful under his associates, or strangers ² coming from any part whatever, ² or brothers, whom he himself had brought up as being younger, and had made them rulers, after being merely private persons, and remarkably rich, after being (very) poor. For among these he could not attach to himself a single one as the sharer of his dominion, although working upon them by persuasion, and teaching, and kindnesses, and alliances ; and he was sevenfold worse off than Darius ; who, placing a trust in persons not his brothers, ³ nor brought up by him, but in those alone associated with himself in their mastery ⁴ over the eunuch, ⁴ divided amongst them seven parts of his dominions, each larger than the whole of Sicily, and made use of them as faithful associates, and attacking neither himself, nor each other ; and gave likewise an example of what a lawgiver and a king ought to be. For he established laws, by which he has preserved even now the Persian power ; and besides this the Athenians, although they had not colonized themselves many Grecian cities, which had been overturned by the Barbarians, but merely got hold of them, when already inhabited, preserved their empire over them for seventy years, through having persons friendly to them in each of the towns.

¹—¹ The Greek is ζῆν μέντοι τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν πρῶτον. But five MSS. omit τὸ, and two πρῶτον. Ficinus has "ea videlicet ratione quotidie vivere," as if he had found in his MS. ζῆν καθ' ἡμέραν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

²—² Instead of ἄλλων δὲ ποθεν, correct Greek requires ἄλλοθεν δὲ ποθεν.

³ I have adopted the idea of Stephens, who unites οὐκ with ἀδελφοῖς, not, as others do, with πιστεύσας.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is τῆς τοῦ Μήδου τε καὶ εὐνούχου. But Μήδου τε καὶ, or Μίδου τε καὶ, as Ficinus found in his MS., is evidently an incorrect explanation of τοῦ εὐνούχου, whose name was Smerdis, as we learn from Herodotus iii. 61.

But Dionysius having through his wisdom brought together the whole of Sicily into one state, yet, through confiding in no one, was with difficulty saved. For he was poor in persons friendly and faithful; than which there is no greater sign as regards virtue and vice, than in being destitute or not of men of that kind. I therefore and Dion advised Dionysius, since what he had received from his father had come to him unacquainted with instruction, and unacquainted too with befitting associates, in the first place to proceed in that direction, to procure for himself friends, different from his relations, but both his equals in age and in accordance with him respecting virtue. But we particularly advised him to be in accord with himself; for that he was wonderfully deficient in this we asserted, not indeed in such clear terms—for this was not safe—but in hints and contending in our discourses, that in this way every man will preserve both himself and those over whom he is the ruler; but that by not turning himself in this direction he will bring to pass every thing the very reverse. But if, after going on, as we said, and rendering himself prudent and temperate, he peopled the cities of Sicily, that had been made desolate, and bound them together with laws and forms of government, so as to be of one family with himself and an assistance to each other against the Barbarians,¹ he would not only double his ancestral dominion, but make it in reality much larger. For if this were done, it would be much more easy to enslave the Carthaginians, than was the slavery effected by them during the reign of Gelon; ² but not as now on the contrary,³ his father fixed the tribute he was to carry to the Barbarians.

. This is what was said and the advice given to Dionysius by us, who were plotting against him, as the reports were circulated on many sides. Such, that after prevailing with Dionysius, they caused him to drive out Dion, and threw myself into a state of terror. But, that I may bring to a close not a few events ³ which occurred in a short time,³ Dion, ¹ departing from

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τά*, not *τὰς*, for *βοηθείας* must belong to the cities in Sicily.

² The words *ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺν αὐτίον* I cannot understand. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "contra quam accidit patri —"

³ Such is the translation of *πράγματα τὰ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ*. But Ficinus has "non pauca in paucis—" as if his MS. omitted *τὰ ἐν*—Taylor translates the whole phrase "in short—"

Peloponnesus and Athens, admonished Dionysius indeed.¹ Since then (Dion)² had liberated and twice restored the town to the citizens, the Syracusans were affected in the same manner towards him, as Dionysius had been, when he endeavoured by educating and bringing him up to make him thus a worthy partner of his power through the whole of life. But ²(he gave his ear)³ to those that were calumniating Dion, and saying that he was doing all that he did at that time, while plotting against the absolute power of Dionysius, in order that the one, being lulled in his mind by his attention to instruction, might neglect his kingdom, and commit it to Dion, and the other make it his own by fraud, and cast out Dionysius from his dominions.

These reports being then bruited a second time among the Syracusans prevailed by a victory very absurd and disgraceful to those who were the causes of it. For how it happened it is proper for those to hear, who are calling upon me on the subject of the present affairs.

Being an Athenian, and the associate of Dion, and one who had battled with him against the tyrant, I arrived, that I might produce a peace instead of a war; but while battling against the calumniators I was overcome. But Dionysius, attempting to bribe me by ⁴honours and riches,⁴ to become on his side a witness and a friend, touching the propriety of his casting out Dion,⁵ failed in all of these things happening to him. And Dion afterwards, on returning home from exile, brought with him two Athenian brothers, who had become his friends, not through philosophy, but through that acquaintance, which runs through ⁶the generality of friends,⁶ and which they formed

¹— Here is evidently something wanting to preserve the connexion of ideas in the narrative.

² The Greek is 'Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν—But two MSS. *ἔπει οὖν*—Ficinus has "Cum ergo—Dion—" He therefore found in his MS. *ἔπει δὲ Δίων*, and subsequently *ἀπορίσ* for *ἀπρίσ*, as shown by his version, "civibus."

³— To complete the sense and syntax Cornarius proposed to insert *ἐπιστάνει* after *ὁ δὲ*—Perhaps Plato wrote *ὁ δ' ἔδω τὸ οὖς τοῖς*—as I have translated.

⁴— Ficinus has "non verbis solum sed pecuniis et honoribus."

⁵ I have translated as if *αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι* followed *διήμαρπεν*, not *Δίω-νος*, where those words are unintelligible.

⁶— Although *πλείστων φίλων* might perhaps stand, yet one would prefer *πλαστοῦς φίλων*, as I suggested in Bailey's *Hermesianax*, p. 155, com-

from paying the rites of hospitality, and from being ¹Mystæ and Epoptæ.¹ Moreover these two, by having brought Dion back, had become his friends, and, from such causes, and the assisting him in his return from exile, his companions. But when, on their arrival in Sicily, they understood that Dion had been exposed by those Siceliotes, who had become free through him, to the calumny of plotting to become a tyrant, they not only betrayed their associate and guest, but became, as it were, the perpetrators of a murder, in that, with weapons in their hands, they stood by to assist the murderers. However, I neither pass by this base and unholy deed, nor do I detail it; for to many others it (has been)² a care to hymn it, and it will be so at some future time.

But the charge, which has been alleged respecting the Athenians, how that it was they, who bound this disgrace around the city, I will take away. For I say that he too was an Athenian, who did not betray this very person, when it was in his power to obtain wealth and many other honours. For he did not become a friend through a shop-mate friendship, but through the communion of a liberal education; to which alone he, who is endued with mind, ought to trust, rather than to the alliance of souls³ and bodies; so that those two were not fit to bring disgrace on the city through having murdered Dion, as being persons of no account at any time. All this has been said for the sake of the advice given to the friends and kindred of Dion.

I give you besides the same counsel, and for the third time address you three in the same words. Do not place Sicily, or any other city, as a slave under persons with despotic power, but under laws; such⁴ at least is my dictum. For this is not the better either for the enslaving or the enslaved, or for their

paring οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι in Sophist, p. 216, E., and ἀληθῶς καὶ οὐ τι πλαστῶς in Legg. i. p. 642. D.

¹ On the Mystæ and Epoptæ see at the Banquet, § 34, n. 46.

² Ficinus has "narraverunt atque narrabunt," as if he had found in his MS. ἐπιμελὲς ἦν—μελήσει. But who are the parties alluded to as having hymned these events, is not, I believe, mentioned elsewhere.

³ This disparagement of a friendship formed by kindred souls seems rather strange in the mouth of Plato. There is an error here, which it would be not difficult to correct by the aid of the proverb in Suidas, Ζεὶ χύτρα, ζῇ φιλία, i. e. "Where boils the pot, There friendship's hot." Ficinus has "animorum conjunctioni et corporum consanguinitati."

⁴ Instead of ὃ γ'—Stephens suggested ὥς γ'—similar to "ut—" in Ficinus.

children or their children's descendants; but the experiment is altogether a destructive one. For souls, whose habits are little and illiberal, love to seize upon gain of this kind, as knowing nothing of what is good and just for the future and present time, nor of things human and divine. Of this I endeavoured to persuade Dion first, and secondly Dionysius, and now I do you the third. Be persuaded then by me, for the sake of Zeus the third saviour.¹ In the next place look to the case of Dionysius and Dion; the former of whom by not being persuaded is now living not honourably; whereas the latter, by being persuaded, died honourably. For it is a thing altogether correct and honourable for him, who aspires after things the most honourable both for himself and his country, to suffer whatever he may suffer; for not one of us is naturally immortal; nor, if this should happen to any one, would he become happy, as it seems he would to the multitude. For in things inanimate there is nothing either good or evil worthy of mention; but good or ill will happen to each soul, either existing with the body or separated from it. But it is ever requisite to trust really² to the sacred³ accounts of the olden time, which inform us that the soul is immortal, and has judges of its conduct, and suffers the greatest punishments, when it is liberated from the body. Hence it is requisite to think it is a lesser evil to suffer, than to do, the greatest sins and injuries. This, indeed, the man who is fond of money and poor in soul does not hear; and should he hear, he laughs it down, as he imagines, and impudently snatches from all sides whatever he thinks he can, like a wild beast, eat or drink, or can contribute (aught)⁴ to the mis-called pleasure of sexual intercourse, at once servile and graceless. ⁵(For) being blind, he is not able to see how great an evil, ever united to each act of wrong, follows the never being satisfied with the unholy perpetration of such snatchings;⁵ which it is

¹ On the expression Ζεὺς ὁ τῶν τριῶν ῥητορ, see at Philib. § 100.

² Ficinus, "revera," answering to ὕψους found subsequently in all the MSS.

³ Here is probably an allusion to the Orphic hymns, real or pretended, which were in circulation during the time of Plato.

⁴ The pronoun τι seems to have dropt out before πορεύειν, or else before περὶ, for otherwise πορεύειν will want its object.

⁵ In this most intricate passage Ficinus has been of signal service, by showing that the words αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ πίμπλασθαι were in his MS. found in a different place to where they are commonly read. For his version

necessary for him, who has acted unjustly, to drag along with himself, both while he is moving about upon the earth, and when he takes¹ under the earth a journey without honour, and thoroughly miserable in every way.

By detailing these and other reasons of the like kind, I was enabled to persuade Dion. And I should have felt most justly against those, who murdered him, an anger, in a certain manner, almost as great as against Dionysius; for both had injured myself and all the rest, so to say, in the highest degree. For² the former had destroyed a man, who was willing to make use of justice; while the latter (was) unwilling to make use of it through the whole of his dominions, although possessing the greatest power. In which (dominions) had philosophy and power existed really, as it were³ in the same (dwelling), they would have set up amongst all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, an opinion not vainly⁴ shining, (and) in every respect the true one, that neither a state nor a man can ever be happy, unless by leading a life with prudence in subjection to justice, whether possessing those things themselves, or by being brought up in the habits of holy persons their rulers, or instructed in justice.

This injury did Dionysius inflict. But the rest would have been a trifling wrong, as compared to these. But he, who murdered Dion, did not know that he had done the same deed

is, "et quasi cæcus non cernit se frustra contendere inexplabilem explere concupiscentiam; neque rursus cernit, quantum sit impietas malum quibusque insit rebus, semper injustitiæ mixta." In other respects however his translation is too loose to be a safe guide. The Greek was perhaps originally to this effect, Τυφλὸς ὢν γὰρ οὐχ ἔχει ὁρᾶν ὡς κακὸν ἡλικὸν δαί μετ' ἀδικήματος ἐκάστου ξυνέπεται αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ πίμπλασθαι τῶν ἀπαγαμάτων ἀνοσιούργια: and so I have translated.

¹ On νόστος and νοστεῖν, taken in the sense of going, not as usual of returning, see my note on Philoct. 43. Here, however, the idea of a return is to be kept in mind. For the dead are said to return to the earth. See at Menexenus, § 6, and compare the language of Walter Scott, who says of the person, who has no love for his father-land, that he

"Living shall forfeit fair renown,
And doubly dying, shall go down
To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,
Unwept, unhonour'd, and unsung."

² To preserve the syntax ἦν must be inserted after οὐδὲν—

³ Ficinus has "vere in idem quasi domicilium"—he therefore found in his MS. ὁντως ὡς ἐν ταύτῳ οἴκῳ, not merely ὁντως ἐν ταύτῳ—

⁴ The Greek is here ἱκανῶς, the sense requires οὐ κενῶς—

as Dionysius. For I clearly know, as far as it is possible for one man to speak confidently of another, that if Dion had retained his power, he would never have changed it to any other form of government than to that, by which he first (caused) Syracuse,¹ his own country, after he had delivered it from slavery, to look joyous, and had put it into the garb of freedom; and after this, he would by every contrivance have adorned the citizens with laws both befitting and the best; and he would have been ready to do what followed in due order after this; and have colonized the whole of Sicily, and have freed it from the Barbarians, by expelling some and subduing others, more easily than Hiero did. But if these things had taken place, through a man just, and brave, and temperate, and who was a philosopher, the same opinion of virtue would have been produced amongst the multitude, as would have been amongst all men, so to say; and have saved² Dionysius, had he been persuaded by me. But now some dæmon surely, or some evil spirit, falling upon³ with iniquity and impiety, and, what is the greatest matter, with the audacity of ignorance, in which all evils are rooted, and from which they spring up, and afterwards produce fruit the most bitter to those, who have begotten it,⁴ this⁵ has a second time subverted and destroyed every

¹ By omitting with six MSS. *καὶ* before *φαιδρόνας*, the syntax is indeed completed; but there is still some error in the words *μὲν πρῶτον*, which it is not difficult perhaps to correct.

² Such is the literal version of *ἀπίσωσι*. But Ficinus—"quæ et salvare—viguisset," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐν σίσωστο*, where the pluperfect passive would want, as it often does, its augment; as shown by Matth. Gr. Gr. 165.

³ The Greek is *ἐμπέσων*, which I cannot understand; nor could Taylor, who translates "replete," as if he was thinking of *ἐμπλήως*. Ficinus has "his sese objiciens." But *ἐμπέπτειν* does not mean "se objicere;" and if it did, there is nothing to answer to "his." Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀλιτήριος συμπίσων ἀνομία*. On the corruption of *συν* into *ἐμ*, see Schæfer on Dionysius *Περὶ Συνθεσ.* p. 147, and in Index under *Σύν*.

⁴ Instead of *τοῖς γεννήσασι*, Ficinus has "qui producentur;" as if he had either read in his MS., or wished to read, *τοῖς τῆς γέννης οὖσι*—

⁵ Stephens justly objected to *αὐτῇ*: which cannot be applied to the preceding *δαίμων* or *ἀλιτήριος*. But he did not perceive that if we read *ἡ θεὰ τίς ἐλατήριος* in lieu of *ἡ τίς ἀλιτήριος*, and place those words before *ἐξ ἧς*, the pronoun will recover the noun to which it belongs, and *θεὰ ἐλατήριος* will be a proper description of the Fury, whose business it is to urge on evil-doers to their ruin. But even thus the passage is not restored to its original state, nor will it be perhaps, till better MSS. are discovered.

thing. However, let us, for the sake of a good augury, keep for the third time a well-omened silence.

I advise therefore you, my friends, to imitate Dion, in the good-will he felt for his country, and in his temperate mode of living, but for the better. But¹ ² under what auspices you ought to endeavour² to fulfil his wishes, and what they are, you have clearly heard from me. But upon the person, who is among you unable to live according to his country's customs in a Dorian fashion, but adopts the life of the murderers of Dion, and what is followed in Sicily, do not call; nor believe that he will in any thing ever act faithfully and sincerely. But call upon the rest to form a settlement of the whole of Sicily, and introduce both from Sicily itself and all Peloponnesus an equality of laws, and do not fear the Athenians; for men are there, who surpass all others in virtue, and who hate the daring of guest-murderers.

But if these things be done at a later period, and the differences, produced each day by factions, are many and of all kinds and hasten you on, it is requisite surely for every man, to whom a divine fortune³ has imparted even a small degree of correct thinking, to know that there will be no cessation of evils to those engaged in revolts, until the victors in battle and in the banishment and slaughter of persons shall cease to have a recollection of wrongs, and to turn themselves to the punishment of their opponents; but, having a mastery over themselves, shall lay down laws common to all, and no less acceptable to themselves than to the vanquished party, and compel them to use these laws, by the two-fold necessity of fear and shame; of fear, through their being superior, by showing their strength; and of shame, on the other hand, through their seeming to be superior in the being both willing and able to be (the masters)⁴ over pleasures, and the slaves of

¹ Ficinus has "magis magisque complectentes." For he was not perhaps aware that *μμεῖσθαι* is united to two accusatives, and that *ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ* follow here *μμεῖσθαι*, as *ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχύω* precede *μμενόμενας* in Politic. p. 297, C., and *ἐπὶ τὰ γελιότερα* follow *μμεμνημένοι* in Phileb. p. 40, C.

² Ficinus has "quibus auspiciis." For his MS. read not *ὥς* but *ὣν*, found subsequently in all the others. It read likewise *περᾶσθαι ἀποτελεῖν ἔδει*—*αὶ δὲ*, as shown by his version, "perficere conandum vobis sit."

³ Ficinus has "sors—divina," which would be in Plato *θεία μοῖρα*—

⁴ As *τοῖς νόμοις* depend upon *δουλεύειν*, so to balance the sentence

the laws. For it is not possible otherwise for a state, divided against itself, to cease from ills; but divisions and enmity, and hatred and distrust, are ever wont to arise in states thus arrayed themselves against themselves. It is then ever requisite for those, who have gained the power, when they are desirous of preserving it, to choose from amongst themselves, in preference to the rest, such as they hear are the best; in the first place, old men, who have children and wives at home,¹ and ancestors the most in number and renown, and all possessing a competence. ² Now for a city of ten thousand persons fifty such will be sufficient.³ These should be sent for from their home with prayers and the greatest honours possible; and ³ they, who have sent for them, should take an oath, and beg and request them³ to lay down laws, and give not more to the victors than to the vanquished, but what is equal for, and common to, the whole state; and when the laws have been fixed, ⁴ all things are in this.⁴ For when the victors exhibit themselves more subject to the laws than the vanquished, all things will be full of security and felicity, and there will be an escape from every ill. But if not, call not upon me or any other to take a part for him, who is not persuaded by the precepts now conveyed. For these are the sisters of what I and Dion did with good intentions attempt to do for Syracuse; although they were, on the second occasion; for the first were those, which were first attempted to be done in conjunction

there ought to be a verb united to *περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς*. Hence Ficinus has "tum in voluptatibus superandis tum in legibus observandis," as if he had found in his MS. *ὑπὲρ τὰ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς—δυνάμενοι εἶναι καὶ δουλεύειν*. For thus *εἶναι καὶ* might have been easily lost after *δυνάμενοι*.

¹ Instead of *οἴκοι*, Ficinus found in his MS. *οἶκον*, as shown by his version, "domicilium."

²— Such is the literal translation of this passage; which Taylor has thus misrepresented: "But ten thousand and fifty inhabitants will be sufficient for a city of this kind."

³— The Greek is *μεταπειθαμένους ὁμόσαντας δεῖσθαι*, of which I have given a literal translation, that I cannot understand. Nor could Ficinus, as shown by his version, "evocantes autem precari atque jurejurando astringere;" where he has given to *μεταπειθαμένους* a passive meaning, at variance with the genius of the language, and translated *ὁμόσαντας* as if it were *ὁρκώσαντας*. What Plato wrote can only be guessed at.

⁴— Here again I am at a loss in the words *ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τὰ πάντα ἵσταν*. I could have understood—*ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δὲ τὰ πάντα ἱστάναι*—"all things must needs stand in their own place."

with Dionysius, a common good to all. But a certain fortune, superior to man, scattered them all. Do you then attempt to accomplish all at present more prosperously, with the aid of some kind destiny, and a luck god-sent. And thus much be it said about my advice and letter, and first visit to Dionysius.

But in my second journey and voyage to Sicily, how reasonably and carefully they took place, he, who feels any interest may hear what followed. For the first period of my sojourn in Sicily passed away, as I have stated, before I could advise the relatives and associates of Dion. But subsequently I persuaded Dionysius, as far as I was able, to let me go. But on peace being made—for there had been then a war in Sicily—we both came to an agreement; for Dionysius said that he would send for Dion and myself again, after he had established for himself a state of affairs connected with his government more securely than before; and he thought it proper for Dion to understand that this was not a banishment at that time, but merely a change of residence.¹ And on these conditions I agreed to come.

On peace being made, Dionysius sent for me; but he requested Dion to stop² another year; but he thought it proper for myself to come by all means. Dion then exhorted and entreated me to set sail. For a strong report had gone abroad from Sicily, that Dionysius had become again wonderfully eager after philosophy at that moment; and on this account Dion earnestly begged of me not to decline the invitation. But I knew that many such things happen to young men in the case of philosophy. However it seemed to me to be more safe, at least at that time, to bid a long farewell to Dionysius and Dion; and I gave offence to both by answering that I was an old man; and that nothing of what was now being done had taken place according to the agreement. But after this it seems³ that Archytas⁴ had betaken himself to Dionysius; now

¹ Ficinus adds here "certo tempore rediturum," as if his MS. were fuller than the rest.

² Instead of *ἵκασθαι*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ἀπουσίαν πάσχειν*. For his version is "absentiam tolerare."

³ Ficinus has "audivi," as if he had found in his MS. *ἀκήκοα* instead of *ἴδον*—

⁴ Of this Archytas, who, as appears from the line in Horace, "Te maris et terræ numeroque carentis arenæ," attempted to measure the

before my departure having made a hospitable and friendly acquaintance with Archytas, and certain other Tarentines, the guests and friends of Dionysius, I sailed away.¹ There were likewise certain other persons at Syracuse, who had heard some of the doctrines of Dion, and among these some others, filled with wrong notions about philosophy, and who seemed to me to attempt to discourse with Dionysius about things of this kind, as if Dionysius had heard all such matters as I had in my thoughts. But in other respects he was not without natural talent or the power to learn, and had a love of honour in a wonderful degree. Perhaps then the discourse of these men was pleasing to him, and he was manifestly ashamed that he heard nothing from me when I was sojourning there.² Hence he came the same time to the longing to hear me more clearly, and at the same time his love of honour urged him on. But on what account he did not hear me during my first sojourn, I have detailed in the account given above.

After I had returned home safe, and refused on his inviting me a second time, as I have just now mentioned, Dionysius appeared to be thoroughly³ on fire through his love of honour,³ lest I should seem to some persons to hold him in contempt, and that, as being acquainted with his nature and habits, and mode of living, I was unwilling to be annoyed by going to him. But I am justified in speaking the truth, and in enduring,⁴ if any one, on hearing what had occurred, should despise my philosophy, and think that the tyrant possessed a mind. For Dionysius sent to me the third time a trireme for the sake of making easy the voyage. He sent also Archedemus,⁵ whom he

quantity of matter contained in the earth; little is known; but of that little the whole is to his credit; especially the fact of his being the means of saving the life of Plato, when he was near losing it by the orders of Dionysius.

¹ Ficinus omits ἀτίπλεον, which seems superfluous after πρὶν ἀπύνααι. But in that case we must read ἐποίησα, in lieu of ποιήσας, similar to "adduxeram," in Ficinus.

² Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "cum ad eum profectus sum." But such is not the meaning of ἐπιδημεύειν.

³ Out of φιλοτιμηθῆναι, which I cannot understand, it is easy to elicit φιλοτιμίᾳ ἀφθῆναι, from "honoris sui causa ardere," in Ficinus. Compare a similar metaphor a little below, ἐξημμένος ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας, ὥσπερ πυρός.

⁴ I cannot understand ὑπομένειν, nor "ferre æquo animo," in Ficinus. I could have understood ἀπαμύνειν, "to repel."

⁵ Stephens tacitly reads here Ἀρχίδαμον, instead of Ἀρχίδαμον, con-

thought I valued the most of all the associates of Archytas, who were then in Sicily, and others of his (own)¹ acquaintances. And all these told to us the same story, that Dionysius had wonderfully increased in² philosophy. He sent too a long letter, well knowing how I was affected towards Dion, and that Dion was desirous I should set sail and come to Syracuse. With a view to all these particulars, therefore, the letter was composed, and at the commencement it said somehow to this effect—"Dionysius to Plato." After saying what usually follows, he said nothing previous to this, except that—"should you at my persuasion come now to Sicily, in the first place the matters relating to Dion shall be put into a train in the way you may wish yourself; for I know that you wish what is moderate, and I will accede to them; otherwise³ nothing that relates to the affairs of Dion,³ nor upon other points, nor as regards himself, will take place."—This is what he said. But the rest that was said would be here prolix, and foreign to the purpose. Other letters likewise came to me from Archytas, and others at Tarentum, speaking in high terms of the love of wisdom shown by Dionysius; and that, unless I came now, I should bring into a state of calumny the friendship existing with Dionysius, which had been effected through me, and which was of no little moment to their political affairs.

Such then being the state at that time of the sending for me, some of those from Sicily and Italy dragging me thither, and others at Athens pushing me away plainly by their entreaties, the same reason returned,⁴ that I ought not to betray Dion, nor my guests and friends⁵ at Tarentum; and it occurring no doubt that the person here alluded to is the same as the one mentioned in Epist. 3, p. 319, A.

¹ I have inserted "own," in allusion to Dionysius. To avoid the tautology in τῶν συγγεγονότων, and γνωρίμων, Ficinus has "nobiles," but that is the meaning of εὐγενεῖς, not of γνωρίμων. Hence αὐτοῦ has probably dropt out before ἄλλους or τῶν.

² Ficinus has "deditum esse." But that would be in correct Greek δεδωκώς, or ἐνδεδωκώς, not ἐπιδεδωκώς.

³ Ficinus—"nihil impetrabis quæ pro Dione optas," which is not the Latin for οὐδέν σοι τῶν περὶ Δίωνα ἔξει πραγμάτων. Perhaps he found in his MS. σὺ τῶν περὶ Δίωνα ἂ εὗξω ἔξει.

⁴ Instead of ἦκεν, Stephens proposed ἦρει, suggested by "ratio dictaret" in Ficinus. But one MS. has correctly, πάλιν ἦκεν, i. e. "returned."

⁵ Bekker has adopted ἐταίρους in lieu of ἐρίπους, found in only one MS.

curred to me, that it was nothing wonderful that a young man, who had heard incorrectly of things worthy of mention, should come with a docile spirit to the love of the best life; and that I ought to prove clearly, in what state the matter stood, and not by any means to betray it, nor to become myself the cause of a disgrace so truly great, if the case was in reality such as reported. Clothing myself then in this reasoning, I departed, fearing much, and prophesying, as it seems, not altogether well. Arriving then the third time, ¹for the saviour this at least I did in reality.¹ For I was again² luckily saved. And for this it is meet for me to give thanks to Dionysius, after the deity, because, when many were wishing to destroy me, he prevented them, and gave up to pity some portion of my affairs.

When therefore I arrived, I thought I ought first to obtain some proof whether Dionysius was in reality touched by philosophy, as by a fire, or whether this great report had come to Athens in vain. Now there is a certain method of making an experiment upon matters of this kind, by no means ignoble, but truly adapted to tyrants, and especially to such as are full of incorrect notions; which, as soon as I arrived, I perceived was very much the case with Dionysius. To such it is requisite to show what (philosophy)³ is, and of what kind, and through how great deeds how great a labour it demands. For he who hears this, if he is truly a lover of wisdom, and related to it, and worthy of it, as being a divine person, thinks he has heard of some wonderful road, and that he ought forthwith to betake himself to it, and that life is not to be endured by him, who acts otherwise. After this he does not, putting both himself and his leader on the stretch, give up the road, until he puts a finish upon all things, or obtains a power so as not to be unable to conduct himself without a person to show the road.

¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek τῷ σωτῆρι τοῦτό γε οὖν ἔπραξα ὄντως: which I cannot understand. For τῷ σωτῆρι is without regimen. Ficinus has "Profectus—sub servatore; id enim revera consecutus sum." What Plato said, I think, originally, was, that he made a sacrifice in honour of the deity, who had saved him from the perils of a sea-voyage.

² Three MSS. have πάλιν for πάλαι, agreeing with "rursus" in Ficinus.

³ Ficinus has alone preserved the word "philosophy," necessary for the sense.

In this way and with these thoughts does such a person live, acting (correctly)¹ in whatever transactions he may be engaged; but before all things perpetually keeping close to philosophy, and (making use of)² that food for the day, which may especially render him quick to learn, and of a good memory, and able to reason in himself,³ by abstaining from wine; and by which he becomes the hater of a practice contrary⁴ to this.

But they, who are not lovers of wisdom in reality, but have a coating of colour in their opinions, like those, whose bodies are sun-burnt, when they perceive how many things are to be learnt, and how great is the labour, and what temperance in daily food is requisite for that thing, they deem it too difficult and beyond their powers, and become unable to attend to it at all. But some of them persuade themselves that they have sufficiently heard the whole, and want no further exertions. This kind of experiment is clear and the most safe, when employed in the case of those living luxuriously and unable to endure labour, through the person throwing the blame not upon the guide but on himself, as being unable to attend to all that is requisite for the matter in hand.

In this way was, what has been now stated, mentioned to Dionysius. But neither did I detail them all, nor did Dionysius require it. For many things, and of the greatest moment, he pretended to possess sufficiently himself through the incorrect notions he had heard from others. And I hear that he afterwards wrote about what he had then heard, as if he were composing what was his own art,⁵ when there was nothing of his own,⁵ as I hear. However, of this I know nothing. But I know that certain others have written about the same things, but who they are⁶ not they themselves.⁶

¹ I have inserted the word εὖ, which has evidently dropt out before ἐν—

² Ficinus has "victu quotidiano utitur;" thus supplying the verb requisite for the sense.

³ I scarcely understand ἐν αὐτῷ.

⁴ The feminine, ἐναντίαν, seems to agree with πράξιν, to be got out of πράξει just before; or else ὁδόν has dropt out before οἱ δὲ—

⁵ Bekker's text, adopted by Stalbaum, is οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν ἀκούοι: which I cannot understand. Ficinus has "cum nihil tamen horum revera ipsorum inesset, ut equidem audio." For he found, no doubt, in his MS. ὡς ἀκούω, as read in three others, and probably οὐδὲν αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ ὄν—an absolute sentence, in lieu of οὐδενός—ὄντος, to avoid the accumulation of genitives.

⁶ Here again I am in the dark. Ficinus leaves the difficulty as he

Thus much however I can say about all, who either have written, or shall write, and state that they know about what things I am occupied, whether they have heard from myself or others, or have discovered themselves, that it is not possible for them to know any thing according to my opinions upon the matter; for there is not, and never will be, any composition of mine about them. For a matter of that kind cannot be expressed by words, like other things to be learnt; but by a long intercourse with the subject and living with it a light is kindled on a sudden, as if from a leaping fire,¹ and being engendered in the soul, feeds itself upon itself. Thus much I know, however, that what has been written or said by me, has been said in the best manner; and moreover that what has been written badly, does not pain me in the least.

But if it had appeared to me that such matters could be written or spoken of sufficiently before the masses, what could have been done by us more beautiful in life than to impart a great benefit to mankind, and to bring nature to light before all? I think, however, that the attempt² in favour of such being promulgated,² would not be beneficial except to a few, who are able with a little showing to make discoveries for themselves. But of the rest, some it will fill not correctly with a contempt by no means in reason, and others with a lofty and vain hope, as if they had learnt something solemn. And it has now come into my mind to say something further still. For perhaps by what I am about to say a portion of what has been said will become more clear. For a certain true account is the antagonist of him, who dares to write any thing whatever about matters of this kind; and which, although it has been stated by me frequently before, seems it must be stated at present likewise.

found it, by his literal version, "*quicumque vero hi fuerint, ne ipsi quidem seipsos.*" Taylor—"but without understanding what they wrote."

¹ By "a leaping fire," Plato meant perhaps "a flash of lightning," or else what is called "*ignis fatuus*," "a will-o-the-wisp," or "jack-a-lantern," that rises from marsh lands, and is seen to move from place to place. I suspect however that for *πηδῆσαντος* we ought to read *πελά-*

σαντος, "being near:" for one MS. has *πηλήσαντος*.

²—³ The Greek is *περὶ αὐτῶν λεγόμενην*. But Ficinus has more correctly—"in his edendis," as if he had found in his MS. *περὶ τούτων λεγόμενων*, and so I have translated.

There are three things belonging to each of those, through which it is necessary for science to be produced. But the fourth is science itself. And as to the fifth, it is requisite to establish that which is known and true. Of these one is its name; the second its definition;¹ the third its resemblance; the fourth its science. Now if you are desirous of understanding what has been just now asserted respecting one example, take it, and imagine thus² respecting all. A circle is called something, to which there is the name we have just mentioned. Its definition is the second thing, composed of nouns and verbs. For that, which is every where equally distant from the extremes to the middle, would be the definition of that, to which the name is of a round, and a circumference, and a circle. But the third is the circle, painted or blotted out, and made by a turner's wheel, or destroyed. By none of which accidents is the circle itself, of which all these properties are predicated, affected, as being of a different nature. But the fourth is science and intellect, and a correct opinion about them. And the whole of this again must be laid down as one thing, which exists neither in voice, nor in a corporeal figure, but is in the soul; by which circumstance it is manifest, that there is something different from the nature itself of the circle, and the three previously mentioned. But among the number of these, intellect, by its relation and similitude, approaches the nearest to the fifth; while the rest are more remote. The same is the case with respect to a thing straight, and circular, and with figure, and with colour, and of a thing good, and beautiful, and just, and of every body, both fashioned by the hand, and produced according to nature, and of fire, and water, and all things of that kind, and of every animal, and of the habit in souls, and of all actions and passions. For unless a person does, after a certain manner, understand of these things all the four, he will never perfectly participate in the science relating to the fifth. Moreover these (four) no less endeavour to show forth the quality, as respects each thing, than the being of each, through the want of power in words. On this account, no one possessing a mind will ever dare to³ place under the same view, and this

¹ So Taylor has translated λόγος by "definition." Ficinus here, as elsewhere, when in doubt, introduces two words, "oratio sive ratio."

² Ficinus has "similiter," which leads to ὡσαύτως in lieu of οὕτως.

³ The Greek is εἰς αὐτὸ τιθεῖν τὰ νενοημένα καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἀμείναι.

too never to be changed, the objects, which are perceived by the mind, and those, that are represented by figures, which is the case with those four.³

And this again, what has just now been said, it is requisite to learn. Every circle described by its doings,¹ or fashioned by a turner's wheel, is full of that, which is contrary to the fifth; for it every where² touches upon the straight line.² But we assert that the circle in the abstract has neither more nor less in itself of a contrary nature; and we assert too, that there is no fixed name for any thing; for there is nothing to prevent things, that are now called round, from being called straight, and those straight, round; nor will there be any less stability in them, when they are changed and called³ by a contrary name. The same assertion is likewise true of a definition, that, since it is composed of nouns and verbs,⁴ there is nothing stable in a sufficiently stable manner.⁴ And there is an infinity of reasons respecting each of the four, that it is uncertain. But what is of the greatest moment is, that since there are, as I have stated a little before, two things, being and quality, when the soul seeks to know, not the quality of a thing, but

κίνητον, ὃ δὴ πάσχει τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, whose version is "in idem atque id immutabile referre, quæ ab ipso intelliguntur, atque quatuor illa; quod utique patiuntur, quæ designantur figuris." From which it is evident that he found in his MS. *εἰς ταὐτό, καὶ ταῦτα, ἀμετακίνητον, τὰ νοημένα καὶ τὰ τέτταρα*. But the words *καὶ τὰ τέτταρα*, by which are meant the four mentioned above, *ὄνομα, λόγος, εἶδωλον*, and *ἐπιστήμη*, all of which are represented by figures in the shape of letters, belong to *πάσχει*, and are opposed to the *νοημένα*: and so I have translated.

¹ Ficinus, unable it would seem to understand *ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν*, has "inter hominum manus—" Perhaps the expression answers to the English "practically."

² By this Plato meant, I presume, that no circle formed materially is perfectly true; and if so, some part of it touches upon a straight line. So the moderns assert that it is impossible to make materially a straight line; for it touches some where upon a curve.

³ Instead of *καλοῦσι*, which is here unintelligible, we must read *καλεῖται*—Ficinus has "nominibus in contrarium permutatis."

⁴ The Greek is *μηδὲν ἱκανῶς βεβαιῶς εἶναι βέβαιον*: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is "cum ex nominibus verbisque componatur, nullam omnino habentibus firmitatem:" which is perfectly intelligible indeed, but not to be got from the Greek. The words *ἱκανῶς βεβαιῶς* ought to follow *μυρίος ὁ λόγος* in the next sentence. For though there might be an infinity of reasons, it should be stated that they were sufficiently firm.

what it is, ¹ unless each of these four previously sought for by the soul through reason and effect, and at last turns out correctly discussed by the senses, through all things that are said and shown, ¹ it fills every man, so to say, with all doubt and uncertainty.

In such cases then as through a depraved education we are not accustomed to seek the truth, but the image of it, which is placed before us, is sufficient (for us to touch upon), ² we do not become ridiculous to each other, the interrogated to the interrogating; but we are able to bandy about those four, and to examine them. ³ But in such cases as we compel a person to exhibit that fifth, any one of those, who are able to reply, and to overthrow, is the superior, ³ ⁴ and causes him, who is explaining (this fifth) either by speech, or writing, or answers, to appear to the multitude of his hearers entirely ignorant of the things, about which he attempts either to write or speak, persons being sometimes ignorant, that it is not the soul of the writer or speaker that is confuted, but the nature of each of the four (spoken of), ⁴ when it is existing improperly. ⁵ But the procession through all these, while changing its place towards each upwards and downwards, scarcely at length generates the knowledge of a thing existing naturally well in a person existing naturally well. ⁵ But when it exists naturally

¹—¹ Such is the literal translation of the Latin version by Ficinus, who could not understand the Greek, nor can I, τὸ δὲ μὴ ζητούμενον ἕκαστον τῶν τεττάρων προτεῖνον τῇ ψυχῇ λόγῳ τε καὶ κατ' ἔργα αἰσθήσιν ἐβέλεγκτον τὸ τε λεγόμενον καὶ δεικνύμενον αἰὶ παρεχόμενον ἕκαστον—where the reading πρότερον, found in his MS. for προτεῖνον, and αἰσθήσιν for αἰσθήσιν, have been confirmed by two others. What Plato wrote, remains still to be discovered.

² This was added apparently by Ficinus to fill up the sense.

³—³ The Greek is ἐν οἷς ὃ ἂν τὸ πέμπτον ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ δηλοῦν ἀναγκάζωμεν, ὃ βουλόμενος τῶν δυναμένων ἀνατρίπειν ἐραεῖ. Ficinus has "Ubi vero necessitas cogit quantum ostendere, quivis eorum, qui possint subvertere atque retractare, pervincit;" where he has omitted ἀποκρίνασθαι in the first clause, and introduced "retractare" in the second, as if his MS. read something wanting at present in the Greek. Taylor translates ἀποκρίνασθαι "to separate:" but that is ἀνατρίπειν. I have translated as if ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ were inserted before ἀνατρίπειν.

⁴—⁴ Plato appears to give here a description of the method, by which the Sophists seemed to confute their opponents, and as he did themselves.

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, as shown by his paraphrase—"Traductio vero,

ill, as exists naturally the habit of the soul of the multitude, with respect to learning, and to what are called morals, and these¹ are depraved, not even ²Lynceus himself can cause such as these to see.³ And in one word, neither docility in learning nor memory will cause (a person to do so), who is not germane to the matter; for they are not originally inherent in foreign habits; so that neither they, who are not naturally close to, and allied with, what is just, and the other things that are beautiful, but are docile and of a good memory, some with respect to some things, and others to others, nor they, who are allied, but are indocile and of a bad memory, will ever learn, as far as is possible, the truth relating to virtue and vice. For it is necessary to learn these, and at the same time the falsehood and truth of the whole of being, with all exertion and much time, as I stated at the commencement. But after each of these have been rubbed together, names and definitions, and the sense of seeing, and (the other) senses, and have been tried by tests in a kindly spirit, and by questions and answers without a feeling of envy, there has with difficulty shone forth³ an intellectual perception respecting each, and a mind putting itself on the stretch, as far as it is possible for human power to do so.

On this account, let every careful man be very far from writing about things truly⁴ worthy of care, lest at some time, by writing amongst men,⁵ he throw (himself)⁶ into envy and

per omnia illa sursum deorsumque in unumquodque discurrendo perveniens, vix tandem scientiam parit intrinsecus; scientiam inquam ipsius quod naturaliter bene affectum est in animo, ad ipsum quoque bene naturaliter affecto."

¹ Instead of τὰ δὲ διέφθαρται, Plato wrote, I suspect, τὰ δὲ δ̄ (i. e. τὰ τὰ) διέφθαρται.

² Here is some error here. For Lynceus had only the power to see acutely himself, not to cause others to do so.

³ The metaphor in τριβόμενα—ἐξέλαμψε will be best understood comparing Rep. iv. p. 435, A., τριβόντες, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων, ἐκλάμπει ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην.

⁴ From "revera," in Ficinus, Faehse suggested ὄντως instead ὄντων.

⁵ This mention of "men" seems rather strange; as if a person were to write for others than men. In lieu of ἀνούς we must read ἀνοίας, i. e. "without mind." In a similar spirit Pindar says that he "wrote for intelligent what, in the case of the many, would require an interpreter."

⁶ After καταβάλω is required an accusative. Read therefore αὐτὸν in lieu of ποτε—

difficulties.¹ But, in one word, it is requisite to know from hence, when any one sees the writings of another, either of a legislator upon laws, or of any person whatever² upon other subjects, that these are not those, on which he has been the most careful, if he is himself a careful person; but that the objects of his pursuit are situated some where in a country the most beautiful. But if the subjects, on which he has been the most careful, are committed to writing, then not the gods but men themselves have their own intellect destroyed.³

Now he, who follows this story and digression, will understand correctly whether Dionysius has written any thing of the highest and first kind respecting nature, or any other person inferior or superior to him; since, according to my reasoning, he has neither heard or learnt any thing sound about what he has written; for he would have venerated them equally with myself, nor have dared to cast them forth into a state unfitting and unbecoming; nor has he written about them for the sake of remembering them; since there is no fear that any one will ever forget them, if he has once comprehended them by the soul; for of all things they lie in the smallest compass. But⁴ (perhaps he did so)⁴ for the sake of base ambition, considering them as his own, or as sharing in a kind of instruction, of which he was unworthy, and loving the renown arising from such a participation.

If however this occurred to Dionysius after one meeting, the fact may be so. But let Zeus,⁵ says the Théban, know how it occurred. For I went through these matters, as I have said, only once; and never afterwards at all. In the next

¹ What Plato says of writing, Euripides applies to learning and speaking in *Med.* 287—296. The doctrine, which evidently emanated from the school of Pythagoras, is touched upon more in detail in *Protagor.* p. 316, B. § 20.

² Instead of *ἄττ' οὖν*, which are never thus united in Greek, correct language requires *δρουοῦν*, opposed to *νομοθίρον*.

³ There is here an allusion, as remarked by Stephens, to a line of Homer, *Ἐξ ἄρα δὴ τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρίνας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί*: while as regards the clause *θεοὶ μὲν οὐ, βροτοὶ δέ*, see Dobree on *Aristoph. Plut.* 555.

⁴ The Greek is *εἶπερ ἔνεκα*, without any apodosis to the sentence, which is not required by the version of Ficinus, "*Forte vero—id fecit*," which would lead to *ἔνεκα—ἔποιε τιγράμμα*, "he composed some writing."

⁵ The allusion to the Theban oath is in the use of *ἴττω* for *ἴστω*, which cannot be expressed in English. To the same form Plato refers in *Phædo*, p. 62, A. § 16.

place, he, who is interested in discovering what occurred relating to those matters, and how it occurred, ought to consider through what reason it was we did not go through them a second and a third time and oftener; whether it was that Dionysius, having heard them only once, thought he knew them, and did know them, sufficiently? or that he discovered them himself, or had learnt them previously from others, or that what had been said was trifling? or thirdly,¹ that they were not according to his standard, but greater; and that thus² he would not be able to live, if he paid any regard to prudence and virtue? For if³ (it be said that he considered)³ the matters frivolous, he will oppose many witnesses, who assert the contrary, and who are much more competent to judge about things of this kind than Dionysius; but if, that he discovered or learnt them, and that they are worthily suited for the instruction of a liberal soul,⁴ how should he, not being a wondrous man himself,⁴ have so readily dishonoured the leader and the lord in these matters?

And how he did dishonour him, I will relate. After an interval of no long time, although he had previously permitted Dion to possess and enjoy his property, he did not permit his guardians to send it to Peloponnesus, as if he had entirely forgotten his letter; for (he said) it was not Dion, but Dion's son, of whom, as being his own nephew, he was according to law the guardian. Such were the transactions of that time that took place up to this period. And from these occurrences I clearly saw the desire Dionysius had for philosophy; and it was lawful for me to be indignant, whether I wished it or not. For it was already summer at that time, and ships were sailing out. But it seemed I ought not to be more offended with Dionysius than with myself, and with those, who compelled me to come the third time to the strait about Scylla,

¹ As three alternatives have been stated already, it is evident that for *ῥήσιν* we must read *τίσιν*.

² I have adopted *εἶναι*, read in one MS. after *καθ' αὐτόν*, and *οὕτως*, found in two MSS., in lieu of *οὕτως*.

³ The words within lines are found only in the version of Ficinus, "existimasse dicatur."

⁴ Although Stephens had correctly pointed out the error in the translation of Ficinus, "quis non id mirum putet Dionysium sic affectum," Taylor has been content to follow it implicitly.

"And dread Charybdis measure still again."¹

and to tell Dionysius, that it was impossible for me to stay with him, while Dion was treated so dirtily. But he soothed me, and begged me to stay, thinking it would not be well for him should I be so swift a messenger of such doings; but unable to persuade me, he said he would prepare the means of sending me away. However, I determined to go on board and sail amongst the vessels outward bound,² being enraged, and thinking I ought to suffer every thing, if he should attempt to stop me, as I had been injured, although I had plainly done no injury. But on seeing that I had no desire at all to stay, he devised a plan of this kind, for delaying my sailing away. On the day after this had taken place, he plausibly addresses me. From myself and you, said he, let Dion, and the affairs of Dion, be removed out of the way, for the sake of our (not³) being frequently at variance about them. For I will, said he, thus act on your account, to Dion. I think it right for him to take away his property and to reside in Peloponnesus, not as an exile, but as one, who may come hither, when it shall seem good to him, to me, and to you who are his friends; and this shall be, if he forms no plot against myself; and you, and your relations, and his here shall be his sureties; and let him give you a guarantee; and let the property, which he takes away, be deposited in Peloponnesus and at Athens, with those you shall think fit; and let Dion enjoy the use of it, but not the power to take it away without your consent; for I have not any very great trust in him that, if he can use the property, he will be just towards myself; for it will not be trifling. But I have greater confidence in you and yours. See, therefore, if this is agreeable to you, and remain on these terms for this year, and then depart to your well-doing,⁴ taking with you the property; and well I know, that Dion will be greatly indebted to you for having managed matters in this way on his behalf.

On hearing⁵ this speech I felt indignant; but still I said I

¹ *Odyssey* xii. 428.

² This, I conceive, is the exact translation of ἀποστόλοις.

³ I have inserted μὴ, which can hardly be omitted. See Hermann on Viger, n. 17.

⁴ On the phrase εἰς ὥρας ἀπύναι, see Casaubon on Athenæus, p. 112, and the commentators on Aristoph. *Bapt.* 380.

would take counsel of myself until the following day on these points, and communicate my resolves. This was our compact at that time. I hereupon, being all alone, and very confused, took counsel of myself. And this consideration first presented itself as taking the lead in my designs. What, if Dionysius intends to do nothing that he says, but on my departure both he and many others of his friends should write¹ in a plausible manner to Dion, what he has now said to me, that Dionysius indeed was willing, but I unwilling, for him to do what he urged me, and that I entirely neglected his (Dion's) concerns; and moreover should Dionysius be unwilling to send me away, and himself give no orders to any master of a vessel (to take me), and easily signify to all men, that I was sailing away without his consent, what sailor would be willing to take me on board, while I was hastening from the dwelling of Dionysius? For in addition to other evils, I dwelt in the garden² which surrounds the dwelling, from whence the porter would not be willing to let me out, unless an order were sent from Dionysius. And should I remain a year, I could indeed send an account of these doings to Dion, and in what state I was, and what I was doing. But should Dionysius do aught of what he says, my conduct would be not entirely ridiculous; for perhaps the property of Dion, if one rightly values it, is not less than a hundred talents.³ But if what is now looming⁴ should, as is likely, take place, I shall be at a loss how to conduct myself. At the same time it is perhaps necessary for me to labour for a year longer, and to endeavour to prove the designs of Dionysius by his deeds.

Having thus determined with myself, I told Dionysius on the following day that I had made up my mind to stay. I hold it right however, said I, for you not to consider me as the master of Dion, and that you should, together with myself, send letters to inform him of the determination, and to ask him whether he was satisfied? and if not, whether he wished for

¹ After αὐτοῦ the Greek has διακαλυόμενος, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted the word. I could have understood, αὐτῷ δὲ καλυόμενοι, i. e. "being ordered by him," and thus one can account for αὐτῶν, found in four MSS.

² Elsewhere it is said that Plato was confined in the Acropolis.

³ i. e. upwards of £13,300.

⁴ This is the meaning of ὑποφαίνειν, which is applied to the appearance of the morning before the sun has risen above the horizon.

and demanded any thing else? and to send word as soon as possible; but that you should do nothing new in his affairs. This was said (by me), and this agreement did we make nearly in the manner just now detailed.

After this the vessels sailed, and it was no longer possible for me to depart; when Dionysius, ¹while speaking, remembered ¹ that the half of Dion's property ought to remain with his son, and that the other half should be sent to Dion; and he said he would sell it, and after it had been sold, deliver one half to myself to send to Dion, and leave the other half for his son; for that this would be the most equitable arrangement. Astonished at the statement, I thought it would be very ridiculous to say any thing further. I told him however, that we ought to wait for the letter from Dion, and again send him an account of these matters. But Dionysius immediately after this did, in a very bold ² manner, sell the whole of Dion's property at what time, and in what manner and to whomsoever he pleased; nor did he say any thing whatever about it to myself; and in like manner I said nothing to him about the affairs of Dion; for I thought I should be able to do nothing more in the matter.

Thus far was assistance given by myself to philosophy and my friends. But after this, I and Dionysius were so living, that I, like a bird, was (always) ³ looking out, and longing to fly away; while he was devising in what manner he might frighten me off, ⁴ and give up none of the property of Dion. We gave out however through the whole of Sicily, that we were friends forsooth.

Dionysius had attempted to reduce the pay of the veteran mercenaries now to a lower rate than according to the custom of his father; and the soldiers, being enraged, collected together in a body, and declared they would not permit it.

¹—¹ The Greek is *ἐμνήσθη λέγων*, where Stephens suggested *λέγειν*, to answer in part to the version of Ficinus, "quasi nonnihil prætermissi reminiscens—inquit."

² The Greek is *νανικῶς*: where I should prefer *τυραννικῶς*, as a little below—*μάλα τυραννικῶς—ἔφη*.

³ Ficinus has "semper," as if he had found here in his MS. *δεῖ*—

⁴ The verb *ἀνασοβεῖν* is applied to scaring away birds, as in Aristoph. 'Ορν. 34, *Ἡμεῖς—οὐ σοβοῦντος οὐδενός Ἀνεπτόμεσθα*, or starting wild game, as in Lysis, p. 206, A. § 7, *εἰ ἀνοσοβοὶ θῆρ' ἰὼν καὶ δυσάλωτο-τίραν τὴν ἀγρὰν ποιοῖ*. Ast however, with Ficinus, translates it "to restrain," a meaning it never has.

Dionysius therefore endeavoured to force them, by closing the gates of the Acropolis; but the soldiers immediately rushed to the walls, raising a kind of barbarous cry and warlike psan; at which Dionysius being terrified, conceded all demands, and even more to those of the light-shield-bearers, who had been collected together. But a report was quickly spread, that Heracleides was the cause of this disturbance. On hearing which, Heracleides took himself out of the way and disappeared, while Dionysius endeavoured to lay hold of him; but being in a difficulty, he sent for Theodotes to come to the garden, in which I happened to be then walking. Now of the rest of their discourse I neither knew nor heard; but what Theodotes said in my presence to Dionysius, I both know and remember. For, said he, Plato, I am persuading Dionysius here, that if I am able to bring Heracleides hither to a conference respecting the charges now laid against him, and if it does not seem good (to Dionysius) for him to dwell in Sicily, I think it is proper for him to take his wife and son, and sail to Peloponnesus, and reside there, doing no injury at all to Dionysius, and enjoying his own property. I have therefore sent to him already, and I will now send to him again. But whether he hearkens to my first or second application, I deem it right to request of Dionysius, that ¹if any one falls in¹ with Heracleides, either in the country or here, no ill shall happen to him, but that he shall be removed from the country, until Dionysius shall decide upon something else. To this, said he, do you accede? addressing Dionysius. He answered, I do accede; nor shall he suffer any ill, contrary to what has now been stated, should he make his appearance at your house.

However, on the evening of the following day, Eurybius and Theodotes came to me in great haste and wonderfully alarmed; and Theodotes said to me, Plato, you were present yesterday at the compact which Dionysius made with me and you respecting Heracleides? To which I replied, How not? But now, says he, the soldiers with light shields are running all round seeking to lay hold of Heracleides; and it appears almost that he is some where here. Follow us then, by all means, to Dionysius. We went therefore and came to him; and they indeed stood silent and in tears, but I said, These persons,

¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and consequently by Taylor.

Dionysius, are afraid lest you should do something of a novel kind¹ to Heracleides, contrary to the compact made yesterday; for it seems to me, that he has returned and is clearly some where here. And he, on hearing this, burnt with rage, and ²assumed all kinds of colours² such as a person in anger does. But Theodotes falling at his feet, and laying hold of his hand, burst into tears, and implored him not to do any such thing.³ Then I, taking up the discourse, consoled him and said, Cheer up, Theodotes; for Dionysius will not dare to act contrary to the compact made yesterday. But he looking at me, and in a very tyrannic manner, With you, says he, I made no compact, either great or small. By the gods, said I, you (did agree not to do) what this man now requests you not to do. After saying this, I turned from him and went out.

After this Dionysius endeavoured to hunt down Heracleides. Theodotes, however, sent messengers to him, and exhorted him to fly. But Dionysius sent Tisias and the soldiers with light shields, and ordered them to pursue him. Heracleides, however, as it is said, anticipated them, and escaped in the small part of a day into the dominions of the Carthaginians. Hereupon the old plot for his not giving up the property of Dion seemed to Dionysius to offer a plausible pretext of enmity against myself. And in the first place he sent me from the Acropolis, framing an excuse, that it was requisite for the women to perform some ten-day sacrifice in the gardens where I resided. He therefore ordered me to remain out during that period with Archidemus. While I was there, Theodotes sent for me, and felt very indignant respecting the transactions of that time, and found fault with Dionysius; who, hearing that I had been with Theodotes, made this another pretext, and the sister⁴ to the former, for enmity against me, and sent a person to ask me, whether I had really been with Theodotes on his sending for me? and I readily replied, I had. The

¹ In νεώτερον is an euphemism for κατόν. See the commentators on Eurip. Med. 37.

² On this expression Stalbaum refers to Boissonade on Aristænetus, p. 396.

³ Unless τοιοῦτον is to be referred to the preceding νεώτερον, one would prefer τι άνιανον. For άνιανον would be thus used as an euphemism for θάνατον, as άνήκιστον is in Thucyd. iii. 39, 45.

⁴ On the metaphorical use of άδελφός, see Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 3, Porson on Aristoph. Plut. 550, Blomfield on S. Th. 343.

party therefore said, Dionysius has ordered me to tell you, that you are acting by no means correctly in always making much of Dion and the friends of Dion. This is what was said; and after this Dionysius never again sent for me to his residence; as it was now clear that I was the friend of Theodotes and Heracleides, and his enemy; and he no longer considered me well affected towards him, because the property of Dion had been consumed entirely.

After this I dwelt out of the Acropolis among the mercenary soldiers; but others, Athenians, and some likewise my fellow-citizens, who were in the service of Dionysius, came and told me that I had been calumniated by the light-shield soldiers, and that certain persons had threatened to kill me, if they could lay hold of me. I devised therefore the following plan for my preservation. I sent to Archytas, and other friends at Tarentum, telling them in what state I happened to be; and they, making some pretext of an embassy to the city, sent a ship of thirty oars, and Lamiscus,¹ one of my friends; who, on his arrival, made a request to Dionysius on my behalf, saying that I wished to depart, and begged of him ²not to act otherwise.² And he consented, and sent me away after providing me with means for the voyage. However, I neither asked for the property of Dion, nor did any one give it me.

On reaching Peloponnesus at the Olympic games, I met with Dion, who was a spectator there, and I told him what had happened. And he, calling Jupiter to witness, immediately declared to me and my relations and friends, that he would prepare to revenge himself upon Dionysius, both for his having deceived me, his guest—for thus he spoke and thought—and for his own unjust expulsion and banishment. On hearing this, I advised him to call upon his friends, if they were willing. But as for myself, I said, you together with others had by force caused me in some manner to share in the food, and the hearth, and the sacred rites of Dionysius;³ who perhaps has thought, in consequence of many calumniat-

¹ Ficinus has "Salmiscum," similar to Σαλαμίσκον in three MSS.

²—³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

³ Ficinus has a supplement here, marked in Italics, not found in the Greek—"suasi ut—me putaret quasi medium quandam æquumque utrinque esse debere, præsertim cum—"

ing me, that I was plotting in conjunction with you against him and his tyranny, and yet he did not put me to death, but treated me with respect. Besides I am of an age to take a part with scarcely any one in war; but I would be a common friend to you all, if at any time in want of a friendly feeling towards each other you should wish to do any good; ¹ but if you are desirous (of doing) evil, ¹ call upon others. This did I say through a feeling of disgust to my wandering about Sicily, and adverse fortune in it.

By ² not obeying and being not persuaded ² by the reasonings (urged) by myself, they have been themselves the cause of all the evils that have at present happened to them; of which nothing, humanly speaking, would have occurred, had Dionysius given Dion his own property, or had been perfectly reconciled to him. For I could easily have restrained Dion from both by my will and power. ³ But now they have rushed against each other, and filled all things with evils. And yet Dion had the same wish, which I would say both myself and any other moderate person ought to have, ⁴ who should consider, touching his own power, and that of his friends, and of his own city, how, by doing a benefit when in power, things of the greatest moment would be in the greatest honour. ⁴ But this will be, ⁵ not if a person enrich himself and his friends and city, by laying plots and bringing together conspirators, when he is poor and has no command over himself, through his yielding to cowardice, ⁶ as

¹ Here again the Latin of Ficinus is more full than the Greek—"quamdiu vero odiis certabitis, ad hæc tanquam propugnatores alios advocabitis—"

²—³ I must leave others to explain the difference between ἀπειθῶντες and οὐ πειθόμενοι.

³ Ficinus has "voluntate mea et consilo et auctoritate," as if he has found in his MS. τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι. Perhaps Plato wrote βουλευέσθαι after δύνασθαι. At least one MS. reads βουλευέσθαι for βούλεσθαι.

⁴—⁵ The version of Ficinus is here so different from the Greek, as to render it impossible to ascertain what he found in his MS.

⁵ Instead of ἔστι δὲ, the sense evidently requires ἔσται δὲ τὰδε, similar to "neque vero id fit" in Ficinus.

⁶ Although δειλίας seems to be defended by the expression in Eurip. Phœn. 600, πλοῦτος ἦν φιλόψυχον κακόν, yet one would rather expect here δουλείας. For not only would there be an oxymoron in ἡττημένος ὑπὸ δουλείας, but a more natural flow of ideas likewise in δουλείας τῆς πρὸς ἡδονᾶς than in δειλίας τῆς πρὸς ἡδονᾶς. For persons are said to be slaves, rather than cowards, as regards pleasure.

regards persons, and subsequently by destroying those, who possess property, and calling them enemies, scatters the wealth of such persons, and exhorts his fellow-citizens and friends (so to act, that no one shall, by saying that he is poor, bring a charge against him. After the same manner, he who benefits his city, will be harassed by it, in consequence of distributing by voting¹ the property of a few among the many; or when any one being the president of a great city, and one ruling over many lesser cities, unjustly distributes to his own city the property of the lesser. For in this way, neither Dion, nor any other person, will ever voluntarily proceed to power, pernicious to himself and family for all time, but to a form of government and the establishment of laws, the most just and best, and effected through the fewest deaths and banishments.

This conduct did Dion lately adopt, by choosing to suffer rather than to do unholy deeds, yet taking care lest he should suffer; still, however, did he stumble, after he had arrived at the very point of being superior to his foes. Nor did he suffer any thing to be wondered at. For a man holy, temperate, and prudent, will never be deceived entirely² respecting unholy things, respecting the soul of such.³ But it would perhaps be not wonderful, should he suffer the suffering of a good pilot,⁴ from whom a storm about to be has not entirely lain hid; but from whom the violence unusually great and unexpected of tempests may have lain hid, and, having lain hid, have by their force overwhelmed him. The same thing upon a small scale⁴ caused Dion to stumble. For they, who tripped

¹ Between *παρὰλειπόμεναι* and *ἔνεος* there seems to have dropt out *ταύτῃ προήσται*, a fact that appears to have escaped Ficinus; who has consequently given here a translation not answering to the Greek.

² As this *ἐνὶ ψηφισμάτων* is at variance with the subsequent *μη κατὰ δίκην*, and the preceding mention of acts of violence done by the victorious party during a revolution, one would prefer *ἐν οἷς ψηφισμάτων*, "by not-voting," i. e. by power.

³ The Greek is *ὅτιος γὰρ ἀνθρώπος ἀνοσίων πέρι*, and at the end of the sentence *τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν τοιούτων πέρι*: which I cannot understand. The version of Ficinus is, "Pium enim virum temperatumque et prudentem omnino quidem in rebus ejusmodi impii nunquam fallunt." From which it is easy to see that he found in his MS. not *ἀνοσίων πέρι*, but *παρ' ἀνοσίων*, i. e. "by unholy persons," to whose unholy doings it is to be referred the expression *τοιούτων πέρι*.

⁴ So I have translated *οἱ ὀλιγίστων*, which Bekker has rejected, with one MS., although acknowledged by "aliquantum" in Ficinus.

him up, did not lie hid from him, as being wicked men; but what a depth of ignorance, and of the rest of depravity, and of greediness insatiable they possessed, this did lie hid; and stumbling on this point, he lies (dead), and Sicily wraps in sorrow infinite.

What therefore I advise you to do, after the facts just now detailed, has been nearly told, ¹and let them be told.¹ But it appeared to me necessary to show, why I undertook the second journey to Sicily, ²and, as it were, of somewhat a compulsory² kind, on account of the absurdity and irrationality attached to the transactions. If then what has been now said has appeared to any one to be more reasonable, and it seems to any one that the excuses for what have occurred are sufficient, what has been now said will have been (said) moderately and sufficiently (well).³

EPISTLE VIII.

PLATO TO THE RELATIONS AND FRIENDS OF DION—
PROSPERITY.

By considering what matters (correctly)⁴ you will do well in reality, I will endeavour, according to my power, to go through in detail. And I hope I shall advise what is conducive not to you alone, ⁵especially at least however to you,⁵

Plato wrote, I suspect, *δι' ἀλογίστων*, "through things not to be calculated upon," similar to the preceding *ἀπροσδόκητον*.

¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

² Ficinus has "quasi compulsus," as if he had found in his MS. *ἀφείν την δυνείραν καί τι ἀναγκαῖον οἶον*, in lieu of *ἀφείν την δυνείραν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι*—where Stephens was the first to object to the pleonasm in *ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι* and the subsequent *δεῖν*.

³ In lieu of *εἶη*, the sense requires *εὖ εἶη*, as I have translated.

⁴ Stephens endeavours to defend "A δὲ thus placed at the commencement of a letter, not aware that *δὲ* is a corruption of *εὖ*, for thus *εὖ διανοηθέντες* would be properly balanced by *εὖ πράττοιτε*."

⁵ The Greek is *μάλιστα γὰρ μὴν ὑμῖν*, which I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus has "sed vobis quidem maxime." I could have understood *τὰ συμφέροντα μάλιστα, κατὰ γὰρ νοῦν ἔμον*, i. e. "most conducive according to my mind:" where lies hid a dramatic fragment, *Μάλιστα συμφέροντα κατὰ γὰρ νοῦν ἔμόν*.

and secondly to all those at Syracuse, and thirdly to your foes (at home) and enemies (abroad), unless some one of them shall have been guilty of an unholy act. For these things are incurable, nor can any one ever wash them out.¹ But bear in mind what I now say.

The tyranny having been dissolved through the whole of Sicily, there is now with you an universal strife about these very things; some wishing to resume the former government; but ²others to put the finish to the escape from tyranny.² Now the counsel relating to such matters appears on each occasion to the multitude to be right, that it is requisite to advise what will effect the greatest evils to foes, and the greatest good to friends. It is however by no means easy for him, who inflicts many evils on others, not to suffer many himself. Nor is it necessary to go far to see this clearly; but what has taken place ³here and there³ relating to Sicily would suffice;⁴ while some are attempting to do, and others to ward off the doers; and by relating them as a tale to others; ye would become on each occasion competent instructors. In these matters then there is scarcely any difficulty. But what would be conducive to all, both foes and friends, or the least of an evil to both, this it is neither easy to see, nor for a person seeing to accomplish. The consultation of such a kind and the attempt to speak look like a prayer. Let it then be in every respect a prayer. For it is meet to begin from the gods in every thing, both in speaking and thinking; and may it eventually indicate to us some such discourse as this.

¹ Although there appears at first sight little to offend in the words *οὐκ ἂν ποτὶ τις αὐτὰ ἐκνίψαι*, yet on such an occasion there should be a reference not to a person washing out a stain, but to a river, as in Soph. Œd. T. 1218, *Οἶμαι γὰρ οὐρ' ἂν Ἰστρον οὔτε Φᾶσιν ἂν Νίψαι καθαρμῶ τῇδε τὴν στεγὴν*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *Οὐκ ἂν ποτ' Ἰστρος αὐτὰ γ' ἐκνίψαιεν ἂν*, which was a line probably of Sophocles, imitated by Seneca in Hippol. 715, *Quis eluet me Tanais?*

²—³ The translation of Ficinus is too remarkable to be omitted, "*alii tyrannidis memoriam omnem prorsus extinguere*."

³— The Greek is *τῇδε αὐτοῦ περὶ*. Ficinus omits the words *τῇδε αὐτοῦ*, which he could not understand, nor can I. Hence I have translated, as if the Greek were *τῇδε τ' αὐτοῦ τε περὶ*—

⁴ Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "*satis exemplo nobis esse possint*," to which there is nothing to answer in the Greek, unless we read—*ἀποκοίη ἂν, ἃ ἄλλοις*—in lieu of *ἃ καὶ ἄλλοις*—

From the time that the war began, nearly one family has been ruling over both you and your enemies; whom your fathers established firmly, when they came into all kinds of difficulty at the period, when there was to that part of Sicily under Greeks a danger extreme of their becoming Barbarians, through their being entirely overthrown by the Carthaginians. At that time they chose Dionysius, as being a person young and warlike; for the affairs of war suited him; but Hipparinus, his superior in age, as an adviser; and both, for the safety of Sicily, with absolute power, calling them, as they say, tyrants. Now whether any one is willing to think that a divine fortune and a god, or the talents of the rulers, or both, together with the citizens of that time, were the cause of the safety of Sicily, let this be as he conceives. Safety however did take place to the men of that time. As then they were in such a state, it was surely just to return thanks to their preservers. But if the tyranny did in after-times use somewhat improperly the gift of the city, for this it has partly had accusations¹ against it, and let it partly suffer the punishment. But what accusations would have been necessarily correct after what had occurred to them. For if you had been able to escape from them easily and without great danger and trouble, or they to recover easily again their power, it would not have been possible to give the advice about to be spoken. But now it is requisite for both of you to bear and call to mind, how often each of you have been in the hope of fancying yourselves to want only a mere trifle towards the accomplishment of every thing according to your mind. Now, this very trifle happens on each occasion to be the cause of great and numberless mischiefs; nor has yet any end been reached; but the old end² seems to be ever combining² with a new beginning; and by this circle (of events), the whole of the tyrannic and popular kind (of government) will be near to be destroyed; and the whole of Sicily, should some event probable, but to be deprecated, take place, will come to nearly a desert, as regards

¹ In lieu of *δικας τὰς*, three MSS. read *δικαστὰς*: and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his "judices," contrary to the genius of the language.

² The Greek is *ξυνάπτει—τελευτή δοκούσα*. The sense requires, as I have translated, *ξυνάπτειν—τελευτή ἤν δοκούσα*.

the language of Greece, by being transferred to some Phœnician or Opic¹ dynasty and power. Against this it is requisite for all the Greeks, with all readiness, to prepare² a remedy. Now if any one has any thing more correct and better than what will be said by myself, let him bring it forward, and be justly called a lover of Greece.

But what now presents itself to me, I will, with all freedom of speech, and making use of a mediatory and just discourse, endeavour to point out. I declare then, speaking in the manner of an arbitrator,³ to two persons, one ruling over, and the other ruled by, a tyrant, my old advice, as if given to each singly.⁴ And now my language of advice would be for every tyrant to fly from the name and the thing itself, and to change his power as a tyrant, if possible, into that of a king. And possible it is, as the wise and good Lycurgus showed by his acts; who, on seeing that the family of his relations in Argos and Messene had proceeded from kings to tyrants, and had been destroying both themselves, and each his own city, felt a fear both for his country and race, and applied as a remedy the government of elderly men, and the bond⁴ of the Ephori, as a preservative of kingly rule; so that it has been preserved for so many generations with glory; since law became the lord and⁵ authorized king of men, and not men the tyrants over the laws. To this my discourse now exhorts all men, aiming at tyranny, that they turn away themselves, and fly with celerity, from the felicity of men insatiably⁶ hungry and without mind, and that they endeavour to come round to a form of kingly government, and to become subservient to laws made by a king, and thus to obtain the greatest honours with the consent both of men and laws,

¹ The Opici were the ancient inhabitants of Campania, in the southern part of Italy.

² Literally "to cut." On the phrase *τίμνειν φάρμακον* see Blomfield on *Æsch. Agam.* 16.

³ Ficinus evidently did not find in his MS. what is here read in the other MSS., for his version is, "quemadmodum jamdiu consuevi, tam exercenti quam patienti tyrannidem, consulam—"

⁴ I have adopted from a var. lect. in one MS., *δεσμὸν* in lieu of *δασμὸν*, which Ficinus has omitted. Taylor translates it "division—"

⁵ I have followed Stephens, who proposed to insert *καὶ* before *βασιλεὺς*—

⁶ Instead of *ἀπλήστῳ*, Heusde suggested *ἀπλήστως*, found subsequently in two MSS.

But those, who are in the pursuit of free institutions, and are flying from a servile yoke as an evil, I would advise to be cautious lest, through an insatiable desire for unseasonable liberty, they fall at some time into the disease of their ancestors; which the persons of that period suffered through an excessive anarchy, from making a bad use¹ of their measureless love of freedom. For the Siceliotes, who possessed the power² before Dionysius and Hipparinus, lived as they thought happily, because they lived luxuriously, and ruled over even rulers themselves; for they pelted and stoned to death³ the ten military chiefs prior to Dionysius, having judged them according to no law, in order that they might not be the slaves of any one either with justice or law as the despot, but be in every way entirely free. From hence arose the tyrannies over them. For slavery and freedom, when excessive, are each an evil; but, when moderate, altogether a good; for moderate is the slavery to a god, but that to a man immoderate; and, to temperate men god is a law, but to the intemperate, pleasure.

Since then such is naturally the case, what I am advising, I exhort the friends of Dion to proclaim to all the Syracusans, as the common advice of Dion and myself. But I will interpret what, had he been living and able, he would have said⁴ to you. What then was the reasoning, some one may say, which the advice of Dion shows forth to us touching the present state of affairs? It was this.

"Receive, O Syracusans, before all things such laws, as appear to you not about to turn your thoughts or desires to money-making and wealth; but as there are three things, soul, body, and moreover wealth, put the worth⁵ of the soul in the place of highest honour; that of the body

¹ Ficinus has "abusi," as if his MS. read *καταχρώμενοι*, not *χρώμενοι*.

² Bekker has adopted *ἀρξάντων* from two MSS., but Stalbaum has retained *ἀρξάντες*: which Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by "qui-gubernabant—"

³ Ficinus has "deposuerunt atque pepulerunt," as if he had found in his MS. *κατέλυσαν ἐκβάλλοντες*. But Bekker has edited more correctly from other MSS. *κατέλυσαν βάλλοντες*—

⁴ From "diceret," in Ficinus, Stephens suggested *εἶπεν ἂν* in lieu of *εἶπεν*—The correction is attributed to Bekker by Stalbaum.

⁵ Taylor's translation is, "it is requisite that that care of the soul should rank:" who has thus followed the text of Stephens, *ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν δεῖ*, in lieu of which six MSS. read *ἀρετὴν ἐντιμοτάτην ποιοῦντες*—

in the mind, but under the soul; but in the third and last, that of wealth, as being the slave both of the body and soul. Now the institution, that effects this, will be a law rightly laid down by you, and render those, who make use of it, truly happy. But the language, which calls the rich happy, is itself senseless, as being the senseless language of women and children: and it makes those who are persuaded of it of the same kind. Now that I am exhorting you to what is true, you will know in fact, if you shall try what has now been said by me on the subject of laws, by having received such laws,¹ which appears to be the truest test in all cases. For since danger is keeping down Sicily, and you are neither sufficiently the conquerors nor manifestly the conquered, it will perhaps be just and conducive to all of you to take a middle path, both those who are flying from the severity of power and those who desire to have it again; the ancestors of whom did in their time, what is a thing of the greatest moment, preserve the Greeks from the Barbarians; so that it is now lawful to hold discourse about a form of government. For had they perished then, there would have been left no where nor any how either a discourse or hope. Now then, let there be to some a liberty combined with kingly government; but to others a kingly government under control, by the laws having a despotic power not only over the other citizens, but over the kings themselves, should they act contrary to the law. And in addition to all this, do ye together with the gods, in a spirit guileless and sincere, appoint a king; first my own son on account of two-fold favours, from myself and father. For he at that period freed the city from the Barbarians; but I have now done so twice from tyrants, as yourselves are the witnesses; and make him the second king, who has the same name as his own father, I mean the son of Dionysius, for the sake of the assistance which he now affords, and of his pious conduct; who, born from a father who was a tyrant, has voluntarily made the city free, and obtained for himself and his race

similar to "*virtutem animi maxime anteponant*" in the genuine version of Ficinus.

¹ i. e. "senseless."

² I have united the words *δεξάμενοι δὲ τοὺς τοιοῦτους νόμους*, and changed *δὲ* into *ὅτι*, to avoid the necessity of an absolute sentence, and to carry out the train of ideas.

ever-living honour, instead of a tyranny lasting for a day, and at the same time unjust. To become the third king of Syracuse it is proper to invite Dionysius the son of Dionysius, if willing, over a willing city, who is now the general of the enemy's army; if he will consent of his own accord to change himself into the form of a king, while fearing his fortunes and commiserating his country and the want of attention shown to sacred rites and sepulchres, and lest through a love of contention he shall destroy every thing in every way, and become an object for Barbarians to rejoice over.

These three kings do ye, whether giving or depriving them of the power they possess at Lacedæmon, by common consent establish after some such manner as this, which has indeed been mentioned to you before; but still do ye hear it now again. If the family of Dionysius and Hipparinus are willing for the safety of Sicily to cease from their present ills, and to obtain honour for themselves and family, both for the future and the present time, on this condition, call them as I have said before, (to power,) ¹ appointing as ambassadors with full powers for the reconciliation, whomsoever they wish; whether they are from their own country, or strangers, or both; and as many as they shall agree to. And let it be for them on their arrival first to lay down laws, and a form of government, such that in it the kings are to be with full power over things sacred, and whatever else it is fitting for those, who are the benefactors of their country; and to make guardians, thirty-five in number, of the laws; and for these, together with the people and senate, to have the rule on questions of war and peace; and to establish different courts of justice, some for one purpose, and others for others; but for the thirty-five guardians of the laws to be the judges of death and banishment; and that in addition to these for jurymen to be chosen from those, who during the last year have been in office, one from each office, who may have been voted the best and most upright; and that these during the following year are to decide on such points as relate to the death and imprisonment and removal of the citizens; but for the king to be not permitted to be a jurymen in such matters, as being a priest, and undefiled by murder, bonds, and banishment. These things I, when living, intended

¹ Ficinus alone has "ad regnum."

to take place for your benefit, and so I intend now ;¹ and then indeed, after having with you overcome my enemies, I should, had not foreign² furies prevented me, established matters in the way I intended ; and subsequently, if deeds had followed upon thoughts, I would have colonized the rest of Sicily, after depriving the Barbarians of the land which they now occupy, with the exception of such as had fought for a common liberty against tyranny ; and I would have reinstated the former inhabitants of Grecian places in their ancient and paternal abodes. The very same things do I even now advise you to think upon and to execute, and to invite all to these doings ; but to consider the person, who is unwilling to do aught, as a common enemy. Nor is this impossible. For he who judges those things to be impossible, which happen to be in the souls of two persons, and which it is easy to discover from reasoning are the best, does not think correctly. Now by the two, I mean the soul of Hipparinus the son of Dionysius, and that of my son. For if these two agree together, to the rest of the Syracusans, and all who have any care for their country, I think (the same things)³ will appear to be correct. But paying to all the gods honours combined with prayers, and to others also, whom it is proper, together with the gods, do ye persuade and exhort both friends and those at variance, gently and altogether,⁴ nor stand apart, until what has now been stated by us, like god-sent dreams standing over those awake, you shall work out clearly, and bring to a happy end."

¹ This would seem to be a strange expression in the mouth of a dead person, were it not that the ancients thought as it would appear that the dead had the same feelings and pursuits as they had when living, as shown by Virgil in *Æn.* vi. 653.

² I cannot understand *ξενικαὶ ἱερνύες*, nor could Ficinus ; whose version is "externi furiaequæ," as if he had found in his MS. *ξῖνοι καὶ ἱερνύες*. But the disorder, although seated somewhat deeper, would not, I think, be difficult to cure.

³ To complete the sense and syntax, I have translated as if *ταῦτα* had dropt out before *τοῖς ἄλλοις* : where *τε* in one MS. after *τοῖς* and *τε* in another, have unitedly preserved a portion of the missing word, while *ἀν* has dropt out after *πᾶσιν*.

⁴ In *πάντως* there is an evident error.

EPISTLE IX.

PLATO TO ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM—PROSPERITY.

ARCHIPPUS and Philonides¹ have come to us, bringing with them the letter which you gave them, and relating the state of your affairs.² Such things then, as appertain to the city, they have accomplished without difficulty; for they were not in every respect laborious. But as to what relates to yourself, they said that you bear it ill in not being able to be released from your close attention to public affairs. Now that it is indeed the most pleasant thing in life for a man to attend to his own affairs, especially if he chooses to do what you are doing, is evident nearly to every one; but you ought also to consider this,³ that each of us is not born for himself alone; but that our country claims one part of our birth, our parents another, and our friends the remainder.³ Much too is given to the occasions, that overtake us in life. Since then your country calls⁴ you to public affairs, it would perhaps be absurd not to hearken;⁵ for at the same time too it happens that (you) leave a place for inferior men, who take the road to politics not for the best. But of these things enough. At present we are taking care of Echecrates,⁶ and shall do so for

¹ Although the phrase *οἱ περὶ τινα* sometimes means the parties attached to any person, yet here it is to be applied to the person himself. See at Hipp. Maj. § 2.

² Ficinus has "de rebus tuis." For his MS. read, no doubt, *περὶ* instead of *κατὰ*, and omitted *κατὰ σοῦ* just afterwards, as he does.)

³ To this saying of Plato Cicero refers, De Offic. i. 7, 22: "Præclare scriptum est a Platone, 'non nobis solum nati sumus, ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici:'" and again, De Finibus, ii. 14. But as in both passages he omits all mention of the parents, it is evident that he quoted from memory; nor did he know that Plato merely put into prose, what he found in the following tristich, probably of Euripides—*Ἐκαστος ἡμῶν γίγονεν οὐχ αὐτῷ μόνον. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν ἡ πατρις μερίζεται. Τὸ δ' οἱ τεκόντες, τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖσι φίλοι.* Whence we must read *τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖσι φίλοι* in lieu of *τὸ δ' οἱ τοῖσι φίλοι*, where *οἱ τοῖσι* is perfectly unintelligible. A similar idea is to be found in Lucan; who says that Cato, "Non sibi sed toti natum se credidit orbi."

⁴ On a voice thus given to one's country, see Cicero Catilin. i. 7.

⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot think Plato wrote.

⁶ Of this Echecrates mention is made in the Phædo, p. 88, D. § 85.

the remainder of the time both for your sake, and that of his father Phrynon, and of the young man himself.

EPISTLE X.

PLATO TO ARISTODORUS—PROSPERITY.

I HEAR that you are now amongst the chief of the friends of Dion, and have been all through exhibiting a conduct the most wise in things relating to philosophy. For I assert that firmness, fidelity, and integrity, is true philosophy. But as to the rest of wisdom and skill, which tend to other things, I conceive that by calling them elegant subtleties, I am giving them a correct appellation. But now farewell; and abide in the conduct in which you are now abiding.

EPISTLE XI.

PLATO TO LAODAMAS—PROSPERITY.

I HAVE written to you before, that your coming to Athens makes a great difference with respect to all you say. But since you assert it is impossible, the second step after this is for myself to come, if possible, or Socrates,¹ as you have said in your letter. Socrates however at present labours under the infirmity of a strangury; and it would be unseemly in me to come and not accomplish that, for which you are inviting me; but that such will take place I have not great hopes; but why (I say so) would require a long letter, were I to go through all the reasons. Moreover I am on account of my age not sufficiently well in body to be wandering about and to risk the dangers, which (a person) meets² with by land and sea; and at the present every thing in travelling is full of danger.

¹ This Socrates is supposed to be the one mentioned in the Statesman.

² I have translated as if *νῆς* had dropt out after *ἀναστῆναι*.

I have it however in my power to advise you¹ and the colonists¹ what Hesiod through me, as the relater, says,

To fancy's easy, to think deep is hard.

For if they fancy that a city can be ever well put into order by the mere laying down of any laws whatever, without some person² in authority having the care of the daily manner of living in the city, in order that it may be, in the case both of slaves and of free-born, temperate and manly, they do not think correctly. But if there are persons worthy of this very office, this should take place. But if there is a need of some one to instruct them, I think there are not amongst you either a person to teach, or those to be taught; it remains then for you to pray to the gods.³ . . . For nearly in this way have cities in former times been put into order, and subsequently well administered,⁴ during the concurrence of matters of great moment, which have happened amidst war and other transactions, when a man shall have arisen on such occasions, with bodily and mental qualifications, and in the possession of large powers. But previously it is meet to feel a readiness (to act), and it is necessary to think deeply upon what I am saying, and not to behave sillily through thinking that you can do any thing off-hand. Be good fortune thine.

EPISTLE XII.⁵

PLATO TO ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM—PROSPERITY.

How wonderfully delighted did we receive the memorials which came from you, and admired in the greatest possible

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus.

² Six MSS. read *τινα*, in lieu of *τι*, answering to "*aliquis*" in Ficinus.

³ Here is evidently a lacuna. The sense of the missing words was to this effect, "to send some divine teacher, and disciples with minds willing to be taught."

⁴ In lieu of *ἐκχρησαν*, five MSS. offer *ἐκκισθησαν*, similar to "*excultæ sunt*" in Ficinus.

⁵ The genuineness of this letter has been contested, as we learn from all the MSS.

manner 'every thing of the winter's.' To us he appeared a man worthy of his celebrated ancestors. For they are said to have been ten thousand² in number; and they were, as the story handed down declares, the best of all³ these Trojans, who during the reign of Laomedon removed themselves from their native land.

With respect to the memorials in my possession, about which you have sent to me, they are not yet in a sufficient state. However, such as they are, I have sent them to you. With respect to the safe care of them, we are of one mind, so that there is no need of exhortation.

EPISTLE XIII.

PLATO TO DIONYSIUS, TYRANT OF SYRACUSE—PROSPERITY.

¹LET the commencement of the letter and at the same time the symbol, be that it is from me.⁴

When you were once feasting some young men of Locri, and were reclining at table at a distance from myself, you rose up (and came) to me, and courteously addressed to me a kind word, as it seemed to me and to the person reclining by me. Now he was one of the handsome youths, who said at that time—Surely, Dionysius, you are benefited much, with respect to wisdom, by Plato. Whereupon you observed—And with respect to many other things; especially since the time of my

¹— In lieu of τοῦ γράψαντος ἀπὸ, which is hardly intelligible, I have translated as if the Greek were τὰ τοῦ γράψαντος πάντα—

² Instead of μυρία, Diogen. Laert. viii. 81, offers Μυρᾱίοι, i. e. the people of Myra, a town in Lycia. One MS. has μυρᾱίοι.

³ The Greek is οἱ τοὶ δ' ἦσαν τῶν—ἀγαθοί. But five MSS. ἀπάντων for τῶν, similar to "omnium" in Ficinus; from whose "praestantissimi" it is easy to see that in οἱ τοὶ, which could not be thus repeated, lies hid μέλιστα, to be united to ἀγαθοί.

⁴— The Greek is Ἀρχὴ σοὶ—καὶ ἅμα σύμβολον—ιστί. But correct language would require ἡ ἀρχὴ—καὶ—τὸ σύμβολον—ἦεν. Moreover I have some doubts about ἅμα: in lieu of which I should prefer ἡμῖν—, for the σύμβολον was known to both Plato and Dionysius—or else καὶ κοινῇ σύμβολον. With regard to the nature of the σύμβολον, Bentley conceived it was the superscription σὺν θεῷ, mentioned below.

sending for him, through this very thing ¹[because I had sent for him]¹ I have been benefited forthwith.

This then I must keep in mind, in order that our mutual benefit may be to us ever on the increase. And in preparation for this event I am sending ²a person of the Pythagorean and the divisions,² as it seemed to me then, of whom both you and Archytas, if indeed Archytas has come to you, will be able to make use. His name is Helicon; his family is of Cyzicum; and he is a disciple of Eudoxus; with all of whose doctrines he is elegantly conversant; and still further, he has associated with one of the disciples of Isocrates, and with Polyxenus, one of the friends of Bryson; and, what is moreover a rare thing, he is neither disagreeable to meet with, nor like an ill-mannered person, but would seem rather to be volatile and of an easy temper. I say this however with some fear, as I am expressing an opinion respecting a man, who is no mean an animal, and one easily changed, except in the case of some few persons and on a few points; and with respect to him I am thinking with fear and without confidence, as I have met with him myself, and made inquiry of his fellow-citizens, and not one of them has said a bad word against the man. Do you therefore reflect yourself, and exercise caution. But above all things take lessons from him, and study philosophy upon any other points, if you have any leisure; but if not, set him to teach some one,³ so that you may, when at leisure, by learning become better, and in good repute,⁴ in order that in your being benefited by myself there may be, in your case, no remission.

¹—¹ The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

²—² The Greek is τῶν διαίρεσεων, for which H. Valesius wished to read τῶνδε αἰρέσεων or τῶνδε αἰρέσεων. But the deictic pronoun would be here unintelligible. Nor can I understand καὶ ἀνδρα. Perhaps Plato wrote τῶν Ἰταλῶν αἰρέσεων ἱκανὸν ἀνδρα, i. e. "a man sufficiently versed in the Pythagorean doctrines and the sects in Italy." Compare Plutarch De Socratis Genio, ii. p. 579, viii. p. 289, R., ἀνδρα γενναῖον—μετὰ γενναίας—ἀρεμῆς τῆς προαιρέσεως—ἐξ Ἰταλίας τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν.

³ In lieu of τινά, which is not sufficiently definite, I should prefer γένηται. For amongst the ancients not a few women, such as Aspasia, and Diotima, and others, were given to philosophy; a list of whom has been collected by Menage, and appended to his notes on Diogenes Laertius.

⁴ I cannot understand here εἰδοξής. I could have understood ἐνδειγής, "you may show—"

With regard to the articles you bade me send you, I have caused to be made the Apollo,¹ which Leptines is bringing, by a young and clever workman. His name is Leochares. There was another work by him, very elegant, as it appeared to me. I therefore purchased it, wishing to present it to your wife; because she had attended me both in health and sickness in a manner worthy of me and you. Present it then to her, unless it seems otherwise good to you. I send you likewise twelve jars of sweet wine for your children, and two of honey. But I came too late for putting up the dried figs; and all the myrtles, that had been put up for you, have rotted. I will however take better care at another time. Leptines will tell you about the plants.

The money in silver for these things² and for the contributions of some persons to the state I have received from Leptines; and told him, what appears to me to be the most becoming and true to state, that, what I had expended on the Leucadian vessel, amounting to nearly eleven minæ, was mine. This therefore I have taken; ³and after taking, I have made use of it myself, and I have sent away these to you.⁴ As to what follows with regard to the money, hear how the case stands. I shall make use of your money, as I told you then, in the same way as I do that of my other acquaintances; but I use it in as small quantities as possible; (for)⁴ such things as seem to be necessary or just or becoming to myself or to the person, from whom I may receive it. Now something of this kind has happened to me. Of my nieces, who died at the period, when I was not crowned, although you had ordered it, there are four daughters living; one is of a marriageable age; another eighteen years old; another a little more than

¹ The statue of Apollo, here alluded to, is, I suspect, the one still existing under the name of the "Apollo Belvidere."

² The Greek is *εἰς ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν τοῦτων καὶ εἰσφορῶν*. But *ἕνεκα τούτων* is superfluous after *εἰς ταῦτα*. Plato, I suspect, wrote, what I have translated, *εἰς ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εἰσφορῶν τινῶν*.

³ I confess I cannot understand *καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὸς τὴν ἰχρησάμεν καὶ ὑμῖν ταῦτ' ἀπέπεμψα*. The sense evidently required is *καὶ τάλλα λαβὼν οὕτως ἰχρησάμεν καὶ ὑμῖν τὰ λοιπὰ πέμψα*, i. e. "and having taken the rest of the money, I have employed it in this way, and have sent you the remainder."

⁴ In lieu of *δοῦναι*, correct Greek requires *εἰς δοῦναι*—On this use of *εἰς*, see Aristoph. Plut. 983, *δράχμας—εἰκοσὶν εἰς ἑμῶν ὅπως δ' ἂν εἰς ἐπιδήματα*.

three years old; and another not yet one year old. All these it will be for myself and friends¹ to give out in marriage, should I survive them; but let those, whom I do not survive,² fare as they may;³ while for those, whose fathers may become richer than myself, I shall not have to provide. At present however my means are greater than theirs. For the marriage of their mothers likewise I have provided with the aid of others and of Dion. One of them is married to Speusippus, of whose sister she is the daughter. For this one there is need of not more than thirty minæ; since the marriage portions given by myself are moderate. Moreover should my mother die, there would be need of not more than ten minæ for erecting her tomb. Such are the sums requisite at present for what are almost necessities. But should any other expense occur, of a private or public nature, through my coming to you, it will be requisite, as I stated then, for me to labour⁴ and to make a vigorous effort for the expenditure to be the least possible; but where I am unable (to do aught), for the expense to be yours. ⁵What I mean after this touching the expenditure on the other hand⁵ of your money at Athens,⁶ is in the first place this;⁶ that should it be needful for me to expend any thing on a choregy,⁷ or any office of that kind, there is no friend⁸ of yours here, who will advance it for you, as I imagine; since even if it made a great difference to you, that a sum would, if expended, be a benefit to you, but an injury, if it were not expended and delayed, until some one should arrive from yourself, such a circumstance would turn out⁹ disgraceful in addition to its being detrimental. For of this I have a proof by having sent Erastus to Andromēdes of Ægina; from whom, as being your

¹ Amongst these was probably Dion, who, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius iii. 3, furnished the means to enable Plato to undertake a choregy at Athens.

² In Greek χαίρω is used in a good sense; but χαίριτω in a bad one; just as in Latin "vale," and "valeas."

³ I have translated as if the Greek were πονεῖν, not ποιεῖν.

⁴ The Greek is ὃ δὴ μέγα ταῦτα λέγω—περὶ τῶν σὺν αὐτῷ χρημάτων—where I cannot understand μετὰ ταῦτα, and still less αὐτῷ—

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were ἐστὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι ἴδεν—not ὅτι πρῶτον—

⁷ On the choregy and all the matters connected with it, see Donaldson's Theatre of the Greeks.

⁸ Literally "a friend connected by ties of hospitality."

⁹ The sense requires ἐστὶν, what I have translated, not ἐστὶ—

finical, you ordered me to get, what I wanted, as you wished him to send even more than you had stated by letter. But he said, what was reasonable and as any person would do, that he had previously laid out money for your father, and had with difficulty got it back again; and that he would now advance a small sum, but nothing more. Thus I received a something from Leptines; and for this it is proper to praise Leptines, not only for having advanced the money, but for doing so readily; and he was in other respects, by speaking of you, and performing what he could, evidently a friend to your interests. For it is meet, respecting such matters and the contrary, for me to tell you in what light each person has appeared to me as regards yourself. On the subject of money, at least, I shall speak with freedom; for it is just; and at the same time I shall be speaking about persons near you, of whom I have some experience; who, after ¹previously stating on each occasion what they think they shall expend for you, do not subsequently mention ¹the subject, as if forsooth they should be disagreeable to you. Do you then accustom them and even compel them to speak upon these points and others too. For you ought to know the whole, as far as you can, and to be a judge, and not to fly from knowing. For this will be the best for your government. For, as regards other things, and the possession itself of money, ²you too have said, and will say, that it is good to know, ²that the expenditure is made correctly and correctly accounted for. Let not then those, who profess to care for you, bring a reproach upon yourself in the eyes of mankind. For this appears to be neither good nor fair to your reputation, ³in the case of your agreements.³

¹ The Greek is *ἐὶ προσγγίλλοντες*—*εἰσγγίλλων, οὐκ ἐθέλοναι προσγγίλλων*. But *προσγγίλλων* could not be thus repeated; nor, if it could, would *εἰσγγίλλων* be thus introduced between the repeated verb. Stephens' version, for the whole epistle is wanting in Ficinus, is "Qui tibi assidue pollicentur se de iis sumptibus, quos faciendos arbitrantur, te admonituros, admonere tamen nolunt—" which has led me to suggest that *εἰσγγίλλων* is a corruption for *εἰς τὰ ἐὰν τελεῖν*—For *τελεῖν* is thus perpetually used in the sense "of paying," as shown by Ast in "Lexicon Platonicum;" while to preserve the balance of the sentence, we must read *προσγγίλλοντες* as opposed to *προσγγίλλειν*: and so I have translated.

² Instead of *καὶ σὺ δὴ φῆς ἀγαθὸν καὶ φήσεις*, which I cannot understand, the sense evidently requires *καὶ σὺ γ' ἔφη ἀγαθὸν εἶδέναι καὶ φήσεις*—

³ In lieu of *δοκεῖ ξύμβολον*, three MSS. read *δοκεῖ αἰς ξύμβολον*, four

In what follows I shall speak of Dion. Upon other points I am not able to speak, before the letters, which¹ you have mentioned, arrive from yourself. But upon those, which you did not permit me to mention to him, I have mentioned nothing, nor conversed at all. I have merely tried whether he bears ill or easily² what is reported; and it seems to me that he will not brook it quietly, if it should turn out a fact.³ But in other respects Dion appears to me to use moderation both in word and deed.

Let us present to Cratinus, the brother of Timotheus, and my friend, a breastplate of the handsome kind worn by the heavy-armed foot soldiers, and to the daughters of Cebes three outer-dresses, seven cubits long, not, however, of the expensive kind from Amorgus,⁴ but of Sicilian linen.⁴ With the name of Cebes you are duly acquainted; for he is mentioned in the Socratic dialogues, as holding, together with Simmias, a conversation with Socrates [in the dialogue]⁵ respecting the soul, and as a man of the same clique with, and well disposed to, all of us.

Of the symbol relating to my letters, I think you have a recollection touching such as I write with care and such as I do not; nevertheless, reflect upon it, and bear it in mind. For many persons insist upon my writing, whom it is not easy to put off. The more important letter a god commences, but the less, gods.⁶

δοκεῖν αἰς ξύμβολον, and two δοκεῖ ξύμβουλον. Hence it is easy to elicit δοκεῖ εἰς ξυμβόλαια, as I have translated.

¹ The Greek is ὥσπερ ἔφησ—Stephens' version is, "quas dicis," as if he wished to read ἄσπερ ἔφησ.

²⁻³ I cannot understand οἷσι γιγνόμενων—εἰ γίγνοιτο. I have translated as if the Greek were οἷσι τὸ λεγόμενον, which is at least intelligible.

⁴ Amorgus, one of the Cyclades, was famous for its fine flax or cotton, as we learn from the Greek Lexicographers quoted by Berkelius on Steph. Byz. Ἀμοργός.

⁴ This allusion to the flax of Sicily is rather strange. For that island was celebrated rather for its wool; unless it be said that Plato wrote ληνίων, not λινών. For Hesych. has Λήναι ἱρίω, from Æsch. Eum. 44.

⁵ The Greek is ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγῳ. But ἐν τῷ λόγῳ could not be thus repeated after ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατικοῖς λόγοις.

⁶ Had Plato meant to say, as Bentley supposed, that the more important letters were indicated by the words σὺν θεῷ, and the less by σὺν θεοῖς, some reason would have been given, I think, for this change of number. Hence in lieu of θεοί, I would read θεά. For by the masculine θεός was

The *symplicians* *Marinus* have requested me to write, as was *Marinus*. For they were *maritally* praise both you and me *over* *Marinus*: and not the *Marin* *Philagrus*, who at that time,¹ was something the matter with his hand; and *Philides*, who has more than the *great king*,² has spoken about you; and if I had not the matter for a long letter, I would have written more what he said: but at present *inquire* of *Leptines*.

Marin was used the *Marin* or any thing else, about which I have written, *inquire* them to any you wish; or otherwise in *Marin*.³ He is one of those, who is continually *inquire* to and for, and is attached to myself, and upon other subjects, and these are relating to philosophy, is a person of *superior* mind, and is a relation of *Tison*,⁴ who was, at the time when I sailed away, the prefect of the city.⁵

May you increase in health and philosophy, and convert others who are *wronger* to it: and embrace for me all our *inlove-symplicians*,⁶ and *enjoin* the others and *Aristocritus*,

mean the *superior* power of mind; but by the *feminine* God, the inferior power of matter.

¹ Here, as elsewhere in this letter, by *rére*, "at that time," is intended the last movement of *Plato* in *Sicily*: unless it be said that *rére* is sometimes yet for *rére*, an idea first promulgated by *Markland* on *Eurip.* *Symon.* *Act.* *Ep.* *A.* 46, and adapted by *Bruck* on *Aristoph.* *Thesm.* 13, *Plat.* *Act.* *Ep.* *A.* 46, and *Schaefer* in *Julian.* *Prof.* p. iv.

² *By* "the great king," is meant the king of Persia.

³ Although *Epist.* might perhaps stand here, yet the word was probably *Epist.* the name of the Sicilian mechanist, who invented the famous ball for *Phalaris*.

⁴ The person here called *Tison* is, I suspect, the same as *Tisic*, mentioned in *Epist.* 7.

⁵ *Lobeck* on *Phrynichus*, p. 681, refers to *Masochi* *Tabul.* *Heracleum.* p. 205, where the verb *relaxare* is found. It would seem that at Syracuse there was an officer called *Helaxar*, similar probably to the "Praetor Urbanus" at Rome, the "Mayer" in borough towns in England, the "Préfet" in France, and the "Burgomaster" in Holland.

⁶ So I have translated *symplicians*, in allusion to the little sphere mentioned in *Epist.* 2, about which there had probably been a meeting of Syracusan "Savans," forming an astronomical and geographical society; for it appears that *Eudorus*, whose disciple was the *Helicon*, mentioned above, was the first to introduce the knowledge of the sphere, which he had acquired in Egypt, to the Greeks. But as the latitude of Syracuse was not the same as of Alexandria, one can easily understand, why the sphere did not answer so well its purpose at one place, as it did at the other. For this idea I am partly indebted to *Scaliger's* note on *Manilius*, p. 155. 6, ed. 1579. *Ast*, with *Stephens*, translates "in pilis ludo collusores."

should any message or letter arrive, relating¹ to you, that they take care you know of it as quickly as possible, and that they put you in mind of it, in order that you may attend to the matter mentioned in the letters. And for the present do you not neglect the repayment of the money to Leptines, but repay it as quickly as possible, so that others, looking to him, may be the more ready to minister to myself.

Iatrocles, who at that time was, together with Myronides, dismissed as a freed-man by myself, sails now with the things sent by me; keep him in your pay, as being well disposed towards you; and make use of him in any way you please,² and know yourself either the letter itself, or if a memorandum of it is preserved.³

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were, what the sense requires, *περί σέ*, not, as at present, *παρά σέ*—

² The words between the numerals I cannot understand. Stephens's version is "et epistolam aut ipsam, aut, si ipsius exemplar servatur, tute cognosce." But *ὑπόμνημα* is not the Greek for "exemplar," but for "commentarius." The Greek is *καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἢ αὐτὴν ἢ, εἰ ὑπόμνημα αὐτῆς σώζεται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἴσθι*. One MS. however has *ἢ αὐτὴν*: two omit *εἰ*: one reads *αὐτοῖς* for *αὐτῆς*, and one *καὶ ὁ αὐτός*: all which are proofs of some deep-seated disorder here. The sense seems to have been originally something to this effect, "and acquaint yourself with the letter from itself, or, if it be not preserved, from the memorandum of the person who has heard it"—in Greek, *καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἢ αὐτὴν ἢ, εἰ μὴ σώζεται, διὰ τὸ ὑπόμνημα αὐτὴν τοῦ ἀκηκόετος ἴσθι*. So in Euripides, Iphigenia is represented as telling the contents of the letter she is putting into the hands of Pylades; for to use her own words in v. 744, *ἦν μὲν ἰκωσὺς γραφὴν, αὐτὴ φράσει σιγῶσα τάπισταλμένα*: "Ἦν δ' ἐν θαλάσῃ γράμματ' ἀφανισθῇ τάδε, τὸ σῶμα σώσας, τοῖς λόγοις σώσεις ἑμοί. i. e.

"If you preserve the writing, 'twill itself
The matter of the missive silent tell;
But if by the sea the writing disappears,
Saving your body, you will save my words."

As the foregoing Epistle was considered by Serranus to be spurious, Stephens was led to defend it by observing that it was referred to by Plutarch in T. ii. p. 533, B., and Theodoret, p. 27, ed. Sylb. So too when Collins had in his "Discourse on Free Thinking" reiterated the opinion expressed by Cudworth in his *Intellectual System*, p. 403, ed. 1678, of the Epistle being spurious, Bentley in his *Remarks*, p. 411, ed. Dyce, observed that the internal character of the letter exhibits all the marks of genuineness; for it is not a mere mass of common-place, such as the letters forged by Sophists generally are, but one of business, and with the circumstantial account of persons and things, suited to the writer and the times in which he lived; as in the passage, where allusion is made

to the Greek statement of Lucianus, who, as we learn from Pliny, H. N. lib. 34, cap. 11, was a celebrated artist, subsequent to the time when he was quoted as by Plato as a young man; and that the other is quoted by Erasmus in Prop. E. cap. 13, p. 530. From these authorities a Doctor Fabricius was probably led to say that he could discover nothing of antiquity, when his opinion was asked by P. Wesseling, who in his "Tractatus de Veteribus," p. 35, has produced fresh testimony in its favour by mentioning a Pausanias in Dion. T. i. p. 966, E., and i. p. 47, L. where Paus. is related to. He conceives, however, that the Doctor may have mistaken the one; and that the first ended was indeed the monument of Lucianus, bringing with him the Apollo of Lucianus. In Pausanias i. p. 253 speaks of the words quoted from the Statues as being towards the close of it. And so far is Wesseling from believing the Poet to be not genuine, that he calculates it was written about A. C. 114.

Doctores, however, the point then brought forward by Stephens, Bentham and Wesseling, with whom Wetzelbach in Phœdon, p. 108, agrees, Erasmus in a Commentarius Sacrosancti Reg. Göttingen, A. D. 1783, endeavoured to show its antiquity by arguments to which Tennemann has replied in his "Lehrbuch und Metaphysik der Scholastiker über Unsterblichkeit," Bonn, 1791, as I learn from Heichen on Fabricius Biblioth. Gr. T. ii. p. 185. On the other hand Teyler in a note on the 12th Epistle, says that he has noticed the 12th as being not genuine, from the allusion there made to the difference between one and many gods—an argument to which I have replied by supposing the existence of a corruption, antecedent even to the time of Erasmus.

END OF VOL. IV.

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With regard to the articles you bade me send you, I have caused to be made the Apollo,¹ which Leptines is bringing, by a young and clever workman. His name is Leochares. There was another work by him, very elegant, as it appeared to me. I therefore purchased it, wishing to present it to your wife; because she had attended me both in health and sickness in a manner worthy of me and you. Present it then to her, unless it seems otherwise good to you. I send you likewise twelve jars of sweet wine for your children, and two of honey. But I came too late for putting up the dried figs; and all the myrtles, that had been put up for you, have rotted. I will however take better care at another time. Leptines will tell you about the plants.

The money in silver for these things² and for the contributions of some persons to the state I have received from Leptines; and told him, what appears to me to be the most becoming and true to state, that, what I had expended on the Leucadian vessel, amounting to nearly eleven minæ, was mine. This therefore I have taken; ³and after taking, I have made use of it myself, and I have sent away these to you.³ As to what follows with regard to the money, hear how the case stands. I shall make use of your money, as I told you then, in the same way as I do that of my other acquaintances; but I use it in as small quantities as possible; (for)⁴ such things as seem to be necessary or just or becoming to myself or to the person, from whom I may receive it. Now something of this kind has happened to me. Of my nieces, who died at the period, when I was not crowned, although you had ordered it, there are four daughters living; one is of a marriageable age; another eighteen years old; another a little more than

¹ The statue of Apollo, here alluded to, is, I suspect, the one still existing under the name of the "Apollo Belvidere."

² The Greek is *εἰς ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν τεούτων καὶ εἰσφορῶν*. But *ἕνεκα τούτων* is superfluous after *εἰς ταῦτα*. Plato, I suspect, wrote, what I have translated, *εἰς ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εἰσφορῶν τινῶν*.

³ I confess I cannot understand *καὶ λαβὼν αὐτός τε ἔχρησάμην καὶ ὑμῖν ταῦτ' ἀπέπεμψα*. The sense evidently required is *καὶ γὰρ λαβὼν οὕτως ἔχρησάμην καὶ ὑμῖν τὰ λοιπὰ ἐπέμψα*, i. e. "and having taken the rest of the money, I have employed it in this way, and have sent you the remainder."

⁴ In lieu of *ὅσα*, correct Greek requires *εἰς ὅσα*—On this use of *εἰς*, see Aristoph. Plut. 983, *δράχμας—εἰκοσὶν εἰς ἑμᾶτιον ὁπρὶ δ' ἂν εἰς ὑποδήματα*.

three years old; and another not yet one year old. All these it will be for myself and friends¹ to give out in marriage, should I survive them; but let those, whom I do not survive, ²fare as they may;² while for those, whose fathers may become richer than myself, I shall not have to provide. At present however my means are greater than theirs. For the marriage of their mothers likewise I have provided with the aid of others and of Dion. One of them is married to Speusippus, of whose sister she is the daughter. For this one there is need of not more than thirty minæ; since the marriage portions given by myself are moderate. Moreover should my mother die, there would be need of not more than ten minæ for erecting her tomb. Such are the sums requisite at present for what are almost necessities. But should any other expense occur, of a private or public nature, through my coming to you, it will be requisite, as I stated then, for me to labour³ and to make a vigorous effort for the expenditure to be the least possible; but where I am unable (to do aught), for the expense to be yours. ⁴What I mean after this touching the expenditure on the other hand⁵ of your money at Athens,⁶ is in the first place this;⁶ that should it be needful for me to expend any thing on a choregy,⁷ or any office of that kind, there is no friend⁸ of yours here, who will advance it for you, as I imagine; since even if it made a great difference to you, that a sum would, if expended, be a benefit to you, but an injury, if it were not expended and delayed, until some one should arrive from yourself, such a circumstance would turn out⁹ disgraceful in addition to its being detrimental. For of this I have a proof by having sent Erastus to Andromēdes of Ægina; from whom, as being your

¹ Amongst these was probably Dion, who, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius iii. 3, furnished the means to enable Plato to undertake a choregy at Athens.

² In Greek *χαίρει* is used in a good sense; but *χαίριτω* in a bad one; just as in Latin "vale," and "valeas."

³ I have translated as if the Greek were *πονεῖν*, not *ποιεῖν*.

⁴ The Greek is *τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα λέγω—περὶ τῶν σῶν αὐτοῦ χρημάτων*—where I cannot understand *μετὰ ταῦτα*, and still less *αὐτοῦ*—

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἔστι τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι ἴδω*—not *ὅτι πρῶτον*—

⁷ On the choregy and all the matters connected with it, see Donaldson's Theatre of the Greeks.

⁸ Literally "a friend connected by ties of hospitality."

⁹ The sense requires *ἔσται*, what I have translated, not *ἔστι*—

friend, you ordered me to get, what I wanted, as you wished him to send even more than you had stated by letter. But he said, what was reasonable and as any person would do, that he had previously laid out money for your father, and had with difficulty got it back again; and that he would now advance a small sum, but nothing more. Thus I received a something from Leptines; and for this it is proper to praise Leptines, not only for having advanced the money, but for doing so readily; and he was in other respects, by speaking of you, and performing what he could, evidently a friend to your interests. For it is meet, respecting such matters and the contrary, for me to tell you in what light each person has appeared to me as regards yourself. On the subject of money, at least, I shall speak with freedom; for it is just; and at the same time I shall be speaking about persons near you, of whom I have some experience; who, after¹ previously stating on each occasion what they think they shall expend for you, do not subsequently mention¹ the subject, as if forsooth they should be disagreeable to you. Do you then accustom them and even compel them to speak upon these points and others too. For you ought to know the whole, as far as you can, and to be a judge, and not to fly from knowing. For this will be the best for your government. For, as regards other things, and the possession itself of money, ²you too have said, and will say, that it is good to know,² that the expenditure is made correctly and correctly accounted for. Let not then those, who profess to care for you, bring a reproach upon yourself in the eyes of mankind. For this appears to be neither good nor fair to your reputation, ³in the case of your agreements.³

— The Greek is οἱ προσαγγέλλοντες—*εἰσαγγέλλειν*, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι προσαγγέλλειν. But προσαγγέλλειν could not be thus repeated; nor, if it could, would *εἰσαγγέλλειν* be thus introduced between the repeated verb. Stephens' version, for the whole epistle is wanting in Picinus, is "Qui tibi assidue pollicentur se de iis sumptibus, quos faciendos arbitrantur, te admonituros, admonere tamen nolunt—" which has led me to suggest that *εἰσαγγέλλειν* is a corruption for *εἰς τὰ σὰ ἀν ταλεῖν*—For *ταλεῖν* is thus perpetually used in the sense "of paying," as shown by Ast in "Lexicon Platonium;" while to preserve the balance of the sentence, we must read προσαγγέλλοντες as opposed to προσαγγέλλειν: and so I have translated.

— Instead of καὶ σὺ δὴ φῆς ἀγαθὸν καὶ φήσεις, which I cannot understand, the sense evidently requires καὶ σὺ γ' ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶδέναι καὶ φήσεις—

—³ In lieu of δοκεῖ ἔμβολον, three MSS. read δοκεῖ αἰς ἔμβολον, four

In what follows I shall speak of Dion. Upon other points I am not able to speak, before the letters, which¹ you have mentioned, arrive from yourself. But upon those, which you did not permit me to mention to him, I have mentioned nothing, nor conversed at all. I have merely tried whether he bears ill or easily² what is reported; and it seems to me that he will not brook it quietly, if it should turn out a fact.³ But in other respects Dion appears to me to use moderation both in word and deed.

Let us present to Cratinus, the brother of Timotheus, and my friend, a breastplate of the handsome kind worn by the heavy-armed foot soldiers, and to the daughters of Cebes three outer-dresses, seven cubits long, not, however, of the expensive kind from Amorgus,⁴ but of Sicilian linen.⁵ With the name of Cebes you are duly acquainted; for he is mentioned in the Socratic dialogues, as holding, together with Simmias, a conversation with Socrates [in the dialogue]⁶ respecting the soul, and as a man of the same clique with, and well disposed to, all of us.

Of the symbol relating to my letters, I think you have a recollection touching such as I write with care and such as I do not; nevertheless, reflect upon it, and bear it in mind. For many persons insist upon my writing, whom it is not easy to put off. The more important letter a god commences, but the less, gods.⁶

δοκεῖν αἰς ξύμβολον, and two δοκεῖ ξύμβουλον. Hence it is easy to elicit δοκεῖ εἰς ξυμβόλαια, as I have translated.

¹ The Greek is ὥσπερ ἱφης—Stephens' version is, "quas dicis," as if he wished to read ἄσπερ ἱφης.

²—³ I cannot understand οἷσι γιγνομένων—εἰ γίγνεται. I have translated as if the Greek were οἷσι τὸ λεγόμενον, which is at least intelligible.

⁴ Amorgus, one of the Cyclades, was famous for its fine flax or cotton, as we learn from the Greek Lexicographers quoted by Berkelius on Steph. Byz. Ἀμοργός.

⁵ This allusion to the flax of Sicily is rather strange. For that island was celebrated rather for its wool; unless it be said that Plato wrote ληνίων, not λινών. For Hesych. has Λήναι ἱρίω, from Æsch. Eum. 44.

⁶ The Greek is ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγῳ. But ἐν τῷ λόγῳ could not be thus repeated after ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατείσις λόγοις.

⁶ Had Plato meant to say, as Bentley supposed, that the more important letters were indicated by the words σὺν θεῷ, and the less by σὺν θεοῖς, some reason would have been given, I think, for this change of number. Hence in lieu of θεοί, I would read θεά. For by the masculine θεός was

The ambassadors likewise have requested me to write, as was natural. For they very heartily praise both you and me every where; and not the least Philagrus, who at that time,¹ had something the matter with his hand; and Philaides, who has come from the great king,² has spoken about you; and if I had not had matter for a long letter, I would have written down what he said; but at present inquire of Leptines.

Should you send the breastplate or any thing else, about which I have written, intrust them to any you wish; or otherwise to Terillus.³ He is one of those, who is continually sailing (to and fro), and is attached to myself, and upon other subjects, and those too relating to philosophy, is a person of elegant mind, and is a relation of Tison,⁴ who was, at the time when I sailed away, the prefect of the city.⁵

May you increase in health and philosophy, and convert others, who are younger, to it; and embrace for me all our fellow-sphærista,⁶ and enjoin the others and Aristocritus,

meant the superior power of mind; but by the feminine *θεά*, the inferior power of matter.

¹ Here, as elsewhere in this letter, by *τότε*, "at that time," is intended the last sojourn of Plato in Sicily; unless it be said that *τότε* is sometimes put for *πότε*, an idea first promulgated by Markland on Eurip. Suppl. 551, Iph. A. 46, and adopted by Brunck on Aristoph. Thesm. 13, Plut. 1117, Soph. El. 278, and Schäfer in Julian. Præf. p. iv.

² By "the great king," is meant the king of Persia.

³ Although *Τερύλλης* might perhaps stand here, yet the word was probably *Παρίλλης*, the name of the Sicilian machinist, who invented the brazen bull for Phalaris.

⁴ The person here called *Τίσων* is, I suspect, the same as *Τισίας*, mentioned in Epist. 7.

⁵ Lobeck on Phrynichus, p. 681, refers to Mazochi Tabul. Heracleens. p. 205, where the verb *παινεῖσθαι* is found. It would seem that at Syracuse there was an officer called *Πολιτάρχης*, similar probably to the "Prætor Urbanus" at Rome, the "Mayor" in borough towns in England, the "Préfet" in France, and the "Burgomaster" in Holland.

⁶ So I have translated *σφαιροφίλοι*, in allusion to the little sphere mentioned in Epist. 2, about which there had probably been a meeting of Syracusan "Savans," forming an astronomical and geographical society; for it appears that Eudoxus, whose disciple was the Helicon, mentioned above, was the first to introduce the knowledge of the sphere, which he had acquired in Egypt, to the Greeks. But as the latitude of Syracuse was not the same as of Alexandria, one can easily understand, why the sphere did not answer so well its purpose at one place, as it did at the other. For this idea I am partly indebted to Scaliger's note on Manilius, p. 155. 6, ed. 1579. Ast, with Stephens, translates "in palmæ hodo collucore."

should any message or letter arrive, relating¹ to you, that they take care you know of it as quickly as possible, and that they put you in mind of it, in order that you may attend to the matter mentioned in the letters. And for the present do you not neglect the repayment of the money to Leptines, but repay it as quickly as possible, so that others, looking to him, may be the more ready to minister to myself.

Iatrocles, who at that time was, together with Myronides, dismissed as a freed-man by myself, sails now with the things sent by me; keep him in your pay, as being well disposed towards you; and make use of him in any way you please,² and know yourself either the letter itself, or if a memorandum of it is preserved.³

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were, what the sense requires, *περί σέ*, not, as at present, *παρά σέ*—

² The words between the numerals I cannot understand. Stephens's version is "et epistolam aut ipsam, aut, si ipsius exemplar servatur, tute cognosce." But *ὑπόμνημα* is not the Greek for "exemplar," but for "commentarius." The Greek is *καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἢ αὐτὴν ἢ, εἰ ὑπόμνημα αὐτῆς σώζεται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἴσθι*. One MS. however has *ἢ αὐτὴν*: two omit *εἰ*: one reads *αὐτοῖς* for *αὐτῆς*, and one *καὶ ὁ αὐτός*: all which are proofs of some deep-seated disorder here. The sense seems to have been originally something to this effect, "and acquaint yourself with the letter from itself, or, if it be not preserved, from the memorandum of the person who has heard it"—in Greek, *καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἢ αὐτὴν ἢ, εἰ μὴ σώζεται, διὰ τὸ ὑπόμνημα αὐτῆν τοῦ ἀκηκόετος ἴσθι*. So in Euripides, Iphigenia is represented as telling the contents of the letter she is putting into the hands of Pylades; for to use her own words in v. 744, *ἦν μὲν ἐκώσχε γραφὴν, αὐτὴ φράσει σιγῶσα τάπεισταλμένα*. "Ἦν δ' ἐν θαλάσῃ γράμματα ἀφανισθῇ τάδε, τὸ σῶμα σώσας, τοὺς λόγους σώσεις ἐμοί. i. e.

"If you preserve the writing, 'twill itself
The matter of the missive silent tell;
But if by the sea the writing disappears,
Saving your body, you will save my words."

As the foregoing Epistle was considered by Serranus to be spurious, Stephens was led to defend it by observing that it was referred to by Plutarch in T. ii. p. 533, B., and Theodoret, p. 27, ed. Sylb. So too when Collins had in his "Discourse on Free Thinking" reiterated the opinion expressed by Cudworth in his Intellectual System, p. 403, ed. 1678, of the Epistle being spurious, Bentley in his Remarks, p. 411, ed. Dyce, observed that the internal character of the letter exhibits all the marks of genuineness; for it is not a mere mass of common-place, such as the letters forged by Sophists generally are, but one of business, and with the circumstantial account of persons and things, suited to the writer and the times in which he lived; as in the passage, where allusion is made

to an Apollo, sculptured by Leochares, who, as we learn from Pliny; H. N. xxxv. 2, and Pausanias, i. 1 and 3, v. 20, became a celebrated artist, subsequent to the period when he was spoken of by Plato as a young man; and that the letter is quoted by Eusebius in *Præp. Evang.* x. 13, p. 530. From these remarks of Bentley Fabricius was probably led to say that he could discover no proofs of spuriousness, when his opinion was asked by P. Wesseling; who, in his "*Epistola ad Venemam*," p. 36, has produced fresh testimony in its favour by appealing to Plutarch in *Dion*, T. i. p. 966, E., and ii. p. 474, D., where Plato is referred to. He conceives, however, that two Epistles have been moulded into one; and that the first ended just before the mention of Leptines, bringing with him the Apollo of Leochares; for Plutarch, in ii. p. 533, speaks of the words quoted from the Epistle, as being towards the close of it. And so far is Wesseling from believing the Epistle to be not genuine, that he calculates it was written about Ol. ciii. 4.

Despite, however, the proofs thus brought forward by Stephens, Bentley, and Wesseling, with whom Wytttenbach on *Phædon*, p. 108, agrees, Meiners has, in *Commentat. Societat. Reg. Gottingen*, A. D. 1783, endeavoured to show its spuriousness by arguments to which Tennemann has replied in his "*Lehren und Meinungen der Sokratiker über Unsterblichkeit*," Iena, 1791, as I learn from Harless on *Fabricius Biblioth. Gr.* T. iii. p. 106. On the other hand Taylor, in a note on the 12th Epistle, says that he has omitted the 13th as being not genuine, from the allusion there made to the difference between one and many gods—an argument to which I have replied by supposing the existence of a corruption, antecedent even to the time of Eusebius.

END OF VOL. IV.

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
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PREFACE.

IN this volume, which completes the Works of Plato, generally admitted to be genuine, will be found the only English translation of the Laws, hitherto made directly from the Greek. For although they form part of Taylor's publication, it is not too much to say that he can scarcely have looked at the original, but must have depended on the Latin version of Ficinus; and this too not the genuine one, but the refiction of it which was made by Symon Grynæus to suit the printed text.

Of the grounds on which this suspicion rests, numerous proofs will be found in the notes. Not only has Taylor tacitly followed Ficinus in his omissions, and insertions, but in numerous instances, where the genuine version had preserved the sense of the original, he has neglected it, in accordance with the revised version by Grynæus.

For this dereliction of the first duty of a translator, Taylor would perhaps have pleaded, that, as he never presumed to rival Ficinus in his knowledge of Plato, whose writings the Italian scholar had studied from his earliest years, he conceived it far more advisable to follow the Latin version than to attempt to unravel the original Greek; where so numerous are the difficulties and so unaccountable the corruptions, as to render it frequently impossible to give even a readable, much less an elegant, rendering. And so too, it would seem, thought the French translator Grou; who, as remarked by Cousin, has frequently followed Ficinus; and even the German translator Schulthess seems to have found it easier to translate from the French than the Greek. Cousin has himself been content

to adopt Grou's translation, as a basis, rather than make a new one from the original ; which he says is full of novelties of syntax, or rather of the want of all syntax, differing in this respect from the other dialogues of Plato—a discrepancy, he thinks, owing to the fact, that the Laws had not received the last touches of the author's hand.

That the Laws have come down to us in a very unsatisfactory state, is well known, and was long since ably shown by Boeckh ; and it was doubtless owing in part to this conviction that, after penning some first-rate remarks on the three opening books, he gave up the task in despair ; he saw that the nine remaining presented a series of obstacles, which it was useless to encounter and hopeless to overcome.

The labour, however, that Boeckh was unwilling to undergo was subsequently undertaken by Ast ; to whose exertions the reader will find I have been not a little indebted. Since his day, although the Greek text has been edited and improved partially with the aid of MSS. by Bekker,—for those, which were collated for Stalbaum's edition, have afforded nothing new or valuable,—yet little has been done in the way of conjectural criticism, either by those scholars, or by the united efforts of Orelli, Baiter, and Winckelmann, in their two Zurich editions. Now though Porson said, as we learn from Kidd, in the Pref. p. xlv. to " Porson's Miscellaneous Criticisms," that in depth of thought Plato was without a rival ; still the stream of his ideas generally flows as clear as if it were the shallowest of rills ; and hence Porson was led to remark, that if the text had not been obscured by numerous interpolations, it had lost a portion of its original transparency.

Equally barren of results has been the search amongst the few Academic Dissertations, written by the scholars of Germany, nearly all of which have passed through my hands. I consider it a fortunate circumstance that my attention has been recently directed to the Notes of Sydenham, published by Matthias, at the end of his edition of the works of Thomas Gray, the poet ; where are anticipated some of the better emendations of subsequent critics. And in the Remarks of Gray himself, it will be seen that, although they are less critical than those of Sydenham, he has forestalled some of

had been really put in practice—the rest, which were a reform rather of existing institutions, than the construction of a code perfectly novel, would be equally practicable, if they were submitted to the same test.

Of the persons of the dialogue, Clinias the Cretan, and Megillus the Lacedæmonian, are supposed by Boeckh to be fictitious characters merely. But as in all the other dialogues of Plato, whenever a speaker is mentioned by a specific name, there is no reason for believing that he is a mere coinage of the author's brain, but every reason for a contrary supposition, it is surely fair to infer that two persons of those names were really living in the time of Plato, although not the least mention of them is to be found, it would seem, elsewhere. Far better founded is the suspicion of the Scholiast, that by the anonymous Athenian Plato himself was intended; and so too thought Cicero, as may be inferred from the language adopted *De Legg.* i. 5, and Plutarch after him, *De Isid. et Osirid.* ii. p. 370, E., as Boeckh was the first to remark.

With regard to the time when the Laws were written, Bentley and Boeckh refer it to *Ol. cvi.* 1, when Plato had passed his seventy-fourth year; while according to a tradition, mentioned by Diogenes Laert. iii. 37, it was not published by Plato himself, but by a friend and disciple, Philip the Opuntian. Hence Wolf in *Prolegomen.* Homer, p. cliii., and Cousin after him, were led to believe that the treatise never received the author's last touches. Similar too are the sentiments of Schneider in *Prefat. Xenophont. Cyrop.* p. xiv.; who conceives however, that although the greater part exhibits only a sketch of what the Philosopher intended to say, yet to some passages he had given the last polish. Now if this were the fact, it would be a work of supererogation to attempt even to correct the numerous passages, where errors of every kind are to be met with. But on this point I confess myself to be rather sceptical. For I cannot understand what could induce an author like Plato, who said that writing was the grave of thought, to scribble down his first and crude ideas upon parchment, when a little time and reflection would have furnished him with matter far more fit to be read. How much more reasonable is it to suppose, that all the faults are to be referred to some other source than the author himself. For as he lived to the advanced age of eighty-one years, and died, as we learn from Cicero, *De Senect.* § 5, in the very act of writing, he had plenty of time during a period of seven years to re-touch, what he had written at first only imperfectly. And hence I have every where been led to adopt in the text or notes, whatever has been furnished by the collations of MSS. and the conjectures of critics, in harmony with the genius of the language and the flow of thought. And hence too the argument against the genuineness of the Laws, which Ast has drawn from the imperfection of the style, will only then be considered of the least value, when it shall be shown that

INTRODUCTION.

PLATO, having in his imaginary Republic delineated what he conceived to be the best form of government, and prescribed the course of instruction, by which the people living under such a polity, might be brought up and fitted for it, has in the *Laws* detailed some of the leading enactments, which such a constitution would require.

To carry out this idea, he supposes that three elderly statesmen come together, belonging respectively to Athens, Crete, and Lacedæmon; and that the first is requested by the second to lay down a code of laws, which the Cretan is desirous of submitting to his countrymen, previous to their re-establishment of a city which had been depopulated. For Clinias had been appointed as one of the ten Commissioners of Cnossus, authorized to draw up a code, such as they might think of themselves, or obtain from any other quarter.

For the preference thus shown to the statesmen of Crete and Lacedæmon, as being the parties who could best appreciate the best code of laws, Plato has furnished the clue in *Protagoras*, § 80. For he there states distinctly, that in those very cities a most beautiful philosophy was to be found, which had been handed down from ancient times; although it was designedly concealed, with the view of preventing other nations from profiting by the knowledge of it. So too in *Hipp. Maj.* § 8, Lacedæmon is represented as a city well regulated by laws; doubtless because the masses, who were the masters at Athens, possessed only a little power at Lacedæmon.

So plainly indeed had Plato, according to Aristotle in *Polit.* ii. 2, 3, exhibited his feelings in favour of a mixed form of government, as recommended in the *Republic*, that the Stageirite insinuates that the philosopher of Athens had imagined merely, what was actually realized at Lacedæmon. But if that were the case, Plato would surely never have wasted his time in writing two elaborate treatises on matters already well known, when it would have been sufficient to point out, in the *Statesman* especially, the institutions of Lycurgus, as the pattern, if not of a faultless government, at least of one, that approached the nearest to perfection. Hence we may fairly suspect that Aristotle merely meant to infer that Plato's notions were not original; a charge to which the philosopher might have replied by saying, that they were all the better on that very account; for it was thus shown that, as some of them were practicable—since they

added the Definitions, attributed to Speusippus, and also what has hitherto passed under the name of Timæus Locrus; none of which, with the exception of the Epinomis, has hitherto appeared in an English dress. And that nothing may be wanting in this translation, relating to the Platonic writings, there will be subjoined the three existing Greek Lives of the philosopher, and the Introduction of Alcinous, all for the first time translated into English.

the objections brought forward by the more recent impugnors of the genuineness of the Letters.

On arriving at the 11th Book, I learnt, for the first time, that there existed in MS. (Harl. 3261) a hitherto unedited version of the Laws and Epinomis, by Gregorius, or, as it should be written, Georgius Trapezuntius. It is not however so much a version as a full abridgment of those two treatises. But it exhibits this remarkable phenomenon, that not only does it agree almost verbatim with the translation of Ficinus, where the latter is at variance with the Greek; but it differs likewise in other passages to such an extent as to show that the MS. he used was the same as, or the counterpart of, the one that fell into the hands of Ficinus. Now as the two translators were contemporary, and the version of Ficinus was not put to press till 1483, and did not appear till 1484, two years before the death of Georgius Trapezuntius at a very advanced age, according to the authority, quoted by Leo Allatius de Georgiis, p. 375, it was scarcely possible for Trapezuntius to have made use of the version of Ficinus. Nor, on the other hand, was it likely that Ficinus would have inserted in his own translation, passages taken from the version of Trapezuntius, not found in the Greek MS. before him; even if we admit that he, who considered Plato to be almost an inspired writer, would have condescended to look into a translation made by the very individual, who had done all in his power to throw down Plato from his former pedestal of honour, and to place Aristotle, Plato's great opponent, in his stead.

As the MS. used by the two translators was either one and the same, or of the same character, it is fair to infer that the variations from the usual text are derived from a MS. far superior to any since discovered; and hence in the case of the other dialogues, where there is no opportunity of testing the version of Ficinus with that of a contemporary translator, there can be no sufficient reason for doubting his good faith in neither adding nor omitting any thing but upon MS. authority.

Had the Epinomis not been confessedly a spurious treatise, it would have been added to the present volume. As it is, it will find a more fitting place in the next, which will contain six other dialogues, all presumed to be spurious; but which are usually given in the more complete editions of the Greek text. To these will be

the imperfection is to be referred to the author alone, and not to the bad faith of interpolators and the carelessness of transcribers.

So far, however, does Ast appear to have been aware of this reasonable solution of the difficulties of the construction, that he has thought proper to startle the learned world with a paradox; and to assert that it is sufficient to read only a page of the *Laws* to be convinced that the treatise was never written by Plato. But as Aristotle distinctly acknowledges the *Republic* and *Laws* to be the production of the same writer, it seems quite futile to fancy that the Stageirite was the dupe of a personated Plato; and still more to draw any inference, but the reverse of what has been drawn by Ast, from the anecdote recorded by Stobæus, in xiii. p. 147; for it proves that Plato did really employ himself in writing *Laws*, after the publication of the *Republic*. The story is that—"Diogenes once inquired of Plato, whether he was writing *Laws*? He was, said the other. But what, have you not written the *Republic*? Certainly. What then, had not the *Republic* laws? It had. Why then was it requisite to write laws again?"—To this, says Cousin, Plato might have given a ready reply, by stating that in the *Republic* the enactments were purely of a moral kind; but in the *Laws*, of a penal character likewise. For in the former treatise, the whole superstructure of a state is supposed to rest on the basis of moral habits, resulting from a correct education; in the latter, the arm of the law is called upon to restrain by punishment the deviations from a correct moral conduct.

And a similar answer may be given to the arguments deduced from the discrepancies to be found in the *Republic* and *Laws*; on which Ast appears to have laid no little stress, as affording a convincing proof that the two treatises could not have emanated from the same head and hand. For Apuleius, quoted by Dilthey, in his dissertation published at Gottingen, in 1820, under the title of "*Platoniorum Librorum de Legibus Examen*," and written in refutation of the theory of Ast, observed long ago, that "in a polity, such as Plato has feigned, there would be no need of any laws whatever;" for their place would be supplied by a virtuous education. Now as the *Laws* are supposed to be laid down for a state not merely ideal, but one to be put into practice, we need not be surprised at finding that specific enactments are suggested, relating to covenants and dealings in trade, which are rejected in the *Republic*, as being useless in a well-regulated state; for there persons would be uninfluenced by that pursuit of gain, which leads mankind to evade the spirit, and sometimes to defy the letter, of the law, and to run the risk of a punishment uncertain and remote.

To meet, on the other hand, the arguments drawn in favour of the genuineness of the *Laws*, from the similarity in sentiment with the ideas promulgated in the *Dialogues*, which Ast himself acknowledges to be genuine, he is compelled to have recourse to a theory,

for which there is not even the shadow of proof. For he supposes that the author of the *Laws* was some moral philosopher of the school of Socrates; who, not understanding the spirit of the *Republic*, amused himself with drawing up a treatise, which was to be rendered of a more practical character, by the rejection of what he considered to be objectionable in the *Republic*; and that it is to this cause we must attribute the absence of all reference to the doctrines, promulgated in the *Republic*, relating to a community of goods, women, and children. But surely it is far more reasonable to suppose that such doctrines were not touched upon by Plato, from his perceiving that they could not be carried out, unless the whole frame of society was remodelled; and that he was therefore content to select, what he considered to be the wisest enactments in the existing codes of different states, and to add to them others, against which there would be no prejudice in favour of any prescriptive ideas of right or wrong. Now that Plato did in all probability make such a selection, may be inferred from the facts brought forward by C. F. Hermann, in his two *Academic Dissertations*, published at Marburg, in 1836, under the titles respectively of "*De Vestigiis Institutorum Veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis*"—and "*Juris domestici et familiaris apud Platonem in Legibus cum veteris Græciæ inque primis Athenarum institutis comparatio.*"

With regard to the matter of the treatise, it is to be regretted that Plato did not, what he might have done very easily, treat it in a more formal manner, by detailing the duties which men owe to the gods, to themselves, and their fellow-creatures; and by mentioning what rewards and punishments ought to be assigned for deeds of a virtuous and contrary character. Instead, however, of adopting so obvious and almost necessary a plan, he has thought proper to imitate the desultory conversation of a garrulous old age, and to make one third of the treatise little more than an Introduction to the remainder; where, while some laws are introduced with an elaborate preface, others are dismissed without any; and instead of the rights of persons and things being defined within strongly marked limits, they seem to be discussed just as his fancy led the writer to touch upon each question, no matter how important, or the reverse.

Of this inattention to the natural order, in which the subjects should have been taken, no better proof can be furnished than by referring to the passage in ix. § 13, where it is stated that—"It is necessary to lay down laws for men, and for them to live according to law, or else to differ in no respect from animals in the wildest state of nature;"—a sentiment, which ought to have been prominently brought forward at the very commencement of the treatise, and made the basis of all legislation; and an additional support would have been thus given to the doctrine, broached in the *Protagoras*, that laws are required to check the weakness and

the depravity of human nature. Instead, however, of assuming a broad basis like this, on which to build the superstructure of his code, Plato commences with an inquiry of a very limited kind—although well suited to the institutions of Crete and Lacedæmon, which appear to have had a great affinity with each other—whether the fortitude exhibited in war is any and what part of virtue; an inquiry that ought rather to have found a place, where laws are laid down relating to the duties of soldiers, who should have been urged to take as their rule of conduct, the sentiment expressed by Bias, and subsequently by Horace,

Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore.

The good, through love of virtue, hate to sin.

In defence, however, of this want of method, Cousin has boldly stepped forward, and asserted that, despite an appearance to the contrary, there is to be found in the Laws a perfect regularity, which reveals itself to those, who study that treatise attentively; while they, who are not sufficiently versed in the philosophy of Plato, will doubtless be unable to follow the thread of the discourse, when it seems to be broken by numerous digressions; for the art, which reigns through the whole treatise, is a kind of snare for a reader of modern times, or a labyrinth with its thousand intricacies, totally unlike the regular and easy road laid down by modern writers on jurisprudence.

What credence this assertion of Cousin may gain with others, I know not; but to myself it is far less satisfactory than his defence of the prefaces to the different Laws, with which Seneca found such fault. For, as Cousin remarks correctly, Plato adopted them, to show that the law-giver ought to treat men, as creatures of reason, and possessing free-will; and that he should employ persuasion as well as force; and explain the moral intention of the laws he introduces; and found the obedience to them rather on the light of reason than the dread of punishment. This very doctrine had indeed, according to Cicero, *De Legg.* ii. 6, been inculcated by Charondas and Zaleucus; but it was left for Plato to enforce it with greater power, and to put it in a clearer light.

Although there are not a few subjects, dispersed through the whole treatise, that can scarcely fail to excite the surprise of a modern reader, the one most conspicuous perhaps is that relating to the importance attached to the cultivation of music and dancing, as something beyond a mere amusement and accomplishment, as they are deemed at present. For though it may be true, that certain kinds of music, even without words, have a tendency to elevate and purify the soul, and to prevent it from seeking a gratification in grovelling and gross pursuits, yet it may be fairly doubted whether any one was ever corrupted by music alone; although he might be by witnessing the dancing, which travellers tell us is to be seen

even at this day in Spain and other countries on the shores of the Mediterranean, and which is evidently only the still surviving remnant of the Satyric dance of the olden time.

The last point to which it is requisite to draw the reader's attention, is the diminutive size of the state, for which Plato has framed his elaborate code of laws. For though it is true, as remarked by Cousin, that it faithfully represents the spirit of the times, when persons legislated for small republics, yet Plato must have known, from what he had seen or heard of, that it would be impossible to preserve his chosen number of 5040 families and the lands assigned to them, even should the increase of births be remedied by emigration, or the population suddenly diminished by pestilence or famine; and it was therefore not without reason, that at the close of the treatise he looks forward to some power to preserve, what he felt, no doubt, carried within itself the germs of future decay, which the largest empires in the East and the smallest republics elsewhere have been destined to feel alike.

As the work of Cousin is not likely to be readily accessible to the readers of this translation, I have transcribed from his note on v. § 8, p. 171, the list of the 59 divisors of 5040, which is more correct and full than the one given by Cornarius.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24, 28, 30, 35, 36, 40, 42, 45, 48, 56, 60, 63, 70, 72, 80, 84, 90, 105, 112, 120, 126, 140, 144, 168, 180, 210, 240, 252, 280, 315, 336, 360, 420, 504, 560, 630, 720, 840, 1008, 1260, 1680, 2520.

For a similar reason I have extracted the parallelisms between the Laws of Plato and Holy Writ, as they are noticed in "*Luxdorphiana e Platone*," which Olaus Wormius edited at Copenhagen in 1790, although some of them might be omitted, as being irrelevant; while in lieu of the pages of ed. Lugd. 1590, I have substituted those of ed. Steph.

Legg. i. p. 626, E. = Proverb. xvi. 32; p. 636, C. = Roman. i. 26; p. 637, E. = Coloss. iii. 11; iv. 6.

Legg. iv. p. 716, A. = S. James iv. 6; p. 717, D. = S. Matth. xii. 36.

Legg. v. p. 728, A. = S. Matth. xvi. 26; p. 732, A. = Roman. i. 22; p. 738, E. = S. Matth. vi. 22; p. 742, C. = Levit. xxv. 35.

Legg. vi. p. 777, E., and vii. p. 793, E. = Ephes. vi. 4—9.

Legg. vii. p. 823, E. = Jerem. xvi. 16.

Legg. viii. p. 839, A. = S. Luke viii. 13.

Legg. ix. p. 856, C. = Deut. xxiv. 16; p. 873, D. = Exod. xxi. 28.

Legg. x. p. 886, A. = Rom. i. 20; Psal. xix. 1—4; p. 904, C. = S. Matth. vi. 22; 905, B. = Psal. cxxxix. 2—10.

Legg. xi. p. 924, E. = Deuter. xxv. 5.

Legg. xii. p. 958, E. = S. Matth. xxvii. 7; Genes. xxiii. 11.

THE LAWS.

BOOK I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

AN ATHENIAN GUEST, CLINIAS OF CRETE, AND
MEGILLUS OF LACEDÆMON.

[1.] HAS a god, or some man, obtained from you, O guests, (the fame of being) the cause of the laying down of laws?

Clin. A god, O guest, a god, to say what is most just; with us indeed, Zeus; but amongst the Lacedæmonians, from whose country is this person here, I think, they mention Apollo.¹ Is it not so?

Megil. It is.

Athen. Say you then, according to Homer,² that Minos did constantly on the ninth year³ go to a conference with his father, and according to the oracular responses given by him, lay down the laws found in your states?

Clin. It is so said by us; and, likewise, that his brother Rhadamanthus—for you have heard the name—was the most just [of men]. Now we Cretans would say that he obtained this praise from his distributing at that time things pertaining to justice in an upright manner.

¹ There is not a little difficulty in *φάναι τούτους*. For *τούτους* could hardly follow *παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων*. Ficinus has "Apollinem dicturos istos existimo." Taylor, "I think Apollo dictated the laws."

² Od. xix. 178, *Μίνως Ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου δαριστὺς*.

³ Ficinus, "semper per novennium," as if he had found in his MSS. *συνουσίαν ἐκάστοτε δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους*. This interpretation is adopted by Boeckh on Pseudo-Platon. Minos, § 13. But Ast prefers the account given by Valerius Maxim. i. 2, "Minos—nono quoque anno—a Jove—traditas sibi leges prærogabat."

Athen. And honourable is the renown, and very becoming to the son of Zeus. But since both you and this person here have been brought up in legal institutions of this kind, I expect it will not be unpleasant for us at present to have a dissertation, by speaking and hearing respecting a form of government and laws, and at the same time to be taking a walk. Now the way from Cnossus to the cavern and temple of Jupiter is, as we hear, altogether sufficient,¹ and the resting-places along the road are, as is proper, during the present sultry weather, shady amongst lofty trees; and it will be suited to our age to rest in them frequently, and by relieving each other during the conversation, to go in this way through the whole walk with ease.

Clin. There are indeed, O guest, to a person as he goes on, in the groves cypress-trees of wondrous height and beauty, and meadows, in which while we rest, we may discourse.

[2.] *Athen.* Speak you correctly?

Clin. Entirely so; and we shall say so more, on seeing them. But let us go with a good fortune.

Athen. Be it so. But tell me, why has the law ordained for your joint-feasts gymnastic exercises and the handling of arms?

Clin. I conceive, O guest, that it is easy² even for every one² to apprehend these customs of ours. For you see that the nature of the whole country of Crete is not a plain, like that of Thessaly. On this account, they make use of horses more; but we of running. ³ Now as this irregular [ground]³ is more adapted to the exercise of foot-races, it is necessary for a person in such a case to have light arms, and not to run⁴ holding what has a weight.⁴ Now the lightness of bows and arrows seems to be fitted (for this). All these therefore have been adopted by us in war; and all this has the legislator, as it appears to me, looking to this point, ordained; especially

¹ In lieu of *ικανή*, I should prefer *οὐ κακή* "not bad—"

²⁻³ Ficinus, finding probably a difficulty in the words *καὶ παντὶ*, has neglected them; and so after him has Taylor. The sense requires either the omission of *καὶ*, or the reading *καὶ παιδὶ* "even to a child." On the loss or confusion of *παῖς* in this formula, see at Phileb. § 32.

³⁻³ The Greek is *ἥδε γὰρ ἀνῶμαλος αὖ*, where *γὰρ* and *αὖ* are equally unintelligible. They are omitted by Ficinus, who has "*hæc inæqualis est.*"

⁴⁻⁴ Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "*ne pondere suo cursum impediatur.*" At all events *μη βαρὺς ἔχοντα* are superfluous after *ἐλαφρὰ—*

since he nearly seems to have instituted the joint feasts, through perceiving how all persons, when engaged in war, are then compelled by the thing itself, for the sake of their own defence, to feast ¹ at that time together.¹ In truth, he appears to me to have condemned the multitude of stupidity, for their not learning that there is constantly through life a war to all with all states. Now if during the time of war it was necessary to feast in common for the sake of defence, and for certain persons, both rulers and ruled, to be drawn up as their defenders, this should be done in the time of peace likewise. For that, which most men call peace, is only a name; but in reality there is a war, not proclaimed by a herald, according to nature, to all ² against all states. For by thus considering, you will almost discover, that the Cretan legislator has, looking to war, ordained for us all institutions both public and private, and ordered us to guard the laws in such a manner, as if nothing else were useful, either of possessions or pursuits, unless one became victorious in war, and all the goods of the vanquished became the property of the victors.

[3.] *Athen.* You appear to me, O guest, to have been well practised in seeing through the laws of Crete. But tell me still more clearly this. For ³ by the definition you have laid down³ of a well-regulated state, you seem to me to say that one ought to administer it, so arranged in order, as to be victorious over the rest of states in war. Is it not so?

Clin. Just so; and I think it will seem so to this person here.

Megil. For how can any Lacedæmonian whatever, O thou divine man, answer otherwise?

Athen. Whether, then, is this right in the case of states towards states, but otherwise in the case of one village towards another?

Clin. By no means otherwise.

Athen. But it is the same?

Clin. Yes.

¹—¹ The words *τούτων τὸν χρόνον* are perfectly unnecessary after the preceding *τότε*.

² Instead of *πάσαις* the train of ideas leads to *πᾶσι*, as shown by the preceding *πᾶσι πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς πόλεις*.

³—³ The words within brackets, in Greek, *ὃν γὰρ ὅρον ἔθου*, are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor; who here, as elsewhere, has paid no attention to the original.

Athen. What then, is it the same in the case of one family towards another family, and in the case of one man towards another?

Clin. The same.

Athen. But in the case of a person towards himself, shall we consider him in that of an enemy towards an enemy? Or, how shall we say?

Clin. O Athenian guest,—for I am not willing to call you Attic, because you appear to me rather to deserve to be called after the name of the goddess Minerva,¹—you have, by correctly carrying back the reasoning to its principle, made it clearer; so that you will more easily discover that it has just now been rightly said, that all persons are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and² each individual to himself.

Athen. How hast thou, O wonderful man, said this?

Clin. ³ And these, too, O guest; it is the first and best of all victories for a man to conquer himself; but to be vanquished by himself is of all things the most shameful and vile. For these words⁴ signify that there is a war in each of us against ourselves.

Athen. Let us then turn back our discourse. For, since each of us is ⁵ one better and another⁶ worse than himself, shall we say that a family, and a village, and a state, have this same thing in them, or not?

Clin. Do you mean that (one)⁶ is better than itself in some things, and the other worse?

Athen. Yes.

Clin. Concerning this too you have rightly inquired. ⁷ For

¹ Namely, Athéné. Plato meant to say that the guest was Athéné-like, not merely born in Attica, where there were many persons not at all like Athéné, the goddess of wisdom.

² Ficinus has "et," answering to *καὶ* in MS. Voss. alone.

³ Ast explains *καὶ ἐν αὐθᾷ* by "in the latter case," viz. of an individual. But *ἐν αὐθᾷ* could hardly be thus applied. There is doubtless some error here.

⁴ Namely, "to conquer and be conquered." Ast.

⁵ Instead of *ὁ μὲν—ὁ δὲ*, which could scarcely thus follow *εἰς ἑκαστὸς ἡμῶν*, one would prefer *τό μὲν—τό δὲ*, similar to *κρίνω—τίνα* in the next speech of Clinias.

⁶ Ast says that *τῇν μὲν* is to be supplied in the first clause, answering to *τῇν δὲ* in the second, and refers to Heusde Specim. Crit. p. 76, Heind. on Gorg. § 24, and Hermann on Viger. p. 699.

⁷ Ficinus has, "non enim minus civitatibus id contingit; immo

a thing of this kind occurs very and much, not the least in states.⁷ For, in the case of those, in which the better conquer the multitude and the worse, such a city would be correctly said to be better than itself, and be most justly praised for such a victory. But the contrary where the contrary (occurs).

Athen. Now the question, whether the worse is at any time more excellent than the better, let us lay aside; for it would be a long discussion; but for the present I understand what is asserted by you; that sometimes citizens of the same family and of the same city, being unjust and numerous, will, by coming together, forcibly attack the just, fewer in number, and enslave them; and that, when they conquer, the city may be justly said to be inferior to itself, and at the same time depraved; but, when they are conquered, better than itself, and good.

Clin. What is now said, guest, is very strange; but yet it is most necessary to confess it.

[4.] *Athen.* Hold then, and let us again consider this. Many brothers may surely be born from one man and from one (woman).¹ Nor is it at all wonderful that the greater² part of them should be unjust, and the lesser just.

Clin. It is not.

Athen. Nor will it be proper for me and you to investigate this, that, when the base vanquish, both the family and every kind of relationship may be called inferior to themselves, but better than themselves, when the base are vanquished. For we do not investigate these things at present for the sake of some elegance or inelegance in words, according to the discourse of many, but for the sake of discovering what is a natural rectitude and error in the case of laws.

Clin. You speak most truly, O guest.

Megil. To me too so much appears to be well said.

Athen. Let us look into this likewise. Can any one become a judge of the brothers just spoken of?

Clin. Doubtless.

Athen. Which then will be the better judge? He, who cuts off such of them as are bad, and orders the good to

maxime in eis perspicuum," which is far more intelligible than the Greek, πάντων γὰρ ἔστι καὶ σφόδρα τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

¹ On the omission of γυναικός, Ast refers to Schæfer on Bos Ellips. p. 93.

² Instead of πλείους, two MSS. πλείους, similar to "plures" in Ficini.

govern themselves? or he, who causes the good to govern, but suffers the bad to live, being willing to be governed? But let us mention a third judge, if such there be, with respect to virtue; who, receiving a single clan at difference with itself, will not destroy any person; but, after having reconciled the parties, will lay down for them laws relating to each other, and be able so to guard them, that they may be on friendly terms.

Clin. Such a judge and legislator would be the better by far.

Athen. And he would frame laws for them, looking to a purpose contrary to war.

Clin. This indeed is true.

Athen. But what is he, who brings a state together? Would he, by looking to external war, better put in order its life than (by looking) to the wars produced constantly within itself, which is called sedition? which every one would particularly wish not to occur in his own state; and when it has occurred, to be released from it as quickly as possible?

Clin. (By looking), it is evident, to this (the latter).

Athen. Whether would any one choose that peace should result from sedition, through one party being destroyed, and the other¹ victorious, or that, by peace and friendship resulting from a reconciliation, they should necessarily² direct their attention to external wars?

Clin. Every one would rather wish it to happen to his own state in this way than in that.

Athen. Would not a legislator too in a similar manner?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Would not every one lay down all laws for the sake of that which is best?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But neither war nor sedition is the best of things, ³—for to be in want of these is a thing to be prayed for—³ but

¹ Ficinus has "cum altera pars victoria potita sit," which led Stephens to alter τῶν πορίων, hitherto found in all the MSS., into τῶν ἐρίων, as the sense evidently requires.

² This "necessarily" seems rather strange, instead of "more readily."

³—³ Ficinus, unable to understand ἀνευκρόν δὲ τὸ δεηθῆναι τούτων, renders these words, "omnes enim deprecantur ne quid horum sibi in-eundum sit." Taylor's version, "for to be in want of these is execrable," shows by its closeness the absurdity of the original. Plato wrote ἀνευκρόν, as I have translated.

peace with, and kindly feelings towards, each other. Moreover, for a state to vanquish itself, is not, it seems, one of the best, but of necessary things; just as if¹ any one should think a body in sickness would, when meeting with medicinal cleansing, be then doing the best, but should pay no attention to the body, which needed (the cleansing) not at all. Should any one in like manner have his thoughts directed to the happiness of a state or an individual, he will never become correctly² a statesman, while looking only and primarily to external war; nor will he be an accurate legislator, unless he lays down laws respecting war for the sake of peace, rather than laws respecting peace, for the sake of war.

[5.] *Clin.* This reasoning, O guest, appears somehow to have been stated correctly. But still, I wonder whether the institutions existing with us, and still more those relating to Lacedæmon, have not given rise to all care for the sake of those things.

Athen. This may perhaps be the case. We ought not, however, to contest the matter at present in a harsh manner; but quietly to ask questions, as both we and they have especially an interest in things of this kind. Do ye then keep pace with my discourse. In the first place, we will place before you Tyrtæus³—who was by birth an Athenian, but afterwards a fellow-citizen with these persons here; and who has the most of all men been engaged on these points—where he says, “I would not bear in recollection the man, nor hold him in any account, not though he were the most wealthy of men, and possessed many good things,”—and he enumerates nearly all,—“who is not always the best in the affairs of war.” For you have surely heard of his poetry. For this person here is, I think, saturated with them.

¹ Before “just as if,” in Greek *ὅμοιον ὥς εἰ*, Ficinus inserts “putare autem optimum civitatis statum in pugnando et vincendo consistere,” adopted tacitly, as usual, by Taylor.

² Instead of *ὀρθῶς*, Boeckh suggested, and Ast approved of, *ὀρθός*, so that *πολιτικὸς ὀρθός* might correspond to *νομοθίτης ἀκριβής*. Stalbaum is, however, content with *ὀρθῶς*, which he would perhaps translate, with Ficinus, “revera.” But such is not the meaning of the word.

³ Tyrtæus was an elegiac poet, lame, and despised by the Athenians. The oracle of Apollo, however, ordered the Lacedæmonians to use him as their general, in the war in which they were then engaged with the Messenians. Arriving at Lacedæmon, he did by his poetry so animate the Lacedæmonians, that they vanquished the Messenians. He flourished B. C. 684. T.

Megil. Entirely so.

Clin. And they have reached us likewise, having been brought from Lacedæmon.

Athen. Come then, let us interrogate in common this poet somehow in this fashion. Thou, most divine poet, Tyrtæus,—for you appear to us to be wise and good, because you have celebrated excellently well those, who excel in war,—and as myself, and this person here, and Clinias the Cnossian, happen, as we seem, to agree very much with you in this particular,—we wish to know clearly, whether we are speaking about the same men or not,—do tell us, whether you too think, as we do, that there are two kinds of war? Or how (say you)? To this I think that a man, much inferior to Tyrtæus, would say the truth, that there are two kinds; one, which we now call sedition, which is the most grievous of all wars, as we just now asserted; but the other kind of war, which we employ in our differences with those out of the state, and of a different tribe, we will lay down, as being milder than the other.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Come now, (inform us) what men, and for what kind of war, have you so transcendently praised (some)¹ and blamed others. For you appear to have praised ²those (engaged) in a foreign (war).² For you have said in your poems thus—that you by no means endure those,

Who dare not upon gory slaughter look,
Nor with the hand, close standing, clutch the foe.

Hence, as an inference, we should say that you, Tyrtæus, are praising, it seems, those, who have been eminently conspicuous in a foreign and external war. Surely he would say this and confess it.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But we, although these are good, assert that those are far better, who are conspicuously the best in the greatest war. We have too the poet Theognis as a witness, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says,

¹ On the omission of *τοὺς μὲν* in the first clause, to be supplied from *τοὺς δὲ* in the second, see above, § 3, n. 6.

²—² In lieu of *πρὸς τοὺς ἑκτὸς*, Boeckh was the first to suggest, what the context requires, *τοὺς πρὸς τὸν ἑκτὸς*—

The man, who, when the strife of party's high,
Is faithful, is in gold and silver worth
His weight.

Now, such a one we say is in a more difficult war altogether superior to the other, by nearly as much as justice, temperance, and prudence, when coming to the same point, are superior ¹ to fortitude (by itself alone).¹ For no one can be found faithful and sound in seditions, without the whole of virtue. But, as Tyrtaeus says, there are a great number of mercenaries who fight ² standing firmly with their legs apart,² and die willingly in battle—among whom are the most ³ bold, and unjust, and insulting,³ and nearly⁴ the most thoughtless of all (men) except some very few. But to what does this story tend? And what did he wish to render clear, when he said this? It was evidently this above all; that both he, who laid down laws here from Zeus, and every one else, from whom there is even a little advantage, will lay down his laws, while always looking for the most part to nothing else than the greatest virtue. But it is, as Theognis says, a faithfulness in things of dread, which a person may denominate perfect justice; but that, which Tyrtaeus has praised so highly, is indeed beautiful, and opportunely celebrated by the poet, yet it may most rightly be called the fourth in number and in the power of being in honour.

[6.] *Clin.* Shall we, O guest, throw⁵ our legislator away amongst the remote legislators?

Athen. Not (him)⁶ indeed, most excellent man, but ourselves, should we imagine, that both Lycurgus and Minos laid down their laws in Lacedæmon and here, looking especially to war.

^{1—1} In lieu of μετ' ἀνδρίας, Proclus on Rep. p. 402, has preserved αὐτῆς μόνῃς τῆς ἀνδρίας, first pointed out by Boeckh, whom Ast has followed. Stalbaum is content with the common reading.

^{2—2} On this gesture of a man fighting see Homer, Il. xii. 458.

^{3—3} In confirmation of the character given here to mercenary soldiers, it is sufficient to refer to Thucydides, vii. 29.

⁴ Clemens Alexandr. correctly omits σχεδὸν ἀπάντων, words quite superfluous, when followed by ἐκτὸς δὲ τινων μάλα ὀλίγων.

⁵ Ficinus has "rejiciemus"—which leads to ἀποβαλοῦμεν in lieu of ἀποβάλλομεν.

⁶ Ficinus has, "Non illum—sed nos ipsos—" as if he had read in MS. Οὐχ ἡμεῖς γ' ἐκείνον, what the antithesis requires.

Clin. What then, (and) how ought we to say?

Athen. ¹As truth and justice, I think, require those to speak, who discourse about a divine (republic).¹ Not looking to some part of virtue, and that the most trifling, but to the whole of virtue, ²he laid down, and according to their species to seek the laws, not what those seek who place species before those now²—for that, of which each person is in want, does he laying aside³ seek; one, the laws about inheritances; ⁴another, those about sole heiresses; ⁴ another, those about an assault; and others, about ten thousand other matters of a similar kind. But we assert that the inquiry about laws is the business of those, who properly inquire, as we have just now begun (to do). And I am in every way delighted with your attempt to give an explanation on the subject of laws. For it is right to begin from virtue, by asserting that for its sake a person has laid down laws. But when you said that the legislator had laid down all (laws) with reference to a part of virtue, and this too the least, you did not appear to me to speak correctly any longer; and on this account did I speak all this subsequent speech. Do you, then, wish me to say in what

¹—¹ Such is Taylor's translation of the Latin of Ficinus; who seems to have found in his MS. the Scholium, discovered in other MSS. also, where it is stated that πολιτείας is to be supplied after θείας. But as such an ellipse would be inadmissible, Stephens suspected that something was wanting in the Greek—"Ὡς περ τό τ' ἀληθές, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπὲρ γε θείας διαλεγόμενους λέγειν, literally, "As (it is meet) for those, I think, who converse about a divine, to say what is true and just"—for χρῆν might be supplied from the preceding speech of Clinias.

²—² Such is the literal translation of the Greek text, given by Bekker and Stalbaum. Ficinus has, what is not quite so unintelligible—"ipsos respexisse putandum, et per singulas earum species leges quæsisse, nec eas species investigasse, quas multi modo proponentes quærent." From whence Stephens was led to read ἐξήτει, found subsequently in one MS., and to suggest the insertion of πολλοί before τῶν νῦν—Ast however would supply πολιτειῶν after τῶν νῦν, and alter ζητεῖν αὐτῶν into ζητεῖν αὐτόν (the lawgiver), so that there may be a change from a direct to an indirect form of speech. What Plato really wrote it is difficult to state positively, but it is easy to see what is required by the natural connexion of ideas.

³ Ficinus, unable, I suspect, to understand παραθέμενος, has omitted it in his version, "id enim quisque maxime quærere solet, quo maxime indiget.

⁴—⁴ The Greek words καὶ ἐπιελήρων are omitted by Ficinus.

manner ¹I am still willing for you to speak in detail, and myself to hear.¹

Clin. Entirely so, O guest.

Athen. It is proper to assert that the laws of the Cretans are not vainly held in very great esteem by all the Greeks. For they are in a correct state by their making those, who use them, happy; for they impart every good. Now there are two kinds of good; one human, and the other divine; and the former hangs upon the divine; and if any state receives the greater, it possesses likewise the lesser; but if not, it is deprived of both. But the lesser are those, of which ²health is the leader, beauty the second in order, and strength for running, and all other movements of the body, the third; but the fourth is, Plutus, (wealth,) ³not blind indeed, ³but seeing acutely, if it follows prudence. Now that which is the first ⁴good (and) ⁴the leader of the divine, is prudence; but the second, after intellect, ⁵is a temperate habit of the soul; from these (two) mixed up with fortitude, ⁶the third in order will be justice; and the fourth, fortitude. Now all these are naturally arranged before those, and so must they be arranged by the lawgiver; ⁷and after these he must enjoin upon the citizens the other ordinances that look to these.⁷

¹—¹ The version of Ficinus—"te nobis distinguere voluisssem," is followed implicitly by Taylor.

²—² The same order is repeated in the Laws, ii. § 6, and in Gorg. p. 451, E. § 14, where it is assigned to a Scolion preserved by Athenæus, xv. p. 694.

³ On the blindness of Plutus see Aristophanes in the play of that name, and Plato Rep. viii. p. 554, B. § 8. Theophrastus, says the Scholiast, observed, that if Wealth had life, it would come only to the good; but now, since it is without life, it falls to the bad likewise.

⁴—⁴ Instead of αἰ, which has no meaning here, and is omitted by Theodoretus, the sense requires καὶ—while ἀγαθῶν in two MSS., in lieu of ἀγαθόν, answers to "bonorum," in Ficinus.

⁵ Since νοῦς seems to be here the same as φρόνησις, it is not easy to understand why Plato made use of two different words instead of repeating the same one. MS. Voss. and Theodoretus read μετὰ νοῦ, similar to the subsequent μετ' ἀνδρείας.

⁶ In the enumeration of the four cardinal virtues, each is generally considered to stand alone, not, as here, one to be mixed up with another one.

⁷—⁷ The Greek is μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὰς ἄλλας προστάξεις τοῖς πολίταις εἰς ταῦτα βλέπουσας αὐτοῖς εἶναι διακελευστίον—where I cannot make out either syntax or sense; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is—

But of these the human look to the divine, and all the divine to their leader intellect. ¹ And he ought to have a care respecting marriages contracted by each other, and after these in the procreation and education of children,¹ such as are male and female, and likewise of those still young, and of those advancing in years to old age, and to hold correctly in honour and dishonour;² directing, in all the intercourse of these persons, his attention to their pains, and pleasures, and desires, and eagerness in all matters of love; and acting as a guard over them to blame and praise correctly through the laws themselves. In the case of anger and fear, and what perturbations soever in the soul arise through misfortune, and whatever escapes from them exist in prosperity; and whatever sufferings happen to men through disease, or wars, or poverty, or the contraries to these, in all such occasions he must teach and define what is beautiful, or not, in the arrangement of each. And after this, it is necessary for the legislator to watch over the property and expenditure of the citizens, in whatever way it may take place, and the unions with and separations from each other in all persons (acting) with their free will or without it; and to have an eye to what is just or not, and in what things it exists or is wanting, and to distribute honours to those who obey the laws, but to inflict upon those, who do not obey, punishments ordained (by law); until, having reached the end of all polity, he shall perceive in what manner it is meet for the burial of the dead to take place, and what honours to pay to them. And after perceiv-

“et mandet omnibus ut semper ad hæc ipsa respicientes in singulis operentur”—thus translated by Taylor, “and should command the citizens to look to these divine goods in all their actions.”

¹—¹ This passage, says Boeckh, is most difficult and corrupt. Viger on Eusebius, Præp. Ev. xii. p. 589, wished to transpose *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*—and to place those words before *περὶ τῶν γάμων*—For he found in Ficinus—“curet præterea oportet nuptias inter cives et generationes—”

² After “dishonour” there is evidently something wanting, supplied by Ficinus; whose version is, “et eos, qui recte in hisce se gerunt, ut decet, honoret”—adopted, as usual, by Taylor; who has in the sentences following been content, without looking at the Greek, to translate the Latin translation of Ficinus, as altered by Grynæus; for the genuine one has, “contra vero dolores, voluptates, cupiditates in omni conversatione vituperet: considerabit etiam diligenter, ad quæ studia quemque raptat amor; rectaque officia per leges laudabit, vituperabit contraria.”

ing, he who has laid down the laws shall place over them all, as guardians, some persons on account of their prudence, and some who have gone through a truthful reputation; so that intellect, binding all these together, may exhibit them as following temperance and justice, and not riches or ambition. In this manner, O guests, I did wish, and still do wish now, that you would explain how all these particulars exist in the laws said to be from Zeus, and in those of the Pythian Apollo, which both Minos and Lycurgus laid down; and how, after they have assumed a certain order, they become evident to a person skilled in the business of law, either through art or certain customs; while to us, the rest of mankind, they are by no means apparent.

[7.] *Clin.* How then, O guest, ought we to speak of what comes after these?

Athen. It appears to me that we ought to go through again from the beginning, as we have begun (in part), in the first place, the pursuits of fortitude; and afterwards we will go through another species of virtue, and again another, if you are willing; and that we may go through the first subject, we will endeavour, by laying down a pattern, and conversing about the others in this way, to make for ourselves a beguilement of the road; and afterwards we will show, if god is willing, that the things relating to the whole of virtue look thitherward.

Clin. You speak well. Endeavour then, in the first place, to sift for us this praiser of Zeus.

Athen. I will endeavour likewise (to sift) both you and myself. For the discourse is common. Speak therefore. Shall we say that the joint-feasts and gymnastic exercises were invented by the lawgiver for the purposes of war?

*Megil.*¹ Yes.

Athen. And that a third or fourth thing (was invented)?
²For perhaps it is necessary for a person thus to make an enumeration respecting those of the rest of virtue, whether it is right to call them of parts, or any thing whatever, only showing clearly what he means.²

¹ Boeckh was the first to substitute Megil. for Clin.

² Such is the literal version of the Greek text, which, I confess, I cannot understand. Ficinus has "Forte enim ita dinumerare oportet,

Megil. The third thing, as I and any Lacedæmonian whatever likewise would say, he discovered was hunting. ¹ And a fourth, and even a fifth, ² thing let us try, if we can, to mention. ¹ I then would endeavour to mention the fourth thing, namely, that which takes place to a great extent with us, in the endurance of pain, which occurs constantly in fighting with hands against each other, and ³ in certain snatchings in the midst of many blows. ³ There is, moreover, what is called a concealment, ⁴ wonderfully laborious as regards endurance (of pain); and the being in winter without shoes and without a bed, and waiting without servants upon themselves, while wandering night and day through the whole country. Still further, in the exercises of naked persons, ⁵ there is a severe endurance amongst us when contending with the violence of intense heat; and there

tum in hoc virtutis genere, tum in cæterarum virtutum sive parte, sive quomocunque aliter, declarationis duntaxat gratia, nominare deceat." From which it is evident that either his MS. was more complete than any subsequently collated, or that he supplied, from conjecture, what he considered to be necessary for the sense. What Plato really wrote, only a bold conjecturist will be able, I suspect, to restore.

^{1—1} The words within the numerals Stephens says have been assigned to the Athenian Guest; an arrangement of which Ast and Baiter approve. Winckelmann however considers the whole sentence to be spurious; but he does not state why, when, or by whom it was interpolated.

² The Greek is ἡ πέμπτου. But Ficinus has "et quintum:" which leads to ἡ καὶ πέμπτου.

^{3—3} Ast explains this by saying that the boys at Sparta were taught to steal; but that, if they were detected, they were beaten, not for the theft, but for doing it clumsily; and he refers to Xenophon Laconic. i. 8.

⁴ Respecting the Spartan κρύπτεα Ast refers to Plutarch in Lycurg. p. 56, E.; who says that such of the young men as were supposed to be of a superior mind were sent through the country with small swords and the necessaries of life, but nothing else; and that during the day they concealed themselves, and took their rest in retired spots; but at night they went to the public roads, and murdered such of the Helots as they could lay hold of. A similar account is given in a fragment of Heraclides Ponticus. According to the Scholiast, it was a form of exercise suited for war. For the young men were stript naked, and ordered to wander for a whole year out of the city, among the mountains, and to support themselves by theft, and other stratagems, but in such a manner that no one might detect them. Hence this was called κρύπτεα, a concealment: for they were punished if they were at any time discovered.

⁵ These "naked exercises" took place at the summer solstice; and hence the allusion to the intense heat, to which those, engaged in them, were exposed.

are very many other things ¹(of this kind),¹ in detailing which a person would ²nearly never cease.²

Athen. You speak well, O Lacedæmonian guest. But come, whether shall we put down fortitude as a contest merely with fears and pains? or with desires likewise and pleasures, and certain vehement fawnings of flattery, which soften³ the minds of those, who deem themselves objects of worship, and mould them like wax?⁴

Megil. ⁵I think thus,⁵ (that it is) a contest with all these.

Athen. If then we call to mind the previous discourse, this person here said, that both a state is inferior in some things to itself, and ⁶a man (to himself).⁶ Was it not so, Cnossian guest?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now then, whether shall we call him the inferior,⁷ who is subdued by pain, or him rather, who is subdued by pleasure?

Clin. Him, it appears to me, who is subdued by pleasure. And surely we all much rather say that he, who is vanquished by pleasures, is disgracefully inferior to himself, than he, who (is vanquished) by pains.

Athen. Surely the legislator through Zeus and he through Apollo did not lay down by law that fortitude is lame, and able to march against things only on its left hand, but unable (to do so) against elegancies and flatteries on its right hand? or (is it able to march against) both?

Clin. Against both, I think.

Athen. Let us, then, mention again what those pursuits are, in both of your states, which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them in the same manner, as they do not avoid

¹—¹ Ficinus has "multa hujusmodi," as if his MS. read ἔτερα τοιαῦτα.

²—² Ficinus, conceiving perhaps that σχεδὸν—οὐκ—ἐκάστοτε could not be united, has "quæ non facile quispiam enumeraret," adopted by Taylor.

³ All the MSS. omit μαλάττουσαι, and some too κηρίνους. Ficinus has "animos flectunt, et quasi cereos faciunt," which leads to κάμπτονται, ὅλον κηρίνους πλάττουσαι; as in vii. 2, p. 789, E., πλάττειν, ὅλον κήρινον.

⁴ Ast quotes opportunely from Horace, "Cereus in vitium flecti."

⁵—⁵ The words Οἷμαι μὲν οὕτω are omitted by Ficinus, and the MS. Z, from which Aldus printed the ed. pr.

⁶—⁶ Ficinus alone has "et virum aliquem inferiorem se ipso," thus supplying what is requisite to preserve the balance of the sentence.

⁷ Instead of κακὸν Boeckh would read κακίον, from "inferiorem" in Ficinus.

pain, but bring persons into the midst of them, (pleasures,) and induce them, partly by force, and partly by honours, to vanquish them. Now where is the same thing ordained in your laws respecting pleasures (as respecting pains)? Let it be stated, what is that, which in your case causes the same persons to be similarly brave, both with respect to pain and pleasures, while they are victorious over those things, in which they ought to be victorious, and to be by no means inferior to enemies the nearest to them and the most difficult (to contend with).

Megil. In the same manner, O guest, as I had the power to mention many laws opposed to pains, I should not thus perhaps possess the means of speaking about pleasures according to their great and conspicuous parts; but according to their small I might perhaps have the means.

Clin. Nor should I be able myself to do any thing of this kind clearly in the case of the laws of Crete.

Athen. This, O ye best of guests, is by no means wonderful. But should any one of us, who is desirous of seeing what is true, and at the same time the best, find fault with any thing in the laws of our respective countries, let us receive (the words)¹ from each other not harshly, but with mildness.

Clin. You speak well, O Athenian guest; and we must obey you.

Athen. ² For no other conduct than this² would become men of our age.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Whether then a person finds fault rightly or not with the Laconian and Cretan polity, is another question. But perhaps I can better tell what is said by the multitude than either of you can. For although the laws are regulated even moderately well, yet there would be with you one law the most beautiful, not to permit any youth to inquire which laws are well or ill established, but (to ordain) all to proclaim, with one voice, and with one mouth, that they are all beautifully laid down, since the gods were the parties who gave them; and that, if any one says otherwise, persons should not endure

¹ Both the syntax and sense require τὰ ἔπη δεχόμεθα, in lieu of ἀποδεχόμεθα, similar to τὰ λεγόμενα—δεχομένῳ shortly afterwards.

² The Greek is Οὐ γὰρ ἂν—πρέπει τοιοῦτον. But Ficinus has "Profecto non aliter—facere decet," which leads to Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' ἂν—πρέπει ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον.

to hearken to him : and that if any old man has any thoughts respecting them, he shall place his reasons before a ruler and his equals in age, but not in the presence of a young man.

Clin. You speak most properly, O guest : and, like a seer, although you were absent from the then thoughts of the party who laid them down, yet you appear to me to have made a conjecture reasonably correct, and to have spoken what is very true.

Athen. There is then a freedom now from the presence of young men ; but we, on account of our old age, are permitted by the lawgiver to speak about the laws among ourselves, without doing any wrong.

Clin. Such is the case. Do not then be remiss at all in reproving our laws. For it is not dishonourable to know aught of what is not beautiful ; but by this means it happens that a remedy exists to a party receiving what is said with not an envious feeling, but with a good will.

[8.] *Athen.* (You speak) correctly. I shall not however speak in reprehension of the laws before diligently considering them to the utmost of my power ; or rather, (I shall speak) doubtfully. For upon you alone of all the Greeks and Barbarians, of whom we hear, the legislator has enjoined to abstain from the greatest pleasures and sports, and not to taste them ; but on the question of pains and fears, which we have lately discussed, he was of opinion, that if any one should avoid them thoroughly from his infancy, he would, when he came to endure necessary labours, and fears, and pains, avoid those, who are exercised in them, and would become their slave. The same lawgiver ought, I think, to have thought the same respecting pleasures, and to have said to himself that, if the citizens shall from childhood be inexperienced in the greatest pleasures, and be unpractised in bearing up against pleasures, so as¹ not to be compelled to do any thing base for the sake of the sweetness arising from pleasure, they would suffer the same as those, who are vanquished by fear, and become the slaves in a different and still baser manner to those, who are able to bear up against pleasures, and are the masters of what relate to pleasures, although they are sometimes the worst of men ; and they would have their soul partly a slave, and partly free, and

¹ Instead of *καί* the sense requires *ὥστε καί*—as I have translated.

be unworthy to be called wholly brave and free. Consider therefore whether aught of what has been now said appears to you to be according to reason.

Clin. It appears so ¹ to us somehow, on the speech being spoken.¹ But immediately (and) readily to be confident about questions of such moment would be the act rather of young and senseless persons.

Athen. But if, O Clinias and Lacedæmonian guest, we discuss some one point of those,² which we proposed—for after fortitude let us speak of temperance—what difference shall we find between these politics and those, which are laid down at random,³ as the things relating to war just now?³

Megil. It is nearly not easy.⁴ But it seems that the joint-feasts and gymnastic exercises have been well invented for both.⁵

Athen. It appears then, O guest, to be a difficult thing for what is incontestable⁶ on the question of politics to exist in deed as well as in word. For it seems almost that, as in the case of bodies, it is not possible to order any one regimen for any one body, because⁷ the very same thing would be seen to do

¹—¹ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, either because they were wanting in his MS., or because he thought them unnecessary; and he is followed tacitly, as usual, by Taylor.

² I have translated as if the Greek were 'ἄλλ' εἰ μετὰ ταῦτα διεξιοῦμέν τι ὦν—not 'ἄλλ' εἰ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα διεξιοῦμεν ὦν—where τὸ is at variance with the sense, and ὦν with the syntax. Ficinus, "quemadmodum," as if he found in his MS. ὥς in lieu of ὦν—

³—³ Such is the literal translation of the words ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον νῦν δὴ. Taylor has, "in the same manner as we have now spoken about war." Perhaps Plato wrote ὥσπερ εἰρηται περὶ—For νῦν δὴ are perpetually united to a past tense.

⁴ After Σχεδὸν οὐ ῥᾶδιον Ast would supply εἰπεῖν. But he says nothing about σχεδόν, which could hardly be thus united to οὐ ῥᾶδιον.

⁵ Ast refers ἀμφοτέρως to ἀνδρίαν and σωφροσύνην. But in that case Plato would, I think, have written ἀμφοτέρως ἀρετὰς: and so perhaps he did.

⁶ Instead of ἀναμφισβητήτως, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἀναμφισβήτητον. For his version is "tutum aliquid certumque." Ast, however, says that the adverb is put for the adjective, and refers to his note on μετρίως γίγνεται, in Rep. vi. p. 504, C.

⁷ The Greek is ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἂν—where Ast was the first to object to ᾧ, which he says must be referred to ἐπιτήδευμα, to the detriment of the sense. But his correction δ οὐκ ἂν—I confess, I cannot understand. I have translated, as if the text were ὁδοῦντες ἂν—for the negative particle is at variance with the train of reasoning, and is properly omitted by Taylor;

an¹ injury to some of our bodies, and a benefit to others,² (so too in a state);³ since these gymnastic exercises and joint-feasts are on many other grounds now beneficial to states, but in seditions are hurtful. This do the children of the³ Milesians and Bœotians and Thurians³ make evident. And in truth this very institution, ⁴legalized of old, appears to have perverted the natural⁴ pleasures of Venus, not only in the case of men, but of beasts.⁵ And of such things a person may accuse your cities the first, and such others, as have chiefly adopted gymnastic exercises. And whether one ought to consider things of this kind in a jocose or serious manner, still we must consider that, to the male and female sex, proceeding to a participation in production, the pleasure arising from the act seems to have been imparted according to nature; but, that the copulation of males with males, or of females with females, is contrary to nature; and that the daring attempt of those who first did so, arose from the non-mastery over pleasure. We all of us indeed bring an accusation against the Cretans, as having invented the story respecting the fable of Gany-mede. (For), since their laws are believed by them to have been from Zeus, they have put together this fable against Zeus, in order that they may enjoy this pleasure, by following forsooth the example of the god. But let us bid farewell to

although it is acknowledged by Ficinus, "*quod aliis prodesse, aliis obesse eidem corpori non videatur*," a version that plainly proves his inability to make any sense out of the Greek words before him.

¹ The MSS. read *βλάπτουν τὰ ἡμῶν*, which leads to *βλάπτουν τι ἡμῶν*, for the article could not be repeated after *τὰ μὲν*—

²⁻³ The words between the numerals, absolutely requisite to complete the sense, are found only in the version of Ficinus, "*sic et in civitate*."

³⁻⁵ On the seditions that took place at Thurii and Miletus, Boeckh and Ast refer to Diodor. Sic. xii. 11, and xiii. 104; but for those that occurred in Bœotia they do not produce any authority, observing merely that many happened there: alluding perhaps to the frequent differences between Thebes and Platæa for example, as detailed by Thucydides; for Thebes itself is stated by Plato, in Criton, § 15, to have been a well-regulated city; and consequently not exposed to seditions.

⁴⁻⁵ I have adopted Boeckh's conjectures, *πάσαι δὲ νόμιμον*, in lieu of *παλαιὸν νόμιμον*, and *τὰς κατὰ φύσιν* instead of *καὶ κατὰ τὰς*—to which last he was led by finding in Ficinus "*naturales Venereorum voluptates*."

⁵ This mention of beasts seems rather strange; for they have not naturally, as men have by law or custom, *γυμνάσια* and *συσσίτια*. Boeckh says that the word *θηρίων* is introduced hyperbolically, and refers to Legg. xii. p. 942, D. Rep. viii. p. 562, E., 563, C. But an hyperbole would be here out of place. In *θηρίων* lies hid, I suspect, *θεῶν θ' ἡρώων τε*—

the fable; but of those, who direct their attention to laws, nearly the whole consideration is with regard to pleasure and pain, in the case of states and the morals of individuals. For these two fountains are permitted to flow by nature; from which he who draws at what place and at what time and what quantity he ought, is happy; and so is a state, and an individual, and every animal: but he, (who draws) unskilfully and at an improper time, will live in a manner the contrary to that person.

[9.] *Megil.* This, O guest, is surely said beautifully. Nevertheless a want of speech does not lay hold of me as to what I ought to say against it. Still to me at least it seems correct that the Lacedæmonian lawgiver exhorted persons to fly from pleasures. But with respect to the Cnossian laws, this person here will, if he pleases, assist us. But those at Sparta relating to pleasures seem to me to be laid down most beautifully of all.¹ For that, by which men chiefly fall into the greatest pleasures and insulting conduct and all kinds of folly, the law casts out from the whole of our country; nor would you see in the fields or in the cities, over which there is to the Spartans a care, banquets or such things as attend upon them, and excite, according to their power, every kind of gratification. Nor is there one, who, meeting with a person revelling from intoxication, would not immediately inflict on him the greatest punishment; nor would he let the party go free, pleading as an excuse a Dionysiac festival, as I once saw was the case with your people when (riding) in carts;² and at Tarentum, amongst our colonists, I have seen the whole city intoxicated during the Dionysiac festival; but with us there is nothing of the kind.

Athen. O Lacedæmonian guest, all such things are to be praised, where there are certain endurances of pain; but, where there is a remission of the latter, the former are rather of a stupid kind. For some one, defending our institutions, would very quickly lay hold of you by showing the free manners of your

¹ Ficinus has "optime omnium," in Greek *κάλλιστα πάντων*, which is far superior to the unintelligible *κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων*.

² Plato alludes to the custom of persons riding in carts to and from the places where revelry was going on during the festivals devoted to Dionysus, the god of wine, and cutting their saucy and ribald jokes on the passers-by. Ast refers to Demosth. on the Crown, p. 268; the Scholia on Aristoph. Plut. 1015; Harpocration in *Πομπείας*, and other authors.

women. Now in all these cases, occurring at Tarentum, and with us, and with you, one answer appears to free them, so that they are not in a bad state, but in a correct one. For every one may answer and say to a stranger, expressing wonder on his beholding what is unusual in his own country—Wonder not, O guest. This law exists amongst us; but with you perhaps there is upon the same points a different one. At present however our discourse is not, O friends, about different men, but about the vice and virtue of the lawgivers themselves. But let us speak more fully about all kind of intoxication. For it is not a thing of a trifling nature; nor to know it thoroughly is it the province of an inferior lawgiver. I am not speaking about drinking wine or not, in general, but about intoxication itself, whether it is to be adopted, as the Scythians and Persians use it, and still more the Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, and Thracians, all of whom are warlike nations; or, as you use it; for you, as you say, abstain from it entirely. But the Scythians and Thracians use it entirely unmixed with water, both women and men, and pour it on their garments, and imagine they are engaged in a beautiful and blessed occupation. But the Persians make much use of other luxuries, which you reject, yet, O thou best of men, in a more orderly manner than these.

Megil. All these, however, we pursue¹ when we take arms into our hands.

Athen. Do not, thou best of men, say this. For many flights and pursuings have been, and will be, without a proof; on which account, we cannot at any time give a clear definition, but (rather) a doubtful one, about occupations honourable or not, when we speak of victory and defeat in battle; especially since the greater states, when fighting, overcome and enslave the lesser; as the Syracusans did the Locrians,² who were thought to be regulated by the best laws of all those around that district; and as the Athenians did the Cceans;³ and we could find numberless other instances of a similar kind. But let us endeavour by speaking to persuade ourselves

¹ Ficinus has "fundimus atque fugamus," as if his MS. read διώκομεν δὲ φύγῃ instead of διώκομεν δὲ γε—

^{2, 3} Respecting the well-regulated city of the Locrians, whose lawgiver was said to be Zaleucus, Boeckh refers to Bentley on Phalaris; and respecting the Cceans, to Heraclides Polit. § 9.

of each pursuit taken by itself; and let us for the present put out of the account victories and defeats, and let us state how a pursuit of this kind is honourable, but of that kind not honourable. But first hear from me, how we ought to consider what is useful or not as regards those very things.

Megil. How then say you?

[10.] *Athen.* All those, who in talking lay hold upon any pursuit and propose to praise or blame it immediately it is enunciated, appear to me to act by no means according to reason; but to do just the same, as if, while one person is praising wheat¹ as good, another should immediately blame it, without having heard either its operation or utility, (and) in what manner, and for what, and with what² and how it has itself, and to persons how having themselves, it is useful.³ The very same thing do we seem to do now in the case of our discourses. For after merely hearing about drunkenness, some of us immediately blame,³ and others praise³ it, and very absurdly too; for making use of witnesses and those who praise, we each of us praise,⁴ and some of us think we say something decisive, because we adduce many (witnesses); but others, because we see that those, who do not make use of it (wine), are victorious when fighting. But this too has been considered doubtful by us. If then we go through in this manner each of the other laws, it will not be to me at least according to sound sense. But⁵ I am desirous of speaking in the manner, which it seems we ought, by endeavouring, if I can, about this very matter⁵ [drunkenness],⁶ to point out the right road for us in all such cases; since ten thousands upon ten thou-

¹ Instead of τυροὺς Cornarius suggested τυροὺς, "cheeses." For this illustration of Plato was obtained from Hippocrates, who says, μὴ ἀπλῶς οὕτω δοκίειν ὅτι πονηρὸν βρῶμα τυρός—ἀλλὰ τίνα τε πόνον, καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τίνι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεόντων ἀνεπιτήδειον.

² The Greek is καὶ ὅπως ἔχοντα καὶ ὅπως προσφέρειν ἔχουσι—which Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, as usual, to the letter, thus translates, "quomodo præparantes et quomodo affectis corporibus offerri debeat."

³—³ Megillus, the Lacedæmonian, had blamed, but the Athenian had praised, the use of wine.

⁴ Instead of ἐπαινοῦμεν Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. αὐτὸ ποιοῦμεν: for his version is "id facimus." Boeckh would however omit ἐπαινοῦμεν.

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal translation of the Greek text. Taylor has merely, "But adducing intoxication as an instance."

⁶ The words τῆς μέθης are evidently an interpretation of αὐτοῦ τούτου.

sands of nations are in doubt upon these points, and would contend in a discourse with your two states.

Megil. If indeed we possess any correct method of inquiry touching these matters, we must not shrink from hearing it.

Athen. Let us then consider somehow in this way. Come now, should one person praise the rearing of goats, and the animal itself, as a beautiful possession, but some other person blame it, from having seen goats feeding apart from the goat-herd, in cultivated grounds,¹ and doing mischief,¹ and from seeing that every kind of cattle is either without a ruler, or under bad rulers,² should thus find fault,³ should we hold that the blame of such a person has blamed any thing whatever soundly?

Megil. How should we?

Athen. But is a commander in ships,³ who possesses merely nautical skill, useful, should he be troubled with sickness or not? or how shall we say?

Megil. ⁴By no means (useful); should he have in addition to his skill the suffering you mention.⁴

Athen. And what is the commander of armies? Is he competent to command, if he possesses the science of war, although he may be timid in danger, and be sick with ⁵the drunkenness of fear.⁵

Megil. How can he?

Athen. But what if he does not possess the art, and is timid?

Megil. You are speaking of a person, who is in every respect vile, and by no means ⁶a ruler of men, but of some very women.⁶

¹—¹ The words within the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in the version of Ficinus—"damnumque facere—"

²—² Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, omits the words between the numerals. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἰδὼν δρῶν τὰυτὸ*, not *ἰδὼν οὕτω*, i. e. "seeing every animal doing the same thing."

³ As the same commander cannot be in two ships at the same time, one would prefer *ἐν πλοῖς*, "in sailings," unless it be said that *πλοίοις* means here "a fleet of many ships" under one commander.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Taylor's translation is, "This passion, which you speak of, is not in any respect connected with the nautical art."

⁵—⁵ Although Ast endeavours with some learning to defend this violent expression, yet one would wish that MSS. had given *ὑπὸ μέθης, ὡς τοῦ φόβου ναυτίας*, i. e. "be sick with fear, as with drunkenness."

⁶—⁶ As the whole train of argument has a reference to a commander merely, and not to the persons, over whom he has the command, there is probably some error here, which it would not be difficult to correct.

Athen. But what (say you) of him, who praises or blames a community, over which is naturally a ruler, and which with him (the ruler) is useful? ¹ But he, who has never seen it in communion with a ruler over itself, but always without a ruler, or in communion with bad rulers, ² can we imagine that such inspectors of such communities ² will blame or praise any thing usefully?

Megil. ³ How can those, who have never seen or been connected with any one of such-like communities rightly constituted? ³

Athen. Attend then. Out of many communities, shall we not lay down, that fellow-drinkers and fellow-drinkings are a certain single association?

Megil. Yes, very much so.

Athen. Has any one then ever seen this existing in a proper manner? Now it is easy for you to answer, that no one has ever (seen it) at any time; for it is neither according to your country nor laws. But I have met with many, and in many places; and moreover I have diligently inquired, as I may say, about all; and I have seen or heard of scarcely one whole (community) existing correctly. And though (there are) a few and small portions, ⁴ yet the whole together, so to say, are for the most part in error.⁴

Clin. How say you, guest, this? Speak still more clearly. For we, as you say, through our inexperience in such matters, would perhaps, even when meeting with them, not immediately know what in them is right or not.

Athen. You say what is reasonable; but, while I am speaking, do you endeavour to learn. Do you then acknowledge, that, in all associations and communions of any doings whatever, it is proper every where for each to have a commander?

Clin. How not?

¹ Before $\delta \delta \epsilon \mu \acute{\eta} \theta' \epsilon \omega \rho \alpha \kappa \omega \varsigma$ there seems to be something wanting.

²⁻² The words between the numerals Taylor has omitted after Ficinus; who saw that $\tau \omicron \upsilon \delta \epsilon \varsigma \tau \omicron \iota \omicron \upsilon \theta \epsilon \tau \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \theta \epsilon \omega \rho \omicron \delta \epsilon$ could not be said of persons, who had not seen at all. Hence we must insert $\omicron \upsilon$ before $\theta \epsilon \omega \rho \omicron \delta \epsilon$, i. e. "non-inspectors." Compare $\tau \alpha \varsigma \omicron \upsilon \pi \omicron \lambda \iota \tau \epsilon \iota \alpha \varsigma$ in viii. § 3, p. 832, B.

³⁻³ Here again Taylor follows to the letter the abbreviated version of Ficinus. "Quo pacto id faciet, qui nunquam societatem recte gubernatam perspexerit?"

⁴⁻⁴ Or we may render the Greek, $\tau \alpha \pi \omicron \lambda \lambda \alpha \delta \epsilon \xi \acute{\iota} \mu \pi \alpha \nu \theta' \omega \varsigma \epsilon \iota \pi \epsilon \iota \nu$, $\delta \eta \rho \eta \tau \eta \mu \acute{\epsilon} \nu \alpha$, "the majority are entirely, so to say, in error."

Athen. But we have just now said, that the commander of persons fighting ought to be brave.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now the brave man is less disturbed by fears than cowards are.

Clin. And this too is so.

Athen. If there were any plan of placing a general over an army, who was not at all timid, nor confused, should we not have done so by all means?

Clin. Most certainly.

Athen. But we are now speaking not of a person about to command an army amongst associations of men, the foes of foes during a war, but of friends, sharing during a peace in the kind feelings of friends.

Clin. Right.

Athen. But an association of this kind, if it is attended with drunkenness, will not be without confusion. Is it not so?

Clin. How should it be (without)? ¹Nay, I imagine quite the contrary.¹

Athen. In the first place then they have a need of a ruler.

Clin. How not, as for any thing else?

Athen. Must one then furnish a ruler, if possible, not confused?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And he ought, it seems, to be thoughtful with respect to associations. For he is the guardian of existing friendship, and has the care of it still becoming greater, through the previous association.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. It is proper, therefore, to place over the drunken a sober and wise ruler, and not the contrary. For, if the ruler of the drunken is himself drunk, young, and not wise, he must have great good luck indeed, if he does not perpetrate some mighty mischief.

Clin. Very great indeed.

Athen. Should then any one blame such associations, when existing as correctly as possible in states, while he is finding fault with the thing itself, he will perhaps properly blame it. But if a person blames a pursuit through seeing it erring as

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him, by Taylor.

much as it can,¹ it is evident, in the first place, that he is ignorant that this existed not correctly; and, in the next place, that every thing will in this manner appear improper, when it is done apart from a sober master and ruler. Or, do you not understand, that when a pilot, and each ruler of each thing, is drunk, he will overturn every thing, whether ships, or chariots, or an army, or whatever else is ruled by him?

[11.] *Clin.* You have said, O guest, this at least what is altogether true. But tell me moreover² what good would it do us, should this regulation respecting drinking be correct?² just as what we lately stated, that should an army meet with a correct leading, there would be victory in war, a no small good to those who followed; and so as regards the rest. But what great advantage will accrue either to individuals or states from a drinking association being placed properly under an instructor?

Athen. What great advantage can we say would arise to a state from one boy, or one chorus,³ being properly instructed? Or shall we not say, when asked this question, that the state derives very little advantage from the education of one person? But if you inquire universally about the education of youth, how does it profit greatly the state, it is not difficult to say, that persons well educated will become good men; and becoming such will act in other respects in an honourable manner; and still further, that they will conquer their enemies in battle. Discipline therefore brings with it even victory; but victory sometimes produces a want of instruction. For many become more insolent through victory in war, and through their insolence are replete with a thousand other ills. Now discipline indeed has never at any time been Cadmeian;⁴ but there have been, and will be, many victories of this kind among men.

¹ Ficinus alone adds here, "propterea que omnem computationem vituperet," which certainly seem required to complete the chain of reasoning.

²⁻³ Here again Taylor has translated not the Greek, but the Latin of Ficinus—"quid nobis computationes istæ, si recte aguntur, conferent."

³ In the word "chorus" is an allusion to the chorus in musical and dramatical performances, on whose education both money and time was expended to a great amount at Athens.

⁴ Here is an allusion to the proverb of a "Cadmean victory," which was said of those, who, like the Theban brothers, Eteocles and

Clin. You seem to say, friend, that the passing the time in common over wine, if it be done properly, tends in a great part to instruction.

Athen. How not?

Clin. Shall you after this be able to state that, what has been just now asserted, is true?

Athen. To assert positively for truth, O guest, that such is the case, while many persons are in doubt, is the province of a god; but, if it be requisite to state what seems to me, there will be no grudging; since we have rushed onwards to make for ourselves a discourse about laws and a polity.

Clin. Let us then endeavour to learn what is your opinion upon these doubtful points.

Athen. It is proper to do so; and that you for the purpose of learning, and myself for that of teaching, should endeavour by some means to lengthen out our discourse. But first of all, hear from me some such thing as this.

All the Greeks consider this city of ours as fond of talking and of many words; but that Lacedæmon and Crete practise, the former a brevity in speech,¹ but the latter, an abundance in thought rather than in words. But I am considering lest I shall give you an idea of my speaking much about a trifling matter,² while cleansing a very long speech² about drunkenness. ³But the rectification of it according to nature would not be able, without musical rectitude, to take off in discourses either clear or sufficient; and on the other hand, music would not be able without the whole of education.³ Now

Polynices, the sons of Œdipus, gained a victory over each other, as destructive as a defeat.

¹ To the Spartan brevity of speech the earliest allusion is in Æsch. Suppl. 265. Other passages from more recent authors are quoted by Ast.

² Such is the literal translation of the Greek—*παμμήκη λόγον ἀνακαθαίρομενος*. But even if a speech could be said "to be cleansed," yet here *περί μικροῦ πράγματος παμμήκη λόγον* could scarcely be repeated after *περί μικροῦ πολλὰ λέγειν* in the sentence preceding. There is evidently an error here, which it would perhaps be not difficult to correct.

³ Such is the literal translation of the Greek text; where, since there is no syntax, neither Wytttenbach, quoted by Ast, nor Ast himself, have been able to elicit a satisfactory sense. The version of Ficinus, "Computationis autem ipsius recta secundum naturam constitutio nunquam poterit sine recta musicæ regula aperte et sufficienter oratione tractari." Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato alluded to the well-known

all this is the work of very many words. Consider then, what we are to do, if we leave these things for the present, and pass on to some other discourse about laws.

Megil. Perhaps you do not know, Athenian guest, that our (family) hearth is the public guest¹ of your city. Perhaps then into all the boys² of each of us the public guests,³ when they hear that they are the public guests of some city, a certain kind feeling enters immediately from their youth towards that city, as being a second country after their own. And this very same thing has now taken place with myself. For immediately on hearing the boys, when the Lacedæmonians were blaming or praising the Athenians for something—How your city, Megillus, say they, has done to us not well or well—on hearing this, and contending⁴ against these assertions, in your behalf, I have ever had every kind feeling towards those, who are bringing the city into blame.⁴ And now, indeed, both

story of some drunken persons becoming sober, on hearing a solemn strain of music. See Iamblich. Vit. Pythag. p. 214, ed. Kiesling; Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. advers. Music vi. p. 357; and Bergk on Anacreont. Fragm. p. 188. But to arrive at the very words of the philosopher would require more alterations than can be stated here.

¹ On the word *πρόξενος* and the duties of the public host or guest, see Valckenaer on Ammonius, p. 201, and Herodotus vi. 57, and the commentators on Soph. El. 1443.

² As *νίος*, "young," was applied to a person older than *παῖς*, "a boy," the expression *παισιν*—*ἐκ νέων* could not have been used by Plato; who probably wrote *ἐξ οὐνύχων*, rendered correctly by Ficinus, "a teneris usque annis." On the phrase *ἐξ οὐνύχων*, or *ἐξ ἀπαλῶν οὐνύχων*, see Bailey on Hermesianact. 62, where Blomfield happily elicited *ἐξ οὐνύχων* from *ἐκ συνόχων*.

³ The words within the numerals, *ἕκαστον ἡμῶν τῶν προξένων*, found between *ἐνδύεται* and *τῇ πόλει*, are omitted by Ficinus, because he could not, nor can I, understand them. But by merely altering *ἕκαστον* into *ἑκάστων*, and placing the words after *παισιν*, all will be perfectly intelligible; and it will be seen, what was not before, that not all boys were meant, but only those, whose families were public guests. Ast indeed asserts that both *παισιν* and *ἕκαστον* are governed by *ἐνδύεται*, and refers to Lobeck on Aj. 716, ed. 1, for similar instances of two different cases thus following the same verb. But all the passages quoted there are evidently corrupt, and may be easily emended.

⁴ Here again Ficinus shows by his translation that he could make nothing out of the unintelligible Greek text. His version is, "pugnabam adversus eos, qui vos vituperabant, magna erga vos affectus benevolentia." All however will be well by reading *προσάντης* (vulg. *πρὸς αὐτὰ*) *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ᾗ* (vulg. *ἀεὶ*) *πρὸς τοὺς τὴν πόλιν εἰς ψόγον ἀγοντας, ᾗ πᾶσαν εὐνοίαν ἔσχον*: i. e. "I went head-foremost in your behalf against those, who were bringing into blame the city, for which I had every kind feeling.

your voice is grateful¹ to me; and that too which is said by many, that such of the Athenians, as are good, are so pre-eminently, appears to be most truly asserted. For they alone, without necessity, by their very nature, and from a divine allotment, are truly and not feignedly good. Therefore on my account at least you may, my friend, boldly say whatever is agreeable to you.

Clin. And in truth after hearing and receiving, O guest, a word from myself, do you with confidence speak what you please. For you have perhaps heard, that Epimenides was held here a divine man, who was of our family, and ten years prior to the Persian war came to your city, according to the oracle of the god,² and performed certain sacrifices, which the god had enjoined; and he told, moreover, the Athenians, who were terrified at the expedition of the Persians, that they would not come for ten years; and that, when they did come, they would depart without having done a single thing they expected, and suffer greater evils than they inflicted. At that time our ancestors were hospitably received by yours; and hence both myself and my parents have a kind feeling towards you.

Athen. You therefore, as it seems, are prepared to hear; and I too am prepared as regards my will, but not very easy as regards my power. I must however make the attempt. In the first place then, as (preparatory) to our discourse, let us define what education is, and what power it possesses. For we say that through this must proceed the discourse taken for the present in hand by us, until it arrives at the deity.³

Clin. Let us altogether do this, since it is agreeable to you.

Athen. While then I am saying what it is proper to assert that education is, do you consider whether what is asserted is agreeable to you.

Clin. Say on.

[12.] *Athen.* I say then and assert⁴ that he, who is about to be a good man in any thing whatever, ought immediately

¹ With *φωνῇ προσφιλεῖς* may be compared *φιλατον φώνημα* in Soph. Phil. 234.

² To point out the god alluded to, Plato probably wrote τοῦ Πυθίου, not τοῦ θεοῦ.

³ Ficinus has "ad deum ipsum," as if he had found in his MS. πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν θεόν.

⁴ As *καὶ φήμι* could hardly thus follow *λέγω δὲ*, there is probably some error here. Ficinus has merely "Assero equidem."

from childhood to practise, when engaged in playful and serious pursuits, the very thing suited to each particular of the object in view. Thus he, who is about to be a good farmer or house-builder, ought, the latter ¹to play at building children's houses; the former, on the other hand, at tilling the ground; ¹ and he, who brings up each of them should provide for each small instruments, the imitations of the true ones; and moreover, they should learn previously what is necessary to learn previously. For instance, a workman, to measure or use a rule; and he, who (is to be) a warrior, should in sport ride on horse-back, or do ² something else of a similar kind; and ³ (the master of the children should) ³ endeavour by sports to turn the pleasures and desires of the children thither, where, when they arrive, it is proper for them to have an end. We say then, that the very head of instruction is a right bringing up, which will lead as much as possible the soul of him, who sports, to the love of that which it will be requisite for him, when he has become a complete man, to ⁴ lay down as a part ⁴ of the virtue of the thing. See then whether, up to this point, what has been asserted does, as I said, please you.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let not then that, which we assert instruction is, be undefined. For now, when we blame or praise the bringing up of each person, we say that one has been educated, but another uneducated; although the men have sometimes been very well educated for ⁵ retail trades, and those of ship-owners, ⁵ and for ⁶ the profits from some other things of this kind. ⁶

¹—¹ Taylor has followed to the letter the version of Ficinus, "oportet a prima ætate vel colere terram vel pueriles quasdam domos ædificare."

² Instead of *ποιούντα*, Boeckh correctly suggested *ποιεῖν*, similar to "facere" in Ficinus.

³—³ Taylor has properly inserted these words; from which I have been led to suggest, that Plato wrote perhaps *καὶ περᾶσθαι δεῖν διὰ τῶν παιδιῶν τὸν παιδαγωγὸν*—For *δεῖν* might easily have been lost through *διὰ*, and *τὸν παιδαγωγὸν* through *τῶν παιδιῶν*.

⁴—⁴ Instead of *εἶναι τῆς*—I have translated as if the words were *θεῖναι τι τῆς*—Ficinus has "quod in virili ætate perfecte comparata virtute operis est acturus." Ast's interpretation of the passage, I confess, I cannot understand.

⁵—⁵ The *κάπηλος*, "a retail-trader," is opposed to *ναύκληρος*, "a foreign-merchant," who was a ship-owner, in the Statesman, p. 290, A. § 29.

⁶—⁶ The Greek is *ἄλλων τοιούτων μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων*. But in the first place, there is nothing to govern the genitives

For of those, who, it seems, consider such things to be education, there would be now no account; but that (we say) is the education from childhood towards virtue, which causes a person to feel a desire of, and a love for, becoming a perfect citizen, and to know how to govern and to be governed with justice. Such a bringing up this discourse would, as it seems to me, define, and be willing to call it the only education; but that, which tends to the acquisition of wealth, or to any bodily strength, or any other cleverness, apart from intellect and justice, is a handicraft trade and illiberal, and not worthy to be called education at all. Let us not then contend with them¹ about a name; but let the assertion, which has been assented to just now, remain, that those, who are properly educated, become nearly (all of them)² good. And it is by no means meet to hold education in dishonour; since when it is present to the best men, it is the first of things the most beautiful. And if at any time a person goes astray, and it is possible for him to set himself right, this must ever be done by every one according to his ability, through (the whole of)³ life.

Clin. Right; and we agree with what you are saying.

Athen. And we formerly agreed, that those are good, who are able to govern themselves, but those bad, who are not.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then resume in a still clearer way the very point we were speaking of; and do you receive me through

ἄλλων τοιούτων; and in the next, μάλα and σφόδρα could not be both united to πεπαιδευμένων. To meet the first objection, Ast would read πράγματα for μάλα, and πεπαιδευμένον, found in one MS., and ἀνθρωπον from conjecture, similar to "quamvis artem cæteraque hujusmodi calleat" in Ficinus. But though Stalbaum says he has thus overcome all the difficulties of the text, yet πράγματα ἄλλων τοιούτων seems very doubtful Greek. In μάλα, I suspect, lies hid λήμματα, "profits," as I have translated. On the word λήμματα see my note on Æsch. Suppl. 357.

¹ Instead of αὐτοῖς, Ast reads αὐτοῖς, with two MSS., in the sense of ἀλλήλους, "each other."

² Ficinus has, what the sense evidently requires, "omnes ferme probi evadunt;" for σχεδόν could not stand here by itself. He adds likewise, "qui contra, improbi." But whether from his MS. or not is a matter of uncertainty.

³ From "per totam vitam," Bernard, in Act. Literar. Societ. Traject. i. p. 107, suggested διὰ παντός βίου, subsequently found in the two best MSS.

some resemblance, if perchance I am able to render clear to you a thing of this kind.

Clin. Only speak.

[13.] *Athen.* Do we not consider each of us ourselves¹ as one?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. But that each has in himself two counsellors, opposite and thoughtless, which we denominate pleasure and pain?

Clin. Such is the case.

Athen. And in addition to both these, there is the opinion about things to be, to which is given the common name of expectation; but individually the expectation, prior to pain, is fear; but that, which is prior to its contrary, is confidence. But in the case of all these there is a reasoning process, as to which of them is better or worse; which, when it becomes the common determination of the city, is denominated law.

Clin. I scarcely follow you. However, say on, what comes after, as if I were following you.

Megil. And the very same state of suffering is to myself likewise.

Athen. Let us then think upon these matters in this manner. Let us consider that each of us is a kind of animal, the wonder of the gods,² and put together, either as their plaything, or through some serious act; for on this point we are ignorant; but this we do know, that these passions are inherent in our nature, and that they pull us, like nerves or ropes, and being themselves contrary, draw us to contrary actions, where virtue and vice are situated apart from each other. For reason says, that each ought always to follow one of the pullings, and, never abandoning it, draw in a contrary direction by the other

¹ In lieu of *αὐτῶν*, Ast has adopted *αὐτὸν* from one MS. and Eusebius, and says that *αὐτὸς ἕκαστος* means "pro se quisque." The reading is received by Stalbaum, who wonders that Bekker should have left *αὐτῶν*. But though *αὐτῶν* is unintelligible, *αὐτὸν* is scarcely correct Greek. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀν ὅντα τιθεῖμεν*—For the negative *οὐκ οὖν* could not be united to the subjunctive *τιθεῖμεν*, and the inductive *οὐκοῦν* would be here without meaning.

² In lieu of *τῶν ζώων θεῶν*, from which no sense can be elicited, I have adopted *τῶν θεῶν ζώων*, the conjecture of Muretus. Boeckh would read *τῶν ζώων θείων*, by which he understands "the living gods," referring to Plato in *Timæus*, p. 39, E., from which passage Taylor was led to explain "the divine animals," by the mundane or junior gods.

nerves; and that this is the ¹golden and sacred leading¹ of the reasoning power, which is called the common law of the state; but that the other (pullings) are hard, and iron-like; but that this is soft, as being golden, ²(and moreover it is uniform,) ³but that the rest are like every variety of forms. It is necessary for us then to assist always the most beautiful leading, belonging to the law. For inasmuch as the power of reasoning is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, its leading has need of assistants, in order that the golden race in us may vanquish the rest of the races. And thus the story of virtue ³relating to our being a wonder, ³will be preserved; and the expression, to be superior or inferior to oneself, will in a certain manner become more clear, as to what it means; and that both a state and a private individual ought, the latter, after receiving in himself the true reason respecting those pullings, to live conformable to it; but that a state, after receiving reason from some of the gods, ⁴or from the very person who knew these particulars, ⁴ought to lay down reason as a law,

¹—¹ In the words *ἀγωγὴν χρυσήν*, Ast says there is an allusion to the golden chain, mentioned by Homer, *Il. O. 17*, and to which Plato has referred distinctly in *Theætet.* p. 153, C. § 27.

²—² The words within the numerals, evidently requisite for the antithesis, were found only in the version of Ficinus, “et uniformem præterea,” until a MS. subsequently collated furnished the Greek *καὶ μονοειδῆ*.

³—³ The Greek is *μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωσμένος ἂν εἴη*. Ficinus has “fabula—virtute servabitur:” and while Taylor translates, “the fable—will be preservative of virtue,” Ast says that *ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς* means “fable about virtue,” with an ellipse of the preposition *περί*. But though *ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωσμένος ἂν εἴη* may be compared with *μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος καὶ ὁ σὸς ἄμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως*, in *Theætet.* p. 164, D., yet as nothing had been said just above, where the story is alluded to about virtue individually, I am at a loss to understand the introduction here of *ἀρετῆς*. Unless I am greatly mistaken, in *ἀρετῆς* lies hid the name of the author of the story. Hence one might read *ὁ μῦθος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης*—similar to *μῦθος ὁ Πρωταγόρειος*: while by *Ἀβδηρίτης* is meant either Protagoras or Democritus; for both those philosophers were said to be natives of Abdera. The very same word has been lost in *Theætet.* p. 165, § 59, where, instead of *τὴν πολυάριθμον σοφίαν*, to which Heindorf justly objects, it is easy to read *τὴν τοῦ Ἀβδηρίτου σοφίαν*.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is *παρὰ τούτου τοῦ γνόντος ταῦτα*. But as *τούτου* is perfectly unintelligible, Ast has adopted *παρ’ αὐτοῦ τούτου γνόντος* from Eusebius, similar to “ab hoc ipso, qui hæc cognovit” in Ficinus. One would prefer *παρ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ γνόντος τὰ τοιαῦτα*, i. e. “from the very person who knew what things of this kind:” for *ταῦτα* has nothing to which it can be referred.

¹and to have an intercourse with itself and the rest of states.¹ Thus vice and virtue would be more clearly disjointed; and this taking place rather conspicuously, both education and the rest of pursuits would be perhaps more apparent, and especially that relating to the passing the time in drinking,² about which it might appear despicable to discourse any further.²

Clin. But perhaps it would appear to be not unworthy of a long discourse.

Athen. You speak well; and let us go through whatever is worthy of the present (mental) exercise.

Clin. Say on.

[14.] *Athen.* If to this wonder³ we bring drunkenness, what thing shall we make of him?

Clin. Looking to what do you ask this?

Athen. 'To nothing particular.'⁴ But if this (the wonder-thing) should be combined with that, (drunkenness,) what would happen to be the result? But I will endeavour to explain more clearly what I mean. For I am asking some such thing as this. Does the drinking of wine cause pleasure, and pain, and anger, and love, to be more violently on the stretch?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Does it on the other hand cause the senses, and memory, and opinion, and prudence, to be in like manner more vehement?⁵ or do these entirely leave him, who may have become saturated with drunkenness.

¹—¹ Ficinus has what is far more intelligible than the Greek, "ad ejusque normam officia sua secum et cum aliis civitatibus instituere."

²—² So Taylor translates literally the Latin of Ficinus—"de qua longiorem habere sermonem vile fortassis putabitur." The Greek is *ἡ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαῦλον περί μῆκος πολὺ λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον*: which Stephens would correct by reading *ἡ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαῦλον καὶ φαῦλον περί*, but Ast by merely altering *ἡ* into *οὐ*—I should prefer *εἰ δοξασθείη μὴ ἂν εἶναι φαῦλον περί του λίαν μῆκος λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον*, i. e. "unless it be thought that there would be a superfluous length of words spoken upon a very trifling subject." For thus *πολὺ*, which is useless after *μῆκος*, might have been easily the corruption of *τευλιαν*. Schramm would alter *ἡ* into *οὐ* governed by *περί*—

³ By *θαῦμα* is meant "man," as shown in § 13, *θαῦμα ἕκαστον ἡμῶν*.

⁴—⁴ So Taylor. The Greek is *Οὐδὲν πω πρὸς ὃ τι*: where Stephens would read *Οὐδέπω* from Ficinus, "Nondum dico ad quid," adopted by Ast, but rejected by Stalb. But to the question, *πρὸς τί*, the answer is perpetually *πρὸς ὃ, τι*; by itself. Hence in *οὐδὲν πω* there is probably some error, which it would be not difficult to correct.

⁵—⁵ Here again Taylor has looked merely to the version of Ficinus,

Clin. They leave him entirely.⁵

Athen. Does he not return then to the same point, (as regards)¹ the habit of the soul, which he had when he was a boy?

Clin. How not?

Athen. At that time then he would have the least control over himself.

Clin. The least.

Athen. Is not then such a one, we say,² the most wretched?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Not the old man then, as it appears, is alone twice a child,³ but the man likewise who is drunk.

Clin. You speak, guest, in the best manner.

Athen. Is there any reason, which should endeavour to persuade us, that we ought to have a taste of this pursuit, and not avoid it, as far as possible, with all our might.

Clin. It appears there is; at least you just now said you was prepared to show it.

Athen. You have correctly reminded me; and I am now prepared, since you have both said that you are willing to hear me with alacrity.

Clin. How should we not hear you, if on no other account, yet for the sake of the wonderful and the absurd, if it is meet for a man at any time to voluntarily throw himself into every kind of depravity?

Athen. Are you speaking of the soul?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. But what (say we) of the deformity, the leanness, and ugliness, and imbecility of the body? should we wonder, my friend, if at any time some one should voluntarily arrive at a thing of that kind?

“an prorsus extinguat, si quis ebrietate fuerit occupatus.” *Clin.* Omnino certe extinguit. For his translation is—“or does it entirely extinguish these, when any one has drunk of it to intoxication.” *Clin.* It entirely extinguishes these.

¹ The margin of MS. Voss. supplies *κατὰ*, which is wanting to support the syntax of *τὴν*—But Ast seems to wish to read *καὶ* before *τὴν*—

² Instead of *φάμεν* one MS. has *μὲν*. I should prefer *ὥς ἔφαμεν*. See § 3, where it is said that the person, who is inferior to himself, is in a wretched state

³ On this saying, which seems to have been first used by Sophocles, Ast refers to a host of authors and commentators.

Clin. How not?

Athen. What then, do we think that those, who go to medical shops for the sake of drinking drugs, are ignorant that, for a short time afterwards, and for many days they will have the body in such a state, that, if they were about to endure to the end, they would not accept of life? or, do we not know that those, who go to places of exercise and labour, do for the time being become weak?

Clin. All this we know.

Athen. And that they willingly go for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

Clin. (You speak) most beautifully.¹

Athen. Is it not, then, requisite to think of the rest of pursuits in the same manner?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. In the same manner, then, we ought to think about the occupation of (drinking) wine, if it is lawful to think correctly upon this amongst those.

Clin. How not?

Athen. If it should appear to us to possess any utility, not inferior to the occupation relating to the body, it is superior at the very outset to bodily exercise, in that, the latter is (attended) with pain, but the former, not.

Clin. You speak correctly. But I should wonder, if we are able to perceive any such thing in it.

Athen. This, then, as it seems, I must now endeavour to explain to you. And tell me—Are we able to perceive two kinds of fear, nearly opposite?

Clin. Of what kinds?

Athen. Such as these. We surely are in fear when we expect that ills will arise.

Clin. Yes.

Athen. And we are often in fear of opinion, thinking we shall be considered bad characters, by doing or saying something not good; which fear, I think, both we and all others call shame.

Clin. How not?

Athen. These then are the two fears I spoke of; one of which is contrary to pain, and the rest of other fears; and

¹ In lieu of *κάλλιστα* Stephens mentions the reading, *μάλιστα*, found at present only in MS. Voss. The words are constantly confounded.

contrary likewise to the most in number and the greatest in kind of pleasures.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Does not then a legislator, and every one, from whom there is derived even a little, reverence this fear with the greatest honour? and calling it shame, does he not denominate the contrary to this, boldness and shamelessness? and has he not held it to be the greatest evil to all, both in a public and private view?

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. This fear then preserves us in many other and great matters; and not a single thing, taken by itself, works out so greatly both victory and safety in war. For there are two things which work out victory, confidence on the part of foes,¹ and the fear of shame on the ground of cowardice² amongst friends.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. It is necessary therefore for each of us to be fearless and fearful. But on what account, either the one or the other, we have defined.

Clin. Completely so.

Athen. When we wish to render any one fearless, in combination with law, we make him such by leading him to the fear of many terrible³ things.

Clin. So we appear to do.

Athen. But what, when we endeavour to render any one fearful in combination with justice, must we not cause him to overcome those, who are arrayed with, and previously exercised in, shamelessness, by his having contended with his own lusts; and⁴ by contending with and overcoming his usual mode of

¹ Such is the literal translation of *θάρρος πολεμίων*. But the sense requires, what Ficinus has, "adversus hostes audacia." This would be in Greek *θάρρος εἰς πολεμίους*, or *θάρρος κατὰ πολεμίων*.

² Ast with Ficinus unites *αἰσχύνης* with *κακῆς*. But as *αἰσχύνη* is always taken in a bad sense, I have translated *κάκης* "cowardice—"

³ The Greek is *φόβων—εἰς φόβων*, which Taylor and Heindorf were equally unable to understand. Hence the one translated "terrible" and the other suggested *φοβερῶν*: while Ast once wished to read *θόρυβον* in lieu of *φόβων*: but he was subsequently satisfied with the verbiage in the text, and so too is Stalbaum.

⁴ Instead of ἢ "or," the sense requires *καὶ* "and."—On the change of those two words see Bast in *Palæograph*, p. 815.

living, he must needs become perfect in fortitude ; but whosoever is unexperienced and unexercised in contests of this kind, he will not become even the half of himself as regards virtue.¹ But how will any one be perfectly temperate, who has not fought with, and overcome by reason, and labour, and art, in sport and in earnest, many pleasures and lusts,¹ that urge him to act with shamelessness and injustice, but who is impassive with respect to all such things.

Clin. It is by no means probable that he can.

[15.] *Athen.* What then, is there a god, who has given any medicine for fear to man, so that by how much the more desirous is any one of drinking it, by so much the more from every draught he thinks himself unhappy, dreads every thing present and to come, and at last, although the bravest of men, proceeds to every kind of fear ; and yet, after having slept, and being released from the effect of the potion, will always become the same man again.

Clin. And what potion of this kind, shall we say, O guest, exists amongst men ?

Athen. None. Yet if such a potion had been from any quarter, it would,² be assured of that,² have been useful ;³ and we should have been able to converse with him much in such a manner as this respecting it.³ Come, (say,) thou legislator, whether you have laid down laws for the Cretans, or any other people whatever, are you in the first place willing to be able to receive a touchstone of the citizens, as regards fortitude and timidity ?

Clin. It is plain that every one would say (he was).

Athen. What, with security, and without great danger, or the contrary ?

Clin. And this too every one will acknowledge, with security.

¹—¹ Aulus Gellius in Noct. Attic. xv. 2. "Plato dicit—nullum unquam continentem prorsum ac temperantem satis fideliter visum esse, cujus vita virtusque non inter ipsa errorum pericula, et in mediis voluptatum illecebris explorata sit."

²—² Instead of *ἔσθ' ὅτι*, I have translated as if the text were *ἴσθ' ὅτι*. Respecting this parenthetic clause, see my Poppe's Prolegomena, p. 128.

³—³ Such will doubtless seem to be a sufficiently intelligible translation of the Greek words, *οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ μάλα εἶχομεν ἂν αὐτῷ διαλίγεσθαι*: in which there are some errors that I can, and some that I cannot, correct satisfactorily to myself.

Athen. Would you make use (of this drinking)¹ by leading them to fears and trying them during their sufferings, so as to compel (one person)² to become fearless, by exhorting, and advising, and honouring him; but disgracing another, who would not be persuaded by you to become in all things such as you enjoin him; and would you dismiss him unscathed, who had exercised himself in a proper and manly manner, but impose a punishment upon him, who (had exercised himself) badly? or would you not use the potion at all, having no other fault to find with it?

Clin. Why should (one) not use it, O guest?

Athen. There would be, friend, an exercise contrary to those at present, and wonderful for its facility, as regards one individual and a few and as many as a person would wish. And whether any one, being alone in solitude, should place the idea of disgrace before his eyes, and thinking that he ought not to be seen,³ before he is in a good condition,³ should thus exercise himself against fear, and prepare merely a potion in preference to ten thousand other acts, he would do something proper; or whether some one trusting to himself to be properly prepared by nature and careful practice, should not hesitate in the company of many fellow-drinkers to show his power,⁴ in the necessary difference of the drinking,⁴ by being superior (to others) and being (his own) master,⁵ so as neither to stumble in one great matter through unseemliness, nor to be

¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, inserts here "hac potione," wanting in the Greek.

² Ast understands τὸν μὲν in the first clause, to answer to τὸν δὲ in the second.

³—³ Ficinus has "antea quam fortior sit."

⁴—⁴ I willingly confess myself utterly unable to understand the words between the numerals. All the MSS. and Ficinus acknowledge διαφορῇ. In Stephens it is διαθορῇ, which Taylor translates "consumption." But διαφθεῖν πῶμα would mean, "to destroy a draught," by a mixture of ingredients. I could have understood ἐν τῇ τοῦ πώματος ἀναγκαίᾳ περιφορῇ, "in the compulsory handing round of the drink," unless it be said that διαφορῇ has the same meaning.

⁵—⁵ I have inserted the words within lunes, remembering the praises bestowed upon Socrates by Alcibiades in the Banquet, for being not only able to drink more than any one else, but to walk away perfectly sober, while all his companions were either dead drunk, or unable to reach their homes without staggering.

changed (in manner) through virtue,¹ but should² depart, before he reached the last drinking,² ³fearing the defeat which all men suffer through drinking.³

Clin. Certainly. For such a one, by thus acting, would conduct⁴ himself with temperance.

Athen. Let us thus then say again to the legislator this. Be it so, lawgiver, that neither has a god given nearly⁵ to mankind such a medicine for fear, nor have we devised one ourselves—for I say nothing of sorcerers⁶ at a banquet—but is there a potion for fearlessness and for excessive confidence, and (doing) unseasonably what is not meet? Or how say we?

Clin. There is, he will perhaps say, meaning wine.

Athen. Has this a property contrary to that which was just now spoken of? Does it make a man drinking it, to be in the first place immediately more cheerful than before; and by how much the more he tastes it, by so much the more to be filled with good hopes and an opinion of his own power; and at last is such a person filled, as if he were wise, with all freedom of speech and of behaviour and of all fearlessness, so as to say any thing whatever without hesitation, and do so likewise?

Clin. Every one, I think, will agree to this.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Let us then recollect this, that we said that two things in our souls ought to be cultivated; one, that we may

¹ With ἀπερὴν here may be compared the expression in Horace, "Narratur et prisca Catonis Sæpe mero caluisse virtus."

²⁻² Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has, "ac juxta ultimam potionem ante ebrietatem discedat."

³⁻³ The Greek is τὴν πάντων ἡτταν φοβούμενος ἀνθρώπων τοῦ πώματος. But all men, as shown in the case of Socrates, are not overcome by liquor. Hence in lieu of ἀνθρώπων, I should prefer ἀνων (senseless) ὑπὸ—For τοῦ πώματος can hardly dispense with a preposition to govern it. Taylor's translation is, "fearing any human potion the least of all things," where he evidently confounded ἡτταν, "defeat," with ἡττον, "less."

⁴ Since all the MSS. have σωφρονοῖ, it is evident that ἀν has dropt out after γὰρ—It was found in the MS. of Ficinus; for his version is, "moderatus evadet."

⁵ I cannot understand σχεδόν thus standing by itself.

⁶ This allusion to sorcerers is made here, because they were supposed capable of curing disorders that had baffled the regular practitioners in medicine.

be as confident as possible ; the other, the very contrary, that we may be as fearful as possible ?

Clin. These, I think, you said belonged to shame.

Athen. You very properly remind me. But since it is meet to practise fortitude and fearlessness in fears,¹ let us consider whether the contrary ought to be cultivated in the case of things contrary.

Clin. It is at least probable.

Athen. In those things, which when we suffer, we are naturally remarkably confident and audacious, it will be proper, as it seems, to meditate, how we may become the least possible shameless and full of boldness, but fearful with respect to daring on each occasion to speak, or suffer, or do any thing base whatever.

Clin. It seems so.

Athen. Are not then these the things, in which we are such, (namely) anger, love, insolence, ignorance, the love of gain, cowardice,² and these too, riches, beauty, strength, and all such things as make a person, drunk with pleasure, to be mad ? Now to the making in the first place an easy and harmless experiment in all these, and afterwards to the meditating upon them, ³with the exception of the touch-stone furnished by wine and sport, what pleasure more in measure, can we mention should it exist in any degree with caution ?³ For, let us consider. Of a disposition morose and savage, from which ten thousand acts of injustice arise, ⁴is it more dangerous for a person,

¹ In lieu of *τοῖς φόβοις*, one would expect rather *τοῖς φοβεροῖς* : for thus the two adjectives *φοβεροῖς* and *ἰσχυροῖς* would answer, as they should do, to each other.

² Ast, justly objecting to *δειλία*, "cowardice," as being thus reckoned with the things, that render a person bold, would expunge the word entirely ; for it owes its origin, he says, to the repetition of the letters—*δεια* in *φιλοκέρδεια*.

³ Such is the literal translation of the Greek ; which I confess my inability to understand. Ast is content to give the version of Cornarius. Ficinus has "Ad horum omnium facile et innocuum periculum faciendum inducendamque exercitationem, nullam habemus voluptatem commodiorum ea, quæ in vini ludo mores examinat, si modo prudens quædam cautio adhibeatur."

⁴ Here again I have given a literal version of the Greek text, which has baffled both Boeckh and Ast ; the former of whom conceives there is something wanting, which he has attempted in part to supply ; while the latter says there will be nothing to desire, if we merely read *ἀσφα-*

when going for the purpose of contracts, to make a trial, and so run a risk respecting them, or when present at the shows of Dionysus?⁴ or to a disposition, yielding to venery, to apply a touchstone, by intrusting to it one's own daughters, and sons, and wives,¹ and thus by running a risk in things the most dear, to see the moral condition of the soul? ²and by mentioning ten thousand things, a person would not accomplish,² by how much excels³ the contemplating in sport, and without a fixed purpose, and without a reward, bringing damage.³ ⁴And this very thing,⁴ we think, that on these points at least, neither the Cretans nor other persons would doubt of this being a reasonable experiment of each other, and of its superiority, as compared with other touchstones, (on the ground)⁵ of its slightness, and security, and despatch.

Clin. This at least is true.

Athen. This, then, will be one of the most useful things, to know the nature and habit of souls by that art, whose business it is to cure them. Now this, I think, is the business of the statesman's art. Is it not?

Clin. It is entirely so.

BOOK II.

[1.] AFTER this, it appears, that point must be considered respecting them, whether this alone has a good, namely, to

λίστερον for σφαλερώτερον. What Plato really wrote, will perhaps remain for ever unknown.

¹ Ficinus omits γυναῖκας.

² Ficinus has "permulta insuper afferre quis poterit neque verbis consequetur," which is more intelligible than the Greek.

³ Here too a literal version shows how utterly unintelligible is the Greek; which Ficinus thus translates—"cum joco simpliciter sine damno hominum mores exquirere," as if he had found in his MS. something to this effect, τὸ μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἀπλῶς ἀνευ ζημίας εἶδος ἀνείτων ἡθους θεωρεῖν: where ἀνείτων is the usual abbreviation for ἀνθρωπείων.

⁴ The words within numerals are omitted by Ficinus; for he could not understand them; nor can any one else. In the letters καὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν αὐτὸ lies hid, I suspect, an answer of Clinias, εἰκοι δὲ πᾶν τοῦτό μοι ἐννοοῦντι, "All this seems reasonable to me on reflection."

⁵ The genitives are here used, says Ast, as if Plato had written accusatives with κατὰ—I have translated as if ἔνεκα had dropt out before καὶ.

see how we possess our natures, or whether some greatness of advantage likewise, that deserves much care, is inherent in the proper use of wine-parties. What then do we assert? It is inherent, as our reasoning seems desirous to point out. But when, and how, let us hear by giving our attention, lest peradventure we are shackled by it.

Clin. Speak then.

Athen. I am desirous therefore of again recalling to memory what we stated a correct education to be. For its preservation, as I now conjecture, consists in this employment being properly directed.

Clin. You speak largely.

Athen. I say then, that the first puerile ¹ perception of children ¹ is pleasure and pain; and that these two ² exist in those, to whose soul vice and virtue are present for the first time. ³ But (as to) reflection and opinions true (and) firm, ³ that man is happy ⁴ to whom they are present even to old age. And that man is perfect, who possesses these and all the goods in them. Now I call the virtue, which is first present to children, education; but ⁵ should pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred be correctly produced in the soul of those not yet able to understand a reason; but of those, who have understood reason, should they agree with the reason, ⁶ to have been cor-

¹—¹ The Greek is τῶν παίδων παιδικήν, where Ficinus omits τῶν παίδων. For those words are the explanation of παιδικήν.

² Ficinus, "hæc duo," as if he found in his MS. τοῦτω, not ταῦτα. But if ταῦτα is to be referred to αἰσθησις, we must read τοῦτ, with one MS.

³ The Greek is φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς βεβαίους—where for the syntax, says Ast, we must understand κατὰ, and for the sense read ἀληθεῖς δόξας καὶ βεβαίους, similar to δόξαι καὶ πιστεῖς γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς in Temp. p. 37, B.

⁴ In lieu of εὐτυχίς Ast reads εὐτυχής, from "felix est" in Ficinus; and so doubtless found Cicero in his MS. For he says, De Finib. v. 21, "Præclare enim Plato, Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opinionones assequi possit;" omitting however βεβαίους.

⁵ Ast says that δὲ here means the same as γὰρ—But that it never does. The particle is omitted by Ficinus.

⁶—⁶ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where I can discover neither syntax nor sense. Ficinus has "propter superiorem bonorum morum consuetudinem," as if, says Boeckh, he had found in his MS. τῷ ὁρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἡθῶν. The whole passage is quoted by Eusebius in Præpar. Evang. xii. 18, p. 591, D., but the only variation there is of λόγων for λόγῳ before λαμβάνειν, adopted by Boeckh

rectly accustomed by fitting customs.⁶ This very consent is the whole of virtue; but its proper nurture is relating to pleasures and pains, so as to hate what it ought to hate, immediately from the beginning to the end, and to love what it ought to love, ¹after having cut off this very thing by reason,¹ and calling it education, you would according to my (mind) rightly call it.

Clin. Both formerly, O guest, and likewise now it seems to have been correctly spoken by you on the subject of education.

Athen. Correctly indeed. ²For of these pleasures and pains, after having been rightly brought up by existing education,² the greater part is relaxed and corrupted by men³ during life; but the gods, pitying the naturally laborious race of man, have ordained for it, as remissions from labour, the returns⁴ of feast-days in honour of the gods, and have given the Muses, and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, as fellow-feasters, in order that they may correct⁵ the nurture that has taken place in the feasts with the gods.⁵ It

and Ast, and shortly afterwards of αὐτῇ ἔσθ' ἢ—for αὐτῆς θ' ἢ—similar to “hæc ipsa consensio” in Ficinus.

¹—¹ The words ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ I confess I cannot understand: nor could Ast; who prefers τοῦ λόγου, what Ficinus, he says, seems to have read; for his version is “si per se ipsam seorsim ratione consideratam.”

²—² Here again I am in the dark. The Greek is τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν ὁρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν, which Ast says are genitives absolute; while παιδεῶν οὐσῶν are added by way of an explanation; but whether these words are likewise genitives absolute, or how they are governed, he does not say. That Ficinus was quite at a loss here is shown by his version—“hujusmodi vero voluptatum atque dolorum rectam educationem, quæ disciplina dicitur, transgrediuntur homines in vita ac sæpe pervertunt,” where to χαλᾶται is strangely given the sense of “transgrediuntur.” Plato wrote, I suspect, ὑπὸ παιδεῶν ἀνοσίων, “by unholy instructions,” an expression absolutely requisite to show how what had been rightly brought up was subsequently corrupted.

³ In lieu of τοῖς ἀνοίς, where the article is unnecessary, I would suggest τοῖς ἀνοίς “the senseless.” On the perpetual confusion of ἀνοίς and ἀνοίς see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

⁴ As the change of the festivals was yearly, Plato wrote, I suspect, not ἐτάξαντο τὰς, but ἐτάξαντ' ἐτείας ἀμοιβὰς, similar to θυσίαις διετησίαις, “sacrifices through the year,” in Thucyd. ii. 38. Ficinus has “solemnia—festa vicissim in ipsorum deorum honorem instituta,” where “solemnia festa vicissim” answers exactly to ἐτείας τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς.

⁵—⁵ Here again a literal translation best shows the difficulties of the

is meet then to see whether the account is hymned by us truly according to nature, or how? For it says that the whole, so to speak, of youth is unable to keep quiet in its body and voice, but is ever seeking to be moved and to speak, at one time leaping and skipping, as if dancing with joy and full of fun, at another uttering all kinds of sounds; and that the rest of animals have no perception of either order or disorder in their movements, to which¹ is given the name of ²rhythm and harmony²; but that the gods, whom we have said were given to us as fellow-choristers, have given to us the perception likewise of what is in rhythm and in harmony in combination with pleasure, by which they excite us and lead the dance, uniting us with each other by means of songs and dances, and given the name³ of dance from the inherent name of pleasure.³ [2.] Shall we then in the first place receive this? Shall we lay down that the first education was through the Muses and Apollo? or how?

Clin. Thus.

Athen. He therefore, who is uneducated, will be with us one, who has not joined a choir; but him, who has been educated, we must lay down as one, who has sufficiently engaged in a choir.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. But a choir, as a whole, is dancing and singing.

Clin. It is necessarily so.

Athen. He then, who is properly educated, would be able to sing and dance well.

text, ἵν' ἐπανορθῶνται τὰς τροφὰς γενομένας ἐν ταῖς ἐορταῖς μετὰ θεῶν: where it is evident that ἐπανορθοῦσθαι could not be applied to τροφὰς γενομένας—μετὰ θεῶν, but to some deviation from or corruption of the rites. Opportunely then do all the MSS. read τὰς τε τροφὰς: from which we may easily elicit τὰς ἀποστροφὰς, and still more easily μετ' ἀθίῶν from μετὰ θεῶν; and thus ἀθίῶν here, and ἀνοσίων restored just above, beautifully harmonize with each other.

¹ Instead of οἷς, which Poppo might have quoted on Thucyd. iii. 97, in support of διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγὰι, ἐν οἷς—Boeckh suggested, and Ast has adopted, αἷς—

²⁻² Rhythm, says Ast, is applied to the motion of the body; harmony, to the modulation of the voice.

³⁻³ Like all plays upon words, this would be unintelligible to a reader, who did not know that in Greek χορὸς is a dance, and χαρὰ, joy. The etymology is adopted in Etymol. M. Χορὸς, οἶμαι, παρὰ τὸ χαίρειν. There is however an error in ὄνομα, which Bekker should have rejected from conjecture, rather than τὸ after παρὰ from the original reading in one MS.

Clin. It seems so.

Athen. Let us see then what has been now asserted.

Clin. What is that?

Athen. (A person), we have said, sings well and dances well. Whether shall we add that he does so, if he sings what is beautiful and dances what is beautiful, or not?

Clin. Let us add it.

Athen. What then, should a person consider things beautiful, as beautiful, and things base, as base, and use them as such, will such a one be better educated for us, with respect to dancing and music, who¹ may be sufficiently able to minister to the body and voice what is considered beautiful, but yet does not rejoice in things beautiful, nor hate such as are void of beauty? Or he, who, though he is not altogether able to act² or think rightly, with respect to his voice and body, yet acts rightly with respect to pleasure and pain, embracing such things as are beautiful, and feeling a disgust at such as are not beautiful?

Clin. You are speaking, guest, of a great difference of education.

Athen. If, then, we three know what is beautiful in singing and dancing, we likewise know correctly the person educated or not educated: but, if we are ignorant of this, we shall not be able to know if there is, and where, a guard of education. Is it not this?

Clin. It is thus.

Athen. We must then in the next place, like dogs on the track, seek out what is beautiful in form, and melody, and singing, and dancing. But if these shall escape us and get away, our discourse about proper education, whether Grecian or Barbarian, will hereafter be in vain.

Clin. Truly so.

Athen. Be it so. What forms then, or melody, is it proper to call the beautiful? Shall we say that the form and the

¹ Ast has rejected, with the approbation of Stalbaum, η before $\delta\epsilon$ $\alpha\upsilon$ —For of the two parties, opposed to each other, the second is not alluded to till shortly afterwards.

² This is Taylor's translation of $\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\phi\theta\epsilon\upsilon\iota\nu$: and Ast too says that $\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\phi\theta\epsilon\upsilon\iota\nu$ means "recte facere." But it does so, only when it is followed by its object, which is wanting here. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote $\kappa\alpha\tau'$ $\delta\phi\theta\delta\omicron\nu$ $\alpha\nu\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$, similar to the version of Ficinus, "ut decet assequi," and similarly $\kappa\alpha\tau'$ $\delta\phi\theta\delta\omicron\nu$ for $\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\phi\theta\epsilon\iota$ in the next sentence.

voice of a brave and a timid soul, held fast by¹ the same and equal labours, are similar?

Clin. How (similar),² since neither are their colours?³

Athen. Well (said), my friend. But in music there are both forms and melody,⁴ since music is conversant with rhythm and harmony;⁵ so that it is possible for a person, making use of a resemblance, as the chorus-teachers do, to speak correctly of a melody or form as being in good rhythm or in good harmony, but not as being of a good colour. Now of a timid, and of a brave man, there is a certain form or melody; and (one) has the power to call those properties of brave men, beautiful, but of timid, ugly. And that there may not be to us a great prolixity respecting these matters, let all the beautiful forms and melodies connected with the soul or body be all abstractedly the property of virtue, either of itself or of some image of it; but of vice on the other hand, all that is of a contrary kind.

Clin. ⁶You correctly make a call upon me;⁶ and let it be decided, for the present, that such is the state of the case.

Athen. But (let us consider)⁷ still further this; whether all of us are similarly delighted with all dancing, or it wants much of such being the case?

Clin. It wants it entirely.

Athen. What then shall we say is that, which has caused us to err? Is it because the same things are not beautiful to

¹ In lieu of *ἐρχομένης* Stephens suggested *ἔχουμένης*, what Ast has adopted, and refers to Heindorf on Gorg. § 163, for examples of *ἔχουμαι*, thus united to *ἐν πόνοις*, and *ἐν ξυμφοραῖς*. The participle is omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

² Ficinus inserts "similes" to fill up the ellipse.

³ Although *φωνή*, *σχῆμα*, and *χρῶμα* are similarly united in Cratyl. p. 423, D., yet here *χρῶμα* is said by Boeckh and Ast to mean not only "colour," as applied to "bodies," but to modulations in music likewise, according to Suidas in *Χρῶμα*—*λέγεται τι κατὰ μουσικὴν χρῶμα*.

⁴ Boeckh would insert here *χρῶματα δ' οὐκ ἔνεστι*. But Ast observes, that the same idea is expressed in the subsequent words, *εὐχρων δὲ μέλος ἢ σχῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν*—

⁵ The words which follow in the Greek, *οὗσης τῆς μουσικῆς*, Ficinus omits here, but seems to have found them after *ὥστε εὐρυθμον μὲν καὶ εὐάρμοστον*: for his version is, "quare boni rhythmī harmoniæque figuram et cantum licet dicere."

⁶—⁸ Ficinus, and after him Taylor, omit *προκαλεῖ*.

⁷ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has inserted "animadvertamus." But the verb is omitted elsewhere in this formula, as remarked by Ast.

all of us? Or that some are, but do not appear to be the same? For surely no one will say that the choric movements of vice are more beautiful than those of virtue; or that he is delighted himself with the forms of depravity, but others with music, the contrary to this. And yet the majority assert, that the correctness of music consists in the power which imparts pleasure to the soul. But this is not to be endured, nor is it holy to speak so at all. But this more probably causes us to err.

Clin. What?

[3.] *Athen.* Since the things relating to choric movements are the imitations of manners, that take place in all kinds of actions, and ¹fortunes, and morals, and imitations, each going through.¹ For those then, to whom is suited what is said, or sung, or danced, according to nature or custom, or both, it is necessary to rejoice in and praise those acts, and to call them beautiful; but for those, to whom they are contrary to nature, or manners, or custom, it is possible neither to rejoice in nor praise them, but to call them base. And they, to whom the things of nature happen to be right, but the things of custom the contrary, or the things of custom right, but the things of nature the contrary, ²address their praises contrary to pleasures.² For they say that each of these is pleasant, but wrong; and in the presence of others, whom they consider to be intellectual, they are ashamed for such movements to take

¹—¹ The Greek of this unintelligible passage is, *καὶ μῦμασι διεξιόντων ἐκάστων*, where Boeckh would read *παθήμασι*, referring to Aristotle in *Poetic.* § 1, who says that dancers *διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἥθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις*. But Ast observes, that as Aristotle omits *τύχαις*, found in Plato, it was only natural for him to substitute its synonyme, *πάθη*. Schulthes, in the notes to his German translation, suggests *σχήμασι*. But *σχήμασι* could not thus follow *πράξεσι καὶ τύχαις καὶ ἥθεσι*. Ficinus has, “Quoniam in chorea variorum morum variarumque rerum variis in fortunis moribusque gestarum imitationes fiunt,” thus giving the general sense in elegant language, but cleverly omitting the words in which all the difficulty lies. By following the clue furnished

by the MSS. that read *μῦμασι* or *μῦμασι*, ^{μα} one may suggest that Plato wrote *καὶ γὰρ μῦμασι δείξει τούτων ἕκαστ' ἦν*, “for it is possible to exhibit each of these things by imitations.”

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek, *ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τοὺς ἐπαινοὺς ἐναντίους προσαγορεύουσιν*. Ficinus has, “Laudes voluptatibus contrarias proferunt,” as if he had found in his MS. *προφέρουσι*. Taylor's translation is, “will denominate things contrary to pleasures laudable.”

place in their body, and ashamed to sing, ¹as if making a display with seriousness¹ of things beautiful; but by themselves they are delighted with them.²

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Does something then bring any injury to him, who is delighted with the forms or melodies of depravity? or an advantage on the other hand to those, who are pleased with the contraries to these?

Clin. It is probable.

Athen. Is it probable, or is it necessary also, for the same thing to take place, as when any one, associating with the depraved habits of depraved men, does not hate, but rejoices in and admits them; and yet blames his own depravity in the way of fun, as if he were in a dream. Surely at that time it is necessary for the party rejoicing to be assimilated to the things in which he rejoices, even though he is ashamed to praise them. And yet what greater good, or evil, can we say, would of every necessity happen to us than a thing of this kind?

Clin. I think, none.

Athen. But where laws are beautifully established, or will be at some future period of time, can we think that the instruction touching the Muses and amusement, will be in the power of poets, so that, whatever delights a poet in composition, or what is connected with rhythm, or melody, or verse, he can, by teaching it to the children of the well-regulated, and to young men formed into choirs, work out whatever may happen with respect to virtue and depravity?

Clin. This has no particle of reason; for how could it?

Athen. But, now it is in their power to do so in all states, so to say, except in Egypt.

Clin. But how say you that a thing of this kind has been established by law³ in Egypt?

Athen. It is wonderful even to hear. For, as it seems, this doctrine, of which we are now speaking, has been known of old amongst them, that young men in cities should be ac-

¹—¹ Ficinus has, what Taylor translates literally, "honestaque et studio digna asserere."

² Ficinus, "secum iis omnibus delectantur."

³ All the MSS. but one, by reading *νενομοθετησθαι*, confirm the conjecture of Stephens, founded on "sancitum esse," in Ficinus, in lieu of *νομοθετῆσθαι*.

customed to occupy themselves with beautiful forms and beautiful melodies. And after regulating these, as to what they are, and of what kind they may be, they exhibit them in their temples; and except these it is not lawful either for painters or others, who work out forms, and whatever else there may be, to introduce any novelty, or even to think of any other than those of the country; nor is it lawful at present to do this, either in these particulars or in the whole of music; and you will, by observing, discover, that what have been painted and sculptured there ten thousand years ago,—¹ and I say ten thousand, not as a word, but a fact,—¹ are neither more beautiful, nor more ugly, than those turned out of hand at the present day, but are worked off according to the same art.

Clin. You say what is wonderful.

Athen. It is, however, a matter relating pre-eminently to law and politics. But you would find other things there of a trifling kind. But this respecting music is true, and worthy of consideration, that it was possible for ²a law-giver upon these points to lay down² firmly and with confidence melodies, possessing correctness naturally. But this would be the work of a deity, or of some divine person; as they say there, that the melodies, which have been preserved for such a length of time, are the production of Isis. So that, as I said, if any one is able to understand their correctness ever so little, he ought with confidence to reduce them to law and order. Since the search after pleasure and pain does, through³ the seeking perpetually to make use of new music, possess ⁴scarcely no great⁴ power towards corrupting the consecrated dancing, by finding fault with its antiquity. The dancing there at

¹—¹ Such is the real meaning of the words *οὐχ ὥς ἐπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ' ὄντως*. Ficinus has, “quasi non adeo vetera sint, ut ita dicam.”

²—² I have translated as if the Greek were *νομοθέτην θέσθαι*, not *νομοθετεῖσθαι*: for *θαρροῦντα* can be said only of a person.

³ To preserve the syntax, we must suppose that *ἐνεκα* has dropt out between *ζητεῖν* and *ἀεὶ*; or, since six MSS. read *που* for *τοῦ* before *καὶ νῦν*, that *ἀπὸ* has been lost before *τοῦ*—

⁴—⁴ This, I confess, I hardly understand. The train of thought would lead rather to *σχεδὸν ἀμεγάρτην* in lieu of *σχεδὸν οὐ μεγάλην*, where *ἀμεγάρτην* would mean “excessive.” For *σχεδὸν* is never, I believe, thus united to a diminutive expression. Hesych. *Ἀμέγατρον*—*πολὸν ἢ μέγαν*. Winckelmann would omit *οὐ*—But words are not to be thus rejected without showing how they probably came into the text.

least it does not seem to have been able to corrupt, but the contrary has been entirely the case.

Clin. It appears from what has been just now stated, that it would be so.

[4.] *Athen.* Shall we not then confidently assert that there is in music and sport together with dancing a correct use in some such manner as this? We are glad, when we think we are doing well; and, when we are glad, think on the other hand we are doing well? Is it not so?

Clin. It is so.

Athen. And at such a time in our gladness we are unable to keep quiet.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. Are not then the young amongst us ready to dance? and do not we their elders think we conduct ourselves properly in looking upon them, while we take a delight in their sports and revelry, since elasticity fails us ¹at our time of life,¹ which regretting ²and loving³ we thus establish games for those, who are able in the highest degree to carry us by the aid of memory to our youth.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. Do we then think that the majority give really in vain the account now told of those who celebrate festivals, that it is meet to consider him the wisest, and to decide that he is the victor, who causes us to be delighted and to rejoice in the greatest degree? For since we are permitted to play at this period, it is surely meet, for him, who causes the most in number to be glad in the highest degree, to be honoured the most; and, as I just now said, ³to bear off the prize of victory.³ Is not this rightly said? and would it not be (rightly) done, if it took place in this way?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. But, O blessed man, let us not hastily decide upon a matter of this kind; but, dividing it into parts, let us consider it in some such manner as this. If any one should at any time simply establish a certain game—but without defining

¹—¹ Instead of *παρ' ἡμῖν*, which can hardly be united to *ἐκλείπει*, the sense seems to require *πρὶν ἡμῖν ὄν*, "which was formerly to us."

²—² The words *καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι* are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

³—³ Instead of the words within the numerals, Ficinus has "victorem esse dicamus," translated literally by Taylor.

whether it is gymnastic, or musical, or equestrian—and, collecting together all those in the city, should make a proclamation, after laying down the prizes of victory, for any one who wished to come and enter the contest for pleasure alone, and that he, who should delight the spectators the most, without receiving any order as to the manner (of contending),¹ and be victorious in effecting this very thing in the greatest degree possible, and should be adjudged to be the most agreeable of all the competitors,¹ what do we think would result from this proclamation?

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. It is surely likely that one would exhibit, like Homer, a rhapsody, another guitar-playing;² one a tragedy, and some again a comedy. Nor would it be wonderful, if some one, by exhibiting things of wonder, should think that he is especially the victor. Now when these and other competitors without number come together, can we say which of them would justly be the victor?

Clin. You ask an absurd question. For who can answer you on this point,³ as if he were cognizant of it,³ before⁴ hearing and being himself a hearer⁴ of each of the champions?

Athen. What then, are you willing for me to reply to this absurd question?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now if very little children were to decide, they would decide that he who had exhibited the things of wonder,⁵ (was the victor over the others).⁵ Is it not so?

¹⁻¹ To avoid the difficulties arising from νικήσῃ thus placed before κριθῇ, to say nothing of the apodosis wanting after δς δ' ἂν τέρψῃ, Ast proposes, with the approbation of Stalbaum, to transpose the sentences thus, καὶ κριθῇ τῶν ἀγωνισαμένων ἡδιστος γεγονέναι, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπεργασάμενος νικήσειν, so that νικήσειν may depend upon προεῖποι. The transposition was suggested by Ficinus, who has "qui spectatores maxime delectabit, judicatusque fuerit id optime omnium effecisse," but omits νικήσῃ entirely.

² By this was probably meant song-singing, accompanied with the "cithera," corrupted into the modern "guitar."

³⁻³ The word between the numerals is omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁴⁻⁴ Others may, but I will never, believe that Plato wrote πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι τε καὶ—αὐτήκοος αὐτὸς γενέσθαι: for he might have written more elegantly πρὶν γε καὶ ἀσμάτων πάντων καὶ ἀθλητῶν ἐκάστων—"before he is himself a hearer of all the songs, and of each of the champions."

⁵⁻⁵ Ficinus alone has "vicisse alios," what the sense requires, in

Clin. How not?

Athen. But if greater boys (were to decide, they would decide in favour of the party exhibiting) comedies; but the women, who are better educated, and the young men, and perhaps nearly the whole multitude, (would decide in favour of the party exhibiting) a tragedy.

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. But perhaps we old men would hear with the greatest delight the rhapsodist, when stringing together in a beautiful manner the Iliad and Odyssey, or some of the works of Hesiod, and say that he was very far the victor. Who then would be rightly the victor? This (must be stated¹) after these.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. It is evident that it is necessary for me and you to say that those are properly the victors, who are judged so by persons of our age; ²for habit seems to us to be by far the best of things at present which are in all states and every where.²

Clin. How not?

[5.] *Athen.* I grant then thus much to the many, that music ought to be judged of by pleasure, yet not by that of any person one meets with,—but that that is nearly the most beautiful music, which delights the best of men, and such as are sufficiently educated; but especially, that which delights one person, who excels in virtue and education. On this account we say that the judges of these things stand in need of virtue; because they ought to be partakers of the rest of prudence and fortitude. For a true judge ought not to learn how to judge from a theatre,³ being stupefied by the clamours of the

Greek, τοὺς ἄλλους νενικηέναι, which words, forming probably one line consisting of twenty-one letters, have dropt out after κρινούσι from all the copies, made from the Codex Archetypus, except the one that fell into the hands of Ficinus.

¹ Boeckh has adopted and confirmed the supplement of λικτίον proposed by Heindorf, and added ἀν εἶη—For Ficinus has “quis ergo jure victor sit, declarandum nonne restat?”

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of Bekker's text, τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ἡμῶν τῶν νῦν δὴ πάμπαν δοκεῖ τῶν—Ficinus has “usus enim rerum, quem ab ætate habemus, omnium quidem civium magnum quiddam ubique est et optimum”—which certainly makes an excellent sense; but it is not to be got out of the Greek. Perhaps Plato wrote τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ἐνεῖμ' ἡμῶν τὸν νοῦν, ὃ δὲ πάλαι πολὺ δοκεῖ—“for habit has imparted to us intellect, which thing of old appears to be much the best.”

³ In lieu of θαρίπον, a MS. of Eusebius in Præp. Ev. xii. 23, p. 597,

multitude, and by his own ignorance; nor on the other hand, while knowing (something),² ought he through unmanliness and cowardice to give from the same mouth, with which when about to judge, he called upon the gods,³ a decision containing a falsehood,³ with an easy disposition. For a judge does not sit as the disciple, but, as is just, the teacher rather of the spectators, and as about to oppose himself to those, who do not afford pleasure fitly and properly to the spectators. For by the old law of Greece, it was permitted (to⁴ do), what the law of Sicily and Italy (permits)⁴ at present; (which⁵) by leaving to the mass of spectators to decide, by the holding up of hands, upon the victor, has corrupted the poets themselves; for they write according to the depraved pleasure of their judges;⁶ so that the spectators instruct themselves;⁶ and it has corrupted likewise the pleasures of the theatre. For while it is meet that the spectators should, by always hearing of manners better than their own, have a superior pleasure, it happens now that they do quite the contrary. What then do the matters discussed in the present discourse intend to point out? Consider whether it is this.

Clin. What?

Athen. The reasoning appears to me, after making a third or fourth revolution, to come to the same point—that education is the drawing and leading of youth to that, which is called by the law right reason, and which has been decreed by the most reasonable and oldest men through their experi-

and one of Plato, have alone preserved *θεάτρον*. On the uproar made in the theatre see Legg. ix. 14, p. 876, B.

¹ Instead of *αὐ* Ficinus has “*fortitudinis autem*,” adopted by Taylor.

² I have translated as if *τι* had dropt out after *γινώσκοντα*.

³ Here too Taylor has followed, what he found in Ficinus, “*iniquum judicium*.”

⁴ To preserve the syntax I have translated as if, instead of *δὴ*, the Greek were *δρᾶν*, and *ἐπ* had dropt out before *ὁ*—

⁵ Ast has correctly supplied *δε* before *τῷ* *πλήθει*; and he might have supplied *τὸ* before *τὸν*, and altered *διακρίνων* into *διακρίνειν*. For by such slight changes would the sentences, in which there is no syntax, be brought under the rules of grammar and sense united.

⁶ Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed implicitly, has “*ita ut spectatores poetas et se ipsos erudiant*,” as if his MS. read *αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοὺς παιδεύουσι*. But since it would be no disadvantage for persons to teach themselves, Plato perhaps wrote *ὥστε αὐτοὺς καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ θεαταὶ ἀπολλύσασθαι*, i. e. “destroy them and themselves.”

ence to be really correct. In order then that the soul of a youth may be accustomed not to feel joy or sorrow in things contrary to the law, and to those that are recommended¹ by law, but follow in joy and in sorrow after the same things as those which an old man does, for the sake of this, the compositions which we call odes, and which are truly incantations for the soul, are (said)² to have been produced, having been carefully adapted to that kind of symphony, of which we are speaking; but on account of the soul of children not being able to bear a serious pursuit, sports and (other)³ odes (are said)⁴ to be played on the pipe and executed.⁴ Just as in the case of persons who are sick and have their bodies in a weak state, they, who have the care of them, endeavour to bring useful food in pleasant meats and drinks; but that, which is annoying,⁵ in such as are bitter, in order that they may receive kindly the one, and be accustomed to reject rightly the other. ⁶In the same way a correct lawgiver will by words fairly spoken and to be praised, persuade, or, not persuading, compel, the poet to represent correctly the attributes of men, temperate, and brave, and good in every way, by composing his forms in rhythm, and his melodies in harmony.⁶

Clin. Do persons, by Zeus, seem to you, O guest, to act thus at present in other states? For, as far as I hear, what you are now speaking of I do not know to be done except by us and the Lacedæmonians; but there are certain novelties ever taking place in dancing, and all the rest of music, and changes not through law, but some inordinate pleasures, which are very

¹ In lieu of *πεπεισμένοις*, Eusebius, *Præp. Ev.* xiii. 20, p. 594, A., has *τεθειμένοις*.

² As *γεγονέναι* has nothing to govern it, some, says Boeckh, have thought that *λέγονται* has dropt out, which it might easily have done from its similarity to *γεγονέναι*, and that it is to be understood before *καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι* shortly afterwards.

³ In lieu of *ΚΑΙ ΟΙΔΑΙ*, the sense requires *ΚΑΙ ΑΛΛΑΙ ΟΙΔΑΙ*.

⁴ The Greek is *καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι*. But as *πράττεσθαι* is to be referred to *παιδία*, so *ψῆδαι* requires its own verb. Hence I have elicited *καὶ ἀυλείσθαι* from *καλεῖσθαι*.

⁵ I have adopted Boeckh's correction, *τὴν δὲ τὴν πονηρὰν*, in lieu of *τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν*, for the genitive is without syntax or sense.

⁶ All between the numerals Ficinus places after *οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων*, omitting there *τούτων ἔνεκα*. This variation was corrected by Grynæus, whom Taylor has followed.

far from being the same, and in the same manner, as you have said occur in Egypt, ¹but never belong to the same.¹

Athen. Most excellent, O Clinias! But if I have appeared to you, as you say, to speak of these things as existing at present, I should not wonder, if I have done this through my not clearly stating my meaning. But as to what I mean as taking place with respect to music, perhaps I have spoken of it in such a way ²as to seem to you to speak of it.³ For to abuse things which are incurable, and far advanced in error, is by no means agreeable, although it is necessary sometimes. But since the same things appear good to you likewise, come, tell me, do such kind of things exist amongst you and these here, more than amongst the other Greeks?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But if they thus existed amongst others likewise, should we say that they would thus be better than they now are?

Clin. By far better, if they subsisted, as they do amongst these here and with us, and as you just now said they ought to subsist.

[6.] *Athen.* ³Come then, (say,) should we agree³ for the present, are the things mentioned by you in every kind of education and music these? Do you compel poets to assert that a good man, if he is temperate and just, is fortunate and happy, and if he is a big man and strong, and if little and weak, and if rich or not? and that, although he is richer than ⁴both Cinyras and Midas,⁴ but unjust, he is miserable, and lives in sorrow, and, as the poet says,⁵ if he says rightly, "I would not mention nor place in account as a man" him, who does not perform all that is called beautiful with justice, and possess it likewise. For

¹ Ficinus has "*sed variae semper fiunt*," translated by Taylor, "but continually vary."

² In lieu of these unmeaning words, Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "*ea tibi, quae fiant, dicere visus sum*." Hence Taylor translates "I appeared to you to speak as if they actually existed."

³ The Greek is *φέρε δὴ*—But as MS. Leid. reads *φέρε νῦν*, I have adopted Boeckh's suggestion, *Φέρε δὴ ἰδὺν*, which is the perpetual form in Plato, as shown by Boeckh.

⁴ Cinyras and Midas, the kings respectively of Cyprus and Assyria, passed into a proverb for persons of great wealth.

⁵ The poet alluded to is Tyrtæus, whose verses are *Οὐτ' ἂν μνησαίμην, οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην*—*Πλουτοίη δὲ Μίδεω καὶ Κινύραο πλείον*.

being such a one¹ he² will stand near and grapple with the foe;² but he, who is unjust, will³ neither dare to look upon gory slaughter, nor will he vanquish in running the Thracian Boreas,³ nor will there ever be to him any other of the things called good. For what are called good by the many, are not rightly called so. For it is said that health is the best thing; beauty the next; strength the third; and riches the fourth; and numberless other things are called good. Thus, to see and hear acutely, and to possess with a clear perception all that is connected with the senses; and further, to do like a tyrant whatever you wish; and, what is said to be the completion of all happiness, to become, after possessing all these, as quickly as possible, immortal. But you and I surely say that all these are the best possessions for just and holy men; but for the unjust, all the worst, beginning from health. (For to be well),⁴ to see, hear, and possess the (other) senses, and, in short, to live, is the greatest evil, when a man is immortal⁵ [through the whole of time],⁵ and possesses all that is called good, except justice and all virtue; but it is a less evil, should such a person survive for the shortest time. In this manner, I think, you will persuade, and, as I said,⁶ compel the poets with you to speak; and moreover, that persons who follow them should, by giving out rhythms and harmonies, thus educate your young men? ⁷Is it not so? Look, then.⁷ For I clearly assert, that the things that are called evil, are good to the unjust, but to the just, are evil; but that things good are to the good truly good, but evil to the wicked. In what then, I asked, do you and I agree, or how?

Clin. We appear (to agree) in some things, but not in others.

¹ Ficinus has, "Is igitur justitia exornatus," translated by Taylor, "Such a one being just—"

²⁻³ The verse of Tyrtaeus is *Καὶ δῶν δρέγοιρ' ἐγγύθεν ἰστάμενος*.

³⁻⁵ The verses of Tyrtaeus are—*Εἰ μὴ τετλαίη μὲν ὁρῶν φόνον αἵματόεντα*, and *Νικῶν δὲ θείων Θρηϊκίον Βορέην*.

⁴ Ficinus alone has "sanum namque esse," adopted by Taylor.

⁵⁻⁵ The words within brackets, *τὸν ξύμπαντα χρόνον*, are properly omitted by Ficinus, as being superfluous after *ἀθάνατον*.

⁶ The Greek is *ἅπερ ἐγώ*—but as there is an allusion to what was said in § 5, Plato probably wrote *ἅπερ λέγω*: and for the same reason Stephens altered *ποιήσετε* into *πείσετε*, confirmed by Eusebius, and "invitabitis" in Ficinus.

⁷⁻⁷ As *ἡ γὰρ* always end a speech in Plato, it is evident that he wrote here *ἡ γὰρ*; *ΚΑ. ἡν γὰρ. ΑΟ. ὁρᾶρ' οὖν ἐγὼ γὰρ*—

[7.] *Athen.* Is it then in the case of a person possessing health, and wealth, and despotic power completely, and, I add further, superior strength and bravery, together with immortality, and to whom there is none else of the things called evil, but who has only injustice and insolence in his own person, that I do not perhaps persuade you that the person so living is not only not fortunate, but that he is clearly wretched?

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Be it so. What then ought we to say after this? For if he is brave, and strong, and beautiful, and rich, and does through the whole of life whatever he wishes, does it not necessarily appear to you, that if he is unjust and insolent, he will live in a shameful manner?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. What then, and wickedly too?

Clin. This (does) not (seem) equally.

Athen. What then, (would he not do so) unpleasantly, and not conducing to his own interest?

Clin. How can we admit this too?

Athen. How? If, as it seems,¹ some god, my friends, should grant us to agree, as we now nearly dissent from each other. For these things appear to me as necessary, as it is not even² for Crete, friend Clinias, to be clearly an island. And if I were a legislator, I would endeavour to compel both the poets and all persons in the state to speak in this manner; and I would impose nearly the greatest of punishments, should any one in the land assert that there are certain wicked men, who lead a pleasant life; or that some things are more advantageous and lucrative, but others more just. And I would persuade my citizens to assert many other things, contrary to what are now advanced, it seems, by the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and, differing from the rest of mankind. For come, by Zeus and Apollo, (say) ye best of men, if we asked the very gods, who laid down laws for us, whether the most just is the most pleasant life, or whether there are some two lives, of which one is the most pleasant, and the other the most just? and if they should say there are two, we should perhaps ask them again, if we in-

¹ The words *ὡς εἴκεν*, in which I can find no sense, are omitted by Ficinus.

² I cannot understand *οὐδέ*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. Perhaps Plato wrote, *οἶδ' εἰ*, "I well know—"

quired properly,—Whom ought we to call the most happy, those, who lead the most just life, or those, who lead the most pleasant one? Now, should they say those, who lead the most pleasant life, their answer would be absurd. But I am desirous that an expression of this kind should not be said of the gods, but of fathers and lawgivers rather. Let then the question previously put be asked of a father and a lawgiver, and let him say that he, who lives the most pleasant life, is the most happy. After this, I would say thus—Have you not, father, wished me to live most happily? And yet you have never ceased exhorting me to live most justly. He, then, who lays down¹ in this manner, whether he is a legislator or a father, would, I think, appear absurd, and unable to speak consistently with himself. But if he should, on the other hand, proclaim that the most just life is the most happy, every one, perchance, who hears him, would, I think, inquire—What is it, which the law praises in that life as good and beautiful, and better than pleasure? For what good, separate from pleasure, can there be to a just man? Come, (tell me,) —Is renown and praise from both men and gods a thing good and beautiful, but at the same time unpleasant? and infamy the contrary? ² We shall say—By no means, O thou dear lawgiver. But neither to do any one an injury, nor to be injured by any one, is it unpleasant, but at the same time good and ³ beautiful? And are the other things pleasant, but shameful and base?²

Clin. How can they be?

[8.] *Athen.* The reason, then, which does not separate the pleasant and the just, and the good and the beautiful, is persuasive, if towards nothing else, yet at least towards the wish to live a holy and a just life; so that the language of the lawgiver will be most disgraceful and opposed (to itself) should

¹ Ficinus has “una concedit—” He therefore did not, I think, find in his MS. *τιθέμενος* but *συμφάμενος*—

²⁻³ All the words between the numerals are considered spurious by Ast. And a portion of them, *ἡκιστα, ὃ φίλε νομοθέτα, φήσομεν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε τινα ἀδικεῖν μήτε ὑπὸ τινος ἀδικεῖσθαι*, is indeed wanting in the MS. from which Aldus printed. But as one cannot account for their introduction, I suspect that Plato wrote, *ΚΑ. ἡκιστα, ὡς θέλοι ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι, φήσομεν*. “By no means, we will say, as the lawgiver would wish (to say).” *ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε*—Compare viii. § 1, p. 829, A.

³ Boeckh suggests and well supports *καὶ*, from “*atque*” in Ficinus.

one deny that these things are so. For no one will voluntarily wish to be persuaded to do that, on which joy does not follow more than sorrow. But that which is seen from a distance produces upon all, so to say, and especially upon boys, a haziness. But the lawgiver, by dispersing the mist, will establish for us an opinion the contrary to this; and he will persuade the citizens, somehow or other, by customs, and praises, and arguments, that things just and unjust are both painted with shadow-lines; ¹ that things unjust, appearing contrariwise to that of the just, being viewed by the unjust and depraved man himself, pleasant; but things just, most unpleasant; but by the just man, all the contrary to every one as regards both.¹

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. But which shall we say is the more decisive truth of judgment? is it that of the worse soul, or the better?

Clin. Necessarily the better.

Athen. It is necessary then that an unjust life should not only be more base and depraved, but, in truth, more unpleasant than a just and holy life.

Clin. It appears nearly so, my friends, according to the present reasoning.

Athen. Would then a legislator, from whom there is even a little benefit, although the fact were not so, as the reasoning has detected it to be, ² dare, if there were any thing else, to tell an untruth to young persons for their good? ³ knowing that he

¹⁻¹ Such is the literal version of an unintelligible text. Ficinus has "atque injusta quidem contra apparere quam justa, nempe injusto ac pravo jucunda videri, cui justa videntur injucundissima; justo autem utraque contra omnino videri"—where I am quite as much in the dark as in the Greek. What Plato wrote, might perhaps be recovered by comparing Parmenid. § 73, *Ἰσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαίνεσθαι*—*προσελθόντι δὲ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα*, and Theætet. § 154, *ἡπειδὴ ἐγγύς, ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος, γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνήμι οὐδὲ μικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι*.

²⁻² Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, "non alienum tamen sua gravitate putaret ad juventutis utilitatem falso aliquid, si modo quid unquam aliud falso dicendum sit, dicere."

³⁻³ The Greek is *ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτου ψεύδος—ἡψεύσατο*, which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is "maxime cum nullum mendacium hac falsitate utilius excogitare possit." Hence I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι τοῦτου οὐ ψεύδος*—

never would have told³ a falsehood more advantageous than this, and ¹more able to cause them to do all just things,¹ not by force, but willingly.

Clin. Truth is indeed, O guest, a beautiful thing, and stable. It does not however appear an easy thing to persuade.²

Athen. Be it so. And yet that fabulous tale of the Sidonian, although improbable, has been easy to persuade, and numberless others (likewise).

Clin. What fable?

Athen. That, teeth having been sown at one time, armed men were produced from them. Now this is a great example to a lawgiver, that he will persuade the souls of young men to whatever ³a person may attempt to persuade;³ so that he ought by considering to find out nothing else, than by persuading to what he may work out the greatest good to a state; and for this to discover every contrivance, after what manner the whole of such fellow-dwellers may speak as much as possible one and the same thing on these points, continually through the whole of life, in odes, and fables, and rational discourses. (So I think).⁴ But if it appears to you to be otherwise than in this way, there will be no grudging about contesting these points in our discourse.

Clin. It does not appear to me that either of us can contest them.

Athen. ⁵It shall then be my business to speak after this.⁵ For I assert, that it is necessary for the choirs, being three, to bring all together⁶ an enchantment upon the still young and

^{1—1} Ficinus has “quod videlicet ita trahere audientes valeat, ut non vised sponte justitiam velint suscipere.” Perhaps he found in his MS. *ἐκόντας ἔλκειν ἀκούοντας*, to which if we add *πάντας*, preserved by Eusebius, and insert *ὥστε ποιῆν* between *πάντας* and *πάντα τὰ δίκαια*, we shall probably recover the very words of Plato, that made up one line of the Codex Archetypus.

² After *πεῖθειν* the object is evidently wanting, and something to connect this remark with the allusion to the fable of Cadmus.

^{3—3} Ficinus correctly omits *τις πεῖθειν* after *ἐπιχειρῶν*. His version, adopted by Taylor, is “quodcunque velit, persuadere.”

⁴ The words within the lunes are found only in the version of Ficinus, “Equidem ita sentio.”

^{5—5} Ficinus has “Prosequar igitur,” translated by Taylor, “I will therefore continue my discourse.”

⁶ Although *ἄπαντας* might perhaps stand, yet Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐκόντας*, similar to *ὁ χορὸς—εἰσίοι*, shortly afterwards.

tender souls of boys, and to say all the other beautiful things we have discussed, and shall still discuss. And let this be the sum of them. By saying that the same life has been pronounced by the gods to be the most pleasant, and the best, we shall, at the same time, speak with the greatest truth, and more persuade those, whom we ought to persuade, than if we assert any thing else.

Clin. We must agree to what you say.

Athen. In the first place then, the boy-choir of the Muses would most correctly enter the first, about to sing in public subjects of this kind, with all earnestness, and for the whole city. And let the second be the choir (of men) up to thirty years old calling upon the god Pæan, as a witness in behalf of the truth of what is said, and praying him to be, together with Persuasion, propitious to the youth. And it is necessary for the third to sing, consisting of those who are above thirty, and up to sixty years old; but those after that period—for they are no longer able to endure singing—are left as the tellers of stories relating to the same habits through a divine oracle.¹

Clin. Who do you mean, guest, by these third² choirs? for I do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them.

Athen. And yet these are nearly the parties, for whose sake most of the above assertions were made.

Clin. We do not yet understand. But endeavour to speak still more clearly.

[9.] *Athen.* We said, if we remember, at the beginning of our discourse, that the nature of all young persons was fiery, and unable to keep quiet either in body or voice, but that it was always speaking without order, and leaping; and that of the rest of animals not one had a sense of order in both of these things, but that the nature of man alone possessed it; and that rhythm was the name given to the order of motion, but to that of the voice, when the acute and the grave are

¹—¹ This I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, whose version, partly adopted by Taylor, is “quia non amplius de iisdem moribus fabulas poterunt decantare, dimittendos divino oraculo censemus.”

² Instead of *τρίτους* one would expect *τρεῖς*, as before *τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς*. The words *τοὺς τριτοὺς*, written in MSS. *τοὺς ᾗ*, are evidently an explanation.

mingled together, the name of harmony was addressed ;¹ and that both together are called a choir. We said too that the gods in pity have given us Apollo and the Muses as our associates in, and leaders of, the choir ; and we mentioned, if we recollect, Dionysus as the third.

Clin. How do we not remember ?

Athen. Now the choir of Apollo and the Muses have been mentioned ; and it is necessary for the third and remaining choir of Bacchus to be spoken of.

Clin. How so ? Say on. For to a person hearing on a sudden a choir of old men in honour of Dionysus it would seem very absurd, if persons, who have been born above thirty and fifty and up to sixty years old, were to join in the dance for that god.

Athen. You speak most truly. But I think there is need of a reason on these points, to show how this, taking place thus, may take place rationally.

Clin. How not ?

Athen. Are then the previous points agreed upon ?

Clin. Respecting what ?

Athen. That every man and boy, freeman and slave, female and male, and the whole city itself, should never cease singing for the whole city what we have gone through,² yet changed perpetually in some manner, and exhibiting altogether a variety, so that there may be to the singers no satiety of hymns and pleasure.³

Clin. How should it be not agreed that this ought to be done ?

Athen. Where then will the best part of the city, and which by its age together with intellect is the most persuasive of those in the state, effect the greatest good by singing the most beautiful subjects ? or shall we thus thoughtlessly omit that, which would be the chief object of songs, the most beautiful and the most useful ?

¹ The Greek is ἀρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύουτο. But the two last words are manifestly superfluous after the preceding ὄνομα εἶη, and are properly omitted by Ficinus. Ast too feels some difficulty in ὄνομα προσαγορεύεται, joined to a dative without the preposition ἐπὶ.

²⁻³ With this literal translation of the Greek original may be compared the looser version of Ficinus, "quotidie—variis modis et carminibus decantare, ut ex innumerabili hymnorum varietate inexplibili quodammodo voluptate concinentes afficiantur," where "quotidie" seems to be introduced as the translation of ἀμῶς γέπως—

Clin. But it is impossible to omit it, as¹ has been just now said.

Athen. How then would it be proper (to do)² this? Consider, if it is in this way.

Clin. In what way?

Athen. Every one on becoming rather old, is full of hesitation with respect to songs, and is less delighted³ in doing this; and when a necessity arises,³ is the more ashamed by how much the older and more modest he is. Is it not so?

Clin. It is so.

Athen. He will therefore be still more ashamed to stand up and sing in the theatre, and amongst persons of all kinds; and this too, if like the choirs that, contending for victory, are compelled, after practising their voices, to sing lean and fasting, such persons should, by singing altogether in a manner unpleasant to themselves and with feelings of shame, perform without readiness their part.

Clin. You speak of what is most necessary (to happen).

Athen. How then shall we soothe them into being ready for singing? Shall we not lay down a law, in the first place, that boys shall not taste wine at all, until they are eighteen years old? (thus) teaching them, that it is not proper⁴ to bring by a funnel fire to fire,⁴ into the body and soul, before they attempt to proceed to labours, (and) exercising a caution about the mad-like habit of young persons; but afterwards to taste indeed wine in moderation, until they are thirty years old; but that a young man is by all means to keep himself from intoxication and much wine; but on reaching forty years, to indulge freely in convivial meetings, and to call upon the other gods, and especially to invite Dionysus to the mystic rites and sports of old men,⁵ in which he kindly⁵ bestowed wine

¹ Instead of *μεθιέναι*, ὥς γε, one would prefer *μεθιέναι δι' ἃ ἔστι*—

² Ficinus has “Quomodo—decenter id fiet,” as if he had found in his MS. *δρᾶν* between *τοῦτο* and *δρᾶτε*.

³—³ The Greek is *πράττων τοῦτο καὶ ἀνάγκης γενομένης*. But Plato evidently wrote *καὶ πράττειν τοῦτο ἀνάγκης γενομένης*—

⁴—⁴ On this proverbial expression see the notes of Boeckh and Ast.

⁵—⁵ The Greek is in one MS. *ἦν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις*—But *ἄλλοις* is omitted in all the others, and by Athenæus x. p. 440, C., which might easily happen from the similarity of *ἄλλοις* and *ἀνοῖς* in MSS. I have, however, translated as if *ἄλλοις* were a corruption of *ἄλωις*, and *ἦν τοῖς* of *ἐν γ' αἰς*—for *ἦν* can neither be referred to *παιδιᾶν* singly, nor to *τελετήν* and *παιδιᾶν* jointly, nor can it thus precede *τὸν οἶνον* by way of an epexegetis, as Ast imagines.

upon man as a remedy against the austerity of old age, so that through this we might grow young again, and that, by a forgetfulness¹ of heart-sinking, the habit of the soul might become from a harder state more soft, just as iron becomes, when it is placed in the fire, and moulded thus more readily. In the first place then, will not each person, who is thus affected, be willing with more readiness (and) with less shame, not indeed amongst many, but a moderate number, nor amongst strangers, but familiar friends, to sing, and, as we have often said, to join in a song?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. To lead them then to join with us in singing, this method will not be altogether unseemly.

Clin. By no means.

[10.] *Athen.* But what voice, and what music, will these men pour forth?² Or is it not evident that it must needs be some one becoming to them?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now what will be becoming to divine men? Will it not be that of choirs?

Clin. We indeed, O guest, and these here,³ would not be able to sing any other song, than what we have learnt in the choirs, and have been accustomed to sing.

Athen. And reasonably so. For you have not in reality hit upon the most beautiful singing. For you have the polity of an army, but not of those dwelling in cities; and you keep your young men collected together in pastures, like colts, and feeding in herds. And not one of you has taken to himself his own offspring, and ⁴dragging from his fellow-feeders⁴ one that is very wild and very unmanageable,⁵ placed over him a groom, ⁶or privately⁶ educates him by rubbing him down and

¹ Instead of *δυσθυμίας λήθην* the sense requires *δυσθυμίας λήθη*—

² In lieu of *ᾄδουσιν*, Porson, on Eurip. Suppl. 932, reads *ἤσουσιν*, (for the fut. of *ᾄδω* is *ᾄσομαι*,) which Stalbaum says is probably correct.

³ From this expression it would seem that more persons were present than the speakers in the dialogue.

⁴—⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him tacitly by Taylor.

⁵ In *ἀγανακτοῦντα*, which would be properly applied to a colt, that frets, while it is being broken in, evidently lies hid, *ἀγαν ἀτακτοῦντα*, as I have translated.

⁶—⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἡ ἰδίᾳ παιδεύει*, not *ἰδίᾳ καὶ παιδεύει*.

rendering him gentle, and giving all that is suited to the bringing up of a boy; from whence he would become not only a good soldier, but able to administer a state and cities, and one who, as we said at the beginning, would be more warlike than the soldiers of Tyrtaeus, and would honour always and every where the possession of fortitude, as being the fourth, and not the first part of virtue, for the benefit of individuals and the whole state.

Clin. I do not know, guest, why you are thus again holding cheap our lawgivers.

Athen. I do so, if (so I do), by not giving my good man, my mind to that point.¹ But by what road the discourse may carry us, by that, if you are willing, we will go. For if we possess music more beautiful than that of the choirs and in the public theatres, let us endeavour to impart it to such as we said were ashamed of that music, and to seek that, which is the most beautiful, to share with them.²

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. In the first place, then, it is meet for this to be present to all things, which a certain agreeableness follows, that there be either this (the agreeableness) itself alone an object of the most serious attention,³ or a certain rectitude, or, in the third place, utility. For instance, I say, that agreeableness follows food and drink, and every kind of aliment, and this agreeableness we should call pleasure; ⁴but if it contributes to health, we denominate it rectitude and utility.⁴

Clin. Entirely so.

¹ Ficinus has "si quidem facio," from whence Stephens wished to insert *ὁρῶ* after *εἶπερ*— But both Boeckh here, and Heindorf on Parmenid. p. 138, D., have learnedly supported the ellipse. They have not, however, remarked, that, as *ἀλλ'* always precedes *εἶπερ*, we must read so here.

² In lieu of *ταύτης*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the word were *τούτοις*. Ficinus has "et aliam quærere meliorem."

³ Ficinus renders *αὐτοῦ τὸ σπουδαιότατον* by "in his alliciat sitque præcipuum."

⁴ Such is Taylor's translation of the version of Ficinus, "rectitudinem vero et utilitatem, si confert ad sanitatem." The Greek is *ἣν δὲ ὀρθότητά τε καὶ ὠφέλειαν, ὅπερ ὕγιον τῶν προσφερομένων λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε, τοῦτο αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὀρθότατον*: which I confess I cannot understand, nor, I suspect, could Ast; for he is content to give the Latin of Cornarius, which, he says, expresses the general sense—*Rectitudo vero et utilitas sita est in salubritate eorum, quæ exhibentur, et hæc est in ipsis id, quod rectissimum est.*

Athen. ¹ And that learning too does an agreeableness follow, (namely,) the pleasure, but that it is the truth which perfects the rectitude and utility, and the well and the beautifully.¹

Clin. It is so.

Athen. ² But what, in the working out of things similar, should such arts as are productive of resemblances effect this, namely, for pleasure to result from them, would it not be most just to call it, should it by following be produced, an agreeableness?²

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. But the equality rather ³ of the so great, and of the such kind,³ would, to speak universally, effect the rectitude of such things.

Clin. Right.

Athen. Hence that alone can be rightly judged of by pleasure, which works out and affords neither a certain utility, or truth, or similitude; nor, on the other hand, a hurt; but which subsists for the sake of that very thing alone, (namely,) agreeableness, which follows the other things, and which a person may most beautifully denominate pleasure, when none of those follow it.

Clin. Are you speaking of innoxious pleasure alone?

Athen. Yes; and I say that this very same (agreeableness) is sport, when it does neither an injury or a benefit worthy of serious consideration or mention.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Shall we not then assert, from what has been now said, that all imitations, and moreover all equality, ought to be judged of the least by pleasure and false opinion? For equality ⁴ would not be equality, or symmetry symmetry⁴

¹ Here again I must leave for others to ascertain the meaning of this literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has "Sic et in discendo gratia inest, quæ voluptas nominatur; rectitudo etiam et utilitas et bonus habitus atque pulcher, quæ ab ipsa veritate efficiuntur."

² Whether I have succeeded in making the meaning of Plato intelligible, I know not; but the translation, I do know, is as close to the Greek as it can be; which cannot be said of the version of Ficinus—Quid porro in artibus, quibus similia effinguntur, nonne id ipsum inspicimus? Voluptas profecto ex illis quandoque provenit, quam par est gratiam nominare."

³ Ast remarks that by "the so great," and "the such kind," are meant, what is now called abstractedly, "quantity" and "quality."

⁴ Ficinus has "æquale ipsum æquale est aut commensurabile ipsum

wholly,¹ although it appears so to some one, or some one is [not]² delighted with it; but they are so from truth, the most of all things, ³but from any thing else the least.³

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Do we not therefore say, that all music is productive of resemblances and is imitative?

Clin. How not?

Athen. When therefore any one asserts that music is to be judged of by pleasure, we must receive such an assertion the least of all, and seek in the least degree such music, as a serious thing, if, perchance, it exists any where; but that music (rather) which possesses a resemblance to the imitation of the beautiful.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. By those then, who are inquiring after the most beautiful singing and music, there ought, as it seems, to be sought not that which is pleasant, but that which is right. For the rectitude of imitation, as we said, was then, when the thing imitated is exhibited, as great and such as it is.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And surely every one will allow this with respect to music, that all its poetry is an imitation and resemblance. And this will not all poets and auditors and players allow?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. It is meet then, as it seems, for a person to know in the case of each poem, what it is, if he is about not to err in that point. For he who does not know its being, what it means, and of what it is the resemblance, will scarcely⁴ understand the rectitude or erroneousness of its intention.

Clin. Scarcely indeed; how not?

Athen. But would he, who does not know, ever be able to decide upon what is well or ill (done)? But I am not speaking very clearly; and perhaps it will be thus said more clearly.

Clin. How?

etiam commensurable;" as if he had found in his MS. αὐτὸ τὸ γε ἴσον οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ σύμμετρον.

¹ One MS. omits ὅλως. Perhaps Plato wrote ὄντως, "really"—

² Instead of μὴ, omitted by Ficinus, and at variance with the train of thought, Boeckh would read καί—

³— The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has "sed nullo alio quam virtute sola."

⁴ Literally, "at leisure." On this use of σχολῆ see at the Sophist, § 39.

[11.] *Athen.* There are surely numberless resemblances, as regards the sight.

Clin. Yes.

Athen. What then, if any one in these cases does not know what each of the imitated bodies is, would he ever know whether it is worked out correctly? I speak of some such thing as this, for instance, whether it has the joints¹ of the body, and the positions of each of the parts of the body, and how many are (the joints), and of what kind, when placed near to what kind, have (the parts) received their fitting arrangement, and moreover their colours and shapes; or whether all these are worked out in a confused manner. Do you think that any one can at all know these particulars, who does not know what is the animal imitated?

Clin. How should he?

Athen. But what, if any one knows that the thing painted, or modelled is a man, and that it has received all its parts, colours, and shapes from art, is it not necessary for a person knowing these facts, to know readily that too, whether it is beautiful, or whether it is in any respect wanting in beauty?

Clin. We should all of us, so to say, O guest, have known the beautiful points in animals.²

Athen. You speak with perfect propriety. Is it not then necessary for a person who is about to be an intelligent judge, to possess these three things, as regards every representation both in painting and music and every where?³ In the first place, to know what the thing is; then that it is⁴ rightly; and then thirdly, that whatever it be of representations, it is worked out well in words and melodies and rhythms?⁴

¹ In lieu of ἀριθμοὺς Heindorf suggested ῥυθμοὺς; but Boeckh understands by ἀριθμοὺς "the numbers and proportions," while Ast explains it by "the measures." Since, however, Ficinus has "articulos," he found, no doubt, in his MS. ἀρθμοὺς, what Plato probably wrote.

² By ζῶων Ast understands here, as in Politic. p. 277, C. § 19, a painted animal.

³ Ficinus has "sive quomocunque aliter fiat," as if his MS. had καὶ ὁποῦν ἄλλῃ, instead of πάντῃ.

⁴—⁴ Since ὁρθῶς and εὖ are synonymous, one of those words is evidently wrong. Taylor translates, "that it possesses rectitude." Plato wrote, I suspect, ἐπειτα ὡς ὁρθή ἐστι τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτισοῦν· ἐπειθ' ὡς, τὸ τρίτον, εὖ εἰργασται πᾶν χρωμασί τε καὶ μέλει καὶ τοῖς ἀρθμοῖς, where colours would refer to painting, melodies to music, and joinings, similar to the "callida junctura" in Horace, to writings and other arts.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. Let us then be not faint-hearted in speaking of music in what point it is difficult. For since it has been bruited beyond the other representations, it requires of all representations the greatest caution. For a person erring in this, will be injured in the greatest degree by receiving kindly¹ depraved manners; and it is most difficult to perceive them, through poets being inferior to the Muses themselves. For these would never err so much as, in composing² the words of men, to give the figure³ and melody of women; and on the other hand in putting together the melody and gestures of freemen, to fit them for the rhythms³ of slaves and the not free; or, in taking as a subject the rhythms and gestures of a freeman, to assign a melody or words contrary to the rhythms. Moreover, they would never place together the voices of beasts and men, and instruments, and every kind of noise, as imitating one certain thing. But human poets, interweaving things of this kind very much, and mixing them together irrationally,⁴ would produce a laugh amongst men, such, as Orpheus says, "have obtained by lot the season of delight."⁵ For the poets perceive⁶ all these things mingled together; and moreover they tear away rhythm and figures⁷ apart from melody, put-

¹ Since φιλοφρονεῖσθαι is not elsewhere said of things, there is probably a word wanting here. Ficinus has "sub ejus suavitate malos imbibat mores."

²⁻³ The Greek is ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ σχῆμα γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι. But as Ficinus has "colorem mulierum," answering to χρῶμα in all the MSS. but the one used by Aldus, Plato wrote, perhaps, τὰ ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ χρῶμα—"the language, and colour, and melody." For ῥήμασι—σχῆμα—μέλη are found in ii. § 5, unless it be said that ῥήματα is a corruption of δράματα.

³ Instead of ῥυθμοῦς, the syntax and sense require ῥυθμοῖς.

⁴⁻⁵ Ficinus has "hujusmodi multa perturbate et sine ratione commiscent," as if he had found in his MS. πολλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, with ἐμπλήκοντες omitted.

⁵ To Orpheus then is probably to be referred the definition of man, as a laughing animal; although, according to Homer, even the gods indulged in "unextinguished laughter," when they beheld Vulcan with his lame foot acting as their cup-bearer. On this fragment of Orpheus see Lobeck's *Aglaophamus*, i. p. 339, and ii. p. 947.

⁶ I cannot understand ὀρῶσι, nor could De Grou, who suggested δρῶσι—Plato wrote, I suspect, not γὰρ ὀρῶσι, but παρορῶσι, "overlook—"

⁷ Twining, on Aristotle's *Poetics*, n. 5, proposes to read ῥήματα, μέλους χωρὶς, "words, apart from melody;" and observes, that by λόγοι ψιλοὶ are meant "words without melody," not, as elsewhere, "words in prose."

ting naked words into measures, and, on the other hand, melody and rhythm without words, and employing the playing the harp and the hautboy nakedly;¹ from which it is very difficult to know what rhythm and harmony mean without words, and to which of the imitations,² worthy of mention, they are similar. But it is necessary to understand that every thing of this kind is full of rusticity,³ as much as it loves swiftness and not stumbling,³ and the voice of wild beasts, so as to make use of playing on the hautboy and the harp, except for dancing and singing. But to use either of those instruments unaccompanied with words, would be wholly a non-musical education, and a wonder-exciting act. In this way such assertions have a reason. And we are considering not only that persons of thirty years old, and those even beyond fifty, ought to make use of the Muses, but in what they ought. This then, for such reasons, does the discourse seem to me to point out to us respecting the music of choirs, that those who are fifty years old, and for whom it is suited to sing, ought to be better instructed (than the others).⁴ For they must necessarily possess a proper sensation and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. Or how shall any one know the rectitude of melodies, and for what the Doric⁵ harmony is proper or improper, and of rhythm, which the poet has united to it, whether it is right, or not?

Clin. It is evident he cannot by any means.

Athen. But the numerous common people are ridiculous in thinking that they sufficiently know what is well harmonized, and in proper rhythm, and what is not so; such (at least) as have been compelled to sing and walk in rhythm. But as they do each of these things ignorantly, they do not reason upon them. Now every melody, when it has what is fitting, is in a proper state; but (when it has) what is not fitting, it is in an erring one.

¹ i. e. "without any words."

² Ast suggests, in lieu of τῶν μιμημάτων, "imitations," τῶν μιμητῶν, "things imitated."

³—³ Such is the literal version of the nonsensical Greek, ὁπόσον τάχους τε καὶ ἀπραισίας, where Ast would read ἀπνευστίας, or προήσεως, or ἀπαυστίας, all of which are to myself at least equally unintelligible, and so is Orelli's ἀποράσεως. What Plato wrote might perhaps be recovered by a bold conjectural critic.

⁴ Ficinus supplies here "cæteris—"

⁵ On the Doric harmony see Rep. iii. § 10.

Clin. Most necessarily so.

Athen. What then, will the person, not knowing what it possesses, know, as we have said,¹ how it is in a proper state in any way and at any time?

Clin. What plan is there (for so doing)?

[12.] *Athen.* This then, as it appears, we have now again discovered, that those singers, whom we are now calling upon, and, after a fashion, compel to sing voluntarily, ought from necessity to be disciplined thus far, as to be able each of them to follow the progressions of the rhythms, and the chords of the melodies, in order that, by perceiving the harmonies and the rhythms, they may be able to choose such as are fit to be sung by persons of such an age, and of such a kind, and who may sing thus, and by singing may themselves be immediately innocently delighted, and become the leaders to an adoption of good manners, suited to younger persons; and being educated to this point, they would take into their hands a share of that more accurate discipline, which has reference to the multitude, and is conversant about poets themselves. For, it is by no means necessary for a composer to know the third point, whether the imitation is beautiful or not. But it is nearly necessary (to know) that which relates to harmony and rhythm; but for those (the elders) to know all the three, for the sake of choosing the most beautiful, and the second, or else never to become a sufficient enchanter of young persons towards the acquisition of virtue. And thus, what our discourse intended at the beginning, namely to exhibit a well-spoken support in favour of the choir of Bacchus, it has spoken to the best of our power. But let us consider whether this has taken place in this manner. For such an assembly does of necessity ever happen to become tumultuous through the drinking going forward to a higher point, as we supposed at the beginning of our discourse it would necessarily do, ²as regards those of the present time.³

Clin. It is necessary it should.

¹ Instead of *ὅτι περ*, Bekker suggests *ὅπερ*, which he got from "ut" in Ficinus. He should have suggested *ὃ τὸ πρὶν*—

²⁻³ This I cannot understand, nor could Ast, who has adopted *λεγομένων*, found in Eusebius, in lieu of *γιγνομένων*. Perhaps in *περὶ τῶν νῦν γιγνομένων* lies hid *περὶ τῶν οἶνον γανυμένων*, "as regards those delighted with wine." On the confusion of *γιγνόμενος* and *γανόμενος*, see at i. § 15.

Athen. And every one becoming lighter than himself is elevated and joyous, and is filled with a freedom of speech, and with the not-listening at such a time to his neighbour, but considers himself sufficient to have a command over himself and the rest.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Did we not say, that, when this takes place, the souls of the drinkers, becoming warmed, are rendered, like iron, more soft and juvenile? so that they are easily led by a person able and knowing how to instruct and mould them, as when they were young, and that this moulder is the same as he, who was then said to be a good lawgiver, from whom there ought to be laws for convivial drinking, competent (to restrain)¹ the person who had become full of confidence and bold and more impudent than is proper, and unwilling to endure a regulation, and the turn for silence and talking and drinking and music; (and so to instruct him,)² that he is willing to do every thing the contrary to those acts; and (laws) also competent to send, together with justice, a fear the most honourable, which is to fight against a confidence not honourable, whilst it is advancing; which divine fear we have denominated modesty and shame.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. [And we said] that there are guardians and fellow-fabricators of these laws, the cool and sober leaders of those not sober; without whom it is more difficult to fight against drunkenness than against enemies without cool leaders; and that the person³ unable to be willing³ to obey these and the leaders of Dionysus, upwards of sixty years old, suffers an equal or even⁴ a greater disgrace than the person, who disobeys the leaders of Mars.

¹ ² Ficinus alone has preserved some words requisite for the sense, "cohibere, atque ita instruere ut," in Greek *κωλύειν παιδεύειν θ' ὥστε*—which may have been lost between *ὑπομένειν* and *ἰθίλειν*, where they made up one line of the Codex Archetypus, consisting of twenty-one letters. See at § 4, p. 52, n. ⁵, and § 8, p. 61, n. ¹.

³ ³ The Greek is *μη δυνάμενον ἰθίλειν παῖθασθαι*. But as the will is that feeling of the mind over which there is no control, Ficinus has omitted *δυνάμενον* in his version, "si quis autem neque obtemperare velit," and so after him has Taylor. Perhaps Plato wrote *μη δυνάμενον ἢ ἰθίλοντα*, "not able or willing—"

⁴ Ficinus has "aequale vel etiam majus," in Greek *ἴσην ἢ καὶ μείζω*, not *ἴσην καὶ μείζω*—

Clin. Right.

Athen. If then there were such drunkenness and such sport, such fellow-drinkers, by being benefited and friends more than before, would not be separated from each other, nor enemies as at present; but having formed their whole association according to law, they would follow, whenever the sober should ¹ come and lead ¹ the not sober.

Clin. Certainly; if the (sport) were such as you now speak of.

[13.] *Athen.* Let us then not blame that part² of the gift of Bacchus simply, that it is an evil, and not worthy to be received into a state. For one might go on and say much more still, since³ it is the greatest blessing which he gives. ⁴There is a fear of speaking before the many, through men improperly taking it up, and knowing it when spoken.⁴

Clin. What is that good?

Athen. A certain tale and rumour is somehow floating secretly, that this god had the intellect of his mind⁵ scattered by his step-mother Juno;⁶ on which account he did, to avenge himself, introduce the Bacehic rites, and the whole of the mad choir; from whence he gave for this purpose likewise wine. But things of this kind I leave for those to say, who think they can assert them with safety respecting the gods. But thus much I know, that every animal is not born with

¹—¹ The Greek is *ὅποτε ἀφίκοντο* in six MSS. Ficinus has “ducentibus sobriis,” from whence Stephens elicited *ἀφηγείντο*, but Ast more correctly, *ὑφηγείντο*— I have translated as if Plato had written *ἀφίκοντο καὶ ὑφηγείντο*—

² I cannot understand what is meant by *ἑκείνῳ γε*— There is an error here, which I could, if needful, correct very easily.

³ Before “since,” says Ast, must be supplied “let us pass it by in silence.” But such an ellipse would be inadmissible here, where the speaker, after confessing his fear of mentioning something before the multitude, actually proceeds to lay open his mind. Here again I could easily restore what the author wrote.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is *λέγειν μὲν*— But *μὲν* could not thus stand by itself without *οὖν*, even admitting, with Ast, that it could without its corresponding *δέ*. Moreover, the subsequent *τὸ ποῖον* requires not *αὐτὸ*, but *τοῦτο*.

⁵ As the expression, *τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν γνῶμην* is not, I believe, to be found elsewhere in Greek, I should prefer *τὴν ῥώμην*, similar to “strength of mind” in English. On the confusion of *γνῶμη* and *ῥώμη* see my note on Prom. 535.

⁶ The earliest allusion to the madness of Dionysus is in Eurip. Cycl. 3.

such and so much intelligence as is suited to it, when perfectly grown; but that, during the time in which it has not yet obtained its proper intelligence, every animal is mad, and cries out in no order; and ¹when any one slays it rapidly, it again leaps without order.¹ But let us recollect that we said these were the principles of the musical and gymnastic arts.

Clin. We recollect it. How not?

Athen. And did we not say too, that this principle imparted to us men the sense of rhythm and harmony, and that Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus were the causes of gods?¹

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. And wine too, it seems, the account of the others says, was given as a punishment for men, in order that we might become mad. But what has been now stated by us shows, on the contrary, that it was given as a medicine, for the sake of the soul acquiring shame, and the body health and strength.

Clin. You have brought, very beautifully, O guest, the story to our recollection.

Athen. And now let the half of the subject respecting the choir be held to be gone through. Shall we go through the (other) half, how it seems to be, or omit it?

Clin. What parts are you speaking of; and how do you divide each of them?

Athen. The whole of the choir was with us the whole of education. But of this one part consists in rhythms and harmonies according to the voice.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. But the other, according to the movement of the

¹—¹ Such is Taylor's translation of the then common text, *ἄνθρωπος ἀποκτείνῃ αὐτὸ τάχιστα, ἀράκτως πηδᾷ*, and this is his note on the passage: "viz. in another life; for the soul carries with it into another the habits and manners which it possessed in the present life." Since his day, the reading in all the MSS. is, *ἀκραίνῳσι αὐτὸ*, similar to which Ficinus has, "et fastu elatum lasciviensque salit." Schneider suggested *ἀπακταίνῃ* or *ἀπακτάνῃ*. Ast prefers *ἀκραίνῃ τις, αὐτὸ τάχιστα—πηδᾷ*, for he saw that *αὐτὸ* would make nonsense here. Winckelmann would read *ἀποκναίσῃ αὐτὸ*, "weary itself down." But of an animal that had wearied itself, Plato would not have said that it *ἀράκτως πηδᾷ*. What the author really wrote still remains to be discovered.

² Instead of *θεῶν αἰτίους*, found in all the MSS., Ficinus has "duces ad hæc," from whence Stephens elicited *τούτων*, adopted by Ast. From the two we might make *τούτων τῶν ἰθῶν*, "of these customs."

body, had a rhythm in common with the movement of the voice, but a figure peculiar to itself; but there (in the former part) melody is the movement of the voice.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. The things then pertaining to the voice, (and extending) as far as the soul, for the discipline of virtue, we have, I know not after what manner, denominated music.

Clin. They were rightly called so.

Athen. But the things pertaining to the body, which we called a dancing of those in sport, if such a movement should extend as far as the virtue of the body, we denominated the artistic leading of it to a thing of this kind, the gymnastic art.

Clin. Most rightly.

Athen. ¹Let then that portion of the musical art, which we have just now said we have gone through, as the half of dancing, and has been brought to an end, be held to have been spoken of.¹ But of the other half shall we speak? Or, in what manner and by what road must we proceed?

Clin. O thou most excellent man, who art conversing with Cretans and Lacedæmonians, (say,) since we have gone through the subject relating to the musical art, but are deficient in that relating to the gymnastic, what do you think either of us ought to reply to this question?

Athen. I would say that you have by putting this question nearly answered it clearly; and I understand that this, although a question, is for the present, as I have said, both an answer, and moreover a command to go through the points relating to the gymnastic art.

Clin. You understand me excellently well; and now act in this way.

Athen. And act I must; for it is not very difficult to speak about things known to both of you; for in this very art you have a greater share of skill than in that (of music).

Clin. You speak nearly the truth.

[14.] *Athen.* Is not then the principle of this very sport, that every animal is naturally accustomed to leap? But man,

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "De musica quidem, quam mediam choreæ partim diximus, satis actum putavimus; atque ita de ea sit dictum:" which Taylor has tacitly adopted. It is certainly preferable to the Greek, where I confess I cannot see the difference in sense between *διεληγυθῆναι* and *διαπεπράνθαι*.

as we have said, receiving a sense of rhythm, has begotten and brought forth dancing; ¹but melody, putting him in mind of, and exciting, rhythm,¹ these two have, by their connexion with each other, brought forth dancing and sport.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. One portion of this, we say, we have already gone through; but the other we will endeavour to go through in order.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then first put a Colophon² (finish) to the use³ of drunkenness, if it seems good to you likewise.

Clin. ⁴Of what kind of person, and whom⁴ are you speaking?

Athen. If any state shall make use of⁵ the pursuit lately mentioned, as being a serious thing,⁵ by law and with order, ⁶employing it as an exercise⁶ in behalf of temperance, and shall not keep itself from the rest of pleasures, in like manner, and for the same reason, by devising a plan for the sake of subduing them, after this manner it may use all these. But (if it uses them) as a sport, and it shall be lawful for any one to drink, both when he pleases, and with whom he pleases, in combination with any other pursuit whatever, I would not give my vote in this way, that it is meet for that state, or that individual to make use at any time of drunkenness; but I would give it much more to the law of the Carthaginians than to the custom of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, namely, that no one, when in camp, is to taste of that drink, but to exist upon water during all that period; and that in the city neither a male or female slave

¹—¹ Ast would read τὸ δὲ μέλος ὑπομνησκοντος καὶ ἐγείροντος τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ—“but rhythm putting him in mind of melody and exciting—” For, says he, if man, already imbued with a perception of rhythm, discovered dancing, how could rhythm be said to be excited by melody?

² On the proverb “to put a Colophon,” i. e. a finish, see at Euthyd. § 15.

³ In lieu of χορεία, Cornarius suggested χρεία, found subsequently in four MSS. One, however, has χρήσει, which seems preferable.

⁴—⁴ Instead of ποῖον—καὶ τίνα, where the allusion to a person seems out of place, Ficinus has more correctly “Quonam pacto—”

⁵—⁵ The Greek is ὡς οὐσης σπουδῆς τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τῷ νῦν εἰρημένῳ. But as οὐσης σπουδῆς is without regimen, for a genitive absolute would be here inadmissible, Plato wrote, no doubt, οὐση σπουδῇ, similar to ὡς παιδιᾷ just afterwards. And so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version, “tanquam re seria, computationibus,” adopted literally by Taylor.

⁶—⁶ A MS. of Eusebius, Præp. Ev. xii. p. 598, C., has correctly, μελέτη, instead of μελίτης: while χρωμένη is no less correctly omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

should ever taste it, nor magistrates during the year of their office, nor pilots, nor judges, engaged in business, should taste wine at all; nor any one, who goes to any council to deliberate upon any matter of moment, neither in the day-time at all, unless for the sake of bodily exercise or disease; nor at night, when any man, or even a woman, are thinking of begetting children. And many other cases a person might mention, in which wine ought not to be drunk by those, who possess a mind and correct laws; so that, according to this reasoning, there is to no state any need of many vineyards,¹ but other kinds of field-works should be ordained, and the whole of diet: but those relating to wine should be nearly of all the most moderate in kind and the least in number. And let this, if it seems good to you, O guests, be held to be said as the Colophon to the discourse relating to wine.

Clin. It is beautifully (said), and it does seem good to us.

BOOK III.

[1.] ²THUS much then on this point. But shall we say what was the commencement of civil government? Would not any one see it from hence in the easiest and best manner?

Clin. From whence?

Athen. From whence he might behold the progress of states marching³ continually to virtue and to vice.

Clin. From whence do you say?

Athen. I conceive, from a length and infinity⁴ of time, and from the mutations in it.

¹ In lieu of ἀμπέλων, Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, found in his MS. ἀμπελώνων, as shown by his version "vineis," and so it is quoted by Eusebius.

² From this commencement it is evident that Plato did not himself divide the dialogue into books.

³ In lieu of μεταβαίνουσιν Boeckh correctly suggested, what Ast has adopted, μεταβαινουσών, referring to Arist. Polit. iv. 5, τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν: and to Proclus on the Timæus, ii. p. 88, πολιτείας γὰρ ἀρχὴν ζητήσας, ἀφ' ἧς εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ κακίαν μεταβαίνουσιν αἱ πόλεις, where this very passage is alluded to.

⁴ The words τε καὶ ἀπειρίας seem unnecessary after χρόνου μήκουσ,

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Come (tell me), do you seem to have ever conceived what a length of time has elapsed, since cities and ¹men have been formed into polities?¹

Clin. This is by no means easy.²

Athen. It would however be something endless, and impossible (to be told).

Clin. Yes, this very much so.

Athen. Have not myriads upon myriads of states existed during this period? and, ³through the same ratio of the length (of time)³ have there not been destroyed no fewer in number? and have they not every where been often under every kind of polity? and at one time become greater from less, and at another less from greater, and worse from better, and better from worse?

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. Let us then lay hold, if we can, of the cause of this change; for perhaps it would show us the first birth of polities, and their altered state.⁴

Clin. You speak well. It is then necessary for you to be ready to show, what you are thinking about them, and for us to follow.

Athen. Do the stories of old appear to you to possess any truth?

Clin. Of what kind?

Athen. That there have been frequent destructions of the human race through deluges and diseases and many other events, in which some small family of mankind was left.

Clin. Every thing of this kind must be very probable to every one.

Athen. Come then, let us consider one (of these destructions) to which alone is referable the subsequent *ἐν τῇ τοιούτῃ*. Perhaps Plato, *καὶ τῶν διὰ γε ἀπειρίας μεταβολῶν*, i. e. "and the changes through the want of skill, during that period."

¹—¹ Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has "civilesque hominum institutiones ceperunt."

² Instead of *ῥᾶν* Ficinus found in his MS. *ῥᾶδιον*. For his version is, "facile."

³—³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, who has merely "totidemque destructos."

⁴ The MSS. vary between *μεταβολὴν* and *μετάβασιν*: which lead to *μετάστασιν*, as I have translated.

out of many, (namely) that which took place through a deluge.

Clin. Considering what about it?

Athen. That those, who then escaped the destruction, were nearly some¹ hill-shepherds, preserved on the tops (of mountains),² like some slight fire-preserving (embers) of the human race.

Clin. It is evidently so.

Athen. Now such as these must surely of necessity have been ignorant of the rest of the arts and contrivance of those in cities towards each other, with respect to cupidity and a love of quarrel,³ and whatever other deeds of ill they had in their thoughts against each other.³

Clin. It is likely.

Athen. Let us suppose then that the inhabited cities, which were in the plains and on the sea-coast, were at that time entirely destroyed.

Clin. Let us suppose it.

Athen. Shall we not say then, that all instruments were destroyed, and that, if any thing connected with art, either in politics or any other wisdom, had been carefully discovered, all such were lost at that period?

Clin. For how, O most excellent man, if these things had remained through the whole time, as they are placed in order at present, could any thing new whatever have been invented by any one whatever?⁴ ⁵Because ten thousand times ten thousand years lay hid from persons then.⁵ But there have been a thousand or twice as many years, since some things have been made known by Dædalus, others by Orpheus, and others by Palamedes; while those relating to music have become

¹ In lieu of *τινες*, "some," one would prefer *πάντες*, "all," on account of *σχεδόν*, "nearly."

² Ficinus alone has "in montium cacuminibus."

³⁻³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, whose "and other base ends," is the version of "*ceterasque adversus alios astutias*" in Ficinus.

⁴ From "*quicquam alicui*" in Ficinus, Stephens fancied he found in his MS. *ὅτι οὐν ὀρφοῦν*, but Boeckh *ὅτι οὐν τῷ*—

⁵⁻⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I am quite in the dark; and so is Boeckh, who endeavours to throw some light on the passage by supplying something which he supposes to have been lost, but which Ast rejects without being able to solve the difficulties of the text.

so by Marsyas and Olympus, and, as regards the lyre, by Amphion; and very many other things by others, so to say, but yesterday and the day before.

Athen. Know you not, Clinias, that you have omitted your friend, who was really of yesterday?

Clin. Do you mean Epimenides?

Athen. Yes, him. For he has leaped far over all amongst you in his contrivance, which Hesiod had formerly, my friend, divined in word, but he has in reality accomplished, as ye assert.

Clin. We do assert it.

[2.] *Athen.* Let us then assert, that, when that destruction took place, human affairs had then a solitude¹ infinitely terrible; that there was a very great part of the earth ungrudged;² and that the other animals having perished, there were some herds of oxen, and a race of goats, if perchance it happened to have survived,³ and these too rare to live for those feeding then at the commencement.³

Clin. How not?

Athen. But of a state, and polity, and legislation, to which our conversation has now turned,⁴ do we think there was any, so to say, any recollection at all?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. From those people then so situated all the present

¹ To the horrors of solitude Cowper alludes, when he feigns Alexander Selkirk, the real Robinson Crusoe of De Foe, to say—

Oh, Solitude, where are the charms

That sages have seen in thy face?

Better live in the midst of alarms,

Than reign in this horrible place:

where in the word “sages” he had an eye to Zimmermann’s work on Solitude.

² This is the literal version of the Greek, γῆς δ’ ἀφθόρου πλῆθος πάμπαν. Ficinus has “fertilium agrorum magnitudinem desertam.” Taylor, “a prodigious part of the earth was unprolific.”

³—³ Here again a literal translation will best show how unintelligible is the Greek, σπάνια καὶ ταῦτα νέμονται εἶναι ζῆν τότε κατ’ ἀρχάς: where to support the syntax Ast says that ζῆν depends upon σπάνια. Ficinus, no doubt finding himself at a loss, has “caprarumque genus, et illud quidem rarum relictum fuisse, quibus pascendis tunc homines vitam agebant.”

⁴ Instead of παρέστηκεν I have translated as if the Greek were περιέστηκεν.

things did not arise, namely, cities and politics and arts and laws and much of vice and much of virtue.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Think we, O wonderful man, that the persons of that time, who were inexperienced in many beautiful things relating to cities,¹ and many too of a contrary kind, had become perfect as regards either virtue or vice?

Clin. You speak well, and we understand what you say.

Athen. As time then went on, and our race multiplied, all things advanced to [all]² their present state.

Clin. Most right.

Athen. But, as is probable, not suddenly, but by little, during some very long period.

Clin. And this too is very likely.

Athen. For there was a fear, I think, tingling³ in all, of coming down from their high ground to the plain.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Did they not with delight behold each other, through the fewness⁴ in things about that time?⁴ For the means of going to each other at that period by land or sea, were nearly all, so to say, lost together with the arts; hence it was not, I think,⁵ very possible for them to mingle with each other. For iron and brass and all metals had disappeared confused together; so that there was every want of means for them to be purified,⁶ and they had a scarcity (of means) in felling timber. For if any instrument had by chance been preserved in the mountains, these had by rapidly wearing away disappeared; and no others were about to be made, before the art of metallurgy had returned again to man.

¹ Ficinus has "cives," by an error, for "urbes," adopted by Taylor.

² Ficinus properly omits *πάντα* between *εἰς* and *τὰ νῦν*; but has "ad eum, quem nunc videmus, habitum." Perhaps Plato wrote *πάντα πάντῃ*, "all in all ways," similar to *πάν παντί* in § 1.

³ Instead of *ἐναυλος*, "tingling in the ears," so well explained by Ruhmkon on Timæus, p. 100, Plato wrote, I suspect, *συναυλος*, "fellow-dweller."

⁴ Here too a literal translation is the true touchstone of the text; where the letters *περὶ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον* have been wilfully altered from others, which it would be easy to recover; and at the same time to re-arrange the different members of the sentences, so as to meet the acute objections of Boeckh.

⁵ Ficinus omits *οἷμαι*.

⁶ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "ut inveniri et in lucem erui non possent."

Clin. How could it?

Athen. But in how many generations afterwards think we did this take place?

Clin. It is evident, in a great many.

Athen. Would not then the arts that require iron and brass, and all things of that kind, have disappeared for the same and even a longer time at that period?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Dissension then together with war was at that time dead every where.¹

Clin. How so?

Athen. In the first place, they loved and had a friendly feeling towards each other, on account of their solitude; and then their food was not an object of contention; for of pastures there was no scarcity—except perhaps to some at the beginning—on which they lived for the most part at that time; for they were not at all in want of milk and flesh; and besides, by hunting they obtained food, neither indifferent (in kind) nor little (in quantity). Moreover, they had plenty of clothing, and beds, and dwellings, and utensils, for fire or not. For the earth-moulding and weaving arts did not require iron at all. And ²a god gave to man these arts to procure all those things,² in order that, when at any time they might fall into a difficulty of this kind, ³the race of man might have a shooting up and an improvement.³ Through some such means persons at that time were not very poor, nor had they, compelled by poverty, any differences with each other. But neither would they ever have become rich, being without silver and gold, ⁴which was then present in them.⁴ Now in any association, where neither riches nor poverty dwell, in this manners nearly the most just will exist. For neither inso-

¹ So Taylor translates πολλαχῇ. But that would be in Greek πανταχῇ. Ficinus omits the word entirely, as being here unintelligible. Perhaps Plato wrote τὰ τ' ἄλλ' ἐχθρῇ, "and the rest of enmities."

² Ficinus has "hæc omnia dei nutu consequimur," as if he had supplied what was wanting in his MS.

³ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "propagari genus humanum possit."

⁴ The words within numerals Ficinus no doubt omitted, as being unintelligible; and so, after him, has Taylor. The sense required seems to be, "for the metals, which then existed, it was not for them to find;" in Greek, δὲ γὰρ τὰ τ' ἦν, οὐκ ἐκείνοις παρῇν εὑρεῖν, corrupted into δὲ τὰ τ' ἐν ἐκείνοις παρῇν.

lence nor injustice, neither emulation nor envy, are produced there. Through these causes, and their so-called simplicity, they were good. For whatever they heard to be beautiful or base, they thought, through being of simple manners, it was said so most truly, and were persuaded. For no one, through his wisdom, knew to suspect an untruth, as at present; but, conceiving all that was said about gods and men to be true, they lived in this manner; and hence they were altogether such, as we have just now described them.

Clin. Both to me and to this person here such seems to be the case.

[3.] *Athen.* Shall we then not assert,¹ that many generations, both of those prior to the deluge and of those at present living in this manner, are likely to be less skilful and less learned as regards the other arts, and those too of war, such as exist at present by land and sea; and such, as in the case of a city being called only there² law-trials and seditions, contrive both by words and deeds every plan for doing evil and injustice towards each other? but that they were more simple and brave, and at the same time more temperate, and in every respect more just? Now of these things we have already detailed the cause.

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. Let then this be held to have been said by us; and let all that still follows upon this be said for the sake of understanding what need of laws there was to persons of that period, and who was their lawgiver.

Clin. You have spoken well.

Athen. Were they then neither in want of legislators, nor was there wont to be any matter of such a kind at that time? For surely to those existing at that portion of the period there were not writings, but they lived following the customs and the spoken³ laws of their ancestors.

¹ Instead of *εἰπωμεν*, one MS. reads *εἴπομεν*, similar to "diximus" in Ficinus. The two lead to *εἴπομεν ἂν*—

² I cannot understand *αὐτοῦ*; nor could Stephens, who suggested *αὐτὸ*, which Ast correctly says has no meaning. Perhaps Plato wrote *νόμον αὐτοῦ δίκαιαι στάσεις λεγόμεναι*, "the so-called just stations of law itself," where lies hid an Iambic verse, *Αὐτοῦ δίκαιαι λεγόμεναι στάσεις νόμον*. Or we may read *καταστάσεις*, as in § 6, p. 684, B.

³ The *λεγόμενοι νόμοι* mean here the same as the *ἄγραφα νόμιμα*, οὓς πατέριους νόμους ἐκονομάζουσι, in Legg. vii. 4, p. 793, A. Ficinus, appa-

¹ *Clin.* It is probable. But the manner of their polity do you know well what it was?

Athen. This.

Clin. What?¹

Athen. All appear to me to call the polity subsisting at that period, a dynasty, which even now exists in many places, both amongst the Greeks and Barbarians. And even Homer speaks some where of it as taking place in the administration of the Cyclopes, saying, (Od. ix. 12,)

“ Meetings, that counsel bring, to them are not,
Nor legal judges. On the high hill-tops
They dwell, or in the hollow cave; and each
To wife and children gives the law, nor care
Aught have they of each other.”

Clin. This poet of yours appears to have been a graceful one; for we have gone through some other pieces of his, very clever, but not many of them; for we Cretans do not make a very great use of foreign poems.

Megil. But we do on the other hand make use of them. And he seems to excel poets of this kind; although he does not describe every where a Laconic, but rather an Ionic, life. At present indeed he appears to testify fairly to your language, mythologically referring the ancient state of mankind² to a savage life.

Athen. So he does testify; and let us receive him, as pointing out that polities of this kind did once upon a time exist.

Clin. Well (said).

Athen. Is it not then from those, who were dispersed by single families and races through the want arising from those destructions, amongst whom the oldest bears sway on account of the authority having come from the father and mother, that following them, as birds³ do, persons will form

rently not aware of this, omitted the word λεγομένοις; which Grynæus, however, reintroduced, and hence Taylor has “as they were called.”

¹ I have followed the arrangement of the speeches found in Ficinus; but in lieu of ἡδὲ καὶ, which are unintelligible, substituted ἡδὲ καὶ εἰ.

² In lieu of αὐτῶν Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἄνθρωπων, as shown by his version, “hominum,” adopted by Taylor.

³ The mention of birds seems rather strange here. For all birds are not gregarious. There is evidently some error in ὄρνιθες, which it would not be difficult to correct.

one herd, and under their fathers' laws be governed by kingly rule, which is the most just of all?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And after this, more of them come together to a common spot, and form larger cities; and betaking themselves to agriculture, first at the foot of hills they make certain enclosures of thorns, as defensive walls against wild beasts, and thus establish one common and large dwelling.

Clin. It is probable that this occurs.

Athen. But is not this also probable?

Clin. What?

Athen. That, while these larger dwellings are increasing from the less and original ones, each of the small would remain,¹ having, according to the race, the oldest person as its ruler, and, through living separate from each other, its own peculiar customs, and different from different parents and bringers-up, and which have been accustomed to be, as regards the gods and themselves, the more modest in the case of the more modest, and more manly in that of the more manly; and thus according to reason, each one, after stamping his own edicts² on his children and children's children, would come, as we said, to the greater community, bringing their own peculiar laws.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Moreover it is surely necessary for each to be pleased with their own laws (first),³ and afterwards with those of the others.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. We appear then to be unconsciously walking, as it were, in the commencement of legislation.

Clin. Entirely so.

[4.] *Athen.* After this then, it is necessary for those, who thus come together to choose some among themselves in com-

¹ Instead of *παρῖναι* the sense requires *περιῖναι*, as I have translated.

² The Greek is *ἀναρρήσεις*, "takings off." Ast suggests *ἀνευρήσεις*, "discoveries," or *αἰρέσεις*, "choice in living," to which Orelli would prefix *ἀει*, not *ἀν*, as stated by Stalb. Winckelmann prefers Ast's *ἀνευρήσεις*. I have therefore translated as if Plato wrote *ἀναρρήσεις*, "edicts," literally "proclamations." Ficinus has been content with the general sense. His version is "et in ceteris omnibus, prout singuli filios aut nepotes eruderunt, quorum ritus, quasi leges proprias, ad maiorem habitationem ferunt."

³ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "in primis" to answer to "afterwards."

mon, who, after inspecting the laws of all, shall lay open such of them as they most approve of in common before the rulers and leaders of the wards,¹ as before kings, and enable them to make a choice; and these would be called legislators; and after appointing their magistrates and making out of the dynasties an aristocratical or kingly government, they would dwell in such a change of polity.

Clin. This would in this way take place in due order.

Athen. Let us then speak of a third form of polity as occurring, in which all the forms and accidents of polities and at the same time of cities happen to exist together.

Clin. Of what kind is this?

Athen. That, which Homer likewise has pointed out, as having taken the third place after the second (Il. xx. 216).

“He built Dardania; for Ilion holy
Was in the plain, not yet a city made
For voice-dividing men; but still they dwelt
Below Mount Ida with its many rills.

For he pronounces these verses, and those which he said respecting the Cyclopes, as having been spoken somehow divinely and naturally. For the race of poets being divine does enthusiastically² handle the hymnings on many events which have truly happened, in conjunction with some of the Graces and Muses.

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Let us then now proceed onwards,³ a fable having just now come upon us;⁴ for, perhaps, it will make some sign respecting our wishes.⁴ Is it not proper?

Clin. Very much so.

¹ This is perhaps the nearest translation of *δήμους*.

² The Greek is *ἐνθουσιαστικὸν ὑμνωδοῦν*, where Boeckh proposed to omit *ἐνθουσιαστικόν*, as being not a Platonic, but a Neo-Platonic word; and his idea is adopted by Ast, Bekker, and Stalbaum. To myself however it is evident that Plato wrote *ἐνθουσιαστικῶς ὑμνωδιῶν*, as I have translated, to which I was led in part by Winckelmann's conjecture, *ἐνθουσιαστικόν*—

³—⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus; for probably he could not understand them, nor certainly can I. Ast however says that Cornarius has correctly translated, “*Uterius itaque pergemus in eo sermone, qui nunc nobis incidit.*” But *μῦθος* is not “*sermo.*” It means “*fabula.*” Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ὑπελθόντος μύθου* i. e. from a fable that has come upon us secretly just now.

⁴ Instead of *βουλήσεως* I should prefer *βουλευσεως*, “*deliberation.*”

Athen. We say¹ then that Ilion was colonized down from elevated places to a large and beautiful plain, upon a hill not very lofty, and having many rivers which rush from Mount Ida.

Clin. So they say.

Athen. Do we not think that this occurred at some long time after the deluge?

Clin. How not a long time?

Athen. A dreadful oblivion then it seems has taken place of the destruction just mentioned, since they thus placed a city under rivers many and flowing from high ground, and put their trust in hills not very high.

Clin. It is then quite evident that they were distant some considerable time from that event.

Athen. And many other cities, I think, were at that time inhabited as mankind multiplied.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And these perchance fought against it; and perhaps by sea, all of them now fearlessly using the sea.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. But the Achæans, after remaining ten years, overthrew Troy.

Megil. Entirely.

Athen. During then that period of ten years, in which Troy was besieged, the affairs of the besiegers happened to each of them to turn out very ill at home through the seditions of the young men, who received the commanders, when returning to their cities and homes, neither in a becoming nor just manner; but so that deaths² and murders and very many banishments occurred to those, who, after being exiled, returned with a change of name, and were called Dorians instead of Achæans, through Dorieus being the person who collected together the exiles of that period. And hence you Lacedæmonians turn all these things into a fable, and go through them.

Megil. How not?

[5.] *Athen.* To the same point from whence, while discoursing at the commencement about laws, we turned aside through falling upon music and drunkenness, we have now arrived again,

¹ From the answer of Clinias, "they say," it is evident that *φασί*, not *φαμέν*, is the correct reading. Ficinus has twice "accepimus."

² To avoid the tautology in *θανάτους* and *σφαγὰς*, it is easy to read *ὡς ἀθροίους* in lieu of *ὡς τε θανάτους*, without *τε*, omitted in one MS.

as it were, through some god ; and our discourse gives us, as it were, a handle. For it has come to the colonization of Lacedæmon, which you said was properly governed by laws fraternal to those in Crete. For the present then we obtain something additional to this extent from the wandering of our discourse, while passing through certain polities and colonizations. For we behold a first, a second, and a third city connected with each other, as we think, by their colonizations during a boundless length of time. But now this fourth city, or, if you please, nation, presents itself to us, ¹ which was formerly colonized, and is so now. ¹ From all which, if we are able to understand what has been colonized well or not, and what laws of theirs preserve, what is preserved, and what corrupt, what is corrupted, and what being changed for what will render, Megillus and Clinias, a state happy, ² (we shall think that enough has been done). ² But all these matters must be discussed by us, as if from the beginning, unless we have any fault to find with what has been said.

Megil. If, O guest, a god had promised us that, if we put our hands a second time to the inquiry respecting legislation, we should hear discourses neither worse nor fewer than those already spoken, I would go a long road, and the present day would appear to me to be short, although it is nearly that of the god, when he is turning from the summer to the winter (solstice).

Athen. It is meet then, as it seems, to consider these matters.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then be present in thought at that time, when Lacedæmon, and Argos, and Messéné, and the places which with them were, Megillus, under the power of your ancestors. ³ For then, it is said, (according to) the story, ³ that after having divided their army into three parts, they colonized three cities, Argos, Messéné, and Lacedæmon.

¹⁻¹ The Greek is κατοικιζόμενον τί ποτε καὶ νῦν κατοικισμένον. But since Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has "alicubi habitavit, et jam habitat," he evidently found in his MS. κατοικισμένον τί ποτε καὶ νῦν κατοικιζόμενον.

²⁻² The words between the numerals are found only in the version of Ficinus, "satis nobis factum putabimus."

³⁻³ Ficinus has "Tunc enim illud fabulæ ipsis, ut dicitur, placuit," as if in τὸ τοῦ μύθου there were an allusion to some dramatic story.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. And Temenus became king of Argos, and Cresphontes of Messéné, but Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedæmon.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Now, all of those then (present) swore to assist them, if any one should destroy their kingly rule.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Now (say), by Zeus, is kingly rule destroyed, or has any government whatever been destroyed by other parties than by themselves? Or after having just now ¹[a little before]¹ met with these words, did we suppose so, but have now forgotten it?

Megil. How so?

Athen. Now then, we will more confirm this kind (of assertion). For meeting with deeds, as it seems, which have occurred, we have arrived at the same discourse; so that we shall not seek the same discourse respecting a vain thing, but one that has occurred and possesses truth. Now this has occurred. Three kingdoms have made an oath with three cities under a kingly government, each with each other, according to the laws which they had laid down, about governing and being governed in common, that one party (the rulers) should not make for itself a government of violence, as time and race progressed, and the other, (the ruled,) that, while the rulers observed these (conditions), they would not at any time themselves destroy the kingly rule, nor permit others to destroy it, but that the kings would defend both kings and the people when injured, and the people, both kings and the people. Was it not so?

Megil. It was so.

Athen. Was not then that, which is of the greatest moment in the establishments of polities, present to these three² cities, regulated by law, whether the kings laid down the laws, or some other person?

¹ The words *ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν* are evidently an interpretation of *νῦν δὲ*, although quoted by Photius in *Νῦν δὲ μὲν*. Unless it be said that *ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν* ought to be inserted after *μᾶλλον ἢ* in the next speech, and *νῦν δ' αὖ* be read there instead of *νῦν δὲ*, as in Eurip. Hippol. 233. *Νῦν δὲ μὲν—Νῦν δ' αὖ*.

² I have with one MS. rejected *ἐν ταῖς*, found in the others between *ταῖς* and *τροσι*, unless it be said that *ἐν* ought to be inserted before *ταῖς καταστάσεσι*.

Megil. What was this?

Athen. That two cities should always assist¹ against the one, which happened to be disobedient to the laws laid down.

Megil. It is evident.

Athen. And yet this do the many order the lawgivers, that they are to lay down such laws as the wards and the masses will willingly receive; just as if any one should order the exercise-masters, or physicians, to take care of, and cure, the bodies under their direction in an agreeable manner.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. It is however often a desirable thing, should any one with no great pain be able to render bodies of a good habit and in health.

Megil. How not?

Athen. This too, which is not a small matter towards making easy the laying down of laws, was present to those of that period.

Megil. What was that?

[6.] *Athen.* There was not to the lawgivers, while preparing an equality of property, the greatest blame, and which exists in many other cities regulated by laws, when any one endeavours to disturb the possession of land, or to wipe out² debts, through perceiving that equality can never sufficiently exist without such measures. For to the lawgiver, who endeavours to disturb anything of this kind, every one on meeting cries out, Do not move things to be not moved;³ and utters curses upon him, who introduces the distributions of land, and the cutting off debts, so that every man is thrown into a difficulty. ⁴ But to the Dorians even this happened successfully and without any finding fault, that both the

¹ Ficinus has "insurgerent," translated by Taylor "rise up against."

² This is the English phrase equivalent to the Greek διαλύειν, "to dissolve." According to Plutarch it was the policy of Solon to get rid of debts, which he said was σισάχθεια, "the shaking off a burden."

³ On this proverbial expression see Ast.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek; where, says Ast, instead of ἦν one would have expected εἶναι, to answer to διανέμεσθαι. But, unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato wrote γῆν τε ἀναμφισβητήτως διανέμεσθαι, οὖσαν πολλήν, καὶ διαλύεσθαι χρεῖα, ἃ μεγάλα καὶ παλαιὰ οὐκ ἦν. For Ficinus has "Doris autem hæc difficultas turbatioque non fuit. Nam agros abunde sine controversia possidebant, debitaque ipsis æris alieni prisca et magna non erant;" where his "abunde" led me to suggest οὖσαν πολλήν; while διαλύεσθαι χρεῖα is similar to χρεῶν διάλυσιν just above. The reason why the words οὖσαν πολλήν καὶ διαλύεσθαι

land was divided without causing disputes, and the debts were not large and of long standing.⁴

Megil. True.

Athen. How then, ye best of men, did the colonization and legislation turn out so badly to them?

Megil. How do you mean? and for what do you blame them?

Athen. That when three administrations had been established, two parts of them quickly corrupted their polity and laws, and one alone, belonging to your city, remained.

Megil. You ask a question not very easy (to answer).

Athen. And yet it is requisite for us, while considering now and examining into laws, and playing a game suited to old men temperately,¹ to go through the journey without annoyance, as we stated, when we began to enter upon it.

Megil. How not? and we must do as you say.

Athen. What inquiry can we make to ourselves relating to laws (in general), more beautiful than respecting those (individually) which have adorned cities of this kind?² or shall we make an inquiry about any cities and colonizations more illustrious and larger than these?

Megil. It is not easy to speak of others in preference to these.

Athen. It is then nearly evident, that the persons of that period conceived this arrangement would be an assistance sufficient not only for the Peloponnesus, but for all the Greeks, if any of the Barbarians should do it any injury; ³just as those, who dwelt then about Ilion, were, when trusting to the power of the Assyrians, as it existed in the time of Ninus, emboldened to excite war against Troy.³ For the showy

were omitted, is to be referred to the similarity of *διανέμεσθαι* and *διालύεσθαι*, which were found at the end of two consecutive lines in the Codex Archetypus.

¹ Ficinus has, "senili quodam modestoque loco;" from whence Stephens proposed to insert *καὶ* after *πρεσβυτικὴν*—I have translated as if the Greek were *σωφρόνως*, not *σώφρονα*.

² Instead of *ταύτας*, Ficinus found in his MS. *πόλεις τὰς τοιαύτας*, as shown by his version, "civitates hujusmodi."

³—³ Respecting the events here alluded to, Ast refers to Pausanias, ii. 22, and Herodotus, i. 3, ii. 120; and, after observing that the account given by Herodotus in i. 95 is at variance with that of Ctesias, preserved by Diodorus, ii. 22, adds, that nothing can be stated for certain about the empire of Ninus and the war against Troy. With regard to the words, *τῇ περὶ Νίνου γενομένην*, Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly,

appearance¹ of its government, still preserved, was by no means small. (And) as we at present fear the great king, so the people then feared the combination (of power) standing together. For the taking of Troy a second time became a great accusation against them; because the Trojan power was a portion of that (the Assyrian) government. On all these accounts then, the unity of the arrangement of the army at that time, divided into three states, under the brother kings, the offspring of Hercules, appeared surely² to be beautifully planned and put into order, and superior to that which went against Troy. For, first, they conceived that the descendants of Hercules were better commanders than those sprung from Pelops; and, next, that this army far surpassed in valour that which came against Troy; for that these were the victors, but those vanquished³ by these, the Achæans by the Doriens. Do we not then conceive, that the persons of that period made their arrangements with this very view?

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Is it not probable then, that they thought their affairs would be in a firm state, and endure for some lengthened period, through their having shared in many dangers and labours, and in being orderly governed by one race of brother kings; and in addition to this, through having made use of many other prophets, and the Delphic Apollo likewise?

Megil. How is it not probable?

Athen. But all these expectations so great flew away, as it seems, at that time quickly, except, as we just now said, a small part around your region; and this has never ceased warring against the two other parts, even to the present day.⁴

seems to have found in his MS. *τῇ παρὰ Νίνου γενομένῃ*; for his version is, "quæ a Nino traxit originem."

¹ On this meaning of *σχῆμα*, Ast quotes Wernsdorf on Himerius, p. 51. See too Musgrave on Eurip. in Andr. 1, *Ἀσιατίδος γῆς σχῆμα Θηβαία πόλις*.

² As all the MSS. read *καλῶς ὥς*, it is evident that Plato wrote *καλῶς πῶς*, where *πῶς* was spoken with a sneer. Stephens, whom Bekker, Ast, and Stalbaum have followed, was the first to reject *ὥς*, omitted by Ficinus.

³ Ficinus has "*superatos fuisse*," from whence Boeckh, whom Ast follows, suggested *ἡττηῖσθαι* in lieu of *ἡττᾶσθαι*.

⁴ All the MSS. read *μέχρι τὰ νῦν*. Ficinus has "*ad hunc usque diem*," from whence Stephens, whom Bekker follows correctly, elicited *μέχρι τοῦ νῦν*.

Since the policy then ¹existing would,¹ by agreeing for one object, have possessed a power in war not to be overturned.

Megil. How not?

[7.] *Athen.* How then, and why was it dissolved? Is it not worth while to consider, what accident destroyed a constitution of such a standing, and of such a kind?

Megil. Scarcely² would any one, looking elsewhere,³ behold either laws or other⁴ politics, conservative of doings beautiful and great, or on the contrary destructive of them, if he neglects these.⁵

Athen. It seems, then, we have by some good fortune come upon a sufficient consideration of this question.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Do not, then, all persons, thou wondrous man, and we too at the present moment, unconsciously fancy perpetually that they see some beautiful thing existing, and which would effect wonders, if a person knew how to use it properly. But now we should ourselves, perhaps, neither think correctly about it, nor according to nature; and moreover all men (err)⁶ respecting all the other things about which they think in a similar manner.

Megil. What do you mean? and about what especially shall we say this speech has been spoken?

Athen. My good man, I have been just now laughing at myself. For upon looking to that very expedition about which we have been conversing, it appeared to me to be very beautiful, and that a wonderful possession would have fallen accidentally to the Greeks, if, as I said, any one had at that time made a proper use of it.

Megil. Did you not say all correctly and with a fixed mind; and did not we properly praise them?

¹—¹ Instead of *kai*, we must read *ἀν*, unless *γενομένη* conceals, what is likely, a corruption; for *γενομένη ἢ τότε* could not be written in the sense of *ἢ τότε γενομένη*.

² Literally, "at leisure." See at ii. § 10.

³ I have adopted Ast's correction, *ἄλλοσε σκοπῶν*, in lieu of *ἄλλο σκοπῶν*.

⁴ ⁵ I hardly understand *ἄλλας* here and afterwards *τούτων*, which Ast explains by "ours." But in that case Plato would, I think, have written *ἄλλοδαπὰς* and *ἡμεδαπῶν*.

⁶ Ficinus alone, whom Taylor tacitly follows, has preserved the word "errant," requisite for the sense; unless it be said that *τὰ αὐτὰ ποιῶσι* have been lost after *πάντες πάντα*.

Athen. Perhaps so. But I think that every one, who beholds any thing great, and having much power and strength, has immediately this feeling, that if he knew as its possessor how to use it, being of such a kind, and such an age, he would do many and wonderful things, and be happy.

Megil. Is not this correct? or how say you?

Athen. Consider now, by looking to what does he, who gives this praise to each thing, speak correctly. Now first, as regards what has been said just now, how would the persons of that period, even if they had known how to draw up an army properly, have, by a complete marshalling, met with ¹the opportunity somehow? ¹ Would it not have been, had they put it together securely, and preserved it ²for ever, so that they might be free themselves, and rule over others whom they pleased, and do ³in short, both themselves and their descendants amongst all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, whatever they desired? Would they not for the sake of these things have felt a desire? ⁴

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. Has not he too, who, on seeing great wealth, or superior honours arising from a family, or any thing else of this kind, would have said the very same thing, said so, looking to this, as if through this there would come to him all he desires, or the greater part of them, and such as are the most worthy of mention?

Megil. It appears so.

Athen. ⁵ But there is certainly one common desire to all men, which is signified by our present discourse. ⁵

¹—¹ I cannot understand τοῦ καιροῦ πως. For the indefinite πως is at variance with the definite article. Plato wrote, I suspect, τοῦ κατὰ ῥοὴν πλοῦ, "a sailing down the stream," i. e. a successful voyage. On the metaphor in πλοῦς see Ast in Legg. vii. p. 803, A.; and with the phrase κατὰ ῥοὴν compare φερομένην κατὰ ῥοὴν in Rep. vi. p. 492, C.

² i. e. τὸ στρατόπεδον, "the army."

³ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows implicitly, has "consequenter," as if he had found some other word in his MS. in the place of πράττειν.

⁴ Instead of ἐπιθυμοῖεν, which Ast says truly makes nonsense here, he would read ἐπαινοῖεν, in reference to the ἐπαινον at the commencement of the speech. Orelli suggests ἐπαινεθεῖεν ἂν.

⁵—⁵ Such is Taylor's literal translation of the Latin of Ficinus. The Greek is Φέρε δὴ, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κοινὸν ἐπιθύμημα ἕν τι, τὸ νῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δηλούμενον, ὥς αὐτός φησιν ὁ λόγος. But there the two last sentences present an insufferable tautology. Which of them was really written by Plato, it is not easy to decide.

Megil. What is it?

Athen. That the things which do take place, should take place at the command of his own soul, all for the most part, but, if not (all), at least human affairs.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Since then all of us when children, and men, and grown old, perpetually wish a thing of this kind, we should of necessity¹ pray for that very thing to the end (of life).

Megil. How not?

Athen. And we would pray for our friends that which they do for themselves.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Now a son, being a boy, is a friend of his father, being a man.

Megil. How not?

Athen. And yet many of the things which the boy prays may happen to himself, the father would pray the gods that they may not happen according to the prayers of his son.

Megil. When, you mean, (the son) prays, being thoughtless and still young.

Athen. Yes; and when the father, being old, or with very youthful feelings, shall, although he knows nothing of what is honourable and just, offer up a prayer with great fervour in the midst of sufferings, akin to those that happened to Theseus, in the case of the unfortunate Hippolytus, when dying, will the boy, think you, who does know, join in prayer with his father?

Megil. I understand what you mean. For you appear to me to assert, that a person ought not to pray, nor be urgent for all things to follow his wishes, but for wishes rather² (to follow) his prudence; and that both a state and each of us ought to pray for and hasten to this, how to possess intellect.

[8.] *Athen.* Certainly. And, moreover, that the statesman (and³) lawgiver ought always to lay down the ordinances of

¹ Ficinus has "sedulo," as if his MS. read another word in the place of ἀναγκαιώς. Perhaps διηνεκώς.

² I cannot understand μηδέν, which Bekker has inserted from four MSS. before μάλλον. Two MSS. read πολὺ—Neither word is acknowledged by Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote ὀπηδεῖν, of which πο has been preserved by some MSS. and ηδεῖν by others.

³ Boeckh was the first to insert καὶ from "legumque lator" in Ficinus; for the statesman and legislator are thus constantly united, as shown by Boeckh and Ast.

your recollection, what, if we remember,¹ was said, at the commencement, that it was your advice, that a good lawgiver ought to lay down all laws for the sake of war; but it was mine, that this would enjoin him to make laws for one virtue out of four existing; that he ought to look to every virtue, but especially the first, which is the leader of the whole of virtue, and that is prudence, and intellect and opinion together, with love and desire attendant on them. But our discourse has now returned again to the same point; and I now say again, what I then said in jest, if you please, or in earnest,² that I assert then,³ that it is dangerous for a person not possessing intellect to pray; but that (it is better³) for the contrary to his wishes to happen to him. If you are willing to suppose that I am in earnest,⁴ suppose it. For I now fully expect to find you following the reasoning we produced a little before, that timidity was not the cause of the destruction of kings, and of the whole of their policy; nor was it because the rulers and they, whom it was meet to be ruled, did not know what relates to war;⁵ but they were destroyed by all the remaining depravity,⁵ and especially by their ignorance respecting the greatest of human affairs. That these things thus happened at that time,⁶ and (must so happen) now, if they happen any where,⁶ and will hereafter happen not otherwise, I will en-

¹ This—"if we remember," is strangely introduced here, and is properly omitted by Ficinus; who has "et ipse recordatus sum et vos nunc recordari volo; nempe vos in disputationis principio dicebatis." Perhaps Plato wrote *κατὰ γὰρ ἀρχὰς ἦν, εὐ μνησθεῖς, τὰ λεχθέντα*, i. e. for it was said, I well remember, at the commencement—

²⁻³ The Greek is *ὅτι δὴ φημι*. But as Plato had just alluded to his being in jest or in earnest, I suspect he wrote *σπουδάζων οὕτω· φήμι δὴ*—for on pronouncing the words *φήμι δὴ*, he no doubt imitated the earnest manner adopted by speakers in public; and to which *σπουδάζων οὕτω* would naturally draw the attention of the other interlocutors.

³ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "satiùs esse," as if his MS. read *ἀλλὰ κάλλιον*, not *ἀλλὰ* by itself.

⁴ If Plato wrote, as I have supposed, just before *σπουδάζων οὕτω*, he must have written here *σπουδάζοντα δὲ μὴ εἰ με τιθῆναι βούλεσθε*, not *εἰ με*, for *σπουδάζοντα μὴ* would answer to *παίζοντα*.

⁵⁻⁶ I confess I cannot make syntax or sense out of *τῇ λοιπῇ δὲ πάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρμένα*. I could have understood *τὰ δ' ὅλα ὁπθῶ ἀπάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρμένα*—"but the whole was destroyed by every depravity following them."

⁶⁻⁶ The Greek is *καὶ νῦν, εἶπον, γίγνεται*: where Bekker would repeat *γίγνεται*.

deavour, if you wish it, to find out, by proceeding according to a discourse in due order, and to show, as far as I can, to you, who are my friends.

Clin. To praise you, guest, in words, would be rather offensive; but we shall mightily praise you in deed. For we shall cheerfully follow what is said, by which (acts) he, who praises as a free-man or not, is most apparent.

Athen. You speak most excellently, Clinias; and let us do as you say.

Clin. These things will be so, if god pleases. Only speak.

[9.] *Athen.* We say then, proceeding along the still remaining road of our discourse, that the greatest ignorance destroyed that power at that time, and that it is naturally able to do the same thing now. So that, if this be the case, the lawgiver must endeavour, as far as he can, to infuse prudence into states, and destroy to the utmost thoughtlessness.¹

Clin. It is evident.

Athen. What then may be justly called the greatest ignorance? Consider whether you agree with me² in what I am going to say.³ For I lay it down to be such as this.

Clin. Of what kind?

Athen. When any one does not love, but hates that, which seems to him to be beautiful, or good; but loves and embraces that, which appears to him to be base and unjust, I assert that this discordance, respecting pain and pleasure, with opinion founded on reason, is the extreme of ignorance; and it is the greatest, because it belongs to the mass of the soul. For that part of the soul, which feels pain and pleasure, is what the common people and the mass are in a city. When, therefore, it is opposed to science, or opinions, or reason, the natural rulers, I call this ignorance; and it is the same as that of a city, when the multitude will not obey the rulers and the laws; and likewise in the case of one man, when although beautiful reasons reside in his soul, yet they do not produce any good effect, but every thing the contrary. All these kinds

¹ Although *ἄνοια* would be properly opposed to *φρόνησις*, yet *ἄγνοια* unites better with *ἀμαθία*: and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version "ignorantiam:" whom Taylor, Boeckh, and Ast have followed.

² So Taylor, which would be in Greek τὸ λεχθῆσόμενον, not λεγόμενον, which Ficinus has omitted.

of ignorance I would lay down as the most inordinate,¹ in the case of a state and each individual citizen, but not as applied to handicraftmen, if, guests, you understand what I mean.

Clin. We do understand you, friend, and assent to what you say.

Athen. Let this then be laid down as determined upon, and said, that to citizens, who are after this manner ignorant, nothing connected with government is to be committed, but they are to be reproached as ignorant, even though they are very skilful in argument, and have laboured at all that is elegant (in language), and whatever relates to a quickness of intellect; but that those, who possess qualities contrary to these, are to be called wise, although they should, according to the saying, ²know neither their letters, nor how to swim,³ and that power is to be given to them as being prudent persons. For how, friends, can the smallest form of prudence subsist without symphony?⁴ It is not possible.⁴ But the most beautiful and greatest of symphonies may be most justly called the greatest wisdom; of which he participates, who lives according to reason; but he, who is deficient, is a family-destroyer, and in no respect a saviour as regards the city, but, quite the contrary, he will appear to be always ignorant on these points. Let this then, as I just now said, be laid down, as having been spoken of in this manner.

Clin. Let it be laid down.

[10.] *Athen.* But it is surely necessary for rulers and ruled to exist in states.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Be it so. But of what kind, and how many, are the axioms⁵ respecting the ruling and being ruled in the case of great and small states, and similarly in that of families? Is there not one relating to a father and mother? and universally

¹ Ficinus has "perniciossissimas—"

² This proverb, peculiar to Athens, is alluded to in Aristoph. Σφηκ. 953.

³ I confess I hardly understand what is meant by *ἁρμονίας* here. Ficinus has "consensu—" I could have understood *ψυχῆς ἁρμονίας*, "a harmony of soul—" Perhaps the best English version of *ἁρμονία* would be, "the being in tune," a musical expression, applied sometimes to the mind.

⁴ Ficinus alone attributes the words "*οὐκ ἔστιν*" to Clinias.

⁵ By *ἀξιώματα* are meant here "the received notions—"

would it not be a correct axiom every where that parents should rule over their offspring?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. And the next to this, that men of high birth should rule over those of low birth? and the third, that the more aged should rule, and the younger be ruled?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And the fourth, that slaves should be ruled, and their owners rule?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And the fifth, I think, that the better person should rule, and the worse be ruled?

Clin. You speak of a ruling very necessary indeed.

Athen. And one that exists the most in all animals, and is "according to nature,"¹ as the Theban [Pindar] says. But the greatest axiom, as it seems, would be the sixth, which commands the ignorant to follow, but the prudent to lead and rule. And yet, O thou most wise Pindar, I should almost say, that this at least is not contrary to nature, but according to it, for the rule of law to be over willing (subjects), and not by an act of violence.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then in speaking of the seventh rule, as being god-loved and fortunate, bring² it to a lot-drawing, and say,³ that he, on whom the lot falls, is most justly the ruler, but he the ruled, who goes away, after being unsuccessful in the lot.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. We will say then, playing with some one of those who go on with facility to the laying down of laws—Dost thou, O lawgiver, see how many axioms there are relating to rulers, and how they are naturally contrary to each other? For now we have discovered a certain fountain of seditions, to which it is necessary for you to attend. First, consider with us, by erring how and in what point, contrary to these axioms, did the kings of Argos and Messéné destroy themselves, and the power of the Greeks, which at that time was wonderful:

¹ On this saying of Pindar, frequently quoted by Plato, see Boeckh; who should however have rejected Πινδαρος as a gl.

^{2, 3} From "producamus" and "ducamus" in Ficinus, it is easy to see that his MS. read προάγωμεν and φάμεν, not προάγομεν and φάμεν.

Was it not through their not knowing that Hesiod had said most truly, that "the half is often more than the whole?"¹ (For), when to receive the whole brings a damage, but in the half is moderation, he held in that case the moderate to be more than the immoderate, as being better than the worse.

Clin. Most correctly so.

Athen. But whether think we that this, when it occurs, destroys on each occasion what² relates to kings before what exists amongst the people?

Clin. It is probable that this is mostly the disease of kings, who live proudly in luxury.

Athen. Is not this evident then, in the first place, that the kings of that time had a power above the established laws?³ and (as) to what they had praised both by word and an oath, they did not accord with themselves.³ But discordance, as we have said,⁴ being the greatest ignorance, although appearing to be wisdom, has destroyed all those things through⁵ error and a sad want of education.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. Be it so. But why was it meet for the lawgiver then laying down laws to be cautious about the generation of this disease?⁶ Is it, by the gods, at the present time, no wisdom to know this, and not difficult to speak of it? but that, if it had been possible to foresee it then, the person, who foresaw it, would have been wiser than we are?

¹ Had not the hexameter line of Hesiod been preserved, *Νήπιον οὐκ ἴσασιν, ὅσῳ πλεον ἡμῖν παντός*, any one would have said that the words in the text, "ἡμῖν τοῦ παντός πολλάκις ἰστί πλεον, made a pentameter.

² I have translated as if *τὰ* had dropt out before *περὶ*, in order that *διαφθεῖρειν* might not want its subject.

^{3—3} Such is the literal version of the Greek, *καὶ δὲ λόγῳ τε καὶ ὅρκῳ ἐπῆνεσαν οὐ ξυνεφώνησαν αὐτοῖς*. But the perpetual antithesis between *λόγος* and *ἔργον* requires *δὲ λόγῳ τε καὶ ὅρκῳ ἐπῆνεσαν, οὐ ξυνεφώνησαν ἔργοις*, i. e. "and what they had praised by word and an oath, did not accord with their acts." Taylor's version is, "and that their actions did not accord with what they had celebrated both in discourse and by an oath."

⁴ In § 9, p. 98.

⁵ Such is perhaps the meaning of the Greek *πλημμίλειαν καὶ ἀμουσίαν τὴν πικράν*, which Taylor translates "through confusion and bitter unskilfulness." Ficinus, "propter errorem et amaram inconcinnitatem." This, however, is not the only passage, where Plato has made use of words conveying a very vague instead of a definite sense.

⁶ I have followed Ficinus in translating *πάθους* "disease," in allusion to the disease mentioned just above.

Megil. What kind of thing are you speaking of?

Athen. For a person looking, O Megillus, to what has occurred with you, it is easy to know, and, knowing, to state what ought to have occurred then.

Megil. Speak yet more clearly.

Athen. Some such thing as this then will be most clear.

Megil. What?

[11.] *Athen.* If any one gives a power too great to things rather small, by disregarding moderation,—as, for instance, sails to ships, food to bodies, and dominion to dispositions—all things are overturned; for some, by being full of insolence, run ¹ into disorders, and others ² to injustice, the offspring of insolence.² What then are we saying? Is it not, my friends, of this kind? that there exists not the nature of a mortal soul, which will be able, when young and not under supervision, to bear the greatest rule amongst men, so as, when filled as to its thinking faculty with folly, which is the greatest disease, not to suffer a hate from his nearest friends; which, when it takes place, is wont to corrupt quickly, and to cause all its power to disappear. To be cautious on this point, through knowing moderation, is the province of great law-givers. ³ Hence what took place at that time, it is now easy to perceive.³ It appears to have been this.

Megil. Of what kind?

Athen. Some god, ⁴ I think, (is) taking care⁴ of you; who,

¹ Ficinus has "in morbos incidunt." Hence two MSS. give as a var. lect. *πίπτει* for *θεῖ*: which is here applied in Greek, as "run" is in English, metaphorically, to persons running into debt, extravagance, and vice generally.

²⁻² Compare Soph. CEd. T. 863, *ὑβρις φρεσὶν ῥύπαννον*.

³⁻³ Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, "Quod igitur tunc factum, facile modo perspectu est." The Greek is *ὥς οὖν δὴ τότε γινόμενον νῦν ἔστι μετριώτατα τοκάσαι*, where Ast was the first to suggest, what the sense requires, *τὸ τότε*: but his paraphrastical translation of *μετριώτατα*, "satis certo et accurate," is at variance with the train of thought; which leads to *ἔστιν οὖν δὴ τὸ τότε γινόμενον νῦν εἰς τὰ μέτρια ῥᾶστον τοκάσαι*, i. e. "It is, then, now very easy to conjecture what then took place as regards things moderate:" where *τὰ μέτρια* is confirmed, not only generally by what has gone before, but specifically by *εἰς τὸ μέτριον* in what immediately follows; while it is not without reason that one MS. offers *μετριώτατον* for *μετριώτατα*.

⁴⁻⁴ The Greek is *εἶναι κηδόμενος*, where Ast understands *ἔστι*—But Ficinus has "ut arbitrator," as if his MS. read *οἶμαι*, adopted tacitly by Stephens, instead of *εἶναι*. Hence Taylor translated "as it seems—" But

through foreseeing future events, and planting for you the two-fold generation of kings descended from one, has contracted you rather to a moderate state; and after this a certain human nature,¹ mixed up with a certain divine power, did, perceiving your government to be still in an inflamed state, mingle the temperate power of old age with the self-willed strength of noble birth, and made equal with the power of the kings the vote of twenty-eight² old men in matters of the greatest moment. But your third saviour,³ perceiving your government swelling with desire and passion, placed upon it the power of the Ephori,⁴ as a bit, and led it near the power which is chosen by lot. And by this arrangement the kingly power with you, being mingled with such things as were proper, and possessing moderation, was both preserved itself, and became the cause of preservation to others. For under the rule of Temenus and Cresphontes, and the lawgivers of that time, ⁵if indeed they were lawgivers,⁵ not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been saved. For they were not then sufficiently skilled in legislation; for, (had they been so),⁶ they never would have thought to moderate by oaths a youthful spirit, when receiving a power from which it was possible for a tyranny to arise. But now the deity has shown what kind of government it was and is necessary to be, that is about to continue the longest. But that these things should be known by us, as I said before, now that they have happened, is no feat of wisdom. For from a model already existing, it is not difficult to see.⁷ But if any one had then

since another MS. has *εἶναι καὶ κηδόμενος*, it is easy to elicit *εἶναι ἔοικε κηδόμενος*, i. e. "seems to have had a care for you—"

¹ This alludes to Lycurgus.

² Taylor has, by an unaccountable mistake, "men eighty years old." On the senate of Sparta, called *Γερουσία*, see Meursius in Miscell. Lacon. § 4, and Cragius de Rep. Lacedæm. ii. 3, who have collected all that is known on the subject.

³ On the third saviour see Ast at Rep. ix. § 9, p. 583, B., who did not see that Plato wrote *ὁ δ' αὖ τρίτος, ὡς σωτήρ*—alluding to Theopompus, as shown by Plutarch in Lycurgus.

⁴ According, however, to Plutarch, in i. p. 43, E., the Ephori were appointed about thirty years after the time of Lycurgus. They were five in number.

⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; where, instead of *οἱ τινες ἄρα*, the sense requires, as I have translated, *εἰ τινες ἄρα*—

⁶ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, supplies the ellipse by "*si fuissent*—"

⁷ Here is evidently something wanting as the subject of *ὁρᾶν*. Hence

foreseen these things, and had been able to render governments moderate, and to form one out of three, he would have preserved all the beautiful conceptions of that time, and neither the Persian expedition, nor any other, would have come against Greece, through despising us as being of little account.

Clin. You speak the truth.

Athen. Hence, Clinias, they defended themselves shamefully. Now by shamefully I mean, not that the persons of that time did not conquer by sea and land, and gain honourable victories; but what I call shameful at that time, I say is this. In the first place, that, out of those three states, (only) one fought in defence of Greece, but the other two were so miserably corrupted, that one of them (Messéné) prevented Lacedæmon from assisting her, (Greece,) by warring against it with all its strength; but the other, which had the first share at that period in the distribution, ¹that about Argos,¹ did, when called upon to repel the Barbarian, neither give ear nor assistance. But by detailing many things that occurred then relating to that war, a person might bring a charge against Greece by no means of a pleasant kind; nor would he, who should say that Greece defended herself, speak correctly; since, unless the policy in common of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had warded off the slavery coming against them, there would have been mixed together nearly all the races of Greeks with each other, and Barbarians with Greeks, and Greeks with Barbarians; just as those, over whom the Persians are now the tyrants, are, after ²being carried away separately or together, and scattered abroad, made to settle down in a miserable state.² This, Clinias and Megillus, is what we have to urge against the men of old, called politicians and legislators, and likewise those of the present day, in order that, by seeking out the causes, we may

Ficinus supplied the sense by translating, "exemplis commoveri." Perhaps δ δει has dropt out before εἰ δέ—

¹—The Greek is ἡ περὶ τὸ Ἄργος, which Ast says is an explanation of ἡ πρωτεύουσα. But though Ἄργος, or τὸ Ἄργος, might be so, ἡ περὶ could not be. In ἡ περὶ τὸ evidently lies hid ἡν περ εἶπον; for the allusion is to the διανομή mentioned in § 5, while Ἄργος would be the gl. for ἡ δ' αὖ—

²—This description may be applied to the very letter to the slaves, carried away singly or together, and compelled to settle formerly in the British West Indies, and even now in Spanish South America.

discover what else besides these ought to have been done, as we say for the present,¹ that it is not meet to lay down great or unmixed powers of rule, through considering this, that it is requisite for a state to be free and intellectual, and a friend to itself, and that a legislator ought looking to these points, to lay down laws. And let us not wonder if, after proposing (other)² things, we have frequently said that the legislator ought to look to these, while laying down laws, and that what have been proposed do not appear to us to be the same. But it is proper to infer that, when we say the legislator ought to look to temperance, or prudence, or friendship, our design is not different, but the same; ³and let not many other expressions of that kind, should they occur, disturb you.³

Clin. We will endeavour to do so by recurring to your reasoning.⁴ But for the present explain, ⁵what you mean by saying with respect to friendship, and liberty, and prudence, that a legislator ought to aim at those objects.⁵

[12.] *Athen.* Hear then now. There are, as it were, two mothers of polities, from which he, who says that all the rest are produced, will speak correctly. Now one of these it is right to call a monarchy, but the other a democracy; and to say that the race of the Persians possess the extreme of the one; but we of the other. Now nearly all the rest are, as I have said, variously formed from these. ⁶It is proper then, and necessary for (a state)⁶ to participate in both these, if there is to be freedom and friendship in conjunction with prudence. Now this our discourse intends to enjoin, by

¹ The Greek in Ald. from one MS. is τὸ παράπαν. But Ficinus has "quod nunc exposuimus," from whence Stephens elicited τὸ παρὸν, found in all the other MSS. I suspect however that Plato wrote τὸ παρὸν ἀπ' αὐτῶν—

² Ficinus has "alia quædam." For he found in his MS. ἀλλ' ἄττα correctly; since ἄττα cannot stand by itself.

³ Such is the exact version of the Greek. Ficinus has "ac si multis etiam aliis hujuscemodi verbis utemur, ne turbemini," literally translated by Taylor.

⁴ Here again Taylor was content to follow Ficinus' version, "verba ordine repetentes."

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας—, πρὸς αὐτὰ, τί βουλόμενος, not τὸ περὶ—πρὸς ὅτι βουλομενος, where Ast has failed, I think, to make out the syntax.

⁶ Ficinus, by omitting δεῖ, and inserting "civitatem," shows that he found in his MS., what the sense requires, πόλιν δὴ οὖν—

saying that a city is unable to be beautifully governed, while it is destitute of these properties.

Clin. For how can it?

Athen. When therefore the one embraces monarchy alone, but the other liberty more than is proper, neither of them¹ possess what is moderate in these.¹ Your cities however in Laconia and Crete (possess it) more (than others); and so too did the Athenians and Persians formerly, but now less so. Shall we go through the causes of this, or not?

Clin. By all means, if we wish to bring to an end what we have proposed for ourselves.

Athen. Let us hear then. The Persians under Cyrus possessed² more of moderation in slavery and freedom. At first they were free, but afterwards the masters of many others. For by sharing as rulers their freedom with the ruled, and leading them to an equality, the soldiers became greater friends with their commanders, and conducted themselves with alacrity in dangers. And if any one among them was intelligent and competent to give advice, as the king was not envious, and granted a liberty of speech, and honoured those, who were able to advise any thing, he brought into the midst of all the common power of intellect; and at that time every thing exhibited an improvement,³ through liberty, and friendship, and a communion of intellect.

Clin. It appears somehow that what has been stated did so occur.

Athen. How then was (that government)⁴ almost destroyed under Cambyzes, and again restored under Darius? ⁵ Are you willing for us, while thinking, to make use, as it were, of divination.⁵

Clin. This at least brings our inquiry to the point, whither we have been hastening.

¹—¹ Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, “mediocritatem servitutis libertatisque servavit.”

² The Greek is ἤγον. But Ficinus found in his MS. εἶχον, as shown by his version, “habebant.”

³ I have adopted with all the modern editors Stephens's ἐπιδωκεν, instead of ἀπιδωκεν.

⁴ Ficinus, “regnum id fere,” as if he had found in his MS. ποτ' αὐτὰ ἀπώλετο σχεδόν—

⁵—⁵ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows literally, has “vultisne ut, quasi divinatione uti, dicamus,” as if his MS. read διαλεχθέντες instead of διανοηθέντες.

Athen. Respecting Cyrus, then, I thus divine; that in other respects he was a good general, and a lover of his country, but that he had not laid hold at all of a correct education, nor applied his mind to the regulation of his household.

Clin. How shall we say a thing of this kind?

Athen. He appears from his youth to have passed his life in the army, and to have committed to women the bringing up of his boys. Now these brought them up as persons fortunate immediately from their childhood, and born blessed, and indigent of nothing of these.¹ Hence they forbade any one to oppose them in any respect, as being ²sufficiently fortunate; ³and compelling every one to praise what was said or done by them, they brought them up ³being some such.³

Clin. You have detailed, as it seems, a beautiful education.

Athen. At least a feminine one, the women princesses having become recently rich, and bringing up the boys, during a scarcity of men, through the men not having leisure (to do so) in consequence of wars and many dangers.

Clin. So goes the story.

Athen. But their father possessed cattle and sheep and many herds of men, and of many other (animals); but he was ignorant that those, to whom he was to hand down all these things, were not instructed ⁴in his country's trade, which was a rough one, as the Persians were shepherds, the children of a rugged land,⁴ and competent to render the shepherds very strong, and able to live out of doors, and to be without sleep, and, if required,⁵ to become soldiers. But he disregarded the corruption of education by the so-called happiness of Media, and by his

¹ There is evidently some error in *τούτων*, which is omitted by Ficinus.

²⁻³ I am at a loss in *ικανῶς εὐδαιμοσι*, especially as *εὐδαιμονας* is repeated just before. Perhaps Plato wrote, *οὐκ ὄνομ', ἰσοδαιμοσι*—On *ἰσοδαιμων*, see Blomf. on Pers. 81.

³⁻³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I must leave for others to explain what I cannot, *τοιούτους τινας*. Taylor has "After this manner they were educated by certain women." Ficinus gives, with his usual fidelity, "ita ipsos tales quosdam educaverunt."

⁴⁻⁴ The Greek is *πατρῶαν—τίχνην οὖσαν Περσικὴν, ποιμένων ὄντων Περσῶν τραχείας χώρας ἐγόνων σκληρὰν*, where Ast would reject all between *οὖσαν* and *σκληρὰν*, as an interpolation. But it will be sufficient to omit *Περσικὴν*, and to insert *ἕτε* before *ποιμένων*, as I have translated. Respecting the rugged country of Persia, see Herodotus i. 71; ix. 122.

⁵ Ficinus has, "et militare, si res postulare." For his MS. omitted *στρατεύεσθαι*, found in other MSS. before *δέοι*.

sons being instructed by women and eunuchs; from whence they became such as it was likely for those to become, who are brought up in luxury¹ unreprieved. Upon the death of Cyrus his sons came into the possession (of power), and being full of luxury and without reproof, at first one of them slew the other, through brooking ill an equality; and subsequently the survivor (Cambyzes) becoming mad through drinking and a want of education, lost his power through the Medes and the then called Eunuch,² who viewed with contempt his silly conduct.³

Clin. These things also are reported, and it seems they somehow happened nearly in this manner.

Athen. And it is said moreover that the power came again to the Persians through Darius and the seven.⁴

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then take a view,⁵ following out the reasoning. For Darius was not the son of a king, nor brought up in a luxurious manner. But coming to power, and receiving it,⁶ he divided it, himself the seventh (sharer), into seven portions, of which there are at present left some small dream-(like)⁷ remnants,⁸ and he thought proper to live, laying down laws (and) introducing a kind of equality common (to all);⁸ and he bound under law⁹ the tribute,¹⁰ which Cyrus had promised the Persians, (and) infusing into all the Persians a feeling of

¹ Ast was the first to correct *τροφῇ* into *τροφῆ*: to which he was probably led by finding in Ficinus, "in summa rerum licentia."

² The name of the Eunuch was Smerdis. See Herodot. iii. 61.

³ Ficinus has "quasi amentem contempserunt." Hence in one MS. *μανίας*. Perhaps Plato wrote both *μανίας τε καὶ μωρίας*, "his conduct at once mad and silly."

⁴ See Herodot. iii. 86. But as there were only seven conspirators, Valckenaer suggests *ε* (6) instead of *ζ* (7).

⁵ Perhaps *θεωρῶμεν* should be taken in the sense of a mental vision, and be translated, "Let us found a theory—"

⁶ Between *λαβὼν* and *αὐτὴν* I suspect *μίαν* has dropt out, i. e. "and receiving it as one—"

⁷ Compare Shakspeare's language in the speech of Prospero:

"And like the baseless fabric of a vision,
Leave not a rack behind."

⁸⁻⁸ Ficinus, whom Taylor translates literally, has "censuitque vivendum esse sub legibus, ad communem quandam conferentibus æqualitatem."

⁹ In lieu of *ἐνίδν* Stephens elicited *ἐνίδει*, found subsequently in six MSS., from "complexus est," in Ficinus.

¹⁰ Respecting the tribute paid by the Persians, see Herodotus, i. 192; iii. 90.

interest, he attached to himself the masses in Persia, by money and gifts. ¹His armies therefore did with a good will add countries to his power¹ not less in number than what Cyrus had left. After Darius (came) Xerxes, who was again brought up with a royal and luxurious education. But it may be most just to ²say perhaps, "O Darius, thou hast not learned the evil conduct of Cyrus, but hast brought up³ Xerxes in the same manners, as Cyrus did Cambyses. He therefore, as being a child of the same education, has brought to pass what is very near to the sufferings of Cambyses; and from that time³ scarcely a single Persian king has become truly great except in name. Now the cause of this was not fortune, but, according to my reasoning, the vicious life, which the sons of those, who were remarkably rich and tyrannical, for the most part lived. For neither boy, nor man, nor old person, will ever become superior in virtue from such an education." And these are the matters which we say should be considered by a legislator, and by us likewise at present. But it is just, O Lacedæmonians, to give this praise to your state, that you never distribute any superior honour or food⁴ to poverty or wealth, or to a private station or a kingly one, which the oracle⁵ from some god has not at the first prophetically enjoined. For it is not proper in a state, ⁶to distribute to any one⁶ superior

¹—¹ Ficinus has, followed to the letter by Taylor, "ita dilectus a militibus—regiones ipse subjugavit."

²—² The Greek is ἴσως, δὲ τὸ Κύρου κακὸν οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἐθρέψω δὲ, where Stephens was the first to reject δὲ and to read ὥς—Ast, however, prefers ἴσως τὸ Κύρου—δὲ ἐθρέψω ἔπειθ'—Perhaps Plato wrote ἴσως τὸ Κύρου κακὸν, δὲ οὐκ ἔμαθες εὖ, ἐθρέψω δὲ, i. e. thou hast preserved the evil of Cyrus, which thou hadst not learned well.

³ Ficinus has "ex illo tempore." But that would be in correct Greek ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ τότε, not ἐκ γὰρ τοσούτου, which means either "after so great a person," or, "from such a long time."

⁴ In lieu of τροφήν Cornarius suggested ἀρχήν, to which he was led perhaps by "munera" in Ficinus. Boeckh and Ast however say that τροφή implies not only food, but education likewise.

⁵ To avoid the tautology in τὸ—θεῖον παρὰ θεοῦ, Ficinus has "oraculo." But Ast says that by τὸ θεῖον is meant Lycurgus, who is described in § 11, as φύσις ἀνθρωπίνῃ μεμιγμένη θεῖα. But in that case Plato would have written ἀνθρωπείον. Perhaps he did write τὸ—ἰθύνον, "the directing power—"

⁶—⁶ The Greek is κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι. But Ficinus found in his MS. κατὰ πόλιν τῇ νείμει, as shown by his version, "in civitate cuiquam conferre."

honours, because he is superior in wealth; nor because¹ he is swift-footed, or handsome, or robust, without some virtue, and not in the case of a virtue even, from which temperance is excluded.

Megil. ²How, guest, say you this?

[13.] *Athen.* Fortitude is surely one part of virtue.

Megil. How not?

Athen. Judge then yourself, after hearing my reasoning, whether you would admit any fellow-dweller or neighbour to be very brave, when not temperate, but profligate?

Megil. Speak good words.

Athen. What then, that an artist is wise in things of his art, but unjust?

Megil. By no means.

Athen. But justice could not be produced³ without temperance.

Megil. How could it?

Athen. Nor could he, whom we just now laid down to be wise, as possessing pleasures and pains, in harmony with, and following right reason.

Megil. Certainly not.

Athen. ⁴But let us still consider this too, touching the bestowing of honours in states, of what kind do they take place properly or not on each occasion.⁴

Megil. What?

Athen. Whether temperance, if it be alone in a soul without all the rest of virtue, can justly be a thing either of honour or dishonour?

Megil. I know not what to say.

Athen. You speak with moderation. For had you said either the one or the other, about which I asked the question,

¹ Ficinus omits *ἔπει*, found after *διαφέρων*. Perhaps Plato wrote *Πλούτῳ διαφέρων αὐτῷ*, "superior to Plutus himself."

² From hence to nearly the end of the book the conversation is carried on with Megillus, and not, as before, with Clinias. This arrangement, as Boeckh was the first to remark, is found in Ficinus.

³ On account of *ἄν* in the answer, we must read here *φύειν* *ἄν* in lieu of *φύεται*.

⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Taylor has translated the Latin of Ficinus, "Id præterea consideremus, ut quomodo inter cives honores recte vel non recte distribuantur, inspiciamus."

you would have appeared¹ to me at least to have spoken beside the measure.²

Megil. ³It would then have turned out well.³

Athen. Be it so. The addition then relating to honours and dishonours will be worthy not of a discourse, but rather of some irrational silence.⁴

Megil. You appear to me to mean temperance.

Athen. Yes. But that which benefits us the most of the others, would, in addition to its being honoured the most, be honoured the most justly; and that which is second (in benefit) would be second (in honour); and thus each thing obtaining, according to the reasoning in succession, its honours in due order, would obtain them justly.

Megil. Such is the case.

Athen. What then, shall we not say that it is the business of the legislator to distribute these?

Megil. And very much so.

Athen. Are you then willing for us to allow him to distribute all things, both pertaining to each work, and to trifling particulars? But with respect to making a triple division, let us endeavour, since we also are somehow desirous of laws, to divide the greatest, second, and third, apart from each other.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. We say then that a state ought, as it seems, if it is about to be preserved happy to the utmost of human power, necessarily to distribute honours and dishonours in a proper manner. Now (to do so) properly, it is for the good things pertaining to the soul, to be laid down as the most honourable and the first in rank, temperance at the same time being present to it (the soul); and as the second in rank, the things beautiful and good pertaining to the body; and as the third in rank, the things pertaining to property and riches. But if any legislator or state proceeds beyond these, by leading either riches to honours, or by placing by means of honours in the

¹ I have adopted Boeckh's ἐδόκεις, similar to "videreris" in Cornarius, in lieu of δοκεῖς in some MSS., or δοκῆς in others.

² On the phrase παρὰ μέλος see at Phileb. § 49.

³⁻⁴ The Greek is Καλῶς τοίνυν γεγονός ἂν εἴη, which I cannot understand. Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "Bene igitur factum est."

⁴ Here again I am at a loss to understand ἀλόγου σιγῆς. Unless I am mistaken, Plato wrote τινος—οὐ λόγου, of which σιγῆς would be the interpretation, with a play upon λόγου and οὐ λόγου.

foremost rank any of the things in the rear, he will do a deed neither holy nor statesman-like. Is this to be held as said, or how?

Megil. Let it be held as said clearly.

Athen. The inquiry into the Persian polity has caused us to speak to a greater length on these points. And we find that they became much worse still;¹ and we say the reason was, that through their taking away too much of liberty from the people, and introducing a despotic power more than was proper, they destroyed the feeling of friendship and of a common interest in the city; and that, when this is destroyed, the deliberations of the rulers are not engaged in behalf of the governed and the people, but for their own power; (and)² should they think that something more, even if it were little, would accrue to themselves, they would, by destroying with fire³ cities overturned, and by (treating) friendly⁴ nations in an hostile and un pitying manner, at once hate and be hated.⁵ But when they come to the people during a time of need to fight for them, they find in them no such communion of interest,⁶ that any one is willing with alacrity⁶ to run a risk and to fight; and though they possess myriads, not to be defined in a calculation, yet they are all useless for war; and, as if in want of men, they hire some, and think they will be saved by mercenary and foreign troops; and added to this, they are compelled to act the part of simpletons, proclaiming by their acts,⁷ that the things constantly called honourable or beautiful in a state are a trifle as compared with silver and gold.

Megil. Entirely so.

[14.] *Athen.* Let then the subject of the affairs of the Persians, which are now administered not correctly through excessive slavery and despotism, have an end.

¹ In the Greek ἐπὶ ἔτι, to which Stephens was the first to object, evidently lies hid πολὺ ἔτι—Cousin would supply τοῦτοις after ἐπὶ—

² ⁴ The words within the luns have been supplied to complete the sense.

³ As the expression πυρὶ καταφείραντες is better suited to πόλεις than to ἔθνη, I doubt not it has been accidentally transposed.

⁵ On account of the preceding ἀν—ἡγῶνται, the syntax requires, as I have translated, μισοῦντ' ἀν in lieu of μισοῦνται.

⁶—⁶ The Greek is αὐ μετὰ προθυμίας τοῦ—I have translated as if it were ὥστε μετὰ προθυμίας τινα—

⁷ One MS. omits ἔργοις, which was originally written, I suspect, before λέγοντες, not after it.

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. But after this it is proper for us to go through in a similar manner the polity of Attica, ¹(that it may appear)¹ how perfect liberty even, exempt from all rule, is not a little worse than that, which has a moderation ²in rule under others.² For at the time, when the Persian invasion took place against the Greeks, and perhaps against almost all the inhabitants of Europe, our polity had been of long standing; and we had some four institutions framed with reference to a property-census;³ and a certain modesty too at that time was a despot, through which we were then willing to live in subjection to the laws. In addition to this, the magnitude of the expedition, extending over land and sea, brought on a fear not to be overcome, and caused us to endure a still greater submission to the rulers and the laws. And on all these accounts a violent friendship came upon us towards ourselves. For nearly ten years before the naval battle at Salamis, Datis had arrived, leading the Persian expedition of Darius, who had sent him distinctly against the Athenians and Eretrians, to reduce them to slavery, and to carry them off; and proclaiming ⁴death to him, if he did not do so. And Datis did in a very short time with his many myriads and by main force subdue them entirely;⁵ and he sent a certain dreadful report to our city,⁵ that not one of the Eretrians had escaped him; for that the soldiers of Datis had by joining hands to hands ⁶got, as into a net, the whole of Eretria.⁶ This report, whether arriving true or in any way whatever, struck with terror the other Greeks, and the Athenians likewise; and on their sending ambassadors every

¹⁻¹ So Taylor, from "ut pateat" in Ficinus.

²⁻² The Greek is in one MS. ἀρχῆς ὑφ' ἐτέρων. In all the others ἀρχῆς is omitted. It answers however to "magistratuum dominatione" in Ficinus, who omits on the other hand ὑφ' ἐτέρων: to which both Boeckh and Ast object, but are unable to correct it satisfactorily. Perhaps Plato wrote ὑφ' ἡγετόρων—without ἀρχῆς.

³ This alludes to the four divisions of the people made by Solon, and called respectively Πεντακοσιμέδωνοι, ἑκαπείς, Ζευγίται, and Θῆτες, as we learn from Plutarch, i. p. 87, F., and Aristotle Polit. ii. 10.

⁴ As there is nothing on which προειπών can depend, Plato probably wrote προειπόντος, to answer to the preceding πέμψαντος.

⁵⁻⁵ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "terribilisque inde rumor ad nos pervenit."

⁶⁻⁶ The Greek is συνάψαντες γὰρ ἅπα τὰς χεῖρας, where Valckenaer on Herodotus iii. 149, tacitly omits ἅπα. He should have read χερσὶ—

where,¹ no one was willing to assist them, except the Lacedæmonians; and even they, through the war then raging against Messéné, or whether something else, as alleged,² prevented them,—for we know not,—arrived one day later than the battle that took place at Marathon. After this, mighty preparations and innumerable threats are said to have come from the king. But as time went on, Darius was reported to have died, and his son, young and violent, to have received from him the government, and by no means to have desisted from his (father's)³ undertaking. Now the Athenians were of opinion, that the whole of this preparation was against themselves, on account of what had occurred at Marathon; and hearing of Athos being dug through, and of (the shores) of the Hellespont being united, and of the great number of the vessels, they thought there was no safety for themselves by land or sea; ⁴for that none would assist them; as they recollected that, even when (the Persians) had come before, and had done thoroughly for the Eretrians, not one had given them assistance then,⁴ or had run a risk by fighting with them; and they expected the same thing would then take place, at least by land; and on the other hand, by sea they saw a want of all means of safety, since more than a thousand ships were being brought against them. They thought, however, upon a single source of safety, slender indeed and dubious, yet the only one, through their looking to what had previously occurred, how even then victory had appeared to spring out of difficulties, as they were fighting.⁵ Carried along upon this hope, they found their refuge rested in themselves alone and in the gods. All these things then ⁶engendered in them a friendship⁶ with each other, both the fear which was then present, and that which had been produced by the laws

¹ Ficinus alone adds, what Taylor adopts, "universam Græciam—"

² Plato alludes to the reason assigned by Herodotus vi. 106. See other reasons in Justin ii. 9, and Lucian Astrolog. § 25.

³ So Taylor follows the Latin of Ficinus, "a cæptis paternis desistere," where *ἡρώπης* is wanting in the Greek.

⁴— Here again Taylor has neglected the Greek entirely, and looked only to the Latin of Ficinus, "præsertim quia in nullius præsidio confidebant, quippe qui memoria tenerent neque tunc, cum primo illorum ingressu capti Eretrienses fuerant, quemquam sibi opem ferre."

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were *μαχομένοις* dependent on *γασθῆσαι*, not *μαχομένους* connected with *νικῆσαι*.

⁶—⁶ Ficinus has "majori inter se benevolentia copularunt—"

before,¹ and which they had felt, when they were submitting to their former laws; (a fear) which we have frequently in the preceding discourse called modesty; to which we have said (all)² must be subservient, who are about to become good men; (and) of which he who is the slave³ is free and fearless; ⁴whom had not this fear seized,⁴ he would never have ⁵quickly come ⁵and defended himself and aided the sacred places, and tombs, and country, and all the rest of household ties, and friends, as he did aid at that time; ⁶but each of us would at that period have been routed in small parties, and scattered one hither and another thither.⁶

Megil. And very much so, guest; and correctly have you spoken, and in a manner becoming both to yourself and country.

[15.] *Athen.* Such is the case, Megillus. For it is just to mention to you, what happened at that time, as being a sharer in the nature of your parents. But do you and Clinias consider, whether we say what is suited to legislation. For I do not go through these matters for the sake of telling a story, but for the sake of what I am saying. For look ye. Since the same circumstance has in a certain manner happened to us, that did to the Persians, while they were leading the people to every kind of slavery, but we, on the contrary, turning the masses to every kind of⁷ freedom, how and what shall we say henceforth? ⁸The reasons that have previously occurred to us, have in a certain manner been detailed correctly.⁸

¹ Instead of *τῶν ἐμπροσθεν*, which I cannot understand, Ficinus has "jam pridem," for he found, no doubt, in his MS. *τῷ ἐμπροσθεν*—

² Ficinus alone has "omnes," adopted tacitly by Taylor.

³ In lieu of *δουλος*, Heusde, Heindorf, Faehse, and Ast justly read *δοῦλος*, similar to "quo quisquis afficitur" in Ficinus, translated by Taylor "a slave"—

⁴ The Greek is *ὅν εἰ τότε μὴ δέος λαβεν*. Ficinus has "ac nisi præsens ille metus pudori huic junctus fuisset—" But *ὅν* is to be referred to the person alluded to in *δοῦλος*, and hence I have translated as if the original reading were *τόδε*, not *τότε*—

⁵ The Greek is *ξυνελθών*, but as that could not be said of a single person, I have translated, as if the original were *δέξας ἐλθών*—On the loss or corruption of *δέξας*, see Porson in *Adversar.* p. 161, on *Æsch. Suppl.* 901.

⁶ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has "ut fecisse narrantur; sed sparsi alius alio abiissent;" adopted in part by Taylor.

⁷ Instead of "all" Ficinus has "mere—"

⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Taylor has translated the Latin of Ficinus, "habita jam verba et commode dicta quodammodo demonstrant."

Megil. You speak well. But endeavour to point out to us still more clearly what has been said just now.

Athen. This shall be. The people was not, my friends, according to the laws of old, the master of any, but did after a certain manner obey willingly the laws.

Megil. Of what laws are you speaking?

Athen. Those relating in the first place to music as then existing—in order that we may detail from the beginning the great progress made in a life of freedom. For music was then divided by us according to certain kinds and figures of itself;¹ and prayers to the gods was a kind of ode, and they were called by the name of hymns; and the contrary to this was another kind of ode, and a person would have called it lamentations for the most part;² and another was Pæans,³ and another the birth of Dionysus, called, I think,⁴ a Dithyramb: and they have called laws⁵ by this very name, as being another ode; and they have given the additional name of “harp music.” After these and some others had been ordained, it was not lawful to use one kind for another. But the authority to know any of these, and, after knowing, at the same time to judge of them, and to fine the person not obedient, was not the whistle⁶ nor certain uneducated noises of the multitude, as at present, nor yet the clatterings that express praise, but it was decreed that persons, who were conversant with education, should themselves hear to the end in silence; but for boys, and boy-leaders,⁷ and the numerous vulgar, there was

¹ I confess I cannot understand *ἁντῆς*, omitted by Ficinus.

² Instead of *μάλιστα* I should prefer *καλλίστα*—

³ The Pæans were hymns to Apollo, sung originally at Delphi to commemorate his killing the serpent, called Python.

⁴ This “I think” is said rather strangely by Plato, as if he did not know whether the Dithyramb did or did not relate to the birth of Dionysus. Cousin refers *οἶμαι* to the etymology given to *διθύραμβος*.

⁵ In Greek *νόμος* is literally “a distribution,” taken in a legal sense, the object of law being to give each person his own; but here it is applied in a musical sense to a measure or tune, that distributes the notes according to the laws of harmony. Specifically the musical “nomes” were sung in honour of Apollo, the god of music. Cousin has given another but less simple explanation.

⁶ Ast says that *σύριγξ*, “a reed,” is put here for the whistling sound made by a reed, and he refers to Muretus, Var. Lect. i. 19, and to Salmasius on Solinus, p. 156. Perhaps it answered to the English “cat-call.”

⁷ The boy-leaders are, I presume, thus put on a level with boys and the masses, because they were sometimes only manumitted slaves.

the admonition by a rod putting them in order. These things having been thus ordained,¹ the multitude of citizens were willing to be ruled, and not to dare to judge in a tumultuous manner. After this, as time went on, the poets (themselves) became the leaders of this uneducated lawlessness; being naturally indeed poetical, but ignorant with respect to what is just and lawful in music, they were acting like Bacchants, and possessed with joy more than was becoming, and were mingling lamentations with hymns, and pæans with dithyrambs, and imitated with harp music the music of the hautboy, and by bringing together all things to all they involuntarily, through their ignorance, asserted falsely that music did not possess any correctness whatever; but that it might be judged of most correctly by the pleasure of the party gratified, whether he were a better person or a worse. Composing, therefore, works of this kind, and adding to them words of this kind, they infused into the multitude a lawlessness with respect to music, and a daring of their being competent to judge. Hence theatres, from being silent, came to be noisy, as if capable of understanding what is beautiful or not in music; and instead of an aristocracy in it, a certain depraved theatrocracy was produced. For if only a democracy of free men had existed, nothing very dreadful would have taken place; but now from music there began an opinion with us respecting the wisdom of all men in all things, and a lawlessness, and after these did a licentiousness follow. For men became fearless, as if endued with knowledge; and this absence of fear generated shamelessness. For through boldness to feel no fear of the opinion of a better person, is almost a depraved shamelessness, (resulting) from a certain liberty that has dared too much.

Megil. You speak most true.

[16.] *Athen.* And consequent upon this liberty, there would arise that of being unwilling to submit to rulers; and following this, to fly from the submission to, and admonition of, a father and mother and elders, and to the being near the point of seeking to be not subject to laws; and (having arrived) at that point, to think nothing at all of oaths and faith and the gods; ² by

¹ I have adopted Heindorf's correction, *τούτων οὕτω τεταγμένων*, founded on Ficinus's "*hæc cum ita ordine fierent*," in lieu of *ταῦτ' οὕτως τεταγμένως*.

² Ficinus has "*unde, ad priscam illam tyrannicamque revoluti naturam*,"

exhibiting and imitating the ancient Titanic¹ nature, as it is called, so that, by again arriving at those² same things, they led a life of difficulty, and never ceased from ills. On what account then has this been said by us? It appears that I at least³ ought to pull up⁴ a discourse, like a horse, on each occasion,⁵ and not, by having its mouth without a bridle, to be carried away forcibly, and, according to the proverb, fall⁶ from the discourse, as from an ass. But I again ask⁷ what was just now said. On what account has this been mentioned?

Megil. Correctly so.

Athen. This then has been said on account of those?

Megil. Whom?

Athen. We have said that a legislator ought in laying down laws to aim at three things, how the state may, by being legislated for, become free, and friendly to itself, and possess a mind. These were the objects. Is it not so?

Megil. Entirely so.

Athen. For the sake of this we selected two kinds⁸ of go-

eadem illa iterum patiemur duraque secula rursus degemus," plainly proving that his MS. read *τυραννικὴν* for *τιτανικὴν*, and was defective in other respects, or that Ficinus himself did not understand what Plato was alluding to.

¹ To this passage Cicero alludes De Legg. "Noster vero Plato Titanum e genere statuit (esse) eos, qui, ut illi cœlestibus, sic hi adversentur magistratibus." From whence it is easy to perceive that instead of *τὴν λεγομένην παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν φύσιν ἐπιδεικνῦσι καὶ μιμουμένοις*, Plato wrote *τὴν λεγομένην πάλην Τιτανικὴν ἐπιδεικνῦσι καὶ φύσιν μιμουμένοις*—"by exhibiting the so-called Titanic contest, and imitating their nature—"

² In lieu of *ἐκείνα* one would prefer *τὰ Κρόνια*, in allusion to the acts of the Titans, the allies of Κρόνος, who after their defeat were doomed to everlasting torments.

³ For the sake of the syntax we must read *ἐμέ γε* for *ἐμοί γε*, as I have translated.

⁴ This would be an English jockey's correct translation of *ἀναλαμβάνειν*.

⁵ As *ἐκάστοτε* could not be said of a single occasion, one would prefer *ἀκατάστατον*, "restless," similar to "stare loco nescit," in Virgil.

⁶ Instead of *βία ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου φερόμενον*, it is evident at a glance that Plato wrote *βία φερόμενον, ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς*— With regard to the proverb *ἀπ' ὄνου πεσεῖν*, and the play upon it in *ἀπὸ νοῦ πεσεῖν*, see Aristoph. Νεφ. 1275, and Erasmus in Adag. Chil. i. Cent. 7. p. 200, who seems to have wished to read *ἀπὸ νοῦ, ὡς ἀπ' ὄνου, πεσεῖν*.

⁷ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπανερωτῶ αὐ*, not *ἐπανερωτῶν*. where the infinitive could hardly depend upon *δεῖν*.

⁸ Ficinus alone has "duas gubernationum species," from whence Boeckh elicited *ἐνec εἶδη δύο* from *ἐνeca δὴ*—

vernment, one most despotic, and the other most free; and we were considering which of these is rightly administered. But on laying hold of each of them, as regards¹ a certain moderation, on the part of some to be despots, and of others to be free, we saw that then (in moderation) prosperity resulted to them in an eminent degree, but that when each party was proceeding to the extreme, the one, of slavery, and the other, of the contrary, no benefit had accrued to either these or those.

Megil. You speak most true.

Athen. And moreover, for the sake of these things, we looked into both the Doric army, and the country under the Dardan mountains, and the settlement by the sea, and first those persons who remained after the deluge; and moreover we had a previous conversation about music and drunkenness, and on subjects still prior to these. For all this has been mentioned, for the sake of seeing, how a state may be best administered, and how every one may individually best pass through life. Now, if we have done any thing of importance, what proof of error can be brought, Megillus and Clinias, against us?

Clin. I seem to myself, O guest, to have something in my mind. For it appears that the subjects of all the discourse, we have gone through, have arisen through some good fortune. For I have come almost in want of them at the present moment; and both you and Megillus here are by some opportune accident present. For I will not conceal from you what has just now occurred to me, but I will make it a kind of omen. For the greatest part of Crete is attempting at present to establish a certain colony, and orders the Cnossians to take the care of the matter; but the city of the Cnossians (imposes it) upon me and nine others; and at the same time orders us to lay down laws (taken) from this place, if any are pleasing to us, and, if there are any, from elsewhere, making no account of their foreign character, should they appear to be better. Let us then grant this favour² to myself and you. ³After making a selection out of what has been said,³ let us in our discourse form a state, and colonize it, as if from its commencement;

¹ By simply inserting *εἰς* between *ἐκατέρω* and *μεριώρητα* I have restored both syntax and sense,

² There is evidently some error here, which might, I think, be satisfactorily corrected.

³—³ Ficinus has, what makes better sense, "collectis undique legibus—"

and there will be to us at the same time an inquiry into what we are in search of, and at the same time I may perhaps make use of this formation for the city that is to be.

Athen. You are not, O guest, proclaiming a war. And, unless there is some opposition on the part of Megillus, conceive that every thing on my side will be to the best of my power according to your mind.

Clin. You speak well.

Megil. And on my side likewise.

Clin. You both have spoken most beautifully. Let us then endeavour, in the first place, to form in our discourse a state.

BOOK IV.

[1.] *Athen.* COME then, what kind of state must we imagine it is to be? ¹ I mean that I am not asking what is its name now, nor what it will be necessary to call it in after-time; ¹ for this perhaps its colonization, or some spot, or the surname of some river or fountain, or of the gods of the place, may give their own appellation to the new state; but this is rather what I wish to ask concerning it, whether it is near the sea, or inland?

Clin. The state, of which we are now speaking, is, O guest, distant from the sea nearly eighty stadia.²

Athen. Are there any harbours along it, or is it entirely harbourless?

Clin. It has, as far as is possible, very good harbours, O guest.

Athen. Ho! ho! What say you? But is the country about it likewise all-prolific, or is it wanting in some things?

Clin. It is nearly in want of nothing.

Athen. Will there be any neighbouring state near to it?

Clin. Not very; on which account it is colonized. For an expulsion of the inhabitants having taken place of old in that spot, caused the country to be desolate for an immense space of time.

Athen. But with respect to plains, and mountains, and woods, how has it obtained by lot a portion of each?

¹—¹ Ficinus, translated literally by Taylor, has merely "neque vero nunc de presenti ejus nomine aut de futuro interrogo."

² About eight miles.

Clin. It is wholly¹ similar to the rest of Crete.

Athen. Would you say it is more rough than plain?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. It is not therefore incurably unfit for the acquisition of virtue. For, if it were near the sea, and had good harbours, but not all-productive, but wanting in many things, it would require for itself some powerful preserver, and certain divine lawgivers,² unless being such naturally, it had been about to acquire³ many various and depraved manners.³ But now it has some consolation from its distance of eighty stadia. It is situated indeed nearer the sea than is becoming, by nearly as much that it has, as you state, good harbours. There is however this desirable circumstance. For a sea, being near to a country, ⁴brings something⁴ pleasant each day, although it is in reality a very brackish and bitter neighbour.⁵ For filling it through ⁶retail-trading with foreign commerce⁶ and money-making, it begets in the disposition a moral conduct tost backwards and forwards,⁷ and not to be trusted, and (renders) the state faithless and unfriendly to itself and to other nations likewise. It possesses however against these evils a consolation in being all-productive; since if it were rugged, it is evident that it would not be ⁸very productive and all-productive at the same

¹ Ficinus has "totius Cretæ," as if his MS. read ὅλης instead of ὅλη. And so Taylor. Eusebius, in Præp. Ev. xii. p. 617, offers ὅλη.

^{2—3} Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. Perhaps Plato wrote ἵνα μὴ πολλά, ἃ γ' ἐμελλεν, ἦθῃ—ἔξου—similar to "ne contraheret" in Ficinus, in English—that it might not have, what it was about (to have), many—

³ On the mischief done to the morals of a people by living near the sea, Strabo, in vii. 9, refers to Plato, assigning, by a slip of the memory, to the Republic what he had read here in the Laws.

^{4—5} I have translated as if the Greek were originally *τι νέμει*, not, as at present, *τὸ μὲν*—

⁵ The expression *ἀλμυρὸν γειτόνημα* Plato is said to have taken from Alcman, the lyric poet, as we learn from the Scholiast on Aristides, quoted by Creuzer on Plotinus de Pulchritud. p. 464, who remarks that *πικρὸν* might perhaps be considered by some to be a gloss; for Aristotle says, *Περὶ Αἰσθῆσ.* iv. p. 1438, B., *τὸ δὲ ἀλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν σχεδὸν τὸ αὐτὸ*: but such is not his own opinion.

^{6—8} On the difference between *ἐμπορος* and *κάπηλος* see at Sophist, § 19.

⁷ Timæus rightly explains *καλίμβολος* by *πολυμετάβολος καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν γνώμῃ μὴ μένων*, similar to the description given by Virgil of a woman, "varium et mutabile semper."

^{8—9} This I confess I cannot understand. I could have understood,

time.⁸ For possessing this (advantage), by possessing a great export-trade, it would in return be filled with gold and silver coin in abundance;¹ than which a greater evil cannot, so to say, exist, (comparing) one thing with another, in a state, as regards the possession of manners generous and just, as we stated, if we remember, in our previous discourse.

Clin. We do recollect; and we concede that we were then and we are now speaking correctly.

Athen. But how is the country situated as regards timber for ship-building?

Clin. There is not any fir worth mentioning, or pine, and not much cypress; and a person would find little of larch, or plane-trees, which it is necessary for shipwrights to make use of for the inner parts of vessels.

Athen. And this too would not be ill for the nature of the country.

Clin. How so?

Athen. Because it is good for a city to be unable to imitate easily its enemies in mischievous imitations.

Clin. To which of the subjects that have been mentioned have you, after looking, said what you are now stating?

[2.] *Athen.* Do thou, O excellent man, ² watch me, looking to what was said at the beginning, the question about the Cretan laws, how they looked to one thing.³ And you two asserted that this very thing was what regards war; but I, taking you up, said, that when ¹ such laws, being laid down, looked to

"since, had it been rugged, it would not have been very productive, much less all-productive I think," in Greek, *οὐκ ἂν πολύφορος γε εἴη, μή τι γε πάμφορος, οἶμαι.* Ast however says that Ficinus has correctly translated, "cumque silvosa sit et aspera, licet omnia ferat, non tamen abunde omnia; nam si esset ad omnia ferax et fœcunda—" And so Taylor to the letter.

¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "multum auri atque argenti," as if his MS. read *πολλοῦ* in lieu of *πάντων*—

^{2—3} Ast says that after *φύλαττε*, "watch," is to be supplied "if perchance I say what is at variance with previous assertions." But such an ellipse is not, I suspect, to be found elsewhere in Plato; who probably wrote here *Ὁ δαμόνιε, ἐφύλαττές μ' εὖ, εἰς τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰρημένον ἀποβλέπων περὶ τῶν Κρητικῶν νόμων*—Well hast thou, O excellent man, watched me while looking to what was said at the beginning about the laws of Crete, that they looked to one thing—where I have omitted *τὸ* before *περὶ*—To avoid however all the difficulties of the text, Ficinus omits *ὡς πρὸς ἓν τι βλέπειν*: and so too does Taylor; but he translates "I am looking," as if the Greek were *ἀποβλέπω*, not *ἀποβλέπων*.

virtue, it was well; but when¹ only to a part, but not to the whole almost of virtue, I did not entirely agree. Do you then still again watch² my present³ legislation, while following me, if perchance I lay down any law not tending to virtue, or to a part of virtue. For I make it a fundamental position, that he alone lays down a law correctly, who, like an archer, ever aims at that, on which alone some of those things that are ever beautiful⁴ follow close, but who leaves all the rest, whether it be wealth or any thing else of that kind, which happens to exist without those before mentioned. And I said on one side, that the imitation of enemies would be then⁵ mischievous, when any one residing near the sea is annoyed by enemies, as for instance—for I will relate (it) to you, although not wishing to remind you of a past annoyance—when Minos imposed the payment of a tribute upon the inhabitants of Attica, through his having acquired a great power by sea.⁶ But the Athenians did not at that period possess, as they do now, ships of war, nor a country abounding in wood, suited for ship-building, so as to exhibit with facility a naval power. Hence they could not, through nautical imitation, become immediately sailors themselves at that time, and defend themselves against their enemies. And it would have been for their advantage to have lost many times ⁷seven young men,⁷

¹ I have twice translated as if the Greek were ὄρε, not ὄρι—Ficinus has “quoniam—quoniam,” adopted by Taylor.

² As Clinias had been already said to be on the watch, he and his friend Megillus could not be ordered “to watch in return;” but they might be “to watch still again.” Hence I have translated, as if the Greek were αὐ εἶρι φυλάξατε, not ἀντιφυλάξατε.

³ Before τῆς παρούσης the article τὰ has evidently dropt out; for otherwise the genitive would be without regimen, and so too would the verb transitive.

⁴ Bekker retains here καλῶν, acknowledged by Ficinus, as shown by his version, “aliquid eorum, quæ bona sunt.” But Ast would read καλόν, found subsequently in four MSS., and taking τίθεσθαι passively, compare the law, and not the law-giver, to an archer, as in Legg. xi. p. 934, B., § 12, τοὺς νόμους τοξότου—στοχάζεσθαι δίκην. But as παραλείπη must be said of a person, not a thing, we must adopt the ordinary version.

⁵ Instead of τὴν κακὴν τοιάνδε, Ficinus found in his MS. κακὴν τότε—For his version is “improbram tunc—”

⁶ To the naval power of Minos allusion is made by Thucydides, i. 4, while the circumstances relating to the tribute are detailed by Diodorus, iv. 60, and Ovid. Met. vii. 556.

⁷ Such was the tribute the Athenians were required to pay.

before ¹(suffering what happened to them. For,) ¹instead of being foot-soldiers, with heavy arms, and remaining firm,² they were accustomed, on becoming sailors, frequently to leap with a run into and upon the vessels, and to come back again quickly; and to think they were doing nothing disgraceful in not daring to die, by waiting for the attacks of the enemy advancing; and there were pretexts plausible and ready to those throwing away their arms, and making, as they said, not disgraceful flights; for language of this kind³ is wont to arise from naval heavy-armed troops⁴—(language) by no means worthy ⁵of unbounded praise, but very much the contrary.⁵ For it is never proper to accustom persons to mischievous habits, and this too the best part of the citizens. And it is surely possible to understand this from Homer, that such conduct is not honourable. For with him Ulysses abuses Agamemnon for exhorting the Greeks, at that time pressed down by the Trojans in fight, to draw down their ships to the sea, and he (Ulysses) is harsh against him (Agamemnon), and says, (Il. xiv. 96,)

Thou bid'st, while e'en of war, still standing round,
The clamour's heard, our well-bench'd ships to drag
Seaward, that, what the Trojans oft have wish'd,
Their prayers may be accomplish'd, and 'gainst us
The scale from on high Death turn. But ne'er will Greeks
Hold to the fight, while ships to sea are drawn;
But frighten'd look, and from the fray retreat.
Such hurt will bring the counsel thou dost preach.

He too knew then that three-banked galleys standing near⁶

¹—¹ The words between the lunes are found only in the Latin of Ficinus, which Taylor has translated “quod illis accidit perpeti; nam.”

² In lieu of *νομίμων*, which is unintelligible, Ficinus found in his MS., with which all but one agree, *μονίμων*, as shown by his version “terrestribus firmisque copiis;” and so read Plutarch, i. p. 363, F., *ἀντὶ μονίμων ὀπλιτῶν κατὰ Πλάτωνα ναῦται γενόμενοι*.

³ From “hujusmodi,” in Ficinus, Coray was led, on Plutarch i. p. 208, 20, to suggest *τοιαῦτα* for *ταῦτα*, adopted by Bekker.

⁴ In lieu of *ναυτικῆς ὀπλιτείας*, which seems a very strange expression, one would expect *ναυτικῆς πολιτείας*, “a nautical polity.” For a state and ship were first compared by Alcæus, as shown, by Horace, Od. i. 14, and then by Sophocles in Antig. 189, and Cicero Epistol. xii. 25.

⁵—⁵ The Greek is *ἐπαίωνων πολλακίς μυρίων ἀλλὰ τούναντίον*. But Ficinus has “non laude quidem ulla sed vituperatione summopere dignas,” which leads to *ἐπαίωνων μυρίων ἀλλὰ πολλακίς τοῦ ἐναντίον*.

⁶ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows literally, has “ad pugnantium fugam

were an evil to heavy-armed soldiers while fighting at sea. For even lions would, by adopting similar conduct, be accustomed to fly from stags. Moreover the states, when power and safety depend upon a navy, do not bestow honours ¹ on the most beautiful of warlike concerns.¹ For an account of the pilot's art,² and the rower's art, and that which is connected with persons of various kinds and of no great worth, no one could bestow upon each individual honours in a proper manner. And yet how can a polity deprived of this exist correctly?

Clin. It is nearly impossible. But yet, O guest, we Cretans say that the naval battle, which took place at Salamis, of the Greeks against the Barbarians, has preserved Greece.

Athen. And indeed many both of the Greeks and Barbarians assert the same thing. But we, my friend, both I and Megillus here, say, that the battle of foot-soldiers at Marathon and Platææ did one of them begin, and the other complete, the safety of the Greeks; and some made the Greeks

paratas," omitting *ἐν θαλάττῃ παριστῶσαι*. With regard to the sentiment in the text, it was proposed by some of the Athenians to burn all their vessels, previous to the last decisive battle, in the harbour of Syracuse, and to march their army by land through Sicily; for the enemy would not be able to follow them thither, and the troops would conduct themselves with greater fortitude, when they saw all means of retreat cut off. See Thucyd. vii. 60.

¹— This I can hardly understand. For honours were most assuredly bestowed on those who excelled in war. Hence in lieu of *πολεμικῶν* one would prefer *πολιτικῶν*, "statesmanlike."

² Between *κυβερνητικῆς γὰρ* and *καὶ ἱετικῆς* the text has *καὶ πεντηκονταρχίας*, which means, says Ast, "the command of a ship with fifty rowers," referring to Jul. Pollux i. 119, and he might have added i. 96. But though the word *πεντηκόνταρχον* is found in Demosthenes, p. 1212, 21, R., as applied to the officer over fifty rowers, yet here the question is not about the number of rowers, or even of soldiers on board, but about a specific art, requisite in all vessels. Hence, unless I am greatly mistaken, in *καὶ πεντηκονταρχίας* lies hid *καὶ κελευστικῆς καὶ ἀναρχίας*: of which *καὶ κελευστικῆς* should follow *κυβερνητικῆς γὰρ* and *καὶ ἀναρχίας* come after *καὶ ἱετικῆς*; for otherwise the subsequent *γιννομένης* will want its noun. With regard to the office of *κελευστής*, it will be sufficient to refer to Alcibiad. i. p. 125, C., *Ἄρα κελευστῶν χρωμένων ἱπταίς*; *Ναί. Κυβερνητικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γέ ἀρετὴ*: where the same three things are united, and all relating to the arts required in vessels. Then as regards *ἀναρχίας*, the sailors of old were, like those of more modern times,—witness the mutiny at the Nore in 1797—accustomed to disregard discipline; and hence Euripides has in Hec. 611, *ναυτικὴ τ' ἀναρχία*.

better, but some not better, so to say of the battles that conjointly saved us at that time ; for to the naval battle at Salamis I will add the one at Artemisium. But now, looking to the virtue of a polity, let us consider the nature of the region, and the order of the laws ; not thinking, as the many do, that to be preserved and to exist is alone to mankind the most honourable of all things, but to become the best, and to continue to be so, for as long a period as they may live. But this, I think, has been stated by us in the former part of our discourse.

Clin. How not ?

Athen. Let us then consider this alone, whether we are proceeding in the same path as being the best for states, touching their settlement and legislation.

Clin. (Let us do so) very much.

[3.] *Athen.* Tell me, then, what is next in order to this, what are the people, who are to be the colonists ; whether any one (may go), who is willing from the whole of Crete, since the masses have become in the cities more numerous than according to the quantity of food to be got from the land ? For you surely do not bring together whoever of the Greeks is willing (to go). And yet I see that some persons from Argos, and Ægina, and other parts of Greece, have settled themselves in the country amongst you. But for the present, tell me, from whence do you say there will be an army of citizens ?

Clin. It seems it will be from the whole of Crete ; and of the rest of the Greeks it appears that (the colonizers) will receive persons from Peloponnesus, as fellow-settlers for the most part. For, what you were saying just now, you said truly, that there are some from Argos, and the race, which has the highest character here at present, is that of Gortyna, because it happens to have settled there¹ from Gortyna in the Peloponnesus.

Athen. The establishment of a colony would not take place in states with equal facility, when one family, like a swarm of bees, going from one country settles down, friends from friends, after having been, as it were, besieged by a certain want of space, or compelled by some other sufferings of a similar kind. For it sometimes happens that a part of a city is forcibly driven out by seditions and compelled to migrate as strangers to

¹ In lieu of *ταύτης* Ficinus found in his MS. *ταύτη*—At least his version has “ huc migravit—”

some other spot ; and sometimes a whole city has exiled itself, after being thoroughly vanquished in war. In all these cases then it is easy for one to be colonized and governed by laws, but difficult for another. For when a colony is of one race, and has the same language, and the same laws, it possesses a kind of friendship, as being a partaker in the same holy rites, and every thing else of a similar kind, nor does it easily endure other laws, and a polity foreign to what it had at home. And sometimes a colony, having revolted through the badness of its laws, and through custom still seeking to adopt the very same habits as those, by which it was previously corrupted, becomes refractory and disobedient to its colonizer and legislator. But on the other hand a colony, composed of all kinds of people flowing together to the same point, will perhaps be more willingly obedient to certain new laws ; but to conspire together, and, like a pair of horses to froth together,¹ as the saying is, individually to the same point, is the work of a long time and very difficult. Nevertheless legislation and the colonization of states is a thing the most effective of all for virtue in man.

Clin. It is probable ; but tell me more clearly, looking to what have you said this ?

[4.] *Athen.* I appear to myself, good sir, while praising² and speculating about legislators, to be about to say something

¹ The MSS. generally read *ξυμφυσῆσαι*, "to weld together," translated by Ficinus, "unum idemque—efflare." But that would be a tautology merely after *ξυμπνεῦσαι*. One MS. has *ξυμφῦσαι*, which leads to *ξυν-αφρίσαι*, "to froth together," which a pair of horses would do by making similar exertions. The word *ἀφρίζειν* is applied to horses in a chariot-race by Sophocles in *El.* 70, and hence in Aristophanes, *Eip.* 902, "Ἀρματα δ' ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν ἀνατετραμμένα Φυσῶντα καὶ πνέοντα προσκινήσεται, where since *φυσῶντα* is the same as *πνέοντα* we may read 'Ἀφρίσαντα, similar to the expression in Petronius, "inter sudores anhelitusque." There are however those, who would be content with "puffing and blowing," as the version of *φυσῶντα καὶ πνέοντα*.

² One MS. has *ἐπαινῶν*, adopted by Bekker in lieu of *ἐπαινῶν*, which Ast refers to the words spoken just before, *ἐστὶ νομοθεσία—τελειώτατον πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνδρῶν*. But in that case Plato would have written *εἰρηκέναι*: for *ἐρεῖν* has always a future sense. On the other hand, *ἐπαινῶν*, "returning," could hardly be said here ; for the subject of the laws had not been lost sight of. Hence I should prefer *ἐπατῶν*, "knowing—" The two verbs *ἐπαινέειν* and *ἐπατῶν* have been similarly interchanged in Hipp. Maj. p. 291, D., and Euthyd. § 79, as remarked by Heindorf.

unimportant. But if we shall say aught opportunely, it would be no matter. And yet why do I feel a difficulty? for nearly all human affairs appear to exist in this manner.

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. I was about to say, that no man is ever a legislator; but that fortune and all kinds of accidents, happening in all kinds of ways, are our legislators. For either a war by violence has overturned politics and changed laws, or the want of means arising from severe poverty. Many innovations too diseases compel men to make, through pestilences falling upon them, and unfavourable seasons during many years. He then, who foresees all this, will be eager¹ to exclaim, as I just now did, that no mortal was ever a legislator, but that nearly all human affairs are accidents; and that it is possible for him, who asserts all this respecting navigation, and the arts of the pilot, and physician, and general, to appear to speak correctly. But on the other hand, it is equally possible for the person (to appear) to speak correctly on these points, who says this.

Clin. What?

Athen. That a god, and, together with a god, fortune and opportunity govern all human affairs; but that it is necessary to admit that art, a somewhat milder power, follows them. For on the occasion of a storm I should consider it a thing of great moment for the pilot's art to take a part, or not. Or how (say you)?

Clin. Thus.

Athen. Will not the same reasoning apply similarly in the case of other things? And we must attribute the very same principle to legislation; that, other things concurring which ought to happen to a country, if it is about to live happily, it is requisite for a legislator, who adheres to truth, to fall on each occasion upon a state of such a kind.

Clin. You speak most true.

Athen. Would not he then, who possesses an art for each of the above-mentioned occasions, be justly able³ to pray for

¹ Instead of *ἀξίσειν* Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ἀξιώσειν*, for his version is "non verebitur," translated by Taylor "will think fit."

² This is the only rendering of *μέγα πλεονέκτημα* suited to the context. But such is not the usual meaning of *πλεονέκτημα*.

³ One would rather expect "be said" than "be able—"

something to be present¹ with him through fortune, should he be wanting² only in art?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And all the rest just now mentioned would, if commanded to tell their prayers, say so. Is it not so?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And a legislator likewise would, I think, do the same.

Clin. So I think.

Athen. Come then, Legislator, (and say)—for let us address him—a city possessing what, and being in what state, shall we give you,³ and you take and hold,³ so that you may administer sufficiently, from the things remaining,⁴ the city? What is it possible to assert rightly after this? ⁵Shall we not say surely something belonging to the legislator? For it is meet.⁵

Clin. It is.

Athen. This. Give me a city governed by a tyrant, he will say; and let the tyrant be a young man, of a good memory, and docile, and brave, and naturally of a magnificent disposition; and let that, which, we said before, ought to follow all the parts of virtue, now accompany the soul of the tyrant, if there is about to be any benefit from the presence of the other qualities.

Clin. Our guest, Megillus, appears to me to say that temperance should follow the other virtues. Is it not so?

Athen. Yes, temperance, Clinias, in its popular sense, and not that, which any one in solemn phrase would call prudence, and compel it to be temperance; but that feeling which, inherent in boys and savage animals, bursts into flower

¹ Correct Greek requires *παρεῖναι αὐτῷ*, not *παρὸν αὐτῷ*—

² One MS. has, what the syntax demands, *ἐπιδέρ*. Ficinus has “*nec alia re, præterquam artificio, opus sit.*” From which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS.

^{3—3} The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁴ Ast says that *ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν* means “hereafter—” But till such a meaning is confirmed by sufficient examples, I shall continue to believe that Plato wrote *ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων*, “after what has been said—”

^{5—5} The Greek is *ἀρα τοῦ νομοθέτου φράζωμεν τοῦτο; ἢ γάρ*; which, Stalbaum says, labours under some great corruption. He would therefore read *ἀρα τὸ τοῦ*—with Ast, and reject *τοῦτο*, and *ἢ γάρ* likewise, as it is wanting in Ficinus. I have however translated, as if Plato had written *ἀρα τοῦ νομοθέτου φράζωμεν πού τι ὄν; δεῖ γάρ*.

on the instant, so that some are incontinent¹ with respect to pleasures, but others continent; and which we said,² when it exists apart from the many things called good, is not worth mention. For you understand what I am saying?

Clin. Perfectly.

Athen. This nature, then, let our tyrant possess in addition to those (mentioned above), if the city is about to have a polity in the quickest and best manner possible, and on the receiving of which it may live the most happily. For there neither is, nor will there ever be, the establishment of a polity more rapid or better than this.

Clin. But how, O guest, and by what argument would any one, who asserts this, persuade himself that he is speaking correctly?

Athen. It is easy, Clinias, to understand how this is so naturally.

Clin. How say you? Do you assert,³ if the tyrant is a young man, temperate, docile, of a good memory, brave, (and) magnificent?

Athen. Add too fortunate⁴ in nothing else, except in that during his time a legislator is existing worthy of praise, and that a certain fortune leads the two to the same point. For, on this taking place, there is brought to pass by a god nearly every thing which (is done), when he wishes any state to be eminently prosperous; and in the second degree, when two rulers are of such a kind; and in the third degree, (when three);⁵ and in a similar proportion more difficult, (as the rulers)⁶ are more numerous; ⁷but, the contrary, by how much the contrary happens.⁷

¹ How the idea of temperance can be thus mixed up with that of incontinence, I certainly cannot understand. Others, I hope, will be more fortunate.

² In iii. § 12, p. 696, D.

³ The Greek is *ἐὶ τύραννος γένοιτο, ὄψς, νέος*— But as there is an allusion to what had been stated just before, Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὅν, τύραννος ἐὶ γένοιτο, ἐφς, νέος*— “Did you not say, if a tyrant were young—”

⁴ I have followed Ast in assigning *Εὐτυχής* to the Athenian, not, as Stephens did, to Clinias, misled, it would seem, by Ficinus.

^{5, 6} Ficinus has alone preserved the words, requisite for the sense, in his version, adopted by Taylor, “*tertio loco, si tres; et, successionis eadem ratione servata, eo difficilius, quo plures.*”

⁷⁻⁷ Ficinus has paraphrased this, “*atque contra, quo pauciores, eo facilius.*”

Clin. You assert, as it seems, that the best state would result from a tyranny, in conjunction with a superior legislator and a well-regulated tyrant; and that it would most easily and rapidly change ¹ into that from such a kind as this; ¹ and that the second in degree is from an oligarchy; and ² the third in degree, from a democracy. Is it not so? ²

Athen. By no means. But the first is produced from a tyranny; the second, from a regal polity; the third, from a certain democracy; but with respect to the fourth, an oligarchy would be able to receive a generation of this kind with the utmost difficulty. For in it there are the greatest number of the powerful. Now we say, that these things then take place, when a legislator is naturally true, and when there exists in him a strength in common with those, who possess the greatest influence in the state. But where this exists the fewest in number, but at the same time the most strong, as in the case of a tyranny, in this way and then there is wont to take place a rapidity and easiness in the change.

Clin. How? For we do not understand.

Athen. And yet I think this has been said by us, not once, but often. But perhaps you never saw a state under a tyrant.

Clin. Nor am I desirous of such a spectacle.

Athen. And yet you may see it in the one just now spoken of.

Clin. What?

Athen. That the tyrant, who wishes to change the habits of a state, has no need either of (great) ³ labour, or any very long time for the accomplishment of his purpose. For ⁴ it is necessary that he should proceed the first in whatever road he wishes, either to turn the citizens to the pursuit of virtue, or the contrary, and mark out the course by acting himself the first, and praising and honouring some things, but bringing a

¹—¹ The Greek is εἰς τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, which I hardly understand. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "ex illa in hanc:" but οὗτος and ὁ τοιοῦτος are not opposed to each other in Greek, as "ille" and "hic" are in Latin.

²—² So Ficinus correctly. The Greek is ἡ πῶς λέγεις; καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ δημοκρατίας. But ἡ πῶς λέγεις could not be thus introduced between the second and third assertion. It is true however that οὐδαμῶς could not give the answer to πῶς, but it might to οὕτως, what Plato probably wrote, not ἡ πῶς.

³ Ficinus has "multo labore," as if his MS. read πολλῶν πόνων, not πόνων simply.

⁴ In lieu of δὲ one would prefer γὰρ, similar to "nam" in Ficinus.

blame upon others, and disgracing the party that is disobedient in each of these doings.

Clin. And how can we imagine¹ that the other citizens will quickly follow him, who has obtained such persuasion, and at the same time force?

Athen. Let no one persuade us, friends, that a state has ever changed² its laws more quickly and easily by any other way than the leading of its rulers, or that this happens now by any other means, or will happen ever again. For that indeed is neither impossible for us, nor would it be done with difficulty. But this is the thing difficult to be done, and has rarely taken place in a long time; although, when it does happen, it produces in the state, in which it is found, ten thousand, or rather every good thing.

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. When a divine love of temperate and just pursuits is inherent in certain mighty powers, whether they rule according to a monarchy, or a marked superiority in wealth or family, or should any one bring back the nature of Nestor, who they say excelled all men in the power of speaking, and still more in temperance. But this, as they say, took place in the times of Troy, but in ours not at all. If then such a man existed formerly, or shall exist, or is at present amongst us, he lives in a blessed state, and blessed too are those, who hear the words proceeding from his temperate mouth. Of a similar kind is the reasoning respecting all power, that, when the greatest power of a man falls to the same point with the acting prudently and temperately, then the production of the best polity and of such kind of laws takes place, but otherwise it will never be. Let this then be held to be spoken oracularly, as if it were a story detailed,³ and to have been shown, that in one way it is difficult for a state to have good laws, and in another, that, if what we have said should take place, it would have them in a manner the quickest and the easiest by far.

¹ One MS. has πανταχοῦ μέγα οἰόμεθα, similar to "ubique magnum quid aut arduum existimabimus—" adopted by Cousin.

² On account of the following, μηδὲ νῦν γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ αὐθις ποτε γενήσεσθαι, it is evident that a past tense is required here, μεταβαλεῖν, found in one MS., without ἀν, or what would be preferable, μεταβεβληκέναι.

³ Unless I am mistaken, Plato wrote not οὐκ καταπερί, but οὐκ, οὐ καθάπερ γραυσί, similar to ὥσπερ γραδὸς μῦθος in Gorg. p. 527, A., and ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοῦ μύθου λεγούσαις, in Rep. i. p. 350, E.

Clin. How so?

Athen. Let us now endeavour, by adapting our laws to your state, to mould it, as old men do boys,¹ by our discourse.

Clin. Let us go this road, and no longer delay.

[5.] *Athen.* But let us call upon a god for the preparation of the state. And may he hear, and hearing come to us, in a propitious and kind manner, to adorn, in conjunction with us, the state and laws!

Clin. May he come!

Athen. But what kind of polity have we in our mind to enjoin upon the state?

Clin. Inform me still more clearly what you wish to say; for instance, whether it is a certain democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or a regal government. For you would not surely speak of a tyranny, as we should imagine.

Athen. Come, then, which of you is willing to answer first, by stating what is the polity at home?

Megil. Is it not more just for myself, who am the elder, to speak first?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Megil. When I consider, guest, the polity of Lacedæmon, I am unable to tell you what I ought to call it thus.² For it appears to me to be similar to a tyranny. For the power of the Ephori in it is wonderfully tyrannical. And yet it sometimes appears to me to be the most similar of all states to a democracy. But, on the other hand, not to say that it is an aristocracy, is perfectly absurd. There is in it likewise the office of a king for life, which is said, both by all men, and by us too, to be the most ancient of all. On being then asked thus suddenly, I cannot, as I have said, by a definition, tell you which of these polities it is.

Clin. I too, Megillus, appear to be affected in the same manner as yourself. For I am quite at a loss as to which of these I should firmly assert the polity in Cnossus to be.

Athen. For you, most excellent men, do really³ participate

¹ The Greek is *παῖδα*—But Ficinus, “*tanquam seniores pueris*,” as if his MS. had *ὡς περ παῖσι*— One MS. reads *παῖδες*, evidently an error for *παῖδας*.

² Ficinus, probably through not understanding *οὕτως*, has omitted it. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἀπλῶς*, “*simply*.”

³ Ficinus has “*Veræ—reipublicæ* :” which has led me to believe that

713 in politics. But those, which we now name such, are not politics, but settlements of cities, ruled over, and a slave to¹ some portions of each other, and each is denominated from the power of the ruler. But if it were meet for a city to be called after this manner, it ought to be called by the name of the god, who is the ruler of those that possess truly a mind.

Clin. Who is this god?

Athen. Must we then still to a small extent make use of a fable, if we are about to explain in a careful manner what has been just now asked? Is it not meet to do so in this way?

Clin. By all means.

[6.] *Athen.* A long time antecedent to that of the cities, whose settlement we have before gone through, there is said to have existed in the time of Saturn a certain government of, and dwelling in, them extremely happy, and of which that, which is now administered the best,² exhibits an imitation.

Megil. It would as it seems be very requisite to hear about it.

Athen. It appears so to me; and hence I have brought the subject amongst us during our conversation.

Megil. And you have done so most correctly; and you will act very correctly too in bringing to an end the fable in due order as far as it is suitable.

Athen. I must do as you say. We have received then a report of the happy life of the persons living of that period, how it possessed all things without stint and produced spontaneously. Of this state of things the cause is said to have been something of this kind. Saturn, well knowing, as we have already detailed, that no human nature, when administering with absolute power the affairs of man, is so sufficient, as not to be filled with insolence and injustice, did, from reflecting upon this, place over our cities, as kings and rulers,

Plato wrote "Ὅντως γὰρ, ὃ ἄριστοι, ἀρίστων πολιτειῶν, with the usual play on the words ἀριστοι ἀρίστων. See my note on Æschyl. Suppl. 304.

¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has more correctly "in quibus una pars servit alteri." For he thus avoids the tautology in δεσποζομένων καὶ δουλευουσῶν. And hence his MS. probably read δεσποζόντων—

² In lieu of ἀριστοκρατεῖται, acknowledged by Ficinus, whose version is "ab optimatibus gubernatur," Stephens mentions a var. lect., ἀρίστα οἰκεῖται, subsequently found in two MSS., and similar to ἀρίστα οἰκοῖν, in iii. § 16, p. 702, A.

not men, but Dæmons of a more divine and excellent race; 'just as we now do, by placing some men over flocks of sheep¹ and such herds of cattle as are tame. For we do not make oxen rulers of oxen, nor goats of goats; but we ourselves rule over them, as being of a better race than them. The same thing does² the god, who being a lover of mankind has placed over us the race of Dæmons, as being better than us; which through the great inactivity³ on their part, and great too on ours, has taken care of us, and by imparting to us peace and modesty and good legislation⁴ and abundance of justice, rendered the human race exempt from sedition, and happy. And now this our discourse, employing (the language of) truth, asserts, that of such states as not a god but some mortal governs, there is to them no escape from evils and labours; but it conceives that we ought, by every contrivance, to imitate the life, said to have been under Saturn; and, as far as immortality is in us, by being obedient to it, to administer both publicly and privately our houses and cities, calling law the distribution of mind. For should one man, or an oligarchy, or even democracy, possess a soul eager after pleasures and desires, and requiring to be filled with these, and retaining nothing,⁵ but connected closely with an⁶ evil not to be finished, and a disease not to be filled,⁶ and should such

¹—¹ The Greek is *ὅλον νῦν ἡμεῖς δρῶμεν τοῖς ποιμνίαισι*, where the dative is without regimen. Hence, since the words *αὐτοῖσι τινας* are found shortly afterwards following *ποιοῦμεν*, where they are perfectly useless, although acknowledged by Julian in *Epistol. ad Themist.* p. 476, Petav., I have translated as if the words in the original were *ἀνθρώπους ἰστάντες τινας*.

² From APA, to which Ast justly objects, I have elicited ΔΡΑ.

³ Here is evidently some error. For the Dæmons did not take care of men through their inactivity, but quite the reverse, in Greek *δραστοςύνῃς*, of which the Ionic form *δρηστοςύνῃ* is found in Homer *Od. O. 302*. And as thus the *δραστοςύνῃ*, the "activity" of the Dæmons, is properly opposed to the *ῥαστώνῃ*, the "inactivity" of mortals, we might insert *δραστοςύνῃς* after *πολλῆς μὲν* and *ῥαστώνῃς* after *πολλῆς δέ*, were it not that the common reading is acknowledged by Julian.

⁴ Instead of *ἐλευθερίαν* Ast and Bekker have adopted *εὐνομίαν* from two MSS. Neither word is found in Julian.

⁵ The metaphor, says Ast, is taken from a sieve or a perforated vessel unable to retain any liquid, and he refers to Gorgias, p. 493, C., *τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπίκναισε—τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν*. I suspect however that Plato wrote *στίργουσαν εὐδὲν*, "contented with nothing—"

⁶—⁶ Such will perhaps seem to be a correct rendering of *ἀνηνύτῳ καὶ*

a person¹ rule over either a city or an individual, and trample upon the laws, there would be, as we just now said, no contrivance for security. It is necessary then to consider, Clinias, whether we shall be persuaded by this account or not.

Clin. It is surely necessary to be persuaded.

Athen. You understand then, that some say there are as many species of laws as of politics; but of politics we have already gone through as many as the multitude say there are. Do not then think that our present doubt is about a matter of no moment, but about one of the greatest. For that, to which the just and the unjust ought to look, has come again to us as a matter of doubt. For persons say that the laws ought not to look either to war or to the whole of virtue, but to see² what may be beneficial to a polity whatever it may be, so that it may always rule, and never be dissolved; and (they say) that the natural definition of the just is laid down most beautifully thus.

Clin. How?

Athen. That what belongs to the superior is beneficial.

Clin. Speak still more clearly.

Athen. Thus (do I speak). On every occasion the superior power, they say, lays down the laws in a state. Is it not so?

Clin. You speak the truth.

Athen. Think you then, say they, that ever at any time will a mob after being victorious, or any other polity, or even a tyrant,³ lay down willingly laws for any other purpose at first, than for what is conducive to the continuance of its own power?

Clin. How should it?

Athen. Whoever transgresses what is thus laid down, him will the lawgiver, who calls such laws by the name of just, punish as a person acting unjustly.

ἀπληστῶ κακῷ νοσήματι. For ἀνηνύτω may belong to κακῷ, as in Gorg. p. 507, E., ἀνηνυτον κακόν; and καὶ follow instead of preceding ἀπληστῶ. One would however prefer ἀπαύστῳ κακῷ καὶ ἀνηκίστῳ νοσήματι, similar in part to "inexplebili inextinguibilique ardore et insannabili morbo" in Ficinus.

¹ Julian properly omits ὁ τοιοῦτος, which words could hardly be interposed between κατὰ πατήσας and τοὺς νόμους.

² I have adopted ἰδεῖν, suggested by Schneider in lieu of δεῖν, to which Ast justly objects. Sydenham and Winckelmann would read ζητεῖν—

³ In lieu of τύραννιδα Ficinus, as shown by his version, "tyrannum," found in his MS. τύραννον, what Bekker has edited from four others.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. In this way then, and in this wise, and by this manner, will what is just exist.

Clin. So at least this reasoning says.

Athen. For this is one of those prerogatives¹ relating to government.

Clin. What are those?

Athen. Those, which we were then considering as to what ought to govern what. And it appeared that it was proper for parents (to rule over) their progeny, and the older over the younger, and the well-born over the ignobly born. And there were many other things, if we remember, and² some an obstacle to others; and among them there was this one; (for) we said somehow that Pindar conceived it to be according to nature for the most violent to take the lead, to use his own words.³

Clin. This was indeed said formerly.

Athen. But consider to what⁴ persons our state is to be committed. For a thing of this kind has taken place ten thousand times in certain states.

Clin. Of what kind?

[7.] *Athen.* When power has been fought for, the conquerors are wont to take the affairs of the state so strongly into their own hands, as to give no share of the government to the conquered, or to their descendants, and they live watching each other,⁵ lest any one should get into power and cause an

¹ In lieu of ἀδικημάτων, Schulthes, in his German translation of the Laws, was the first to read ἀξιωμάτων. For the allusion is to iii. § 9, p. 690, A., as remarked by Ast, who has adopted the reading. The Zurich editors have however given δικαιωμάτων—

² Instead of καί, which is unintelligible here, Ficinus seems to have found ὢν, for his version is “quorum—”

³ From the expression ὡς φάναι, Ast supposes that the words of Pindar were “κατὰ φύσιν ἀγει τὸ βλαύτατον.” But in the passage of the lyric poet, to which there is an allusion in iii. § 10, p. 690, and a quotation from it more at length in Gorg. p. 484, B., the words were, as shown by Boeckh, κατὰ φύσιν ἀγει τὸ δικαιώτατον ὑπερτάτῃ χειρί: from whence, in lieu of ὡς φάναι, one would prefer ἐς θέμιν—Ficinus has “secundum naturam ac justum imperium esse, ut potentiora imbecillioribus dominentur,” which is a paraphrase rather than a translation.

⁴ The Greek is ποτίρεις τισιν— But that could be said only if a choice were to be made between two persons or things stated distinctly. Ficinus has “quibus,” which leads to ποίοις τισιν—

⁵ In lieu of ἀλλήλους, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus,

insurrection, through remembering the ills which had taken place. At present we surely say that those are neither politics, nor upright laws, which are not laid down for the sake of the whole state in common; and those, which so exist for the sake of some (alone), we call ¹seditions, but not politics; and that the things which they call just, are called so in vain. Now this has been asserted by us on this account, because we will give your state no one as a magistrate, because he is rich, or possesses any thing of this kind, such as strength, or size, or family; but whoever is most obedient to the laws laid down, and gains this victory in the state, to him we assert must be given the ministerial office, that relates to the gods,² the greatest to the first; the second to him, who gains the second prize; and ³so, according to a certain ratio,³ to those coming in a certain order must each of the things after these be assigned. But those, that are called rulers, I have now denominated the ministers of the laws, not for the sake of introducing any innovation in names; but I think ⁴there will be to a state a safety from this more than from any thing (else), and the contrary (from a contrary).⁴ For I see destruction is at hand to that state, ⁵in which the law is ruled over, and is powerless.⁵ But in the state, where the law is the absolute ruler over the rulers, and the rulers are slaves of the law, I behold safety and all for he has omitted the word, Plato wrote, I suspect, ἄλλοι ἄλλους, "some these, and others those—"

¹ Ficinus has "non cives sed seditiosos." He therefore found in his MS., what is read in all the rest, *στασιώτας ἀλλ' οὐ πολίτας*. Ast however defends *στασιωτείας ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας*, by quoting viii. 3, p. 832, C., *πολιτεία μὲν οὐδέμια, στασιωτεία δὲ πᾶσαι λέγουντ' ἄν*.

² In lieu of *θεῶν* Schulthes suggested, what Ast has adopted, *νόμων*, on account of the subsequent *ὑπηρέτας νόμοις*. Sydenham too would read *νόμων*—Orelli prefers *θεσμών*—Stalbaum defends *θεῶν* by saying that in *θεῶν*, "gods," is included the idea of "the laws." But how this can be, I do not see. Perhaps Plato wrote *θειῶν νόμων*, "laws given by the gods."

³ Ficinus has "eademque ratione," as if his MS. read *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* in lieu of *κατὰ λόγον οὕτω*—

⁴ The Greek is *παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τοῦτο σωτηρίαν τε πόλει καὶ τούναντίον*. But Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, "*salutem hinc maxime civitati fore et contrarium ex contrario*," as if he had found in his MS. *παντὸς μᾶλλον ἂν εἶναι παρὰ τούτου σωτηρίαν τῇ πόλει, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐναντίον τούναντίον*.

⁵ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "in qua non lex magistratibus, sed legi magistratus præsunt."

other good things, such as the gods have bestowed upon states.

Clin. Truly so, by Zeus, O guest ! For according to your age you perceive acutely.

Megil. For every man, when young, sees, himself by himself, matters of this kind very dully ; but most acutely, when old.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. But what after this ? Shall we not suppose settlers as having arrived and being present ? and must we not finish the portion next in order of our discourse for them ?

Clin. How not ?

Athen. Let us then address them. O ye men, God, as the old saw¹ (says), having (in himself) the beginning, and end, and middle of all things, does, proceeding in a circle, according to nature, bring things to an end by a straight road ;² and him does Justice ever follow, the punisher of those, who are deserters from the divine law ; and close upon her attends in a humble and orderly manner he, who would be happy ;³ but

¹ The old saw alluded to is the Orphic verse preserved by Eusebius in *Præp. Evang.* xiii. 12, 'Ἀρχὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μίσητον ἤδὲ τελευτήν, not the distich quoted by the Scholiast, *Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μίσησα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τίττεται, Ζεὺς πᾶσιν γαίης καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος*, i. e. "Zeus is the beginning, and the middle, Zeus ; And formed from Zeus are all things, and of earth Zeus is the base, and of the starry sky : " which the Scholiast, probably after Proclus, thus explains—"He is the beginning, as the producing cause ; but the end, as the final (cause) ; the middle, as being equally present to all things, although all things partake of him differently. But by 'that which is direct according to justice,' (Plato) signifies desert, and the not inclining to one side, and, as it were, by one rule ; but by 'proceeding round,' he signifies the existing eternally, and that too which is perpetually after the same manner, and according to the same ; for the circumference has in sensible objects this property." Such is the literal translation of the Scholium. But Taylor has—"But by that which is direct according to nature Plato signifies desert, according to justice"—as if he wished to read *εὐθεία δὲ κατὰ φύσιν σημαίνει κατὰ δικῆν ἢ ἀξίαν*.

² Ast quotes opportunely Eurip. *Tro.* 896, *Ζεὺς, εἴρ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἶπε νοῦς κρατῶν, Προσηξάμην σε πάντα γάρ, δι' ἀψόφου Βαίωνων κελύθου, κατὰ δικῆν τὰ θνήτ' ἄγει*.

³ Unless I am greatly mistaken, in the whole of this description Plato had an eye to Alcibiades, who used to pride himself upon his wealth, and honours, and handsome person, and was no less remarkable for his insolent bearing, than for the high opinion he entertained of his talents as a statesman. With regard to the language, it is quite evident that Plato has put into prose, what he found in the verses of Eupolis or Aristophanes to this effect—*Σκυρτᾷ ταραττων πάντα, καὶ πολλοῖς τι*

he, who is lifted up by high-boasting, exalting himself¹ through his riches, or honours, or the fine form of his body, and having from his youthfulness and thoughtlessness his soul inflamed with insolence, as one who is in no need of either a ruler or a leader, but competent to lead even others, is left, deserted by the deity; and being thus left, and falling in with others of a similar kind, he leaps about, when he throws all things into confusion together; and to many indeed he appears to be somebody; but in no long time afterwards suffers a punishment, which justice would not blame, and causes himself and family and city to be utterly destroyed.³ With regard then to these matters thus disposed in order, what must a prudent man do, or think, and what must he not?

Clin. This at least is plain, that every man ought to think how he may be one of those, who are to follow the deity.

[8.] *Athen.* What manner of acting then is dear to and attendant upon the deity? There is one, which possesses one reason of old, that the similar will be friendly to the similar, when it is moderate; but that the immoderate are neither friendly to each other nor to the moderate. Now the deity will be especially the measure to us of all things, and much more than, as persons say, a man.² He then, who is to become friendly to a nature of this kind, must necessarily become such to the utmost of his power. And, according to this reasoning, our temperate man is dear to the deity, for he is similar to him. But the intemperate man is dissimilar, and at variance (with the deity), and unjust; and the rest of instances are by the same reasoning affected in this way. Let us then consider that language of this kind is to follow these premises, (language) I think the most beautiful, and the most true of all, namely, that for a good man to sacrifice to, and be conversant ever³ with, the gods, ⁴by means of prayers, and

σιν Ἐδοξεν εἶναι τις μετὰ δ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον Τιμωρίαν ὑπέσχετο οὐ μεμπτήν, ποιῶν Ἀρδὴν ἑαυτὸν, δῶμα, πόλιν, ἀναστάτους.

¹ Others may, but I will never, believe that Plato would thus after *ἐξαρθεῖς* introduce *ἐπαιρόμενος*, when he might have written *γαυρούμενος*, although *ἐπαιρόμενος* is acknowledged by Suidas in *Πλάτων*.

² The persons alluded to are the sect of Protagoras, who said that "man was the measure of all things," as stated in *Cratyl.* p. 386, A. § 6.

³ In lieu of ΔΗ all the MSS. read ΔΕΙ, answering to "deceit" in *Ficinus*: from which it is easy to elicit AEI.

⁴— The words between the numerals, although found in *Ficinus*, are omitted by Taylor.

offerings, and every kind of attention to the gods,⁴ is a conduct the most beautiful, and best, and most conducive to a happy life, and moreover pre-eminently becoming; but to the wicked man the contraries of these naturally happen. For the wicked man is unpurified in his soul, but the contrary one is pure; and to receive gifts from a defiled person is not at all correct for either a good man or a god.¹ To the unholy then there is much labour in vain respecting the gods; but it is the most seasonable to all holy men. Such then is the mark at which we ought to aim. ² Whither then can be most correctly carried, what are called the arrows of a person, and what is the shooting out by thought, as it were by arrows?² We assert, in the first place, that he, who gives after the Olympian gods, and those who preside over the city, as honours to the terrestrial gods, the things of an even number,³ and secondary, and on the left hand,³ will in the most proper manner reach the mark of piety; but to the gods above these, things of an odd number, and those that signify the opposite to what have been just now mentioned. And after these gods a prudent person will celebrate the holy rites of Dæmons, and after them of Heroes. And after them follow the statues of the household gods, held holy according to law; and after them are the honours paid to living parents; since it is just for a person, who owes the first and the greatest of debts, to pay those that are of the

¹ To this passage Cicero alludes De Legg. ii. 16, and there is a similar sentiment in Plautus' Rudens Prolog. quoted by Ast.

²⁻² The Greek is βέλη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅλον ἢ τοῖς βέλεσιν ἔφεσις τὰ ποῖ' ἂν λεγόμενα ὀρθότατα φέρου' ἂν; where I am completely in the dark; and so was Ast, who has laboured, as I conceive, in vain, to make out the syntax and sense. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were βέλη δ' ἂν του τὰ λεγόμενα ποῖ' ἂν ὀρθότατα φέροιτο, καὶ διανοίη τις, ὥς βέλεσιν, ἢ ἄφεσις. The error arose from the words διανοίη, ὥς βέλεσιν, ἢ ἄφεσις, forming one line of the Codex Archetypus, being displaced, and οἷον η τοῖς being written instead of διανοίη τις ὥς. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has "sagittæ vero ad illud quænam? at quis propius ipsarum impetus rectissime diceretur?" as if he had found in his MS. βέλη δὲ αὐτοῖς τίνα; καὶ τις αὐτοῖς ἔφεσις ὀρθότατα λείγου' ἂν. Winckelmann would read τὰ ποῖ' ἀλλ' ἂν—

³⁻³ The idea of giving to the gods above the earth things of the first number (odd), and of the first place, and omens on the right (lucky) hand, emanated from the school of Pythagoras, as remarked by Ast; who quotes from Porphyry's Life of that philosopher, p. 197, ed. Cant., τοῖς μὲν οὐρανίοις θεοῖς περιττὰ θύειν, τοῖς δὲ χθονίοις ἅρτια: and refers to Plutarch, who says that Numa put forth many precepts similar to those

longest standing ; ¹ and to think, ¹ that the things he has acquired and holds belong all to those, who begot him and brought him up, for supplying what is required for their service to the utmost of his power, beginning from his substance ; and, in the second place, from his body ; and, thirdly, from his soul, by paying off the debts due for their care of him, and in favour of those, who gave the pangs of labour as a loan to the young ; and by returning ² what has been due a long time to those ² who in old age are greatly in want. It is requisite likewise through the whole of life for a person to hold and to have held pre-eminently a kind language towards his parents ; because there is ³ for light and winged words a punishment most heavy ; for Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, has been appointed an inspector over all persons in matters of this kind. ³ It is necessary then to yield to them when in anger, and gratifying their feelings, whether they so conduct themselves by words or deeds, as not being ignorant ⁴ that a father would very reasonably be exceedingly angry with his son, if he conceived he had been injured by him. But, on the death of parents, the funeral which is the most moderate is the best ; and (let) not its size exceed what is customary, nor be deficient in those things, which the forefathers made for their parents ; and on the other hand, let persons pay yearly to such, as have now reached their end, the attention that brings a decoration (to the tomb) ; and by omitting nothing, ⁵ that contributes to a perpetual re-

of Pythagoras, and amongst others τοῖς μὲν οὐρανόις περισσὰ θύειν, ἄρτια δὲ τοῖς χθονίοις.

¹ Ficinus alone has "putare quisque debet," adopted by Taylor.

² The Greek is ἀποδίδοντα δὲ παλαιοῖς, where the article before παλαιοῖς could not be omitted. I have translated as if the text were ἀποδίδοντα, ἃ δὲ παλαι, τοῖς— To avoid the difficulty in δὲ after ἀποδίδοντα, Ast has cut out what he should rather have corrected.

³ Here again lies hid a poetical fragment, found originally in an Æsopo-Socratic fable—πράγματος κόφου Ἦν ζημία δὲ βαρυτάτη λόγων πτηνῶν. Ἐπίσκοπος γὰρ ἄγγελός τε περὶ ταῦτα Δίκης ἐτάχθη πᾶσι Νέμεσις οὐς ἡ καὶς : where πρᾶγματος κόφου is confirmed by λόγων, κόφου πρᾶγματος in xi. § 13, p. 935, A., while Νέμεσις is here called the daughter of Justice, as in the hymn of Mesomedes in Antholog. Gr. iii. p. 6, and as Adrastæa is by Ammianus Marcellinus. xiv. 1, "Adrasteia—quam theologi veteres fingentes Justitiæ filiam."

⁴ So Taylor has adopted "non ignorantes," found in Ficinus. But ἐγγιγνώσκειν means in Greek "to pardon," rather than "to be conscious."

⁵ I have translated as if τε had dropt out before παραλείπειν.

membrance, by this especially is there ever an honour, and likewise by a person contributing for the dead a moderate expense, such as is allowed by fortune. By acting thus, and living thus, we shall each of us on each occasion carry off what is due to us both from the gods and such as are superior to us, and we shall pass the greatest part of our lives in a good hope. But why¹ the person who is doing perfectly what relates to his offspring, and kindred, and friends, and fellow-citizens, and what relates to the rites of hospitality (laid down)² by the gods, and the intercourse arising from all these matters, ought to make his life a shining ornament according to law, the very course of the laws will (show forth);³ which, by persuading some of our habits and punishing by violence and justice others, that do not yield to persuasion, renders our state blessed and happy. But what it is meet and necessary for a legislator, who thinks as I do, to say, but which when spoken are unfitted to the form of a law, respecting these it appears to me that a person would,⁴ by bringing forward a pattern both before himself and those, for whom he is about to give laws, and by going through all that remains to the utmost of his ability, make after this a beginning in the laying down of laws.

⁵ *Clin.* Let then such things be laid in some form especially.

Athen. But⁶ it is not a very easy thing to embrace them, as it were in some one form, and to speak of them; but let us in

¹ Here again Ast has laboured hard to unravel the intricacies of this perplexed passage; which can be overcome I think only by supposing that Plato wrote not 'Α δὲ πρὸς, but 'Αλλὰ διότι τὰ πρὸς—as I have translated.

² The Greek is ξενικά πρὸς θεῶν θεραπεύματα: where since the words πρὸς θεῶν are perfectly unintelligible thus standing by themselves, Ast would expunge them. But though the idea is adopted by Stalbaum, yet it is more reasonable to suppose that τεθέντα has dropt out between θεῶν and θεραπεύματα, as I have translated.

³ Ficinus has "legarum ipsarum tractatio demonstrabit," from which Ast was led to believe that δείξει had dropt out before ἡ διέξοδος. Plato wrote, I suspect, διδάξει ἡ ὁδός—

⁴ The syntax requires us to read, as I have translated, προενηγκόντ' ἂν ὑατῶ—ἀρχεσθαι, not with ἂν omitted.

⁵⁻⁶ I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Ast; who did not however perceive that Plato wrote ἔστω, not ἔστι, and that ἀλλ' has been lost after κείμενα.

this way take some method, if perchance we may be able to establish any thing of a firm kind respecting them.

Clin. Say what method.

Athen. I should wish them to be very obedient as regards virtue; and it is evident that the legislator will endeavour to accomplish this through the whole of his legislation.

Clin. How not?

[9.] *Athen.* What then has been now said appears to me to effect something of moment towards a person listening with a greater mildness and a kinder feeling to what the words recommend, provided they do not come in contact with a disposition altogether savage; so that should what the words say render the person, who has become if not very much, yet a little more kindly disposed, more docile, we must be quite content. For there is no great facility¹ nor an abundance of those, who feel a desire to become the best to the greatest degree and in the shortest time; and the many point out Hesiod as a wise person for asserting that the road to wickedness is smooth, and offers itself to be passed through without sweat, as being very short; but (says he)

“Th’ immortal gods have before virtue placed
The sweat of labour, and the road is long
And steep, that to it leads. At first ’tis rough;
But when you reach the top, ’tis easy all,²
Although it was all difficult before.”³

Clin. And he appears to be like a person who speaks well.

Athen. Entirely so. But what the discourse has done, as it has been going on, I wish to place in the midst of you.

Clin. Place it then.

Athen. Let us then say to the legislator, while addressing these words to him—Tell us, Legislator, is it not evident that, if you knew what we ought to do and say, you would have said it?

Clin. It is necessarily so.

Athen. Did we not hear you saying a little before, that a legislator ought not to suffer poets to say what they please?

¹ I cannot very well understand here *εὐπείρεια*; nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted the word entirely.

^{2, 3} Instead of *δὴ πείρα* and *χαλεπή περ*, I have translated as if the Greek were *δὴ ἔς πάντα* and *χαλεπή πρὶν*—

For they would not know, that by saying what is contrary to the laws, they would injure the state.

Clin. You speak truly.

Athen. If then we should speak in this manner to him in behalf of the poets, would what has been said be in moderation?

Clin. In what manner?

Athen. In this. There is an old story, O legislator, which is constantly told by ourselves, and seems correct to all the rest, that a poet, when he sits on the tripod of the Muse, is then not in his right senses, but, like a fountain, readily permits what comes to it to flow out:¹ and as his art is an imitation, he is (often) compelled, when representing persons placed in situations contrary to each other, to contradict himself frequently, and does not know whether of what is told these or the others are true. But it is not possible for a legislator to act in this manner in the case of a law, namely ²(to say) two (different) things about one thing;² but he must always make one assertion about one thing. And do you so consider it from what has been said just now. For in the case of a funeral, one being excessive, and another deficient, and a third moderate, you, having chosen one of these, the moderate, order it, and simply praise it. But if my wife were pre-eminently rich, and should order me to bury her,³ I would celebrate in a poem her magnificent sepulchre;³ but on the other hand, a parsimonious and poor man (would praise) a deficient one; but he who possesses moderate means, and is moderate himself (in mind), would praise a moderate one. But you must not talk, as you did just now, when speaking of the moderate; but you must tell us what the moderate is, and of what quantity it is; or do not imagine that a discourse of this kind is a law.

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were not *ῥεῖν*, but *ἐκρεῖν*, similar to "effundere" in Ficinus.

² Ficinus has "duo quædam diversa de uno in lege loqui," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐν τῷ νόμῳ δύο περὶ ἐνὸς λέγοντι ἀλλοῖα, ἀλλὰ—*

³ Such is Taylor's translation of the Latin of Ficinus, "in poemate excedens sepulchrum laudarem." The Greek is *ἐν τῷ ποιήματι τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα ἀν τὰφον ἐπαινοῖν*: where Ast, unable to understand *ποιήματι*, suggested *γράμματι*, in allusion to the writing of the will; but Winckelmann prefers *ἐπιστήματι*, referring to ix. p. 958, E.—*λίθινα ἐπιστήματα*—said of the stone tablet on a tomb. Perhaps Plato wrote

Clin. You speak most true.

[10.] *Athen.* Whether then will he, who is placed by us over the laws, say nothing of this kind at the beginning of his laws, but immediately state what it is meet to do, and what not, and, having threatened a fine, turn himself to another law, and add nothing of exhortation and persuasion ¹to those, for whom the laws are laid down? ¹ ²But as in the case of physicians, one is accustomed on each occasion to attend in this way, and another in that, ² let us call to mind the method of either, in order that we may beg the legislator, as children do a physician, to cure them in the mildest manner. But what are we saying? There are, surely, we say, some persons physicians, and others the ministers of physicians; and these too we somehow call physicians.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And (this too), whether they are free-men, or slaves, and possess the art through the injunctions of their masters, both according to theory and experience, but not by nature, just like free-men, (who) ³ have both learnt the art in this way themselves, and are teaching it to their children? ⁴ Would you put down these as two kinds of the so-called physicians?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Do you then not perceive that when there are both slaves and free-men sick in cities, the slaves do for the most part go round and cure the slaves, or remain in the medical

ἐν τῷ Πλούτου νοήματι—"with the thoughts of a Plutus." Cousin translates "dans mes vers."

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, while Taylor translates τοῖς νομοθετουμένοις, "the legislators," thus confounding the active voice with the passive.

²—² Ficinus has "Afferamus autem in medium modos medendi duos, quibus alii medici aliter curare consueverunt; ut quemadmodum pueri medicum orant, ut modo quodam facillime eos curet, ita et nos legum latorem—" From which it is evident that his MS. was defective here; or, if as full as the others, that he did not know how to make sense of the passage. After θεραπεύειν, Cornarius proposed to insert καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ποιήσει. Ast, however, conceives that a question put by Clinias, has been lost, while Bekker is content to place a dash after θεραπεύειν, to mark an aposiopesis. Stalbaum says the passage is corrupt, and requires correction.

³ Ficinus has "sicuti liberi, qui," which leads to what the syntax requires, ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ—

⁴ From this it would seem that in Greece the medical art was frequently hereditary; although occasionally a slave was taught his master's trade.

shops; and that not one of such physicians either give or receive any reason respecting each of the diseases of each of the slaves, but, as if knowing accurately from experience, orders, as if he were a self-willed tyrant, what seems good to him; and then goes away, bounding off from one sick domestic to another; and by this means affords a facility to his master of attending to (other) patients? But the freeborn physician, for the most part, attends to and reflects upon the diseases of the freeborn; and, by exploring them from the beginning, and according to nature, and communing with both the patient himself and his friends, does, at the same time, learn something himself from the sick, and at the same time teach him, as far as he can, something, and does not order him any thing until he has persuaded him of its propriety; and then, after rendering the patient gentle by persuasion, endeavours to finish the business by bringing him (back)¹ to health. Which of these is the better physician? he who cures in this way or in that?² [and which is the better exerciser? he who exercises in this way or that?]² he, who effects his single power in a twofold manner, or he, who works it out in one way, and in the worse and the more rustic of the two?

Clin. The twofold, O guest, is surely the superior.

Athen. Are you willing then for us to look into this twofold and simple method, as it exists in legislation?

Clin. How am I not willing?

[11.] *Athen.* Come then, by the gods, (and state) what law will the legislator first lay down? Will he not, according to nature, regulate by his ordinances first the commencement of generation³ relating to states?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Is not the connexion by and communion of marriages the commencement of generation in all cities?

¹ In *δει*, which is found, without any meaning, before *παρὰσκευάζων*, lies hid, I suspect, *αὖ*, which should be placed after *ὕγιαν*.

²⁻³ Unless the word *γυμναστής* is to be taken in the sense of the English "practitioner," applied to a medical man, one would suspect the words *καὶ γυμναστής γυμνάζων* to be an interpolation; for not a word had been said, nor even an allusion made to the exerciser previously; although it is true that amongst the ancients there was such a connexion between the professors of the medical and gymnastic arts, that the two were sometimes found united in the same person. See Sydenham on the Rivals, § 3, n. 33.

³ I have with Ast omitted *περὶ* before *γενέσεως*. For Ficinus has "generationis—principium."

Clin. How not?

Athen. The laws then of marriage being first laid down correctly, seem to be laid down for correct conduct in every state.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Let us then first speak of the simple law, which would perhaps exist somehow in this way; that a man is to marry when he is from thirty to thirty-five years old; but if he does not, that he should be fined both in money and with the loss of political privileges;¹ in money to this or that amount, and in disfranchisement of this or that kind. Let this then be the simple law respecting marriages; but this the twofold; that a man is to marry from thirty to thirty-five years old, considering that the human race has in some measure partaken naturally of immortality, of which every one has naturally every desire.² For to become famous, and not to lie when dead without a name, is the desire of a person of this kind. The human race then is a thing connected with all time, and follows and will follow it to the end, becoming in this manner immortal through that, which is ever the same and one, partaking by generation of immortality, in consequence of its leaving³ children's children. Now for a man to deprive himself willingly of this, is by no means holy; and he intentionally deprives himself of this, who has no care for children and a wife. He, therefore, who obeys this law would depart without a fine. But let him, on the other hand, who does not obey it, and does not marry when he is thirty-five years of age, be fined yearly so and so, in order that his solitary life may not seem to bring him gain and an easy state; nor let him share in those honours, which the younger in the state pay on every occasion to the elder. It is then in the power of a person, who hears this law compared with that, to form an idea of each particular law, whether it ought to become in this way double, and the longest⁴ in length

¹ Such is the real meaning of *ἀτιμία* in Greek, not simply "dishonour," but what in one word would be "disfranchisement," wholly or in part.

² A similar sentiment is to be found in the Banquet, § 32.

³ Instead of *καταλείπόμενον* the passive participle, which has no meaning here, Ficinus found in his MS. *καταλείπον*, as shown by his "relinquendo," unless it be said that *καταλείπόμενον* is in the middle voice.

⁴ Instead of *σμικρότατον*, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ast suggests, what I have adopted, *μακρότατον*—

through its mingling threats with persuasions; or by employing threats alone, it ought to become simple in length.

Megil. It is the Laconic practice, O guest, to prefer ever the shorter method. But should any one order me to become a judge of such enactments, which of the two I would wish to be written and laid down for a state, I would prefer the longer; and as regards every law according to this model, if two such were proposed, I should make the same choice. It is, however, requisite that the present legislation should be agreeable to Clinias; for his is the state, which is now thinking of making use of laws of this kind.

Clin. Well have you spoken, Megillus.

[12.] *Athen.* To take any account of enactments either prolix or brief is very silly. ¹For we must honour, I conceive, the best, but not the shortest, nor (look to) their length.¹ But, in the laws which we have just now spoken of, one differs from the other not by the double alone as regards the value of their use; but that, which was said just now, respecting the twofold kind of physicians, was most properly adduced. To this point however no legislator seems at any time to have given a thought, that, when it is possible to make use of two things in legislation, persuasion and force, they employ the other alone,² as far as is possible, against the masses unexperienced in education. For they legislate, not mingling a fight³ with force, but (employing) unmingled violence alone. But I, O blessed men, perceive that a third thing likewise ought to exist with regard to laws, but which does not exist at present.

Clin. Of what kind are you speaking?

Athen. Of something, which has arisen, through a certain god-send, out of the matters we have just now discussed. For

¹—¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has more elegantly "non enim brevissima aut longissima sed optima sunt, ut arbitror, eligenda."

² If τῷ ἐρίῳ is to be referred to βία it should be τῷ ἐρίῳ. But Plato wrote, I suspect, τῷ βαιοτέρῳ τρόπῳ, "the more violent method."

³ In lieu of μάχην, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ast would read ἀνάγκην; but Winckelmann on Plutarch Amator. p. 233, διδαχὴν, referring to Plato in Tim. p. 51, E., τὸ μὲν—διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς. Epist. vii. p. 332, A., πειθοὶ καὶ διδαχῇ. Ficinus has "minas," as if he had found in his MS. ἀπειλήν—Cousin defends μάχην by saying that it means the same as ἀνάγκην, and is sufficiently well opposed to πειθῶ. Badham on Euripid. Helen. 907, suggests ἀρχήν—

from the time when we began to speak about laws in the morning, mid-day has now arrived ; and we have been in this very beautiful retreat discoursing upon no other topic than laws. But we seem to me to be just now beginning to speak about laws ; and that all before has been a prelude to laws.¹ Now why have I mentioned this ? It is because I wished to say, that in all discourses, and whatever else partake of a vocal sound, there are both preludes and, as it were, movements backwards and forwards,² that possess some artificial handling, useful to that which is about to be gone through. And, indeed, of the laws, as they are called, of guitar-songs and of every kind of music, preludes are laid down composed with wondrous care. But of laws really so, which we say are political, no one has ever at any time made any mention of their preludes, nor, as being a composer, has he brought it to light, as if it did not naturally exist. But our present discussion, as it seems to me, indicates that it does exist ; and the laws, which were just now mentioned as twofold, have seemed to be³ not surely thus twofold simply, but there (have seemed) to be some two things, law and a prelude to a law ; but the tyrannical injunction, which was spoken of as being similar to the orders of slave-physicians, (has appeared) to be an unmingled law ; but that, which was spoken of prior to this, and called persuasive by this person here, (seemed) to be in reality persuasive, but to have the power of a prelude, relating to discourses. For in order that the person, to whom the legislator addresses his law, may receive kindly, and, through his kindness, with more docility, the injunction, which is the law, on this account the whole of this discourse has appeared to me to have been spoken ; ⁴which the speaker has spoken persuading.⁴ Hence, according to my reasoning, this very thing

¹ Cicero de Legg. ii. 7, 16, "Habes legis procemium ; sic enim appellat Plato."

² By *ἀνακινήσεις*, says Ast, are meant the movements of the arms which a boxer especially adopts, previous to his striking a blow ; and he refers appositely to Aristotle Rhetor. iii. 14, *οὐδὲν προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἀρχεται*, and the notes of Victorius on that passage.

³ To support the syntax of *εἶναι*, Ast would supply here *κατεφάνησαν* from *κατεφάνη*, found a little below. But all the infinitives here depend rather upon *ἔδοξαν*.

⁴ I confess I cannot understand *ὃν πείθων εἶπεν ὁ λέγων* : nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is "quæ ad persuadendum est inducta."

would be properly called a prelude to a law, but not a discussion of it. What then, after saying this, should I wish to be stated subsequently? It is this; ¹that the legislator ought ever prior to all laws to make them not without a share of preludes; and as regards each law, in so far as they differ from themselves, as much as the two just now mentioned have differed.¹

Clin. For my part, ²I would never exhort ²a man, skilled in these things, to lay down laws in any other manner.

Athen. You appear therefore to me, O Clinias, to speak correctly, so far that there is a prelude to all laws; and that it is requisite for a person commencing the business of legislation, to prefer to every discourse a preface, that is natural to each. For that, which is to be said after this, is not a thing of little moment, nor is it a trifling difference, whether they are stated clearly or not clearly. However, if we should enjoin upon legislators to make a prelude equally about what are called great and small laws, we should not speak ³correctly. For this is not to be done either in every song or in every discourse; since, though it naturally belongs to all, yet it is not to be used for all; and a thing of this kind is to be allowed to the orator, the lyric singer, and the legislator.

Clin. You appear to me to speak most true. But let us make a no further exercise of delay, but return to the question, and begin, if it is agreeable to you, from those points, which you did, as a person not preluding, speak of at that time. Again then, as persons say, when playing,⁴ since second things are better, let us turn up and back⁵ from the be-

¹—¹ Here again I am quite at a loss; and so is Ast; who has however suggested some slight alterations, from which nothing is gained.

²—² So Ficinus translates correctly τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐκ ἀν—διακελεύοιτο—

³ Ficinus has "si—jubeamus, non recte juebimus," in Greek εἰ—προσάττοιμεν, οὐκ ἀν ὀρθῶς προσάττοιμεν, which would be more in the manner of Plato, who is generally wont in this formula to repeat the same verb.

⁴ The Scholiast says that the proverb alluded to has reference to persons making a second sacrifice, after the omens in the first have proved unfavourable; but this idea is disproved at once by the introduction of the word παίζοντες. There is a somewhat similar proverb in Phileb. p. 60, A. § 140, τὸ καὶ δις καὶ τρίς τὸ γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δέιν.

⁵ The verb ἐπαναπολεῖν has two metaphorical meanings, one applied to turning up the soil, and causing that which was previously under to

ginning, as finishing a prelude, and not an accidental discourse, as just now. Let us take then their commencement¹ acknowledging that we are preluding. And what has been just now stated, respecting the honours to be paid to the gods, and the attention due to ancestors, is sufficient. But let us endeavour to speak about what is next in order, until it shall appear to you that the whole prelude has been spoken of sufficiently. And after this you will go through detailing the laws themselves.

Athen. About the gods, then, and those that come after them,² and parents, both when living and dead, we made sufficiently then a prelude, as we call it now; but the portion that still remains of this kind of a subject, you appear to exhort me to lead forth into the light.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And after these matters, how it is necessary for persons to keep their souls, and bodies, and substance with reference to serious pursuits and remissions (of labour), and fitting too for both the speaker and the hearers to ruminate³ in common, and to become, to the utmost of their power, successful in attaining instruction. These very matters then must in reality⁴ be spoken of and heard by us after those.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

come to the top, as persons do when digging or ploughing; and the other to the act of ruminating, when an animal throws up the cud from the stomach to the mouth, where it is rolled about and turned over. But as neither sense seems suited to this place, I have translated the word literally, "turn up and back," for the allusion is probably to some sport, of which nothing is known at present.

¹ I cannot understand *λάβωμεν αὐτῶν ἀρχήν*, nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; whose version is "incipiamus" merely, which Taylor has translated. I could have understood "Let us lay down a foundation for other (laws)," in Greek, *βάλλωμεν ἄλλων ἀρχήν*—for thus "the others" would be opposed to those relating to the gods.

² Namely the Demons and heroes, see § 8.

³ I have adopted this word, found in its metaphorical sense in Shakespeare, as the ordinary meaning of the Greek *ἀναπεμπάζεσθαι*; but I conceive that the other sense, "to reckon up," as persons do on their five fingers, is what Plato here intended; and if so, *πάντα* must be inserted before *ἀναπεμπαζομένους*.

⁴ Instead of *ὄντως*, which I cannot understand, the sense seems to require *οὕτως*, "thus."

BOOK V.

[1.] *Athen.* LET every one then hear, who has already heard what we have said respecting the gods, and our dear progenitors. For a man's soul is, after the gods, the most divine of all his possessions, as being most his own. Now the whole of a man's possessions are altogether twofold. The more powerful and the better are the lords, but the weaker and worse, the slaves. Of those then that are his the lord must always be held in honour before the slaves. Hence after the gods, who are lords, and those that follow next to them, I properly exhort a person¹ to honour his own soul by speaking of it as the second in rank. But not one, so to say, honours his soul properly, although he appears (to do so). For honour is somehow a divine good; but of things that are evil not one is honourable. He then, who fancies that he shall enlarge his soul by certain discourses or gifts or certain yieldings, and yet does not make it better from being worse, appears indeed to honour it, but by no means does so. For instance,² every boy on becoming a man thinks himself competent to know all things,³ and that he honours his soul by praising it, and he freely permits it to do whatever it pleases. But⁴ we now say³ that he, who acts so, injures and does not honour (his soul). And yet it is necessary, as we have said, (to honour) it in the second rank after the gods. Nor, when a man does not consider himself, but others, as the cause of his own errors and of ills the most in number and magnitude, and ever exempts himself as free from blame, is he honouring his own soul, as he forsooth fancies; for he is far from doing so; since he injures it; nor when⁴ contrary to

¹ Instead of *δεῖν*, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were *τινι*—It came from *δεῖ*—*δενρίσαν* a little below.

² Such was the case of Menexenus, it would seem, and of Melitus. See *Menex.* § 1, n. 7.

³ Taylor has adopted "*nos dicimus*," found in Ficinus; whose MS. probably read *λέγομεν*, not *λεγόμενον*. Hence we may read *ὃ δὲ νῦν λέγομεν ἔννοιαι*, i. e. what we intellectual people say; for *τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενον ἔστιν* would mean "there is now said as a proverb."

⁴ So Ficinus from his MS. probably. The others read *παρὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ ἔπαινον*.

reason, and the praise of the legislator,⁴ he indulges in pleasures, does he honour it all; but he dishonours it, by filling it with vice and repentance. Nor yet when, on the contrary, he does not thoroughly labour by bearing up against exertions that receive praise, and against fears and pains, but sinks under them; for ¹ by sinking he then dishonours it; for he causes it to be in dishonour by doing all these acts.¹ Nor does he honour it, when he thinks that to live is altogether a good: for then too he dishonours it. For while his soul imagines that every thing in Hades is evil, he yields, nor does he strive against it by teaching and convincing it that it does not know whether, on the contrary, that, what relates to the gods there is not the greatest of all good to us. Nor yet, when any one honours beauty before virtue, is this any other thing than truly and wholly a dishonour to the soul. For such an assertion falsely proclaims that the body is more honourable than the soul. For nothing born of earth is more honourable than what is in Olympus; and he, who thinks otherwise of the soul, is ignorant that he is careless of this wonderful possession. Nor when a person, who desires to possess wealth not honourably, or when possessing (unjustly),² does not bear it ill, does he then honour his soul with gifts? He fails³ of it entirely. For he sells what is honourable and at the same time beautiful in his soul for a little gold; for all the gold both on the earth and under the earth is of no value against virtue. And, to speak comprehensively, he, who is neither willing by every contrivance to abstain from such things, as the legislator numbers up and ranks amongst the disgraceful and bad, nor, on the other hand, to pursue to the utmost of his power the good and the honourable, does not perceive that, in all these cases, he treats his soul, which is a thing the most divine, with the greatest dishonour, and in the most unseemly manner. For not one, so to

¹—¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has merely "*hæc enim agens omnia animum suum dedecorat*," rejecting *τότε οὐ τιμῇ ὑπέικων*, words certainly quite unnecessary.

² Ficinus alone has "*possidens injuste*," thus preserving the very word required by the train of thought. Hence we must insert *κακῶς* before *κτώμενος*.

³ The Greek is *παντὸς μὲν οὖν λείπει· τὸ γὰρ αὐτῆς*—But in this formula, as remarked correctly by Ast, *λείπει* is not elsewhere found. It is always *δεῖ*. Hence we may read *παντὸς μὲν οὖν δεῖ· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ αὐτῆς*.—

say, considers what is the greatest of the so-called¹ punishment for evil conduct. Now the greatest is in the becoming similar to bad men; and by becoming similar, to avoid good men and good discourses, and to be cut off from them, but to be glued to (the bad),² while³ pursuing according to their intercourse;³ and sticking close to such persons, he must of necessity do and suffer what such persons naturally do and say to each other. Such a state then is not one of justice, for the beautiful is just [and justice],⁴ but of punishment, the attendant on a state⁵ of injustice, with which both he, who does meet, and he, who does not meet, are miserable; the one in not being cured; the other in being destroyed, in order that many may be saved. But to us it is an honour, to speak generally, to follow the better and to make the worse, still⁶ capable of becoming better, the best possible.

[2.] There is not then a possession belonging to a man more naturally fitted, than the soul, to flying from evil, and⁷ to tracking out and taking⁷ what is of all things the best; nor, when it has taken it, to associate with it for the rest of life. Hence it has been ranked second in honour; but the third—every one will understand this at least—is the honour, according to nature, of the body. It is however requisite to consider these honours, which of them are genuine, and which with a false stamp. ⁸ Now this is the business of a legislator. And he appears to me to point out that they are these and some such as these;⁸ that the body is honourable, not when it pos-

¹ Ficinus, probably unable, like myself, to understand *τὴν λεγομένην*, has “*maximam enim secundum Justitiam ulfionem*—”

² Ficinus alone has “*improbis*,” what the antithesis requires.

³⁻³ The Greek is *διώκοντα κατὰ τὰς ξυνουσίας*, which is, I believe, equally at variance with sense and syntax, that united require *διώκοντα τὰ ἀκόλαστα τῆς ξυνουσίας*, i. e. “while pursuing the licentiousness of an intercourse with them.”

⁴ The words *ἡ δίκη* are plainly an explanation of *τὸ δίκαιον*.

⁵ As Plato had just before used *πάθος*, he could not possibly have written *πάθη*: which Ast says is put for *πάθημα*. One MS. has *πάθει*, governed by *ἀκόλουθος*: and so I have translated.

⁶ The Greek is *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, words I cannot understand; nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; for he has omitted them. Plato probably wrote *δυναρὰ ἐν ὄντι*—as I have translated; while in *δε*, before *βελτίω*, lies hid *ἡδη*—

⁷⁻⁷ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has “*ad investigandum eligendum-que*.”

⁸⁻⁸ Ficinus, supplying perhaps what was partly wanting in his MS., has “*quorum differentia a legislatore declaranda mihi videtur*.”

sesses beauty, or strength, or swiftness, or size, or health—although this would seem so to many—nor even when it possesses the contraries to these. But those things which, being in the middle, touch upon the whole of this possessing,¹ are by far the most moderate and safe.² For the former cause the soul to be puffed up and confident, but the latter humble and servile. And similarly situated is the possession of ³money and means,³ according to the same measure of valuation.⁴ For an excess in the bulk of all these things produces enmity and revolts, both in states and amongst individuals; but a deficiency (produces) slavery for the most part. Let not then any one be desirous of riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them very wealthy; for this is better neither for them nor the state. For the substance of the young is not the prey of flatterers; and if it is not in want of the necessities of life, it is the most harmonious and the best of all. For by its harmony and fitness in all things it renders our life free from pain. It is meet then to leave to children abundance of modesty, not of gold. And we think we ⁵shall accomplish this⁵ by reproving impudent young men, when they act shamelessly. This, however, is not effected by the exhortation given at present to young men; which persons give by saying that it is meet to be modest in every thing; but a prudent legislator will rather advise old men to feel a shame before the young; and above all things to take care, that no young person, at any time, either sees or hears them doing or saying any thing base; since where old men are shameless, there too must young men of necessity be the most impudent; for the most excellent education both of the young and of themselves is, not in giving advice, but in being seen to do through the whole of life, what a person would say, while giving advice to another. But he who honours and venerates his relationship and the whole communion ⁶of family gods, that possess the nature of

¹ In ἕξις there is an allusion to the preceding ἔχον.

² Ficinus has, what Stephens preferred, "moderationa tutioraque."

³—³ In Greek χρήματα and κτήματα differ as in English "personal" and "real" property.

⁴ I have followed Cornarius and Ast in rejecting καὶ before τμήσεως.

⁵—⁵ So Taylor follows the version of Ficinus, "id nos facturos," instead of the Greek, τοῦτο καταλείψειν, "will leave this—"

⁶—⁶ Ficinus has, more briefly, "et universam sub iisdem penatibus generis communionem."

the same blood,⁶ will have, according to reason, the gods who preside over births favourably disposed towards him for the procreation of children. And moreover, he will obtain the kind feeling of friends and associates in the intercourse of life, by considering their attentions to himself as of a greater and more respectful kind than they do; but his own favours to them less than his friends and associates do themselves. As regards, however, the state and fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who prefers before the contests at Olympia and all in war and peace, to be victorious in the glory of being the servant of the laws at home, ¹[as having been subservient to them]¹ in a manner the most beautiful of all men through (the whole of)² life. We must consider too the laws of intercourse³ with strangers to be matters of the most holy kind. For nearly all the delinquencies of strangers towards strangers depend more upon an avenging deity ⁴than do those in the case of fellow-citizens.⁴ For a stranger being destitute of companions and kindred, is an object of greater pity both to men and gods. He therefore, who is more able to take vengeance, is more ready to assist. Now the ⁵Dæmon of each person, and the god of hospitality, are as the attendants upon Zeus, who presides over strangers, powerful in the greatest degree. It is then a matter of much caution for a person, to whom there is even a little portion of forethought, to proceed on to the end of life, without having committed any error with regard to strangers. But,

¹—¹ The words ὡς ὑπηρετηκώς are evidently an explanation of ὑπηρεσίας.

² In ἀπορίᾳ lies hid πάντως—the origin of “totam” in Ficinus, whom Taylor has tacitly followed.

³ The Greek is συμβόλαια, derived from σύμβολον, “a symbol,” which was a piece of metal, wood, or leather, cut into two corresponding parts, one of which was retained by a person who had formed an acquaintance with a stranger, and the other by the stranger himself. The bearer of the symbol, whether one of the original parties, or a friend of theirs, was entitled, on presenting it, to the rights of hospitality, which were considered to be of the most sacred kind, and not to acknowledge them was a crime of the deepest dye.

⁴—⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were ἡ τὰ περὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, not ἀπὸ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν—which would require the addition of εἰς πολίτας. Ficinus has “præ illis, quæ inter cives committuntur.”

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were ἐκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς ὁ ξένιος τῷ ξενίῳ—not ὁ ξένιος ἐκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς τῷ ξενίῳ—For ὁ ξένιος ought to precede τῷ ξενίῳ, as shown by the mass of passages collected by others and myself on Æsch. Suppl. 139.

of all the crimes done by strangers and denizens, the greatest is that which takes place in the case of each towards suppliants. For the god, with whom the suppliant happens to have met, as a witness to agreements made with a suppliant, becomes himself pre-eminently the guardian of the sufferer.¹

² So that no one, who injures suppliants, will go unpunished.³

[3.] Thus then have we nearly gone through the modes of intercourse³ relating to parents, and to a person himself, and the things belonging to him, and those relating to the state, and friends, and kinsmen, and strangers, and natives. But as to what follows how a person by being what can best pass through life, (it is meet)⁴ to detail, not what a law, but what praise and blame may, by teaching individuals, render them more obedient to the rein, and more kindly disposed to the laws about to be established. These then are the matters we must subsequently speak of. Now truth is the leader of every good both to gods and men; of which he, who is about to be blessed and fortunate, should participate immediately from the beginning, in order that for the greatest length of time he may live a person of truth. For he is trust-worthy; but he is not trust-worthy, by whom a voluntary falsehood is loved; while he, by whom an involuntary one is so, is a senseless person; of which states neither is an object of envy. For he, who is not trust-worthy and untaught, is unloved; and as time progresses towards morose old age, he becomes known, and at the end of life has prepared for himself a solitude complete; so that, whether his associates and children are alive or not, his life becomes nearly equally an orphanhood. He however who

¹ Ficinus has "deus enim, per quem supplex fœdus est consecutus, diligentissimus ejus est custos." For he could not understand, nor can I, the Greek, μεθ' οὗ γὰρ ἱκετεύσας μάρτυρος ὁ ἱκέτης θεοῦ ἔτυχεν ὁμολογιῶν, φύλαξ διαφέρων οὗτος τοῦ παθόντος γίγνεται. But by merely changing ἱκετεύσας into ἱκετεύσαντι all will become quite plain, as is shown by the translation.

²⁻³ Such is Taylor's translation of the Latin of Ficinus, "quare nullus in supplices sceleratus impunis abibit." The Greek is literally, "so that he, who has met with (the god), will not suffer, what he has suffered, unavenged."

³ This is the only way of translating literally δμολήματα. Ficinus has "officia—"

⁴ For the sake of the syntax and sense, we must suppose that δεῖ has dropped out before διεξιλθεῖν, as I have translated. Ficinus, being equally at a loss, has omitted ἐπόμενον τούτῳ, and so after him has Taylor.

does no injury is held in honour ; but he, who does not suffer the unjust to act unjustly, deserves more than double the honour of the former person. For the former has a value equal to one man ; but the latter to many others,¹ by pointing out to the rulers the injustice of the rest. But let him, who unites with the rulers in inflicting punishments to the utmost of his power, be proclaimed the great man in a state, and the complete victor, if ever one was,² in virtue. The very same praise it is meet to proclaim of temperance and prudence ; and the person, who possesses other goods, that have a power not only for him to possess them himself, but to share them with others, it is meet to honour, as being at the tip-top (of excellence) ; but him, who is unable, although willing, to put aside in the second rank ; and to blame indeed the man who is envious and unwilling through friendship³ to be a sharer of any of his good things with any one ; but not to hold a jot the more in dishonour his possession on account of the possessor, but to acquire it with all one's might. Let then every one contend with us for virtue unstintingly. For such a person advances a state by striving himself, and not cutting down others through calumny. But the envious man, while he thinks to become the superior by detracting from others, tends less himself to true virtue, and makes his competitors disheartened through their being blamed unjustly ; and by these means causing the whole state to be untrained for the contests of virtue, he renders it, as far as he can, of less account as regards its renown. It is proper, moreover, for every man to possess a spirit, and yet to be as mild as possible. For it is not possible to avoid the unjust acts of others, which are harsh and difficult to be cured, or entirely incurable, otherwise than by fighting and conquering, after defending oneself, and by remitting nothing, when in the act of punishing. Now to do this every soul is unable, without possessing a noble spirit.

With respect to the acts of those, who do an injury that admits of a cure, it is requisite to know, in the first place,

¹ The Greek is *ἑτέρων* : but one would have expected here *ἄλλων*, as in the very words of Homer, *πολλῶν ἀντάξιός ἄλλων*, which Plato had in mind. Ficinus however omits *ἑτέρων*—

² In lieu of *οὗτος*, which is never said in praise of a person, correct language requires *εἰ τις*, as I have translated

³ Instead of *διὰ φιλίας*, the sense evidently requires *δι' ἀφιλίας*, "through a want of friendship."

¹ that no unjust man is voluntarily unjust.¹ For no one would at any time willingly possess any of the greatest evils, and least of all in the case of the most honoured belonging to himself. Now the soul, as we have said, is in truth a thing the most honoured by all. No one, therefore, would at any time voluntarily receive the greatest evil in the thing most honoured, and live through the whole of life possessing it. But the unjust man and he who has what are evils, is in every respect an object of pity. It is proper, however, to pity him, who has an evil that is curable, and to restrain and soften down one's anger, and not, like a woman with an excess of passion, to continue embittered against him. But it is meet to let loose one's anger against a person incontinently² sinful, and past all exhortation depraved. On which account we have said that the good man ought to be conspicuous³ for possessing a spirit, and yet to be on each occasion mild.

[4.] But of all evils the greatest is implanted in the souls of the major part of mankind; for which, while each one is giving himself a pardon, he devises no plan for avoiding it. And this is what people⁴ say; that every man is naturally a friend to himself, and that it is well for a thing of this kind to be necessarily so. But, in truth, the cause of all his mistakes arises to each man, upon each occasion, through the violent love of self. For the lover is blinded with respect to the object loved.⁵ So that he judges improperly of things just, and good, and beautiful, through thinking that he ought always to honour what belongs to himself in preference to truth. For it is necessary that he, who is to be a great man, should love neither himself, nor the things belonging to himself, but what is just, whether it happens to be done by himself or by another

¹—¹ On this celebrated saying of Plato, Ast refers to a mass of writers, who have alluded to it.

² In lieu of ἀπαρῶς Ast would read ἀνάρως, as the antithesis to *λάσιμα*. Ficinus too has "qui autem ita sunt flagitiosi, ut incurabiles sint."

³ Stephens would reject *πρέπειν*, omitted by Ficinus; while Ast would read *θυμοειδῆ, εἰ πρέπει*, "if fitting—"

⁴ Since the time of Plato, not only the people, but philosophers likewise have said the same, as may be seen in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. Aristotle however, in Polit. ii. 2, says τὸ φιλαυτὸν εἶναι ψέγει-
-αι δίκαιως.

⁵ To this doctrine of Plato allusion is made, says Ast, by Plutarch, Galen, and Longinus.

person rather.¹ From this very same mistake it has come to pass in all cases that his ignorance appears to a person to be a wisdom peculiarly his own. Hence, although we know, so to say, nothing, we fancy we know every thing; but, by not permitting others to do that, of which we ourselves are ignorant, we are compelled to make mistakes through doing it ourselves. On this account every man ought to avoid the vehement love of himself, and ever² to follow one better than himself, without placing, in a matter of this kind, a feeling of shame in the foreground. But what are of less importance than these, and mentioned frequently, and not less useful than these, it is proper for a person to remind himself of and to state. For, as something is always flowing away from us, it is necessary for something on the contrary to be flowing (to us). Now recollection³ is the influx of thoughts, which had left us. On which account⁴ it is meet to abstain from ill-timed laughter, and tears; and for every man to announce to every man that he must endeavour, by concealing⁵ all excessive joy and all⁶ excessive sorrow, to preserve a decent bearing, each person, while his Dæmon is standing steadily, going on successfully or unsuccessfully to places on high and steep, while Dæmons are opposing

¹ This μάλλον is found rather strangely here. It should follow ἀλλὰ or τὰ δίκαια—

² Instead of ΔΕΙ, which is unnecessary after χρῆ, Plato evidently wrote ΑΕΙ, as I have translated.

³ On the Platonic doctrine relating to memory, see the Phædrus, p. 72, E., and Meno, p. 81, D.

⁴ Unless I am greatly mistaken, something is wanting here to unite what now appears to be very disjointed.

⁵⁻⁵ By merely placing πᾶσαν before περιωδυνίαν, instead of after περιχάρειαν, we shall get rid of the difficulty, which Stephens and Ast could not master, nor Orelli, who proposed to read κοάλεμον for ὅλην, nor Winkelman, who suggests ἄλλην—

⁶⁻⁶ Such I conceive to be the meaning of this difficult passage, where the Greek is at present κατὰ τε εὐπραγίας ἱσταμένου τοῦ δαίμονος ἐκάστου καὶ κατὰ τύχας ὅλον πρὸς ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἀνάντη δαιμόνων ἀνθισταμένων τισὶ πράξει. But from the preceding mention of excessive joy and excessive sorrow, it is evident that as εὐπραγίας is to be referred to περιχάρειαν, so must τύχας be referred to περιωδυνίαν. Hence for κατὰ τύχας, I suspect, Plato wrote κατ' ἀτυχίας: while for the syntax and sense united τε has been changed into γε, ἐκάστου into ἑκάστων, καὶ into ἡ, ὅλον into ἰόντα and πράξει into ταράξειν: unless it be said that after ὅλον there has dropt out Σίσυφον and ἰόντα after ἀνάντη. With regard to ἱσταμένου, that verb is applied to a wind, which when it blows steadily from any quarter is said to stand, as in Thucyd. ii. 97, κατὰ πρύμναν ἱσθῆται τὸ πνεῦμα.

with certain disturbances;⁶ and that it is meet ever¹ to hope that the deity will, when troubles fall upon the good state,² which he has given, make them less instead of greater, and (cause) a change from the present state to a better one; and with respect to³ [good things]³ the contraries of these, that they will always be present to them⁴ with good fortune. In these hopes it is meet for every one to live, and in the recollection of all these things to be sparing on no point, but ever amidst serious and sportive occupations to remind another and himself clearly.⁵

[5.] Now then there have been mentioned nearly (all), as far as divine things are concerned, respecting the pursuits, to which every one ought to attend, and respecting each individual himself, of what kind he ought to be; but matters relating to man have not been at present spoken of. But it is necessary (to speak of them): for we are conversing with men, and not with gods. Now pleasures, and pains, and desires, are naturally in the highest degree human; on which it is necessary for the whole mortal animal to hang, as it were,⁶ [and to be suspended]⁶ with the greatest earnestness. It is requisite then to praise the most beautiful life, not only because by its form it is superior, as regards fair renown; but because, if any one is willing to taste of it, and not, as being young, to become a deserter from it, it excels in that too, of which we all are in search, (I mean) the possessing more of joy and less of sorrow through the whole of life. That this will be clearly the case, if any one tastes of it correctly, will readily and vehemently appear. Now what is this correctness? This it is requisite to ascertain from the reasoning, and to consider whether it is produced according to nature in this way, or in another, contrary to nature. It is requisite therefore to consider in this manner one life, as compared with another, if it be more pleasant and more pain-

¹ Ficinus has "sperare semper—debent." He therefore found in his MS. ἐλπίζειν δὲ ἀεὶ δεῖν, not merely ἐλπίζειν δὲ ἀεὶ—

² I have followed Cornarius and Ast in considering τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς to be governed by ἐμπιπτόντων, and in that case τὸν θεὸν must precede, not follow, τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

³ The words τὰ ἀγαθὰ are evidently an explanation of τὰ ἑναντία.

⁴ Instead of αὐτοῖς, which has nothing to which it can be referred, one would prefer ἀγαθοῖς.

⁵ In lieu of σοφῶς the sense requires σοφῶς, "wisely."

⁶ I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, the difference between ἐξηρησθαι and ἐκκρεμαμένον εἶναι. Nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; who has merely "quasi pendere—"

ful. We wish for pleasure to be present with us; but we neither choose nor wish for pain. But what is neither the one or the other we do not wish for in the place of pleasure; but we do wish for it to be exchanged in the place of pain. We wish too for less pain with more pleasure; but we do not wish for less pleasure with greater pain. But we can show clearly that we do not wish to possess each of these, equal in the place of equals. All these differ in multitude and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in whatever things are the contrary to all these, with respect to wishing; but ¹with respect to the choice of each, ¹they do not differ. Since then these things have been thus arranged by necessity, we wish for that life, in which the many and great and intense of each kind exist, but in which pleasures exceed; but we do not wish for that life, in which the contraries to these exist. And on the other hand, the life in which things few and little and quiet exist, but in which pains exceed, we do not wish for; but we wish for that life in which the contraries to these exist. ²And again, the life, in which the balance is equal, as we said before, it is meet to consider as an equal-balanced life; ²since we wish for the life, which exceeds ³in what is agreeable to us; but we do not wish for that (which exceeds) in what is disagreeable. ⁴Now it is necessary to consider all our lives as naturally bound up in these; and ⁵[it is necessary to consider] ⁵what kind (of lives) we naturally wish for. And if we say,

¹—¹ As the words *πρὸς βούλησιν* and *πρὸς αἵρεσιν* have the same meaning, Ast would place *πρὸς αἵρεσιν ἐκάστων* in the next sentence before *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*—But see just before *οὐθ' αἰρούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα*.

²—² Ficinus has more briefly, “*si autem æqualia sunt, de æquali vita, ut diximus, cogitandum;*” while Taylor translates *ισορροπεῖ* by “these possess equal power.” Plato wrote, I suspect, *ισορροπεῖ πάντα καθ' ἐκάτερα τὰ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν*,—“all are balanced according to either of the things previously stated,” namely, pleasure and pain.

³ The Greek is *τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων*—*τῶν δ' αὖ*—But as the genitive is without regimen, Ast suggests *τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα*—*τὸν δ' αὖ*—to agree with *βίον* understood, and so Taylor had already translated. I should prefer *τὰ τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων*—Ficinus has “*volumus enim, quæ illo excedunt*—”

⁴ Why Plato should thus have written *τοῖς ἐχθροῖς* here, to balance the preceding *τῷ φίλῳ*, I cannot understand. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, avoids the difficulty by translating, “*quæ contrario superant*,” as if his MS. read *τῷ ἐναντίῳ*, of which *τοῖς ἐχθροῖς* would be the explanation.

⁵—The words within the brackets are evidently an interpolation, and properly omitted by Ficinus.

that we wish for any thing except these, we say so through an ignorance of, and inexperience in, lives as they exist.

[6.] What then and of what kind are the lives, respecting which it is necessary for a person to know something,¹ while forecasting² what is to be wished for and is voluntary, and what is to be not wished for and is involuntary; and,³ after prescribing a law to himself, to choose what is agreeable and pleasant and the best and the most beautiful, and to lead a life as far as possible, the most happy for man? Let us then call one life temperate, another prudent, another brave, and rank one as healthy;⁴ and four others, the contraries to these four, by the name of the imprudent, the cowardly, the intemperate, and the diseased. He, then, who knows the temperate, will lay it down as mild in all things, and exhibiting quiet pains, and quiet pleasures, and placid desires, and loves not insane; but the intemperate as being impetuous in all things, and exhibiting vehement pains, and vehement pleasures, and desires on the stretch and goaded on, and loves the maddest possible; and that in a temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains; but in an intemperate one the pains (exceed) the pleasures in magnitude and multitude and intensity. Hence, the one of these lives happens of necessity to be according to nature more pleasant to us, but the other more painful; and it is no longer in the power of him, who wishes to live pleasantly, to live voluntarily in an intemperate manner; but it is evident, if what has been said is correct, that every licentious person is of necessity so unwillingly. For the whole mass of mankind live in the want of temperance, either through the want of teaching, or through incontinence, or through both. The same things are to be considered respecting a diseased and healthy life, that

¹ The Greek is *ιδόντα*. But Ficinus has "nosse." Hence his MS. probably read *ἐπατεῖν τι*— On the loss or confusion of *ἐπατεῖν*, and of the phrase *ἐπατεῖν τι περὶ τινος*, see myself on Hipp. Maj. § 22, n. 4.

² In lieu of *προελόμενον*, which could not thus precede the subsequent *ἐλόμενον*, I have translated as if the word were *προϊδόμενον*— Ficinus omits *προελόμενον* entirely.

³ Ficinus has "hisque cognititis," from which Stephens was led to suggest *εἰτα* for *εἰς*, which Ast says may mean "instar." But such is never its meaning. Perhaps Plato wrote *καί*, which was first corrupted into *ὦς*, and then into *εἰς*—

⁴ Ficinus has "sanam denique quartam," as if his MS. read not "ENA, but ONTA Δ, where Δ would mean "the fourth—" On the errors arising from letters expressive of numerals see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 223.

they possess pleasures and pains, but that the pleasures exceed the pains in health, but the pains the pleasures in illness. Our wish however in the choice of lives is not that pain may exceed, but, where it is exceeded, that life we have decided to be the more pleasant. Now the ¹[temperate man],¹ we would say, possesses in both respects things fewer, and less, and slighter than [the intemperate], and the prudent than the imprudent, and the man of bravery than the one of timidity, each exceeding each on the score of pleasures; but on that of pains, ²the former exceeding the latter,² the brave man has the victory over the timid, and in that of the prudent the imprudent; so that ³of the lives, the more pleasant are the temperate, and the brave, and the prudent, and the healthy, than the timid, and imprudent, and intemperate, and the diseased;³ and in short, the life which is connected with virtue, pertaining either to the body or the soul, is more pleasant than the life which is connected with depravity, and is superior even to superfluity in the other points, such as beauty and rectitude and virtue and fair renown; so that it causes the person, who possesses it, to live more happily in every respect and totally, than he (who possesses) the contrary (life).⁴

[7.] ⁵Let then the prelude of the laws, having been here spoken of, have an end of the speeches.⁵ But after the prelude

^{1—1} The words within brackets, in Greek ὁ δὲ σώφρων τοῦ ἀκολάστου, Cornarius, with whom Ast agrees, was the first to reject as an interpolation. For the question relating to the σώφρων and ἀκόλαστος has been discussed already; besides, the subsequent words, ἐκάτερος ἐκάτερον, prove that only two lives are spoken of, not three.

^{2—2} So I have translated, as if the Greek were ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλλόντων, τοὺτους, not αὐτούς; but why the genitive plural ἐκείνων and τοὺτους should be thus introduced in lieu of the nominative singular to answer to the preceding antithetical clause, I confess I cannot understand, much less explain. Ast indeed refers the plurals to the ἀφρων and δειλός, opposed to the φρόνιμος and ἀνδρείος respectively; and as regards the genitive for the nominative quotes his own note on ii. 3, from which however nothing is gained. With respect to Ficinus, he seems to have been so completely at loss, as to omit nearly all the words, in which the whole difficulty lies, between ἔχων and βίων; for his version is, "habet; et alter voluptatibus, alter doloribus superat, ita ut fortis—"

^{3—3} All between the numerals are tacitly omitted by Taylor.

⁴ So Taylor correctly; for he probably wished, instead of τοῦ ἐναντίου, to read τοῦ τὸν ἐναντίον, with the ellipse of ἔχοντος and βίων.

^{5—5} All between the numerals Taylor has tacitly omitted; while Ficinus has merely "Verum exordium legum jam finem accipiat." For he was doubtless dissatisfied (as who is not?) with the Greek, Καὶ τὸ μὲν

it is necessary somehow for the strain to follow ; or rather, in good truth, to write down the laws of a polity. As then it is not possible, in the case of a web, or any other tissue whatever, to work up the weft and the warp from the same materials, but there must needs be a difference as regard their quality in the production of the warp, by being some of it ¹ strong and assuming a firmness through the spindle,² and another part of it softer and ³making use of a just easiness ;³ from whence⁴ it is meet that those, who are about to hold great offices in the state, should be judged of separately in this way, and those too, who have been tested in a trifling education, on each occasion according to reason. For there are two kinds of politics, one relating to the appointment of offices to each individual, and the other relating to the laws assigned to the offices. But before all it is requisite to consider things of this kind. A shepherd, and a herdsman, and a breeder of horses, and whatever else there are of this kind of occupations, will, after receiving the whole herd, never attempt to attend to them otherwise than by first applying a purification suited to their individual living together ; and having by a selection separated the healthy and diseased, and the well-bred and ill-bred, he will send away one part to some other herds, but attend upon the other part, thoroughly perceiving that his labour would be in vain and non-effective as regards both the body and soul,⁵ which after nature and improper aliment had corrupted, ⁶they

προοίμιον τῶν νόμων ἐνταυθοῖ λεχθέν τῶν λόγων τέλος ἔχεν: where Plato wrote, I suspect, δειχθέν τῷ λόγῳ, i. e. "shown by the discourse—"

¹ Here, as elsewhere, τὸ μὲν is to be supplied from the subsequent τὸ δέ.

² Instead of τοῖς τρόποις, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ast would read from "tortura" in Cornarius, ταῖς στροφαῖς, referring to Politic. p. 282, E., τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀτράκτω τε στραφέν καὶ στερὸν νῆμα γενόμενον: from which it is easy to elicit τοῖς ἀτράκτοις, as I have translated. Cousin translates βεβαυῶτητα ἐν τοῖς τρόποις by "solide dans sa façon" c' est a dire, solidement."

³—³ I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, the words ἐπιεικὴς δικαίᾳ χρώμενον, applied to a process in weaving. For ἐπιεικεία is elsewhere applied to a person. Ficinus has "ut facilius cedat."

⁴ Ast correctly remarks, that to answer καθάπερ there should have been here ὡσαύτως, similar to "ita" in Ficinus.

⁵ The idea of a soul is strangely united to that of the body in the case of an animal ; unless it be said that ψυχὴ means here "spirit," as in Minos, § 17.

⁶—⁶ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "ut, nisi quis segreget sanorum integrorumque morum ac corporum genus, in singulis contagione interimant."

moreover destroy the race of healthy and unmixed habits and bodies in each of the flocks, unless a person purifies what is present in them.⁶ The attention, however, which is paid to other animals is indeed less, and is alone worthy to be brought forward for the sake of an example. But the affairs of men (need) the greatest attention on the part of the legislator, to investigate and detail what is suited to each individual, as regards purification and all other actions. For instance, that which relates to the purification of a state should be in this way. Of many existing purifications, some are rather easy, but others more difficult; and he who is both a tyrant and a legislator may be able to use such purifications as are difficult and the best. But the legislator, who without being a tyrant lays down a new polity and laws, would, if he were able to purify with the mildest of purifications, do a thing of this kind contentedly. ¹The best purification is however painful; just as are the remedies of some such kind, which leading for justice to punishment with avenging,¹ put death or exile as the finish to punishment. For it is wont to free the city from those, who have erred the greatest, and who, as being incurable, are the greatest hurt to the state. But with us there is a milder purification of this kind. For upon these, who, having nothing themselves, do, through the want of food, exhibit themselves as prepared to follow their leaders in an attack upon the property of persons, who possess something, upon such, as being naturally a disease in the state, it imposes a removal, under the name, by way of good omen, of a colony, and sends them away in the kindest possible manner. This then should somehow be done at the very commencement by every one legislating. To us however what is still more strange than this has now happened relating to these. For there is no need to devise either a colony or any selection for a purification; but as if the waters, partly from fountains and partly from mountain torrents, were flowing together into one lake, it is necessary for persons to be on the watch, that, partly by pumping

¹⁻¹ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, *ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀριστος ἀλγυνός, καθάπερ ὅσα τῶν φαρμάκων τοιούτοτροπα, ὁ τῇ δίκῃ μετὰ τιμωρίας εἰς τὸ κολλάζειν ἄγων*, where I am quite at a loss in the last clause; and so, I think, was Ficinus; whose version is "nam exactissima purificatio, quemadmodum medicina, quæ validior corporibus adhibetur, doloris plena est, et cum ultione justa penam infert, morte peccantem aut exilio dam-nans."

out, and partly by drawing off into channels, and partly by diverting its course, the water flowing together may be the most clear. But labour and danger, as it appears, are to be found in every political establishment. However, since what is now done exists in discourse, and not in action, let our selection be held to be completed, and the purification to have taken place according to our notions. For having by every kind of persuasion and for a sufficient length of time tried by a test those amongst evil men, who were endeavouring to enter our city in order to administer it, let us prevent them from reaching it, and let us introduce the good, (rendering them)¹ well-disposed and propitious to the utmost of our power.

[8.] Let not, however, the good fortune, which has happened, lie hid from us, that, as we said that the colony of the Heraclidæ was fortunate, because it escaped the dreadful and dangerous strife respecting the division of land and the abolition of debts,² in which strife³ it is impossible for a state, compelled to be regulated by law, to leave any of its ancient institutions undisturbed, nor on the other hand is it possible to disturb them after a certain manner (successfully),⁴ (the same thing appears nearly to have happened to us);⁵ and there is left merely, so to say, a prayer,⁶ and a trifling change to those making a slight alteration cautiously⁷ and slowly in a great length of time; ⁸ which alteration should take place⁸ by those persons innovat-

¹ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "*facientes*:" unless it be said that Plato wrote τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς, θεοῖς ἴσους δυναμένους εἶναι εὐμενεῖς—not τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς δύναμιν εὐμενεῖς—i. e. "the good, able to be, equally with gods—"

² From the version of Ficinus, adopted by Taylor, "*dividendorum agrorum contentionem*," it is evident he found in his MS. γῆς διανομῆς καὶ χρῶν ἀποκοπῆς περί—not γῆς καὶ χρῶν ἀποκοπῆς καὶ νομῆς περί—for the correct word is διανομή, not νομή, as shown by διανομήν τῆς γῆς shortly afterwards; although νομή is found a little below—

³ The Greek is ἦν, which is without regimen. The sense and syntax require ἐν γ, i. e. ἰρίδι: where ἐν has been lost through the last syllable of ἐξέφυγεν—

⁴ Here I have inserted εἶ, which might easily have dropt out before εὐχῇ—

⁵ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has alone, what is required to complete the sentence, "*ita ferme et nobis accidisse videtur*."

⁶ On this use of εὐχῇ in Greek, and "*votum*" in Latin, see Ast.

⁷ I have translated as if the Greek were εὐλαβῶς, not εὐλαβῆς—

⁸—The Greek is ἡ δὲ τῶν κινούντων—ὑπάρχειν, where I cannot discover either sense or syntax. Hence for the sake of both I have translated as if the text were ἦν δαὶ οὕτω κινούντων—ὑπάρχειν.

ing, who have an abundance of land, and have likewise many debtors, and are willing through a kind consideration to share with those in want, partly by giving up (debts) and partly by distributing (property), and by holding to moderation, and by thinking that poverty does not consist in a diminution of property, but in an insatiable desire to acquire more. For this is the greatest beginning of safety to a state; and upon this, as upon a stable foundation, it is possible to build up whatever political arrangement any one would raise up, befitting a constitution of this kind. But when the change is of an unsound kind, no political movement will afterwards take place easily in a state. ¹ From this, as we have said, we fly. It would however have been more correct to have said in what way, if we have not fled from it, we might have made for ourselves the flight. Let it then be said how that through not being fond of money together with justice; but there is no other escape, either broad or narrow, of such a plan.¹ Let this then be laid down by us as ²a prop of a state.² For it is necessary that (the citizens)³ should somehow raise up for themselves their property without reproach from each other; ⁴or, that they should not be willing to proceed previously to the before of the rest of the constitution,⁴ who have

¹—¹ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version, of which the latter portion has been adopted by Taylor to the letter, is “itaque nos, id fugientes, immo vero verbis, quo pacto fugiendum sit, ostendentes, dicimus nullam esse aliam aut latam aut angustam fugiendi viam, nisi ut colamus justitiam, neque acquirendi cupiditatem sequamur.” Equally in the dark was Heindorf, who wished to read μετ’ ἀδικίας for μετὰ δίκης, with the full approbation of Ast, and the less decided one of Stalbaum. With regard to ὁρθότερον, Stephens correctly saw that ἀν εἶη had dropt out before εἰ—while Ast remarks that τῆς τοιαύτης μηχανῆς διαφυγῆς is put for τῶν τοιοῦτων διαφυγῆς μηχανῇ—But he does not state what could induce Plato to put down words, that, taken literally, have no meaning, in the place of others, which would have been perfectly intelligible.

²—² Since two MSS. offer λιμήν as a various reading for ἡμίς, it is probable that both are corruptions of the word written here originally; and as Plutarch has in Polit. Præcept. ii. p. 814, 25, ὥσπερ ἔρμα τῆς πολιτείας βέβαιον, I suspect he has preserved what he found in Plato, although πόλεως ἔρμα is similar to ἔρμα πόλεως in Ιλ. Π. 549, and Οδ. Ψ. 121.

³ Ficinus alone has “cives,” what is required by ἀλλήλους.

⁴—⁴ Here again the version of Ficinus proves he could not understand the Greek, which to myself is equally unintelligible. His translation, adopted to the letter by Taylor, is “vel ulterius in acquirendo progredi ultro desistant.”

accusations of old standing against each other, and to whom there is even a small share of intellect. But for those persons, to whom a god has given, as it has to us at present, to settle a new state, and for ¹no enmities to exist¹ against each other, to become ²themselves the cause of enmities to each other² through the division of the land and dwellings, would be a not-human want of education, united to every kind of wickedness.

What then would be the method of a correct distribution? In the first place, it is requisite to fix³ the same quantity³ of the number, ⁴how great it ought to be.⁴ After this it must be agreed respecting the distribution to the citizens, into how many and what kind of parts it is to be made by them for the mass of people. And for this purpose the land and dwellings must be distributed as equally as possible. Now a sufficient quantity of the mass of people cannot be correctly stated otherwise than with reference to the land and cities of neighbouring nations. As regards⁵ the land, how much of it is sufficient to feed how many temperate persons⁶—for of more there is no need—but as regards the number, how many would be able to defend themselves ⁷not altogether without resources⁷ against bordering tribes acting unjustly, and to assist their neighbours when injured. Having then viewed these points, we will define both

¹—¹ The Greek is *μή τινας ἐχθράς—πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. It was originally, I suspect, *ἐχθροὺς*—

²—² Here again, by the slight change of *τούτους* into *αὐτοὺς*, and taking *ἐαυτοῖς* in the sense of *ἀλλήλους*, I have recovered what is required by the train of thought.

³—³ The Greek is *τὸν αὐτὸν ὄγκον*, where Boeckh suggested, what Bekker, Ast, and Stalbaum have adopted, *αὐτῶν*. But *αὐτῶν* could not be thus inserted between *τὸν* and *ὄγκον*—It would be in correct Greek, *αὐτῶν τὸν ὄγκον* or *τὸν ὄγκον αὐτῶν*. Ficinus has omitted *αὐτὸν* entirely. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὸν ὅλον ὄγκον*—

⁴—⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

⁵ Six MSS. read *γῆ*, one *γῆι*, and another *γῆς*. The last, answering to *πλήθους* in the next sentence, has been retained by Ast; who says that the genitive is used absolutely in the sense of *κατὰ γῆν*. But Stephens more correctly would supply *δεῖ*—for otherwise in lieu of *προσδεῖ* there would have been written simply *δεῖ*.

⁶ Ast observes correctly that Aristotle, alluding to this passage in *Polit.* ii. 4, has misrepresented the very party with whose doctrines he finds fault.

⁷—⁷ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him tacitly by Taylor, because they were not in his MS., or deemed by him to be not suited to the train of thought; which would require rather *βοηθῆσαι εὖ παντάπασιν ἀπὸροις οὖσι*, i. e. to well assist (the neighbours) altogether without resources.

by deed and word the land and neighbours. But now, for the sake of a sketch and outline,¹ that the thing itself may be accomplished, let the discourse proceed to our laying down the laws.

Let the land-owners and those that defend the distribution of the land, be, for the sake of a fitting number, five thousand and forty; and let, in like manner, the land and the dwellings be distributed into the same portions,² so that the man and his portion may accord in distribution.³ And in the first place, let there be of the whole number two parts distributed, and afterwards three of the same;³ for it is by nature (divisible) into four and five, and so in succession as far as ten. Thus much ought every person, who is legislating, to understand respecting number, what it is, and what kind will be the most useful to all states. Let us then say it is that, which possesses in itself the greatest quantity of divisions and most in orderly succession. For the whole number does (not)⁴ obtain by lot all kinds of divisions for all things. But the number five thousand and forty, in matters relating to war and whatever in peace have to do with conventions and communions, and relating to revenue and distributions, cannot be cut into more than sixty parts wanting one; but there are continuous divisions of it from one up to ten.

[9.] These things however it is meet for those to take in hand firmly at leisure,⁵ on whom the law enjoins to take them; for they cannot exist otherwise than in this manner. But it is requisite for them to be mentioned to a person settling a state for the sake of this; that no one, whether

¹ Ast aptly compares Rep. viii. § 3, p. 548, E., λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράφαντα, μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι.

²⁻³ So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus—"ut vir et portio cum distributione convenient." The Greek is διανεμηθῆτων γεγόμενα ἀνὴρ καὶ κλῆρος ξυννομή: which I cannot understand. Perhaps Plato wrote διανεμηθῆτων, ἢ ἂν λεγομένη, ἀνὴρ καὶ κλῆρος, ξυννομή ᾗ, i. e. "that a man and portion may be called a co-share."

³ I have adopted with Ast the correction of Stephens, τοῦ αὐτοῦ for τὸν αὐτὸν, omitted entirely by Ficinus and Taylor.

⁴ Instead of ὁ μὲν πᾶς, Ast reads οὐ μὲν πᾶς, from "non enim omnis" in Gryneus' refiction of Ficinus, adopted tacitly by Taylor. Ficinus himself has not the negative.

⁵ Before κατὰ σχολὴν there is introduced καὶ, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.

he is making a (polity) new from the beginning, or patching up an ancient one that has been corrupted, will, if he has any mind, attempt to disturb, with respect to the gods or sacred rites, and whatever else ought to be established in the state for each of the gods or dæmons, by whatever name they may be called, whatever (has come)¹ from Delphi or Dodona² or Ammon,³ or what⁴ certain old accounts have somehow persuaded persons on hearing them, when, through visions having occurred or an inspiration from gods having been declared,⁴ parties have, through being persuaded,⁵ established sacrifices mixed up with mystic ceremonies, (emanating) either from their own country, (or) being exotic⁶ from Tyrrhenia,⁷ or Cyprus,⁸ or any other place what-

¹ I have translated as if ἤκεν had dropt out between ὅσα and ἐκ—

² Delphi and Dodona, the two most ancient oracular shrines in Greece, are similarly united by Æschylus in Prom. 678, 'Ο δ' ἐξ τε Πυθῶ καπὶ Δωδώνης συχνοῦς Θεοπρόπους ἰαλλεν: and by Sophocles in 'Οδυσσ. Ακανθοπλ. Fr., Νῦν δ' οὔτε μ' εἰς Δωδῶνος οὔτε Πυθικῶν Γυάλων τις ἀν πέσειε (τοὺς θεοπρόπους Πέμψαι).

³ There is not, I believe, any mention in ancient authors of the shrine of Ammon in Libya antecedent to the time of Herodotus, when those at Delphi and Dodona had lost no little of the odour of sanctity they once possessed.

⁴ Ficinus exhibits all between the numerals in this abridged form, "vel prisca quadam oratione per visiones inspirationesque deorum asserta." Hence it is impossible to ascertain whether his MS. had the insufferable tautology *ἔπεισαν—πείσαντες*, or, what the sense manifestly requires, *ἀκούσαντας*, as I have translated, and to which *πείσονται* in one MS. seems to lead.

⁵ The Greek is *ἔπεισαν—πείσαντες* δέ, in which on the ground of language there is nothing to offend except that *κατέστησαν* should have been written instead of *κατεστήσαντο*. Hence, as Ficinus has "quibus approbatis veteres," he probably found in his MS. *πεισθέντες*, as I have translated.

⁶ The Greek is *αὐτόθεν ἐπιχωρίους*. But from the mention of two places, Tyrrhenia and Cyprus, it is evident that Plato wrote, as I have translated, *αὐτόθεν ἢ ἀποχώριους οὔσας*—

⁷ Although it is known that the Romans received their religious rites from Tuscany, yet that the Greeks did so likewise, is not, I believe, mentioned elsewhere. Perhaps however Plato had heard of what is stated by Theopompus, quoted by Athenæus, xii. p. 517, that they had wives in common,—the very doctrine which he inculcated.

⁸ It is difficult to understand what are the Cyprian rites to which Plato alludes. For if they were those of Venus, these, according to Ovid, were taught by Nature alone, and were indigenous in all countries. Is there any reference here to the fact mentioned by Strabo, xiv. p. 1001, B., that there was in Cyprus a temple of Venus, which women were not permitted to enter?

ever; and from these ancient accounts and oracles they consecrated statues, and altars, and temples, and made for each of the deities a sacred grove. Of all these not even the least must the legislator disturb; but he must assign to each of the portions a god, a dæmon, or some hero. And in the division of the land, he must give up, selected for the first in rank, the groves and all that is fitting, so that the assemblies of each of the portions, taking place at stated times, may furnish resources against their wants, and during the sacrifices kindly entertain, and become familiar with, and recognise, each other. ¹For there is no greater good to a state than for persons to be the acquaintances of each other. ¹ Since where there is no light ² to each other in the manners of each other, but a darkness, there no one will properly meet with the honour due to his worth, nor with offices, nor even with the justice which is fitting. ³It is meet then for every man in all states to be earnest in this matter, compared as one with one, ³ that he never appear to any one to be of a base stamp, but always artless and true, and that no other person of that kind ⁴ deceive him. But the next movement, as in the case ⁵ of the pebble-game,

^{1—1} The Greek is οὐ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους—εἶναι: where Ast says that ἢ γνωρίμους—εἶναι is superfluously added by way of an explanation. But correct sense would require οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν—and correct syntax, ἢ τὸ γνωρίμους—εἶναι, as I have translated. With regard to the sentiment, Ast refers to Aristotle Politic. vii. 4, 7.

² On this metaphor Ast quotes from Cicero, “in luce atque in oculis civium magnus,” and from Xenophon, εἰς κάλλος βίῃ τὸ φῶς—παρίχεν, and refers to Wetstein on S. John iii. 21, “Let your light so shine before all men, that they may see your good works—”

^{3—3} Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has what is more intelligible, “nihil est autem, si unum uni conferas, in quo majus studium—ponere quisque debeat,” as if he had found in his MS. οὐδὲν δὲ ἦν, ὃ δεῖ πάντα ἀνδρά μαλλον, ἐν πρὸς ἐν, ἢ τοῦτο σπεύδειν, not δεῖ δὲ πάντα ἀνδρά, ἐν πρὸς ἐν τοῦτο σπεύδειν.

⁴ Namely, “of a base stamp.”

⁵ The proverb, to which Plato alludes, has been thus explained. In the game called *πίττωια* there were five lines on two opposite sides of the board, as there are eight on a draught-board; and between them a vacant line, not occupied by the pebbles, or counters, used in the game. This vacant line was called *ιερά γραμμή*, “the holy line;” and the party who was driven to it the first, was considered as the loser, just as in the game of fox and geese; although there it is not a line, but a space that is left vacant: and hence, as Plato has written ἀφ’ *ιεροῦ*, we must understand *τόπον*; but *γραμμῆς* after ἀφ’ *ιεράς*. With regard to the authors who have treated on the subject, Ast refers to the Scholiast here; Suidas on *Ἀφ’ *ιεράς**;

from the sacred spot would, as being unusual, cause, in the case of legislation, the person who hears of it for the first time perhaps to wonder. To him however who has reasoned upon, and tried it, it will appear that the state is in a second way settled for the best. Perhaps however some one will not receive the movement, through its not being customary with a tyrannic legislator. It will¹ however be most correct to speak of the best polity, and of the second and third, and then to leave the choice to each person,² who is the lord in the co-settlement.³ Let us act then even now according to this very method, by speaking of a polity the first, and the second, and the third in worth; and let us leave the choice to Clinias at present, and to any one else who may be willing to come to the selection of such polities, and to assign, according to his own method,³ that which is agreeable to him (with respect to) his own country.³

[10.] Now the first state and polity and the best laws are there, where the old saying may be most in vogue through the whole state; for⁴ it said that, amongst friends all things are really in common. This saying, whether it now is or ever will be (practised),⁵ that women are in common, and children in common, and all possessions in common,⁵ has taken away⁶ by every means every where and entirely from life what is called private property; and it has planned that things even naturally

Pollux, ix. 7; Eustath. Od. A. p. 28, 42; Meursius De Ludis Græcor.; Erasmus Adag. p. 28; and Salmasius on Vopisc. p. 466, A. The proverb was applied to those, who placed themselves in a perilous position.

¹ Ficinus has "agetur." He found therefore in his MS. *ἔσται*, not *ἔσσι*.

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of τῷ τῆς συνουκίσεως κυρίῳ. Ficinus has "arbitratu suo quamlibet electuro," from whence Taylor translated "to choose that which pleases him the most."

²⁻³ The Greek is τὸ φίλον αὐτῷ τῆς αὐτοῦ πατρίδος. This Ast renders "ea quæ in patria sua ipsi placent;" which I cannot understand. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "patriæque (Bekker incorrectly "partique") suæ, quod sibi placet tribuere." I have translated as if *πᾶσι* had dropt out after *πατρίδος*.

⁴ Instead of δὲ the sense requires γὰρ, as I have translated, or else ὅ *λέγεται*, similar to "quo fertur" in Ficinus.

⁵⁻⁶ The St. Simonians of the present day have attempted to put this precept into practice, but with so little success, as to show that Plato's Laws are better suited for an ideal Republic than a real one.

* If the doctrine had never been put into practice, one cannot understand why Plato used the definite perfect *ἔγρηται* and *μεμυχάνηται* instead of the indefinite pluperfect *ἔγρητ' ἄν* and *μεμυχάνητ' ἄν*.

private, as far as possible, become by some means in common; such as the eyes, the ears, and the hands, in seeming¹ to see, and hear, and work, in common; and that, again, all men taken singly² praise and blame as much as possible (the same things),³ rejoicing in, and pained by,³ the same things;⁴ and (hence) no one (has) ever laid down or will lay down a definition more correct and better (than this), that of such laws as cause a state to be as much as possible one, (there is) the superiority on the ground of virtue.⁴ Such a state will ours⁵ be, whether gods or the children of gods, more in number than one,⁶ dwell there,⁷ and with delight save and regulate⁸ those living in that manner.⁸ Hence it is proper to reflect upon the pattern of a polity in no other way; but, sticking to this, to seek that, which is as much as possible of such a kind. But that, which we have now taken in hand, would,⁹ if it ex-

¹ This "seeming" seems very strange here, as if the eyes, ears, and hands did not really see, hear, and work. The verb *δοκῆν* ought, I conceive, to follow *παινεῖν τε*, in lieu of *αὐ*, which is perfectly superfluous.

² In lieu of *καθ' ἑνα*, which is unintelligible, Ast, whom I have followed, suggests *καθ' ἑνα*.

³ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "*laudentque et vituperent eadem similiter*."

⁴ The Greek is *καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οἱ τινες μάλιστα νόμοι μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα πόλιν ἀπεργάζονται τούτων ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ποτε ἕρον ἄλλον θέμενος ὁρθότερον οὐδὲ βελτίω θήσεται*: which, says Ast, has been wrongly translated by Ficinus, Cornarius, Serranus, and Schulthes. In fact they were all equally at a loss, and naturally so; for the passage is evidently corrupt. It was, I suspect, originally to this effect—*Καὶ οὕτω κατὰ δύναμιν—τούτων ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι οὐδεὶς ποτε ἕρον ἄλλον ἢν θέμενος*—as I have translated. To meet the difficulty Ficinus places the clause *τούτων ὑπερβολὴ—θήσεται* after *κοινὰ φίλων*: and from his version, "*certe in hoc præcipue virtutis erit terminus, quo nullus poni rector poterit*," it is evident that his MS. was defective, or that he designedly abridged what he found in it.

⁵ The Greek is *ἡ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις*, which Ast calls an absolute sentence. He should have called it rather an imperfect one. For Plato probably wrote *ἡμῖν δὴ τοιαύτη ἡ πόλις ἔσται*, as I have translated.

⁶ By the expression of more numerous than one are probably intended Castor and Pollux, the twin sons of Jupiter, who were the tutelary gods of Sparta.

⁷ The gods were supposed to dwell in the towns sacred to them.

⁸ The Greek is *οὕτω διαζῶντες*. But four MSS. read *διασῶζοντες*. Ficinus united both—"ita viventes eamque servantes—vivunt"—Hence I have been led to *τοῦς οὕτω ζῶντας διασῶζοντες*—

⁹ In lieu of *εἶναι τε*, where *τε* is connected with nothing, Heindorf suggested *γε*—He should have proposed *ποτε*—

isted at all, be the nearest to immortality; and if it is ¹ not in the first rank, it will be at least one in the second.¹ After this we will, god willing, go through the polity, which is the third in order. But now let us speak of this polity, what it is, and how it may be produced.

In the first place, let them distribute the land and houses. But let them not cultivate the ground in common; since a thing of this kind is spoken of as greater than is suited to their present birth, nurture, and education. Let them however distribute land and houses with somehow such an intention as this, that each on obtaining his allotment ought to consider it as being common to the whole state; and, as this country is their paternal land, they ought to attend to it in a greater degree than children do their mother, in that, being a goddess, she is the sovereign mistress of mortals. The same conceptions they ought to have of the gods of the place, and likewise of dæmons. But that these things may exist in this manner through all time, on this too they must thoroughly reflect. As many hearths as are distributed by us at present, so many must there be always, and neither more nor less. Now a thing of this kind will be firmly established through every state in this way. Let the person, who has obtained his allotment, leave ever the child, who is most dear to him, the only heir of his household, and his successor, and the attendant upon the gods and family and state, and of those still living, and of such as their end has already reached up to the then period. But with respect to the other children, they, to whom there are more than one, must give their daughters in marriage according to a law to be laid down; but distribute their male children as sons to those, who have no family, as an act of kindness conferred; but if there be a lack of kindness, or if more females are born than some² males, or the contrary, when they are fewer, through barrenness taking place, let the magistrate,³ whom we shall lay down as the greatest and most honourable, consider what

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, “ac si non primo, saltem secundo loco erit una.” He therefore found in his MS. *kai, ei mē ā, ἀλλὰ δευτέρα ἔσται μία*: where *ā* is *πρώτη*. See my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 223. The Greek is *kai ἡ μία δευτέρως*, which Ast would explain by referring *δευτέρως* to what is to follow.

² I scarcely understand *τινες* here. It is omitted by Ficinus.

³ In lieu of *ἀρχὴν* Winckelmann would read *ἀρχή*, obtained from “magistratus” in Ficinus.

is proper to be done with the superabundance and deficiency of children, and devise a method by which five thousand and forty households alone may exist always. Now there are many methods. For there are checks to procreation when it is overflowing;¹ and, on the contrary, care and an attention to the number of births do, by means of honours, and disqualifications, and ²the advice of elders to young persons, meet (the difficulty), and are able to effect what we are speaking of [by admonitory discourses].³ ³Moreover, should at last every difficulty arise about the inequality of the five thousand and forty households,³ and an excessive influx of citizens take place through the kind feelings of those, who dwell together, and we come to want, there remains the old contrivance, which we have often mentioned, of friendly colonies being sent out from friends, whithersoever it may appear to be suitable. But if, on the contrary, there should at any time come⁴ a wave bringing an inundation,⁵ or ⁶a destruction arising from plagues or wars, and the people become, through a state of orphanhood, much less than the prescribed number, we must not willingly introduce citizens educated in a not legitimate discipline; but ⁷to use force against necessity it is said not even a god has the power.⁷

¹ Aristotle had this passage in view in Polit. ii. 3, 6.

²⁻³ The Greek is *νουθετήσῃσι πρεσβυτέρων περὶ νέους διὰ λόγων νουθετητικῶν ἀπαντῶσαι*. But after *νουθετήσῃσι* the words *διὰ λόγων νουθετητικῶν* present an insufferable tautology; and hence they ought to be inserted just above after *γένεσις*, as showing of what nature are the checks to which Plato allude. The cause of the mistake is owing to the fact, that they formed one line of the Codex Archetypus, containing about twenty-one letters. Moreover, as Ficinus has "*monitionibus senum ad juvenes*," Cornarius correctly saw that his MS. read *πρὸς νέους*—Lastly, as one MS. offers *λόγους* in lieu of *νέους*, it is probable that in *περὶ λογὸς* lies hid *ἀπορία λέχους*, and thus *ἀπαντῶσαι* will recover, what it has lost, its object.

³⁻⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows in part, has "*denique hinc omnes defectus oritur et inopia, cum quinque millium et quadraginta domorum numerus non servatur.*"

⁴ Instead of *ὧν* Ficinus found in his MS. *οἱ*, as shown by his "*quo*—"

⁵ For examples of cities situated on the sea-coast being destroyed by a wave, see Thucyd. ii. 89; Pausanias vii. p. 585; Agathias ii. p. 53; Athenæus vii. p. 333, C.; and Suidas in "*Υφαλος*."

⁶ I have adopted *ἡ*, introduced by Cornarius, before *καὶ*—Ficinus has "*morborem lues bellorumve calamitas, velut quadam illuvione.*"

⁷ This sentiment is attributed to Simonides by Plato in Protag. p. 345, D. § 87, but to Pittacus by Diogen. Laert. i. 77.

[11.] This then let us assert our present discourse advises, by saying—O ye best of all men, do not relax¹ in honouring similitude and equality and the same and what is generally acknowledged according to nature and according to number and all the power of things beautiful and good.² And now guard, in the first place, through the whole of life the above-mentioned number; next, do not hold in dishonour³ the height and magnitude of³ the property, which ye first distributed, as being moderate, by buying from, and selling to, each other. For neither⁴ the distributing lot, being a god, is an ally,⁴ nor the legislator. For now the law, in the first place, enjoins upon the disobedient,⁵ by proclaiming beforehand, that upon these conditions any person, who is willing, may cast lots or not; and that, since the land, being sacred, belongs first to all the gods, and next, to the priests and priestesses, who pray at the first sacrifices, and the second, and even to the third, both the buyer and seller of tenements and farms, which they have obtained by lot, are to suffer what is befitting upon such transactions; and having written⁶ memoranda on cypress (tablets),⁶ they shall place them in temples⁷ written for the time hereafter;⁷ and in addition to

¹ Ficinus has “neque id unquam transgrediamini,” as if his MS. read *παρίετε αὐτὰ*—

² I must confess my inability to understand what Plato is aiming at.

³—³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of Bekker's text. Ficinus has “neque, deus ipse distributor—favebit,” as if his MS. read *οὔτε γὰρ ὁ νείμας θεὸς αὐτός*, not *οὔτε γὰρ ὁ νείμας κλήρος ὢν θεός*, where Stalbaum has

adopted *κλήρον*, found in Stephens, and written thus in two MSS., *κλήρος*—But who was the god, that distributed the lot, is no where mentioned. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὔτε γὰρ Ἑρμῆς, ὁ νείμας κλήρον, ὢν θεός*—For Hermes was not only the god, who presided over buying and selling, but he gave his name likewise to the lot first drawn out, and therefore the successful one; as we learn from a gl. in Hesychius and Photius, *Ἑρμοῦ κλήρος*—and hence we find in Aristoph. *Εἰρ.*, 364, *Ἑρμῆς γὰρ ὢν κλήρω ποιήσεις οἶδ' ὅτι*: where see the Schol.

⁵ Although *ἀπειθοῦντι* is repeated a little below, yet here it is scarcely intelligible: for there is nothing to which the idea of disobedience can be referred.

⁶—⁶ The Greek is *κυπαριττίνας μνήμας*, where Stephens explains *κυπαριττίνας* by saying that the cypress tree was selected as being free from the attacks of worms.

⁷—⁷ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “ad posteritatis instructionem,” omitting *γεγραμμένας*, which certainly seems unnecessary, and adding, what renders *εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον* more intelligi-

this they shall invest the guardianship of these, ⁸ in order that they may be, ⁸ in that magistrate, who seems to see the most acutely, in order that the matters fraudulently introduced ¹ may not lie hid from them, but that they may punish the person disobedient at the same time to the law and to the god. ² For how great a good will what is now enjoined be to all states that are persuaded, when they adopt the following arrangement, according to the old proverb, ³ no person being wicked will know, but being experienced and reasonable in his habits (he will). For in such an arrangement there exists not much of money-making; and there is attendant upon it the being neither necessary nor lawful for any one to make money by any illiberal kind of money-making—inasmuch as the so-called operative art is reproached as subverting liberal habits—nor to think it right to scrape money together at all by such means.

[12.] In addition to this a law still follows all these, that no private person be permitted to possess any gold or silver; ⁴ but that (there be) ⁵ a coin ⁶ for the sake of daily exchange, which it is almost necessary for handicrafts to change, and for all, who have a need of such things, ⁷ to pay the wages due to hired persons, be they slaves or domestic servants. On which account we say that they must possess coin, which is of value amongst themselves, but of no worth amongst the rest of mankind. For the sake of war indeed and of going abroad to other countries—for instance in the case of embassies, or some other business of a herald, compulsory on the state—should it be

ble than those words now are. But unless I am greatly mistaken, the clause *εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον* ought to follow (⁸—⁸) *ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται*, or rather *γίγνωνται*, i. e. *μνημαί*, as in Ficinus, “ut—serventur.”

¹ Ast translates *παπαγωγαί* “transgressionēs.” But this neither is nor could be its meaning. Ficinus has more correctly “si qua forte præter rationem hæc commercia fiant.”

² Here again by the god is to be understood Hermes.

³ What the old proverb is, to which Plato alludes, I confess I do not know. It was perhaps like the line of Pope—

“He best can paint them, who has felt them most.”

⁴ This was the law of Lycurgus, as we learn from Polybius vi. 47, and Plutarch in Lycurg. i. p. 44, D.

⁵ Ast understands *κεκτῆσθαι*: but I suspect that *εἶναι* has dropt out before *ἐνεκα*.

⁶ The coin was iron in Laconia. What kind of metal Plato had in mind is no where stated.

⁷ The Greek is *τῶν τοιούτων*, which, says Ast, agrees with *νομισμάτων*

requisite to send out the common coin of Greece, it will be necessary on each occasion for the state to possess it.¹ But if there be any necessity for a private person to go abroad, let him, after obtaining leave of the magistrate, go abroad ; but the foreign coin, which on his return home he has brought from any place, still remaining, let him put down for the state, and take up that of the country at the rate (of exchange).² And if ³any-one is detected in making (the foreign money) his own,³ such money shall become public property ; and let him, who ⁴knows the fact, but does not divulge it, be subject to a curse⁴ and reproach together with the party bringing it in, and to a fine in addition, not less than the amount of the foreign money so brought in.

And (be it enacted), that a person who is going to marry, or is giving (a daughter) in marriage, is neither to give or receive a marriage portion at all of any kind whatsoever, nor to deposit money with a person, ⁵whom one does not trust,⁵ nor to lend money upon interest, since it will be lawful for the borrower to repay neither interest nor principal. Now that these pursuits are the best for a state to pursue, a person would decide correctly by considering them in this way, and referring them ever ⁶to their origin and intention.⁶ Now the intention of the statesman, who has a mind, we say, is not that, which the many would say, that a good legislator ought to wish, how the state, ⁷for which he is with correct thoughts legislating,⁷

understood ; for coin is of different kinds and value. I suspect however that in *χρεία τῶν τοιούτων* lies hid *χρεία ἂν ᾗ ἀντὶ τοῦ τι ποιεῖν*— where *ἀντὶ τοῦ τι ποιεῖν* would depend upon *μισθοῦς*, “wages for doing something.”

¹ Ast correctly rejects *νόμισμα Ἑλληνικόν* as interpolated from the beginning of the sentence ; where however those words are omitted by Ficinus, who perhaps found in his MS. *ἕνεκα δὲ*, not *ἕνεκά τε*—

² Ficinus omits *πρὸς λόγον*, which he perhaps did not understand.

³ Ficinus has, what the sense requires, “quod si quis eos occultare et in privatum usum convertere—”

⁴ With this passage may be compared the curse imprecated by Œdipus on the party, who might know, but would not divulge, the murder of of Laius in Soph. Œd. T. 236.

⁵ This seems a strange idea, as if any one would deposit money with a person he could not trust. What Plato really wrote might be guessed at, but not without, perhaps, a rather violent alteration.

⁶ Ficinus has “si ad præcipuam ipsam recti legum latoris semper referat voluntatem,” which would lead to *εἰς αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν*, what the train of thought evidently requires.

⁷ The words *ᾗ νόων εἰς νομοθετοῖ*, omitted by Ficinus, Ast considers an

may be the greatest and the wealthiest possible, and possess gold and silver money, and rule over as many as possible by sea and land; and they would add, that the person legislating correctly ought to wish the state to be the best and the happiest possible. Now of these things some can take place, but others cannot. The possible then the arranging party would wish; but the impossible he would not; ¹ nor would he make even an attempt at wishes that are vain.¹ For it is almost necessary for them to be at the same time happy and good. This then he would wish. But it is impossible for persons to be very rich and good, such at least as the many reckon rich. For they reckon rich those, who amongst a few persons have possessions valued at the greatest quantity of coin, which even a bad man may possess. Now if such be the case, I will never agree with them that the rich man, if not a good one, can be truly happy; but that it is impossible for the person pre-eminently good, to be pre-eminently rich. What then?² some one would perhaps say. Because, we would say, the possession of what is obtained both justly and unjustly, is more than double of that which is obtained justly alone; and that the expenditure, which is wont to be made neither honourably nor disgracefully, is doubly less than that which is honourable, and is wont to be made for honourable objects. He, therefore, who acts in a contrary manner, will never be richer than him, who has double the means and half the expenditure. Now of these, the one is a good person, but the other not a bad one, since he is (< verely)³ parsimonious; sometimes, indeed, he is altogether bad; but, as we have just now said, is never good. For he, who receives both justly and unjustly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is indeed rich, because he is parsimonious; but he who is altogether bad, as being for the most part luxurious, is very poor. And he, who spends upon honourable objects and acquires only justly, will never at any time become pre-eminently rich, nor yet very poor; so that our assertion is

interpolation. Perhaps however they ought to follow *τὴν βούλησιν*, just before, by reading *ᾗ ὁ εἰς νόων ἀν εἰς νομοθετοῖ*, thus forming one line of the Codex Archetypus, consisting of twenty-one letters.

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐδ' ἀν ματαίας βουλήσεις*, not *ματαιας βουλήσεις οὐτ' ἀν*— Ficinus avoids the difficulty by his version, "nam vana esset cupiditas; neque aggredditur."

² The sense requires *τί δ' οὐ*; why not? not *τί δὴ*; Ficinus, "cur ita?"

³ Ficinus alone has "duntaxat," required by the sense.

right, that the very rich are not good men ; and, if they are not good, they are not happy.

[13.] With us, however, the laying down of laws looks to that point, that the citizens may become the most happy and in the highest degree friends to each other. But the citizens will never be friends, where there are many lawsuits with each other and much injustice ; but (most so) where the least and fewest are found. We have said too, that there ought to be neither gold nor silver in the state ; nor, again, much money-making through handicraft trades and usury,¹ or ugly cattle,² but what agriculture gives and bears,³ and of these too such as will not compel a person by making money to neglect those things, for the sake of which riches are produced.⁴ Now these are the soul and body ; which, without gymnastics and the rest of discipline, would never be worth mentioning. Hence we have said more than once, that we must put the attention to money in the last place of honour. For, since all, about which every man is seriously engaged, are three, the last and third is correctly the attention paid to riches, but the middle is that relating to the mind ; but that relating to the soul the first. And, indeed, the polity, which we have just now been going through, has been correctly laid down by laws, if it ordains honours in this manner. But if any one of the laws which are ordained in it shall seem to put health in the place of honour in the state before temperance, or wealth before health and temperance, it will appear to be not properly laid down. A legislator, therefore, ought often to point out to himself this.⁵ "What do I intend ?" and, "If this happens, or I fail in my

¹ Ficinus, "cauponationibusque et fœnore," which would lead to *καὶ καπηλειῶν καὶ τόκων*.

² This introduction of *βοσκημάτων αἰσχροῶν* is very strange, for nothing had been said on the subject before. Ficinus has "ex pecoribus turpiter," as if his MS. read *βοσκημάτων αἰσχροῶς*. I suspect however that some words have dropt out, in which interest was said to increase like cattle, just as Shylock says in Shakspeare, that "his monies breed as fast as ewes ;" or as Aristophanes in *Neph.* 1291, says of interest, that it is a wild beast, which "by months and days becomes a larger sum."

³ Instead of *φείρει*, I should prefer *τρέφει*, "feeds."

⁴ This idea of Plato seems to have been caught by Juvenal, and embodied in the verse—"Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas."

⁵ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows almost to the letter, has "quid ipse velit ; quid, si contigerit, bene succedet ; sin minus, instituti sui spes eum frustrabitur—" To supply however the ellipse, I have added "what then ?"

aim,"⁵ (what then?) And thus perhaps he would get himself out of legislation, and liberate likewise the rest, but never a single person by any other means. Let then the person, who has obtained by lot his portion, keep it on the conditions we have detailed.

¹It were a beautiful thing¹ for each person to come to the colony possessing the rest of things also equally. But as this is not possible, and one will come possessing more means, and another less, it is requisite, for the sake² of many things, and of the opportunities in the state, for the sake of equality,³ that the value of property should be unequal, in order that magistracies, and contributions, and distributions,³ (may exist) to each (according) to the value of his worth;³ ⁴(and) that, not according to his own virtue alone, and that of his ancestors, nor yet according to the strength or beauty of his body, but according to the using of wealth and poverty they may receive as equally as possible, by what is unequal, but commensurable, and not differ.⁴ For the sake of these things it is requisite that there should be four valuations in the size⁵ of property; and that these should be called first, second, third, and fourth, or by some other appellation; and that, when they remain in the same valuation, and when becoming richer from being poor, and poor from being rich, each may pass to the valuation suited to themselves. This scheme of law I would lay down as following after these.

We say then that in a state, which is to have no part in the greatest of diseases, which would be more correctly called dissension or sedition, there should exist neither severe poverty amongst some of the citizens nor (great)⁶ wealth: for both

¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed, has "probe autem fieret," as if his MS. read *ἦν δ' ἀν καλόν* in lieu of *ἦν μὲν δὴ καλόν*.

² The words between the numerals I scarcely understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is "multorum et æqualitatis in civitate, temporum opportunitatumque causa," as if his MS. read *πολλῶν, ἰσότητος τε καὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλιν καιρῶν*, for thus *ἰσότητος—καιρῶν* would be put in opposition with *πολλῶν*—

³ I have adopted the suggestion of Stephens, who supposes that *κατὰ* has dropt out before *τὴν τῆς ἀξίας*, and *γίγνονται* after *τιμῆς*.

⁴ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek; in which Ast confesses there are more errors than he can pretend to correct.

⁵ Ficinus has "magnitudine—" His MS. therefore read *μεγέθει*, subsequently found in another.

⁶ From "ingentes divitiæ" in Ficinus, it is easy to see that he found in his MS. *πολὺν* before *πλοῦτον*.

these produce both. It is therefore requisite for a legislator to say at present what is the bound of each. Let then the limit of poverty be the valuation of the lot, which ought to remain, and which no magistrate will ever overlook its becoming less to any one, nor any one of the rest of those who in the same way love honour on the score of virtue. Now the legislator, having laid down that limit as a measure, will permit a person to possess the double, triple, and even to the quadruple of it. But, if any one possesses more than these, whether by finding them, or their being given, or by money-making, or by acquiring through any other such like fortune, by giving up what is above the measure to the state and to the gods, who guard the city, he will be in good repute and without damage. But if any disobeys this law, any one may inform against him on condition of receiving half the property, and the delinquent shall pay another portion to the same amount, and the half shall go to the gods. And let the whole property of all, except the allotment,¹ be written down openly before the magistrates, who are the guardians, in order that such of the suits upon all points as² relate to money may be easy and extremely clear.

[14.] After this it is meet in the first place to build³ the city as much as possible in the middle of the country, ⁴after selecting a spot from those at hand, which possesses what is suited for a city,⁴ which it is not difficult to imagine and detail. After this, to divide it into twelve⁵ parts; and placing first the temple of Hestia, (Vesta,) and Zeus, and Athéné, to call it the

¹ Ficinus has "ultra sortem"—Taylor, "as surpasses the allotted portion," what the sense seems to require. But in that case the Greek should have been *πέρα*, not *χωρίς*—

² From *ῥσαι*, which is unintelligible, Stephens elicited *ῥσ' εἰς*, adopted by Ast.

³ For the sake of the syntax we must read *ἰδρῦσαι* in lieu of *ἰδρύσθαι*, as I have translated.

⁴—⁴ I have followed Ast in the interpretation of this passage; who should however have proposed to read *ἔχοντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τόπον*, in lieu of *τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχοντα τόπον*.

⁵ The reason, says Taylor, why Plato adopted this division is, because the number 12, the image of all-perfect progression, is the product of 3 by 4, both of which numbers, according to the Pythagoreans, are images of perfection. On the other hand, Ast conceives that Plato had in mind the division of the country into twelve parts found in Egypt and elsewhere, and which seems, as may be inferred from vi. 15, p. 771, B., to have been connected with the division of the year into twelve months, each under the superintendence of one of the twelve greater gods.

Acropolis, and to throw round it a circular (enclosure), and from it to cut the city and all the country into twelve parts. But the twelve parts ought to be equalized by the portions of the prolific land being small, but those of the unprolific large, and the allotments to be five thousand and forty. And again (it is meet) to cut each of these into two; and to unite two sections into one allotment, each having a share of what is near to, and what is remote from, the city, the near portion being added to that one farthest off, making one allotment; and that, which is the second from the city, (to be added) to that, which is the second from the extremity; and so on with all the rest.¹ And (it is meet) to contrive in the twofold divisions, that what has just now been said (respecting)² the badness and goodness of the land, be equalized³ by the greater and less quantity at the distribution; and to divide the males⁴ likewise into twelve parts; and for a person to arrange the whole⁵ of the rest of property into twelve parts equal, as much as is possible, a description being made of all particulars. After this, to assign the twelve allotments to the twelve gods, and to call them after their names, and to consecrate to each the portion obtained by lot, and to call it a Phylé;⁶ and again to divide the twelve sections of the city in the same manner as they divided the rest of the country; and that each should possess two habitations, one near the centre and the other near the extremity; and thus let the method of settlement have an end. But it is requisite for us to consider by all means a matter of this kind, that all the points, which have just now been stated, will never concur on such like occasions, so that all should happen to take place according to reason; and that men will exist, who would not feel annoyed at such a method of living together,

¹ To this passage Aristotle alludes in Polit. vii. 10.

² Ast would supply correctly *πέρι* after *φαιλότητός τε* from "de fecunditate" in Ficinus.

³ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπανισούμενον ἔσεσθαι*, not *ἐπανισουμένους*, which is without syntax or sense.

⁴ Taylor has "the streets," as if his head was running upon *τὰς ἀγυιάς* in lieu of *ἀνδρας*—

⁵ Ast, unable to understand *τὴν τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας*, would read *τὰ τῆς*—Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ τὴν ὅλην τῆς*—as I have translated, or else *τὸν—συνταξάμενον*—

⁶ From this passage it is evident that *Φυλὴ* means "a parish," which in Christian countries is dedicated to some saint, as the Phylé was in Attica to some god or demigod.

but would endure to have property fixed (by law) and moderate through the whole of life; and the procreation of children to be such as we have mentioned; and to be deprived of silver and gold, and other things, which the legislator is clearly, from what has been said, about to forbid; and (endure) further ¹the equalization of the land and the dwelling in a city placed in the centre,¹ as we have mentioned above. ²Of all which matters a person has been speaking almost as if they were dreams, and moulding² a state and citizens, as it were, of wax. Subjects however of this kind have been in a certain manner not badly spoken of. ³But it is requisite to take up again against himself things of this kind.³ ⁴For the legislator would say⁴ again to us this—"Do not think, my friends, that what has been now asserted in these speeches has lain hid from me, and that (a person)⁵ has gone through in some manner the truth. But I think this will be most just in each of those things about to be, that he, who exhibits a pattern, according to which the thing attempted ought to be done, should omit nothing of what is most beautiful and true; but that he, to whom it is impossible for any thing of this kind to happen, should decline executing that very thing; but that of those which remain, and is nearest to it, and most closely connected naturally with what it is fitting to do,⁶ he should devise a plan how this very thing may take place;⁶ but permit the legislator to put a finish to his intention; and this being done, then to con-

¹—¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *ὡς εἰρήκαμεν ἰσότητας, not εἰρηκε μεσότητας*. For the construction is *χώρας ἰσότητας καὶ ἀστειος ἐν κύελψ οἰκήσεις*. Ficinus has "regiones et urbis in medio et in extremis, sicut ordinavimus, ubique habitationes."

²—² The Greek is *πάντη σχεδὸν οἷον ἐνείρατα λέγων ἢ πλάττων*—But as there is nothing to which *λέγων* can be referred, I have translated as if the Greek were—*ἂ πάντ' ἦν σχεδὸν οἷον ἐνείρατά τις λέγων καὶ πλάττων*.

³—³ Such is the literal translation of the Greek—*χρηθ' ἐπαναλαμβάνειν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ τοιάδε*: where I am quite in the dark; and so, I think, was Ficinus; whose version is, "sed ea quoque narranda, quæ legislator adversus diceret—" One MS. has *πάντα λαμβάνειν*. Perhaps Plato wrote *χρηθ' εἰπεῖν τιν' ἀναλαμβάνειν πρὸς ταῦτ' ἂν τοιάδε*. "But it is meet to conceive that a person would say against such remarks something of this kind."

⁴—⁴ The Greek is *πάλιν ἄρα—φράζει*—I have translated as if it were *πάλιν γὰρ ἂν φράζοι*—

⁵ After *διείρηται* there has evidently dropt out *τις*—

⁶—⁶ Ficinus has "omni studio prosequatur—"

sider in common with him, which of the matters that have been mentioned are conducive, and which adverse to legislation.¹ For it surely behoves the artist in a matter the most trifling to make by all means his work consistent with itself, if it is to be worthy of mention. But now after the decree relating to the division into twelve parts, we must be ready to look into this too,² namely, to show in what manner the twelve parts have the greatest possible number of divisions of the things within them,³ and what are consequent upon these, and produced from them, up to the five thousand and forty; and from whence (they have)⁴ clans,⁵ and wards, and villages, and, in addition, the drawing up and leading out of (troops) in war, and moreover coins, and measures dry and liquid, and weights; all these it is requisite for the law to regulate in measure⁶ and in harmony with each other. In addition to these we ought not to feel a fear even on that ground, lest there should be what is considered an attention to trifles, should any one regulate all the chattels which persons are to possess, nor permit any of them to be immoderate, and consider by a reason common to all, that the distributions and variations of the numbers are useful for all things, even such as are various themselves⁷ in themselves, and such as are so in length and depth, or in sounds and motions, both those that proceed in a straight direction upwards and downwards, and (those that)⁸ move in a circle. For it behoves the legislator, looking to all these points, to enjoin all the citizens not to swerve from this arrangement to the utmost of their power. For no one branch of learning suited to

¹ The Greek is *πρόσαντες εἴρηται*. But *εἴρηται* is plainly superfluous after the preceding *εἰρημένων*.

² Instead of *δῆλον δὲ*, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, I think, for he has omitted those words, wanting likewise in another MS., I have translated as if the Greek were *δηλοῦν δὲ*—

³ In lieu of *αὐτοῦ*, which is unintelligible, Ast reads *αὐτῶν*—He should have suggested *αὐτῶν*, similar to “in se” in Ficinus.

⁴ I have introduced “they have” from “habent” in Ficinus.

⁵ By *φάρτρια* was understood one of the three sections into which the *φυλή* was divided, as shown by Harpocration in *Τριττός*, which was another; and the third was called *ἔθνος*.

⁶ Ficinus has “commensurata,” as if his MS. read *σόμετρα*.

⁷ In lieu of *αὐτοὶ*, the sense requires *αὐτὰ*, and hence we can get rid of the verb, “accipiunt,” which Ficinus has introduced to supply the otherwise defective syntax in *ποικίλματα*, which is evidently an interpolation.

⁸ Before *τῆς* there has evidently dropt out *ταῖς* to answer to the preceding *ταῖς*.

children possesses such a mighty power as regards domestic economy, and state politics, and all arts, as the study of numbers; and, what is the greatest of all, excites even the sleepy person and naturally untaught, and renders him docile, and with a good memory, and clever, while making a progress, by a divine art, beyond his own nature. All these, if a person shall have taken away by other laws and pursuits illiberality and a love of money from the minds of those, who are about to possess them sufficiently and profitably, would become a course of instruction honourable and befitting; but if not, a person would unconsciously, instead of wisdom, produce the so-called cleverness, such as it is in our power to see the ¹ Egyptians and Phœnicians,¹ and many other nations produce, through the illiberality of their other pursuits and possessions; either because some indifferent legislator of theirs has caused such results, or a severe misfortune has fallen upon them, or some other nature of this kind. For let not this, Megillus and Clinias, lie hid from us respecting places, that some differ² from others in producing men better or worse; in opposition to which we must not lay down laws. For through all kinds³ of winds and violent heat, some persons are of an alien disposition, and with feelings of hostility;⁴ others through the water; but others ⁵through that food from the

¹—¹ Respecting the love of money amongst the Egyptians and Phœnicians Ast refers to Plato Rep. iv. 11, p. 436, A., and respecting the so-called cleverness of the former, see the learned note of Berkellius on Steph. Byz. Αἰγυπτος.

² So Ficinus, whom Cornarius, Taylor, and Ast have followed. The Greek is οὐκ εἰσιν, where, I suspect, ἀκούουσιν lies hid in the Latin sense of “audiunt,” and which is found likewise in Greek.

³ In lieu of παντοῖα I should prefer ἀνταῖα, “hostile,” see my note on Æsch. Suppl. 814, or πᾶν βίαια, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 261. For it was not the variety but the quality of the wind, that would produce the difference in the inhabitants.

⁴ I have adopted the emendation of Ruhnken, ἀνέριστοι for ἐναίσιτοι. Ast would read ἐξαίσιτοι, which Stalbaum passes off as his own conjecture. But ἐξαίσιτος is never, I believe, applied to a person.

⁵ The Greek is at present διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφήν ἀναδιδούσαν οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἀμείνω καὶ χεῖρῳ. But as Galen in T. i. p. 349, ed. Bas., quotes διὰ τὴν—ἀμείνον καὶ χεῖρον, Plato wrote, I suspect, διὰ τὴν γῆν ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τροφήν ἀναδιδούσαν οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἀμείνω καὶ χεῖρῳ, i. e. through the earth yielding from its womb food, better or worse, not only for the body— For thus πνεύματα, ὕδατα, and γῆ would make up the three powers of matter, air, water, and earth, which

earth,⁵ which not only imparts to bodies (properties) better and worse, but which is no less able to infuse all things of this kind into their soul. But of all the places in a country those excel the most, in which there is a certain divine inspiration, and allotments for dæmons, who are either always propitious to the inhabitants, or the contrary; for whom the legislator, who has a mind, would, after reflecting, as much as it is possible for man to reflect upon (all)¹ things of this kind, endeavour to lay down laws; which must be done by you, Clinias; for to matters of this kind must he turn himself, who is about to colonize a country.

Clin. Very beautifully, Athenian guest! do you speak; and so must it be done by me.

BOOK VI.

[1.] *Athen.* BUT, after all that has now been said, there will be almost² the appointment of magistrates in your state.

Clin. Such is the case.

Athen. Respecting the proper arrangement of a polity, these two kind of things happen to exist. First, the appointment of offices, ³[and of persons about to rule,]³ how many they ought to be, and in what manner appointed. Next, with respect to the laws that are to be imposed upon each office, what, and how many, and of what kind it will be fitting (to impose) upon each. But, previous to choosing them, let us

were constantly united, as being the creators and preservers of the world, and all that it contains, as I have shown on *Æsch. Prom.* 88, and to the passages there quoted I could now add many more; while on the causes that have led to the loss or corruption of γαστήρ it would be easy to write a still longer note. Suffice it to say that γαστήρ might have easily dropt out between τῆς and τρε—

¹ Instead of οὐρῳ, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were πάντα.

² In σχεδόν, although supported by "ferme" in Ficinus, there is, I suspect, some error. For it could hardly thus stand by itself.

³⁻³ The words between brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus. They are evidently an explanation of ἀρχῶν, as shown in part by ἀρχόντων, found in Bas. 2, in lieu of ἀξίοντων.

stop a little, and give some account fitting to be detailed respecting them.

Clin. What account is this?

Athen. This. Something of this kind is surely evident to all, that, since the work of legislation is a matter of moment, ¹ by placing a state well furnished with laws well laid down under not suitable magistrates, ¹ not only would there be a very great laugh at the (laws) well laid down to no purpose, but there would arise nearly the greatest mischief and bane to states from them.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then consider this, as happening to you, my friend, touching the present polity and state. For you see that it is necessary in the first place for those, who are proceeding in a straight road to the powers of magistrates, to have given, both themselves and their respective families from childhood to the period of their election, a sufficient test. Next for those, who are about to make the choice, to have been brought up and well taught in legal habits, so as to be able to judge correctly of those worthy of either (fate), and to receive, or to reject them with disgust.² But how can those, who have recently met together for this purpose, and are unacquainted with each other, and moreover uninstructed, be ever able to choose magistrates in a blameless manner?

Clin. They nearly never can.

Athen. But a contest, as they say,³ does not readily admit of

¹—¹ By merely changing τοῦ into τῷ, and ἐπιστῆσαι into ὑποστῆσαι, the passage which Stephens, Heindorf, Ast and all others consider to be defective, and endeavour to supply, becomes perfectly intelligible. For Plato meant it to be inferred that even good laws, when improperly administered, are a bane to a state.

² Ast remarks correctly that in the words δυσχεραίνοντάς τε καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ὁρθῶς κρίνειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν, there is the figure of speech called Chiasmus; by which δυσχεραίνοντάς and ἀποκρίνειν, the two extreme terms of the sentence, are to be united, and ἀποδεχομένους and κρίνειν, the two middle terms.

³ This passage alone would be sufficient to show that Taylor translated from neither the Greek nor the genuine version of Ficinus, but the refiction of it by Grynæus; who alone has added "ut aiunt." The Greek is προφάσεις οὐ πάντῃ δέχισθαι, where to support the syntax, Stephens proposed to insert φασὶ after προφάσεις: while Ficinus has "suscipit," as if his MS. read δέχεται. Respecting the proverb see Aristoph. Ἀχ. 367, Ὅς σκῆψιν ἁγῶν εὐτος οὐ προσδέξεται, and the Schol. on Cratyl. p. 421, D., with Heindorf's note.

excuses. This then must now be accomplished both by you and me; since you have with readiness undertaken to settle a colony for a clan of the Cretans, and are, as you say, the tenth commissioner; and I have promised to assist you, according to our present story-telling. I will not therefore willingly leave this discourse without a head.¹ For should it meet us,² while wandering in this state, it would appear to be deformed.

Clin. You have spoken, guest, very well.

Athen. Not (spoken) merely, but so I will do to the utmost of my power.

Clin. Let us do by all means, as we have said.

Athen. Be it so, if god be willing; and so far at least let us be victors over old age.

Clin. And it is likely that he will be willing.

Athen. It is reasonable. Following him therefore, let us understand this.

Clin. What?

Athen. In how manly and hazardous a manner will our state have been at present settled.

Clin. Looking to what³ and whither especially have you thus spoken at present?

Athen. How easily and fearlessly have we laid down laws for persons unskilled, in what way they may receive what has been just laid down. Thus much, at least, is evident, Clinias, nearly to every one, although not very wise, that no one will easily admit these laws at first. But if we wait for the time⁴ when those, who in their boyhood had tasted of, and been sufficiently brought up in, the laws, and accustomed to them,⁴ shall have taken a common part in them with the whole city in the election of magistrates,⁵ on such an event happening as we

¹ A similar idea is to be found in Gorgias, p. 505, D., § 131, of a story without a head: which is explained by Plutarch, de Defect. Orac. p. 417, E.

² I have adopted with Ast the version of Erasmus, who saw that Plato wrote here ἀπαρτῆ, similar to περτῆ in the similar passage of the Gorgias. Bekk. and Stalb. are content with ἀπάντη, for which Heindorf proposed to read ἄπαντι—

³ Stephens correctly proposed πρὸς in lieu of περὶ. Ficinus has merely "Quorsum hæc."

⁴ Ficinus has "donec legibus instituti pueri unaque et diu sub iisdem legibus conversati," from which it is difficult to see what he found in his MS.

⁵ Here again the version of Ficinus is extremely loose, "certe et tunc et in posterum procul ab errore sic instructa civitas permaneret."

are speaking of, if this should take place in a certain manner and skill, I conceive there would be a great security that a state would remain even after the then existing period educated in this way.⁵

Clin. This carries reason with it.

Athen. Let us then look to this, whether we can furnish any means sufficient for this end. For I assert, Clinias, that the Cnossians ought, in a manner superior to the other Cretans, not merely to go through a formal rite¹ respecting the country which is now being colonized, but to be strenuously careful that the first magistrates may stand² in the most secure and best manner possible. With respect to others, it is a shorter work; but it will be most necessary for us to choose the guardians of the laws with every care.

Clin. What road then and method³ can we discover⁴ for this?

Athen. This. I assert then, ye sons of Cretans, that the Cnossians, since they take the lead of the majority of cities, ought to choose in common with those who are going to this joint settlement, from themselves, and them, thirty-seven men in all; nineteen from the settlers, but the rest from Cnossus itself; and let the Cnossians give up these to your state, and for yourself to be a member of this colony and one of the eighteen men; and this, either by employing persuasion or moderate force.

Clin. But why do not you, O guest, and Megillus, share with us in this polity?

[2.] *Athen.* Athens, O Clinias, has a high opinion of herself, and so too has Sparta, and each have their dwellings far off. But to you and the other settlers there is a care on all points, the same as what we were just now saying respecting

¹ On this meaning of the word ἀφοσιῦσθαι Ast refers to Maussac on Harpocration, p. 259, Valckenaer on Herodotus iv. 149, and Wyttienbach on Phædon, p. 127.

² In lieu of στῶσι one would have expected καταστῶσι, similar to "constituantur" in Ficinus.

³ From the reply in τόνδε it is evident that Plato did not write πόρον καὶ λόγον. But he might have written, what he probably did, πόρον κατὰ λόγον—"a road according to reason—"

⁴ Ficinus has "faciemus,"—as if his MS. read τίς ἂν οὖν—ἀνευρίσκομεν for τίνα οὖν—ἀνευρίσκομεν.

you. ¹Let it then be held to have been stated how these things may, from what is at present in our power, take place in the most likely manner.¹ But as time progresses, and the form of polity continues, let the choice of them (the magistrates) be something in this way. In the election of magistrates let all take a share who bear arms, either as horse-soldiers or foot-soldiers, and who have taken a part in war according to their respective ability in age; and let the election take place in whatever temple the state holds in the highest veneration; and let each person bring to the altar of the god a small tablet, on which he has written the name of his father,² and parish, and ward where he is a liveryman;³ and let him write thus his own name in the same manner.⁴ But let it be lawful for any one to take away the tablet, which appears to him to be not properly⁵ written, and to place it in the Agora, (there to remain⁶) for not less than thirty days. Of the tablets let the magistrates exhibit to the view of the whole city up to three hundred, that have been judged to be amongst the first; and from these in a similar manner let the city vote whomsoever each person pleases; and let (the magistrates) exhibit again to all one hundred of those selected out of them a second time; and out of the hundred let any one vote a third time for whom he pleases, going⁷ through cuttings.⁷ But the thirty-seven, who

¹— All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has "et quæ tibi et illis hac tempestate convenientissime fieri possunt."

² I have translated as if the Greek were not *πατρόθεν*, but *πατρός θ' ἄμα*, to which *πρόσθεν* in one MS. seems to lead. Plato could hardly have said *πατρόθεν*. For children in Greece were seldom called after their father. They got their name either from some accidental circumstance, or else from their grandfather.

³ This seems to be the exact meaning of *δημοτεύεσθαι*, explained by Hesychius, *τὸ μετίχειν δήμου καὶ πολιτείας κατὰ νόμον*.

⁴— The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, either because they were wanting in his MS., or because he knew that, as *παρεγγράφειν* means to "introduce improperly into a writing," it would be here inadmissible; and hence too just before he has "nomen suum et patris," as if his MS. read *αὐτοῦ τε τοῦνομα πατρός θ' ἄμα*—

⁵ So Taylor from "non recte" in Ficinus; who either found in his MS., or wished to read, *κατὰ νόμον* in lieu of *κατὰ νοῦν*—

⁶ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "ubi—permaneat," as if *ὄν* had been found in his MS. after *ἐλαττον*, or *μένον* after *ἡμερῶν*.

⁷— Such is the literal translation of *διὰ τομίων*, with which words Ficinus was probably so dissatisfied as to omit entirely *διὰ τομίων πορευόμενος*. One MS. has *τομίωνων*. From "per eosdem" in Cornarius, Stephens

may have the greatest number of votes, let some persons deciding declare to be the magistrates. Who then, Clinias and Megillus, shall appoint all these things for us in the state, respecting magistrates and the testing of them? Do we not perceive, that in states, so united from the first, there must be some; ¹ but who they would be, it is not the province of all magistrates? ¹ It is however necessary (that there should be some), and these too men of not an inferior kind, but as much as possible at the very summit. For the beginning, according to the proverb, ² is the half of the whole; and all men praise a good commencement. But this, as it seems to me, is more than the half; nor has any one sufficiently praised it, when it has taken place correctly.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then, since we know it, not pass it by untold, by making nothing clear to ourselves as to the manner in which it exists. For my part I have it not in my power to say but one word necessary for, and conducive to, the present purpose.

Clin. What is it?

[3.] *Athen.* I assert that to this state, which we are about to settle, there is not, as it were, a father and mother except the city which colonizes it. Nor am I ignorant that oftentimes some differences have arisen, and will arise, between colonies and their parent countries. At present then, as a child, although it is about to be at variance with its parents, through its present want of instruction, loves and is beloved by them, and is constantly flying to its relations, finds allies in

seems to have introduced τῶν αὐτῶν— Plato wrote, I suspect, διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἅμα τομῇ πορευόμενος, "going through the names with a cutting instrument—" Cousin translates "procédant de divisions en divisions—" But what can be the meaning of those words here he does not say.

¹— Here again a literal version best shows that the Greek is unintelligible; where in lieu of πρὸς πασῶν, Ast has edited πρὸ πασῶν, from "ante magistratus," in Cornarius; while one MS. has ἐκ, from which nothing, as far as I can see, is gained. Ficinus was equally at a loss; whose words are, "qui vero ex omnibus magistratibus deligantur, in eis nequam reperientur," partially adopted by Taylor, "but that they will never be found among those that are chosen for magistrates." Cousin gives in his Notes a paraphrase in the place of a literal translation.

² The proverb alluded to is in Hesiod, and quoted in iii. 9. Ovid too says, "Dimidium facti, qui bene cœpit, habet."

them alone, which¹ I assert has now taken place² readily to the Cnossians through their care for the new city, and to the new (city through their care) for the Cnossians. I repeat then, as I have just now said,³—for what is well said it does no harm (to say) twice—that the Cnossians ought to have a care over all these particulars in common, by selecting from those, who are departing for the colony, the oldest and best possible,⁴ not less than one hundred, and let there be another hundred from the Cnossians themselves. I say too, that these should, on coming to the new city, be careful how the magistrates are appointed according to the laws, and after being appointed undergo a scrutiny. And on this taking place, let the Cnossians dwell in⁵ Cnossus; and let the new city endeavour to preserve itself and become prosperous. Let then those numbered amongst the thirty-seven men be held to have been chosen both now and for all time to come for these purposes. First, let them be guardians of the laws; next, of those writings (in) which⁶ every one shall write down for the magistrates the amount of his property, except⁷ the person who has the greatest valuation of four minæ,⁸ and the second of three, and the third of two [minæ];⁹

¹ Instead of *α* one would have expected *τοῖα*, on account of the preceding *καθάπερ*—Hence Ficinus has “ita quoque.”

² This past time seems very strange here, as if the colony had been already settled.

³ Ficinus has “non enim nocet bis dicere, quod bene dicitur,” who either found in his MS., or supplied from his head, *λέγειν* or *εἰπεῖν* after *βλάπτει*. To the same proverb there is an allusion in xii. 8, p. 957, A., and in Phileb. p. 59, E. § 140, and Gorg. p. 498, E. § 117.

⁴ Before *μὴ ἔλαττον* there is inserted *ἐλομένους*, which could not thus be repeated after the preceding *προσελομένους*.

⁵ Ficinus has “Gnosum Gnosii redeant—” as if his MS. read *τὴν μὲν Κνωσὸν τοὺς Κνωσίους ἤκειν αὐ*—which is far preferable to *οἰκεῖν*—Cousin is content with *οἰκεῖν*, which he renders, “resteront chez eux,” and explains it by saying, “c’est à dire ne se mêleront plus que de leurs propres affaires.” But how *οἰκεῖν* can have such a meaning he does not state, nor do I see.

⁶ Stephens would insert *δὲ* before *ὧν*, from “ubi” in Ficinus.

⁷ The word *πλήν*, which I cannot understand, nor could, I think, Ficinus, as he has omitted it, Ast renders “verumtamen,” a meaning that I am not aware it ever has elsewhere.

⁸ Ast says that after *ὁ μὲν μέγιστον ἔχων τεττάρων μνῶν*, is to be supplied *τίμημα ἔχέτω*. But how this could be, I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus has, what is perfectly intelligible, “sitque maximus census minarum quatuor.”

⁹ The insertion of *μναῖν* here, after its omission in the preceding clause, seems very strange.

but the fourth of (one)¹ mina. But if any one shall be shown to possess any thing else beyond what has been written down, let all this become public property ; and, besides this, let him² undergo a punishment, through any one bringing him to trial, neither honourable nor with a good name, but disgraceful,³ should he be convicted of despising the laws through the love of gain. Let then any one indict him for being addicted to a disgraceful love of gain, and follow up the charge by a trial before the guardians of the laws. And if the defendant is condemned to pay a fine, let him have no share in the public property ; and when any distribution takes place in the state, let him be without a share, except as regards his (first)³ allotment ; and let him be written down, where any one who wishes may read it, as a person condemned, as long as he lives. Let not the guardian of the laws be in office more than twenty years ; and let him not be inducted into his office, if he is less than fifty years of age. But if he is sixty years old when he is inducted into it, let him hold it for ten years ; and according to this ratio let it be, that he, who has passed beyond seventy years, shall not imagine that he holds an office of such importance amongst those who are holding it.

[4.] Let then these three ordinances be considered to have been stated, touching the guardians of the laws. But as the laws progress, each one may enjoin upon these men, what matters they ought to attend to, in addition to what have been detailed already.

And now we will speak in order about the election of other magistrates. For after this it is necessary to elect Generals, and such as minister to them in war, such as the⁴ Hip-

¹ One MS. has *μᾶς* for *μῶς*. Plato probably wrote both, *μᾶς* δὲ *μῶς* ὁ τέταρτος.

² Ficus, unable, it would seem, to understand the Greek, is content to give the general meaning, "præterea reus sit volentis eum tanquam infamem accusare." Cornarius, more closely, "ad hoc autem iudicium subeat—non honestum neque illustre sed turpe." But *εὐώνυμος* never elsewhere does or could mean "illustre." Ast renders it by "faustum." But what is "iudicium faustum" he does not explain, nor can I tell.

³ Ficus alone has "præter sortem primam."

⁴ In using the words Hipparch, Phylarch, and Taxiarch, Plato merely adopted the custom of his own country, as may be inferred from Demosth. Phil. i. where they are similarly united. By Hipparch was meant the commander-in-chief of the cavalry ; by Phylarch, the commander of the cavalry of each Phyle, with which may be compared the cavalry in England, called Fencibles, and with the infantry of the Phyle the regiment of Militia, belonging to each county.

parchs and the Phylarchs, and those who drill the foot-soldiers of the Phyle,⁴ to whom would be very fitting the name of Taxiarchs, as the common people call them. ¹ Of these let the guardians of the laws propose for Generals from this very state itself;¹ and from those so proposed let all, who have taken a part in war at their proper age, or are in the act of doing so on each occasion,² make the selection. But if it shall appear to any one that some one of those, who have not been proposed, is superior to some of those, who have been proposed, let him name the person, whom he proposes, in the place of some one, and, taking an oath touching this very matter, let him bring forward the other party; and which ever shall be voted by a show of hands, let him be decreed as belonging to the selection. And let the three, who have the greatest number of votes for them to be Generals and to have the care of the war department, undergo a scrutiny, as the guardians of the law (underwent). And let the twelve elected Generals propose twelve Taxiarchs for themselves, for each tribe one;³ and let there be a preference nomination, as occurred in the case of the Generals, done in the same manner, respecting the Taxiarchs, and a second show of hands and a decision. And let the guardians of the laws, after they have brought together an assembly at a place the most holy and most convenient, cause to sit, before the Prytanes and Council have been chosen, the heavy-armed apart, and apart too the cavalry, and the third in order after these the whole of those employed in war. And let all hold up their hands for the Generals and Hipparchs; but for the Taxiarchs those who carry shields; but let all the cavalry choose for itself⁴ Phylarchs; but let the Generals appoint for themselves the officers

¹ The words between the numerals I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is, "Igitur ipsi custodes legum hujusmodi exercitus duces futuros aliquos civitatis hujus cives proponant," as if he had found in his MS. οὕτω δὴ στρατηγούς μὲν τοιαύτης ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως στρατιῶς πολίτας τινὰς αὐτοὶ οἱ νομοφύλακες. προβαλλίσθων—

² I hardly perceive the meaning of ἐκάστοτε here, omitted by Ficinus.

³ Ficinus alone has "unum cuilibet tribui," for he found, no doubt, in his MS. ἓνα between δώδεκα and ἐκάστη— On the loss of εἷς and its cases before ἐκαστος, see my Poppe's Prolegom. p. 226, and to the passages quoted there I could now add many more.

⁴ Instead of αὐ τοῦτοις Ast has suggested, what I have adopted, αὐτοῖς—

over the light-armed soldiers, or archers, and the rest of those employed in war. There still remains for us the appointment of the Hipparchs. These then let those propose, who proposed the Generals; and let the election and the preference nomination¹ take place, as it occurred in the case of the Generals. And let the cavalry hold up their hands for them in the presence of the infantry looking upon them; and let the two, who have the greatest show of hands, be the commanders of all the cavalry; and let the disputes about the show of hands² take place up to twice; but if any one doubts about them a third time, let those determine the votes,³ whose province it is to fix the measure of voting.³

[5.] The Council shall consist of thirty dozen; for three hundred and sixty would be suited to the distributions; and by dividing that number into four parts, (each) ninety, from each portion of the census ninety councillors would give (their vote).⁴ And in the first place let all those of the largest valuation give their vote; or the person who disobeys (the law) will be fined⁵ according to the fine decreed,⁵ and⁶ when they shall have been carried in, let a person put a mark against them. On the following day let those of the second class give (their vote), as on the former (day); and on the third day let any one of the third class bring (his vote). In the case of those belonging to these three classes, let it be compulsory⁷

¹ I have with Bekker adopted Ast's emendation, ἀντιπροβολήν, in lieu of ἀντιβολήν—

² Ficinus has "pronominationem bis fieri liceat," as if he had found in his MS. not τῶν χειροτονιῶν, but τῶν προβολῶν, which he constantly renders "pronominationem," and ἐξείναι in lieu of εἶναι.

³ Such is Taylor's translation of the Greek οἷσπερ τῆς χειροτονίας μέτρον ἐκάστοις ἕκαστον ἦν, which Ast confesses to be obscure, but has been unable, I conceive, to throw any light upon the subject. Ficinus too was equally at a loss; whose version is, "qui comitiorum modum in singulos statuere," which Ast says he cannot understand, nor can I. Did Plato write, οἷσπερ τὰ τῆς χειροτονίας μετρεῖν ἐν ἐκάστοις ἐκάστοι ἦν— "to whom it is ever the business to take the measure of the voting on each matter."

⁴ So Ast understands φέρειν, with the ellipse of ψῆφον.

⁵ Such is the literal version of τῇ δοξάσῃ ζημίᾳ. Ficinus has "pro arbitrio condemnatur."

⁶ Such is the Greek literally. Ficinus has "postquam vero delati sunt, conscribantur." By comparing what Plato says a little below, it would seem that a mark was placed against the names of those who declined to vote, and that the list of them was laid before the rulers.

⁷ This law was introduced by Plato, perhaps in imitation of the enact-

to give (a vote); but let the fourth and smallest class be dismissed exempt from fine, should any one belonging to it be unwilling to give (a vote). On the fourth day let all belonging to the fourth and smallest class give (their votes); but let him, who belonging to the third and fourth class, is unwilling to give (a vote) be exempt from a fine. But let him, who, belonging to the second and first class, does not give a vote, be fined; he, who belongs to the second rank, be fined the triple of the first fine;¹ and he, who belongs to the first, quadruple. On the fifth day let the rulers bring out for all the citizens to see the names that have a mark against them; and let every man of them give (a vote) or be fined with the first fine. And after selecting one hundred and eighty out of each class, let them, after choosing by ballot one half of them, make a scrutiny of them, and these shall form the council for one year.

The election taking place in this manner, would be a medium between a monarchy and a democracy; which medium a polity ought always to preserve. For slaves and masters can never become friends, nor the depraved and worthy, when proclaimed² with equal honours. For through things, that are unequal, those that are equal will become unequal, unless they partake of moderation; for, through both of those (inequalities) polities are filled with seditions. For the old saw, being true, that equality produces friendship,³ has been asserted very correctly⁴ and carefully. But through its not being very evident what the equality is, which is able to effect this, it

ment of Solon, who would not permit persons to be neutral during public commotions; for he knew that they merely waited till the opposing parties were exhausted, and could thus secure the prize for which both were contending.

¹ By the first fine is intended what is called above "the fine decreed by law." Ast.

² In lieu of *διαγορευόμενοι*, Stobæus has *διαγενόμενοι*; from which Ast would elicit *διαγόμενοι*, "living." But *διάγεισθαι* is not found, I believe, in that sense any where. The passage produced by Ast from vi. 6, p. 758, is not in point.

³ This saying is similar to that quoted by the Scholiast on Phædrus, p. 240, C. § 37, *Ἡλιξ ἥλικ' ἔτερπε, γέρον δέ γ' ἔτερπε γέροντα*, and the other passages collected there by Ast, and on Sympos. p. 195, B. § 21.

⁴ The expression *μάλα ὀρθῶς* is plainly superfluous after *ἀληθής ὦν*—For if a saying be true, it must be said correctly. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀηθής ὦν νῦν*, "being unusual at present—" On the confusion between *ἀηθής* and *ἀληθής*, see at Euthyd. § 16, p. 60.

throws us into great trouble. For, as there are two equalities,¹ of the same name, but in reality nearly contrary to each other on many points, every state and every legislator is competent to introduce one of these in the case of honours by regulating, as regards the distribution by means of the ballot, the equality consisting in measure, weight, and number; but it is not easy for every one to perceive the most true and the best equality.² For it is the decision of Zeus;³ and it furnishes⁴ but little at all times to men; although as much as it does furnish to states or private persons, it works out every good. For it distributes more to the greater, and less to the smaller,⁵ imparting to each what is moderate according to its nature. Moreover it distributes greater honours to those who are even greater in virtue,⁶ but to those who have (less) of virtue and education (it distributes) less (honours), as being suited⁶ to each according to reason. For this surely is justice itself even in politics, at which we ought at present to grasp, and, looking to this equality, Clinias, to settle our now rising state. And should any one settle any other (state), he ought to give laws, with his mind turned to this point, and not to a few tyrants, or one, or to any power of the people, but always to justice itself. And this is what has just now been stated, namely, the distributing what is according to nature, equal to unequals.

¹ The two equalities alluded to are the arithmetic and geometric, as shown by Plato in Gorg. p. 508, A. § 136. Aristoph. Nicomach. v. 4, and Plutarch. Sympos. Problem. viii. 2, p. 719, B., quoted by Ast.

² See Aristot. Polit. vi. 3, *περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δίκαιου—πάντα χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν*.

³ According to the Scholiast on Gorg. p. 508, A., the decision of Zeus is *δικαιοσύνη*, another name for geometric analogy. For Plato, says Plutarch, in Sympos. viii. 2, p. 718, R., *γνώμην ἀπεφάνετο γεωμετρεῖν τὸν θεόν*. But he adds, *εἰ γὰρ δὴ θεῖον εἶναι τὴν ἀπόφασιν ταύτην Πλάτωνος*.

⁴ This is the usual meaning of *ἐπαρκεῖν*. But the sense requires rather "it is used by—"

⁵ Plato is here speaking of a geometric equality, according to which the merits of individuals are to be estimated; so that as merit is to merit, so should gift be to gift. T.

⁶—⁶ The Greek is *τοῖς δὲ τοῦναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον*. But Ficinus has "minoribus autem virtute et disciplina minores, et—quod decet." From whence Stephens was led to suspect that something had dropped out to answer to the preceding *μείζους*. Perhaps Plato wrote *μείζους, μείους δὲ τοῖς μείον τι ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ παιδείας, ὥτε πρέπον*—as I have translated.

It is necessary however for every state to make use of these (two)¹ equalities in name, if it is about not to have a share in seditions in any degree. ²For the easy and lenient temper of what is perfect and accurate contrary to justice the correct is improperly broken down when it takes place.³ Hence it is perhaps necessary to make use in addition of the equality by ballot, on account of the moroseness of the multitude; and afterwards to invite by prayers a god and good fortune to direct the ballot to what is most just. In this manner then it is necessary to use both the equalities; but the one which is in need of good fortune on the very fewest occasions.

[6.] These things, and in this way, and for these reasons, it is necessary, friends, for that state to do, which is about to be preserved. But since both a ship, while sailing on the sea, requires constantly a watch both night and day, and in like manner a state dwells,³ while driven along by the storm of other states, and running the risk of being caught by all kinds of plots, it is requisite through the day to night, and from night to day, for the rulers to join with rulers, and watchers

¹ Ficinus alone has, what is more intelligible, "his duabus æqualitatibus," as if his MS. read ταύταις δυοσι παρωνύμοις ἰσότησι.

^{2—3} Such is the literal version of the Greek, τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον τοῦ τελείου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν ὀρθὴν ἴστι παρατεθραυσμένον, ὅταν γίγνηται, which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose paraphrastic version is "æquabilitas enim illa laudabilis et æqua dijudicatio perfecti atque exacti, cum præter rectum iudicium fit, violatur et frangitur." Taylor has more closely, "the equitable and lenient judgment of the perfect and accurate." But the genitives τοῦ τελείου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς could not thus follow τὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον. Of this Ast seems to have been aware. Hence his rendering is "perfecti et exacti dissolutio et depravatio;" and he makes τοῦ τελείου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς to depend upon παρατεθραυσμένον, observing that the participle is in the place of a noun. But no perfect participle passive can stand for a noun, except when it is united to an article. Schneider too has been at a loss here; for his version is "infracti juris et recti violatio," as if he wished to read παρατεθραυσμένον. In this mass of difficulties it seems almost hopeless to suggest any thing certain. But to my mind the train of ideas would lead to something like this—"For what is easy and lenient is, when it exists to any person, broken down by the complete and exact relating to justice unbending—in Greek, τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον ὑπὸ τοῦ τελείου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς περὶ δίκην τὴν ὀρθὴν ἴστι παρατεθραυσμένον, ὅταν γίγνηται. With regard to the union of ἐπιεικὲς and ξύγγνωμον, it will be sufficient to refer to Aristot. Ethic. vi. 11, τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ φαιμέν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἓνα συγγνώμην.

³ In lieu of οἰκῆ, which I cannot understand, Plato wrote, I suspect, δεινῆ, "is in fear—"

with watchers, and to succeed each other constantly, and never to cease handing over (their power). But the multitude is not able to do any of these things quickly. And it is necessary to permit the majority of the counsellors to remain for the greatest part of their time properly managing their own private affairs; but that a twelfth part of them should distribute themselves over the twelve months, so as to furnish a watch, one part for one month, and ¹ to be in readiness for any thing ¹ in the case of any one coming from any where else, or from the city itself for any purpose, whether a person should be desirous of telling or hearing aught respecting what it is fitting for one state to give an answer to other states, or by putting questions to others to receive replies; and moreover for the sake of those innovations of all kinds which are wont to happen perpetually, in order especially that they may not occur; or, if they have occurred, that the consequences may be cured as quickly as possible, after the state shall have become acquainted with them. Hence that portion, which presides over the state, ought to be the master of public meetings and their dissolutions, which take place both according to law and on a sudden. All these matters it should be for the twelfth part of the council to arrange, who are to be at rest for eleven parts of the year. But this part of the Council ought always to keep these watchings over the state in common with the other magistrates.

Such then being the state of affairs as regards the state, they may be put into order with moderation. But what care, and what order, will there be in all the rest of the country? Must there not, since all the city, and the whole country, is distributed into twelve parts, be shown to be Commissioners of the roads, and dwellings, and buildings, and harbours, and of the market-place, and fountains, and moreover of sacred groves, and temples, and all other things of this kind belonging to the state?

Clin. How not?

[7.] *Athen.* Let us say then, that there ought to be persons to cleanse the temples, and priests and priestesses; and that it is meet to choose three kinds of officers over roads and

¹—¹ The Greek is *ἐτοιμῶς ἐπιρυχεῖν*, which I cannot understand, nor could Ast; for he proposes to read *ἐνρυχεῖν*. Plato probably wrote *ἐτοιμῶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔχην*, and so I have translated.

buildings, and the ornaments belonging to things of this kind, and over human beings that they may do no injury, and over the rest of wild beasts,¹ in the very encircling enclosure and suburb of the city, in order that every thing may take place befitting cities; and that as regards the duty just now stated, it is meet to call them City-Stewards,² but as regards the market, Market-Stewards, and as regards the temples, Priests. But let us not disturb those, with whom, as priests or priestesses, the sacred office is hereditary. But if, as is likely to happen to those first settled, nothing has been laid down respecting holy³ things of this kind in favour of any body or only a few, one must appoint priests and priestesses to be the cleansers of the temples of the gods. But of all these things some are to be in their appointment by election, and some by lot, through those that are and are not Wardsmen mingling in a friendly manner with each other in every district and town, in order that they may be as much as possible of one mind. To commit then what relates to sacred rites to the god himself, let it be an act of gratification to him, and to allow divine fortune to settle by lot. But the party who has happened to obtain the lot, (it is meet) to subject to a scrutiny first, whether he is of a sound body and lawfully begotten; next of a family as pure as possible, and unpolluted himself by blood and all crimes of such a kind against the gods, and whether his father and mother have lived in a similar manner. And it is meet to bring from Delphi the laws relating to all divine things, and, after appointing interpreters for them,

¹ To avoid the strange notion of thus uniting human beings with the rest of wild beasts, Ast translates *ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων*, "not only men, but wild beasts likewise." I suspect, however, that Plato wrote *περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἀπανθρώπων τε καὶ τινῶν ἀνελευθέρων*—For he had probably in mind the mutilation of the Hermæ, which took place at Athens at the hands of some persons not human and of a not gentlemanly conduct. In Greek, *ἀνελεύθερος* means frequently what is understood in English by "ungentlemanly." On the loss or corruption of *ἀπανθρώπων* see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 220.

² The officers called *ἀστυνόμοι* in Greece corresponded to those called *Ædiles* in Italy.

³ I have adopted Orelli's emendation of *ῥοια* for *οἷς*, to which Stephens was the first to object, and to correct it by reading *ὀλιγίστοις*, in lieu of *ὀλίγοις οἷς*—Ficinus has "*si vero aut nullis aut paucis aliqua hujusmodi sunt—ubi hæc desunt*," which would lead to *εἰ δὲ—πάρεστι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ μηδενὶ ἢ τισιν ὀλίγοις, οἷς μὴ*—instead of *περὶ τὰ*—But the other method is preferable.

to make use of them. And let the priestly office be for a year, and not longer; and let the person be not less than sixty years of age, who is, according to holy laws, to attend for us sufficiently to divine matters. And let there be the same¹ laws relating to priestesses. And let² the thrice four tribes bring (to the vote) thrice four interpreters,² each (one) from themselves; and after scrutinizing the three who have the greatest number of votes, (it is meet) to send the other nine to Delphi, for the god to designate by an oracle one out of each triad; and let the scrutiny relating to these, and their age, be as in the case of the priests,³ and let these be interpreters for life; and let the four⁴ wards⁵ elect in the place of him, who may have left (life), (another)⁶ from the ward where there is a deficiency. (It is meet) too to choose Stewards for the sacred money in each of the temples, with full powers over the sacred groves and their produce, and the leasing (of the property), and three for the largest temples out of those with the largest estates; but two for the smaller temples, and one for the most moderate;⁶ and let the choice and scrutiny of these be in the same manner as the election of the Generals was made. And let what relates to sacred things take place in this way.

[8.] But let nothing be as far as possible without a guard.

¹ Ficinus has "eademque—statuta." For his MS. read not *ταῦτα*, but *ταῦτά*— Perhaps Plato wrote *τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα*—"the very same laws."

²⁻² I have adopted, what Ast suggested, *φερέωσαν μὲν τρεῖς τέτταρες αἱ τρεῖς τέτταρες φυλαὶ*—in lieu of *τρεῖς φερέωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ τέτταρες*, for the parishes were twelve, and each parish had its own Interpreter on sacred matters. Ficinus too found something similar in his MS., as shown by his version, "interpretes autem ter quatuor ferant tribus ipsæ quatuor, ex earum ordine unaquæque tres." But why Plato should thus employ *τρεῖς τέτταρες* instead of *δώδεκα* I confess I cannot explain.

³ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, "qualis et sacerdotum dicta est," as if his MS. read *καθάπερ εἶρηται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱερῶν*.

⁴ Ast would expunge *τέτταρες*, or read as before *αἱ τρεῖς τέτταρες*. Cousin renders *αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ* by "les tribus, divisées quatre par quatre."

⁵⁻⁶ The Greek is *τὸν δὲ γε λιπόντα προαιρεσθῶσαν*—where must be supplied *βίον* after *λιπόντα*, and *ἕτερον* after *προαιρεσθῶσαν*, to suit the sense in the version of Ficinus, "et in defuncti vicem—aliū eligant." But even thus the syntax would be incorrect, which would require *ἀντὶ τοῦ λιπόντος*—

⁶ So Ast translates *ἡμελείστατα*. Ficinus, as usual in doubtful passages, employs two words, "mediis maximeque concinnis."

Let the guards of the city be in this way, through the Generals, and Taxiarchs, and Hipparchs, and Phylarchs, and the Prytanes, and moreover the City-Stewards and Market-Stewards, attending to their (respective) duties, after they have been chosen and appointed sufficiently; but the whole of the rest of the country (it is meet) to guard in this way. The whole country has been divided by us into twelve parts as nearly as possible equal. Let then, one Phylé (ward), after being allotted to each portion, furnish for the year five, as it were, Rural-Stewards and Phylarchs.¹ And let it be for these to choose, each of ²the five,² out of their own Phylé, twelve from the young men not less than five-and-twenty years of age, and not more than thirty. To these let there be allotted portions of the country during a month, each for each, so that all of them may have a practical knowledge of every part of the country. But let the government and guardianship continue to the guards and governors for two years; and let those, who³ first obtain by lot their respective portions, the guard-officers lead out, changing the places of the country constantly, (by going) ⁴to the place next in order towards⁴ the right in a circle, and let the right be that which is in the east. But as the year comes round, in the second year,⁵ in order that the greatest portion of the guards may become acquainted with the country, not only during one season of the year, but that as many as possible may know thoroughly, in addition to the country, at the same time what occurs relating to each spot in the country at each season, let the then

¹ Cousin, and after him, C. F. Hermann, would read Φρουράρχους instead of Φυλάρχους, as shown by ἀγρονόμους—καὶ φρουράρχους, shortly afterwards. And so too Sydenham in Not. MSS.

²⁻³ Ficinus omits τῶν πέντε—and so after him did Taylor.

³ Ast renders ὅπως ἀν—“quomodocunque—” For he did not perceive that Plato wrote ὅροις ἀν—where ὅροις, Attic for οἰσισι, depends upon ἡγεῖσθαι a little below, and ὅροις is put by attraction for τισιν, οἱ—On similar errors arising from ὅρων and ὅροις being corrupted into ὅπως, see myself on Æsch. Eum. 282.

⁴⁻⁵ Bekker, whom Ast and Stalbaum follow, has edited tacitly τὸν ἐξῆς τόπον instead of τῶν ἐξῆς τόπων, which Stephens had preserved from Ald., for he doubtless knew that μεταλλάττειν is united to an accusative and genitive, and not to two accusatives; or else we must read αἰ ἐπὶ τὸν—ἐξῆς—ἡγεῖσθαι—as I have translated: for ἐπὶ might easily have dropt out between αἰ and τὸν—

⁵ This use of ἐν after ἐνιαυτοῦ seems to be supported by ἐν ὥραις ἐτῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν in Rep. x. p. 906, C.

officers lead them out again to the left, ¹ constantly changing the place, until they go through the second year.¹ In the third year, (it is meet) to choose other Rural-Stewards and guard-officers as the five curators of the twelve young men; and in their occupations attention should be given of some such kind as this to each place. First that the country may be as much as possible well fortified against the enemy, ² by trenching and digging out² wherever it is requisite, and with buildings restraining, as far as they can, those endeavouring to injure in any way the country and its possessions; and by making use of animals under the yoke, and the servants in each place, for these purposes, ³ doing through them, standing over them, selecting as much as possible their own employment in their own works,³ to render every place difficult for the enemy to pass, but as easy as possible for friends, and animals under the yoke and cattle; and by taking care ⁴ of the roads that they may be in the most quiet state,⁴ and of the waters from Zeus,⁵ that they may not injure the country, but benefit it rather, when descending from high grounds into hollow places in the mountains,⁶ and by restraining the outlets of the waters with buildings and ditches, such hollows may, by receiving and drinking up the waters from Zeus, produce streams and fountains for the fields below them and for all places,⁷ and thus cause the

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

²—² Ficinus has "foveis—effossis," as if his MS. omitted *καὶ προσκάπροντας*, an evident explanation of *ταφρεύοντας*.

³—³ Such is the literal translation of the text. How much more elegant is the version of Ficinus, adopted to the letter by Taylor, "ad hæc utique facienda subjugalibus servisque indigenis utantur, quando minime in suis operibus occupantur, nonnullos ipsis præficientes—" From whence it is evident that in his MS. some words were transposed, and others, in which the difficulty lies, omitted. Plato wrote, I suspect, something to this effect, *χωρμένους—πρὸς ταῦτα τῶν οἰκείων ἔργων ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐναργίαις ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκλυομένοις, ἃ δὲ δόκνως ποιοῦντας αὐτοὺς, ἐκίνοις τε ἐπιστατοῦντας*—"employing for these purposes (those), when released during the idle time of the year from their own occupations, and doing themselves what is requisite, and superintending the others unhesitatingly." It is not then without some advantage that one MS. omits *αὐτῶν*, and another reads *ἐκλεγομένοις* and four *ἐν τοῖς*—

⁴—⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁵ So rain water was called. Hence the title of *Ζεὺς ὀμβριος*.

⁶ Such hollow places are frequent in all mountainous districts.

⁷ I cannot believe that Plato wrote *ἀγροῖς τε καὶ τόποις πᾶσι*. Ficinus

most dry places to possess water plentiful and good. And let them, by ornamenting the water from fountains, whether it is a river or its source, with plantations and buildings,¹ render it more beautiful, and bringing all the streams together make them abundant by means of ²mine-like tunnels and surface-irrigations, according to each season,³ if perchance there may have been a grove or sacred precinct about those very streams dedicated to a deity,³ and by sending which⁴ to those spots they may adorn the holy places of the gods.⁵ By all means too in spots of this kind it is necessary for youths to fit up places for naked exercises for themselves, and old men's baths, and

has "inferioribus locis agrisque omnibus." But though this is somewhat less objectionable, yet *τόποις* would hardly thus precede the repeated *τόπους*. I should prefer *πίστρους*, "water-troughs." Compare Eurip. Cycl. 45, *ποιητὰ βοτάνη, δινῶν θ' ὕδωρ ποταμῶν ἐν τίστραϊς κείται*.

¹ Juvenal, however, in ii. 18, objects to the buildings placed round the fountain of Egeria, which he says was more beautiful in its natural state than when decked with marble. Plato had probably in mind the fountain of Callirhoë at Athens, which was built over by the Peisistratidæ, as we learn from Thucyd. ii. 15.

² Such seems to be the meaning of *μεταλλείαις—ὕδρειαίς τε καθ' ἐκάστας τὰς ὥρας*, where Bekker, whom Stalbaum follows, has edited *ὕδρειαίς τε*, which I confess I cannot understand; and still less *καθ' ἐκάστας τὰς ὥρας*: as if irrigations took place at any fixed season. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote *συνάγοντες εἰς μισγαγκείας νάματα πάντα, ἀφθονὰ ποιῶσιν εἰς ὕδρειαίς τὰς κατὰ κανονικὰς τὰς ὥρας*. For thus there would be an allusion to the Homeric *μισγάγκεια*, and to the line of another poet, *Ἐς μισγάγκειαν συνάγοντες νάματα πάντα*, and the irrigations be said to take place, as they should, during seasons of excessive heat. Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to translate the whole passage literally, has thought proper to remodel it—"lucos quin etiam jugi irrigatione et dedicatos Diis agros aquis immissis pinguefacere curent et metallis humorem scatebrasque adhibeant," omitting entirely *καθ' ἐκάστας τὰς ὥρας*.

³ Instead of *ἀφιμένον*, defended by Winckelmann on Plutarch Erotic. p. 230, Ast suggested *ἀνιμένον*, which he doubtless got from "dedicatos" in Ficinus. But *ἀνιμένος* neither is, nor could be, applied in this sense to a thing, only to a person or animal. Hence I should prefer *καθημένον*, "situated—" Sydenham in Not. MSS. suggested *ἀφιδρυμένον*—

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were, not *ρέυματα ἀφιέντες εἰς αὐτὰ*, but *ρέυματα, ἃ ἐφιέντες εἰς αὐτὰ*, where *ἃ* refers to *ρέυματα*, and *αὐτὰ* to *ἄλλος ἢ τίς*.

⁵ Plato seems to have had in mind the celebrated passage in the Hippolytus of Euripides, as supplied by myself in The Surplice, No. 22 *Αἰδῶς δὲ ποταμίαισιν οὐ πλημμυρίσιν ἄλλ' ἄλλος ἀμιάντοισι κηπεύ. δρόσοις*.

making them warm for the aged, by placing wood ¹dry and dry¹ for the benefit of those labouring under diseases, ²and receiving kindly bodies worn down by rustic labours, and a habit (of body) much better than that of a medical practitioner not very skilful.²

[9.] All these things then, and of this kind, would be to such places an ornament and use, in conjunction with sport by no means unpleasant. But let the serious attention relating to these things be this.—Let the sixty³ defend, each their own place, not only on account of enemies, but for the sake of those, who call themselves friends. But if any one, whether he is a slave or a free-man, injure his neighbour, or any other citizen, let those five rulers act as judges in the case of the party asserting that he has been injured, with respect to trifling matters; but where one person brings a charge against another on greater matters, let the seventeen, together with the twelve, on questions up to three minæ. No judge or magistrate ought to be exempt from giving an account of his conduct as judge or magistrate, except such as, like kings, put the finish to suits. Moreover as regards the Rural-Stewards if they behave insolently to those, of whom they are the guardians, by enjoining unequal tasks, or by attempting to seize and carry off any thing from those, employed in agriculture, not having previously persuaded them (to give it up); and if they receive aught from those, who offer it to curry favour; or if they give their decisions unjustly, through yielding to adulation; let them bear off as their reward the reproach of the whole state. But for the other wrongs, which they may

¹—¹ That Plato wrote *αὔην καὶ ξηρὰν* no man can for a moment believe. One word is plainly enough an explanation of the other; but which is which it is impossible to decide. Ficinus has “copiose siccia,” answering to *αὔην* or *ξηρὰν*—*ἄφθονον*, but not to both.

²—² Such is the literal translation of a mass of Greek words, where Stephens confesses himself to be quite in the dark; and so too am I; although Ast conceived he had restored the passage by simply omitting *δ'* between *ἰατροῦ* and *ἔξιν*. But Winckelmann would read *δέξιν*, to correspond with *δεχομένους*, and similar to *Δεξιόμεθα δέξιν, ἥν σε δέξασθαι χρεών*, in Eurip. Iph. 1182. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, “ut et remedium ægrotantibus, et lenimen labore defessis benevole afferatur; quæ sane curatio longe melior est quam medici parum periti medela.”

³ “The sixty” are made of the five Rural-Stewards, which each of the twelve wards is supposed to have chosen in § 8.

do to those in their district, let them voluntarily undergo a fine, as far as one mina, imposed by the villagers and neighbours. But for greater or smaller injuries, on each occasion, if they are not willing to pay, through their trusting to being removed monthly to another place, and thus escaping, although pursued by law, in such cases the injured party is to have the chance of a trial at common law; and if he obtains a verdict, let him demand of the defendant to pay ¹ a double fine, ¹ and ² having been unwilling, ² to undergo punishment willingly.

And let the rulers and the Rural-Stewards have their dietary for the space of two years in some such manner as this. First let there be in the different places a common table, ³ ⁴ [at which they must all make a common table]. ⁴ And let the person, who is absent from table, and sleeps out for one day or night, without orders from the rulers, or ⁵ some every necessity ⁵ falling upon him, if the five inform against him, and, after writing the indictment, place it in the market-place, to the effect that he has broken through his guardianship, let him bear the disgrace of having on his part betrayed the constitution, and be chastised with stripes by any one, who meets him, and is willing (to do so) with impunity. And if any one of the rulers themselves is doing any thing of this kind himself, it is necessary for all the sixty to direct their care to such

¹—¹ By "a double fine" is meant the double of what the defendant would otherwise have paid, had he not compelled the plaintiff to sue him. This double sum was no doubt ordained to prevent defendants from compelling plaintiffs to undergo the expense of a lawsuit to obtain justice. For a similar reason in England a verdict in favour of the plaintiff generally carries with it costs. See Taylor on Lysias, T. v. p. 34, R.

²—² The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor; for they were perhaps considered unintelligible by them, as they certainly are by me. I could have understood *ὥς μὴ ἐθελήσαντα υποσχεῖν, ἣν ἐκόντ' ἔδει, τιμωρίαν*, "as not having been willing to undergo the punishment, which he should have done willingly." There are indeed a few passages in Sophocles and Xenophon that seem to give some support to the common text here; but they only seem; for they are in reality corrupt, as I could easily show, were this the place for doing so.

³ Plato in his *Συσσίτια* has adopted what took place at Sparta.

⁴—⁴ All the words between the brackets are omitted by Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed, correctly; for they are evidently an explanation of *εἶναι συσσίτια*.

⁵—⁵ The Greek is *πάσης τινος ἀνάγκης*. But though *πᾶσα ἀνάγκη* is perfectly correct, *πᾶσά τις ἀνάγκη* is by no means so. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐκ βίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης*, i. e. "by force, or some necessity."

a person; and let him who perceives or hears of it, but does not bring him to trial, be amenable to the same laws¹ (as the party offending);¹ and let him be punished with a greater fine than the young men,² (and)³ be held dishonoured with respect to all the rule over young men.

Of these doings likewise let the guardians of the laws be the inspectors, in order that either they may not take place at all, or, taking place, meet with condign punishment. Now it is meet for every man to bear in mind touching all men, that⁴ he, who has never been a servant, will never be a master worthy of praise;⁴ and it is requisite to pride oneself rather upon acting properly the slave, than on acting properly the master, first towards the laws, since this is being a servant to the gods; next towards elders and the young persons⁵ who have lived with honour. After this it is meet for the person, who has been one of the Rural-Stewards, to taste during these two years daily food of a humble and poor kind. For, after the twelve magistrates shall have been enrolled,⁶ let them come together with the five and take counsel, that, like domestics, they will not have other persons to be domestics and slaves to them, nor will they from the household of other farmers and villagers use their attendants for their own concerns, but only so far as relates to the public at large; but in other matters let them consider that they are to live, dependent themselves on themselves, and ministering to, and ministered by, themselves; and in addition to this, searching through the whole country, summer and winter, in arms, for the sake of guarding and knowing thoroughly all places, that successively present themselves. For it appears that for all to know accurately

¹ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "qua (lege) qui pec-cavit."

² As nothing has been said of the fine imposed upon young men, this allusion to them seems to be here out of place. Cousin understands by τῶν νέων "les simples games, lesquels sont des jeunes gens de vingt cinq à trente ans."

³ Ficinus has "et," for his MS. probably read περί τε τὰς— not περί τὰς— Ast however says that the conjunction is unnecessary.

⁴ To this sentiment of Plato Cicero alludes, De Legg. ii. 2, 5, "Qui bene imperat, paruerit aliquando necesse est."

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were, τοῖς νέοις, not τοὺς νέους, omitted by Ficinus, for he was probably at a loss.

⁶ Ficinus omits καταλεῖψιν, not knowing that it is the aor. 2 pass., or else his MS. read καταλεῖψιν with two others, out of which it is impos-sible to elicit a particle of sense

their own country is a piece of learning inferior to none. For the sake of which it behoves a person at the period of youth to attend to hunting by dogs and to other kinds of catching wild beasts, no less than for the sake of any other¹ pleasure and profit at the same time, which results through these means to all. ² These very pursuits³ then let every man to the utmost of his power readily pursue, whether a person delights to call them³ concealments, or rural stewardships,³ or by any other name, if they are about to preserve sufficiently their own state.

[10.] After this there follows the subject relating to the election of those acting as rulers, both Market-Stewards, and City-Stewards. Upon the Rural-Stewards, sixty in number, there should follow three City-Stewards, dividing the twelve parts of the city into three; and in imitation of those (the Rural-Stewards) they should have the care of the path-ways, and of the city, and the public roads, that respectively stretch from the country to the city, and of the buildings likewise, so that all of them are made according to law; and moreover of the streams of water, ⁴ which those, who watch them, send to them and deliver, after being attended to,⁴ in order that they may pass on to the fountains, sufficient in quantity and clear, and adorn at once and benefit the city. These too ought to be

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἄλλης τινος*, not *τῆς ἄλλης*—Ficinus, “alterius—”

²⁻³ I cannot see to what *τούτους—αὐτοὺς* can be referred. Ast says that persons are put here for things. How much easier it is to read *ταύτας—αὐτὰς*, and to supply *ἐπιτηδεύσεις* from *ἐπιτηδεύειν*, as I have translated.

³⁻⁴ The Greek is *κρυπτοὺς εἶτε ἀγρονόμους*, where Ast would erase *κρυπτοὺς*, and says that one would have expected *φρουροὺς* or *φύλακας*: and so too remarks Stalb., but without mentioning Ast's name. Orelli suggests *Ἰππαγρίδας*, a name given at Sparta to officers over the youths, called *Ἰππείδαι*. To myself however the error seems to be in *ἀγρονόμους*, for which I would read *ἀγρονομίας*, and *κρυπτείας* likewise, similar to “studio illo—quod ab occultando—appellatur, sive sic, sive agri custodia sit appellanda,” in Ficinus.

⁴ Ficinus has merely “quas custodes deduci in urbem curant—” for he could not understand, nor can I, the Greek, *ὅπόσ' ἂν αὐτοῖς πέμπωσι καὶ παραδίδωσιν οἱ φρουροὺντες τετραπευμένα*. For by the verb *πέμπωσι*, it would seem that the water was sent in casks placed on carts, and by *τετραπευμένα*, that it had undergone some filtering process; neither of which were likely to have been thought of in his day; to say nothing of the guards appointed to watch the waters; as if persons were wont, except during a war, to defile the waters or to divert their course. To my mind the whole passage is in a very imperfect state.

persons of influence, and at leisure to pay attention to public affairs. On this account let every man propose as a City-Steward whomsoever he wishes out of those with the largest property. ¹ And when (all) have had hands held up for them, and those are reduced to six,¹ to whom the most (votes)² have been given, let those, who are to have this charge, select by ballot the three, and after they have undergone a scrutiny, let them be in office according to the laws laid down for them. Next in order after these (it is meet) to choose Market-Stewards, five in number, out of those with the valuation of the second and first class; but in other respects let their election be in the same manner as for the City-Stewards. ³ (For it is meet) that ten out of all the rest, having had hands held up for them, should ballot for the five,³ and declare them, after undergoing a scrutiny, to be the persons in power. And let every one hold up his hand ⁴ for ten in all.⁴ But let him, who is unwilling to vote, if informed against before the rulers, be fined fifty drachms, in addition to his being held to be a bad man. And let any one who wishes go to the public assembly and common meeting; and let it be compulsory on him, who belongs to the second and first class of property, to be fined ten drachms, if he • is not present and mustered at the conventions; but it shall not be compulsory on the third and fourth class of property; but let such a person be dismissed without a fine, unless the rulers give an order for all to be present in consequence of some (urgent) necessity.

¹—¹ Here again Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has been content to give the general meaning in his version, “et de sex, qui suffragio ceteros superabunt,” instead of translating literally the Greek—*διαχειροτονηθέντων δὲ καὶ ἀφικομένων εἰς ἕξ, οἷς ἂν πλείσται γίνωνται*—where Heindorf, with whom Ast agrees, would insert *εἰς κρίσιν* after *ἀφικομένων*, similar to *ἀφικομένων εἰς κρίσιν* in § 11. Winckelmann suggests *εἰς ἰξέτασιν*. I have translated as if *πάντων* had dropt out after *χειροτονηθέντων* δὲ—

² The ellipse of *ψηφοι* is supplied in § 12.

³—³ Here too Ficinus has given what he conceived to be the sense, instead of sticking close to the Greek—*δέκα ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χειροτονηέντας τοὺς πέντε ἀποκληρώσαι*—where since all the MSS. but one read *δέκα ἢ τῶν*, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ficinus has, with reference to what goes before, translated thus, “quippe de decem, qui ceteros suffragio superarint, quinque sorte designentur—” which Taylor has adopted to the letter.

⁴—⁴ Instead of *πᾶς πάντα* one MS. has *πᾶσι πάντα*, which leads to *πᾶς ἰ πάντας*: where *ἰ* means “ten.” On corruptions arising from letters indicative of numbers, see my Poppo’s Proleg. p. 224.

And (it is meet) for the Market-Stewards to preserve the orderly arrangement enjoined by the laws relating to the market-place; and to take care of the temples and fountains in the market-place, so that no one injures them; and to punish the party so injuring with stripes and bonds, if a slave and a stranger; but if a native acts in a disorderly manner with respect to things of this kind, let them be authorized, after a trial, to fix a fine up to one hundred drachms in money, but to fine up to the double of this sum the offending party, if they are sitting in judgment in common with the City-Stewards. Let there be the same power to fine and punish allowed to the City-Stewards in their own department, so as to fine offenders up to a mina themselves, but the double of this sum in conjunction with the Market-Stewards.

[11.] After this it will be proper for the leaders in Music and Gymnastics to be established, two kinds of each; some of them for the sake of instruction, and others for the sake of contesting. Now in the case of instruction, the law relating to Gymnasia and schools means to speak of those, who have the care of orderly arrangement and instruction to boot, and of the attention paid to such matters, and of the frequenting and staying at schools on the part of young persons, both male and female: but in the case of contesting, (it means to speak of) those who assign the prizes to competitors in Gymnastics and Music; and these two are two-fold; one employed on Music, and the other on Gymnastics.¹ Now in the contests of men and horses,² it would be proper for the same persons to assign the prizes; but in those of Music, for some to do so in the case of solo-singing and the imitative art,³ such as the rhapsodists, and all of this kind; but others over chorus-singing and players on the harp and hautboy. First then with regard to the amusement of the choirs of boys and men, and girls (exercised) in dancing, and in the whole order of music, it is surely requisite to elect their leaders. Now one leader, not

¹ I have adopted Sydenham's *ἀγωνιστικὴν* in lieu of *ἀγωνίαν*—

² To explain this reference to horses, Ast refers to Plutarch in Problem. Sympos. ii. 5, p. 639, E., who says that to the horse alone of all animals there was a participation in a crown and contest; since he alone, both by nature and art, is wont to be present with man and to fight on his side.

³ Under the imitative art was included the Drama, as we learn from Aristotle's Poetics. For otherwise one can hardly understand why any allusion was made to it.

less than forty years old, will surely suffice for these. One too not less than thirty years old will suffice for solo-singing, and to be the introducer of, and to give a judgment sufficiently upon, the competitors. Now the leader and regulator of the choir it is requisite to choose in some such manner as this. Let those, who have a friendly feeling towards such matters, go to the meeting, subject to a fine if they do not go, and of this let the guardians of the law be the judges; but upon the rest, if they are not willing, let there be nothing compulsory. And let the person, who makes the nomination, select one out of those who are skilful; and in the scrutiny let there be only this one charge and denial, on the part of some, that the person, who has obtained the lot, is unskilled, but on the part of others, that he is skilled; and let the person who, out of ten previously voted for, has obtained singly the lot, be, after undergoing a scrutiny, the leader of the choirs according to the law for one year. In the same manner as these, let him who, out of those that come to a trial, in this way obtains the lot,¹ be the leader for that year of the ³solo-singing, and concert-singing,³ after giving, as the party so obtaining the lot,² to the judges the power to decide. After this it is necessary to choose from the persons belonging to the third and even second class of property, the assigners of prizes in the contest relating to the exercises of horses and men. Now to the election let it be compulsory upon the three classes to go, but let the smallest class be dismissed without a fine; and let there be three who obtain the lot, twenty having previously had hands held up for them, but three of the twenty obtaining the lot, whom the vote of the examiners shall approve of. But if any one is rejected through any balloting or decision whatever of a magistrate, let another be chosen in his stead, and the scrutiny take place in the same manner respecting him.

[12.] There remains now the ruler relating to what has been mentioned by us before, namely, the party to take care

^{1, 2} As the words *ὁ λαχών* are repeated in each clause, Ast, whom Stalbaum follows, would reject it here as an interpolation; but the subject ought to be found rather in the first clause than the second. Hence too Orelli suggested *ἀποδιδούς ὅλων τὴν κρίσιν*— But *ὅλων* could not stand here without the article *τῶν*—

³⁻³ By *μονωδία* was meant singing without an accompaniment either on or off the stage; by *συναυλία*, a playing on more instruments than one, with or without a vocal accompaniment.

of the whole instruction of females and males. Let the person who is to rule over these be, according to the laws, not less than fifty years old, and the father of children lawfully begotten, males and females especially, but if not, of either sex. And let both him, who selects, and him, who is selected, consider that this office is by far the greatest of the chief offices in the state. For the first budding of every plant, when it runs in a beautiful manner to the excellence of its nature, is the most powerful to put a suitable finish ¹ of other plants,¹ and of animals tame and wild and men. Now man we say is a tame animal; and when he meets with proper instruction and a fortunate nature, is wont to become an animal the most divine and tame; but when he is not sufficiently or not properly brought up, he is the most savage of all the animals, which the earth produces. On which account the legislator ought not to suffer the bringing up of children to be a secondary thing, or as a by-work. ² But it is necessary to begin from the first step, by the person,² who is about to have the care of them, being selected, who is the best in all respects of those in the state; ³ and by the legislator ordering that person to be by all possible means set over³ and to take care of them. Let all the magistrates, therefore, except the Counsellors and Prytanes, go to the temple of Apollo and give, unknown to the guardians of the laws, their votes for him, whom each conceives would rule the best

¹— That Plato would thus repeat τῶν τε ἄλλων φυτῶν after the preceding παντός δὲ φυτοῦ, I will never believe; and still less, when the genitive τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν is without regimen; for it cannot be taken absolutely, nor can it depend upon πρόσφορον. To avoid the difficulty in the syntax, Ficinus has “quod et in plantis evenit—” adopted by Taylor, who however omits καὶ ἀνθρώπων. What Plato really wrote it is impossible to state positively; but it was, I suspect, something to this effect—τίλος ἐπιθεῖναι ποτε πρόσφορον ἑαυτῷ· ταῦτό δὲ ἄλλων φατέον πέρι, i. e. “to put at some time a finish suitable to itself; and the same remark is to be made respecting other things—” where ἑαυτῷ is confirmed by “sibi” in Ficinus.

²— The Greek is πρῶτον δὲ ἀρξασθαι χρεὼν τὸν μέλλοντα—αἰρεθῆναι— I have translated as if it were ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτον δὲ ἀρξασθαι χρεὼν τοῦ τόν—remembering the expression in Eurip. Med. 475, Ἐκ τῶν δὲ πρῶτων πρῶτον ἀρξομαι λέγειν.

³— Ficinus, apparently unable to understand καθιστάντα, has rendered it, as if his MS. read καταστάντα, found in Stobæus; while to avoid the want of connexion likewise, I have translated, as if the Greek were καὶ τοῦτον—καταστάντα αὐτὸν προστάττειν, where τοῦτον would refer to the teacher selected, and αὐτὸν to the lawgiver selecting, and προστάττειν be read with all the MSS. in lieu of προστάτην καὶ—

amongst those conversant with education. And let him, for whom the most votes come together, after he has been scrutinized by the other magistrates, who, with the exception of the guardians of the laws, have chosen him, enter upon his office for five years; but in the sixth year, let another be chosen to the office in a similar manner.

[13.] But if any ruler dies while employed in a public situation before the term of office shall have expired, wanting more than thirty days, let those, to whom this duty belongs, appoint another in the same manner to the office. And if any one, who is a guardian to orphans, dies, let the relations on both the father's and mother's side, as far as the cousins, who may at that time be in the country, appoint another within ten days, or let each be fined a drachm a day, until they shall have appointed the guardian¹ for the children.¹

Now every state will surely become no state,² in which courts of justice are not properly established; and on the other hand a voiceless judge, and who, in the preliminary proceedings,³ does not speak more than the litigants, as in the case of arbitrators,⁴ will never be sufficient for the purpose of deciding justly. On this account, it is not easy, when there are either many or few indifferent characters, to have a fair trial. But it is necessary for the matter in dispute to be clearly stated by each party; and time too and the sifting slowly and frequently a question conduce to the rendering a doubtful point clear. On this account it is meet for those, who complain of each other, to betake themselves first to their neighbours and friends, and those the most conversant with the subject of dispute. But if a party is unable to obtain a satisfactory decision from them, let him go to another tribunal; but if those two cannot bring about a reconciliation, let the third put an end to the suit. In

¹— The words *τοῖς παισὶ*, answering to "orphanis" in Ficinus, have been found in five MSS., and, though rejected by Bekker, are adopted by Stalbaum.

² The oxymoron *πόλις ἀπολις* is found in Æsch. Eum. 435.

³ The technical word *Ἀνάκρισις* is explained by Harpocration as an inquiry instituted before the Archons previous to a trial. It may be compared with the examination of a case made in England before a Police Magistrate, or the Grand Jury.

⁴ From this it would appear that the arbitrators at Athens had no power to examine witnesses, only to decide upon the case as laid before them by the contending parties. According to Aristotle in Rhetor. i. 13, quoted by Ast, a judge looks to the law, an arbitrator to equity.

a certain respect, indeed, the establishment of courts of justice depends on the choice of magistrates; for every magistrate is necessarily a judge of certain things; but every judge¹ is not a magistrate, although, in a certain respect, during the day in which he is deciding a suit, he is no mean a magistrate. Considering, then, the judges likewise as magistrates, let us state which of them would be proper, and of what matters they are to be the judges, and how many for each suit. Let then that tribunal be of the highest authority,² which each show forth, themselves to themselves, after having chosen certain persons in common.³ But as regards the rest, let there be two tribunals; one, when a private person accusing another private person of doing him a wrong, shall bring him to trial, and be willing for the suit to be decided; the other, when any one conceives that the public has been injured by some of the citizens, and is willing to aid the community at large. Let us state then³ of what kind are the judges, and who.³

In the first place then, let a tribunal common to all, who are contending for the third time, as private persons with each other, exist in this manner. All the magistrates that are in office for a year, and those for a longer period, ought, when the new year is about to commence in the month that succeeds the summer solstice,⁴ to come on the day, before that very⁵ day of the month, together to one temple, and, swearing by the god, to take, as it were, for the initiatory rite⁶ of every

¹ The word *δικαστής* answers not only to a judge, but to a juryman, both of which were united in the same person at Athens.

² I confess I am at a loss here. For there is nothing to which *ἑκαστοὶ* and *τινας* can be referred. Ficinus—"quod sibi met aliqui præfecerunt, communi sensu judicem eligentes," as if his MS. read *ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἀποφώνωσι τινες, δικαστὰς κοινῇ ἐλόμενοι*, in lieu of—*ἀποφώνωσιν ἑκαστοὶ κοινῇ τινας ἐλόμενοι*.

³ Ficinus has, what is far preferable, and has been adopted by Taylor, "quos et quales judices esse oporteat—"

⁴ Plato follows here the custom of his country, where the civil year, which was, as amongst the Jews, lunar, commenced on the first new moon after the summer solstice, just as the University year does in England, in the month Hecatombæon, answering to the last half of June and the first half of July.

⁵ Instead of *ταύτης* Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ᾧ της*, i. e. *πρώτης*, for his version is "pridie kalendas." Respecting the confusion of *α της*, *αὐτῆς*, and *πρώτης*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 223.

⁶ On the initiatory rite, expressed by *ἀπάρχεσθαι*, and *καράρχεσθαι*, see the Commentators on Eurip. Alc. 75. Iph. T. 56. El. 91.

office, one judge, who shall be deemed to be the best in each office, and appear likely to decide in the best and most holy manner lawsuits amongst his fellow-citizens¹ during the ensuing year. When the judges are chosen, let a scrutiny take place by the very persons who have chosen them; and if any one is rejected, let them choose another in the same manner; but let the persons approved of act as judges in the case of those,² who have fled from the other courts of justice,² and let them give their vote openly. The Counsellors, however, and the other officials, who chose them, must of necessity be the hearers and spectators of these decisions; and other persons too, whoever wish it. But if any one accuses any person of having willingly decided a suit unjustly, let him go and make the accusation before the guardians of the law; and let the party found guilty undergo a punishment of this kind, namely, to pay half of the damage done to the injured party; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater fine, let those, who tried the suit, fix what additional punishment he ought to suffer (in person), or to pay either to the public treasury, or ³to the person who has suffered the injury.³ But with respect to public accusations, it is necessary in the first place for the multitude to participate in the decision. For all are injured, when any one does wrong to the state; and hence the multitude would justly take it ill, if they had no share in such decisions; but both the beginning and the end of such a suit it is requisite to refer to the people; but the inquiry into it, to the three greatest magistrates, whom both the defendant and plaintiff agree in acknowledging; but if they are unable to participate in such agreement themselves, let the Council decide upon the choice⁴

¹ I have translated τοῖς πολίταις αὐτῶ, "his fellow-citizens." For Ast says that αὐτῶ is here put for αὐτοῦ. Ficinus omits αὐτῶ entirely.

^{2—2} Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, "qui per præcedentia reconciliati non sunt."

^{3—3} So Taylor translates the version of Ficinus, "injuriam passo." But such could not be the meaning of τὴν δίκην δικασμένῳ, but of τὴν δίκην καταδικασμένῳ, found in xi. p. 928, C. § 8. Plato wrote, I suspect, τὴν δίκην ἀδικίας αἰτιασάμενῳ, to answer to the preceding ἐπαιτῖται—ἀδίκως κρίναι τὴν δίκην. For the sense would then be, as it should, "to the party accusing justice of injustice."

⁴ Instead of αἶρεσιν, "choice," the sense evidently requires διαίρεσιν, "difference," i. e. the points where one party differed from the other. Ast however explains τὴν αἶρεσιν ἐκατέρου by "the choice, which each party would make of a person to act as judge."

of each of them. It is meet moreover for all to have a share as far as they can in private suits. For he, who has no share in the power of acting as a judge with others, conceives that he has in no respect a share in the state. On this account then it is necessary for the courts of justice to be according to the wards, and for the judges to give on the instant, uncorrupted by entreaties, their decision by ballot; and that of all such matters that tribunal is to give the final decision, which we say is established, as far as is possible by human power, the most incorruptible in the case of those, who are unable¹ to come to terms¹ either through their neighbours or the tribunals belonging to the wards.

[14.] Now in truth, respecting courts of justice, of which we said that a person speaking could not easily assert indubitably that they are offices of rule or not, this description, painted, as it were, in outline,² has asserted some things, and nearly left out others. For the exact laying down and at the same time the division of laws relating to suits³ will take place by far the most correctly at the end of legislation. Let it then be told to those subjects to wait for us.⁴ For the appointments relating to other magistrates have taken up nearly the greatest part of legislation. But the totality and exactness relating to one and all of the subjects connected with a state, and the whole of a state administration,⁵ cannot become clear, until the digression shall arrive at the end, after having embraced⁶ from the beginning portions of itself, the second and the middle and all. At present, however, as far as the choosing of magistrates has taken place, this would be a sufficient finish to what has been previously mentioned; while⁷ the commence-

¹—¹ I have translated as if the Greek were not ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, but καταλλάττεσθαι, similar to διαλλάξαι a little above.

² Ast aptly compares The Statesman, § 19, p. 277, E., τὴν ἐξωθεν περιγραφὴν.

³ Ast has adopted δικανικῶν for δικῶν, as suggested by Stephens from "judicialium" in Ficinus.

⁴ Ficinus has "Quare ad idem tempus has differamus," from which it is impossible to discover what he found in his MS.

⁵ I have adopted Ast's διοίκησιν in lieu of διοικήσεων, which would require the article τῶν, if it is the genitive after πᾶσαν.

⁶ So Ficinus, from the natural train of thought, renders ἀπολαβοῦσα—which would otherwise mean "cut off."

⁷—⁷ The Greek is ἀρχή—ἄμα. But one MS. has ἀρχήν, and another ἀρα. Hence it is easy to see that Plato wrote ἀρχή ἤν—ἀρα.

ment of the laying down of laws is⁷ requiring no longer a putting off and doubts.

Clin. Having spoken, O guest, what has gone before entirely to my mind, you have now said this, still more agreeably than those, by uniting the beginning with the end, touching both what has been, and is to be, said.

Athen. Thus far then will the game of prudent old men have been played by us in a becoming manner.

Clin. Beautiful is the serious pursuit of men, which you appear to show forth.

Athen. It is probable. But let us reflect whether this appears to you as it does to me.

Clin. What kind of thing? and about what?

Athen. You know that, as in painting to the life, the business appears never to have an end as regards each animal, but that by colouring, and decolouring, or by whatever name the sons of painters call a thing of this kind, it seems that it never would cease giving a fresh touch, so that what has been painted receives an increase towards becoming more beautiful and more clear.

Clin. I almost understand, by hearing, what you mean, although I am by no means conversant with this kind of art.

Athen. This will be no detriment to you. But let us employ the expression, which has occurred to us respecting the art, to this purpose, so that, if any one had an idea of painting a most beautiful animal, and to keep it for not a worse state, but a better one, as time was continually progressing, do you not perceive that, through his being a mortal, unless he left behind him a successor to set it to rights, should it make any slip through time, and ¹who would be able to add what, through his own weakness in the art, had been omitted,¹ and by giving a brilliancy cause it to improve, all his great labour would last but a short time?

Clin. True.

Athen. What then, does not this appear to you to be the intention of the legislator? First, to write down his laws as accurately as possible, (or)² sufficiently so? In the next place,

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were not *καὶ τὸ παραλειφθὲν—ολός τε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔσται*, where I cannot understand *εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν*, but *καὶ ὅς τὸ παραλειφθὲν—ολός τε ἔσται προσθεῖναι καὶ*—similar to “*prætermissum adjicere possit atque*—” in Ficinus.

² To avoid the absurdity in *πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἱκανῶς*—for

do you think that in the course of time, and after making an actual trial of what has been decreed, any legislator has been so insane, as not to know that many things of this kind must necessarily be left out, which it is requisite for some successor to set to rights, in order that the polity and arrangement may by no means become worse, ¹(but always better and more adorned,) as regards the state settled by him? ¹

Clin. It is likely—(how not?)—that every (legislator) whatever intends a thing of this kind.

Athen. If then any (legislator) possesses any plan for this, in deed and in word, namely, by what method he could teach another, whether a greater person or less, to have his wits upon this point, how it is requisite to preserve laws and to set them to rights, he would never be tired of telling a thing of this kind, until he reached the end.

Clin. How should he?

Athen. Ought not this then to be done both by you and me at present?

Clin. Of what kind of thing are you speaking?

Athen. Since we are about to establish laws, and guardians of the laws have been chosen by us, but we are ourselves ²at the sunset of life,² and the guardians are young men as compared with us, it is, as we have said, necessary for us at the same time to lay down laws, and to endeavour likewise to make these very (young) men, as much as possible, both legislators and guardians of the laws.

Clin. How not? since we are able to do so sufficiently.

Athen. Let us then make the attempt, and be eager (to do so).

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us say to them—O friends, the preservers of the laws, we shall leave very many things relating to matters, the laws of which we have laid down; for it must needs be so; nevertheless we will not omit matters of not small moment, nor the whole as far as we can, undescribed, as it were, by some

what is done as accurately as possible is done more than sufficiently so—I have translated as if ἦ had dropt out before *ικανως*. Ficinus avoids the difficulty by rendering “sufficienter et exquisite pro viribus.”

¹—The words between the lunes are inserted by Taylor from the Latin of Ficinus, “sed melior semper ornatioque efficiatur:” while, since the next clause is omitted by Ficinus, it is omitted by Taylor likewise.

²—According to Aristotle in Poetic 21, Plato got this metaphor from Empedocles.

sketch;¹ and what is so sketched, it will be requisite for you to fill up. But it is meet for you to hear by looking to what point you will accomplish a thing of this kind.

[15.] For Megillus, and myself, and Clinias have spoken upon these matters with each other not seldom, and we agree that it has been spoken correctly. And we are desirous for you to be at the same time indulgent to us,² and to become our disciples,² looking to those points, to which we have agreed among ourselves that a guardian of the laws and a legislator ought to look. Now this agreement has one head,³ namely, how a man may become good by possessing that virtue of the soul, which is suited to his nature, either from a certain study, or some habit,⁴ or from some kind of possession or desire or opinion, or from some kind of learning, whether the nature of those dwelling together is male or female, youthful or aged, in order that there may be, through the whole of life, every serious exertion directed⁵ to that very same object, of which we are now speaking; but of all the rest, that are an impediment to these, there will appear not one person holding a single thing in greater honour; but that he will at length even die for⁶ a state, rather than be willing to support the yoke of slavery, should there appear a necessity for it to be overthrown, and to be under the rule of worse men, or to quit it a not-state by flight;⁷ since every thing of this kind

¹ Ficinus has "exteriore quadam circumscriptione," as if his MS. read *τινι περιγραφῇ ἔκωθεν*, similar to *περιγραφὴ τις ἔκωθεν* a little above, in § 14.

² Ficinus evidently found this passage more complete in his MS. For his version is, "et imitari, quasi discipuli, magistros velitis."

³ Shakspeare uses "head" similarly in his expression in Othello—"The very head and front of my offending Is this."

⁴ I have adopted *ἔθους*, found in three MSS., and similar to "usu" in Ficinus, in lieu of *ἡθους*.

⁵ From "tendat" in Ficinus, Stephens, in lieu of *τεταγμένη*, preserved by Bekker, and defended by Winckelmann on Euthyd. p. 71, was the first to suggest *τεταμένη*, adopted by Ast and Stalbaum.

⁶ The Greek is *πόλειως*, *ἰάν*—But as there is nothing to govern the genitive, I have translated as if it were *πρὸ πόλειως τις θανεῖν*, *ἰάν*—similar to "pro patria—mori" in Ficinus. The attempt made by Ast to restore the passage, although it has met with the approval of Stalbaum, seems to myself any thing but a happy one.

⁷ The Greek is *λείπειν φυγῇ τὴν πόλιν*. But *πόλιν* could hardly be thus repeated after *πόλειως*. Correctly then has Ficinus "fuga ipsam deserere," which leads to *λείπειν φυγῇ αὐτὴν ἀπολιν*: where *ἀπολιν* is similar to *πόλις ἀπολις* in § 13, p. 767, D.

is to be endured by those who are suffering, before they take in exchange that polity, which naturally makes men worse. On these points we have previously agreed; and do you now, looking to both of these, praise and blame the laws; blaming¹ such as are not able to effect these objects;² but, embracing and receiving with a kind feeling such as are able, do live³ ye in them; but to other pursuits, and many⁴ of those called good, it is meet for you to bid a farewell.

Let this then be to us the beginning of the subsequent laws, commencing from things holy. For we ought in the first place to resume the number five thousand and forty, because it had and has now convenient distributions, both the whole number, and that which was assigned to the wards; which we laid down as the twelfth part of the whole, being exactly four hundred and twenty. And as the whole number has twelve divisions, so also has that of the wards. Now it is meet to consider each division as a sacred gift of a deity, through its following both (the order of) the months and the revolutions of the universe.⁵ Hence that which is inherent⁶ leads every state, making them⁷ holy. Some persons indeed have perhaps made a more correct distribution than others, and with better fortune have dedicated the distribution to the gods. But we now assert, that the number five thousand and forty has been chosen most correctly, as it has all divisions as far as twelve, beginning from one, except that by eleven; and this has the slightest correction.⁸ For it becomes whole,

¹ Ficinus alone has "eas, inquam, vituperate," from whence Stephens introduced *ψέγετε μὲν*, omitted in all the MSS.

² i. e. To be a good man.

³ Instead of *ζῆτε* Cornarius suggested *ζῆτε*, found subsequently in all the MSS. but one, from "vitam agite" in Ficinus.

⁴ The Greek is *ἄλλα*—which Ficinus, unable to understand, renders "alio—" But that would be *ἄλλοσε*—I have therefore translated, as if Plato had written *πολλὰ*—

⁵ By this is meant, says Ast, the twelve signs of the Zodiac.

⁶ I hardly understand *ἐύμφρον*, whether it is rendered "cognate" or "innate." Cousin explains *τὸ ἐύμφρον* by "la divinité locale—"

⁷ Ast refers *αὐτὰς* to the plural, implied in *πᾶσαν πόλιν*.

⁸ The word "correction" is the proper translation of *ἴαμα* taken in its arithmetical, not medical, sense. For 5040 divided by 11 is $458\frac{2}{11}$, a sum that is only not an integer. Cousin's note is—"En divisant 5040 par 11, on a pour quotient $458\frac{2}{11}$ de sorte, que, si on retranche deux unités de 5040, 11, et 458, en sont les divisions exactes."

¹ if two hearths are distributed to the other parts.¹ Now that these things are true, a tale not very long would show at leisure, Believing then for the present in the present tradition² and story, let us distribute this number ; and dedicating to a god, or a son of gods, each portion, and giving the altars, and the things pertaining to them, let us institute monthly two meetings relating to sacrifices, twelve according to the division of the wards, and twelve to that of the city ; the first, for the sake of the favour of the gods, and of things pertaining to the gods ; the second, for the sake of our relationship and acquaintanceship with each other, and for the sake of every kind, as we should say, of intercourse. For as regards the communion in, and mixture of, marriages, it is necessary to take away the ignorance as to the parties from whom a person leads home (a wife), and what (woman)³ he is giving in marriage and to whom, deeming it of every importance that there should be in matters of this kind as far as is possible no mistake at all. For the sake then of a serious object of this kind it is necessary for youths and maidens to make for themselves sports by dancing together, and at the same time seeing and being seen by each other,⁴ rationally, and at an age that has a fair pretext,⁴ being both often naked as far as a prudent feeling of modesty exists in each party. Of all these let the rulers of the choirs be the guardians and

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek—*δυοῖν ἑστίαν ἀπονεμθείσαιν*— Now though *ἑστία* means, like “focus,” what is called geometrically “the focus” of an ellipse, yet here such a meaning would be unintelligible, where the sense requires the mention of “a fraction.” Did Plato, write *δυοῖν ἐνὸς ῥομαῖν*, “two sections of one integer”? But there is still a difficulty in *ἐπὶ θάρτερα* : where however one might read *ἐπὶ ὁ ἑτέρας*, “to nine other sections”— For thus $2+9 = 11$. Cornarius was the first to confess himself at a loss here, and to suggest *ἀπονεμθείσαιν* for *ἀπονεμθείσαιν*, adopted by Grou and Ast.

² I have adopted Ast's *ἦν* for *ἃ*, suggested by “quam” in Ficinus. Cousin says that “*καὶ ἃ* semble estrange—J' ai su ici un hellenisme, une redondance et une répétition des formes pour dire seulement *καὶ οἷς ἐκδίδωσι ἃ ἐκδίδωσι* quels sont ceux, aux quels on donne, ce qu' on donne—”

³ Cousin says that “Il n' est pas ici question de la tradition mais d' arithmétique seulement ; et cette arithmétique est prise mystiquement—*φήμη* dit la même chose que *λόγος* avec une certaine idée de sainteté attachée aux nombres, selon la doctrine Pythagoricienne, dont l' esprit est manifeste dans tout cet endroit.”

⁴—⁴ All the words between the numerals should be inserted above, after *παιδῶς ποιῆσθαι* : for Plato meant to confine the sports within the boundaries of reason and of a suitable time of life.

arrangers and the legislators likewise, together with the guardians of the laws, by ordaining what we may have left out. But it is necessary, as we have said, that, as regards all such matters, the legislator should leave out all that are small and numerous; but that those, who become in succession during the year experienced by learning from their use, ¹ be arranged and being corrected move yearly, ¹ until there shall appear to have been made a sufficient limit ² to such legal enactments and pursuits. Now the space of ten years will, when applied to all and each, be at the same time moderate and sufficient for an experience ³ in sacrifices and choirs, ³ ⁴ a legislator, who had arranged, living in common, ⁴ but coming to his end, let each of the magistrates themselves, bringing before the guardians of the laws, what is omitted in their own office, be corrected, ⁵ until

¹—¹ Such is the literal translation of *τάττεσθαι καὶ ἱκανοθυμίζοντας κινεῖν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν*, which I cannot understand; nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; whose version of the whole clause is—"quæ magistratus sequentes, usu rerum commoniti, quotannis movebunt et corrigent." He has thus avoided not only the objectionable repetition of *κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν*, but the difficulty of taking *τάττεσθαι* in either a passive or middle sense, and of knowing to what *αὐτῶν* is to be referred. What Plato really wrote I think I could discover; for though it seems that, contrary to the genius of the language, he has shortly afterwards taken *ἱκανοθυθεῖσθαι* in an active sense, yet it only seems; for the passage is corrupt.

² In lieu of *ὅρος* Ficinus found in his MS. *χρόνος*. For his version is "donec tempus illud venerit."

³—³ This mention of sacrifices and dances seems very strange to Ast, and justly so; for the question is here about the manner of reforming laws.

⁴—⁴ Here again I am completely at a loss in the words *ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ τάξαντος νομοθέτου κοινῇ*; for *κοινῇ* could not be found thus by itself; and hence probably Ast was led to unite *κοινῇ* with *ἱκανοθυθεῖσθαι*, found towards the end of the sentence. Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, "quæ quidem per experientiam emendatio, vivente legum latore, communiter cum illo fiat." But *τάττειν* never does, nor could, signify by itself, "to emend," and least of all in a place where its usual sense, "to arrange" or "order," is seen in the words *οὗς ἔραξε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς νομοθέτης*.

⁵ I have said just above that *ἱκανοθυθεῖσθαι* only seems to mean "to correct." The fact is that *δι'* has dropt out before *αὐτάς*, and *ἱκανοθυθεῖσθαι* is to be taken in a passive sense, and to be united to *τὸ παραλειπόμενον* as its subject; while to avoid the difficulty in *κοινῇ*, I would suggest that *τάξαντος κοινῇ* be altered into *τάξοντας κοινῇ*, and be placed after *τοὺς νομοφύλακας*: for the sense would be, "while the law-giver is living; but at his decease, through each of the magistrates bringing before the guardians of the laws, who are to arrange the matter in common, what is deficient in their own offices, let it be corrected."

each thing shall appear to have attained the end of having been done properly. And then, after laying them down as immovable, let them use them in conjunction with the other laws, which the legislator, who laid them down,¹ ordained at the beginning; ²of which it is becoming² for them to change voluntarily not a single thing at any time. But should perchance any necessity seem to lay hold of them, it is requisite for all the magistrates and all the people to consult together, and to go to all the oracles of the gods; (and) should all these accord, then to disturb (the laws), but by no means otherwise; but let the person, who prevents (a change), ever be, according to law, the superior.

[16.] Whenever then at whatever period a person amongst those of five-and-twenty years old believes that he has, after ³seeing and being seen³ by others, found some one⁴ to his mind and fitted for a communion in, and procreation of, children, let him marry when he is within thirty-five years of age; but how it is requisite to seek the becoming and fitting, let him first hear. For it is meet, as Clinias says, to lay down before each law a prelude relating to it.

Clin. You have very properly reminded us, guest; and you have seized upon the opportunity of a discourse, that appears to me to be extremely well-timed.

Athen. You speak well. Let us then say to a person born of good parents—It is meet, O boy, to contract those marriages, which appear correct amongst thinking men; who would advise you neither to avoid a marriage with poor persons, nor to pursue pre-eminently one with the rich; but, if all the other things are equal, to always honour the inferior, and to enter into a communion with it. For this⁵ would be

¹ The Greek is οὗς (νόμους)—ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς νομοθέτης—where it is strange that no critic has yet remarked that νομοθέτης is an evident interpolation; and that, although αὐτοῖς might end a sentence, Plato probably wrote here ἀποῖς.

^{2—2} Instead of ὧν περί, where the preposition has no meaning, I have translated as if the Greek were ὧν πρέπει—

^{3—3} This use of σκοπεῖν “to see” in a bodily, instead of a mental sense, is very rare. Compare, however, below, § 18, and xii. p. 963, B § 11.

⁴ Ast vainly endeavours to defend πρίποντα applied to a woman, through not seeing that τινά had dropt out.

⁵ Ficinus found in his MS. τοῦτο, not ταύτη, as shown by his version, “id conducit.”

advantageous both to the city and the hearths which come together. For the equable and commensurate infinitely surpass the immoderate with respect to virtue. He therefore, who is conscious of being rather headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting towards all kinds of actions, ought to be eager to become the relation of parents of orderly manners: but he, who is naturally of a contrary disposition, ought to proceed to an alliance of a contrary kind. And in every case, let there be one story¹ respecting marriage. For it is meet that each person should be a suitor in a marriage that is beneficial to the state, and not what is the most pleasant to himself. For all are naturally carried to that, which is the most like to themselves; from whence the whole state becomes in an anomalous position as regards wealth and manners; through which those things, that we do not wish to happen to ourselves, happen especially to the majority of states. Now in our system to order by law that the rich are not to marry with the rich, or the party, who has much power, not to do so with another such, but to compel the quicker in their habits to go by a community of marriage to the more slow, and the slower to the quicker, would, in addition to its being ridiculous, excite a feeling of anger with the many. For it is easy to understand that a city ought not to be mixed like a cup,² in which the maddened wine, when poured forth, effervesces; but one that, being corrected by another and a sober deity,³ does, after receiving a beautiful commingling, produce a good and moderate drink. But not one, so to say, is able to clearly see this taking place in the mingling (of the sexes) with respect to children. On this account it is necessary to leave alone things of this kind in a law; and to endea-

¹ In lieu of *μῦθος* one would prefer *θεισμός*, similar to "ratio" in *Ficinus*.

² Donaldson in *The New Cratylus*, p. 370, ed. 1, seems to think that an Iambic verse lies hid here—*Πόλις δίκην κρατήρος ἦν κεκραμένη*. But he might have elicited without much difficulty some Trochaic tetrameters—*ῥάδιον ἦν, δίκην κρατήρος ἐγκεκραμένου, πόλιν νοεῖν. Οὐ μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, στόμ' ὥς μανίας, ἀφρῶ*. Ὑπὸ δὲ θεοῦ νήφοντος εἰ κολάζε-*ται, κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει καλὴν, ποιεῖ τε πῶμα μέτριον κάγαθόν*: where I have inserted *στόμ' ὥς μανίας ἀφρῶ*, remembering the expression in Eurip. Med. 1174, *κατὰ στόμα—ἀφρόν*, and in Iph. T. 308, *στάζων ἀφρῶ*, both applied to the foam from the mouth of a person in a state of madness, but here to the froth of wine, similar to Champagne.

³ By "the sober deity" was meant water. On this celebrated passage, see *Athenæus* x. c. 61, and *Longinus* § 32, quoted by *Ast.*

your by charms to persuade ¹ each person to set a greater value upon the equality in their children, themselves to themselves, than in the equality of marriages, insatiable of wealth,¹ and by reproaches to turn aside him, who makes riches the object of his pursuit in marriage, but not to compel him by a written law.

[17.] Let these then be the exhortations respecting marriages, and those too, which have been mentioned previous to these,² that it is requisite to hold fast to ever-producing nature, by leaving behind children of children, and to deliver them over continually as servants of god in the place of ourselves. All this then, and still more, a person may say respecting marriages, how they ought to take place, and may make use of a prelude correctly. But if any one cannot be persuaded willingly, but keeps himself in the city estranged and without connexion, and remains unmarried for five and thirty years, let him be fined every year, if he possesses property of the largest class, one hundred drachms; if of the second, seventy; if of the third, sixty; but if of the fourth, thirty; and let the fine be sacred to Juno.³ And let him, who does not pay every year, be made a debtor tenfold; and let the Steward of the goddess exact the fine; and if he does not exact it, let him be the debtor. ⁴ And let every (Steward) in the passing of his accounts give a statement relating to (debts) of this kind.⁴ Let him then, who is unwilling to marry, be thus punished as regards money; and of all honour from juniors let him be deprived: nor let any young man voluntarily obey him in any thing; and, if he attempts to chastise any one, let any one assist and defend the injured person; and let him, who when present does not assist, be pronounced by the law to be both a cowardly and a bad citizen. Concerning the marriage portion we have spoken before; and let it be said again, ⁵ that equal things are in return for equal

¹—¹ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand; nor could Ast, I suspect; who is content to produce the version of Cornarius—"Ut quisque pluris faciat liberorum inter se æqualitatem, quam nuptiarum æqualitatem pecuniis inexplabilem—" which to me at least is quite as unintelligible as the Greek. Ficinus has "ut æqualem temperatamque liberorum suorum generationem pluris faciant, quam opulentissimæ affinitatis æqualitatem."

² See iv. § 11.

³ For she was the goddess who presided over marriages.

⁴—⁴ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek; out of which I cannot make

things, by neither the poor receiving nor bestowing 'through want of money to grow old.⁵ For the necessities of life exist to all of those in this state; and to wives, there will be less of insolence, and to the men who marry for money, (less of) humble and illiberal slavery.¹ And he who is obedient (to this law) will perform one of the things that are beautiful. But let him, who is not obedient, and either gives or receives more than the worth of fifty drachms² for the sake of a garment,² pay³ one mina, or three half-minæ, or two minæ;³ but let him who has the largest property, pay another such sum to the public treasury; and let whatever has been given or received be held as sacred to 'Juno and Zeus,⁴ and let the Stewards of those deities exact the fine, just as was stated in the case of those who did not marry, that the Stewards of Juno were on each occasion to exact the fine,⁵ or each of them to pay it themselves.⁵ With respect

any sense, nor could Cornarius, nor Ast, nor Wyttenbach; all of whom have suggested emendations, from which nothing is gained, even if we adopt *διδάσκειν* found in Ald., but not in the MS. Z. from which Aldus printed, in lieu of *γηράσκειν*. I could have understood the Greek, had it been *ὡς ἴσα παντὶ ἴσῳ ἔσται τῷ μήτε λαμβάνειν τι μήτε ἐκδιδόναι τι διὰ γὰρ χρημάτων ἀπορίαν οὐ τι διὸς γηράσκειν τοὺς πένητας*—in English—"that equal things will be to every one on an equality by neither receiving nor giving aught; for there is no fear of the poor growing old from the want of means"—where *λαμβάνειν τι μήτε ἐκδιδόναι τι* is due to Cornarius.

¹ Ast aptly refers to Eurip. Phæthon, Fr., of which the sense is,

Who for a dowry has his body sold,
Is, though free-born, still of a wife the slave.

²—³ Ast alone has objected justly to *ἐσθῆτος χάριν*. But he did not see that Plato probably wrote *εἰς θήλεος χάριν*—"for the gratification of a female;" although it is true that persons did in former times, as they do now, make presents of parts of a dress to gratify those, whom they were courting, as shown by Aristoph. Plut. 983, where an Old Girl, speaking of her young lover, says,

"Some twenty silver drachmas he would ask
For a cloak, and for a pair of sandals eight."

³—⁴ As there were four classes of property, the fines of 1, 1½, 2, and 4 minæ belong to them respectively. Hence if we insert *δὲ* between *ὁ* and *τὸ μέγιστον*, and refer *τοσοῦτον ἕτερον* to the last-mentioned *δυσὶν κναῖν*, there will be no need of adopting Ast's notion, that all the words from *ἐσθῆτος* to *κναῖν* are an interpolation; while to meet the objection, that *μναῖς* and the other genitives are without regimen, we may elicit *ὀφλήσιν ὀφειλέτω* from *ὀφλήσει ὀφειλέτω* in one MS.

⁴—⁵ Zeus, like Juno, presided over marriage. See Hesych. *Ζύγιος Ζεύς*.

⁵—⁶ The Greek is *ἡ κατ' αὐτῶν ἐκάστου τὴν ζημίαν ἐκτίνειν*. Ficinus,

to the power of betrothal, let the first be in the father, the second in the grandfather, and the third in that of brothers by the same father. But if there be none of these, let the right rest afterwards in a similar manner on the mother's side; but should an unusual misfortune¹ occur, let the nearest of kin have the power together with the guardians. But whatever are the rites before marriage or any other sacred act, relating to things future, present, or past, and fitting to be done, it is requisite to inquire of the interpreters, and for each person to consider that, by obeying them, every thing will take place in moderation in his behalf. [18.] With respect to (nuptial)² feasts, it is meet to invite together not more than five male and five female friends; and as many of both sexes of kindred and familiars; and let the expense be not more than is according to any one's substance; a mina to him of the largest property; to another, the half of that sum; and so to another in succession, according as the value of his property decreases. And it is requisite for all to praise the person who obeys the law; but let the guardians of the law punish the disobedient, as being a person unskilled in what is becoming, and uneducated in the laws relating to marriage songs. To drink, however, to intoxication, is never at any place becoming, except in the festivals of the god who is the giver of wine; nor is it safe³ for a person seriously occupied about a marriage;³ at which it is becoming for the bride and bridegroom to be particularly prudent, as making no small change in their life, and at the same time, that the offspring may always be produced as much as possible from prudent parents. For it is nearly uncertain what kind⁴ of night or day will in conjunction with a deity

whom Taylor follows, has "qui si neglexerint, de suo persolvant—" as if his MS. read *ἡ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν παριέντων ἐκπράττειν ἐκδόνους*—

¹ Ficinus has "desolatio," as if his MS. read *ἐρημία τύχη*—"a desolation by accident." For *ἄρα* would thus be the remnant of *ἐρημία*.

² The word "nuptial" Taylor took from "nuptiale" in Ficinus, who introduced it to suit the train of thought; for *ἐορτασις* means "the feast" that takes place at the hearth of any one.

³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus; who probably could not understand *οὐτ' οὖν δὴ—ἰσπουδακότα*, nor see that Plato wrote *οὐτ' ἀσφαλὲς ἴσ' ἀναίδεια τῷ περὶ*—not *οὐτ' ἀσφαλὲς οὐτ' οὖν δὴ περὶ—ἰσπουδακότι*. For the sense would thus be, as it should, "nor is shamelessness a safe thing for the person seriously occupied about a marriage."

⁴ I cannot understand *ὅποια* applied to the night or day. I could have understood *ὅποιον* applied to the offspring.

produce. And moreover it is meet for the work of procreation to take place, not when bodies are relaxed by drinking,¹ but for what is born to stand together compact, not wandering and quiet in fate.¹ But he, who is filled with wine, is carried along every where, and carries (others)² along, maddened both in body and soul. Hence he, who is drunk, is² at the same time beside himself,³ and bad to sow seed; so that it is probable he would beget offspring anomalous, and not trustworthy, and with a habit of body and mind not straightforward. Hence,⁴ it is requisite⁵ through the whole year, and life more, but mostly during the time of procreation, to be careful,⁵ and not to do willingly such things as produce disease, or such as are close upon conduct riotous or unjust. For it must needs be, that what is squeezed out into the souls and bodies of what is being born, should be moulded into a form, and produce things in every respect inferior. But pre-eminently is it requisite to abstain from what is related to such things on that day and night. For the principle and deity⁶ seated in man preserves all things, if it obtains the honour, suited to it, from those, who make use of it. And it is requisite for the bridegroom to consider that one of⁷ the two dwellings assigned by lot⁷ is for the procreation and bringing up of, as it were, fledgelings; and that, separated

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek; which Cornarius could not understand, nor can I; although it would be not difficult to carry out the correction first proposed by that scholar, and to restore what Plato wrote.

² The syntax, as regards *φέρει*, and the antithesis, as regards *αὐτὸς*, show that *ἄλλους* has dropt out between *φέρει* and *λυττῶν*—

³—³ Ficinus has “*tanquam mente captus*—” as if his MS. read *ἅτε παράφορος ὦν, κακός*—not *παράφορος ἅμα καὶ*—

⁴ In lieu of *οὐδὲν εὐθύπορον ἦθος οὐδὲ σῶμα*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *οὐδὲ εὐθὺ ἦθος οὐδὲ σῶμα εὐπορον*—

⁵—⁵ Ficinus has, what is far more intelligible, “*per totam quidem vitam—abstinebit quisque*,” thus avoiding all the difficulty in the Greek, *μᾶλλον μὲν ὅλον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ βίον—εὐλαβεῖσθαι*; where *ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ βίον* are thus strangely united, instead of being thus written, *ὅλον τιν’ ἐνιαυτὸν μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ βίον*, to say nothing of *εὐλαβεῖσθαι* standing alone. What the train of thought evidently requires is something to this effect, *διὸ φιαλῶν μὲν ὅλον τὸν βίον ἀμίαντον χρῆ*—

⁶ By “*deity*” Taylor understands “*the intellect*.” Plato wrote, I suspect, not *καὶ θεός*, but *κατὰ θεὸν*—Ast suggests *ὡς θεός*, “*as a god*.”

⁷—⁷ By “*the two dwellings*” Ast says we are to understand those mentioned in § 14, as being one near to, and the other distant from, the city.

from his father and mother, he is to make his marriage there, and have it as his own residence and the nurture-place of his children. For where in friendships¹ there exists a feeling of desire, it glues together and binds all habits; but where intercourse becomes satiated, and has no retaining power, it causes the desire, that existed for a time for each other, to glide away through excess of repletion. On which account it is meet for husbands to give up to mother, and father, and the relations of the wife their own dwellings, as if they were departing for a colony, and to live² observing at the same time and observed,³ while begetting and rearing children, and handing in succession from some to others life, like a torch,³ and ever paying, according to law, worship to the gods.

[19.]⁴ (We must consider)⁴ after this by having what possessions would a person keep his substance in the most careful order. The majority indeed it is not difficult to imagine or possess; but in the case of domestic servants there is a difficulty on every side. Now the reason for this we can assign in a certain manner not correctly, and again in a certain manner correctly; for we consider what is said respecting slaves to be contrary, and yet according to, the use of them.

Megil. How can we say this?⁵ For we do not, O guest, understand at all what you are asserting at present.

¹ This mention of "friendships" seems very strange here; as if friendships could exist where there is no feeling of desire. One would expect rather *θηλείαις*. For Plato seems to have had in his mind a dramatic pentastich, *Γαμεταῖσι θηλείαις τις ἂν γ' ἐν γ' πόθος, Κολλᾷ τε καὶ συνδεῖ τὰ πάντ' ἤθη δόμων*. *Ξυνοουσία δὲ κατακορῆς αὐτὸν πόθον, Δία χρόνον οὐκ ἴσχονσ'*, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πάλιν *Ἐπόησ'* ἀπορρεῖν *πλησμονῆς ὑπερβολαῖς*.

² I confess I hardly understand these words; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is "*ac vicissim, se ipsos respicientes*." I could have understood *ἐπισκοτοῦντάς τε πολλὰ καὶ ἐπισκοτουμένους*, "throwing a darkness over many things, and being in the dark themselves;" where *πολλὰ* is still seen in *ἄλλα*, read in one MS. for *ἕμα*.

³ From this allusion to the game at Athens, called *Δαμπαδηφορία*, where persons carried lighted torches, and, while running, handed them from one to another, Lucretius is supposed to have borrowed the idea in his well-known verses—"Inque brevi spatío mutantur secula animantum, Et, quasi cursores, vitæ lampada tradunt."

⁴ Ficinus alone has "*Considerandum est*," to supply the necessary connexion. Perhaps Plato wrote *Κτήματα δὲ δεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ποῖα*—not *Κτήματα δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποῖα*—

⁵ The Greek is *πῶς δ' αὖ τοῦτο λέγομεν*. But as *αὖ* has no meaning here, we must read, *πῶς δ' ἂν τοῦτο λέγοιμεν*—

Athen. And very reasonably so, Megillus. For the Helot state amongst the Lacedæmonians would give rise to the greatest doubt and contention to nearly all the Greeks, to some as being well introduced, but to others, not; ¹ but a less contention would the enslaving of the Marianduni by the Heracleotes furnish, and the clan of the Penestæ under the dominion of the Thessalians.¹ Looking to which and every thing of that kind, what ought we to do with respect to the possession of servants? a subject, that I happened to pass by in my discourse, when I was speaking; and as you have very properly asked me, what I meant, (I say) it is this. We know, that we should all assert, that it is requisite to possess slaves of the kindest and best dispositions. For many slaves, by conducting themselves with respect to all virtue better towards some persons than brothers and sons, have preserved their masters, and their possessions and the whole of their dwellings; for we surely know that these things have been said of slaves.

Megil. How not?

Athen. And is not the contrary likewise (said), that, as there is nothing healthy in the soul of a slave, it behoves a person, who possesses any intellect, never to trust at all to that race. The wisest too of poets has given this opinion, when speaking of Zeus, he says, (Od. xvii. 332,)

“Half of their minds wide-seeing Jove has ta'en
From men, whose doom has slavery's day brought on.”

Since then each person has got such notions in his mind, some place no confidence at all in the race of slaves, but with goads and whips, not thrice alone, but often, cause the souls of their domestics, as if they had the nature of wild beasts, to become slavish; but others on the other hand do what is quite the contrary.

² *Megil.* How not?

¹ Such is the interpretation of this passage given by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 215. But to get at it we must transpose some words, despite the fact that the common order is found in Athenæus, vi. p. 264, E., and read ἐλάττω δὲ ἢ τε ὑπὸ Ἑρακλεωτῶν δούλεια τῶν Μαριανδύνων ἔριν δὲ ἔχοι, τό τε ὑπὸ τῆς καταδουλώσεως Θετταλῶν τὸ Πενεστικὸν ἔθνος. For whatever Ast may say, δούλεια, “slavery,” never does nor could mean “mastery;” and least of all in a place where καταδούλωσις has the same meaning. With regard to the double insertion of ὑπὸ, the preposition could not be omitted without destroying the perspicuity of the whole account.

² I have with Stalbaum adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Ast.

*Clin.*² How then must we act, since persons thus differ, in the case of our land, touching the possession, and at the same time the punishment of slaves.

Athen. How, Clinias, is it not¹ evident that, since man is an animal ill-tempered, he is by no means willing to be easily got under hand³ for the purpose of a compulsory definition, namely, to define in reality a slave, [a free-man,]³ and a master?

Clin. So indeed he appears to be a thing difficult to have and hold.

Athen. (True.) For it has been often proved by facts in the case of the frequent revolts of the Messenians, that have been wont to occur, and of the cities of those, who possess many servants, speaking one language, how many mischiefs happen; and further still, (by)⁴ the doings and sufferings of all kinds of the thieves, called "Prædonēs,"⁵ who exist round Italy. By looking to all of which a person would doubt what he ought to do in all matters of this kind. Two methods then alone are left, namely, for those, who are to act rather easily as slaves, to be not of the same country with each other, and, as much as possible, not of the same language; ⁶ but to bring them up correctly, and to hold them in honour, not only for their sakes, but much more for the sake of themselves.⁶ Now the proper

¹ The Greek is τί δ', ὦ Κλεινία; δῆλον ὡς—I have translated, as if the Greek were τί δ' οὐ, Κλεινία, δῆλον, ὡς—

² Instead of εὐχρηστον ἰθίλει εἶναι τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι; φαίνεται χαλεπὸν δὴ τὸ κτῆμα—where εὐχρηστον is scarcely intelligible, and καὶ γίγνεσθαι superfluous after εἶναι, I have translated, as if the Greek were εὐχείριστον ἰθίλει εἶναι. Οὕτω γὰρ γίγνεσθαι φαίνεται χαλεπὸν δὴ τὸ κτῆμα—where Ast would, I think, be pleased with εὐχείριστον, for it suits better with the sense, "tractable," which he has given to εὐχρηστον. Stobæus, however, in lx. p. 385, acknowledges the common reading.

³ As the question is between δοῦλος and δεισπότης, this introduction of ἐλεύθερος seems to be rather irrelevant.

⁴ To preserve the syntax we must suppose that either περὶ or διὰ has dropt out between εἰ and τὰ—Ast would supply δέικναι, to be got out out of ἐπιδεδέικται.

⁵ In the strange word περιδίωνων, explained by the Schol. πειρατῶν, evidently lies hid the Latin "prædonum," written in Greek πραιδώνων: and hence for κλοπῶν we must read κλώπων, an explanation of πραιδώνων. Ast indeed says that by κλοπῶν ἔργα are meant "thefts." But ἔργα could be thus united only to persons, not to things. Cousin observes that "λεγομένωνν indique que l'épithète περιδίωνων était passée en surnom à des esclaves fugitifs, qui, à ce qu'il paraît, infestaient alors l'Italie sur terre ou sur mer."

⁶—The Greek is τρέφειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ὀρθῶς, μὴ μόνον ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, πλείον

education of such persons is in not behaving insolently towards domestics, but in acting less unjustly towards them, if possible, than towards one's equals. For he is quite clearly a person reverencing justice naturally and not fictitiously, who truly hates what is unjust as regards those human beings, amongst whom it is easy for him to do a wrong. He then, who is with respect to the habits and doings of slaves undefiled by an unjust and unholy manner,¹ will be the most competent to sow what is² suited for the springing up of virtue. The very same thing one may correctly assert, when speaking at the same time of a despot and a tyrant, and of any person exercising authority of any kind over a party weaker than himself. It is however necessary³ to punish slaves,⁴ and not to make them conceited by admonishing them, as if they were free-men; and the address to a slave ought to be entirely (or) nearly a command; nor should persons ever in any respect jest with them, whether males or females—acts which many persons do very foolishly towards their slaves—and by making them conceited, render it more difficult during life for their slaves to be governed, and for themselves to govern.

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. When then a person has become furnished with domestics to the best of his power, as regards their number and fitness to assist in each employment, is it not requisite after this to describe the dwellings?

Clin. Entirely so.

[20.] *Athen.* And of the entire, so to say, house-building, it appears we ought, as regards a new city and one never before inhabited, to have a care, in what manner each, as respects the temples and walls, ought to be. The buildings ought⁵ in-

δὲ αὐτῶν προτιμώντας: where αὐτοὺς and ἐκείνων are improperly applied to the same persons, whatever Heindorf and Ast may say to the contrary, and there is nothing to which αὐτῶν and προτιμώντας can be referred. Opportunely then has Ficinus "educunturque recte, non solum, ipsorum gratia, sed dominorum multo magis," adopted to the letter by Taylor, although no notice is taken of the omission of προτιμώντας. Plato wrote, I suspect, τρέφειν δὲ δεσπότας τοὺς τοιούτους ὀρθῶς—"but for masters to bring up such kind of persons correctly—"

¹ By the aid of "manner" in Taylor's translation, I have been led to suggest τρόπου for πῶρι, which is scarcely intelligible.

² I have translated as if τὰ had dropt out between σπείρειν and εἰς—

³ Ast was the first to restore from Athenæus δεῖ for ἀεί—

⁴ To this doctrine Aristotle objects in Polit. i. 8.

⁵ The Greek is γάμων δ' ἣν ἐμπροσθεν ταῦτα. But Ficinus has

deed, Clinias, to precede the marriages. But now, since it exists only in word, it is all very well for matters to stand as they do at present. When however it shall exist in reality, we will, if god wills, make these (the walls) before the marriages, and then put those things, that are requisite,¹ to a finish after all matters of this kind. But at present let us go through in a few words some model merely.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. The temples, then, it is necessary to build around all the market-place, and about the whole city in a circle upon elevated spots, for the sake of defence and purity.² And hard by them the dwellings of the rulers, and the courts of justice;³ in which, as being most holy, they shall inflict and undergo punishments;⁴ partly, as being about holy matters, and partly, ⁵ the seats established of such kind of gods;⁵ and in these ⁶ courts of

"quæ sane nuptias præcedere debebant," as if his MS. read, γάμων δὲ δέον ἦν ἐμπροσθεν εἶναι ταῦτα—

¹ To defend the hyperbaton in ἤδη τότε, Ast refers to Thætet. p. 165, E. § 59, ἤδη δὲν τότε ἐλύτρον. But there the three oldest MSS. read γε: while here it is easy to read, as I have translated, & δεῖ, τότε—On the impropriety of ἤδη τότε see at Phileb. § 18, n. 64.

² So Aristotle, in Polit. vii. 12, says, Ἀγορὰν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὀνίων πάντων.

³ I have translated as if the Greek were δικαστήρια, not δικαστηρίων, which Ast vainly endeavours to explain.

⁴ From this it would seem that the rulers were to undergo their punishments, when convicted of any crime, in the very courts of law where they had presided. Ficinus indeed renders τὰς δίκας—λήφονται τε καὶ δώσουσι, "justam et accipient et ferent sententiam." But such is never the meaning of δίκην δίδοναι. And should it be said that δίκας means here "lawsuits," it may be replied that δίκας λαμβάνειν is not elsewhere found united in any legal sense. I suspect that Plato wrote τοὺς εἰς τὰς δίκας ὅρκους—λήφονται καὶ δώσουσι, i. e. "they shall receive and tender the oaths relating to lawsuits." For not only has Pollux in iv. 30, ὅρκους—δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, but the phrase is found in Eurip. Suppl. 1187, Πρῶτον λάβ' ὅρκον. 1231, Ὅρκια δώμεν τῷ δ' ἀνδρὶ πόλει τε. Instead however of λαμβάνειν, Plato uses its synonyme, δέχεσθαι τε ὅρκους παρ' ἀλλήλων—καὶ δίδοναι κυρίους, in Legg. xii. p. 949, B.

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων θεῶν ἰδρύματα, which Ast would explain by saying that τοιούτων is to be referred to δόσιων—as if the gods were ever called δόσιοι—and by supplying δντα after ἰδρύματα, and thus considering τὰ μὲν—ἰδρύματα as an absolute sentence. Ficinus has "partim quidem tanquam de rebus sacris judicaturi, partim vero tanquam judicantium deorum ibi sint delubra," which is evidently an attempt to make something like sense out of words he could not understand literally.

⁶—⁶ The words δικαστήρια ἐν οἷς have been evidently repeated by some

justice, in which⁶ there shall be fitting suits relating to murders and whatever crimes are worthy of death. With respect to the walls, Megillus, I would agree with Sparta, to let them lie sleeping on the earth,¹ and not raise them up on this account.² For well is hymned that poetical saying respecting them, that "walls ought to be³ of brass and iron,³ rather than made of earth." But our plan, in addition to this, of sending young men every year into the country to dig out the earth and make trenches, and by means of buildings to keep off the enemy,⁴ as if forsooth not suffering them to put their foot on the boundaries of the land,⁴ would justly pay the forfeit of very great ridicule. For we throw round a wall, which in the first place by no means contributes to the health of the citizens; and moreover it is wont to produce a cowardly habit in the souls of the inhabitants, by inviting them to fly to it, and not to repel the enemy, nor to find their safety in some persons in the city ever guarding it both night and day, but to fancy that, while they are hedged in with walls and gates and asleep, they will in reality possess the means of safety, as if they were born not to labour, nor knew that an easy life is the result of labour; but that, as I conceive,⁵ from a disgraceful inactivity and easy temper⁶ labours naturally result again. But if there is any need to men of walls, it must needs be that the buildings of private dwellings be so laid down from the commencement, that the whole city may be one wall through the equality and similarity of all the dwellings, possessing, as regards the roads, a good fortified position; and by the city having thus the form of one house, it would be not unpleasant to look upon;

fault of transcription, which both here and just before only a better MS. than any hitherto collated will enable us to correct.

¹ On this celebrated passage relating to Sparta being without walls see Longinus § 4, and Aristotle in Polit. vii. 11, who ridicules the notion as being antiquated and silly.

² The words *τῶνδε εἶναι* are omitted by Ficinus. Ast attempts to explain them in a way, I confess, I cannot understand.

³ By walls of brass and iron were meant the bodies of men clothed in armour.

⁴ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

⁵ Ficinus justly omits *οἶμαι*—unless *δε γε οἶμαι τῆς* conceal *ὃ αὐ καὶ γαμήταις*, so that *καὶ γαμήταις αἰσχρᾶς* may mean "disgraceful even for married persons."

⁶ Ast would reject *καὶ ῥαθυμίας* as a gl. for *ῥασιώνης*.

and it would be in every respect pre-eminently adapted to the ease of its guards, and the safety of the garrison. To these points it should be particularly incumbent on those, who are to dwell in it, to direct their care, until those at the commencement are built up, and that the City-Stewards should look to it, and compel the party, who pays no attention, by imposing a fine; and they ought to have a care with respect to the purity of every thing in the city; and that no private person seizes upon any public property, either by buildings or diggings; and moreover it is requisite to take care that the waters from Zeus (i. e. rain water) may run off easily; and that every part, both within and without the city, may be fit for dwelling in. And let the guardians of the laws, knowing all this by experience, lay down additional laws on all these points, and on such others as the law may from its want of power have omitted. But since both these matters and the buildings about the market-place, and the particulars relating to the gymnasia,¹ (have been gone through,)² and the schools, that have been prepared, and the theatres too, are waiting for scholars and spectators, let us now proceed to what is consequent upon marriages, and keep close to the business of legislation next in order.

Clin. By all means.

Athen. ³Let then marriages be considered, Clinias, by us to exist.³ But the mode of living prior to child-getting should subsist for not less than a year ⁴after this;⁴ but in what

¹ After *γυμνάσια καὶ* are found the Greek words *πάντα ὅσα*, which, I confess, I cannot understand; and in one MS. *πάντα τὰλλα ὅσα*, which is not more intelligible. I could have understood *καὶ πάντα τὰ τ': ἀνὰ καὶ ὅσα*, i. e. "and all matters of a human and holy kind." Ficinus has what, I suspect, he conceived the sense required, rather than what he found in his MS.—"et gymnasia et theatra spectantium, et docentium discentiumque domicilia disposita sunt"—Ast too evidently found some difficulty here; but his method of meeting it is by no means satisfactory.

² I have added the words between the lunes to supply what I conceive to have been lost.

³ Ficinus—"De nuptiis igitur ita, ut diximus, O Clinia, res se habeat."

⁴ Although the formula *τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο* is frequently found, and is elsewhere perfectly intelligible, yet here I must leave for others to see its beauty. Ficinus has "vivendi regula, quæ præcedit,—sequitur," as if his MS. read *διαίτα δὲ, ἥ—γίγνοιτ' ἂν, ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο*—Plato wrote, I suspect, *διαίταν δὲ, ἥ—γίγνοιτ' ἂν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' ἀκουστίον*—or something similar.

manner it is requisite for a bride and bridegroom to live in a city, which is ¹about to be pre-eminent¹ above the majority of cities—²a point which is close upon what has been mentioned already²—is a thing not the most easy of all to state. But though not a few of what have gone before are of such a kind, this will be still more difficult than all of those for the many to take in. Nevertheless, Clinias, that which appears to be right and true must be mentioned.

Clin. By all means.

[21.] *Athen.* He then, who thinks to promulgate laws for states, as to what manner citizens³ should live and perform their public and common duties, but of their private concerns⁴ such as necessity does not bind down ought to be let loose,⁴ and that there should be a license for each person to live as they please each day, and no need for every thing to take place by an order, and [thinks]⁵ that by leaving private matters not regulated by law, persons will be willing, as regards public and common concerns, to live according to law, (he) does not think correctly. Now on what account has this been asserted? On this; that we shall lay down that the bridegrooms ought neither pre-eminent⁶ more⁶ or less, than during the time previous to marriage, to have their living at the com-

¹—¹ I do not remember to have met with a phrase similar to *διαφερούση* —*ισομένη*. The verb substantive is united to a participle, as shown by Porson on *Hec.* 1169, and Paley on *Æsch. Suppl.* 454, *τήνδε γηρυθείσ' ἔσει*, who refers to *Ced. C.* 816, *Ced. T.* 1146, *Antig.* 1067, and Plato *Apolog.* *πεπονθώς ἴσομαι*, *Xenoph. K. A.* *κατακτανόντες ἔσεσθε*: and the participle *οὔσιν* is found with *κεκιβδηλευμένοις* in *Aristoph. Batr.* 720, but not the future, as here, with the present.

²—² The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus and Taylor.

³ The Greek is *αὐτοῦς*— But the preceding *πόλεσι* requires *ἀσποῦς*— Cousin refers *αὐτοῦς* to *πολίτας*, understood in *πόλεσι*.

⁴—⁴ The text is *τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσον ἀνάγκη μὴδὲ οἰεται δεῖν*: where the genitive is without regimen, and *οἰεται* repeated unnecessarily after the preceding *διανοεῖται*: to say nothing of the negative *μὴ*, which ought to precede, not follow, *ἀνάγκη*, unless the verb be introduced, as in *Phædon*, p. 64, E., *καθόσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη (ᾗ) μετέχειν αὐτῶν*. To meet all the difficulties, I have translated as if the Greek were *τῶν δὲ ἰδίων, ὅσ' ἀν ἀνάγκη μὴ δεῖν, ἀνεῖν δεῖν εἶναι*, where there would be a play in *δεῖν*, “bind,” and *ἀνεῖν δεῖν εἶναι*, “ought to be let loose.”

⁵ The verb *ἡγείται*, like *οἰεται* just before, could not be thus foisted in between *διανοεῖται* at the beginning and end of the sentence. In *ἡγείται* *τά γε* lies hid *κατὰ γε τὰ*— For the preposition could not be omitted.

⁶ The antithesis in *μὴδὲ ἤττον* requires here *μᾶλλον*, not *ἤμιν*—*μὴδὲν*—

mon tables. Now this was ¹ a wonderful thing when it took place at first in your country through some war, as it seems, or some other circumstance possessing the same power, establishing it legally over you, ² when hampered during a paucity of people by a great want of means. But after you had tasted these common tables, and been compelled by necessity to make use of them, the law was deemed ³ to conduce very greatly ⁴ to your preservation; and in some such manner as this, the employment of common tables was established amongst you.

Clin. So it appears.

Athen. What I mentioned as being at that time ⁴ a thing wonderful and fearful for some to enjoin, it would not be now equally difficult for the person enjoining it to establish by law. But that which follows this, namely, that the thing naturally existing would exist in a proper manner, but not existing at all at present, ⁵ it would want but little to cause ⁵ the legislator, as the saying of persons in jest is, ⁶ to card wool for the fire, ⁶ and to do by labouring ⁷ in vain an infinity of things of this kind, it is ⁸ not easy to mention, nor, after mentioning, to accomplish. ⁸

Clin. What is this, guest, which you appear, although attempting to mention, so vehemently to shrink from?

Athen. You shall hear, in order that there may be no longer needlessly a waste of time about it. For every thing, that in a state partakes of order and law, produces every good; but of things that are without order, or ordered badly, the majority

¹ I have adopted Ast's ἦν for ὅν—

² I have inserted ὑμῖν, required for the sense. It was lost through ἐν—

³ The Greek is μέγα διαφέρειν. Plato wrote, I suspect, μέγιστα δὴ φέρειν, as I have translated. For the phrase is rather φέρειν εἰς τι than διαφέρειν εἰς τι: and, while δὴ and δια are constantly thus interchanged, δὴ is perpetually united to a superlative, as I have shown in my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 309.!

⁴ In lieu of πότε the sense requires τότε. Ficinus probably found in his MS. πρῶτον. For his version is "Mirum igitur id fuit, imperantique primo arduum."

⁵ The sense and syntax require ὀλίγον δέον, ποιῶν in lieu of ὀλίγον τε ποιῶν—

⁶ As wool is carded generally for the loom, to card it for the fire is in fact to do so for no useful purpose.

⁷ I have adopted Ast's πονοῦντα for ποιῶντα, who aptly compares ἀνῆντα—πονῶν in Rep. vi. 2, p. 486, D.

⁸ The words between the numerals are found in the version of Ficinus, at the commencement of the sentence, after "that which follows this—"

¹loosens some of the well ordered, and destroys others:¹ which has² just now happened touching the matter under discussion. For in the case of your countrymen, Clinias and Megillus, the common tables relating to the men have been instituted in both a beautiful, and, as I have said, wonderful manner, from a certain divine necessity; but those relating to the women have been by no means correctly left unregulated by law; nor has the arrangement of their common tables been brought to light. But though³ the female sex is really⁴ rather more given to secrecy and stealth, on account of its weakness, than we men are, yet it is not properly dismissed, as being difficult to regulate in consequence of the legislator conceding this point. For, through this being neglected, many things have in your state glided by, which would have been far better than they at present are, had they met with laws. For the want of regulations⁵ relating to women, is not, as it would seem, when disregarded, merely the half (of human concerns);⁶ but, by how much the nature of women is worse than that of men, as regards virtue, by so much does it differ in being more than the double (as regards vice).⁷ This therefore to take up again and to correct, and to arrange all pursuits in common for women and men, is better for the happiness of the state. But at present mankind is so led on in a manner by no means fortunate for this purpose, that it is the part of a person with mind not even to mention it in some other places and

¹—¹ The Greek is *λύει τὰ πολλὰ τῶν εὖ τεταγμένων ἄλλα ἕτερα*, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who, in his version "*quæ bene sunt ordinata, confundunt*—" omits *ἄλλα ἕτερα*, in which the chief difficulty lies; while Ast's attempt to explain these words proves that he too was at a loss. I have translated as if the Greek were *τὰ πολλὰ λύει τῶν εὖ τεταγμένων τινα ὁλλύει θ' ἕτερα*. For there would be thus a play on *λύει* and *ὁλλύει*.

² The Greek is *οὗ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐφέστηκε περί*, where Ast says that *οὗ* is governed by *περί*. But the preposition could not be thus separated from its case. I have therefore adopted *δ*, from "*quod*" in Ficinus.

³ Although Bekker has adopted Ast's *ἀλλ' ὅ*, I confess I cannot understand it. The sense evidently requires, as I have translated, *ἀλλ', εἰ—*

⁴ Ast would read *ἄλλων* for *ἄλλως*, not remembering that *ἄλλως* means "*really*," as shown by Ruhnken on *Timæus*, p. 199.

⁵ I have adopted with Ast *ἀκόσμητον* in lieu of *ἀκοσμήτως*, similar to "*res—inordinata*" in Ficinus.

⁶ Ficinus alone has "*humanarum rerum*," as if his MS. read *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, i. e. *τῶν ἀνθρωπείων*, after *μόνον*.

⁷ I have supplied what the antithesis requires for the sense

states, where it has been voted that common tables shall not exist at all in a city. How then shall any one without being laughed at attempt in reality to compel women to make their consumption of meat and drink a conspicuous spectacle? For there is nothing which that sex would with more difficulty endure than this. For being accustomed to live in retirement¹ and obscurity it will, when brought by force into the light, make every possible resistance, and greatly overpower the legislator. This sex then, as I have said, would not elsewhere endure a reason urged even correctly, without making every kind of outcry; but in this state perhaps they would. If then it is agreeable to you, for the sake of conversation, that our reasoning, as regards every kind of polity, should not be imperfect,² I am desirous of telling you, how good and becoming a thing this is; if, as I said, it seems good to you to hear; but if not, to leave it alone.

Clin. But, O guest, it does seem by all means wonderfully good for us to hear.

[22.] *Athen.* Let us then hear it. But do not wonder, ³if I appear to you to make an attempt from some source far back.³ For we are now in the enjoyment of leisure, and there is nothing pressing us so as to prevent our seeing on every side and in every way what relate to the laws.

Clin. You have spoken correctly.

Athen. Let us then return to what was stated at first. For it is proper for every person to correctly understand so much as this, that the generation of men either never had any beginning at all, nor ever will have an end, but always was and always will be, ⁴or that the length of time from which its

¹ I have adopted *δεδουκός*, suggested by Stephens, in lieu of *δεδοικός*, and confirmed not only by Plato in Rep. ix. p. 579, B., but by a MS. subsequently collated.

² In lieu of *ἀνυχή*, Ficinus, as shown by his version "manca," found in his MS. *ἀρελή*, as remarked by Faehse and adopted by Ast. Stalbaum prefers *ἀνυχή*. But *λόγος ἀνυχής* is not, I believe, found elsewhere in Greek.

³⁻³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "si rem altius repetere visus fuero." If then he is to be depended upon, he must have found something in his MS. very different to what is read in other MSS.

⁴⁻⁴ The Greek is *ἡ μῆκος τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν ἀμήχανον ἀν χρόνον ὅσον γεγονός ἂν εἴη*. I have translated as if it were originally — *ἡ μῆκος τι, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς γέγονεν, ἀμήχανον ἦν χρόνου, ὅσον οὐδὲ χρόνος ἂν γνοίη*: where *χρόνου* is due to Ast; who, with Stalbaum, gave up the correction of the passage as hopeless; for they did not per-

beginning took place, is so measureless, that even Time would not know it.⁴

Clin. How not?

Athen. What then, do we not think that there have been the establishment and subversion of cities, and all sorts of pursuits relating to order and disorder, and the use¹ of drink and food, (and) the desires of all kinds of those, mad in the affairs of love, and through all the earth, and all varieties in the alterations of seasons, in which it is likely that animals have undergone very many changes?

Clin. How not?

Athen. What then? Do we believe that vines appeared somehow, not having existed previously; and in a similar manner olives, and the gifts of Demeter and her virgin daughter; and that a certain Triptolemus was the minister of such powers; and do we not think that during the time, in which these did not exist, animals turned to devouring each other, as they do now?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But we see the custom remaining even now in many places of men sacrificing each other;² and we hear,

ceive that Plato had here probably played upon *Χρόνος*, as he has on *Ἀνδρεία* in Lach. § 23, *ἵνα μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτῇ ἡ Ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν*: and on *Μῶμος* in Rep. vi. p. 487, A., *οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος τὸ γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο*: where he probably wrote *μωμήσαιτο*, as shown by the imitation of Aristænetus in l. 1, *οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος—μωμήσαιτο*: and of an unknown writer in Suidas, *Μῶμος—ὥστε μὴδὲ ἂν τὸν Μῶμον αὐτὸν ἐπιμωμήσασθαι*: to which may be added Strato in Athenæus ix. p. 383, *τὸν δ' οὐκ ἂν ταχὺ Ἐπεισεν ἡ Πειθῶ*. Lucian in Hist. Conscript. § 38, *τὰ μὲν πραχθέντα οὐδὲ Κλωθῶ ἂν ἔτι ἀνακλώσειεν*: and the passages quoted by Porson on Heo. 779, *τίς οὕτω δυστυχὴς ἔφθ γυνή; Οὐκ ἔστιν· εἰ μὴ τὴν Τύχην αὐτὴν λέγεις*: who might have added from Plautus in Captiv., "*Neque jam servare Salus, si vult, me potest, nec copia est;*" and from Mostellar., "*Nec salus nobis Saluti jam esse, si cupiat, potest.*"

¹ In lieu of *βρώσεως*, which Ast considers an interpolation, Orelli suggested, with the approbation of Stalbaum, *ἀφροδισίων*, referring to the expression shortly afterwards—*βρώσιν μὲν ἱλέγομεν—καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδισίων—διαπτοίησιν*. From whence I suspect that Plato wrote here *ἐπιθυμήματά τε παντοδαπὰ τῶν δι' ἀφροδίσια πρoιούτων*: while in *βρώσεως* evidently lies hid *χρήσεως*, as shown by "*cibi potique—usus*" in Ficinus; and so I have translated. Subsequently Orelli proposed *ἀβρότητος*.

² By the human sacrifices, to which Plato alludes as existing in his time, are perhaps meant those, that took place at Carthage, of which country the Athenians had begun to know so much, through their connexion with Sicily and their attack upon Syracuse, as to enable Aris-

on the contrary, that in others we did not dare to taste the flesh even of oxen, and that the sacrifices to the gods were not animals, but ¹ cakes moistened with honey, and fruits,¹ and other innocent offerings² of a similar kind; and that we entirely abstained from flesh, as it was unholy to eat it, and to defile the altars of the gods with blood; and that there existed, what is called the Orphic³ life amongst persons of that period, keeping fast to all things without life, but abstaining on the contrary from all that had life.

Clin. What you say is greatly bruited abroad, and is very easy to be believed.

Athen. But for what purpose, some one may say, has all this been mentioned now?

Clin. You very correctly understand, O guest, the matter.

Athen. I shall endeavour therefore, Clinias, to state, if I can, what follows in order upon this.

Clin. Speak then.

Athen. I perceive that all things in the case of man hang from a threefold want and desire; through which virtue results to them, if they are properly led, but the contrary, if improperly. These are, immediately on being born, eating and drinking, for which every animal having an innate love, is full of a mad feeling, and a disinclination to hearken to him, who says that one must do something else than, by satisfying the pleasures and desires connected with such things, to be

totle shortly afterwards to give an account of the political constitution of that city.

¹—¹ The Greek is *πέλανοι δὲ καὶ μέλιτι καρποὶ δεδεύμενοι*. But as we read no where else of fruits being moistened with honey, I have translated as if the words were—*Πέλανοι δὲ μέλιτι δεδευμένοι καὶ καρποὶ*—remembering the words of Horace in *Epist. i. 10, 10*, “*Pane ego jam mellitis potiore placentis*.” According to Pausanias viii. 2, the custom, first introduced by Cecrops, of offering cakes, called *πέλανοι*, to Zeus the Highest, had been preserved even to his day.

² In lieu of *θύματα*, which means sacrifices by fire, Orelli proposed to read *θύημα*, from Timæus. But *ἀγνὰ θύματα* is found Pollux i. 26, on which I have written something in Poppo’s *Prolegom. p. 176*, and more in the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, vol. ii. p. 81, 2nd series*; and I could now add not a little to supply what C. F. Hermann has omitted in Schneidewinn’s *Philologus, T. ii. p. 1—11*.

³ On the Orphic life, adopted by the Pythagoreans, relating to the abstinence from animal food, see the passages quoted by Ast here, and on *Rep. x. § 3*, from Eurip. *Hipp. 946*, Aristoph. *Barp. 1064*, Horace *A. P. 391*, and Porphyry “*On Abstinence*,” ii. 6, 7.

ever¹ freeing oneself from all pain. But a third, and the greatest want, and a desire the most acute, comes rushing on the last, and causes men to be the most inflamed with all kinds² of madness, (I mean) that which is on fire with the very great³ sexual passion for propagating the species. These three diseases it is meet to turn⁴ from what is called the most pleasant⁵ to the best,⁴ and to endeavour to keep them down by the three greatest (bonds), fear, and law, and truthful reasoning; and by making use moreover of the Muses, and the gods who preside over contests,⁶ to extinguish their increase and influx. ⁷But after marriages let us place the procreation of children, and after procreation their nurture and instruction. And by our discourse proceeding in this manner, each law will perhaps advance onwards to (our doctrine of) common tables; when, after arriving at communities of this kind, we shall perhaps see better⁸ by approaching nearer to them, whether they ought to exist of women likewise, or of men alone; and by putting into order the institutions antecedent to these, which are at present not laid down by law, we will consider them previously; and, as has been just now said, we shall see them more accurately, and lay down laws more suited to them and becoming.⁷

¹ The Greek is *ἀεὶ δεῖν*, where Ast conceives that ΔΕΙΝ is only the repetition of ΑΕΙ, or else that it has been interpolated from the preceding δεῖν. Perhaps the words ἀποπληροῦντα, οἷα λύκους, τῆς ἀπαστίας ὀδυνῶν lie hid in ἀποπληροῦνται (so one MS.) λύκης τῆς ἀπάσης ἀεὶ δεῖν—i. e. “by satisfying ourselves, like wolves, to be free from the pain of not tasting food.” For the wolf is known to be an animal, that remains the longest without food, and gorges himself the most when he gets plenty of it; and while ἀπαστία is found in Aristoph. *Νεφ.* 621, in the sense of νηστεία and ἀσιτία, the change of λύκους into λύπης would be owing to the common confusion of κ and π, as shown by myself on *Æsch. Suppl.* 927.

² In lieu of πάντως one would prefer, as I have translated, παντοίαις—

³ Instead of ὕβρει πλείστην, Plato wrote, I suspect, either ἀπλήστην, “insatiable,” or ἀκολάστην, “unchecked.”

⁴—⁴ Stephens, whom Ast has followed, was the first to alter παρὰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἥδιστον into παρὰ τοῦ λεγομένου ἥδιστου, from “ab eo quod jucundissimum dicitur,” in Ficinus.

⁵ In μέν, which has no meaning here, lies hid δεσμοῖς—

⁶ The gods who presided over contests were Jupiter, Neptune, Apollo, and Mercury, as shown by *Æschylus* in *Suppl.* 193.

⁷—⁷ Stalbaum considers all between the numerals an interpolation; for according to two MSS. it was wanting in some copies.

⁸ Instead of μάλλον, which came from ἀκριβέστερον μάλλον, just below, the sense requires κάλλιον, as I have translated.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Let us then keep in recollection what has been just now said ; for perhaps we shall have a need of it hereafter.

Clin. What do you bid us (remember) ?

Athen. That which we defined by three words. For we surely spoke about eating, and secondly, drinking, and thirdly, a kind of madness in the matters of love.

Clin. We will by all means, O guest, recollect, ¹what you now bid us (to do).¹

Athen. It is well. Let us proceed then to the affairs of marriage, and teach the parties how and in what manner they ought to get children ; and, if we cannot persuade them, we will threaten them with certain laws.

Clin. How ?

[23.] *Athen.* It is requisite for the bride and bridegroom to consider, that they are about to exhibit to the state children, the most beautiful and the best in their power. Now all persons, who share in any work, when they give their minds to themselves and the work, produce the whole beautiful and good ; but the contrary, when they do not give their minds, or do not possess any. Let the bridegroom then give his mind both to the bride and to child-getting ; and in the same way let the bride give her mind to the bridegroom pre-eminently at the time when children have not yet been born to them. And let the women, whom we have chosen, be the overseers of these matters, whether many or few, just as the rulers may order, as many and at what time they please ; and let them assemble every day in the temple of Eileithuia,² and (continue there) for the third part of an hour ;³ where they shall, on being assembled, tell, if they have seen any man or woman, of those connected with child-getting, looking to any thing else than to what are ordained to be done during the sacrifices and sacred ceremonies pertaining to marriage. Let the procreation of children, and the supervision of those connected with child-getting above mentioned, continue for ten

¹—¹ Ficinus has "quæ modo dicta sunt."

² The goddess called Eileithuia, who at Athens was Athéné, and elsewhere Artemis, was worshipped at Rome under the title of Juno Lucina.

³ So Ficinus understands ὥρα ; but Cornarius, "a day." Ast sides with Ficinus. But ὥρα rarely in Greek, if ever, means "an hour." It does however mean "a day," as shown by H. Stephens in Thes. L. Gr. Perhaps Plato wrote τριτημορίου, with the ellipse of ἡμέρας.

years, but not for a longer time, when there is a fecundity in generation. But should some continue unprolific for this space of time, let them, after having consulted with their kindred, and the women that are in power, be divorced for the benefit of each party. If however any dispute arises respecting what is proper and beneficial to each, let them select ten of the guardians of the law,¹ and abide by what they shall impose and ordain.¹ And let these women, entering into the houses of the young folks, partly by admonitions and partly by threats, cause them to cease from their error and ignorance. But if they are unable to do so, let them go and speak to the guardians of the law; and let these restrain the parties. If they too are unable to effect any thing, let them bring the matter before the public assembly, after having put up in writing the names of the parties, and made an affidavit that they are unable to make this or that person better. And let him, who is indicted, unless he can obtain a verdict in a court of law against the parties so putting up in writing his name, be disgraced on these points;² (namely), let him not go to weddings, nor to the rites solemnized for children;³ and should he go, let any one who wishes scourge him with stripes with impunity. And let there be the same enactments in the case of a woman. For let her not share in female out-goings⁴ and honours, and the visits made at weddings, and at the birth-rites⁵ of children, if

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "cognoscant." Taylor, "shall take cognizance of and determine the affair." To avoid however the insufferable tautology in *ἐπιτρέψωσι* and *τάξωσι*, one may easily read, what the train of thought requires—*ὅς ἂν πᾶν ἐπιτρέψωσι, καὶ ἃ οἶδε τάξωσι, τούτοις ἐμμενῇν*—i. e. "to whom they may commit the whole affair, and to abide by what they may enjoin." Winkelman suggests *ἃ ὅς ἂν ἐπιτρέψωσιν, οἶδε τάξουσιν*—

² Ficinus omits *τῶνδε*, and so does one MS. subsequently collated.

³ The Greek is *τὰς τῶν παίδων ἐπιτελειώσεις*: which Ast explains by saying that "there is an allusion to the sacred rites, which took place on the tenth day after the birth of a child, as we learn from Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 493, and 923." For the ancients knew, as well as the moderns, that the critical period in childbirth was the ninth day; and that until it had well passed over, it was useless to make any rejoicing for the birth of the child.

⁴ It is not easy to say what is meant by *ἐξοδοί*, unless it alludes to the circumstance that women, who were mothers, were permitted to go out of the house, where and when they pleased, which virgins were not; for a married woman without children, would be only another kind of virgin.

⁵ In lieu of *γενέσεις*, Schneider suggested *γενέσια*; but Stalbaum has edited *γενεθλίων* from three MSS. On the difference between *γενέσια* and *γενεθλία* see Buttmann on Alcibiad. i. p. 121, D. There is likewise

she be indicted as acting disorderly, ¹and does not obtain a verdict.¹ But when they are begetting children according to law, if any man has a connexion with another woman for such a purpose, or a woman with another man, while such other parties are getting children, let the same fines be imposed upon them, as have been mentioned in the case of those ²still getting them.² After this let the man and woman, who act temperately with respect to such points, be altogether in good repute, but those who act contrariwise be held in a contrary light, or dishonoured rather. And if the majority act with moderation in matters of this kind, let such points lie in silence without being established by law; but if they act disorderly, ³let enactments be laid down in this way, and punishment enacted³ according to the laws then laid down. The first year is the beginning of the whole of life to every one; which ought to be written in the temples of their fathers, as the beginning of life, both to a boy and girl. In every Phratia⁴ too, let the number of the rulers⁵ that are numbered for a year, be written on a whitened wall, and near to them the names of those still living in the Phratia be always written; but blot out those who have departed from life. Let the limits of a marriageable age for a female be from sixteen to twenty

a dissertation, "De Veterum Solennibus Natalibus," by Schöne, Halberstadt, 1832; but whether he has thrown any light on this passage I know not, as I have never seen it.

¹—¹ Ficinus has strangely mistaken the sense of this passage; for his version is "si in iudicium arcessitæ damnatæ etiam fuerint," translated by Taylor, "if they are similarly condemned in a court of justice."

²—² Such is the version of *ἐτι γεννωμένοις*. But this I cannot understand; nor could Taylor, whose version is—"when they did not beget children"—Two MSS. read *ἀπρι* for *ἐτι*, from which nothing is gained.

³—³ Ficinus has more fully "legum circumscriptione declarentur et ad eorum normam de singulis hujusmodi iudicetur atque agatur."

⁴ The Phratia was one part out of three, into which the Phylé was divided.

⁵ The persons called by Plato *ἀρχοντες* seem to be similar to the *Φρατρίαρχοι*, mentioned by Harpocration in *Φράτορες*; while from this passage it may be inferred that the officers of the Phratia at Athens were chosen annually, and that their names were written on the whitened part of the wall of a temple, just as the names of the newly appointed officers and common council of a ward in the city of London are pasted up annually on the outside of the parish church; and that the names of all belonging to the Phratia were written near those of the officers, just as the list of the names of those, who have been outlawed, or have taken out game-certificates, is affixed to church doors in England.

years of age—and let this be the longest definite time—but for a man from thirty to thirty-five; and let the time for any public office be, in the case of a woman, forty years of age; but in that of a man, thirty; but with respect to war, for a man from twenty to sixty years; but for a woman, should it appear necessary to employ her for warlike purposes, and after she shall have brought forth children, up to fifty years of age, enjoining what is possible and becoming for each.

BOOK VII.

CHILDREN then, both male and female, having been begotten, it will be most correct to speak next about their nurture and education; which it is perfectly impossible to be¹ not mentioned; and being mentioned it will appear to us to be rather like a kind of teaching and admonition than laws. For the numerous and trifling and not conspicuous matters, which happen to all privately, and in each family, since they easily take place through the pain, and pleasure, and desire of the respective individuals, will render, contrary to the advice of the legislator, the habits of the citizens all-various, and not similar to each other. Now this is an evil to states. For on account of their insignificance and frequency, to make them subject to a fine would be at the same time unbecoming and unseemly. But it destroys² even the laws already laid down in writing, if persons are accustomed to act contrary to law in things insignificant and numerous; so that it is difficult to lay down laws concerning them, and yet impossible to be silent. But what I mean to say, I must endeavour to show clearly by bringing, as it were, samples to the light; for there seems (to be) on what is now said in some respect a darkness.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Has not then this been rightly said, that a nurture perfectly correct ought to show itself able to render both bodies and souls the most beautiful and best?

Clin. How not?

¹ Ficinus has "silentio præterire"—which leads to *ἔαν* for *εἶναι*.

² Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "derogaret," as if his MS. read *διαφθείροι δ' αὖν*—in lieu of *διαφθείρει*—

Athen. Now the most beautiful bodies I conceive, (to speak) in the most simple style, ought, while boys are still young, to grow up in the most upright manner.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. What then, do we not understand this, that the first shooting forth of every animal is produced the greatest and most abundant by far; so that it has given rise to a dispute amongst many, whether the length of human bodies does or does not become by increase from the age of five years doubled¹ in the remaining twenty-five?²

Clin. True.

Athen. What then, when a great increase flows on without much and commensurate exercise, do we not know that it produces ten thousand maladies in bodies?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. There is need then of most exercise, when most nutriment is introduced into bodies.

Clin. What then, O guest, shall we enjoin upon the recently born, and the youngest, the greatest exertions?

Athen. By no means; but to those still prior, who are being nourished in the wombs of their mothers.

Clin. How say you, thou best (of men)? Are you speaking of those in a state of being conceived?

Athen. Yes. But it is not at all wonderful for you to be ignorant of the exercise of such as these; which, although it seems absurd, I am willing to render clear to you.

Clin. By all means (do so).

Athen. For us indeed a thing of this kind is more easy to understand through some persons playing there³ sports more than is needful. For with us not only children, but some older men, bring up the young of birds,⁴ and exercise such

¹ The modern theory is, that the body of a child at the end of the second year is generally the half of what it will be when grown up.

² Plato mentions thirty, because at that period the growth, as far as height is concerned, ceases; and he adds the "remaining," because thirty was supposed to be the average limit of human life.

³ By *αἰροῖσι*, "there," is meant Athens.

⁴ Plato is supposed to allude here to the sport of quail-feeding and fighting, similar to cock-feeding and fighting in England. See at Alcibiad. i. § 34. According to Ælian in V. H. ii. 28, there was yearly a cock-fight in the theatre at Athens, to commemorate the victory gained over the Persians by the Athenians; whom Themistocles had urged to

kinds of wild animals¹ in fighting with each other, and they are far from thinking that the labours are moderate, in which by exercising they stir them up. For in addition to this,² each taking under their arms the smaller in their hands, and the larger under their arms within,³ they walk about, going many stadia, and this, not for the sake of the good state of their own bodies, but for that of the birds. And thus much they signify to the person capable of learning, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and motion, ⁴when moved without weariness, of all that⁵ are moved by themselves, or by swings,⁶ or carried on the sea,⁷ or on horseback, or borne along in any manner soever by other bodies;⁶ and through these getting the mastery over food and drink, they are able to impart to us health, and beauty, and ⁷the rest of strength.⁷

[2.] Since then such is the case, what shall we say we ought to do after this? Are you willing for us to say with a laugh, that we are laying down laws for the pregnant woman

imitate the bravery of two cocks, whom the army happened to see fighting with each other.

¹ As *θηρίων* seems strangely applied to birds, one would suspect the existence of some error here. At all events the words *τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν θηρίων* are omitted by Ficinus.

²—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. But *ὑπὸ μάλης* and *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντὸς* mean the same thing. Ficinus has more correctly—"minores in manibus, majores sub ulna capientes—" Hence it is easy to see that *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντὸς* is an explanation of *ὑπὸ μάλης*, and that Plato wrote *λαβόντες ἕκαστος τοὺς μὲν ἑλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, μείζους—δὲ ὑπὸ μάλης*—Aristotle and Stalbaum after him explain *ὑπὸ μάλης* by "secretly." But as there could be no need of secrecy, such a meaning would be here quite out of place. The German translator Schulthes too considered *ὑπὸ μάλης* an interpolation.

³—³ Here again a literal version best points out that something is incorrect in the Greek—*κινούμενα ἄκοπα δύνανται πάντων ὅσα τε*—where since two MSS. offer *καὶ κινούμενα* in the text, and one of them *κατακινούμενα* in the margin, and Stobæus *πάντως* for *πάντων*, one would prefer—*δύνανται, εἰ γε κινούμενα ἄκοπα πάντως ἐστὶ, εἰ τε ὑπὸ*—i. e. are benefited, if indeed, when moved, they are entirely without weariness, whether—

⁴ The words *ἐν αἰώραις* are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁵ *κατὰ θάλατταν—δχομένων*—Compare *Æsch. Prom.* 477.

⁶ Instead of *σωμάτων*, which is not used indefinitely in Greek, as "body" is in English, to express any substance, one would prefer the more proper word, *χημάτων*.

⁷—⁷ As *τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην* is strangely added to *ὕγιαν καὶ κάλλος*, Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has omitted *τὴν ἄλλην*. It is however acknowledged by Stobæus. Perhaps Plato wrote *πολλὴν τὴν ῥώμην*—

Athen. Now the most beautiful bodies I conceive, (to speak) in the most simple style, ought, while boys are still young, to grow up in the most upright manner.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. What then, do we not understand this, that the first shooting forth of every animal is produced the greatest and most abundant by far; so that it has given rise to a dispute amongst many, whether the length of human bodies does or does not become by increase from the age of five years doubled¹ in the remaining twenty-five?²

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² Plato mentions thirty, because at that age the growth, as far as height is concerned, ceases; and he adds "the remaining," because thirty was supposed to be the average limit of human life.

³ By *αὐτοῖς*, "there," is meant Athens.

⁴ Plato is supposed to allude here to the practice of quail-fighting, similar to cock-feeding and fighting in England. See *Strabo*, *Geogr.* lib. x. c. 28, there is a reference to cock-fight in the theatre at Athens, and to the victory of the Athenians over the Persians by the Athenians.

kinds of wild animals¹ in fighting with each other, and they are far from thinking that the labours are moderate, in which by exercising they stir them up. For in addition to this, ²each taking under their arms the smaller in their hands, and the larger under their arms within,³ they walk about, going many stadia, and this, not for the sake of the good state of their own bodies, but for that of the birds. And thus much they signify to the person capable of learning, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and motion, ³when moved without weariness, of all that³ are moved by themselves, or by swings,⁴ or carried on the sea,⁵ or on horseback, or borne along in any manner soever by other bodies;⁶ and through these getting the mastery over food and drink, they are able to impart to us health, and beauty, and ⁷the rest of strength.⁷

[2.] Since then such is the case, what shall we say we ought to do after this? Are you willing for us to say with a laugh, that we are laying down laws for the pregnant woman

imitate the bravery of two cocks, whom the army happened to see fighting with each other.

¹ As *θηρίων* seems strangely applied to birds, one would suspect the existence of some error here. At all events the words *τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν θηρίων* are omitted by Ficinus.

^{2—3} Such is the literal version of the Greek. But *ὑπὸ μάλης* and *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντός* mean the same thing. Ficinus has more correctly—"minores in manibus, majores sub ulna capientes—" Hence it is easy to see that *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλην ἐντός* is an explanation of *ὑπὸ μάλης*, and that Plato wrote *λαβόντες ἕκαστος τοὺς μὲν ἱλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, μείζονες—δὲ ὑπὸ μάλης*—Aristotle and Stalbaum after him explain *ὑπὸ μάλης* by "secretly." But as there could be no need of secrecy, such a meaning would be here quite out of place. The German translator Schulthes too considered *ὑπὸ μάλης* an interpolation.

There again a literal version best points out that something is in the Greek—*κινούμενα ἄκοπα ὀνίναται πάντων ὅσα τε*—where MSS. offer *καὶ κινούμενα* in the text, and one of them *κατα-* in the margin, and Stobæus *πάντως* for *πάντων*, one would say *κινείται, εἴ γε κινούμενα ἄκοπα πάντως ἔστι, εἴ τε ὑπὸ*—i. e. moved, if indeed, when moved, they are entirely without weariness,

words *ἐν αἰώραις* are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. *ἀλατταν—ὀχουμένων* compare Æsch. Prom. 477.

and of *σωμάτων*, which is used indefinitely in Greek, as in English, to denote substance, one would prefer the

proper word, *χρημάτων*. The word *ὅσα* added to *ὕγιαν καὶ κάλλος*, followed by Taylor, is from *τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην*. It is however acknowledged by Stobæus. *πολλὴν τὴν ῥώμην*—

to walk about, and to mould the infant as a thing of wax, while it is yet flexible, and to put it in swathing-clothes until it is two years old; and that we are moreover compelling the nurses by legal fines to carry the children either into the fields, or to the temples, or their acquaintance, until they are sufficiently able to stand alone; and then that they should be careful, lest by the limbs becoming distorted, while forcibly resting on them, being still young, to undergo the additional labour of carrying the infant, until it had completed its third year; and that the nurses ought to be as strong as possible; and, in addition, that unless these things take place to each child, we are to enact a fine upon those who do not act so? or is this far from being the case? For that, which has just now been mentioned, would happen to us without stint.¹

Clin. What is that?

Athen. To pay the debt of abundant laughter, through² the womanlike and servile manners of the nurses being unwilling to obey us.³

Clin. But on what account then did we say that this ought to be stated?

Athen. On this. A person, on hearing⁴ of the habits of masters and free persons in states, would perhaps come to the correct conception, that, without a proper administration of private concerns taking place in states, one would think there would be vainly any stability in the laying down of laws; and so thinking, he would make use of the laws just now mentioned; and using them correctly, he would by his administration render both his own household and the city happy.

Clin. You have spoken very reasonably.

Athen. Let us then not desist from the legislation of this kind, until we have given out the pursuits relating likewise to the souls of very young children in the same manner as we

¹ The Greek is πολλὰ καὶ ἄφθονον. Ficinus avoids the tautology by translating "abunde," and so too does Taylor.

² I have adopted πρὸς τὸ, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of πρὸς τῷ—

³ In ἀν, which is unnecessary here, lies hid ἡμῖν, answering to "nobis" in Ficinus.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were ἀκούσας τις εἰς—not ἀκούσαντα εἰς— For although τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν might be written for οἱ δεσπόται, yet τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἦθη could not; and still less could τὰ ἦθη be said to hear and to come to a conception.

began to go through the subject, when the accounts were stated relating to the body.

Clin. Perfectly right.

Athen. Let us then receive this as an element with respect to both the circumstances, ¹[the body and soul,]¹ of the very young, that the nursing and motion, taking place as much as possible all the night and day, are profitable to all, and not the least ²to the youngest; so that,² if it were possible, they may live as if always sailing on the sea. But now, ³(since this is impossible),³ it is requisite to act as near as possible to this with respect to ⁴the newly born nurslings of children.⁴ And ⁵(what ought to be done) one may conjecture⁵ from this, that both the nurses of infants, and those who are initiated in the remedies⁶ relating to the Corybantes,⁶ have adopted this from experience, and know it to be useful. For, when mothers are desirous to put to sleep their children, who sleep with difficulty, they do not bring to them a state of quietness, but, on the contrary, of motion, by shaking them ever in their arms; nor yet that of silence, but that of singing to them; and they artlessly⁷ soothe their children, as it were, by the sound of a pipe, and, as the remedies of the mad Bacchantes are employed,⁸ by making use, at the same time, of the movements in music and the dance.

Clin. What then, O guest, is especially the cause of this?

Athen. It is not very difficult to know.

¹⁻¹ The words between the brackets are evidently an explanation of ἀμφότερα.

²⁻² The Greek is τοῖς ὅτι νωτάτοις καὶ οἰκεῖν, where not only is ὅτι absurdly placed before νωτάτοις, but οἰκεῖν is without regimen. Ficinus has, "tenerrimis, ut, si fieri possit, sic habitent," which evidently leads to τοῖς νωτάτοις, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν ἦν—

³⁻³ The words between the lunes are found only in Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, "quoniam autem fieri nequit—"

⁴⁻⁴ The Greek is τὰ νεογενῇ παιδῶν θρήμματα. But θρήμμα is united to the word for the parent, not for that of the offspring. Hence for παιδῶν one would prefer ἀπ' ὠδίνων—

⁵⁻⁵ The Greek is at present simply τεκμαίρεσθαι χρῆ. But it was more full in the MS. of Ficinus; at least his version is, "quod autem fieri oporteat, conjectare hinc licet," adopted tacitly by Taylor.

⁶⁻⁶ I have adopted Cousin's interpretation.

⁷ I have taken ἀτίχνως in its natural sense of "artlessly," not, as others, of "really," in Greek ἀρεχνῶς.

⁸ Although εἰσι might be understood after λάσεις, yet, I suspect, γίγνεται lies hid in ταύτῃ.

Clin. How so?

Athen. Both these passions result from fear; and there are certain terrors through a depraved habit of the soul. When therefore any one brings from without an agitation to passions of this kind, that which is from without overcomes the dreadful and insane motion within; and after overcoming, it seems to have produced a calm in the soul, and a quietness in the leaping, which had been troublesome as regards the heart of each; ¹(and) thus, (what is) altogether agreeable,¹ it causes some to obtain by lot² sleep; but others, who are awake, and dancing and soothed by the pipe under the influence of the divinities, to whom each may be supplicating and sacrificing, it causes to possess habits of sound sense in the place of a maddened state. Now this, to speak in brief, has in this way a certain probable reason.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now if these things possess thus any such power, it is requisite to consider this point as connected with them, that every soul, which has been familiar with fear from youth, would be more accustomed to be conversant with fears.³ But this every one will surely say is an exercise of timidity, and not of fortitude.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But the contrary pursuit we should say is that of fortitude, in the overcoming, even from youth, what falls upon us in the shape of fears and terrors.

Clin. Correctly so.

Athen. Let us say then, that this one thing, the all-perfect

¹—¹ Stephens was the first to see that in *παντάπασιν ἀγαπητόν τι* there was something wanting. For he found in Ficinus, "atque ita;" as if his MS. had *καὶ οὕτως*, instead of *ἀγαπητόν τι*. I have translated, as if the Greek were *καὶ οὕτως, ὃ ἀγαπητόν ἐστί τι*, unless it be said that the words *παντάπασιν ἀγαπητόν τι* ought to follow *ἔπνου* in the next sentence.

² Instead of *λαγχάνειν* one would prefer *τυγχάνειν*. But the disorder lies somewhat deeper. For Plato probably wrote *ἔπνου λαμβάνειν ἀχνην*, remembering the expression in Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 91, *ἔπνου—ἀχνην*, to which the Etymol. M. alludes in *Ἀχνη* after *Ἀχρη*—where *Ἀχνη* is quoted from Homer in the sense of sea-foam; from Hippocrates, of the fluff of flax; from Æschylus, of the lightness of smoke; and from Aristophanes, of the lightness of sleep; while, as regards the change of *λαμβάνειν* and *λαγχάνειν*, it will be sufficient to refer to Porson on Hec. 41.

³ Instead of *γίγνισθαι*, which Ast would defend by dissimilar passages, quoted by Valckenaer on Phœn. 482, Cornarius would read *κινεῖσθαι*, suggested by "ferri" in Ficinus.

gymnastic exercise of children in motion, greatly contributes to a part of virtue¹ in the soul.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And moreover, that a disposition, morose or not, in the soul² would become and be called² respectively no little part of cowardice or bravery.

Clin. How not?

Athen. In what manner then is to be implanted which of these we may wish in the newly born? We must endeavour to state how and to what extent a person may have an easy road in these matters.

Clin. How not?

[3.] *Athen.* I will mention then the fixed opinion with us, that luxury renders the manners of youth morose and irascible, and vehemently agitated by things of a trifling nature; but that an excessive and rustic servitude causes them to be contrary to this, abject and illiberal, and man-haters, and unfitting associates.

Clin. But how will the whole state be able to bring up those, who have as yet no perception of language, and are unable to have any taste for the rest of instruction?

Athen. Somehow in this way. Every animal, as soon as it is born, is wont to utter some sound with a loud cry, and not the least the human species; and more than the rest of animals it is affected in addition to its crying with the shedding of tears.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now nurses, looking to what infants are desirous of, make a conjecture by their presenting to them something. For they think they correctly offer that, on which being presented the children are silent; but incorrectly that, at which it sheds tears and cries out. For in the case of children tears and cries are the indications of what they love and hate, (and are) signs by no means lucky. Now this period is not less than three years, a not small portion of life to pass through badly or not badly.

¹ So Fortitude is said to be one part of virtue in the soul, in Laches § 29, and in the Statesman § 44.

²—² I have translated as if the Greek were γιγνόμενον λέγοιτ' ἀν— Ast. however, refers to iii. 4, a passage which is equally faulty, and as easily emended.

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. Does not a person who is morose, and by no means good-tempered, appear to you to be for the most part given to lamentation and full of moanings more than is fitting for the good to be?

Clin. It appears so to me.

Athen. What then, if a person were to endeavour, by bringing together every method, during those three years, that the nursling may be affected as little as possible with sorrow and fears and with every pains in our power, do we not think that we should render then the soul of the nursling more cheerful and kind?

Clin. It is evident, O guest; and most of all, should any one supply it with many pleasures.

Athen. In this I cannot, O wondrous man, follow Clinias. For with us such conduct would be a destruction the greatest of all. ¹For it occurs perpetually at the commencement of nurture.¹ But let us see whether we are asserting any thing.

Clin. State what you mean.

Athen. That our discourse is at present about a not trifling matter. Do you then, Megillus, look to it, and decide between us. For my assertion is, that an upright life ought neither to pursue pleasures, nor entirely to avoid pain, but to embrace the medium between them, which I have just now denominated a favourable temper; a disposition, of which, according to some voice of an oracle, we correctly speak as belonging to a deity.² This habit, I assert, that he amongst us ought to pursue, who would be divine; nor let him go wholly headlong to pleasures; for in this case he would not be free from pain; nor let him permit any other person, old or young, male or female, to suffer ³the

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, “nam talis educatio, cum in principio statim adhibeatur, omnium maxima perniciēs est;” where *ἐκάστοτε* is omitted.

² This, as Ast remarks correctly, refers to the fact, that the word *ἱεως* is generally applied to a deity; and he quotes very opportunely Euthydem. p. 273, F., *ἱεω εἶητον ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφῶ, ὥσπερ θεῶ, προσαγορεύω.*

³—³ Ast, unable to understand to what the words *ταὐτὸ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν*, omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor, are to be referred, would read *αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν*, where *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* would allude, he says, to *τὸ προπετὴ γίγνεσθαι*, and *ἡμῶν* to *ἄλλον*.

same thing with us,³ and, as far as he is able, the newly born the least of all. For all the manners are, through custom, implanted in all the most powerfully at that period. And further still, if I were not about to appear to be jesting, I would say, that one ought to attend to women, who are carrying any thing in the womb, the most of all during that very year, so that the person pregnant may neither enjoy pleasures numerous and violent, nor, on the other hand, feel pains, but live through that period, preserving a line of conduct benignant, and good-tempered, and mild.

Clin. There was no need, O guest, of your asking Megillus, which of us spoke in the more proper manner; for I agree with you, that all persons ought to avoid a life of unmingled pleasure and pain, and that they should always pursue a certain middle course. You have, therefore, both spoken and heard in a proper manner.

Athen. Very properly so, Clinias. But, in addition to these points, let us all three consider this likewise.

Clin. What?

[4.] *Athen.* That all these matters, which we are now going through, are by the many called unwritten laws; and that those, which they call the laws of the country, are no other than of such a kind; and further still, that the discourse, which has just now flowed upon us, how that we ought not either to call them laws, or to permit them to be unmentioned, has been spoken correctly. For these are the bonds of all polity, existing in a middle state between all laws that have been, and are, and will be hereafter, laid down in writing; and being, as it were, altogether the laws of a country, and ancient in every respect, and which, when laid down correctly and have become a custom, have invested the written laws with every kind of security; but should they advance improperly beyond what is right, they cause, like supports placed by carpenters in the buildings of houses, and gliding away from the centre, every thing to fall together to the same point, and to lie, some under others, both themselves and what has been subsequently built upon them, after the old portions have secretly given way. Reflecting upon which, it is necessary for us, O Clinias, to bind together your city new on all sides, and to the utmost of our power to omit nothing great or small which a person may call laws, or manners, or pursuits; for

she be indicted as acting disorderly,¹ and does not obtain a verdict.¹ But when they are begetting children according to law, if any man has a connexion with another woman for such a purpose, or a woman with another man, while such other parties are getting children, let the same fines be imposed upon them, as have been mentioned in the case of those² still getting them.² After this let the man and woman, who act temperately with respect to such points, be altogether in good repute, but those who act contrariwise be held in a contrary light, or dishonoured rather. And if the majority act with moderation in matters of this kind, let such points lie in silence without being established by law; but if they act disorderly,³ let enactments be laid down in this way, and punishment enacted³ according to the laws then laid down. The first year is the beginning of the whole of life to every one; which ought to be written in the temples of their fathers, as the beginning of life, both to a boy and girl. In every Phratia⁴ too, let the number of the rulers⁵ that are numbered for a year, be written on a whitened wall, and near to them the names of those still living in the Phratia be always written; but blot out those who have departed from life. Let the limits of a marriageable age for a female be from sixteen to twenty

a dissertation, "De Veterum Solennibus Natalibus," by Schöne, Halberstadt, 1832; but whether he has thrown any light on this passage I know not, as I have never seen it.

¹—¹ Ficinus has strangely mistaken the sense of this passage; for his version is "si in iudicium arcessitæ damnatæ etiam fuerint," translated by Taylor, "if they are similarly condemned in a court of justice."

²—² Such is the version of *ἐτι γυνωμένους*. But this I cannot understand; nor could Taylor, whose version is—"when they did not beget children"—Two MSS. read *ἀπρι* for *ἐτι*, from which nothing is gained.

³—³ Ficinus has more fully "legum circumscriptione declarentur et ad eorum normam de singulis hujusmodi iudicetur atque agatur."

⁴ The Phratia was one part out of three, into which the Phylé was divided.

⁵ The persons called by Plato *ἀρχοντες* seem to be similar to the *Φρατρίαρχοι*, mentioned by Harpocration in *Φράτορες*: while from this passage it may be inferred that the officers of the Phratia at Athens were chosen annually, and that their names were written on the whitened part of the wall of a temple, just as the names of the newly appointed officers and common council of a ward in the city of London are pasted up annually on the outside of the parish church; and that the names of all belonging to the Phratia were written near those of the officers, just as the list of the names of those, who have been outlawed, or have taken out game-certificates, is affixed to church doors in England.

years of age—and let this be the longest definite time—but for a man from thirty to thirty-five; and let the time for any public office be, in the case of a woman, forty years of age; but in that of a man, thirty; but with respect to war, for a man from twenty to sixty years; but for a woman, should it appear necessary to employ her for warlike purposes, and after she shall have brought forth children, up to fifty years of age, enjoining what is possible and becoming for each.

BOOK VII.

CHILDREN then, both male and female, having been begotten, it will be most correct to speak next about their nurture and education; which it is perfectly impossible to be¹ not mentioned; and being mentioned it will appear to us to be rather like a kind of teaching and admonition than laws. For the numerous and trifling and not conspicuous matters, which happen to all privately, and in each family, since they easily take place through the pain, and pleasure, and desire of the respective individuals, will render, contrary to the advice of the legislator, the habits of the citizens all-various, and not similar to each other. Now this is an evil to states. For on account of their insignificance and frequency, to make them subject to a fine would be at the same time unbecoming and unseemly. But it destroys² even the laws already laid down in writing, if persons are accustomed to act contrary to law in things insignificant and numerous; so that it is difficult to lay down laws concerning them, and yet impossible to be silent. But what I mean to say, I must endeavour to show clearly by bringing, as it were, samples to the light; for there seems (to be) on what is now said in some respect a darkness.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Has not then this been rightly said, that a nurture perfectly correct ought to show itself able to render both bodies and souls the most beautiful and best?

Clin. How not?

¹ Ficinus has "silentio præterire"—which leads to *ἐῖναι* for *εἶναι*.

² Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "derogaret," as if his MS. read *διαφθείροι δ' αὖν*—in lieu of *διαφθείρει*—

Athen. Now the most beautiful bodies I conceive, (to speak) in the most simple style, ought, while boys are still young, to grow up in the most upright manner.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. What then, do we not understand this, that the first shooting forth of every animal is produced the greatest and most abundant by far; so that it has given rise to a dispute amongst many, whether the length of human bodies does or does not become by increase from the age of five years doubled¹ in the remaining twenty-five?²

Clin. True.

Athen. What then, when a great increase flows on without much and commensurate exercise, do we not know that it produces ten thousand maladies in bodies?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. There is need then of most exercise, when most nutriment is introduced into bodies.

Clin. What then, O guest, shall we enjoin upon the recently born, and the youngest, the greatest exertions?

Athen. By no means; but to those still prior, who are being nourished in the wombs of their mothers.

Clin. How say you, thou best (of men)? Are you speaking of those in a state of being conceived?

Athen. Yes. But it is not at all wonderful for you to be ignorant of the exercise of such as these; which, although it seems absurd, I am willing to render clear to you.

Clin. By all means (do so).

Athen. For us indeed a thing of this kind is more easy to understand through some persons playing there³ sports more than is needful. For with us not only children, but some older men, bring up the young of birds,⁴ and exercise such

¹ The modern theory is, that the body of a child at the end of the second year is generally the half of what it will be when grown up.

² Plato mentions thirty, because at that period the growth, as far as height is concerned, ceases; and he adds the "remaining," because thirty was supposed to be the average limit of human life.

³ By *αἰροῦσι*, "there," is meant Athens.

⁴ Plato is supposed to allude here to the sport of quail-feeding and fighting, similar to cock-feeding and fighting in England. See at Alcibiad. i. § 34. According to Ælian in V. H. ii. 28, there was yearly a cock-fight in the theatre at Athens, to commemorate the victory gained over the Persians by the Athenians; whom Themistocles had urged to

kinds of wild animals¹ in fighting with each other, and they are far from thinking that the labours are moderate, in which by exercising they stir them up. For in addition to this,² each taking under their arms the smaller in their hands, and the larger under their arms within,³ they walk about, going many stadia, and this, not for the sake of the good state of their own bodies, but for that of the birds. And thus much they signify to the person capable of learning, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and motion,⁴ when moved without weariness, of all that⁵ are moved by themselves, or by swings,⁶ or carried on the sea,⁵ or on horseback, or borne along in any manner soever by other bodies;⁶ and through these getting the mastery over food and drink, they are able to impart to us health, and beauty, and⁷ the rest of strength.⁷

[2.] Since then such is the case, what shall we say we ought to do after this? Are you willing for us to say with a laugh, that we are laying down laws for the pregnant woman

imitate the bravery of two cocks, whom the army happened to see fighting with each other.

¹ As *θηρίων* seems strangely applied to birds, one would suspect the existence of some error here. At all events the words *τά τοιαῦτα τῶν θηρίων* are omitted by Ficinus.

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. But *ὑπὸ μάλης* and *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλῃν ἐντὸς* mean the same thing. Ficinus has more correctly—"minores in manibus, majores sub ulna capientes—" Hence it is easy to see that *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγκάλῃν ἐντὸς* is an explanation of *ὑπὸ μάλης*, and that Plato wrote *λαβόντες ἕκαστος τοὺς μὲν ἱλάττονας εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, μείζους—δὲ ὑπὸ μάλης*—Aristotle and Stalbaum after him explain *ὑπὸ μάλης* by "secretly." But as there could be no need of secrecy, such a meaning would be here quite out of place. The German translator Schulthes too considered *ὑπὸ μάλης* an interpolation.

³⁻³ Here again a literal version best points out that something is incorrect in the Greek—*κινούμενα ἄκοπα δύνανται πάντων ὅσα τε*—where since two MSS. offer *καὶ κινούμενα* in the text, and one of them *κατακινούμενα* in the margin, and Stobæus *πάντως* for *πάντων*, one would prefer—*δύνανται, εἰ γε κινούμενα ἄκοπα πάντως ἔστι, εἰ τε ὑπὸ*—i. e. are benefited, if indeed, when moved, they are entirely without weariness, whether—

⁴ The words *ἐν αἰώραις* are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁵ *κατὰ θάλατταν—ὀχουμένων*—Compare Æsch. Prom. 477.

⁶ Instead of *σωμάτων*, which is not used indefinitely in Greek, as "body" is in English, to express any substance, one would prefer the more proper word, *χηρμάτων*.

⁷⁻⁷ As *τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην* is strangely added to *ὑγίειαν καὶ κάλλος*, Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has omitted *τὴν ἄλλην*. It is however acknowledged by Stobæus. Perhaps Plato wrote *πολλὴν τὴν ῥώμην*—

to walk about, and to mould the infant as a thing of wax, while it is yet flexible, and to put it in swathing-clothes until it is two years old; and that we are moreover compelling the nurses by legal fines to carry the children either into the fields, or to the temples, or their acquaintance, until they are sufficiently able to stand alone; and then that they should be careful, lest by the limbs becoming distorted, while forcibly resting on them, being still young, to undergo the additional labour of carrying the infant, until it had completed its third year; and that the nurses ought to be as strong as possible; and, in addition, that unless these things take place to each child, we are to enact a fine upon those who do not act so? or is this far from being the case? For that, which has just now been mentioned, would happen to us without stint.¹

Clin. What is that?

Athen. To pay the debt of abundant laughter, through² the womanlike and servile manners of the nurses being unwilling to obey us.³

Clin. But on what account then did we say that this ought to be stated?

Athen. On this. A person, on hearing⁴ of the habits of masters and free persons in states, would perhaps come to the correct conception, that, without a proper administration of private concerns taking place in states, one would think there would be vainly any stability in the laying down of laws; and so thinking, he would make use of the laws just now mentioned; and using them correctly, he would by his administration render both his own household and the city happy.

Clin. You have spoken very reasonably.

Athen. Let us then not desist from the legislation of this kind, until we have given out the pursuits relating likewise to the souls of very young children in the same manner as we

¹ The Greek is πολλὰ καὶ ἀφθονον. Ficinus avoids the tautology by translating "abunde," and so too does Taylor.

² I have adopted πρὸς τὸ, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of πρὸς τῷ—

³ In ἀν, which is unnecessary here, lies hid ἡμῖν, answering to "nobis" in Ficinus.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were ἀκούσας τις εἰς—not ἀκούσαντα εἰς—For although τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν might be written for οἱ δεσπόται, yet τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἦθη could not; and still less could τὰ ἦθη be said to hear and to come to a conception.

began to go through the subject, when the accounts were stated relating to the body.

Clin. Perfectly right.

Athen. Let us then receive this as an element with respect to both the circumstances, ¹[the body and soul,]¹ of the very young, that the nursing and motion, taking place as much as possible all the night and day, are profitable to all, and not the least ²to the youngest; so that,² if it were possible, they may live as if always sailing on the sea. But now, ³(since this is impossible),³ it is requisite to act as near as possible to this with respect to ⁴the newly born nurslings of children.⁴ And ⁵(what ought to be done) one may conjecture⁵ from this, that both the nurses of infants, and those who are initiated in the remedies⁶ relating to the Corybantes,⁶ have adopted this from experience, and know it to be useful. For, when mothers are desirous to put to sleep their children, who sleep with difficulty, they do not bring to them a state of quietness, but, on the contrary, of motion, by shaking them ever in their arms; nor yet that of silence, but that of singing to them; and they artlessly⁷ soothe their children, as it were, by the sound of a pipe, and, as the remedies of the mad Bacchantes are employed,⁸ by making use, at the same time, of the movements in music and the dance.

Clin. What then, O guest, is especially the cause of this?

Athen. It is not very difficult to know.

¹—¹ The words between the brackets are evidently an explanation of ἀμφότερα.

²—² The Greek is τοῖς ὅτι νεωτάτοις καὶ οἰκεῖν, where not only is ὅτι absurdly placed before νεωτάτοις, but οἰκεῖν is without regimen. Ficinus has, "tenerrimis, ut, si fieri possit, sic habitent," which evidently leads to τοῖς νεωτάτοις, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν ἦν—

³—³ The words between the lunes are found only in Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, "quoniam autem fieri nequit—"

⁴—⁴ The Greek is τὰ νεογενῇ παιδῶν θρέμματα. But θρέμμα is united to the word for the parent, not for that of the offspring. Hence for παιδῶν one would prefer ἀπ' ὠδίνων—

⁵—⁵ The Greek is at present simply τεκμαίρεσθαι χρῆ. But it was more full in the MS. of Ficinus; at least his version is, "quod autem fieri oporteat, conjectare hinc licet," adopted tacitly by Taylor.

⁶—⁶ I have adopted Cousin's interpretation.

⁷ I have taken ἀτίχνως in its natural sense of "artlessly," not, as others, of "really," in Greek ἀτεχνῶς.

⁸ Although εἰσι might be understood after ἰάσεις, yet, I suspect, γίγνονται lies hid in ταύτῃ.

Clin. How so?

Athen. Both these passions result from fear; and there are certain terrors through a depraved habit of the soul. When therefore any one brings from without an agitation to passions of this kind, that which is from without overcomes the dreadful and insane motion within; and after overcoming, it seems to have produced a calm in the soul, and a quietness in the leaping, which had been troublesome as regards the heart of each; ¹(and) thus, (what is) altogether agreeable,¹ it causes some to obtain by lot² sleep; but others, who are awake, and dancing and soothed by the pipe under the influence of the divinities, to whom each may be supplicating and sacrificing, it causes to possess habits of sound sense in the place of a maddened state. Now this, to speak in brief, has in this way a certain probable reason.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now if these things possess thus any such power, it is requisite to consider this point as connected with them, that every soul, which has been familiar with fear from youth, would be more accustomed to be conversant with fears.³ But this every one will surely say is an exercise of timidity, and not of fortitude.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But the contrary pursuit we should say is that of fortitude, in the overcoming, even from youth, what falls upon us in the shape of fears and terrors.

Clin. Correctly so.

Athen. Let us say then, that this one thing, the all-perfect

¹—¹ Stephens was the first to see that in *παντάπασις ἀγαπητόν τι* there was something wanting. For he found in Ficinus, "atque ita;" as if his MS. had *kai οὕτως*, instead of *ἀγαπητόν τι*. I have translated, as if the Greek were *kai οὕτως, δ ἀγαπητόν ἐστὶ τι*, unless it be said that the words *παντάπασις ἀγαπητόν τι* ought to follow *ὑπνόν* in the next sentence.

² Instead of *λαγχάνειν* one would prefer *τυγχάνειν*. But the disorder lies somewhat deeper. For Plato probably wrote *ὑπνόν λαμβάνειν ἀχνην*, remembering the expression in Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 91, *ὑπνόν—ἀχνην*, to which the Etymol. M. alludes in *Ἀχνη* after *Ἀχοι*—where *Ἀχνη* is quoted from Homer in the sense of sea-foam; from Hippocrates, of the fluff of flax; from Æschylus, of the lightness of smoke; and from Aristophanes, of the lightness of sleep; while, as regards the change of *λαμβάνειν* and *λαγχάνειν*, it will be sufficient to refer to Porson on Hec. 41.

³ Instead of *γίγνεσθαι*, which Ast would defend by dissimilar passages, quoted by Valckenaer on Phœn. 482, Cornarius would read *κινεῖσθαι*, suggested by "ferri" in Ficinus.

gymnastic exercise of children in motion, greatly contributes to a part of virtue¹ in the soul.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And moreover, that a disposition, morose or not, in the soul² would become and be called² respectively no little part of cowardice or bravery.

Clin. How not?

Athen. In what manner then is to be implanted which of these we may wish in the newly born? We must endeavour to state how and to what extent a person may have an easy road in these matters.

Clin. How not?

[3.] *Athen.* I will mention then the fixed opinion with us, that luxury renders the manners of youth morose and irascible, and vehemently agitated by things of a trifling nature; but that an excessive and rustic servitude causes them to be contrary to this, abject and illiberal, and man-haters, and unfitting associates.

Clin. But how will the whole state be able to bring up those, who have as yet no perception of language, and are unable to have any taste for the rest of instruction?

Athen. Somehow in this way. Every animal, as soon as it is born, is wont to utter some sound with a loud cry, and not the least the human species; and more than the rest of animals it is affected in addition to its crying with the shedding of tears.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now nurses, looking to what infants are desirous of, make a conjecture by their presenting to them something. For they think they correctly offer that, on which being presented the children are silent; but incorrectly that, at which it sheds tears and cries out. For in the case of children tears and cries are the indications of what they love and hate, (and are) signs by no means lucky. Now this period is not less than three years, a not small portion of life to pass through badly or not badly.

¹ So Fortitude is said to be one part of virtue in the soul, in Laches § 29, and in the Statesman § 44.

^{2—2} I have translated as if the Greek were *γινόμενον λέγουσ' ἄν*—Ast, however, refers to iii. 4, a passage which is equally faulty, and as easily emended.

Clin. You speak correctly.

Athen. Does not a person who is morose, and by no means good-tempered, appear to you to be for the most part given to lamentation and full of moanings more than is fitting for the good to be?

Clin. It appears so to me.

Athen. What then, if a person were to endeavour, by bringing together every method, during those three years, that the nursing may be affected as little as possible with sorrow and fears and with every pains in our power, do we not think that we should render then the soul of the nursing more cheerful and kind?

Clin. It is evident, O guest; and most of all, should any one supply it with many pleasures.

Athen. In this I cannot, O wondrous man, follow Clinias. For with us such conduct would be a destruction the greatest of all.¹ For it occurs perpetually at the commencement of nurture.¹ But let us see whether we are asserting any thing.

Clin. State what you mean.

Athen. That our discourse is at present about a not trifling matter. Do you then, Megillus, look to it, and decide between us. For my assertion is, that an upright life ought neither to pursue pleasures, nor entirely to avoid pain, but to embrace the medium between them, which I have just now denominated a favourable temper; a disposition, of which, according to some voice of an oracle, we correctly speak as belonging to a deity.² This habit, I assert, that he amongst us ought to pursue, who would be divine; nor let him go wholly headlong to pleasures; for in this case he would not be free from pain; nor let him permit any other person, old or young, male or female, to suffer³ the

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, "nam talis educatio, cum in principio statim adhibeatur, omnium maxima perniciēs est;" where *ἐκάστοτε* is omitted.

² This, as Ast remarks correctly, refers to the fact, that the word *ἡλεως* is generally applied to a deity; and he quotes very opportunely Euthydem. p. 273, F., *ἡλεω εἶπτον ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφῶ, ὥσπερ θεῶ, προσαγορεύω.*

³—³ Ast, unable to understand to what the words *ταὐτὸ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν*, omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor, are to be referred, would read *αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν*, where *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* would allude, he says, to *τὸ προπετῇ γίγνεσθαι*, and *ἡμῶν* to *ἄλλον*.

same thing with us,³ and, as far as he is able, the newly born the least of all. For all the manners are, through custom, implanted in all the most powerfully at that period. And further still, if I were not about to appear to be jesting, I would say, that one ought to attend to women, who are carrying any thing in the womb, the most of all during that very year, so that the person pregnant may neither enjoy pleasures numerous and violent, nor, on the other hand, feel pains, but live through that period, preserving a line of conduct benignant, and good-tempered, and mild.

Clin. There was no need, O guest, of your asking Megillus, which of us spoke in the more proper manner; for I agree with you, that all persons ought to avoid a life of unmingled pleasure and pain, and that they should always pursue a certain middle course. You have, therefore, both spoken and heard in a proper manner.

Athen. Very properly so, Clinias. But, in addition to these points, let us all three consider this likewise.

Clin. What?

[4.] *Athen.* That all these matters, which we are now going through, are by the many called unwritten laws; and that those, which they call the laws of the country, are no other than of such a kind; and further still, that the discourse, which has just now flowed upon us, how that we ought not either to call them laws, or to permit them to be unmentioned, has been spoken correctly. For these are the bonds of all polity, existing in a middle state between all laws that have been, and are, and will be hereafter, laid down in writing; and being, as it were, altogether the laws of a country, and ancient in every respect, and which, when laid down correctly and have become a custom, have invested the written laws with every kind of security; but should they advance improperly beyond what is right, they cause, like supports placed by carpenters in the buildings of houses, and gliding away from the centre, every thing to fall together to the same point, and to lie, some under others, both themselves and what has been subsequently built upon them, after the old portions have secretly given way. Reflecting upon which, it is necessary for us, O Clinias, to bind together your city new on all sides, and to the utmost of our power to omit nothing great or small which a person may call laws, or manners, or pursuits; for

by all things of this kind a state is bound together ; but none of these can be stable without each other ; so that one need not wonder, if many and at the same time trifling things, appearing to us to be enactments, or even customs, should, when flowing to the same point, cause the laws to become of a greater length.

Clin. Both you speak properly yourself, and we too shall reflect in this manner.

Athen. If then, in the case of a boy and girl of three years old, any one should bring these matters accurately to an end, and make use of what has been said in not a careless manner, they will be of no small advantage to those recently brought up. But there will be a need of sports¹ for the habits of the soul at three, and four, and five, and even six years of age. But we must already remove them from luxury, by chastising them, not in an ignominious manner, but, as we said on the subject of slaves, by chastising not with insults so as to encourage an angry feeling in them, when so chastised, nor a feeling for licentiousness by suffering them to go unpunished, we must do the same in the case of the free-born. Now the sports of persons of that age are self-produced ; and which, when they come together, they almost invent themselves.² All children then of this kind ought to come together at the temples distributed through the villages, from three to six years of age, each of those belonging to the same village to the same spot in common ; and let the nurses take cognizance of their orderly behaviour and licentiousness ; ³ but of the nurses themselves and their whole pack, let one of the twelve women be appointed to each to regulate for the space of a year, of those

¹ Both Ast and Staßbaum have adopted παιδιῶν for παιδίων, as suggested by the German translator Schulthes.

² Such may have been the case in Greece, and in the time of Plato. But in other countries and more recent periods the sports of children, so far from being invented by themselves, have been handed down from age to age ; and, as Paley once remarked, while empires have flourished and decayed, the sports of children have remained unchanged by time ; for they still ride on sticks, and play at odd and even, as Horace tells us they did in his day ; and make horses and carts out of orange peels, as Aristophanes states they did more than 2000 years ago.

³—³ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible original ; where it is not easy to say to what " each " belongs. Ast understands by it τῇ ἀγίλῃ τῶν τροφῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν. For he had read in Ficinus, " et cuique cætui nutricibusque una quædam præsit de mulieribus duodecim, annuo

of the before-mentioned, whom the guardians of the law may have ordained.³ And let the women, who have full powers over the care of marriages, choose them, one out of each ward, and of the same age with themselves; and let her, who is appointed, perform her office, by going each day to the temple, and ever punishing the person who does wrong, a male and female slave, and a stranger, male or female, herself, (or)¹ by means of certain domestics² of the state; and let her take a citizen, when disputing about his punishment, before the City-Stewards for trial; but let her punish herself, even a citizen, when there is no dispute. After six years of age, let each sex be separated; and let boys pass their time with boys, and girls in like manner with each other; and it is meet for each to be turned to learning, the males from the teachers of horsemanship, and archery, and the hurling of darts, and the using of slings, and the females too, if they consent so far as to learn especially what relates to the use of arms. But what is at present established on matters of this kind, is unknown to nearly all.

Clin. What is that?

[5.] *Athen.* That what relates to the right and the left hand differs naturally,³ with respect to their use in the several actions pertaining to the hands; especially since there appears in what relates to the feet and the lower limbs no difference as regards labour. But in the case of hands we each of us

tempore imperatura, prout legum custodes ordinaverint;" as if he had found in his MS. τῶν δὲ τροφῶν καὶ ἀγίλης, ἐκάστης ἐκ τῶν δώδεκα γυναικῶν μίαν τετάχθαι κοσμοῦσαν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν, ὡς ἂν τάξωσιν οἱ νομοφύλακες, with the omission of *ἐμπάσης* after *ἀγίλης*, and τῶν προτερημένων after *ἐνιαυτὸν*, and the change of *ἄς*, found in six MSS., into *ὡς*, read in one. What Plato in reality wrote might perhaps be recovered by merely rearranging the different members of the sentence. Cousin however has penned a long note here, but produced nothing satisfactory.

¹ All the MSS. but one read *αὐτῇ* for *αὐτῆν*, in which lies hid *αὐτῇ ἡ*, as I have translated.

² Instead of the strange expression *τινων τῆς πόλεως οἰκετῶν*, one would have expected *ὑπηρετῶν*: or, as they were called at Athens, *τοξότων*, similar to the "tipstiffs," or rather "javelin-men," that still attend upon the High Sheriff of a county in England.

³ How Plato could say that the right and left hand differ naturally, one cannot understand. Perhaps he wrote *ἑστ' ὅς, ὁ θαυμ' ἦν, φησὶν, ἡμῶν*—not *ἑστ' ἡμῶν φύσει*, i. e. "there is one, who says, what is wonderful," probably Protagoras; whose doctrine Aristotle has supported in the passages quoted by Ast here, and by Gataker on Marc. Anton. xii. 6.

become, as it were, lame, through the (folly and)¹ ignorance of our nurses and mothers. For while the nature of our limbs on each side² is nearly balanced, we have ourselves, by not using them correctly, made them, through habit,³ different. In such employments as where there is no great difference, it is of no consequence, whether a person makes use of a lyre with his left hand and of the plectrum⁴ with his right, and whatever else is of a similar kind. But to make use of these examples in other cases, ⁵where there is no need of using it,⁵ is nearly a folly. This fact has the law of the Scythians pointed out, where a person does not push from him the bow with his left hand (merely), and draw to himself the arrow with his right merely, but he makes use of either similarly for both purposes. And there are very many other examples of this kind in charioteering and other things. From which one may learn, that those, who make the left hand weaker than the right, act contrary to nature. This, as I have said, is of no great moment in the case of plectra made of horn, and such like instruments; but in war, when it is necessary to use weapons of iron, and bows, and spears, ⁶and each of these,⁶ it matters much; but it is of the greatest moment by far, when it is necessary to use shields against shields. There is too a great difference between a person learning and one not learning, and between one, who exercises himself, and one, who is not exercised. For as he, who is perfectly exercised in the pan-

¹ As some MSS. read *ἀνοία*, and others *ἀγνοία*, I suspect that Plato wrote both, as I have translated.

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐκατέρωθεν*, similar to "in utramque partem," in Ficinus, not *ἐκατέρων*, which to me at least is unintelligible.

³ I have adopted, with Stephens and others, *ἔθῃ* for *ῥῥῥῃ*, suggested by "consuetudinem," in Ficinus.

⁴ The "plectrum," used for the lyre, answered the purpose of the quill, by which the string was struck in the old-fashioned harpsichord; while from a subsequent remark it appears it was made of horn.

⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁶ The words between the numerals, not very easy to understand, are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has what is more intelligible, "*cæterisque hujusmodi*," unless it be said that the correct translation is, "But when it is requisite to make use in war both of bows and javelins, and each of these made of iron."

cratium,¹ or in boxing, or wrestling, is incapable of combating with his left-hand limbs, and becomes lame, and drags himself along in a superfluous manner,² when any one, causing him to change his position, compels him to exert himself on the other side, so the same thing, I conceive, one must expect in the case of shields, and in all the rest of weapons, that it behoves him, who possesses doubly the arms by which he can defend himself and attack others, not to suffer, to the utmost of his power, either³ of these to remain idle, and without skill;⁴ but if any one were born, possessing the nature of Geryon or Briareus,⁵ he ought to be able with their hundred hands to hurl a hundred darts. Of all these matters it is meet for the care to be under the female and male rulers; the former being superintendents over the sports and nurture (of the children), but the latter over their education, in order that all the boys and girls by having the perfect use of their feet and their hands may do, to the best of their power, no injury to their natures by their habits.

[6.]⁶ But a twofold education, so to say, it will happen to make use of;⁶ one, of gymnastics, relating to the body; the other, of music, for the sake of a good state of the soul. Again, those of the gymnastics are twofold; one dancing and the other wrestling. And of dancing one kind imitates the

¹ The pancratium was a contest of boxing and wrestling united.

² This is perhaps the best rendering of *πλημμελῶν*. Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to understand *χολαίνει δὲ καὶ ἐφέλκεται πλημμελῶν*, has given a sense out of his own head, "præsto se accommodat:" while Taylor translates *ἐφέλκεται πλημμελῶν* by "is confused in his notions." I suspect, however, that Plato wrote something very different from what is in the text.

³ In lieu of *μηδὲν* the sense requires *μηδέτερον*, "neither," as translated by Taylor.

⁴ To avoid the violent prosopopœia in *ἀνεπιστήμον*, applied to a weapon, one would prefer *εἰς μηδέτερον ἄργον αὐτὸν μηδὲ ἀνεπιστήμον ἔαν εἶναι*—in lieu of *μηδὲν—τούτων—ἀνεπιστήμον*—for *εἰς* might easily have dropt out after *ἄλλοις*.

⁵ These two giant sons of Heaven and Earth are similarly united in Euthyd. p. 299, C.

⁶—⁶ In the words *τὰ δὲ μαθήματα που διττὰ, ὥς γ' εἰπεῖν, χρήσασθαι ξυμβαίνοι δν*, Ast says there are two constructions blended into one. But even this method of explaining away a faulty syntax, does not touch the difficulty in *ὥς εἰπεῖν*, which is quite useless here, nor supply the subject required by *χρήσασθαι*. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote, *ὥστε χρήσασθαι, παντὶ ξυμβαίνοι δν*—

diction of the Muse,¹ preserving the gorgeous at the same time with the liberal; but another kind is for the sake of a good habit of body, and lightness, and the beauty of its limbs and parts, their own harmonious motion being imparted to each, (according to)² what is becoming in their bending and extending,³ and, at the same time, scattered through and following upon every kind of dancing sufficiently.³ The wrestling, however, which Antæus⁴ or Cercyon⁵ placed among their arts, for the sake of useless contention, or the boxing, which Epeius⁶ or Amycus⁷ did likewise, do not deserve to be graced by a discourse, as being of no use in the fellowship of war. But what relates to a stand-up wrestling, and the untwisting of the neck, and the hands, and the sides, when the labour is accompanied with a spirit for contention and a well-framed arrangement of body, for the sake of strength and health, these, as they are useful in every way, are not to be omitted; but we must enjoin upon disciples and masters at the same time, that when we come to that point of our laws, the latter are to impart with a good will all information of this kind, and the former to receive it with thanks. Nor must we omit such imitations in dances as are fit to be imitated; as regards this place, the armed sports of the Curetes,⁸ and, as regards Lacedæmon,

¹ Dancing amongst the ancients was, like the ballets of modern times, pantomimic, and suited to words at first actually written, but afterwards supposed to be so.

² I have translated as if *καὶ*, preserved in five MSS. after *ἐκτάσειω*, were a corruption of *κατὰ*, and had dropt out before *τὸ προσῆκον*.

³ Others may, but I cannot, understand all between the numerals. Plato wrote, I suspect, *Αἰδοῦς πορευομένης καὶ ξυνακολουθούσης*—*διακονικῶς*—similar to the expression in Tibullus, “quoquo vestigia vertit. Componit furtim subsequiturque Pudor.” To this emendation I have been led by *διασπειρωμένης*, read in two MSS., in lieu of *διασπειρομένης*, while *διακονικῶς* might easily have been corrupted into *ικανῶς*.

⁴ To this Antæus, a king of Libya, celebrated as a wrestler, and vanquished by Hercules, there is an allusion in Theætet. p. 169, B.

⁵ On this Cercyon, who lived in the Isthmus of Corinth, and compelled all who passed near his dwelling to wrestle with him, but was overcome eventually by Theseus, see Diodor. Sic. iv. 61; Plutarch. Thes. i. p. 5; and Pausan. Attic. i. 39, quoted by Ast.

⁶ Epeius, the maker of the Trojan horse, was the victor in boxing at the funeral games in honour of Patroclus.

⁷ Amycus, the son of Neptune, was beaten by Pollux, as we learn from the spirited account given by Theocritus, in Id. 22.

⁸ These were called the Pyrrich dances; see the authors quoted by Ast.

those of the Dioscuri.¹ Our virgin too and mistress (Athéné) being delighted with the amusement of the dance, does not think fit to sport with empty hands; but, being adorned with a complete suit of armour, goes in this manner through the dance;² which acts it will be proper for the boys and girls to imitate, and to do honour to the kindness of the goddess shown during the needs of war, and in behalf of festive days. It will likewise be proper for the boys forthwith,³ and for as long a time as they shall not have gone out to war, to make to all the gods processions and pomps, with the adornment of arms and horses, and to perform their supplications to the gods and the sons of the gods, swifter and slower, with dances and marches; and to enter into contests, and preludes of contests, if for any purpose, for not other than these. For these, both in peace and war, are useful for a polity and private households. But the rest of labours, and sports, and pursuits relating to the body are not, Megillus and Clinias, suited to free-men. And thus the gymnastic, which I said in our former discourse ought to be gone through, I have almost gone through at the present moment, and the subject is finished. But if you have any thing better than this, lay it down as a common topic and speak upon it.

Clin. It is not easy, O guest, to put these on one side, and to have any thing better to say about gymnastics and contests.

Athen. With regard then to the gifts of the Muses and Apollo, which is the sequel to the preceding, we formerly thought that, as having said 'all correctly' (about them), we should have to leave only the subject relating to gymnastics;

¹ The twin sons of Zeus were Castor and Pollux, the tutelary deities of Laconia, in whose honour was a dance, mentioned by Lucian, *Περὶ Ὀρχησ.* § 10.

² From this passage it would seem that at Athens, during probably the greater Panathenaic festival, a virgin was dressed up to imitate the goddess, and who danced in armour during a part of the procession; just as, during the early part of the French Revolution a female, nearly naked, was paraded through Paris, as a representation of the goddess of Liberty. For most assuredly Athéné herself did not appear in person, nor was she even thought to do so.

³ I scarcely understand εὐθὺς thus by itself. It is omitted by Ficinus.

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were εὖ πάντα, not ἅπαντα. Ficinus has "de quibus ita satis dictum esse putabamus;" as if his MS. read εἰρηκότες ἱκανῶς, without ἅπαντα—

but now it is evident that there is something which should be first mentioned before all. Let us then speak of it in order.

Clin. It must by all means be spoken of.

Athen. Hear me then, although you have heard previously. Nevertheless it is requisite for both the speaker and hearer to be cautious as to what is very strange and unusual ; and now too, although I am going to tell a tale not to be spoken without fear, I will nevertheless take courage, and not stand aloof.

Clin. What mean you, O guest, by this ?

[7.] *Athen.* I mean that in all states it is a thing unknown to all, that the family of games is of the greatest power in the laying down of laws, as to whether what are laid down will remain or not. ¹ For if it is so ordered, that the same persons shall always use the same (sports),¹ and according to the same, and in a similar manner,² and be delighted with the same playthings, it permits the institutions laid down with seriousness to remain quiet. But when the sports are disturbed, and innovations made in them, and they are affected constantly by changes, the young never speaking of the same things as being dear to them, and neither in the bearing of their own bodies, nor in the rest of their dresses, the becoming and the unbecoming are laid down as acknowledged by them, and when the person, who is ever making some innovation, and introducing something different from what is customary, as regards shape and colour, and every thing of that kind, is pre-eminently held in honour, we should, by saying that no greater bane could happen to a state than by such a thing, speak most correctly ; for he is secretly changing the morals of the young, and causing what is old to be dishonoured, and what is novel to be held in honour. Than this, both an assertion and a fixed

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, “ quippe si hoc ita ordinatum fuerit, ut iisdem ludis—iisdem homines semper utantur,” who has thus omitted the words *καὶ μεράσχοι* after *ταχθῆναι μὲν αὐτὸ* ; out of which he could not make, I suspect, the least sense or syntax ; nor can I ; nor do I see how *αὐτὸ*, the family of games, could be ordered to do any thing by any power. There is some deep-seated disorder here, which would require perhaps a violent remedy.

² On the phrase *τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀεὶ*, expressive of what exists for ever and the same and under similar circumstances, Ast refers to Wytttenbach on Phædon, p. 198.

opinion, I assert again, there is not a greater bane to all states. Hear, then, how great an evil do I say it is.

Clin. Do you mean the circumstance, that what is old in states is found fault with?

Athen. Entirely so.

Clin. You will then have in us no ordinary auditors, with respect to this very discourse, but the best disposed possible.

Athen. It is likely.

Clin. Only speak then.

Athen. Come then, let us hear it ¹more attentively than we usually do,¹ and thus speak to each other. For we shall discover that a change in all things, except the bad, causes us to stumble the most, in the case of all seasons,² and winds,² and in the diet of bodies, and in the manners of souls, and not merely, so to say,³ in some, but not in others,⁴ but in what⁴ I have just now said, in things bad. ⁵So that (any one will see), if he looks to⁵ bodies, how, being accustomed to all kinds of food and all kinds of drink and labours, they do, although they are at first disturbed by them, in time generate from those very substances flesh, kindred to such substances, and by becoming friendly and accustomed to, and acquainted with, all that diet, they exist in the best way as regards pleasure and health. But if at any time a person⁶ is compelled by necessity to change any part of the approved diet, he is at first disturbed by diseases, and with difficulty is set on his legs

¹—¹ This is the proper rendering of *μειζόνως ἡμῶν αὐτῶν*.

²—² The words *ἐν πνεύμασιν* are omitted by Taylor. For finding in Ficinus "inventis," and not looking to the Greek, he did not see that "inventis" did not mean "in inventions," as he probably fancied, but "in winds."

³—³ On the phrase *οὐ τοῖς μὲν, τοῖς δ' οὐ*, see at Phileb. § 32, n. ³—³.

⁴ I have adopted *ὁσπερ* in lieu of *ὅτι περ*, as suggested by Bekker, for the sake of the syntax.

⁵—⁵ The Greek is *ὥστε, εἴ τις ἀποβλέψει πρὸς σώματα*, where Ficinus has omitted all but *σώματα*. For those words were either wanting in his MS., or, what is more likely, he saw that, if they were retained, there would be required something to complete the sense, in some other part of the sentences following. I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were *ὥστ' εἰσεταί τις, εἰ ἀποβλέψει*—For *ὥστ' εἰσεταί τις εἰ* might have been easily corrupted into *ὥστε εἰ τις*—

⁶ It is evident that *τις* has dropt out after *αὐθις*, for otherwise *συνταρχθεις* and *ἀπολαβών* would be without regimen.

again,¹ ² after acquiring again a familiarity with his food.² The same thing, it is meet to think, takes place as regards the ideas of men, and the nature of their souls. For every soul has a reverence for the laws in which it may have been brought up,³ and which have, by a certain divine good fortune, remained undisturbed ⁴ through time (so) long and much, that ⁴ no one either recollects or has ever heard of their having been otherwise than they are at present, and it fears to disturb any of those then existing. The legislator then ought to devise from some quarter a plan as to the manner in which this may take place in a state. In this way then do I discover it. All men, as I have said before, consider the sports of youth, when they are disturbed, to be in reality sports, and not that the greatest seriousness and mischief arise out of them; so that they do not avert (the change),⁵ but comply with and yield to it; nor do they consider this, ⁶ that the children, who engage in these new sports, must necessarily become men different from those who were children in the former period;⁶ and that, becoming different, they will seek a different life; and so seeking will be desirous of other pursuits and laws; and no one fears that, after this, there will come upon states what has been just now called the greatest evil. But other changes would effect lesser evils;⁷ such at least as relate to fashions would suffer a thing of this

¹ Such is the exact meaning of *κάτεστη*.

²⁻² Ficinus has "antequam novo victui consuescant," translated by Taylor, "until they are accustomed to the new food."

³ Instead of *ἐντραφῶσι*, both sense and syntax require *ἐντραφεῖσ' ἦ*, as I have translated.

⁴⁻⁴ The Greek is *γίνωνται μακρῶν καὶ πολλῶν χρόνων*, *ὥς*— But though *χρόνος* may be united to *μακρὸς* or *πολὺς* singly, it cannot to both at once. Moreover, *ὥστε*, not *ὥς*, is thus joined to an infinitive. Plato wrote, I suspect, *γίνωνται οὕτω μακραίωνων χρόνων*, *ὥστε*— while *καὶ* (or *ἦ*) *πολλῶν* would be the explanation of *μακραίωνων*. Ficinus has simply "longis temporibus."

⁵ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "mutationem hanc innovationemque," where the two words show, as usual, that he found only one in the Greek, probably *τὰ κεκαινοτομημένα*, similar to *κινούμενα*—*καὶ καινοτομούμενα*, a little above in p. 797. B.

⁶⁻⁶ For the sake of perspicuity, Ficinus has supplied some words wanting in the Greek. His version is, "quod necesse est, pueros diversis ac priores ludis gaudentes diversos differentesque a prioribus vivis fieri."

⁷ The Greek is *ὅσα περὶ σχήματα πάσχει*— But one MS. has *πάσχει*, which leads to *ὅσα γε περὶ σχήματ' ἂν πάσχοι*— as I have translated.

kind. But whatever alterations occur frequently with respect to praise and blame, touching the question of manners, these would, I think, be the greatest of all, and require the most caution.

Clin. How not ?

[8.] *Athen.* What then, do we still believe in our former assertion, in which we stated that the matters relating to rhythm and every kind of music are imitations of the manners of men better and worse ? Or how ?

Clin. Our fixed opinion would be in no respect otherwise than this.

Athen. We assert then, that we must contrive every kind of plan in order that the children in our state may not hanker after other imitations in dancing and singing, nor any one persuade them (to an innovation)¹ by introducing pleasures of various kinds.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. Has then any one of us any art better for this purpose than that of the Egyptians ?

Clin. What art do you mean ?

Athen. Of making holy every kind of dancing and melody, by ordaining, in the first place, festivals, after calculating² for the year, what ought to take place, and at what time, and in honour of what gods respectively, and the sons of gods, and dæmons ; and after this, what ode ought to be hymned at each sacrifice of the gods, and with what dances to honour the then sacrifice : ³which when they are ordained,³ (it is meet to) ordain some other things, so that all the citizens may in common make sacrifices (and)⁴ libations to the Fates, and to all the other deities, (and) consecrate their several odes to the gods severally, and to the others.⁵ But if any person intro-

¹ Ficinus alone has "ad novitatem," adopted by Taylor.

² Ficinus omits *συλλογισαμένους*, and so, after him, does Taylor.

³ Before the words *ἃ δ' ἂν ταχθῇ* the text has *τάξαι μὲν πρῶτον τίνος*, out of which as Ficinus could make no sense, he has omitted them ; and so, after him, has Taylor. Stephens too was at a loss ; and hence he proposed to read *τινας*, suggested by "aliquas" in Cornarius. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἃ δ' ἂν ταχθῇ, τάξαι μὲν ἑτέρ' αὐτῶν, ὥστε*—as I have translated.

⁴ I have inserted "and" ; for *καὶ* might easily have dropt out before *σπένδοντας*.

⁵ Ficinus has, instead of *καὶ τῶν ἄλλων*, "eorumve filiis et dæmo-

duces in honour of any god other hymns and dances besides those which are instituted by law, let the priests and priestesses, together with the guardians of the laws, restrain him in a holy manner, and according to law; and let him, who is restrained, if he is not willingly restrained, (suffer) the punishment of his impiety through the whole of life from any one who is willing to inflict it.

Clin. Right.

Athen. But since we are now engaged on this subject, let us be affected in a manner befitting us.

Clin. About what are you speaking?

Athen. Every young person, not merely the old, on seeing or hearing any thing out of the way, and by no means customary, would not immediately 'run thus' and concede what is the doubtful point respecting them, but he would stand still; and, as if being where three roads meet, and not knowing very well the road, whether he happened to be travelling alone, or in company with others, he would inquire of himself and the others, and not proceed before he had settled the question in his mind, as to whither the road would lead him. And we must act in a similar manner at present. For a strange conversation having now fallen upon us on the subject of laws, we ought necessarily to make every inquiry; and, being of such an age, to speak not readily on matters of such moment, insisting with vehemence, that we have it in our power to say something clearly on the instant.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. We will, therefore, give the subject time, and decide then firmly upon it, when we shall have considered it sufficiently. But in order that we may not be prevented from going through in vain the arrangement consequent upon the laws, let us proceed to the end of them. For, perhaps, if god wills, this very digression will obtain wholly its completion, and point out sufficiently what is at present a matter of doubt.

Clin. You speak most excellently, O guest, and we will do as you say.

nibus," found just before. Taylor's translation is "and their attendants," which he got from I know not whence.

¹ I cannot understand *ἐπιδραμὼν οὕτως*—I could have understood *ἐπιδραμὼν ἀνοήτως*, i. e. "run thoughtlessly towards—" For thus "the running towards" would be opposed to "the standing still."

Athen. Let then, we say, this strange thing be decreed, that odes exist for us as laws, [and]¹ just as the ancients gave such a name, as it seems, formerly² with respect to playing on the harp;³ so that, perhaps, not even they would have entirely dissented from what is said by us at present; and some one has surely, as if either in a night dream or with his eyes open in the day, imagined and prophesied this. Let this then be the decree respecting it. Let no one utter any song besides the public and sacred songs, or move in any dance, contrary to the whole dancing of the young men, any more than (he would act) contrary to any other law: and let him, who is such,⁴ be dismissed without a fine; but let, as was said just now, the guardians of the laws, and the priests and priestesses, chastise him, who does not obey. Let then this be held to be laid down by us in our discourse.

Clin. Let it be laid down.

[9.] *Athen.* But in what manner can any one, so laying them down as laws, not be altogether a laughing-stock?⁵ Let us still consider something of this kind respecting them.⁶ It is the safest course to mould for them, as it were, certain impressions in our discourse. Now I assert that one of the impressions is something of this kind. The sacrifice having taken place and the victims burnt according to law, if some person, a son, we say, or a brother, should⁷ as a private person stand by the altars and sacred rites, and blaspheme with every kind of blasphemy, should we not say that he gave vent to a want of thought, and imposed an evil omen and prophecy both against his father and the rest of his kindred?

Clin. How not.

Athen. ⁶Now this is occurring in the places with us, the

¹ The word *kai*, which has no meaning here, is properly omitted by Ficinus.

²⁻³ Not only formerly, but in more modern times, the same word has been taken in a legal and musical sense. Thus the French "*loix*," a law, and "*lais*," a tale or song, are evidently of the same origin, and derived from the Latin "*leg-o*," I read, either letters or notes.

³ Ficinus has, more intelligibly, "*qui parat*," adopted by Taylor.

⁴⁻⁵ All between the numerals is omitted by Taylor.

⁵ The Greek is *φαμέν*, which is quite unnecessary, not to say absurd, before the subsequent *φαίμεν δν*—From the following *ἀθυμία*, one would suspect that Plato wrote *ἀθυμος δν*—

⁶⁻⁷ The Greek is *ἐν τοῖν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν τόποις τοῦτ' ἐστὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν γιγνόμενον ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν σχεδὸν ὀλίγου πάσαις*. But *ταῖς πόλεσιν*

states, so to say, nearly all by a little.⁶ For when any magistrate shall have performed any sacrifice publicly, after this there comes not one choir, but a multitude of choirs; and standing not far from the altars, but sometimes close to them, they pour forth every kind of blasphemy against things sacred, putting on the stretch¹ the souls of the hearers with words, and rhythms, and the most doleful harmonies; and he who causes the city, after it has made the sacrifice, to weep the most on the instant, carries off the victory.² Do we not reject by our votes this law? And if at any time it is requisite for the citizens to hear sorrows of this kind, it should be, not when the days are clear of any stain, but of an inauspicious³ kind rather; and then it is proper for some dancers (and)⁴ singers to be hired from abroad, just as those, who are hired at funerals,⁵ send forward⁶ the dead⁷ with some Carian strain. A thing of this kind would properly take place about such odes⁸ as these. Moreover a robe will be proper for funeral odes,⁹

could not thus follow *τοῖς τόποις*, nor *ὀλίγου* be united, after *ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, to *σχεδὸν* and *πάσαις*. Plato probably wrote *τοῖς τε παρ' ἡμῖν—ταῖς τε ἄλλαις πόλεσι—ὀλίγου πάσαις*; while *σχεδὸν* would be the explanation of *ὀλίγου*, although *σχεδὸν ὀλίγου πᾶσα* is found in p. 805, A. § 11. Ficinus avoids all the difficulty by his version, "In nostris civitatibus ferme omnibus, ut breviter dicam, hoc ita fit."

¹ Ficinus has "infiunt," as if his MS. read some other word in lieu of *συντείνοντες*.

² In the preceding words there is evidently an allusion to the tragedies performed at or near temples, in which the characters, especially in the plays of Euripides, frequently gave vent to blasphemous expressions.

³ The Greek word *ἀποφράδες* is said by the Schol. to be applied to the days in which either no ordinary business was done, or only of a melancholy kind. It answers to the Latin "nefastus," or "nefandus," in Horace.

⁴ Ficinus alone has "externique cantores," who found, no doubt, *καὶ* before *ψδοῦς* in his MS.

^{5, 6} I cannot believe that Plato wrote *περὶ τοὺς τελευτήσαντας—τοὺς τελευτήσαντας*. He might have written, *περιττῶς τίλη λύσαντας*, i. e. "having paid sums extravagantly," and inserted those words after *προπέμπονσι*.

⁷ A similar custom of hiring mourners still exists in England, while the Carian howl of sorrow was no doubt the counterpart of the wake at an Irish funeral.

⁸ In lieu of *ψδαῖς*, which is evidently an absurdity, and omitted in one MS., Plato wrote as evidently *ῥας*, "seasons."

⁹ Here too *ψδαῖς* has again ousted the correct word *ἀνδής*—For it should be told, of what kind was the robe. Hence Ficinus, who acknowledges *ψδαῖς*, inserted, probably out of his own head, "lugubris" before "vestis."

and not crowns, or golden ornaments, but every thing the contrary, that I may be freed as quickly as possible from speaking on these matters. But thus much do I ask of you again, whether of the impressions relating to odes it is agreeable¹ to you for this first one to be laid down?²

Clin. Of what kind.

Athen. As a good omen; and moreover, let the genus of the ode be every where, and in every respect, a good omen to us. Or shall I not ask you at all, but lay it down thus?

Clin. Lay it down by all means; for by all votes this law is the victor.

Athen. What then, after this good omen, shall be the second law of music? Will it not be for prayers to be (offered) to the gods, to whom we on each occasion sacrifice?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But the third law, I think, will be, that it behoves poets, when they know that³ prayers are requests from men to the gods,³ ever⁴ to direct their mind very carefully to this point,⁵ that they may not unconsciously ask for what is an evil, as if it were a good.⁶ For the condition of a prayer of this kind taking place, would, I think, be ridiculous.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Were we not a little while ago convinced, that a Plutus, neither of silver nor of gold, ought to dwell in a state, as if settled there?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Of what then shall we say that this discourse has been spoken as the pattern? Is it not of this, that not every race of poets is competent to know thoroughly things good and evil? Some poet then surely, having composed either in

^{1, 2} The Greek is ἀρεσκον κείσθω. But the imperative could not thus follow—ἐπανερωτή—ei— The syntax evidently requires, as I have translated, ἀρεσκοὶ κείσθαι—similar to “utrum placeat—adhiberi”—in Ficinus.

^{3—5} The Greek is εὐχαὶ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰσι—which is evidently incorrect. Ficinus has “preces ipsas petitiones hominum a diis”—who found in his MS εὐχαὶ αἰται παρ’ ἀνῶν θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰσι—as I have translated, omitting αἰται, which is unnecessary.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were AEI, not ΔEI.

⁵ In lieu of αὐτοῦς one MS. has αὐτοῖς, which seems to lead to ρούτοις.

⁶ On mistakes of this kind, see Alcibiad. ii. § 1.

prose or 'verse, on a mistaken subject,¹ (so that)² our citizens make their prayers not correct respecting matters of the greatest moment, ³will not do all with impunity,³ especially since, as we have already said, we shall not find many mistakes greater than this. Let us then lay down this as one of the laws and forms respecting the Muse.

Clin. What one? Speak to us more clearly.

Athen. That a poet shall not compose any thing, either beautiful or good, contrary to what is lawful and just in the state; nor shall he be permitted to show what he has composed to any private person, before it shall have been shown to the judges and guardians of the law, appointed for this purpose, and approved of by them. Now they have been almost marked out, whom we have chosen as the lawgivers relating to music, and the guardian likewise of education. What then, as I have often asked, shall this be laid down⁴ as a law, and a type, and a third impression? Or how seems it?

Clin. Let it be laid down; how not?

[10.] *Athen.* After these there should be sung hymns to, and praises of, the gods accompanied with prayers; and after the gods in like manner, there should be prayers with praises to the dæmons and heroes, and suited to all of them.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And after these there should take place this law without any stint. Such of the citizens as may have come to the end of life, after having performed works honourable and laborious relating to the body and soul, and have been obedient to the laws, it shall be fitting for these to meet with praises.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But to honour those still living with praises and

¹—¹ I have translated as if the Greek were μέλος τι, τὸ ἡμαρτημένον, not μέλος τοῦτο τὸ ἡμαρτημένον—

² To support the syntax, which Ast has been unable to explain satisfactorily, I have supposed that ὥστε has dropt out.

³—³ From the words τάναντία ποιήσει, which I cannot understand, one may elicit πᾶν ἀνὰ τὴ οὐ ποιήσει—as I have translated. Ficinus has “quare, si quisquam poetarum verbis aut cantu præter ipsam rationem preces non rectas nobis tradiderit, is contraria in rebus maximis petere cives faciet,” as if he had found in his MS. κατὰ τὸ ἡμαρτημένον—

⁴ The Greek is κείσθω— I have translated as if it were κείσεται— For an imperative cannot be used interrogatively, although a future indicative can.

hymns, it is not safe, ¹ before a person after having run through the whole of life, shall stand (still) at an honourable end.¹ Let all these be common to men and women, who have been conspicuously virtuous. But it is necessary for odes and dances to be established in this manner. There are many ancient and beautiful poems of old writers relating to music, and similarly to dancing for bodies.² Against choosing out of these what is becoming and suited to an established polity, there is no objection. Of these let the persons selected³ as examiners, being not less than fifty years old, make a selection. And let them select whatever of the ancient poems appears to be all-sufficient; but whatever is defective, or altogether unsuitable, let it be rejected entirely; or let them take poets and musicians, and employing their powers of poetry, adapt it to a new rhythm after it is corrected;⁴ but let them not give way to pleasure or desire, except in some few cases; but, interpreting the intention of the legislator, establish dancing and singing, and every dancing⁵ according to their own good sense. For every occupation relating to music, which adopts order, is infinitely better than that without order,⁶ even when the pleasant in music is not added. Now the pleasant is common to all music. For that music, with which a person has lived from childhood to a staid and intelligent age, ⁷(he considers to be pleasant,)⁷ inasmuch as it is temperate and in order. But on hearing a

¹—¹ Plato alludes, as remarked by Ast, to the celebrated saying of Solon, recorded by Herodotus, i. 32, or to a similar sentiment promulgated by Sophocles in *CEd. T.* 1515, and other poets.

² This introduction of "bodies" seems very strange, and has been omitted by Ficinus.

³ In lieu of *ἐλομένους*, one MS. has *ἐνημένους*, which leads evidently to *ῥημένους*—as I have translated.

⁴ Instead of *ἐπανερόμενους* in Ald., all the MSS. read *ἐπανερόμενον*: from which Ast happily elicited *ἐπανορθούμενον*, similar to "corrigant" in Ficinus.

⁵ As no one, I suspect, can explain the difference between *δρχησιν* and *χορείαν*, I cannot believe that Plato wrote here *χορείαν*, in lieu of which one would prefer *χαρὰν*, "joyousness."

⁶ The Greek is *ἀτακτός γε*— But two MSS. read *ἀτάκτως γε*— Hence, since Ficinus has "quam cum est sine ordine," Ast suggested *ἀτάκτου*— He should have proposed *ἀτάκτου ἔστι*—for *γε* has no meaning here.

⁷—⁷ The words between the numerals, absolutely requisite for the sense, are found in Ficinus, whom Taylor has tacitly followed, "eam jucundam arbitratur." Ast too remarks that after *διαβίῳ* there ought to follow—*ταύτην ἐκαινῇ τε καὶ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι φησιν*.

contrary kind, he dislikes it, and calls it illiberal. But if he has been brought up in that, which is pleasant and common, he says that the contrary to this is frigid and unpleasant. So that, as I just now said,¹ what relates to the pleasant or the unpleasant does not exist about either as a superabundance, but from a superfluity the one makes those, who have been brought up in it on each occasion better, the other worse.¹

Clin. You have spoken well.

Athen. Further still, it will be meet to separate the songs suited to females and males, by defining them under a certain type, and necessary moreover to adapt them to harmonies and rhythms. For it is a shocking thing for the whole of harmony to be a discord, or rhythm to be out of tune, and thus to attribute to melodies nothing adapted to each of them.² It is necessary then to lay down by a law the figures of these. And it is necessary to attribute both constrained to both, but those of the females, by the difference of the nature of each, by this it is meet to mark out clearly.² Now that which is gorgeous and verges to fortitude, must be called manly; but that which more inclines to the ornamental and the moderate, must be handed down, both in law and in discourse, as more feminine. This, then, is the order. After this, let the teaching and handing down of them be detailed, as to the manner how, and the persons by whom, and the time when it is requisite to perform them. (And) as a shipwright,³ when he lays down the keel timbers, as the commencement of the ship-building, draws the form of vessels,³ I appear to myself to do the same thing,

¹—¹ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand. How much more intelligible is the Latin of Ficinus, adopted by Taylor, “*jucunditatis et molestiæ in utraque pro consuetudine nostra par ratio est; sed emolumenti et detrimenti ratio impar; nempe altera meliores, altera deteriores facit utentes.*”

²—² Such is the literal version of a passage which, as Sydenham and Ast truly observe, is evidently corrupt; but which neither have been able to correct satisfactorily. Ficinus has, what is adopted by Taylor, and is indeed intelligible; but it cannot be got out of the Greek, as existing at present—“*Horum igitur formæ necessario legibus statuendæ sunt, utrisque convenienter attribuendæ; et quid virum quidve mulierem, deceat, ex ipsa utriusque naturæ differentia declarare.*”

³—³ Such is the literal version of the original. One would however have expected to find *καταβάλλεται—ὁπογραφομένος*—for the sense would then have been—“after drawing the forms of vessels, lays down the keel-timbers as the commencement of the ship-building.” Ficinus

by endeavouring to distinguish the figures of lives according to the manners of souls, (and) in reality to lay down their keel-timbers, (and) very properly to consider by what device, and after what manner, we may live together and be carried the best during this voyage¹ of life. Human affairs, indeed, are not worthy of great attention; yet it is necessary to attend to them. This indeed is not a fortunate circumstance. But since we are here, if we can somehow accomplish this in a fitting manner, it will perhaps be within our measure. ²But what am I saying? This very point perhaps some one would take up, and rightly so.²

Clin. And very much so.

Athen. I say then, that to a serious thing we ought to pay a serious attention, but to a not serious one none at all; and that the deity is naturally worthy of every blessed³ attention, but that man, as I said before,⁴ has been devised as the plaything of a deity, and this is truly his best attribute. It is necessary then for every man and woman to pursue this mode, and, by engaging in the most beautiful sports, to pass thus through life with thoughts the reverse of what they think at present.

Clin. How?

Athen. At present indeed they think that serious pursuits ought to exist for the sake of sports. For they consider that they ought to well dispose the serious pursuits relating to war for the sake of peace. But in war there never has been naturally either sport or instruction worthy of mention, nor is there, nor will there be. But this we say is a thing to us the most serious, (that) every one ought to pass through life for the most part and the best in peace. What then is the proper manner, (in which)⁵ a person may pass through life in sport? and what are the sports for a person to engage in, while sacrificing

avoids the difficulty by his abridged version, "quemadmodum vero navium faber carinulas primum ad navis formam supponit."

¹ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "per hæc maria."

²—³ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows implicitly, has "sed quid dicam, recte fortassis aliquis queret."

³ I hardly understand *μακάριον* here.

⁴ In i. § 13.

⁵ The Bipont editor was the first to insert here *ῥ* for the sake of the sense and syntax; and so after him Ast, to whom Stalbaum attributes the correction. Winckelmann, with Stephens, prefers *τι πάλαιοντα*—

and singing and dancing, so as to be able to render the gods propitious to him, and to repel foes, and to be the victor in battle? Now by what singing and dancing a person may accomplish both these things, a portion of the type has been detailed, and the paths, as it were, have been cut, in which the person is to proceed, who thinks that the poet has well said, (in *Od.* iii. 26,)

“Some things, Telemachus, thou wilt thyself
Find in thy heart; but others will a god
Suggest; for I do not conceive thou hast
Been born or brought up 'gainst the will of gods.”

The same ought our nurslings likewise to bear in mind, and to consider that some things have been stated sufficiently, but that others a dæmon and a deity will suggest to them respecting sacrifices and dances in honour of what divinities and at what time they will by playing, each for each, render them propitious, and live themselves according to the manner of their nature, while they are for the most part things to stare at, yet partake in certain small particles of truth.

Megil. You are vilifying, O guest, in every respect the human race.

Athen. Do not wonder, Megillus, but pardon me. For, looking to the deity, and being affected (somewhat),¹ I have said what I have just [now]² said. But let our race be not a vile thing, if it so please you, but worthy of some serious attention.

[11.] With regard to the subject next in order after these, mention has been made³ of public schools, situate in a tripartite manner in the middle of the city; but out of and around the city the exercising grounds for horses have been (assigned) in a tripartite manner, and ample places put into order for the sake of the young men, learning and practising themselves in archery and other hurlings of missiles. But if they were not then spoken of sufficiently, let them now be mentioned in our discourse together with the laws.

In all these cases let masters in each art be induced by

¹ I have adopted Stalbaum's suggestion, that $\tau\iota$ has dropt out before $\pi\alpha\theta\omega\upsilon$, although $\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ $\tau\iota$ is generally an euphemism for “to die.”

² In the formula $\epsilon\iota\pi\omicron\nu$, $\delta\pi\epsilon\rho$ $\epsilon\iota\pi\eta\kappa\alpha$, there is not elsewhere found $\nu\upsilon\nu$. See a host of examples collected by Abresch and Blomfield on *Agam.* 67, to which I could add as many more.

³ In vi. § 11.

wages to reside as strangers, and to teach every one, who frequents their school, the learning that relates to war, and likewise to music; not only the youth, who comes to school, because his father wishes it, but him too who, because (his father) does not (wish), neglects his education, but, as the saying is,¹ every man and boy must by compulsion be instructed as well as they can, since they belong rather to the state than their parents. The very same things my law would mention relating to females, as it does to males. ²(For) it it is meet³ to exercise equally the females likewise. And I should fear to say respecting this subject of horsemanship and gymnastics, that they are becoming indeed to men, but not to women. For by hearing stories of the olden time have I been persuaded. And even at present, I know that there are, so to say,³ countless myriads of women about Pontus, whom they call Sauromatides,⁴ on whom there has been enjoined an exercise in common with, and perhaps equal to, that of men not only upon horses, but in bows likewise, and in the rest of arms. But I have, moreover, a reason for this, of some such kind as this. I say then, that if it is possible for these things to happen in this manner, of all things is that, which now takes place in our countries, the most silly, in the men not pursuing all together, and with all their might, and with one mind, the same pursuits as the women. For thus the whole state is and becomes but the half, instead of being the double, from the same expense and labour. And wonderful would this very error be to (any) legislator.

¹ With this saying Ast compares the one found at the end of the Euthydemus, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ παῖδια. But the passages quoted there are scarcely in point. I suspect that, as we meet in the next § with the expression τὸ λεγόμενον, πάντα χρήματα, the whole saying alluded to was a verse in Comedy—Πάνθ' ἄμ' ἄνδρα, πάντα παῖδα, πάντα χρήματ' ἐξολῶ, spoken by some general of an army, when threatening with utter destruction a city, that had refused to open its gates. Compare Plato in 'Ελλάδ. Fr. iii. Εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τὴν θάλασσαν ἀποδώσεις καὶ γῆν ἐκόν· Εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ πάντα πάντως σοῦ τριαιῶν ἀπολίσω, supposed to be spoken by Xerxes to an ambassador from Athens.

²—³ The Greek is ἴσα καὶ—δεῖν. But I have translated as if it were ἴσα γὰρ καὶ—δεῖ, where δεῖ is due to one MS.

³ Ficinus omitted ὥς ἱστος εἰπεῖν, for he did not remark that the phrase is to be referred to μυριάδες ἀναριθμητοί.

⁴ The women called here Sauromatides are better known by the name of Amazons. See Herodotus iv. 11, and the other authors quoted by Ast.

Clin. It seems so. Very much however of what has been asserted by us at present is, O guest, contrary to customary politics.

Athen. But I have said¹ that it is meet to permit² (us) to go through the discourse properly, and, when we have gone through³ it, to select⁴ thus what seems (the best).⁴

Clin. You have spoken very elegantly, and caused me to reproach myself for what I just now said. Speak therefore on this point whatever is agreeable to yourself.

[12.] *Athen.* This very thing (is agreeable)⁵ to me, Clinias, what I said above, that, if these matters are not sufficiently proved by deeds, that they can take place, it would be possible perhaps to gainsay them by words. But now something else must be sought for by him, who does not admit this law at all; but our exhortation will not in this case be extinguished, so that we should say that the female sex ought not to partake as much as possible in education and other studies in common with the male sex. For it is required that we⁶ think on these points in some such way as this. Say then, if women do not share in common with men in the whole of life, is it not necessary for some other arrangement to be assigned to them?

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. What arrangement⁷ then among those, which are exhibited at present, shall we assign them in preference to this very partnership, which we are assigning to them? Is it

¹ All the MSS. read εἰπὼν in lieu of εἶπον, found only in Ald., as required by the sense. What the MS. of Ficinus had, is not known. For he omits entirely ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἶπον.

² In lieu of ἵασθαι one MS. has ἱάται: which seems to lead to πάντα, found perhaps in the MS. of Ficinus. For his version is, "totam disputationem," from whence Ast was led to say that if πάντα had been confirmed by a MS. he would have adopted it.

³ Instead of διελθόντος, which is without regimen, Ast would read, what I have adopted, διελθόντας, agreeing with ἡμᾶς understood.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is οὐρῶ αἰεῖσθαι τὸ δεκοῦν: where I cannot understand οὐρῶ, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it in his version, "quod potissimum videtur, eligere," and added, what the sense requires, "potissimum."

⁵ Ficinus alone has "Hoc ipsum mihi placet."

⁶ I have adopted ἡμῖν, read in one MS., instead of οὖν.

⁷ Ficinus has "quem alium—potius," as if his MS. read τιν' οὖν ἄλλην πρόσθεν—and correctly so, as regards πρόσθεν: for ἐμπροσθεν is never, I believe, united to a genitive.

that, in which the Thracians and many other nations employ their women, to cultivate the ground, and to tend cattle and sheep, and to minister to them in no way different from slaves? Or, as we do ourselves, and all around that place?¹ ²for what happens at present with us, is in this way.³ For having brought together into one dwelling, according to the saying, ³all our chattels,³ we hand over to the women the power to act as stewards, and to rule over the shuttles and all kinds of working in wool. Or shall we, Megillus, speak of a medium between these, adopted in Laconia? so that the virgins should live, partaking in gymnastic exercises and music, but the married women be unemployed in wool-work,⁴ but, weaving a kind of active life and in no respect mean or worthless, arrive at some middle point in the duties of attendants and stewards and bringers up of children; but not to take a part in warlike concerns, so as not to fight, even should a necessity arise from any accident to do so, in behalf of their city and children, nor be able with skill to take a part in the use of bows, like certain Amazons, or in any other kind of dart-hurling;⁵ nor yet, seizing the spear and shield, to imitate the goddess, and standing up nobly for their country, while it is laid waste, ⁶strike terror at least, if able to do ⁶nothing more, into the foe, when they are seen drawn up in a kind of array. And yet living even in this manner, they would not dare to imitate at all the Sauromatides, who would appear, as compared with them, to be men. Let then the person, who is willing to praise your legislators on these points, praise them; but my opinion will not be given otherwise. For a legislator ought to be a perfect and not a half one, who permits the female sex to

¹ Ficinus, unable perhaps to understand τὸν τόπον ἐκεῖνον, has "vicinique nostri," adopted by Taylor.

²⁻³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

³⁻³ See in § 11, n.

⁴ I have adopted the interpretation suggested by Ast, who might have remarked that in διαπλέκειν βίον there is a concealed play on ἀργούς τਾਲασίας; for ἀργούς means in fact οὐ πλεκούσας.

⁵ Ast correctly observes, that Plato meant to say that the women at Sparta did not lead as idle a life as they did at Athens, nor so laborious a one as they did in Thrace.

⁶⁻⁶ The Greek is φόβον γε, εἰ μηδὲν μείζον, πολεμίοισι δύνασθαι παρᾶσχῆν—I have translated, as if it were—μείζον δύνασθαι, πολεμίοισι παρᾶσχῆν.

indulge in luxury and waste by making use of an unregulated living, and who, by taking a complete care of the male sex, leaves to the state nearly the half instead of the double of a happy life.

Megil. What shall we do, Clinias? Shall we permit our guest thus to run down our Sparta?

Clin. Certainly. For, since a liberty of speech has been given to him, we must permit him, until we shall in every way have gone through the laws sufficiently.

Megil. You speak correctly.

Athen. Is it not then nearly my business to endeavour to unfold what follows upon this?

Clin. How not?

[13.] *Athen.* What then will be the mode of life amongst men, for whom what is necessary may be procured in moderation, and the affairs of art handed over to others, and agriculture committed to slaves, who are to pay the first-fruits of the earth, sufficient for persons who live in a moderate manner; and common meals adopted, the men being placed apart, but their household kept near them,¹ and the female children likewise,¹ and their mothers; and where all these common meals are regulated by male and female governors, so that, after having inspected them daily, and seen the behaviour of those taking the common meals,^{2 3} they may on each occasion dismiss them;³ and after this, that the governor and the rest, after making libations to the gods, to whom that day or night is dedicated, may go home⁴ thus in this manner.⁴ By per-

^{1—1} Such is the literal version of the original. One would however expect that, as the girls are mentioned with their mothers, so would the boys, after a certain age, be with their fathers. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν παίδων τ' ἐν ἡβῃ ἰγγύς, ἔχόμενα δὲ τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκίῳν θηλειῶν τε, in lieu of παίδων τε ἅμα θηλειῶν— And thus too we shall get rid of the tautology in ἰγγύς ἔχόμενα, to which Ast justly objects.

² In lieu of συσσιτίων, Schulthes first proposed συσσίτων, similar to “those that eat in common,” in Taylor’s translation.

^{3—3} The words λύειν ταῦτ' ἐκάστοις are without regimen placed between προστεταγμένα and τὰ ξυσσίτια— Ficinus found them transposed in his MS. after συσσιτίων, as shown by his version, “in eis observent quotidie animadvertentque singula, deinde cætus ipsos dissolvant—” Hence, to complete the sense and syntax, I have translated as if the Greek were, ὥστε, τὰ ξυσσίτια—ξυσσίτων, λύειν ταῦτα ἐκάστοτε—

^{4—4} In the words κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως, omitted by Ficinus, as being with-

sons under such regulations no work that is necessary, and in every way fitting, is left undone. But must each of them live after the manner of cattle, and grow fat? This, we say, is neither just nor honourable; nor is it possible for a man, who lives in this manner, not to fail in what is fitting. But it is fitting for an animal idle and grown fat through indolence to be almost torn to pieces by another animal amongst those greatly worn down by fortitude¹ and labours to boot.¹ If then we investigate these matters with sufficient accuracy, as we are doing now, they will perhaps never take place, as long as women, and children, and dwellings² remain private property, and every thing else is made such by each of us.² But those things, which have just now been mentioned as secondary to these, if they take place at all, would take place in a very moderate manner. We say then that to those, who live thus, there is left a work, neither the least nor vilest, but the greatest of all ordained by a just law. ³ For while the life of him, who is eager for victory in the Pythian or Olympian games, supplies a want of leisure for all other business,³ that life is filled with a double, or more than a double want of leisure,⁴ which has chosen most correctly the care of the body and soul altogether relating to virtue,⁴ for there ought to be nothing in the shape of a by-work as an impediment to the other works suited to the body, as regards the emolument⁵ from labours out any definite meaning, lies hid, I suspect, *κατὰ πάντα εὐτάκτως*, "in every respect in good order."

¹—¹ Instead of *τετραχωμένων μετὰ ἀνδρίας*, which I cannot understand, I must leave for others to discover what the author wrote.

²—² Ficinus has briefly "et reliqua propria cuique erunt?" For he could not perhaps understand, nor can I, *ἴδιαι καὶ ἰδίως ἄπαντ' ᾗ*— I have therefore translated as if the Greek were *ἴδιαι οὐσίαι ὡς καὶ πάντ' ᾗ*—

³—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "nam cum singuli vivendi modi a ceteris omnibus operibus distrahant, ut si quis Pythia vel Olympia vincere studeat, is aliis rebus vacare nequeat." He must therefore have found in his MS. something in the Greek answering to "cum singuli—distrabant," all of which Taylor has omitted, although he has adopted to the letter the latter half of the Latin version.

⁴—⁴ I have adopted the correction proposed by Ast, *ὁ τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος πάντως καὶ ψυχῆς εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιμέλειαν βίος ἡρημένος ὀρθότατα*, and suggested by the version of Cornarius, "vita, quæ rectissime totius corporis ac animæ curam ad virtutem elegit," in lieu of *ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ—εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν—εἰρημένος*, out of which I can make nothing; nor could Ficinus, as shown by his abridged version, "qui recte animi corporisque virtuti vacat."

⁵ In lieu of *ἀπόδοσιν*, Stephens testifies to the existence of another

and bringing up, nor in the case of the soul, from education and habits. Indeed the whole of the night and day is scarcely sufficient for a person, who is doing this very thing, to extract from them what is perfect, ¹ or even something sufficient.¹ Since then such is naturally the case, there ought to be to all free-men an order in the employment of all time, beginning almost ² from the morning until the other, ever continually both morning and sunrise.³ A lawgiver would indeed appear to be ill-conditioned, who speaks of many and frequent and trifling matters relating to the management of an household, ³ and the other things and whatever about sleeplessness³ it is becoming for those, who are about to watch completely over the state carefully. For that any citizen whatever should pass the whole of any night whatever in sleep, and not be seen by all his domestics, as being awake and getting up the first, this ought to be considered by all a disgraceful act, and not that of a free-man, whether it is meet to call it a law or a fashion. So too for a mistress to be called up by any servants, and

reading, *ἐπίδοσιν*, which was evidently the conjecture of some scholar, probably Victorius; from which however nothing is gained. Opportunely then does one MS. offer *ἀπόδον*: from which and *ἀπόδοσιν* united it is easy to elicit *πρόσοδον ἀπὸ*—as I have translated, similar to the subsequent *ἐκλαμβάνειν*. From the loose translation of Ficinus it is impossible, as remarked by Stephens, to ascertain what he found in his MS. His words are, “nihil enim exercitationis corporeæ, nihil doctrinarum animi morumque propter alia negotia negligendum est.”

¹—¹ To avoid the absurdity of *τέλειόν τε καὶ ἱκανόν*—I have translated as if the Greek were *τέλειον ἢ τι καὶ ἱκανόν*—

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek—*ἐξ ἔω μέχρι τῆς ἑτέρας αἰς ξυνεχῶς ἔω τε καὶ ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς*: where since *ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς* is the same as *ἔω*, it is manifest that Plato did not write *ἔω τε καὶ ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς*, but he might have written, and probably did, what is obvious to common sense—*ἐξ ἔω μέχρι τῆς ἑσπέρας αἰς καὶ ξυνεχῶς αὐτὸ ἐκ νυκτὸς εἰς ἡλίου ἀνατολήν*—i. e. “from morning to evening constantly, and continuously again from night to the rising of the sun.” Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible—“ab ortu solis perpetuus ad alterum solis ortum.”

³—³ Here again a literal version proves the original to be unintelligible. The Greek is *τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅσα νύκτωρ ἀϋπνίας περὶ*—which Ficinus renders “cum in aliis, tum etiam in nocturna vigilia”—thus evading all the difficulty in *περὶ*, which is omitted in one MS., while another reads *ἀϋπνεί*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ ἃ ἐστὶ νυκτὶ πρῶ τ’ ἀϋπνίας γέρα*, i. e. “but things of moment and what are the rewards of sleeplessness during the night and early dawn—” For thus the *μεγάλα* answers to the *σμικρά*; and while the “night and dawn” follow up the idea of the preceding *ἐκ νυκτὸς εἰς ἡλίου ἀνατολήν*, the words *Ἄ νυκτὶ τ’ ἐστὶ πρῶ τ’ ἀϋπνίας γέρα* would be the quotation from some drama.

not for herself to first call up them, it is meet for the male and female slaves and house-lad to speak of amongst themselves, and, if it were possible, the whole household together, as a disgraceful thing. It is meet then for all to get up by night, and to perform their many parts in the business of the state and household; the rulers, as regards the city, and the mistresses and masters in their own families. For much sleep is not naturally suited to our bodies or souls, or to the actions relating to them. For he, who is asleep, is not of any more worth at all than he, who is not alive. But whoever amongst us is careful to live (well),¹ and to be the most wise, keeps awake for the greatest part of his time, reserving only what is necessary for his health. But ²it is not much going well to a habit.³ Now magistrates, who are awake by night in states, are a terror to evil-doers, whether enemies or citizens, but are admired and honoured by the just and the wise, and a benefit both to themselves and to the whole state.

[14.] The night, when passed through in this manner, supplies, in addition to all the above-mentioned (advantages), a certain fortitude to the souls of each of those who are in the state. But on the return of day and the early dawn, it is requisite for the boys to turn their steps to their teachers. For neither sheep nor any thing else ought to live without a shepherd, nor boys without some boy-leaders, nor slaves without masters. Now a boy is of all wild beasts the most difficult to manage. For by how much the more he has the fountain of prudence not yet fitted up,³ he becomes crafty and keen, and the most insolent of wild beasts. On this account it is necessary to bind him, as it were, with many chains;⁴ first by

¹ I have inserted "well," conceiving that εὖ has dropt out after τοῦ—

²⁻³ Ficinus has—"ad hanc vero non multo opus est somno, si bene assueveris." The Greek is ἐστι δ' οὐ πολὺ καλῶς εἰς ἔθος ἰόν: it was, I think, ὅ ἐστι δὴ οὐ πολὺ, εἰ καλῶς τις εἰς ἔθος τοῖ— i. e. "which is not much if a person gets well into a habit."

³ The Greek word *κατηρυμένην* seems to be applied to *πηγὴν* with reference to the fact, that in hot countries fountains are generally protected by brick or stone work, to prevent the water from being dried up as it would be if exposed to the heat of the sun, or rendered unfit for use by cattle coming to drink and making it muddy. Ficinus has "perfectum," from which Cornarius elicited *κατηρτισμένην*. One MS. however reads *κατειρημένην*, which seems to lead to *κατειργμένην*—"restrained," as indeed Ast renders *κατηρυμένην*—What Plato however really wrote it is difficult to discover.

⁴ To this passage Cebes refers in the Picture of Life, § 33, quoted by Ast.

boy-leaders, as soon as he is freed from his nurse and mother, ¹on account of his childishness and infantine state; ¹and still again by those who teach him ²any thing whatever, and by instructions ²as a free-born youth; but as being a slave, let it be lawful for any free-born man to punish the child, boy-instructor, and master, whenever any one of these commits any sin. But if any one, who happens to be present, does not punish the offenders according to justice, let him in the first place be subject to the greatest reproach; and let that one of the guardians of the law, who has been chosen to preside over the boys, look to the party who was present at the deeds of which we have spoken, and did not chastise (the offenders) when it was fit to chastise them, or did not chastise them in a proper manner; and looking with a keen eye, and pre-eminently regarding the bringing up of the boys, let him regulate their dispositions, by ever turning them to what is good according to the laws. But how shall our law itself sufficiently instruct that very person? For this it has not at present stated at all in a clear and sufficient manner, but only in some things, and some not. It is however necessary, to the utmost of our power to leave nothing for him (to do); but to explain the whole reason, in order that he may be to others both an interpreter and a bringer up. Now something has been already said about a ³choir, and melodies, and dancing, ³and possessing what type they are to be selected, and corrected, and made holy. But as regards what is written out of metre, we have not stated of what kind and in what manner it is meet for the boys brought up under thee, thou best guardian of the boys, to handle them. And yet you understand by our discourse what subjects relating to war it is meet for them to learn and to practise; but

¹—¹ Displeased it would seem with the tautology in *παιδίας καὶ νηπιόγητος*, Ficinus has “ad puerilem lasciviam regendam.”

²—² This *καὶ ὁτιοῦν* seems very strange, as regards the sense, and so too does *καὶ μαθήμασιν*, as regards the syntax. Ficinus has “doctrinarum potissimum gratia—” as if his MS. read *ἔνεκα μαθήσεων*: to which *μάθησιν* in another MS. would appear to lead. Plato wrote, I suspect, *καλόν τι, οὐ ἔνεκα μάθημα δύνῃσ' ἰλεύθερον*—i. e. “something honourable, on account of which instruction benefits a free-born lad.” This at least would be worthy of the author, which the present text is not.

³—³ This passage seems at first sight to defend *χορείας* and *ὀρχήσεις* in § 10, unless it be said that *καὶ* is to be struck out, so that *μελῶν ὀρχήσεως* may mean “the melodies for dancing.”

what relates to letters first and secondly ¹to the lyre, and about calculations, of which we said there is a need, and whatever it is requisite for each to learn relating to war, and house-regulation; and the administration, as respects the state, and relating to the very same things still useful of those in the revolutions of divine things, and respecting the stars, and sun, and moon, whatever it is necessary to regulate about these things in every state. But of what things am I speaking? Of the order of days according to the revolutions of months, and of months according to each year, in order that seasons, and sacrifices, and festivals, receiving each what is suited to them, by being celebrated according to nature, may render the city alive and awake, and pay to the gods the honours due, and cause men to be more intelligent respecting them ¹—all these matters, my friend, have been thus ²sufficiently discussed for you by the legislator. Direct therefore your mind to what is about to be said after this. Now we have said that you do not sufficiently understand what is the first thing respecting letters, ³while we were finding some fault with the conversation on this point, that it has not been as yet clearly stated to you, whether he, who is about to become a moderate citizen, should betake himself to an accuracy in learning, or not betake himself at all. And so too in the case of the lyre. ⁴We say then that he ought to betake himself. ⁴For learning

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the mass of incoherent words existing at present in the Greek text; of which it would have been impossible to guess even at the meaning, had not Ficinus fortunately made his translation from a MS. far superior to any collated subsequent to his time; unless it be said, that he not only cut out, what he could not understand, but inserted out of his own head, what he conceived to be necessary for the sense. His version, adopted partially by Taylor, is to this effect—"quæ ad lyram, a legislatore dictum est, præter ea quæ ad computationem numerorum spectant, quibus opus esse diximus; et omnino quæcunque ad bellum ac rem familiarem publicamque conducunt; item quæ ad divinorum, astrorum, solis lunæque circuitum perquirendum, ut universa civitas non ignoret ordinem dierum in mensem mensiumque in annum; atque ita tempora, solemnitates, sacrificia, ut decet disposita naturali quodam ductu, vivam civitatem vigilantemque reddant, et diis honorem tribuant et homines ad hæc prudentiores efficiant."

² Cousin would read with one MS. *ὄπω* in lieu of *ὄρω*—

³ By *γράμματα* in Greek was meant not simply letters or writing, but both united, what we call "reading and writing."

⁴—⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

to read and write three years would do for a boy ten years old. But to those, who are thirteen, three years for handling the lyre would be a moderate time. Nor let it be lawful for ¹a father (to permit), or his son of his own act ¹to make his application to these studies more or less, and for more or less years than these ²whether desirous to learn or hating it.² And let him, who disobeys (the law), be deprived of those youthful honours, which are to be mentioned shortly afterwards. But hear this first, what the youths ought to learn during this period, and what the masters to teach. They ought to labour at letters until they are able to write and read. But let us leave those unregarded, whom nature has not urged on to become, ³with respect to quickness and beauty,³ proficient within the years enjoined. But in the case of the lyreless learning⁴ of poets preserved in writings, some in metre, and others without metrical⁵ divisions, ⁶which are called merely compositions in prose⁶ destitute of rhythm and harmony, there have been left to us unsafe writings⁷ by some such men, the majority⁷ of

¹—¹ The Greek is *πατρὶ μὴν αὐτῷ*—out of which neither Stephens nor Ast could make any thing satisfactory to themselves or to others. Bekker has edited *πατρὶ μὴδ' αὐτῷ*—"to not even a father himself," which Stalbaum calls an egregious emendation; but which I confess I cannot understand, even if *ποιεῖσθαι* be taken in the sense of *διδάσκεισθαι*, "to put out to learn—" For in that case the pronoun *αὐτῷ* would be superfluous, while the mention of the son could not be dispensed with. The paraphrase of Ficinus gives, what the train of thought evidently requires, "*nec liceat aut patri plus vel minus in his liberos detinere, aut liberis, sive tædio affectis, citra id tempus, sive desiderio compulsis ultra his rebus, contempta lege, vacare.*" By the aid of which it is easy to elicit, as I have translated, *πατρὶ ἰᾶν μὲντι νιῇ αὐτῷ*—On the loss or corruption of *ἰᾶν* see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 121.

²—² The Greek is *φιλομαθοῦντι—μυσοῦντι*. But Plato wrote *φιλοῦντι μαθεῖν—μυσοῦντι*.

³—³ On the phrase *πρὸς τάχος* or *πρὸς κάλλος* with *γράφειν*, see the Commentators on Thom. Mag. p. 274, with whose notes had Badham been conversant, he would not have proposed in Præf. Iph. T. p. 19, to read *εἰς καλὰς τύχας* for *εἰς κάλλος τύχας* in Eurip. Troj. 1202.

⁴ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "monumenta," as if his MS. read *μνήματα* instead of *μαθήματα*.

⁵ I have adopted *ρυθμικῶν* for *ρυθμῶν*, proposed by the Bipont editor.

⁶—⁶ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, who is followed by Taylor. They are evidently an interpolation.

⁷—⁷ Such is the literal version of the Greek *παράτινων τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων*: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; who omits *τῶν πολλῶν*—Perhaps Plato wrote *παρά τινῶν ὄντως ἀπλῶν*

which, ye best of all guardians of the laws, how will ye make any use? Or how would a lawgiver, ordering you to use them, correctly order? I expect he would be much at a loss.

Clin. ¹What is this, guest, which you seem to say, as regards yourself, as being in reality at a loss.¹

Athen. You have taken me up correctly, Clinias. But before you, who are associates with me on the subject of laws, it is necessary for me to state ²what seems to be an easy matter, and what does not.²

Clin. What then, do you now say, ³and what has been your state,³ with respect to these matters?

Athen. I will tell you. For it is by no means easy to speak what is opposed to many myriads of mouths.

Clin. But what, does it (not) ⁴seem to you that the few and trifling matters, previously mentioned by us relating to laws, are somewhat opposed to the multitude?

Athen. You have spoken this with the greatest truth. ⁵For, as it seems to me, you are exhorting me to proceed confidently in this road, although it is arduous and odious to many, and to advance through the path of laws, which our present discourse has laid open, without omitting any particular, when perhaps a journey of this kind will be pleasing to others not fewer in number, and, if fewer, not worse.⁵

ἀνοήτων τ' ἀνθρώπων, i. e. "by some persons really simpletons and un-intellectual."

¹—¹ Ficinus has merely "Quid, hospes, tecum ita dubitasti?"

²—² Ficinus, followed by Taylor, almost literally, has "quæ certa et quæ dubia mihi videntur."

³—³ Here again Taylor has followed Ficinus, "quid te movit."

⁴ In lieu of *ὀλίγα* four MSS. offer *ὀλίγον*, which evidently leads to *ὀλίγ' οὐ*—

⁵—⁵ From this version made by Taylor, it is shown beyond all doubt that he looked merely to the Latin of Ficinus, and not to the Greek; which is literally—"For you are indeed exhorting me, as it seems to me, while the same road has become hateful to many, and perhaps agreeable to others not fewer, and if fewer, not the worse at least, with whom you are exhorting me to run a risk, and with confidence to march along the road of legislation, now cut out by the present conversation, and to be remiss in nothing." Here although Ast would supply the want of the apodosis in the latter part of the sentence by repeating *διακίλευει* after *κελεύει*, yet Ruhnken on Timæus, 128, felt disposed to adopt the correction of a critic in *Miscell. Observ.* ii. 2, p. 307, who proposed to read; what the sense requires in part, *ὁδοῦ ἔχουσαι ἐχθοδοποῦ*—while no one has hitherto seen that Plato certainly wrote *ταυτῆς τῆς ὁδοῦ*, "this road," not *τῆς*

Clin. How not?

[15.] *Athen.* I am not then remiss. I assert indeed, that there are very many writers of poetry amongst us, in hexameters and trimeters,¹ and all the so-called measures,¹ some having aimed at seriousness, others at fun; in whose writings very many myriads assert that we ought to bring up such of the youths as are properly instructed, and to render them full even to satiety, by making them to be frequent hearers at the reading of them, and very learned in them, through having got whole poets by heart. But others say that, selecting the heads from all, and bringing to the same point entire sentences, they ought to learn them well² by committing them to memory, if any one among us is about to be a good man and wise through much experience and much learning. Do you, then, exhort me with a freedom of speech to show to them what they say correctly or not?

Clin. How not?

Athen. By saying what then upon all these points shall I in one word say what is sufficient? I think it nearly something of this kind, in which every one would agree with me, that each of those³ (the poets) have said many things beautifully, and many the reverse. And if this be the case, I assert, that much learning is bringing danger to youth.⁴

Clin. How then, and what would you advise the guardian of the law to do?

Athen. Of what are you speaking?

Clin. By looking to the pattern of what thing would he permit all the youths to learn one subject and forbid them another? Speak, and do not shrink from speaking.

αὐτῆς ὁδοῦ, "the same road," and probably *ἔχουσιν ἀποδοῦς πολὺ*, to balance the subsequent *προσφιλοῦς*, and *διὰ καλοῦ δεῖ*, in lieu of *διακελεύει*: for thus *πορεύεσθαι* would be governed by *δεῖ*, and *διὰ καλοῦ* show that the march was for the sake of what is honourable.

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, who followed Grynæus, who threw them out of the translation of Ficinus, because there was nothing to answer to them in the then existing Greek text, which has been subsequently supplied by six MSS.

² As *ἐκμανθάνειν* means by itself "to learn by heart," to avoid the tautology in *εἰς μνήμην τιθεμένους*, I have translated as if the Greek were *εὖ μανθάνειν*—

³ Ficinus has "poetis," as if his MS. read *τῶν ποιητῶν*, not *τούτων*—

⁴ This was the doctrine of Heracleitus, who said *ἡ πολυμαθὴ νόν οὐδὲν δίδασκει*.

Athen. My good Clinias, I seem almost in a certain manner to have been fortunate.

Clin. About what?

Athen. In not being entirely in want of a pattern. For now, after looking to the discourse, which we have gone through, from the morning up to the present moment, not without the inspiration of some god, as we appear to myself, ¹I fancy, by Zeus, that something has been said by a person in his senses ¹altogether similar to a kind of poetry. Nor has perhaps any wonderful event fallen upon me, in being delighted with looking upon our own discourse, as being collected together.² For of the very many discourses in poems, or spoken thus in prose, which I have learnt and heard, they have appeared to me to be the most moderate of all, and the most fit for youths to hear. Hence I conceive I could not have to mention to a guardian of the laws and an instructor a pattern better than this, or to exhort the masters to teach boys these subjects, and what are next and similar to these, whether a person happens to be going through the compositions of poets, or what has been written in prose, or spoken thus nakedly, without being written, as being the brothers of these discourses, so as not to neglect them in any way, but to write them down; and in the first place to compel the teachers themselves to learn and praise them; ³and not to employ as co-workers the teachers, to whom they are not acceptable; but that such a person may find giving their votes for praise, let him make use of these, and hand over to them the youths to teach and to instruct. Here then and thus let my tale be brought to an end, after having been told as regards the teachers of letters and letters likewise.³

Clin. ⁴As regards the argument,⁴ stranger, we do not ap-

¹—¹ The Greek is *ἰδοῦσαν δ' οὖν μοι παντάπασι*, from which I have elicited *ἰδοῦσα νῆ Δί' ἐννῶ τι παντάπασι*— For thus *ἀποβλέψας* will recover, what it wants at present, its verb.

² I must leave for others to understand, what I cannot, *οἶον ἀθρώους*. From the preceding allusion to the inspiration of some god, it is quite evident, to myself at least, that Plato wrote *οἶον ἐνθίους*—"as if god-inspired." On the corruption of *ἐνθεός* see myself on Eumen. 17.

³—³ Of this needlessly prolix matter Ficinus has given this abridgment, adopted in part by Taylor, "et eos, qui non probent, repellat; his vero, qui probant, erudiendos instituendosque adolescentes, committat. Sed de literis eorumque magistris jam satis."

⁴—⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

pear to myself at least to have wandered from the subject proposed. But whether we are right upon the whole or not, it is perhaps difficult to assert positively.

Athen. But this, Clinias, will then become more clear, as is reasonable, when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of this digression respecting the laws.

Clin. True.

[16.] *Athen.* After the grammar-master is not the harp-master to be spoken of?

Clin. How not?

Athen. I fancy that, if we recollect our previous discourse, we assigned to the harp-masters what was suited to the teaching and the whole of education in things of such a kind.

Clin. Of what kind of things are you speaking?

Athen. We said, I think, that the Dionysiacal singers of sixty years of age¹ ought to have pre-eminently a fine perception of rhythms, and the compositions of harmonies, in order that² (some one, through knowing well) the imitation by melodies, when it is well or ill done, at what time an affection how violent soever may happen to the soul,³ may thus,⁴ by being able to select the resemblances of the good (soul) and those of the contrary one, reject the latter, but bring forward the former, and⁵ hymn to and enchant the souls of the young,⁶ and invite each of them, while following him on account of the imitations, to be led on⁷ to the possession of virtue.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. For the sake then of these matters, it is requisite

¹ This mention of singers of sixty years old, having a fine perception of rhythms, seems very strange. For at that period of life all the finer perceptions have generally ceased to exist, at least in northern climates, and still more in the southern; where the faculties of man are more early developed, and more early decay. In ii. p. 670, B. § 11, the age is fifty years.

²⁻³ For the sake of the syntax, without which it is impossible to get satisfactorily at the sense of an ancient author, I have translated as if, instead of *ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχῇ γίγνηται*—the Greek were originally *ἐγγονός, πάθημ' ὅσον ὅταν ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνηται*—

³ In lieu of *ὦν τις*, the sense seems to lead, as I have translated, to *ὦν, οὕτως*—

⁴⁻⁵ The Greek is *ὑμνῇ καὶ ἐπάδῃ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς*. Ficinus has “*adolescentium auribus concinant trahantque eorum animos*—”

⁶ The Greek is *ἐπισθαί—συνακολοθοῦντας*. But as Ficinus has “*imitatione quadam perductos*,” I suspect he found in his MS. *ἀγέσθαι*, as I have translated.

for both the harper and his pupil to use the sounds of the lyre, ¹ for the sake of the clearness of the chords, by bringing out sounds in accordance with sounds.¹ But (as regards) the difference and variety of the sounds of the lyre—the chords producing some melodies, and the poet who composes the strain others—and moreover² others by their making the thick³ and the thin, the swift and the slow, the sharp and the flat, agree with or opposed to each other respectively, and by adapting similarly all the varieties of rhythms to the sounds of the lyre, it is not lawful⁴ to bring all such things as these before those, who are about to extract quickly in three years what is useful in music. For contraries, confusing each other, produce a difficulty in learning. But it is requisite that the young should be as quick as possible to learn. For the subjects of education enjoined upon them are of necessity not trifling or few. However, our discourse, as it proceeds, will, together with time, point them out. To such matters relating to music, let the teacher thus attend. But the melodies and words, of what kind and what it is meet for the choir-masters to teach, have been all previously discussed; and we have said that, by being consecrated and adapted each to festivals, they ought to be of service to the state, by contributing to a pleasure of a happy kind.⁵

Clin. And this too have ⁶you discussed with truth.

Athen. Most truly indeed.⁶ And let him, who is chosen the ruler as regards music, receive these rules from us, and let him

¹—¹ I confess I hardly understand what Plato is aiming at. Ficinus has “*expressionis gratia, quæ ex canoris fidibus provenit, et vocibus voces consonas reddere.*” Ast refers to *Histoire de l'Academie des Inscript.* T. iii. p. 199. Cousin adds T. 8, p. 9, and 35, and T. 37.

² From the words *καὶ δὴ καὶ* is evident that some participle has dropt out of the sentences preceding.

³ By *πυκνότης* is meant, says Martianus Capella, ix. p. 320, quoted by Ast, “a certain quality composed of three sounds,” which I must leave for musical Greek scholars to explain.

⁴ The Greek is *πάντ' οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ*—But one MS. for *μὴ* reads *μὲν*—where *νόμιμον* lies hid; and hence I have altered *οὖν* into *οὐ*—

⁵ I scarcely understand *ἡδονὴν εὐτυχῇ*—unless it be said that, to use the language of Horace, there is a “*voluptas, empta dolore,*” which “*nocet.*”

⁶—⁶ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; Ficinus has “*Hæc itaque vere distincta electus ad musam magistratus suscipiat,*” as if his MS. read *ἀληθέστατά τοί νυν ταῦτα παραλαβὼν ὁ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἀρχὼν αἰρεθείς*, without *καὶ* and *ἡμῶν*.

attend to them with a kind fortune. ¹ But let us deliver them relating to dancing and the whole of the gymnastics pertaining to the body, in addition to what has been stated previously; (and) as we have delivered the instruction, that remained respecting music, let us act in a similar manner with regard to gymnastics. For it is meet for boys and girls to learn to dance and to practise gymnastics likewise.¹ Is it not?

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Now for the boys dancing-masters, but for the girls dancing-mistresses, would be the better fitted² for going through the occupation.

Clin. Be it so.

Athen. Again, let us call the man, who has the most to do, the curator of youth; and who, since he attends to the subjects relating to music and gymnastics, will not have much leisure.

Clin. How then is it possible for a person, advanced in years, to attend to so many things?

Athen. Easily, my friend. For the law has allowed and will allow him to take to himself as his associates³ in such an employment, whomever of the male and female citizens he pleases; and he will know whom he ought (to take); and he will be desirous⁴ not to do wrong in these matters⁴ while⁵ prudently knowing and reverencing the importance of his office, and⁵ being conversant with the reasoning⁶ that, when youths

^{1—1} Such 'is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has thus transposed the sentences, "nos vero, sicut musicæ docendi modum, qui restabat, adjecimus, ita nunc saltationi et universæ corporis gymnasticæ, cum idem reliquum sit, idem quoque adjiciamus:" while Taylor has adopted the transposition and thus abridged the original, "But as we have delivered what remained to be discussed respecting music, we shall do the same respecting dancing, and the whole of the gymnastic pertaining to the body."

² I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀνεπιτηδείστεροι*, not *ἀνεπιτηδέϊστερον*.

³ On this sense of *προσλαμβάνειν*, see at *Æsch. Prom.* 225.

^{4—4} The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

^{5—5} I have followed, as Taylor does likewise, Ficinus in transposing the order of the words *αἰδοῦμενος ἐμφρόνως καὶ γινώσκων* into *γινώσκων ἐμφρόνως καὶ αἰδοῦμενος*.

⁶ The Greek is *λογισμῶ — ξυνῶν*, where Ast would read *ξυνυῖς* — Ficinus has "ignoret." Taylor, "being well convinced."

have been and are properly brought up, every thing will sail on prosperously ¹(over the sea of life);¹ but if not,² it is not fit to state, nor do we state (what will follow)³ through our venerating the great lovers of prophets in a new city.⁴

[17.] Much then has been said by us on the subjects relating to dancing and all the movements of gymnastics. For under gymnastics we place all the exercises relating to war in archery and every kind of hurling, and the use of the small shield, and all the fighting with the large shield, and the tactics of sallying out, and all the marching of armies, and their conduct in camps, and whatever relates to cavalry regulations. For all these subjects there ought to be teachers in common, obtaining their pay from the state, and having both men and boys as their pupils, and girls and women skilled in all these matters—those who are still virgins practising every kind of dancing, and fighting in armour, but the women laying hold of the science of sallying out,⁵ and of laying down and taking up arms, if for nothing else,⁶ at least for this, that should there be a necessity at any time for those, who had been guarding⁷ the children and the rest of the city, to leave the town with their whole force,⁸ and to march to a distance from it, the women may be sufficient for so much⁹ as this. Or, on the contrary,

¹—¹ Taylor has introduced "the sea of life," from "in vita" in Ficinus.

² The Greek is *πλεῖ, μὴ δέ*—But an aposiopesis cannot be expressed by a prohibitive formula. Plato wrote *πλεῖ, εἰ δὲ μὴ*—as I have translated.

³ Ficinus adds, what the sense requires, "quid sequatur," as if his MS. read *τὸ ἐπὶ* for *ἐπὶ* before *καὶ νῦν πόλει*.

⁴ Here again Ficinus has, what is better suited to common sense, "*perniciosum in civitatem novam omen fugientes*." For why there should be in a new state persons more fond of prophets than in an old one, it is not easy to understand.

⁵ The Greek is *διεξόδων καὶ τάξεων*. It should be *διεξόδων τακτικῶν*, as just before.

⁶ Ficinus, "si nullius rei alterius gratia, attamen," as if his MS. read *εἰ μηδενὸς ἕνεκα ἄλλου, ἀλλ*—as remarked by Stephens.

⁷ I have adopted *φυλάξαντας*, found in four MSS., in lieu of *φυλάξον-τας*, which Ast says may be referred to the women. But then Plato would assuredly have written *φυλαξούσας*. Ficinus has, in an abridged form, "*si res cogat, ut in militiam viri omnes profisciantur, possint ipsæ inter-irim, si quid adversi acciderit, civitatem defendere*."

⁸ Unless I am greatly mistaken, *πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει* is an explanation of *πανδημει*.

⁹ As to defend the town.

(should it happen,) ¹ ² what is not at all denied to be possible, ³ that enemies from without fall upon it with some mighty power and force, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and furnish the necessity for a battle to take place for the state itself, it would surely be a great fault in a polity for the women to have been brought up in so shameful a manner, as not to fight, as even birds do in behalf of their offspring with the strongest of wild animals, ³ nor to be willing to die, and to expose themselves to every danger; but straightway to hurry ⁴ to sacred places, and to fill all the altars and temples, and to bring down upon the race of women the bad repute ⁵ of being the most cowardly of all animals.

Clin. ⁶ By Zeus, O guest, this would be by no means seemly, independent of the cowardice, in any state, where it might take place. ⁶

Athen. Let us then lay down the law so far as this at least, that warlike concerns ought not to be neglected by women, but that all the citizens, both male and female, ought to attend to them.

Clin. I agree with you.

Athen. With respect to wrestling, then, we have said something; but that which is, as I should say, the greatest thing, we have not spoken of; nor is it easy to speak of it, without pointing it out with the body, as well as by word of mouth. This then we will determine, when our language, following out acts, shall indicate something clear about the other points of which we have spoken; and that such a wrestling is in reality of all motions allied the nearest to a personal encounter in battle; and, moreover, that it is requisite to attend to this for the sake of that, but not that for the sake of this.

¹ Stephens was the first to see, that as there is nothing to govern the infinitive *παρασχεῖν* something has dropt out here. The missing word was, I suspect, *τυχόν*, as I have translated.

^{2—3} So Ast explains *ἀνέμωρον*. With regard to the syntax in *ὣν οὐδὲν ἀνέμωρον*, Stephens suggested, what Ast has adopted, *ὃν οὐδὲν ἀνέμωρον*. But the sense requires rather *ὃ οὐδ' αὖμ' ἀνέμωρον*—

⁴ With this sentiment Ast compares a similar one in Lycurgus c. Leocrat. T. iv. p. 229, and Musonius in Wyttienbach. Philomath. i. p. 159.

⁵ Faehse aptly compares *Æsch. S. Th. 165*.

⁶ The Greek is *καὶ δόξαν*. I have translated as if it were, *καὶ ἀδοξίαν*, similar to *ἀλσος ἔχει* in Hom. Od. A. 432, and the passages quoted on Menexenus, § 14.

^{6—6} Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has, "Per Jovem, hospes, et dedecori hoc et detrimento est civitati."

Clin. Beautifully indeed do you say this.

[18.] *Athen.* Let then thus much be held to have been said up to the present moment on the subject of wrestling. But with respect to the other motions of the whole body, the greatest part of which a person would, by calling it a certain dancing, call it correctly, it is proper to consider as of two kinds; one imitating the solemn in the more beautiful bodies, but the other the depraved in baser bodies. And again, of the depraved there are two species, and two of the serious. Of the serious motion one kind exists, when bodies of beauty and a soul of bravery become implicated in war and violent exertions: but the other, when a temperate soul (being mixed up) with a prosperous state and moderate pleasures. Now he who calls a dancing of this kind pacific, calls it according to its nature. ¹ But the warlike, on the other hand,¹ which is entirely different from the pacific, a person would correctly call Pyrrhic; which imitates the careful guarding against all blows and hurlings by leanings away,² and by every kind of yielding and leapings on high, together with a lowering of the body; and the contrary to these, which are borne along to active gestures in the shooting of arrows, and the hurling of javelins, and which attempt to imitate the infliction³ of all kinds of blows. ⁴ But that which is erect and braced up in these, when an imitation takes place of good bodies and souls, becoming straightforward for the most part of the limbs of the body, receiving a thing of this kind as right, but the contrary as not

¹—¹ The Greek is *τὴν πολεμικὴν δὴ τούτων*: where I cannot understand *τούτων*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. For his version is, “*illum vero a pacifico diversum, Pyrrichen recte quisque vocabit.*” I have translated as if the Greek were *τὴν πολεμικὴν δ’ αὖ, τὸ πᾶν ἄλλην*, where *δ’* is due to Ast.

² Ast and others explain *ἐκνεύσεις* by “*inclining away.*” But that would be *ἀπονεύσεις*: and so perhaps Plato wrote. For *ἐκ* and *ἀπ* are constantly confounded in MSS. See Porson Miscell. Crit. p. 181.

³ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐμβλήματα*, not *μιμήματα*, which I cannot understand, despite the references to Lucretius ii. 40, Virgil *Æn.* v. 585, and Livy xxix. 22, made by Ast. Ficinus has simply “*cædendo,*” omitting *πασῶν πληγῶν μιμήματα ἐπιχειρούσας μιμῆσθαι*.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, out of which Ast has been unable to make any thing satisfactory; and I am equally in the dark. Ficinus has “*in his omnibus arbitrari oportet, quando intrepidus et constans habitus in membrorum rectitudine et fortitudine adhibetur, recte fieri; quando vero, non recte.*” What Plato wrote, might, however, be

right.⁴ In this way, on the other hand, we must look upon the pacific dancing of each,¹ whether a person lays hold or not of the beautiful dancing, and conducts himself in a becoming manner in the dances of men, acting according to law. It is necessary, then, to separate first the dancing about which there is a doubt from that about which there is not a doubt. Now what is this? And how must we separate them? Such then as is Bacchic, and belongs to those that follow the Bacchants, whom some persons,² calling by the name of Nymphs, Pans, Silenuses, and Satyrs, say that they imitate, and,³ drunk with wine, perform⁵ purifications and certain mystic rites, the whole of this kind of dancing it is not easy to define, as being neither pacific, nor adapted to war, or (to say) what it means. But it seems to me that it is nearly the most correct to define it in this way, by placing the warlike dancing apart, and apart too the pacific, and to assert that this kind of dancing is not adapted to a civil⁴ life. Leaving it, therefore, to lie down lying there,⁵ let us return to the warlike and pacific dancing, as being indubitably ours. Now the kind of the unwarlike Muse, and that which honours⁶ the gods and the sons of the gods by dancing,⁷ will become altogether one kind,⁷ when it takes place in the reputation⁸ of doing well. And we could

recovered by a bold conjecture, which it is unnecessary to bring forward.

¹ In lieu of *ἐκάστων*, which Ast could not understand, nor can I, he suggested *ἐκάστοτε*. Stalbaum says that *ἐκάστων* is to be referred to *τῶν ὀρχουμένων*. But neither Plato nor any other sensible writer is wont to omit words absolutely requisite for the sense and syntax.

²⁻³ In lieu of *ἱκονομάζοντες ὥς φασι μιμῶνται*, where *ὥς* is omitted by Ficinus, I have translated as if the Greek were, *ἱκονομάζοντες τινες, φασὶν ὅτι μιμῶνται, καὶ—*

⁵ From *ἀποτελουμένων*, in which, as there is no syntax, there can be no sense, it is easy to elicit *ἀποτελεῖν, τὸ—* as I have translated, and to change the following *τὸ* into *γε—*

⁴ Instead of *πολιτικοῦ*, Taylor has “to war,” misled by the preceding *πολεμικοῦ*.

⁵ Since *κείμενον—κείσθαι* are not, I believe, thus united elsewhere, in *δε κείμενον* lies hid perhaps *δ' ἐκβαλλόμενον*, “rejected.” Compare Axioch. § 12, *δήμου παίγνιον ἐκβαλλόμενον*.

⁶ I have with Stalb. adopted *τιμῶν*, first suggested by Stephens, and subsequently found in five MSS.

⁷⁻⁷ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁸ The expression *ἐν δόξῃ*, whether *δόξῃ* means “opinion,” or “reputation,” or “glory,” is to my mind perfectly unintelligible; and so to Fici-

make of this a twofold division; the one, possessing greater pleasures, after we have escaped¹ from certain labours there¹ and dangers to what is good; but the other, when there is a preservation and increase of former good things, possessing pleasures milder than them;² since in matters of this kind, every one is affected with greater movements in the body, when the pleasures are greater, but with less, when they are less; and he, who is more orderly, and more exercised in fortitude, exhibits less changes of movement; but he, who is timid, and unexercised in temperance, the more vehement; and generally every one, who emits a sound, whether in singing or in speaking, is not entirely able to exhibit tranquillity in his body. Hence an imitation of what has been said, taking place by gestures has produced the whole of the art of dancing. In all these occasions, one person amongst us moves elegantly, but another inelegantly. Now it is fitting for him, who reflects, to praise many others of the old names, as being assigned correctly, and according to nature; and to one of them, relating to the dancings³ of those who are doing well, and are moderate in their pleasures,³ how correctly and at the same time musically did he, whoever he was, give a name. For⁴ assigning to them taken all together a name according to rea-

nus was, I suspect, the whole passage from τὸ δὴ τῆς ἀπολέμον to διαιροῖμεν ἂν. For he has thus abridged it in his version, "genus autem illud musæ, quo in pace et prosperitatis opinione utimur, deos deorumque filios honorantes, bipartito distinguitur."

¹—¹ Here again I am at a loss in understanding τινῶν αὐτοῦ: and so too was Stephens, as regards αὐτοῦ; for which he proposed to read αὐτῶν, unless αὐτοῦ is to be united, he says, to τὸ μὲν; from which, however, it would be more distant than is customary. The idea is nevertheless caught at by Ast, despite the fact that αὐτοῦ could not be united to τὸ μὲν, with ἐκ πόνων τινῶν interposed; and even if it could, in the formula τὸ μὲν—τὸ δὲ the pronoun is never thus introduced. Both τινῶν and αὐτοῦ are omitted by Ficinus in his version, "alterum enim, cum pericula laboresque evasimus et bona adepti sumus," as if his MS. read ἐκ μὲν κινδύνων καὶ πόνων ἡμῶν διαπεφευγόντων.

²—² Here too Ficinus appears to have been in the dark, and so am I, as to the meaning of ἐκείνων: which he has omitted, and supplied the words "peragi solet," wanting to complete the sense, as if his MS. read κινούρ' ἂν in lieu of ἐκείνων.

³—³ Ficinus has "quod saltationes cunctas moderatorum hominum, in rebus secundis temperate gaudentium," as if his MS. read περὶ πάσας τὰς ὀρχήσεις τῶν μετρίων, ἔχόντων δὲ μετρίως πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τῶν ἐπ' αἰσχρογόντων, which makes a much neater sense.

⁴ After καὶ there is evidently wanting γὰρ—

son, he called it *Emmeleia*.¹ and established two kinds of beautiful dancings, one warlike, called *Pyrrhic*, the other pacific, called *Emmeleia*, assigning to each a becoming and fitting appellation. These matters it behoves the lawgiver to explain by types, but the guardian of the laws to seek out; and having sought out, to combine dancing with the rest of music, and to distribute at all festivals that which is suited to each of the sacrifices; and having thus made them all holy in their order, hereafter to disturb nothing connected with dancing or singing. ²For it is requisite that the same city and the same citizens should pass their time as far as possible equally in the same pleasures,³ and live really³ well and happily.

[19.] The matters then relating to the dancings of beautiful bodies and souls, of what kind it has been said they ought to be, have been gone through. But it is necessary to look into and know those relating to disagreeable bodies and thoughts, and of those that are directed to the comicalities of laughter, as regards the language, and the song, and the dance, and the imitations of all these, done in a comical way. For it is not possible to learn serious things without the laughable, nor the converse of any thing without its contrary, if a person is about to be intellectual; but to do both it would be not possible, if a person is on the other hand about to have even a little share of virtue. But it is meet to learn them for the sake ⁴of this very thing,⁴ namely, the not doing or saying at any time through ignorance what is ridiculous, when there is

¹ I have preserved the Greek word *Ἑμμέλεια*, in which there is an allusion to *μέλος*, "a melody," and *ἑμμελ-ής*, "elegant," derived from *ἐν-μέλιν*, "to have a care in," and hence *ἑμμέλεια* means "an elegance in melody," an appellation given to tragedy; while *κόρδαξ* was that given to comedy, and *σικιννίς* to farce, as we learn from Athenæus i. p. 20, E.

²—³ I have adopted for the most part the version of Ficinus, "sed in iisdem voluptatibus civitas eadem perseverans, civesque iidem similes semper pro viribus permanentes," who probably found in his MS. *ἐν δὲ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἡδοναῖς τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολίτας διάγοντας ὁμοίως—εἰς δύναμιν*, instead of *ἐν ταῖς δ' αὐταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὡσαύτως τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν καὶ πολίτας διάγοντας*: *ὁμοίους* where since *ὡσαύτως* is without sense, and *διάγοντας* without syntax, I have translated as if the Greek were, *ἐν γὰρ ταῖς αὐταῖς—τοὺς αὐτοὺς—δεῖ δύναντας ὁμοίως*—

³ In lieu of *δύναντας*, which is superfluous after *διάγοντας*, Plato probably wrote, what I have translated, *δύναντες*—

⁴—⁴ Ficinus has "hujus—" For his MS. read *αὐτοῦ—τούτου*, more correctly than *αὐτῶν—τούτων*—

no need of it; but (it is proper)¹ to order slaves and hired strangers to imitate things of this kind; but for no serious study of them to exist at any time, or for any free person, either woman or man, to be seen learning them,² but for some novelty of imitations about them to always appear.³ Thus then let whatever are the sports pertaining to laughter, which we all call comedy, be laid down both by our language and law. But should any of the serious poets, who, they say, are occupied on tragedies, come to us and ask—Shall we, O strangers, come to your city and country, or not, and bring our poetry and act³ it? or how is it decreed for you to do in matters of this kind? what answer to this should we correctly give to these divine men? This to myself indeed it seems good to say—O most excellent of strangers, we are ourselves, to the utmost of our power, poets of a tragedy the most beautiful and best. For the whole of our polity consists in an imitation of a life the most beautiful and best, which we say is in reality the truest tragedy. You, therefore, are poets, and we too are poets of the same kind, being your opponents in art, and antagonists in the most beautiful drama, which true law alone has naturally completed,⁴ as is the hope in us. But do not think that we shall so easily suffer you to fix your scenes in

¹ I have inserted *δεῖ*, which might have been easily lost after *δὲ*—

^{2—3} Such is the literal version of the Greek, *καινὸν δὲ δεῖ τι περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι τῶν μμημάτων*: where since *τῶν μμημάτων* is plainly superfluous after *αὐτὰ*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *καινὸν δὲ δεῖ ποτε περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ὅτων μμήματ' ᾗ*: i. e. "but to ever appear new to the subjects of which these are imitations;" where *καινὸν* would apply to a person and not to a thing. Ast indeed says that the reason for the novelty in the imitations is, that, if the same subjects were repeated, people would become accustomed to them; for he perhaps remembered the lines of Pope, who says that,

"Vice is a monster of such hideous mien,
That to be hated it needs but be seen;
But seen too oft, familiar with its face,
We first endure, admire, and then embrace."

But so far was Plato from patronizing any novelty in ludicrous imitations of comedy, that he would not admit even the serious ones of tragedy.

³ Ast has mistaken the meaning of *ἄγειν* here, as shown by his reference to Xenoph. K. II. iii. 3, 2, *φέρειντας καὶ ἄγοντας*, where the expression is in its usual military sense of carrying off dead plunder, and driving off the living.

⁴ Instead of *ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκεν*, one would have expected *ἀποτελεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει*, similar to "potest perficere" in Ficinus.

our place of meeting, and, introducing players with beautiful voices, and who talk louder than we do, to speak in public before our children and wives and all the masses not the same things as we do about pursuits, but for the most part even the most contrary. For we should be ourselves nearly quite mad, and the whole state too, should it permit you to do what has been just now mentioned, before the magistrates shall have decided whether you have composed what is to be spoken and fit to be brought forward or not. Now then, ye children,¹ offspring of the tender Muses, we will, after first showing your odes² by the side of ours to the rulers grant you a Chorus; if what has been said by you shall appear to be the same as, or better than³ that by us, but if not, we shall never, friends, be able to do so. Let then these be the customs, ordained by laws, relating to all kind of dancing and the teaching of them, that separate are the affairs of slaves, and separate those of masters, if so it seems good to you.

Clin. How does not this seem good, at least for the present?

[20.] *Athen.* Three things however still remain for the free-born to learn; one is computation, and what relates to numbers; but that, which measures length, breadth, and depth, is a second one;⁴ and the third that, which (measures) the orbits of the stars, (and) how they naturally march with re-

¹ Ficinus has "viri," either because his MS. read *ἄνδρες* instead of *παῖδες*, or because he disliked with the tautology in *παῖδες*—*ἐκγονοί*.

² As the Athenian speaker and his friends were not the Archons, they could not say of themselves that they would grant the writers of tragedy a chorus, or refuse one. Hence there is evidently some error in *δῶσομεν* and *δυναίμεθα*: which it is easy to correct, if we bear in mind that Plato has merely put into prose, what he found in verse, probably in the *Μαλθακοί* of Cratinus, to this effect: *Νῦν δ' ἴτε, παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν, Ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσιν Πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας ψάδας. Κἂν μὲν ταῦτ' ἡ καὶ βελτίω τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν λεχθέντα γένηται, Δώσουσ' ὑμῖν χορόν· εἰ δ' αὖ μὴ, Διδόναι ποτ' ἂν οὐχὶ δύναιντ' ἂν*: where most opportunely one MS. according to Bekker reads *γένηται* in lieu of *φαίνεται*, and another according to Stalbaum omits *λεγόμενα*. The verses of Cratinus were spoken probably by the Chorus at the end of the play, where the author anticipated a victory, and gave the audience to understand that he had ready for production other comedies as good as, if not better than, the present one.

³ Ficinus alone has what the sense requires, "nostris," i. e. *βελτίω ἢ τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν*, instead of *βελτίω τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν*.

⁴ The Greek is *ἐν αὐτῷ δεύτερον*. But *εἰς δεύτερον* could not be thus united. Plato wrote *ὡς ὅν αὐτῷ δεύτερον*— For *ὡς* is thus perpetually joined to a participle.

lation to each other. On all these it is not requisite for the many to labour to a nicety, but only some few; of whom, as we advance, we will speak towards the end (of our discussion).¹ For so it will be becoming.¹ But such as are necessary for the masses, it has been very correctly said even by boys,² that it is shameful for the many not to know. However it is neither easy nor altogether possible to search into all things accurately; but whatever is necessary among them, it is not possible to throw aside. And it seems that he,³ who first spoke proverbially of the deity, that not even a god will ever at any time be seen contending against necessity, (said so) looking to this, namely, such necessities⁴ as, I conceive, are at least⁵ divine; since, (if he said so) of human necessities, to which the multitude look when, speaking in this manner, it would be the most stupid by far of all their speeches.

Clin. What then are those necessities for instruction, O guest, which are not such, but divine?

Athen. I think they are those, which he, who does not practise, nor in any respect learn, will never become either a god, a dæmon, or a hero among men, competent⁶ to undertake the care seriously of mankind. And he would want much of being a divine man, who is unable to tell either one, or two, or three, or, in short, even and odd, or in any respect to know how to number, or to reckon nights and days, and is unskilled in the revolutions of the moon, the sun, and the other stars. There is then much folly in the notion that all this education is not necessary for him, who is about to know the most beautiful subjects of instruction. But of what kind is each of these, and how many they are, and when they are to be learnt, and what with some, and what apart from others,

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

² In lieu of *καὶ πῶς*, to which Ast objects, I have translated as if the Greek were *καὶ παρὶν*—Compare “*pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, Si recte facies*,” in Horace.

³ Namely Simonides, as shown by iii. § 12, n.

⁴—⁴ Stephens was the first to suggest *ἀναγκῶν*, subsequently found in two MSS., in lieu of *ἀναγκαίων*. For Ficinus has “*divinis necessitatibus*.”

⁵ Despite the attempt of Dorville on Chariton, p. 419, to defend *τε*, I have adopted *γε*, as proposed by Heindorf on Protag., § 87, which both Ast and Stalbaum have neglected to notice. Bekker considers *τε* as an interpolation.

⁶ I have omitted *δυνατός*, which Ast acutely saw was the explanation of *ολος*.

and the whole combination of them, these are the subjects, which a person ought to learn the first; and, with this instruction as the guide, to go on to the rest. For thus a necessity has overtaken him naturally, with which we say no divinity contests at present, or ever will contest.

Clin. What has been asserted at present, O guest, seems to have been somehow truly asserted, and you speak according to nature.

Athen. Such is the case, Clinias. But it is difficult for a person, who has previously arranged thus for himself, to lay down laws in this manner. But if it seems good to you, we will lay down laws for ourselves in a more accurate manner at some other time.

Clin. You seem to us, guest, to fear our habit of ignorance on matters of this kind. You do not, however, justly fear. Endeavour then to speak, concealing nothing on this account.

Athen. I fear the very things you are now speaking of; but I fear much more those, who have indeed laid hold of these points of education, but have laid hold of them improperly. For an ignorance of all things is by no means a dreadful thing nor slippery,¹ nor yet the greatest evil; but much skill and great learning united to an improper education, is a calamity much greater than these.²

Clin. You speak the truth.

[21.] *Athen.* It is necessary then to say that the free-born ought to learn of each of these subjects so much as the great mass of boys in Ægypt learn together with their letters. For, in the first place, the rules relating to reckoning have been so artlessly devised for children, that they learn it in sport, and with pleasure; (for there are)³ distributions of certain apples

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were not ΣΦΟΔΡΟΝ, but ΣΦΑΛΕΡΟΝ.

² I cannot understand *τοῦτων*; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.

³ In the whole of this description of the manner, in which the boys in Ægypt were taught numeration, there is a sad want of perspicuity; so much so that Athenæus, in xv. p. 671, F., has taken upon himself to solve what he calls a Platonic problem, by saying, that in the allusion to the apples and chaplets, the philosopher meant something of this kind: "He wanted to discover a number, by which all might have an equal share, until the last guest had entered, either of apples or chaplets. I assert then, that the number 60 divided into 6 fellow-drinkers, is able to complete the equality. For I know that towards the beginning (of our discourse), [i. p. 4, E.] we stated that not more than five persons supped

and chaplets, the ¹ the same numbers being adapted to more and at the same time to fewer :¹ and in the case of pugilists and wrestlers, ²the assessorships and co-allotments² in turn and in successive order,³ and ⁴how they exist naturally;⁴ and, moreover, when playing, ⁵they mix phials of gold, and copper, and silver, and other things of this kind, and some distribute them whole,⁵ adapting, as I said before, to their sports the use of necessary numbers; and thus they benefit those, who are learning to draw up and lead out armies, and to arrange encampments,⁶ and to regulate a household, and cause in short the men⁷ to be more useful

together; but that we are as many as the grains of sand, is evident. Now the number 60 will commence in this way, when the drinking party is filled up to six. The first comer to the meeting receives 60 chaplets, half of which he gives to the second, and each has therefore 30; and dividing them all again with the third comer, each has just 20; and, sharing again in like manner with the fourth, just 15; with the fifth, just 12; and with the sixth, just 10. And thus is completed the equality of the chaplets." In which passage I have every where changed EK into EIC, and omitted γίνονται after δεκαπέντε. But as there is not a word in Plato about the number 60, the whole of this explanation is evidently the fanciful interpretation of some over-clever commentator. But for the express quotation in Athenæus of μήλων τέ τινων διανομαί, I should have said that Plato wrote μήλων τετμημένων διανομαί καὶ στεφάνων ὄλων. For thus the apples cut up and the whole chaplets would answer to numbers fractional and integral.

¹—¹ I confess I do not exactly understand what is meant by the words between the numerals; I could have understood perfectly πλείοσιν ἅμα καὶ ἑλάττοσιν ἀρμοσόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν ἰόντων κοινῇ, καὶ—i. e. "the numbers being adapted to the more and fewer likewise of those who had come in common."

²—² Ast says that in ἐφεδρείας and συλλήξεως there is an allusion to the custom of appointing by lot a third combatant, who was to contend with the conqueror in a preceding contest, as shown by Aristoph. in Βατρ. 791.

³—³ The Greek is ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ— But one MS. omits καὶ ἐφεξῆς correctly. For the two expressions mean the same thing. Correctly too one MS. omits καὶ.

⁴—⁴ How the ἐφεδρεία and σύλληξις can be said to take place naturally, I cannot understand.

⁵—⁵ Here again I am at a loss. All would be intelligible, were we to read, what Plato probably wrote, ἢ οὐ πλείας ἢ πλείας, in lieu of καὶ ὅλας πως. For "the full" and "not full" would express whole and fractional quantities.

⁶ In lieu of καὶ στρατείας, omitted by Ficinus, two MSS. read στρατοπεδείας, which leads to στρατοπεδεύσεις, as in p. 813, E.

⁷ Here again Ficinus omits τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, as being superfluous at least, and scarcely intelligible. The antithesis in ἐργηγορότας seems to lead to μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς νωθροτέρους, "more than the indolent."

themselves to themselves, and awake ; and after this in the case of measurements, relating to length, breadth, and depth, (since they say)¹ that there is naturally inherent in all men a certain ridiculous and disgraceful ignorance on all these points, they liberate them from this.

Clin. What and what kind of ignorance do you mean ?

Athen. My dear Clinias, I too, having altogether late in life heard how we are affected on these points, have felt a wonder ; and it seems to me, that it is the situation not of human beings, but rather of certain swine-like animals ; and I have been ashamed not only of myself, but of all the Greeks.

Clin. About what ? Tell us, guest, what you mean.

Athen. I will tell you ; or, rather, I will point it out to you by asking a question. And do you give me a short answer. You surely know what length is ?

Clin. How not ?

Athen. And what breadth is ?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And that there are these two things, and that a third of these² is depth ?

Clin. How not ?

Athen. Does it not, then, seem to you, that all these may be measured by each other ?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. I mean length by length, and breadth by breadth ; and that depth is naturally capable of being measured similarly ?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. But, if some of these can do this neither³ violently nor quietly,³ but some can, and others not,⁴ and yet you imagine that all (can), how do you conceive yourself to be situated with respect to these ?

Clin. Badly, it is evident.

¹ I have inserted "since they say," to complete the sense. The Greek is *περι πάντων—φύσει*. But *ἐπεὶ* might easily have dropt out before *περί*, and *φασὶ* corrupted into *φύσει*.

² In lieu of *τούτων*, which I cannot understand, Plato wrote I imagine *ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάμει*—

³⁻³ In *σφόδρα*, says Ast, there is an allusion to the same word in the answer of Clinias ; and hence, to preserve the antithesis, Plato added *ἡρέμα*. For otherwise he would have written *μᾶλλον* and *ἥττον*.

³ That is to say, some quantities are incommensurable, and others not. T.

Athen. But again, as regards length and breadth against depth, or length and breadth against each other, do not all of us the Greeks think, touching these questions, thus, that they can be measured against each other in some way?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But if this be at no time and by no means possible, and yet all the Greeks, as I have said, think it is possible, is it not fit, that, being ashamed of them all, we should thus address them,—O ye best of Greeks, this is one of the things, which we said it was base not to know. But is it not altogether beautiful to know things necessary (to be known)?

Clin. How not?

Athen. And in addition to these, there are other things allied to them, in which many errors, the sisters of those [errors],¹ are produced in us.

Clin. What are these?

Athen. Those relating to quantities that are commensurable and not commensurable, by what nature they exist. For it is necessary that he, who reflects upon them, should distinguish them, or be altogether a person of no mark; and it is meet² by throwing out problems to each other, and, being engaged in an amusement more agreeable than the pebble-game³ of old men, to have a love for contention in a pursuit worthy of all attention.⁴

Clin. Perhaps so. At least it seems that the pebble-game and this education are very⁵ different from each other.

Athen. These subjects then I assert, Clinias, the youths ought to learn. For they are neither hurtful nor difficult; and

¹ Ast has properly rejected ἀμαρτημάτων as an interpolation.

² In lieu of AEI the sense requires ΔΕΙ, as I have translated.

³ So I should have translated πεττεία at Charm. § 47, Alcib. i. § 15, and here in v. § 9. For though the modern draughts is the nearest approach to the Greek πεττεία, yet there seems to have been some difference in these two games. Wrongly therefore have I translated πεττείαν, "a game of dice," in the Statesman, § 38, as shown by Phædr. p. 274, D. πεττείας τε καὶ κυβείας.

⁴ Instead of ταύτων, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were πάντων—

⁵ All the MSS. read οὐ πάμπολον— Stephens was the first to suggest καὶ πάμπολον, found subsequently, according to Stalbaum, in the margin of a solitary MS. For Ficinus omits the negative. But as καὶ has no meaning here, I should prefer πον— On the confusion of ον and πον see Porson at Hecub. 300. Winckelmann refers to his note on Plutarch Erot. p. 217, but what he says there I know not, for I have never seen the book.

when they are learnt, combined with sport, they will do a benefit, but never a hurt, to our state. But, if any one says otherwise, let us hear him.

Clin. How not?

Athen. If then these things appear to be so, it is evident that we shall decide in their favour; but appearing to be not so, they will be decided against.

Clin. Evidently so. How not?

Athen. Let then these be laid down as belonging to necessary instructions, in order that what relates to the laws may not be (done) by us in vain.

¹ *Clin.* Let them be laid down.¹

Athen. ²(For they are) as it were pledges from the rest of the polity, which may be dissolved,² if they should in no respect receive kindly³ us, who propose them, or you, who establish them.

Clin. The condition you propose is just.

[22.] *Athen.* After these then look to the instruction relating to the stars, whether this being chosen for youth pleases us, or the contrary.

Clin. Only speak.

Athen. And yet there is respecting them a subject of great marvel, and to be endured at no time and by no means.

Clin. What is this?

Athen. We say that we ought not to search after the greatest god,⁴ and the whole order of the world, nor to be busy in explaining the causes (of things); for it is not holy. It seems indeed, that, if the very contrary took place, it would take place correctly.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. What is stated is a paradox, and some one may think it is not suited to old men; but when any one conceives

¹—¹ I have assigned the words *κείσθω μέντοι* to Clinias. For *μέντοι*, following a word repeated, always indicates the assent of the party thus repeating the word, as I have shown on Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2.

²—³ I confess I cannot understand the words between the numerals.

³ Ast says that *φιλοφρονῆται* means "be agreeable." But *φιλοφρονεῖσθαι* has always elsewhere an active sense. Hence I am at a loss here for the real meaning of the whole sentence.

⁴ On this celebrated saying of Plato Ast has referred to a host of writers, who have alluded to it, from Cicero De N. D. i. 12, to Theodoretus.

that instruction is something beautiful, and true, and advantageous to a city, and likewise in every respect acceptable to the deity, by no manner of means is it possible not to mention it.

Clin. You say what is reasonable. But shall we find an instruction of this kind in the case of the stars?

Athen. All we Greeks, so to say, tell, O ye good men, a falsehood respecting those mighty divinities the Sun and Moon.

Clin. Of what kind is the falsehood?

Athen. We say that they never proceed in the same path, and that there are some other stars with them, to which we give the name of planets.

Clin. By Zeus, you are saying, guest, the truth. For in the course of my life, I have often seen myself the morning and the evening star, and certain other stars, never proceeding along in the same track, but wandering entirely. And we all know that the Sun and Moon ¹are perpetually doing so.¹

Athen. These then are the things, Megillus and Clinias, which I assert our citizens and youths ought to learn respecting the gods in heaven, so far as this ²about all these matters, so far² for the sake of not blaspheming them, but of offering sacrifices ever with good-omened words, and piously in prayers approaching³ them.

Clin. This indeed is right, if, first, it is possible to learn that, of which you are speaking; and next, if we are not at present speaking properly about them, yet after learning, we shall speak so of them. Thus much do I go along with you; and that a thing of this kind must be learnt. Do you, then, endeavour to explain entirely that these things are so, and we will together follow you as your disciples.

¹ The Greek is *δρῶντας ταῦθ' ἃ ἀεὶ*—which is perfectly unintelligible. Hence Ast would read *ταῦτα ἀεὶ*, similar to “semper hæc facere” in Cornarius. But Ficinus has “errare semper omnes cognovimus:” Plato wrote, I suspect, *δρῶντες ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα θείν*—i. e. “on looking at them we know that they run hither and thither.” On the confusion of *δρῶντες* and *δρῶντες* see my remarks in Troad. Præf. p. xxiii., and on *ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα*, found in viii. § 5, p. 835, B., see at Eumen. 95.

² The Greek is *περὶ πάντων τούτων μέχρι*—where *μέχρι* is repeated unnecessarily, whatever Ast may say to the contrary; and *περὶ πάντων τούτων*, omitted by Ficinus, have nothing to which they can be referred. I suspect that we ought to transpose them after *εὐφημεῖν δὲ*, and read *περὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν χάρι*—

³ I have translated as if the Greek word was formerly *ἐρχομένους*, not, as at present, *εὐχομένους*.

Athen. It is not easy to learn what I am saying, nor is it on the other hand altogether difficult, nor is it a matter of a very long time. And the proof is, that, although I myself have heard these things, neither recently¹ nor formerly, I am able to render them manifest in a little time. And yet had they been difficult, I, who am in years, would not have been able to explain them to you, who are in years.

Clin. You say what is true. But what is the instruction, which you call marvellous; but which you say it is fitting for the youths to learn, and yet we are ignorant of? Endeavour to speak about it, at least to this extent, with the utmost perspicuity.

Athen. I must endeavour. The notion then, thou best of men, respecting the Sun and Moon and the other stars, that they are planets, is not correct; but the very contrary is the case. For each of them perpetually traverses the same path, being not many, but one, in a circle; but they appear to traverse many. And that, which is the most swift of them, is not rightly thought to be² the slowest, and contrariwise the contrary. Now if such is the case naturally, but we do not think so, if we had such notions respecting the horses, that run at Olympia, or of men contesting in the long course, and we called the swiftest the slowest, and the slowest the swiftest, and, passing our encomiums, celebrated the vanquished as the victor, I think we should not attach our praises properly, nor in a manner agreeable to the racers, ³being men.³ But now, when we err in the very same manner respecting the gods, do we not think that, what,⁴ when it took place there, would be then ridiculous and incorrect, takes place here at present (not well) in the case of the gods.

Clin. Ridiculous, I am aware, entirely.⁵

¹ From "nuper" in Ficinus, Stephens suggested *νίον*, found subsequently in one MS., in lieu of *νίος*: which should otherwise be *νίος ὦν*, to which *νέως* in three MSS. seems to lead, or else to *νεωστὶ*, which Winckelmann prefers.

² I have translated as if the Greek were *εἶναι*, not *αὖ*—

³—³ The words between the numerals Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has omitted; for he saw that *ἀνθρώποις* could scarcely thus be mentioned singly after the preceding *ἵππων* and *ἀνδρῶν*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἀνθρώποις ἵπποις τε*, not *ἀνθρώποις οὖσι*.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *οἶδ'*, *ὅλως*, not *οὐδαμῶς*—

⁵ I have adopted the notion of Ast, that Plato wrote *οἶομεθ' ὅ*—not *οἶομεθα*—He should have elicited likewise *ἐντραυθοὶ οὐκ ἐβ'* from *ἐντραυθοὶ καὶ*—as I have translated.

Athen. It is not then an act acceptable to the divinity, when we hymn to the gods what is false.

Clin. Most true; if such is the case.

Athen. If then we can show that such is the case, all these subjects are up to this point to be learnt; but, if we cannot show it, we must dismiss them; and let this be thus laid down.

Clin. By all means.

[23.] *Athen.* It is then proper to say now, that the legal institutions relating to the instruction of childhood, have reached their end. And it is requisite to reflect in a similar manner upon hunting and every thing else of this kind. ¹ For it appears that the office of a lawgiver is not merely that of laying down laws; but that he ought to make use of what is a mean between admonition and laws; ¹ an idea that has often occurred to us during our discussion; for instance, (when we were speaking) about the bringing up of the very young. For we said there were things not to be mentioned; and that, speaking of them as laws laid down, we thought the notion ² to be full ³ of folly; but laws having been written in this way, and the whole of a polity (laid down), ⁴ the praise of a citizen pre-eminent in virtue is not then perfect, when any one says that he, who ministers the best to the laws, and obeys them the most, is the good man; but this would be said more perfectly, that he is so, who leads a life without stain, ⁵ through being obedient to the writings of the party, who lays down the laws and distributes praise and blame. This is the most correct language for the praise of a

¹—¹ Such is the literal translation of Ficinus. That of the Greek is less intelligible. "For it seems almost that, what is ordained by the lawgiver, is for some other purpose than for the lawgiver to be freed (from trouble), and that there is something else in addition to the laws, which is naturally something between admonition and laws." Instead however of ἐπὶ μῆζον εἶναι, which Ast would defend, Stephens suggested ἐπὶ μῆζον ἵεναι: while the Bipont editor prefers ἐπὶ μῆζον εἶναι, obtained from the version of Cornarius.

² In lieu of εἶναι, which I cannot understand, nor could Ast, as is evident from his unsatisfactory explanation, I have translated as if the Greek were ἐννοίαν—For there would be thus a Platonic play upon ἐννοίαν—ἀνοίαν γίμειν— See at Phileb. § 57, n. 56. Ficinus has, what Taylor adopted, "idque tentare dementis esse."

³ This is the happy restoration by Cornarius of γίμειν for γε μὴν.

⁴ Ficinus alone has "republica constituta," required by the sense.

⁵ Ficinus omits ἀκράτον— Winckelmann suggests ἀκρότατος.

citizen ; and the legislator in reality ought not only to write down his laws, but in addition to the laws to write down, interwoven with them,¹ what seems to him to be beautiful and not beautiful ; and the tip-top citizen should establish firmly these no less than what are bound down by fines imposed by the law. And we adduce as a witness the subject of our present discussion ; for it will show more clearly what we mean. For hunting is a thing of wide extent, comprehended at present under nearly one name. For there is much hunting of aquatic animals ; much of those that fly ; and still more of those on land, not only of wild beasts, but that which² it is fit to consider as the hunting of men, I mean³ in war, and much too is the hunting in the way of friendship, of which one part brings praise, the other blame. The thefts too of robbers and armies are huntings. The legislator, therefore, who establishes laws about hunting, can neither leave these unnoticed, nor, by imposing regulations and fines on all, lay down laws of a menacing kind. What then is to be done in cases of this kind ?⁴ On the one hand, the legislator ought to praise and blame the business of hunting,⁴ relating to the labours and pursuits of youth ; and on the other hand, the young man ought to hear and obey, and neither pleasure nor labour ought to prevent him (from doing so) ; but let him honour what is mentioned with praise, rather than what has been laid down by law, and are accompanied with threats, united to fines relating to each,⁵ and perform what is enjoined.⁵ This being premised, the praise and blame of hunting will follow in a becoming manner. For that, which makes the souls of young men better, belongs to the person praising, but to the party blaming that, which (effects) the contrary. Let us then speak of what follows in order, addressing the young men by a prayer—O friends, never may any desire or love of fishing by sea, or of fishing with a hook, seize you ; nor, generally, of labouring to catch

¹ Ficinus omits νόμοις ἐμπελεγμένα.

² I have translated as if the Greek were ἦν, what the syntax requires, not τῇν—

³ Stephens correctly suggested τῇν γε—in lieu of τῇν τε—

⁴ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has “oportet ut legislator, quæ in venatione, laudanda sunt, laudet ; quæ contra, vituperet.”

⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

any aquatic animals with an osier net,¹ either when you are awake or asleep!² May no desire ever come upon you to catch men at sea, nor to rob them, which would make you cruel and lawless hunters! And never may it come into your farthest thoughts³ to commit thefts in the country and city; nor let a desire, ⁴full of cleverness, but not a very liberal one,⁴ come upon any young person to catch birds. The hunting then and catching of land animals alone remains for our athletes; of which, one kind, performed by those sleeping⁵ ever⁶ in turn, and called nocturnal, belongs to sluggish men, and is not worthy of praise; nor yet the other (of those awake),⁷ which, enjoying a remission from labour, does by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a soul fond of labour, get the savage strength of wild beasts into its power. That hunting then of quadrupeds alone remains as the best of all, performed with horses and dogs, and by the bodies of the parties themselves; over all of which animals they get the mastery by running them down, and inflicting blows, and hurling darts, the parties themselves, to whom there is any care of possessing a godlike bravery, being engaged with their own hands in the hunt. Of all these matters then in the shape of praise or blame, let this discourse have been spoken; and let this be the law. Let no one hinder these truly sacred hunters from hunting, wherever they please. But no one shall ever suffer any person at any place to engage in nocturnal hunting with dogs⁸ and ropes. And let him not prevent

¹ The nets, to which Plato alludes, are still in use in England for catching eels especially, and are called eel-baskets.

² This allusion to catching fish, when the fisherman is asleep, will be best understood by knowing that nets are generally set over-night; when fish are more eager in their search for food than during the day.

³ Ast, dissatisfied with *εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον νοῦν*, would reject those words as an interpolation; or, omitting only *νοῦν*, render *εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον* "to the man of lowest character," referring to Aristotle Polit. vii. 1. Stalb. would expel *εἰς* and *νοῦν*. I should prefer *εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἔσχατου—νοῦν*. Ficinus omits *ἔσχατον* entirely. Winckelmann would read *εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον*, referring to Herodot. vii. 229.

⁴—⁴ Ficinus has "jucunda venatio, servilis magis quam libera." But *αἰμύλος* is not "pleasant," but "crafty," as shown by myself on *Æsch. Suppl.* 1035.

⁵ Ficinus seems to refer *τῶν εὐδόντων* to the animals.

⁶ In the unmeaning *ad* lies hid *ἀεὶ*—as I have translated.

⁷ Instead of *τῶν διαπαύματα*, Winckelmann suggests *τῶν ἐγρηγορότων διαπαύματα*—what I have adopted.

⁸ In lieu of *κυσι* Grou proposed to read *ἀρκυσι*, whom Ast and the Zurich editors have followed.

fowling in uncultivated places and in mountains; but any one who may be present shall forbid it in cultivated and 'sacred holy' places, and a person catching fish, except in ports or sacred rivers, and marshes or pools; but in other places let it be lawful for him to catch them, provided he does not use a mixture of juices.² Now, therefore, it is proper to say, that the legal institutions respecting education have arrived at their end.

Clin. You may well say so.

BOOK VIII.

[1.] CLOSE upon these it is for us to regulate and lay down by law, in conjunction with the Delphic oracles, festivals, (and)³ what (are to be) the sacrifices and the divinities,⁴ to whom it will be better and more advisable for the state to sacrifice, and at what time, and how many in number. Of these matters,⁵ I think⁶ it will be perhaps nearly our business to lay down some by law.

Clin. Perhaps so, as regards the number.

Athen. Let us then speak first as regards the number. ⁷For let there be⁷ of three hundred and sixty-five ⁸nothing wanting;⁸ so that some one⁹ of the magistrates may always sacri-

¹—¹ The Greek in one MS. is *ισοῖς ἀγίοις*: where Ast would reject *ἀγίοις* as a gl. The six others read *ἀγίοις*: which seems to lead to *ισοαῖς ὀργάσι*— On the word *ὀργὰς* see Ruhnken on Tim. p. 195.

² This is the earliest allusion to the custom, still prevalent in England, of catching fish by putting poisonous or stupifying drugs into the water.

³ I have translated as if *καὶ* had dropt out before *αἱ τινες*, and thus met the objection first started by Stephens against the want of syntax.

⁴ Although *θεοῖς ὁλοσίου* might be defended by the passages produced by Lobeck on Ajac. 801, ed. 1, yet here one would prefer *θεοὶ, ὁλοσίου*—and so in Aristoph. *Barp.* 889, "Ἐρεποι γὰρ εἶσιν, ὁλοῖν εὐχόμεαι θεοῖς"—Brunck correctly adopted *θεοὶ*, found in some MSS.

⁵ In lieu of *ἐνὰ γ' αὐτῶν*, where *γε* is useless, Plato wrote, I suspect, *τούτων*, as I have translated.

⁶ One MS. has *ἀν εἶναι νομοθερεῖν*, evidently an error for *ἀν οἷμαι νομοθερεῖν*, which I have adopted.

⁷—⁷ Instead of *ἱστῶσαν*, Ficinus has "*oportere censeo*," translated by Taylor, "I should establish."

⁸—⁸ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁹ In lieu of *ὅπως ἀν μία γέ τις*, I should prefer *ὅπως ἀν ὁσημέραι τις*—

fice to some god or dæmon in behalf of the city, and the people,¹ and their property. And let the (holy) interpreters, and the priests, and the priestesses, and the prophets, being assembled together, with the guardians of the laws, ordain what it was necessary for the legislator to omit. ²For it is requisite that these should take notice of things omitted.² For the law will say that there are twelve festivals to the twelve gods, from whom each tribe has its name, and that persons are to make to each of these monthly sacrifices, and dances, and musical contests, and to assign the gymnastic exercises, in a manner befitting both to the gods themselves, and the several seasons; and to distribute the female festivals likewise, such as ought to be separated from the men, and such as ought not. Moreover, the festivals of the gods below, and such as are to be called celestial, and what is attendant on these, must not be mixed together, but must be separated in the twelfth month, sacred to Pluto,³ by persons paying rites according to law: nor must persons feel, like enemies, an ill will towards that god, but they must honour him, as being even the best to the race of men. ⁴For the communion between soul and body is not better than the separation, as I affirm, speaking seriously.⁴ Besides, it is re-

For Plato meant to say that there ought to be a sacrifice daily; for he knew that the year consisted of 365 days. With regard to the word *ὁσημέραι*, it is found twice in Aristophanes, and is to be restored again for *σήμερον*, as I remarked in the Cl. Jl., No. 37, p. 130, although *μία γε τις* might be supported by at least a dozen passages.

¹ Ficinus has "*se ipsis*," from whence Ast would read *αὐτῶν*. He should have suggested *ἀστών*, unless it be said that *αὐτῶν* agrees with *πολιτῶν*, to be got out of *πόλεως*. See Porson on Hec. 22.

²⁻³ So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus, "*nam derelictorum cognitores istos esse oportet*." The Greek is *καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου χρὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιγνώμονας τοῦ παραλειπομένου τούτους τοὺς αὐτοὺς*: where *καὶ δὴ καὶ*, "moreover," is an absurdity, for the sense requires *καὶ γὰρ*, and *τοῦ παραλειπομένου* is an evident explanation of *αὐτοῦ τούτου*: to say nothing of the unmeaning *τούτους τοὺς αὐτοὺς*, "these the same." Plato wrote in Greek *καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὺς τούτου χρὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιγνώμονας*—answering to the Latin of Ficinus.

³ In like manner during the 12th month the Saturnalia were celebrated in ancient Rome.

⁴⁻⁴ I must leave for others to explain the relevancy of the sentiment between the numerals. It is beyond my comprehension. Unless I am greatly mistaken, there is a lacuna here, in which it was shown that the union of body and soul was effected by the agency of the celestial gods, and the separation by that of the infernal; and that both were equally kind

quisite for those, who are about to distinguish these sufficiently, to have this notion, that this our city is such, as no one will find another like it, of those at present, as regards the leisurely employment of time, and the power over things necessary for existence. But it ought, like a single individual, to live well. Now to those living well, it is necessary for this to be present the first, namely, ¹ that persons should neither injure others,¹ nor be injured by others. Now of these, the former is not very difficult; but it is very difficult to possess the power of not being injured; nor is it possible to perfectly acquire it otherwise than by becoming perfectly good.² The same thing also takes place in a city, to which, when it is good, there is a life of peace; but of war from without and within, when it is wicked. And as this is the case nearly every where,³ each must exercise themselves in war, not during a war, but during a life of peace. It is necessary then for a city, endued with intellect, to exercise itself in war, for not less than one day in each month, but for more as it may seem fit to the rulers, without taking thought of cold or heat, both the men, and the women and the boys, ⁴ in order that all may be prepared,⁴ when it shall somehow⁵ seem good to the rulers to lead forth the people in a mass,⁶ and sometimes in portions.⁶

to man, while living and dead, if he only acted during life piously towards both. With regard to the sentiment that death is not inferior to life, Stobæus will furnish plenty of passages in Tit. cxx.

¹—¹ I have adopted the reading found in the text of two MSS., and the margin of one, μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν ἄλλους, similar to “ut nec ipsi aliis nec alii ipsis injuriam inferant” in Ficinus, where ἄλλους, wanting in the rest, has been supplied, as required by the antithesis; on which see my Poppo’s Prolegom. p. 157. Perhaps however Plato, τὸ μήτ’ ἀδικεῖν μήτ’ ἀδικεῖσθαι, as we find Δάκνειν, δάκνεσθαι in Aristoph. Barp. 886.

² For a perfectly good man cannot be injured; because he, who is injured, is deprived of some good. Now virtue is the property of a perfectly good man; but this cannot be taken away. T.

³ I have translated as if the Greek were πάντη, not ταύτη—

⁴—⁴ The words between the numerals have been adopted by Taylor from the Latin alone of Ficinus, “ut omnes parati sint.”

⁵ The Greek is ὥς πανδημίαν: where ὥς is unintelligible. Ficinus has “quodammodo—” which leads to πως. Winckelmann suggests πανδημία—

⁶—⁶ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. The Greek is τότε δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρη: where Stephens would read τότε, adopted by Ast and Stalb. But though τότε is sometimes found in the second clause, with the omission of it in the first, yet here Plato wrote, I suspect, either τότε δ’ αὖ or ἐνίοτε—

And it is meet¹ to devise some beautiful sports, together with sacrifices, that certain festival-battles² may take place, imitating as distinctly as possible the battles in war; and it is meet to distribute rewards of victory and valour to each of these, and to make encomiums upon, and abuse of, each other, according as each may conduct himself in the contests, and through the whole of life, ³by decking the party, who has been thought to be the best, and dispraising him, who has not.³ But, in the first place, let not every one be a poet on such subjects, but let him be a person not less than fifty years of age; nor, in the next place, such of those, as possess poetry and music sufficiently in themselves, but have never done any honourable and conspicuous act, but such as are good men themselves and held in honour by the state, and have been the doers of honourable deeds. (And)⁴ let the compositions of such persons be sung, even although they may not be naturally musical. But let the decision on these matters be with the instructor of youth, and the other guardians of the laws; and let them⁵ assign, as an honour to them⁶ alone, a freedom of speech in songs; but to the others let there not be this liberty; nor let any one dare to sing a song, which has not been approved of by the guardians of the laws, who are to decide, not even if it be sweeter than the hymns of ⁷Thamyris and Orpheus;⁷ but such sacred poems as have, after being decided upon, been dedicated to the gods; and such as, being the poems of worthy men, scattering blame or praise on certain parties, have been adjudged to do a thing of this kind with moderation.

[2.] The same things, I assert, ought to take place similarly, both among men and women, respecting war, and the liberty of speech in poetry. But it is meet for the legislator to bring the question before himself, and to cast about it with this discourse—Come, what citizens shall I, after having

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were ΔΕΙ not ΑΕΙ.

² These festival-battles would be now called sham-fights, occurring on certain holy-days.

³⁻⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

⁴ I have translated as if *kai* had dropt out after *καλῶν*—

⁵ I have adopted *οὔτοι δὲ*, suggested by Ast, for *τούτοι*—

⁶ Ficinus has “*probis viris*,” adopted by Taylor.

⁷ In the time of Plato there was some poetry afloat, attributed to Orpheus: but this and another passage in Ion, § 4, are the only two, where a similar allusion is made to the existing poetry of Thamyris.

nourished the whole state properly, bring up? Ought they not to be the combatants in the greatest contests, to whom there are ten thousand antagonists? Entirely so, some one speaking with propriety may say. What then, if we had brought up boxers or combatants in boxing and wrestling united, or persons contending in any other contests of this kind, should we have met¹ them in the contest itself, not having ourselves fought with any one at a former time? Or, if we were pugilists, should we not have learned to fight many days previous to the contest, and laboured hard in imitating all such things as we should be about to adopt at that period,² when we were contending for victory? And should we not, with the view of coming the nearest possible to what is similar, have put on boxing-gloves³ instead of the cestus, in order that the blows and the avoidance of blows might be practised as sufficiently as possible? And should there have happened to be a deficiency of fellow-combatants, should we not, through dreading the laughter of the senseless, have dared to hang up an inanimate image,⁴ and practise ourselves against it? And if we were in want both of animate and inanimate adversaries, should we not have ventured, in some desert spot, to fight even with a shadow⁵ against ourselves? Or, for what else would any one say that this practice in moving the hand took place?

Clin. For nearly nothing else, O guest, than the very one you have just now mentioned.

Athen. What then, will the warlike portion of the city dare

¹ Ficinus, mistaking the meaning of ἀπέντρον, has rendered the passage "itane in ipsum certamen educeremus, ut cum nullo antea unquam pugnaverint:" and his mistake is followed to the letter by Taylor.

² Instead of εἰς τόρε, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἐν τῷ ὄντι, for his version is "in vero certamine," adopted by Taylor.

³ The Greek is σφαίρας, literally "balls," from which it is evident, that by σφαίραι were meant what we call in England "boxing-gloves," that have on the outside a semi-spherical projection; while by the word ἱμᾶς, literally, "a thong," was meant "a leather strap, studded with iron nails," called in Latin "cestus," which, as we learn from Theocritus, Id. xx. 3, was put round the knuckles, not only to protect them, but to cause the blow to be heavier.

⁴ Such was the practice of the Romans, as we learn from Juvenal vi. 246, Senec. Epist. xviii. 6, and Vegetius de Re Milit. i. 11, ii. 23, quoted by Ast; who might have referred to the Laches, § 1, where the fighting in armour was probably something of a similar kind.

⁵ On this σκιαμαχία, Ast refers to Virgil, Æn. v. 376; Plato, Rep. vii. 5; Apolog. § 2; and Schol. on Philostratus Heroic. p. 393, ed. Boiss.

on each occasion to go to the greatest of contests, worse prepared than combatants of this kind, when it is about to fight for life, and for children, and property, and the whole of the state. And will not then the legislator, fearful lest these gymnastic exercises with each other should appear to some persons ridiculous, lay down a law, and ordain that persons are to act the soldier each day in a little way without arms, and cause the dances, and the whole of gymnastic exercise, to tend together to this point? and will he not likewise ordain that some of the gymnastic exercises for instance,¹ either greater or less, ²are to last for not less than a month; and that persons are to enter³ into contests with each other through the whole country in seizing upon places, and making ambuscades,³ and by imitating the whole of war in reality,⁴ to fight with boxing-gloves, and to make use of darts somewhat dangerous, and as near as possible to the hurling of real ones; in order that the sport may not be altogether without a fear from each other, but cause some terror, and thus, after a manner, show who is the man of mettle, and who is not; and by distributing correctly honours to some, and disgrace to others, he may render the whole state through its (whole) life useful for a real contest. And moreover, should any one happen to die in these contests, that, as the death was involuntary, he may lay down that the homicide shall, after being purified according to law, be pure in hand; reflecting that when not many men die, others will be born again not inferior; but when fear, as it were, dies, in all these cases he will no longer

¹ This is the only passage I remember to have met with, where *οἶον* or any word is introduced between *οἱ δὲ* and *τινες*—and even here it is omitted by Ficinus; whose version however is not sufficiently close to enable us to see what he found in his MS.

^{2—3} Ast would reject *τε καὶ ἐλάττους*, as being not only at variance with the train of thought, but omitted likewise by Ficinus. But he forgot that in *μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους*, for *τε* is properly omitted by one MS., there is an allusion to the *πανδημία ἢ κατὰ μέρη* mentioned in § 1, and that *καὶ* is to be taken in the sense of *ἢ*, as shortly afterwards *καλλίω [τε] καὶ ἀσχημονεστίαν*. For other examples see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 173.

³ I have translated as if Plato wrote *ἀμίλλας—ἀμιλλωμένους—καὶ ποιουμένους ἐνίδρας*, not *ἀμίλλας—ποιουμένους—ἀμιλλωμένους καὶ ἐνίδρας*—

⁴ In lieu of *ὄντως* one MS. has *ὄντος*. Neither word is acknowledged by Ficinus. One would prefer *οὕτως*, and unite it to *σφαιρομαχεῖν*.

be able to discover a test of the better and the worse ; which is, in no small degree, a greater evil to a state than the other.¹

Clin. We will agree with you, O guest, that he ought to lay down matters of this kind by law, and direct the attention of the whole state to them.

[3.] *Athen.* Do we then all of us know the reason, why in cities at present no such dancing and contest exist, scarcely at any time or in any manner, except to a very small extent ? Shall we say that this happens through the ignorance of the masses, and of those who have laid down laws for them ?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. By no means, O blessed Clinias. But it is proper to say that there are two causes of this, and very sufficient too.

Clin. What are they ?

Athen. One is, that, through the love of wealth making the whole of time to be without any leisure² for the care of other things except private property, on which the soul of every citizen is hanging, it can have no care for other things but of daily pecuniary gain ; and whatever learning or pursuit leads to this, every one individually is most ready to learn and to practise, but he laughs down all the rest. It is proper therefore to mention this as one reason, why a state is unwilling to engage seriously in this or any other honourable and excellent pursuit ; but through an insatiable desire of silver and gold is willing for every man to undergo every art and artifice, both the more beautiful and the more base,³ if he is about to become wealthy, and to engage in a line of conduct holy and unholy, and thoroughly disgraceful, and to feel no annoyance, if only he possesses the power, like a wild beast,⁴ to eat all

¹ Namely, "the involuntary destruction of a few individuals." T.

² From hence it is evident that the favourite doctrine of the Political Economists of the present day, that "time is money," is older than they are probably aware of.

³ With this passage may be compared the celebrated one in Horace i. Ep. i. 65, "rem facias, rem, Si possis, recte ; si non, quocunque modo, rem."

⁴ Instead of *θηρίω* Stephens was the first to suggest *θηρίον*, adopted by Ast and Stalb. Winckelmann conceives that *γαστρι* has been erased before *καθάπερ θηρίω*, answering to "ventri" in Ficinus, "veluti pecora, ventri ac veneri servant."

kinds of things, and drink likewise,¹ and to obtain all satiety in all forms of venereal enjoyments.

Clin. Right.

Athen. Let this then be put down as one reason, which I assign, as preventing states from practising² any thing else that is honourable or what relates to war sufficiently; but by causing the naturally well-ordered to become merchants, and ship-owners, and servile ministers, and the brave to be robbers, and house-breakers, and guilty of sacrilege, and fond of war, and tyrannical, it destroys, and greatly so³ sometimes, those who were well-disposed but unfortunate.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Why should I not call those in every respect unfortunate, to whom there is a necessity by feeling hungry through the whole of life and neglecting their own soul to be perpetually engaged in a contest?⁴

Clin. This, then, is one reason. But what do you assign, O guest, as the second?

Athen. You have very properly reminded me.

⁵ *Clin.* This insatiable search (after wealth)⁶ that makes each person to be without leisure, is, as you say, one impediment to each practising what relates to war. Be it so. But tell us the second.

Athen. Do I seem to have not spoken, but to have wasted time through a want of readiness?

Clin. You do not. But you seem to us to reprobate, as through hatred, a custom of this kind more than is becoming,⁷ in the language which has just now fallen from you.⁷

¹ Although *ὡσαύτως* might perhaps stand, yet I should prefer *ἀσώτως*—"intemperately." See at viii. § 6.

² I have omitted here *ἑῷσα*, which is evidently out of its place, and translated as if *ἑῷσι*, "neglecting," followed *τὴν ψυχὴν αἰεὶ τὴν αὐτῶν* in the next speech of the Athenian.

^{3—3} The Greek is *ποιοῦσα καὶ μάλ' ἐνίστε*— But *ποιοῦσα* is evidently superfluous after the preceding *ἀπεργαζομένη*. Plato wrote, I suspect, what I have translated, *ἀπόλλυσι καὶ μάλα ἐνίστε*—

⁴ Instead of *διεξελεθῆν*, Ficinus found some word answering to his "cruciare," probably *διεξαθλεύειν*.

⁵ This speech belongs rather to Megillus. For otherwise Clinias will be found to repeat his previous request.

⁶ Ficinus alone has, what is required by the sense, "divitiarum—"

^{7—7} The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

Athen. You find fault with me, guests, most correctly ; and you shall hear, as is reasonable, what is after this.

Clin. Only speak.

Athen. I say, then, that the not-polities, of which we have often spoken in our previous conversation, namely, a democracy, an oligarchy, and a tyranny, are the causes of this. For in these there is not a single polity ; but all may most justly be called states of sedition. For not one willingly rules over the willing, but willingly over the unwilling, and this always with some compulsion. And as the governor fears the governed, he never at any time willingly permits a person to be handsome, or wealthy, or strong, or brave, or altogether warlike. ¹ These two then are nearly pre-eminently the causes of all things, but of these they are really the pre-eminent.¹ But the polity for which we are now giving laws, avoids both these. For it leads a life of the greatest leisure ; and (the people) are free from each other, and will, I think, become from these laws the lovers of money the least. So that such an establishment of a polity would alone of all existing at present, probably and according to reason receive at the same time the instruction that has been gone through, and the warlike sport, which has been perfected correctly at least by description.

Clin. Correctly (said).

[4.] *Athen.* Is it not then next in order to these for us to have a recollection of all gymnastic contests, so that we may attend to such of them as appertain to war, and lay down the rewards of victory, but to bid farewell to such, as do not appertain. But what they are, it is better for them to be detailed from the beginning, and to establish by law. And, first, must we not lay down what appertains to running and swiftness ?

Clin. We must lay them down.

Athen. Now the quickness of the body is altogether of all things the most appertaining to war ; one kind connected with the feet, and the other with the hands ; that of the feet being required for running away and overtaking, but (of the hands)

¹ Such, according to Ast, is the literal translation of the Greek : but of their meaning he says nothing, nor can I explain what he understood by them. What Plato really wrote, might, I think, be recovered by a conjecture. To my mind he certainly did not write what is found in the text at present. Ficinus has "Hæ duæ omnium quidem quodammodo, horum certe præcipuæ causæ sunt."

¹ the fight in close conflict and the standing up together requiring strength and vigour.¹

Clin. How not?

Athen. But neither of them without heavy arms possesses the greatest utility.

Clin. For how should they?

Athen. The crier, then, shall first invite the runner in the stadium, as he does now at the games. And the runner will enter, having a shield; for we do not put down rewards for the light-armed soldier. He, who is about to contend by running in the stadium,² will enter the first with his arms; but the second, he (who is to run) the doubled course; the third, he (who is to run) the horse course; the fourth, moreover, he (who is to run) the long course;² and the fifth,³ whom we shall start the first with his arms on,³ is to run a dis-

¹⁻¹ Ast, justly objecting to the omission of *χειρὸς* or *χειρῶν*, required to balance *ποδῶν*, proposed to expel *ἰσχύος*, as being superfluous before *ῥώμης*, and to insert in its place *χειρὸς*. But Schæfer has shown that those two words are frequently united. To myself the error seems to be rather in *μάχη καὶ σύντασις*, for which I would read *ἀψιμαχία καὶ σύστασις*, where *ἀψιμαχία* would necessarily carry with it the idea of a fight at close quarters. Suidas has opportunely *Ἀψιμαχία συναφή μάχης*. *Ἀππιανός*.

²⁻² According to Ast, the whole course was divided into four parts. The first was called the *Στάδιον*, consisting of 125 paces = 625 feet; the second was called *Δίαυλος*, because the distance being a straight line, like a pipe, was the double of the stadium, and persons run from the starting post of the stadium to its winning post, and back again; the third called *Δόλιχος*, was six times the length of the stadium, and sometimes seven, as may be inferred from Soph. El. 717; the fourth, *Ἰππειος*, was, according to Pausanias, twice the *Δίαυλος*, or four times the length of the stadium. Now if such was the case, it seems strange that the *Ἰππειος* should be mentioned after the *Δόλιχος*, and still more strange that if the course was called *Ἰππειος*, as it seems to have been from Euripides in Electr. 824, that Plato should call it *ἐφίππιον*: from whence Ficinus was led to render *καὶ τρίτος, ὁ τὸν ἐφίππιον*, by "tertius, qui equis," as if the question were here about a person riding on horseback, as well as running on foot, an interpretation at variance with the whole train of thought.

³⁻³ After "the fifth," Ficinus alone has, what is required by the sense, and adopted by Taylor, "qui leviori armatura ornatus," antithetical to the *πάλιν βαρύτερον* just afterwards. This however is not the only variation, for he thus transposes the next sentences, by writing after "ornatus"—"quem primum sexaginta stadiorum spatio ad aliquod templum Martis perventurum immitteremus; alius etiam graviore armatus armatura, brevius ac planius spatium cursurus,"—where not only has he omitted *ἔκτονος*, which is here perfectly unintelligible, but inserted "alius," to

tance of sixty stadia¹ to a certain temple of Mars; and again calling by name (another) heavier armed to contend in a (shorter and) smoother road; and again, another who is an archer, and having all the dress of an archer, (to run) a hundred stadia while engaged in the contest, through mountains and all kinds of country, to a temple of Apollo and Artemis; and after establishing the contest, we will wait for them, until they arrive, and we will then bestow upon each victor the prize.

Clin. Right.

Athen. Let us then consider these contests as of three kinds; one of boys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. And for the beardless youths we will lay down two thirds of the whole course; but for boys the halves of these,² when contending with archers and armed men.³ With respect to females, for girls not yet arrived at puberty and undressed,³ (we will establish) the stadium, and dialulum,⁴ and horse-course, and the long course,⁴ for them to contend⁵ in the course itself,⁶ but to those, who are thirteen years of age, the communion remaining until marriage, for a period not longer than twenty years, nor less than eighteen.⁶ And clothed with a fitting dress let them descend to the contest in these courses.

And thus much concerning the contests of men and women

answer to the following τὸν δὲ ἄλλον, and "brevius,"—likewise, which if not absolutely necessary, certainly renders the sentence more elegant. With regard to Ast's explanation of the common text, it is not such as will, or indeed should, satisfy any one.

¹ To this passage Spanheim thinks that Callimachus had an eye, when he says in H. in Pall. 23, that the goddess had δις ἐξήκοντα διαθρίξασα διαύλους, to show her power to do twice as much as a mortal runner.

²⁻³ The German translator Schulthes, as I learn from Ast, found some difficulty here, which Ast has endeavoured to master by rendering the Greek as if it were εἴτε τοξόταις ὥς εἴτε καὶ ὀπλίταις ἀμυλλωμένοις, i. e. "whether contending as archers or heavy-armed."

³ From the expression in Eurip. Hec. 933, μονόπεπλος—Δωρίς ὡς κόρα, one might infer that the girls were not completely naked; although the contrary would seem to be the case from the passages of Anacreon and Duris, quoted there by the Scholiast.

⁴⁻⁴ I suspect the words between the numerals are an interpolation.

⁵ I cannot understand ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δρόμῳ. Plato probably wrote ἐν αὐτῶν τῇ δρόμῳ, "in their own course." From which it would be seen that the females had a course of their own.

⁶⁻⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ast has endeavoured vainly, I think, to explain. I cannot understand it.

in running. With regard to trials of strength, in the place of wrestling, and such things, we will establish what are now considered heavy contests, namely, the fighting in heavy armour, by one contending with one, and two with two, and up to ten with ten. But what and to what extent it is requisite for a person not to suffer, or to do, to gain the victory, just as recently in the case of wrestling, the parties conversant with that exercise have laid down laws, relating to what is the work of a person wrestling well, or not; so it is requisite to invite parties skilled in fighting with arms, and to request them to lay down laws, as to who is justly the victor in contests of this kind, and what regulation shall determine likewise the defeated party. And let the same laws be laid down respecting the females up to the time of marriage. And it is requisite for us to oppose to the contest in boxing and wrestling united the whole of the art of the light-shield soldier, where parties contend with bows, and light shields, and short spears, and in the hurling of stones from the hand and from slings; and to lay down laws on these matters, (and)¹ to distribute legal honours² and victories² to the party conducting himself³ the best on these points. After this it would be in the order of events for laws to be laid down respecting equestrian contests. There is not, indeed, much need of horses, nor many of them, at least in Crete; so that of necessity there is less attention given to the rearing of horses, and the contests with them. For not one of you⁴ is in any respect⁵ the rearer of a chariot,⁵ and there would be no ambition founded on reason to any one on this point: ⁶so that for us to establish competitors in a pursuit, which does not belong to the country, would be for us to have no mind, and to seem not to possess it.⁶ But by proposing rewards for single horse contests, and for colts, that have not shed their first teeth, and for those that are between

¹ I have translated as if *kai roũ* had dropt out between νόμους and τῶ—

² The words *kai τὰς νίκας* I suspect are an explanation of τὰ γέρα.

³ I do not remember to have met with another passage, where ἀποδιδόναι has this meaning. Plato wrote, I suspect, ἐπιδόντι, "who had improved"—For such is the constant meaning of ἐπιδιδόναι.

⁴ Stephens reads ὑμῖν for ἡμῖν, from "vestram" in Ficinus.

⁵ To explain the strange expression ἄρματος—τροφεύς, Ast says that ἄρμα is here used for "equus," as "currus" is in Latin. But the usage is found only in poetry.

⁶ Taylor has merely, "So that it would be foolish to establish contests of this kind."

full-grown horses and colts, and to those that are full-grown, we should introduce an equestrian amusement, suited to the nature of the country. Let then there be on these points, according to law, a contest and a love of contests, and let there be granted to the Phylarchs and Hipparchs a decision in common respecting all the courses themselves and those, who descend into them as competitors with their arms on. But by establishing contests either in gymnastic exercises or for those without arms here, we shall not correctly lay down the law. But as an archer on horseback, or a javelin-hurler, a Cretan is not useless, so that there will be¹ for the sake of sport a strife and contest in these points. But it is not fit to force females by laws relating to these matters and by ordinances touching a sharing in common. But if from their previous education, proceeding to a habit, their nature admits of it, and there is no reluctance in boys² and virgins to take a share, (it is proper) to permit them and not to blame.

[5.] Here then has there now completely come to an end the plan for contending and the learning of gymnastics on such points, as we labour in contests, and such (as we learn) under³ masters day by day. And of music, moreover, the greater part has been gone through in like manner, and the matters relating to the Rhapsodists, and those that follow after them, and whatever contests of choirs necessarily occur at festivals, and will be orderly arranged in the months, and on the days, and in the years,⁴ assigned to the gods and those with them,⁵ whether they are distributed into triennial periods, or quinquennial, or in whatever way or manner the gods have given an idea respecting their arrangement. At that period too it is meet to expect that the contests of music will take place, when ordered by the prize-distributors and the instructor of the youths, and the guardians of the laws; who, on meeting

¹ Since ὥστε cannot be united to an imperative, I have translated as if the Greek were ἴσται, not ἴστω. A few passages may indeed be produced to gainsay this canon. But they all admit of an easy correction.

² By παῖδες are meant here, what are called a little before ἀνηβοί.

³ To support the syntax, Stephens was the first to read ὑπὸ διδασκάλων, suggested by "sub magistris," in Ficinus. The idea has been adopted by Ast and Stalb. I should prefer καθ' ἡμῖραν ἐν διδασκάλων, with the usual ellipse of οἴκῳ. And so Winckelmann, who refers to Protagor. p. 325, F. and Alcibiad. i. p. 110, B.

⁴ Ficinus has, what is more natural, "diebus mensibusque et annis."

⁵ Instead of μετὰ θεῶν, Ficinus has "dæmonibus"—

together at a common spot, touching those very matters, shall become themselves the lawgivers, as to the time when, and the persons who, and with whom, they shall make the contests relating to all choirs and dancing. But of what kind each of these ought to be, both with respect to the language, and songs, and harmonies mingled with rhythms and dancing, has been often said by the first legislator; according to which the second legislators ought, by following in their steps, to distribute the contests in a manner befitting the several sacrifices at proper periods, and to permit the city to enjoy its festivals. With respect to these and other such like points, it is not difficult to know what kind of a lawful arrangement they should obtain by lot;¹ nor would the placing them here and there bring any great gain or loss to the state. But what is of no small consequence, and difficult to effect by persuasion,² would be the work especially of a god;² if indeed it is possible for the regulation to exist from him; but now there seems almost to be the need of some bold man to do honour pre-eminently to the liberty of speech, and to state what seems to be the best for a city and citizens, by enjoining upon souls, that have become corrupt, what is becoming and consequent upon the whole polity, and by speaking in opposition to the greatest desires, and this without having a human being as an ally, but solely following reason alone.

Clin. Of what reason are you now speaking, guest? for we do not understand you.

Athen. Very likely. But I will endeavour to speak to you in a yet clearer manner. For when I arrived in the discourse at education, I perceived the lads and lasses associating with each other in a friendly manner. And it came, as was natural, upon me to be alarmed, when I considered how a person would use a state of that kind, where young men and women are delicately brought up, and unoccupied in those violent and vulgar labours, which very greatly extinguish rudeness, and where sacrifices, and festivals, and choirs are a care to all through the whole of life. By what means then in such a state will they abstain from those desires, which hurl many men and many

¹ In lieu of λαγχάνειν one would prefer τυγχάνειν, "meet with." For the idea of obtaining by lot a lawful arrangement is scarcely intelligible.

²—² I have translated as if the Greek were θεοῦ μὲν μάλιστα ἂν ἔργον εἶη, εἰ—not θεοῦ μάλιστα ἔργον, εἰ—

women into the worst state, ¹ from which should reason order them to abstain, a law is attempting to become.¹ Indeed it is not wonderful, if the laws previously ordained obtained a mastery over the majority of desires. For the not permitting a person to be excessively wealthy, is a no trifling advantage towards being temperate; and the whole of education has adopted laws in moderation for objects of this kind. Added to this, the eye of the rulers is compelled not to look elsewhere, but to regard even the young. ² These then, such at least as relate to man, possess moderation, as compared with the rest of desires.² But against the (unnatural)³ love for boys and girls, and for women (as if they were)⁴ men, and for men (as if they were)⁵ women, whence innumerable evils⁶ arise both to men individually and to whole cities, how can any one be on their guard? and ⁷by cutting what remedy⁷ for each of these will a person discover an escape from such a danger? This is by no means easy, Clinias. For in other things not a few the whole of Crete and Lacedæmon will properly⁸ contribute no small assistance to us, while laying down laws alien to the manners of the majority; but in matters of love—since we are alone,⁹

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. Ficinus has “ita ut ratio, quæ abstinere imperet, lex efficiatur,” as if his MS. read ὥστε ὁ λόγος, ὃν ἂν προσάττη ἀπέχεσθαι, νόμος ἐπιχειρεῖν γίγνεσθαι. But this would be equally unintelligible. Taylor’s translation seems to preserve the train of thought—“So that those things may be forbidden by law, which reason orders us to abstain from.”

²—² Such is the version of the present text. But Ficinus, whom Ast has partially followed, seems to have found in his MS. ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιθυμίαις, ὅσαι γε ἀνθρώπιναι, μέτρον παρέχει. For his translation is “ceteris quidem humanis cupiditatibus modum adhibent.” The reading is rejected by Stalbaum; for he was not aware that ὅσαι γε ἀνθρώπινα could not be referred to ταῦτα, on account of the intervening ἐπιθυμίας.

³ Ficinus alone inserts “contra naturam,” requisite for the sense.

⁴, ⁵ Ficinus has “pro feminis” and “pro viris,” as if his MS. read ἀντ’ ἀνδρῶν and ἀντὶ γυναικῶν, instead of ἀνδρῶν and γυναικῶν without the preposition.

⁶ The word κακὰ, omitted in all the MSS., is found only in Ald., and acknowledged by “mala” in Ficinus. Ast refers to Propertius, i. 14.

⁷—⁷ On the phrase τέρμινει φάρμακον, repeated in xi. § 4, p. 919, B., and Epist. vii. p. 353, E., see Blomfield on Æsch. Agam. 16.

⁸ One MS., and Ficinus, and after him Taylor, omits ἐπιεικῶς.

⁹ On the formula αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν, omitted here by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor, see at Menexenus § 5, n. 31, and the parallel passages quoted here by Ast; amongst which the most apt is that of Cicero de Divinat. ii. 12, “Sed soli sumus; licet verum exquirere sine invidia.”

(I say it,) they are entirely opposed to us.¹ For, if any one, following nature, should lay down the law, which was prior to the time of Laius,² and assert it was proper not to have an intercourse with men and boys, as if they were females, and bring forward as a witness the nature of wild beasts, and show that for such purposes the male does not touch the male, through its being unnatural, perhaps he would make use of a probable reason; but he would by no means accord with your cities. ³Moreover he would not agree with them in that point,³ which we have said the legislator ought always to observe. For we ever seek⁴ in the laws laid down what contributes to virtue or not. Come then (say), should we agree that this may be at present laid down legally as something beautiful, or at least as not base, what part of it would aid us in the road to virtue? Whether, when it takes place, will the habit of fortitude be produced in the soul of him, who is persuaded? or a kind of a temperate form in the soul of him who persuades? Or would no one be persuaded on these points? but rather in every way the contrary of this. Will every one blame the soft disposition of him, who yields to pleasures, and is incapable of self-control? But will not every one blame on the other hand the likeness of the image in him, who proceeds to an imitation of the female sex? What man then will lay down as a law such a thing as this? Scarcely not one, who has true law in his mind. How then do we say that this is true? It is necessary for a person to see the nature of friendship and desire at the same time, and of the so-called loves, if he would reflect upon these matters correctly. For they are two, and there is another and a third kind arising from both, and which, comprehended under one name, produces every doubt and darkness.

Clin. How?

¹ Respecting the habits of the people in Crete and Lacedæmon in love affairs, Ast refers to Strabo x. p. 39, Cas., and Servius on Virgil *Æn.* x. 325. Add Hesych. in *Κρήτα τρόπον* and *Λακωνικὸν τρόπον*.

² On the story of Laius, see Valckenaer in *Diatrib.* p. 23.

³—³ The Greek is *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις—τοῦτο ἐν τοῦτοις οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ*, where the same pronoun is repeated very inelegantly. Plato wrote, I suspect, *τοῦτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὁμολογοῖ*—For Ficinus has “quod minime assequetur.”

⁴ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has “semper enim observari oportet,” as if his MS. read *τηροῦμεν* in lieu of *ζητοῦμεν*, a confusion of words found elsewhere, as I have shown on Eurip. *Tro.* 927.

[6.] *Athen.* We surely call a friend one, who is like to like and equal to equal, as regards virtue. ¹And on the other hand, a friendly thing that, which is in want of what has become wealthy, although it is the contrary in sex.¹ But when each of these friendships becomes vehement, we call it love.

Clin. Right.

Athen. The friendship, then, which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and does not often possess any thing in common; but that which arises from similars is mild and common to both parties through life. But as regards that, which is mixed up with these, it is not, in the first place, easy to learn thoroughly what the person, who possesses this third love, would wish to happen to himself; and, in the next place, being drawn by both to a contrary point, he is in a state of doubt; the one exhorting him to enjoy the prime of youth, and the other forbidding him. For he, who is a lover of the body and hungers after its ²beauty, as if it were a ripe grape,² exhorts himself to be filled with it, and pays no honour to the moral feeling in the soul of his beloved. But he, who holds the desire of the body as a thing of secondary importance, and ³looks rather than loves³ with his soul, is wont, after feeling a desire for the soul in a becoming manner, to consider the satiety relating to the body⁴ as an insult; but, reverencing, at the same time, and worshiping temperance, and fortitude, and what is highly becoming,⁵ and prudence, he would wish to live ever chastely with the object of his love. But the love, which is mixed up with both these, is the love,

¹—¹ In the words between the numerals Plato alludes to the love supposed to exist between those, who sell and who buy the beauty of body.

²—² On this comparison of beauty to a ripe grape, see my note on *Æsch. Suppl.* 994. Add *Ælian. Epist.* 8, τὸ κάλλος τῶν σωματῶν ὁπώρα ἔοικε. *Himerius*, quoted by *Photius*, p. 1131, ἀναμενεῖς τὴν ὥραν τὴν τῆς ὁπώρας ὁμώνυμον.

³—³ Ast has properly remarked the play on the words ὁρῶν and ἐρῶν here, and just before in ὥρα et ὁπώρα, which one cannot preserve in another language, although *Ficinus* has attempted to do so in part by his version—"considerat potius quam desiderat."

⁴ I have followed Ast in rejecting τοῦ σώματος as an explanation of τὴν περὶ τὸ σῶμα. Perhaps however Plato wrote—τὴν περὶ τὸ ἄσωτον τοῦ σώματος πλησμονήν. See at viii. § 3.

⁵ This introduction of μεγαλοπρεπές amongst the cardinal virtues seems very strange; and so does the union of αἰδοῦμενος and σεβόμενος. Hence I suspect that τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές ought to be inserted between καὶ and σεβόμενος.

which we have just now detailed as the third. Since then there are these so many in number,¹ ought the law to forbid all of them, and prevent them from subsisting in us? or, is it not manifest that we should wish for the love, which is of virtue, and which is desirous of a young person becoming the best possible, to exist in the state? and, if it were possible, that we would prevent the other two? Or how shall we say, friend Megillus?

Megil. You have spoken, guest, on these very matters in a manner perfectly beautiful.

Athen. I was likely, as I conjectured, friend, to meet with your accordance in sentiment. And there is no need for me to examine what your law intends on points of this kind, but for me to receive your agreement with my reasoning. But after this, I will again endeavour to persuade Clinias by a kind of enchantment² to be of our opinion. Let then, what has been conceded by you to me, be dismissed, and let us now go through entirely the laws.

Megil. You speak most correctly.

Athen. For laying down law itself³ I possess a certain art, which at present is partly easy, and partly in every respect the most difficult possible.

Megil. How say you?

Athen. We know even at present very many men, who, although they act contrary to law, yet are restrained properly and carefully from an intercourse with beautiful persons, not unwillingly, but as much as possible willingly.

Megil. When, say you?

Athen. When any one has a beautiful brother or sister; and in the case of a son or daughter, the same law, although unwritten, defends as sufficiently as possible (a person)⁴ from sleeping with (them) either openly or in secret,⁵ or in any other way from embracing and touching them.⁵ Nor does even the desire of this intercourse come at all upon the masses.

¹ Ficinus has "cum ergo tres sint amores," adopted by Taylor.

² Ficinus omits *ἐπαίδων*, and so after him does Taylor.

³ I have adopted *αὐτοῦ*, found in one MS., in lieu of *τούτου*.

⁴ Ast says that *συγκαθεύδοντα*, and *ἀσπαζόμενον* are used indefinitely. But the mention of the son and daughter would require a distinct mention likewise of the parents, which Taylor has introduced.

⁵—⁵ Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed as usual, has omitted the whole clause, because, I suspect, he could make no sense out of it. For he

Megil. True.

Athen. Does not then a small word extinguish all such pleasures?

Megil. What word do you mean?

Athen. The assertion that these acts are by no means holy, but hateful to the gods, and of [all]¹ base acts the most base. And is not this the cause, that no one even speaks of them in other terms? but that each of us immediately from our birth² hear persons speaking of these acts at all times and in all places, both in fun and oftentimes in all the so-called seriousness of tragedy, when persons introduce³ Thyestes, or some Œdipuses or Macareuses,⁴ who have had secretly a connexion with their sisters,⁴ but on being detected have readily inflicted death as the punishment of their wickedness upon themselves?

Megil. You have spoken most truly so far as this, that fame⁵ has some wonderful power, since no one attempts even to breathe in any other manner⁶ contrary to law.

[7.] *Athen.* That, therefore, which we just now said was right, that for a legislator, desirous of bringing under subjection some one of those passions, which pre-eminently get the mastery of men, it is easy to know in what manner he should take this in hand. For by making this (evil) report a

doubtless knew that *πως ἄλλως* could not be written in the place of *ἄλλως πως*; and if it could, that there is nothing to which that phrase could be referred by way of an antithesis; and that *τούτων* could not be used for *αὐτῶν*, and still less for *ἐκατέρων*, what correct language would require. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὸν πατέρα, ἀσελγῶς ἀσπαζόμενον ἄπτεσθαι τοῦ ἡ τῆς*—i. e. "the father libidiously embracing and touching one or the other."

¹ Ficinus alone has "omnium," adopted by Taylor. But in the formula *αἰσχυρῶν αἰσχυιστα* the word *πάντων* is omitted, as shown by the passages quoted by myself on *Æsch. Eum.* 230.

² To avoid the absurdity of supposing, that persons from their birth understand what is spoken, Ficinus has "statim ab ineunte ætate."

³⁻⁴ On such plural proper names see at *Menexen.* § 17.

⁴ This assertion is applicable only to Macareus, who had a son by his sister Canacé. In the case of Thyestes, the act of incest was with his daughter; and in that of Œdipus, with his mother.

⁵ I confess I cannot understand what fame has to do here. The sense requires rather the mention of a dispirited conscience, or evil report. Perhaps Plato wrote—*τῆς ἀθύμου συννοίας*—or rather *τῆς δυσφημίας*, which coincides better with the subsequent *ταύτην τὴν φήμην*.

⁶ Instead of *ἄλλως*, which I cannot understand, Plato evidently wrote *ἄλους*, similar to the preceding *ὀφθίντας*, and to *Μοῖχος γὰρ ἦν τύχης ἄλους* in *Aristoph. Neph.* 1079.

holy thing amongst all the slaves and free-born and children¹ and women, and the whole city, he will² in the same manner³ thus work out the greatest stability relating to this law.

Megil. Entirely so. But (consider)³ how it will be possible to make all persons willingly speak in this manner.

Athen. You have taken me up correctly. For this is what was stated by myself, that I possess an art, relating to this law, of making use of an intercourse according to nature for the procreation of children, by persons abstaining from a connexion with males, and not designedly destroying the race of man, nor sowing upon rocks and stones that, which,⁴ even if it takes root, will never obtain its naturally productive power; and by abstaining from every female field,⁵ in which what is sown is unwilling to germinate. This law then, by becoming perpetual and in power at the same time, as it is now in power in the case of the intercourse amongst parents, would,⁶ if it prevailed in other connexions justly,⁶ produce⁷ benefits innumerable. For, in the first place, it is laid down according to nature. And, next, it causes persons to restrain from the fury and madness of love, from all adulteries, and all the immoderate use of meats and drinks, and to be familiar with and friendly to their wives; and many other benefits would arise⁸ if any one could be the master of this law.⁸ But, perhaps, some violent and young man, who is brim-full of seed, would,

¹ In lieu of *παισι* Ficinus found in his MS. *ἀνδράσι*, as shown by his version, "masculos," adopted by Taylor.

²⁻² The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

³ On the ellipse of *ὅρα* before *ὅπως ἔσται* see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 520, 4.

⁴ Instead of *οὐ μήποτε*, which is without regimen, Ast suggested *οὐ οὐ μήποτε*—He should have elicited rather *ὅ γ' οὐ μήποτε* from *ὅ τι* in Clemens Alexandr. Pædag. ii. 10, p. 224, ed. Potter.

⁵ On this metaphor Ast refers to numerous passages collected by himself and others. He has however neglected to observe that Plutarch in Præcept. Conjugal. § 42, alludes to this place in the words *ἐξ ὧν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς φέσθαι θέλωσιν*.

⁶⁻⁶ Ficinus omits *ἰάν-νικήσῃ δικαίως*—correctly.

⁷ One MS. has *ἔχοι* instead of *ἔχει*. Hence we must read *μυρί' ἀν ἀγαθὰ ἔχοι*, similar to "innumeriorum erit bonorum causa," in Ficinus.

⁸⁻⁸ To avoid the manifest absurdity in the Greek—*εἰ τοῦ νόμου τις τούτου δύναιτο ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι*, Ficinus has "si apud quemque fuerit stabilita," which would lead to *εἰ τοῦ νόμου πᾶσι τούτου δύναιτο πᾶν κράτος εἶναι*, i. e. "if the whole strength of this law could be over all persons." Taylor has, what the sense requires, "If this law was diligently observed by every one."

on hearing this law laid down, immediately abuse (us) for framing laws foolish and impracticable, and would fill every place with his vociferations. It was then through looking to this, that I said I possessed a certain art, in part the easiest of all, and in part the most difficult, for perpetuating this very law, when laid down. For it is very easy to understand that this is possible, and in what way it is so. For we have said that, when this legal institution shall have been sufficiently made holy, it will bring under subjection every soul, and cause them through fear to be entirely obedient to the laws laid down. But matters at present have come to such a pass,¹ that it appears it never can take place; just as the practice of common meals is believed to be a thing impossible for a whole state to practise through its whole life and to exist;² and though it has been proved by the fact, that it does take place amongst you, yet as regards the female sex, it does not seem even in your states³ to have the nature of being able to exist (for ever).³ Hence through the strength of this unbelief, I said it was very difficult for both of these to remain according to law.

Megil. And you were right in saying so.

Athen. Since then it is not above the power of man, but it may indeed take place, are you willing that I should endeavour to tell a tale bordering on credibility?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Will then a person abstain more easily from venery and be willing to do, what is enjoined, respecting it, in a moderate manner,⁴ when he has his body in a good condition, and not like an ordinary person,⁴ or when in a bad one?

Clin. By much the most, when it is not like an ordinary person.

Athen. Do we then not know by hearsay of Iccus⁵ of Taren-

¹ The Greek is *προβέβηκε νῦν*. One MS. has *προβέβηκεν αὐ νῦν*, which leads to *προβέβηκε τὰ νῦν*—

² I have omitted with Ficinus *δύνασθαι*, which could not be inserted after *μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι*, whatever Ast may say to the contrary.

³⁻³ The Greek is *φύσιν ἔχειν γίγνεσθαι*. Ficinus has “*fieri posse putatur*,” from which it is evident that he found here *δύνασθαι γίγνεσθαι*. But the syntax requires *τοῦ* before *δύνασθαι*, and the sense *αἰ* after *γίγνεσθαι*.

⁴⁻⁴ As *ιδιώτης* is opposed to *ἀσκητής* in Xenophon quoted by Ast, one would prefer here *ἀσκητικῶς τὸ σῶμα*, instead of *εὖ τὸ σῶμα*—

⁵ This Iccus is spoken of again by Plato in Protagoras, p. 316, D., where the Scholiast brings forward the names of the three others men—

tium, how,¹ for the sake of his contests at Olympia and the rest,² he did, from his love of contest and his art and his possessing in his soul fortitude combined with temperance, never, as the story goes, touch any woman or a boy during the whole period of his practice.³ And the same account is told of Crysson, and Astylus, and Diopompus, and very many others; although they were much worse educated as to their souls than my fellow-citizens and yours too, Clinias, and had their bodies swelling much more with carnal desires.

Clin. In this you speak the truth that, what has been stated by persons of old respecting those athletes, did really take place.

Athen. What then, did they for the sake of victory in wrestling, and in running, and such like things, dare to abstain from that, which is called happiness by the masses? and shall our youth be unable to have a mastery over themselves, for the sake of a far more excellent victory? which we tell them from their very childhood is the most beautiful, and in fables in prose, and by singing in verse, charm them, as is natural.

Clin. What victory?

Athen. The victory over pleasure; (so that)⁴ by being masters of themselves they live happily; but by being mastered, the very reverse. In addition to this, will not the dread of its being at no time and by no means a holy act give them the power to be the masters over those things, which others, worse than them, have mastered?

Clin. It is probable.

[8.] *Athen.* Since then we have arrived thus far on the subject of this law, but have fallen into a difficulty through the wickedness of the many, I assert (with confidence),⁵ ⁶ that

tioned here; of whom nothing seems to be known with the exception of Astylus, who Pausanias says, was a victor in the dialum.

¹ I have adopted ὥς for ὧν, as suggested by Heindorf on Protagoras, p. 489.

² The Greek is καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους—where καὶ—τε could not thus follow καὶ—Plato wrote, I suspect, καὶ πολλοὺς ἔτ' ἄλλοι—

³ Ast quotes opportunely Horace in A. P. 412, "Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam—Abstinnit Venere et vino."

⁴ I have translated as if ὥστε had dropt out after νικῆς—

⁵ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has alone "audacter"—as if his MS. read φημι θαρρῶν—

⁶—The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

our legal institution ought to march on without disguise, and to say on these points,⁶ that our citizens ought not to be worse than birds, and many other wild animals; who, produced in large herds,¹ live without intercourse, and pure, and chaste, up to the time of procreation; but when they arrive at that period, the male for its gratification pairing with the female, and the female with the male, they live for the remainder of their time in a holy and just manner, firmly abiding in the first compacts of friendship. It is requisite then for them² to be better than wild beasts. If however they are corrupted by the other Greeks, and the greatest number of the Barbarians, and on seeing what is called the unregulated Aphrodité, and on hearing that it has the greatest power, are thus unable to have a mastery over it, there will be a need for the guardians of the laws to become legislators, and to devise for them a second law.

Clin. What law would you advise to be laid down for them, if the one now laid down escapes them?

Athen. Evidently, Clinias, that which follows upon this.

Clin. What law do you mean?

Athen. That they should especially cause the strength of pleasures to be not exercised, by turning, by means of labours, to other parts of the body the course of their overflow and feeding.³ And this will take place, if in the use of venereal pleasures there is no shamelessness. For they, who, through shame, make a rare use of a thing of this kind, will have their mistress of less power,⁴ [by using it seldom].⁴ ⁵Let it then be held by custom and an unwritten law, that to do any of these lawful things secretly, is honourable; but not secretly, is disgraceful;⁵ ⁶but not to do it, not at all; thus this would lie

¹ Plato had perhaps in mind flocks of small birds and herds of wolves; although in the case of gregarious quadrupeds very few, I believe, are known to pair.

² Instead of *ἀνθρώπους* I should prefer *ἀστροφούς*—"citizens."

³ In lieu of *τροφήν* one would have expected *τροφήν*, "luxuriousness."

⁴—⁴ The words between the brackets are evidently superfluous, and correctly omitted by Ficinus, and tacitly after him by Taylor.

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows implicitly, has—"Clam ergo consuetudo et lex non scripta hæc fieri suadeat, contra autem fieri, velut turpe, dissuadeat."

⁶—⁶ Stephens was the first to see that the Greek, of which I have given a literal translation, concealed some error, which he confesses his

in our law as being disgraceful on the other hand, and honourable secondly possessing a second rectitude.⁶ And thus one genus, comprehending three genera, would compel those, who are corrupted in their nature, (and) whom we have spoken of as being inferior to themselves, not to act contrary to the law.

Clin. What are these?

Athen. The god-worshipping (genus), and the honour-loving, and that which is produced from the desire not of beauties in the body but of those really existing in the manners of the soul. And these matters perhaps, now detailed by us, are like prayers¹ in a fable; but they will be by far the best, should they perchance exist in all states. Perhaps, too, if a god pleases, we may compel one of two things to take place in matters of love; either that no one shall dare to touch any free and well-born woman, besides his married wife, or sow the seed, for which there has been no sacrificial rite,² and which is illegitimate, amongst harlots, nor that, which is barren, amongst males, contrary to nature; or we will take away entirely the intercourse of males; but with respect to females, if any one has an intercourse with any one, except those who come to his house, together with the gods, and sacred marriages, whether such women are bought, or acquired by any other means,³ and he does not lie hid from all men and women,³ to such a person we should, if we caused him by law to be disfranchised of the privileges⁴ in the state, perhaps appear to have acted by law correctly, as being one who is truly like a foreigner. Let this law, whether it is one, or we ought to call inability to correct; and so do I; nor has the long note of Cousin thrown, I think, any light on the passage. Ast, however, has suggested some alterations, from which nothing appears to be gained. Ficinus, "turpeque sic non omnino agere; sic enim et secundo servabimus honestum loco."

¹ Compare v. § 8.

² This alludes to the fact that sacred rites preceded a marriage, as shown by *μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων*. Ast quotes opportunely Iamblich. Vit. Pythag. § 195, *ἀθυτος καὶ νόθη συνουσία*. But the *ἀθύτους τε καὶ ἀγάμους γάμους*, mentioned by Suidas in *Ἀθύτους* and *Διαξαίνειν*, related to what Persius calls "fædos hymenæos," as may be inferred from the expression *τὴν ἀνδρῶν ἀπειπάμενος φύσιν*.

³⁻³ I confess I hardly understand this clause.

⁴ I do not remember to have met elsewhere with the phrase of *ἀτιμον ἐπαίνων*. Ficinus has "infamis lege omnibusque civitatis honoribus," as if his MS. read *ἀτιμον αὐτὸν πασῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τιμῶν*.

them two, be laid down respecting all venereal and amatory matters, which, through having an intercourse with each other from desires of such a kind, we transact both in a proper and improper manner.

Megil. Even now,¹ O guest, I would vehemently accept this law from you ; but let Clinias here tell us himself, what he thinks on these points.

Clin. So shall it be, Megillus, when it appears to me that a fitting opportunity presents itself ; but, for the present, permit our guest to proceed forward in the matter of his laws.

Megil. Right.

[9.] *Athen.* But having proceeded so far, we are almost at the establishment of common meals, which we said would with difficulty exist elsewhere ; but in Crete no one else² would suppose that it ought to be adopted. But after what manner ? whether as here, or as at Lacedæmon ? or is there a third kind of common meals beside these, which would be better than both ? This it seems to me it is not difficult to discover ; and when discovered, to work out not a great good. For what has been now prepared is in an elegant condition.

Following upon these is the preparation for livelihood,³ in what manner it ought to follow them.³ Now a livelihood in other states would be of various kinds and many, and especially from the double sources of what there would be to these. For what relates to food is obtained by most of the Greeks from the earth and sea ; but by these from the earth alone. This therefore will present a more easy task for the legislator. ⁴For not only will half the laws be moderate, but much fewer,⁴ and still befitting free-men. For the legislator

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *καὶ τὰ νῦν*, not *καὶ τοῖνυν*—

² Instead of *ἄλλως*, rendered “frustra” by Ficinus, all the other MSS. read *ἄλλος*—an error I presume for *ἄνός*, i. e. *ἄνθρωπος*. Taylor has “but no one will suppose but that it ought to be adopted in Crete.” From which I have been led to suggest—*οὐδ’ εἰς ἄλλ’ ἢ ὡς δέον ὑπολάβοι ἂν γίνεσθαι* ; unless it be said that the sense is—“But in Crete no one would think that it is adopted in vain.” But in that case *δεῖν* ought to be omitted.

³⁻³ Such is the literal version of the Greek—*τίν’ αὐτοῖς ἂν τρόπον ἔποιτο*. Ficinus—“quomodo haberi possit.” But Taylor has, what the sense requires—“in what manner it should be procured for our citizens,” which would be—*τίν’ ἀστοῖς ἂν τρόπον ἔποιτο*. This confusion of *ἔποιτο* and *ἔσοιτο* I have noted twice or thrice elsewhere.

⁴⁻⁴ The Greek is *οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ γίνονται νόμοι μέτριοι*

of this state is freed for the most part from matters relating to ship-owners, and foreign merchants, and retail dealers, and inn-keepers, and tax-collectors, and miners,¹ and money-lenders, and usurers at compound interest,¹ and ten thousand other things of this kind, and bids them all go hang; but he will lay down laws for the tillers of land, and shepherds, and the breeders of bees, and the guardianship and the superintendents of the operations connected with such matters, after having laid down laws on subjects of the greatest moment relating to marriages, and the procreation and the bringing up of children, and still further, their education, and the establishment of magistracies in the state. But at present it is necessary for the legislator to turn himself² to (the laws), relating to feeding² and to those, who labour for it. Let the laws then, called Agricultural, be first laid down. And let this be mentioned as the first law relating to Zeus, who presides over boundaries. Let no one remove the landmarks, either of a fellow-citizen, who is a friend, or of a neighbour,³ while possessing himself at the extremities he is a neighbour to another stranger,³ thinking that this is truly "To remove what is not to be removed."⁴ But let every one be desirous to attempt to remove the greatest other⁵ [except a boundary] stone⁵ rather than a small stone, which is the boundary

πολὺ δ' ἱλάττους, which Ficinus, whom Taylor follows in part, has thus abridged, "multo enim major quam dimidia pars legum sufficiet." For he probably saw that αὐ had no meaning here, and knew that after οὐ μόνον correct Greek would require ἀλλὰ καὶ, not πολὺ δέ—I have translated as if the words were ἀν γίγνοιτο: but I cannot correct the error in πολὺ δ' ἱλάττους.

¹—¹ The Greek is—καὶ δανεισμῶν καὶ ἐπιτόκων τόκων. But one MS. has ἐπὶ τόκῳ, which shows that καὶ is an interpolation. On the expression ἐπὶ τόκῳ τόκου, Ast refers to Spanheim on Aristoph. Νεφ. 1155.

²—² I have translated as if the Greek were ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους τὴν τροφήν περὶ καὶ ὅσοι—and not ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν τροφήν καὶ ὅσοι περὶ—For Ficinus has "ad leges de victu deque iis qui—"

³—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek—μήτε ὁμοτέρμονος, ἐκ' ἰσχυατῆος κεκτημένος ἀλλ' ἄλλω ξίνοι γειτονῶν—out of which, I confess, I can make nothing; nor could Ficinus, whose abridged translation, adopted by Taylor, is "nec finitimi peregrini, si agri extrema possideat."

⁴ On this saying see Ast at iii. § 6, p. 684, D.

⁵—⁵ The words between the brackets are omitted by Ficinus, whom Ast has followed with the approbation of Stalbaum. One MS. likewise omits πλὴν ὄρον μᾶλλον. But unless I am mistaken, in the letters ἄλλον πλὴν ὄρον lie hid the names of two mountains, one in Crete, and the other in Laconia. Hence, instead of πλὴν ὄρον, I would read ἡ Ταΐνα-

of friendship and hatred sworn before the gods. For Zeus, who presides over a kindred-clan, is the witness of the one, and he who presides over hospitality, of the other; which deities¹ are excited together with the most hateful wars.¹ Now he, who is obedient to the law, will have no perception of the ills, that come from it: but let him, who despises it, be exposed to a double punishment, one, and the first, from the gods, but the second, under the law. For let no one voluntarily remove the landmark of his neighbour; and against him, who does remove them, let any one, who is willing, inform the landowners; and let them bring him into court; and if any one has to pay damages on the charge of his having made privately and by force the land to be without a division,² (respecting) the party so having to pay,³ let the court fix the penalty, as to what he is to suffer (in person) or in purse after being defeated. After this, many and small injuries from neighbours do, through their frequency, beget a great weight of enmity, and cause a neighbourhood to be disagreeable and excessively bitter. Hence it is requisite for a neighbour to take every care not to cause any differences with his neighbour; and to be particularly cautious in other matters, and especially as regards the cultivation of grounds, which they have a mutual right to till. For to do an injury is by no means difficult, but is in the power of every man; but to do a benefit is not in the power of every one. Let him then, who, stepping over his own boundary, secretly tills³ his neighbour's land, pay for the mischief done; and, on account of his shameless and sordid conduct, pay another sum, the double of the mischief to the injured party. Of these and all such like matters let the Land-Stewards take cognizance, and act as judges and fix the fine;

πον, but what we are to read for ΑΑΑΟΝ, I am unable to state, unless it be ΙΔΑΙΟΝ. Cornarius has "quam terminum aut parvum lapidem," as if he wished to read μάλλον τιν' ὄρον ἢ μικρόν λίθον—

¹ The words between the numerals, I confess, I do not understand. Ficinus has—"qui hostili prælio semper insurgunt," partially followed in Taylor's translation, "are roused in conjunction with the most hostile battles." If it were permissible to personify War here, one might fancy that Plato wrote οἱ μάλιστα Πολέμῳ τῷ θεῷ ἰχθίστω ἡγείρονται.

² Aστ, whom Stalbaum follows, would reject τοῦ ὀφλόντος, as an interpolation. I have translated as if περὶ had dropt out between ποι-οῦντος and τοῦ ὀφλόντος—

³ Instead of ἐπεργάζεται one MS. reads ἀπεργάζεται: which evidently leads to ὑπεργάζεται, as I have translated.

and over the greater suits, as it has been stated before, let the whole order of the twelfth part (preside); but of the lesser, the chiefs of the guardians of these. And if any one ¹pastures his flocks over (his neighbours' grounds),¹ let those who witness the injury, decide upon it and fix the fine. And if a person appropriates to himself the swarms of bees belonging to another, ²by following the pleasure of the bees, and making a noise, by beating them down² thus makes them his own, let him pay for the injury done. And if any one sets fire to his own wood, and takes no thought of his neighbour's, let him be fined according to the damage decided on by the rulers. And if in planting he does not leave a proper distance from his neighbour's land, (let him pay,)³ as has been stated even by many legislators sufficiently;⁴ of whose laws it is meet to make use, and not to think that the greater regulator of a state is to lay down laws for all matters, both great and small, and such as belong to a casual legislator. Since relating even to water laws of the olden time, and those beautiful too, have been laid for the tillers of the ground, which it is not proper ⁵for us to use (like water-channels) in our discourse.⁵ But let him, who will, lead water to his own ground, commencing from common streams, and not cutting off the sources, evidently belonging to a private person; and let him lead it

¹—¹ Such is the meaning of *ἐπινέμω*, which Ficinus renders "pascuis noceat;" and Taylor, "distributes cattle—"

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has, what is far preferable, "si aliena examina quis persequitur, atque æra pulsans delectatione apes ad se trahit." But whether he found in his MS. the counterpart of his translation is another question. By the aid however of the gl. in Photius and Suidas, *Μελιττοπηχύν τὸ κρούοντας φόβον ποιεῖν, ἵνα μὴ αἱ μέλισσαι προπέτῳνται*, or as it should be read, *Μελίττειόν τι ἤχρην—ἵνα μὴ—παραποπέτῳνται*, i. e. "To sound something suited to bees, in order that they may not fly away"—one may hazard a conjecture that Plato wrote something to this effect—*τῇ τῶν μελιττῶν πτήσει συνεπόμενος, καὶ ἡδονῇ κατακηλῶν κρονομένον του αὐτὰς οὕτως οἰκειῶται*, i. e. "by following the flight of the bees and charming them with the delight of something being beaten, thus make them his own."

³ The words between the lunes are supplied by Ficinus alone, "ita plectatur," whom Taylor has followed. In two MSS. it is stated that *ζημιούσθω* is understood here.

⁴ Plato is thought to allude here to Solon; who introduced a similar law at Athens, as we learn from Plutarch i. p. 91, D.

⁵—⁵ I have introduced the words "like water-courses," to preserve the play in *παροχετεύειν*, applied here to both the course of the water and conversation.

where he likes, except through dwellings, or certain sacred (places) or tombs, and doing no damage, except what arises from¹ leading aside the water. But if the natural dryness of the ground in certain places should be incapable of retaining the waters from Zeus,² and there is a deficiency in necessary drink, let a person dig in his own ground, until he comes to the clay.³ But if in this depth he does not meet with water, let him draw from his neighbours as much drink as is necessary for each of his domestics. But if there should be a scarcity⁴ amongst his neighbours also, let him, after receiving an order from the Land-Stewards, take to himself the regulation-allowance each day, and thus have a share in the water of his neighbour. But if there be water from Zeus, and one of those on the lower ground does an injury to a farmer on the upper, or to the party dwelling near him, by not allowing an outlet to the water; or, on the contrary, if the party above carelessly permits the waters to run down, and does an injury to a party below; and (the two parties) are for this unwilling to communicate⁵ with each other on these matters, let the party, who wishes it, bring in a City-Steward in the city, and in the country a Land-Steward, and let him regulate himself⁶ what each ought to do; and let him, who does not abide by the regulation, undergo a punishment for his envious and at the same time morose temper, and let him, the verdict being against him, pay to the injured party the double

¹ To support the syntax we must insert either *δι'* or *ἀπ'* before *αὐτῆς*, similar to "ab ipso" in Ficinus.

² i. e. rain-water.

³ To this passage Plutarch alludes in ii. p. 827, D., and from i. p. 91, it appears that Plato adopted merely a law of Solon.

⁴ So Ast, after Ficinus, understands *δι' ἀκρυβείας*—a meaning those words never did or could bear; and though Faehse has failed in successfully correcting them, he has happily suggested, what I have adopted, *δεξιόμενος* in lieu of *ταξάμενος*—

⁵ Ficinus renders *κοινωνεῖν* by "convenire," i. e. to come to terms; a meaning which that verb does not, if I rightly remember, have elsewhere.

⁶ This seems a rather strange enactment. For the party, who is brought in, ought rather to appoint what each should do. To avoid this absurdity, Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed, omits *ἐπάγων ὁ βουλόμενος*, as shown by his version, "in urbe quidem ædilis, in agris vero, qui agris præest, modum imponat." Hence in lieu of *ἐπάγων—ταξάσθω τι*—one would prefer *ἐπαγέτω—τάξεις θήσονται, τι*—i. e. let him bring a person to lay down regulations.

of his loss, ¹through not being willing to obey the person in office.¹

[10.] It is meet likewise for all to have a communion in some such way as this of the fruits of autumn. ²The goddess herself has a twofold gift of grace for us; ³ one a Dionysal instruction,³ not to be treasured up; the other, which is naturally suited for laying by. Let then this law be ordained respecting the fruits of autumn. Whoever tastes the rustic fruit, be it grapes or figs, before the season for gathering them, which falls in with the rising of Arcturus,⁴ either in his own or the grounds of others, pay fifty drachms sacred to Dionysus, if he has plucked them from his own land; but if from his neighbour's, a mina;⁵ but if from that of others, two-thirds of a mina. But let him who wishes to gather the grape now called "well-born,"⁶ or grapes called "well-born,"⁷ if he takes them from his own ground, pluck them how and when he likes; but if from another's, let him, if he has not

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

²—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, διττὰς ἡμῖν δωρεὰς ἡ θεὸς ἔχει χάριτος αὐτῇ: but the goddess imparts rather than possesses gifts. Hence Ficinus translates ἔχει by "largitus," a meaning assigned elsewhere, but improperly, to ἔχει. Plato evidently wrote διττῆς—δωρεᾶς—χίται χάριτας, i. e. "pours out the favours of a double gift." On the confusion in ἔχειν and χίταιν, see at Menexen. § 14, p. 82. Winckelmann suggests χάρις τις αὐτῇ, which I cannot understand.

⁴ Here again is an error in the text, which, although it has baffled the ingenuity of Cornarius, Ast, and Stalbaum, it is not very difficult to correct. The Greek is παιδείαν Διονυσιάδα—where lies hid ὁποῦ ἡδεῖαν Διονυσίου λιβα—"the sweet flowing of the Dionysian juice," a quotation from some lyric poet; while in ὁπός there would be an allusion to Ὀπώρα, which, says the Etymol. M. in Ὀπός, is so called, ὅτι ὁπός αὐτῇν ὥρεϊ, ὃ ἔστι φυλάττει, or, as it should be read, ὅτι ὁπός αὐτῇ ὥρεϊ. With regard to λιβα, see at Æsch. Eum. 54, where I elicited λιβα from διὰ, adopted by every editor except Wellaver. Winckelmann refers here to something he has written on this passage in Act. Societat. Græc. ii. p. 17. But as I have never seen the work, I do not know what he has done for the correction or explanation of the passage.

⁵ This star, at the tail of the Greater Bear, rises about the autumnal equinox.

⁶ That is, double; for the mina contained 100 drachms.

⁷ Although Eustathius on Il. E. p. 544 = 414, quotes from this passage γενναίαν and γενναία, yet Plato wrote, I suspect, the names of two places, where the grape and fig were grown to perfection.

⁸ Ficinus adds here, "neque commode recondi possint."

persuaded (the owner), be fined ¹in that way ever¹ following out the law,² that a person is not to remove what he has not put down. But if a slave, not having persuaded the owner of the ground, gathers any fruit of this kind, let him be scourged with stripes equal in number to each grape on a bunch and fig on the tree. Let a foreign settler, who has bought the "well-born" autumnal fruit,³ eat them if he pleases; but if a stranger sojourning in the land, as he passes along the road, (either alone)⁴ or with one follower, desires to taste the autumnal fruit, let him taste the "well-born" fruit, receiving it as the gift of a host; but the law prohibits even a person of such a kind⁵ from sharing in the fruit called rustic. If any one ignorantly tastes these, either himself or a slave, let a person punish the slave with stripes, but send away the free person after admonishing and teaching him that he may taste other autumnal fruits (unfit)⁶ for laying by, but that those, belonging to raisins and wine and dry figs, are unfit for him to have. With respect to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and all such fruits, let it not be held a disgraceful act to gather them secretly. But if a person under thirty years of age is detected (gathering them), let him be struck and repelled, but without wounds, but let there be no infliction of such like blows upon a free-man. And let it likewise be lawful for a stranger to be a partaker of these, as of the autumnal fruits.⁷ But if any older person tastes of them, eating them on the spot, and secretly taking away none, let him partake of all such as a stranger does; but if he is not obedient to the law, let him run the risk of being no competitor for virtue, should any one at that time give information of such matters to the then judges.

[11.] Water for gardens is pre-eminently the most nutritive

¹—¹ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, unable it seems to understand *ἐκείνως* *δεῖ*, has omitted those words; and so he has *ἐπόμενος*, for which Stephens suggested *ἐπομένως*, found in Timæus, p. 27, C.

² This too was a law of Solon, as we learn from Diogen. L. i. 57.

³ Ficinus renders *τὴν γενναίαν*, by "ad repositionem ineptis," and shortly afterwards *τῆς γενναίας* by "fructus non reponendos—"

⁴ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has alone "si transeat solus."

⁵ Instead of *τῶν τοιούτων*, all the MSS. have *τὸν τοιούτον*, answering to "peregrinos" in Ficinus.

⁶ Ficinus has "ficus uvasque solum modo ad repositionem ineptas," who therefore found in his MS. *ἀνεπιτηδείων* after *εἰς ἀπόθεσιν*.

⁷ Here too Ficinus has inserted "quos superius diximus repositioni ineptos."

of all things, but it is easily rendered corrupt. For it is not easy to corrupt either the earth, or the sun, or the air, which together with water are the nourishers of what springs up from the soil, either by drugs, or turnings aside, or thefts; but all such things as these can take place in the case of the nature of water; and hence it requires the assistance of law. Let this then be (the law) respecting it. If any one willingly corrupts the water of another by drugs, or diggings, or thefts, whether such water be from a spring or collected (in a tank), let the party injured have a trial before the City-Stewards,¹ and write down the estimated amount of the injury.¹ ² And if any one be found guilty of having corrupted it by any drugs, let him, in addition to the fine, cleanse the spring or the tank of water in the way that the laws of the (holy) interpreters shall point out, how the cleansing ought to be done on each occasion, and by each person.²

With respect to the conveyance of all fruits in season, let it be lawful for any, who wishes, to carry home his own property through every place, wherever he shall do no damage to any one, or gain an advantage himself three times as much as the damage done to his neighbour. But of these questions let the magistrates take cognizance, and of all other injuries that one person wilfully commits by violence or secretly against another person unwillingly, either himself or his property, by means of the property of the former. And let the party (injured) lay all matters of this kind before the rulers, and receive compensation for the injury up to three minæ; but if the complaint of one person against another be of a higher amount, let him bring his suit before the common courts of justice, and let him have satisfaction against the party, who has done the injury. But if any magistrate shall be found to decide upon the damage with an unjust sentence, let him be considered as a debtor to the injured person for twice the loss sustained. And let any one, who wishes it, bring the unjust conduct of the magistrate before the common tribunals in each case³ of complaint. But as there are ten thousand trifling

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

²—² In the place of all between the numerals Taylor has merely, "and if convicted he shall be punished adequately to his offence."

³ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐν ἑκάστῳ*, not *ἐκαστῶν*, which is without regimen.

things of law, according to which punishments ought to be inflicted, respecting the distribution of trials by lot, and the citations, and the persons citing, whether the citation ought to be made before two, or how many, and whatever else is of such a kind, these are not to be left unregulated by law, nor yet are they worthy of an aged legislator. Let young men, therefore, lay down the laws relating to these,¹ (by looking) to the enactments of their predecessors, and modelling trifling matters after great,¹ and by becoming experienced in the necessary use of them, till every thing shall appear to be sufficiently laid down. ² And then rendering them immovable, let them live and use them as possessing a power in moderation.³

With respect to the other handicraft trades, it is requisite to act in this manner. In the first place, let no person of the country be one of those, who labour at handicraft trades, nor yet the domestic of a person of the country. For a citizen, who is to preserve and hold the arrangements of the state, common to all, is engaged in an art requiring much practice, and, at the same time, much learning, nor is he able³ to attend to the pursuit as a by-work. Now to labour accurately in two pursuits, or two arts, scarcely not a single nature of man is sufficient. Nor is the same person sufficient⁴ to exercise one art, and to superintend another person, exercising another. This therefore ought first of all to take place in a state. Let no coppersmith be at the same time a carpenter; nor let a carpenter attend more to others, who are coppersmiths, than to his own art, making as a pretext, that while he is attending to many servants, who are working for him, he very reasonably attends more to them, for the sake of greater gain accruing from thence to himself than from his own art; but let every artist in the state exercise one art alone, and from that obtain

¹—¹ Such seems to be the meaning of the Greek, *πρὸς τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν νουθετήματα ἀπομιμούμενοι σμικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα*, although *μιμῆσθαι* and its compounds do not, as far as I know, mean "to cause to imitate."

²—² Ficinus has "deinde sufficienter, positis immobiliter, his utantur," as if his MS. read *μετρίως* in lieu of *μέτριον*, which can hardly stand here without *τι*—Baiter would read *μέτρον*, and refers to p. 836, A., 957, A., 959, A.

³ I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐδ' ἐν παρέργῳ δυνάμενος ἐπιτηδεύειν*, not *δεόμενος*, which Ast is able to understand only by saying that *ἐπιτηδεύειν* is to be taken in a passive sense.

⁴ The Greek is *αὐτὸς ἱκανῶς*. But five MSS. read *ἱκανός*, while *αὐτός* is plainly required by the sense.

his living. This law let the City-Stewards with all exertion preserve; and let them punish with disgrace and infamy any person of the country, if he inclines to any art more than to the attention to virtue, until they bring him to his own proper course. But if any stranger applies himself to two arts, let them, by punishing him with bonds, and fines, and expulsions from the city, compel him to be one person instead of being many. With respect to the wages of workmen, and the destruction¹ of their works, and² should any other person injure them, or they³ any one else, let the City-Stewards pass a judgment as far as to fifty drachms; but beyond this, let the common tribunals decide according to law.

And let no person in the state pay any duty on exports and imports. But with respect to frankincense, and other foreign aromatics, for the gods, and purple, and other dyed colours, which this country does not produce, or with respect to any other art, requiring foreign articles to be imported, let no one introduce any of these without some necessity; nor, on the other hand, export any thing which it is necessary to remain in the country. On all these matters let the twelve guardians of the laws, five of the elder being excepted, take the cognizance and have the care. With respect to arms and all warlike instruments, if there should be a necessity for importing any foreign art, relating to plants,⁴ or metals, or chains,⁵ or any animals,⁶ on account of their use of such a kind,⁶ let the Hipparchs and the Generals have full powers over the import and export of such articles, ⁷the state

¹ This I cannot understand, nor could Ast, who thinks that something has been lost here. Ficinus has "de operis ipsorum approbatione aut improbatione."

² This "and" seems strangely introduced here.

³ The Greek is *ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἔτερος ἢ ἐκεῖνοί τιν' ἄλλον ἀδικῶσι*. But in this antithetical formula, where *αὐτοὺς* is found in the first clause, it is always repeated in the second. There is some error here; which might be corrected without much difficulty.

⁴ The plants used for warlike purposes were, the ash made into spear handles, and other trees converted into shields and bows and arrows.

⁵ The Greek is *ἡ μεταλλευτικοῦ κτήματος ἢ δεσμευτικοῦ*. Ficinus has "senea instrumenta, funes—"

⁶ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "quæ ad bellum conferant."

⁷ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus fills out the sense in his version, "ut civitas invehendi evehendique simul, cum opus sit, facultate non privetur." What Plato wrote and meant to say, I confess myself unable to discover.

giving at the same and receiving;⁷ but the guardians of the laws shall lay down, respecting these matters, laws becoming and sufficient. And let there be no higgling for the sake of money-making, ¹either by this person or any one else,¹ either in the whole country or city, or in any part.

[12.] With respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country, the correctness of the method near to that laid down by the law in Crete, would seem, if adopted, to be adopted with reason. For it is meet that all should distribute into twelve parts the whole produce of the land, in which way also it is to be consumed. Let every twelfth part, for example, of wheat and barley, of which let all the rest of fruits be the followers, that are to be divided, and all the animals in each,² that are to be sold, be divided into three parts, according to a certain proportion; one being for free-men, another for their domestics, and the third for handicraftsmen and strangers generally, and such as are residing with the foreign settlers, in want of necessary sustenance, or are constantly arriving during the exigencies of the state, or any individual. Of all the necessaries (of life), let this third part so distributed be alone vendible from necessity; but of the two others let nothing be necessarily sold. How then would these be distributed most correctly? In the first place, it is evident that we should distribute³ them partly equally, and partly unequally.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. It must needs be, that the land produces and brings up each of these things worse or better.

Clin. How not?

Athen. ⁴In such a way then as this, ⁴as there are three parts, let no part have more, when distributed, either (that)⁵ for masters

¹—¹ Here again I am in the dark, as to the person or thing meant by τοῦτον and ἄλλου μηδενός.

² Cousin understands after ἐκάστοις the words μέρεσι τῆς χώρας.

³ In lieu of νέμομεν, one MS. has νεμόμενα: which leads to νέμοιμεν ἄν.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is τῷ μὲν τοίνυν τοιούτῳ, where Ast would read τοῦ μὲν τοίνυν τοιούτου. But to my mind nothing is gained by the change. In both cases I am equally in the dark. Ficinus renders τῷ μὲν τοίνυν τοιούτῳ, by "quoad hoc." But that would be in Greek, τοῦτου γ' ἕνεκα. Winckelmann suggests τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ, which I have adopted.

⁵ Stephens and Ast would read μητε τὸ—found subsequently in two MSS.

or slaves, nor, on the other hand, that for strangers; but let the distribution give ¹the equality of similitude, ¹the same to all. And let each citizen, on receiving his two parts, have the power to distribute both to slaves and free-men, as much of his share, and of what kind, as he pleases. ²But the greater quantity of these ³it is meet to be distributed by measure and number, in this way, (by a person) taking the number of all the animals to which there ought to be food from the earth and distributing it. After this it is meet for habitations to be separately assigned them in an orderly regulated manner. Now the following regulation is suited to matters of this kind. There ought to be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth part; and in each hamlet, to be selected first a market-place, and temples for the gods and the dæmons, who follow the gods; and whether these are some local (heroes) amongst the Magnetes, ³or the holy seat of other ancients, whose memory has been preserved, to these let persons pay the honours due to ancient men, and found every where temples to Vesta, and Zeus, and Athéné, and to him who may be the leader of the others, that belong to each twelfth part. And first (it is meet) for the buildings to be about these temples, where the ground is the highest, as receptacles the best protected possible for the garrison; but to prepare all the rest of the country, by distributing it into thirteen parts for the handicraftsmen; and to cause one portion of these to settle in the city, by distributing this portion amongst the twelve parts of the whole city; ⁴(but to have the other) ⁴persons distributed out of the city, and in a circle about it; and every hamlet to cause the race of handicraftsmen to settle together, that are useful to the agriculturists; and of all these let the Land-Stewards have the care, and of how many and of what kind each place may require; and of the spots in which the handicraftsmen may dwell, and be the least annoyance, and the greatest benefit to the agricul-

¹—¹ I must leave for others to explain what Plato meant by this expression; on which however Ficinus has thrown some light by his version, "*æqualis eademque similiter sit omnibus distributio.*"

²—³ Cousin translates τὸ δὲ πλεον τούτων—"pour le surplus."

³ The Magnetes here alluded to were the inhabitants of Magnesia in Crete. For a list of other cities of the same name in the Troad, Lydia, and Macedonia, see Steph. Byz.

⁴—⁴ Ficinus alone has, what is required by the sense, "*aliæ exteriorem undique teneant locum,*" omitting however καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ.

turists; but of those in the city, let the City-Stewards in like manner have the care.¹ [13.] But to the City-Stewards each of the matters relating to the market-place must be a care. For after their inspection of the sacred things, let their attention (be given) to the matters of the market-place,² lest any one does wrong in what relates to the needs of man;³ their second work would be to punish, as being the inspectors of temperance and insolence, the person requiring punishment; but such of the vendible articles, as the citizens are under regulations to sell, they must first look into, in behalf of the strangers, whether each article is according to the law. And let the law be this. On the new⁴ day of each⁴ month, let the superintendents⁵ bring out a portion of what is to be sold to the foreigners; namely, a first twelfth part of the corn; and let the foreigner buy corn, and such things as pertain to corn, on the first market for the whole month. But on the twelfth⁶ day of the month, let some make a selling, and others a buying of liquid articles, sufficient for the whole of the month. And on the twenty-third day (of the month), let there be a sale of such animals⁷ as are to be sold by each party, or bought by those in want of them, and the sale of such chattels and goods as (suit) the agriculturists, such as of skins, and all kind of clothing, either woven or felt-like, or other things of such a kind;⁷⁸ but it is necessary for foreigners to

¹ The Greek is *ἐπιμελεσθῆναι καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed in omitting *ἐπιμελεσθῆναι καὶ*, properly wanting in one MS.

^{2—3} Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “ne quis vendendo emendove injuriam faciat,” adopted to the letter by Taylor.

³ I do not remember to have met elsewhere with the word *νέμω* instead of *πρώτῃ*, and even here the Scholiast evidently read, *ἐνῇ καὶ νέμω*, by which was meant the last day of the old moon, and the first of the new.

⁴ Bekker has *νόμος δὲ ἔστω, μηνός*— But six MSS., *νόμος δ' ἐκάστῳ μηνός*. Plato wrote *νόμος δὲ ἔστω ἐκάστου μηνός*, as shown by “*mensis cujusque*” in Ficinus, who however omits *νόμος δὲ ἔστω*.

⁵ After *τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους*, the Greek text has *οσοὶ τοῖς ἀστοῖς ξένοι ἢ καὶ δοῦλοι ἐπιτροπεύουσι*, which Taylor has omitted with Ficinus, who probably could not understand those words; nor assuredly can I, even after Ast's attempt to explain them.

⁶ All the MSS. read *δεκάτῃ*, answering to “decimo” in Ficinus.

^{7—7} Ficinus has thus abridged all between the numerals, “*quibus homines egent, supellectiliumque, ut corii vestiumque ac similia.*”

⁸—⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand; nor, I think, could Ficinus, whose rendering is “*nece*

acquire them by purchasing from others ; but the retail dealing in these articles either barley or wheat, distributed in the form of meal, or any other food in general, for citizens and their slaves, let no one sell or buy from any person of this kind.⁸ But in the markets for foreigners, let a foreigner (sell) to the handicraftsmen, and their slaves, ¹exchanging the sold articles for wine and food, which the majority call a retail trading ; and let the cooks expose for sale portions of animals cut into pieces to foreigners and handicraftsmen and their domestics.¹ Let too a foreigner buy daily the whole of the materials for burning in a mass, from the superintendents of farms, and sell it again to other foreigners for as much as he pleases, and when he pleases. But of all other goods and chattels, as much as there is a need of them to each person, let (the foreigners) sell (any part)² at the common market, after bringing them to a place appointed³ for each occasion,⁴ ⁵where they shall wait, having made a conjecture about fitting situations, until the guardians of the laws, and the Stewards of the market, with the City-Stewards, shall have marked out the limits of the sale-stands.⁵ In these

autem est peregrinos omnia a possidentibus emere, ne cauponatio in tritico et hordeo circa farinam ac cætera alimenta ulla fiat ; nec civibus nec servis eorum cauponari omnino liceat."

¹—¹ Here again I am quite in the dark. Ficinus has "vinum cibum-que commutare ac vendere carnesque coctas similiter ; quæ res a plurimis cauponatio dicitur—" thus translated by Taylor, "exchange to artificers and their slaves wine and food, and in like manner distributed flesh."

² I have translated as if *ὁτιούν*, required to govern the genitive *χρημάτων*, had dropt out after *πωλεῖν*.

³ Ficinus has "in locis determinatis," who therefore found in his MS. *εἰς τακτὸν τόπον* in lieu of *εἰς τὸν τόπον*, where the article has no meaning.

⁴ Instead of *ἕκαστον*, which cannot follow *εἰς τὸν τόπον ἕκαστον*, whatever Ast may say to the contrary, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐκάστοτε*—

⁵—⁵ In this most intricate passage the Greek is at present *ἐν οἷς ἀν νομοφύλακες τε καὶ ἀγορανόμοι μετ' ἀστυνόμων τεκμηράμενοι ἔδρας πρεπούσας ὄρους θῶνται τῶν ὀνίων*. Ficinus has "ubi legum custodes censorumque una cum ædilibus locum designarint et pretia venalibus imposuerint." But *τεκμαίρεσθαι* never does and never could signify "to mark out," nor could *ὄρους τῶν ὀνίων* mean "pretia venalibus." Unless I am greatly mistaken the words *τεκμηράμενοι ἔδρας πρεπούσας* have been misplaced, and should follow *ἵνα μενοῦσι*, which I have elicited from *ἐν οἷς ἀν*— For Plato meant to say that the market people were to bring their goods and place them where they thought they would be allowed to have their stalls, as soon as the civic authorities had marked

places let a person exchange money for goods, and goods for money, one party not giving up to another the article of barter (without an equivalent).¹ But if a person does give it up in confidence, whether he recovers (its value) or not, let him rest contented ; as there is no action relating to contracts of this kind. ²But the article sold and bought, by how much the more it is, or at a greater (price) than according to the law, which has stated through how much its being increased and decreased it is meet to do neither of these acts ;³ let the greater be written up before the guardians of the laws, and the contrary expunged. Let the same take place respecting the foreign settlers with regard to the registering of their property.

And let any one, who wishes, come to the emigration on certain conditions, ³as there is a location for any foreigner, who has the wish and the power to emigrate,³ if he belongs to any craft ; and if there is to him sojourning not more than twenty years from his enrolling himself, and paying no foreign settler's tax, ever so small, except that of living temperately, nor any other hawker's licence for the sake of buying and selling. But when the time (twenty years) shall have expired, let him take away his property and depart. ⁴But if during these years it should happen to him to become a person of note through some sufficient acts of kindness done to the state, and he trusts he can persuade the Council and Assembly by making a request that a delay may take place in his quitting the country absolutely, or that he may stay there for the whole of life, let him go and persuade the city ; (and) whatever he out the boundaries for each kind of wares. It would seem however, from a passage just afterwards, that the magistrates had a power to fix a price upon different articles. But the words are too corrupt to lead to any positive conclusion.

¹ I have inserted the words between the lunes to fill up what I conceive to be the sense.

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of the text. Ficinus has "*si quid vero venditum emptumque pluris minorisve est, quam lex jusserit, qua rerum venalium mensuræ et pretia constituta sunt*"—by the aid of which Ast would read *πλέον ἂν ᾗ ἢ καὶ μείον* instead of *πλέον ἂν ᾗ καὶ πλεόνος*—Cousin's version is "*Si on vendait ou si on achetait une chose en plus grande quantité et plus cher qu' il n' est marquée par la loi*"—thus applying *πλέον* to quantity, and *πλεόνος* to price.

³⁻³ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor, who has just afterwards adopted from Ficinus—"*quo in tempore incolendi vectigal nullum solvere cogatur.*"

⁴⁻⁴ Here again Taylor has adopted almost to the letter the abridged

may persuade, let it be accomplished for him.⁴ But in the case of the sons of foreign settlers, who are handicraftsmen and fifteen years of age, let the period of their settlement commence after their fifteenth year; and after these let a person remain twenty years, and then depart whither he pleases; but if he wishes to remain let him remain after having persuaded (the government) on the same grounds. ¹But let the person, who is leaving, go and expunge for himself the registrations, which have been written previously about him before the rulers.¹

BOOK IX.

[1.] ²After these there would be law-suits, consequent upon all the preceding doings, according to the natural arrangement of laws. Now of the doings whatsoever, respecting which it is requisite for law-suits to take place, some have been mentioned, namely, those relating to agriculture, and what follow upon them; ³but some of the greatest moment have not been mentioned at all; and each having been mentioned stated singly ³what recompence it ought to receive,

translation of Ficinus—"Quod si magnum aliquod beneficium intra viginti annos civitati contulerit velitque plus temporis aut etiam per vitam in civitate manere, fiat sibi, quod petierit ratumque habeatur, si modo consilio concionique persuaserit."

¹—¹ Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has "qui autem recedit, oblita descriptione, quæ apud magistratus erat conscripta, sic abeat;" Taylor is content with the general sense. "But if they choose to leave the city, they may depart, after their registers, which were committed to the care of the magistrates, are obliterated."

² Ficinus has, "Judicia vero, si post hæc superioribus actionibus convenientia reddantur, naturalis utique ferendarum legum ordo servabitur," as if his MS. read *Δίκαι δὲ, αἱ τὰ—οὔσαι κατὰ φύσιν γίγνονται* ἄν— But Ast says that *οὔσαι γίγνονται* ἄν is merely a circumlocution for *γίγνονται* ἄν.

³—³ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek, *τὰ δὲ μέγιστα οὔτε εἰρηταί πω, καθ' ἑν ἕκαστον τε λεγόμενον ῥηθὲν*, out of which Cornarius, Stephens, and Ast have been unable to elicit any thing satisfactory; while Ficinus has been content to give an abridgment of the whole passage in his version, "de maximis vero judiciis et judicibus sigillatim nondum diximus." What the train of thought requires might perhaps

and what judges to meet with, these are to be stated after those in order.

Clin. Right.

Athen. It were, however, after a manner disgraceful ¹ to lay down all the laws, that we are now about to do, ¹ in such a kind of state as we assert will be well regulated, and meet with every thing leading directly to the pursuit of virtue. For ² ever to think that in such a state a man can be born, who will participate in the depravity ³ of the others, the greatest, ³ so that it is necessary to lay down laws by anticipation, and to put out threats, should such a character arise, and for the sake of averting these, when they do arise, to lay down against them laws of punishment, as if they would arise, ⁴ (this,) as I said, were after a manner disgraceful. But since we do not, as the ancient legislators did, give laws ⁵ to heroes the sons of gods, as the story now goes, and they who were born from gods, gave laws (to themselves) ⁶ and others, born themselves from such beings, but we do at present legislate as men for the seed of men, there is no dread of doing wrong in fearing that some of our citizens should be, as it were horn-struck, ⁷ and

be obtained, but not without alterations, which would appear too violent. In lieu of *ῥηθὲν*, which Ast would expunge, Winckelmann proposes *διαρρήδην*, Orelli, *ῥητὴν ἤν*—

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were, *ἢν νομοθετεῖν πάντα, ὅποσα νῦν μέλλομεν, δρᾶν ταῦτα, not καὶ νομοθετεῖν πάντα, ὅποσα νῦν μέλλομεν τοῦτο δρᾶν*, where Stephens and Ast have justly found fault with *τοῦτο δρᾶν*, and Stalbaum with *καὶ*— Ficinus has, "Turpe quodam modo videri potest leges de hujusmodi rebus, quales tractabimus, illi civitati tribuere," as if his MS. read *Αἰσχροὺν μὲν δὴ τίνα τρόπον εἶναι ἔοικε νομοθετεῖν, ὅσα νῦν μέλλομεν δρᾶν, ταύτη τῇ πόλει*—

² The Greek is *ἐν δὲ*—The sense requires *ἐν γάρ*—On the confusion of *δὲ* and *γάρ*, see Schæfer's Index to Porson's Euripides in *Γάρ*.

³ I cannot understand *τῶν ἄλλων*—*τῶν μεγίστων*, nor could Ast; who understands *ἀστῶν* after *τῶν ἄλλων*, and would insert *πέρι* after *τῶν μεγίστων*.

⁴ I have adopted *ἰσομένους*, suggested by Stephens, in lieu of *ἰσομένους*, which is without regimen.

⁵ In lieu of *νομοθετούμενοι* we must read *νομοθετούμενοις*, or, what is preferable, omit the word altogether.

⁶ I have inserted "themselves," absolutely requisite to balance *ἄλλοις*. For *αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς τ'* might easily have been corrupted into *αὐτοὶ τ'*.

⁷ In the word *κεράσβολος*, there is an allusion to the notion of some ancient agriculturists, that seeds which, when sown, had struck against the horn of a bull or cow, produced fruit so hard as to be cooked with difficulty, and in fact to never become tender. The notion was ridiculed

become naturally so hard, as not to be liquefied,¹ (and,) as those kinds of pulse are in the case of fire, so these persons should in the case of laws, although ever so strong, become not wasted.²

³In favour of whom I will state what is no favour,³ first a law relating to sacrilege, should any one dare to commit it. Now we would neither wish, nor is it to be very much feared, that any citizen amongst those, who have been properly brought up, will ever labour very greatly under this disease; but their domestics and strangers, and the slaves of strangers, would attempt many things of this kind. For the sake of whom especially, and at the same time being cautious of all the weakness of human nature, I shall mention the law relating to sacrilege,⁴ and all the other matters of that kind, as are to be cured, or ⁵not to be cured at all. The prelude, however, to these matters ought, according to what has been formerly agreed upon, to be as short as possible. Some one then would, conversing and at the same time admonishing, address him, whom an evil desire calls aside by day and excites by night, and leads him to plunder temples, in these words:—O wonderful man, no ill, either human or divine, stirs up that—which is now urging you to proceed to an act of sacrilege, but a certain madness, begotten in men from crimes of old date, and not yet cleansed, and which is carried round in the form of something to be expiated; and against which you ought, with all your might, to be on your guard. Learn, then, what this

by Theophrastus, quoted by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 155, who has shown that *ἀρεάμων*, which was originally said of pulse that, like some kind of peas, does not become soft by boiling, was afterwards applied by Aristophanes and Plato to a person; and, he might have added, by Æschylus likewise in Prom. 198, and 1098.

¹ ² Ast would read *τέγγεσθαι* and *ἀτεγκτοί* in lieu of *τήκεσθαι* and *ἀτηκτοί*. For the idea of wasting away is not applicable to pulse, but of becoming soft rather, as in Ælian, *ὥστε καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἀτίγκτους τε καὶ ἀτεράμοντας τέγγει*. Ficinus, not understanding, it would seem, the allusion to vegetables boiling over a fire, renders *δσπρια πυρὶ* by “legumina fulminis tactu,” whom Taylor follows with his “leguminous substances, blasted by thunder.”

³—³ This is the only rendering I can give to *χάριν οὐκ ἐπίχαριν*, similar to *χάριν ἄχαριν* in Eurip. Iph. T. 566, and *δίκην ἄδικον* below, § 12, p. 873, C. Ast however would unite *οὐκ ἐπίχαριν* with *νόμον*, and so does Ficinus in his “legem—quamvis onerosam nobis atque molestam.”

⁴ In lieu of *ἱεροσύλων* Ast once wished to read correctly *ἱεροσυλιῶν*, similar to “sacrilegio” in Ficinus, whom Taylor and myself have followed.

⁵ Ficinus has “aut vix aut nullo modo sanari possunt.” He therefore found in his MS. *ἤ*, not *καὶ*, or perhaps both *ἤ καὶ*—

caution is. When any such idea comes upon you, betake yourself to expiatory rites ; betake yourself, as a suppliant, to the temples of the gods who avert evils ; (and) betake yourself to the society of men, who are called good, and partly hear, and partly endeavour yourself to say, that every man ought to honour what is beautiful and just. But fly, without turning back, from the society of the wicked. And if, while you are so doing, the disease becomes somewhat lighter, (it is well) ;¹ but if not, consider that death is more honourable than life, and free yourself from it.

[2.] Since, then, we have sung these preludes to those, who turn their thoughts to all such things as are unholy and destructive to the state, ²it is meet for the law to be silent in the case of him who obeys :³ but to him, who does not obey, to sing, after the prelude, loudly—He, who is detected in the act of sacrilege, if he is either a slave or a stranger, shall have the circumstance marked in his face and hands ;³ and after being scourged with as many stripes as the judges shall think proper, he shall be cast out naked beyond the boundaries of the country. For, perhaps, after suffering this punishment, he will, by being brought to his senses, become a better man. For punishment, taking place according to law, is not inflicted as an evil, but it nearly effects one of two things ; for it makes him who suffers the punishment, either better or less depraved. If however any citizen shall appear to have done any thing of this kind, in the shape of a crime, considered one of the heinous and not to be mentioned,⁴ relating to the gods, or parents, or the state, the judge shall consider such a person to

¹ On this ellipse, see Koen on Gregor. de Dialect. p. 48, ed. Schæf.

²⁻³ I have translated as if the Greek were τῷ μὲν πειθομένῳ τὸν νόμον εἶναι σιγηλὸν δεῖ, not τῷ μὲν πειθομένῳ τὸν νόμον ἔαν σιγῇ δεῖ : where Stephens was the first to find a difficulty, but unable to master it ; although he has quoted, very appositely, ix. p. 938, A., πειθομένοις μὲν σιγῇ, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ φωνῇ νόμου ἥδε. The error arose from the similarity between ἔαν and εἶναι, and ΣΙΓΗΑΟΝΔΕΙ and ΣΙΓΗΔΕΙ. Ficinus, no doubt feeling himself at a loss, has given a paraphrase—"quicunque ex his paruerint, eos a lege liberos dimitemus."

³ On the punishments inflicted upon sacrilegious persons, Ast refers to Meursius, Them. Attic. ii. 2, and Petit. Leg. Attic., p. 671. With regard to the marks on the hand, something similar was done formerly in England to persons found guilty of manslaughter.

⁴ I have adopted the interpretation given by Dorville on Chariton, i. 5, in preference to that of Ast, who explains ἀπορρήτων by "forbidden."

be incurable, from reflecting that though he had met with an education and a bringing up of so excellent a kind, he had not kept himself from the greatest wickedness. Now to such a person death is the least of evils. But he will by his example benefit the rest, when he is held in dishonour, and is made to disappear,¹ and (is cast out) beyond the boundaries of the country. But to his children and race, if they avoid their father's habits, let there be glory and words of honour, inasmuch as they have well and bravely fled from evil to good. It will not, however, be becoming for the property of such person to be confiscated to the state, in which the same and equal allotments ought to remain for ever. But when any one shall be voted to have committed crimes worthy (of a loss) of property, let him pay² from his possession the fines,³ if there be any overplus beyond his allotment properly furnished; and to this extent let him be fined, but not beyond. And let the guardians of the laws, looking into these matters accurately from the registers, ever give a clear statement to the judges, in order that no one may be idle,³ with regard to his allotment, through the want of means. But should any one be voted to be worthy of a greater fine, and none of his friends be willing to be his surety, and, by paying jointly the fine, to procure his liberty, punish him with bonds for a length of time, and in public, and with some kind of ill-treatment;⁴ and let no one for any offence be at any time without a punishment,⁵ not even if he is driven over the boundaries;⁶ but it is meet for the

¹ The verb ἀφανίζειν is an euphemism for ἀποκτείνειν.

²⁻³ Although ἐκτίσεις—ἐκτίνειν would be correct Greek, yet I very much doubt whether ζημίας ἐκτίσεις—ἐκτίνειν be equally so. I have therefore translated, as if the text were ζημίας ἐκ κτήσεως—similar to χρημάτων—ἐκτίσεις shortly afterwards.

³ As each allottee was required to cultivate his allotment, he would of necessity remain idle, if it were confiscated, and no provision made for its cultivation by another person; which could not take place in a state, where every one is supposed to be already occupied in some business.

⁴ An English reader will perhaps better understand τισι προπηλακισμοῖς, by knowing that formerly, when persons were put into the pillory, they used to be pelted with mud, which is literally προπηλακισμός in Greek, and with rotten eggs. What, however, Plato meant specifically by that word, I do not know, nor has any one, I believe, been able to explain.

⁵ This is a rare sense of ἄτιμος. Ast refers to Eustathius on Od. Δ. 32.

⁶ So Ast explains εἰς ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα—where he has adopted εἰς, as suggested by Stephens. But then the article would be required, as shown

punishment to be either death, or bonds, or stripes, or certain¹ formless sittings or standings, or by-standings at temples,¹ at the extreme parts of the country, or, as we before stated, the payment of money; ² and for the trial to take place in this way. Let then² the guardians of the laws be the judges of death; and let the tribunal consist of the last year's magistrates, selected for their excellence. But as regards the bringing (before the court) an accusation and the citing (the witnesses), and such like matters, and how they ought to take place, this must be the care of the junior legislators, but ours to lay down the law for regulating the manner of giving votes. Now let the vote be given openly; but, prior to this, let the judge be seated before the face of the accuser and defendant,³ in order, as near as possible, according to old age;³ and let all the citizens too, who are at leisure, diligently attend as the hearers of such causes; and let the accuser speak first one speech, and afterwards the defendant; and after these speeches, let the senior judge commence by his own inquiry⁴ and proceed to a sufficient examination of what has been stated; and, after the elder judge, all the rest in order ought to go through whatever a person is ⁵ still desirous of being stated, or (regrets to have been) not stated⁵ by each party. But let him,

by εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἐκπέμπειν in ix. p. 866, D., and xi. p. 936, C. Hence ὑπερόριον, proposed by Steph. and found in two MSS., is preferable.

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek—ἀμόρφους ἔδρας ἢ στάσεις ἢ παραστάσεις εἰς ἱερά—where I cannot well understand ἀμόρφους; nor can I believe that Plato wrote στάσεις ἢ παραστάσεις, especially as Dio Cassius, iv. p. 790, quoted by Casaubon, on Suetonius August. c. 24, has ἔδραι τε ἀτιμοὶ καὶ στάσεις ἐπονείδιστοι—By comparing however Timæus Lex. in Παράστασις· στάσις παρὰ τινά ἀτιμος—(or, as it should be read, παρ' ἱερά τινά)—it would seem that ἡ στάσις is a part of an explanation. Perhaps by ἀμορφοὶ or ἀτιμοὶ ἔδραι are to be understood sittings, where the party offending was placed in a corner or had a dress of dishonour put on him; while with the standing at the temple may be compared the custom in modern times of persons doing penance by standing in a church with a white sheet thrown over them.

²—² I have adopted, what Ast has suggested—τὴν δὲ δίκην ταύτη γίνεσθαι, in lieu of τὴν δίκην ταύτην γενέσθω, which is without sense or syntax. To complete however the connexion of the sentences he should have suggested δὴ γὰρ δὲ—

³—³ I confess I hardly understand ἐξῆς ἐγγύτατα κατὰ πρῆσβιν—

⁴ According to Harpocration, by Ἀνάκρισις was meant an inquiry by a magistrate previous to a trial. But here it must mean a sifting of the evidence of the opposite parties, after a trial had commenced.

⁵—⁵ The Greek is ῥηθὲν ἢ μὴ ῥηθὲν ἐκπιθεῖν—I have translated as if

who desires or regrets nothing, give up his right of inquiry to another. But of the matters mentioned, whatever may seem to be to the purpose, let persons affix a seal to the writings, and, after putting the marks of all the judges, place the document in the temple of Vesta; and again on the morrow, after coming together to the same place, let them inquire into and go through the suit, and again affix marks to what has been stated; and when they shall have done this thrice, after having sufficiently sifted the proofs and testimony, let each judge, carrying in his hand a sacred¹ pebble, undertake before Vesta,² to decide, as far as he can, justly and truly, and thus put an end to a suit of this kind.

[3.] After the offences relating to the gods, (let us speak)³ of those, that relate to the dissolution of a polity. Now he, who brings a person into power and makes the laws slaves, and puts the state under the control of factious societies, and effects all this by force, and excites sedition, acts contrary to the law. Such a person it is meet to consider as the greatest enemy of all to the whole state. And it is meet to hold him as the second in wickedness,⁴ who, although not taking any part in any of these acts, yet while he has a share in the greatest offices of the state, either lies hid from the knowledge of these matters,⁵ or not lying hid does through cowardice not act the part of an avenger on behalf of his country. But let every

ἐπιποθῇ were written *ἐτ ποθῇ*, and *ποθῇ* taken in the 'double sense of desiring and regretting. But if this is not possible, we must omit *ἢ μὴ ῥηθῆν*, with two MSS., if *ποθῇ* means "be desirous;" but *ῥηθῆν ἢ*, if it means "regret."

¹ I do not know another place where mention is made of a holy pebble. By comparing *φανερὰ ἢ ψῆφος* just before, one would prefer *φανερὰ* to *ιερά*—

² As Ficinus has "jurejurando per Vestam," Stephens suggested *πρὸς τῆς Ἑστίας*, adopted by Ast, and found afterwards in five MSS. But *ὕπισχνεῖσθαι* has not elsewhere in the sense of "to swear."

³ Ficinus has alone "dicatur—"

⁴ Unless *κάκη* is to be referred to *δειλία*, which can hardly be the case, one would prefer *κακία*—

⁵ That Plato would thus brand with dishonour a person, who did not know what was going on in secret and factious associations, I cannot for a moment believe; unless the want of knowledge were a willing act. Hence I suspect he wrote *λεληθότα τε πάντα ἔκοντα τὰ μὴ κεκευθότα*—i. e. "and wilfully lying hid from all things not concealed—" To obviate the difficulty, Ast, whom Stalbaum follows, says that *λεληθότα ταῦτα* is put for *λεληθότων τούτων*.

one, who is of the smallest utility, lay an information before the magistrates,¹ and bring to trial the person who is plotting for a violent and at the same time an illegal change in the form of government. And let the judges for these be those in the cases of sacrilege; and let the whole process be conducted for the former in a similar manner as for the latter; and let the vote,² which is the superior in number, bring with it death.² And in one word,³ let not the disgrace and punishment of the father follow upon any of the children, unless the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather of any one have in succession paid the penalty of death; and let the children keep their own property, except so much as belongs completely to the regulated allotment, and let the state send them away⁴ to their ancient paternal land and state.⁴ But as to those citizens, who shall happen to have more children than one, and these not less than ten years of age, let ten of them cast lots, whom the father or grandfather on the father's or mother's side shall mark out; and let the names of those who have obtained the lot be sent to Delphi; and whomsoever the god fixes upon, (it is meet to) appoint with a better fortune as the heir of the family of those who have left their home.

Clin. And properly so.

Athen. Let there be still a one-third⁵ law in common, respecting the judges⁶ [who ought to judge for them],⁶ and the mode of the suits,⁷ in the case of those, against whom a person shall lay a charge of treason, and bring them before a court of justice.⁷ In like manner, let there be in the case of their children this

¹ Ficinus has "judicibus," adopted tacitly by Taylor.

²⁻² This seems a rather strange law. Since even if the greater number of votes were for an acquittal, the party would still be put to death. But perhaps Plato meant to say, that if a bare majority of votes were given against the accused, he was to suffer death.

³ This expression seems here perfectly out of place.

⁴⁻⁴ The reader should bear in mind that the laws laid down by Plato were intended for a colony sent out from a mother country, and not for one existing already; where it would be in some cases impossible for them to be acted upon.

⁵ To avoid the incorrect *τρίτος εἷς*, Sydenham suggests *ἐπὶ τρισὶν εἷς*—I should prefer *τρίτος οὗτος ἔστω ὁ νόμος*—

⁶⁻⁶ The words between the brackets are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁷⁻⁷ Here again Ficinus has briefly "adversus eos, qui proditiōnis accusati sunt," followed tacitly by Taylor.

one law on all points¹ touching their remaining in, or departing from, their country, as regards the three, a traitor, and him who commits sacrilege, and him who by violence destroys the laws of the state. Against a thief too, whether he steals a thing great or small, let there be one law, and one punishment, after a trial² in all cases. For if any one is cast in a trial of this kind, and he has other property, beyond his allotment, sufficient to pay, he must in the first place pay double of what has been stolen; but if he has not, let him be put into bonds, until he either pays, or persuades the party, who has a verdict against him, (to forego his claim). But if any one is cast in a trial relating to a public theft, let him be freed from bonds, after he has either persuaded the state, or paid the double of the property stolen.

Clin. How say we, guest, that there is no difference in the case of a thief, who purloins a thing small or great, and from places sacred or not sacred; and in such other cases, as present a dissimilitude in the whole of thieving, which, as being various, the legislator ought to follow up by assigning punishments not similar at all?

Athen. You have, Clinias, in the best manner, nearly beaten me off, while I have been as it were carried along;³ and after stirring me up, you have reminded me, although I had previously thought of it myself, that the matters relating to the laying down of laws have never at any time been by any means properly worked out,⁴ as it has fallen out to speak of them at present.⁴

Clin. But how again say we this?

[4.] *Athen.* We did not make use of an incorrect image, when

¹ In lieu of *περὶ ταῦτα*, which is scarcely intelligible, I have translated as if the Greek were *περὶ πάντα*—

² I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐκ δίκης τιμωρία*, in lieu of *δίκη τιμωρία*, which is unintelligible; and hence Ast wished to read *δίκη τιμωρίας*, for he found *δίκη τιμωρίας* as a var. lect. in two MSS. Ficinus omits *δίκη* in his version “una lex pœnaque—” Winckelmann suggests *Δίκη τιμωρός*—but that would be too poetical.

³ The Greek is *ὥσπερ φερόμενον*. But *ὥσπερ* requires the mention of something to serve as a comparison. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὥσπερ θῆρα*, *φερόμενον*—For to a wild beast would well apply the verb *ἀνήγειρα*.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *ὥς γε ἐν τῇ νῦν παρόντι πέπτωκ' αὐτὰ λέγειν*, not *ὥς γε ἐν τῇ νῦν παραπεπτωκότι λέγειν*: which I cannot understand. Opportunely then do four MSS. offer *παρόντι*: which leads to *παρόντι πέπτωκ' αὐτὰ*—

we compared all those, who were now regulated by laws, to slaves under the care of slave-physicians. For it is meet to know a thing of this kind correctly, that if at any time one of those physicians, who handle the medical art from practice (alone) without theory, should come upon a free-born physician, discoursing with a free-born patient, and making use of theories bordering upon philosophy, and touching upon the disorder from its very commencement, and going back to the subject relating to (the whole) nature of bodies, he would quickly and greatly laugh, and speak no other language than is ready on such subjects to be addressed to the majority of the so-called physicians. For he would say—O stupid fellow, you are not curing the sick man, but you are almost giving him a lesson, as if he wanted to become a physician, and not to be in health.

Clin. And would he not speak properly in speaking so?

Athen. ¹ And would not the same person deservedly object against us,¹ that whoever discusses laws, as we do now, gives the citizens lessons, but not laws?

² *Clin.* And would he not seem to say this too correctly?²

Athen. Perhaps so.³ But at present a fortunate circumstance has occurred to us.

Clin. What is it?

Athen. That there is no necessity for us to lay down laws; but that, entering voluntarily upon an inquiry into all kinds of polity, we are endeavouring to perceive in what manner the best one and the most necessary may take place. And now, as it seems, it is permitted us, if we please, to consider what is the best, or, if we had rather, what is the most necessary on the question of laws. Let us choose, then, whichever it seems (is best).

Clin. We propose, O guest, a ridiculous choice, and we

^{1—1} Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, "Nonne et nobis merito idem objiciet," who either did not find in his MS. the words *τάχ' ἂν εἰ προσδιανοοῖτό γε*, or else could not understand them a bit better than myself; although it is easy to see that they conceal something like *Τάχα δ' ἂν ὦν ἐν ταῖς διανοοῖς' ἂν*, i. e. And perhaps even one still a boy would thoroughly understand.

^{2—2} The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him tacitly by Taylor.

³ The word *ἰσως* has been hitherto assigned to Clinias. Evidently incorrectly.

should become really similar to those legislators, who are compelled by some great necessity to give laws immediately, as being not permitted (to defer it) till the morrow. But it is lawful for us to speak with god's will, just as it is for masons, or those, who commence any other putting together of materials, to bring together for ourselves dispersedly, things out of which we may select what is suited to the combination which is to be, and to collect them at leisure. Let us then suppose ourselves to be for the present house-builders, not from necessity, but those, who at leisure put aside for their use some things, and put together others, so that we may have to say correctly, that some portions of the laws have been laid down, but others laid aside.

Athen. For thus, Clinias, our survey of the laws will be more natural. But, by the gods, let us consider some such thing as this, relating to legislators.

Clin. What?

Athen. There are writings and written discourses in cities by many other persons, and writings likewise and discourses by the legislator.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Whether then shall we direct our attention to the compositions of the rest of poets, and of such as in prose ¹ and in verse, ² have put together their advice relating to life, to be remembered by their having written them down, ² and by no means apply ourselves to the writings of legislators? Or (to the latter) most of all?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. But surely it is not necessary for the legislator alone of those who write to give counsel about things beautiful, and good, and just, while teaching what they are, and how they ought to be studied by those, who are about to be happy.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But is it more disgraceful for Homer, and Tyrtaeus, and the rest of poets, to have laid down in their writings what is incorrect, relating to life and its pursuits, and less so for Lycurgus, Solon, and such as, being legislators, have composed

¹⁻¹ The words *καὶ μετὰ μέτρων* are properly omitted in the two best MSS., as being superfluous after *ποιητῶν*: unless it be said that *ποιητῶν καὶ* are to be omitted, as being scarcely intelligible after *τῶν ἄλλων*—

²⁻² Ficinus has "operibus de ratione vivendi compositis."

writings? Or is this correct, that of all writings in cities those relating to laws ought to appear, when unfolded,¹ the most beautiful and best; ²but that those of the rest, either following after them, or at discordance with them, are to be laughed down?³

³ *Clin.* Let us think in this way.

Athen. And³ that with regard to the writing down of laws, it ought to take place in states, that the writings seem to be of persons, who, in the garb of a father or mother, have feelings of love, and possess a mind, ⁴and not, like a tyrant⁴ and despot, commanding and threatening, ⁵and after writing (decrees) on walls, to depart.⁵ Let us consider then, even now, whether we should, after thinking upon laws, endeavour to speak in this manner, whether we are able or not. Let us (gird up ourselves⁶ for it), exhibiting at least an alacrity, and proceeding along this road, let us, if we must suffer aught, endure it. And may the attempt be fortunate; and (fortunate), if god pleases, it will be in this way.

Clin. You have spoken well. And let us do as you say.

¹ So I have translated *διαπυτυττόμενα*, adopted from MSS. by Bekker and Stalbaum, in lieu of *διατυπούμενα*, got by Stephens from *διατυπώμενα*, the conjecture of Cornarius, instead of *διαπυτυττόμενα* in Ald. Ficinus, and Taylor after him, omit the word altogether.

^{2—3} In the place of these unmeaning words Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, “cæterorum vero scripta probari, si legibus consentanea sunt; sin dissona, derideri.”

^{3—5} The Greek is, οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων δεῖν—all put into the mouth of the Athenian. I have translated as if it were originally, ΚΑ. οὕτω διανοώμεθα. ΑΘ. περὶ νόμων δὲ δεῖν—Ficinus, to avoid the want of connexion in the sentences, and to conceal, probably, the difficulty in οὕτω διανοώμεθα, has given the general sense of the passage, “Sic igitur leges civitatibus conscribantur.” Cornarius proposed to read, Οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων, μὲν δὲ δεῖν—but Ast, πῶς δεῖ, so that γραφῆς might be governed by πῶς, which he would defend by πῶς—τῆς συμφωνίας, in p. 860, C., and the other passages quoted by himself on ναυπηγησίμης ὕλης—πῶς ἔχει, in p. 705, C.

^{4—4} I have translated as if the Greek were καὶ μὴ, not ἢ—Cousin says that the clause to which ἢ is to be referred, is τὰ γεγραμμένα φαίνεσθαι ἐν σχήμασι πατρὸς: but the laws would surely not be said to be as mild as a parent, or as severe as a tyrant.

^{5—5} Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “rationem vero nullam penitus assignantis,” with the omission of ἀπηλλάχθαι, neglected here by Taylor likewise.

⁶ Ficinus alone supplies, what the sense requires, “accingamur,” translated by Taylor, “let us attempt it.”

[5.] *Athen.* In the first place then, let us accurately consider, as we have attempted to do, respecting those who commit sacrilege, and about every kind of theft, and injuries of all kinds. And let us not take it ill, if we lay down some, during our legislating, and deliberate about others. For we are becoming to be legislators, but are not yet so, although perhaps we soon shall be. But if it seems good to you, to consider about what I have said, let us, ¹as I have said,¹ consider.

Clin. By all means.

Athen. With regard to all things that are beautiful and just, let us endeavour to look in some such way as this, how we may for the present agree with, and how differ from ourselves; ²who would say that we desire, if nothing else, to differ from the majority, and the majority too on the other hand with themselves.²

Clin. Of what kind of disagreement among ourselves are you speaking?

Athen. I will endeavour to state. On the question of justice generally, and of just men, and of things, and of actions, we all of us in a manner agree, that all these are beautiful;³ so that if any one should strenuously affirm that just men are, through their most just habit, all-beautiful, although they should happen to be ugly in body, scarcely a single person would, by speaking thus, be thought to speak improperly. ⁴Is not this true?

Clin. Perhaps so.

Athen. But let us see⁴ that, if all things that border upon

¹—¹ According to two MSS., *ὡς εἶρηκα* have been noted as spurious.

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek; in lieu of which Taylor has, "for we acknowledge, that we desire, though we may not be able, to excel others." Ficinus, "qui in hoc maxime studere nos profitemur, ut a plurimis differamus, quo item alii a se ipsis dissentiunt—" by the aid of which one might read, *ἐν ᾧ οἱ πολλοὶ γε, αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς, οὐ*—"on a point, where the many differ, themselves from themselves, not at all."

³ Ficinus, uncertain whether *καλὰ* means "honourable" or "beautiful," has expressed as usual both ideas, "honesta pulchraque."

⁴—⁴ Such is Taylor's translation of *οὐκοῦν ὁρθῶς*. *ἴσως*: who seems to have adopted the idea of Stephens, who says that after *οὐκοῦν ὁρθῶς* is to be supplied *ταῦτα καὶ σοὶ λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ*. But as such an ellipse is not to be found elsewhere, Bekker assigns *οὐκοῦν ὁρθῶς* to Clinias, as if *δόξειε λέγων* were to be understood. But to such a question the Athenian could not answer *ἴσως*, "perhaps," after he had stated distinctly what

justice are beautiful, ¹the sufferings of all of us are nearly equal to our doings.¹

Clin. What then?

Athen. Whatever action is just, so far as it partakes of what is just, it nearly partakes of the beautiful likewise.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Whatever suffering then partakes of what is just, it would so far, by being confessed to be beautiful, exhibit a reasoning not discordant.

Clin. How not?

Athen. But if we should agree that a suffering is just, but not beautiful, the just and the beautiful would be discordant through things that are just being said to be the least beautiful.

Clin. How have you said this?

Athen. It is not difficult to understand. For the laws which have been laid down a little before, would seem to proclaim what is perfectly the contrary to our present assertions.

Clin. To what assertions?

Athen. We surely laid it down, that he, who committed sacrilege, would justly die, and he too, who is hostile to well-established laws; and, as we were about to lay down many other laws of this kind, we stopped short, on perceiving that these sufferings were infinite in multitude and magnitude; and that they were of all sufferings the most just, and of all the least beautiful. Will not then things just and beautiful appear in this manner at one time to be the same, and at another to be the most opposite?

Clin. There is a danger of it.

Athen. By the multitude, then, things beautiful and just,

his opinion was. To meet this difficulty, Ast would render ἰσως—"truly so." But such is not the meaning of ἰσως. Plato wrote, I suspect, ΚΑ. ἰσως. ΑΘ. οὐκ οὐν ὁρθῶς ἰδοιμεν ἂν—instead of ἰδωμεν δὲ—

¹—¹The meaning, says Ast, is—"Every thing that is just, is honourable and beautiful. Hence not only what we do justly, but what we suffer justly, must be beautiful; and hence no suffering that is just can be disgraceful." But this is rather the explanation of the next speech of the Athenian, than of the present one, where Plato asserts that what men suffer is nearly on a par with what they do, as regards the numbers of each set of events. But why this assertion thus follows the supposition, that all things, which border upon justice, are beautiful, I must confess my inability to explain.

which are so discordant ¹ on these kind of points, ¹ are addressed as things separate.

Clin. It appears so, guest.

Athen. Let us then, Clinias, view again our notions, as to how the accordance ² exists on these very points.

Clin. Of what accordance, and with what, ² are you speaking?

Athen. I think I have clearly stated in the previous discourse; ³ but if not before, suppose me saying it now.

Clin. What? ³

Athen. That all wicked persons are in all things wicked involuntarily; ⁴ and that as this is the case, it is necessary for this inference to follow in order.

Clin. What (inference) do you mean?

Athen. That the unjust man is wicked; and that the wicked man is such involuntarily. Now there is no reason for a voluntary act to be ever done in an involuntary manner. He therefore, whoever acts unjustly, will appear to act so in an involuntary manner to him, who considers injustice to be an involuntary act. And this too must now be acknowledged by me. For I have agreed, that all men act unjustly involuntarily; and though some one, for the sake of contention or ambition, may say, that unjust men are involuntarily unjust, but yet many act unjustly voluntarily, the other is my assertion, and not this. In what way then should I agree with my own assertions, should ye, Clinias and Megillus, thus interrogate me—If these things are so, what would you, O guest, advise us respecting the legislation for the city of the Magnesians? To legislate for them, or not? ⁵ How not? I shall say. ⁵ Will you then sepa-

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. Taylor has "with each other."

²—² Ast was the first to object to *πρὸς ποίαν*—for there is nothing to which *ποίαν* can be referred; and he proposed to read *ποῖον*. He should have suggested *ποῖα*, as Baiter has done, answering to *ταῦτα* in the speech of the Athenian, and either *περὶ* here or *πρὸς* there, to preserve the balance of the sentences. Ficinus, unable perhaps to understand *πρὸς ποίαν*, has omitted those words.

³—³ The words between the numerals have been translated by Taylor, from the Latin of Ficinus: "*Athen.* In superioribus manifeste mihi dictum arbitror. *Clin.* Quo pacto? *Athen.* Quod si supra dictum non est, nunc saltem me dicere existimate. *Clin.* Quidnam?"

⁴ On this doctrine see at v. § 3.

⁵—⁵ Ficinus, "Ego vero dare leges consulam."

rate injuries into the involuntary and voluntary? And shall we assign greater punishments for voluntary offences and injuries, and less (for the contrary)?¹ Or equal for all, since injuries are not voluntary at all?

Clin. You speak properly, O guest. But how shall we make use of what has now been said?

Athen. You have inquired correctly. Let us in the first place use them for this.

Clin. For what?

[6.] *Athen.* Let us call to mind that we stated correctly, that there is a great confusion and dissonance amongst ourselves respecting things just. Laying hold then of this, let us ask ourselves again ²(what shall we say).³ Since we have neither found a way clearly out of the doubt relating to these matters, nor defined how those things differ from each other, which in all states, and by all legislators, that have ever existed, are laid down as forming two kinds of injuries, one voluntary, and the other involuntary, ⁴are they to be legally established⁵ in this way likewise?⁶ and shall the language, which has been expressed by us, as if it had been spoken by some god, be dismissed, after having said only thus much, and without assigning any reason, that it has spoken correctly; shall it in some manner lay down a counter-law? This may not be.⁷ But it is somehow necessary, before we lay down laws, to show these two things as existing, and (having) another⁶ difference between them, in order that when any one assigns a punishment for either; every one ⁷may follow what is said,⁷ and be able to judge, whether it is established in a becoming manner, or not.

Clin. You appear to us, O guest, to speak well. For it is necessary to do one of two things, either to say that all unjust

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ἰλάττους*, not *τῶν δὲ, ἰλάττους*—to preserve the balance of the sentences.

^{2—3} I have translated as if the Greek were *τί ἐροῦμεν*, not *ἀρ' οὖν*, to supply the apodosis of the sentence.

^{3—5} The Greek is *νομοθετεῖται*. I have translated as if it were *νομοθετηρία*—Ficinus has “ita varie puniuntur.”

⁴ i. e. in a twofold manner.

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἔσται*, not *ἔστιν*—

⁶ I cannot understand *ἄλλην*, nor could Ficinus, who omits it in his version, “et quam differentiam habeant—” Did Plato write *πολλήν*?

^{7—7} Ficinus has “intelligat,” translated by Taylor, “may understand—”

actions are not involuntary, or to show, ¹by first defining,¹ that this has been stated correctly.

Athen. Of these two things one I can by no means endure that it takes place,² (I mean) ³the denying that the person, who thinks so, has the truth on his side ;³ for this would be neither according to law⁴ nor holy. But in what manner these are two, if they do not differ by the involuntary and voluntary, but by something else perchance, I must endeavour by some means to show.

Clin. By all means, O guest : for it is not possible for us to understand this at least otherwise.

Athen. Be it so. Come then, (say,) does not, as it seems, much damage take place amongst citizens in their communications and intercourse with each other, and yet the voluntary and the involuntary abound in these transactions ?

Clin. How not ?

Athen. Let not however any one imagine, after laying down that all damage is an injury, that in this way the injuries exist in them of a double kind, partly voluntary, and partly involuntary. For the involuntary damage done by all men is neither in number, nor in magnitude, less than the voluntary. But consider ⁵whether I am saying any thing, when I say what I am about to say,⁵ or nothing at all. For I do not say, Clinias and Megillus, that if some one hurts another, ⁶not willingly, but unwillingly,⁶ he does an injury to a person unwilling (to be injured). And in this way I will lay down the law, by making legally this an involuntary injury ; nor will I consider a damage of this kind as an injury at all, whether it be of a greater or less magnitude. And we shall frequently

¹—¹ Ficinus has “antequam ad alia pergamus—”

² I have adopted γίγνεσθαι, found in all the MSS., in preference to γίγνεται, suggested by Cornarius, with the approbation of Steph., Ast, and Stalb.

³—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “ut videlicet, quod ita esse existimo, negem,” translated by Taylor, “I mean the denying that I think it is so.”

⁴ In lieu of νόμιμον five MSS. read ἐμὸν, similar to “officii mei est” in Ficinus. But νόμιμον is required by ὅσιον.

⁵—⁵ In lieu of this repetition of λέγω λέγων—λέγειν, Ficinus has “utrum deinceps veri aliquid afferam.”

⁶—⁶ As Ficinus could not understand, nor can I, the difference between μὴ βουλόμενος and ἄκων, he very wisely omitted ἀλλ’ ἄκων, and so after him did Taylor.

say that through¹ assistance taking place not correctly, he, who is the cause of the assistance, does an injury,² at least if my opinion is the better.³ For, my friends, if any one gives one any thing, or, on the contrary, takes it away, it is not meet to call such an action thus simply just or unjust; but whether a person does to another in any thing a benefit or harm, while making use of (a correct)³ habit, and a just manner, to this ought the legislator to look; ⁴and [direct his attention]⁴ to (these) two things, injustice and detriment; and ⁵by making, what has been damaged, uninjured⁵ as much as is possible, by the law, and by restoring, what has been lost, and raising up again, what has fallen by means of any one, ⁶and making, what has been wounded, whole, and, what has been killed, expiated with money,⁶ let him ever endeavour to convert, in the case of the doers and sufferers, by means of his laws, each of the injuries from a state of variance to that of friendship.

Clin. This at least is well (said).

Athen. Unjust damages therefore and gains, if any one can by injuring a person cause ⁷to be a gain to himself,⁷ he ought to cure, such at least as are to be cured, as being diseases in

¹ To support the syntax, I have translated as if δι' had dropt out between δὲ and ὠφέλειαν—

^{2—3} Ald. alone has ἢ γ' ἐμὴ νικᾷ, with the usual ellipse of δόξα—as Stephens was the first to remark; although he has edited himself ἢ γε μὴ νικᾷ, deceived by “si hæc minime superat” in Ficinus.

³ Ficinus has “probis moribus,” as if his MS. read ἦθει ὁρθῶ, to balance δικαίῳ τρόπῳ.

^{4—4} The Greek is καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτίον πρὸς τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην. But βλεπτίον is superfluous after the preceding θεατίον: nor could πρὸς τε be thus repeated after πρὸς δύο, where ἀδικίαν and βλάβην are the two things alluded to; nor lastly, could τὰ be omitted before δύο.

^{5—5} The Greek is τὸ μὲν βλαβὲν ὑγίης—ποιητίον: where Ast was the first to see that the sense and syntax require ποιούντα, while since four MSS. read ἀβλαβεῖς in lieu of βλαβέν, it is evident that Plato wrote τὸ μὲν βλαβέν ἀβλαβεῖς, of which ὑγίης is the explanation.

^{6—6} The Greek is καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἢ τρωθὲν ὑγίης, τὸ δὲ ἀποίνοις ἐξίλασθιν—where Ast would reject ἢ τρωθὲν ὑγίης as an interpolation; but Stalbaum insert ἰώμενον after τὸ θανατωθὲν, forgetting that for what is dead there is no cure. Cousin would understand ποιούντα—I have translated as if the Greek were—καὶ τὸ τρωθὲν ὑγίης ἰσάντα καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἀποίνοις ἐξίλασθιν—and so Winckelmann, but without ἰσάντα.

^{7—7} In κερδαίνειν lies hid κέρδη εἶναι, and ἑαυτῶ in τούτων, as I have translated.

the soul ; but the question of the cure of injustice it is meet to say inclines in this way.

Clin. In what ?

Athen. That what injury soever a person may do, be it great or little, the law may instruct, and altogether compel him, either not to dare again at any time to do such an act voluntarily, or far less frequently, in consequence¹ of the punishment for the injury. This should any one accomplish, either by works or words, or by pleasure or pains, or by honours or dishonours, and by fines of money or gifts, or altogether by any means whatever, (so that)² a person may hate injustice, and love, or at least not hate, the nature of justice, this is the very business of laws the most beautiful. But, upon the persons, whom the legislator perceives to be incurable on these points, he shall impose a punishment and law,³ knowing that to all such as these it is better even for themselves not to live any longer, and that they will doubly benefit the rest, when freed from life, by being an example to others to do no wrong, and by causing the state to be devoid of bad men. In this way there is a necessity for the legislator to assign death, as the punisher of delinquencies of this kind,⁴ but by no means otherwise.

Clin. This appears to have been spoken by you with great moderation ; but we would hear still more gladly this spoken, namely, the difference between injustice and detriment,⁵ and how the question of what is voluntary and involuntary is in these cases variously represented.⁶

[7.] *Athen.* I must endeavour therefore to do and say as you request me. For it is evident that, respecting the soul, you⁶ say to, and hear from, each other⁶ thus much, that one

¹ This is a rather strange use of *πρός*—Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has “*pœnæ impositione deterritus*.”

² After *τις* there has evidently dropt out *ὥστε*—

³ In lieu of *καὶ νόμον*, which are evidently corrupt, Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has “*ultimo supplicio affectos*.” Winckelmann would suggest *κατὰ μοθηήσει*. Cousin understands by *νόμον τινα* “une certaine peine—qui seule peut obtenir l’effet désiré.” But *νομος* never has nor could have such a meaning.

⁴ Ficinus has “*insanabiles homines*,” as if his MS. read *τῶν ἀνιάτων* in lieu of *τῶν τοιούτων*.

⁵—⁶ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, and thus abridged by Ficinus—“*et quomodo sponte et non sponte fiant*.”

⁶—⁶ Ficinus has “*sæpe dicitis et auditis*,” as if his MS. read *πολλάκις λέγετε* instead of *καὶ λέγετε*.

property of nature resides in it, whether as an accident or part, namely, anger,¹ a thing naturally hard to contest with and to overcome, and which overturns many things by its irrational violence.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And we speak moreover of pleasure as not being the same as anger; and we say that it possesses, from a contrary influence, a power through persuasion, united to a violent deception, to do whatever the will pleases.

Clin. And very much so.

Athen. He too who says that ignorance is a third cause of crimes, will not state a falsehood. Now the legislator, who makes a twofold division, would act the better by considering one kind as simple, and the cause of light offences; but the other twofold, when any one is in a state of non-instruction, not only by being afflicted with ignorance, but by an opinion of wisdom, as if he knew perfectly what he does not know at all; and laying down things of this kind, when followed by power and strength, as the causes of crimes mighty and unmusical;² but when followed by imbecility, as are the crimes of children and old men, he will consider them (all) as crimes, and will ordain laws against those who commit them; (laws), however, the mildest of all, and near to the greatest pardon.

Clin. You speak what is reasonable.

Athen. Now nearly all of us say, that one of us is superior to pleasure and anger, and another inferior. And such is the case.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But we have never heard even, that one of us is superior to ignorance, and another inferior.

Clin. Most true.

Athen. But we say that all these allure to their will a person, who is frequently drawn at the same time to things opposite.

Clin. Very often indeed.

¹ In lieu of ὡν ὁ θυμὸς, five MSS. read ὅν ὁ θυμὸς, which leads to ὄνομα ὁ θυμὸς, similar to "quam iracundiam dicimus," in Ficinus. Taylor omits the words entirely.

² Such is the literal version of ἀμούσων, by which was meant, says Ast, the whole of a liberal education; an idea which it is impossible to convey by any single word in English. Taylor has "rustic—" We might say by a paraphrase, "arising from a want of education."

Athen. Now I will define to you clearly the just and the unjust, of which I was speaking, with no variety of colouring. For I denominate injustice to be wholly the tyranny over the soul through anger, and fear, and pleasure, and pain, and envy, and desires, whether it does, or does not, harm any one. But the opinion of what is the best, by whatever way a state or any individuals may think it¹ will exist, ²should it (the opinion,) by having a power in the soul, arrange in order the whole man, even though it stumbles in some matter, we must say that, what is done in this way, is just entirely, and (that too) which is under a rule of this kind of each, and of men through the whole of life best; ² but that a damage of this kind is thought by the multitude to be an involuntary injustice. However, our discourse at present is not a harsh contest about names. But since there have been pointed out three kinds of delinquencies,³ let us, in the first place, still more diligently recall them to our memory. Of pain then, which we denominate anger and fear, there is one kind.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But of pleasure and desires there is a second kind; another the third, of hopes, and ⁴a desire of true opinion about that which is the best.⁴ Now by this third being divided into two parts, five kinds will be produced, ⁵as we have just now stated,⁵ for which we must lay down five laws, differing from each other in two genera.

Clin. What are these?

Athen. One, when a deed is done constantly with violence

¹ In lieu of *τούτων* one MS. has from a correction *τούτον*, which leads to *τούτο*, i. e. *τὸ ἀπαισιν*, as suggested by Cousin.

^{2—3} Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek; upon which Ast has written what has failed, in my opinion at least, to throw any light. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows for the most part, has “si animo dominata omnem virum exornet, etiamsi quid minus recti illi successerit, iustitiam nomino; et quicquid inde gestum est, iustum appello; atque eos, qui huiusmodi principatui libenter parent.”

³ As Plato alludes to what he had stated just above relating to the causes of crimes, it is strange to find here *ἀμαρτανόμεινων* instead of *ἀμαρτάνειν ποιούντων*.

^{4—5} All between the numerals are considered by Ast to be an interpolation; for the three causes of crimes were said already to be pain, and pleasure, and an opinion of wisdom. Grou suggested *ἄφεισις* in lieu of *ἔφεισις*, which, although the Zurich editors seem disposed to adopt it, I cannot understand. Cousin would reject *ἔφεισις* as a faulty gloss.

^{5—5} Ficinus, and after him Taylor, omits *ὡς νῦν φάμεν*.

and accordant¹ actions; and the other, when it takes place secretly in darkness and with a fraud; but sometimes the act is done with both of these, against which there will be laws the most severe, if they possess their proper character.

Clin. This is reasonable.

[8.] *Athen.* But let us after this proceed to the point, from which we have digressed, and finish the laying down of laws. Now the subjects laid down by us were respecting those, who rob the gods, and are traitors to their country, and who corrupt the laws for the purpose of dissolving the existing polity. Of these some one may perhaps commit an act, when mad, or affected with a disease, or a very great age, or childishness,² differing not at all from things of this kind.³ Of which acts should any become manifest to the judges selected on each occasion, either by the party himself informing, or a person making an excuse in behalf of the perpetrator, and he be decreed, when in this state, to have acted contrary to the law, let him pay simply for the damage, whatever he may have done; and let him be exempt from other punishments, unless by having killed any one his hands are not clean from murder; for in this case let him depart to another country, and dwell there in exile during a year; but if he returns before the time prescribed by the law, or puts his foot on the whole³ of his native land, let him be imprisoned by the guardians of the laws for two years in the public gaol, and then released from bonds.

Since then we have begun with murder, let us endeavour to lay down laws completely for every kind of it. And, in the first place, let us speak of that done with violence and in-

¹ In lieu of *ἑμφώνων* Faehse suggests *ἐμφανῶν*, from "aperte" in Ficinus; but Ast, *ἐμφανῶν*, antithetical to *μετὰ σκότους*. Cousin says that either alteration is admissible. The Zurich editors suggest *ἀξυμφώνων*—

²⁻² Such is the literal version of the Greek, *οὐδέν πω τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρων*: where Stephens was the first to remark that *τῶν τοιούτων* had nothing to which it could be referred. Ast however, with whom Kühner agrees in Gr. Gr. § 373, says that *παίδων* is to be supplied from the preceding *παιδία*. Plato wrote I suspect *οὐδέν πω τῶν ἀνοήτων διαφέρων*—for both the very old and young are equally silly, according to the saying *Δις παῖδες οἱ γέροντες*.

³ Ast explains *πάσης* by "altogether—" There is, I suspect, some error here. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows literally, has "aut etiam intra fines deprehendatur." The word *πάσης* seems to have been inserted from *ἐμπάσης τῆς πατρίδος*, a little below.

voluntarily. If then any one in a contest, and at the public games, shall involuntarily kill a friend, either on the instant, or some time after from the blows inflicted; or, in like manner, during a war, or in warlike exercises, of which the rulers have enjoined the practice, with naked bodies, or with any weapons, in imitation of warlike doings, let him be purified¹ according to the law brought from Delphi² touching these matters, and let him be held to be pure.³ And in the case of physicians, should any person, when attended upon by them, die, without their willing it, let every one³ be held to be pure by the law. But if any one with his own hand unwillingly slays another, whether with his own naked body, or with an instrument or dart, or by administering drink or food, or by the hurling of fire, or a tempest,⁴ or the privation of breath, whether he does this with his own body, or through the means of other bodies, let him be considered altogether a slayer with his own hand, and suffer punishments such as these. If he kills the slave (of another),⁵ thinking that he had done for⁶ his own, let him either cause the master of the dead (slave) to be without loss or hurt, or be fined double the value of such slave; and let the judges make an inquiry into the value, and let the homicide make use of greater and more purifications than those, who kill a person in gymnastic exercises; and in such cases let the holy interpreters, whom the

¹ In lieu of *καθαρῶς* Desiderius Heraldus, *Observ. ad Jus Attic. et Roman.* p. 354, suggested *καθαρθείς*, similar to *φόνον καθαρθείς—καθαρὸς ἔστω* in ix. p. 869, A., and viii. p. 831, A., *κατὰ νόμον καθαρθέντα, καθαρὸν εἶναι*—Ficinus omits *καθαρῶς*, and so after him does Taylor. But the correction of Heraldus has been confirmed by two MSS.

² Compare *Æsch. Cho.* 1069, and *Eum.* 283.

³⁻³ To avoid the absurdity in *καθαρὸς ἔστω*, applied to the patient—for so it must be according to the rules of syntax—Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has altered the construction in his version, “omnes autem medici, qui curantes non sponte occiderint, mundi sint.” Plato wrote, I suspect, *ιατρῶν δὲ πέρι, πᾶς τις*—not *πάντων*—and so I have translated. Respecting this clause in favour of a physician, Matthiæ quotes opportunely Antipho, p. 694, R.

⁴ This appears strangely introduced here, as if a person could kill another by bringing a storm upon him. Ficinus renders *χειμῶνος* by “frigoris et fluctus,” uncertain of the meaning of *χειμῶνος*, in which there is evidently some error.

⁵ Ficinus alone has “alienum servum,” what the sense requires; as if his MS. read ΔΟΥΛΟΝ ΑΛΛΟΟΥ—

⁶ This is the exact rendering of *διεργάσθαι*.

god ordains, decide without an appeal.¹ But if any one kills his own slave, let him, after undergoing a purification, be released according to law from (the stain of) murder. But if any one kills involuntarily a free-born person, let him be purified with the same purifications as him, who has killed a slave. And let him not dishonour ²some of so-called² old stories of the ancients. For it is said, that a person, who had lived with the feelings of a free-man, having been violently put to death, was, when recently dead, angry with his murderer; and being filled ³with fear and terror³ likewise through his violent suffering, and beholding the person, who slew him, passing the time in his own seats, [familiar haunts,]⁴ terrified him, and, being disturbed himself, disturbed with all his might the murderer and his doings, by having Memory⁵ as an ally. On this account, it is requisite for the doer to withdraw himself from the sufferer through all the seasons of the year, and to cause a void in all his own places through the whole of his native land. But if the party deceased is a stranger, let (the homicide) be debarred the country of the stranger for the same period. And if any one willingly obeys this law, let him, who is the nearest relative of the deceased, be the examiner into all that has taken place and grant a pardon; ⁶and by keeping quiet, he would

¹ Such is the proper meaning of *κυρίους*, in lieu of which Faehse suggested *καίριους*, to answer to "idonei" in Ficinus.

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of *παλαιὸν δὲ τινα τῶν ἀρχαίων μύθων λεγόμενον*: where instead of *παλαιὸν δὲ τινα*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *παλαμναῖον δὲ Δία ἐν τινι*— For the Etymol. M. has *Παλαμναῖος ὁ τοῦς αὐτοχειρὶ φονεύσαντας τιμωρούμενος Ζεὺς παλαμναῖος λέγεται*. "And let him not dishonour Zeus, who avenges murder, as stated in some of the stories of old." Ficinus has "priscum mysterium non contemnat," as if his MS. read *μυστηρίων* instead of *μύθων*.

³⁻⁴ Why the murdered man should be said to be filled with fear and terror, I must leave for those to explain, who can point out the story to which Plato alludes. According to the Greek dramatists, it was the murderer rather, who felt the touch of fear, as shown in the case of Clytemnestra and Orestes. Unless I am greatly mistaken, the author wrote *φθόνου* (to which *φόνου* in one MS. plainly leads) *καὶ λήματος*; where *λήμα* would be the counterpart of *φρόνημα* mentioned just above.

⁴ The word *συνθηθείαις* is evidently an explanation of *ῥήθειαις*.

⁵ What Plato means by *μνήμη*, Euripides, in *Orest.* 396, expresses by *σύνεσις*, in English "conscience."

⁶— Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "qui etiam pace ipsi reconciliatus et æquus omnino erit."

be altogether moderate towards him.⁶ But if a person does not obey, and, in the first place, being still unpurified, dares to go to the temples, and to sacrifice; and, further, is not willing to be an exile, and to complete the stated time; let the nearest relative of the deceased prosecute the murderer on a charge of blood, and let his punishment be doubled when found guilty. But if the nearest relative shall not prosecute¹ [for the act of suffering],¹ let any one, since the pollution has come round to the relative,² through the sufferer turning on himself the suffering,² prosecute the relative and compel him by law to be absent from his country for five years. But if a stranger involuntarily kills a stranger amongst those in the city, let whosoever is willing prosecute him on the same laws; but if a foreign settler (kills a stranger), let him be exiled for one year; but if he be altogether a stranger, in addition to the purification, let him, if he shall have killed a stranger, or a foreign settler, or a citizen, be banished for his whole life from the country which has the supreme power over these³ laws, and if he returns contrary to the law, let the guardians of the laws punish him with death; and if he has any property, let them give it to the nearest relative of the deceased. But if he returns involuntarily by sea, and has been cast out on the coast by a storm,⁴ let him fix a tent (on the shore), so that his feet may touch (the water),⁴ and watch for an opportunity of sailing; but, if he is brought on land

¹—¹ The Greek words *τῷ παθήματι* could not thus follow *ἐπεξίγῃ*, as shown by *ἐπεξίγω τῷ κτείναντι*. They should be *τῷ δράματι*, or rather be omitted entirely as an interpolation.

²—² Such is the literal version of the unintelligible original; where the Scholiast says that *προσπρεπομένου* means the same as *ἀποπρεπομένου*: but *πρός* and *ἀπό* never have the same meaning. The Scholiast's interpretation is, however, adopted by Ficinus; whose version is—"ipso videlicet interempto passionem in illum convertente," translated by Taylor—"or in other words the slain person turning his anger towards him."

³ In lieu of *τῶνδε*, Ficinus found in his MS. *τοιῶνδε*, as shown by his "hujusmodi."

⁴—⁴ So Taylor, and after him Ast, paraphrases the Greek—*σκηνησάμενος ἐν θαλάττῃ, τέγγων τοὺς πόδας, πλοῦν ἐπιφυλαττέω*—But as one MS. has *συννησάμενος*, Plato wrote, I suspect, something more fit to be read than what the literal version presents—"let him, fixing a tent in the sea and wetting his feet, watch for a sailing." Ficinus has "*navigandi opportunitatem, pedibus mare tangens, expectet*," omitting *σκηνησάμενος*.

forcibly by any one, ¹ let the magistrate, who of those in the city first meets him, ¹ release him ² and send him safe from harm to the country over the borders. ² But if any one with his own hand kills a free-man, and what is done is done through passion, it is meet, in the first place, to make a two-fold distinction in a thing of this kind. For a thing is done in a passion by those who, on a sudden, and without intending to kill, destroy by blows, or such other means, a person, ³ on the instant that an impulse arises, and when repentance is close upon the deed ; ³ and (a deed is done) in a passion by those too, who, having been befouled by words or deeds of dishonour, pursue with revenge and subsequently kill a person, intending to murder, and for the deed there is no repentance. We must therefore, as it seems, put down two kinds of murder, and both of them as arising nearly from passion, and they may be said most justly to be between the voluntary and the involuntary. ⁴ Each, however, is only a likeness. ⁴ For, he who stores up his anger, and does not immediately (and) ⁵ suddenly, but with malice prepense ⁶ after a time ⁷ revenge himself, is like to the voluntary ; but he, who, without storing up ⁸ his anger, does on the instant [immediately] ⁹ gratify his passion, without premeditation, is like to the involuntary. He is not, however, altogether involuntary, but the likeness of the involuntary. On this account, the murders committed in anger are difficult to define, whether one ought to lay down laws for them, as being voluntary, or some of them involuntary. The

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has, what is less objectionable—"a magistratu, cui primo res delata fuerit—"

²—² Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, is content with the general sense—"et intactus in exilium retrudendus."

³—³ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, thus abridges this passage—"ita ut confestim post impetum pœnitentia sequatur."

⁴—⁴ Ficinus alone supplies, what is wanting for the sense—"neutra enim voluntaria revera vel involuntaria est ; sed altera alterius est imago."

⁵ Ficinus has "nec repente"—for he found probably in his MS. *καὶ* between *παράχρημα* and *ἐξαίφνης*.

⁶ This legal phrase in English answers best to the Greek *ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς*.

⁷ In lieu of *ὑστερον χρόνῳ* I should prefer *ὑστέρῃ χρόνῳ*. See my note on *Æsch. Suppl.* 220.

⁸ The common expression in English of "not bottling up one's anger," would answer the best to *ἀραμύτως* in Greek.

⁹ The word *εὐθὺς* is evidently an interpretation of *ἐκ τοῦ παράχρημα*.

best and the truest method therefore is to put both down as likenesses ; and to divide them apart from each other, by their being done with malice prepense and without premeditation ; and to lay down by law severer punishments for those, who kill in anger, and with malice prepense ; but milder for those without premeditation and on the sudden. For that, which is like a greater evil, should be punished more severely ; but that, which is like a less one, less severely. Let it then be thus established by our laws.

Clin. By all means.

[9.] *Athen.* Let us then return again to the subject and say, that if any one with his own hand kills a free-man, but if the deed, when done, took place without premeditation, in a moment of anger, let him in other respects suffer, as it is proper for the party to suffer, who has killed a person, not in a passion ; but let him of necessity be an exile for two years, and thus punish his passion. But he, who in a passion, but with malice prepense, commits a murder, let him (suffer) in other respects as the former does ; but let him be an exile for three years, as the other is for two, and be punished for the greatness of his passion by a longer time. And let this be held¹ universally respecting these matters.¹ It is difficult however to give laws on such matters with accuracy. For sometimes of these two murders, the one, which is held by the law to be the more atrocious, is the milder ; and that, which is the milder, would be the more atrocious, ²according as the murder is committed in a more savage or a more gentle manner.³ But for the most part the deeds take place according to what has been mentioned already. Of all these matters, therefore, it is meet for the guardians of the laws to have the cognizance ; and, when the period of the exile shall have expired³ to each

¹—¹ As four MSS. read *καθόδου*, and six *τούτοις*, Bekker and Stalb. have so edited. But Ficinus found in his MS. *καθόλου—τούτων*, as shown by his version—"Universalis—istorum dispositio." Either would do. But as *καθόδος* means "the return from exile," to which Plato alludes just afterwards, the reading of the MSS. is to be preferred.

²—³ So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus—"prout atrocius aut mitius gesta est." But the Greek is *καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν φόνον ἀγρωτέρως ἢ πράξειεν, ὃ δὲ ἡμερωτέρως*. By uniting the two it is easy to read—*καθάπερ ὃ μὲν τὸν φόνον—ὃ δὲ*—i. e. "according as one—"

³ Taylor has thus expressed in English, what Ast says would be in Greek not *ἐλθῃ*, but *ἐξελθῃ*, as shown by x. p. 909, A., xi. p. 921, C.

offender, to send twelve judges to the borders of the country, (so that)¹ after having examined still more clearly the conduct of the exiles during that period, they may be the judges of the pity (to be shown) and of their reception; and let the exiles acquiesce in the decisions of such magistrates. And if, after having returned from exile, any one of them shall, overcome by passion, commit again the very same offence, let him be exiled and never return again; and if he returns, he shall suffer in the same way as a stranger for returning from exile. And let him, who kills his own slave, undergo a purification. But if, in a passion, he kills the slave of another, let him pay to the master double the value of the loss. But whoever of all the homicides does not obey the law, but, while he is uncleansed, defiles (by his presence) the place of public meeting, and of contests, and other sacred places, whoever is willing may bring to trial the relative of the deceased, who has neglected (his duty), and the murderer likewise, and compel him to pay a double fine, and ²to do some of the other doings;² ³and let the (accusing) party carry off the payment according to the law.³ If a slave kills his master in a passion, let the kindred of the deceased use the murderer in whatever manner they please,⁴ and be clean (of the acts), so long as they do not by any means ⁵preserve the life⁵ (of the slave). ⁶But if a slave kills (not his own master, but) some other free-man, in a passion,⁶ ⁷let the owners give up the slave⁷ to the relatives of

¹ I have translated as if ὥστε had dropt out.

^{2—2} Such is the literal version of the Greek; which Ast explains by saying, that "the other doings" refer to the acts requisite to be done for the purpose of a purification. But if such be the meaning, and I confess I have nothing better to offer, it is a pity that Plato did not take the trouble to express his ideas more clearly.

^{2—3} Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Taylor has thus translated, "And let the offending party consider the fine as legal."

⁴ From ἀνέλωσι Stephens acutely elicited ἀν ἰθίλωσι, suggested by "velint" in Ficinus. And so one MS. subsequently collated.

^{5—5} This is a very unusual meaning of the verb ζῶγειν, literally "to take alive."

^{6—6} The Greek is ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλος τις δοῦλος ἐλεύθερον ἀποκτείνῃ θυμῷ—But Ficinus has more fully, "sin vero servus non dominum suum sed alium liberum per iram necaverit," from whence Faehse was the first to correct ἄλλος into ἄλλον—

^{7—7} This mixture of numbers, οἱ δεσπόται τὸν δοῦλον, seems rather strange; as if one slave had many masters.

the deceased, and let them of necessity put him to death in whatever manner they please. If a father or a mother in a passion kills their son or daughter by blows, or any other violent manner—events that happen but rarely—let them be purified after the same manner as other homicides, and be exiled for three years; and on their return from exile, let the husband be divorced from the wife, and the wife from the husband, and let them never afterwards beget children together, nor be a fellow-dweller with those, whom they have deprived of a child or brother, nor have a share with them in sacred rites. But he, who has acted impiously in these matters, and does not obey the laws, let him be brought to trial for impiety by any one who is willing. If a husband kills his wife in a passion, or a wife does the same thing in a similar manner to her husband, they shall undergo the same purifications, and complete an exile for three years; and let not the party, who has so acted, on his return, have a share with their children in sacred rites, nor ever eat at the same table with them. And let the father or the child, who disobeys the law, be brought to trial for impiety by any one who is willing. If a brother kills either a brother or a sister, or a sister (kills) a brother or a sister in a passion, let the matters, relating to purifications and exiles, be stated as necessary to take place in the same manner, ¹as have been stated in the case of parents and children; ²and (on their return from exile), ³let not any one ⁴be a fellow-dweller or a sharer in sacred rites with those, whom a person ⁴has deprived, brothers of brothers, and fathers of children. And if any one disobeys the law, he would rightly with justice ⁵be amenable to the before-mentioned law,

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has “non aliter quam parentes, qui liberos interfecerunt.”

²—² So Taylor, from “post reditum,” in Ficinus; who probably found in his MS. *καὶ τοῦτοις—κατιούσι δὴ*, instead of *καὶ τοῦτοις—τούτοις δὲ*, where the same pronoun is repeated uselessly. On the meaning of *κατιέναι*, similar to *κατέρχεσθαι*, see Porson on Med. 1011.

³ Instead of *αὐτοῖς*, Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xii. p. 711, D., has *αὐτὸς*—which leads to *αὐτὸς τις*, as I have translated, and similarly in ⁽⁴⁾ *τις* is to be read for *τε* after *ἀδελφοῦς*—

⁵ That Plato wrote both *ὀρθῶς* and *μετὰ δίκης*, it is hard to believe; but which of the two he did write, it is equally hard to say. I suspect however that *ὀρθῶς* is an interpretation of *μετὰ δίκης*: for there would be a Platonic play on the words *ὁπῶδικος μετὰ δίκης*. Ficinus has merely “jure ut impius condemnabitur.”

relating to impiety on these points. But should any one in the case of his parents be so powerless over his passion, as in the madness of anger to dare to murder one of his parents, if the deceased shall, before he expired, have voluntarily absolved the perpetrator of the murder, let him be purified as they are, who commit murder involuntarily,¹ and performing the other things that they do, let him be considered as pure; but if (the deceased shall) not have absolved him, let the party who has done a deed of this kind be amenable to many laws. For he will be amenable to the extreme punishments for an assault, and, in like manner, for impiety and for the robbery of what is holy, because he has robbed his parent of his life; so that, if it were possible for the same man to die oftentimes,² it would be most just for a person, who had in a passion committed an act of parricide or matricide, to meet with many deaths. For in the case of him, whom no law will permit, even when defending himself and about to be made an end of by his parents, to destroy his father or mother, who have brought his nature to the light, and whom (the legislator) shall order³ to endure all things rather than do a deed of this kind, how would it be fitting for such a person to meet with punishment legally in any other way? Let death then be laid down as the punishment for him, who in a passion kills either his father or mother. But if a brother shall in his own defence, during a fight occurring in a sedition or in any other similar manner, kill a brother, while warding off the party, who first had recourse to his hands,⁴ let him be held clear in the same manner, as he who kills an enemy; and similarly, if a citizen (kills) a citizen, or a stranger a stranger; and if a citizen in defending himself kills a stranger, or a stranger a citizen, let him in the same way be held to be clear; and similarly if a slave (kills) a slave. But if a slave, in his own defence, kills a free-man, let him be amenable to the same laws as him, who kills his father. And what has been stated

¹ Cornarius was the first to perceive that the sense required not *ἐκούσιον*, but *ἀκούσιον*, as shown by p. 865, B., and 869, E.

² Compare Criton, § 6.

³ This future seems rather strange here. One would prefer *νομοθερεῖται*, similar to "præcipitur" in Ficinus.

⁴ On the phrase *ἀμύνεσθαι τὸν ἀρχοντα*, with or without *χειρῶν*, see Ast's learned note.

respecting the absolution from murder by a father, let the very same thing take place respecting every absolution in matters of this kind; that if any person of his own accord gives an absolution to any one for such an act, let the purifications take place for the perpetrator, as if the murder had been involuntary, and let one year be the term of absence from the country according to law. And thus let the matters relating to murders, done with violence and involuntarily and in a passion, be held to have been detailed in moderation. But as regards those relating to such as are voluntary and perpetrated with every kind of injustice, respecting these and what are done with malice prepense, through yielding to pleasure and desires and envy, it is to be spoken of subsequently.

Clin. You speak correctly.

[10.] *Athen.* ¹Let us then again speak to the utmost of our power in the first place upon these points, how many they are.¹ Now the greatest is desire, having a mastery over a soul rendered savage by regrets.² And this exists for the most part there, where³ there happens to be the greatest and most vehement wish for wealth on the part of the many, and⁴ a power that is producing an infinite love for the possession of property insatiable and boundless, by means of a natural disposition and a wretched want of education,⁵ of which the cause is that wealth is praised improperly by report amongst both the Greeks and Barbarians.⁵ For by placing as the first of good things that, which is the third,

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows in part, has "Primum igitur, quod voluntariæ cædis causæ sint, pro viribus declaremus."

² Taylor, misunderstanding the meaning of "libidinibus," Ficinus' version of πόθων, has translated "venereal incentives—"

³ Ast, by not perceiving that οὐ after ἐνταῦθα is an adverb, and not a pronoun, has missed entirely the meaning of the passage.

⁴ The Greek is in all the MSS. ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς—I have translated as if Plato had written τῶν χρημάτων, ἥ τε τῆς—

⁵—⁵ Here again by the slightest change I have, I hope, restored what Plato wrote. For where the Greek is now—τῆς δὲ ἀπαίδευσις ἡ τοῦ κακῶς ἐπαινεῖσθαι πλοῦτον φήμη—it was originally ἥς δὲ ἀπαίδευσις ἐστ' αἰτία τὸ κακῶς ἐπαινεῖσθαι πλοῦτον φήμη—where δὲ is due to the best MS., and τὸ to Stephens, who was led to it, I suspect, by the version of Cornarius, "imperitiæ vero causa est fama, qua et a Græcis et a Barbaris divitiæ male laudantur." Cousin translates ἀπαίδευσις by "préjugés," a meaning which that word does not and could not bear.

they do (by this opinion)¹ injure both those after them and themselves. ²For that the truth respecting wealth be told in all states is of all things the most beautiful and the best;³ (namely,) that it exists for the sake of the body, but the body for the sake of the soul. ³Of the good things then existing, for the sake of which wealth naturally exists, it would be the third after the virtue of the body and soul.³ This reasoning then will be to us⁴ a teacher, that it is not meet for him, who would be happy, to seek to be wealthy (by any means),⁵ but [to be wealthy]⁶ in a just and temperate manner. For⁷ thus murders, which require to be purified by murders,⁸ would not take place in cities. But now, as we stated at the beginning of the discussion, this is one and the greatest thing, which causes the greatest punishments of voluntary murder. The second is the habit of an ambitious soul, producing envy, a fellow-dweller the most disagreeable to him who possesses it,⁹ and secondly,¹⁰ to the best of those in the state. But the third is a cowardly and unjust fear, which has caused many murders, when acts are being done or have been done by a person, which he does not wish to be conscious to himself of their taking place, or of having taken place. They therefore take off by death the informers of such acts, if they cannot do it by any other means. About all these matters then let this be

¹ The words between the lunes are adopted by Taylor from "*hac sententia*," found in Ficinus alone.

²⁻³ Here again Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. something more complete than is furnished by the other MSS. For his version is—"Optime sane et pulcherrime viveremus, si vera de divitiis sententia ubique prædicaretur."

³⁻⁵ Ficinus, whom Taylor has translated in part, has—"quare cum bona adsint, quorum gratia possidendæ divitiæ sunt, tertium gradum post virtutem animi corporisque tenebunt."

⁴ Ficinus has "nos tanquam magistra docebit," as if his MS. read ἡμῖν between οὖν and ἀν—

⁵ Ficinus inserts, what is required to balance the sentence, "*quomodo-
docunque*"—unless it be said that he remembered the passage in Horace—"*rem facias; rem, si possis, recte, si non, quocunque modo rem.*"

⁶ This repetition of *πλουτεῖν* is omitted correctly by Ficinus.

⁷ Ficinus, "sic enim," which leads to *καὶ γὰρ* instead of *καὶ*—

⁸ On the doctrine that murder is to be cleansed by murder, see *Æsch.* Cho. 304.

⁹ The Greek is τῷ κεκτημένῳ τὸν φθόνον. But τὸν φθόνον could not thus be repeated after φθόνους—I have therefore omitted those words.

¹⁰ Instead of *δευτέροις* one MS. has *δευτέρους*, which leads to *δευτέρως*, similar to "*deinde*" in Ficinus.

held to be said as a prelude ; and in addition to this, the story, which many of those engaged seriously in the Mysteries have heard touching these subjects, and strongly believe, that of such persons there is in Hades a punishment ; and that it is necessary for them to come back hither to suffer punishment according to nature, namely, of suffering from another what a person had done himself, and with such a fate to finish his then life. For him therefore, who from this prelude is persuaded, and fears altogether such a punishment, there is no need to hymn a law on this point, but for him, who is not persuaded, let this law be expressed in writing.

[11.] Whosoever shall designedly and unjustly kill with his own hand any one soever of his tribes-men, let him, in the first place, be debarred from legal rights, nor let him pollute the temples, or the place of public meeting, or the ports, or any other general assembly, whether any person forbids the perpetrator or not. For the law forbids him ; and it is ever seen and will be seen forbidding him in behalf of the whole state. But the relative of the deceased as far as a cousin,¹ on the male or female side, who does not, when requisite, prosecute, or forbid him to be debarred (from those things),² shall first of all take upon himself the pollution, and the hatred of the gods, ³ as the imprecation by the law provokes the report ;³ and secondly, let him be amenable to any, who is willing to avenge the dead ; and let him, who is willing, avenge, after performing every thing respecting the observation of washings⁴ for such occasions, and of such other acts as the deity has enjoined as legal in cases of this kind ; and after

¹ Ast quotes opportunely Demosthenes in Macart. p. 1068, 28, R., and in Euerg. p. 1161, 8, R.

² Ficinus alone has "ab his—" From the passages of Antipho and Demosthenes, quoted by Ast, one might suppose that τῶν νομίμων had dropt out between προαγορεύων and εἰργεσθαι.

³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, as shown by his translation—"sicut vulgo legis imprecatio et maledictio dictat," while that of Ast—"ut legis imprecatio existimationem provocat," proves him to have been equally in the dark. I could have understood ὡς ἡ τοῦ νόμου φήμη τὴν Ἀρὰν προτρέπεται—"since the report of the law calls up a curse," as if Plato had in mind a dramatic saying—Ἀρὰν προτρέπεται τοῦ νόμου φήμη (πικρὰν)—

⁴ The Greek is λουτρῶν φυλακῆς περί— But Ficinus has "de luendi criminis observatione—" from which Faehse was led to λύτρων— Ast however explains λουτρῶν by "the washings," which the party, who prose-

making the proclamation let him go and compel the perpetrator to suffer the vengeance of justice according to law. But that these things ought to take place through certain prayers and sacrifices to certain deities, who have a care of such matters, so that murders may not take place in cities, it is easy for a legislator to show. But who are the deities, and what would be the manner of introducing such suits most correctly as regards the divine power, let the guardians of the laws, together with the (holy) interpreters, and the prophets, and the god, lay down by law, and introduce these suits. But let the judges of these matters be the same as those, to whom has been given the power of deciding upon sacrilege. Let him too, who is convicted, pay the penalty of death, and ¹ let him not be buried in the country of the murdered person,¹ on account of his shameless conduct, in addition to the act of impiety. But if he goes away, being unwilling to stand a trial, let him suffer a perpetual exile. ² And if any one of these sets his foot upon the land of the murdered party,² let whatever relation or even citizen, who first meets him, kill him with impunity, or, placing him in bonds, hand him over to the magistrates, who decide upon the suit, to put him to death. ³ But let him, who urges (the suit), require bail at the same time from him, against whom he is urging it; ³ and ⁴ let the latter produce three persons, whom the magistrate appointed for such matters shall decide to be in sufficient credit,⁴

cutted the murderer, is supposed to undergo, to avoid the pollution of blood. But as of such washings nothing is to be found elsewhere, Plato wrote, I suspect, something else, which it would be not difficult to discover by bearing in mind a celebrated scene in the Choephoroi of Æschylus.

¹—¹ Ast refers to Demosthenes in Aristocrat. p. 634, 26, R.

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has merely "et si unquam citra fines fuerit deprehensus." Winckelmann suggests *τις ἐπιβῆ τῶν τόπων τῆς—χώρας*, as in iv. p. 705, C., *ὁ τόπος—τῆς χώρας*, v. p. 747, E., *τόποι χώρας*, vi. p. 760, C., *τοὺς τῆς χώρας τόπους*.

³—³ Ast was the first to explain this passage, which Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed to the letter, thus translated incorrectly, "quod si quis hunc defensurus accesserit, pro eo fide jubeat, quem tutatur."

⁴—⁴ Ficinus has "tresque is fidejussores, quos judices ipsi sufficientes putaverint, afferat," from whence Ast was led to read, what I have adopted, *τρεῖς ἐγγυητὰς, οὓς ἀν ἡ—ἀρχὴ κρίνῃ ἀξιώχρως*, in lieu of *τοὺς ἐγγυητὰς ἀξιώχρως, οὓς ἀν ἡ—ἀρχὴ κρίνῃ τρεῖς ἐγγυητὰς ἀξιώχρως*—Cousin, however, so far from being dissatisfied with the repetition of *ἀξιώχρως*, conceives it to be perfectly after the manner of Plato.

who shall engage to produce (the accused) at the trial; but if the latter either will not or cannot get bail, let the magistrate take and put him in prison, and produce him at the trial of the suit. If a person shall not with his own hand (perpetrate),¹ but suggest to another, a murder, and by his willing and plotting cause the murder to take place,¹ and dwell in a city, having been the instigator of, and not pure in his soul from, the murder,² let there be to him in the same manner, with the exception of the bail, a trial and verdict on these matters;² and, if convicted, let it be lawful for him to have the family³ burial-place; but let other things take place in the same manner to him, as to the party previously mentioned; and let the same things take place in the case of strangers towards strangers, and citizens and strangers towards each other, and of slaves towards slaves, with respect to a murder done by a person's own hand and instigation, with the exception of the bail; but this let the murderers with their own hands be required to procure, as has been stated;⁴ and let the party who brings forward the suit, require bail of them likewise.⁴ But if a slave voluntarily murders a free-man, whether with his own hand or through a plotting, and there is a verdict against him, let the public executioner lead him to the tomb of the deceased, or⁵ to a place, where he may see the tomb, and after scourging him with as many stripes as the plaintiff shall order, put the murderer, if he survives the whipping, to death. But if any one kills a slave, who has done no wrong, through the fear of his disclosing deeds disgraceful and wicked, or for any similar reason,⁶ let him, as if he underwent the punishment of murder for having killed a citizen, undergo similarly

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has merely "sed voluntate consilio insidiisque hominem interfecerit."

²—² Ficinus has more briefly, what Taylor adopts, "condemnatus similiter puniatur, præterquam quod fidejussores non præbebit."

³ So I have translated *τῆς οἰκίας*—

⁴—⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, for perhaps he could not understand them; nor do I very clearly see why they are introduced here.

⁵ Ficinus alone has "vel," from which Ast elicited *ἢ* before *ὄθεν*—Cousin however translates *πρὸς τὸ μνημα* "du côté du monument du mort," and explains it by "dans un lieu d'ou le coupable puisse apercevoir la tombe du mort."

⁶—⁶ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has merely "quasi civem necaverit, sic puniatur."

and with the same forms a punishment on account of the slave, who had thus perished.⁶

[12.] But if cases occur, for which it is a thing of dread and by no means agreeable to legislate, and impossible on the other hand¹ not to legislate, (relating to) the murder of relations by a person's own hand or plotting, and done willingly and wickedly in every way—which take place for the most part in states² badly administered and nurtured,³ and which will somehow take place in a country where no one would expect it—it is requisite to mention again, what has been stated a little before, should perchance some one, on hearing us, be enabled more willingly on this account to abstain from murders the most unholy in every way. For a fable, or a story, or whatever else it is meet to call it, has been clearly told by priests of old, that⁴ Justice, the avenger and inspector of kindred blood, makes use of the law, which we have just now mentioned; and has ordained that he, who has done any such act, shall necessarily suffer what he has done;⁵ (so that)⁴ if any one has ever murdered his father, he has at some time suffered⁵ the very same fate by the daring and violence of his own children;⁵ and if he has (murdered) his mother, he has in after times become necessarily⁶ a partaker in a feminine na-

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *δ' αὖ ἀδύνατον*, not *δὲ ἀδύνατον*—

^{2—3} Ficinus has merely “male gubernatis—” For his MS. read perhaps *οἰκουμέναις* in lieu of *οἰκούσας*, which is scarcely correct.

^{3—3} In the prose of Plato evidently lies hid a dramatic tetrastich—*Τῶν ξυγγενῶν ἄρ' αἱμάτων ἐπίσκοπος Δίκη νόμῳ τιμωρὸς οὐδ' ἱχρῆτ' αἰεὶ τοιῷδ'.* ‘*Ἀρὰ δ' ἔταξε τῷ δράσαντί τι ταῦτ' αὐτ' ἀνάγκαις, ἅπερ ἔδρασ' ἄλλον, παθεῖν*—where I have substituted ‘*Ἀρὰ δ' ἄρα*, for the verses were probably spoken by Œdipus, while cursing his sons for their unkind conduct to their father: and I have inserted *ἄλλον*, for *δρᾶν* frequently has two accusatives, one of the person and another of the thing. With regard to the sentiment Ast refers to Choeph. 409. He might have added Cho. 311, ‘*Δράσαντα παθεῖν*’ *Τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ*: and Agam. 1541, *μῖμνει δ' ἀμύνοντος ἐν χρόνῳ Διὸς παθὼν τὸν ἐρξαντα*—for so we must read in lieu of *Μῖμνει δὲ, μῖμνοντος—παθεῖν τὸν ἐρξαντα*. For the sense is, “the sufferer waits for the doer, when in time Zeus is the avenger.”

⁴ Ficinus, by his “ut,” shows that his MS. had *ὥστε* between *ἔδρασιν* and *εἰ*—

^{5—5} I have translated as if the Greek were *αὐτὸ ταὐτὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τέκνων τὸλμης καὶ βίᾳ*, not *αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὑπὸ τέκνων τολμῆσαι βίᾳ*, where *αὐτὸ ταὐτὸ* is due to Ast, τῶν to one MS., and *τόλμης* to Stephens.

^{6—6} By partaking in a feminine nature is meant, I presume, the be-

ture,⁶ and having become so, has departed from life at the hands of his offspring. For of a common blood defiled there is no other cleansing, nor is the pollution wont to be washed out, before the life, that has done (wrong), shall pay like blood for like blood, and appease and put to sleep the anger of all the kindred. It is requisite then for a person to be restrained on these points, through the fear of such punishments from the gods. But if so wretched a calamity should lay hold of any one, as that he should dare designedly and willingly to separate the soul of his father or mother, or brethren or children, from the body, the law of the mortal lawgiver legislates respecting matters of this kind in this way, that there is to be a proclamation¹ respecting a debarring from all rights,¹ and the same bail, as mentioned above; and if any one is convicted of a murder of this kind,² [for having killed any one of those,]² let the ministers of the judges and the magistrates put him to death, and cast him out of the city naked to an appointed place, where three roads meet; and let all the magistrates, in behalf of the whole state,³ carry each a stone and hurl it at the head of the dead body,³ and thus make an expiation for the whole state; and afterwards carry the corpse to the boundaries of the country, and cast it out there unburied, according to law. But what ought he to suffer, who murders his nearest and so-called dearest friend? I mean, he who kills himself, and by violence deprives himself of his share of fate, being compelled neither by a verdict of the city ordering it, nor by a very painful (and)⁴ unavoidable misfortune falling upon him, nor by sharing in a thing of shame, without a resource, and not to be lived through, and who by his indolence and⁵ the cowardice

coming, like a woman, full of fears, according to the sentiment in Shakespeare, that "conscience doth make cowards of us all."

¹—¹ I have adopted with Ast the emendation suggested by Matthiæ in *Miscell. Philolog.* i. 2; p. 161, *περὶ τοῦ τῶν νομίμων*, in lieu of *περὶ τῶν*—

²—² The words within brackets, evidently an interpolation, are properly omitted by Ficinus, whom Taylor has tacitly followed.

³—³ On such kinds of stoning see Valckenaer in *Adnotat. Crit.* in N. T. ii. p. 287, ed. Lips., quoted by Ast, and Scaliger on Propertius iv. 5, 75. Jacobs on *Epigr. Inc.* 234. The practice has been still preserved in the East, as we learn from Laurent's "Recollections," p. 209, and Henricker's "Notes," p. 277.

⁴—⁴ Stephens was the first to insert *καὶ*, suggested by "et." in Ficinus, whom Ast has followed.

⁵—⁵ Baiter suggests *ἀνανδρία καὶ δειλία*, in lieu of *ἀνανδρίας*
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of unmanliness⁵ imposes upon himself an unjust punishment. To such a person a god knows what ought to take place on other points, and relating to purification and burial; about which it is necessary for the nearest relatives to inquire of the (holy) interpreters, and at the same time the laws relating to them, and to do according to the orders given by them; but let the tombs of those, who have perished thus, be in the first place by themselves, and with no one buried in them; next, let them be in the twelve boundaries of the divisions, which are uncultivated and without a name; and bury them¹ without honour, nor mark their tombs with any pillars or names. But if a beast of burden or any other animal shall kill any person, except such as may do so in some public contest, let the relations prosecute the causer of the death: and let the Land-Stewards, upon whom and how many the relative shall impose the task, decide upon the matter; and let them destroy the condemned animal, and cast it² beyond the borders. If any lifeless thing deprives a man of life, except lightning, or any other such-like bolt sent from a god, but of all the rest that kill a person, by either the person falling upon it, or it falling upon the person, let the nearest of kin appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge for him, and let him make an expiation both for himself and the whole of his kindred; but drive the thing condemned beyond the borders of the country, as has been stated in the case of the living kind. If any one is found dead, and the murderer is not known, and is not to be discovered by parties searching not carelessly, let there be proclamations, as in other cases; and let the heir-at-law³ make a proclamation against the perpetrator of the murder, and state in the Market-place that the person, who has murdered so

δειλίᾳ— I should prefer ἀνανδρίας δουλείᾳ, “the slavery to unmanliness.”

¹ Matthiæ in Gr. Gr. has suggested αὐτως for αὐτοῦς, in allusion to ἀκλείς αὐτως in Il. vii. 100.

² The word διορίσαι is strangely introduced here. One would have expected something like διαμερίσαι, “to cut up into pieces.” Unless it be said that διορίσαι is the same as ἐξορίζειν, a little below. Ficinus omits the word entirely. His version is, “extra regionis fines interficiant.”

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were τὸν ἐπιδικασάμενον καὶ—not καὶ ἐπιδικασάμενον: where καὶ is omitted by two MSS. Ficinus, apparently not understanding ἐπιδικασάμενον, has omitted it.

and so, is not, as being guilty of murder, to set his foot upon any sacred place, or in the whole of the country¹ of the party suffering,¹ as he shall die, should he be found and known, and shall be cast out unburied, beyond² the country of the sufferer.² Let this one law then be laid down by us as decisive on the subject of murder. And thus (be it said) up to this point about matters of this kind.

But for killing whom,³ and on what conditions, a person would be properly pure, let this be laid down. If any one catches a thief, entering his house by night, for the purpose of stealing his property, and kills him, let him be pure. In like manner, let him be pure, who kills a cloak-stripper⁴ in his own defence. And if any one commits a rape upon a free-born woman or a boy, let him be put to death with impunity, either by the party treated with insult and violence, or by the father, or brothers, or sons of the party. And if a man comes upon his wedded wife, while being ravished, and kills the party using violence, let him be pure by the law. And if any one, while assisting his father, when doing nothing⁵ unlawful and unholy,⁵ or his mother, or children, or brothers, or joint-parent of his children, shall kill a person, let him be in every respect pure.

[13.] Let these then be the laws laid down relating to the nurture and education of a living soul, with which if it meets it may live; but not meeting, the reverse; and relating also to violent deaths, what punishments there ought to be for them. Mention too has been made of the nurture and education of bodies; and what is close upon those subjects, namely, actions done with violence by persons to each other, both voluntary and involuntary, we must define according to our power, what they are, and how many, and meeting with what punishment

¹ Ficinus omits τῆς τοῦ πεπονθότος— Taylor, with a total defiance of the original, translates, "where the deed was committed."

² Ficinus has what seems preferable, "extra regionis fines."

³ I have with Ast adopted ὅν, found in one MS., in lieu of ὧν— Ficinus has "nunc dicamus, in quibus recte mundus sit," as if his MS. read νῦν δὲ—ἐφ' οἷς, not ὧν δὲ—ἐφ' οἷς τε—

⁴ Literally, "one who robs another of his clothes at the public baths."

⁵ The Greek is βοηθῶν θάνατον μὴδὲν ἀνόσιον, where since θάνατον is without regimen, I have translated as if Plato had written ἀθίμυτον μὴδὲν καὶ ἀνόσιον. Ficinus has "haud quaquam per scelus cædem patranti," which Ast truly observes is at variance with the train of thought.

¹ they would each of them possess what is suited to them.¹ For² these, it appears, would be properly laid down as laws after those. Now the person of the least mark amongst those, who have turned themselves to law, would rank wounds, and mutilations from wounds, as secondary to murders. Wounds then are to be divided in the same manner as murders have been divided. For some are involuntary, others done in a passion, some through fear; but such as take place from design are called³ voluntary. Now about all such something of this kind must be premised; that it is necessary to lay down laws for mankind, and for them to live according to law, or for them to differ not at all from animals the most savage in every respect. And the cause of this is, that the disposition of not a single man is naturally sufficient to know what is conducive to a polity amongst men; and, when it does know, to be always able to do and wish what is the best. For first it is difficult to know that not private but public interests must necessarily be the object of the true science of politics—for a common interest binds states, but a private one tears them asunder—and that it conduces to both public and private interests, when the public are well established rather than when the private are so. Secondly, that, although a person should obtain sufficiently from art the knowledge that such things are so naturally, yet should he after this possess power in the state, without being brought to book,⁴ and hold it in his own hands entirely, he would never be able to remain in this opinion, and continue to live, while nourishing the public interest in a state as the leading one, and the private as following the public; but his mortal nature will ever urge him on to the wish to possess more, and to his own individual well-doing. (For) through irrationally avoiding pain, and pursuing pleasure, it will set both of these before what is more just and excellent; and, by producing a darkness in itself, it will at length fill both itself and the whole state with every ill. Since should any man, born with a divine destiny, be

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “commode reprimendæ—”

² Ficinus alone has “Recte enim,” required by the connexion of ideas.

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were not *γινόμενα*, but *λεγόμενα*—

⁴ This is the exact rendering of *ἀνυπεύθυνος*; in which there is an allusion to the custom prevalent at Athens of all magistrates having their accounts audited before they laid down their office.

¹ naturally competent to comprehend¹ this,² he would require no laws for the government of himself. For there is no law or order superior to science; nor is it lawful for intellect to be the minister, and the slave of any thing, but the ruler of all, if it is thus³ true and really free by nature. But now (it is not so);⁴ for it does not exist any where and in any manner, except to a small extent. On this account then we must choose the second in rank, namely, order and law; ⁵ which the one for the most part sees and beholds, but the other is entirely unable.⁵ Thus much then has been stated for the sake of these matters; and let us now ordain what he ought to suffer (in person), or pay (in purse), who wounds or otherwise⁶ injures another. ⁷ For it is easy for every one upon every point to take up correctly of a party having wounded what thing, or what person, or in what manner, or whether are you speaking;⁷ for there are numberless things of this kind and very different from each other. It is therefore impossible to commit to courts of justice, to decide upon all these matters, or not one. For it is necessary to commit in the case of all to decide upon this one point, whether each of these acts have taken place

¹—¹ The Greek is φύσει ικανός—παρалаβεῖν δυνατός— But δυνατός is evidently an interpretation of ικανός—which was probably wanting in the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is—"ea natura præditus esset, ut cognosceret."

² Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has—"publicum bonum."

³ So Taylor, from "ita," in Ficinus. The MSS. read ὄντως, which is superfluous after ἀληθινός— One MS. has neither ὄντως nor ὄντως. Plato probably wrote, ἴανπερ ἀληθινῶς ἐλεύθερός γε ἦ—for γε thus perpetually follows ἴανπερ.

⁴ After νῦν δὲ Ast says there is an aposiopesis, as in the Banquet, § 8. But there, as here, I suspect that οὐ has dropt out before οὐ—

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; for his version is "a quibus plurima quidem perspicuntur, omnia vero videri nequeunt."

⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were ἱέρως, not ἱερον. Ast would read ἱερον ἄλλο, of which Stalbaum approves.

⁷—⁷ Such is the literal version of the Greek, where in lieu of πότερα, since one MS. gives us a var. lect. πότε, Orelli suggested πότ' ἄρα— But ἄρα is not thus found at the end of a series of questions. Ficinus has—"cuique enim facile est singula hujusmodi recte comprehendere, utrum videlicet quis vulneraverit an non, quem, qua in parte, quo pacto"—which is intelligible indeed, but not to be got out from the Greek. Cousin however is perfectly satisfied with πότερα, which he seems to identify with τὸ πότερον, and which last he refers to the question touching the reality of the fact, or falsehood of the accusation.

or not ; but on the other hand not at all to commit to them, (to decide) upon this point, what the party, who has done any of these injuries, ought to be fined (in purse), and suffer (in person) ; and yet (for the law-giver¹) himself to lay down laws upon all questions, small and great, is nearly impossible.

Clin. What then is the inference consequent upon this ?

Athen. It is this ; that some matters should be committed to courts of justice, and others not, but be ²left to (the legislator) himself.

Clin. What then are the matters, which are to be laid down by law, and what those to be committed to courts of justice ?

[14.] *Athen.* After the preceding, it would be the most correct to say this ; that, in a state, where the courts of justice are depraved and dumb, and concealing³ their opinions pass sentence in private ; and, what is still more dreadful than this, when, not in silence, but full of noise, as in a theatre, they praise and blame with an uproar each of the orators in turn ; then is a grievous calamity wont indeed to occur to the whole state. It is not then a fortunate circumstance for a person to be laid hold of by some necessity to legislate for courts of justice of this kind ; nevertheless, when he is laid hold of by a necessity, ⁴he must commit to them to order fines only relating to matters of the slightest kind, but he must himself distinctly lay down those relating to the most numerous,⁴ ⁵if he would ever legislate correctly⁶ for such a kind of polity.⁵ But in a state, where courts of justice are established as correctly as possible, and those, who are about to judge, are brought up well and undergo a scrutiny with all accuracy, there it is right and it will be well to commit to such judges to decide upon most points relating to those who are found guilty, as to what they

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *αὐτὸν τὸν νομοθέτην*, not *αὐτὸν* simply, and so too just afterwards (²), *αὐτῷ γὰρ νομοθέτῃ ἐατέον*, not *αὐτῷ νομοθετητέον*.

³ The Greek is *κλείποντα*. But Ficinus found in his MS. *καλύπτοντα*, as shown by his version—"occultæ manent."

⁴—⁴ Such is evidently what the train of thought requires. Hence we must read *αὐτὸν περὶ τὰ μικρότατα*, not *ὅτι περὶ μικρότατα*, as shown by the antithesis in *τὰ πλείστα*.

⁵—⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁶ In lieu of *ποτε*, the sense evidently leads to *πᾶρ' εὖ*, as I have translated.

are to suffer (in person), or to pay (in purse). Against us then there will be no cause of complaint for our not laying down laws relating to matters the greatest and most numerous, into which judges, who have been educated in the meanest manner, would be able to look, and to adapt to each offence a punishment suited to the suffering and act. But since we are of opinion, that those, for whom we are laying down laws, will be not the least clever of judges in such matters, we must commit to their decision the greatest number of cases. However, as we have often said and done during the previous laying down of the laws, that by giving an outline and types of punishments, we have presented to judges patterns for their never going beyond the line of justice; and, as this was then correctly done, so must we now do likewise the very same thing, while returning again to the laws. Let then the outline¹ (of the laws) relating to wounds be thus laid down. If any one, having both the intention and wish to kill a friend, except it be those whom the law ordains, shall wound, but is unable to kill him, towards the party with such intentions, so inflicting a wound, it is not meet to feel a pity nor to pay a regard to him, otherwise than by compelling him to undergo the punishment of murder, as if he had actually killed his friend;² and, by doing reverence to his Fortune, not bad in every respect, and his Dæmon likewise, who, pitying both him and the wounded party, became to both an averter of evil—to one, in the wound not being incurable,³ and to the other, in the accident and calamity being exposed to a curse³—it is meet⁴ to give thanks to this Dæmon; and, by not opposing him, to take away the punishment of death from the party inflicting the wound, but for a removal to take place to him during life to a neighbouring state, enjoying there

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were not *γραφῇ* but *περιγραφῇ*, to answer to the preceding *περιγραφῇν*—

² Such was the law at Athens, as we learn from Lysias, p. 159, R. quoted by Ast.

³ How the Dæmon could be called an averter of evil, by the accident of a person being exposed to a curse, I cannot understand. Did Plato write *ἐπάραιον μόνον κατ' ἀτυχῇ ξυμφορὰν*—"to be exposed only to a curse touching the event which failed"—instead of *ἐπάραιον τύχην καὶ ξυμφορὰν*. Ficinus endeavoured to evade the difficulty by translating—"fecitque, ne vulnus huic letiferum, illi fortuna calamitasque execranda infligeretur."

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *τούτῳ δεῖ*, not *τούτῳ δὴ*—

his property ; but if he has inflicted any loss upon the wounded person, let him pay for the loss ; and let the court of justice, that tried the cause, fix the sum ; ¹ and let those, who would have decided about the murder, had the party died from the blow of the wound, ² be the judges.¹

If a child designedly wounds his parent, or a slave his master, the punishment shall be death. And if a brother wounds in like manner a brother or sister, or a sister a sister or brother, ³ and there is a verdict of wounding by design, ³ let the punishment be death. But if a woman wounds her husband with the design of killing him, or (in like manner⁴) a husband his wife, let (each) undergo a perpetual exile ; and, if their sons or daughters are at that time but children, let guardians manage their property, and take care of the children, as being orphans ; but if they are adults, let it not be a compulsory act for the exiled parent to be supported by their offspring, but let there be a permission to take possession of the estate. But whosoever happens to be childless, when falling into calamities of this kind, let his kindred, as far as cousins, both on the male and female side, come together, and appoint for this family, being one of the five thousand and forty in the state, an heir, after consulting with the guardians of the laws (and) considering the matter ⁵ in this manner and reasoning, ⁵ that no house out of the five thousand and forty is the property of its inhabitant, or of all his kindred, but of the state, considered in a public and private view, and that it is requisite for the state to possess its own houses, as holy and as happy as is possible. When therefore any house has become at the same time unhappy and unholy, so that its possessor has left no children in it, and ⁶ being in youth and married

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the intelligible Greek, which Taylor has thus mistranslated,—“ But those judges that decide in cases of murder, shall decide in this case,” although he might have found a more correct version in Ficinus, “judices autem sint, qui cædis essent, si vulneratus obiisset.”

² To avoid the tautology in *πληγῆς* and *τραύματος*, we might read *τοῦ τρώσαντος*—

³—³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁴ Ficinus alone has “similiter,” adopted by Taylor.

⁵—⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁶—⁶ Here again Taylor has tacitly omitted the words between the numerals, because they were wanting in Ficinus.

has died childless,⁶ through his having been convicted of voluntary murder, or some other crime against the gods or his fellow-citizens—¹ the punishment for which has been distinctly laid down by the law to be death—or if a person is in perpetual exile, being without male² children,¹ let it be necessary in the first place to purify this house and make use of expiatory sacrifices according to law; and next, let the kindred coming together, as we have said just now, examine together with the guardians of the laws, what family there is in the state in the greatest repute for virtue, and fortunate at the same time, and in which the children are rather numerous; from which let them put one upon the father of the deceased and his progenitors, as their adopted son,³ and let them call him, for the sake of⁴ a good omen,⁴ by the name (of the father,)³ and pray that he⁵ may become for them a parent⁵ and hearth-preserver and minister of rites holy and sacred, with better fortune than his predecessor;⁶ (and)⁷ after praying in this manner, let them appoint him the heir according to law, and suffer the sinner to lie nameless, and childless, and shareless, whenever such a calamity shall have seized upon him.

[15.]⁸ There is not, as it seems, in all existing things a boundary close in contact with a boundary; but in things to which there is a boundary, that in the middle being previously thrown

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has merely—“cujus mors vel sempiternum exilium pœna est”—while Taylor’s translation is, “the punishment of which according to law is evidently death, or perpetual exile.”

² In lieu of τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄπαις, we must read, as I have translated, τῶν ἀρρένων ἄπαις, as shown by the passages quoted by Ast.

³—³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. With regard to the addition “of the father,” I have been led to it by finding in Ast’s note “a patre mortui denominantes.”

⁴—⁴ The Greek is at present φήμης— I have translated as if it were formerly εὐφημίας—similar to “boni ominis causa” in the note of Ast.

⁵—⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were γεννήτορά τ’ ἂν αὐτοῖς—γίγνεσθαι—similar to “fore” in Ficinus, in lieu of γεννήτορά τε αὐτοῖς—γίγνεσθαι: which I cannot understand.

⁶ Taylor, by translating “his predecessor,” has led me to suggest τοῦ πάρος instead of τοῦ πατρός, which is here unintelligible.

⁷ I have translated as if τε had dropt out between ρούρω and τῷ—

⁸—⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I must leave for others to explain. Ficinus has—“Non est autem in omnibus rebus

to either of the boundaries, would become between both.⁸ Moreover, we have said that what takes place in a passion is something between what are voluntary and involuntary. If then a person is found guilty of wounds ¹existing, taken place ¹in a passion, in the first place let him pay double the amount of the damage, if the wound is curable; but fourfold in the case of those incurable. But if it be curable indeed, and yet brings upon the wounded party a feeling of considerable shame and disgrace,² let the party pay fourfold.³ But when ⁴a person in wounding another, injures not only the sufferer, but the state likewise, by rendering him unable to assist his country against its enemies, he must,⁵ in addition to other fines, pay for the damage done to the state. ⁶For besides his own period of service abroad, let him go through that of the disabled party, and execute the orders relating to war (at home) in the place of the other; ⁶or not doing so, let him be brought to trial by any one whatever, according to law, for neglect of military duty. And let the judges, who have given their votes against him, fix the equivalent for the damage, whether it is to be twofold, or threefold, or fourfold. If one relative by blood wounds another in the same manner, let the parents⁷

terminus termino conjunctus. Nam ubi confinium aliquod commune est, ibi hoc inter rerum terminos utrisque conventum medium fit—"where πρότερον is omitted, in which one part of the difficulty lies.

¹—¹ I cannot believe that Plato wrote τραυμάτων ἐνεστώτων ὀργῇ γενομένων—I suspect he wrote ἀνωϊστως ἐν ὀργῇ—"not knowingly, in a passion."

² Ficinus omits καὶ ἐπονείδιστον.

³ Sydenham was the first to suggest τριπλασίαν for τετραπλασίαν, and so too Orelli, comparing shortly afterwards εἴτε διπλῆν, εἴτε τριπλῆν, εἴτε καὶ τετραπλασίαν.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were, what is suggested by Stalbaum, ὅταν, not ὅσα, which is without regimen; unless it be said that τραύματα is understood, and that τρώσας governs two accusatives.

⁵ Although τοῦτον δὲ might perhaps be defended, yet I have no doubt that Plato wrote τοῦτον δέ, as I have translated. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "similiter puniatur, ac præterea damnum civitati restituat."

⁶—⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek; which Taylor has thus abridged: "Besides too his own military duties, he shall perform those of the wounded person."

⁷ So Bekker and Stalb. with six MSS. But this is at variance with the subsequent mention of giving up the party to the parents. Hence Ast

and kindred, as far as the cousins on the male and female side, come together, and decide to deliver the offender to his parents to fix the fine according to nature. But if the fixing of the fine be a matter of doubt, let the kindred on the male side fix the fine definitely. And if they are unable (to decide), let them at length commit it to the guardians of the laws. And of such kind of wounds as are inflicted by children on their parents the judges must be of necessity above sixty years old, and whose children are not adopted but truly their own. And if a person is found guilty, let them fix the punishment, whether such a person must die or suffer something else greater, or not much less; but let none of the relatives of the doer act as judge, not even if he be of the age which the law has ordained. But if a slave wounds any free-man in anger, let his owner give up the slave to the wounded person, to use him as he pleases; but if (the owner) does not give him up, he himself shall remedy the wrong. And if any one brings an accusation touching what has happened, as being a plan arising from an arrangement between the slave and the wounded party, let him contest the matter; and if he does not get a verdict, let him pay the damage threefold; but if he does, let him hold the party planning as amenable together with the slave under the statute of slavery. But let him, who involuntarily wounds another, pay a simple fine; for no legislator is competent to be the ruler over accident; and let the judges be those, who were mentioned in the case of children (wounding) their parents, and let them fix a fine for the damage.

[16.] All the aforesaid sufferings come under the class of violent; and violent too is every kind of assault and disfigurement. It is necessary therefore for every man and every woman in matters of this kind alway to bear in mind that, what is older is honoured in no small degree beyond what is younger, both amongst gods and such persons as are about to be in a state of safety and happiness. To see therefore an assault made upon an elderly person by a younger is in a state a thing shameful and hateful to the deity; and it seems reasonable for every young man, when struck by an old one, to refrain with a light heart

correctly prefers *γνήρας*, answering to "contribules" in Ficinus, and refers to Pollux viii. 111, and Taylor on Demosthenes, in Reisk. Appar. Crit. p. 1023.

his anger, ¹and to lay up for himself such a kind of honour for his old age.¹ Thus then let it be. Let every one reverence both in deed and word a person older than himself; and let him, deeming a person, who is his superior by twenty years of age, whether male or female, as a father or mother, act reverently towards them, and let him keep his hands from every period of life, that would be able to beget or bring forth himself, for the sake of the gods who preside over births. In like manner let him keep his hands^{2 3} from a stranger, whether a resident of old, or a new comer. For neither as the aggressor nor in self-defence let him dare to punish by blows such a person.⁴ But should he conceive that a stranger ought, through acting wantonly and rudely, to be punished, let him lay hold of the party and bring him before the office of the City-Stewards; but let him abstain from beating him,⁵ in order that he may be far from daring to strike a fellow-citizen.⁵ And let the City-Stewards, reverencing ever⁶ the god of hospitality, receive (the stranger) and sift the matter; and let them, should the stranger appear to have struck unjustly the inhabitant of the country, cause the stranger to cease from his foreign and bold behaviour, by inflicting as many blows as he may himself have struck. But if he has acted not unjustly, let them after threatening and reproaching the party, who

¹—¹ Such seems to be the meaning of the Greek, *αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τιμὴν ταύτην εἰς γῆρας*, or, what correct language would require, *τιμὴν τοιαύτην*, as I have translated. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has “id ob senectutis reverentiam patienter ferre.” Cousin translates, “se préparant a lui-même la même déférence dans vieillesse.”

² Ficinus has here, “abstineat, inquam, non solum cive, sed seniore etiam.”

³—³ Here again the version of Ficinus differs from the Greek in consequence of some words having been misplaced in his MS. and others omitted, and others added that are wanting in all the other MSS.

⁴ In lieu of *νομοθεεῖν* in Ald. Stephens happily conjectured *νοουθεεῖν*, found, it would seem, in all the MSS. but one.

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has, what is more intelligible, “ut eo magis a cædendis civibus suis abstineat, quando etiam a peregrinis se continet.”

⁶ The Greek is *τὸν ξενικὸν αὖ θεόν*, where *αὖ*, which has no meaning, is either a corruption of *ἀεὶ*, or, what is more probable, of *ἡγουν*, and thus showing that *θεόν* is an interpretation of *τὸν ξενικόν*, or, as it should be read, *τὸν ξένιον*. On a similar use of the article and adjective without *θεός* see Suidas in *Φίλιος Ζεός*.

had brought him, dismiss them both. If one person strikes another of the same age with himself, or ¹ who is a little older, but without children, or if an old man strikes an old man, or one youth another, let a person defend himself according to nature, ²[without a weapon,]³ with naked hands. But if any one more than forty years old dares to fight with another, either as the aggressor, or in self-defence, let him be called rude, and ill-mannered, and slave-like, and meeting with this disgraceful punishment, he will have what is becoming to him. And if any one is obedient to these admonitions, he will be led easily by the rein; but let him, who is disobedient, and heeds not a prelude,⁴ receive with readiness the following law. If any one strikes another, who is older than himself by twenty years or more, in the first place, let him, who happens to be present, if he is neither of an equal age, nor younger than the combatants, prevent them; or ⁴(if he does not prevent them,) ⁴let him be considered a bad man according to law. But if he is of the same age with, or younger than, the person struck, let him defend the injured party, as if he were his brother or father, or a person still more remote;⁵ and further still, let him, who has dared to strike his senior, undergo the punishment for an assault and disfigurement, as stated; and if he is found guilty, let him be put into prison for not less than a year; ⁶and if the judges fix the fine for a longer period,⁶ let the time so fixed be considered as positive. If a stranger or a settler strikes his senior by twenty years or more, let the same law have the same power, with respect to the assistance of those who are present. And let him, who is defeated in a suit of this kind, if he is a stranger, and not a settler,⁷ ⁸undergo this very punishment, by being in bonds

¹ Ast correctly adopts η before $\kappa\alpha\iota$, from "vel," in Ficinus.

²—² Ficinus justly omits $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon \beta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, which is evidently an interpretation.

³ Stephens was the first to see that the preceding $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\mu\upsilon\theta\iota\omicron\varsigma$ seems to lead to $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\mu\upsilon\theta\iota\omicron\nu$ here in lieu of $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\iota\mu\iota\omicron\nu$.

⁴—⁴ Ficinus alone has, what is adopted by Taylor, "si non prohibuit—"

⁵ The word $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ was applied to a relation older than a father. See my note on Soph. Philoct. 180, and compare § 14, $\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu\omega \tau\omicron\upsilon \gamma\epsilon\iota\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$.

⁶—⁶ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows tacitly, has "immo etiam majore, si modo iudicibus id videbitur."

⁷ In this passage $\xi\nu\nu\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ seems to be put for $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$, a meaning which that word does not bear, as far as I have observed, elsewhere.

⁸—⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek, $\delta\upsilon\omicron \xi\tau\eta \delta\epsilon\delta\epsilon\mu\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\nu\epsilon\tau\omega$

for two years.⁸ But if he is a settler, and disobedient to the laws, let him be in bonds for three years, unless the court of justice shall fix upon him a punishment for a longer period. And let whoever happens to be present on any of these occasions, and does not give assistance according to law, be fined, the person of the largest estate, a mina, of the second class, fifty drachms, of the third, thirty, and of the fourth, twenty; and let the court of justice for such matters consist of the Generals and Taxiarchs, and ¹Phylarchs and Hipparchs.¹

[17.] With respect to the laws, some, as it seems, are in behalf of worthy men, for the sake of their instruction, as to what manner they may associate with each other on friendly terms; others for the sake of those, who fly from instruction through their being of an unmanageable nature ²and not to be softened,³ so that they proceed to every kind of vice. These are the persons, who would have caused³ the discourses to be spoken, that are about to be; for whom in truth the legislator would of necessity lay down his laws, while wishing that there may never be a need of using them. Whoever then dares to touch his father ⁴or mother or their progenitors still,⁴ ⁵and to violently maltreat them,⁵ neither fearing the anger of the gods above nor the so-called vengeance of those below the earth, but, as one who, thinking he knows what he does not know at all, despises the men of old, and what has been asserted by all, and acts contrary to the law, for such a person there is

ταύτην αὐτὴν τὴν δίκην: where I cannot see the force of *αὐτὴν*, nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version, adopted by Taylor, is merely “biennium vinciat.” Ast says however that *ταύτην αὐτὴν* is put for *αὐτὴν ταύτην*, from which nothing, as far as I can see, is gained.

^{1—1} As the Taxiarch, answering to the English Colonel, was under the General, and is therefore placed after him, so ought the Phylarch to come after the Hipparch, as being an inferior officer, according to Aristotle, quoted by Harpocration in *Φύλαρχος*; unless it be said that there is here a Chiasmus, a figure of speech frequently found in Plato.

^{2—2} The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, who might have remarked the similar passage in § i. p. 853, D.

³ I confess I hardly understand *πεποιηκότες ἂν εἶεν*. One would have expected the indicative *πεποιήκασι*. Ficinus has “hi sequentium verborum causa sunt.”

^{4—4} The Greek is *ἡ μητρὶς ἡ τούτων ἐτι προγόνων*, where Ficinus omits *ἡ μητρὶς*, and Taylor *ἐτι*. But as *ἐτι* could not be united to *προγόνων*, Plato probably wrote *ἐτι προγενεστέρων*—

^{5—5} The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

a need of some extreme turning aside. Now death is not the extreme; but the pains inflicted¹ on such persons in Hades are still more amongst the extreme than this;² and though they tell³ the greatest truths, they effect nothing in the way of turning aside in the case of such souls as these. For otherwise there would not have been persons to strike their mothers,⁴ nor the unholy daring of blows inflicted upon other parents.⁵ It is requisite then, that the punishments here for crimes of this kind, should be as much as possible in no respect inferior to those in Hades. Let then what follows be stated in this way. Whoever shall dare to strike his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, unless he is seized with madness, let, in the first place, any one, who is present, as mentioned before, give assistance; but if it be a settler or stranger,⁶ who assists, let him be called to the principal seat at the (public) games; but, not assisting, let him suffer a perpetual exile from the country. But let him,⁷ who is not a settler,⁷ if he assists, receive praise; but if he does not assist, blame. And if a slave assists, let him be made free; but if

¹ I have here adopted Taylor's idea, who probably wished to read *γενόμενοι* for *λεγόμενοι*, which could hardly be united to *τούτοις*.

² As the last thing mentioned was death, it is evident that Plato wrote not *τούτων*, but *τούτων*, as I have translated.

³ Here *λέγοντες* is to be united to *πόντοι* by a *prosopopœia*, of which I could produce full thirty examples, if requisite; of which the most apposite is *Æschyl. Pers. 823, Θῖνες δὲ νεκρῶν στόμασιν εὖ βροτῶν γένει Ἀφωνα σημανοῦσι καὶ τριτοσπόρφ, Ὡς οὐχ ὑπὲρ θεῶν θνητῶν ὄντα δει φρονεῖν*, i. e.

“Well with the mouths of dead men shall the shores

To the third race of mortals voiceless say,

‘No man must deem himself above a god:’”

where *στόμασιν*, in lieu of *δμμασιν*, vainly defended by Paley, is confirmed by *Diodor. Sic. i. 2, p. 5. αἱ πράξεις—διαβοῶμεναι τῇ τῆς ἱστορίας στόματι*, and *Epigr. Inc. 387, Πᾶν ἔπος ἀφθίγκτω τῷδε λέγω στόματι*, supposed to be spoken by a pen.

⁴ With regard to this allusion to the heinousness of the crime of striking a parent, see *Æschyl. Eum. 269*; and *Aristoph. Barp. 150*; Kuhn on *Pausanias x. p. 866*; and *Wytttenbach on Phædon, p. 319*.

⁵⁻⁶ Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has “nulli, qui parentes scelerate pulsarent, unquam reperirentur.”

⁶ Taylor omits “or stranger,” although found in Ficinus.

⁷⁻⁷ Cousin, unable to understand *ὁ μὴ μέτοικος*, considers *ἡ ξένος* as a gloss of *μὴ μέτοικος*, which a transcriber had improperly applied to *μὲν μέτοικος*, instead of applying it to *μὴ μέτοικος*—but he correctly adds that this supposition is far from being satisfactory.

he does not assist, let him receive a hundred stripes with a whip. And if this occurs in the market-place, let him (be whipt) by the Market-Stewards; but if out of the market-place in the city, let any one of the City-Stewards, who is resident, inflict the punishment; but if in the rural parts of the country, let the chiefs of the Land-Stewards do so. If any denizen happens to be present ¹(when parents are struck by their child),¹ whether such denizen be a boy, or a man, or a woman, let him assist, and call the striker an impious wretch; and let him, who does not assist, be implicated in the curse sworn in the name of Zeus ²Homognius, and Patroius,² according to law.³ And if any one is convicted on the charge of assaulting and disfiguring his parents, let him, in the first place, suffer a perpetual exile from the city to some other country; and next, let him keep himself from all sacred rites; but if he will not so keep himself, let the Land-Stewards punish him with blows, and entirely as they please. And if he returns from exile, let him be punished with death. And if any free-man ⁴shall eat or drink with such a person, or have any other communication of such a kind⁴ with him, or only touch him voluntarily, should he happen to meet him any where, let the party neither enter a temple, nor a place of public meeting, nor, in short, the city, until he is purified; conceiving that he has had a communication with a calamity of an impious kind. But if, disobedient to the law, he shall ⁵contrary to the law⁵ defile the sacred places, and the city, let the magistrate, who, cognizant of this, does not institute a suit

¹ Ficinus alone has, what is adopted by Taylor, as being requisite for the sense, "parentibus a filio verberatis."

² On these titles of Zeus, Ast refers to v. § 2, and Rep. iv. § 5.

³ Taylor omits the formula *κατὰ νόμον*, although found in Ficinus.

⁴ On this rite of excommunication, see my note on Æsch. Eum. 437, where I should have referred to Cæsar, in B. G. vi. 13, "Iis (quos sacrificiis interdicant Druides) omnes decedunt; auditum eorum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant; neque iis petentibus jus redditur, neque honor ullus communicatur;" and I should have corrected the remarkable passage in Eurip. Iph. T. 947, by reading 'Ἠλθον δ' ἐκεῖσ', οὐ πρῶτα μὲν μ' οὐδ' εἰς ξένος ἔκων γ' ἰδέεσθ', ὥς θεοῖς στυγούμενον. "Ὅς δ' ἔσχεν αἰδῶ ξένια μονοτράπεζά μοι Παρεῖχ' ἀκοινώνητά τ' ἐν ταύτῳ στέγει, εἰς γῆν δ' ἐκέκτητ' ὅμμι'—ἀπόφθεγκτόν τ' ἔπος, εἰς τ' ἄγγος ἰδίων γαῦμ' ὄσον γ', οὐ βάκχιον μέτρομα πληρώσας τις, ἔχε', ἐν ἡδονῇ Δαιτὸς γάνος τ' ἦν πώματος, πάντων δίχα.

⁵ The expression *παρὰ νόμῳ* seems perfectly superfluous after *ἀπειθῶν νόμῳ*.

against such a person,¹ be held amenable² to the greatest accusation for this very matter.³ If a slave strikes a free-man, whether a stranger or citizen, let any one present give assistance, or pay the fine above-mentioned, according to the value of his estate; ⁴ and let those who are present succour the party struck, and having bound the striker, deliver him to the injured party; ⁴ and he, on receiving him, shall ⁵ put him into the stocks,⁵ and give him as many stripes with a whip as he pleases, without doing an injury to the slave's owner, to whom let him deliver up the slave, to be his possession according to law. And let the law be this. Whatever slave strikes a free-man, without the order of the magistrates, let his owner, on receiving him bound from the party struck, not release him from bonds, until the slave shall have persuaded the party struck that he deserves to be released and to live. And let the same laws be for women, with respect to each other, on all matters of this kind; and for women with respect to men, and men to women.

BOOK X.

[1.] AFTER assaults,⁶ let a law of some such kind as this be stated relating to acts of violence, one for all; that no one

¹ Ficinus translates ἐπάγγλόν τῷ τοιούτῳ by "punierit," adopted by Taylor.

² I have translated as if the Greek were ἐπεύθυνος, not ἐν εὐθύναις—

³ In lieu of ἐν τούτῳ αὐτῷ, Bekker would read ἐν τούτῳ αὐτῷ, and in that case ἐν εὐθύναις might remain; for the sense would be, "let this thing be held as one of the greatest charges against him, when the accounts of his office are examined."

⁴ Such is the English for the Latin of Ficinus, "qui ergo præsentes erunt, pulsato succurrant, vinciantque pulsantem, et ei vinctum tradant, cui fecit injuriam." The Greek is, συνδῆσαντες δὲ οἱ προστυγχάνοντες μετὰ τοῦ πληγέντος παραδόντων τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ; where μετὰ τοῦ πληγέντος is perfectly unintelligible; for it would thus seem that the striker and the struck were to be bound together—an idea that never could have occurred to Plato. Perhaps however it will be said that μετὰ τοῦ πληγέντος may mean, "after the blow has been struck—" But that would be in correct Greek, μετὰ τὸ πληγέν—

⁵ Taylor omits the words between the numerals, although duly found in Ficinus.

⁶ Ficinus, uncertain how to render αἰκίας by a single word, has made use of three, "cæde, vulneribusque et verberibus."

shall ¹ carry or take away ¹ any thing belonging to another, or use his neighbour's property, if he has not induced the possessor (to permit it). For from a thing of this kind ² all the above-mentioned evils have depended, and do and will (depend).² But of the remaining evils, the greatest are the lasciviousness and insolence of young men; to the greatest extent, when they are directed against sacred things; and they are particularly great in the case of public and holy matters,³ or in those of the common portions of tribes-men, or any other (persons)³ who have a communion in things of that kind. The second in order and heinousness, are those (directed against) the sacred concerns of individuals and sepulchres. The third, when, apart from the acts previously detailed, a person behaves insolently towards parents. The fourth kind of insolence is, when any one, despising the magistrates, carries off, or ⁴ drives away, or makes use of any thing belonging to them, without having persuaded them (to suffer it). ⁵ The fifth consists in unjustly calling to account the political conduct of any citizen.⁵ ⁶ For each of these there must be assigned a law in common.⁶ For in the case of sacrilege, it has been stated summarily what a person ought to suffer, if it takes place with violence and secrecy. But with regard to what a person does by word or deed insolently towards the gods, let me now detail, after laying down

¹—¹ In the phrase *φέρειν καὶ ἀγειν*, the first verb was generally applied to things inanimate and portable, the second to animals driven away alive.

²—² The Greek is *πάντα ἡρτημένα τὰ τε εἰρημένα κατὰ γέγονε καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται*. Ficinus has "hinc enim mala omnia, quæ narravimus, dependerunt pendentque jam et in posterum dependebunt." From which Ast was led to read *τὰ γε εἰρημένα*— and Stalbaum to consider *τε* as an interpolation. But then *γέγονε* would have to be united to *ἡρτημένα* in a manner not to be found elsewhere in lieu of *ἦν*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *πάντ' ἦν ἡρτημένα τὰ τε εἰρημένα κατὰ καὶ ἃ γέγονε*—

³—³ Ficinus, not perceiving that *ἄλλων* agrees with *ἀνθρώπων* understood, as opposed to *φυλετών*, has thus translated the Greek, "vel in tribuum aliquarum communem vel aliorum hujuscemodi," as if his MS. read *ἢ κατὰ μέρη φυλῶν τινων, ἢ ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων*.

⁴ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, omits *φέρειν ἦ*—

⁵—⁵ Such is Taylor's translation. The Greek is, *πέμπτον δὲ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀν εἴη ἐκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρισθὲν δίκην ἐπικαλούμενον*, where I cannot make out the syntax or sense; nor could Ast, I think, for he is quite satisfied with the loose version of Ficinus, "quintum cum civis alicujus civilis dignitas læditur vel offenditur."

⁶—⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "quod genus omnino ultionem poscit."

an exhortation,¹ what he ought to suffer. Let it then be this. No one, who believes that there are gods, conformably to laws, has ever at any time voluntarily done an impious act, or spoken a word contrary to the laws; but he,² who does or says an impious deed or word against the gods,² suffers one of these three things; either he does not think, what I have stated;³ or, secondly, that, although they exist, they take no care of mankind;⁴ or, thirdly, that they are easily appeased by sacrifices,⁵ and drawn aside by prayers.⁶

Clin. What then shall we do, and what shall we say to them?

Athen. Let us, my good man, first hear, what I prophesy they will jocosely say in contempt of us.

Clin. What?

Athen. Perhaps they will say with a banter—O guests from Athens, and Lacedæmon, and Cnossus, you speak the truth. For some of us think ⁷the gods are no gods⁷ at all; others,⁸ that they take no care of us; and others, that they are drawn aside by prayers,⁸ as you have described them. We deem it then proper, as you have deemed it with respect to the laws, that, before you threaten us severely, you should endeavour to persuade and teach us that there are gods, by stating sufficient arguments, and that they are beings too good to be drawn aside, contrary to what is just, by any gifts. For now;

¹ In lieu of παραμυθιον, Ficinus found in his MS. προοίμιον, as shown by his version, "proœmio quodam proposito," which seems to lead to παραμυθιόν τε καὶ προοίμιον, as in xi. p. 923, C. παραμυθιά τε καὶ προοίμια—

^{2—2} The words between the numerals, wanting in the Greek, are found only in the version of Ficinus, "faciunt autem aut dicunt impium aliquid in deos."

³ Namely, "that there are gods;" which very words Taylor has adopted from Ficinus, "deos esse negant."

⁴ A similar sentiment is to be found in Hippodamus, quoted by Ast from Stobæus xli. p. 250, 40, ἤτοι μὴ εἶμεν τὸ θεῖον, ἢ καὶ ἔδν, μὴ ἔχειν οὕτως ποτὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, ὥστ' ἐπιβλέπεν αὐτὸ καὶ φροντίζειν.

⁵ On this doctrine, see iv. § 8.

⁶ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits παραγομένους—

^{7—7} I have adopted the reading θεοὺς οὐ θεοὺς, preserved by the Scholiast, in lieu of θεοὺς οὐδαμῶς. See Dobree on Aristoph. Eccl. 115, and myself on Crito, § 13, n. 5.

^{8—8} The words between the numerals are wanting in all the MSS. but the one used by Cornarius, and another by Ficinus, as shown by his version, "alii, nihil nostra curare; alii, muneribus facile placari—" who has however omitted οἷους ὑμεῖς λέγετε, which certainly seem to be superfluous.

after hearing this, and other things of such a kind, from those said to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and ten thousand times ten thousand others, the majority of us do not turn to the acting unjustly, but, after acting so, we endeavour to get a salve. But on the part of legislators, who profess themselves to be not savage, but mild, we think it reasonable for them to make use of persuasion in our case, by stating, with regard to the gods, if not in a manner much superior to the rest, yet superior at least as regards the truth, that they do exist. And then perhaps we may be persuaded by you. Endeavour then, if we say what is fair, to speak on the points, to which we invite you.

Clin. Does it not seem then easy, O guest, to say with truth, that there are gods?

Athen. How?

Clin. In the first place, the Earth and Sun, and all the Stars, and the arrangements so beautiful of the Seasons, divided into months and years, (prove this);¹ and moreover, that all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, believe that there are gods.

Athen. I feel a fear, O blessed man—for I will never say that I feel shame, lest depraved persons hold you in contempt. For you are not acquainted with the cause of their difference² (in opinion); but you imagine that their souls are impelled to an impious life, by a want of mastery alone over pleasures and desires.

Clin. But what other cause can there be, O guest, besides this?

Athen. ³That, which you would know nearly not at all, through living out of their way, and which would lie hid from you.³

Clin. Of what are you speaking at present?

Athen. A certain ignorance of a very grievous nature is appearing to be the greatest prudence.

¹ The words between the lunes, absolutely requisite for the sense, are found only in the version of Ficinus, "id ostendunt."

² Cornarius seems to have found in his MS., or rather to have wished to read, *διαφορᾶς*; which Stephens, and after him Stalbaum, considered to be correct. Cousin is content with *διαφορᾶς*—I should prefer *τούτων περί—διαφορᾶς*, "of the difference on these points."

³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has merely "Quod vos ipsius expertes penitus fugit."

Clin. How say you?

[2.] *Athen.* There are certain stories put into writing amongst us, which, as I understand, are, through the virtue of your polity, not amongst you, some in a kind of verse, and others out of it, which speak of the gods. The most ancient (assert), that the first nature was that of Uranus¹ and the other (gods); and proceeding they detail, not far from the beginning, the birth of the gods, and how after being born they had intercourse with each other. Upon those, who hear the accounts, whether they are well or not upon any other ground, it is not easy to cast a censure, as they are of the olden time; but as regards the attention and honour to be paid to parents, I would never praise them, nor say that they are beneficial, nor that they have been correctly² told at all. Let then, what relates to the writings of the ancients, be dismissed and bidden farewell, and let them be spoken of, as may be pleasing to the gods. But let the poetry³ of the young and wise⁴ be blamed as the cause of evil; for the language of such persons effects this. For when you and I, detailing the proofs, that there are gods, bring forward those very things, the Sun and Moon, and Stars, and the Earth, as being gods and of a god-like nature, they, who have been persuaded by these wise men, would say that they are⁵ earth and stones,⁵ and incapable of paying any regard to human affairs; and that such ideas are cleverly wrapped round in a paste of words⁶ to render them plausible.

¹ I have thus translated Οὐρανοῦ: for it alludes to a person, not a thing, as shown by ἄλλων (θεῶν).

² Instead of ὀρθῶς five MSS. read ὀντως. But as Ficinus has "vera esse," he probably found in his MS. ὀρθὰ ὄντα—

³ I have adopted Ast's ἐπη for ὅπη, which Cousin retains without attempting to explain it.

⁴ This union of the young and wise seems rather strange. Hence one would prefer νέων καὶ ἀσώφων—the young and not wise, in lieu of νέων καὶ σοφῶν— Unless it be said that σοφῶν is to be taken ironically.

⁵ Ast refers opportunely to Apolog. § 14, where, according to the doctrine of Anaxagoras, the Sun was said to be a shining stone and the Moon a mass of earth. Had the philosopher lived in our days, he would perhaps have compared the Sun to a large diamond, or a mass of pure carbon reduced to a solid state, and by the aid of the Earl of Rosse's telescope confirmed his guess that the Moon is a mass of earth in its most solid state of granite.

⁶ On the metaphorical use of περιπίπτειν Ast refers to Aristoph. Plut. 159, Ὀνόματι περιπίπτουσι τὴν μοχθηρίαν. Lucian Anachars. § 19, περιπίπτειν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Valckenaer Diatrib. p. 158, A.

Clin. You have spoken, guest, a speech, grave indeed, even if only one had (said so);¹ but now, since there happen to be very many (who say so),² it will be still more grave.

Athen. What then shall we say, and what ought we to do? Shall we apologize, as if some person were accusing us before impious men, who fly³ from the subjects relating to legislation, and³ assert that we are acting in a shocking manner by legislating as if there were gods? Or shall we bid farewell to these, and return again to the laws, in order that this our preface to the laws may not become rather prolix? For the discourse will, if stretched out, become by no means short, if we sufficiently prove only moderately by reasons to men, eager to act impiously, some of the points, on which they say we ought to speak; ⁴and if we lead them to feel a fear upon others; and if, after having caused them to be disgusted on others, we lay down laws after this on matters that are becoming.⁴

Clin. But, O guest, we have often, for so short a time at least, said this very thing, that for the present it is not meet to prefer brevity to prolixity. For nobody, according to the saying,⁵ is pursuing us in haste. ⁶And it would be ridiculous,⁶ and at the same time paltry, for us to be seen preferring the shorter to the best. And it is a thing of no little moment, for our reasons possess somehow a power to prove that

Jacobs in *Athenæum*, p. 297. Other passages are quoted by Dobree on Aristoph. l. c. According to Donaldson in the *New Cratylus*, p. 370, ed. 1, there lies hid here a comic verse, *Λόγοισι δ' εὖ πως ταῦτα περιπεπεμμένα*, similar to *ῥηματίοις περιπεφθεῖς* in Aristoph. *Σφηκ.* 668.

^{1, 2} The words between the lunes have been introduced from the version of Ficinus—"etiamsi solummodo unus dixisset, nunc vero—quo plures sunt, qui dicunt."

^{2—3} I have translated as if *τὰ* had dropt out before, and *καὶ* after, *περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας*. Orelli however has suggested, what Stalbaum approves of, *περιττὰς νομοθεσίας*: and while Winckelmann would read *ψέγουσι* in lieu of *φεύγουσι*, Ficinus, unable perhaps to understand *φεύγουσι* *περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας*, has omitted these words; and so after him has Taylor.

^{4—6} Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed in part, has thus abridged—"atque etiam terrore illos a scelere amovere, demum vero, quemadmodum convenit, leges ferre."

⁵ On this saying, the origin of which is unknown, Ast refers to vi. § 1, *σχολῆς ἀπολαύομεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ κατεπεῖγον*.

^{6—6} The Greek is *γελοῖον δὲ*—It was *γελοῖον δ' ἦν ἂν* in the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version—"quare ridiculum—esset." On the corruption of *δ' ἦν ἂν* into *δὲ* see Porson *Miscellan. Crit.* p. 182.

there are gods, that they are good, and that they honour justice pre-eminently more than men. For this will be nearly the most beautiful and excellent preface to all our laws. Let us then, without feeling any disgust, or being urged on, exhibit, as far as we can, sufficiently whatever power we possess in the way of persuasion, and lay aside no part of such kind of reasonings.

Athen. ¹The speech just now spoken by you appears to me to invite a prayer,¹ since you put yourself on the stretch with alacrity, nor is it fitting to delay any longer to discourse.

[3.] But come, (tell us) how can any one speak without a feeling of anger on the question² that there are gods? For there is a necessity for us to bear ill with and to hate those, who have been and are³ now the cause of the discussion, ⁴in not being persuaded⁴ by the tales, which they have heard even ⁵from young children,⁵ and when they were fed with milk from their nurses and mothers, and which were spoken, as it were, in epodes,⁶ both in sport and in earnest, and together with sacrifices hearing them in prayers, and seeing the sights that follow them,⁷ which a young person sees and hears with the greatest delight, when they take place; while their parents are making a sacrifice with the greatest earnestness, and occupied in it in behalf of themselves and them;⁸ and addressing in prayers

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek; that of Ficinus is a paraphrase—"Iste sermo tuus adeo te paratum promptumque ostendit, ut ad preces votumque videatur provocare"—But what this naked mention of prayer has to do in this place, I confess I cannot understand. Nor could Sydenham; who proposed to read *εὖ μὴν* for *εὐχὴν*—But *μὴν* does not elsewhere thus follow *εὖ*, if I rightly remember.

² Taylor adds, no doubt to complete the idea, "as if it were a thing of a doubtful nature."

³ Ficinus, and Taylor after him, omit *καὶ γίγνονται*.

⁴—⁴ I have, with Ast and Stalbaum, adopted Stephens's correction—*γίγνονται νῦν, οὐ πειθόμενοι*—in lieu of *γίγνονται νῦν οὖν πειθόμενοι*—which is perfectly unintelligible. Cousin however observes that "la construction suspendue (est) extrêmement claire—Il était difficile de gâter davantage une plus belle phrase—"

⁵—⁵ It is correct Greek to say *ἐκ νέων* or *ἐκ παιδων*, but not *ἐκ νέων παιδων*. Hence Winckelmann proposed to insert *ἀρξάμενοι* after *παιδων*—I would rather read *ἐκ νηπίων* in lieu of *ἐκ νέων παιδων*—

⁶ I confess I cannot understand what is meant by *ὅλον ἐν ἐπιρδαῖς*.

⁷ Ast translates, after Ficinus, *ἐπομένας* by "consentaneas—"

⁸ In lieu of *ἐκείνων* I should prefer *τέκνων*—On the custom of persons praying for themselves and children only, I have written something on II. Alcibiad. § 18, n. 10, *τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς θεοὺς δίδοναι κελεύοντες μόνους σφίσιν αὐτοῖς*.

and supplications the gods, as really existing, both at the rising of the Sun and Moon, and at their setting; and when they hear and see the rollings on the ground and acts of adoration of Greeks and Barbarians of all kinds,¹ under the influence of all kinds of adversity and prosperity, not as if the gods were not existing, but as if existing in reality, and giving not even a handle for the suspicion that the gods do not exist—they who despise all these facts, and from not a single sufficient reason, as all would say, who possess even a little intellect, compel us to speak as we do at present, how can any one in mild language admonish, and at the same time teach them, in the first place, that the gods do exist? Let us however dare the attempt. For it is not meet that some of us² should be mad through a violent hankering after pleasure, and others through being angry with such characters as these. Let then our address to persons thus depraved in their intellect be of this kind and passionless, and let us speak mildly after extinguishing our anger, as if conversing with one of such persons—³ My child, you are young. But time, as it advances, will cause you to change in many points the opinions you now hold, and to give them to the opposite side.³ Wait then until that period, so as to become a judge of matters of the greatest moment. Now that is of the greatest moment, which you at present deem to be of no consequence, namely, to have correct ideas on the subject of the gods, and to live well or not. If then I first point out⁴ to you a thing of this kind, as being one of great moment, I shall not appear to tell a falsehood. Not you alone nor your friends are the first, who have held this opinion respecting the gods; but there have been always a greater or less number labouring under this very disease. I will therefore tell you this, as I have come in contact with many of them, that not one of them, after adopting this opinion

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were not πάντων, but παντοίων, to suit better with the subsequent παντολας—

² In lieu of ἡμῶν, which Stephens wished to reject, Winckelmann would read ἡττωμένους—Sydenham suggested ἡδονῶν for ἡδονῆς ἡμῶν—Cousin translates ἡμῶν by “parmi nous autres hommes—”

³⁻³ In the Greek it is easy to detect a dramatic fragment in Anapaestics—ὦ παῖ, νέος εἶ· προῖών δ' ὁ χρόνος Πολλὰ ποιήσει σ', ὧν δοξάζεις Νῦν, μεταβάλλοντ' ἐπὶ τάναντία θίσθαι. Ficinus has “juvenis adhuc es—” as if his MS. read ἐνι νέος εἶ.

⁴ Ficinus has “sacrificavero,” from which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS. in lieu of μνήων—

from their youth respecting the gods, that they do not exist, has continued to old age remaining in it. Two circumstances have however remained as regards the gods, not indeed to many, but to some; one is, that the gods exist indeed, but take no care of human affairs; and the other after this, that they do indeed take care, but are easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. If then you will be persuaded by me, you will, turning over¹ with all your might this doctrine, ²which has ever been clear² to you, wait and consider whether it be thus or otherwise, by inquiring of other persons, and the legislator in particular. But during that period do not dare to act impiously towards the gods. For he, who lays down laws for you, must endeavour, both now and hereafter, to teach you on these points in what state they are.

Clin. What has been said thus far, is, O guest, most beautiful.

Athen. Entirely so, Megillus and Clinias; but we have unconsciously fallen upon a wonderful assertion.

Clin. Of what kind are you speaking?

Athen. That, which is thought by many to be the wisest of all assertions.

Clin. Speak yet clearer.

[4.] *Athen.* Some persons surely say, that all things, which are and have been and will be, exist, some from nature, others from art, and others from chance.

Clin. And do they not (say) well?

Athen. It is reasonable, indeed, for wise men to speak correctly. Let us then follow ³those from that point,³ and consider what they happen to be thinking of.

Clin. By all means.

Athen. It seems, say they, that nature and chance effect the

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were περιελίττων, not περὶ αὐτῶν, which I cannot understand.

²⁻² Here again, by the slight change of ἀν into αἰ, I have made the meaning of Plato intelligible, of which Ficinus and Cornarius had only a vague idea, as may be seen from their respective versions, quoted by Ast.

³⁻³ In lieu of τοὺς ἐκείθεν Ast suggests τὸ ἐκείθεν, "what results from thence," and translates τί διανοοῦμενοι τυγχάνουσι by "quid inde colligant," a meaning those words certainly cannot bear. I suspect that Plato wrote τοὺς Ἰῶθεν, "those from Ias," the name for the people of the country called more commonly Ionia. For the writer is here alluding more particularly to the tenets of Ionic philosophers.

greatest and most beautiful things, but art the lesser ; which, receiving from nature the generation of great and primary works, moulds and fabricates all the smaller works, which all of us call artificial.

Clin. How say you ?

Athen. I will speak still clearer in this way. They say that fire and water and earth and air exist from nature and chance, and not one of them from art ; and that the bodies, next after these, of the Earth, and the Sun, and the Moon, and the Stars,¹ are generated through them, being entirely without a soul ; and that, ²each being borne along by the chance, which is a portion of the power of each,³ to the spot where they fall together, ³fit together in some congenial manner,³ the hot with the cold, the dry with the moist, and the soft with the hard ; and that all things, which by the mixture of contraries, according to chance, have been commingled through necessity, have in this way and under such circumstances really⁴ generated the whole of heaven and all that are in heaven, and animals and plants together,⁵ all the seasons having been produced from them ;⁵ and not, say they, through intellect, nor any god, or art, but, as we have stated, by nature and chance ; and that art, mortal itself, being subsequently produced from these, themselves mortal, generated afterwards some kind of instruction, not partaking very much of truth, but certain images allied to themselves,⁶ such as painting produces, and music, and whatever arts are fellow-workers : and that if any⁷

¹ Ast says that *πῆρι* after *ἀστρον τε* might be omitted ; and omitted it was in the MS. of Ficinus ; from whose "stellarum omnium" it is easy to elicit *ἀστρον τε πάντων*—unless it be said that in *περι παντων* united lies hid *περιπλανών*, "wandering round," i. e. planets.

^{2—3} This is the only translation I can give of *τύχῃ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἐκάστων*—

^{3—3} The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

⁴ From *οὕτως* in Euseb. P. E. i. 7, Viger elicited *δυνως*, which I have adopted ; for *ταύτῃ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω* is not found elsewhere thus united.

^{5—5} Why Plato should have thus introduced genitives absolute after the preceding accusatives, it is hard to say.

⁶ In lieu of *ἐαυτῶν* Ast suggests *αὐτῶν*, i. e. *τεχνῶν*. But Taylor translates *ἐαυτῶν* by "each other," a meaning assigned elsewhere to the same pronoun.

⁷ I have translated as if the Greek were, not *αἱ δὲ τι—γεννώσι*—for *ἀν* or *ἐάν* could hardly be omitted—but *ἀν δὲ τινές τι*—for thus *τῶν τεχνῶν* recovers, what it had lost, its governing pronoun.

of the arts produce any thing of a serious nature, they are such as communicate their own power with that of nature, such as the art of medicine, and of agriculture, and of gymnastics ; and, moreover, the statesman's art communicates in some small part with nature, but very much with art ; and thus the whole of legislation is not from nature, but art ; of which¹ the positions are not true.

Clin. How say you ?

Athen. The gods, O blessed man, these persons say, in the first place, exist from art, not nature, but from certain laws ; and that these are different amongst different people, according as each have agreed to have laws laid down for each.² And, moreover, that things beautiful by nature are of one kind, those by law of another ; and that³ things just do not exist by nature at all,³ but that persons continue to dispute amongst themselves about them, and are perpetually changing them ; and that, what they change and when, possess then a fixed authority, emanating from art and laws, but not from any certain nature. All these, my friends, are amongst young men⁴ the doctrines of the wise, both private persons⁵ and poets,⁶ who assert that to be the most just, by which a person obtains a victory through violence. From whence both impiety comes upon young men—since gods are not such as the law enjoins us we ought to think there are—⁷and seditions too (arise) on this account, while persons are drawing towards the

¹ I cannot understand ἡς applied to τέχνη. Plato wrote, I suspect, οἷς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς φήσω εἶναι τὰς θέσεις, "to whom I will say that their positions are not true;" where φήσω might easily have dropt out after ἀληθεῖς—

² I have adopted ἐκάστοις, preserved in one MS. in lieu of ἐαυτοῖς, similar to ἕκαστα ἐκάστων—

^{3—3} On this doctrine Ast refers to Gorg. p. 482, E. § 85; Theætet. p. 172, B. § 75; Protag. p. 337, D. § 69; and Aristot. Polit. i. 3.

⁴ As ἀνθρώποις is seldom thus united to νέοις, Plato wrote, I suspect, both here and shortly afterwards, ἄνοις, "senseless," for such young men are, and ἄνων for ἀνθρώπων a little below. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

⁵ Ficinus has "scriptores alii—" which would lead to ΛΟΓΙΩΝ ΤΙΝΩΝ in lieu of ΙΔΙΩΤΩΝ. Where λογίων would mean "prose writers—"

⁶ Plato alludes to Pindar, as shown by iii. § 10.

^{7—7} Such is the literal version of the Greek, out of which I can make nothing, nor could, I think, Ficinus ; whose translation is—"hinc etiam seditiones oriuntur, per quas ad eam homines vitam, quasi secundum naturam rectam, trahuntur, qua ita vivant, ut ceteros vincant, nec secundum

life, which is correct according to nature, which is in truth that a person lives, the master over others, and not the slave of others according to law.⁷

Clin. What an account have you, O guest, gone through, and what a mischief (detailed) to young men, both publicly in cities, and in their private homes!

Athen. You speak truly, Clinias. What then think you a legislator ought to do, ¹when states have been of old in this condition.¹ Ought he ²merely to stand up in the city² and threaten all, that unless they assert, and ³are thoroughly satisfied in their own minds,³ that there are gods, such as the law says there are, ⁴(they shall suffer punishment).⁴ And with respect to things beautiful and just, and every thing of the greatest moment, and whatever tends to virtue and vice, that it is meet for them to think and act in the way the legislator leads by his writings; and that, whoever does not exhibit himself obedient to the laws, one of them ought to die, another to be punished with stripes and bonds, and another with disfranchisement, and others with poverty and exile; and that while he is laying down laws for men, ⁵he is to have no persuasion over them, (so that) by fitting them to reasonings, he may, as far as he can, render them mild.⁵

Clin. By no means, O guest. But should any persuasion, though small, happen to exist relating to matters of this kind, it behoves a legislator, who is of the least worth, to be never

leges aliis servant"—From which however it is easy to see that his MS. read *ἐλκομένων*, what the sense seems to require, instead of *ἐλκόντων*—

¹—¹ In lieu of the words between the numerals Taylor has merely "in this case," got from "cum ita se res habent—" in Ficinus.

²—² The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and partly by Taylor likewise.

³—³ Such seems to be the meaning of *διανοηθήσονται δοξάζοντες*. But as such an union of words is scarcely admissible in Greek, there is probably some error in *δοξάζοντες*, for which one would prefer *οὐ διστάζοντες*, "nothing doubting"—a word quoted by Stephens from Synesius Epist. 44, and he might have added Plato in p. 897, B. § 8.

⁴—⁴ The words between the lunes, absolutely requisite for the sense, are found only in the Latin of Ficinus—"eos omnino pœnas daturus."

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which, although it is not quite unintelligible, is not so clear as the Latin of Ficinus—"ut autem in legum latione persuasionem minis adjungat, qua mitiget, nihil curabit:" by the aid of which Ast has given, what he considers to be the general sense of the passage, not to be elicited fairly from the Greek.

faint-hearted, but¹ to utter, as the saying is, every cry,¹ and to become an helper to the old legal saw,² that there are gods, and such other things as you have discussed; and moreover, to aid both nature itself and art, (by showing) that they two exist by³ nature, or not less than nature,³ since they are the progeny of intellect, according to correct reasoning, which you seem to me to have stated, and as I now believe.

Athen. O thou most eager-minded Clinias, what, are not the matters thus spoken before the multitude difficult to follow up by arguments, and do they not possess a prolixity spoken with a clamorous voice?

Clin. But what, O guest, have we on the subject of drunkenness and music waited, while we were speaking at such a length, and shall we not wait (while speaking) on the subject of the gods, and such like matters? Moreover there will be⁴ the greatest assistance to the legislation, which is united to intelligence, because the ordinances relating to the laws being put into writing, will, ⁵as being about to afford a disproof,⁵ for all time remain⁶ perfectly quiet. So that we ought not to be alarmed, even if those things are at the commencement harsh to hear, which it will be in the power of a person, who is slow to learn, by frequently recurring to them, to look into; nor even, if they are prolix, yet useful, do they on this account possess no consideration; nor does it seem to me to be a holy thing for every person not to assist these assertions to the utmost of his power.

Megil. Clinias appears to me, O guest, to speak most excellently.

Athen. Yes, very much so; and we must do as he says. For if assertions of this kind were not scattered, so to say,

¹—¹ On the expression—*πᾶσαν φωνὴν λέγειν*, Ast refers to his note on Rep. v. § 19, p. 530, A.

² The Greek is *τῷ παλαιῷ νόμῳ ἐπικούρον γίνεσθαι λόγῳ*: where Winckelmann would expunge *νόμῳ*, but Orelli alter it into *νομίμῳ*, whom I have followed.

³—³ This I confess I hardly understand. The sense seems to require *φύσει ἢ φύσεως οὐχ ἥττονί τῳ*—"by nature or by something not less than nature."

⁴ Ficinus has "est futurum," for his MS. doubtless read *ἔσται*, not *ἔστι*—

⁵—⁵ Ficinus has "redargutioni subjecta—" as if his MS. read something the reverse of *δῶσοντα*—

⁶ One MS. has *ἡμεῖς*, to which if we add *ἀν*, we shall have what Ficinus found in his MS., answering to "quiescant."

amongst all men, there would be no need of arguments to prove that there are gods. But now this is necessary. To whom then does it pertain, more than to the legislator, to give assistance to the greatest laws, when corrupted by wicked men?

Clin. To no one.¹

[5.] *Athen.* But do you, Clinias, tell me again—for it behoves you to take part in the conversation—does not he, who mentions these things, namely, fire and water and earth and air, appear almost to consider them as the first of all things, and to call them nature, and (to say) that soul is (a production) subsequent to them? Does it seem that he not only appears (to think so), but in reality signifies to us so much by his assertions?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Have we not then, by Zeus, discovered, as it were, some source of the stupid opinion of those men, who have ever touched upon inquiries relating to nature? Look into and examine the whole subject. For it is a matter of no small moment, if those, who meddle (themselves) with impious assertions, and are the leaders to others, are seen to employ arguments not correctly, but erroneously. Such to myself at present² appears to be the case.

Clin. You speak well; but endeavour to show why so.

Athen. It seems then I must employ rather unusual arguments.

Clin. You must not, guest, hesitate. For I understand that you conceive you will travel out of legislation, if we handle reasonings of this kind. But if it is not possible to agree in any other way than this with what has been according to law just now stated, as being correct,³ on the subject of the gods,³ let us, O wonderful man, speak even in this way.

Athen. I will detail then some such reasoning as this, which, as it seems, is nearly not usual. The discourses, which have worked upon the soul of the impious, have shown that,

¹ Instead of οὐκ ἔστιν the syntax requires evidently οὐ τίνα, to answer to the preceding τίνα.

² The sense requires τὰ νῦν, as I have translated, not τοίνυν.

³ In lieu of θεοίς, which is perfectly unintelligible, Ast suggested λόγοις. But Ficinus found in his MS. θεῶν περί, as shown by his version, "de diis secundum legem"—which Sydenham says is correct. For otherwise there would have followed, not ὡς ὁρθῶς ἔχουσιν, but ὡς ὀρθῶς εἶσιν. Orelli would read θεσμοίς, and refers to Epist. viii. p. 355, Bekk.

what is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, was not produced the first, but subsequently, and that the subsequent was prior : from whence they have erred respecting the real existence of the gods.

Clin. I do not yet understand.

Athen. Almost all men, my friend, appear to have been nearly ignorant what the soul happens to be, and what power it possesses, with respect to other things belonging to it, and its generation besides—how that it is amongst the first of substances and before all, and that more than any thing else it rules over the change and altered arrangement of bodies. And if this be the case, is it not necessary for things allied to soul to have been produced prior to those pertaining to body, through soul itself being more ancient than body?

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. Now opinion, and care, and intellect, and art, and law, would be prior to things hard and soft, and heavy and light. And moreover the great and first works and doings of art would be amongst the first things ; but those produced by nature, and nature herself, which they do not correctly call by that name, would be posterior to, and ruled by art and intellect.

Clin. ¹How not correctly?

Athen. Because¹ they are willing to say that nature is the generation relating to the first; ²and they place bodies amongst the first.² But if soul shall appear to be first, and not fire or air, ³soul would be said with almost the greatest

¹—¹ I have with Ast adopted what Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his version—*Clin.* Cur non recte? *Athen.* Quia— From whence Ast saw correctly that ὄντι had dropt out before φύσιν—

²—² Ficinus alone has, what the train of thought requires, “primaque ponunt corpora—” in Greek, according to Cornarius, τὰ δὲ σώματα τιθέασιν τὰ πρῶτα—words evidently lost through τὸ ὁμοιοτέλετον. Cousin, however, considers those words to be perfectly useless.

³—³ I have followed for the most part Ficinus, whose version is, “anima ipsa corpore antiquior rectissime affirmabitur; et hæc ipsa ita natura constare, si animam corporibus antiquiorem esse constiterit,” who seems to have found in his MS. ψυχὴ δὲ, not ψυχὴ δὲ—and εἶναι καὶ φύσει, not εἶναι διαφερόντως ὄντι φύσει—while to preserve the train of thought, it is requisite to read ἔσται for ἐστὶ—Ast, however, adopts διαφερόντως φύσει, from Eusebius P. E. xii. p. 622, D., which, I confess, I do not understand. Cousin says—“On eclaireit la phrase entiere un peu en lisant καὶ ὁ τι οὐ ὅτι δὲ, i. e. et que c'est là le véritable ordre naturel des choses.”

correctness to have been produced amongst the first; and these will be pre-eminently by nature in this state, should any one show that soul is more ancient than body;³ but otherwise not.

Clin. You speak most true.

Athen. Shall we then, after this, proceed to this very point?

Clin. Undoubtedly.

Athen. But let us by all means guard against a deceitful reason, lest perchance, being of a youthful look, it persuades us old men improperly, and after escaping, makes us a laughing-stock; and lest we appear, ¹after throwing ourselves upon greater things, to miss even the little.¹ Consider then, if it were requisite for us three to pass a river, running with a strong current, and I, happening to be the youngest of us, and acquainted with many rivers, should say,—It is proper for myself to make an experiment the first, and, leaving you in safety, to ascertain whether it is fordable by you, older than myself, or how it is; and, on its appearing to be in that state, I were then to call upon you, and by my experience cause you to pass it together with myself; but if not fordable by you, for the danger to fall upon myself—I should appear to speak with moderation. So now, the future reasoning is of rather a violent kind, and perhaps nearly impassable, at least by your strength.² Lest then it should cause in you a dizziness and giddiness, by being carried round, and put questions to you unaccustomed to give answers, and afterwards beget in you an unseemly and unbecoming conduct,³ it appears to me that I ought, in the present case, to do thus to myself, (namely) to interrogate myself, first, while you are hearing in safety, and after this to give the answer myself, and thus to go through the whole of the reasoning, until, as regards the soul, it is finished, and shows that soul exists prior to body.

¹—¹ There seems to be here an allusion to the fable of the Dog and Shadow. At least in the prose of the original lies hid a Choliambic verse, *Μεῖζω δ' ἐπιβληθεὶς ἀπέτυχε καὶ σμικρῶν*.

²—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Taylor however thought it sufficient to translate nearly as closely the Latin of Ficinus, “ne vertiginem tenebrasque vobis faciat, ad eas vos quæstiones deducens, quibus consueti non estis, atque hoc pacto dedecore et tristitia afficiat—” where *παραφερόμενος* was probably omitted, as being unintelligible; for Plato wrote no doubt *περιφερόμενος*: since giddiness is produced rather by a circular than a lateral motion. And so I have translated.

Clin. You seem to us, guest, to speak most excellently; and do then as you are saying.

[6.] *Athen.* Come then, if at any time we ought to call upon gods,¹ let this be done so now; (and) let them be called on with all earnestness to the demonstration of their existence. And laying hold, as by some secure rope,² let us mount up to the present reasoning. Now it appears to me that, when I am examined upon these points, I shall answer most securely after this fashion,³ to questions of this kind. When a person says—O guest, do all things stand still,⁴ and is nothing moved; or does quite the contrary⁵ to this take place? Or, are some things moved, but others remain (fixed)? To this I shall reply—Some things are moved, but others remain (fixed). Do not then the things, which stand still, stand in a certain place; and are not the things, which are moved, moved (in a certain place)? How not? And some things would surely do so in one spot, but others in more (than one). Are you speaking, we shall say, of the things, which, obtaining the power of such as stand in the middle, are moved in one (spot), just as the circumference of tops,⁶ which are said to stand still, revolves? I do. And we understand that, in this circumference, the motion, which carries round⁷ the largest and the smallest circle,⁷ distributes itself proportionally in small and large circles, and is proportionally less and more. Hence it becomes

¹ I have adopted *θεῶς*, suggested by Viger on Euseb. P. E. xii. p. 623, in lieu of *θεῶν*— See my note on *Æsch.* Suppl. 630.

² Ast refers to Phædo, p. 85, D. where reasoning is compared to a raft.

³ In lieu of the unintelligible *κῆρα δέ*, I have with Ast adopted *κατὰ τὰδε*, furnished by Eusebius, and similar to *hujusmodi* in Ficinus.

⁴ This was the doctrine of Parmenides.

⁵ This was the doctrine of Heracleitus.

⁶ So I have translated *κύκλων*. For Plato is alluding here to the fact, that a top, when it revolves the quickest, seems to stand still, or, as boys in England say, to sleep. See my note on *Sophist* § 73, p. 155. And hence by *ἐν μέσῳ*, "in the middle," we must understand "on their centre—" See § 8, on *τῶν ἐντόρων*—*κύκλων*.

⁷—⁷ This allusion to the large and small circles will be understood at once by knowing that in a top the circles are less and less, as the sides of the toy taper to a point. With regard to the collocation of the words *τὸν μέγιστον καὶ τὸν μικρότατον*, as Plato has written just afterwards *μικροῖς τε καὶ μέζουσιν* and *ἐλάττων τε—καὶ πλείων*, one would prefer here *τὸν μικρότατον καὶ τὸν μέγιστον*: unless it be said that there is the figure of speech called Chiasmus.

the fountain of all wonderful things, ¹proceeding (with) slowness¹ and swiftness, that coincide with large and small circles,² in a manner that one would expect to be an impossible occurrence. You speak most true. But by things that are moved in many (places), you appear to me to mean such as are carried along by a movement, and pass from one place to another. And ³sometimes it is when³ they obtain the going of some one centre, and sometimes more,⁴ by being rolled around,⁵ ⁶and meeting on each occasion with each, they are cut through by

¹—¹ Sydenham, dissatisfied, it would seem, with the syntax of *βραδύτητας πορεύουσα*—for the accusative can depend only upon *κατὰ* understood—proposed to read *πορίζουσα*, remembering probably the preceding *περιάγουσα*—*κίνησις*— I should however prefer *παιρῖνουσα*—

² Here *κύκλοις* is taken in its usual sense. For there is a general inference drawn from a particular fact.

³—³ The Greek is *τότε μὲν ἔστιν ὅτε*—where Stephens, after justly objecting to such an union of words, supposes that *ἔστιν ὅτε* is used pleonastically with *τότε*. The idea is adopted indeed by Ast; but neither of those editors have produced a parallel passage, nor could they, I suspect, produce one. In *ἔστιν ὅτε βασιν* lies hid perhaps *αστάτου μεταβάσιν*—where *μετάβασις* would coincide with the preceding *μεταβαίνοντα*, and *αστάτου* with *εἰς ἕτερον αἰε τόπον*—and the sense would be, “and sometimes they obtain the changing motion of some one centre that is not at rest.”

⁴ I cannot understand to what *πλείονα* is to be referred. From its being opposed to *ἐνός κέντρον*, one would expect *πλείονων*. But as *ἐνός κέντρον* depend themselves upon *βάσιν*, (or *μετάβασιν*, if my correction is correct,) the sense would require *βάσεις* (or *μεταβάσεις*) *πλείονων*. With regard to the two kinds of motion, one of a body revolving on its centre in a fixed place, and another of a body revolving similarly, but with a change of place, Ast refers to Parmenid. p. 138, D. § 24, and Theætet. p. 181, D. § 95.

⁵ Cousin translates *περικυλινδεῖσθαι*, by “rouler çà et là dans l'espace.” But that would be in correct Greek *ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν κυλινδεῖσθαι*.

⁶—⁶ Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I confess I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; who has “et cum singula sibi invicem passim occurrant, si stantibus resistentibusque obvia fiunt, scinduntur—” as if he had found in his MS. *προστυγχάνοντα δὲ ἐκάστωι ἕκαστα ἑαυτοῖς τοῖς ἐστώσι καὶ ἀνθεστώσι διασχίζεται μὲν*—For Plato might have alluded to a theory promulgated perhaps by some philosopher, who endeavoured to unite the conflicting tenets of Parmenides and Heraclitus, that the Earth, which was supposed to be at rest at the centre of the system, might be split by a planet coming in contact with it; just as some modern astronomers have fancied that the four asteroids, Juno, Ceres, Pallas, and Vesta, are the fragments of a large planet, that was once found between the Earth and Mars.

those that stand still ;⁶ ¹ but being in the middle and between things of this kind, they are mingled with each other, meeting from an opposite direction, and carried along to one point.¹ I mean that these things are, as you say. And, moreover, the things that are mingled together,² are increased ; but when separated,³ waste away, when the existing condition of each remains ; but when it does not remain, both are destroyed. But the generation of all things takes place, when what event occurs ? It is evident that, when the commencement, after receiving an increase, arrives at the state of a second transition, and proceeding from this to that which is near, as far as three, ⁴ it possesses sense in things sentient.⁴ Every thing therefore is generated by this change and transition, and it exists in reality when it remains ; but when it is changed into another condition, it becomes entirely destroyed. Have we not then detailed, O friends, the whole of motion in its species and numbers, except two ?

Clin. Of what kind are those ?

Athen. They are nearly those, my good man, for the sake of which has been the whole of our present inquiry.

Clin. Speak more clearly.

Athen. It was surely for the sake of soul.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Let then one motion be that, which is able to move other things, but is ever unable to move itself ;⁵ and let the

¹—¹ Here again I am quite in the dark ; and so was Ficinus, as is evident from his unintelligible version, “sin vero contra latis unum facta, tam hæc quam ipsorum intermedia conjunguntur atque condensantur ;” and so too was Taylor, whose translation is—“But when they meet with each other and are borne along in an opposite direction, then the parts situated in the middle, and those between these, becoming one, they are mingled together.” Cousin says—*J’entends μεταξὺ τῶν τοιούτων par μεταξὺ τῶν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀπαντῶν τῶν καὶ φερομένων*, c’est à dire que deux corps qui, partis de deux points opposés, se rencontrent, forment un seul corps, dont le mouvement tient le milieu entre les deux mouvemens, qui poussaient les deux corps, dont il est composé.”

²—² Ficinus, aware that *συγκρινόμενα* could not be translated into Latin by a single word, has properly made use of two, “conjuncta densataque,” and rendered similarly *διακρινόμενα* by “disjuncta rarefactaque.”

⁴—⁴ Unless *σχή* is to be taken in the sense of *παρέχχ*, we must take *αἰσθησιν* in a passive sense, says Ast ; whose version is “percipi possit ab iis, qui sensibus præditi sunt—” referring to *ἀρχή* as the thing to be perceived. For myself I am quite content to confess my inability to perceive what Plato is aiming at in the whole of this passage.

⁵ This motion belongs to nature. T.

other be that, which is ever able to move both itself¹ and other things, by a commingling and a separation, and by increase and the contrary,² and by generation and corruption; and let this motion be different from all the other motions.

Clin. Be it so.

Athen. Shall we not then place that motion as the ninth, which always moves another, and is moved by another; but the motion, which moves both itself and others, (and) which is adapted to all doings and sufferings, and which is truly denominated the change and motion of all things, shall we not call this almost³ the tenth?⁴

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But which of the ten motions shall we most correctly select as the most powerful of all, and pre-eminently effective?

Clin. It is necessary to say, that the motion, which is able to move itself,⁵ is superior ten thousand-fold, and that all the rest come after this.

Athen. You speak well. Must we not then alter one or even two of our present assertions, as having been made not correctly?

Clin. Of what are you speaking?

Athen. That, which was stated respecting the tenth, was not correctly stated.

Clin. In what way?

Athen. According to reason, it is the first in generation and strength; but we hold, as second to this, that which comes

¹ This is the motion of soul. T. On these two kinds of motion Plato founds his leading argument in the *Phædo* for the immortality of the soul.

² Why Plato should thus have written *καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ*, instead of *μειώσεις*, to balance the preceding *αὐξαις*, it is difficult to understand. Something similar however is found in v. 5, as I have remarked in p. 163, n. 4.

³ This "almost" seems very strange here, as if there could be any doubt of its being the tenth or not. The word is properly omitted by Ficinus. It came from *δεκάτης*—*σχεδόν* shortly afterwards.

⁴ The genus of motion is here distributed into ten species: 1. revolution about a fixed centre; 2. transition from place to place; 3. condensation; 4. rarefaction; 5. increase; 6. decrease; 7. generation; 8. destruction; 9. change produced in another by another; and 10. change produced by a thing itself, both in itself and in another. This last is the tenth motion, of which he now speaks, and is the motion of soul. T.

⁵ Ficinus has "et se et alia movere," as if his MS. read *τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἕτερα κινεῖν*—similar to *τὴν τε αὐτὴν κινούσαν καὶ ἕτερα* just before.

after it, (the tenth,) although it has been just now absurdly called the ninth.

Clin. How say you ?

[7.] *Athen.* Thus. When one thing moves another, and something else always moves the former, will there ever be amongst such things any thing which first moves ?

*Clin.*¹ How can that, which is moved by another, ever be the first of things that cause an alteration ?

*Athen.*¹ It is certainly impossible. But when a thing, by moving itself, alters another thing, and this latter some other thing, and thousand things upon ten thousand become moved thus, will there be any other commencement of all the motion than the change of that, which moves itself ?

Clin. You speak most beautifully ; and on these points we must agree.

Athen. Let us speak² still further in this way, and give an answer to ourselves. If all things that are produced should somehow stand still together, as the majority of such persons³ dare to assert (they do), which of the above-mentioned motions must necessarily exist the first ?

Clin. That surely which moves itself. For things⁴ will never change by a fall under another, when there has not existed previously a change by a fall in themselves.⁴

Athen. We will say then that the commencement of all motions, and which first exists in things standing still and moved, is that, which moves itself ; (and) that this is necessarily the most ancient and the most powerful change of all : but that the second is that, which is altered by another thing, and moves other things.

Clin. You speak most true.

Athen. Since then we are at that point of our reasoning, let us likewise give an answer to this.

¹—¹ I have adopted in part the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Ast, and approved by Stalbaum. Cousin however is content with the common arrangement, but without being able to assign any satisfactory reason in its favour.

² Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "nos ipsos interrogemus."

³ By "such persons" are meant "the impious," whose arguments the Athenian is supposed to be bringing forward and refuting.

⁴—⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐ μὴ ποτὶ τιν' ἐμπροσθεν μεταίσῃ*—not *ποτὶ ἐμπροσθεν*—for otherwise *μεταίσῃ* would want its subject.

Clin. To what ?

Athen. If perchance we should see this (first)¹ motion taking place in a body formed of earth, or water, or fire-like, whether separate or mixed, what circumstance should we say was inherent in a thing of this kind ?

Clin. Do you ask me, whether, when a thing moves itself, we should say it is alive ?

Athen. Yes.

Clin. That it is alive. How not ?

Athen. But what, when we see soul inherent in any thing, must we admit ²that it lives through any thing else than this ?

Clin. Through nothing else.³

Athen. Hold then, by Zeus. Would you not be willing to understand three things with respect to each thing ?

Clin. How say you ?

Athen. One, the existence ; and one, the definition³ of the existence ; and one, its name ; and that there are likewise two questions respecting every thing that exists ?

Clin. How two ?

Athen. Sometimes each of us, when the name itself⁴ is proposed, inquires the definition ; and sometimes, when the definition itself⁴ is proposed, we inquire on the other hand the name. Are you then willing for us to speak again of a thing of this kind at present ?

Clin. Of what kind ?

Athen. There is surely a twofold distinction in other things, and in numeration. Thus, for instance, in numeration, "even" is a name ; but the definition is, a number divided into two equal parts.

Clin. Certainly.

¹ Ficinus has alone, what the train of thought requires, "primum motum," as if his MS. read *ταύτην τὴν α̃* instead of *ταύτην* merely.

²⁻³ I have followed Ficinus, who doubtless found in his MS., *ἄλλω ἢ τούτῳ αὐτὸ ζῆν*, and *οὐκ ἄλλω*, in lieu of *ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτόν τούτῳ ζῆν—οὐκ ἄλλο* : which Ast could not understand, as is evident from his attempt to explain and correct the common reading.

³ The proper Greek word for definition is *ὅρος*. But *λόγος* is sometimes taken in that sense, as shown by Wyttienbach, quoted by Ast, on Phædon, p. 198.

⁴⁻⁴ I cannot see what *αὐτὸ* and *αὐτόν* have to do here. The sense seems to require rather, *τὸ ὄνομα προτεινόμενόν πού του*—"the name perchance of a thing being proposed—" and similarly in the next sentence, *τὸν λόγον αὐ τοῦ προτεινόμενον* instead of *αὐτόν*—

Athen. I mean some such thing as this. Do we not speak of the same thing in each way, when, on being asked the name, we give the definition, or, being asked the definition, (we give) the name? ¹and when we call by the name of "even" a thing really the same, but by a definition divide a number as into two (equal) ¹ parts?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. But what is the definition of that thing, to which there is the name of soul? Have we any other than what has been just now mentioned, I mean, the motion which is able to move itself?

Clin. Do you mean, that the thing, which moves itself, is the definition of that existence, which we all call by the name of soul?

Athen. Yes, I do. But if this be the case, do we not still regret that it has not been shown sufficiently, that soul is the same with the first generation and motion of things which are, and have been, and will be, and, on the other hand, ²of all the contraries to these; ² since it has appeared to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

Clin. No. For soul has been sufficiently shown to be the most ancient of all things, and the commencement of motion.

Athen. Will not then the motion, which exists in another through another, but which never causes a thing to be moved in itself, be the second in order? ³and ought it not to be placed after the former motion, by whatever interval of numbers any one may choose to reckon, ³ since it is the change by a truly soulless body?

Clin. Right.

¹—¹ I have translated the Latin of Ficinus, "quandoquidem unam eandemque rem, nomine quidem, parem, ratione vero numerum in duo æqualia divisibilem appellamus;" for he probably found in his MS., not simply *δίχα διαιρούμενον*, but *δίχα εἰς ἴσα διαιπερίον*, similar to *διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη* just before.

²—² What Plato meant by the contraries to things that are, have been, and will be, I confess I cannot conceive.

³—³ Such is Taylor's translation of the Latin of Ficinus, "et quoto quis velit numerorum intervallo, superiori motui postponendus," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ ὅπου ἀριθμῶ βούλοιτ' ἂν τις ἀριθμῆν αὐτήν, πολλοστή τοσοῦτῳ*, instead of *ὅπου ἂν ἀριθμῶν—πολλοστήν τοσοῦτων*, where I cannot discover either syntax or sense. With regard to *πολλοστή*, Ast says it means "one out of many, i. e. the least," referring to Phileb. p. 44, E., while "postponendus" would lead to *ἐκτρία* in lieu of *τε καὶ*—

Athen. Rightly then, and decisively, and most truly, and most completely, should we have said that soul was generated prior to body, and that body is posterior and secondary, as being according to nature ruled over by the ruling soul.

Clin. With the greatest truth indeed.

[8.] *Athen.* We surely remember, however, that we agreed on a previous occasion that, if soul should appear to be more ancient than body, the things pertaining to soul would also be more ancient than those pertaining to body?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now conduct, and manners, and wishes, and reasonings, and true opinions, and attention, and memory, would have been generated prior to the length, and breadth, and depth, and strength of bodies, if soul be (prior) to body.

Clin. It is necessary.

Athen. Is it not then necessary after this to acknowledge, that soul is the cause of things good and evil, and of honourable and base, and of just and unjust, and of all contraries, if we lay it down as the cause of all things?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Is it not also necessary to assert, that soul, which administers ¹[and dwells in] ¹all things that are moved in every way, administers likewise the heavens?

Clin. How not?

Athen. One soul, or many? Many; (for) I will answer for you. Let us not then lay down less than two, one the beneficent, and the other able to effect things of a contrary kind.²

Clin. You speak very correctly.

Athen. Be it so. Soul then leads every thing in heaven, and on earth, and in the sea, by its movements; the names of which are, to will, to consider, to take care of, to consult, to form opinions true and false, to be in a state of joy, sorrow, confidence, fear, hate, love, together with all such primary movements as are allied to these, and which, receiving those of bodies that are secondary efficient, lead all things to increase

¹—¹ The words *καὶ ἐνοικεῦσθαι* are omitted by Clemens Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 593, A. = 701, Pott., correctly; for the argument turns not upon *διοικεῖν* and *ἐνοικεῖν* united, but *διοικεῖν* singly.

² On this doctrine of two powers, good and evil, Ast refers to Xenophon Cyrop. vi. 1, 41.

and decay, and to rarefaction and condensation, and to things consequent upon these, such as heat, cold, gravity, lightness, the hard and the soft, the white and the black, the sour and sweet, (and the bitter,)¹ and all that Soul makes use of, when, being a goddess herself,² she ever takes as an ally Mind, a god,³ and disciplines all things correctly and happily; but when with Not-Mind,³ it works out every thing the contrary. Shall we lay down that such is the case? or do we still doubt whether the case is different?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. Whether then shall we say, that the genus of soul has a power over heaven and earth, and the whole circuit,⁴ (as being)⁵ intellectual and full of virtue, or as⁶ possessing neither of these qualities? Are you willing then for us to answer these questions thus?

Clin. How?

Athen. If, let us say, O wonderful man, the whole path of heaven, and at the same time the progressive movement of all it contains, possess a nature similar to the motion and circulation and reasonings of Mind, and proceed in a manner allied to them, it is evident that we must say that the most excellent soul takes care of the whole world, and leads it along a path of that very kind.

Clin. Right.

¹ The words between the lunes are omitted by Bekker, with the two modern MSS., which have been evidently tampered with. Ficinus found them in his better one, as shown by his version, "austerum, dulce, amarum."

² I have followed the text of Bekker, *προσλαβοῦσα ἀπὸ θεὸν θεὸς οὔσα*, and translated *προσλαβοῦσα*, "taking as an ally," remembering the expression in *Æsch. Prom.* 225, *προσλαβόντα μητέρα*, as explained by Barker in *Classical Recreations*, p. 303, who to the passages quoted from Demosthenes might have added *Thucyd.* i. 82, and *Xenophon K. A.* i. 7, 3. In considering Mind as a god, Plato had perhaps in mind the doctrine, to which Euripides alludes in *Tro.* 890, *Ζεὺς εἶρ' Ἀνάγκη φύσιος εἶρε Νοῦς κρατῶν*: where Musgrave refers to Cicero de N. D. i. 11, "Cur quidquam ignoraret animus, si deus esset?"

³ To preserve the antithesis in *Νοῦς* and *Ἀνοεία* I have translated "Mind," and "Not-Mind."

⁴ Ficinus has "totumque orbem." But as *περίοδος* could not have that meaning by itself, one would suspect that *τοῦ παντός* had dropt out between *τῆς* and *περιόδου*, similar to *ἡ τοῦ παντός περίοδος*, in *Timæus*, p. 58, A.

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἄτε φρόνιμον ὦν*, and *ἡ ἄτε*, not *τὸ φρόνιμον*, and *ἡ τὸ*—

Athen. But if it proceeds in a mad and disordered manner, that the evil (soul leads it).

Clin. And this too is correct.

Athen. What nature then does the motion of Mind possess? To this question indeed it is difficult, friends, to answer prudently. It is therefore just that I should for the present anticipate¹ you in the answer.

Clin. You say well.

Athen. Let us then not look, as it were, opposite to the sun,² and, bringing upon ourselves night in mid-day, answer the question,³ as if we could ever sufficiently see and know Mind with mortal eyes:³ but one may see it more securely by looking to the image of the object of the question.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. From among those ten motions let us take (one)⁴ as an image, to which Mind is similar, which bearing in remembrance, I will in common with you give a reply.

Clin. You would speak most beautifully.

Athen. We remember, at present,⁵ so much at least of what was said formerly, that some of all things we laid down were moved, and others remained (at rest).

Clin. We do.

Cthen. But of things, which are moved, some were moved in one place, but others borne along in many.

¹ I have adopted *προλαμβάνειν*, found in one MS. of Eusebius, in preference to *προσλαμβάνειν*, which Ast says means the same as *ξυλλάμβάνειν*: an assertion so little to the taste of Winckelmann, that he proposes to read *προθύμως ξυλλάμβάνειν*, referring to *ξυλλήπτωρ—προθύμως*, in xii. p. 968, B.

² Ast explains this correctly by saying that persons by looking upon the sun blunt their eye-sight. But unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato did not write *ἐξ ἑναντίας*. For *εἰς ἥλιον* expresses all that *ἐξ ἑναντίας εἰς ἥλιον* could do, to say nothing of *οἶον*, which ought to precede, not follow, *ἐξ ἑναντίας*. But he might have written something to this effect, *γλανξὶν ἀνοήταις ὅμοιοι*, i. e. "like owls without sense—" For owls, like bats, cannot see when flying against the sun.

³—³ In the words of the original lies hid, I suspect, a poetical fragment, *οὐ νοῦν ποτε θνητοῖς Ὀμμασιν ὀψόμενοι γνωσόμενοι θ' ἱκανῶς*.

⁴ I have translated as if *μίαν* had dropt out after *λάβωμεν*. Of this fact had Ficinus been aware, he would have given a closer version than the following, "Videamus, cui potissimum decem illarum agitationum similis sit intellectus, ut, tanquam imagine, hac utamur."

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were not *τοῖνον* but *τὰ νῦν*, to balance *τῶν τότε*—

Clin. They are so.

Athen. Of these motions, it is necessary for that, which is borne¹ along in one place, to be moved round a certain middle point, in imitation of ² circles fashioned by a wheel,² and that it is in every respect as much as possible allied and similar to the circular movement of Mind.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. In saying that both Mind and the movement borne along in one place, are moved according to the same, and in a similar manner, and in the same, and round the same, and towards the same, according³ to one reason, and one order, similar to the movements of a sphere⁴ made round by a turner, we should not appear to be at all indifferent workmen for beautiful similes in a speech.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. The motion, then, which is not borne along in a similar manner, nor according to the same, nor in the same, nor round the same, nor towards the same, ⁵ neither in arrangement, nor in order, nor in one certain reason,⁵ will be allied to all Not-Mind.

Clin. It will so most truly.

Athen. It will then be now no longer difficult to assert distinctly, that since it is soul, which leads all things in a circular

¹ As *φέρεισθαι* is generally employed by Plato to denote a progressive motion, *φερομένην* could scarcely be introduced here; nor was it, I conceive, in the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is "qui semper in uno fit." But since Eusebius acknowledges it, and it is repeated twice afterwards, it would be perhaps uncritical to reject it in this place.

^{2—3} Such is Taylor's English for the Latin of Ficinus, "circuli torno confecti similis." For neither of them knew that Plato was alluding to a top, as I have shown on § 6, p. 419, n.⁶. Hence the real meaning is, "being an imitation of tops made round by a turner." For according to Hesychius, the *τόρνος* was an instrument used to make things round. With respect to the text, it is strange that Bekker should not have adopted *οὖσαν* from Eusebius, in lieu of *οὐσῶν*, which is perfectly unintelligible, and properly rejected by Ast.

³ Ast would read *καθ' ἑνα* in lieu of *καὶ ἑνα*, which is without regimen. Ficinus too has "una ratione et uno ordine."

⁴ By this "sphere," was meant "a top."

^{5—5} Others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote here, *ἐν κόσμῳ*—*ἐν τάξει*—*ἐν τινι λόγῳ*, after he had written in the corresponding clause of the preceding speech, *καθ' ἑνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν μίαν*, although it is true that *κόσμῳ* seems to have been introduced here to pave the way for the subsequent *κοσμοῦσαν*. In lieu however of *τινι* we must evidently read *ἐνι*, as I have translated.

manner, we must of necessity assert, that the best soul, or the contrary, leads round, and takes care of, and arranges the circular movement of heaven.

Clin. From what has been now stated, it is not, O guest, holy to say otherwise than that either one soul, possessing every virtue, or more souls, lead those things round.

Athen. You have listened, Clinias, to the reasons in the best manner; but listen still further to this.

Clin. To what?

[9.] *Athen.* If a soul leads round the Sun, and Moon, and the other Stars, does it not do so to each singly.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let us then direct our arguments to one (luminary), that they may appear to suit all the stars.

Clin. Which one?

Athen. Every one sees the body of the Sun, but not one its soul; nor (the soul) even of the body of any other animal, either living or dead; ¹ but there is a great hope that this genus (of things), which is naturally altogether not perceptible by all the senses of the body, would be thoroughly perceptible by the Mind alone. Let us then take something of this kind in our thoughts respecting it.¹

Clin. What?

Athen. If soul leads the Sun, we shall perhaps not miss the mark by asserting that it does so in nearly one of these three methods.

¹—¹ I have translated as if the Greek were—*ἀλλ' ἑλπίς ἐστι πολλή, τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὃ ἀναίσθητον τὸ παράπαν πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπέφυκε, διανόητον ἂν εἶναι νῶ μόνῳ καὶ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι λάβωμεν αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ τοιόνδε*—not *ἀλλ' ἑλπίς πολλή τὸ παράπαν τὸ—τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις—περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δ' εἶναι νῶ μόνῳ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι*—where, as Ast was the first to remark, there is neither syntax nor sense. With regard to the transposition of *τὸ παράπαν*, it is required by the usual practice of Plato, who unites perpetually *πᾶς* with some of its adverbial derivatives, and so too he does *καὶ δὴ καὶ*: and while *περιπεφυκεν ΔΙΑ* might have been easily corrupted into *περιπεφυκεν ΑΙ*, where the compound *διανόητον* is better suited than the simple *νοητὸν* to the following *διανοήματι*, both the syntax and sense require rather *ἂν εἶναι* after *ἑλπίς* than *εἶναι*. Lastly, as regards *διανόητον—νῶ μόνῳ*, Ficinus found that very reading in his MS. as shown by his version—“*idque genus cum nullo corporis sensu percipiatur, sola mente comprehenditur*,” although less dependence than usual is to be placed here upon his translation, as he has omitted *ἑλπίς πολλή*—*τὸ παράπαν* and *περιπεφυκέναι*—Baiter too would unite *νῶ μόνῳ* with *νοητὸν*—

Clin. What methods?

Athen. That either, residing within this apparent circular body, it entirely carries along a thing of that kind, just as the soul within us carries us around every where; or that, by supplying somehow from without a body of fire or air, as the doctrine is of some persons, it violently impels body with body; or thirdly, that being itself destitute of body, yet possessing certain other powers pre-eminently wonderful, it leads the way.

¹ *Clin.* Yes, this is necessary, that a soul, by doing some one of these things, should lead through² all.

*Athen.*¹ ³ And this too is surely better,³ for every man to consider this very soul as a god,⁴ which, keeping together the Sun, as a well-reined car, brings a dancing light to all the universe, whether derived from without, or in whatever manner, or by whatever road. Or how shall we say?

Clin. Yes, (for every man) surely, who has not arrived at the extremity of silliness.

Athen. But with respect to all the stars, and the moon, and years, and months, and all the seasons, shall we give any other

¹—¹ I have followed the arrangement of the speeches found in Ficinus.

² Instead of *διάγειν* one would have expected rather *περιάγειν*, or *διακομίζειν*—

³—³ I have translated as if the Greek were *καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἦν ἄμεινον τὸ ταύτην*, not *αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον*: to which Stephens was the first to object; for since *ἄμεινον* and *χρεών* could not both be found in the same sentence, one of them is superfluous. He did not however remark that *αὐτὸς* and its cases never begin a sentence, unless followed by *μέν*, *δὲ*, *γάρ*, or an enclitic.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is *εἴτε ἐν ἄρμασιν ἔχουσα ἡμῖν ἥλιον ἄγει φῶς τοῖς ἄπασιν, εἴτ' ἐξωθεν εἴθ' ὅπως εἴθ' ὅπη, θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι χρεών πάντα ἄνδρα*. But as the first *εἴτε* has nothing, to which it is opposed, it is evidently an error. So too is *ἐν ἄρμασιν*. For the Sun was not held to be in more cars than one, but to be seated in a car drawn by four horses. Moreover *ἡμῖν* is perfectly useless. And lastly, *χρεών* would, as remarked already, be superfluous after *ἄμεινον*. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were *ἢ γε, ὅλον ἄρμα, συνέχουσα εὐήνιον ἥλιον, ἄγει φῶς χορεύον τοῖσδε πᾶσιν εἴτ' ἐξωθεν εἴθ' ὅπως εἴθ' ὅπη θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα ἄνδρα*: where *εὐήνιον* is plainly confirmed by Plato himself in *Phædr.* § 57, *τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα ἰσορρόπως εὐήνι' ὄντα ραδίως πορεύεται*, and his imitator Plutarch, ii. p. 445, B., *ὥσπερ εὐήνιον θρέμμα καὶ πρᾶον ὁ λόγος ἡνιοχέι*: and while *χορεύον*, as applied to the heavenly bodies, is sufficiently defended by Euripides in *Peirith.* Fr. 2, *Νῦξ αἰολόχρως ἄκριτός τ' ἄστρον* *Οχλος ἰνδολεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει*, and by Tibullus in ii. l. 87, "*Nox jungit equos currumque sequuntur—sidera fulva choro—*" the expression *τοῖσδε πᾶσιν* may be compared with *ἑμβιβάσας ὡς εἰς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξε*, in *Timæus*, p. 41, E.

account than this, that, since a soul, or souls, good in every virtue, are seen to be the causes of all these things, we will call them gods, whether they exist in bodies, as being animals, and put in order the whole of heaven, by whatever road or in whatever manner (they do so)? nor is there the person,¹ who, assenting to this, would endure (to say) that all things are not full of gods.²

Clin. ³ There is not, O guest, a person so insane.³

Athen. After assigning then limits to him, who at the former period conceived that gods do not exist, let us, Clinias and Megillus, free ourselves (from this person).

Clin. What (limits)?

Athen. Either that he is to teach us we do not speak rightly, in laying down that soul is the first generation of all things, and such other points as follow upon this; or, if he is unable to assert any thing better than we do, that he is to be persuaded by us, and live for the remainder of his life in the notion that gods do exist. Let us then see whether we have spoken sufficiently to those, who do not conceive that gods exist, or insufficiently.

Clin. Insufficiently, O guest, the least of all.

[10.] *Athen.* For these then let this be the end of our discourse. And let us thus ⁵ soothe him, who conceives that gods exist indeed, but take no care of human affairs. Let us then say, O thou best (of men),⁶ since you think there are gods, perhaps a certain divine relationship leads you to honour what is cognate, and to think it does exist; but the ⁷ (good) fortune ⁷ of

¹ I have adopted *οὐθ' ὄστις*, as suggested by Ast, in lieu of *εἰθ' ὄστις*, to answer to *οὐκ ἔστιν—οὐδεὶς* in the answer of Clinias, and *ὁμολογῶν* with four MSS., and *ὑπομενεῖ* with Stephens.

² This was the theory of Thales. See Aristot. *Περὶ Ψυχῆς*, i. 8, Diogenes Laert. i. 27, and Stobæus *Ecl. Physic.* Ast.

³⁻⁵ From the words of the original may be elicited an Iambic verse—*Οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως παραφρονῶν οὐδ' εἰς, ξένη.*

⁶ Ficinus omits entirely *ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ*. Taylor has “at present.”

⁷ Ficinus has “sic,” answering to *ὥδε* in Theodoretus. The word is wanting in all the MSS. of Plato.

⁸ Ast, not aware that *δὴ* follows the superlative, as I have shown in Poppo's *Prolegom.*, and that *ἀριστὲ δὴ* is to be taken ironically, conceives that *δὴ φῶμεν* is put by an hyperbaton for *φῶμεν δὴ*—as if *δὴ* could thus begin a clause after a vocative.

⁷⁻⁷ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has “successus,” as if his MS. read *εὐτυχίαι*, not *τύχαι*.

evil and unjust men, both in private and public life, who, although not truly happy, yet are deemed to be very much so in common opinion, and are improperly hymned by the Muses, and in all kinds of compositions to boot, leads you not very sensibly¹ to impiety. Or perhaps, on seeing that impious old men, after arriving at their end, have left behind them grandchildren in the greatest honours, you are disturbed² for the present² in all these matters;³ or learning by hearsay, or perhaps being altogether an eye-witness,⁴ you have met with many and dreadful impieties, that have occurred to some, who through such very acts have arrived⁵ from small means at despotic power and the greatest (state).⁶ On account of all such events, you would then evidently be unwilling to blame the gods as the causes of such things, through your relationship with them; but at the same time being led by a want of reason, and unable to feel an ill-will towards the gods, you have arrived at your present state, so as to think that they do indeed exist, but that they despise and neglect the affairs of men. In order then that your present opinion may not⁷

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *μάλ' οὐκ ἐμμελῶς*, not *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμμελῶς*—Ficinus has "temere," without *ἀλλ'*—

²⁻² In lieu of *τὰ νῦν*, Plato evidently wrote *τι νοῦν*—remembering the expression in Sophocles *Ced. T. 473*, *Δεινὰ με νοῦν δεινὰ ταρασσει σοφὸς οἰωνοθέτας*—for so we must read in lieu of *Δεινὰ μὲν οὖν*—which every editor of the dramatist has hitherto failed to correct; while from *ὅταν*, which Eusebius has after *ὅταν*, Stephens elicited *ὦ' τὰν*, with the approbation of Ruhnken on *Timæus*, p. 281. But as Ficinus has "valde turbaris," perhaps he found in his MS. *ἄγαν* instead of *ὅταν*; and in that case I should prefer *ἄγαν τι νοῦν*—For this *ἄγαν τι* is similar to *πάνν τι* in *Phileb.* p. 63, B., and in *Athenæus* xiii. p. 555, A., and the other passages quoted by D'Orville on *Chariton V. 4*, p. 477, ed. Lips.

³⁻³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

⁴⁻⁴ Ficinus has "audistis fortassis aut etiam ipse vidisti." For he found in his MS. *ἴσως δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ αὐτόπτης προστυχῶν*, not *ἰδὼν ἢ δι' ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης προστυχῶν*, where *ἰδὼν αὐτὸς* is evidently an explanation of *αὐτόπτης*—Cousin however says that the common reading "est irréprochable et même élégante."

⁵ For the sake of the syntax, it is evident that we must read *τισι*—*ἀφικομένοις*, not *ἀφικομένως*.

⁶⁻⁶ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has what is more elegant, "ex re parva in magnam et ex infimo gradu ad tyrannidem."

⁷ Ficinus has "te trumat," as if his MS. read *ὠθῇ σε*, not *ἔλθῃ σοι*, from which I have elicited *ἔλθῃ σε*—For *ἔλκειν* and *ἔλθειν* are else-

draw you in the direction of impiety to greater suffering, but that¹ we may be able, as it were, to send it away,² while advancing (like a disease), by reasonings, let us endeavour to unite the reasoning next in order, with that, which we went through from the beginning, against the party, who held that gods did not exist at all, and to make use of it for the present. And do you, Megillus and Clinias, in succession, answer for the young man, as you did before; and if in our reasonings any thing difficult occurs, I will, as I did just now, take hold of you and cause you to pass the river.

Clin. You speak correctly. And do you act in this manner, and we will, to the best of our power, do as you say.

*Megil.*³ But, perhaps, it would not be difficult to prove this at least, that the gods are no less attentive to small things than to such as are pre-eminent in greatness. For I surely⁴ heard and was present⁴ during what was just now said, that they are good and possess every virtue, and have a care peculiarly their own of all things.

Clin. And I too heard it very distinctly.

Athen. Let us then after this search out in common thus, by speaking of what virtue of theirs do we acknowledge that they are good. Come then, to be temperate, we say, and to possess a mind, (belongs) to virtue, but their contraries to vice.

Clin. We say so.

where interchanged, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 234, and to the passages there quoted I could add not a few more.

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were ἀλλ' ἵνα, not ἀλλ' ἕδν, to which Ast was the first to object.

² The verb ἀποδιοπομπεῖσθαι, similar to "averruncare" in Latin, is applied to the driving away a calamity or disease; and hence I have introduced just afterward the words, "like a disease," as has been done just before in the phrase "impietatis morbum," and for the same reason, by Ficinus; whose translation, "remedium pro viribus, opinionem hanc refutantes adhibeamus," is thus partially adopted by Taylor, "to the utmost of our power to convince you of its fallacy."

³ I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Ast; while in ἀκούε, found in five MSS., and ἤκουον, in three, lies hid ἀκήκοα or ἤκηκόειν. So too, again, where one MS. reads ἐπήκουεν for ἐπήκουον, there Plato ἐπηκηκόειν. In like manner ἀκούεις is quoted incorrectly by Georg. Lecapen. in lieu of ἀκήκοας in Meno, § 32.

⁴ Plato has here, as elsewhere, adopted an ὕστερον πρότερον. Ficinus therefore, designedly perhaps, abridged the whole passage in his version, "præsertim cum paulo ante dictum fuerit, eos omni virtute refertos providentiam omnium sibi propriam vindicare."

Athen. And that fortitude (belongs) to virtue, and cowardice to vice.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. And shall we say that some of these are base, and others honourable?

Clin. Of necessity.

Athen. And shall we say that of such things those, that are vile, if (vile) they are,¹ belong to us; but that to gods there is no share in aught that is great or small amongst things of this kind?

Clin. And this too every one would acknowledge.

Athen. What then, shall we place carelessness, and idleness, and luxuriousness, as belonging to the virtue of soul? Or how do you say?

Clin. How can we?

Athen. But belonging to the contrary?

Clin. Yes.

Athen. The contraries therefore to these belong to that which is contrary.

Clin. To that which is contrary.

Athen. What then, would a person luxurious, and careless, and idle, whom the poet² says is most like the bees without a sting, be³ wholly of such a kind amongst us?³

Clin. ⁴Having spoken most correctly.⁴

Athen. It must not then be said, that a god has a habit of

¹ On the ellipse in εἴπερ Ast refers to ii. § 10.

² Hesiod in 'Epy. 300.

³⁻³ The Greek is ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. But four MSS. acknowledge πᾶς, adopted by Stalbaum; who confesses however the passage to be corrupt, nor is it clear how it ought to be corrected. Ficinus has—"nonne odio nobis habetur"—as if his MS. read γίγνοι' ἂν στύγητος in lieu of γίγνοι' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος—Hence, if we read πᾶς ἐν ἡμῖν likewise, we shall probably have what Plato wrote, unless we adopt Winckelmann's—ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶσι νεμεσητός, got from the words in Hesiod, Τῷ γε θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι.

⁴⁻⁴ To make something like sense out of these words, Ficinus, who is followed by Taylor, translated—"Rectissime profecto poeta ille cecinit." But the question is not whether Hesiod said what was correct or not, but what any one else would say. Hence I suspect the true reading to be 'Ορθότατα ταῦτά γε ὁ εἰπὼν εἶποι ἂν; i. e. "He who says so, would say so most correctly." For ταῦτα might easily have dropt out after 'Ορθότατα, and εἶποι ἂν after εἰπὼν. With regard to the formula, perpetual in Plato, see Ast on iii. p. 682, and myself on Criton, § 8, n. 10. And to the passages there quoted I could now add full twenty more.

such a kind that he himself hates it; nor must we overlook it, when a person attempts to say so much.

Clin. By no means. For how could it (be said) ?

Athen. But of him, to whom it belongs pre-eminently to do, and to take care of, any thing, does the mind take care of great things, but neglect small? (And)¹ shall we not do wrong entirely in the case of a person by praising such an assertion? But let us view the matter in this way. Does not he, who acts so,² whether a god or a man, so act according to two kinds (of acting)?

Clin. What two?

Athen. We will tell (you).³ Either because he thinks it of no consequence to the whole, when the small are neglected; or, if it is of consequence, he does through indolence and luxuriousness (knowingly) disregard them.⁴ Or does negligence take place in any other way? For surely, when it is impossible to take care of all things, there will not then be a neglect of things small, or great, in the case of the party not taking care of what⁵ either a god may be wanting in power or some trifling person unable to take care.⁵

Clin. How not?⁶

[11.] *Athen.* Now then let those two, who, although they both confess that there are gods, yet one (says) they are easy to be turned aside, and the other that they neglect matters of small moment, give an answer to us three. Do ye both assert, first that the gods know, and see, and hear all things, and that no-

¹ I have with Taylor inserted "and," as if *καὶ* had dropt out before *κατὰ*—

² i. e. neglects the small.

³ Ficinus omits *λέγομεν*: which Stephens and all subsequent editors assign to Clinias on the authority of Eusebius. But in that case Plato would have written *λέγεις*, or *λέγοιμεν ἄν*;

⁴ In *ὁ δὲ*, to which Stephens justly objects, lies hid *εἰδῶς*—or, since Ficinus has "*pigritia mollitieque detentus*"—*ἀλούς*—a word elsewhere corrupted, as I have shown on *Æsch. Prom.* 918.

⁵ The Greek is—*δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις, ὧν ἑλληνικῆς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται*. The version of Ficinus—"sive homo quidam sit impotens, sive deus aliquis non posse fingatur"—who either found in his MS. or else wished to read—*ἢ ἄνθρωπος τις—δυνάμει φαῦλος ἢ θεός τις μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι λέγεται*. I have translated as if Plato wrote *ἢ δυνάμει θεὸς ὧν ἑλληνικῆς, ἢ καὶ—φαῦλός τις μὴ δυνατὸς*—

⁶ In lieu of *ἄν* the syntax requires *οὔ*. For otherwise to supply the ellipse *ἴσται* would be united to *δν*, which I have shown to be impossible, in Poppo's *Prolegom.* p. 125—132.

thing of what there is a perception or knowledge can lie hid from them? Dò ye say that such is the case? Or how?

Clin. That it is such.

Athen. What then, that they are able to do all things over which there is a power to mortals and immortals?

Clin. How will they not agree that such too is the case?

Athen. We five then have agreed that the gods are good and the best.

Clin. Entirely.

Athen. Is it not, then, impossible to confess that they do at all any thing whatever through indolence and luxuriousness, since they are such as we confess they are? For with us inactivity is the offspring of cowardice, but indolence of inactivity and luxuriousness.

Clin. You speak most truly.

Athen. Now of gods not one is negligent through inactivity and indolence; for in cowardice surely they have no share.

Clin. You speak most correctly.

Athen. It remains then that, if they neglect things of little moment and size of those in the universe, they would do so either through their knowing that there is no need of taking care of things of this kind; ¹or—what remains but to think the contrary?¹

Clin. Nothing.

Athen. Whether then, O thou ²most excellent and best of men,² shall we put you down, as saying that (the gods) are ignorant, and through their ignorance neglect, when they ought to take care; or that, knowing what is proper, they do just as the weakest of mankind are said ³to do, when they know

¹—¹ The introduction of a question, where one would expect an assertion, expressive of another alternative, is at variance with the generally transparent style of the author.

²—³ I confess myself quite incompetent to understand, much less to explain, the difference between *ἀριστε* and *βέλτιστε*. Ficinus has merely "O vir eximie."

³ Plato had probably in mind the sentiment of Medea, in Euripides, *Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά· θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων*, in v. 1074, 5, where it is strange that Porson did not perceive that the dramatist wrote, *τῶν καλῶν βουλευμάτων*—similar to "video meliora proboque; Deteriora sequor," in Ovid, and the version by Meursius of Chalcidius, "Nec me latet nunc, quam cruenta cogitem; Sed vincit ira sanitatem pectoris—" both of which passages are quoted by himself.

there are other things better to be done¹ than what they are really doing, they do not do them through some failure, arising from pleasure or pain.

Clin. But how could there be ignorance?²

Athen. Do not human affairs partake of a nature endued with soul? and at the same time is not man of all animals the most pious towards the gods?³

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. Now we assert that all mortal animals are the property of gods, to whom belongs⁴ the whole of heaven.

Clin. How not?

Athen. Let then any one say that these things are to the gods either small or great, (it matters not);⁵ for on neither ground would it be fitting for our owners, who are the most careful and the best, to neglect us. For let us, in addition to these points, consider still further this.

Clin. What?

Athen. Respecting sensation and power, are they not naturally contrary to each other, with reference to easiness and difficulty?

Clin. How say you?

Athen. To see and hear small things is more difficult than large. But on the other hand, to carry, and to rule over, and to take care of, small and few things, is for every one more easy than in the case of their contraries.

Clin. Yes, more easy.

¹ I have taken ποιεῖν in a passive sense after βελτίω, remembering a similar expression, Ῥῆων φυλάσσειν for φυλάσσεισθαι, in Med. 320. Ficinus, it would seem, not aware of this, and remembering the passage in Ovid, has given this version, "An sicut improbos homines dicimus meliora quidem videre, sed voluptate aut dolore fractos deteriora sequi, sic deos, quamvis sciant providendum esse, similiter non providere."

² Instead of ἀν, one of the best MSS. read ἀνία, which evidently leads to ἀν ἄγνοια εἶη—and so I have translated. For otherwise ἀν would have nothing to which it could be referred.

³ Compare a similar sentiment in Menexen. § 7.

⁴ In lieu of ὧν περ, Ficinus, as shown by his "quemadmodum," found in his MS. ὥσπερ, of which Ast here approves, and Wytttenbach likewise on Phædon, p. 62, B., § 16, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.

⁵ So Ast supplies the ellipse before γὰρ—of which Ficinus not being aware, thus renders, "Jam ergo, seu parva hæc sive magna quis dixerit diis esse, nullo modo, cum providentissimi atque optimi sint, negligenda sibi sua possessio est—" which Taylor has for the most part adopted.

Athen. But when the whole of a thing is enjoined upon a physician, both willing and able to cure, will the whole itself¹ ever be in a good state, while he is taking care of great matters, but neglecting parts that are small?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. Nor will things many and large, apart from the few and small, ²(be in a good state)² in the case of pilots, or army-leaders, or housekeepers, nor, ³on the other hand, of some³ statesmen, or any other person of such a kind. For masons say, that great stones do not lie well without small ones.⁴

Clin. ⁵For how (is it possible)?

Athen. We will not then think it right⁵ for a god at least to be even more vile than mortal artificers; who, the better they are, by so much the more do they from one art bring out accurately and perfectly the works small and great, pertaining to their own trade; but that a god, who is most wise, and both willing and able to take care of things, does of things which, being small, it is easy to take care of, take no care at all, like a person inactive or timid, or listless through labour, but only of things that are large.⁶

Clin. Let us by no means, O guest, receive this notion, respecting the gods; for we should form a conception neither holy nor true.

Athen. We seem then, to myself, to have conversed in a very moderate manner with him who loves to find fault with the carelessness on the part of the gods.

¹ I have adopted *αὐτὸ*, found in Eusebius, in lieu of *αὐτῶ*—

²—² Ast supplies *καλῶς ἔξει* from the preceding speech.

³—³ In lieu of *τισι* one MS. has *τοῖσι*— Hence in *αὐ* and *τισι*, neither of which is suited to the train of thought, there lies hid, I suspect, some other reading; perhaps *οὐδέ ᾧ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*—where *ᾧ* is put for *πρώτοις*—as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom, p. 223.

⁴ Donaldson in The New Cratylus, p. 551, ed. 1, compares very aptly Soph. Aj. 158, *Καίτοι μικροὶ μεγάλων χωρὶς Σφαλερὸν πύργου ῥῦμα πέλονται. Μετὰ γὰρ μεγάλων βαυὼς ἀριστ' ἄν, Καὶ μέγας ὀρθοῖθ' ὑπὸ μικροτέρων.* He did not however perceive that in the words of Plato there probably lies hid a proverbial hexameter—*Οὐ γὰρ ἀνεμὶ μικρῶν μεγάλους κείσθ' ἐστὶ λίθους εὖ.*

⁵—⁵ The Greek is *Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; Μὴ τοίνυν—ἀξιῶμεν—* But there is nothing to which *ἄν* can be referred; and moreover *μή—ἀξιῶμεν* is rather doubtful Greek. To meet the latter difficulty, we might read *ἀξιῶμεν* with Theodoretus in Therap. Serm. vi. p. 570, B., or—*Οὐ μὴ τοίνυν ἀξιῶμεν*—which last word is found in one of the best MSS.

⁶ The aposiopesis is to be supplied from the next speech of Clinias.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. By forcing him through our reasoning to confess that he does not speak correctly. He seems however to myself to be still in want of enchantments by certain words.¹

Clin. Of what kind, my good man?

[12.] *Athen.* Let us persuade the young man by our reasonings, that by him, who takes care of the universe, with a view to the safety and excellence of the whole, every thing has been arranged, each part of which, as far as possible, suffers and acts what is suited to it; and that over each of these parts rulers have been appointed with reference to even the smallest portion of action and passion,² having worked out an end to the ultimate distribution;³ of which parts, even thy portion, O miserable man, is one, and although it is very small, it is continually stretching its view to the whole. But this very thing has lain hid from you, that all generation is for the sake of the whole, in order that the existence of the universe may be happy in its life, and not for the sake of you; but that you exist for the sake of the universe. For every physician, and every skilful handicraftsman, works out all things for the sake of the whole, stretching (his view)³ to that which is the best, taken in common; and he fashions a part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of a part.⁴ But you take it ill, through not knowing that what is best with respect to yourself, happens both to the universe and yourself, according to the power of a common generation. But since a soul, connected⁵ at one time with one body and at another with

¹ Stephens compares the expression *μύθοις οὕς—ἐν ἐπιδόαις—λεγομένων*, in p. 877, D. § 3.

^{2—2} Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which Stalbaum conceives to be corrupt; and so too does Ast; for he proposes to read *τελείως* in lieu of *τέλος*: but I confess I cannot see what is gained by the change. Ficinus has what is intelligible indeed, but not to be got from the Greek at present—"per singulas et extremas universi particulas distributione, ad ultimum usque peracta, curam habent"—as if his MS. read *καὶ μερισμὸν τοῦ ὅλου τελίως τίς τὸ ἔσχατον ἀπειργασμένοι*, i. e. "and working out a distribution of the universe perfectly to its extreme point."

³ I have added "his view," on account of the preceding *ἐννέεινον βλέπον*—from which came here *ἐννέεινον*, corrected first by Stephens into *ἐννέεινων* from Eusebius.

⁴ Of this passage in Plato Horace had perhaps a recollection, when he wrote his remark—"Infelix operis summæ, quia ponere totum Nescit."

⁵ In lieu of *συντεταγμένη* one would prefer *συμπεπηγμένη*—

another, undergoes all kinds of changes through itself, or through some other soul, nothing else remains for the player at pebbles¹ than to place the habit, which has become better, into a better place, but the worse into a worse, according to the proper condition of each, in order that they may obtain their fitting allotment.

Clin. In what way do you mean?

Athen. I appear to myself to be speaking in that way, by which an inactivity on the part of the gods in taking care of all things would seem to have a reason. For if any one, always looking to the whole, were to mould all things by changing their forms—for instance, water² with a soul³ from fire, and either³ many things from one or one from many—participating in a first, or second, or even a third generation, the things relating to an altered arrangement would be infinite in number. But now there is a wonderful easiness to the party taking a care of the universe.

Clin. How again, say you?

Athen. Thus. After our king had seen all his actions, possessing a soul,⁴ and much of virtue existing in them, and much of vice, and both soul and body being a thing⁵ indestructible,

¹ The game called *περρεία* I have supposed to be something similar to the modern backgammon. But Ficinus has here “harum rerum ordinatori, tanquam talos jacenti,” from which it is easy to elicit, what the sense requires, *ἔργον, ὅλον περρεύει, αὐτῇ* (i. e. *ψυχῇ*) *λείπεται*— With regard to the metaphor, in addition to the authors quoted here by Ast, may be added those, of which I have given a list on *Æsch.* Suppl. 14, to be still increased by as many more.

²⁻² In lieu of *ἐμψυχον* Cornarius proposed to read *ἐμψύχον*—“cold-producing—” But Ast says that in *ἐμψυχον* there is another allusion to the theory of Heracleitus; who conceived that from the change of the fiery particles of matter into the aqueous the principle of all things was evolved, as we learn from Clemens Alexandr. *Strom.* v. p. 712, while according to Plotinus in *Ennead.* iv. 8, 1, p. 468, the doctrine of all things undergoing a change was the leading tenet of the same philosopher.

³ I have with Ast adopted *ἦ*, the conjecture of Cornarius, in lieu of *μη*—

⁴ How actions can be said to have a soul, I confess I cannot understand.

⁵⁻⁵ Here again I am at a loss to understand how that, which is indestructible, is not eternal. Taylor indeed says that body, when it is corrupted, is resolved into the elementary wholes, from which it originated, but is never destroyed. This would however be true only of the particles of which a body is composed, not of the body, taken as a mass of particles put into some form; for the form might be destroyed, while the particles remained indestructible.

but not eternal,⁵ like the gods, existing according to law,¹ for there never would have been a generation of living beings, if either of these (soul or body) had been destroyed,—and that the thing which, as being² a good in the soul, has been thought to be always naturally disposed to be of service, but that the thing which, as being an evil in it, (has been thought) to do mischief,—all this, when (the king) beheld, he planned, where each of the parts should be situated, and cause virtue to gain the victory in the universe,³ and vice to suffer a defeat, in the easiest⁴ and best manner. He planned therefore generally⁵ this, how a thing, being generated of what kind, what seat it ever ought to share in,⁶ and in what place⁷ reside; but he left to the will of each of us the causes of generation of⁸ this or that.⁸ ⁹For wherever a person has a desire, and of what kind he may be as to his soul, there nearly on each occasion, and such becomes each of us, for the most part.⁹

¹ By "law," says Taylor, Plato meant intellectual distribution; so that the gods according to "law," are those divine natures, which proceed from the intellect of the fabricator of the universe; while by "law," Ast understands "the law of fate." But in that case Plato would have written here, as he does shortly afterwards—*κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἰμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον*—

² I have adopted, what Stephens suggested, *ὥς ὃν* for *ὅσον*, which I cannot understand. Cousin says that *ὥς ὃν* means the same as *ὅσον*.

³ In lieu of *τῷ* one MS. has *αὐτῷ*; which seems to lead to some other reading.

⁴ On the doubled superlative *μάλιστα ῥῆστα*, see Monk on Hippol. 487

⁵ Ficinus has "ad universum," as if his MS. read *πρὸς τὸ πᾶν*, translated by Taylor, "with reference to the universe," and by Ast, "universi rationibus convenientem—" And hence we can avoid the impropriety in *τὸ ποῖόν τι*—by reading *πρὸς τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο, ποῖόν τι*—

⁶ Ficinus has "sortiri," as if his MS. read *μεταλαγχάνειν*—

⁷ I hardly understand here the difference between *ἵδραν* and *τόπους*: for where the seat is, there also will be the place. Ficinus has "*sedem habitationemque*—"

⁸ So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus—"talīs cuiusdam aut talis—" as if his MS. read *τοῦ ποίου ἢ τινος*—Eusebius and Theodoretus offer *τὸ ποίου τινος*—approved of by Stephens and Ast. But the definite *τοῦ* could not be thus united to the indefinite *τινος*.

⁹ Such is the literal version of the Greek, out of which I must leave for others to make what sense they can. I am quite in the dark. In lieu of *ὁποῖός τις ὦν* Theodoretus has, what Ast adopts, *ὁποῖος ἂν ᾖ*, similar to "*qualisque animus sit*" in Ficinus; while from "*ferme semper habitat*" in the same version, Cornarius elicited *σχεδὸν ἐκάστοτε οἰκίζεται*. Lastly *ἀπας ἡμῶν* is omitted there, as being considered perhaps perfectly useless.

Clin. It is likely.

Athen. Every thing then, that has a share of soul, is changed, and possesses in itself the cause of the change; but, when changed, it is borne along according to the order and law of fate. And ¹of the manners such as being changed are less and less (wicked),¹ proceed along the superficies of the region;² but those that are more (changed) and are more unjust, fall into a depth, and into the so-called places below, which persons, designating by the name of Hades, and what are close upon these appellations, greatly fear, and dream of, when living ³and freed from their bodies; but the soul when it partakes more of vice than of virtue through its will and intercourse becoming strong, when mixing with divine virtue, it becomes pre-eminently such, and it is changed to a pre-eminent place entirely holy, after being carried to some other better place; but when the contrary, it transfers its life to the contrary.³

¹—¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *σμικρότερα μὲν τὰ τῶν ἡθῶν μεταβάλλοντα καὶ ἐλάττω κακὰ κατὰ*—not *σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἡθῶν μεταβάλλοντα ἐλάττω, κατὰ*—which Ast would correct by omitting *ἐλάττω*, an explanation he says of *σμικρότερα*: as if any one would ever think of explaining a word so common and intelligible as *σμικρότερα*: while to support the syntax in *ἡθῶν*, he conceives that *σμικρότερα τῶν ἡθῶν* is the same as *ἡθῶν, ἃ σμικρότερα αὐτῶν ἐστὶ*—an idea he would, I think, find it difficult to confirm by a parallel passage. Ficinus has “*quæ minus peccarunt, minus profundæ*,” which is evidently a guess, and not a very successful one, at the meaning. Cornarius has “*quæ quidem animæ minus pravos mores habent, minus mutantur*,” which is certainly more intelligible, but not to be obtained from the Greek; and if it could be, it is at variance with the train of thought, which relates to the changes made positively, and not in a greater or less degree. Hence Viger on Eusebius *Præp. Ev.* xiii. 18, p. 703, B., proposed to read *ἐλάττω μὲν καὶ δικαιότερα*, antithetical to *πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα* in the corresponding clause. But though *ἐλάττω μὲν* could scarcely follow *σμικρότερα μὲν*, yet was Viger near the mark; at least he led myself to conjecture *καὶ ἐλάττω κακὰ*, where *κατὰ* might have been easily lost before *κατὰ*—

²—² I confess I cannot understand what Plato meant by *τῆς χώρας*—nor could Ast, I suspect; for he supplies “*terræ*” in his translation, “*per terræ planitiem*—” But from the subsequent *εἰς βάθος τὰ τε κάτω λεγόμενα τῶν τόπων*—it is evident that some word was written here originally, as antithetical to *κάτω λεγόμενα*, as *ἐπίπεδον* is to *βάθος*. Now this would lead at once to *τῆς ἀνω χώρας*.

³—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I am completely in the dark; and so too was Ficinus, I suspect; for he has been content to give what he conceived to be the general sense—“*anima vero, quæ majoris virtutis vel vitii compos est, quando propria voluntate et assidue*

[13.] ¹ This is the judgment of the gods, who hold Olympus—¹

O thou ² boy and youth,² who thinkest that thou art neglected by the gods; for that the person, who has become more wicked, departs to the more wicked souls; but he, who has become better, to the better, both in life, and in all³ deaths, to suffer and do what is fitting for the like⁴ to do to the like.

consuetudine vehementius permutata, divinæ virtuti adhæsit, talisque præcipue facta est, in locum similiter longe meliorem sanctumque transfertur; quæ vero contrario modo affecta est, in contrarium translata vitam peragit suam." But as Eusebius offers *διαλυθέντες δὲ σωμάτων*, properly opposed to *ζῶντες*— I suspect that Plato wrote to this effect, *διαλυθέντες δὲ τῶν σωμάτων μείζω δεδίασιν, ἢ ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς πλείον ὅταν μεταλάβῃ διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς βούλησιν καὶ ὁμιλίαν γενομένην ἰσχυράν καὶ αἰσχροὺς ὅταν δ' αὖ μένῃ ἀρετῇ θείᾳ προσμίζασα, γίγνεται διαφερόντως αἰσχυρὰ, διαφερόντως καὶ, εἰς τόπον ἁγίων ὅλον μετακομισθεῖσα, εἰς ἀμείνω μετέβαλιν' ὅταν δὲ τάναντία ποιῇ, κατὰ τάναντία μεθιδρύσαστο εἰς τινα τόπον ἀνιερὸν τὸν αὐτῆς βίον*: i. e. "But after being freed from their bodies they have a greater fear, when the soul shall have participated in more of vice than virtue, through its will and converse (in life) having become violent and base. But when on the other hand it shall remain, having an intercourse with divine virtue, it becomes such (i. e. divine) pre-eminently; and pre-eminently, after being conveyed to a place entirely holy, it is changed for the better; but when it acts in a contrary manner, it has, under contrary circumstances, placed its existence in some unholy spot." To produce however this light out of darkness, it was requisite to alter the position of some words, and to change *δε δὴ* into *δεδίασιν*, and *οποταν* into *πλεον οταν*, and *οποταν μιν* into *οταν μιν*, and *γίγνεται* into *γίγνεται*, and *διαφερόντα* into *διαφερόντως*, and *ἐπὶ τάναντία* into *ποιῇ κατὰ τάναντία*; and *τοπον ἕτερον* into *τοπον ανιερων*; and lastly, on the authority of Eusebius, *μεθιδρύσασα* into *μεθιδρύσαστο*, which Stephens was the first to point out and approve. With regard to *μείζω δεδίασι*, this is evidently required as a climax to the preceding *σφόδρα φοβούνται*—and so too both *ἰσχυράν* and *αἰσχροὺς* are required by *βούλησιν* and *ὁμιλίαν*: and *διαφερόντως καὶ* by the preceding *διαφερόντως*: and lastly, *τόπον ανιερων* to balance *τόπον ἁγιων*: by the aid of which it is easy to see that in § 13, where all the MSS. read *ἀγιώτερον—τόπον*, contrary to the sense, except that of Ficinus, which seems to have had *ἀπώτερον*, answering to his "remotiorem," as remarked by Stephens, Plato probably wrote *ἀνιερώτερον*— Neither of these corrections would however meet with the approbation of Winckelmann, if he still adheres to his proposed reading, *τόπον ἄλλον* in lieu of *τόπον ἁγιων ὅλον*—

¹ This is from Hom. Od. T. 43.

² *Παῖς* and *νεανίσκος* are not, I think, thus united elsewhere.

³ This "all" seems rather strange here, as if the question were about many kinds of death.

⁴ From *προσφέρουσι* in Ald. Cornarius elicited *προσφέρῃσι*, by the aid of "a similibus ad similes" in Ficinus. And so all the MSS. subsequently

But neither must you or any one else¹ pray, after becoming fortunate,² to be superior to this judgment of the gods. For this judgment, pre-eminent above all, did those, who ordained, ordain, and it is meet to regard it carefully in every way. For you will never be neglected by it,³ not though you were so small, as to sink into the depths of the earth, nor so lofty, as to fly up to heaven;³ but you will suffer from them the fitting punishment, whether you abide here, or depart to Hades, or are carried to a place still more wild⁴ than those. And my language will be the same to you, as it was respecting those persons, whom you have seen becoming great after being small, and whom, after committing unholy acts,⁵ [or doing something of that kind,]⁵ you thought had become happy after being miserable. And then you conceived that you beheld in their doings, as in a mirror, the disregard of all things on the part of the gods, nor did you know in what way they pay up the full amount of their contribution to every one;⁶ and to know that, think you, O most courageous of all men, is a thing of no consequence?⁷ which he who is ignorant of, will neither see a type of life, nor be able to contribute a discourse about it on the subject of happiness or an unhappy fortune. If then Clinias here, and the whole of this old assembly,⁸ are able to persuade you that you do not know what you are saying about the gods, a god himself will kindly give you his aid; but if

collated. Eusebius has however προσφύσι. But even there some MS. probably reads προσφέρεισι—

¹ Instead of οὔτε εἰ ἄλλος, Ficinus found in his MS. οὔτε τις ἄλλος, as remarked by Ast. For his version is "nec alius ullus—"

² I have adopted εὐτυχής, found in the three best MSS., in lieu of ἀτυχής, through the usual change of εὐ and α, as I have shown on Eurip. Tro. 606. Ficinus too found εὐτυχής, as shown by his version, "adeo felicem." Eusebius however acknowledges ἀτυχής.

³ On this sentiment, Ast refers to Dorville on Chariton, p. 665, and Wytenbach in Biblioth. Crit. iii. iv. p. 37.

⁴ Ficinus has "remotiorem inaccessibilemque," as if he had found in his MS. ἀπώτερον καὶ ἄβατον— But see just before in § 12.

⁵ The words between the brackets are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. They are certainly superfluous.

⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were παντί τῷ, not τῷ παντί—for the allusion to the universe would be here out of place.

⁷ I have adopted πρὸς οὐδέν, found in Eusebius, in lieu of πῶς οὐ δεῖν— Winckelmann suggests πῶς οὐ πολλοῦ δεῖν δοκεῖς;

⁸ Instead of γερουσία, Plato probably wrote γερῶτα, for such was the Spartan word.

you are still in want of a further reason, hear us, if you possess any mind whatever, while we are speaking to the third party. For that there are gods, and that they take care of men, I would say has been not altogether badly shown by us. But that the gods can be turned aside by receiving gifts from those who act unjustly, must not be conceded to any one; but on the other hand, disproved by every means in our power.

Clin. You speak most beautifully; and let us do as you say.

Athen. Come, then, by the gods themselves, (say) if forsooth¹ they are turned aside in what manner are they so moved; and who and what kind of beings are they? Now it is surely necessary for those to be rulers, who regulate continually the whole of heaven.

Clin. It is so.

Athen. But to what rulers are they like? or what rulers are like to them ²amongst such as it is in our power to meet with, while likening the less to the greater?² Would such be either the rein-holders, while two-yoked cars are contending (in the course), or the pilots of ships? Perhaps however they may be likened to certain leaders of armies. Or it would be possible to liken them to physicians, who have a prudent care respecting the war of diseases³ about bodies; or to husbandmen, who, in fear for the generation of plants, wait for the usual period of bad seasons; or to the superintendents of herds. For, since we have agreed amongst ourselves that heaven is full of many good things, and that there are some of the opposite kind, but the majority is of those that are not,⁴ we assert that a war of this kind is immortal, and requires a wonderful watching. The gods however, and at the same time dæmons, fight on our side; for⁵ we are the property both of

¹ In lieu of *αὖ*, which has no meaning here, Plato wrote, what I have translated, *δὴ*, taken in its usual ironical sense.

² Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has "ut possibile nobis sit minores majoribus comparare," as if he had found in his MS. *ὡς δυνατόν ἢ ἡμῖν ἀπεικάζειν μείζουσιν ἐλάττωνας*, in lieu of *ἀπεικάζουσι τυγχάνειν*.

³ Although the expression *νόσων πόλεμον* might perhaps stand, yet I should have preferred *νόσων πολὺν ἔσμον*—similar to *νόσων ἔσμος* in Æsch. Suppl. 677, and "morborum cohors," in Horace. Winckelmann suggests *νόσους διὰ πόνων*, referring to *πόνους Νούσων* τὲ, in Hesiod *Epy.* 91.

⁴ Ast would supply *ἀγαθῶν* after *μή*—

⁵ The Greek is *ὅ' αὖ*—but as *αὖ* has no meaning, it is properly omitted in one good MS. Plato wrote *γάρ*, not *δέ*, as I have translated.

gods and dæmons. But injustice and insolence together with imprudence corrupt us; whereas justice and temperance, united to prudence, which dwell in the soul-endued powers of the gods, preserve us. Now that some little portion of such properties resides in us, one may clearly see even in this way. Certain souls residing on the earth, and possessing an unjust disposition,¹ it is plain, have a savage feeling towards the souls of their guardians, whether dogs, or shepherds, or in every respect the highest of all rulers. (And)² falling upon these, they persuade them³ by flattering words, and some prayer-like enchantments³—as say the reports of the wicked—that it is lawful for them to possess a superfluity of power amongst men, and not to suffer anything. Now this superfluity, what is now denominated a sin, we surely say is called, in the case of fleshly bodies, a disease; in that of the seasons of the year,⁴ a pestilence; and in that of cities and polities, by giving again to this very word a change, injustice.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Such a reasoning as this it is, therefore, necessary for him to state, who asserts that the gods always pardon men⁵ unjust and acting unjustly,⁵ should any one offer a part of his unjust gains, just as wolves⁶ give a small portion of their

¹ I have adopted *λήμα*, suggested by Ast, in lieu of *λήμμα*, which Dorville on Chariton, p. 87, vainly identifies with *λήμα*. See Valckenaer on Ammonius, p. 87.

²⁻³ The Greek is *προσπίπτουσαι πείθουσι*—But no person, who wishes to persuade another, would think of making a violent attack upon him. Nor can *προσπίπτουσαι* be rendered "falling down to" in an attitude of prayer, as applied to souls. There is then, evidently, some error in *προσπίπτουσαι*. But since *προσπίπτουσαι* suits sufficiently well with *θηριώδεις*, one would say that the error is in *πείθουσι*, were it not that *πείθουσι* suits equally well with *θωπείαις λόγων*. Hence to avoid either dilemma, perhaps Plato wrote *δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ θηριώδεις εἰσὶ—δεσπότων, ὅμως πλάθουσι προστρέπουσαι*—i. e. it is plain that, even if they are savage—they still approach them and beg of them by flattering words—that it may be lawful—

³ Ast explains *ἐκταίαις ἐκπαδαῖς* by "carminibus preces continentibus"—But Plato wrote, no doubt, *καὶ ἱκεταίαις ἐν τῇ τισιν ἐκπαδαῖς*, "and by supplications and some enchantments—"

⁴ Although *ἐτῶν* and *ἐνιαυτῶν* are united in Homer, they are not so in prose. Hence Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has omitted one of those words.

⁵⁻⁵ Ficinus unable, no doubt, as I am, to see the difference between *ἀδίκους* and *ἀδικούσιν*, has merely "injustis," adopted by Taylor.

⁶⁻⁶ By this passage may perhaps be understood the *λυκοφιλία* alluded to in Epist. iii. p. 318, E.

plunder to dogs,⁶ who, being softened down by gifts, allow them to seize upon the sheep. Is not this the assertion of those who say that the gods are easily turned aside?

Clin. It is this.

[14.] *Athen.* To which then of the aforesaid guardians would any man ¹by likening the gods ¹not become a laughing-stock? Is it to pilots, who turned aside

²By wine-libations and the scent of fat,²

destroy both the ships and the sailors?

Clin. By no means.

Athen. Nor yet to charioteers, who, when drawn up in order for contest, are induced by a bribe to give up the victory to the other two-yoked cars.

Clin. For in speaking such a speech you would speak of a dreadful likeness.

Athen. Nor yet to army-leaders, nor to physicians, nor to husbandmen, nor to shepherds, nor to certain dogs softened down by wolves.

Clin. Speak good words. For how could³ (a person, by so likening them, not be a laughing-stock)?

Athen. But are not all the gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest affairs?

Clin. Very much so.

Athen. Shall we then say that those, who watch over the most beautiful things, and over ⁴themselves pre-eminently,⁴ with a guard as respects virtue, are worse than dogs, and men of a moderate kind, who would never betray justice for the sake of bribes⁵ given in an unholy manner from unjust men?

Clin. By no means—such an assertion is not to be borne; and of those, ⁶who are engaged in every kind of impiety,⁶ he

¹—¹ The Greek is ἀπεικάζων ὁμοίους φύλακας εἶναι θεοὺς— But Ficinus found, no doubt, φυλάκων without ὁμοίους εἶναι—for his version is “quibus prædictorum custodum deos aliquis conferens—”

²—² Plato had in mind *l. A. 500*.

³ After δὲν is to be supplied ἀπεικάζων καταγέλαστος οὐ γίγνεται, from a preceding speech of the Athenian.

⁴—⁴ In lieu of διαφέροντας αὐτοὺς, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were διαφερόντως αὐτοὺς—

⁵ Instead of δώρων, “gifts,” one would have expected rather δωρεῶν, “bribes,” as I have translated.

⁶—⁶ The words between the numerals here, or between those at ‘—’,

who lays hold of this opinion runs the risk surely of being most justly adjudged to be ⁷ of all impious persons ⁷ the worst and most impious.

Athen. Let us say, then, that the three subjects proposed, namely, that the gods exist and have a care of (all things),¹ and that they are not to be drawn aside (by entreaties) contrary to what is just, have been demonstrated sufficiently.

Clin. How not? and we give our votes together in favour of these reasonings.

Athen. The arguments have however been somehow stated with greater vehemence through the love of contention in bad men. But, friend Clinias, this love of contention has been indulged in on this account, that wicked persons may not imagine that, by being the masters in words, they have a licence to do what they please, (according to)^{2 3} what and of what magnitude and of what kind³ they conceive of the gods. There has then arisen a readiness on this account, to speak in rather a novel⁴ manner. But if we have done even a little of moment towards persuading somehow the (three)⁵ men to hate themselves and to love manners quite the reverse, the prelude to the laws relating to impiety will have been spoken by us to a good purpose.

Clin. There is a hope at least; but should (the event be) not so, this kind of discourse will bring no blame upon the lawgiver.

[15.] *Athen.* After the prelude, then, such a discourse as is the interpreter of the laws, would follow⁶ correctly, pro-

are evidently an interpolation. They are omitted in the former place by Ficinus, whom Taylor does, and Ast would, follow. They ought rather to be omitted in the latter. For we find in § 15, *περὶ δόξιν διὰ τῶν ὄντων*. But in both passages Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἰόντων*. For *εἶναι περὶ τι* is scarcely correct Greek.

¹ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, alone has "omnium."

² The syntax and sense show that *καθ'* has dropt out before *δ*— Hence Taylor has "conformably to—"

³⁻³ Ficinus has merely "et qualiacunque adversus deos," as if his MS. read *καὶ ὅλα πρὸς θεοῦς*— in lieu of *δὲ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅλα περὶ θεοῦς*— Cousin would omit *δὲ καὶ* and read *διανοεῖσθαι*.

⁴ On account of *σφοδρότερον* just before, perhaps *νεωτέρως* means here "rather like a young man."

⁵ I have translated as if *Δ* (i. e. *τρεις*) had dropt out before *Ἄνδρας*, for there were three parties, whose ideas Plato had shown to be incorrect.

⁶ So Taylor after Ficinus, who found no doubt *ἔκαστο* in his MS., an-

claiming to all impious persons, that they must stand apart from their depraved manners, and (betake themselves) to such as are pious. But against those, who are not persuaded, let this be the law relating to impiety. If any one is impious in word or deed, let any one who happens to be present repel him by giving information to the magistrates; and let the magistrate, who first hears of it, bring, according to law, the party before the court of justice appointed for such matters. But if any magistrate, on hearing of it, does not act so, let him be accused of impiety by any one, who is willing to be the avenger on behalf of the laws. And if any one is convicted, let the court of justice fix a fine against each person¹ for each act of impiety. And let a prison in the case of all be assigned, since² there are three prisons in the city; one in common for the generality of crimes committed about the Market-place, for the sake of safety to the majority of persons; another by the spot, where meetings take place at night, and which has the name of the House of Correction; and another in the middle of the country, where the locality is most solitary and wild,³ and⁴ having as an appellation of punishment some ill name.⁴
⁵ There being respecting impiety three causes which we have

swering to his "sequitur." Stalbaum however defends γίγνοιτο, and refers to his small edition of the Euthyph. p. 5, C.

¹ I have adopted Winckelmann's ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ in lieu of ἐν ἐκάστῳ.

² To avoid τὸ ἀσύνδετον, Stephens suggested, what Ast has adopted, γὰρ δὲ: but Plato wrote rather ἄτε, as I have translated.

³ Ficinus renders ἀγχιώτατος incorrectly by "silvestris."

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek, where others may, but I will not, believe that Plato wrote τιμωρίας ἔχων ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην τινα. For it is evident that ἐπωνυμίαν is the explanation of φήμην: while, since every prison is a place of punishment, the name of no individual one would be τιμωρία, although it might be μωρία, as the opposite to σωφρονιστήριον. Hence we must read μωρίας—For thus the philosopher would lead us to consider wickedness to be only a kind of folly. Ficinus has "supplicii nomine notatus."

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, περὶ ἀσίβειαν δὲ ὄντων αἰτίαις μὲν τρισὶν, ἀλσπερ καὶ διήλθομεν, where Ast, despairing doubtless of being able to make out the syntax, is content to give the sense in his version, "Quum tribus de causis (homines) in impietate versentur:" and so too is Ficinus, "tres quoque impietatis, ut supra narravimus, causae sunt." I suspect however that Plato wrote, περὶ ἀσίβειαν δ' ἰόντων Δ Αἰτίαις ἐν τρισὶν, ἀλσπερ διήλθομεν, δύο δὲ—i. e. "The three being engaged in impiety from the three causes which we have gone through, two indeed—" For here, as before in § 14, ἰόντων has been corrupted into ὄντων, and Δ (three) been lost through A in αἰτίαις.

gone through; and since from each of such-like causes two are produced, there will be six kinds of crimes against the gods; which, ¹as being worthy of a distinction,¹ require neither an equal nor a similar punishment. For to him, who may think that gods do not exist at all, there may be a naturally just habit (of mind); and such become the haters of the wicked; and through their bearing ill with injustice, they do not give themselves up to committing actions of that kind, and they avoid the unjust, and love the just. ²But upon whom, in addition to their opinion that all things are destitute of the gods, there falls a want of self-control in pleasures and pains, and to whom there is present a strong memory and a quickness in learning, the notion that gods do not exist, would be one circumstance common to both; but in the mischief done to the rest of mankind, one effects less of evil, the other more;³ for the one would in word be full of a freedom of speech on the subject of the gods, and about sacrifices and oaths, and, laughing at the others, he would perhaps render the rest like himself, should he not meet with punishment. But the other, who thinks as the former does, is called by the vulgar clever,³ but is full of fraud and stratagem;⁴ from whom many diviners are produced, and such as are excited⁵ with respect to every kind of witchcraft; and sometimes, too, from them are produced tyrants, and mob-orators, and army-leaders; and those, who plot against⁶ private mysteries,⁷ and with the plans of men called sophists. Of these indeed there are many species. But two of them are worthy of legislation; one of which the ironic⁸

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I confess I do not understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; who has in the last clause, what Taylor has adopted to the letter, "in hoc autem differunt, quod, ceteris hominibus ille minus, hic plus, nocet."

³ From *εὐρυχῆς*, found in two MSS., in lieu of *εὐφυνῆς*, Winckelmann elicits *εὐστοχός*, and refers to xii. p. 950, B., *θεῖον δὲ τι καὶ εὐστοχόν*.

⁴ Literally "ambush," in Greek *ἐνέδρας*, which is strangely applied here to the mind of a man.

⁵ Winckelmann reads *καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν—κεκτημένοι*, referring to ii. p. 635, D.

⁶ Such is the exact meaning of *ἐπιβεβουλευκότες*. But the sense seems to require "plot against others with their own private mysteries—"

⁷ I have translated, with Cornarius, as if the Greek were *μηχαναῖς*, not *μηχαναί*: which Ast considers as the abstract for the concrete. Ficinus has "et qui homines captiunculis sophistarum decipiunt," which gives a better sense.

⁸ I confess I cannot understand what Plato means by *ειρωνικόν* here.

errs in a way to deserve not one or two deaths, (but more);¹ but the other requires admonition and bonds. In like manner the notion that the gods are careless, produces two errors; and that they are easily turned aside, another two. Of these persons, so placed apart, such as have become so through folly, without a vicious frowardness and manners, let the judge² appointed by law,³ put into the House of Correction, for not less than five years; and during that time, let no one of the citizens converse with them, except those, who participating in the assembly by night,⁴ associate for the purpose of admonition and the safety of the soul. And when the period of their imprisonment expires, if any one amongst them appears to be modestly behaved, let him dwell together with the modest; but if not, and he is again convicted on such a suit, let him pay the penalty of death. But such as, in addition to their believing that gods do not exist, or that they are careless, or easily turned aside, become brute-like, and despising mankind, allure the souls of many while living, and pretend they can allure too the souls of the dead, and promise they can⁵ persuade the gods, as bewitching them with sacrifices, and prayers, and incantations,⁶ and who endeavour by these means to destroy utterly individuals and whole families and cities, for the sake of their property; amongst these whoever shall be deemed to be convicted, let the court of justice determine that he is to be imprisoned⁷ according to law in the prison of the midland district; and let no free-man be ever allowed to visit him; but let the food, appointed for him by the guardians of the laws, be brought to him by servants; and, when he dies, let him be cast out, beyond the boundaries of the country, unburied; and if any free-men shall⁸ together bury him,⁹ let the party undergo the punishment for impiety

¹ On "many deaths," see at ix. § 10. Ficinus alone has what the sense requires—"sed pluribus."

²⁻³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

³ On the *νυκτερινος ξύλλογος*, see at xii. § 14.

⁴⁻⁴ A similar idea is expressed in Rep. ii. § 7, quoted by Ast.

⁵ In lieu of *δεδίσθαι*, which could not be applied to a future event, common sense requires *δεδήσεσθαι*: on which Attic future passive see myself at Æsch. Eum. 302. Ficinus, omitting *τιμάτω τὸ δικάστηριον*, has merely "vinciatur."

⁶⁻⁶ Ast, who justly finds fault with *συνθάπτει*, did not see that Plato wrote *τὸ σῶμα θάπτει*, i. e. "bury his body."

through any person who is willing to obtain by lot a trial.¹ If he leaves behind him children, sufficient² for the state, let the guardians of orphans take care of these likewise, as being orphans not less than the others, from the day, on which their father was convicted.

But it is meet for a common law to be established in all these cases, such as shall cause the masses to behave less improperly towards the gods, both in word and deed, and may render them moreover less devoid of intellect, through not permitting them to attend to sacred matters in a manner contrary to law. Now let this law be laid down simply for all together. Let no one practise sacred rites in a private dwelling.³ But when it enters into the mind of any one to sacrifice, let him go to the public buildings, and there sacrifice; and let him place his offerings in the hands of the priests and priestesses, to whom the holy ritual is a care; and let him pray, both himself and whoever else may wish to join with him in prayer. And let this take place on this account. It is not easy to build temples and place statues of the gods; but to do such things correctly, is the work of some mighty intellect. But it is a custom with all women especially, and all⁴ men in sickness, or in danger, or in want, and, on the contrary, when they receive an abundance of any thing, ever to consecrate that which is at hand, and to vow sacrifices, and to promise statues to the gods, and to dæmons, and to the sons of the gods; when they are awakened by frightful⁵ apparitions, and in dreams bring up the recollection of many visions likewise; against all of which things they endeavour to make for each of themselves⁶ remedies, by filling all the streets⁷ and all the villages with altars and chapels, and fixing them in purified places, and⁸ wherever a person has met with such events.⁸ On account of all which

¹ On the phrase *λαγχάνειν δίκην*, see Ast on vi. § 9.

² I do not remember to have met elsewhere with *ικανούς*, used in a similar manner.

³ Ast quotes a similar enactment in the laws of the Twelve Tables at Rome. "Separatim nemo habessit deos."

⁴ In lieu of *πάντη* Taylor, by his "all," seems to have wished to read *πᾶσι*, subsequently found in a good MS.

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were *διαφόβοις*, not *διὰ φόβους*.

⁶ I have adopted *ἐκάστοισι*, found in three MSS., in lieu of *ἐκάσταισι*—

⁷ Instead of *οικίας* Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἀγυίδας*, as I have translated. See Buttmann on Demosthen. Mid. § 15, n. 2.

⁸—⁸ Such I conceive to be the meaning of the words *καὶ ὅπη τις ἐτυχε*

things it is meet to act according to the law now mentioned, and on account moreover of the impious ; in order that they may not, after acting fraudulently by such doings, put up altars in their private dwellings ; and, thinking to render the gods propitious by sacrifices and prayers in secret, increase injustice unlimitedly, and give rise to accusations on the part of the gods against them and those, who permitted them (to do so), although the latter were themselves ¹the best of all ; ¹ and thus the whole city meet ²justly, after a certain manner, with mischief through the impious. The god, however, shall not blame the lawgiver. For let the law be laid down that no one is to have holy places in private houses ; and the party, who is discovered as having other places and performing orgies, except such as are public, let the person, who is cognizant of it, denounce to the guardians of the laws ; and let them, ³if a man or a woman has it, not having committed any great or impious crime, ³order the parties to carry their private sacred affairs to the public places ; and not persuading, ⁴let them punish with a fine, until they are carried. But, if any one shall be conspicuously committing, ⁵not the impious deed of unholy boys, but of men, ⁵whether by sacrificing ⁶to the gods in private or in public temples, let him be condemned to death, as one who has sacrificed, not being pure ; and let the guardians of the laws, ⁷after deciding, whether there is (any impiety) or not,

τῶν τοιούτων : which Ast renders "ubique ejusmodi homines ea collocant—" Ficinus, apparently unable to understand them, has omitted them entirely, and so after him has Taylor.

¹—¹ As five MSS. read *βελτίστοις*, I have altered *αὐτῶν* into *πάντων*—

² Ast quotes very opportunely Hesiod *Erg.* 238, *Πολλάκι καὶ ζυμπᾶσα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπήνρα*—where *ἀπαύρσθαι*, like *ἀπολαύειν* here, is used in the sense of "unhappily enjoying—" a meaning first remarked by Jensius in *Lectio. Lucian.* i. 4, p. 24.

³—³ The words between the numerals Ficinus doubtless found transposed, as he has translated them ; or else he exercised a sound discretion in so transposing them.

⁴ One would have expected here *πεισθίντας* in lieu of *κείθοντες*, which Ast strangely says is put for *πειθομένους*.

⁵—⁵ Ficinus has "non puerilem sed nefariam impietatem," who therefore did not find in his MS. *ἀνδρῶν*. But what he did find, it is not so easy to tell ; and still less, to what circumstances Plato is here alluding.

⁶ So Taylor, from "sacrificando" in Ficinus, who probably found in his MS. *ἱερυσάμενος* instead of *ἰδρυσάμενος*.

⁷—⁷ This seems a rather strange enactment. For if the guardians of the laws decided that there was no act of impiety on the part of the boys, there could be no necessity for bringing the matter before a court of jus-

on the part of the children, bring it before a court of justice,⁷ and thus put in their case a finish to the trial for impiety.

BOOK XI.

[1.] AFTER these, the compacts with each other would require from us a suitable regulation. Now a thing of this kind at least is surely simple. ¹Let no one touch,¹ as far as possible, my property, nor disturb the least thing (of mine), without previously persuading me; and may I, possessing a well-disposed mind, act in the same manner with respect to the property of others. Let us then, in the first place, speak about such a treasure,² as a person ³not descended from my parents,³ has placed as a thing to be kept both for himself and those belonging to him, and which may I never pray to the gods to find, nor, on finding, to disturb; ⁴nor on the other hand to communicate with those called diviners, who in some sort advise me to take up the deposit put into the ground.⁴ For I should never be so much benefited by the possession of property, should I take it up, as I should increase in the virtue of the soul and in justice by not taking it to myself, ⁵(and

tice. To avoid therefore this difficulty, Ast renders *εἰσαγαγόντες* by "judicium reddentes," a meaning that *εἰσάγειν* never has, nor could have.

¹—¹ Although *μὴ ἔπτοιτο* expresses here a wish, yet the wish itself is of the nature of a command. So in English, "let a person not do a thing," is said both of a wish and command.

² The Greek is *τῶν τοιούτων*, which, says Ast, depend upon *πρῶτον*, and that the sense is *πρῶτον τῶν τοιούτων*, "primo inter has res." But *πρῶτον* is always used by itself adverbially. Ficinus has "thesaurum eum," which leads to *τὸν τοιοῦτον*—

³—³ So Taylor, after the Latin of Ficinus, "qui meorum parentum non erat," as if his MS. had read, *μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν ὡν πατέρων*, instead of *ὃν πατέρων* in five MSS., adopted by Stalbaum. Ast retains the Aldine, *ὃν πατρίων*, and supplies *ἀγαθῶν* with Stephens after *πατρίων*.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek; where however Stephens suggested, what Ast has adopted and Stalbaum approves, *ἐν συμβουλευούσιν* for *ἐν συμβουλευούσιν*. Ficinus has merely "nec hariolis depositum accipere consulentibus credam," which Taylor has thus translated, "nor be induced to partake of by those who are called diviners." I wish too that Stephens had proposed *μηδὲ τι*, for *αὐ* has no meaning here.

⁵—⁵ In lieu of this verbiage, where the phrase *ἀμείνων ἐν ἀμείνων* is

by acquiring one possession instead of another, a better in a better, (and) preferring justice in the soul to wealth, to hold it as a property in preference.⁵ For on many occasions it is well said—"Do not disturb what ought not to be disturbed—" and it may be said on this too, as being one of them. It is likewise meet to be persuaded by the stories¹ told relating to these matters, that things of this kind do not contribute to the procreation of children. Now he, who is careless of children, and disregards the enactment of the lawgiver, and takes up that, which neither he nor his grandfather had deposited, such a one destroys the most beautiful and simple law, which has been laid down by a man,² ignoble by no means, which says, "Thou shalt not take away that, which thou hast not deposited." What then he ought to suffer at the hands of the gods, who, disregarding these two lawgivers, takes up a trifling thing, which he did not deposit himself, but is sometimes a mighty treasure, the god³ knows; ⁴(but let us declare what he ought to suffer from men.)⁴ Let him, who first sees (the offender) give information, if such an event happens in the city, to the City-Stewards; if in the marketplace of the city,⁵ to the Market-Stewards; and, if in any other part of the country, point him out to the Rural-Stewards and to their chiefs; and when the parties have been pointed out, let the city send to Delphi; and whatever the god gives as an oracle respecting the money and the person who

without syntax and sense, Ficinus has more tersely, "*pro possessione igitur pecuniæ melior mihi possessio animi justitiæ erit, si virtutem divitiis proposuero.*"

¹ It is difficult to understand what stories Plato is here alluding to, unless it be something like what the Etymologist mentions relating to Helen, that she was after her birth thrown by Tyndareus into a marshy spot, and there taken up by Leda. So too Œdipus was exposed by the order of Laius, and afterwards taken up by a shepherd; and a similar story is to be found in the case of the children of Melanippé, and doubtless in many other dramas likewise.

² This was Solon, as we learn from Diogen. Laert. i. 57.

³ Why Plato thus introduced the article, as if some specific god were intended, it is difficult to say. From the subsequent mention of Delphi, one would suspect that he wrote *ὁ Πύθιος*—

⁴—⁴ Ficinus alone has, what the train of thought requires—"quæ vero ab hominibus, declarabimus—" which Stephens however and Stalbaum conceive he added out of his own head, and not from the MS. before him.

⁵ Ficinus omits *τῆς πόλεως*, which is not elsewhere thus united to *ἀγορά*.

has removed it, let the city perform, and be the minister to the oracle; and if the informer is a free-man, let him have a reputation for virtue; but, not informing, for wickedness; but if he is a slave, let him for informing be made, and justly so, free by the city, paying the value to his owner; but not revealing it, let him be punished with death. This enactment there would in due order follow this same¹ law relating to matters great and small, ²(so as) to follow.² If a man leaves any property of his own willingly or unwillingly, let him, who may happen to meet with it, suffer it to remain, conceiving that the dæmon, who presides over roads, watches over things of this kind, that are dedicated to the deity³ by the law. When any one shall be ⁴disobedient to the enactment, and, contrary to it,⁴ take up and carry home any thing of little worth, let him, if a slave, receive many stripes from any one not less than thirty years of age, who may happen to meet him. But, if he is a free-man, let him in addition to his being considered ungentleman-like⁵ and out of the pale of the law, pay as a fine to the party, who left it, ten-fold the value of what he took up. When any one accuses another of detaining his property, whether it be much or little, and the party (who detains it) acknowledges that he has it, but (denies) that it is the other's property, if there be a written statement relating to the property laid before the magistrates according to law, let the plaintiff call the detaining party before the magistrate,⁶ and let the latter place the property in court;⁶ and the matter being rendered clear, if the property mentioned in the written statement shall appear to belong to either of the

¹ Instead of *ταὐτὸ τοῦτο*, some MSS. read *ταύτην τούτω*: which seems to lead to *τοιοῦτό τι*—"some such as this."

²⁻² It is impossible to believe that Plato would have added *ξυνακολουθεῖν* after *ἐπόμενον ἐξῆς*—and this too without any word to govern the infinitive. He might however have written *ξυνακολουθοῦν*—of which *ἐπόμενον* would be the interpretation.

³ The deity was Diana, the Moon, or Hecatē, three names for one goddess, whose power was respectively on earth, in heaven, and in hell.

⁴⁻⁴ It is evident that *ἀπειθῶν* is a gl. of *παρὰ ταῦτα*—

⁵ This is perhaps the best translation of *ἀνελεύθερος*—

⁶⁻⁶ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, for they are wanting in Ficinus; who probably did not understand the expression *ὁ δὲ καθιστάτω*—where Ast would supply *ἑαυτόν*: but the ellipse is rather of *αὐτό*, the property in "dispute," just as we say in England, "money paid into court."

contending parties, let him have it and depart. But if it belongs to some of those, who are not present, whichever party shall in favour of the absent owner produce trust-worthy bail, that he will deliver it up to him, ¹ let the party (so producing the bail) take the property away, according to the right of taking away in the absent party.¹ But if the property in dispute be not stated in writing before the magistrates, let it lie under the charge of the three oldest magistrates until the trial; and if the property under security be ²a thing requiring food,² let the party defeated in the suit respecting it, pay the magistrates for its keep; and let the magistrates decide the question within three days.

[2.] ³Let any one who wishes, provided he is in his senses, take his own slave and treat him as he pleases, in whatever way it is holy, and let him on behalf of a relation or friend, for their security, lead the slave (to punishment) who has revolted.³ But if any one takes away another person, as if the latter were a slave led away, on the ground ⁴of giving him freedom, let the party so leading let (the other) go; and let the person taking away, on producing three trust-worthy bail, take away on these conditions,⁴ but otherwise not. And if a person takes away contrary to these conditions, let him be amenable to the laws relating to acts of violence; and on being cast, pay to the party, who has taken away,⁵ double of the damage which

¹—¹ Such, I presume, is the meaning of the Greek *κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀφαιρέσιν ἀφαιρέσθω*: which Ficinus, perhaps unable to understand literally, has thus put into Latin—"is tantumdem deponere cogatur," translated by Taylor, "let him be compelled to deposit it."

²—² Such, I conceive, is the correct translation here of *θρίμμα*, not merely "an animal—"

³—³ All the words between the numerals are tacitly omitted by Taylor, although duly found in the version of Ficinus.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek; where I must confess myself to be quite in the dark. For as *ἀφαιρείσθαι* is never, that I know of, taken in an intransitive sense, I cannot perceive how *ὁ ἀφαιρούμενος* differs from *ὁ ἄγων*. Ficinus however, not aware of this difficulty, renders "qui vero ita ductus est"—adopted by Taylor, who translates moreover—*μεθίρω μὲν ὁ ἄγων*, by "let him who leads him be dismissed"—either because he did not know that *μεθίρω* was of the active voice, and *μεθίσθω* passive; or else that the train of thought led to such a translation, at variance with the language. I could have understood the passage had the Greek been *μεθίσθω μὲν ὁ ἀγόμενος* instead of *μεθίρω ὁ ἄγων*—

⁵ Ficinus renders *τῷ ἀφαιρεθέντι* "a quo abstulit"—thus taking the participle in a passive sense; and so Ast translates it—"detrimento af-

has been stated in the pleadings. And let a person lead (to punishment) his freed-man, if he does not attend to those, who have made him free, (at all) or not sufficiently. Now the attention is in the freed-man going thrice in the month to the hearth of the party, who had made him free, and engaging to do whatever is requisite of acts just and in his power; and as regards marriage, to do whatever seems good to his lord. And let it not be lawful for him to possess more wealth than the person who made him free; and let the overplus belong to his lord. And let a freed-man remain not longer than twenty years, but like ¹the rest of strangers¹ depart, taking his whole property with him, unless he can persuade the magistrates and the party who made him free. And if the property of a freed person, or of any other stranger, is more than that of the census, the third in magnitude, let him within² thirty days from that on which this occurs³ take his property and depart; nor let there be granted to him by the magistrates a request for a further stay. And if any one disobeys them, let him be brought before a court of justice, and after being convicted, let him be punished with death, and his wealth become public property. And let the suits in these cases be ⁴amongst the suits relating to parishes,⁴ unless the parties are previously freed ⁵from the accusations against each other⁵ in the presence of neighbours or chosen judges. And if any one lays his hand upon an animal or any thing else whatever, as being his own property, let him who has possession of it bring (the claimant) to the party who sold or gave it, being trust-worthy, and having the right to do so, or who handed it over in any

fecto," i. e. *cujus servum quis in libertatem asseruit*"—and this too although he had shown from Demosthenes, p. 1327, 22, R., and Æschines, p. 85, 6, R., that ἀφαιρείσθαι εἰς ἐλευθερίαν meant actively—"e reliquorum servorum numero eximere et in libertatem vendicare."

¹ This is said because slaves were generally brought from foreign countries.

² The ellipse of ἐντός before ἡμερῶν is supplied in § 1.

³ Ficinus, followed partly by Taylor, has—"factum deprehensumvé sit"—where he designedly added, what he saw was requisite for the sense, "deprehensumve."

⁴ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "tribuum judices cognoscant"—as if his MS. read ἐν τοῖς φυλετικοῖς δικασταῖς—

⁵ In lieu of the words between the numerals, Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has merely "litigantes" and "arbitros" as the version of αἰρετοῖσι δικασταῖς, from which Winckelmann was led to ἐν διαιτηταῖς—

manner with authority,¹ in the case of a citizen, or a settler in the city, (within) thirty days, but in the case of a transfer by a stranger, within five months, the middle of which² is the month in which³ the summer sun turns to the winter.³ And whatever articles one person exchanges with another by sale or purchase, let them thus make the exchange, by one party giving and the other receiving on the instant the value in the place appointed for each kind of articles in the market-place, and no where else; and let no one engage in the purchase or sale of an article on credit.⁴ But if any one person barter with another any thing whatever for any thing whatever in any other manner or in any other place, by trusting the party, who is making the exchange, let a person act in this way towards him, as no action will lie⁵ according to law, respecting articles, that have not been purchased according to what is here detailed. ⁶With respect to joint contributions, let any who is willing ask a contribution as a friend amongst friends; but if any difference arises respecting the payment of the contribution,⁷ let the parties act thus,⁸ as there will be no action against any one on such matters.⁶

¹ Ficinus has strangely here—"et veritas, si ad civem vel urbis incolam ille retulit, intra triginta dies inveniatur—"

² So Ficinus, as if his MS. read *ὥν* in the place of *ἤς*, which Ast refers to *παράδοσις*— But in both readings I am equally at a loss.

³—³ On this method of marking the summer solstice, when the sun turns from the tropic of Cancer to that of Capricorn, see at iii. § 5.

⁴ This is the phrase in English, answering to *ἐν ἀναβολῇ*. Plato's object was that all transactions should be for ready money alone. For he knew that the credit system was the forerunner of usury; and usury, of extravagant profits; and these, of large fortunes; and these again, of luxurious habits; and these, lastly, of a corruption in morals and the destruction of the state.

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were not *οὐδὲν*, but *ἐσμένον*, repeated shortly afterwards.

⁶—⁶ All between the brackets are evidently out of their place: unless it be said that Plato introduced the subject of friendly contributions, with the view of showing that under no circumstances, either of barter or voluntary subscriptions, was any credit to be given; or if given, any remedy by law for the creditor.

⁷ The *Ἐρανοί* at Athens were like the Benefit Societies or Clubs in England, to which persons contributed by monthly, as in England by weekly, payments; and the money thus raised was, according to certain regulations, given to the contributors when in want. At Athens the contributors could be sued for arrears. But this Plato would not permit in his code of laws.

⁸ i. e. as friends. But *οὐρα* conceals, I suspect, some error.

Whoever sells an article and receives for it a price of not less than fifty drachms, let him remain of necessity ten days in the city; and let the buyer know the residence of the seller, for the sake of the complaints which usually take place on such matters, and the return of the articles according to law. Now let the return or not, according to law, be in this way. If a person sells a slave labouring under a consumption, or the stone, or a strangury, or the disease called sacred,¹ or any other malady not apparent to the many, of long standing and incurable, whether of the body or mind, if the sale be to a physician or a master of gymnastics, there is to be no return; nor yet, when the seller tells beforehand the (whole) truth to any one; but if a handicraftsman sells to a person not in trade an article of such a kind, let the buyer return the article, except in the case of (a slave affected) with the sacred disease, within six months; but in the case of the disease, let it be lawful to make the return within a year; and let the matter be decided before some physicians, whom the parties may bring forward and select in common, and let the party defeated pay double the value for which the party sold it. But if a party not in trade sells to another not in trade, let the return and decision take place in the manner mentioned above; and let the party defeated pay simply the value. If any one knowingly sells to another knowingly a slave, who has killed any person, let him have no return in the case of a purchase of this kind; but to a person not knowing, let there be a return then, when any buyer becomes aware of it; and let the decision rest with the five youngest guardians of the laws; and if it is decided that the seller was cognizant of the fact, let a person purify the residence of the buyer according to the law of the sacred interpreters, and let the seller pay the purchaser triple the sum.

[3.] Let him who exchanges either money for money, or any thing whatever for things of life or not of life, give and receive every thing unadulterated, following out the law. Let us however receive² a prelude, as in the case of other laws, so likewise with respect to the whole of this wrong. It is meet

¹ Epilepsy, as we learn from Celsus, quoted by Ast. See too Herodot. iii. 33, where Wesseling refers to Hippocrates, p. 308.

² In lieu of *δειξώμεθα*, Winckelmann would read *ἀποδείξώμεθα*, "let us exhibit."

for every man to consider adulteration, and lying, and fraud, as forming one genus; to which it is usual for the multitude to apply the saying, although speaking improperly, that when such a conduct is adopted opportunely, on each occasion, it often turns out well. But as they leave the occasion, and the where, and the when, in an unregulated and undefined state, they do by this assertion much injury to themselves and to others. But it is not fitting for the legislator to leave this undefined; but he ought always to state clearly the greater and lesser limits. Let them be determined now. Let no one who is not about to be the most odious to the gods, perpetrate, either by word or deed, a falsehood, or fraud, or adulteration in any thing, when calling (to witness) the race of the gods. Now such is (in the first place)¹ he, who while swearing false oaths, thinks nothing of the gods; and secondly he, who speaks falsely before those who are better than himself. Now the better are superior to the bad, both the elder, to speak in general terms, than the younger, and parents [better]² than their offspring, and men than women and children, and governors than the governed; ³ all of whom it is becoming for all to reverence in every other government,³ and especially in political offices, ⁴ for the sake of which⁴ the present conversation has come upon us. For every one of those in the market-place, who by adulterating any thing perpetrates a falsehood and a fraud, and calling upon the gods takes an oath,⁵ according to the regulations and precautions of the Market-Stewards, is a person who has no regard for men nor reverence for the gods. ⁶ It is indeed a beautiful institution not to defile the names of the gods, while a person is taking it

¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, alone has "primum"—

² The word *κρείττους* is properly omitted in one good MS.

³ Ficinus has "quos revereri par est, cum in omni principatu—"

⁴ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "cujus gratia," as if his MS. read *οὐ γ' ἕνεκα* in lieu of *ὅθεν οὖν*, found in four MSS. Ast suggests that the words *ὅθεν ὁ νῦν παρὼν ἡμῖν λόγος ἐλήλυθε* mean, "ut, unde digressa est oratio, eo revertatur." But had Plato so meant, he would have written something to this effect, *ὥστε, ὅθεν ὁ πρὶν ὧν λόγος ἀπελήλυθεν, ἀνελυθησὲν αὐτῇ ἡμῖν ὁ νῦν παρὼν*—

⁵ Ficinus and all the subsequent translators, says Ast, have taken *ἐπὶ νόμοι* incorrectly in the sense of swearing falsely.

⁶ Ficinus, misled, it would seem, by the phrase *ἔχοντα ὡς ἔχουσιν*, which has generally a meaning not suited to this place, or because his MS. was incorrectly written, thus renders the whole passage, "Æquum

easily, as the majority of us do on each occasion as regards the greater part of a pure and holy conduct in what relates to the gods.⁶ If then a person is not persuaded¹ (by these reasonings),¹ let this be the law. Let the seller of any thing in the market-place never mention two prices of what he is selling; but after mentioning a simple one, if he does not meet with it, let him take the article back again, and justly so, nor value it for that day at a greater or less sum. Let puffing² and oaths be absent in the case of every thing sold. And if a person is disobedient to these enactments, let any citizen, not less than thirty years of age, who happens to be present, punish the party swearing, and strike him with impunity; and if he neglects to do so, and is himself disobedient (to the law), let him be amenable to blame for his betrayal of the laws. And let him,³ who falls in with those who know³ the seller of an adulterated article, and unable⁴ to obey the present reasonings, if he is able himself to detect the party, expose (the fraud) before the magistrates, and if he is a slave or a settler, let him carry off⁵ the adulterated article. But let the citizen, who does not expose (the fraud), be proclaimed a bad man, as one who defrauds the gods: but if he exposes it, let him offer up (the adulterated article) to the gods, who preside over the market-place.⁶ And let him, who has been discovered selling any thing of this kind, in addition to his being deprived of the adulterated article, be scourged with as many lashes from a whip as there are drachms in the sum at which he valued the article, by the hands of the crier, proclaiming in the market-place the reason of his being

profecto est nomina deorum non facile inquinare, nec ea huc atque illuc devolvere; sed omnia, quæ ad deos pertinent, pure casteque servare."

¹—¹ Ficinus alone adds "his rationibus—"

² This is the best rendering in English of the Greek *ἐπαινος*.

³—³ Such is the literal version of *ὁ προστυγχάνων τῶν γιγνώσκοντων*. But the sense requires rather *ὁ γινώσκων*, and hence Ficinus has "qui advertit—"

⁴ This "unable" seems very strange here, where one would have expected "unwilling." Correctly then has Ficinus "qui legi non obtemperaverit," as if he had found in his MS. *νόμοις* instead of *λόγοις*.

⁵ Ficinus, not understanding apparently the meaning of the middle voice, has "secum asportet," translated by Taylor, "bring with him." The adulterated article was forfeited to the informer.

⁶ These gods at Athens were Zeus and Hermes especially, as shown by Aristoph. *Plut.* 1156, quoted by Ast.

about to be whipped. And let the Market-Stewards and the guardians of the laws, after hearing from those who are skilled in each of the adulterations and evil practices of the sellers, write out ¹ what the seller ought and ought not to do; ¹ and let them, after writing down the laws that are to afford clear information to those engaged in business about the market-place, ² put them upon a pillar before ³ the court belonging to the Market-Stewards. ³ But the particulars relating to the City-Stewards have been sufficiently detailed above. Should it however appear that any thing more is wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the laws, and writing down what seems to be wanting, let them place on a pillar at the court belonging to the City-Stewards, the first and second regulations, as laid down by their authority.

[4.] To the business of adulteration ⁴ there follows on its heel ⁵ those of the huckster's trade. But about the whole of this let us first give advice ⁶ according to reason, (and) ⁶ afterwards a law respecting it. For the whole of huckstering in a city does not exist for the sake of doing an injury, at least naturally, but the reverse. For how is not every one a benefactor, who causes the existence of property of any kind soever, that is out of measure and unequally (diffused), to become so equably in measure? ⁷ This it is meet for us to acknowledge, and to work out the power of money; and it is necessary

¹—¹ This clause Ficinus places after ², whom both Ast and Stalbaum are disposed to follow, as Taylor had done already, forgetting however that *ἀναγραφάντων* would, thus standing by itself, have no meaning.

²—² In lieu of *ἀγορανόμον*, which is unintelligible, Stephens suggested, what Ast has adopted and Stalbaum approves of, *ἀγορανομίον*, obtained from "foro" in Ficinus, similar to *ἀντυνομίον* just afterwards.

⁴ I have adopted Winckelmann's *κιβδηλίας*, in lieu of *κιβδήλους*, to balance the subsequent *καπηλείας*.

⁵ Such is the idiomatic English version of *κατὰ πόδα*.

⁶—⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were not *καὶ λόγον*, but *κατὰ λόγον καὶ*, where *κατὰ* is due to one of the best MSS.

⁷—⁷ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has, "quod nummularius, mercator, mercenarius, et hospitalis diversorii magister faciunt; hi enim ceterique hujusmodi sive honestiores sive turpiores, indigentiam supplere rebusque aequalitatem præbere;" from which however I have been led to elicit *δείξει* and *ἐκπορεύειν* out of *ἐξευπορεῖν*, which cannot stand here, as *εὐπορεῖν* and its compounds are intransitive, whereas the syntax requires a transitive verb.

to say that the merchant is ordained for this; and the person who is hired, and the tavern-keeper, and other trades, that are some, more genteel, and some, less, have all this power, to show assistance to all in need, and to cause an equality in property.⁷ But let us see why this seems to be neither honourable nor becoming, and why it happens to lead to calumny, in order that, although we may not cure the whole by a law, yet we may at least a part.

¹ *Clin.* This, as it seems, is no trifling matter, and requires no little virtue.

Athen. How say you, friend Clinias?¹ ² A race of men small and naturally few,³ and brought up with a superior education, are, when they fall into want and a desire for certain things, able to bear up with moderation; and when they have it in their power to acquire great wealth, behave soberly, and prefer that, which borders on moderation, to excess. But the mass of mankind conduct themselves in a manner perfectly the reverse of this; for they desire without measure; and when they have it in their power to obtain a moderate gain, they prefer to have a gain that never satisfies. Hence all the races of men engaged in trades ³ retail and wholesale,³ and as tavern-keepers, have been calumniated and subject to disgraceful reproaches. For should any one—which never may it happen, nor ever will—compel—⁴ what it is ridiculous indeed to say, yet said it shall be⁴—the best of men in every way to keep a tavern for a certain time, or to be a huckster, or to do any thing of this kind, or even ⁵ women (the most holy)⁵ through some necessity of fate, to take part in an employment

¹⁻¹ Ast, with whom Stalbaum and the Zurich editors agree, has adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Grou; who continues the words, Πρᾶγμ' ἔσθ'—ἀρετῆς to the Athenian, and assigns Πῶς λέγεις to Clinias, and Ὡ φίλε— to the Athenian.

²⁻³ Ficinus, unable probably to see the difference here between μικρὸν and ὀλίγον, has merely "Pauci admodum homines." Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato wrote φύσει οὐ λιχνόν— On the meaning and loss of λιχνόν see Porson on Hippol. 917.

³⁻³ On the difference between καπηλός, "a retail dealer," and ἔμπορος, "a wholesale merchant," see at Sophist, § 19, n. 23.

⁴⁻⁴ In the words of the original lies hid an Iambic verse, Εἰπεῖν γελοῖον, ἀλλ' ὅμως εἰρήσεται—

⁵⁻⁵ Ficinus alone has "mulieres sanctissimas," as if he had found in his MS. something to balance the preceding τοὺς πανταχῇ ἀρίστους ἀνδρας—

of such a kind, we should know that each of these is ¹ honest and laudable,¹ and that ² if they occurred uncorrupted according to reason,² all such acts would be honoured, as belonging to the character of a mother and a nurse. But now, since some one has for the sake of a retail trade established dwellings in solitary places, and, having in every direction a length of road, receives in much-desired resting-places those unable to proceed, or affords a warm and quiet spot to those driven³ by the violence of severe weather, and a cool one in hot; and afterwards having them received as friends, does not give them⁴ symbols of friendship ⁵ subsequent to their reception,⁵ but, ⁶ as if they were enemies taken in war and in their power, lets them go for a ransom very great, and unjust, and not to be cleansed⁶—these actions and such as these, having been disgracefully ⁷ committed by all persons of this kind, have correctly⁷ furnished a ground of calumny against the assistance given to distress. Against these the lawgiver ought therefore to prepare⁸ a remedy. For the saying⁹ of old is correct, that against two opposite things it is hard to fight, as in the case of diseases

^{1—1} So Taylor translates the Latin of Ficinus, “*honesta et approbanda*.” But such is not the meaning of φίλον και ἀγαπητόν, “dear and to be loved,” words which I can scarcely understand here, even if they are applied to a person, and not, as the train of thought seems to require, to a thing.

^{2—2} Here again I am at a loss, and so was Ficinus; who translates, “*nisi corrupte fierent*,” omitting entirely κατὰ λόγον, while Taylor has “according to uncorrupt reason.”

³ I have translated as if the Greek were φιλικά—ξύμβολα, not φιλικὰ ξένια—

⁴ I have adopted with Ast ἐλαυνομένοις, as suggested by Stephens, in lieu of ἐλαυνόμενους—

^{5—5} The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor; who through the whole of this passage has looked only to the Latin version.

^{6—6} Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has “*sed ut inimicos atque captivos crudeliter se redimere cogunt rebusque omnibus spoliant*.” For he did not understand, nor can I, the meaning here of μακροτάτων and ἀκαθάρτων λύτρων.

^{7—7} In lieu of ὀρθῶς, Ficinus found in his MS. αἰσχροῦς, as shown by his version, “turpiter.” Plato wrote, I suspect, both words; and so I have translated.

⁸ Literally, “to cut.” On this expression, see Blomf. on Agam. 16.

⁹ To this saying there is an allusion in Phædon, § 38, πρὸς δύο οὐδ’ Ἡρακλῆς λέγεται οἶός τε εἶναι, where by the two were meant the Hydra and Crab, as shown by Euthydem. § 60.

and many other things. But at present the contest is against these two things, poverty and wealth; the latter of which corrupts the soul of man through luxury, while the former turns itself through pain to shamelessness of every kind.¹ What protection, then, will there be against this disease in a state endued with intellect? In the first place, let it make use, to the utmost of its power, of the fewest in number of the race of hucksters; next, we enjoin² such trades upon some³ of those persons, from whose corruption there would be not a great mischief to the state; and thirdly, to discover a plan in the case of those, who take a part in these occupations, how their morals may not happen to become freely partakers in impudence and in feelings unfitted for free-men. Let then, after what has now been stated, a law of this kind take place, with a good fortune relating to these matters. Of the Magnesians, whom a god is again raising up and settling into a colony, let no one amongst such as have a share in the land, and possess hearths amounting⁴ to five thousand and forty,⁵ either willingly or unwillingly become a retail or wholesale dealer, nor hold any situation whatever under individuals, who are not upon an equality with himself, except under a father or mother, and those⁶ who are still higher up in birth than these,⁴ and all who are older than himself, and (live)⁵ like free-men in a free manner. It is not however easy to legislate for what is gentleman-like or ungentlemanly. Let however a distinction be made by those, who have obtained the prize of excellence, by their hatred and reception of these doings (respectively). Let then any one, who is willing, indict, on the charge of disgracing his family, the person, who takes a part in any trickery

¹ As αὐτήν cannot thus follow ἀναισχυντίαν, I have translated as if the Greek were παντοίην.

^{2—3} I have translated as if the Greek were ταῦτά τισιν, not τοῦτοισι, which is without regimen. Ficinus has "his hominibus cauponandi artes."

^{3—3} Taylor has, by an error perhaps of the press, "forty-five thousand."

^{4—4} I have translated as if the Greek were ἐν τοῦτων εἰς τὸ ἄνω γένος ἰοῦσι, not γένεσι; or since one MS. has γένεσιν, γένος ἰοῦσιν. For in this formula the singular γένος is either adopted or omitted entirely, as in ix. p. 878, A., πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄνω τοῦ γένους. Menex. §. 5, τῶν ἀνωθεν ἐν προγόνων, and the other passages quoted by myself on Philoct. 180. Ast too would read here εἰς τὸ ἄνω γένους—

⁵ Ficinus alone has "qui libere vivunt," as if his MS. read ζῶσι after ἐλευθέρως.

of an ungentlemanly huckstering; and if he shall appear to have defiled his paternal hearth by any unworthy employment, let him, after being in bonds for a year, abstain from such employment; and if he does so again, for two years; and on each conviction let him not cease doubling the previous period. A second law ordains, moreover, that a person must be a settler or a stranger, who is to follow a retail trade. And a third one (ordains this) the third,¹ in order that the best character, or one the least improper, may be a fellow-dweller in the city, that it is requisite² for the guardians of the law to consider that they are the guardians not only of those, whom it is easy to guard against, when (acting) contrary to the law, and becoming wicked—such, I mean, as are well born and have been well brought up—but that they ought to guard still more against persons, who are not of such a kind, and who follow pursuits, that possess a powerful incentive³ to their becoming bad. ⁴Such then are the circumstances⁴ relating to retail trade, which is extensive, and embraces many occupations. Respecting then such of these, as may be left, through their being thought to be, from a great necessity, requisite in a state, it behoves the guardians of the laws to come again together with those skilled in retail trades, as we before enjoined in the case of adulteration, an occupation allied to this; and, after coming together, to see what receipts and outlay produce a moderate profit to the retail dealer; ⁵and after writing down the outlay and receipts, to lay down the result,⁵ and, to watch over it, in some matters the Market-Stewards, in others the City-Stewards, and in others the Rural-Stewards. And thus will retail trading be of service in some points on nearly every occasion,⁶ and be of the least disservice to those, who make use of it in states.

¹ Ficinus incorrectly omits τὸ δὲ τρίτον, but correctly adds “cavendum monet,” requisite to complete the sense.

² I have translated as if the Greek were χρῆναι νοῆσαι, as required by the syntax, not χρῆ—

³ I have omitted προτρέπειν, which Ast vainly, I conceive, attempts to defend.

⁴—⁴ In ταύτη δὲ, which has puzzled Ast not a little, evidently lies hid—ταῦτ’ ἦν δὲ—similar to “cum vero cauponatio—sit,” in Ficinus.

⁵—⁵ All between the numerals is thus translated by Ficinus, “et tam impendium quam emolumentum conscribant,” and by Taylor, “and establish its expenses and emolument.”

⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were ἐκάστοτε, not ἐκάστους—

[5.]¹ Whatever compact a person acknowledges to have made, if he does not act according to the acknowledgment, except in cases where laws or a decree prevent him, or where he has made the acknowledgment through being compelled by some unjust necessity, or if he is prevented unwillingly by an unexpected accident, let an action lie against him² in the legal suits relating to the tribes,² for an acknowledgment not completed in other respects, unless the parties are able to come to a reconciliation previously, in the presence of arbitrators or neighbours.¹ The race of artificers is sacred to Hephæstus and Athéné,³ who jointly fit up our life by their arts;³ while, on the other hand, they, who preserve the works of artificers by other arts of a defensive kind, are (sacred) to Ares and Athéné. And justly too is this race sacred to those gods; for all these are through life attending to the country and people; some by presiding over the contests of war; others by bringing to an effect the production by hire of instruments and works; to whom it would not be a becoming act to tell a falsehood about these matters, while reverencing the gods, their progenitors.⁴ If then any operative shall, through improper conduct, not complete his work by the stated time, and, paying no reverence to the god, who is the giver of life, conceive, seeing nothing with his mind's eye, that a god, as being of his own kindred, will pardon him, such a one will, in the first place, suffer punishment from the god himself; and secondly,⁵ let a law be laid down conformably to this;⁵ and let him be bound to pay the value of the work, of which he has defrauded by a falsehood the party, who gave it out; and let him complete it again from the commencement within the stated time gratuitously. And as the law has advised the seller not to make an attempt (on the purchaser) by

¹—¹ All between the numerals is omitted by Taylor, although duly found in the version of Ficinus.

²—² Here, as above in § 4, Ficinus translates *ἐν ταῖς φυλετικαῖς δίκαις* by "tribuum iudices cognoscant," as if his MS. read *ἐν τοῖς φυλετικοῖς δίκασταῖς*. And so he does in § 5, where the Greek is *ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φυλὰς δικάσθησι*—

³—³ A similar expression in Menexen. § 7, where however the names of the deities are not given. Compare too Protagor. § 33, and the Statesman, p. 274, C., and Pseudo-Plato in Critias, p. 109, C.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "auctores—" translated by Taylor, "the authors of these arts—" And so too Ast.

⁵—⁵ The words between the numerals seem strangely introduced. Ficinus has "hoc lege reus factus," what is far preferable.

valuing (an article)¹ at more than its worth, but in all simplicity at its worth—for the operative knows the value—so does it advise in the case of a person undertaking a job, and gives the same order. In cities, therefore, of free-men, it is not meet for the operative himself to make an attempt upon unskilled individuals by his own skill in an art, which is a thing naturally clear and devoid of falsehood; but (it is meet) for an action to lie on this ground in behalf of the person injured against the party doing the wrong. If then any one, after giving out work to an operative, does not pay him his wages, according to the agreement legally drawn up, but by dishonouring Zeus, the guardian of the city, and Athéné,² (both) sharing in the polity,³ and, by being in love with a little gain, shall loosen⁴ great societies, let there be a law to assist, conjointly with the gods, the binding together of the state. For let him, who, after he⁴ has bargained for work and got hold of it,⁴ does not pay the wages at the time agreed upon, be sued for double the amount.⁵ And if a year has elapsed, while all the other monies are without interest, which a person confers as a loan, let him put down the interest at the rate⁶ of an obolus,⁵ for a drachm monthly, and let the cause be tried in the courts of justice⁷ belonging to the tribes. As, however, (we have made mention)⁸ incidentally of those, who in war are the workers of safety, and of army-leaders, and such as are artists in

¹ I have translated as if $\tau\iota$ had dropt out before $\tau\mu\acute{\alpha}\nu$.

^{2—3} As I do not believe that Zeus and Athéné, both of whom are called elsewhere πολιούχοι , are ever spoken of as $\text{κοινωνοὶ πολιτείας}$, I suspect there is some error here, arising from the improper position of some words, and the faulty writing of others. To avoid the difficulty, Ficinus has "Minervamque hujus rei participem—"

³ Ficinus alone has "pro virili parte dissolverit."

^{4—4} Such seems to be the meaning of $\text{προαμειψάμενος ἔργον}$. I suspect however that Plato wrote something like $\text{προειπὼν ἔργον καὶ ἀψάμενος}$ — But as the very same phrase is repeated shortly afterwards, it is perhaps to be considered as a technical one, applicable to various trades. Cousin's note is—"Celui, qui apres avoir commandé un ouvrage à un artisan, $\text{προαμειψάμενος ἔργον}$, ne le paie pas le prix convenu, paiera le double."

^{5—5} All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although duly found in Ficinus.

⁶ As the obolus was the sixth part of a drachm, the rate was above 16½ per cent. monthly.

⁷ From this passage it is evident that, although the expression in § 4 and 5 is $\text{ταῖς φυλῆταικαῖς δίκαις}$, Plato wrote in all the three places $\text{τοῖς φυλῆτικοῖς δικαστηρίοις}$.

⁸ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "mentionem fecimus"—

these matters, ¹it is (only) just to say that we have been reminded of operatives altogether, as in the case of these being again, like those, as it were other operatives.¹ If then any one even of these undertakes a public work, either voluntarily or from a command,² and executes it beautifully, (and)³ the law justly pays him in honours, which are the wages of men skilled in war,⁴ such a law one will never be tired of praising;⁴ ⁵but he will blame it, if it does not pay, after it has bargained for and got hold of any work of those [works]⁶ that are beautiful in war.⁵ Let then this law mingled with praise be laid down by us respecting these matters, in the form of advice, and not of compulsion, to the mass of the citizens, namely, to pay secondary honours to brave men, who are the saviours of the whole state, whether by their valour, or by stratagems in war; for let the greatest guerdon be given to those the first, who have been able⁷ to honour pre-eminently the writings of good legislators.

[6.] The greatest of compacts, that men have with each other, except such as relate to orphans, and the guardians of orphans, have been laid down by us in due order, in nearly (the best manner).⁸ It is necessary however, after what has

¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek; which Ficinus, unable, like myself, to understand, has given a translation of it, adopted to the letter by Taylor, "non alienum est ut de his quoque dicamus."

² Ficinus has "jussus," which leads to *προσταχθεῖς*: but if *προσταχθέν* be retained, we must read *ἐκούσιον* instead of *ἐκόν*.

³ I have adopted *καί*, suggested by Stephens, and inserted by Ast.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *τοῦτον ἐπαινῶν οὐποτε καμῖ τις*, not *αὐτόν*—*καμῖται*, for the sense partly, and partly the syntax. For there is no such form in Greek as *καμοῦμαι*, as I have remarked on *Æschyl. Suppl. 851*, *Οὔτοι καμοῦμαι σοὶ λέγουσα τάγαθά*: where I edited *Οὔτοι κάμοιμ' ἄν*—We meet indeed with *περὶ δ' ἐγγχεί χεῖρα καμῖται* in *Il. B. 389*. But there it is easy to read *χεῖρ καμῖται*: where *τεν* is plainly confirmed by the preceding *ἰδρώσει μέν τεν τελαμών*, and the following *ἰδρώσει δέ τεν ἵππος*: while here, as regards the sense, it will be sufficient to refer to *Prom. 340*, *Τὰ μὲν σ' ἐπαινῶν οὐδαμῇ λήξω ποτε*, and *Theognid. 1327*, *οὐποτε σ' αἰνῶν Παύσομαι*.

⁵ Ficinus has been content to give the general sense, "sin autem ei, qui rem bellicam bene gesserit, nihil redditur, juste conqueretur."

⁶ The word *ἐργων* could not be thus repeated after *ἐργον*.

⁷ This introduction of "able" seems very strange here. It was probably omitted by Ficinus designedly. One MS. has *διανθεῖσι*. The sense seems to require—"who have caused the writings of good legislators to bloom pre-eminently in eternal honour:" in Greek, *τιμῇ διαφρόντως αἰδίῳ ἀνθεῖν θείσι*. With the expression *τιμῇ αἰδίου* compare *αἰδίων δόξαν* in *Thucyd. iv. 87*.

⁸ I have translated as if *κάλλιστα* had dropt out between *διατίταται* and *ταῦτα*, for *σχεδόν* could scarcely stand here by itself.

been now detailed, to arrange these matters at least in some manner. Now of all these is the desire ¹of those about to die¹ respecting their will, and the circumstances of those who have made no will. I have said it is necessary, Clinias, from looking at the harsh and difficult temper of such persons; nor is it possible to leave the point unarranged. For each party would, ²previous to his being about to make his will,² introduce many clauses at variance with each other, and contrary to the laws, and the manners of the living, and their progenitors, if one gave a power for a will to be effective, simply in the manner, that a person may have made it in whatever state he might be towards the end of life. For most of us, when we think we are about to die, are in a certain manner silly in mind, and broken down in spirit.³

Clin. How say you this, O guest?

Athen. A man, Clinias, when about to die, is morose, and full of language very terrible to legislators, and difficult (to treat with).

Clin. In what way?

Athen. Seeking to be the master of all things, he is wont to speak with anger.

Clin. What?

Athen. It is a shocking thing, O ye gods, says he, if I am not permitted to give my property to whomsoever I please, ⁴and not ⁴to one person more, and to another less, amongst such as have evidently behaved ill or well towards me, after they have been tested sufficiently, (some)⁵ during my disorders, and others during my old age, and in other circumstances of various kinds.

Clin. Does he⁶ then, O guest, not appear to you to speak correctly?

¹—¹ Ficinus has "qui mortui sunt," as if his MS. read τῶν τελευτηκότων, not τῶν τελευτᾶν μελλόντων.

²—² Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits all between the numerals.

³ Ast renders διατεθρυμμένως "animo fractos," and refers to Xenophon's Agesilaus ii. 14, ἀσπίδας διατεθρυμμένας. He should have read here διατεθραυσμένως, and there διατεθραυσμένας.

⁴—⁴ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits καὶ μὴ. But Stephens says that the ellipse is to be thus supplied, καὶ μὴ δοῦναι, ᾧ δοῦναι μὴ ἐθέλω.

⁵ Here οἱ μὲν is to be supplied from the subsequent οἱ δὲ—

⁶ Taylor has, what the train of thought requires, the singular here, not the plural, as if he wished to read, δοκεῖ σοί γε, instead of δοκοῦσι σοι—

Athen. The lawgivers of old appear to me, Clinias, to have been cowards, and to have legislated, while they were looking to ¹and thinking upon ¹a trifling portion ²of human affairs.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Terrified at this language (of the dying man),³ they laid down this ⁴law, that it should be lawful for any one⁵ to dispose of his property without exception entirely as he pleased. But I and you will answer those in your state about to die, in a more careful manner.

Clin. How?

Athen. O friends, we will say, ⁶who exist really but for a day,⁶ it is a difficult thing for you to know your own affairs, and yourselves to boot, as the writing of the Pythian (priestess)⁷ says at present. I, therefore, as being a legislator, lay down that neither yourselves are your own property, nor this substance of yours, but that they belong to the whole of your family, both past and to come; and further still, that both the whole of your family and substance belong to the state; and this being the case, should any one by flattery insinuate himself⁸ into your favour, either during a disorder or when you are tost about by old age, and persuade you to dispose of your property by will in not the best manner, I shall not willingly agree to it; but looking to all that is the best both for the whole state,

¹—¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, omits *καὶ διανοούμενοι*—

² Ficinus has “ad minimum quid,” as if his MS. read *σικρότατόν τι*, not *σικρόν* merely.

³ Ficinus adds “*morituri hominis*,” and so after him Taylor, “of the dying man.”

⁴ The Greek in all the MSS. but two is *τόνδε*, in lieu of which Bekker, whom Stalbaum follows, has edited *τόν*—contrary, I conceive, to the genius of the language. They should have read *τούτον*—With regard to the law itself, Ast refers to Plutarch, in Solon, p. 90, A., but there, as remarked by Cousin, Solon permitted a father to dispose of his property, only when he had not a son.

⁵ Ficinus has “*licet cuique*,” as if his MS. read *ἐξεῖναι τῷ τᾷ*—

⁶—⁶ Ficinus, not aware that Plato had in mind the expressions in Pindar, Æschylus, and Aristophanes, where man is described as “the being of a day,” has “*brevi procul dubio morituri*,” and so Taylor after him.

⁷ Of the celebrated saying, “Know thyself,” to which Plato has alluded in not less than five places, the earliest notice is in Æsch. Prom. 317, *Γίγνωσκε σαυρόν*; and the passage the least noticed is in Ovid, A. A. ii. 499, “*Est ibi (at Delphi) diversum fama celebrata per orbem Littera, cognosci quæ sibi quemque jubet*.”

⁸ Ast quotes opportunely, Rep. iv. § 5, *χαρίζεται ὑποτρέχων*.

and your family, I will lay down laws ¹ by justly putting to a less account that which belongs to each individual.¹ May you, therefore, be mild and well-disposed towards us, and proceed in the path, ² in which you are now, according to man's nature, journeying; ³ while of the rest of your concerns it will be for us to be the guardians, by taking, to the utmost of our power, a care (of every thing),³ and not of merely some, but not of others. Let this then, Clinias, be ⁴ the consolation for the dead, and for the living this the prelude (of the law); ⁴ but this the law itself.

[7.] Let him, who makes a will, disposing of his property, if he is a father of children, appoint first whichever of his sons he thinks proper to be his heir, but of his other children whichever he gives to another person to adopt, let this too be written down. And if any of his sons survive him, after having been adopted, but not with any heir-property, and of whom there is an expectation that he will be sent to a colony according to law, let the father be permitted to give him from his other property what he pleases, except the paternal allotment, and all the chattels belonging to it. And if there are more children, let their father distribute in shares the remainder of the allotment in whatever manner he pleases. But whichever of the sons possesses a house, let him not leave to such a one any money. To a daughter, in like manner, to whom a man has been affianced, ⁵ [that he may be about to be her husband,]⁵ let him not give a share; but to her, who is not betrothed, let him give a share. And if any allotment in the country shall be found to be in the hands of any of the sons or daughters, after the will has been made, let it be left ⁶ for the heir of the party

¹—¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has more fully, "ut singulorum commoda minoris quam cunctorum, ut par est, aestimem."

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "quo nature humanæ vos necessitas vocat," thus rendered by Taylor, "as human nature requires you should."

³ I have with Taylor adopted "omnium" in Ficinus, similar to the expression of Phocylides, *Δέριοι κακοί, οὐχ ὁ μὲν, θεὸς δ' ὅς, Πάντες δ'*—

⁴—⁴ To avoid the figure of speech called Chiasmus in the original, I have placed the words in their natural order; while Ficinus has altered the construction by his version, "hæc præmio solamina."

⁵—⁵ The words between the numerals are evidently an explanation, and are omitted by Ficinus, who has "filie, quæ viro sit desponsata."

⁶ In lieu of *καταλείπω* Ast suggests correctly *καταλείπῃσθω*, similar to "relinquatur" in Ficinus.

who has made the will. And if the testator has no sons, but daughters, let him write down what man he would wish as the husband for any of his daughters, and as the son-in-law for himself. And if the son of any one, whether natural or adopted, happens to die before he could be enrolled amongst men, let the testator mention this circumstance in the will, and signify whom he wishes to be his son in his stead with better fortune. And if any one without children makes a will, let him select the tenth part of his property, beyond the allotment, and give it to whom he pleases; but all the rest let him give without blame to his adopted son, and make for himself, according to law, a son kindly disposed. And in the case of a person whose children require guardians, if, after having made his will, he dies, and has mentioned as guardian for his children parties of the number and kind he wishes, and who are willing and agree to act as guardians, let the selection of the guardians be according to what has been written down in full force. But if a person dies intestate, if there is ¹any thing deficient in the selection¹ of the guardians, let the next of kin, two on the father's side, and two on the mother's, and one from among the friends of the deceased, have power to act as guardians; and these let the guardians of the law appoint (as guardians) to any orphan, who is in want of them. And of the whole care of orphans, let fifteen of the guardians of the laws, who are the oldest, have the charge ²ever according to seniority; and having divided themselves into threes, let three (act) in one year, and in another year three others, until the five periods are accomplished in a circle;² and let no one fail in this duty to the best of his power. But should any one die without having made a will at all, and leave children that require a guardian, let the indigent state of the children share in the same laws. And should any one, meeting with an unexpected misfortune, leave behind him daughters, let him pardon the legislator if, looking to two things out of three, namely, proximity of race, and the preservation of the allotment, he makes provision for

¹—¹ Instead of ἡ τῆς—αἰρέσεως ἐλλειπῆς, where there is nothing to govern the genitive, I have translated as if the Greek were ἡ τι τῆς—αἰρέσεως ἐλλειπῆς ᾗ—

²—² Ficinus, partly followed by Taylor, has thus abridged all between the numerals, “ut terni pro dignitate singulis annis curent, et, exacto quinquennio, similiter quindecim alios.”

the giving the daughters in marriage; but the third point, to which the father would have attended, namely, ¹ by looking to habits and manners, ¹ (to select) ² from all the citizens a fitting son for himself and a husband for his daughter, he omits, through the consideration of it being an impossibility. Let then this law be laid down relating to matters of this kind. If any one, dying intestate, leaves behind him daughters, ³ let the brother on the father's or mother's side, if he is without an allotment, take the daughter and the allotment of the deceased. But if there is not a brother, let a brother's son (do so) in like manner, if the cousins are of a sufficient age. And if there is not one of these left, let the son of (the father's) sister (act) in the same way, and let the fourth after these be the father's brother; the fifth, the son of this (brother); and the sixth, the son of the father's sister; ³ and in like manner let the race be continued perpetually by consanguinity, if a person leaves behind daughters, proceeding through brothers and cousins, first the males, and afterwards the females, in one ⁴ family. And let the judge on reflection determine the fitness or unfitness of the time of marriage, by looking at the males naked, and at the females naked, as far as the navel. And if there is a want of kindred to families, as far as the sons of brothers, and as far too as the children of grandfathers, whomsoever of the other citizens, being willing, the girl shall of her own free-will select, with the consent of her guardians, let that person become the heir of the deceased, and the husband of his daughter. Further still, there might be ⁵ a great want of many things, and a still greater of persons of this kind, ⁵ at some time in this very state. Should then a female, ⁶ being in want of nuptials, ⁶ see any one going from hence to a colony, and it

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

² Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, "deligat." Hence, as one MS. reads κλέπτων for βλέπων, Winckelmann suggests ἐκλέγων, βλέπων.

³—³ With this law Ast compares a similar one at Athens, as shown by Isæus, T. vii. p. 270, R., and Demosthenes, p. 1067, R.

⁴ Ficinus has, what is preferable, "in eodem genere—"

⁵—⁵ I have adopted the reading suggested by Ast—πολλή πολλῶν ἀπορία καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶ πλείων—in lieu of πολλὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀπορία τῶν τοιούτων πλείων—What Ficinus found in his MS. it is impossible to discover by his version, adopted to the letter by Taylor—"quod si magna in penuria illorum, qui urbem habitant—"

⁶—⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were τὸ οὐδ' ἀπορος ὑμεναίων, not τὸ ἀπορουμένην—which Ast vainly, I think, endeavours to explain.

is in her mind for that person to be the heir of her father's property, provided he is a relation, let him enter upon the allotment according to the arrangement of the laws. ¹But if he is out of the family, those in the city being out of relationship,¹ let him have the power, through the selection of the guardians and of the daughter of the deceased, to marry her, and returning home, to take the allotment of the intestate. And if any one, who has no male or female children at all, dies intestate, let other matters hold good respecting such a person, according to the aforesaid law; but let a female and a male go, as joint-sharers, from his family to the dwelling, on each occasion deserted; and to them let the allotment belong as owners; and let a sister (enter) first; a brother's daughter, second; a sister's offspring, third; a sister of the father, fourth; a daughter of the father's brother, fifth; and a daughter of the father's sister, sixth. Let these females live together with those (males) according to affinity and lawfulness, as we have previously laid down by law. Nor let the weighty nature of laws of this kind lie hid from us, that sometimes it harshly ordains the relation of a deceased person to marry a relation. ²(For he who introduces a law of this kind,) ²does not appear to consider that ³ten thousand impediments arise, so as to render a person unwilling to comply with mandates of this kind; and that there are those, who would suffer any thing whatever, when diseases and maimings in body or mind come upon some of those ordained by law to marry, or be married. The legislator then will perhaps seem, not correctly so, to some, to pay no regard to these matters. Let this then be stated, as if it were a prelude in common, both for the lawgiver, and the party to whom laws are given; which requests ⁴those under laws to grant a pardon to the legislator, because, while he is taking care of public concerns, he cannot at the same time regulate the circumstances that occur to each in-

¹—¹ Such is the Greek literally. Ficinus has, what is more intelligible,—"sin vero civis quidem, sed non ex genere sit," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐὰν δὲ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντων ἐκτὸς γίνους τις ἢ*—without *ἐξω τῆς ξυγγενείας*.

²—² The words between the lunes are found only in the version of Ficinus, "quippe qui hujusmodi legem fert," adopted by Taylor.

³ In lieu of *ἀ μὲν* Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ὥς μὲν*—For his version is "quam multos—"

⁴ Ast unites *δεόμενον* with *προοίμιον* by a rather violent *prosopopœia*.

dividual likewise; and, on the other hand, ¹(the legislator to grant) ¹a pardon to those under laws; since they are sometimes unable, and reasonably so, to perform the commandments of the legislator, which, ignorant ²(of private circumstances),² he has ordained.

Clin. By doing what then, O guest, will a person be the most in measure in such a case?

Athen. It is necessary, Clinias, to choose arbitrators between laws of this kind, and for those governed by them.

Clin. How say you?

Athen. Sometimes ³the son of a rich father ³would not be willing to marry the daughter of his uncle, ⁴through being given to luxury and keeping his thoughts upon a greater connexion; ⁵and sometimes too, while the legislator is enjoining the greatest calamity, he would be compelled by necessity to disobey the law, which forces ⁶him to accept an alliance with a mad woman, or other terrible calamities of body or soul, and by possessing them, to live a life not to be endured. ⁵Let then this law, which has been just now spoken of, ⁷be laid down by us. If any persons find fault with the laws laid down relating to wills and any thing else whatever, and marriages to boot, (by saying) ⁸that if the legislator himself were ⁹present and living, ⁹he would never compel a person to act thus, nor would those compelled to marry, or to be married, do either; or should any of the family or any guardian assert, that (as) the lawgiver

¹—¹ I have inserted the words between the numerals, as being requisite for the balance of the sentence.

²—² Ficinus, followed tacitly by Taylor, has alone, what the train of thought requires, “singularum calamitatum—”

³—³ The Greek is *πλουσίου* without regimen. But one MS. has *πλείονος*. From the two it is easy to elicit *πλουσίου* *νίδος*, as I have translated.

⁴ I have omitted *ἀδελφιδούς*, as a gloss for *θείου*.

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus found something different, it would seem, in his MS. For his version is “non nunquam calamitate maxima puellæ seu corporis sive animi coactus, legi illi non obtemperat, qua ad insana connubia invitatus trahitur, quibus implicatus vivere nollit.”

⁶ I have followed Stephens, who reads *ἀναγκάζονται* in lieu of *ἀναγκάζοντος*, which is without regimen.

⁷ I have translated as if the Greek were *λεγόμενος*, not *λόγος*, which I cannot understand, and Ast fails, I conceive, to explain satisfactorily.

⁸ Ast supplies *λέγοντες*, which he got from “asserant” in Ficinus.

⁹—⁹ I confess I cannot understand why Plato thus put the cart before the horse. Ficinus omits *παρόντα καὶ*—

had left the fifteen of the guardians of the laws to appear¹ as arbitrators and parents to male and female orphans, to these² let those go, who are contesting about any of such like matters, and by them be adjudged, and bring to an end their decrees as being decisive. But should it seem to any one that too great a power has been given to the guardians of the law, let him carry the matter to the tribunal of selected jurymen, and decide the question about contested points; and upon him, who is defeated by the legislator, let blame and reproach lie, a fine in the eyes of him, who possesses a mind, more heavy than a mass of money.³

[8.] And now there would be, as it were, a second birth to orphans. After the first the nurture and education for each have been spoken of. But after the second, rendered desolate by the want of fathers, it is meet to devise by what means the misfortune of their orphanhood may excite the least possible pity for their misfortune in the case of those who have become orphans.⁴ First then, we assert that we assign by law to them the guardians of the laws to be not worse parents, in the place of those who begat them; and we ordain moreover, that for each year they take a care of them, as if they were their own.⁵ And such is the prelude we have given with care⁶ to them and the guardians, relating to the bringing up of orphans. For we appear to have detailed at some fitting time in the previous discourse, how that the souls of the dead possess a certain power,⁶ by which they attend to human affairs.

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *φανῆναι*, not *φάναι*, which, says Ast, often means "to think." But even if such were the case, of which I am very doubtful, we should here gain nothing by such a meaning.

² In lieu of οὗς I have adopted *τούτους*, as suggested by Stephens; who got the idea from "ad hos ipsos" in Ficinus. For otherwise the apodosis of all the preceding sentences would be wanting.

³ In the Greek there evidently lies hid a dramatic distich—*Ψόγος βαρύτερα χρημάτων πολλῶν ἂρ' ἦν Ἡ ζημία τῶ νοῦν ἔχοντι σῶφρονα*.

⁴ That Plato should have been guilty of this wretched verbiage seems hardly credible. Ficinus has—"Post secundam vero, operam dare debemus, ut privati parentibus, quam minime miserabili calamitate premantur"—thus translated by Taylor, "But after the second it is necessary to devise some means by which orphans may be oppressed with calamity as little as possible."

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were—*ἐμμελῇ ταῦτα τοῦτοις*—not *ἐν μελίῃ τοῦτοις*—Opportunately then do three MSS. offer *ἐμμελῇ*—

⁶ I have omitted *τελευτήσασαι* with Ficinus.

On this point indeed the reasons are true, but long, through the going round about. It is necessary likewise to believe in the other traditions relating to matters of this kind, which are so numerous and very old; and to believe too in those who legislate, unless they seem to be altogether insane, that such is the case. If then such is naturally the case, let persons fear in the first place the gods above, who have a perception of the desolate state of orphans; next, the souls of the dead, to whom in the course of nature it belongs to have a care of their own offspring, and to be kind to those who do them honour, but hostile towards those who treat them with dishonour; and further still, the souls of those who are living, but in old age, and in the greatest honours;¹ for to whom there is a state under good laws and prosperous, their² children's children live a pleasant life, through paying them a proper attention. ³ For all those acutely hear and acutely see every thing³ relating to these matters, and are kind to those who act justly to these persons, but excessively angry, on the other hand,⁴ with those, who behave insolently towards orphans and the destitute; since they deem (such a state) to be a deposit the greatest and the most sacred. To all of which points it is meet for the guardian and magistrate, who possesses the smallest degree of intellect, to direct his attention, and by bestowing his care upon the bringing up and education of orphans, to pay, as it were, a contribution for the benefit of himself and children, and to confer wholly a kindness to the whole of his power. He then, who is persuaded by this story⁶ before the law, and does not behave insolently towards an orphan, will never know distinctly the anger of the legislator about matters of this kind. But let him, who is unpersuaded and does an act of injustice to one

^{1, 2} I have translated as if the Greek were *δρῶν γὰρ*, not *δρῶν περ*, and *τοῦτο*, not *τοῦτο*—On the Attic *δρῶν* see myself in *Æsch. Eum.* 282.

³⁻³ The Greek is at present—*καὶ τὰ περὶ*—It was, I suspect, originally, *καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι πάντες πάντα περὶ*—as I have translated. And thus we need not adopt the transposition recommended by Desiderius Heraldus; which Ast and Stalbaum call an egregious one.

⁴ I have adopted *αὐ τοῖς*—the reading of Ast, in lieu of *αὐτοῖς*—which is unintelligible.

⁵ Ast quotes opportunely Demosthen. c. Aphob. p. 840, 7, R.

⁶ Ficinus has “hoc ante legem exordio”—as if his MS. read *παρὰ τὴν θίψ*: for *παρὰ τὴν θίψ* is found in nearly the same sense as *προσέμειον* in x. p. 885, A., § 1, as remarked by Stephens.

deprived of father and mother, suffer a punishment entirely the double of what he would have done from acting evilly to a party whose parents are both alive.

With regard to the remaining portion of legislation applicable to guardians, in the case of orphans, and to magistrates touching their supervision of guardians, if they had not¹ themselves a pattern for bringing up free children, in bringing up their own, and taking care of their own property, and laws relating to these very matters stated² in moderation, there would have been some reason to lay down certain laws for guardians, as differing very much individually from others, and causing to vary by individual pursuits the life of orphans from that of those who are not so. But now, with respect to every thing of this kind, the care of orphans does not with us differ much from paternal care; but it is unwilling to be equalized in honour, and dishonour, and in attentiveness. Hence as regards this very point the law has, by consoling and threatening, attended to the legislation relating to orphans; and further still, a threat of this kind would be very seasonable. Let him, who is the guardian of a female or a male, and him, who is appointed by the guardians of the law to watch over the guardian, love, not less than his own children, the party who has a share in the misfortune of an orphan; nor let him pay less attention to the property of the party brought up than to his own, but better than according to the forethought³ shown to his own. Let then every one act as a guardian while having this one law relating to orphans. But if any one acts otherwise (and) contrary to this law in affairs of this kind, let the magistrate fine the guardian.⁴ And let the guardian bring the magistrate, (who has acted contrary to the law,) before the tribunal of select (jurymen),

¹ I have with Baiter adopted *εἰ μὲν μὴ*, suggested by Grou, for *εἰ μὲν δὴ*.

² Instead of *διγρημένος*, Ast would read, what Stalbaum has edited from two MSS., *διειρημένους*—

³ The sense requires *προμήθειαν*, not *προθυμίαν*.

⁴—⁴ All the words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor; although Ficinus has “magistratus autem ad electorum iudicium a tutore vocatus, duplo damno afficiatur; id damnum sententia iudicum aestimatur—” But even thus it would be impossible to see what Plato intended to say, unless we suppose, with Ast, that after *ἀρχοντα* is to be supplied *παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντα*, and, what he has neglected to remark, *δφλόντα* after *ζημιοῦτω*—as I have translated.

and punish him (if convicted) with a fine, that shall have seemed good to the tribunal, two-fold.⁴ And if the guardian shall appear to the kindred of the orphans, or to any other of the citizens, to act negligently or viciously, let such party bring him before the same tribunal; and ¹in whatever sum he shall be cast, let him pay the quadruple,¹ and let one half belong to the child, and the other to the party who brought the charge forward. When an orphan arrives at puberty, if he thinks that he has been badly treated by his guardian, let him be allowed to obtain by lot a trial relating to guardianship up to ²five years from the close of the guardianship;² and if any guardian is found guilty, let the court of justice fix what he is to suffer (in person), or pay (in purse); and if any magistrate shall appear to have injured an orphan through negligence, let the court of justice fix what he is to pay the child; and if through injustice, in addition to the fine, let him be removed from the office of a guardian of the law; and let the common power of the state appoint another in his place for the country and the city.

[9.] Greater differences take place between fathers and sons and between sons and fathers, than is proper; in which fathers will think that the legislator ought to permit them to renounce, if one wishes it, a son by the public crier, (and to say) he is no longer his own according to law; and sons, on the other hand, that they ought to be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of silliness, when they are disgracefully in that state through disease or old age. Now these things are wont to take place, when the morals of men are perfectly corrupt. For on the half only of these evils taking place, as in the case of a wicked parent and child, or the contrary, calamities, which are the progeny of such a mighty hatred, have no existence. Indeed, in any other polity, a son disowned by his father would not necessarily become cityless; but in a state, where these are the laws, it is a matter of necessity for the fatherless to settle himself in some other place; since it is not possible for a single one

¹ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "quadruplum damni restituit." Hence, to avoid the difficulty, which presented itself to Ficinus, one might read *εἰς τὸ πέντε ἀγίτω δικαστήριον αὐτόν· ἂν δ' ὀφλῇ*—instead of—*ἑκατὴν τήριον ὅτι δ' ἂν ὀφλῇ*—

² A similar law was in force at Athens, as shown by Demosthenes, p. 989, 22, R., quoted by Ast.

to be added to the five thousand and forty households. On this account it is necessary that the son, who shall suffer this justly at the hands of one person, his father, should be renounced by his whole race. It is meet then, in relation to matters of this kind, to act according to some such law as this. For him, upon whom a feeling by no means fortunate has come, whether justly or not, in his desire to release the party, whom he has begotten and brought up, from a relationship to himself, let it not be lawful to do so upon slight grounds, nor on the instant; but let him first bring together his own relations up to cousins, and in like manner those of his son on the mother's side; and let him accuse his son before them, and show that he deserves on all accounts to be expelled from the family; and let him allow his son to give reasons of equal weight (to prove) that he does not deserve to suffer any thing of that kind; and if the father can persuade them, and get to vote on his side more than half of all the relations,¹ except the father,² mother, and the son himself,³ and of the rest such as are complete women and men,³ in this way and under these regulations let it be lawful for the father to renounce his son; but otherwise not; and if any of the citizens is willing to adopt as his son the party so renounced, let no law prevent him from so adopting him. For the habits of youth naturally undergo many changes continually in life. But if during ten years no one wishes to adopt the renounced party as a son, let the curators of the superabundant population⁴ (that is fit) for a colony,⁴ look to these likewise, in order that they may have a share in the same colony in a proper manner.⁵ But if disease, or old age, or

¹ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has here "tam viri quam mulieres—"

² After πατρός the Greek has διαψηφιζόμενον, which neither Ast nor Baiter could understand; for the former would read διαψηφιζόμενους, and the latter διαψηφιζομένων: nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it. I could have understood κρίβδα ψηφιζομένων placed after ξυγγενῶν, or after τῶν τε ἄλλων—

³⁻³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has "tam viri quam mulieres conferant, nisi ætas impedimento sit," which evidently leads to ὅσοι περ ἂν ᾧσι—μὴ τέλειαι, what the sense requires: where τέλειαι is to be taken in the sense of "perfect" in limbs and full grown.

⁴⁻⁴ Ficinus alone has, what the sense seems to require, "quam constitimus transmissis coloniis amputari—" But what he found in his MS. it is not so easy to say.

⁵ I confess I scarcely understand here ἐμμελῶς, which Ficinus translates "congrue," and Ast would unite to ἐπιμελίσθαι.

harshness of manners, or all these together, more than any thing else, cause a person to be pre-eminently beyond the majority out of his mind, and this is concealed from every one, except those who live with him, and, as being the master of his property, he brings his family to ruin, but his son hesitates and fears to bring a charge of silliness, let a law be first laid down in this case, that the son is to go to the oldest guardians of the law, and inform them of his father's calamity; and let them, when they have seen him sufficiently, take counsel together, whether the suit is to be entered upon or not; and if they together advise (a suit), let them be both witnesses and parties in the cause. And if the father is condemned, let him for the remainder of his time be without the power of disposing by will of even the smallest portion of his property, but dwell at home for the rest of his life, like a child.

[10.] If a husband and wife cannot, through the misfortune of their tempers, agree with each other, it will be requisite for ten men, from amongst the guardians of the laws, as mediators, and similarly ten women, who are the curators of marriages, to have the care of matters of this kind; and if they are able to reconcile the parties, let their decision be valid. But if their minds swell rather violently, like waves, let them seek, to the best of their power, such persons as will reside¹ with either party; and as it is likely that such persons are not tempered by gentle manners, it is meet² to endeavour to fit to them social habits and manners of greater weight and mildness, and that such as, being without children, or having but a few, disagree, ³should, even for the sake of children, make for themselves a joint-dwelling.³ ⁴But it is meet for such as, when there is a sufficient number of children, to make for themselves a separation and an union, for the sake of a joint old age, and a care for each other.⁴ If a woman dies,

¹ Instead of *ξυνοικήσουσιν* five MSS. read *ξυνοίσουσιν*, similar to "convenient" in Ficinus; who has likewise "facto divortio," to which there is nothing at present to answer in the Greek.

² In lieu of *δὴ* one MS. has *δε*, which leads distinctly to *δεῖ*—

^{3—3} Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor follows in part, has "procreandorum liberorum causa conjugium rursus querere compellendi." Hence instead of *τὴν*, Winckelmann suggested *καὶ τὴν*—Orelli, *ἀλλήν*—

^{4—4} Here again Ficinus swerves from a literal translation in his "quod

and leaves behind her male and female children, let the law laid down advise, but not compel, (the husband)¹ to bring up the children, and not bring upon them a stepmother; but if there are no children, let him of necessity marry, until he has begotten children, sufficient both for his household and the state. But if the husband dies, and leaves behind him a sufficient number of children, let the mother of the children remain (a widow),² and bring them up. But if she seems to be younger than is fitting for a person to live in a state of health without a husband, let her kindred, communicating with the women who take care of marriages, do what seems good to themselves and the women touching matters of this kind; and if they are in want of children, even for the sake of children;³ and let an exact sufficiency of children be considered, according to law, a male and a female. When it is agreed that an offspring is the progeny of the adopters,⁴ but there is a need of a decision, as to which of the parents the child ought to follow,⁵ if a female slave shall have had connexion with a slave, or with a free-born person, or with a freed-man, let the offspring be the property of the master of the female slave; and if a free-born woman shall have had intercourse with a slave, let the offspring belong to the master of the slave. If a slave becomes pregnant by her master, or a mistress by her slave, and this becomes apparent, let the women⁶ send the offspring of the woman, together with the father, into another country; but let the guardians of the law (send away) the offspring of the man together with its mother.

[11.] ⁷To have a neglect of parents neither a god nor a man, *si filios non paucos habent atque dissentiunt, senectutis mutuo curandæ gratia, divortio facto, aliud conjugium ineant.* What Plato meant to say, I must leave for others to explain.

¹ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires here, "virum—"

² Here again Ficinus supplies, what is wanting for the sense, "vidua—"

³ Ficinus adds here—"ducant nubantve:" but Ast understands *τοῦτο ποιοῦντων*, which he explains by "mulierem viro nubere jubento." I am quite in the dark.

⁴ From the version of Ficinus, "qui sibi eos vendicant," Stephens, who is followed by Ast, was led to *προσποιοῦμένων*—"of those who lay claim to it"—Taylor translates "the begetters"—But that would be in Greek *πεποιηκῶτων*. Winckelmann would read either *ἀποποιοῦμένων* or *ὁποιοῦμένων*—

⁵ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, inserts "sic agatur"—

⁶ i. e. those, who have the care of marriages.

⁷ Winckelmann, in the Preface to the *Phædrus* in the smaller Zurich

who has any mind, would ever advise any one. ¹ And it is necessary to consider that a prelude of this kind would be relating to the ministering to the gods,¹ having been properly regulated touching the honours and dishonours shown to parents. Now laws have been of old laid down relating to the gods amongst all men in a two-fold manner. For seeing clearly some of the gods,² we honour them; but of others we place statues as resemblances; which³ while we are honouring, although not endued with life, we do not vainly⁴ imagine that the gods, who are endued with life, feel a great goodwill on this account, and gratitude towards us. Let not then any one, whose father or mother, or the fathers or mothers of these, lie in his house, like a deposit, worn down with old age, ever conceive that while he has such a possession⁵ at his hearth and in his house, there will be ever a statue more powerful,⁶ if only the possessor ministers to it in a proper manner.⁷

Clin. What is the propriety which you say exists?

Athen. I will tell you. For things of this kind, friends, it is fit to hear.

Clin. Only mention it.

Athen. We say that Œdipus, having been dishonoured by his children, imprecated upon them what every one celebrates in hymns,⁸ ⁹ as having come to pass and being heard⁹ by the

edition, has supplied here what he conceives to be omissions, by the aid of a fragment of Pempelus the Pythagorean, in Stobæus Tit. 77, p. 460.

¹ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has changed the terms of this proposition—"Sed quod de cultu deorum ignorare non oportet, id recte dictum ad honorandos parentes procemium erit," as if he had found in his MS. *φρονήσαι δὲ χρὴ τὸ περὶ θεῶν θεραπείας ὁρθῶς συντεταγμένον τοῦτο δὴ προοίμιον ἀν' γινόμενον εἰς τὰς τῶν γεννησάντων τιμὰς τε καὶ ἀτιμίας.*

² By these are meant the Sun and Moon.

³ Instead of *οὗς*, which is unintelligible, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἄς*, similar to "eas" in Ficinus.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐ κενῶς*, not *ἰκύνους*—

⁵ I have adopted *κτῆμα*, which the Bipont editor elicited from *οἶκημα* in Ald., in lieu of which five MSS. offer *ἰδρυμα*, evidently a various reading for *ἀγαλμα*, both of which are found shortly afterwards.

⁶ Ast incorrectly explains *κύριον* by "his own"—See a little below.

⁷ I have omitted *ὁρθῶς*, plainly an explanation of *κατὰ τρόπον*, although it seems to be defended by the subsequent *ὁρθότητα*.

⁸ On these imprecations of Œdipus see Valckenaer on Eurip. Phœn. 67.

⁹—Here again Plato has chosen to put the cart before the horse. For the prayers must have been heard by the gods before they were brought to pass.

gods. Amyntor too is said to have cursed in anger his son Phœnix,¹ and Theseus too Hippolytus,² and innumerable other fathers innumerable other sons. From which it has become manifest that the gods hearken to parents (when praying) against their children. For a parent is to his children, as no one else is to other persons,³ when imprecating a curse, most justly pernicious.³ Nor let any one imagine, that for a deity to be hearkening to the prayers of a father and mother, when dishonoured pre-eminently by their children, is according to nature; for when a parent is held in honour, and has become very joyous, and on this account is earnest in prayer and is calling upon the gods for good things to his children, shall we not imagine that they equally hear and grant us (their requests)? For otherwise they would not be just distributors of what is good—an act, which we say becomes the gods the least of all.

Clin. Certainly.

Athen. Let us think then, as we observed a little before, that we could not possess a statue more honoured by the gods, than that of our father and grandfather, worn down by old age, and of mothers and grandmothers, possessing the same want of power;⁴ which when any one honours, the god is glad; for otherwise he would not hear them.⁵ For the statues of our progenitors (still living) are wonderfully superior to those without life. For those, which are animated, do, when ministered to by us, pray for us on each occasion; but the very contrary when they are held by us in dishonour. But (the inanimate do) neither of these. So that he, who behaves properly to his father and grandfather, and all persons of this kind, would possess the most powerful of all statues, as regards his portion (of life) beloved by the gods.

Clin. You speak most beautifully.

¹ This was probably told in the Phœnix of Euripides, who followed Homer in *Il.* i. 417.

² See Eurip. Hipp. 891.

³—³ One MS. has βλαβερός, all the rest ἀπαῖος— Plato wrote, I suspect, both, as I have translated, βλαβερός γὰρ ἀπαῖος— Winckelmann proposes βαρὺς γὰρ ἀπαῖος, comparing Soph. Trach. 1202.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were not δύναμιν, but, what the sense requires, ἀδυναμίαν, as suggested by Winckelmann. Pempelus however, quoted by Stobæus, has τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν, in lieu of τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν.

⁵ As there is nothing to which Ἀντῶν can be well referred, one would prefer Αἰτῶν, "prayers."

Athen. Every one therefore, who has any mind, fears and honours the prayers of his parents, as knowing that they have come to pass to many persons and at many times. Since then this is the ordinance of nature to good men, their aged progenitors will be a god-send, when living to the extremity of life, and young persons, when they depart,¹ be a source of great regret; but to the bad, on the contrary,² very terrible. Let then every one, persuaded by these reasonings, honour his parents with all lawful honours. But if the voice of preludes like these lays hold of any deaf person,³ for such would this law be properly laid down. If any one in this state takes a less care of his parents than is fitting, and does not pay them in all matters more attention than he does his sons, and all his offspring and himself, and is (not)⁴ fulfilling their wishes, let the party suffering in this way lay an information, either himself or by sending some one to three of the oldest guardians of the law, and likewise to three of the women, who have the care of marriages; and let these attend to the matter, and punish the offenders, if young men, with stripes and bonds, if they happen to be up to thirty years of age; and let women be punished with the same punishment, up to ten years more. But if they are beyond these years, and do not stand aloof from the same neglect of parents, but maltreat them in some way,⁵ let (persons) bring them before a court of justice, to one and each of the citizens,⁶ who may be the oldest of all; and if a person is cast, let the tribunal fix what he is to pay (in purse) or suffer (in person), and consider nothing of what a person can suffer (in person) or pay (in purse) as a thing not to be told. And

¹ Instead of ἀπιόντες Winckelmann would read ἀπόντες, comparing Lys. p. 215, B.

² In lieu of εἰς Ficinus found in his MS. αὖ, as shown by his "contra—"

³ I have translated as if the Greek were not κωφή, but κωφόν, similar to "surdus" in Ficinus; unless it be said that Plato wrote κωφή κωφόν, for κωφός means both "deaf" and "dumb."

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were ἀποπληρῶν μὴ ᾗ, not ἀπληρῶν ᾗ—

⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek—εἰς δικαστήριον εισαγόντων αὐτοὺς εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν—which I cannot understand, nor could Bekker; who proposes to read ἕκατον, from which nothing appears to be gained; and still less from Ast's method of explaining εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον, as if it were ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἑκάστῳ, which he renders "coram singulo quoque—" Winckelmann too is equally at a loss; he wishes to read εἰς τὸ τῶν ἐκκρίτων δικαστῶν δικαστήριον εισαγόντων αὐτοὺς καὶ διαδικάζουσιν τῶν πολιτῶν οἵτινες—I am quite in the dark

if any one, who has been maltreated, is unable to tell the tale, let him, who has heard from free persons, lay an information before the rulers, or let him be considered a bad man, and brought to trial by any one who is willing, for a mischief done. And if a slave gives information, let him be made free; and if he is the slave, either of the maltreating or maltreated parties, let him be made free by the magistrate; but if he is the slave of any other citizen, let the public (treasury) put down his value for his master; and let it be a care to the magistrates, that no one, in revenging himself, does an injury to a person of this kind for giving the information.

[12.] With respect to the cases, where one person does a mischief to another by means of poisons, such as are deadly have been already spoken of; but as regards other mischiefs, if any does an injury willingly and with malice prepense, by drink, or meat, or ointments, of these nothing has been stated as yet. For two kinds of poisonings ¹according to the race of man ²stop the statement. ³ For (the poisoning), of which we were just now clearly speaking, is doing an injury to bodies by bodies according to nature; but the other is that, which, by sorceries and incantations and the so-called bindings, ³ persuades those, who dare to injure them, ⁴ that they are able to do something of this kind; and others, that they are injured more than any thing by those, who are able to act the sorcerer. Now these matters, and all relating to things of this kind, it is neither easy to know how they exist in nature, nor, if any one did know, to persuade others. But upon the minds of men, who look with suspicion on each other in things of this kind,

¹—¹ Winckelmann, unable, like myself, to understand *κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὖσαι γένος*, proposes to read *κατὰ—ποιούσαι*— i. e. “doing mischiefs to the race of man.”

²—² Here again I am at a loss. For though Ast translates *ἐπίσχουσι τὴν διάρρησιν* “inhibent expositionem,” yet I cannot see how such a result could arise from the poisonings merely of two kinds. Ficinus omits the words entirely.

³ What the ancients understood by “bindings,” is perhaps similar to what would now be called “mesmerisms,” when a person is thrown into a state of torpor, and becomes spell-bound. To this kind of quackery the earliest allusion is in Eumen. 322, *ὑμνος ἐξ Ἐρινύων δέσμιος φρενῶν*—

⁴ Ficinus, unable probably to understand *αὐτοὺς*, has omitted it. Taylor has “others.” But Plato wrote, I suspect, either *τοὺς ἄνους*, or *τοὺς ἀνοήτους*—Winckelmann suggests *ἐναντίους*—

it is not worth while to endeavour to make an attack,¹ if perchance they see representations moulded in wax, either on the house-door, or where three cross-roads meet, or on the tombs of their parents, and to exhort those, who have no clear notions about them, to hold all things of that kind cheap. Dividing then the law relating to poisonings into two parts,² according as a person may attempt to use poisons in one way or the other,³ let us first beg, and exhort, and advise persons, that they ought not to attempt to do a thing of this kind, nor to terrify the masses of mankind, frightened like children; nor, on the other hand, to compel the legislator and judge to cure mankind of such fears;³ since, in the first place, he who attempts to make use of poison, if he does not know what he is doing, both as regards the body, if he happens not to be skilled in medical science, and as regards on the other hand sorceries, unless he happens to be a diviner, or an interpreter of miracles.³ Let this law then be stated in words⁴ respecting poisons. He, who employs poison, not for deadly injury⁵ to a person himself, or to the folks belonging to that man,⁵ but⁶ for an injury of another kind, or deadly⁶ to cattle and hives of bees, if he happens to be a physician, and is condemned for poisoning

¹ I have translated, both for the syntax and sense, as if the Greek were *ἐπιθῆναι*, not *πείθειν*.

^{2—3} The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and by Taylor after him.

³ There is evidently a lacuna here.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *λεγίσθω δὴ ἐν λόγοις ὅδε νόμος*, not *δὴ λόγος ὅδε*, where *λόγος* is omitted by Ficinus, as being, no doubt, unintelligible.

^{5—6} The words between the numerals I hardly understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus. At least he has omitted them, and so after him has Taylor. The difficulty lies in *ἐκείνου*, placed after *αὐτοῦ*, whether the two pronouns be applied to the same person or not. Cornarius applies it to the same. Moreover *ἀνθρώπων* is strangely used here for *ἀνδραπόδων*, or *ἄλλων*, opposed to *αὐτοῦ*: from whence one would be led to read *ἐν οἴκῳ* for *ἐκείνου*.

^{6—6} Stephens was the first to object to *εἰτ' ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ εἰτ' οὖν θανάσιμῳ*, thus introduced after *ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μὴ θανάσιμῳ*. He would therefore expunge *εἰτ' ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ*, as an interpolation. But *εἰτ' οὖν* could not stand here or any where without *εἴτε* in a corresponding clause. I suspect that Plato wrote *ἐπὶ ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ*, explained by *ἡγουν θανάσιμῳ*: for when *ἡγουν* was corrupted into *εἰτ' οὖν*, the *ἐπὶ* would of course be altered into *εἴτε*. Ficinus seems, as remarked by Ast, to have found in his MS. *εἰ γ' ἄλλῃ βλάβῃ ἢ θανάσιμῳ*. For his version is "sive etiam ut aliter quam morte bestiis noceat."

let him be punished with death; but if he is unskilled (in medicine), let the tribunal fix what he must suffer (in person) or pay (in purse). But if any one by bindings-down, or allurements, or certain incantations, or any of such like poisonings whatever, appears to be like a person doing an injury, if he is a diviner, or an interpreter of miracles, let him be put to death. But if any one is accused of poisoning, without being a diviner, let the same thing take place to him likewise. For respecting him, let the tribunal fix what it seems good to them he ought to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse). Whatever injury one person does to another by fraud or force, if it be a great one, let him pay a greater fine; but a smaller one, if it be small; and in all cases let a party pay as much as he may on each occasion have done an injury, until he shall have remedied the mischief done. ¹In each case of wrong-doing, let each person pay the penalty that follows it, for the sake of bringing him to his senses; ¹ and let one, who in thoughtlessness has done wrong, and by making use of a persuasion foreign to his nature, through his youth or some such thing, (pay) a lighter (fine), but another one a heavier, through his own thoughtlessness, or his non-mastery over pleasure and pain, from the fears of cowardice,² or certain desires, or envyings, or angers, that have become difficult to cure; and let him suffer a punishment, not for having done wrong—³for what has been born, ne'er will be unborn³—but for the sake of this, that in after-time both the culprit and those, who see him under the sentence of the law, may either hate injustice entirely, or that a great portion of a calamity of this kind may cease. For the sake of all which, it is meet for the laws to look to all these matters, nor, like a bad archer, to take aim, for the sake of the magni-

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

² Stephens and Ast, objecting to *ἐν φόβοις δειλίας*, wished to read, the former *ἐν φόβοις ἢ δειλίας*, the latter *ἢ δειλία*— But as one MS. has *λια*

*δεινω*s, perhaps Plato wrote *ἐν φόβοις δουλούμενος*—“enslaved by fear.” Winckelmann suggests *ἐν φόβοις δειλοῖς*, referring to p. 870, C.

³—³ With this sentiment, *Ὁ γὰρ τὸ γεγὸς ἐστὶν ἀγέννητον ποτε*—which is a dramatic fragment, Ast compares Soph. Trach. 743, *τὸ γὰρ Φανθὲν τίς ἀν δύναιτ' ἀν ἀγέννητον ποιῆν*—and Horace, “neque Diffinget infectumque reddet, Quod fugiens semel hora vexit,” and the other passages quoted by Gataker in Misc. Adv. Posth. p. 756.

tude of the punishment in each case, and the proper desert viewed as a whole.¹ The same ought the judge to do, and to be the minister to the legislator, whenever a law puts upon him to fix what the party tried ought to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse); and, like a painter, he ought to sketch out the acts, in conformity with the description of them; which must be done at present by us, Megillus and Clinias, in the most beautiful and best manner; and we must state what fines, as they are called, are to take place for all acts done by fraud and violence, in order that the gods, and the sons of gods, may permit us to lay down laws.

[13.] If any one is insane, let him not be seen openly in the city, but let the relations of each person watch over them at home, in the best manner they know of; or let them pay a fine, he with property of the largest valuation a hundred drachms, if he is negligent in the case of a person, whether a slave or a free-man; he of the next valuation, four out of five parts of a mina; he of the third, three parts of a mina; and he of the fourth, four parts. Many indeed are mad in various ways. Some, of whom we have just spoken, through disease; others, through the vicious nature and nurture to boot of passion; for being excited by a trifling enmity, they send forth a loud voice and speak blasphemously against each other. But nothing of this kind ought to take place at any time, or by any means, in a state under good laws.² Let then there be this one (law) relating to all on the subject of evil-speaking. Let no one speak evil of another. But when one person has³ in some discourses³ a dispute with another, let him give to and receive instruction, from the person disputing, and those who are present, and abstain entirely from evil-speaking. ⁴For from uttering prayers and curses against each other, and bringing through disgraceful names the language of women upon each other,⁴ in the first place from words,

¹ Such seems to be the meaning here of *παντελῶς*, which is omitted entirely by Ficinus.

² I have adopted *εὐνόμῳ* for *εὐνόμων*, as suggested by Stephens, who refers to xii. p. 950, D., to which he was led by finding "*bonis legibus instituta*" in Ficinus, followed tacitly by Taylor.

³—³ In lieu of *ἐν τισι λόγοις* Winckelmann suggests *ἐν πράξει λόγοις*, referring to p. 888, A., but Baiter *ἐν τισι συλλόγοις*—

⁴—⁴ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has thus abridged all between the

which are a light thing, hatred and grievous enmities are produced in deed. For by gratifying anger, a thing most unlovely, the speaker gorges passion with an evil feast, and just as much as he was once rendered mild by education, to such an extent does he again make his soul savage, and, living in moroseness, becomes like a wild beast, and receives from passion a bitter delight. And under these feelings all are frequently wont to go out of the way to utter something ridiculous about their opponents; to which there is no one who accustoms himself, but who fails in a seriousness of manner, partially or entirely, or destroys of highmindedness many a part. On this account therefore, let no one ever speak any word of this kind in a temple, or ¹at public sacrifices,¹ or at public games, or in the market-place, or a court of justice, or at any common meeting. But let the magistrate, who is the president at such places, punish without damage to himself the individual (so speaking); ²or never let him enter the lists for the prizes of good conduct, as being one who pays no attention to the laws, nor performs what is enjoined by the legislator.² And if any one in other places begins abuse or uses it in self-defence, and does not keep himself from language of this kind, let any more elderly person, who meets him, in defence of the law restrain with blows those, who ³act kindly towards anger, another ill;³ or let them be held amenable to the fine ordained. We say too at present, that he, who ⁴is entangled with abuse,⁴ is not able to make use of it without seeking to say what raises a laugh;

numerals—"cum enim sibi invicem verbis turpibus maledicunt, mulieres habentur—"

¹—¹ Philoctetes is said by Sophocles, in v. 8—11, to have interrupted the rites of sacrifice *δυσφήμiais βοῶν, ἰύζων*. Compare likewise El. 630, *Οὐκ οὖν ἑάσεις οὐδ' ὑπ' εὐφήμου βοῆς θῦσαι με;*

²—² Ficinus is here unusually prolix—"quod si non fecerit, quasi legum proditor præceptorumque legislatoris spretor, nunquam ad publici cujusquam muneris certamen, quasi de virtute certaturus, ascendat."

³—³ The Greek is *τοὺς θυμῷ, ἐτέρῳ κακῷ, φιλοφρονουμένους*: where *φιλοφρονουμένους* is strangely used for *χαριζομένους*, and *ἐτέρῳ κακῷ* applied to *λοιδορίῳ*. Ficinus has "ira, alieno malo, concitati," dissatisfied, it would seem, with *φιλοφρονουμένους*. Winckelmann proposes *θυμῷ, ὥσπερ θηρίῳ κακῷ*—I should prefer *θυμῷ, ἀγρίῳ κακῷ καὶ ἀφίλῳ, θηριουμένους*—Cousin with Grou refers *κακῷ ὄντι* to *πληγαῖς*—

⁴—⁴ Stephens was the first to find fault with *λοιδορίαις συμπλεκόμενος*, and to suggest that *συμπλέεσθαι* might mean "velitari," for he had perhaps a faint recollection of the passage in Festus quoted by Ast—"Velitatio dicta est ultro citroque probrorum objectio, ab exemplo velitaris

and this is what we abuse ourselves, when it takes place through anger. But what then? ¹ Shall we admit the propensity of comic writers to say what raises a laugh against persons, if without any feeling of anger they attempt in their comedies to say any thing of this kind against the citizens? Or shall we make a twofold division into the playful and not? and that it may be lawful for any one in fun to say what is laughable, if without anger, about any one; but that it be not lawful for any one, as we said before, when on the stretch² and with any angry feeling? This then must by no means be put off; but let us lay down by a law for whom it may be lawful, or not. Let it then be not lawful for any composer of comedies, or of any iambics or melodies of the Muses, either by words or caricatures, to make any citizen a butt in comedy, either in anger or without anger. And if any one disobeys (this law), let the umpires at the contests expel him utterly from the country on the very same day, or be fined three minæ, sacred to the god to whom the contest belongs. But let it be lawful for the others, to whom it has been stated above that there is a permission, to do so to each other without anger and in sport; but let it not be allowed in seriousness and in anger. And let the inquiry into this matter be committed to him, who has the care of the whole education of the young. And whatever he shall select, let it be lawful for the composer to bring it before the public; but whatever he rejects, let not the author show it to any one, nor let him be found to have taught it to any other person, either a slave or free-man; or let him be considered as a vicious character, and disobedient to the laws.

[14.] But he is a person deserving of pity, not when he is hungry or suffers a thing of this kind, but when temperate, or possessing some (other) virtue,³ or a part of it, he has in

pugnæ;" and hence λαιδορίαῖς συμπλεκόμενος would signify "fighting with abuse," as Thersites doubtless did, until he was stopt by Ulysses—¹ idea that would have been borne out to the letter, had Plato written—*ζητεῖν, Θερσίτης δὲν*—

¹—¹ Ficinus is here rather wide of the Greek—"Comicorumne satyrorumque sales et ridiculosa convicia, quibus adversus cives utuntur, absque ira sic mordeant, admittemus."

² In lieu of *ἐνντταραμίνω*, Heusde was the first to suggest, what Schœbaum takes to himself, *ἐνντταραμίνω*, got from "concitato" in Ficinus.

³ Ficinus alone has "virtute alia," as if his MS. read *τιν' ἄλλαν ἀρετήν*

addition a certain calamity.¹ Hence it would be a thing of wonder, should a person, who is such, be so entirely neglected, as to arrive at extreme poverty, whether a slave or a free-man, in a polity and a city which is regulated even moderately. On this account it would be safe for the legislator to lay down for such persons a law of this kind. Let there be no beggar in the state. But if any one attempts to do a thing of this kind, by collecting food by prayers² which cannot be satisfied,² let the Market-Stewards expel him from the market-place, and the City-Stewards from the city, and the Rural-Stewards send him from the rest of the country, over the land on the borders, in order that the land may become altogether pure from an animal of such a kind.

If a male or a female slave injures the property of persons ever so little, the injured party himself not being a joint-cause, through inexperience or any other event of an intemperate kind, let the owner of the party, who has done the mischief, either remedy the mischief in not a deficient manner, or hand over the injuring party himself. But if the owner (of the slave) brings an accusation by saying that the charge has been made by the common trick of the parties injuring and injured, with the view of depriving him of his slave, let him bring against the person, who pretends to have been injured, an action for fraudulent practices; and if the party is convicted, let him receive double the value of the slave, at which the tribunal may have fixed it; but if he is himself defeated, let him remedy the mischief and give up the slave. And if a beast of burden, or a horse, or a dog, or any other animal, injures the property of neighbours, let³ (the owner of the animal)³ in like manner pay for the mischief done.

If a person is unwilling to be a witness, let the party, who wants him, cite him;⁴ and after being cited,⁵ let him meet the

¹ After "calamity" Taylor inserts what is neither in the Greek, nor in the Latin of Ficinus—"But this cannot be said universally of any one, who falls into such like misfortunes."

²—³ Such is Taylor's translation of "inexplebilibus" in Ficinus; a meaning that *ἀνεύρεται* can scarcely bear.

³—³ Ficinus, whom Taylor tacitly follows, has alone, what the sense requires, "*animalis dominus*—"

⁴ This would be said in England "to serve him with a subpoena."

⁵—⁵ Ficinus, followed for the most part by Taylor tacitly, has—"citatique tempore idoneo adsit ut testimonium, prout sciverit, afferat."

party at the trial ; and if he knows the facts, and is willing to give evidence, let him give it.⁵ But if he says that he knows nothing, let him swear by the three deities, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, that he knows nothing, and be dismissed from the trial ; and let him, who, when cited to give evidence, does not attend,¹ be held amenable for the mischief according to law. If any one cause a juryman to stand up as a witness, let him not, while giving evidence, give his vote upon the case. Let a free woman be allowed to bear witness, and appear as counsel, if she is more than forty years of age, and to obtain by lot a trial, if she is unmarried ; but if her husband is living, let her be allowed to be a witness only. Let a male and female slave, and a boy,² be allowed to be a witness in the case of murder, and to act as counsel, if they can produce trust-worthy bail that they will remain up to the trial, should they be accused of bearing false witness. Let either of the litigants bring a charge against the whole or part of the evidence, if he asserts that some have borne false witness before the trial is decided ; and let the magistrates preserve in writing the accusations put under the seal of both, and bring them forward for the purpose of deciding upon the false testimony. If any one shall be twice convicted of having borne false witness, let the law no longer compel him to bear witness again ; but if thrice, let him not be allowed ever to bear witness again. And if he dares, after having been caught thrice, to bear witness, let any one who is willing, inform against him before a magistrate ; and let the magistrate deliver him to a tribunal, and if he is convicted, let him be punished with death. Of whomsoever, that have seemed to have borne false witness in a cause, and by so doing to have gained the suit for the plaintiff, the evidence shall be detected, if more than half of such testimony is condemned, let the verdict obtained by such evidence be set aside, and let there be a question of doubt, and a trial, whether the cause had been decided or not by such evidence ; and according as the decision may be on either side, let the final result of the previous trials be determined by this decision.

While however there are many things of beauty in the life

¹ The technical word in Greek was ἀπαντᾶν, "to meet," as shown by Demosthenes in various places, quoted by Ast.

² This boy would appear strange, did we not know that youths up to eighteen years of age were called "boys" at Athens.

of man, to the majority of them there stick, as it were naturally, evil fates, which stain and defile them. And yet, as there is justice amongst men, how is not that beautiful, which renders all human affairs mild? And this being beautiful, how would it not be beautiful in us to take the side of a party in a cause? But ¹ on these notions being of such a kind a certain maliciousness brings a calumny,¹ by putting forward art under an honourable name, which says forsooth that the first thing is a certain stratagem in causes, and that it is able to gain a victory ² by litigating, and taking a part in causes,² whether what may have been done respecting each suit is just or not; and that of this art, and of the speeches resulting from it, there is a gift, if a person will give money in return. This therefore, whether it is an art, or an artless skill ³ and practice, it is particularly necessary that it should not exist in our state; but, as the legislator ⁴ requests (the people) to be persuaded by him, and not to say what is contrary to justice,⁴ ⁵ be sent about its business to some other country.⁵ ⁶ To those then, who are persuaded, silence (is sufficient); ⁶ but for the unpersuaded let this be the voice of the law. If any one is thought to be endeavouring to turn the power of justice, which is in the souls of the judges, to a contrary direction, and out of season ⁷ to

¹—¹ The Greek is *ταῦτα οὖν τοιαῦτα ὄντα διαβολή τις κακή*— But as all calumny is bad, and as there is nothing to govern *ταῦτα—τοιαῦτα*, Cornarius proposed to read *κακοί*, adopted by Stephens. Since however

one MS. offers *διαβάλλη*, and another *διαβάλλη*, I have, with the Zurich editors, accepted *διαβάλλει*, and altered *κακή* into *κακία*, where Orelli would read *κάκη*, and Winckelmann, *δικανική*—

²—² Such, I presume, is the meaning of *τῷ τε δικάσασθαι καὶ ξυνδικεῖν*: which Ficinus either did not understand, or else he found something very different in his MS. For his version is “quo agenda et dicenda, sive honesta, sive turpis sit causa, superare facile quis possit, victoresque facere, quibus ipsa rationibus suis favet.” The art however to which Plato alludes here is evidently that of the Sophist, who boasted that he “could make the worse appear the better reason.”

³ Ast quotes opportunely Gorg. p. 464, E. § 45, and Phædr. p. 259, E.

⁴—⁴ Here again the version of Ficinus, followed in part by Taylor, has something different from the Greek, “legum verita conditorem, nihil adversus leges proferat.”

⁵—⁵ Ficinus differs again from the Greek, “et alio profecta, vires suas ostendat.”

⁶—⁶ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

⁷—⁷ Instead of *πολυδικεῖν*, which is not, I believe, to be found else-

toss back and fro⁷ a matter of this kind,¹ or to side with it, let any one who is willing, indict him for the perversion of a suit, or siding with a wrong one; and let the trial come on in the court for select jurymen; and if he is convicted, let the court decide whether he seems to have done a deed of this kind through a love of money or contention; and if through a love of contention, let the court decide for what length of time such a person is not to obtain by lot a suit, or to side in a suit with any one; but if through avarice, let him, if he is a stranger, depart from the city, and never return to it again, or be punished with death; but let a citizen be put to death for his love of money, which has been honoured by him in every way; but if a person is convicted of having done so twice through a love of contention, let him be put to death.

BOOK XII.

[1.] ² If an ambassador or a herald by telling falsehoods performs improperly an embassy from one state to another, or when sent does not report the embassy on which he is sent, as it is in reality; or again, on the other hand, is clearly bringing back not correctly from enemies or friends what he has heard as an ambassador or herald,² let indictments be drawn up against these persons, for having, contrary to law, acted with impiety towards the messages and mandates of Hermes and Zeus; ³ and let there be a fine as to what he is to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse).³

where, I have translated as if the Greek were *παλινδικεῖν*, where there is a play on *δικεῖν*, "to throw," and *δίκη*, "a suit," as in Aristoph. *Ach.* 376, *Τῶν τ' αὖ γερόντων οἶδα τὰς ψυχὰς, ὅτι Οὐδὲν βλέποντο' ἑς ἄλλο πλὴν ψῆφον δικεῖν*; for so I corrected in *Præf. Troad.* p. xxviii., and should have compared Archestratus, quoted by Athenæus vii. p. 305, E., *Εἰώθασι δονεῖν ψήφους αἰθωνι λοχισμῷ*.

¹ Stephens would omit, with Ficinus, *τῶν τοιούτων*. Ast refers those words to *τις*. He should have read *τι τῶν τοιούτων*, as I have translated.

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed for the most part by Taylor, has "Si legatus aut præco falsa, quæ sibi commissæ sunt, nunciaverit, dicendave tacuerit, vel rursus ab hostibus amicisve rediens, quæ ab illis acceperit, aliter quam acceperit, retulisse reperiatur."

³⁻³ Ficinus has more fully "et iudices pro magnitudine rei, quid pati dareve ipsum oportet, si damnatus fuerit, statuunt."

The stealing of money is an ungentlemanlike act, but seizing by violence is a shameless one. But of the sons of Zeus not one¹ has ever carried on either of those pursuits by fraud or force with impunity. Let no one therefore, acting improperly, be deceived and persuaded at all² by poets or certain mythologists, and think that, if he makes use of fraud or force, he does nothing disgraceful, but only what the gods themselves are doing. For this is neither true nor becoming. But whoever³ does a thing of this kind contrary to law, is neither a god, nor a son of the gods. But this it is fitting for the legislator rather than all poets to know. He therefore, who is persuaded by our discourse, is happy, and may he be happy through the whole of time; but let him, who is unpersuaded, be restrained⁴ subsequently by some such law as this. If any one steals what is public property, whether great or small, he has need of the same punishment; for he who steals a trifle, steals with the same desire, but with less power. But he, who removes any thing of greater value, and does not put it down again, is wholly unjust. The law however deems it just to punish the one with a less punishment than the other, not on account of the greatness of the theft, but through one of them being perhaps curable, but the other incurable. If any one convicts before a tribunal a slave or a stranger of stealing any public property, let sentence be passed on him as to what he ought to suffer (in person),⁵ or what fine he ought to pay,⁵ as if he were, from what is likely, curable; but if a citizen, who has been brought up, as he will have been brought up, is caught committing a theft upon, or doing violence to, his country, whether taken in the fact or not, it is meet to punish him with death, as being nearly incurable.

¹ Ast very opportunely quotes from Horace, speaking of Mercury, "Callidum, quicquid placuit, jocosum condere furto." But I do not remember where it stated that he did not practise his art with impunity.

² I have translated as if the Greek were *μηδαμῶς ὑπό τε*, not *μηδ' ἄλλως ὑπό*—where I cannot understand *ἄλλως*, nor could Ficinus; who has "a fabulosis aliis hominibus," as if he wished to read, or found in his MS., *μηδ' ὑπ' ἄλλων τινων μυθολόγων*—

³ Instead of *ὥς τις*, one MS. has *ὅς τε*, from which the Zurich editors have elicited, what I have adopted, *ὅς τις*—similar to "qui" in Ficinus.

⁴ In lieu of *μαχέσθω*, Stephens would read *κατεχέσθω*, from "arcebitur" in Ficinus. But Ast, more correctly, *ἐνεχέσθω*—

⁵ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus; for the letters *ἡ τινα ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν*, made up one line of the Codex Archetypus.

[2.] For the sake of foreign expeditions much consultation and many laws are properly instituted. The greatest of all things, however, is for no one, either male or female, to be at any time without a ruler, nor the soul of any one, either seriously engaged or in sport, to be ever accustomed to do any thing alone itself by itself; but that in all time of war and in all of peace, to look perpetually to a ruler, and, following him, to live and be governed by him in the smallest things; as for instance, to stand, when he commands, and to march and to engage in gymnastics, and to wash himself, and to take food, and to get up at night, to mount guard and to convey orders; and in the midst even of dangers, neither to pursue nor to give way to any one, without the orders of the rulers; and in one word, to teach the soul by habit to do nothing apart from the rest, nor to think of, or know it at all; but that the life of all men should, as much as possible, be in all things collected (into one), and in common. For nothing is, or will ever be, superior to, and better, and more full of art than this, for the purposes of safety and victory in war. And in peace, too, men must from their childhood be practised in ruling over others, and being ruled by others; but anarchy must be expelled from the whole life of all men, and ¹of wild beasts under man.¹ All dancing moreover (it is meet) to celebrate with a view to the best modes of warfare, and to practise a complete facility in using the body and arms for the sake of the same objects, and an endurance in food and drink, and of cold weather and the contrary, and a hard bed, and, what is the greatest of all, the not destroying the powers of the head and feet through the covering of strange clothing, and by relaxing² the generation and growth of our natural caps and shoes.³ For these extremities, when preserved, possess the greatest power of the whole body; but the contrary, when in a contrary state; and one (the feet) is the most subservient to the whole body; but the other (the head) has the greatest power, through possessing naturally all its dominant senses. And this praise of a war-like life, it is meet, it seems to me, for young men to hear: but the laws are these. Let the party serve in a campaign, who is on the list, or has been ordered through a certain quota

¹—¹ This, I confess, I scarcely understand.

² I have translated as if the Greek were ἀπολύοντας, not ἀπολλύντας.

³ By a natural cap is meant the hair, and by a natural shoe, the hardened flesh.

But if any one through cowardice deserts his post, without a dismissal from the army-leaders, let an indictment for desertion lie before the war-officers, when they return from camp; and let those, who have served, try each of the parties, the heavy-armed foot and the cavalry severally, and all the other arms of the service each of the parties in a similar manner; and let the heavy-armed bring (the defaulters) before the heavy-armed, and the cavalry before the cavalry, and each of the other arms in like manner to those of their comrades. If any one is convicted, let it be not in his power to be a candidate for the whole prize of good conduct; ¹ or to indict another party for not serving in a campaign, ¹ or to be an accuser on these matters; and besides this, let a court of justice decide what he is to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse). After this, when the trials for desertions have been decided, let the commanders of each arm of the service form an assembly; and let the party, who wishes it, have amongst his own clans a trial relating to the prizes for good conduct; but let him not produce any testimony touching a former war, nor the confirmation of his assertions by witnesses, but only of the campaign, which had taken place at that time; and ² let the crown of victory to each be that of a bough; ² and let this person, after writing out an inscription, hang it up in the temple of whatever war-god he likes, as a witness through the whole of life, of the decision relating to the prize of good conduct; and so of the second and third prizes likewise. But if any one goes out during a campaign, but returns home before his time, without the commanding officers having sent him away, let there be indictments against such persons for leaving the ranks before the same parties as those in the case of non-service; and against the parties convicted, let punishments be imposed, such as have been laid down before. Now it is requisite for every man, when bringing every kind of law-suit against a person, to have a fear of bringing a false punishment, ³ either willingly or

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "*corona ex frondibus arboris perpetuo virentis conserta*," as if his MS. omitted τὸν νικητήριον, and had αἰεζῶου after θάλλου. Taylor's translation is "let a crown of olive too be the reward of the military champion." From which I have been led to conceive that ελαίνου has dropt out after θάλλου—

³ Winckelmann, perceiving that there was nothing to answer to μήτε

unwillingly, to the best of his power. For Justice is said to be a modest ¹ virgin, and ² is said to be so really.³ Now Falsehood is naturally an object of blame to Modesty and Justice. Respecting other matters then it is requisite to take care not to err against Justice; but pre-eminently so, in the case of throwing away arms in war; lest perchance a person by making a mistake about the throwing away of arms from a necessity, places such acts on the score of a reproach, and brings lawsuits unjustly against a person not deserving them. Indeed it is by no means easy to define one or the other of these points. It is necessary however for the law to endeavour to define somehow in part. Employing then a fable, let us say, that had Patroclus been carried to his tent without arms, and was still alive, as has befallen numberless persons, ³ and those former arms, which, as the poet says,³ (Il. Σ. 84,) were given as a wedding present to Peleus by the gods on his marriage with Thetis, had Hector possessed, would it have been lawful for such bad men, as were at that time, to reproach the son of Menœtius, for throwing away his arms? Still further, ⁴ (could such persons be reproached,) ⁴ who, by being thrown down from precipices, have lost their arms, or (have fallen) into the sea ⁵ during storms, or ⁶ in level places, when a

τιμωρίαν, proposed to read *κατηγορίαν μήτε μαρτυρίαν*— So too Ficinus has “supplicium multamve,” unless it be said that he has here, as elsewhere, translated one Greek word by two Latin.

¹ In lieu of *αἰδοῦς* Stephens suggested *αἰδοίη*, which he got from “pudica” in Ficinus, and *παρθένος—Δίκη—αἰδοίη* in Hesiod *Ἔργ.* 256. Winckelmann would read—*αἰδοίη Διὸς Δίκη*, answering to *παρθένος ἰστί Δίκη Διὸς* in Hesiod. But since it would matter nothing to the argument, whether *Δίκη* was, or was not, a virgin, Plato wrote, I suspect, *παράθρονος γὰρ Αἰδοῦς Δίκη*—for we find in the next sentence *Ψεῦδος δὲ Αἰδοὶ καὶ Δίκη νεμεσητόν*—On the confusion between *παράθρονος* and *παρθένος* see my note on *Æsch.* *Eum.* 227.

² ² As *ὄντως εἰρηται* never are, because they could not be, so joined, Plato wrote, no doubt, *πάντως εὖ εἰρηται*, “wholly well said—”

³ ³ Ficinus has “et arma, quæ a diis, ut poeta dicit, in dotem Thetidi data fuerant, ab Hectore rapta fuissent,” as if his MS. omitted *πρότερα ἔκεινα*, and read *εἰλεν* for *εἶχεν*.

⁴ ⁴ I have adopted, what Ficinus alone has preserved, absolutely necessary for the sense, “eruntne vituperandi—”

⁵ ⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were *χαμένων ὄντων ἢ*, not *ἢ χαμένων*—

⁶ ⁶ The Greek is *ἐν τόποις ὑποδεξαμένης*—where Ast would read *ἐν τόποις*, Orelli *ἐν κότοις*, and Winckelmann *ἐν στρόβοις*. I have trans-

great flow of water has suddenly received⁶ them—and¹ numberless things of this kind one might chaunt, when consoling (persons), and beautifying an act bad (in itself), and easy to be abused? It is necessary, however, to the utmost of our power, to divide the greater and the most grievous evil from the contrary. Now in abuse, the very abundance of such appellations possess nearly a certain division. For a person would not be justly called in all cases a thrower away of a shield, but the loser of them. For he, who is deprived (of his arms) by a reasonable display of force, and he, who throws them willingly away, would not be equally a thrower away of a shield; but there is a difference wholly and entirely. Let then this be held as spoken by a law. If any one, being overtaken by the enemy, and having arms, does not turn round and defend himself, but voluntarily drops them, or throws them away, catching at a base life, united to ²a soulless cowardice,² rather than at an honourable death, united to manliness, against such a loss of arms thrown away, let there be justice done; but let the judge neglect to consider the loss mentioned above. For it is requisite always to punish the coward, in order that he may become better; but not the unfortunate. For in this there is no advantage. ³But what punishment will be suited to him, who gives up such a power of defensive weapons to a contrary purpose?³ ⁴For it is not possible to do, in the case of a man, the contrary to what they say a god did, by changing

lated as if it were originally *ἐν τόποις ἀπείδοις δεξαμένης*—for *ἀπεδον*, found in Thucyd. vii. 78, *χωρίον ἀπεδον*, is explained in Greek Lexicons by *ισόπεδα, ὁμαλά*: while it is chiefly in level grounds that a sudden rush of waters, when it overtakes an army, is sure to carry off soldiers, unless they throw away their arms.

¹ In lieu of *ἤ*, Stephens saw that the sense requires *καί*, as I have translated.

²⁻³ The Greek is *μετὰ τάχους*, which is perfectly absurd. Porson was the first to point out, in *Miscellan. Critic.* p. 266, that Photius in *Κάκη*, has preserved a portion of the original reading, *μετὰ κάκης*—while Winckelmann was the first to see that in *μετὰ ταχους* lies hid *μετ' αψυχου*—and that Plato wrote *μετ' ἀψύχου κάκης*, as I have translated.

³⁻³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “sed quænam abjectionis armorum damnato et a virili fortitudine degeneranti pœna congrua erit?” One would prefer *τὸν ἐναντίον*, “the enemy—”

⁴⁻⁴ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows almost to the letter, swerves here from the Greek, which I have closely translated, in his version, “præ-

Cæneus of Thessaly from a woman into the nature of a man.¹

¹ For to the man, who throws away his shield, the sex would, after a manner, be the most becoming of all, which is the contrary to that sex, which, by the being changed from a man into a woman, would become a punishment to such a person.¹ But now, what² is the nearest to these, in order that a person, for the sake of a love of life, may through the remainder of life run no risk, but live as long as possible, as being a coward and coupled to reproaches, for such let this be the law. The man, who is convicted of having disgracefully thrown away his weapons of war, let neither the general of an army, nor any other military officer, ever employ as a soldier, nor put him into the ranks at all; otherwise let the party, who is the auditor of his accounts and doings, set him to rights thus.³ If the person who has put the coward into the ranks, belongs to the highest property-census, (let him pay) a thousand drachms;⁴ if to the second, five minæ; if to the third, three; and if to the fourth, one mina. And let him, who has been convicted (of throwing away his arms), pay, in addition to his being excluded from manly dangers, through his own individual nature, a thousand drachms, if he belongs to the highest census; and five minæ, if to the second; three, if to the third; and one mina, in like manner as the preceding, if to the fourth.⁵

[3.] With respect to the auditing⁶ of accounts, what would be for us the fitting discourse, when some of the magistrates are chosen by the chance of a lot for a year, and others for many years

sertim cum impossibile sit homini in contrarium commutari, ut Cæneum Thessalum ferunt divina quadam vi in naturam viri ex foemina commutatum." The god alluded to is Neptune, as we learn from the Scholiast and Hyginus, Fab. xiv., quoted by Ast; who should have adopted Stephens' ϕ in lieu of his own ω , for ω ς—

¹—¹ Here again Taylor has followed the abridged translation of Ficinus, "abjectori enim armorum contrarium maxime conveniret, ut in mulierem ex viro translatus sic puniatur."

² I have adopted Ast's δ , τ for $\delta\tau$ — And so too Sydenham.

³ Photius in *Eὐθύνας* quotes—*τούτους καταθέμεν αὐτοῖς*—where lies hid *οὐτως*, as I have translated.

⁴ i. e. 10 minæ.

⁵ After *τεράριον* the text has *μέρους*, which is evidently an interpolation.

⁶ I have adopted *εὐθύνων*, which Ficinus found in his MS. for *εὐθύνων*, as shown by his version—"repetendis—rationibus—"

and from a selection? For of such accounts who will be a sufficient Auditor? ¹ For should any one of the persons in office say or do any thing not straightforward, when bent down by the weight of his duties, or by the want of power, with respect to the dignity of his office, it (would be) by no means easy to find a ruler, superior to (other) rulers in virtue; ¹ still we must endeavour to discover some god-like Auditors. For the case is this. There are many occasions for dissolving a polity, as of a ship, ² or any animal; ² ³ of which while we say there are blocks, and underjoinings, and fibres, and ropes, ³ we call the nature one, yet dispersed in many parts by many names. But this is an occasion by no means the smallest, for the preservation of a polity and its dissolution and falling away. For if those, who audit the accounts of the magistrates, are better than the magistrates, and this takes place with justice not to be blamed, ⁴ and in a blameless manner, the whole country and state thus flourishes and is happy. But if that, which relates to the audit of the magistrates, takes place in a different manner, then the justice,

¹—¹ Ficinus, whom Taylor follows to the letter, has “Quis enim sufficiens repetundarum iudex erit, si quis magistratus, rerum pondere pressus, dixerit feceritve suo aliquid indignum principatu? Difficile inventu hoc est. Nam cum delecti magistratus virtute alios antecellant, quo pacto præstantiorem eis inveniemus?” where not only are sentences transposed, but many words omitted; and “feceritve” added; from which Cornarius elicited *ἡ πράξις*, wanting in every other MS.

²—² This introduction of an animal seems very strange here, as if an animal were, like a form of government or a vessel, made by man. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato wrote *νεὼς εὐζώστου τινος*, not *νεὼς ἡ ζώου τινος*, for he goes on to mention the parts of a well-joined vessel.

³—³ The Greek is at present *οὗς ἐντόνους τε καὶ ὑποζώματα καὶ νεύρων ἐπιτόνους*. I have translated as if it were originally—*ἡς λέγοντες ὄνους τε καὶ ὑποζώματα καὶ νεῦρα εἶναι ἐπιτόνους τε*—for by *ὄνους* is meant what we call the “blocks” through which the ropes run, or a windlass, as it would seem from Eustathius on *Il. A.* p. 862 = 807, and the Schol. on Thucyd. vii. 25, *ὄνος ἐστὶ μηχανὴ ἐπ’ ἄκρων τῶν ἀκατίων πηγνυμένη, ἀφ’ ἧς περιβάλλοντες βρόχους τοὺς σταυροὺς ραδίως ἐκ τοῦ βυθοῦ ἀνέσπων*. With regard to *ἐντόνους*, that word is never found in the sense of a rope; only *τόνους* and *ἐπιτόνους*—both of which however would not be used here: and with respect to *νεύρων ἐπιτόνους*, Cornarius was the first to read *νεῦρα καὶ ἐπιτόνους*, for he doubtless remembered the passage in the *Timeus*, p. 84, E., *τοὺς τε ἐπιτόνους καὶ τὰ ξυνεχῆ νεῦρα*—By *νεῦρα* are probably meant ropes made of the tendons of animals twisted like the so-called cat-gut.

⁴ Winckelmann would expunge *ἀμέμπτω*: Orelli read *ἀμιάντω*, referring to p. 777, E. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has “ut nemo jure conquiri possit.” What Plato wrote, others, I hope, will discover.

which binds together all political affairs into one, being dissolved, the whole government is torn apart, one portion from another, and ¹no longer inclining to the same point,¹ they cause the city from being one to become many, and, filling it with sedition, destroy it quickly. On this account then it is requisite for the Auditors to be objects of admiration for their virtue. Let us then devise by some method that their production shall be of this kind. Let the whole city come together each year, after the turn of the sun from the summer to the winter, to a sacred grove, common to the Sun and Apollo,^{2 2} with the view of exhibiting to the god³ three men, which each person shall judge to be the best of all except himself, and not less than fifty years of age; and of those voted in preference by the greatest number of persons, let them make a selection up to the half, if they are an even number; but if they are odd, let them take away the one, who had the fewest votes, and leave the half, and make a decision by the number of votes; but if to some the votes are equal, ⁴and they make the half number more,⁴ let them take away the surplus, after rejecting on account of the youth; but selecting the others, let them give their votes again, until three with unequal votes are obtained.⁵ But if for all or for two the votes are equal, then, committing the affair to good fate and fortune, let them select the victor by a lot, and let them crown him, and the second, and the third, with a bough;⁶ and after giving the prizes for excellence, let (a crier) proclaim to all, that ⁷the city of the Magnesians having again obtained

¹— The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. For he could perhaps make nothing out of *μία οὐσαι*, corrected by Stephens into *μεύουσαι*, but into *ρείνουσαι* by Winckelmann.

² This is the only place I remember, where the Sun and Apollo are considered different deities.

³—³ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has simply "electuri"—

⁴—⁴ These words, I confess, I cannot understand. Ficinus has "dimidiumque numerum auxerint"—which is equally unintelligible. Taylor translates—"and the half of these is more than three"—

⁵ In lieu of *λειφθῶσιν* Stephens proposed to read *ληφθῶσιν*, similar to "obtaineant" in Ficinus, and so the best MS., followed by Ast and Stalbaum. The Zurich editors prefer *λειφθῶσιν*. But in the whole of this passage I must acknowledge myself to be quite in the dark.

⁶ Here, as before in § 2, Ficinus renders *θάλλω* by "ex semper virentis arboris frondis contexta"—

⁷—⁷ In the original there seems to lie hid the following pentastich, 'Ἡ κατὰ θεὸν τυχούσα Μαγνήτων πόλις Σωτηρίας, θεῖο' ἦν κατ' ἀρχαίων

safety from a god, shows before the Sun three of her best men, and offers them up, according to the old law, as a common first-fruit to Apollo and the Sun, for as long a time as they follow their judgment.¹ Let these in the first year mark out twelve Auditors¹ (and do so)¹ until each has reached his seventy-fifth year; and afterwards, let three be always added every year. Let these, dividing the magisterial offices into twelve parts, freely² examine them, by making use of all kinds of touchstones; and let them reside, as long as they are Auditors, in the grove sacred to the Sun and Apollo, in which they were elected. And let each, judging of some matters privately, and of others in common with each other, exhibit the rulers before the state; and putting, what they have written respecting each office in the market-place, let it be stated what the parties are to suffer (in person) or pay (in purse) according to the decision of the Auditors. And whichever of the magistrates shall not admit that he has been judged of with justice, let him bring the Auditors to the select jury-men; and if he escapes from the Auditors' decision, let him, if he will, bring a charge against the Auditors themselves; and if he is convicted, let him, if the punishment fixed by the Auditors against any one is death, simply die, as necessity requires; but of the other fines, of which it is possible to pay the double, let him pay the double.

It is now meet to hear what the honours³ of these Auditors are to be, and after what manner. Let the first seats in all public meetings be given to those, who, while they live, are deemed by the whole state worthy of the prizes for good conduct; and further, in the case of sacrifices, and holy embassies

νόμον Τρεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας, ἀκροθίνιον Κοινόν τ' Ἀπόλλωνος καλόν θ' ὃν Ἥλιον, Ὅσον περ ἀκολουθῶσι τῇ δίκῃ χρόνον, where, however, correct Greek would require a dative after ἀκροθίνιον, as shown by ἀκροθίνια Λοξία in Pheniss. 210. As regards the last clause, all the words after "Sun" are tacitly omitted by Taylor. Ficinus has—"quatenus iudicium secuturi sunt—" But the business of the Auditors was to follow not the judgment of any one, but justice alone. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote not κρίσει, but δίκῃ. The two words are confounded in MSS. elsewhere.

¹—¹ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, supplies "idque facient—"

² Instead of ἐλευθέραις, the two best MSS. read ἐλευθέρους, which leads distinctly to ἐλευθέρως.

³ I have adopted τιμὰς, as suggested by Ast, in lieu of εὐθύναις, which is here unintelligible. On the other hand, Ast quotes opportunely τῶν ἄλλων τῶν δοθεισῶν τιμῶν, found at the end of this section.

amongst the Greeks in common, and of holy rites, in which there is a communion on other grounds,¹ let them send from amongst these the chiefs of each holy embassy; and let these alone of those in the state be adorned with a crown of laurel; and let all of them be priests of Apollo and the Sun; and let one be the high priest for the year, who is adjudged to have been the first amongst the priests² in that year;² and write up his name every year, in order that it may become the measure of the period of time, as long as the city is inhabited. And when they die, let the laying out of the corpse, and the carrying it out, and their graves, be different from those of the other citizens; and let (every one)³ wear his whole robe white, and let no one be without weeping and lamentation; and let there be also (one) choir of fifteen girls, and another of as many boys, and let each stand round the bier, and sing in turn praises on the priests, as it were a set hymn, and celebrate their happy state in an ode the whole day long; and on the morning (following), let a hundred young men, amongst those engaged in gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the deceased shall have selected,⁴ carry the bier to the sepulchre. And first, let the unmarried young men precede (the bier), each having put on a warrior's dress, the horsemen with their horses, and the heavy-armed foot-soldiers with their shields, and the rest after a similar manner; and let the boys around the bier go before and sing the national hymn, and let the girls follow behind, and such of the women as happen to be freed from child-bearing; and after them let the priests and

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐτέρας*, not *ἐτέρω*, although I confess I do not understand what Plato meant to say here; nor could, I think, Ficinus; who has omitted the clause *καὶ ὅσων ἂν ἐτέρω κοινωνήσωσιν ἑρῶν*—and so after him has Taylor.

² Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "in superiori anno." But how *ἐκείνῳ* came here in lieu of *περσίνῳ* I am unable to explain.

³ So Taylor, as if he wished to read *πάντα* for *πᾶσαν*—Plato wrote, I suspect, *πάντας πᾶσαν*—For *πᾶς* is thus repeated perpetually.

⁴ So Ficinus, and after him Taylor. But from his "delegerint" it is difficult to elicit what he found in his MS. It was certainly not *ἀν—ἐπόψωνται*—for there is no such Greek aor. 1, mid. as *ἐπόψμην*; and incorrectly did Stephens suggest, and Ast and Stalbaum adopt, *ἐπόψωνται* to avoid the solecism in *ἀν—ἐπόψονται*. Equally at a loss was Buttman, who in Gr. Gr. T. ii. p. 201, suggests *ἐπιόψωνται*, a word perfectly unknown in Greek. Perhaps Plato wrote *οἷς ἂν—ἐπιτρέψωνται*, i. e. "upon whom the relations of the deceased may have imposed the duty."

priestesses follow, as to a pure tomb, although they are repelled from other tombs, if at least the Pythian priestess gives her vote so and on this side; and let the place of deposit for them be built under the earth, a long vault composed ¹of stones very valuable, and without old age to the best of their power,¹ and having couches, made of stones, lying by each other; where having placed the man, who has become blessed,² and raising a mound in a circle, they shall plant a grove of trees around, except at one limb, in order that the burial-place may have an enlargement,³ such that there may be no deficiency in a mound for those to be placed there in all time;³ and they shall make yearly contests in music and gymnastics and horsemanship. Such are the honours to be paid to those,⁴ who have escaped (the reversal) of their auditorship.⁴ But if any one of these, confiding too much in his having been tried, should exhibit ⁵(a depraved)⁵ human nature, by becoming depraved after his trial, let the law ordain that any one, who is willing, may indict him; and let the trial take place at a tribunal, in some such manner as this. First let the guardians of the laws belong to this tribunal. Next ⁶of these very persons

¹—¹ The Greek is *λίθων προτίμων καὶ ἀγήρων εἰς δύναμιν*. But Julius Pollux ix. 49, and Suidas in *Ψαλίδα*, offer *λίθων πολυτίμων*; which has led me to suggest *ἐπιτίμων*: for Suidas in *Λίθος* has—*οἱ δὲ Ἀβαροὶ—λίθων τὰς ἐπιτίμους ἀποφέρεσθαι ἤξιον*. Moreover as *ἀγήρων εἰς δύναμιν* is here perfectly unintelligible, Hemsterhuis on Pollux, p. 1039, was led to consider those words as an interpolation. But since words are not introduced thus without some reason, it is probable, that they are either a corruption of some others, or, what is more likely, misplaced; for they might follow *τὸν μακάριον γεγονότα θέντες*—where they perhaps dropt out, as forming one line of the Codex Archetypus.

²—² On this custom of calling a deceased person by the name of blessed, see Blomfield on *Æsch. Pers.* 639.

³—³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, who is thus followed by Taylor—"that the sepulchre may be always enlarged, when it is requisite."

⁴—⁴ Such is, as Ficinus saw correctly, what the sense requires. This is evident from his version, adopted almost to the letter by Taylor, "*hæc præmia illis reddantur, quorum de relatis rationibus judicia damnata non sunt.*" But such is not the meaning of *τοῖς τὰς εὐθύνας διαφυγούσιν*—What Plato wrote, I must leave for better scholars to discover.

⁵—⁵ I have translated as if *κακὴν* had dropt out before *κακός*—

⁶—⁶ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek, *αὐτῶν τούτων οἱ ζῶντες*: where Ast would read *αὐτῶν τῶν εὐθύνων ζῶντες*—But that is equally obscure. Ficinus has "*accusati ipsius collegæ,*" as if he had found in his MS. *τοῦ ἐν αἰτίᾳ ὄντος αὐτοῦ οἱ συζῶντες*—

the living;⁶ and moreover let the tribunal be composed of the select jurymen. And let him, who lays the indictment, put on the record against the party, whom he is indicting, the charge, averring that this or that person is unworthy of the prize for good conduct and of his office. And if the defendant is cast, let him be deprived of his office, and sepulchre, and the other honours granted to him; but if the accuser does not obtain a fifth part of the votes, let him pay, if his property is of the highest valuation, twelve minæ; eight, if of the second; if of the third, six; and if of the fourth, two.

[4.] Respecting the so-called decision of Rhadamanthus, in judicial matters, it is indeed worthy of admiration. For he saw that the men of that time distinctly believed that there were gods, and reasonably so; because at that time the majority were the descendants of gods, of whom he was himself one, at least as the story goes. He appears, therefore, to have thought that he ought to commit (nothing)¹ to any man as a judge, but to gods; from whence causes were decided by him simply and quickly. For by tendering an oath to the disputants upon each matter in dispute, he was freed from them with rapidity and safety. But since at present, as we have stated, some portion of mankind think that the gods do not exist at all; and others conceive that they take no care of us; while the opinion of the greatest and worst part is, that, by receiving trifling sacrifices and abundance² of flattery, they will conjointly deprive persons of considerable property, and free them from harm on many occasions,³ the art of Rhadamanthus in lawsuits would no longer be suited to men of the present time. For since the opinions of men respecting the gods have undergone a change, it is necessary for laws to be changed likewise. In the allotment of causes therefore, it is meet for those who, possessing a mind, lay down laws, to take away the oaths of either of the opposing parties, and for the party, who has obtained by lot a trial against any one, to write down

¹ I have translated, as if οὐδέν had dropt out between οὐδένι and διανοούμενος.

² I have retained πολλὰς, which Bekker, followed by Stalbaum, has inconsiderately omitted with two indifferent MSS.

³ Such seems to be the meaning of κατὰ πολλὰ— I suspect however that Plato wrote κατ' αἰκάλην, "according to their flattery." The word αἰκάλη Stephens found in a MS. Greek lexicon explained by ἀπάτη. Ficinus omits all after χρήματα, and so does Taylor.

the accusations, but to swear no oath; and for the defendant in like manner to write down his denial, and to hand it over to the rulers without an oath. ¹For it is surely a terrible thing to know well that, while many lawsuits are occurring in the state, almost one half of the parties have perjured themselves,¹ by having been easily mixed up with each other at joint-feasts² and through other intercourse and private joint-producing of each one.³ Let it therefore be laid down as a law that he, who is about to act the jurymen, shall take an oath as a jurymen; and that he, who appoints for the commonweal the magistrates by oaths, or by the bringing of votes,³ must bring them from sacred places and do something of this kind;³ and on the other hand, that the judge of choirs and all kinds of music, and the presidents over, and the umpires at, the gymnastic and equestrian contests, and in all matters which, according to the opinion of men, do not bring a gain to the party forswearing himself, (shall take an oath;) ⁴but in those, that seem to be plainly a great profit to the party, who makes a denial or takes an oath, let all, who bring a charge against each other, be judged by lawsuits without any oaths.⁴ And generally in a lawsuit let

^{1—1} Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has rather strangely, what Taylor has adopted, "Nam si jurandi licentia cuique dabitur, ubi plura quotidie ad iudices deferuntur, omnes pœne perjuri erunt."

^{2—2} Such is the literal version of the Greek, *συνουσίαις τε καὶ ἰδιωτικαῖς συγγενήσεσιν ἐκάστων*: where Ast explains *συγγενήσεσιν* by *συνουσίαις*, thus introducing a needless tautology. Moreover *γένησις* always means elsewhere "a producing," or "production." Opportunely then does the best MS. offer *συντρονήσεσιν*, from which it is easy to elicit *συμπρονήσεσιν*, "joint-labourings;" but as the idea of an act, done jointly by more persons than one, requires the mention of such persons taken jointly, not individually, it is evident that for *ἐκάστων* the train of thought leads here to *δικαστῶν*: while the antithesis required by *ἰδιωτικαῖς* plainly shows that *δημοσίαις* has dropt out after *συνουσίαις*; and thus the sense will be "by other intercourse, and joint-labourings of jurymen of a public and private kind," where, by the figure Chiasmus, *ἰδιωτικαῖς* belongs to *συνουσίαις*, and *δημοσίαις* to *συμπρονήσεσιν*.

^{3—3} The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. With regard to the expression *τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφ' ἱερῶν φέρεσθαι*, Ast explains it by saying that the pebbles used in voting were taken to a temple, as stated in vi. p. 753; C. § 2, and afterwards brought from thence with the odour of sanctity about them.

^{4—4} Ficinus, followed almost to the letter by Taylor, has thus abridged all between the numerals, "in quibus autem utilitatem ex perjurio aliquis assequitur, ea sine jurejurando judicentur."

not the presidents permit a person while speaking to take an oath, for the sake of making his assertion credible, or to imprecate curses on himself and race, or to employ unseemly entreaties or the piteous tones of a woman, but let the party proceed ever with good words in teaching¹ and learning¹ what is just; and if not, let the magistrate, as if the party were speaking out of the record, bring him back to the arguments that may happen to be relating to the business in hand.² But let it be in the power of a stranger (when litigating) with a stranger, as at present, to receive from, if they are willing, and to tender to, each other oaths.² For they will not grow old,³ nor by hatching young ones⁶ in the state,⁴ will they furnish the power to others for the most part of such a brood to become the masters of the country.⁴

In the same manner let there be a decision respecting the allotment⁵ of lawsuits against each other in all cases, where a free-man is not obedient to the state in matters, deserving neither stripes, nor bonds, nor death. But as regards the non-attendance⁶ at dancings, or processions, or other public acts of a showy kind, or sharing in public duties, such as take place for the sake of a sacrifice in peace, or a contribution in war, in all these let the first necessity be a remedy⁷ for the damage done; but from such, as are disobedient, let a security be demanded by those, on whom the state and the law together enjoin to demand it;⁸ and of such, as are inattentive

^{1—1} The words between the numerals, evidently out of place here, are omitted in the best MS. Ficinus has elegantly, but not closely, "*sed quod justum putant mansuete doceant, et docentem audiant.*"

^{2—3} Here again Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has abridged the original in his version, "*peregrinis autem inter se litigantibus, quemadmodum nunc, si velint, jurare liceat.*"

^{2—3} The metaphorical word *ἐννεορρεῦντες* is omitted by Ficinus and Taylor; who should have remembered *ἐπιθυμίας—ἐννεορρεῦμέναις* in Rep. ix. p. 573, E. § 3, quoted by Ast.

^{4—4} Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has strangely represented this passage in his version, "*non est formidandum, ne alios corrumpant.*"

⁵ Such, I presume, is the meaning of *λήξεως*. But the reading is here uncertain. For two MSS. offer *λέξεως*: while Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "*Eodem autem modo inter liberos homines executio iudicii fiat.*"

⁶ Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "*siquis ad choreas—non venit*"—as if his MS. read *τῶν οὐ ποιήσεων*, not *τινῶν*—

⁷ I have adopted *ἴασιν* for *ἰαρήν*, as suggested by Ast.

^{8—8} Here again Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has strangely rendered—"exactoque tempore—"

(to the matter),⁸ let there be a sale of the security, and let money (got from the sale) belong to the state. But if they are in need of a greater fine, let each of the magistrates, after imposing a fitting fine on the disobedient, bring the parties before a court of justice, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.

[5.] It is necessary moreover to consult about what it is meet to do for a state, which does not make money, except by what¹ arises from the land, and does not import any thing,^{2 3} touching the going abroad of its own people out of the country, and the reception of foreigners from other parts.³ On these points the legislator ought to give advice by first persuading to the utmost of his power. The intermixture indeed of states with states naturally causes a mixture of all kinds of manners, through strangers making with strangers innovations⁴ with each other;⁴ which thing would bring an injury the greatest of all to those, who have a good polity through good laws. But, to the greater number of states, as being by no means under good laws, it makes no difference for the citizens⁵ to be contaminated by receiving foreigners, and for the citizens⁶ to revel in other states, when a person is desirous of going abroad in any way or at any time, whether he is young, or rather advanced in years. But, on the other hand, for these never to receive others, and never themselves to travel elsewhere, is not at all suitable; and it would appear to be a behaviour rustic and rude to the rest of mankind, who would make use of harsh names, such as the so-called stranger-expellings,⁷ and manners self-willed and morose, as they would seem to be. Now to

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *πλήν τοῦ*—not *πλήν τὸν*—

² I have supplied *τι*, which seems to have dropt out after *ἐμπορεύηται*, unless it be said that *ἐμπορεύεσθαι* means “to be a foreign merchant—”

²⁻³ Ficinus, followed partly by Taylor, has—“neque peregrinationibus vacat, neque peregrinos aliunde suscipiat—”

⁴⁻⁴ As *ἀλλήλοις* is evidently superfluous, Ficinus has “*plurima innovare*—” either because his MS. read *μάλα πολλάς*, or he wished to read so from conjecture. I should prefer *ἀλλῃ ἄλλους*, i. e. “some in one way, and others in another.” See my Poppe’s Prolegom. p. 135.

^{5, 6} Winckelmann has correctly suggested *ἀστοῖς* for *αὐτοῖς*, and he should have read likewise *ἀστούς* for *αὐτούς*—in *. What Ficinus found in his MS. it is impossible to ascertain; for he has abridged the passage in his version, adopted by Taylor—“*si tam senes quam juvenes pro arbitrio et alio peregrinatur et aliunde peregrinos suscipiant.*”

⁷ In *ξενηλασίαις* is an allusion to a Spartan custom. Ast refers to Protog. p. 342, C. § 80, and Plutarch, Lycurg. p. 56, C.

appear to be good, or not good, to others, it is meet never to consider a thing of small importance. For the multitude¹ do not, as far as they happen to fail in the substance of virtue, fail so far in their judgment of others, who are vicious and useless,¹ but there is even in the bad a something divine and felicitous in hitting the mark, so that very many even of the very bad distinguish very well, both by their words and thoughts, the better sort of men and the worse. And hence the exhortation to many states is correct, to set some value on the good opinion of the multitude. For it is a thing the most correct and of the greatest consequence for a man truly good to hunt in this way after a life of fair repute; for without it, he will by no means become the perfect man. And truly becoming would it be for the city, settled in Crete, to render itself in the opinion of the rest of mankind the most beautiful and best. And there is every hope in all likelihood, should it conduct itself according to reason, that in a little time² the Sun and the other gods will see it amongst the states and countries, that are well-governed. In this way then it is meet to act, with regard to travelling into other countries and places, and the reception of foreigners. In the first place, let it not be lawful for a person less than forty years of age to go abroad at any time, or in any manner; and further still, for no person on a private account, but on a public one, let it be lawful for heralds or ambassadors, or certain holy inspectors (to go abroad). But to be absent from the country during a war or a campaign, does not deserve to be called a going abroad, nor to be a part of such political doings. It is likewise requisite to send persons to the Pythian Apollo, and the Olympian Jupiter, and likewise to Nemea and the Isthmus,³ to take a share in the sacrifices and contests (sacred) to those gods; and to send the most numer-

¹—¹ Here again Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has given merely an abridgment of the Greek in his version—"quamvis virtutes experte sint, qui tamen probi sint, qui improbi, judicant." From which however it is easy to see that he found in his MS. *οἱ εἰσι προηροὶ καὶ χρηστοὶ*—where *χρηστοὶ* is confirmed by four other MSS., while *οἱ εἰσι* has been corrupted into *ἄλλοι* in two.

² Bekker has adopted *μετ' ὀλίγων* from four MSS., similar to "*cum paucis aliis civitatibus*" in Ficinus.

³ It seems strange, that after Plato had mentioned the names of the gods, who presided over the Pythian and Olympian games, he should have omitted that of Neptune, who presided over the two others. Hence one would suspect that *τῷ Ποσειδῶνι* had dropt out after *τῷ Διὶ καὶ*—

ous, and such as are the most beautiful and the best in their power, who may cause the state to appear of fair repute in holy and peaceful meetings, by exhibiting its apparatus for renown as the counter-part of what is requisite for war. And when they return home, they will teach the young, that the legal institutions of the rest of mankind relating to political affairs, are second to their own. ¹ But on other grounds it is (not) meet to send out holy inspectors; but some such as these, after obtaining permission of the guardians of the laws,¹ should any of the citizens be desirous to look at the affairs of the rest of mankind, let no law restrain. For a state, while unacquainted with good and wicked men, cannot by being unsociable be sufficiently mild and perfect. ² Nor again, can it preserve its laws without taking them into consideration, but not only by morals.² For amongst the multitude there are always some, not many, godlike men, every way worthy of being associated with, and who are produced in no respect the more in well-governed states than in those that are not so; in whose footsteps it is ever meet for him, who dwells in well-regulated states, to proceed, when on going out by sea or by land, he is seeking the party, who may be uncorrupted, so as to make some of the legal institutions, that have been laid down correctly, more firm, and to correct others, where there is any deficiency. For without such an inspection and search, a state will never continue perfect; ³ not even if they inspect it badly.³

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor. For they were either wanting in his MS., or, what is more probable, he could not understand the Greek—*θεωροῦς δὲ ἄλλους ἐκπέμπειν χρεῶν τοιούσδε τινὰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας*—nor could Stephens; from whose “*si oporteat*” Ast was led to suggest—*εἰ χρεῶν*—but Winkelman, whom I have followed, reads more correctly, *οὐ χρεῶν, τοιούσδε δὲ τινὰς*—while none have seen that Plato wrote *ἄλλως*, not *ἄλλους*—and so I have translated the whole passage. Stalbaum, after confessing the difficulty, says that if *κάν*, not *άν*, were found in MSS., he would adopt it. But I cannot discover what is to be gained by the change.

²—² Ficinus has “*nec leges servare moribus et consuetudine solum, nisi etiam notitia legum prudentur fiat*,” which has led me to suggest that Plato wrote *ἀνευ τοῦ μὴ μόνον γμῶμῃ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ᾗθεισιν*—not *ἀνευ τοῦ γμῶμῃ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον ᾗθεισιν*—For *μὴ μόνον* could scarcely thus follow *ἀλλὰ*—

³—³ The words between the numerals I cannot understand. Three MSS. offer *ταύτην* for *αὐτήν*: from which nothing is gained. I could have understood *οὐδ' ἂν κακίστην τινα θεωρῶσιν*, “not even if they inspect a very bad one,” in lieu of *κακῶς ταύτην*—

Clin. How, therefore, can both of these take place?

Athen. Thus. [6.] First let an inspector of this kind be not more than fifty years of age; and further, let him be of good repute for other matters and for war, if he is about to lay before other cities a specimen of the guardians of the laws. But when he is more than sixty years of age, let him no longer be an inspector. And having made an inspection for as many years of the ten as he likes, let him return home and go to the assembly of those who inspect the laws. And let this (assembly) be composed of old persons and young; and let it be held of necessity every day, from day-break until the sun rises; and let it be composed first of those priests, who have received the prizes for good conduct; next, ten of the guardians of the laws, ¹who happen to be the seniors; ¹ and further still, the guardian of the whole education, both the new one, and those who have been released from the office. And let each of these go not alone, but with a young man from thirty to forty years of age, having taken as an ally the person agreeable to himself; and let there be a conference amongst them, and a conversation upon the laws of their own state, and on such matters as they shall have heard of, superior at all in any other quarter; and about objects of learning to boot, such as may seem to be of use in this inquiry, and which, to those, who have learnt, will be more clear to be understood; ² but to those, who have not learnt, the points relating to laws would seem to be rather dark. ³ And whatever the elders may select from these, let the younger learn with all attention; and if any one of those, who have been invited, seems to be an unworthy person, let the whole meeting blame the party who invited him. But let the whole ⁴ state watch over those of the young men, who are in good repute, ⁵ looking at them, and observing them pre-eminently; and let them hold in honour those, who

¹—¹ In lieu of τοὺς αἰεὶ πρεσβεύοντας, where there is nothing to govern the accusative, Ast suggests οἱ αἰεὶ πρεσβεύοντες, similar to "decem-seniores" in Ficinus.

² In lieu of εὐαγίστερον γίνεσθαι, which I cannot understand, I have translated, as if the Greek were εὐαγίστερα γινώσκεσθαι—to which I have been led by finding in Ficinus "facilius—intellecturi sint."

³ After φαίνεσθαι I have omitted καὶ ἀσαφῆ, evidently an explanation of σκοτωδέστερα.

⁴ Instead of ἅλλην, Ficinus found in his MS. ὅλην, as shown by his "tota."

⁵—⁵ The words between the numerals Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits.

are in the right way,⁵ but in dishonour more than the rest, if they turn out worse than the majority. To this meeting let him, who has inspected the legal institutions amongst the rest of mankind, go immediately on his arrival; and if he has discovered any persons possessing any rumour about the laying down of any laws, or of education or bringing up, let him mention it, or if he has himself thought upon any matters, let him communicate it to the whole assembly. But if he appears to have returned in no respect either worse or better, let him be praised at least for his very great readiness to go; but if (he returns) much better, let him while living be greatly honoured, and when dead, let all the power of the parties in the assembly honour him with befitting honours. But if he appears to have returned corrupted, although he pretends to be wise, let him associate with no one, either young or old. And if he is obedient to the magistrates, let him live in private; but if not, let him be put to death,¹ at least if he be convicted in a court of justice of being a busy-body on the subject of education and the laws.¹ But if none of the rulers bring him before a court of justice, when he deserves it, let a reproach be laid up against the rulers at the time of their undergoing a trial for the rewards for good conduct. Let him then, who goes abroad, go abroad in this manner, and being such a person. But after him it is meet to receive kindly the person, who comes from abroad. Now there are four kinds of foreigners of whom we ought to make mention. The first is he, who comes ever in the summer, and continues for the most part in his visits like birds of passage; and of these the majority flying, as it were, cleverly² over the sea in the spring of the year,³ wend their way to other cities, for the sake of making money as merchants; which persons it is meet for the magistrates, appointed for such purposes, to receive in the market-places, and ports, and public buildings outside the city, at the city;⁴ taking care that

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus, "sin autem contra magistratum voluntatem de disciplina legibusque civilibus disputare condemnatus in iudicio fuerit—"

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐντίχυνως*, not *ἀτίχυνως*. For most assuredly neither birds of passage, nor persons in the pursuit of gain, fly from place to place "artlessly."

³ Although *πετόμενοι*—*πίτονται* might perhaps stand, yet I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐπιτείνονται*—

⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *πρὸς τῇ πόλει*: which Fi-

none of such foreigners make any innovation ; and distributing correctly to them the claims of justice, and having an intercourse with them for what is necessary, but as little as possible. The second kind is he, who is in reality an inspector with his eyes, and receives¹ with his ears such sights, as are presented by the Muses. For every such person it is meet that lodgings should be fitted up near the temples by the kindness of people towards strangers ; and it is meet for the priests and the sweepers of the temples to take care² that, after they have staid a moderate time, and have seen and heard (all), for the sake of which they came, they take their departure, uninjured by doing or suffering any thing ; and let the priests be their judges, should any one of them do an injury to any one, or any one else³ do an injury to any one of them, to within fifty drachms. But if there be a greater charge laid against them, it is requisite that the trial in such cases be before the Market-Stewards. The third kind of foreigner it is meet to receive in a public manner, when he arrives from another country on some public business. Him let the Generals, and the Hipparchs, and the Taxiarchs alone receive ; and let the care of such person rest with that one of the Prytanes, with whom alone any person, received as a stranger, takes up his abode. The fourth, should he come at any time, is a rarity ; but if he should come, the counterpart of the Inspectors from us,⁴ let him, first, be not less than fifty years of age ; besides this, let him think it right to see something beautiful, and superior in its beauty to the things in other cities,⁵ or to show something of the same kind to another city.⁶ Let then every such person come unbidden to the doors of the wealthy and wise, as being himself another of such a kind.⁶ And let him go to the house of the party, who is the guardian of the whole of education, trust-

cinus renders, "in ipsis suburbiis." But such could scarcely be the meaning here. Plato wrote, I suspect, πρὸς τῇ ἐμπολῇ, "for the purpose of traffic."

¹ I have adopted, with Stephens, the conjecture of Cornarius, δέχεται for ἔχειται.

² I have omitted, with Ficinus, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ, an evident explanation of τημελεῖν.

³ The sense evidently requires ἄλλος for ἄλλον, as I have translated.

⁴ Ficinus alone inserts here "hic ita recipietur," adopted by Taylor.

⁵ Winckelmann would read καὶ δεῖξαι τι κατὰ ταῦτά ἄλλο τῇ πόλει.

⁶ i. e. both wealthy and wise.

ing that ¹the reception of a stranger by one of those, who have gained a victory for virtue, will be sufficient for a stranger¹ of such a kind; and after being with some of these, and teaching in part, and learning in part,² let him go away honoured, as a friend should be by friends, with gifts and becoming honours. According to these laws it is meet to receive all strangers, both male and female, from another country, and to send out our own people, doing honour to Zeus, who presides over hospitality, nor to make an expulsion of foreigners by eatings and sacrifices, as ³the nurslings of the Nile³ do at present, nor yet by savage proclamations.

[7.] Let a person, who makes himself a guarantee, make it in an explicit manner, by acknowledging the whole transaction in writing, before not less than three witnesses, where the guarantee is for a sum under a thousand drachms; but, if above a thousand, before not less than five. ⁴Let the broker of a person, who sells any thing not justly, or is not trustworthy, be a guarantee;⁴ and let the broker, like the seller, be amenable to a lawsuit.

If a person wishes to search for his property in the possession of another party, let him, having previously sworn by the gods who preside over laws, that he expects to find (the property), search for it, either naked, or wearing a small cloak

¹—¹ The Greek is ξένος τῷ τοιούτῳ ξενῶνι τήν—where Ast, unable to understand τήν, would omit it. But the difficulty rests rather in ξένος—ξενῶνι. I have therefore translated as if Plato had written ξένισιν—ξένῳ, where ξένῳ is furnished by two MSS. Baiter suggests ξένος—ξένῳ ἡ—and so does Grou.

² Ficinus, followed by Taylor, inserts “quæ discenda docendaque putavit.”

³—³ Despite the assertion, καθάπερ ποιοῦσι νῦν, it is hard to believe that in the time of Plato the people in Egypt fed upon foreigners and sacrificed them; while from the poetical expression, θρέμματα Νείλον, one would suspect that Plato obtained the knowledge of the fact from some drama, the argument of which was similar to the Helena and Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides. Ast however explains the passage by saying, that “to expel foreigners from banquets and sacrifices is to prohibit them the use of such things.” But the dative βρώμασι could not be thus taken in the sense of the genitive ἀπὸ βρωμάτων.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek, where ὁ προπωλὼν means, in English, a “broker,” i. e. the party who finds for the seller a purchaser. Ficinus however seems to have found the whole passage more full in his MS., for his version is “fidejussor autem sit, qui prius vendidit, ejus de quo an jure possit vendere, dubitatur, atque ejus, qui videtur minus ad promissa sufficere.”

and ungirded;¹ and let the other permit him to search the house, and the portions sealed up or unsealed. But if any one does not allow the search to the party desiring it, let the party, who is prevented, bring an action, after setting a value upon the property sought;² and, if the person is convicted, let him pay for twice the loss of the property valued. If the master of the house happens to be abroad, let those that inhabit it permit the search of such portions as are unsealed, and let the searcher place his own seal by those already sealed, and appoint any person he pleases as a guard for five days. But if the master is absent for a longer time, let the other party take the City-Stewards along with him, and search it thus, by breaking the seals, and, together with the relations and City-Stewards, seal them again in the same manner (as before).

Of property in dispute ³it is meet to define the time,³ during which, if a person has held it, it will not be lawful to dispute it any longer. Of farms and dwellings indeed there will be in this way no dispute. But of other property, whatever a person may have had in his possession, if he appears to have used it in the city, and market-place, and at sacred rites, ⁴(openly for a whole year),⁴ ⁵and no one has made a claim upon it, and he says he has been seeking (an owner)⁶ during that time, but that the party has concealed himself and never

¹ Ast, misled by "præcinctus" in Ficinus, says that the object of this clause was, that the searching party might get over the business more speedily. But in that case the searcher would have been *εὐζωστος*, in Latin "succinctus." By his being *ἀζωστος* he would lose the opportunity of carrying away any small article of great value, concealed in the folds of the cloak.

² From "amissæ rei" in Ficinus, Ast was led to τὸ *ἡρπυγόμενον*, for τὸν *ἡρπυγόμενον*, subsequently confirmed by two MSS.

³⁻³ The Greek was once *χρόνου ὅρος*, where Stephens wished to insert *ἔστω*—the remains of which, Stalbaum says, seem to be found in five MSS. that read *χρόνου δὲ ὅρος*: where however lies hid δὲ *ὁρίσαι*—similar to "determinandum est" in Ficinus.

⁴⁻⁴ I have adopted "aperte anno integro," found in the version of Ficinus; for otherwise the subsequent *τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον* would be unintelligible.

⁵⁻⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "atque hunc non occuluisse constat, nec quisquam interea, quamvis quærens, eam exegerit."

⁶ To complete the sense I have translated as if *δεσπότην* had dropped out between δὲ and *ζητεῖν*.

appeared—if a person has thus held possession of any thing for a year,⁵ ¹ and he continues to be the seeker,¹ let it be lawful for no person² to lay claim to property of this kind, after a year has gone by. But if a person uses it neither in the city nor in the market-place, but in the fields openly, and no one offers himself during five years (as the owner), let it not be lawful for any one, after the five years have elapsed, to lay claim to it for the remainder of time. But if any one uses it at home in the city, let the period (of laying claim) be for three years; but if he uses it not openly in the country, for ten years; but if in another land, whenever (the owner) shall find it any where, let there be no definite period in all time for laying claim to it.

If any one by violence prevents another from being present at a trial, whether the party himself, or his witnesses, or his slave, or that of another person, let the cause be unfinished and undecisive; but if (the party prevented) is a free-man, in addition to the cause being unfinished, let (the party preventing)³ be in bonds for a year, and let him be amenable to a trial for making him a slave at the suit of any one, who wishes. And if any one by violence prevents an antagonist in a gymnastic or musical or any other contest from being present, let any one, who is willing, inform the prize-distributors; and let them send to the contest a free-man, who is willing to contend; but if they are unable (to do so), let them, should he, who has prevented a party from contending, be the victor, assign the reward of victory to the party prevented, and write him down as the victor in whatever temples he pleases; but to the party preventing let it not be lawful for any offering or inscription of such a contest to exist; and let him be amenable to a trial for doing an injury, whether he is defeated in the contest, or is the victor.

If any one receives stolen property knowingly, let him undergo the same punishment as the thief. Let death, too, be the punishment of him, who harbours an exile.⁴ For⁵ let every

¹—¹ Such, I presume, is the meaning of ὁ δὲ ζητῶν διαγένηται, for so we must read in lieu of διαγένηνται—which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, for he has omitted the whole sentence.

² I have adopted Ast's μηδενὶ for μηδέν—

³ Ficinus alone has what the sense requires—"qui depulit—"

⁴ Ficinus alone adds here—"seu quemvis hujuscemodi fugientem—"

⁵ Ficinus alone has "quippe—"

one consider the same person a friend and enemy, as the state does. If any one makes privately a peace¹ with, or a war against, certain persons, without the public (sharing in it), let death be the punishment for such a one. But if any part of the state makes a peace with, or a war against, any persons for its own benefit for itself, let the Generals bring the authors of this affair before a court of justice; and let death be the punishment of the party convicted. For they, who serve their country in any way, ought to do so without gifts. And let there be no pretext or argument held out,² that for good deeds we ought to receive gifts, but not for bad. For it is not easy either to know,³ or knowing⁴ to restrain oneself⁴ patiently, when this knowledge is obtained. It is, therefore, the safest plan to obey the law—"Do not serve for gifts"—and let him who does not obey, simply die, when found guilty at a trial.

With regard to the contribution of money to the public, it is meet for⁵ the state of each person⁵ to be valued, for many reasons; and for the parishioners to put down in writing before the Rural-Stewards the yearly produce, in order that, as there are two contributions, the public may, after deliberating⁶ every year, make use of whichever it pleases, whether it be a part of the whole valuation, or of the income arising each year, exclusive of the sums paid for the joint-feasts.

It is meet likewise for a man of moderate means to make moderate offerings to the gods. Now the Earth is the holy hearth of the whole⁷ domicile of all the gods. Let no one

¹ Of this an instance is feigned to take place in Aristoph. Ach. 291. See too Thucyd. v. 60, ἐνὶ ἀνδρὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει σπίνδεται.

² Instead of ἐπαινούμενον, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were ἐπιτείνόμενον—

³ Taylor adds, and so does Ast—"when actions are good or bad."

⁴ So Ficinus understood καρτερεῖν, as shown by his version—"continere"—to which Ast adds—"from accepting gifts."

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were, not ἑκάστων τὴν οὐσίαν, but ἑκάστου τὴν οὐσίαν, similar to "cujuscunque census—" in Ficinus.

⁶ I have adopted Ast's βουλευόμενον, applied to τὸ δημόσιον, instead of βουλευομένων, omitted entirely by Ficinus; for he probably saw it was without regimen.

⁷ The Greek is πᾶσι, which, as it is omitted by Cicero Legg. ii. 18, 45, and Ficinus, Casaubon would reject on Apuleius Apolog. p. 30, ed. Lugd. 1614, but Wagner on Cicero alter to πᾶσα: which would be correct only if οἰκήσις be read with Ficinus in lieu of οἰκήσιως, that requires πάσις, as I have translated.

then consecrate (the same thing)¹ a second time to the gods. But gold and silver in [other]² states, both privately and in temples, is an invidious possession.³ And ivory, as belonging⁴ to a body, that has departed from life, is not a pure⁵ offering to the gods. And iron and brass are the instruments of war.⁶ Let, then, any one offer up whatever he pleases, of wood,⁷ and of one kind of wood,⁸ and, in a similar manner, of stone at the public temples; and let the woven portion be not more than one month's work for one woman; and the colours becoming to a god, both in other things and those woven, should be white; and offer nothing dyed, except for warlike ornaments. But the most godlike gifts are birds and pictures, such as a painter could finish in a single day. And let all the other offerings be imitations after this fashion.

Since then the portions of the whole state have been detailed, as to what number and of what kind they ought to be, and the laws have been mentioned relating to compacts of the greatest moment, it would be requisite that, as to what remains, the lawsuits⁹ relating to all matters should be mentioned.⁹ In the first place, there should be in the courts of justice selected judges, whom the defendant and plaintiff may choose in common, having the more becoming name of arbitrators, than

¹ Cicero has "iterum idem;" who therefore found in his MS. *ἐπὶ καθιερούτω ταῦτά*—unless he quoted from memory. Theodoret in Theophrast. Serm. iii. p. 519, B., offers *ἐπὶ εἰκόνα*—similar to "simulacra" in Ficinus. And in truth *εἰκόνα*, or rather *εἰκώ*, might easily have dropt out between *ἐπὶ* and *καθιερούτω*. What Plato wrote is quite uncertain.

² Both Cicero and Ficinus omit *ἄλλαις*, acknowledged by Clemens Alex. Strom. V. ii. p. 692, Pott., which I confess I cannot understand; and I should therefore prefer *πολλαῖς*—

³ Cicero's version is "res," as if his MS. read *χρῆμα*. Compare Eurip. Phœn. 205, *Φιλόσογον τι χρῆμα θῆλυ γένος ἔφν*.

⁴ So Taylor, and after him Ast; who would, however, read *ἄτε λελοιπότος* in lieu of *ἀπολελοιπότος*—He should have suggested that *ἄτ'* had dropt out before *ἀπ'*—

⁵ In lieu of *εὐχέρεις*, Clemens, Theodoret, and Euseb. P. E. iii. 8, p. 99, D., offer *εὐαγές*, similar to "satis castum" in Cicero. Ficinus has "in-cptum—" Perhaps Plato wrote *οὐκ εὐαγοῦς χειρὸς*—

⁶ Cicero adds "non fani—"

⁷ Ast explains *ξύλου*, where the genitive is without regimen, by "quod attinet ad—" But *ἐκ* has evidently dropt out between *ὄργανα* and *ξύλου*—similar to "ex ligno" in Ficinus, and *ἐκ λίθου* in Theodoret.

⁸ Cicero adds "cavato—"

⁹ The Greek is *δικας—γίγνεσθαι*. But Ficinus has—"de judiciis—dicamus"—which leads to *δικας—λέγεσθαι*: to which I have added *περὶ πάντων*, commonly read before *εἰρηνται* just above.

of judges. Secondly, let those of the same village and parish divided according to a twelfth part (be the judges), before whom let those go to contest about greater damages, who shall not have had the cause decided before the first judges; and let the defendant, if he is defeated a second time, pay the fifth part of the damages ¹ in the indictment.¹ But if any one brings an accusation against the judges, and wishes to contest the matter a third time, let him carry the cause before the select judges; and if he is again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages, and the half of it besides. But if the plaintiff, after being defeated before the first (judges), will not be quiet, but goes to the second, let him, if he is the victor, receive the fifth part; but if defeated, pay the same portion. And if the parties go to the third tribunal, not satisfied with the former trials, let the defendant, if defeated, pay ²as has been stated, the whole of the damages, and the half to boot,² but let the plaintiff pay the half only of the damages. With respect to the allotments of the tribunals,³ and their fillings up,⁴ and the appointments of persons⁵ to minister to the magistrates, and the times at which each of these ought to take place, and the matters relating to votes, and puttings off, and all that of such a kind necessarily takes place in lawsuits, and the obtaining by lot former and latter (trials)⁶ and the necessities of answers,⁷ and of coming (into

¹—¹ The Greek words, *τῆς γραφείσης δίκης*, are not translated by Fin-
cinus, whose version is—"quin tam debiti partem persolvet."

²—² Ast, with the approbation of Stalbaum, would read *τὸ πεμπτημόριον*,
ὥσπερ εἶρηται, καὶ τὴν ἡμιολίαν. But Cousin correctly observes that *ὥσπερ*
εἶρηται is to be referred to *τὴν ἡμιολίαν*, and not to *τὸ πεμπτημόριον*.

³ If Plato had here an eye to the customs of his own country, he would
have written *δικαστῶν*, "jurymen," as is evident from the Scholiast's
explanation of Aristoph. *Plut.* 277.

⁴ From the note of Ast it appears that Matthias in *Miscell. Philolog.*
T. i. p. 3, p. 253, has discussed this passage. But as I have never seen
the work, I am unable to state whether he has done so satisfactorily or
not. Judging however from the extract made by Ast, it would seem that
he has not thrown much light on the obscurity in *πληρώσεις*: by which
word I suspect Plato meant to show, that, when all the special jurymen in
any cause, called *ἐκλεκτοὶ δικασταί*, did not appear in court, their place
was supplied by some of the common jurymen, who happened to be pre-
sent, as is done to this day in England.

⁵ Ast says that *ὑπηρεσιῶν* is here put for *ὑπηρετῶν*.

⁶ Budeus, quoted by Ast, supplies here *δικῶν*— for the order, in which
the suits were to be taken, was determined by lot.

⁷ Harpocration explains *ἀπόκρισις* by *ἀπολογία*. But I suspect it

court)¹ and all together that are the nearest of kin² to these, we have spoken of even before;^{3 4} but what is right is beautiful twice and thrice.⁴ All such legal matters then, as are of a trifling kind, it is requisite for a young legislator to fill up after an older one has passed them by. The tribunals relating to private suits, would, when existing in this way, have a sufficient measure. But those, that are public and common, and which it is meet for the magistrates to make use of, (so as) to administer affairs suited to each office,⁵ are in many states the not unseemly legislation nor few of reasonable persons;⁶ from whence it is requisite for the guardians of the laws to furnish what is suited to the polity now being in a state of birth, by reasoning together, and correcting themselves (and) testing by experience, until each of the points shall appear to be laid down sufficiently; and then by putting a finish, to place a seal on what is to be thus irremovable, and to use them for the whole of life. But what relates to

means what is called "an answer" given to an "interrogatory," put by one party to another, as in the Court of Chancery in England.

¹ Ast explains παρακαταβάσεις, as if it were put for κατάβασις, thus neglecting the meaning of παρὰ entirely. Grou suggested παρακαταβολῶν. For by παρακαταβολή was meant a certain sum deposited in court in certain causes by opposing parties, and which was lost by the defeated one. The whole passage was however so little intelligible to Ficinus, that he has introduced after "de mora et dilatione judicii," answering to ἀναβολῶν, apparently out of his own head, "termino, citatione, repulsa." Cousin prefers the sense given by Ast.

² In Greek ἀδελφά, which is used metaphorically in a similar manner elsewhere. See at Epistol. 6, p. 499, n. ⁴.

³ This assertion seems here very strange. For Plato has touched upon scarcely one of these matters before. But if εἰπομεν μὲν καὶ πρόσθεν is to be united to what follows, then is there something wanting at the close of the preceding paragraph, supplied by Ficinus, who has "quamvis in superioribus tetigimus, tamen, quæ pulchra sunt, ut habet proverbium, et bis et ter recte dici possunt," which is at once intelligent and elegant, what cannot be said of the Greek; where Stephens was the first to find some difficulty, but failed to correct it. Cousin refers to vi. § 12 and 13, although he confesses that there is nothing to be found there precisely bearing on the points detailed here.

⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Cornarius has "sed pulchrum est quod rectum est, etiam bis ac ter," with which Ast indeed is satisfied; but λέγειν could not be omitted, as shown by vi. § 3, Gorg. § 117, and Phileb. § 140.

⁵ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "in multis civitatibus a prudentibus viris, recte constituta reperiuntur," thus omitting οὐκ ὀλίγα—

the silence and the good-omened language¹ of the judges and the contrary, and what in other states cause² (the mind) of the many to change improperly (about) things³ just, good, and honourable, these have been mentioned in part; but a part will be still mentioned towards the end. To all of which it is requisite for him, who is about to be an impartial judge according to justice, to look, and possessing⁴ them in writing to learn respecting all.⁵ For of all objects of learning the matters laid down relating to laws have the greatest power to make the learner better; ⁴which event, if the laws are laid down correctly, would take place (well);⁴ or vainly would the law, (considered) by us divine and wonderful, possess a name having an affinity with intellect.⁵ And moreover⁶ of the rest of discourses whatever are detailed in poems, as the praise or blame of some persons, or whatever in prose, whether in writings, or in all the rest of daily meetings, and are disputed about through a love of contention, and through concessions sometimes very foolish⁶—of all these the writings of the legislator

¹ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, renders *εὐφημίας* by “laude vituperationeque—”

²⁻³ The Greek is *παρὰλλάττει τῶν πολλῶν—δικαίων*, which Ficinus unable to understand, omits *τῶν πολλῶν*, and thus renders—“de justis—quæ in aliis civitatibus differunt.” I have translated as if it were originally—*πολλῶν νοῦν—περὶ δικαίων*—

³⁻³ The Greek is at present *γράμματα αὐτῶν περὶ μανθάνειν*: which Ast unable to understand, has adopted *πᾶρα* for *περὶ*, as suggested by Stephens. But *πᾶρα* is never thus put after its case, as *περὶ* constantly is. I have translated as if it were originally *γεγραμμέν' αὐτὰ πάντων περὶ μανθάνειν*. Ficinus has, what he considered to be the general sense, “atque operam dare, ut has legum constitutiones ante omnia dicat et mente firmiter teneat.”

⁴⁻⁴ The Greek is *ἂ εἴπερ*— But two MSS. omit *ἂ*— They should have read *ὃ εὖ, εἴπερ*—as I have translated. On the phrase *εὖ—γίγνοι'* *ἂν*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 182.

⁵ In a similar strain it has been said by some English lawyer, who perhaps had heard of this passage in Plato, that “Law is the perfection of Reason.” With regard to this notion of the Athenian philosopher, Taylor remarks that *νόμος* is properly *νοῦ διανομή*—an idea obtained, I suspect, from Proclus or some other Neo-Platonist.

⁶⁻⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I can scarcely discover what Plato is aiming at. How much more intelligible is the Latin of Ficinus—“Nam cum multi sermones de laude vituperationeque nonnullorum, partim carminibus, partim soluta oratione, tum scripti circumferantur, tum quotidie in coronis, seu contendendo sive falso assentiendo, habeantur.” With regard to *ἀλλαις πάσαις συνουσίαις*, which could not be thus opposed to *γράμμασιν*, the author wrote, I suspect, *λαλίας πᾶ-*

would be the clearest touchstone; which it behoves a good jurymen to possess in himself, the remedies, as it were, against the poison of other discourses; and by putting himself and the state in a straight course, ¹ to furnish to the good an abiding and an increase in justice; ¹ but to the bad a change, to the best of his power, from ignorance and intemperance, and timidity, and in one word, from all injustice; to such at least of the bad as have opinions that can be cured; but to such as have (their opinions) really ² woven by fate, ² the jurymen and leaders of the jurymen would be deserving of praise from the whole state, by assigning, what would be frequently said justly, death as the cure for minds so disposed. After the lawsuits, that occur yearly, have been decided upon, and come to an end, it is necessary for carrying out the proceedings after the verdict, ³ that these laws should hold good. Let the magistrate, who tried the cause, hand over to the victor all the monies of the defeated party, except what is required for necessities, immediately after each verdict has been proclaimed by the cryer and in the hearing of the jury. And when a month, next upon those, when lawsuits are tried, shall have arrived, unless a party has willingly sent the victor willingly away, ⁴ let the magistrate, who tried the cause, follow the victor, and deliver to him the property of the party in his debt. But if he has not the wherewithal, and there is a deficiency not less than a drachm, let him have no lawsuit against any other person, until he has paid to the full the whole of what is due to the victor; but to

σης συνουσίαις, which would be in one Greek word *λίσχαις*. Reasonably then did Ficinus omit *ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις* as being unintelligible.

^{1—1} In lieu of the words in the text, here translated literally, Ficinus has most strangely, “*bonos confirmabit atque extollet*—” which Taylor has followed in his “confirming and praising—”

^{2—2} Ast explains *ἐπικελευσμένοι* by “*fato quasi destinatae, ut immutari non possint*.” Ficinus however, justly despairing of being able to make any sense out of the Greek, as it stands at present, has followed the train of thought, and translated “*nam si sanari non possunt*,” adopted by Taylor. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Plato wrote *ἀποκελευσμένοι*, in the sense of the Latin, “*conclamatae*—” which would be a proper antithesis to *λάσιμοι*.

³ Such is the meaning here of *πράξεσιν*, which would be rather, in correct Greek, *ἐκπράξεσιν*.

⁴ Ast correctly explains *ἀπαλλάττηται* by “*creditori satisfiat debito solvendo*;” and aptly refers to Demosth. p. 914, 4, R.; 1189, 13; and 249, 28. The phrase in English would be, “satisfy the plaintiff.”

others let there be lawsuits decisively.¹ And if any one when condemned ²(unjustly) takes (any thing)³ from the condemning magistrate, let the parties unjustly despoiled bring him before the tribunal of the guardians of the laws; and if he is cast in this suit, let him be punished with death, as one who is destroying the whole state and the laws.

[9.] To a man ⁴after this,⁵ who has been born and brought up, and has begotten children and brought them up, and has been mixed up with contracts in a moderate manner, and has made restitution, if he has done any one an injury, and ⁶on the other hand received ⁷(when injured)⁸ what is just in law,⁹ ⁷(and) in turn⁷ has grown old, his end would take place according to nature.

With respect then to the dead, whether a person be male or female, let the interpreters (of the gods) have full powers to ⁸detail the laws of the gods under the earth, and of those here⁹ relating to things divine¹⁰ (and) what it is proper to be done. But let the receptacles be in such spots as are not cultivated at all; nor let the monument be either great or small; but such spots, as being useless, possess¹¹ a nature fitted for

¹ Ficinus omits *κυρίως*, for I presume he could not understand it, nor can I.

²⁻³ Ficinus has "*læserit aut quicquam eorum injuste abstulerit*," thus supplying *τι*, which Ast correctly says *ἀφροῖται* requires.

³⁻⁵ Ficinus, unable, like myself, to understand *τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο*, has omitted those words, and inserted in their place, apparently out of his own head—"sub his legibus"—adopted tacitly by Taylor.

⁴⁻⁴ The Greek is *ἐκλαβόντι*. But in the phrase *λαμβάνειν δίκας*, the preposition *ἐκ* is never, I believe, added. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were *αὐ λαβόντι*—

⁵ I have inserted, what the very balance of the sentence requires, which would be in Greek *καὶ ἡδικομένην*—

⁶ Instead of *λαβόντι σὺν*, I suspect Plato wrote, as I have translated, *λαβόντι τὸ ἴσον ἐν*—

⁷⁻⁷ The Greek is at present *ἐν μοίρᾳ*. But as *μοῖρα* would be more correctly applied to *τελευτή* than *γηράσαντι*, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐν μέρει*—

⁸ I have adopted the splendid emendation of Valckenaer on Herodot. vii. 106, *κυρίους φράζειν τὰς θήκας δὲ*, in lieu of *κυρίους φράζοντας θήκας δὲ*—Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "*secundum responsa interpretum fiant*."

⁹ In lieu of *τῶν τῇδε* Ficinus found in his MS. *τῶν ἀνω*, as shown by his version—"sive superos," adopted by Taylor.

¹⁰ To avoid the strange expression *περὶ τὰ θεῖα*, Ficinus has "parentations," as if he had found in his MS. *περὶ τὰ ἐντάφια*—

¹¹ The Greek is—*δὲ δὲ ἡ χώρα δεχομένη κρύπτειν*, which Stephens would

that alone, and which easily receive and conceal the bodies of the dead in the least painful manner to the living, these (it is meet) to fill up. ¹ For whatever the earth, being a mother, naturally wishes to bear as food for man, of this ¹ let no one alive or dead deprive any of us still living. And heap up no mound higher than what would be the completed work of five men in five days. And make not the upright tomb-stones greater than what may contain the praises of the deceased in not more than four heroic verses. And let the laying out of the corpse within (the house), be ² for not a shorter or longer ² time than to show ³ that the person is in a death-like trance, or really dead. But the carrying out to the tomb would, as human affairs are, be for a moderate period on the third day nearly. It is meet likewise to be persuaded by the legislator on other points, namely, when he says that soul is altogether superior to body; and that there is nothing, but the soul, which causes each of us to be ⁴ in this life the very thing we are; ⁴ and that the body, like an image, follows each of us; and that, when we are dead, the bodies of the deceased are beautifully said to be image-like forms; and that each of us, being in reality immortal, ⁵ but called

correct by reading either *ἡ δὲ τῆς χώρας*, or *ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ*: but Ast, *ἡ δὲ δὴ χώρα*, of which Stalbaum approves. Ficinus has—"ad cætera inutilis," which has led me to *ἡ δὲ δύσχωρα—δεχόμενα εὖ κρύπτειν*—From Cicero de Legg. ii. 27, 76, who seems to have quoted the passage from memory, nothing is to be obtained.

¹—¹ Ficinus, unable, no doubt, to make out the syntax in the Greek, has given merely an abridgment of the general sense, adopted to the letter by Taylor—"nec enim a vivis neque a mortuis terræ matris fœcunditas impedienda est." To meet all the difficulty, I have translated as if *πρὸς ταῦτα* were a corruption of *τις ταῦτα*, to be placed after *μήτε ζῶν*—for thus *ζῶν τις ταῦτα* would balance *τις ἀποθανών*, and *ταῦτα—τὸν ζῶντα* be, as usual, the two accusatives after *στερείτω*.

²—² The Greek is in five MSS. *πρῶτον*, in lieu of *πρότερον* in one. But as Ficinus has "non breviori vel longiori tempore," I suspect he found in his MS. *μὴ μακρότερον μὲν ἢ μικρότερον*—At least all the MSS. read *μὲν μακρότερον for μὴ μακρότερον*.

³ Although *τοῦ δηλοῦντος* might perhaps stand, yet correct Greek would require the infinitive *τοῦ δηλοῦν*—

⁴—⁴ The Greek is at present *ἐν αὐτῇ τε τῷ βίῳ—τοῦτ' εἶναι*. But Ficinus has—"in hac vita—hoc ipsum sit quod sumus." He therefore found in his MS. *ἐν τούτῳ τε τῷ βίῳ—ὃ ἐσμεν, αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι*—

⁵ In the Greek *εἶναι* follows here *ἀθάνατον*, which cannot, as remarked by Stephens, be united to *ὄντα ὄντως*, nor to *ἐπονομαζόμενον*. We might indeed read *μεῖναι*; but then we must insert *τε* after *παρὰ*, similar to "eamque" in Ficinus.

by the name of soul, depart to other¹ gods, to render an account, as the law of our country asserts, full of confidence to the good, but very fearful to the bad; and that to this (last) one there is no great assistance when dead. For it behoved all the relatives to aid the living man, so that he might have lived, when living, most just and holy, and when dead, have been punished for his wicked sins, during the life after this. Since then such is the case, there is no need to ruin a family by acting in a luxurious manner,² through thinking that the mass of flesh, which is buried, belongs to him; ³but not that his son, who lies dead,³ or brother, or whomsoever he regrets the most, and conceives he is burying, has departed, after bringing to an end⁴ and fulfilling his fate; and that he ought ⁵to do the best with present events,⁵ by expending a moderate sum upon, as it were, ⁶the lifeless altar of those in the earth.⁶ Now the legislature would divine what this moderate (expense) would be in not the most unseemly manner. Let this then be the law. By him in the highest census of property let there be expended not more than five minæ on the whole funeral; by him of the second class, three minæ; and two, by him of the third; and let one mina be the measure of expense to him of the fourth.⁷ And it is necessary for the guardians of the laws ⁸to do many other things,⁸ and to take care of many things, and especially of this, that they may

¹ The word ἄλλους is added because the soul, as being immortal, is considered itself a god.

² As Wyttenbach on the Phædo, p. 325, correctly saw that the sense is here "sepultura sumptuosa," it is strange he did not see likewise that Plato wrote διατρύφῳ, as I have translated, not διαφερόντως.

³⁻³ The Greek is at present ἀλλ' ἐκείνον— But ἐκείνον has no meaning here, while the antithesis requires the negative. Hence I have translated as if the Greek were originally—ἀλλ' οὐ κείμενον—

⁴ Ficinus, in lieu of περαινοῦντα καὶ, which he omits, has "alio"—and so after him has Taylor.

⁵⁻⁵ The proverb τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν is found again in Gorg. p. 499, C. Sometimes in lieu of ποιεῖν we meet with τιθῆναι, or even θραπέειν, as in Soph. Philoct. 149.

⁶⁻⁶ The Greek is εἰς ἄψυχον χθονίων βωμόν. Ficinus has—"ad manium aram, anima carentem—" But as every altar is ἄψυχος, one would have expected here ἀψύχων τῶν χθονίων βωμόν.

⁷ Ficinus, followed by Taylor to the letter, inserts here—"atque its singulorum moderata erit impensa—"

⁸⁻⁸ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

live attending to boys and men, and ¹persons of every age.¹ And moreover, at the end (of the life) of all, let one of the guardians of the laws, whom the relations of the deceased shall ²take as a superintendent,² act as president,³ ⁴to whom let whatever takes place in a proper and moderate manner be an honour; but what in not a proper manner, a disgrace.⁴ And let the laying out, and (carrying out),⁵ and all the rest relating to such matters, take place according to this law. But things of this kind it is meet to give up to the legislator, who lays down a political law.⁶ It would be a thing unseemly to order, or not, persons to weep for the dead; but it is necessary⁷ to forbid them to lament loudly, and to send the voice like that of a messenger⁸ out of the house, and to bring forth⁹ the corpse into the open part of the roads,¹⁰ and to talk¹¹ while going along the paths, and to go¹² out of the city before day. Let such laws then be thus laid down on these points; and let him, who is obedient, be exempt from punishment; but let him, who disobeys one of the guardians of the laws, be punished by a punishment that appears fit to all in common. What other burials, or non-burials, in the case of persons guilty of parricide and sacrilege, and all acts of such a kind,

¹—¹ Ficinus, followed in part by Taylor, has—"et, ut summam dicam cujuscunque sexus vel ætatis homines—"

²—² Ficinus has—"conjuncti elegerint, funus totum observet."

³ The Greek is ἐπιστάται. But two MSS. ἐπιστάτη—*which leads to ἐπιστατοίη δν*—

⁴—⁴ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has—"providetque, ut bene moderateque omnia, non contra gerantur; et illud sibi honori, hoc dedecori sit."

⁵ I have adopted "elationes," found in Ficinus, but neglected by Taylor.

⁶ Ast was the first to approve of πολιτικὸν νόμον, found in the MS. of Ficinus, in lieu of πολιτικῷ νόμῳ, as shown by his version, "civilis autem legislatori concedatur ista."

⁷ The best MS. has εἰ ἀπογορεύειν: where evidently lies hid δεῖ ἀπαγορεύειν—as I have translated.

⁸ In ἐξαγγέλλειν is an allusion to the tragic stage; where an Ἐξάγγελος was frequently introduced to tell of any terrible event, that had happened in a house.

⁹ Ficinus has "efferre:" from which, or from Stobæus cxxi. p. 613, Stephens suggested προάγειν in lieu of προσάγειν.

¹⁰ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "vias—frequentiores—"

¹¹ Ficinus renders φθίγγεσθαι "ejulare," a meaning that verb never has.

¹² The Greek is εἶναι. I have translated as if it were originally ἵεναι—Ficinus has "se afflictare non liceat;" where "non liceat" confirms my δεῖ ἀπαγορεύειν just above.

take place of the dead, these have been spoken of in our previous discourse and laid down by law ; so that our legislation would now have nearly arrived at the end. But the end is not in having on each occasion done of nearly all matters something, nor in possessing and in settling, ¹ but in having discovered a preservation for what has been produced, and in thinking that all, which ought to have been done, has been then done completely ; but previously, that the whole is incomplete.¹

Clin. You speak well, O guest. But tell me still more clearly, for what purpose has been said, what has just now been said ?

[10.] *Athen.* Much, Clinias, of former (sayings) have been hymned beautifully, and nearly not the least so are the appellations of the Fates.

Clin. What are these ?

Athen. In Lachesis being the first, Clotho the second, and Atropos the third, ² the saviour of what has been asserted, things assimilated by that of those woven by fire, of working out a power not to be turned aside ; ² which in a city and polity ought not only to furnish health and safety to bodies, but a good state of law in souls, or rather the preservation of laws. But it appears to me that this is yet wanting to laws, how it is needful ³ for a power to exist in them to be according to nature not turned.

Clin. You speak of no small affair, if it is possible to find how a thing of this kind may exist in every possession.

Athen. But this is possible, as it appears to me, in every respect at present.

Clin. Let us then by all means not separate until we

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has—"sed in eo potius, quod, sicut recte sunt facta, ita et firmiter stabilita sint ; in hujusmodi enim conservatione putandum est, quantum oportuit, factum esse ; aliter minime." With regard to the sentiment, Juvenal seems to have had a recollection of it, when he wrote—"Nil actum censet, dum quid superesset agendum—"

²—² Such is the literal translation of the unintelligible Greek—*σώτειραν τῶν λεχθέντων ἀπικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων τῷ πυρὶ, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζομένων δύναμιν* : where in lieu of *λεχθέντων* Bekker suggests *ληχθέντων*, and so does Sydenham. Ast, *λαχόντων*. Cornarius proposed *φύσει* for *πυρὶ* : but Ast, *πλώσει* or *πλήσει* : Winckelmann, *τῷ συσπειρῶν* : and Baiter, *τολύπη*— What Plato wrote might perhaps be recovered by a bold conjectural scholar.

³ Ficinus has, what is preferable, "possit—"

have supplied this very thing to the laws already mentioned. For it is ridiculous to labour at any thing in vain, and not to lay down something stable.

Megil. You correctly exhort me: and you will find me to be such another person.

Clin. You speak indeed well. What then, say you, would this preservation be, and after what fashion for our polity and laws?

Athen. Have we not said that an assembly ought to be held in our city of this kind—That ten of the oldest guardians of the laws and those, who have received the prizes for good conduct, ought ever to be gathered together at the same spot [with them]?¹ and further, that those, who had gone abroad² to make a search, if perchance it has happened to them to hear of any thing opportune for guarding the laws, (ought),³ on arriving safe at home, to be voted, ⁴after having been tested by these very doings, worthy to become partakers of the assembly?⁴ and in addition to this, that each ought to take as an ally one of the young men, not less than thirty years of age,⁵ and that he himself, after deciding that the young man was a worthy character both by nature and nurture, should introduce him to the others; and, if it should seem good to the others, that he should take him as an ally; but if not, that the judgment, which may have taken place, should be kept secret from the rest, and especially the party rejected;⁶ and that the assembly ought to be at day-break, when there is leisure for the most part to every one from all other business, both public and private? Something of this kind was stated by us in the preceding discourse.

Clin. It was.

Athen. Resuming then the subject relating to this very as-

¹ This *ρούροις* at the end of the paragraph seems perfectly useless.

² Ficinus adds here "multas urbes—" Taylor, "many regions—"

³ Although Ast saw that *kai* had no meaning here, yet he did not see that perhaps it was an error for *δια*—

⁴—⁴ Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has "sed hi ad cœtum hujusmodi non recipiantur, nisi ex ea peregrinatione incorrupti et integri rediisse, et cœtu digni esse probentur."

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, whom Taylor has followed closely, has most strangely only "qui natura educationeque digni esse asciscendi primum, deinde et universo cœtui, videantur: quod si quis indignus adhibeatur, nullius momenti sententia sit."

sembly, I would say something of this kind. I assert then that if any one throws out this, as an anchor¹ for the whole city, that it has in itself every thing requisite to preserve all we wish.

Clin. How so?

Athen. ²On what comes after this an opportunity will occur for our speaking correctly, and to omit nothing of our readiness (to act).³

Clin. You speak exceedingly well; and do as you intend.

Athen. It is meet therefore, Clinias, to understand that with respect to every thing there is a saviour suited to each kind of work; as in an animal, the soul and the head are naturally the greatest.

Clin. How again say you?

Athen. The power of these two, doubtless, affords safety to the whole animal.

Clin. How?

Athen. In soul there is, besides other things, intellect implanted; and in the head, besides other things, sight and hearing. And, in short, intellect being mingled with the most beautiful senses, and becoming one, it would justly be called the preservation of each.

Clin. It appears so at least.

Athen. So indeed it appears. But would not intellect, when conversant about something, and mingled with the senses, become the safety of vessels, both in storms and fair weather? Do not, in the case of a ship, the pilot and the sailors, by mingling their senses with the intellect of the pilot, preserve both themselves and what relates to the ship?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But there is no need of many examples relating to things of this kind; but let us consider, as in the case of armies, and (diseases),³ after laying down what mark would both generals and all the ministering of physicians direct their aim (for the sake) of preservation.

¹ On this metaphor Ast refers to Wytttenbach Plutarch, S. N. V. p. 104.

²—³ Ficinus has again most strangely—"Opportune modo dicemus totisque viribus incumbemus."

³ I have adopted Baiter's νόσων, which might easily have dropt out before νοήσωμεν. Ficinus has "in exercitu et medicina," as if he had found in his MS. ταρπικῆς, what Cornarius was the first to remark.

¹ *Clin.* Very right.¹

Athen. Does not the former (aim at) victory, and the power over the enemy? and the latter ² [of physicians and their assistants,] ³ at a preparation for the health of the body?

Clin. How not?

Athen. But if the physician is ignorant of that relating to the body, which we now call health, or the general of that relating to victory, or of the other things we have mentioned, would either appear to possess intellect relating to any of these matters?

Clin. How could they?

Athen. But what with respect to a city? If any one is ignorant of the mark, at which a statesman ought to look, could he in the first place be justly denominated a ruler? And in the next, would he be able to preserve that, of the scope of which he knows nothing at all?

Clin. How could he?

[11.] *Athen.* It is necessary therefore now, as it seems, if the settlement of this our country is to have an end, that there should be something in it, that knows, in the first place, what we call the mark, ³ whatever that may happen to be in a statesman's view; ³ next, after what manner it is requisite to partake of it; and which of the laws first, and, afterwards, who among men, will properly or improperly consult with a view to it. But if there shall be any state devoid of a thing of this kind, it will not be wonderful, if, by being mindless and senseless, it should on each occasion perform in each of its doings whatever presents itself by chance.

Clin. You speak the truth.

Athen. Now then, in what part of our state, or pursuits, is there any sufficient guard whatever prepared of such a kind? Have it we in our power to tell?

Clin. Not I indeed, guest, clearly. But, if I must make a guess, this discourse seems to me to tend to that assembly, which you said ought to come together at night.

Athen. You have rightly understood me, Clinias; and, as

¹—¹ This answer of Clinias seems very strange. Unless I am mistaken, *ὁρθῶς* belongs to the speech of the Athenian.

²—² The words between the brackets are correctly omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

³—³ Taylor omits entirely the words between the numerals. Ficinus has—"quisnam civilis sit finis."

the present reasoning indicates, this (assembly) ought to possess every virtue; the beginning of which is not to be wandering, by guessing at many things, but by looking to one thing, always to direct every thought, like arrows, to this.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Now then we shall learn that it is not a wonderful thing for the legal institutions of cities to wander; because the system of laws in each city looks, one to one thing, and another to another. And for ¹the most part it is no wonder that ¹to some the limit is that of what is just, in order that certain persons, whether they happen to be better or worse, may have dominion over the state; to others, that they may be wealthy, whether they are slaves of certain persons, or not; the attention of others again is urged on to a life forsooth of liberty; but others are regulated by laws, ²like two united, ²looking to both, that they may be free (themselves), ³and the lords of other states. But the wisest, as they think themselves, (look) to these, and to all such points as these together, and not to any one (singly), ⁴as they are unable to mention any one thing held in pre-eminent honour, to which it is needful for them to direct ⁵the rest.

Clin. Would not then, O guest, our assertion formerly laid down be right; for we said that the whole of our laws ought always to look to one point; and we conceded that this might be called very correctly virtue.

Athen. Yes.

Clin. And we laid down surely that virtue is fourfold.

Athen. Entirely so.

Clin. And that of all these, intellect was the leader, to which all other things, and three of the virtues, ought to look.

Athen. You have followed me in a most beautiful manner;

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

²—² So Ast explains ξύνδυο— But Ficinus “ad duo”—omitting πρόσ ἄμφω βλέποντες, whom Taylor follows, as usual.

³ Ficinus has correctly “ipsi,” in Greek αὐτοί, to balance ἄλλων— By comparing iii. p. 694, A. § 11, αὐτοὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἐγένοντο, ἔπειτα δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν δεσπόται, Stephens would read πολλῶν for πόλεων.

⁴ I have adopted the reading suggested by Stephens. εἰς ἓν δὲ οὐ· οὐδ’ ἓν —For οὐ· οὐδ’—are thus constantly united in Plato. See at The Banquet, § 8, n. 83.

⁵ Ficinus has “ad quod cætera dirigit”—as if his MS. read τρέπειν, not βλέπειν

Clinias; and follow me too in what remains. For we have said, that the intellect of the pilot, and of the physician, and of the general, looks to that one point, ¹ to which it ought to look; ¹ but examining the intellect of the statesman, we are at that point now; and interrogating it, as if it were a person, we will say—O wonderful creature, to what point are you looking? What is that one thing, of which the intellect of the physician can speak in a clear manner? but of which you, who are forsooth ² superior, as you would say, to all clever persons, will not have it in your power to speak? Or can you, Megillus and Clinias, define and speak for him, and tell me what it is, as I have defined to you in behalf of many other matters?

Clin. By no means, guest.

Athen. But what, ³ ought we not to be desirous of knowing well ³ what it is, and in what it is?

Clin. ⁴ In what, for example, do you mean? ⁴

Athen. For example, when we said that there are four species of virtue, it is evidently necessary to say that each is one, since they are four.

Clin. How not?

Athen. And yet we call all these one. For we say that fortitude is a virtue, and that prudence is a virtue, and the two others (likewise), as if this virtue was not in reality many things, but only one.

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. So far, then, as these two differ from each other, and have received two names, and the other two (likewise), there is no difficulty in speaking of them; but so far as we apply to both one (name) of virtue, and to the others (likewise), it is not easy to speak of them.

Clin. How say you?

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, who perhaps could not understand *οἱ δὲ βλέπειν*: where Ast was the first to edit *οἱ δὲ βλέπειν*, found subsequently in two MSS. And so too Sydenham after Stephens.

² Although Stephens saw that *ὠν-διαφέρων* is scarcely correct, yet he did not see that Plato wrote *ὡς δὲ*—used here ironically, as elsewhere.

³—³ I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐ τι δεῖ προθυμεῖσθαι γ' εὖ ξυνιδεῖν*—not *ὅτι δεῖ προθυμεῖσθαι τι ξυνιδεῖν*—where *ὅτι* and *τι* are equally unintelligible. Ficinus has “An non quærendum putatis—”

⁴—⁴ Ficinus, apparently unable to understand *ὅλον ἐν τισι λέγεις*, has “Dic plane.”

Athen. It is not difficult to explain what I mean. For let us distribute among ourselves the (business of) interrogating and answering.

Clin. How again are you speaking?

Athen. Ask me why, when speaking of virtue as one thing, we have given this appellation to two things, one of which is fortitude, and the other prudence? for I will tell you the reason. Because one of these is conversant with fear, from whence¹ both wild beasts participate in fortitude, and so do the habits of children very young. For the soul may be brave without reason and from nature; but on the other hand, without reason it never has been prudent and possessed of intellect, nor is it so now, nor will it ever be, since this is a different thing.²

Clin. You speak truly.

Athen. In what way then these are different and two, you have received from me through the reasoning; but in what way they are one and the same, do you on the other hand tell me. But bear in mind that you are going to tell me in what way, being four, they are one; and require of me (to tell),³ after you have shown that they are one, in what way they are again four. And after this, let us consider whether for him,⁴ who would know sufficiently respecting any thing whatever, to which there is both a name and a definition, it is meet to know only the name, but to be ignorant of the definition; or whether it is disgraceful for him, who knows⁵ something of what excels in magnitude and beauty, to be ignorant of all such matters as these.

Clin. It appears so.

Athen. But is there any thing of greater consequence for a legislator and a guardian of the laws, and for him, who is

¹ In lieu of *οὐ* Ficinus found, as remarked by Stephens, *ᾧθεν*, as shown by his version "unde—"

² Ficinus has more intelligibly, "*aliud ergo hæc est quam illa,*" i. e. that prudence is a different thing from fortitude. Of this Shakspeare was well aware, when he made Falstaff say that "Discretion is the better part of Valour."

³ After *τίτταρα* Ast says that *ἵπειν* is to be supplied. I suspect it has dropt out by accident.

⁴ Ficinus has "*intellecturus,*" as if his MS. read *εἰδέναι μᾶλλον* instead of *εἰδότες*, which, if preserved, would require *οὐχ ἱκανῶς*, to the detriment of the sense.

⁵ I have adopted with Ast *γινόντα*, for *γε ὄντα*, as suggested by Cornarius.

thought to excel all others in virtue, and who has received the rewards of victory in these very points, than fortitude, temperance, justice, and prudence?

Clin. How can there be?

Athen. On these points then ought not holy interpreters, and teachers, and legislators, and the guardians of others, to (speak)¹ to him, who requests to know and to perceive, or who requests to be punished and reproved² when erring, by teaching him what power virtue and vice possess, and by showing that they (themselves) excel the rest in every respect? Or must some poet come³ to the city, or an instructor of youth, and assert that he is seen to be better than him, who has been the victor in every virtue? And then will it appear wonderful in a state like this, where both in word and deed the guardians would be incompetent through their⁴ not having correctly⁴ a knowledge of virtue, that such a state, by being without a guard, should suffer what the majority of existing states suffer?

Clin. Not at all (wonderful), as it seems.

[12.] *Athen.* What then, must we do what we just now said? Or how must we make the guardians more exact with respect to virtue, in deed and word, than the masses? Or after what manner will our state be assimilated to the head and senses of the prudent, through possessing in itself a guard of this kind?

Clin. How then, O guest, and after what manner, shall we speak, assimilating it to a thing of this kind?

Athen. It is evident⁵ that, while the state itself is (the resemblance) of a cavity,⁵ the young of the guards, who are

¹ I have translated, as if λέγειν or αὐδαῖν had dropt out between δεῖ and διδάσκοντας. For otherwise the dative τῷ δεομένῳ would be without regimen. I have adopted likewise διδάσκοντας and δηλοῦντας, in lieu of the singular, which Ast vainly endeavours to defend.

² I cannot understand how the active ἐπιπλήξαι can here follow the passive κολάζεσθαι. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were ἐπιπλήσσεισθαι—

³ Ficinus has “urbem nuper ingressus,” as if his MS. read ἐλθόντα νεωστί τὴν πόλιν—

⁴ To avoid the incongruity of the assertion that guardians would be incompetent, who had a competent knowledge of virtue, I have translated, as if the Greek were οὐ καλῶς, not ἱκανῶς.

⁵ I must leave for the others to make out the sense and syntax in the words—ὥς αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐσης τοῦ κύτους— I could have understood—ὥς αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸν κύτους εἰκὼν— i. e.

selected, as it were,¹ for the top of the head, as being of the best disposition, and possess a quickness of perception in their whole soul, survey the whole state in a circle; and, while guarding it, they deliver up the senses to memory, and become the announcers to the elders of every thing in the state; and that these [the elders],² being assimilated to intellect, through considering pre-eminently many matters and those worthy of regard, enter into consultations, and employ the young, as agents, in their joint deliberations; and thus both truly preserve the whole state in common. Whether then shall we say that they are to be established in this manner, or how otherwise? Or that they all possess all things equally,³ and that some of them have been brought up and educated in not the most exact manner?⁴

Clin. But this, O wonderful man, is impossible.

Athen. Let us then proceed to a more accurate education than the former.

Clin. By all means.

Athen. Would not that, which we almost touched just now, happen to be the very one, of which we have a want?

Clin. Entirely so.

Athen. Did we not say then, that of each trade the tip-top handicraftsman and guardian ought to be able not only to look to the majority of things, but to hasten onwards to one thing, and to know it, and, after knowing it by looking at it, to arrange every thing in order?

Clin. Correctly so.

Athen. Would there be then to any person whatever a speculation or a sight more accurate, respecting any thing whatever, than to be able to look to one form out of many and dissimilar?

"that the substance of the city itself is the resemblance to some receptacle—" Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "quia civitas capitis quædam capacitas erit"

¹ I have adopted ἀπειλεγμένους, found in four MSS., in lieu of ἀπειλημένους, which Ast translates "seorsim collocatos—"

² The words τοὺς γέροντας are evidently an interpolation.

³ The Greek is ὁμοίους πάντας κεκτημένους. Ficinus has "æquales omnes habendas esse censemus." But κεκτημένους is never found in a passive sense. I have translated as if Plato had written ὁμοίως πάντα πάντας κεκτημένους—

⁴ I have, with Ast and Stalbaum, adopted διηκριβωμένους, for διηκριβωμένους, as suggested by Stephens from "exacte" in Ficinus.

Clin. Perhaps (not).

Athen. Not perhaps, but in reality, O thou godlike man, there is not any method more clear than this to any one.

Clin. Trusting to you, O guest, I admit it; and in this way let us proceed in our discourse.

Athen. We must compel, then, as it seems, even the guardians of our divine polity to see accurately, in the first place, what happens amongst all the four virtues to be the same; and which, being one thing in fortitude, and temperance, and prudence, and justice, we assert would be properly called by one name, virtue. This, my friends, if we are willing, let us for the present, as it were¹ squeezing violently, not let go, before we state sufficiently what it is that we must look at, whether as one thing, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way it exists naturally. Or, if this escapes us, think we that we shall ever sufficiently possess the things relating to virtue, of which we shall be unable to say, whether it is many things, or four, or one thing? If, then, we follow ourselves as fellow-counsellors, we shall by some means devise a plan for this to take place in our state. But if it seems good to you² to dismiss the subject altogether, it is necessary to dismiss it.³

Clin. By the god, who presides over hospitality, we must, O guest, dismiss a subject of this kind the least of all, since you appear to us to speak correctly. But how can any one devise this plan?

Athen. Let us not at present speak of the how we can devise it; but let us first establish firmly by agreement amongst ourselves, whether it is requisite or not.

Clin. It is doubtless requisite, if possible.

[13.] *Athen.* But what, with respect to the beautiful and the good, ³do we think the same on this point?³ Must our guardians know only that each of these is many? Or that it is one, and how it is so?

¹ The Greek is *ὅλον περ*—But Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὅλον Πρωτῖα*—“like Proteus,” or rather *ὅλον χεῖρ Πρωτῖα*—For it was necessary to lay hold of Proteus with a firm grasp, before he would open his lips, as a prophet, as we learn from Homer *Od. Δ. 414* and *454*.

²⁻³ I have adopted the reading proposed by Baiter, *δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἶναι δὲ χρῆναι*. So we say in English—“If I must, I must.”

³⁻³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor.

Clin. It seems almost necessary for them to understand how (each of these) is one.

Athen. But what, (ought they) to understand, but be unable to show by arguments ¹(what they understand)?¹

Clin. How so? For you are speaking of a certain habit belonging to a slave.²

Athen. But what, with respect to all serious pursuits, is there the same reasoning, that it behoves those, who are to be really guardians of the laws, to know really the matters relating to the truth, and to be competent to interpret them in a discourse, and follow them out in deeds, deciding upon the things that exist beautifully according to nature, or do not exist?

Clin. How not?

Athen. Is not then one of the most beautiful things that relating to the gods, which we went through with seriousness, how that they exist, and of how great a power they seem to be the lords; and that man, as far as he can, ought to know this; and, that we ought to pardon the greatest number of those in the state, if they will only follow the voice of the laws; but that we ought not to commit to persons a share in the guardianship, who have not laboured to acquire every faith in the existence³ of the gods; and that there should be ⁴this one object of care,⁴ namely, never to choose any one for a guardian of the laws, who is not a divine man, and has not laboured for them,⁵ nor (permit him)⁶ to become one of those selected for his virtue.

¹—¹ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, adds, what the sense requires, "quod intelligunt."

² This is said, because slaves were either foreigners, or uneducated.

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐσίῳ*, not *οὐδῶν*—which has nothing to which it can be referred. Compare shortly afterwards *οὐσίαν ἐπόρισεν*.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is *τὴν δὲ μὴν ἐπιτροπήν*—where Ast would read *τὴν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτροπήν*—adopted by Bekker and others; which, I confess, I cannot understand. I have translated therefore, as if the Greek were *τὴνδὲ δὲ μίαν ἐπιτροπήν*—

⁵ Stephens was the first to object to *αὐτὰ* thus placed by itself; although he says that *τὰ θεῖα* is to be got out of *τὸν θεῖον*: and so too does Ast. But Plato would in that case have written *τοιαῦτα*—Ficinus has, what is far more elegant and intelligible—"nisi divinus sit divinisque studiis operam dederit."

⁶ The Greek is at present *αὐ*—It was formerly *ἐγὼ*—as I have translated.

Clin. It is just then, as you say, for him, who is inactive on matters of this kind, or unable to give a reply,¹ (to be)² at a distance from honourable affairs.

Athen. Do we then not know, that there are two things relating to the gods, which lead to a belief in what we have gone through in our previous discourse?

Clin. What are they?

Athen. One is that, which we asserted respecting the soul, that it is the oldest and most divine of all things, of which a motion, by receiving the generation, imparts an ever-flowing existence;³ and one too is that, concerning the movement, how orderly it is, of the stars and such other things with which⁴ mind has, by its power over them, adorned the universe.⁴ For he, who views these matters in neither a mean manner nor like a common individual, has never been an atheistical person, so as not to be affected in a manner the contrary to what would be expected by the many. For they imagine that those, who take in hand subjects of this kind through astronomy and other necessary⁵ arts in conjunction with it, become atheists from having seen that it is possible for things to exist by necessity and not from the⁶ intellect of a divine plan⁶ relating to good things to be brought to pass.

Clin. How then would it exist?

Athen. All things,⁷ as I have said, are in a contrary state

¹ Ficinus avoids the difficulty in ἀποκρίνεσθαι by omitting the word entirely, and translating—"et ineptus sit—" Did Plato write ὑποκρίνεσθαι, "to act the part" of a divine person—or rather ἢ, ὡς δὲ αἰ, ἀδύνατον ὑποκρίνεσθαι—"unable to act the part he ought."

² After τῶν καλῶν there has evidently dropt out εἶναι, as I have translated.

³ Ast conceives that Plato had in his mind the doctrine of Heraclitus, which he has developed more at length in the Cratylus and Parmenides, that all things are in a state of flowing.

⁴ This was the doctrine of Anaxagoras, to which Euripides alludes in Tro. 890, where I should have supported the conjecture of Bouhier, νοῦς κρατῶν for νοῦς βροτῶν, by referring to νοῦς ἡγερατής in this passage.

⁵ Such as Geometry and Arithmetic.

⁶ The Greek is διανοίας βουλήσεως, which I confess I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has "voluntate divina." I have translated therefore, as if the Greek were διανοίας βουλήσεως θείας—remembering the Διὸς δὲ τελείου βουλή in Homer, Il. A. 5.

⁷ I have translated, as if the Greek were πάντα— If πᾶν is to be preserved here, we must prefix τὸ and read ἀψυχὸν αὐτὸ— But the other

now to what they were, when those, who thought upon them, conceived them to be without soul. ¹A feeling of wonder crept even then upon the mind respecting them; and what is now really determined upon, was suspected then by such as touched upon accuracy, how that things without soul would never have made use of reasonings wonderful for their accuracy, had they not possessed intellect.¹ And some indeed dared to hazard this very doctrine even at that period, by saying that ²it was Mind, which put into order every thing in heaven.² ³But the same persons erred again³ about the nature of the soul, (by not knowing)⁴ that it is older than body; but conceiving it to be younger,⁵ they did, so to say, overturn all things, and themselves much more.⁶ For ⁷all things, that were before their eyes, while carried along the heavens, appeared to them to be full of stones and earth, and many other soulless bodies, that furnished reasons for the existence of the whole world.⁷ ⁸These doctrines it was that caused much of atheism and disgust to flit about amongst such persons.⁸ Moreover revilings

is the preferable method. Hence at the end of the speech we must read likewise *πάντα τὸὐναντίον ἔχει* in lieu of *πάν*—

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus, which Ficinus, followed almost to the letter by Taylor, has thus abridged and remodelled—“*quamvis etiam tunc, quicunque diligentius aliis illa perscrutabantur, mire veritatem tangebant, quod videlicet nunquam, si anima carerent, tam exquisita ratione uterentur mentis expertia.*”

²—² Here again is an allusion to Anaxagoras, whose *Κόσμος* began with this sentence—*‘Ομοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἔην· νόος δὲ αὐτὰ διήρπει καὶ διακόσμεε.*

³—³ The Greek is at present, *οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ πάλιν ἀμαρτάνοντες*— But unless I am mistaken, it was formerly *οἱ γε ἔτι πλεον ἀμαρτάνοντες*— i. e. “who erring still more about the nature of the soul.”

⁴ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, “*nescientes*—”

⁵ The same doctrine, that the soul is younger than the body, is advocated by Locke and the other Materialists of modern times.

⁶ How Anaxagoras overturned his own theory may be seen in *Phædo*, p. 98, B.

⁷—⁷ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed to the letter by Taylor, has “*Nam quæ ante oculos sunt, hæc et in cælo esse crediderunt. Itaque terra lapidibus aliisque inanimatorum corporibus referta esse cælestia credentes his causas totius mundi dederunt.*” With regard to the notion of the heavenly bodies being full of stones, this has been partially confirmed in modern times. For it has been said that the Earl of Rosse’s telescope shows that the Moon is a mass of granite.

⁸—⁸ The Greek is *ἀπρεσθαί*, where Ficinus felt himself so much at a loss as to give merely the general sense of the whole passage, “his igitur

have come from the poets, (so that,) while likening philosophers to dogs that make use of vain howlings, they said, ¹ on the other hand, other senseless things.¹ But now, as I have said, all the contrary takes place.

Clin. How could this be?

[14.] *Athen.* It is not possible for any mortal man ever to become firmly pious, who does not receive these two things, that the soul is the oldest of all things, which share in generation and is immortal; and that it rules over all bodies. And in addition to this, what has been said very often, who shall receive ² the mind said of beings in the stars,² and the necessary learning before³ these subjects,⁴ and after beholding the communion in these according to the Muse,⁴ shall make use (of it) in a manner fitting to the pursuits of morals and legal institutions; and shall be able to give a reason for such things as admit of a reason,⁵ and do not.⁵ Now he, who is not able to acquire these in addition to public virtues, will scarcely ever become a competent ruler over a whole state; but he would be a minister to other rulers. It is then, Clinias and Megillus, re-

factum est, ut, qui hæc tractant, philosophi tanquam impii vulgo circumferuntur." I have therefore altered ἄπτεσθαι into ἄττεισθαι. On the loss and corruption of ἄττειν, and its use in an astronomic sense, I could say not a little; suffice it to quote at present Plutarch De Fortun. Roman. t. ii. p. 326, ἄστρον φερομένου καὶ διὰ ττοντος ἐπὶ δυσμᾶς ἐξ ἀνατολῶν.

¹ Such is the version of Bekker's text adopted by Stalbaum; who should have suggested πολλά καὶ ἀνόητα—

² Such is the literal translation of the Greek—τόν τε εἰρημένον ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις τῶν ὄντων, which Ast endeavours to explain by his version and paraphrase, "the reason of all things in the stars," that is, "dwelling there and most conspicuous." Ficinus has "veram esse mentem in astris," as if his MS. read τόν τε ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις ὄντα ὄντως, without εἰρημένον, omitted in another MS. Perhaps Plato wrote τόν τε, αἰωρούμενον ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις, νοῦν ὄντα ὄντως—i. e. "the mind, really existing, and suspended amongst the stars," or rather something to this effect, τόν τ' αἰωρούμενον ἐν ἄστροις ☉ ἐνιαυτῶν μόνον ἄνακτα, "the Sun suspended amongst the stars, the only ruler of years"—where ☉ is (ἥλιον). See myself on Æsch. Eum. 2.

³ In lieu of πρὸ, "before," I should prefer περὶ, "respecting—"

⁴ Here again I am quite at a loss; and so, I think, was Ficinus; whose version is "Musæ etiam his convenientis non ignarus ad mores componendos legesque servandas ipsa utatur."

⁵ Bekker, followed by Stalbaum, considers ὅσα τε καὶ μή, omitted by Ficinus, as an interpolation. But who would have inserted those words, or why, we are not told.

quisite to see ¹ in addition to all the laws already detailed, which we have gone through,¹ whether we can bring this nocturnal meeting of the rulers to be a guard,² according to law, for the sake of preservation, after becoming a sharer in the education, such as we have gone through. Or how shall we act?

Clin. But how, O thou best of men, should we not bring it, if perchance we are able, even for a little?

Athen. Let us then enter altogether into a contest for a thing of this kind at least. For I will readily be your helper in this; and in addition to myself perhaps, through my skill in things of this kind, and my thinking upon them very frequently, I shall find others likewise.

Clin. Let us, O guest, proceed in this path, rather than any other, in which even a god is almost leading us. But what is the method, which, if it took place, would take place correctly, this let us now speak of and seek out.

Athen. Laws about things of this kind, Megillus and Clinias, it is not possible to lay down, until (the whole state)³ is orderly arranged; ⁴ for then (one can) lay down, over what it is meet for them to have an authority.⁴ ⁵ But the furnishing such things at present would be, if it were done correctly, an act of instruction combined with much intercourse.⁵

Clin. How so? Why do we say that this is mentioned again?

Athen. In the first place, a list should be drawn out of those, who would be fitted for the nature of a guard by the power of their time of life, and instruction, and by their morals and manners. But after this, it is neither easy to find (oneself),⁶ what one ought to learn, nor to become the disciple

¹—¹ In lieu of this unmeaning verbiage Ficinus has merely "prædictis legibus."

² Ficinus has "ut apicem custodemque," as if his MS. read κορυφήν καὶ φυλακήν—

³ Ficinus alone has, what the sense seems to require, "civitas universa—"

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "tunc enim debita cum auctoritate constituendæ videntur."

⁵—⁵ Here again Ficinus has swerved not a little from the Greek in his version, "sed eo non aliter recte, quam doctrina multa et longo disputationis examine, probabuntur."

⁶ I have inserted "oneself," for αὐτὸν might easily have dropt out

of another, who has found it out. In addition to this, it is a vain thing to state in writing the times ¹which and ¹in which it is requisite to obtain each particular. For not even to the learners themselves would it be manifest, what is learnt opportunely, before the science of the instruction is generated in the soul of each. Hence, all, that relates to these matters, being spoken of, would not be said to be properly secrets ; ²but they (might be said to be) not previously spoken, through nothing of what has been spoken indicating what has been previously spoken.³

Clin. Since then this is the case, what, O guest, must we do ?

Athen. According to the proverb, friends, it appears ³we are lying in a common and middle ground.³ And if we are willing to run a risk respecting the whole polity, we must do all things, by throwing, as they say, either thrice six, or thrice ace.⁴ I will, however, undergo the danger with you in stating and explaining, what appears to me respecting the education and nurture, which has been agitated in our conversations. The hazard is, indeed, neither small, nor similar to any others. But I exhort you, Clinias, to have a care of this. For you will obtain the greatest renown by establishing

after οὔτε—for the sake of the balance in ἄλλον, on which see my Porpo's Prolegom. p. 254. In vi. p. 772, D. § 16, αὐτὸς is however omitted in the words σκοπῶν καὶ σκοπούμενος ὑπ' ἄλλων—

¹—¹ Ficinus, with the approbation of Stephens, omits οὐδὲ καὶ—

²—² The Greek is — οὕτω δὲ πάντα τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ἀπόρρητα μὲν λεχθέντα οὐκ ἂν ὁρθῶς λέγοιτο, ἀπόρρητα δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν προρηθέντα δηλοῦν τῶν λεγομένων : which, I confess, I cannot understand ; nor could Ficinus ; for his version is “ quæ igitur in his palam dici non possunt, non recte tentantur ; dici autem non posse inquam, quoniam, si dicantur, nihil planius explicant.” Nor could Faehse, who would read ἐλεγχθέντα with one MS., or δειχθέντα from conjecture ; nor, lastly, could Ast, who proposed ἀπρόρρητα, adopted by Bekker and the subsequent editors. But what we gain by the alteration, I am yet to learn ; although I have so translated it.

³—³ The proverb is ἐν μίσῳ κεῖσθαι, not, as here, ἐν κοινῷ κεῖσθαι. See Bergler on Alciphron. ii. 3, n. 75. It was applied to neutral ground lying between two contending parties:

⁴ On the expression τρίς ἕξ, applied to a lucky throw with three dice, see Blomfield on Agam. 33, and on τρεῖς κύβους, an unlucky one, Hemsterhuis on Jul. Pollux ix. 95, ἡ μονὰς—ὄνομα εἶχε κύβος καλεῖσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ παροιμιώδης λόγος μηνύειν ἔοικεν Ἡ τρίς ἕξ ἢ τρεῖς κύβους— The corresponding phrase for the latter in English hazard is “ crabs.”

correctly the city of the Magnesians, or after what other event a god shall give it a name ; or you will at least not escape the seeming to be ¹the bravest of all born afterwards.¹ If then this divine assembly shall be established by us, O friends and companions, the city must be delivered to its care ; ²nor will there be any dispute amongst any one, so to say, of the legislators at present respecting³ these institutions ; ² but there will be completed almost ⁴a day-dream in a matter, which we touched upon in our discourse a little before as a night dream,⁴ when we mingled together a certain image of the agreement of the head with intellect ; if indeed these men are accurately mingled together by us, and properly instructed, and when instructed, reside in the acropolis of the country, and become guardians, such as we have never seen in our previous life, as regards the power of preservation.

Megil. O friend Clinias, from all that has been now said by us, we must either give up the city, as regards⁵ its settlement, or not dismiss this our guest, but by entreaties and all kinds of devices make him a partner with us in settling the city.

Clin. You speak with the greatest truth, Megillus ; and both myself will act thus, and do you also co-operate.

Megil. I will co-operate.

¹—¹ With the phrase ἀνδρείοτατος τῶν ὕστερον, compare ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων in Thucyd. § 1 ; otherwise one would prefer ἀνδρείότερος, found in a good MS.

²—² Such is the literal version of the Greek, which differs not a little from the version of Ficinus—"neque his reliqui legumlatores tanquam minus sufficientes adversabuntur."

³ I have translated as if the Greek were περὶ, not παρὰ—

⁴—⁴ On the difference between ὕπαρ, "a day-dream," i. e. a reality ; and ὄναρ, "a night-dream," i. e. a non-reality, see at vii. 8.

⁵ I have translated as if πέρι had dropt out after κατοικίσεως—

END OF VOL. V.

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
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PREFACE.

IN the present volume are contained those dialogues which, although considered spurious by the generality of critics, are always found in the complete editions of Plato. To these are added the three several Lives attributed to Diogenes Laertius, Hesychius, and Olympiodorus, and the two Introductions to the Platonic System by Alcinous and Albinus; also the three books of Apuleius relating to the Philosophy and Logic of Plato and Aristotle.

Of all these works, the only portions which have hitherto appeared in an English dress, are the *Epinomis*, the *Life of Plato* by Diogenes Laertius, and the *Introduction of Alcinous*. But even of these not one has been translated directly from the original.* In the *Epinomis*, Taylor followed the Latin version of Ficinus as revised by Grynæus; and Stanley, strange to say, adopted, in preference to the Greek, Ficinus's Latin version of Alcinous as revised by D. Heinsius; while Smith, in

* Since this preface was written, a complete translation of Diogenes Laertius (from the Greek) has been published in Bohn's Classical Library.

his abridged translation of Diogenes Laertius, has followed the Latin version given by Stephens.

To render this edition as perfect as possible, it has been deemed advisable to insert Sydenham's Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato ; a copious selection from the Notes of Gray, as published by Matthias in the 2nd volume of his edition of the Works of that poet ; and a General Index to the entire work.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EPINOMIS.

ALTHOUGH this dialogue is called the *Epinomis*, which might be rendered into English by "A Sequel to the Laws," yet it contains not a single hint for an enactment of any kind. It is in fact little more than a Homily, written for the most part on the Laws, vii. § 20—22, p. 300—308, and it seems to be the production of some Pythagorean; who, perceiving that Plato had adopted some of the ideas promulgated by that school of philosophy, was desirous of showing that he had only partially touched upon their tenets relating to numbers. For with this question were intimately connected all their ideas relating to the power and attributes of the deity. And this the writer was the more willing to dilate upon, as Plato had expressed his unwillingness to discuss the subject of religion at a greater length. For after witnessing the fate of Socrates, who had endeavoured to rationalize the creed of his country, Plato probably thought it dangerous, as Aristotle certainly did afterwards, to run counter to popular prejudices; and he was therefore led to remark, that all the enactments relating to religion should be left to the discretion of its ministers, assisted by the interpreters of the voice of the gods.

Respecting the author of the dialogue, nothing is known for certain. Thus much however is tolerably clear, that it was not written by Plato. For, as remarked by Ast on § 7, where mention is made of the five elements, out of which all living things are said to be formed, this doctrine is at variance with that promulgated in the *Timæus*, where only four are enumerated. But when in § 5, where the Athenian Guest alludes to some memoranda made by Clinias and Megillus of the previous conversation, Ast would infer that the Laws had been published already, he seems not to be aware that an

inference the very reverse ought to be drawn. For the memoranda would rather be made shortly after the conversation had taken place, just as was done by Xenophon in the case of Socrates, with a view to their being published afterwards. And hence we can account for the tradition, that the Laws were not given to the world, till after the death of their author.

The *Epinomis* is indeed attributed to Plato by Nicomachus; but not by Proclus, as has been sometimes asserted. For Boeckh has shown that the Neo-Platonist on Euclid i. p. 12, originally expressed himself in a way to indicate that he did not know who was the author of the dialogue. Boeckh himself feels inclined to assign the authorship to Philip of Opuntium; who appears from Suidas to have written not a little on subjects relating to Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy, all of which are discussed at greater or less length in the *Epinomis*.

Be however the author who he may, the dialogue itself has, like the Laws, come down to us in rather an unsatisfactory state; and hence I have been compelled to write longer notes than would otherwise have been necessary.

THE EPINOMIS;

OR,

THE PHILOSOPHER.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

AN ATHENIAN GUEST, CLINIAS A CRETAN, AND
MEGILLUS A LACEDÆMONIAN.

[1.] *Clinias*. ACCORDING to our agreement, we have all of us, guest, come correctly, being three, I, and you, and Megillus here, to consider the question of intellect, in what manner it is meet to go through in a discourse that, which we say belongs to the constitution of man, (and which,)¹ when it has been thought upon, causes² it to be in the best state with regard to itself,³ as far as it is possible for man to possess it. For, as we assert, we have gone through all the other matters, that existed, relating to the laying down of laws. But that, which is of the greatest moment to discover and to speak of, namely, by learning what will a mortal man become wise, this we have neither spoken of nor discovered. Now then let us endeavour not to leave this behind. For we should nearly do that imperfectly, for the sake of which we have all rushed onwards, with the view of making clear (every thing)⁴ from the beginning to the end.

Athenian Guest. You speak well, friend Clinias. But I

¹ I have translated, as if ὅ τε had dropt out before δραν—

^{2, 3} I have adopted ποιῶ, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of ποιῶν: which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted it in his version, adopted in part by Taylor, "quo intellecto, humanus habitus optime se, quantum natura fert, ad prudentiam habet." From which however it is easy to see that he found in his MS. πρὸς αὐτὴν, of which πρὸς φρόνησιν would be the interpretation.

⁴ I have translated, as if πάντα had dropt out before ποιήσονται. Ficinus avoids the difficulty by thus abridging two sentences into one, "cujus aperiendi gratia hucusque profecti sumus."

think you will now hear a strange discourse, and on the other hand in a certain respect not strange. For many, who meet us in life,¹ tell² the same story, that the human race will be neither blessed nor happy. Follow me, then, and see whether³ to you I likewise appear together with them to speak correctly on a point like this.³ I assert then that it is not possible for men, except a few, to be blessed and happy ; ⁴ I limit this to as long as we live ; ⁴ but there is a fair hope that a person will after death obtain every thing, for the sake of which he would desire, when alive, to live in the best manner he could, ⁵ and dying to meet with such an end.⁵ And I assert nothing (very) wise,⁶ but what all of us, both Greeks and Barbarians, after a certain manner know, that to be produced is at the beginning difficult for every animal. In the first place, it is difficult to partake of ⁷ the state of conception, next to be born,⁷ and, further still, to be brought up and educated ; (for) all these things take place, as we all say, through ten thousand troubles. The time too would be short, ⁸ not only with respect to the calculation of annoyances, but what every one would imagine to be moderate ; and this seems to

¹ Ficinus evidently found something different in his MS., for his version is "multi enim fluctibus hujus vitæ jactati—"

² I have adopted *λέγοντες*, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of *φίροντες* : for *λέγον φέρειν* is said only of a messenger bringing news.

³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus has thus abridged, "utrum et ipse recte hac de re dicere videar—" while Taylor has given this unaccountable mistranslation, "whether it appears to you, as well as to me, that by speaking as follows about this affair, we shall speak well."

⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus and Taylor, and in their place is introduced "in this life" in the sentence preceding.

⁵ Here again Ficinus and Taylor after him omit all between the numerals, and in their place substitute one word, in Latin "exegit," and in English "die," in the sentence preceding.

⁶ Ficinus has more fully "nec inauditum aliquod novumque adduco ;" but Taylor merely "Nor is my assertion novel."

⁷ Ficinus has "in conceptione et utero primum ; deinde in natiuitate et partu—" while Taylor omits "to be born—"

⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek. In the MS. of Ficinus there was something wanting, as shown by his version, adopted almost to the letter by Taylor, "non solum respectu diuturnitatis malorum, verum etiam quocunque modo quis cogitet, quod quasi circa humanæ vitæ medium respirare parumper nos facit," where are omitted the words *μῆτρον οὐτός δὲ σπείδων*, that made up the twenty letters in each line of the Codex Archetypus.

make almost a kind of breathing-time in the middle of the life of man.¹ Old age however, quickly overtaking a person, would make him not at all willing to live his life over again,¹ after he has considered the life he has lived,¹ unless he happens to be full of the thoughts of a child. Now of this what is to me the proof? It is, because what is sought for in our discourse exists naturally in this way. Now we are seeking by what manner we shall become wise, as if there were to each of us some such power as this. But it flies quickly away then, when any one proceeds to an² investigation of the so-called arts or notions,² or any other things of that kind, which we imagine to be sciences; whereas not one of them is worthy to be called by the name of that wisdom, which is conversant with the affairs of man; while on the other hand, the soul is very confident, and divines, as if this wisdom were existing in her by some gift of nature; but what it is, and when, and how it exists, it is wholly unable to discover. Does not then in this manner our difficulty about, and search after, wisdom,³ seem somehow greatly to be full of the hope, which exists³ to each of those amongst us, who are able to examine both themselves prudently, and others harmoniously,⁴ through reasonings of all kinds and spoken in every manner? Shall we agree that these things are not thus, or thus?

Clin. We will agree in this, O guest, in the hope perhaps, which will arise in the course of time, of having hereafter with you opinions the most true on these points.

Athen. We must then first go through the other sciences, as they are called, but which do not render him wise, who receives and possesses them, in order that, by putting them out of the way, we may endeavour to place by our side those, of which we are in want, and, after placing them by our side, learn them.

¹ Ficinus has—"cum præteritas molestias cogitet—"

² I cannot believe that the author wrote φρόνησιν—φρονήσιων—but what he did write I am no less at a loss to know; unless it were ἐραύνησιν for φρόνησιν: for ἐρ and φρ are elsewhere confounded as I have shown in *Præf. Eurip. Tro. p. xviii.*, and so I have translated.

³ The Greek is in one MS. σφόδρα προσίχ' ἡμῶν—πλείων—γίγνομινη—but in three, προσίχοι, in two προσίχει, and in one προσίχ'—while Ficinus has—"huc spectat—plena nimirum spe"—I have translated as if the Greek were—σφόδρα πως ίσιχ'—πλίως είναι—γίγνομίνης—for the other I cannot understand.

⁴ I confess myself unable to see what is meant here by συμφώνως.

[2.] Let us, then, first look into the sciences, of which the race of man is first in want; since these are nearly the most necessary, and truly the first. Now he, who becomes skilled in these, even though he seemed at first to be wise, yet now he is not considered to be wise, but obtains rather a disgrace by a science of this kind. We will therefore mention what they are, and (show) that nearly every one, to whom is proposed the contest of seeming to become the best man, avoids them through the possession of intellect and study. Let the first art then be that, ¹ which, withdrawing us from eating human flesh, that, as the story goes, took place formerly amongst mankind after the manner of savage animals, has recalled us to a more lawful food.¹ ² And may those before be propitious to us, and they are. For whosoever we are, who have spoken, let them be bidden the first farewell.³ The manufacture of wheaten flour and barley meal and moreover the food is indeed beautiful and good; but it will never be able to work out the man completely wise. ⁴ For this very thing, under the appellation of a manufacture, would produce a difficult handling of the things manufactured.³ Nor would the cultivation of nearly the whole country (do so); ⁴ for we all appear to take

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus—"quæ ab humanarum carnium esu, qui ferarum ritu quondam inter homines inoleverat, ut fabulæ ferunt, abstinere jussit et ad victum modestiorem nos revocavit"—This is at least intelligible; what cannot be said of the Greek—*ἴστω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἢ τῆς ἀλλήλοφαγίας τῶν ζώων ἡμᾶς, τῶν μὲν, ὡς ὁ μῦθος ἴστω, τὸ παράπαν ἀποστήσασα, τῶν δὲ, εἰς τὴν νόμιμον ἰδωδὴν καταστήσασα*—which Ast says is obscure; nor has his attempt to explain it made it, I conceive, less so; for it is literally—"Let that be in the first place, what has withdrawn among some animals us from eating each other, as is the story, and of others instituted for lawful eating."

²—² Here again is a passage, of which the literal translation proves it to be perfectly unintelligible. And so have thought Stephens, Ast, and Winckelmann on Euthyd. p. 69, of whom the two last have suggested alterations from which nothing is gained; while the first has been content to draw attention to the version of Ficinus—"in quo sane prisci homines, quamvis mansuete et humaniter nobis consuluerint, valeant tamen, nec sapientiæ nomen usurpent;" which is certainly what the train of thought requires; but whether Ficinus found in his MS. the Greek words answering to the Latin, is another question.

³—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus has thus abridged and improved—"difficultatem enim et molestiam potius quam sapientiam afferet."

⁴—⁴ Here again Ficinus has expressed in his Latin version, adopted by Taylor, what is far more elegant than the original Greek, "non

in hand the earth, not by art, but by nature, according to a god.⁴ Nor yet would the weaving together¹ of dwellings nor the whole of house-building, and the manufacture of all kinds of utensils, and copper-work, and the preparing of instruments for carpenters and moulders, and weavers, and trades in general, although possessing what is useful for the common people, be suited for virtue. Nor yet does the whole of hunting, although various and full of art, contribute what is greatly becoming² together with what is wise. Nor yet does the diviner's and interpreter's art at all; for such merely knows what is said, but has not learnt whether it is true. Since then we see that the possession of necessities is worked out indeed by art, but that not one of these arts makes any person wise, there would be left after this a certain sport,³ imitative for the most part, but by no means a serious pursuit. For persons do with many instruments,⁴ and with many imitations, effected by their own bodies,⁴ not altogether graceful, make an imitation of things, expressed⁵ in prose and verse,⁵ and of those, of which painting is the mother, while colours many and various are worked out,⁶ by many substances moist and dry; by operating upon none of which with the greatest care does the imitative art render a person wise. ⁷And when all has been done,⁷ there would be something remaining in the assistance without number given to persons without number; the greatest of which and for the most numerous occasions is the art of war, called by the name of generalship, of the highest repute in the case of need, but requiring the greatest good fortune, and that which is assigned naturally rather to bravery than wisdom. And what persons

enim arte sed natura, dei quodam favore, terræ culturam aggressi videmur—"

¹ On the expression *οικήσεων ξυνυφή*, see my note on *Æsch. Prom.* 460, *πλινθυφεῖς δόμους*—

² I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, why *τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς σὺν τῷ σοφῷ* is thus introduced instead of *τὸ σοφὸν* by itself.

³ The *παῖδις* is here opposed to *σκουδῆ*, as in *Epist.* 6, p. 499, where I have referred to Wyttenbach in *Epist. Crit.* p. 14.

⁴ Ficinus has more elegantly "*corporum gestibus et figuris*—" Did the author write *κινήμασι*?

⁵ As quoted opportunely Legg. viii. § 5, p. 835, A., *κατὰ λόγον καὶ κατ' ὥδαν*—

⁶ One MS. has, what seems preferable, *ἀποτυπωμαίνων*, "put into a form"—similar to "*exprimuntur*" in Ficinus.

⁷ Ficinus has—"imitatione vero sublata—" From which it is difficult to ascertain what he found in his MS.

call the medical art is ¹surely itself an assistance nearly of such (ills) as the seasons cause by cold and unseasonable heat, and make by all such matters, ¹the nature of animals their spoil. But not one of these (arts) is in good repute for the truest wisdom ; for being made the subject of conjecture, they are carried along without measure by opinions. And assistants we will call pilots and sailors likewise. But not one of these let any person, by cheating us with words, proclaim a wise man on every ground. For not one of them would know the rage of the winds or their kindness, which is the most acceptable thing in the whole of the pilot's art. Nor yet such as say they are assistants in lawsuits by their power in speaking, and, by their memory and practice, give their minds to unusual ²opinions, but stumble outside the truth in cases of real justice. There still remains a certain strange power with respect to the opinion of wisdom, which the many would then call by the name of nature rather than wisdom, when any one perceives that he is easily learning, what even a child ³could learn, and is remembering many things and firmly so, and can call to mind what is suited to each thing, and quickly do it, when it would be becoming, if it took place. Now all this some will place ⁴under nature, others under wisdom, and others under a cleverness of nature. But no prudent person would ever be willing to call any one of these a truly wise man.

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek—*βοήθεια δὲ πον καὶ αὐτὴ σχεδὸν ὅσων*—where *καὶ αὐτὴ* is without meaning, and so too is *σχεδὸν* by itself ; while *βοήθεια ὅσων*, which is the same as *βοήθεια τόσων δ*—would introduce the relative *δ*, to which nothing is to be referred. Ficinus indeed avoids all the difficulty by his version—“*medicina quoque nobis opitulatur contra immoderati caloris et frigoris impetum cæterorumque hujusmodi*”—But this he got rather out of his own head than his MS. Unless I am greatly mistaken, the author wrote something to this effect—*βοήθεια, ἄλυκος καὶ θεία τις σχεδὸν, νόσων, αἱ ἄρρω ψυχὴ καὶ καύματα ἀταίρων*—i. e. “an assistance painless and almost a divine one in diseases, which through cold before its season, and heat out of its season—”

² The Greek is at present *δόξης ἤθει*—which Winckelmann, unable to understand, would correct into *δόξαις ἢ ἤθει*—But the sophists, to whom the author is here alluding, were wont rather to run counter to opinions and customs, than to pay attention to them. Hence I have translated, as if the Greek were originally *δόξαις ἀηθεί* : for *ἀηθεί* and *ἀληθείας* would be opposed to each other here as in *Euthyd.* § 16, n. 35 ; *Laws vi.* § 5.

³ Two MSS., in lieu of *πᾶσαν*, read *πᾶσαν*, in which lies hid *παῖς δ*—as I have translated.

⁴ All the MSS. but the one used by Ficinus, as shown by his “*nuncupabunt*,” read *θήσουσι* for *φῆσουσι*.

[3.] It is however necessary for a certain science to become apparent, by which he, who possesses it, would be wise in reality, and not be so in opinion merely. Let us, then, consider. For we are endeavouring by a reasoning, difficult in every way, to find some other science beyond those already mentioned, which may be truly and with propriety called wisdom; while he, who receives it, will be a person neither vulgar nor silly, but wise and good through it; and, whether he governs or is governed by the state, in justice¹ become an elegant² person.

Let us, therefore, consider that science first, which singly proceeds from human nature, and which, amongst all that are present, would, by not being present, render the race of man of (all) animals³ the most senseless and thoughtless. Now this it is not very difficult for any one to consider. For that, which has given number to the whole race of man, would, so to say, being compared 'one against one,' effect this. I conceive however that a certain god himself, rather than a certain accident, gave it to us to preserve us; but whom I conceive to have been the god, it is necessary to state, strange although it be, and, on the other hand, somehow not strange. For how must we not conceive that he, who is the cause to us of every good thing, should not have been the cause likewise of intellect, the greatest good by far? Now what god am I speaking of, Megillus and Clinias, and making an object of worship? It is almost⁴ Heaven, whom it is most just we should honour, as all the other dæmons and gods do, and pray pre-eminently to it. For all of us would confess that it is the cause of all good

¹ Instead of *ἐνδικως* Ast would read *ἐνδικος*, and unite *ἐνδικος ἄμα καὶ ἡμελῆς*. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits *ἐνδικως* entirely.

² This word *ἡμελῆς*, strangely introduced here, is translated by Ficinus "modestus." It seems to have been one of those, to which Plato and his imitators attached no specific meaning, or at any rate to which there is no definite equivalent in English.

³ Instead of *ζῶων* all the MSS. read *τὸ ζῶον*— I have translated, as if the author had written *πάντων ζῶων* without *τὸ*— Ficinus has—"quæ ex omnibus humanis artibus ita se habet, ut si hæc una semoveatur amentissima et insipientissima hominis natura reddatur"—which has led me to read *ἥτις* for *τις*, and *καὶ* for *ἡ*— Ast too is here equally at a loss.

⁴—⁵ On this expression see Ast on Legg. i. § 14.

⁶ This *σχεδόν* is strangely introduced here by itself. It should be united to *δικαίωταρον*—

things to us. And we assert to boot that it has given us number, and will give it us still, if any one is willing to follow us. For if a person will proceed to a right view of it, whether it be the pleasure of any one to call it the World, or Olympus, or Heaven, let him so call it; but let him follow, wherever it assumes a varied form, when it causes the stars in it to revolve along all their courses,¹ and when it imparts the seasons and food for all, and the remaining gift² of intellect, as we should say, together with all number, and every other good. Now this is the greatest thing, when any one, receiving from it the gift of number, proceeds through every period. Returning back still a little in our discourse, let us call to mind that we have conceived very correctly, that if we take away number from human nature, we should be intellectual not at all. For the soul of the animal, from whom reason is absent, would scarcely any longer be able to receive every virtue. Now the animal, which does not know two and three, even and odd, and is entirely ignorant of number, would never be able to give a reason respecting those things, of which it alone possesses sensation and memory; but nothing hinders it (from possessing)³ the other virtues, fortitude and temperance. But he, who is deprived of true reason, will never become wise; and he, to whom wisdom is not present, which is the greatest part of the whole of virtue, would never be perfectly good, nor happy. In this way there is every necessity for number to be laid down as a principle. But why it is necessary, there would be a discourse longer than all that has been spoken. And correctly will the present one have been stated likewise, that of the things, mentioned as belonging to the other arts, which we have gone through, 'and permitted them all to be arts,'⁴ not even one would remain, but all perish entirely, when any one

¹ Ast says that in *δεξιόδους* there is an allusion to the notion, that the stars formed an army, which went out upon expeditions. But, unless I am greatly mistaken, the author wrote *λοξός δόους*—For not only was the apparent course of the Sun through the ecliptic said to be oblique—and hence he was called *Λοξίας*—but those of the other stars likewise. See at the Rivals, p. 420, n. 6. On the confusion of *λοξός* see at Hipp. Maj. § 16, n. 65, and here, § 9, p. 26, n. 1.

² In lieu of *δι οὖν*, which could not thus follow *καὶ τὴν ἄλλην*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *δόσιν*, similar to *ἀριθμῶν δόσιν* just afterwards.

³ Ficinus alone adds, what the sense requires, "habere—"

⁴ The words *ἐὼντες εἶναι* are omitted by Ficinus and Taylor.

takes away the science of numbers. But to some of those, who have looked to the arts, the race of man would appear sufficiently¹ for the sake of some small matters to have no need of number. And yet is it a thing of moment. And if any one looks to what is divine and mortal in generation, in which piety towards the gods and true number are known,² he could not mention the person, who³ knows the whole of number, and of what power it is, when present, the cause; since it is evident that what relates to all music, requires numbered motion and sound; and, what is the greatest, that it (number) is the cause of all good things, but of nothing evil, this must be known well,⁴ which would perhaps take place by another road; for⁵ the movement, which is without reason, and order, and shape, and rhythm, and harmony, and all such things as partake of any evil, is deficient in nearly all number. And this it is meet for him to conceive in this way, who is about to end his days happily; and no one,⁶ except him, who knows the just, the good, the beautiful, and all such things, and has laid hold of a true opinion respecting them,⁷ will through number know how with regard to any thing⁸ to persuade himself and others at all.

[4.] Let us then proceed to consider this very thing, how we learnt to number. Say, from whence did it arise that we have understood one and two? ⁶ Do persons possess from the

¹ Instead of *ικανῶς*, which is unintelligible here, Ficinus has "forte," from which Cornarius elicited *ἰσως*, adopted by Ast. The author wrote, I suspect, *οὐ κενῶς*— See at Hipp. Maj. p. 258, n. 6; Epist. 7, p. 515, n. 4.

²⁻³ The Greek is in some MSS. *οὐκ ἂν εἴη πᾶς ἂν τις*— in others *πᾶς μάντις*— similar to "inveniet nullum vatem" in Ficinus. But then *πᾶς* ought to be omitted, or *τις* introduced. I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐκ ἂν εἴη εἴποι τιν', ὅς*—

³⁻⁴ The Greek is at present, *ὃ καὶ τάχα γίνοιτ' ἂν. ἀλλ' ἢ σχεδόν*,— all of which Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits. I have therefore adopted, what Stephens suggested, *γίνοιτ' ἂν ἀλλ' ὅτι σχεδόν*— Ast indeed asserts that *ἀλλὰ* means "enimvero," but that it never does, nor could do.

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐδεὶς ποτε, πλὴν ὁ γινώσκων*, not *οὐδεὶς ποτε μὴ γινώσκων*—

⁵⁻⁶ The Greek is *διαριθμήσεται*, which Ficinus translates "numen rationisque vi uti poterit," as if his MS. read *διαριθμήσεται καὶ διαλογίσεται*, the origin of *διαλογίζηται* as a var. lect. in one MS. I have translated, as if the Greek were originally *δι' ἀριθμοῦ γινώσεται πρὸς τι*— not *πρὸς τὸ*—which I cannot understand.

⁷⁻⁸ I have translated, as if the Greek were *φύσιν τοιαύτην ἰσχοῦσιν ἰσ*

creator a nature of this kind towards their⁶ being able to understand them? Nature, indeed, has not been present to many other animals for this very purpose, so that they are able to learn from their father to number; but the deity has established within us¹ this very thing first, so as to be competent to understand what is shown to us; and afterwards he showed it and is still showing; of which things what can a person see one, as compared with one,² more beautiful than the birth³ of day? ⁴and then, when he comes to the portion of night, he will have a sight,⁴ from whence every thing will appear to him quite different. And when⁵ he ceases not revolving upon these very matters for many days and many nights, ⁶(he will see) how⁶ Heaven ceases not in teaching men one and two, until even the most hard to learn shall learn sufficiently how to number. For⁷ thus each of us, on perceiving these, would understand three and four and many. And amongst these the deity has formed one thing, the Moon; which at one time appearing greater, and at another less, ⁸proceeds through (her path), showing continually another day⁸ up to fifteen days and nights. And this is a period, if any one is willing to establish the whole circle as one; so that the most indocile animal, so to say, would learn to number, if it were one, to whom the deity had imparted the nature of being able to learn. And up to these points, and in these matters, the whole mass of animals have the power to be-

τοῦ ποιούντος πρὸς τὸ δυνατός—*not φύσιν ταύτην ἰσχυροῦν ἐκ τοῦ παντός πρὸς τὸ δυνατός*: where τοῦ ποιούντος is similar to τοῦ πατρὸς just afterwards.

¹ I cannot believe that the author wrote *παρὰ ἡμῖν—ἐνψύκισιν*, contrary to the genius of the language. Hence I would read *γίρας* for *παρὰ*—

² I have adopted *ἐνὸς ἀνθ' ἐνός*, as suggested by Stephens, from “*si unum uni conferatur*,” in Ficinus.

³ I have translated *γένος* “birth.” Ficinus has “*diei lucem*,” as if his MS. read *σίλας*.

⁴ The Greek is *εἶτα εἰς—ἐλθοι—ἔχων*—where *ἐλθοι* is without regimen. I have translated as if it were originally *εἶτα εἰ εἰς—ἐλθοι—, ἔχοι δὲν*—where *εἰ* is due to Ast.

⁵ I have adopted *δραν*, furnished by three MSS., in lieu of *δντα*—⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were not *δς*, but *εἰσεται ὥς*, to which I have been led by finding in Ficinus “*videbis*—”

⁷ Ast would read *καὶ γὰρ* for *ὥς γὰρ*, with the usual change of *ὥς* and *καὶ*, noticed by Schaefer in Meletem. Crit. p. 73. See below, p. 24, n. 3.

⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has “*ita quotidie varia—cernitur* :” which leads to *ἄλλην αὐτὴν δεῖ φαίνουσα—δσημίραι*—“showing itself ever different daily—”

come skilled in numbers, by considering one thing, itself by itself. But always to reckon up all numbers, when compared with each other, I think is ¹ a greater work.¹ And for the sake of this, the deity having formed, as we have said, the Moon, increasing and decreasing, has put together months into the year,² and caused us to compare every number with number, with a prosperous fortune.² Hence, there are ³ fruits for us, and the earth has become pregnant,³ so that there is food for all animals; while winds and showers take place, neither out of season nor measure. But if any thing occurs contrary to this on the side of evil, it is meet to accuse not the divine, but human, nature, as unjustly distributing its own life. Now to us, while we were investigating the laws, it appeared, that the other things, which are nearly the best for man, are easy for us to know; and that every one would be competent to understand what was said, and to do it, if he knew what is that, which is likely to be a benefit, and what is not. But it has appeared, and now appears still, that all the other pursuits are not very difficult; but in what manner it is meet for men to become good, is very difficult. And, again, to acquire all the rest of good things, as the saying is,⁴ it is both possible and not difficult; but with respect to substance, how much is requisite and not requisite, and with respect to the body, how much is requisite and not requisite, and with respect to the soul, that it ought to be good, every one agrees with every one. But in what manner it ought to be good, every one (when asked)⁵ answers, by being ⁶ just, and temperate, and brave,

¹—¹ So Ficinus translates *μειζονος*, which is at present without regimen. Winckelmann suggests *μειζονος πόνου*—I should prefer *δοκῶ νοῦ μειζονος εἶναι*, *εἶναι*—

²—² Such is Taylor's translation of the version of Ficinus, "conferri docuit—" which Ast too seems disposed to adopt. But how the Greek words *ἤρξατο συννοῦν*, "he began to look together," can have that meaning, I cannot understand. Did the author write *ἤρξατο τις συντίπειν*, i. e. "a person began to combine—"

³—³ This mention of fruits before the pregnancy of the earth seems a rather strange *ἑρμηνείαν πρότερον*.

⁴ To what saying the author here alluded, I confess myself unable to explain. I would therefore read *ἀ λήγομεν*—"of which we have spoken," for the best MS. Z. offers *δ λήγομεν*—

⁵ Ficinus alone has, what is required by the sense, "interrogatus—"

⁶ Such I presume is the meaning of *ὅτι—δικαίαν*— But I can scarcely make out the syntax, unless we read *διὰ τὸ εἶναι* in lieu of *ὅτι μὲν αὖ*—where *αὖ* is perfectly unintelligible; while for *ὅτι δὲ σοφὴν*, the balance of the sentence requires *τὸ δὲ αὖ σοφὴν*, to answer to *τὸ δὲ—ἀγαθὴν*—

and this ;¹ but (in what manner) to be wise,² or what wisdom is,³ not one, as we just now observed, agrees at all with one of the many. Now therefore, besides all the previous kinds of wisdom, we have discovered one, by no means vile for this very purpose, that he, who has learnt what we have discussed, will seem to be wise ; but whether he, who is skilled on these points, is wise and good, on this it is requisite to hold a discussion.

Clin. How reasonably, guest, did you say, that you are endeavouring to speak greatly about great things !

Athen. For they are not trifling things, Clinias ; and, what is still more difficult, they are in every respect and entirely true.

Clin. Very much so, guest ;³ but do not however be faint-hearted in stating what you mean.³

Athen. Truly so ; nor do you in hearing.

Clin. This shall be ; for I will speak to you for both of us.

Athen. It is well. [5.] But it is necessary, as it seems, to speak first of all from the beginning, especially if we are able to comprehend in one name what is that, which we consider to be wisdom ; but if we are quite unable, (to consider) in the second place, ⁴ what and how many are the (arts) ⁴ through which he, who receives them, will, according to our story, be a wise man.

Clin. Say on.

Athen. What follows after this will be without blame to the legislator ; who, making a conjecture about the gods, speaks more beautifully and better than those, who have spoken⁵ before ; and who passes his life in making use, as it were, of a beautiful discipline, and honouring the gods, and exalting them with hymns, and felicity,⁶ and thus passes through life.

¹ The phrase in Greek, answering to "et cetera" in Latin and English, is not *kai raũta*, but *kai roiaũta*, as shown by Demosthenes perpetually ; and so probably found Ficinus in his MS., for his version is "cæteraque hujusmodi."

² The Greek is *ἦν τινα δέ*— It was, I suspect, originally, *ἦ ἦν τινα δέ*—as I have translated.

³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed in part by Taylor, has "labori ne cedas, quin, ut cæpisti, progrediare."

⁴ The Greek is *τίνας—καὶ ὅσους τίνες*— But *τίνες* I believe is never thus repeated. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has, what the sense requires, "quænam et quot sunt artes," and hence his MS. probably read *τίνας* for *τίνες*—

⁵ Three MSS. offer *εἰρηκώρων* for *εἰρημίωνων* ; and so found Ficinus.³ In his, as Stephens elicited from his "quam prisci," adopted by Taylor.

⁶ Ast vainly, I think, endeavours to explain the strange expression

Clin. ¹ Well and beautifully ¹ are you speaking, guest; and may the end of your laws be this, that after falling down ² before the gods, and passing a life the most pure, ³ you may meet with its close the best and the most beautiful.

Athen. How then shall we speak, Clinias? Does it not seem to you that we honour the gods greatly by hymning them, and by praying that it may come into your minds to say things the most beautiful and the best respecting them? Say you in this way, or how?

Clin. In this way, wonderfully. But do thou, O' godlike man, confiding in the gods, offer up a prayer, and speak the one amongst your beautiful speeches that comes into your mind relating to the gods and goddesses.

Athen. This shall be, if the deity himself be our leader. Do you only pray with me.

Clin. Say then what is to follow this.

Athen. It is necessary then, as it seems, for me, since those, who have gone before, have represented improperly the generation of gods and of animals, to give in the first place, according to our former reasoning, a better representation, by resuming the discourse, which I took in hand against impious assertions, and to assert that there are gods, who have a care for all things both small and great; and that they are not to be softened down by those, who are engaged in unjust ⁴ acts, if you remember, Clinias; for you took down a memorandum of it; for what was then said was very true. But this was the great-

εὐδαιμονία γεραίροντι. The author wrote, I suspect, *ὑμνοῖς τε γεραίροντι κατ' εὐδαιμονίας διάγειν τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον*, answering to "*feliciter vivat*," in Ficinus.

¹ The Greek is at present *ἡ καλῶς λέγεις*. But the formula *καλῶς λέγεις*, never is nor could be preceded by the interrogative *ἤ*—The author wrote, no doubt, *Εὐ καὶ καλῶς*—as I have translated.

² How Stephens and Ast could patronize here *προσπαισάντι*, I cannot understand; as if Clinias could mean to say that the Athenian was playing with or making fun of the gods. I have translated as if the Greek were, what the sense evidently requires—*θεοὺς προσπαισόντι*—Sydenham suggests *προσπαιανίσαντι*, answering to *ὑμνοῦντες*—

³ Although I am well aware that the comparative is sometimes found, where one would expect the superlative, yet here the superlatives in the next sentence imperiously demand, as I have translated, *καθαρῶτατον* instead of *καθαρῶτερον*.

⁴ I have adopted, what Ast saw the sense required, *ἀδικοι* in lieu of *δικαιοι*. Ficinus too has—"præter justum"—as if his MS. read *παρὰ δικαιοι*: but *παρὰ* could not thus follow *εἰσι*—

est, that every soul is older than every body. Do you not remember (this) ? or this at least perfectly, that what is better, and older, and more divine, is credibly prior to that, which is worse, and younger, and less honourable ; and in every way that what governs, is (prior) to what is governed ; and that what leads, to what is led. Let us then receive this at least, that soul is older than body. Now if this be the case, it is more credible that, what is first in the generation of the first, would be almost the beginning ; and let us lay down that the beginning exists in a more becoming manner than a beginning,¹ and that we have most correctly come upon ²the greatest (parts)³ of wisdom, relating to the generation of the gods.

Clin. Let these things be stated ³to the best of our power.³

Athen. Come, then, let us assert that an animal is said most truly (to exist)⁴ according to nature then,⁵ when one combination of soul and body coming together produces one form.

Clin. Correctly so.

Athen. A thing of this kind then is most justly called an animal.

Clin. It is.

Athen. Now it is requisite, according to a probable account, for five solid bodies to be mentioned, from which a person might model the most beautiful and best of things ; but the whole of the other genus possesses one form. For there is nothing else, which can be generated without a body, and possessing in no respect and at no time colour, except the really most divine genus of soul. Now this is nearly that alone, to which it pertains to mould and fabricate ; but it belongs to body, as we call it,⁶ to be moulded and produced,

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀρχῆς, not τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς—which I cannot understand. The author meant, I presume, to say that the first cause is superior to any other cause.

² Ficinus omits τῶν μεγίστων—which Ast says are to follow σοφίας—But in that case σοφίας would require the article.

³ Ficinus has—"pro humanis viribus"—as if his MS. read δύνανται ἀνθρῶπινην—

⁴ From γέ I have elicited εἶναι—or else we must read γενέσθαι for λέγεσθαι—by the perpetual confusion in those words.

⁵ In lieu of τοῦτο Stephens would read τότε—obtained from "tunc" in Ficinus ; and this, which is confirmed by three MSS., the Zurich editors have adopted, as Ast too feels half inclined to do. Staibaum however scornfully rejects it, for he did not remember that the author had repeated in p. 974, B. and 976, B., the same formula, τότε, ὅτ' ἀν—

⁶ Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits ὃ λέγομεν—

and to be visible. But to the other (soul)—for let us say it again, ¹since it is to be said not merely once, ¹—(it pertains) to be invisible, and to know and to be intelligible, ² and to have a share of memory and of the reasoning power in the changes of even and odd. As there are, therefore, five bodies, it is requisite to say that fire ³(is the first), and water (the second), ³ and air the third, and earth the fourth, and æther the fifth; and in the dominions of each of these there is produced many an animal and of every kind. Now it is meet to learn this singly, thus. Let us, in the first place, lay down the whole of the things of earth as one, namely, all human beings, and all such animals as are with many feet, or none, and such as can move on, and such as are stationary, as being held down by roots. And it is requisite to consider the one thing belonging to it as this, that all these are formed of all those genera, but that the greater part is of the earth and the nature of solidity. It is, however, requisite to lay down another kind of animal, which is generated, and, at the same time, able to be seen. For it consists for the most part of fire; but contains likewise a small portion of earth and air, and of all the other things. Hence, it is requisite to assert that animals of every kind and visible are generated from them. ⁴ It is necessary likewise to think that all in the heavens are these genera of animals, ⁴ ⁵ which it is necessary to say ⁵ is the whole divine race of the stars, consisting of a most beautiful body, and of a soul the most happy and the best. ⁶ It is requisite moreover to impart to them, at least in opinion, one of two fates. ⁶

¹—The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and Taylor after him.

² In lieu of νοητῇ I have adopted νοερεῖ, suggested by Sydenham from "cognitionis compos" in Ficinus.

³—I have translated, as if the Greek were πῦρ φάναι ἄ καὶ ὦ ὕδωρ—where ἄ is "first" and ὦ "second"—On ὦ as one form of β, see Bast in *Palaeograph.* p. 708.

⁴—Ficinus has more briefly—"hæc cœlestia putamus animalia esse."

⁵—The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. Taylor has—"or in other words—"

⁶—Such, I presume, is the meaning of the Greek, *δνοῖν δὲ ἀποτρεῖ μιστῶν τῶν ἐρίαν χρη δόξῃ, παραδιδόσθαι σχεδόν*: which Ficinus thus translates, "his utique animalibus e duabus sortibus alteram tribuendam putamus:" where *δόξῃ* and *σχεδόν* are both omitted, as being here equally unintelligible, and *ἐρίαν* taken in the sense of "alterutram;" for so, I suspect, Ficinus wrote, not "alteram," which would be without any meaning. Taylor's version is—"It is also requisite to consider this respecting the two genera of animals—" where there is scarcely a word like the original.

For each of them is either indestructible and immortal, and altogether, from every necessity, divine, or ¹ possesses some long-aged life of life, sufficient for each, than which¹ there would be never any need of more.

[6.] Let us then consider first, that there are, as we have said, these two kinds of animals; and² let us say again that both of them are visible, the one being, as it would seem, wholly of fire, and the other of earth, and that the earthy is moved in a disorderly manner, but the fiery in all order. Now it is meet to consider that, what is moved without order, is senseless,³ as the animal, which is around us, acts for the most part;³ but that, what has its going in order and in the heavens, it is meet to make for ourselves as a great proof of its being intellectual; for it goes on ever according to the same and in a similar manner; and by doing and suffering⁴ it would afford a sufficient proof of its living intellectually.⁴ Now the necessity of a soul possessing intellect would be by far the greatest of all necessities. For it lays down laws as governing, and not governed. But when soul, which is a thing the best, deliberates according to the best intellect, that, which is not to be changed by turning, comes out perfect in reality according to intellect; and even adamant would not be superior to such a soul, and less to be changed by turning. But in reality the three Fates hold and guard, so as to be perfect, that, which has been deliberated upon by each of the gods with the best counsel. It was necessary therefore that there should be to man a proof that the stars are endued with intellect through⁵ the whole of their pro-

¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek, μακράϊωνα βίον ἔχεν ἱκανὸν ἑκάστῳ ζωῆς, ἥς οὐδὲν τι πλείονος ἀν προσδίσθαι ποτε: where to avoid the tautology in βίον ζωῆς, Ast would read ἱκανὸν ἑκάστῳ ζωῆς ὥστε— but Winckelmann, ἑκαστον ὥστε, without ζωῆς— omitted by Ficinus, who has merely “vitam longævam—”

² In lieu of γὰρ, omitted by one MS., Ficinus found δὲ, as shown by his “rursusque—”

³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in the version of Ficinus, “quod plerumque faciunt, quæcunque apud nos animalia sunt:” from which it would seem that his MS. read ὁρᾷ τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα, not τὸ—ζῶον.

⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and by Taylor, the former however adding “eadem” after “agitque et patitur,” translated by the latter “the same—”

⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were κατὰ, not τε καὶ— For though

gression, because they always do the same things, through its having been planned of old that they are to do so for some wondrous length of time, and through a change not taking place in the plan, by their doing some things at one time, and others at another, and by wandering ¹ up and down ¹ and altering their orbit. Now the very reverse of this has appeared to the majority of us, that, by their doing ² the same things and in a similar manner, they have not a soul. The masses, too, have followed persons so senseless, as to conceive that the human race is intellectual and vital, as being moved, but the divine race unintellectual, as remaining in the same movements. But it is allowable for the man, who places himself on the side of what is more beautiful, and better, and more agreeable (to the gods), ³ to conceive that he ought, on this very account, to consider as intellectual that, which does always the same things ⁴ according to the same and in a similar manner; and that this is the nature of the stars, most beautiful to behold, and which by a progression and dance, ⁵ the most beautiful and magnificent of all choirs, completes for all animals what is needful. Now (to show) that we are justly saying they possess a soul, let us consider first their size. For they are not in reality so small, as they appear to be; but each of them is of immense bulk, as is worthy to be believed; for this is admitted by competent demonstrations. For it is possible to conceive correctly that the whole Sun ⁶ is larger than the whole earth, and that all the stars, which are borne along, ⁷ possess a wonderful size. Let us then take into our thoughts what

the stars might be supposed to be endued with intellect, the path they described could scarcely be thought to be equally intellectual.

¹ I have translated, as if *ἀνω καὶ κάτω* followed originally *πλανᾶσθαι* τε, not, as at present, *μεταβουλεύμενον*— Compare Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 3, *ἀνω κάτω πλανύτομεν*.

² Instead of *πράττειν* Stephens proposed *πράττει*, adopted by Bekker, Ast, and Stalbaum. The author wrote rather, as I have translated, *ὅτι τῷ ῥά*— to which *ὅτι τὸ ῥά*—*πράττειν* in the best MS. Z. plainly leads.

³ Ficinus alone adds, what the sense requires, “*diis*,” to “*gratiora*.”

⁴ In lieu of *διὰ τοῦτο* Ficinus has “*eadem*,” which led Cornarius to propose *κατὰ*— The preposition *διὰ* was a var. lect. for *κατὰ*, as shown by “*per eadem similiter profecta*.”

⁵ On the dance of the stars Ast refers to Lucian in *Astrolog.* § 7, and Julian *Or.* iv. p. 135, A.

⁶ Ast refers to Cicero *N. D.* ii. 19.

⁷ By the stars borne along the author meant perhaps the planets.

would be the method of any nature in causing so great a bulk to revolve for ever for the same time¹ that it revolves at present. Now I assert that a god would be the cause, and that it could not be possible otherwise. For it would not otherwise become animated than through a god, as we have shown. But since a god is able in this respect, to him there has been every facility for every animal, in the first place, to be produced, and every body, and every bulk; and next, to cause them to move in that way, which he conceived to be the best. And now upon all these points we will make one true assertion. It is impossible for the earth and heavens and all the stars and all the bulky bodies made from them to subsist, unless a soul were present to each, or in each, so that² they proceed with such accuracy according to years, and months, and days, and for every good, which is produced, to be produced for us all. But it is requisite that, by how much the more vile is man, (the less) ought he to be seen to trifle, but to assert something clear concerning them. Should then any one assert that certain violent motions of bodies or natures or any thing of this kind are the causes, he will say nothing that is clear.

[7.] It is however requisite to reconsider seriously what we have said, whether our discourse has a reason for it, or altogether comes after it. In the first place then, (we said,) there are two things, the one, soul, and the other, body, and that many things pertain to each; but that all are different from one another,³ and each from each;³ and that there is no other third thing common to any one; and that soul differs from body; and⁴ that the former is intellectual, but the latter unintellectual; and that the one rules, but the other is ruled; and that the one is⁵ the cause of all (that happens), but the other is not the cause of any accident;⁵ so that to assert that the things in

¹ In lieu of χρόνον, which is unnecessary after *αἰ*, I should prefer *δρόμον*, "course—"

² In *εἴρα*, furnished by five MSS., lies hid *ἔσσε*, as I have translated.

³⁻³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus, who has "et quæ ad utriusque genus pertinent esse multa; eaque ab aliis in suo genere differre, et utraque genera a se invicem esse diversa," where Ast conceives that Ficinus added something for the sake of rendering the sense clearer.

⁴ In the Greek is strangely introduced *θῆσσομεν*, which is properly omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor; although it is difficult to say how or why it came here.

⁵⁻⁵ The Greek is *αἰτίον πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἀναιτίον πάσης πάθης*—

heaven were generated by something else, and that the productions of soul and body do not exist in this way, is a great folly and a want of reason. If then it is requisite for the reasons, relating to all such matters, to be victorious, and for all things of this kind to seem confidently to be divine, we must lay down one or the other of these two points; we must either hymn¹ those things most correctly, as being gods themselves, or (we must) consider them, like images, to be resemblances of the gods, the gods themselves having manufactured them. For they² (are the works of artificers)³ neither senseless nor of little worth. But, as we have said, we must lay down one or the other of these points. ³And what is laid down, we must honour pre-eminently before all statues.³ For never will there be seen statues more beautiful and ⁴more common of all⁴ men, or put up in pre-eminent places, and excelling for their purity, and solemnity, and the whole of life,⁵ than are these,⁶ how they have been generated altogether in this way.⁶ Let us then endeavour (to prove)⁷ so much, at least, relating to the gods, by perceiving that these are the two visible ani-

thus translated by Ficinus, "*illa omnium passionum corporibus, hoc nullius causa.*"

¹ From "*putabimus*" in Ficinus, it is evident that his MS. did not read *ὑμνηρίων*, but *ἡμῖν νοητίων*—

² Of the words between the numerals, Ast has supplied *ἔργα*, "works," and Ficinus, "*artificibus*—" Hence the author probably wrote *οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἀνοήτων ἔργ' ἔστιν*—

³ To avoid the absurdity in this sentence, Ast would read *ταῦτα δὲ τοῖσιν*, in the sense of "and on this being laid down—" But as I cannot see what is gained by the change, I suspect the author wrote *τάδε δ', ἄτε θεῖ' ὄντα, πάντων ἀγαλμάτων ἀντιτιμητίων διαφερόντως*, "and these, as being divine, are to be honoured before all statues pre-eminently," and that he put those words after *ἔργασαμένων* just above; while *ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰρηκαμεν—θερία* must be placed after *ἡ ταῦτα* a little below.

⁴ I confess I cannot understand *κοινότερα* *ἐμπάντων ἀνθρώπων*, as if it were any praise for a statue to be common. I could have understood *ἰδεμνότερα*, "better made—"

⁵ Here again I am at a loss in *ἐμπάσῃ ζωῇ*.

⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek—*ὡς πάντα γηγίνηται*: which Ficinus could not understand; for his version is—"quæ unigue similiter constructa sunt"—as if he wished to read *τῇ αὐτῇ*— Unless I am greatly mistaken, the author inserted here—*ἀλλ', ὅτι εἰρηκαμεν, τοῦτων ἡμῖν θάτερα θερίων*, before *ὡς πάντα τῇ ἢ τῇ γηγίνηται*, i. e. "that all things have been produced in this way or that."

⁷ I have inserted "to prove" for the sake of the sense. Ficinus for the same reason rendered *ἰγχυρώμεν* by "*asseveremus*"—

mals, of which we have spoken, (one) immortal ; but the whole of the ¹ other has been created of the earth, mortal ; (and) ² let us attempt³ to speak of the three, which are in the midst of the five [between them],³ and exist according to reasonable opinion, most clearly. For after fire let us place æther ; and let us lay down that from it the soul moulds animals, which possess a power, like some other genera, the greater portions from their own nature, but the smaller portions, for the sake of a link, from other genera ; and after the æther that soul moulds from air another genus of animals, and a third from water. And it is probable that soul, after it had fabricated all these, filled the whole of heaven with living matter, by making use, to the best of its power, of all genera, since all of them exist, partakers of life ; but that the second and the third, and the fourth and the fifth, beginning their generation from the gods, who are manifest, end in us, who are men.

[8.] The gods, then, Zeus and Juno, and all the rest, (let any one place) ⁴ where he pleases, according to the same law ; and let him consider this reasoning as fixed.

We must call therefore the nature of the stars, and such things as we perceive existing together with the stars, the visible gods, the greatest and the most worthy of honour, and who as seeing on every side the most acutely, are the first in rank. And after them, and under them in due order, it is very meet to honour with prayers the dæmons, ⁵ for the sake of their silent going to and fro, ⁶ an ærial genus, that occupies a third⁶ and middle seat, and is the cause of interpreting. But of these

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were γίγναι καί, not γυγνέναι—

² Ast says that *πειραθῆναι* depends upon *ἐγχεσθῆναι*—but what is the meaning of “let us endeavour to attempt,” he has not attempted to show. The author wrote *πειραθῆναι*—as I have translated.

³ The words *τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων* are evidently an explanation of *τὰ μέσα τῶν πέντε*.

⁴ Ficinus alone supplies “*locato*”—Ast would insert *ὀνομάζων*, understanding by *θεοὺς*—*φανερῶς*, the stars, or planets ; one of which, commonly called Venus, had likewise the name of Juno, as shown by Timæus Locrus, p. 96, E. and Apuleius *De Mund.* p. 58.

⁵ So I have translated *εὐφύμην διαφορείας*—remembering the passage in the Banquet, § 28, where mention is made of a race, that is *ἐρημνέων καὶ διαπορευμένων θεοῖς τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν*.

⁶ “The dæmons are said to possess a third seat, as coming after the gods, visible by the mind, and the stars, visible by the eye.” Ast.

two kinds of living beings, ¹one (formed) of æther, and the other in due order of air, neither of them is entirely visible; ¹and though present and near at hand, they do not become manifest to us; but let us say that, participating in a wonderful intelligence, as being docile and of a good memory, they know all our thoughts; and that in a wonderful manner they love the honourable and good man amongst us, and hate excessively the wicked, as being himself a sharer in pain; for the deity, who possesses the completion of a divine allotment, is (placed) beyond these (two), pleasure and pain, but has had a share in thinking upon and knowing, according to all things.² And as the heaven is full of living beings, they interpret to each other and the highest gods all things and in all ways,³ through the living beings in the middle being carried to earth and through the whole of heaven with a light and rapid motion. But he, who assimilates the fifth genus of living beings, which is from water, to a demigod, will assimilate rightly; and this genus is sometimes visible, and sometimes concealed from view; but when visible,⁴ it exhibits a wonder through an obscure vision. Since then there are these five kinds of living beings really existing, in whatever manner any of us meets with them, ⁵falling in with them in a

¹ So I have translated the Latin of Ficinus, "alterum ex æthere, alterum deinceps ex aëre est; ac neutrum conspici totum potest—" who found in his MS., as Aldus did in his, *οὐ διορώμενον*—not *ὁν διορώμενον*, which could not thus precede *εἶναι*—even if they were in other respects intelligible. The reading *ὁν διορώμενον* is confirmed by Varro, quot' by Augustine De Civitate Dei, vii. 6, "aerías animas—animò, non oculis, videri et vocari—genios—" as remarked by Ast.

² I scarcely understand here *κατὰ πάντα*. I suspect the author wrote, *πάντα ἐκλήιστα*, i. e. "all things in the best manner—" Ficinus has "sapientia cognitioneque penitus fruitur," and thus avoids all the difficulty in *γινώσκουσιν* thus standing without its object.

³ I have adopted *πάντως*, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of *πάντας*—

⁴ Ast has adopted *καὶ δῆλον* from Ficinus—"et cum videtur," in lieu of *καὶ ἀδῆλον*—

⁵ Such is the literal translation of the unintelligible Greek; where Stephens was the first to confess himself at fault; nor has Ast been able to make out the syntax and sense satisfactorily. Ficinus, apparently in despair of being able to translate literally, has given what he conceived to be the general sense in his version, adopted in part by Taylor—"quæ aut somnis aut vaticinio audituque per vocem sanorum aut egrotantium auribus percepta, aut etiam in ipso e vita excessu nobis sese offerentia nostros animos movent; unde multa multis sacra et privatim et publice his opinionibus instituta sunt, instituenturque in posterum."

dream, in an interpretation of a dream, or spoken by oracles and prophecies to some in hearing, healthy or sick, or being met with at the close of life, and opinions being present privately and publicly, from whence many sacred rites of many have taken place, and some will take place ;⁵ of all these the legislator, who possesses even the smallest particle of mind, will never dare, by making innovations towards a god-worship, which does not possess something clear, to overturn his own state ; nor will he, knowing nothing at all (himself), forbid any portion¹ of what the law of his country has spoken, on the subject of the gods.² For³ it is not possible for human nature to know any thing on points of this kind. And does not the same reason hold good, that those are the worst of men, who do not dare to speak to us of the gods really existing 'in a manifest form, and to make them manifest,'⁴ by permitting⁵ the other gods to be without sacred rites, and not to receive the honours that are due to them ? But now there happens a thing of this kind to take place, as if some one of us had seen the Sun and Moon existing and looking upon all of us ; and, 'although able to speak, had not said'⁶ that they remained still⁷ sharing in no honours ; nor was he anxious for his part to bring them into a place of honour, nor to cause festivals and sacrifices to take place for them ; nor, through the computed time,⁸ to distribute to each of them the seasons of fre-

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were οὐδ' ἓν—not οὐδ' ὧν—

² I have adopted θεῶν, found in the margin of two MSS., in lieu of θυσίων—

³ In lieu of ὥσπερ, which he could not understand, Ast suggested ὥς—He should have proposed καὶ γὰρ, as I have translated.. On the confusion of ὥς and καὶ see § 4, p. 12, n. 7.

⁴ Others may, but I will not, believe that the author wrote ὄντας ἡμῖν φανεροὺς ὄντας θεοὺς—and afterwards φανεροὺς ποιῖν—For if the gods were really manifest, it would be unnecessary to make them so. But what he did write, I confess my inability to discover.

⁵ In lieu of ὄντας Ficinus found, in his MS. ἰόντας, as shown by his version—"relinqui—patiuntur."

⁶ Grou was the first to read, what the sense requires, δυνάτοῦς, for ἀδύνατος. But as Ficinus omits καὶ μὴ ἔφραζεν ἀδύνατος ὧν πρ ἑφράζειν—Ast would omit those words likewise, without even venturing to assign a reason for their being found here. I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were (?) τῆς ἐτι—μῖναι, not τῆς τε—ἑμα : where ἑμα is perfectly unintelligible.

⁸ Ast, unable to understand ἀπολαμβάνοντον—χρόνον, suggested ἀπολαμβάνοντα—He should have proposed, as I have translated, ἀπολαμβάνοντον—χρόνον—

quently longer and shorter years.¹ Would not such a one, if he were said to be bad both to himself and to any other, who knew him, be justly said to be so?

Clin. How not, O guest, as being the worst (of men)?

Athen. Know then, friend Clinias, that this very thing has now happened respecting myself.

Clin. How say you?

[9.] *Athen.* Know that amongst those, relating to the whole heaven, there are eight powers, sisters to each other, on which I have looked; and yet I have done nothing of consequence; for this is easy even to another person.² Of these there are three, one of the Sun, one of the Moon, and one of the not-wandering³ stars, which I mentioned a little before, and there are five others. With respect to all these, and the (gods) in them, whether they move of themselves, or are carried along in cars, let not one of us all think even that some are gods, and others not; nor yet, that some of them are genuine,⁴ but others such as it is not lawful for any of us to mention; but let us all say that they are all of them brothers, and live in fraternal allotments; and let us honour them, not one for a year, and another for a month, nor let us ordain for others any allotment or time, in which (each) proceeds through its revolution, and completes the arrangement, which reason, the most divine of all, has ordained to be visible; (and) which he, who is under a good dæmon,⁵ has first wondered at, and then felt a desire to learn, as much as it is possible for a mortal nature, from thinking that he shall thus pass through life in the best and most fortunate manner, and after death arrive at places adapted to virtue; and being thus truly initiated and in reality participating in prudence, one in one, will pass the rest of his time as a holy spectator of things the most beautiful, as far as sight is concerned.

It now remains for us to state after this how many and

¹ By "the longer years" are meant the solar, and by "the shorter" the lunar, which were made to coincide, when requisite, by necessary intercalations.

² Ficinus has, what is preferable, "civis"—Perhaps the author wrote *ἀγρίῳ τῷ τοῦτον*—i. e. "to even a savage. Of these—"

³ All the MSS. offer *πλανητῶν*: from which Ast has elicited *ἀπλανῶν*—which I have adopted.

⁴ I confess I hardly understand *γνήσιοι* here.

⁵ So I think *ἐδάμωον* ought to be translated.

what they are. For we shall not be seen to be false. Thus far at least I firmly insist upon. For I say again, that of these there are eight; and that of the eight, three have been already spoken of, and there are five still remaining. Now ¹the fourth and fifth onward movement and oblique path ²are nearly ³equal in velocity with the Sun,¹ and are neither slower nor swifter. And let us say that he, who possesses intellect, is altogether competent to lead these three; and that these (movements) belong to the Sun, and Lucifer. But the third it is not possible to speak of by name,⁴ through its not being known; and the reason of this, that the person, who first saw it, was a Barbarian. For an ancient place⁵ was the nurse of those, who first thought of these matters, in consequence of the beauty of the summer season, which Egypt and Syria⁶ possess sufficiently, (enabling) persons to look upon all the stars, visible, so to say, perpetually; inasmuch as they dwelt (in a part)⁷ of the world at a distance from clouds and rain.⁸ Hence to every where else and hither too has reached what has been tested by the time of thousands of years, and even infinite; and on this account it is meet with confidence to lay down these matters as laws. For (to think)⁹ that divine (natures) are not to be held in honour, or that these are not divine, is clearly the province of persons not endued with intellect. It is necessary however for this to be assigned as the reason, why they

¹—¹ According to the *Timæus*, p. 38, D., and Macrobius in *Sonn. Scip.* i. 19, quoted by Ast, the fourth and fifth, having the same velocity as the Sun, were Venus and Mercury. See here shortly afterwards.

² Here again, as in § 3, p. 10, n. ¹, I have translated as if the Greek were λοξή ὁδός, not διέξοδος: unless it be said that διέξοδος answers to "trajecio" in Cicero, and in English to "passage across the heavens."

³ This "nearly" appears to be strangely added. For if the movement were neither slower nor swifter, it could not be said to be nearly equal.

⁴ The author is supposed by Ast to refer to the name Στάβων (Mercury), on the authority of Pseud.-Aristot. *Περὶ Κόσμ.* ii. p. 1204, translated by Apuleius *De Mund.* p. 58, and of Chalcidius in *Tim.* p. 176.

⁵ As the adjective παλαιός is not elsewhere, I believe, united to τόπος, and as all the MSS. offer τρόποις, the author wrote, I suspect, παλαιούς—τρόποις τόπος—

⁶ Ast refers opportunely to Cicero *de Divinat.* i. 1.

⁷ To support the syntax, it is easy to read δει τὶ τοῦ κόσμου, as I have translated, instead of δει τοῦ—

⁸ That Syria is free, like Egypt, from rain, is not, I believe, mentioned elsewhere.

⁹ I have translated, as if ἡγήσθαι had dropt out after μὴ θεία—

have no names¹ with the masses; for they have appellations with some divine persons.¹ For Lucifer and Hesperus, being the same, have the appellation almost of Venus, and are very well suited to a Syrian name-giver.² But the star, which revolves with an equal velocity with the Sun and this (Lucifer), has (the name) almost of Mercury.³ And further, let us speak of three onward movements (of those stars), that take their course to the right hand, together with the Sun and Moon. But it is requisite to call the eighth orb one, which a person may most correctly⁴ call the upper world, which proceeds contrary to all those,⁵ and draws the others along with it, as it would appear to persons who know little on these matters; but what we know sufficiently, it is necessary to speak of,⁶ and we do speak.⁶ For wisdom really existing is somehow in this way apparent to him, who has a share, although a small one, of consciousness⁷ correct and divine. Three stars then remain, one of which differs from the rest⁸ by the slowness of its motion. Some call it by the name of Phænon [Saturn];⁹ but that, which is after this in slowness, it is meet to call Phaethon

¹—¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were—*πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἰππωνρίας εἰλήρασιν πρὸς θεῶν ἰνίων*—where *πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν* has been preserved by the best MS. Z, and has thus led me to elicit *θεῶν* from *θεῶν*, acknowledged by "deorum" in Ficinus, and found subsequently in five MSS. in lieu of *ινίων*—And thus there is a proper antithesis between *πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν*, and *πρὸς θεῶν ἰνίων*—

² In lieu of *νομοθίτη* Ast happily conjectured *ὀνομαροθίτη*, not, as Stalbaum says, *ὀνομαθίτη*. The words are constantly confounded, as shown perpetually in the Cratylus. With regard to the name of Venus being suited to a Syrian name-giver, Ast correctly explains it by showing that Venus was worshipped in Syria under many names.

³ Such is the reading of the MS. of Ficinus, and of all the others but the best Z, which offers *Ερίδων*, without *σχεδόν*—Now, since so rare a word could hardly be introduced as an explanation, I suspect that the more common *Ἐρμού* is the explanation of *Ερίδωνος*—

⁴ Ficinus has "jure," as if his MS. read, what the sense requires, *καλλίος* instead of *μάλιος*—for the two words are constantly confounded.

⁵ Ast quotes Cicero in Somn. Scip. 4, "Huic (extimo orbi) subjecti sunt septem, qui versantur retro contrario motu atque cælum."

⁶—⁶ The words between the numerals Ficinus and Taylor omit.

⁷ In lieu of *συννοίας*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ἰννοίας*, as shown by his "intelligentiæ"—

⁸ So Ficinus, whose "ceteris" plainly proves that he found in his MS. *τῶν ἄλλων* instead of *ἀντῶν*—

⁹ "As I have rejected just before *Ἐρμού*, the interpretation of *Ερίδωνος*, so here *Κρόνον*, *Διός*, and *Ἀποός* are the explanations respectively

[Jupiter];¹⁰ and after this follows Puroeis, [Mars,]¹¹ which has the reddest colour of all. Of these things when a person is speaking, it is not difficult to have a notion; but after learning, it is requisite to think of them, as we have said.

957d3 [10.] This however it is necessary for every Greek to have in his thoughts, that we inhabit a spot,¹ belonging to the Greeks,¹ nearly the best,² as regards virtue. But it is proper to say that it deserves praise for being situated in the middle of the natural qualities of summer and winter. ³ But though its nature, as regards summer, falls short of that, which belongs to the region there,⁴ as I have stated, it gave subsequently to them the mental perception relating to these gods of the world.³ Let us then admit that, whatever the Greeks have received from the Barbarians, they work it out to a more beautiful end.⁵ And the very same notion we ought to have with respect to what has been said now, that it is difficult to discover all matters of this kind without feeling a doubt. There is however a hope, both much and glorious, that the Greeks will respect all these divinities in a manner more beautiful and more just than the tradition, which has come from the Barbarians, by employing both discipline and the Delphic oracles and every attention according to the laws. Nor let any Greek be afraid of this, that mortals ought not to busy themselves about divine matters; but to think quite the contrary of this, that the deity is not senseless, nor ignorant of human nature; but knows that, where he teaches, (man) will follow, and learn what has been taught; and that he surely knows that he does teach us this very thing, and that we learn both number and to number. For being ignorant of this, he would be the most stupid of all beings. For, according to the saying,⁶ he would

of *Φαίνορα*, *Φαίδοντα*, and *Πυρόεις*. Opportunely then does the best MS. Z. offer *Φαίνορα* for *Κρόνον*, and *δρυμα* instead of *πυρρυσμια*: for *πυρρυσμιαν φθίγγεσθαι* is a phrase not to be found elsewhere.

¹ The words between the numerals both Ficinus and Taylor omit.

² In the formula *ἐν τοῖς ἀπύρτοις*, so common with Thucydides, and even Plato, the word *σχεδόν* is never, I believe, added elsewhere.

³ Taylor has followed here to the letter the loose translation of Ficinus, "quoniam vero magis quam barbari, ut diximus, ab æstiva serenitate distamus, horum deorum ordinem tardius intelleximus."

⁴ By "there" is meant Syria.

⁵ On this notion Ast refers to the anonymous biographer of Pythagoras in Porphyry. ed. Cantab. p. 65.

⁶ I confess I cannot explain to what saying the author is here alluding.

in reality be ignorant of himself, if he were annoyed at a person able to learn, and did not rejoice without a feeling of envy at a person becoming good through a god. Now there is a reason great and good (for supposing) that, when men had their first notions about the gods, how they existed, and of what kind they were, and what actions they took in hand, ideas were then broached, not to the mind of the moderate, nor agreeable to them, nor even of those, who were next after them;¹ amongst whom what relates to fire and water and the other bodies, was said to be the most ancient; but posterior to them the wonderful soul; and that the movement, which the body has obtained by lot, is better and of more value for carrying on both itself (and soul)² by the aid of heat and cold, and all things of that kind; but that the soul could not (do so) to body and itself. But now, when we say that soul (exists),³ if it exists in body, it would be not at all wonderful⁴ for it to move and carry about both the body and itself; nor would, according to any reason, soul be believed⁵ to be unable to carry about a weight.⁶ Since then soul is the cause of the universe, and of all good things being such, and on the other hand of evil things being such, it is not at all wonderful that soul should be the cause of every bearing on and movement; but that the bearing on and movement towards the good belongs to the best soul, but the bearing on and movement towards the contrary, to a contrary⁷ (soul); and that it is necessary for the good to have vanquished, and to vanquish still, what are not of this kind. ⁸ Hence let these

¹ Such, I presume, is the meaning of οἱ δεύτεροι, unless it be said that the author wrote οἱ γ' ὅσπερ—

² I have adopted Ast's notion, that καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν have dropt out here, for they are required to balance σώμα τε καὶ αὐτὴν.

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were εἶναι, not μὲν—

⁴ Both the sense and syntax require, as I have translated, θαυμ' ἂν οὐδὲν ἦν, not θαῦμα οὐδέν—

⁵ In lieu of ἀπιστοῖ Stephens was led, from "dubium—nullum est" in Ficinus, to read ἀπιστοῖται, subsequently found in the best MS. Z. But the syntax would require ἀπιστοῖτ' ἂν—

⁶ In the Greek are found the words διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιοῦντων, which Ficinus has omitted, either because they were wanting in his MS., or he could not understand them. I have transposed them to (*).

⁷ The sense evidently requires ἐναντίας in lieu of ἐναντίαν, which Ast vainly attempts to defend.

⁸— I have transposed hither the words διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιοῦντων, and added ἴστω ταῦτα, &— elicited from τῶν ταῦτα—

be the assertions of us, now thinking in this way;¹ all of which has been stated with reference to Justice, the punisher of the impious. [11.] With respect however to that, which has been brought to a test, it is not possible for us to disbelieve, that we ought not to consider the good to be wise.

Let us then see, whether to this wisdom, of which we were of old in search, we can direct our mind either by education or art ; and being wanting in the knowledge of which we should be ignorant of things just. ' Being such we seem to me,'² and we must speak. For after seeking up and down, I will endeavour to make it at the end plain to you in the way it has become very plain³ to myself. The greatest part of virtue, when it is not practised correctly, becomes the cause (of ignorance),⁴ as, from what has been said, the thing itself⁵ seems to me to signify forcibly. But let no one persuade us, that there is any (part)⁶ of virtue belonging to the race of mortals greater than piety. Now that this does not exist in the best natures through ignorance, we must declare ; since the best are those, which are produced with the greatest difficulty, and which, when produced, are of the greatest benefit. For the soul, that receives moderately and mildly what belongs to a nature slow and the reverse, would be of an easy disposition ; and admiring fortitude, and being obedient towards temperance, and, what is the greatest in these natures, able to learn, and with a good memory, it would be able to rejoice much in things of this kind,⁶ so as to be a lover of learning.⁶ For these things are not easy to be produced ; and when they are produced, and meet with the nurture and education of which there is a need, they would be able

¹—¹ The Greek is *ὄντες τοιοῦτοι δοκούμεν δὴ μοι*. This Ast could not understand, and he therefore suggested *ὄντως τοιοῦτον*— But as Ficinus has "Ita profecto mihi videtur," I should prefer *οὕτως τι τοιοῦτον δοκᾷ εἶναι μοι δῆλον*.

² One MS. has *μεταρυχούσα*, where evidently lies hid *μάλαρυχούσα*, as I have translated.

³ Ficinus alone has "ignorantiæ," adopted by Taylor.

⁴ The Greek is *ἀπρῆ*, but one MS. has *ἀν τι*, which plainly leads to *αὐτὸ*, for thus *αὐτὸ σημαίνειν* is similar to *αὐτὸ δηλοῖ* in Hipp. Maj. § 18.

⁵ Ast would read, as Taylor had already translated, *μέρος τι* before *ἀπειρῆς*— Winckelmann prefers *γίρας*—

⁶—⁶ Ast translates *ᾧσι—εἶναι* "through being—" But such could not be its meaning here, nor in the passage of Xenophon Cyrop. iv. 3, 7, which he quotes. Ficinus has "discendi studio deditus," as if his MS. read *διὰ τὸ φίλη μαθήσεως εἶναι*, instead of *φιλομαθὴς ᾧσι εἶναι*.

to keep down most correctly ¹ the most part of their inferiors,¹ by instructing² them to do and say respecting the gods each of the matters³ that are requisite, and when they are requisite, ⁴relating to sacrifices and purifications,⁴ connected with gods and men,⁵ and not to make use of artifice in outward shows, but to honour virtue in truth, which is of all things of the greatest moment to every state. This part, therefore, we say is naturally the most important; and if there be a person to teach, it is able to be learnt in the most beautiful and best manner possible. But no one can be a teacher unless a god leads the way. If however ⁶ a person teaches any thing correctly,⁶ but does not perform any thing of this kind in a fitting manner, it is better not to learn. However, from what has been said, it is necessary to learn these things, and for me to say that a nature of this kind is⁷ the best. Let us then endeavour to go through by a discourse what these are, and of what kind, and how it is requisite to learn them, both according to my ability, who am the speaker, and the ability of those, who are able to hear, in what manner a person may learn some things about god-worship. It is a thing almost absurd for the hearer. But we mention its name, which is, what a person through his ignorance of the subject would not imagine, astronomy. Are you then ignorant that the person, who is truly an astronomer, is necessarily the most wise? Not, indeed, he, who is an astronomer according to Hesiod, and all such, and looks to risings and settings, but he, who (looks to ⁸the circle) of the eight orbits, and the seven under the first,⁸ while each is

¹— So Ast translates *τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ χεῖρους*. But in *αὐτῶν* lies hid, I suspect, *αὐτῶν*, i. e. *ἀνθρώπων*—

² I have translated as if the Greek were *φρονεῖν*, not *φρονεῖν*.

³ The sense and syntax require *ἕκαστα ὧν*— instead of *ἕκαστα ὡς*—

⁴— The words between the numerals are transposed by Taylor, although found in their proper place in the version of Ficinus.

⁵ For the sacrifices relate to the gods, and the purifications to men.

⁶— As there is nothing to which the subsequent *τὸ τοιοῦτον* can be referred, I have translated, as if the Greek were *εἰ δὲ τί τις εὖ διδάσκει*, not *εἰ ἴ' οὖν*, or *εἰ οὖν τις*— Ficinus avoids the difficulty by his version, "ab eo vero, qui modum in docendo non servat"—

⁷ So Taylor, as if he wished to read *εἶναι* for *τε καὶ*—

⁸— The Greek is at present *τὸν τῶν ὀκτῶ περιόδων τὰς ἐπὶ τὰς περιόδους*, which Ast endeavours to explain by saying that *περίοδος* is to be taken in the double sense of an "orb" and "circuit." But such a double sense would be here out of place. Ficinus has "qui circuitus octo et quomodo septem sub primo versentur," which has led me to suggest that the

going through its own¹ orbit in such a way, that no i would be competent to contemplate them easily, unless i took of a wonderful nature,² as we have just now said say to those, to whom³ we are stating what⁴ it is m learn, and how. Let this be mentioned first by us.

[12.] The Moon goes through its orbit the quickest first⁵ leads on the month and the full moon. The sec is meet to consider is the Sun, that leads on the so through the whole of its orbit, and those that describe course together with it. But that we may not freq converse in the same way about the same things, the orbits, which we mentioned before, and⁶ which it is nc to comprehend, we ought to contemplate;⁶ and for objects it is requisite⁷ to prepare natura, such as can by teaching them many things beforehand, and accus the party, while a boy or youth, to labour thoroughly a is requisite.⁸ On this account there would be a need of i matics; but the greatest and first (need) is of numbers abstract, and not of such as are connected with bodies,⁹ the whole generation and power of the even and the odd so much as they contribute to the nature of things that Now to him, who learns this, there comes in due order w

Greek was originally τὸν τῶν δευτέρου περιόδου κύκλον τὰς θ' ἐπὶ πρώτης ἰούσας, as I have translated.

¹ The sense evidently requires αὐτῆς for αὐτόν, as just afterw αὐτοῦ περιόδου.

² This repetition of φύσεως, omitted by Ficinus, seems rather and is scarcely intelligible.

³ In lieu of ὧς, I have translated, as if the Greek were οἷς—

⁴ Ficinus, "quid oporteat," as if his MS. read ὅτι in lieu of ὅ.

⁵ Instead of πρώτην, Sydenham suggests πρώτην, which adopted.

⁶ I have translated literally the Latin of Ficinus, "quive n intelliguntur, contemplari debemus," who doubtless found some his MS. superior to the unintelligible τούτων οὐ ράδιον ἐννοεῖν

⁷ I have translated, as if the Greek were παρὰσκευάζειν τὰ οἷας δυνατοὶ εἶναι, χρῶν— not παρὰσκευάζοντες φύσεις δι' αἷς εἶναι χρῶν— out of which Ast can make nothing satisfactory, e the aid of his alterations, παρὰσκευάζοντα φύσεις, δι' αἷς δυνατὸν

Opportunately then do three MSS. offer οἷας, and one δι' οἷας, wl ας—

⁸ In ἰθιζοντα δεῖ evidently lies hid ἰθιζοντα α δεῖ— Ast wc ἰθιζοντα ἥδη—

⁹ Instead of σώματα Ast suggests σῶμά τι, from "corpus" in

call very ridiculously by the name of geometry.¹ But the similitude of numbers, that are naturally not similar to each other, becomes conspicuous, when applied to the properties of plain surfaces; which wonderful thing, not of human but divine origin, will appear very clear to him, who is able to think. And after this, those numbers, that are increased by a triple² (ratio), and are similar to the nature of a solid, and those, that are on the other hand dissimilar, and are by another art similar to this, which those, who are conversant with it, call stereometry,³ (to be considered):⁴ which is indeed a thing divine and wonderful to those, who look into it; that,⁵ while the power is ever revolving about the double, and that which is from the opposite to this, according to each analogy does every nature fashion out for itself a species and genus.⁵ Now the first power of the double, according to number,⁶ proceeds, according to pro-

¹ Alluding to its name, literally, earth-measuring; which is a mechanical operation; while the geometry here intended is a speculative science. T.

² Bekker was the first to edit *triple* for *triple*, which Taylor had expressed in his "triple increase," and Sydenham suggests in Not. MSS. Ficinus has "in tres usque dimensiones—"

³ I have adopted *στερεομετρίαν*, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of *γεωμετρίαν*.

⁴ Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, and is adopted by Taylor, "considerandi sunt," as if his MS. had *σκεπτικόν* after *γεωμετρίας*—

⁵ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. As conceives that the author meant to say something to this effect, "As numbers are doubled, by passing from simple to compound, so nature, by preserving a kind of ratio in all things, fashions both genus and species."

⁶ Of numbers, some represent lines, others superficies, and others solid and cubic quantities. To the first belongs the number 2; to the second, 4, which is the square of 2; and to the third, 8, which is the cube of 2. Double proportion was considered likewise by the ancients as perfect. First, because it is the first proportion, produced between 1 and 2; and secondly, because it contains all proportions within itself; for the sesquialter ($1\frac{1}{2}$), sesquitercian ($1\frac{1}{3}$), and the other proportions are, as it were, parts below double proportion. The numbers, which the author here adduces, are 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 12. The ratio of 4 to 2 is double; and that of 8 to 4 is also double. Now these two excesses are equal in ratio; for each is double; but they are not equal in number; for 8 exceeds 4 by 4, but 4 exceeds 2 only by 2. Again, if we compare 6 to 4, and afterwards to 8, in the first case we have a sesquialter, and in the second a sesquitercian ratio; but these excesses are unequal in ratio, although equal in number. For the ratio of 6 to 4 = $1\frac{1}{2}$, and the ratio of 8 to 6 = $1\frac{1}{3}$; but 6 exceeds 4 by 2, and is exceeded by 8 by 2. Again, compare 12 to 6, which is a double ratio, and between these compare 8 to each. Then, 12 to 8 will be a sesquialter ratio, and 8 to 6 will be a sesquitercian ratio; but a double ratio

portion through one to two,¹ ²possessing a double by But that, which, as regards the solid and tangible, is double, proceeds from one to eight. ³But that of the quantity to the middle, and perhaps, what is more less, and less than the greater ;³ ⁴while the other by part surpasses, and is surpassed by the extremes.⁴ the middle of six to twelve, there is found the sesqui sesquitertian proportions. And in the middle of power, ⁵turned to both,⁵ has distributed to men a use voice and measure are combined, for the sake of sports, and harmony, after having been granted to the happy of the Muses.

[13.] Let all these then be held to take place in 1 and let them exist. But as regards the finish to th proceed to the divine generation and the most beau divine nature of things visible, as far as a deity has g man to look upon them ; ⁷which nature, no one, afte beheld, will boast of having received with facility wi particulars mentioned above.⁷ Besides this, in our se arises from 12 to 6 ; while the excesses between 12 and 8, and 8 unequal both in ratio and number. T.

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, who have found in his MS., *ἔστι δὲ 2ν*, instead of *2ν*—Ast too say would have expected *ἀφ' ἐνός*, but that *2ν* is the subject of th *μὴν πρώτη τοῦ διπλασίου*. But how this could be, I confess understand.

²—² Such is the version of the Latin of Ficinus, “duplur possidens.” Taylor has “being double according to powe would be in Greek, *διπλάσιον κατὰ δύναμιν οὔσα*. But *δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν οὔσα* would mean, “that according to power bein words I confess I cannot understand. I could have understoo author written to this effect, “But the double of one, as regar fices, proceeds to four.”

³—³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I am loss. Ast explains it by a paraphrase, “With regard to the p double, as regards the middle number (4), it exceeds by as lesser number (1), as it is exceeded by the larger number (8)

⁴—⁴ Ast considers all the words between the numerals as an int for they merely repeat the idea already expressed in the precedin

⁵—⁵ Here again I am at a loss to understand the expression both ;” for it was sufficient to say simply that there is 9, a mid between 6 and 12, applicable to the 9 Muses ; for such, I presu the author meant to say.

⁶—⁶ Ficinus has translated *χρεῖαν* by “*usum commodumque*,” uncertain here, as elsewhere, how he ought to render it by one

⁷—⁷ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I can

tercourse we must refer every individual thing to its species, '(and all things to one,)'¹ by asking questions and disproving what has been not correctly asserted. For this is truly a touchstone the most beautiful and thoroughly the first amongst men ; but in the case of such, as are not (touchstones), and only pretend to be, there is a labour the most vain of all.

Further still, the accuracy of time must be considered by us, and how exactly it completes all that takes place in heaven ; so that he, who believes the assertion to be true, that soul is a thing older and more divine than body, would also conceive it has been very beautifully and sufficiently said, that all things are full of gods ; and that we have never been neglected through the forgetfulness or carelessness of superior beings. But as regards all such things as these, we should bear this in mind, that, if any one apprehends correctly each of these matters, there will be a great benefit to him, who has apprehended them ; but if not, that it will be better for him to be ever calling upon a god,² according to method.² And let this be the method—for it is necessary to say so much at least as this—Every diagram, system of number, and composition of harmony, together with the one agreement of all the stars in their revolutions, ought to be apparent to him, who learns in a proper manner. And that, of which we are speaking, will become apparent, if a person rightly learns, looking to one thing. For to those, who think upon the matter, there will appear to be naturally one bond to all of these. But if a person will take the matter in hand in any other way, he must, as we have said, call upon fortune. For, without these, no nature will become lucky in states. But this is the method, (and) this the nurture, and through these subjects of instruction we must proceed, whether they are difficult or easy. Nor is it lawful to neglect the gods ; since the happy report, relating to all of them, has, according to a manner, become apparent. And I call him, who thus apprehends all these points, the man the most truly wise ; who, I stoutly affirm, both in jest and

stand ; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose abridged version is "*quam nunquam sine dictis artibus assequemur.*"

¹—The words between the brackets are found only in the version of Ficinus, "*omnia denique in unum—*"

²—I have transposed *κατὰ πρόσωπον* from the end of the preceding sentence to its present place, as required by the words immediately following.

earnest, will, when he shall have filled up by death his portion in things of this kind, ¹ if he be still almost dying, share any longer in many of his senses then, as sent; and he will, after being a partaker of one destiny and becoming one out of many, be fortunate, and, at the time, most wise and blessed; whether any one lives on the continent, or in islands; and that he will participate a fortune, which ever happens to be of this kind; and whether any one studies these questions, living a public private life, he will meet with the same fate and in a manner from the gods. But what we said at the beginning the same assertion appears even now to be really true; is not possible for men to be perfectly blessed and happy except a few. And this is rightly asserted by us. For we are divine and at the same time prudent men, and cannot participate in the rest of virtue, and in addition have access to all, that is closely connected with a blessed instructive such things as we have mentioned, to these alone have gifts of fortune fallen by lot, ² and are in a sufficient state those then, who have laboured in this way upon such things, we say privately and lay down publicly as a law, that the greatest offices ought to be given to those, who have attained at the period of an old man; and that all the others ought to follow them, and with good words hymn all the good goddesses; and lastly, that all of us, after having known sufficiently examined the nocturnal assembly, most co-exhort it to this wisdom.

¹—¹ The words between the numerals Ficinus, followed by Taylor omitted, either because they were not in his MS., or, what is probable, because he could not understand them; nor, in fact, how they can stand here, unless *θανάτω* just before be omitted.

²—² I have translated as if the Greek were *εὐτυχέ τε καὶ ἱκανῶς* not *ἱκανῶς εὐτυχέ τε καὶ ἔχει*. Ficinus has rather loosely—"in modo satis ad felicitatem omnia se habere videntur."

INTRODUCTION TO THE AXIOCHUS.

ALTHOUGH the *Axiochus* and five following dialogues, all equally spurious, have been generally appended to the complete editions of Plato, yet, strange to say, they have never been translated into English. This fact, as regards the *Axiochus* especially, is the more remarkable, as that dialogue has been so great a favourite with scholars of different countries, that twelve translations have been made of it into Latin, four into German, and two into French. For though Cousin asserts that his own is the only French version, yet he might have known from Fabricius and Fischer, that Dolet had preceded him in 1544; whose tiny volume, that contains a translation likewise of the *Hipparchus*, is so scarce, that no copy of it is to be found in the National Library at Paris, as is stated distinctly in a modern reprint of it; nor is it mentioned, I may add, in the different Catalogues of the British Museum.

Of these twelve translations nine have appeared in print; but the remaining three are to be found only in MSS. from the pens respectively of Cincius Romanus, Rainutius, and Leonardus Aretinus; unless it be said that to one of these three is to be referred the copy, once in the possession of Swart of Altorf, in the Catalogue of whose library, says Fischer, it is described in P. 2, p. 277, n. 871, under the title of "*Axiochus Platonis de contemnenda morte. Venundatur ab Alex. Haliatte, Mediolanensi, s. a. 4.*" Of the version by Cincius MSS. are to be found in Archbishop Parker's library at C. C. Camb., as stated in the Catalogue, p. 65, and in the British Museum, Burney MSS., 226, and in the National Library at Paris, Cod. 6729; while a copy of the version by Rainutius is in MS. Harl. 4923, and in Arundel MSS. 277. To these however I have paid no attention; as they are done too loosely to enable one to ascertain

what the translators found in the MSS. before them. But such is not the case with Ficinus, who has here, as elsewhere, kept very close to the original, except when he perceived the text to be manifestly corrupt. And a similar observation is applicable to the translation of Hieronymus Wolfius, printed, together with the text and notes, at Basle in 1577, 4, under the title of "*Doctrina recte vivendi et moriendi*," a fact not known, it would seem, to Cousin, who attributes that work to an anonymous scholar.

With regard to the author of the dialogue, Ficinus attributes it to Xenocrates, either because he found it so assigned in the MS. before him, or because he knew that the follower of Plato had written a treatise "*On Death*," as recorded by Diogenes Laert. iv. 12. By others the author was supposed to be Æschines, the follower of Socrates. But this idea was given up, when it was ascertained that none of the passages quoted by Athenæus and Pollux, from the Axiochus of Æschines, were to be found in the existing dialogue of that name.

But whatever uncertainty may exist as to the author, it is evident from § 8, p. 45, n. 1, as Wolf was the first to remark, that it was written at the time, when the successors of Plato occupied the Academy, and those of Aristotle the Lyceum, at Athens.

AXIOCHUS;

OR,

ON DEATH.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, CLINIAS, AXIOCHUS.

[1.] Soc. WHEN I had gone out on the road to Cynosarges,¹ and had arrived at the Ilissus, the voice of some one reached me, calling out, "Socrates, Socrates." And when on turning towards (the sound) I looked round to see from whence it might be, I beheld Clinias, the son of Axiochus, running towards the fountain Callirrhoe, together with Damon the musician, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. Of these,² one was the other's music-master, and the other was, from a feeling of friendship, at once the loving and beloved. I determined therefore to give up the direct road, and to meet them, that we might come together in the easiest manner.

[2.] And Clinias, with tears in his eyes, said—Now, Socrates, is the time for you to exhibit the wisdom ever bruited by you.³ For my father has at some sudden season⁴ become

¹ This was a place, where there was a temple dedicated to Hercules, at which illegitimate children were registered, who were under the protection of the god, who was himself the illegitimate son of Zeus.

² I have adopted Wolf's correction, *αἰροῖν*, confirmed in part by the best MS. V., which has *αἰρών*, while all the rest have *αἰρώ*. It is however uncertain, as remarked by Wolf, which was the lover, and which the loved, Clinias or Charmides.

³ As Socrates was never known to proclaim his wisdom, but rather the want of it, we must either omit *πρός* with Stephens, or read *περί* with Wolf, similar to "de te" in the version of Agricola.

⁴ In lieu of *ῥαπ*, to which Stephens was the first to object, as being improperly united to *αἰφνιδίον*, Fischer would read *συμφορᾶς*, which the

powerless, and is at the end of life, and with pain the idea of dissolution; although at a former period he ridicule those, who were afraid of the bugbear of death to rebuke them mildly. Come then, and console him as he wont, in order that ¹he may without a groan pursue the road of fate,¹ and that, ²together with the remainder of piety, this too may be done by me.² In no moderator, Clinias, (said I,) shall you be disappointed in me; even as you are inviting me to do a holy act. Let us then hasten; for if such is the state of affairs, there is a need.

Clin. On merely seeing you, Socrates, he will rarely often has he been on his legs again after a (serious) syncope [3.] *Soc.* When we had traversed rather quickly along the wall,⁴ at the Itonian gates⁵—for he dwells not close to the pillar of the Amazon⁶—we came upon him when he had already⁷ recovered his senses, and ⁸his body

Zurich editors seem disposed to adopt. I should prefer δὲ "weakness," or τινος νόσου φοβᾶς, "attack of some disorder."

¹— The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

²— I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals nor could Ficinus; whose version is, "unaque cum aliis pium equere," as if his MS. read καὶ ἄμα σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵνα εὐσιβεία θῇς.

³ Although σύμπτωμα is elsewhere any symptom, yet here it means "a serious one;" unless it be said that δεινὸν has dropped ἀνασφῆλαι, as it has between γίγνεσθαι and συμπτώματος: for united to νόσων, and κακῶν with ἀνασφάλλειν, in the passages of H. Steph. in Thess. L. Gr. Ficinus has merely "ut quodam sipisceret."

⁴ In lieu of ἤμεν ταῖς, Matthiæ in Gr. Gr. would read ἤμεν. He should have retained however ἤμεν, as I have done in the text.

⁵ By the Itonian gates are probably meant those, near to which he had perhaps a shrine, and was worshipped there under the name of Itonia, and as she had the same appellation at Coronea in Bœotia, the suspect, at Athens were placed across the road that led from the town in Bœotia. Ficinus has "per Itonios agros." An critic has suggested τῆς Ἰρωνίας. The reading Σιτωννιμίας, four MSS., is to be referred to the fact stated by Steph. Byz. that a town in Thessaly called Ἰρών, had likewise the name of Σιτών.

⁶ The Amazon was Antiopé, as may be inferred from Pausanias.

⁷ The word ἀφ᾽, which properly means "the touch of the hand," is applied to the other senses likewise, as shown by Hesych. and Pollux ii. 236. Correctly then has Cornarius, "coll sensibus—"

⁸— Instead of τῷ σώματι, the best MS. V. has τὸ σῶμα, which to τὸ σῶμά τι, as I have translated.

strength, although his mind was weak, and he stood greatly in need of consolation ; and frequently did 'he raise himself up,' and give vent to moans, together with the shedding of tears, and the noisy beating of his hands. On beholding him, Why is this, Axiochus? said I. Where are your former boastings and frequent praises of virtue, and your boldness not to be broken down?¹ since, like a cowardly combatant, you have exhibited yourself of noble bearing in the place of exercise, but have failed in the fight. Will not you, a man of so long a life, and the hearer of (the finest)² reasonings, and, if nothing else, at least an Athenian, after surveying³ nature consider that this is surely a common (saying),³ and bruited amongst all, that life is a kind of sojourn (upon earth);⁴ and that we must pass through it in a reasonable and good-tempered manner, and take our departure, only not singing pæans⁵ on the road to fate; while to conduct yourself in so cowardly a manner, and to be torn with difficulty from existence, is to exhibit, like a child, a period of life not over-wise.⁶

Axio. This, Socrates, is true; and you appear to me to

¹—¹ Such seems to be the meaning of ἀναφερόμενον here. Hence Cornarius, "ut qui sæpe se attolleret;" but Ficinus, "respirantem—"

² In lieu of ἀρρηκτον, Stephens was the first to suggest ἀρρηκτον, adopted by Boeckh. To this passage however Ruhnken refers the gl. in Timæus, Ἀρρατον ἰσχυρόν, στερεόν.

³ I have translated as if καλλίστων has dropt out between και and κατήκοος—

⁴ I have with Boeckh adopted περισκεμμένος, suggested by Horreus, in lieu of περισκεμμένος—

⁵ Although σου constantly follows δὲ, yet here it seems to conceal ἔπος, as I have translated, similar to "sententiam" in Ficinus. The sentiment emanated from the school of Pythagoras. At least Stobæus, in cvl. p. 573, Gean., quotes from Hipparchus the Pythagorean, οἱ ἄνθρωποι—ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἰοῦντι τινα παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ποιησούνται. See too Marc. Antonin. li. 17, "Ὁ βίος δὲ πόλεμος καὶ ἐίνου ᾗ τὴν φύσιν, which seems to be a verse of Menander. Cicero De Senect. § 23, "ex vita ita discedo, tanquam ex hospitio."

⁶ I have added "upon earth," what the sense seems to require.

⁷ Wolf quotes opportunely from Cicero Tusc. i. "Si quid tale acciderit—at exeamus e vita, læti et agentes gratias pareamus." Ficinus omits μόνον οὐδὲ καὶ αὐτὸν. For those words, consisting of twenty-one letters, made up one line of the MS., from which his own was transcribed.

⁸ So Fischer translates περιφρονούσαν. But such a sense would be in correct Greek περιφρονούσαν. For περιφρονούσαν is properly "despising." It means however simply "to think upon" in Aristoph. Nep. 226, περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον.

speak correctly. And yet I know not how, when I the very point of what is dreadful, those powerful & clever reasonings unconsciously fall away,¹ and are held in honour; while in their stead a fear lays hold of me, my mind in various ways, if I am to be deprived of this here, and of the good things (of life),² and to lie wherever³ it may be, unseen and unheard of,⁴ after I am turned into worms and nondescript creatures.⁵

[4.] Soc. Through your own ignorance,⁶ Axiochus, you are combining sensation with the want of sensation; you are acting and speaking in a manner at variance with yourself; and you do not consider that you are at one and the same time lamenting your want of sensation, and perceiving the idea of your rotting away, and of being deprived of life, which is pleasant, as if you are to die and live in another state, not to pass⁷ into insensibility complete, and the same before you were born. As then none of the mischief of the political period of Draco and Clisthenes pertained to yourself—for you, to whom it might have pertained, did not

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *ὑπεκκίπτονται*, *ἐκκίπνουνται*. For *λόγοι* is not elsewhere, I suspect, united thus in *ἐκκίπνουνται*, although we speak in English of "words that breathe." has "clanculum evanescunt."

² Faehse, perceiving that something was wanting here, proposed *τῶνδε ἀγαθῶν*, answering to *τοῦδε τοῦ φωτός*—But the good thing was not pointed out, as the light could. Hence I have translated as if it had dropped out after *καὶ*—

³ I have adopted *ὅπου δῆποτε*, from the best MS. V., in lieu of *ὅπου*, an adverb of motion, could not be united to *ἐκκίπνουνται*, *καὶ* *ἐκεῖ*. With the whole passage compare the speech of Claudio in *Measure for Measure*, act iii. sc. 1, "Ay, but to die," &c.

⁴ In lieu of *ἀγνοῦντος* Stephens was the first to edit *ἀπυστος*, bearing no doubt the expression in *Hom. Od. i. 242*, *ὅχιρ' αἰστος*,—where Hesych. explains *ἀπυστος* by *ἀνήστος*—

⁵ The word *κνώδαλα* seems strangely introduced here. Fapplied rather to the larger animals than the smaller; although I explain *κνώδαλον* by *ζῶον μικρόν*, where Heinsius refers to *passage*. Ficinus has "feras—"

⁶ I have omitted *ἀνεπιλογίστως*, which is quite superfluous and *τὴν ἀνεπιστάσιαν*, and has evidently come from § 16.

⁷ I have translated as if the Greek were *εἰς ἑτεροζῶταν*, not *εἰς ἄλλαν*, which is without regimen. Ficinus has "in aliam vitam transire," in lieu of *ἀποθανοῦμενος*.

⁸ The best MS. offers *μεταβαλῶν*, in lieu of *μεταβάλλων*, wished to read, similar to "migratus" in Ficinus.

at all—so it will not after death occur to you; for you, to whom it might occur, will not be in existence. [5.] Throw aside then all silliness of this kind, and think upon this, that, after the union of soul with body has been once dissolved by the former being settled in its own home-place, what is left of the latter is of the earth and devoid of reason, nor is it a man.¹ For we are soul, a thing of life and immortal, pent up in a mortal prison. And nature has for some mischief² fitted round this tabernacle, ³to which pleasant things are in a recess,³ and on the wing, and mixed up with the majority of pains; but the things of sorrow are unmixed, and last a long time, and have no share in what is pleasant; (I say nothing)⁴ of diseases and inflammations in the sensoria and of internal ills, with which the soul, as if sown⁵ with pores, does, when it sympathizes, of necessity desire its congenial atmosphere of heaven, and feels a thirst for the life that is there,⁶ and a hankering after its dancing;⁶ so that a removal from this life is but a change from an evil to a good.

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[6.] *Axio.* Since then, Socrates, you consider life to be an

¹ Fischer quotes opportunely Cicero in Somn. Scip. 8, and Lactantius Instit. Divin. ii. 3, 8, "Hoc enim, quod oculis subjectum est, non homo, sed hominis receptaculum est." Ficinus has "umbraculum—"

² Such I presume is the meaning of πρὸς κακοῦ—

³—³ This is the literal version of the Greek, ὃ τὰ μὲν ἥδοντα μυχιαῖα— But ἥδω is a verb of naught, and μυχιαῖα, if derived from μυχός, and from nothing else it can be derived, is perfectly unintelligible. Hence from ἀμυχιαῖα in Stobæus, Stephens elicited ἀμυχιαῖα, for he found in Hesych. Ἀμυχή· ἐπιπόλαιον ἄλκος. The reading has been adopted by Boeckh; for he did not remember that nearly all words in -αῖος indicate either weight, or value, or length of time. Unless I am egregiously mistaken, the author wrote here, ὃ τὰ μὲν ἥδὲ ὄντα ὀνυχιαῖα, and shortly afterwards ἥδιον ὄντων, not ἥδόντων— For ὀνυχιαῖα would mean "the length or value of a nail." Wolf was near the sense when he suggested δαρυαῖα—although from "adulterina" in Ficinus, he was once led to μοιχιαῖα—

⁴ To preserve the syntax, I have translated, as if the Greek were νόσους ὃ ἰὼ καὶ—not νόσους δὲ καὶ—Perionius has "Quid morbos commemor." On the loss of ἰὼ, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 121.

⁵ To avoid the strange metaphor, περιεπαρμένη τοῖς πόροις, one would wish the Greek had been ἀρ' ἀπόροις περιπαρμένη τοῖς πόροις, "as if pierced by pores stopt up," or something similar. Ficinus, "per singulos diffusa meatus."

⁶ Correct Greek would, instead of ἐκίσας, require ἐκεί, or ἐκείθε, to which ἐκείθεν in one MS. seems to lead. Ficinus omits ἐκίσας—

⁷ In lieu of χορταῖς I should prefer χαράς. The two words are confounded in the Laws, vii. p. 273, n. 5.

ill, why do you remain in it? and this too, when you are a person of reflection, and excel us, the mass, in mind.

Soc. You do not, Axiochus, testify truly in my case; but you conceive, as the mass of Athenians do, that, since I am searcher after facts, I am acquainted with something. And indeed I would pray to know all things of even a common kind, so much am I deficient in what are superior. But what I am now saying are the proclaimed doctrines of Prodicus the wise, that have been bought, some for half a drachm, others for two drachms, and others for four; for that person never teaches any thing for nothing, but his custom is perpetually to proclaim the sentiment of Epicharmus—

Hand hand washes; give then something,¹ and get something in return.¹

[7.] And lately, when he was making a display at the house of Callias, the son of Hipponicus, he spoke so much against living, that I drew a line through (the word) life as a thing of the least value; and from that time, Axiochus, my soul yearned for death.

Ario. And what was said then?

Soc. I will tell you all² I can remember. For what part of life, said he, is free from pain? Does not the infant cry at its first birth, beginning to live from pain? Nor is it deficient in any suffering, but is affected painfully either by the want of something, or excessive cold or heat, or a blow; and being unable to tell what it is suffering, it cries continually, possessing this voice alone of its discontentment. And when it reaches its seventh year, after having gone through many troubles, there are boy-leaders, and teachers of grammar, and drilling-masters tyrannizing over him. And as he grows bigger, there is a still larger number of despots, who teach him correctness in composition,³ and geometry, and military tactics.

¹ In the fragment of Epicharmus, it is easy to restore the lost Doric words by reading δός τι, εἰ, ἤν τι λῆς, λάβ' αὖ, i. e. "give something, and, if you wish for something, receive in return:" an emendation, of which Porson would, I think, have approved; for he has restored to the same poet τίς δέ κα λῆς γενίσθαι, in *Adversar.* p. 303.

² I have translated as if the Greek were πάντα, not ταῦτα—

³ Such was no doubt the office of the *κρητοί* alluded to; unless it be said that the author wrote *ῥητορικοί*. Ficinus has, what seems to be preferable in part, as it preserves the natural order of events, "Sursum nimirum pedagogi, grammatici, gymnastici, paedotribæ—cum paulisper adoleverit, censores, arithmetæ, geometræ, distributores," although it is not easy to understand what he meant by "distributores."

[8.] And when he is registered amongst the young men, there are, what is a worse fear, the ¹Lycéum and Academy,¹ and the Gymnasiarchs and their staves, and a measureless amount² of ills. And the whole period³ of youth is under Moderators and the selection of those placed over young persons by the Council of the Areopagus. And when he is forced from them, cares straightway come upon him in secret, and considerations as to what road of life he is to tread; ⁴ and (compared with)⁵ the after difficulties the first appear to be childish, and the terrors in truth of infants; for there are campaigns, and wounds, and continuous contests. [9.] And then old age stealthily and unconsciously comes on, to which flow together all that is on the verge of death and hard to be remedied. And should a person not pay, as a debt, his life rather quickly, Nature, like an usurer, stands near and takes as a pledge from one his eye-sight, and from another his hearing, and frequently both; and should he still delay,⁶ she brings on a paralysis, (or) a mutilation (or) a distortion of limbs; ⁷ while they, who on the threshold of old age are still vigorous,⁷ ⁸ in mind, be-

¹— From this passage, says Wolf, it is clear that the dialogue was written after the death of Plato, when his successors occupied the Academy, and the followers of Aristotle the Lycéum.

² I have adopted *ἀμετρία*, found in Stobæus and the two best MSS. V. Z. Ficinus, "immoderatio—"

³ Even if *χρόνος* had not been found in the two best MSS. V. Z., I should have adopted it in preference to *πρόνος*. The two words are constantly confounded. Cousin too has shown the superiority of *χρόνος*.

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐμβήσεται*, not *ἐνστήσεται*, found in one MS. in lieu of *ἐνστήσονται*. Ficinus too leads to *ἐμβήσεται*, by his "ingredi."

⁵ Wolf acutely saw that *παραβαλλόμενα* had dropt out here, or something similar, answering to "comparations" in Ficinus.

⁶ Ficinus, "quod si resistat quis."

⁷— I have translated as if the Greek were, not *ἄλλοι πολυγέρωσ ἀκμάζουσι*, words that have hitherto baffled the sagacity of critics, but *ἀλλ' οἱ ἐκ' οὐδ' ὧ γήρωσ*— The phrase first introduced by Homer in a passage quoted in § 10, has been restored by Valckenaer on Herodot. iii. 14, to Lycurgus from Suidas, in *Ἐπὶ γήρωσ οὐδ' ὧ*, and by myself to the Banquet, § 21, n. 7, where I have corrected this passage. According to Pollux ii. 15, it was adopted by Hyperides. See too Meineke on Menander, Fr. Inc. 125. Ficinus has "nonnulli ad extremum usque senium vivunt."

⁸— In the words *τῶ νῦν δις παῖδες οἱ γέροντες γίγνονται*, lies hid a Choliambic verse, *Δις παῖδες οἱ γέροντες εἰσιν ἐν τῶ νῦν*— written probably by Socrates, and adopted in part by Aristophanes in *Νεφ.* 1419, where see the Schol. and Bergler.

come twice children, though grown¹ old. And hence the gods, who take cognizance of human affairs,² release quickly from life² those, on whom they set the greatest [10.] For example,³ Agamenes and Trophonius,³ v up the close, sacred to the god at Pytho,⁴ did, after that the best thing might befall them, lay themselves bed⁵ and never rise from it again. So too the sons priestess at Argos, after their mother had in like prayed for some honour to be paid them by Juno i for their piety, when, through the pair (of mules) b late, they undressed themselves,⁷ and drew her (in th the temple, they did, after the prayer, change, during t their existence. And long would be the story to go of the poets, who, with their more divine mouths,⁸ hav holy hymns the tales relating to life, how they utter lame against living. Of one alone I will however remember most worthy to be spoken of, who says, (Il. xxiv. 526

The gods for mortals, in a hapless state
To live, in sorrow wove the web of fate—

and, (Il. xvii. 446,)

Of all that breathe and creep upon the earth,
There's nought than man more wretched (from his bir

And what does he say of Amphiraus? (Od. xv. 246.)

Him heartily the Ægis-bearing Zeus
Loved, and Apollo with the feelings all
Of friendship; yet he did not of old age
The threshold reach.

And what does he¹⁰ appear to you, who bids us

¹ I have adopted with Wolf *διὰ τοῦτο*, found in Clemens A Strom. vi. p. 625, A., and subsequently in the best MS. V. Fi has "quapropter—"

² Ficinus, "quos amat, ad se ex hac revocat vita."

³ The same story told by Cicero in Tuscul. i. 47, and the quoted there by Davis.

⁴ Delphi is rarely called by this name. See at Alcib. i. p. 35

⁵ Ficinus renders *κοιμηθῆντες* by "somno pressi—"

⁶ These were Cleobis and Biton, as we learn from Herodotus i. was probably the first narrator of the anecdote.

⁷ Ficinus renders *ὑποδύντες* by "subeuntes—"

⁸ I have adopted with Boeckh *στίμασι*, from Stobæus, in lieu *μασ*. On the loss by corruption of *στίμασι*, see at the Laws ix. p. 4

⁹ I have added "from his birth," for the sake of the rhyme.

¹⁰ Namely Euripides, from whose lost play, called Ctesphor

Weep for the ill, to which the new-born comes.

But I will stop¹ here, lest, contrary to my engagement, I become prolix by making mention of others likewise. [11.] With what pursuit or art does not he,² who has chosen it, find fault, and is discontented with his present state?³ Let us go to handicraftsmen and workers at a furnace, who labour from night to night, and with difficulty procure the necessities of life, and let (us hear)⁴ them bewailing their fate and filling up their sleepless hours with lamentations and tears. Or let us reckon up the sailor's (life),⁵ passed in the midst of so many dangers, and which, as Bias has shown, is neither amongst the living nor the dead;⁶ for the man who belongs to earth, has, as if he were amphibious, thrown himself upon the sea, and become wholly in the power of fortune.⁶ But⁶ farming is at least a pleasant thing. Clearly so. But is it not wholly a sore, for ever finding for itself a pretext for sorrow? crying now at a drought; now at a continued rain; now at a burning up; now at a mildew; now at unseasonable heat or cold.⁶ [12.] And the much-honoured states-

verse is quoted, and has been wretchedly translated by Cicero in Tusc. i. 48.

¹ I have adopted *παύσομαι* from the best MS. V., in lieu of *παύομαι*. Ficinus too has "desinam—"

^{2,3} Compare Horace—"Qui fit Mæcenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem Seu fors seu ratio dedit,—Contentus vivat?"

³ I have translated as if *ἀκούωμεν* had dropt out after *δακρύων*: for otherwise the preceding genitives would be without regimen. Respecting the similarity of *δακρύων* and *ἀκούωμεν* see myself on Philoct. 367.

⁴ Here again I have supplied *βιον*, which has evidently been lost after *πλωτῶν*. On the change of *κον* into *βιον*, see myself on *Æsch.* Suppl. 336.

⁵ Fischer quotes opportunely from Columella in Præf. de R. R. § 8, "Terrestre animal, homo, ventorum et maris objectus iræ, se fluctibus audet credere"—where lies hid a poetical distich—"Terrestre animal, homo, sese ventorum et maris Objectus iræ, fluctibus audet credere."

⁶ In the Greek words between the numerals there evidently lies hid a dramatic fragment, taken probably from the *Γεωργοί* of Aristophanes—*Α. ἀλλ' ἡ γεωργία γλυκὺ ἦν δῆλον. Β. ἀλλ' ἦν οὐχ ὑπουλον, ὡς λόγος. Κάλλος, πρόφασιν λύπης τιν' εὐρὺν εἰσαί; Νῦν μὲν δὲ αὐχμὸν, νῦν δ' ἐπομβρίαν θεῖ. Ἦν ἐγκαλῶν, νῦν δ' ἐρυσίβην, νῦν θάλαρος αὐ' Ἀκαίρον, ἐκαύσαν δὲ νῦν ἀγροῦς κρύος*—a passage that Horace plainly had in mind while penning his stanza in *Od.* III. i. 29, "Non verberatæ grandine vineæ Fundusque mendax, arbore nunc aquas Culpante, nunc torrentia agros Sidera, nunc hyemes iniquas." And hence it is easy to see that

manship—for many things I pass over—through revolutions¹ how great is it driven, while it possesses a pleasure, like that of a state of fever, in its quiverings and palpitations, but a failure, full of pain, and worse than a thousand deaths. Who then living for the mob can be happy? even if he has been favourably received with a gentle buzz, or noisy hubbub, as the plaything of the people, (but afterwards)² rejected, hissed, fined, put to death, and pitied. ³Tell me this,³ thou statesman, Axiochus, where died Miltiades? where Themistocles? where Ephialtes? and where recently the ten army-leaders?⁴ when I did not put (the question) to the vote; for it did not seem to me a solemn act ⁵to hold office in union with⁵ a maddened mob;

the author wrote not οὐχ ὅλον—ἔλεος, but οὐχ ὑποῦλον—κάλλος, similar to κάλλος κακῶν ὑποῦλον in Soph. Œd. T. 1386, and not εἰδῶν, which neither ἔλεος nor κάλλος could be said to do, but ὑπεκαλῶν: and lastly, not νυνὶ δὲ ἱπικαύσαν, which is superfluous before or after θάλασσαν, but νυνὶ δ' ἱπικαύσαν ἀγροῦς κρύος: for thus ἱπικαύσαν ἀγροῦς κρύος would be properly opposed to θάλασσαν ἀκαιοῦ, and the expression ἱπικαύσαν ἀγροῦς κρύος be similar to "tellus hiscit adusta gelu—" in Ovid.

¹ In lieu of δεινῶν, I have translated as if the Greek were δινῶν. On the confusion of the two words, see myself on Philoct.

² The sense requires ἱεβαλλόμενον δ' αὖ—as I have translated, opposed to πομπησθεῖν καὶ κρηνηθεῖν: which Ficinus not understanding has thus translated—"irridetur atque exploditur."

³—³ In ἐνὶ τοῖς γε evidently lies hid εἰπ' οὖν τοῦτό γε—as I have translated.

⁴ This is supposed to allude to the ten naval officers, for whose condemnation Socrates, in his character of chairman of a public meeting, refused what he had the power to do, to put the question to the vote; as he knew well that they would in the then excited state of the people be put, as six of them subsequently were, to death, for neglecting to take up the dead bodies of the Athenians, who had fallen into the sea, in the naval battle at Arginusæ. With regard to the text, two MSS. read πρῶν βασιλεῖς καὶ στρατηγοί: of the rest, some omit βασιλεῖς καὶ, and others only βασιλεῖς; and while Ficinus has "duces reliqui," Stobæus offers πρῶν οἱ δόκα στρατηγοί, adopted by Boeckh. But as it is difficult to account for the introduction of βασιλεῖς καὶ, I suspect that those words are a corruption of β. ποσι λίουσι, i. e. "two-footed lions," and that διποσι λίουσι ought to follow ἡπρόρμην τὴν γνώμην, i. e. "I did not put the vote to the two-footed lions"—for such might Socrates fairly consider the Athenians, roaring for their prey, just as Clytemnestra is described by Æschylus in Agam. 1231, διπορος λίαυα. The error is to be referred to the fact that β means "two:" as I have shown on the Statesman, p. 250, n. 66, where β. ποσι, i. e. διποσι has been corrupted into ποσι.

⁵—⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were ἀναμιξ ἄρχων, not συνε-ἀρχων, where ἱξ has no meaning. For though ἱξάρχων is applied to the

whereas Theramenes and Callixenus did on the day after introduce secretly fictitious chairmen (of the meeting), and got against the men a vote of death without a trial; and yet did you (Axiochus) lawfully¹ defend them and Euryptolemus² likewise, while thirty thousand were at the general meeting.

[13.] *Axio.* It is so, Socrates. And from that time I have had enough of the platform,³ and nothing has seemed to me more disagreeable than statesmanship. And this is plain to those who have been engaged in the business. And you indeed speak thus, as taking a view from a look-out; but we, who have made the experiment, know it more accurately. For the mob, my dear Socrates, is a thing ungrateful, satiated with the mere touch, cruel, envious, uneducated, as being made up of a mass of persons brought together, violent (and)⁴ triflers; while he, who acts the courtesan to it, is more miserable by far.

[14.] *Soc.* Since then, Axiochus, you lay down the science, which is the most free, as the least to be prayed for amongst the rest, what shall we think of the remaining pursuits? Are they not to be avoided? I once indeed heard Prodicus saying that death does not exist as regards either the living or those, who have changed their existence.

Axio. How say you, Socrates?

Soc. That as regards the living, it does not exist; while they, who are dead, do not exist; so that neither, as regards you, does it exist; for you are not dead; nor, should you suffer aught, will it exist, as regards you; for you will then not exist. Vain then is the sorrow in Axiochus grieving for

leader in a dance or song, as shown by Eurip. Tro., 148; yet *ὄν* could scarcely be united to it. Fischer indeed asserts that *συνεξάρχειν* means to "gratify"—But he has not been able to prove his assertion, nor could he do it. Wolf has suggested *συνεξαμαρτύν*, well aware that *συνεξάρχειν* would be here out of place.

To avoid the absurdity in *μόνος*—*καί*—I have translated, as if the Greek were *νομίμως*—*καί*—Ficinus omits *μόνος* entirely.

² I have adopted *Εὐρυπτόλεμος*, suggested by Stephens, and found subsequently in a good MS., and confirmed by Xenophon, H. Gr. i. 7, 8. Ficinus has—"Eriptolemo—"

³ This is the English idea, answering to the *βῆμα* of the Athenians, the place to which those went up, who wanted to harangue the people.

⁴ To obviate the objection started by Stephens, I have translated, as if *καί* had dropt out between *βιαιῶν* and *φλυνάρων*. Ficinus omits *βιαιῶν*.

Axiochus, touching a thing that neither is nor will be; and it is just the same, as if a person were to grieve for Scylla or the Centaur, which, as regards you, do not exist now, nor will they, after your close of life, exist. For what is fearful is so to those, who exist; but to those, who do not exist, how can it be so?

[15.] Axio. These clever things you have said from the talkativeness, which is floating on the surface (of society) just now. For from thence is this idle speaking, which has been cleverly got up for the young men. But the deprivation of the good things of life is what gives me pain, even should you rattle out reasons, Socrates, still more plausible than those just now.¹ For the mind, when it is wandering, thinks nothing of fine-spoken words; nor do these touch even its surface, ²which affect indeed a mere pomp² and splendour of diction, but are wanting in truth. Now sufferings do not endure sophisms; and upon those things alone, that can reach the soul, rests there any aid.³

[16.] Soc. You are putting together, Axiochus, (words)⁴ without reason, in bringing the perception of things that are bad as opposed to the deprivation of things that are good, through your forgetting that you are dead.⁵ For the counter-suffering of ill pains him who is deprived of good; but he, who does not exist, does not lay hold even of deprivation. How then should there be a grief for that, which is about to furnish no knowledge of the things that will cause pain?

¹ I have adopted τὴν ἀπρί in lieu of ἀπρί, as suggested by Fischer, who refers to τὴν γὰρ ἀπρί δινότερα, in Theætet. p. 165, A.

² I have translated, as if the Greek were ἄλλως μὲν—ἀνέται— not ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν—ἀνέται— For τείνει, not ἀνέται, requires the preposition εἰς. With regard to ἄλλως πομπήν, see Ruhken on Tim. p. 199. Ficinus, apparently unable to understand ἀνέται, has "etsi audit, negligit."

³ In lieu of ἀπειραι, which is perfectly unintelligible, Hemsterhuis suggested ἀείραι, of which Wesseling approves on Herodot. iv. 91; and the same alteration is proposed by Segaar in Epistol. ad Valckenær, p. 19, and in Præf. ad Observat. in S. Luc. p. 9. But it is rejected both by Fischer and Boeckh; for they doubtless knew that ἀείσθαι is a deponent, not a passive, verb. I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were ἀπειρί τι ἐν τοῖς— Ficinus has "solæ hæc attendit."

⁴ Although γὰρ might stand here, yet as συνάπτεις requires its object, I have translated, as if the author had written τὰ ῥήματα—

⁵ This seems strangely said to a person who was still alive.

¹ For had you, Axiochus, at the beginning laid down (with me),¹ in some way that there is no perception (to the dead),² you would not, through your ignorance, have shuddered at death. But now you are turning yourself round,³ while fearing that you shall be deprived of soul,⁴ and place a soul round deprivation;⁴ ⁵ and you fear that you shall not have a perception; and yet you imagine that you shall by perception comprehend a perception, that will not exist.⁵ [17.]
⁶ In addition to their being many and beautiful reasons for the immortality of the soul.⁶ For a mortal nature would surely not ⁷ have proceeded and been lifted up ⁷ to such a greatness in action,⁸ as to despise the violence of superior wild animals, and to pass over seas, and to build cities, and to lay down forms of polity,⁸ and to look up to heaven and behold the revolutions of the stars, and the courses of the sun and moon, and their eclipses, and rapid return to their former state, and the equality of days,⁹ and the two tropical movements, during winter and summer, and the rising and setting of the Pleiades,⁹

¹—¹ I have adopted the correction of Wolf, τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ, ὥ 'Αξιοχε, ἱμοί, in lieu of ἀρχὴν γὰρ, ὥ 'Αξιοχε μὴ— Ficinus has briefly "principio enim nimis sensum quandam poneret—"

² I have inserted, what is required by the sense, τοῖς θανούσιν, which might easily have dropt out after αἰσθῆσιν.

³ Such is the literal version of the Greek, νῦν δὲ περιτρέπεις σεαυτὸν, which I cannot understand. The author wrote, I suspect, νῦν δ' ἐπ' ἄπορα τρέπεις σεαυτὸν— i. e. "but now you are turning yourself to a difficulty—" Ficinus, "pervertis te ipsum—"

⁴—⁴ Here again I am at a loss, as I cannot perceive how a soul or life can be placed round deprivation. Did the writer mean to say, "and you invest deprivation with existence?" similar to "amissioni animam addicis" in Ficinus.

⁵—⁵ Here again I must leave for others to understand, what I cannot, all between the numerals.

⁶—⁶ Unless I am greatly mistaken, there is a lacuna here; for the train of thought exhibits a sad want of connexion, which Ficinus supplies by "ex eo quod—"

⁷—⁷ By the aid of the two best MSS. V. and Z., that read τοσόνδε, and of one, that offers τόσον διους, and of V., that has also ἀν ἥπαρ, I have been able to elicit τοσόνδε τοῦσ' ἀν ἥπαρ, as I have translated, in lieu of the unintelligible τοσόν τοῖσιν διούσιν διήπαρ, found in all the other MSS. Ficinus has "in tantam excellentiam surrexisset—"

⁸—⁸ With this passage compare Soph. Antig. 332—368.

⁹—⁹ I have adopted Wolf's certain restoration, who reads καὶ τροπὰς διττὰς χειμῶνος καὶ θέρους, καὶ ἀνατολὰς τε καὶ δύσεως τῶν Πλειάδων: where καὶ ἀνατολὰς τε καὶ δύσεως have been brought from the place they previously occupied between σελήνης and ἐκλείψεις. For not only do

and the winds, and the fall of rain, ¹and the ill-fated trailing along of fiery meteors,¹ and to lay down on a tablet what the universe is to undergo for ages,³ unless there had been in the soul some ³breath of divinity,³ through which he possessed the power of thinking upon and knowing subjects of so vast a kind; so that you are not, Axiochus, changing your existence for death, but for immortality; nor will you have a deprivation of good things, but a still purer enjoyment of them; nor pleasures mixed up with a mortal body, but unmixed with every pain. For you will, when released from this prison, depart thither, where all is without trouble, and moanings, and old age, and life is a calm, and with no taste⁴ of ill, and where in a mild atmosphere of unruffled tranquillity you (will dwell),⁵ looking round upon Nature, and acting the philosopher not before a mob and a theatre, but in the presence of Truth, blooming around.⁶

[18.] *Axio.* You have by your discourse brought me round to a contrary point. For I have no longer a fear of death, but already a desire to say myself, in imitation of the orators, something still more; and for a long time I have been thinking upon things on high, and I will go through the eternal and divine course, since after my weakness I have collected my strength and am become a new man.

[19.] *Soc.* (Hear too),⁷ if you are willing, another account which Gobryas related to me—a man of the Magi, (who)⁸ said that during the expedition of Xerxes, his grandfather,

we thus recover a noun, required to govern Πλειάδων, but perceive likewise why the Pleiades are introduced here; since, as we learn from Hesiod Epy. 383 and 615, both farmers and sailors were wont to pay attention to the rising and setting of the Pleiades.

¹—¹ Ficinus has “jactum præteris fulgurisque coruscum,” and translates παραρηξασθαι by “mirifice sisteret—”

² Wolf refers here to the statement of Pliny, that Hipparchus had calculated the eclipses of the sun and moon for 600 years to come.

³—³ So Horace, “divinæ particulam aures.”

⁴ I have adopted Matthiæ's correction, ἀγευστος for ἀγοτος, remembering the expression κακῶν ἀγευστος in Soph. Antig. 590.

⁵ In καί, which Bekker has incorrectly omitted, with a single and inferior MS., lies hid οὐκ ἔστις—

⁶ Fischer refers to Cicero de Finib. v. 19, and Augustine de Trin. iv. 2.

⁷ I have adopted ἀκοῦσαι, supplied by the best MS. V. and Stobæus. Ficinus has “Referam—”

⁸ I have translated, as if ὅς had dropt out between μάγος and ἐπε— Ficinus, to supply the want of connexion, has “Inquit enim—”

who was his namesake, was sent to Delos to watch over the island, where the two deities¹ presided, according to some brazen tablets, that Opis and Hecaergus² had brought from the Hyperboreans; and that he learnt that after³ the soul was released from the body, it departed to the uncertain⁴ spot, and some dwelling under ground, where is the royal palace of Pluto,⁵ not less than the hall of Zeus, inasmuch as the earth possesses the middle portion of the world, and the pole (of heaven) is spherical; of which the gods of heaven have obtained by lot one portion of the hemisphere, and the gods below the other, being some of them brothers,⁶ and others the children of brothers;⁷ and that the gates before the road to Pluto's domain are fast bound by iron locks and keys; and that the river Acheron receives him, who has opened them, and, after it, Cocytus, both of which it is necessary for him to pass over, and to be led to Minos and Rhadamanthus,⁸ (where is)⁹ what is called the plain of Truth. [20.] There are they seated as judges to sift each of the comers as to what life he had led, and in what pursuits he had dwelt in the body;⁹ and that to tell a falsehood is out of his power. On such then as a kind daemon has breathed during life, these are located in the region of the pious. ¹⁰There without stint the seasons bloom with every kind of produce, and fountains of pure

¹ The two deities were Apollo and Artemis.

² By Opis was meant Artemis, and by Hecaergus, Apollo.

³ In lieu of *κατὰ* Horreus once proposed to read *μετὰ*, which I have adopted, confirmed, as it is, by the best MS. V. Fischer however says that Horreus changed his opinion in *Miscell. Crit.* p. 171.

⁴ Since a good MS. Z. reads "ἄδον in lieu of ἀδελον, perhaps the author wrote Αἰδον ἀνήλιον, similar to τὰν ἀσιβῆν Ἀπόλλωνι—χίρσον in *Æsch. S. Th.* 857. Ficinus has "occultum—"

⁵ In Ficinus it is "Junonis," evidently a literal error for "Plutonis."

⁶ These were Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto.

⁷ Namely Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus.

⁸ I have translated, as if ἔν' had dropt out between Παράμανθον and δ, and ἴσσι after κλέζεται. Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "in eam videlicet regionem, qui veritatis campus cognominatur."

⁹ As the subject of ἐνψύισθη is wanting, it is to be supplied, I suspect, by reading ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ψυχῇ οὖσα— For ἢ ψυχῇ οὖσα might easily have dropt out before ψεύσασθαι. Ficinus avoids all the difficulty by omitting βεβίωκε—σώματι, and rendering "cujusque vitam," as if his MS. read ἐκαστον τὸν βίον in lieu of ἑκαστον, τὴν βίον—

¹⁰—¹⁰ Wolf was the first to remark the poetical colour of this passage;

water flow;¹⁰ and every where are meadows made beautiful¹ by flowers of varied hues, and places of discussions for philosophers, and theatres of poets, and cyclic choirs,² and the hearing of music, and elegant³ banquets, and feasts self-furnished, and an unmixed freedom from pain, and a delightful mode of living. Nor is produced there violent cold or heat, but a well-tempered air is diffused around, mixed with the sun's mild beams. There is the seat of honour to those, who have shared in the Mysteries;⁴ for they perform together their holy rites even thither.⁵ How then is there not to you first⁶ a share in the honour, as being of the family⁷ of the goddesses?⁸ And there is a report that Heracles and Dionysus descended to Hades after having previously shared in the Mysteries here; and that they put on⁹ a boldness for the journey thither from the Eleusinian (rites).⁹ [21.] But they, whose life has been passed in a course of evil doings, are driven by the Furies to Erebus and Chaos through Tartarus, where

where it is easy to elicit a distich, probably of Sophocles, "Ἐνθ' ἄρδοναι μὲν ἦρε παγκάρπῳ γέαι Βρούνοσι, καθαρῶν δ' ἐκρίονσι ναμάτων Πηγαί: Ficinus too has—"ver eternum—"

¹ In lieu of *ἱεριζόμενοι*, which is not a Greek word, I have translated, as if the author had written *ῥοιζόμενοι*—

² From the juxta-position of *ποιητῶν*, I have taken *κύκλιοι* in the sense of "cyclic." It may however mean "circular"—for *κυκλίων χορῶν* is found in Eurip. Helen. 1328.

³ Instead of *εὐμελῆ*, five good MSS. read *ἡμελῆ*, similar to "jocunda" in Ficinus, which I have adopted; although the author wrote, I suspect, *πυμελῆ*—"rich."

⁴ Compare Soph. Fragm. Inc. 52, ὡς τρισυλβιοὶ Κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἱ ταῦτα διερχθέντες τίλη, Μόλωσ' ἐς "Αἶδον. τοιοῦδε γὰρ μόνους ἐκεί Ζῆν' ἔστι τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις πάντ' οἰκίε κακά.

⁵ Correct Greek would require *ἐκεῖ*, not *ἐκεῖσε*—in which word lies hid, however, *κατὰ εἰστας*. On the box, used at the Mysteries, see Lobeck's *Aglaophamus*, p. 25, who quotes from Clemens Alex. Cohortat. p. 18, *ἐλαβον ἐκ εἰστας—ἀπεθίμην εἰς κάλαθον καὶ ἐκ καλάθου εἰς εἰσταν*.

⁶ In lieu of *πρώτῳ* one would prefer *εἴπερ τῷ*, i. e. "if to any one—" For Axiochus was not the first who had a share in the honour.

⁷ So Fischer understands *γεννήτη*. But as three MSS. read *γενήσῃ*, and two *γενεῖτῃ*, little doubt can remain of the truth of Wolf's correction, *γῆ μύστη*—

⁸ I have adopted Wolf's elegant *ἐνδύσασθαι*, in lieu of *ἐνδύσασθαι*, which Fischer vainly attempts to explain. Ficinus has "suscipere"—

⁹— Although *τελετῆς* might perhaps be understood after *τῆς* 'Ελευσινίας, yet I should prefer *τῆς* 'Ελευσίνι ἀγνείας—

is the region of the impious, and the unfilled urns of the daughters of Danaus, and the thirst of Tantalus, ¹and the entrails of Tityus, and the uncompleted stone of Sisypheus,

To whom begins again his labour's end.¹

There too are persons licked round by wild beasts,² and ³terrified by the torches of the Furies glaring around them ;³ and enduring every kind of ignominious treatment, they are by eternal punishments worn down. This account did I hear from Gobryas ; and you, Axiochus, can decide upon it. For carried along myself by reason I know firmly this alone, that the soul is wholly immortal, and that, when it is removed from this spot, it is there⁴ without pain ; so that it must needs be, Axiochus, that, if you have lived piously, you will be happy either below or above.

Axio. I am ashamed, Socrates, to say a word.⁵ For so far am I from fearing death, that already I feel a desire for it ; ⁶so greatly has this beautiful discourse⁶ of yours⁷ persuaded me, as if it were a heavenly one.⁸ And even now I

¹—¹ In the Greek lies hid the following dramatic distich—*Καὶ σπλάγχνα Τείδου Σισύφου τ' ἀνέηυτος Πίτρος, οὐ τὰ τίρματ' αὐδὴ ἔρχεται πόνων.*

² I do not remember to have read elsewhere of persons in Hades being licked round by wild beasts, except in the case of Bacchus, as described by Horace—"Te vidit insons Cerberus—leniter atterens Caudam et recentis trilingui Ore pedes tetigitque crura"—nor in fact could the act of licking indicate any thing of a dreadful kind. Hence in lieu of *περιλιγόμενοι* one would prefer *περιάλλα χασμωμένους*—i. e. with jaws very widely opened. Ficinus avoids the difficulty by his version—"ubi feræ mordaces inseparabiliter corporibus se circumplicant."

³—³ The Greek is *λαμπάσιν ἐπιμόνως πυρούμενοι*, i. e. "fired continually with torches." But as Stobæus offers *δασίν* instead of *λαμπάσιν*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *δρασι περιλαμπομένους πυρούμενοι* : for *πυρούμενοι* would be another example of the verb *πύρισθαι*, found in § 16, where the best MS. V. reads incorrectly *πυρίης* for *πυρρείης*. Ficinus, unable to understand satisfactorily the Greek, has given, what I suspect he did not find in his MS., "ubi faces inextinguibiles carnes exurunt."

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were not *καί*, but *ἐκεῖ*, to balance *ἐς τοῦδε τοῦ χωρίου*.

⁵ Ficinus has "ulterius loqui," as if his MS. read, *τε εἰπεῖν πλείον*—

⁶—⁶ The Greek is at present *οὕτω με καὶ οὕτως*—but three MSS. read *οὕτω μὴν καὶ*—and one omits *καὶ*. Hence the Greek was, I suspect, originally, *οὕτως μ' ἄγαν καλῶς*—

⁷ I have adopted *ὁ σός*, furnished by two MSS., in lieu of *ὁ* simply.

⁸ Three MSS. omit correctly *ὁ* before *οὐράνιος*— One would prefer, however, *ὦν οὐράνιος*— Ficinus has "quasi cœleste oraculum."

have a contempt for life, as being about to remove to a better home. For the present then I will cast up quietly with myself¹ what has been said; and at mid-day you will be with me, Socrates.

Soc. I will do as you say. And for a while² I will go back for a walk to Cynosarges,³ from whence I was sent for hither.

¹ In lieu of ἀναριθμήσομαι, the best MS. V. reads ἀναριθμήσομαι, which seems to lead to πάντ' ἀριθμήσομαι—Ficinus has "animadvertam—" Wolf suggests ἀναμνησέσομαι, i. e. "nominabor—"

² In lieu of δέ, two MSS. read γάρ. I have translated as if the author wrote τίνας—

³ Matthiae, as I learn from the Zurich editors, proposed to reject ἐς Κυνόσαργας. Why, I know not.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ERYXIAS.

Of this dialogue, which Fischer has, on the authority of Suidas, attributed to *Æschines*, a follower of Socrates, but Boeckh to an unknown writer, five translations have appeared in Latin, one in German, and one in French. But as they have been all made from a printed text, they are in a critical point of view of very little use. And a similar observation is applicable to the notes of the different editors, who have been apparently unwilling to meddle with the text, even when they could scarcely have failed to see it was corrupt. I have therefore been reluctantly compelled to supply partially their omissions, and to attempt to do, what would have come with a better grace from Boeckh.

From the allusion in § 2, to the embassy sent from Sicily to Athens, as recorded by Thucydides in iii. 86, Fischer infers that the dialogue is supposed to have taken place about Ol. 88, 2; and as regards the subject of it, that the wise alone are the really wealthy, he refers to Cicero, *Paradox* 6, and to Iamblichus, *Protrept.* p. 23, ed. Arceer.

ERYXIAS;

OR,

ON WEALTH.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, ERYXIAS, CRITIAS, ERASISTRATUS.

SOCRATES.

[1.] We happened to be taking a walk, myself and Eryxias, of the ward of Steiria, in the portico of Zeus, who presides over Freed-men, and there came to us Critias the son of Phæax, (and)¹ the nephew of Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus happened at that time to be recently arrived from Sicily and those places;² and on approaching near he said—"Hail, Socrates." And (hail)³ too thou, said I. What then, can you tell us of any news⁴ from Sicily? And very (good) too, said he; but are you willing for us to sit down first? for I am tired from having walked yesterday from Megara.⁵ Perfectly so, (said I,) if it seems good to you. What then of the events there, said he, do you wish to hear the first? Is it of the people there, themselves, what they are doing, or how they are affected towards this state of ours? For they appear to me to

¹ I have translated, as if *kai* had dropt out after *Φαίλας*: and I have thus got rid of the difficulty, which others had seen, but failed to overcome.

² In the words *τὸν τόπον τοῦτον* there is an error, which I am unable to correct.

³ In this formula *χαῖρε* is wont to be repeated. See Porson on Eurip. Orest. 470, and myself in Tro. Præf. p. xxiii.

⁴ In lieu of *καλόν*, Bas. 2, has *καίνον*—Corradus renders "Ecquid novi—affers? An habes pulchri aliquid?" thus uniting both readings. But *καλόν* ought to follow *kai πάντ*, as I have translated.

⁵ Megara was about 14 English miles from Athens.

be in a case similar to wasps; for if any one excites latter in any slight manner to anger, they become difficult battle against, until one falls upon them and destroys nest and all. So, I think,¹ are the people of Syracuse. unless, after entertaining angry feelings, one² shall go th with a very large fleet, it is not possible for them to come our power; but by all these little doings they will be en the more, so as to become the most difficult of all (to man and they have just now sent ambassadors,³ intending, seems to me, to deceive in some way the state.

[2.] During our conversation the ambassadors from cuse happened to pass by; when, pointing to one of Erasistratus observed—That person, Socrates, said he, most wealthy of the⁴ Siceliotes and Italiotes;⁴ and how s he not be, who has land without stint; so that it is ea him, if one wished it, to cultivate a great deal of it; and i such a kind, that there is none other so good,⁵ at least an the Greeks; and he has still many⁶ things leading to w chattels,⁶ (and)⁷ slaves, and horses, and gold and silver. seeing him excited,⁸ as if about to dilate upon the man's stance, I asked him—What kind of person, Erasistratus this man seem to be in Sicily? This man, said he, both to be and is the most knavish of all the Siceliotes and Ita by how much he is the wealthiest; so that, should y

¹ Instead of *οὖν* the sense requires *οἶμαι*, as I have translated.

² I cannot understand *ἔργον ποιησάμενος*. Hence I have translated as if the author had written *ὄργην ποιησάμενος*, a phrase found in *cyd.* iv. 122, and *Demosth.* F. L. p. 370, R., where Shilleto might satisfy the doubts of Markland by quoting the two passages introduced.

³ The embassy, to which allusion is here made, is mentioned in *cydides* in iii. 86. From which it would seem that the dialogue was ten much earlier than is commonly supposed.

⁴—⁴ By Siceliotes and Italiotes were meant the settlers in Sicily, not the native people called *Σικελοὶ* and *Ἰταλοὶ*.

⁵ Although *ἑρίπας ἄλλη* is found elsewhere, yet here the sense requires as I have translated, *ἑρίπα καλή*—

⁶—⁶ The Greek is *τάλλα—ἀπλά*. But Hemsterhuis and Thibaut suggested *ἑπιπλά*, adopted by Boeckh; and they should have suggested wise *πολλὰ*—as I have translated.

⁷ In lieu of *καὶ* the sense requires *καί*—

⁸ Fischer conceives that in *ἀναγόμενον* there is a metaphor from a person setting sail, or appearing at a distance from the land. See Arnold on *Thucyd.* i. 112, and myself on *Philoct.* 573.

willing to ask any Siceliote whom he thought to be the greatest rogue, not one would mention any other person than him.

[3.] Conceiving then that he was holding a conversation not upon trifling matters, but what seemed to be the greatest, namely, virtue and wealth,¹ I asked him which would he say is the wealthier person, he, who happened to have ²two talents³ of silver, or he, who had a field worth two talents? I think, said he, the person who has the field. By the same rule then, said I, he, who happens to have garments, or bed-furniture, or other goods of greater value than are those, which the stranger possesses, would be the wealthier. To this he assented. Now, should any one give you the choice, which would you wish? I would wish that, said he, which is the most valuable. Would you not (say so), as conceiving yourself to be more wealthy? Just so. For the present then he appears to be the wealthiest, who possesses things the most valuable. Yes, said he. [4.] Would not then, said I, persons in health be more wealthy than those who are ill? at least if health is a possession more valuable than the property of a person who is ill. For surely there is no one, who would not set a higher value on health, although he possessed only a little money, than on illness, although he possessed the property of the great king,³ through his conceiving, it is plain, that health is of greater value; for he would never prefer it, unless he considered it of greater value than property. He would not. If then any thing else seems to be of greater value than health, the person, who possesses that thing, would be the wealthiest. Yes. If then a person were to come to us and ask—Can you, Socrates, and Eryxias, and Erasistratus,

¹ I have omitted *τίσι*, which could not be thus repeated; for *ἀρετῆς* and *πλοῦτος* are put in apposition with *τῶν μεγίστων*.

²⁻³ The Greek is *δύο ταλάντι τάλαντα*. But six MSS. read *ὃν ταλάντι*, and one *τάλαντον*. Both are adopted by Boeckh. But no one would ask whether the owner of a field, worth two talents, was not richer than the owner of one talent; although he might compare a certain amount of money with the same amount of money's worth. Some reason should however be given to prove how the field was superior to the silver. Hence I suspect that something has been lost here to this effect, "For the talents might be taken away by force or fraud, or lost by accident, or be diminished in value by rust; none of which events would happen in the case of the field."

³ Of Persia.

tell me, what possession is the most valuable to man? not that, by possessing which a person would deliberate best on this point, how he could best transact his own affairs and those of his friends? What should we say is this? To me it appears, Socrates, that happiness is the thing of the greatest value to man. And not wrongly so, said I. But shall we consider those the most happy, who are the best to do, or those who appear so. [5.] Would not those then be the best to do, who err the least, in the case of themselves and the rest of mankind, and regulate affairs the most successfully? By all means. They then, who know what is evil and what is good, and what is to be done and what is not, would regulate affairs the most successfully, and err the least. To this too he assented. Now then, the same persons appear to be the wisest and the best to do, and the happiest, and the wealthiest: indeed wisdom is a possession of the greatest value. But, said Erasistratus,¹ taking up the discourse, of what advantage would food and drink, and if there is anything of this kind, be to a person, if he were wiser than Nestor, yet did not happen to have the necessaries of life? Would his wisdom be a benefit? Or how could he be the wealthiest, when nothing prevents him from being poor, if he possesses no resources for the necessaries (of life)? he thought indeed he had said something extremely (wise). But would the person, said I, who possesses wisdom, suffer in this way, even if he were in want of these things?² For if a person possessed the residence³ of Polytion, and the treasures⁴ were full of gold and silver, would he be in want of anything? Nay, said he, there is nothing to prevent that person from immediately disposing of his property, and obtain-

¹ Fischer was the first to correct 'Ερασίστρατος into 'Ερυξίας, as by all subsequent editors except Bekker.

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *Σφόδρα οὖν ἰδόναι εὖ* not *καὶ λῆγειν*, remembering the phrase in p. 399, B. § 16, *σφόδρα εὖ διελίχθαι*.

³ In lieu of *τούτων* the sense requires *πάντων*, or rather *τοιούτων*—

⁴ Instead of *δὲ* the train of reasoning requires *γὰρ*, as I have translated. The words are constantly confounded.

⁵ To avoid the repetition in *οἰκίαν* and *οἰκία*, we must evidently read *οὐσίαν*—*οἰκία*—The origin of the error is to be traced to the sin between *ι* and *κ* in MSS. See Porson *Adversar.* p. 53, 131.

in return for it whatever he happens to want for his living, or money even; in exchange for which he will be able to procure them,¹ and to have on the instant all things in plenty. [6.] Provided, said I, persons existing happen to be in want of his residence,² more than of the wisdom of that person; since, if they were such as to value more the wisdom of the man,³ and what results from it, he would have⁴ much more to dispose of, if he happened to be in want of any thing, and wished to dispose both of it and the works resulting from it. Surely⁵ of the residence⁶ the use happens to be much and necessary; and great is the difference to a person in the case of things relating to life, as regards his living⁷ in a dwelling of this kind, or in a small and mean tenement; but of wisdom the use costs little,⁸ and slight⁹ is the difference for a person to be wise¹⁰ or untaught in questions of the greatest moment. And oh! that men should despise the one,¹¹ and not be buyers of it! but that of cypress for their residence, and Pentelican¹² marble, many should be in want, and willing to purchase! Now would not a person, if he were a clever pilot, or a skilful physician, and able to practise well and creditably his art,¹³ or any other of such kind of arts,¹³ be of greater value

¹ In lieu of *ταῦτα* I should prefer *τοιαῦτα*, "such things—"

² Here again we must read *οἰσίαν* for *οἰκίαν*.

³ Since the name of Nestor, who is here alluded to, has not been mentioned recently, I suspect that in *ἀνθρώπου* lies hid *γενηνίου ἱππότου*—with reference to the *γενηνιος ἱππότα Νίστωρ* in Homer.

⁴ I have adopted *ἀν ἔχοι* from Fischer, who correctly saw that *ἀν* had dropt out after *μᾶλλον*—

⁵ In lieu of *ἦ*, which I cannot understand, I have translated, as if the interrogative *ἦ* were written originally.

⁶ Here again one would prefer *οἰσίαν* to *οἰκίαν*—

⁷ Instead of *οἰκίαν*, which is without regimen, the syntax and sense require *οἰκοῦντι*, as I have translated.

⁸ Such seems to be here the meaning of *ὀλίγου ἀξία*, which elsewhere signify "of little value."

⁹ Instead of *σικερά*, one would have expected *οὐ σικερά*—

¹⁰ To support the syntax, we must suppose that *ὥστε* has dropt out before *ἦ*—

¹¹ The Greek is *ἦ τοῦτον μὲν καταφρονεῖν*— I have translated, as if it were *ἦ τὸ τοῦ μὲν καταφρονεῖν*—where *τοῦ μὲν*, referring to *τὸ σοφὸν εἶναι*, is opposed to *τῆς δὲ ευπαιττου*; while on the syntax in *τὸ καταφρονεῖν*, it will be sufficient to quote *Τὸ Δία νομίζειν*, in Aristoph. *Nep.* 817.

¹² Pentelé was a mountain in Attica famous for its marble.

¹³ The words between the numerals seem strangely introduced here.

than ¹ any one whatever ¹ of those ² of the greatest pos-
 according to substance? ² and would not he, who is at
 deliberate well both for himself and another, how he
 do the best, be able to dispose (of his skill), ³ if he wish
 do so?

[7.] (On this) Eryxias, taking up the discourse, and ⁴
 ing with his eyes under, ⁴ as if he had been injuri-
 treated, ⁵ observed—And would you, Socrates, if one must
 the truth of you, assert that you are wealthier than Cal-
 the son of Hipponicus? And yet you would acknowledge
 you are not less taught (than he is) on matters of the gre-
 moment, but wiser rather; and still you are not on this
 count the wealthier. For perhaps you imagine, Eryxias
 I, that these arguments, which we are now discussing,
 sport, since the facts are not really so; but that they are
 pebbles in the pebble-game, which if a person cleverly ⁷ b
 forward, ⁸ he will be able to cause the opposite players
 beaten, ⁹ so as not to have what they can bring forward as
 those movements. Perhaps then you imagine, that
 ters are thus without any reference to the rich; and
 there are certain arguments in no respects either tr

and so thought Clericus and Horreus. Fischer defends them by q
 the translation of Pirkheimer, "aut alius quispiam simili arte præ-
 who evidently wished to read *ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν τοιοιτοτρόπων τε*
ὦν— in lieu of *ἢ τιν' ἄλλην τῶν τοιοιτοτρόπων τεχνῶν*—

¹—¹ This is the proper English translation of *οὐδενός ὅτου οὐκ* in
 literally "no one not—"

²—² Although this may perhaps be understood, yet I should
κελημίνων to *κτημάτων*, in English, "of those called the grea
 regards their means—"

³ I have added "of his skill," to complete the sense.

⁴—⁴ In lieu of *ὑποβλήσας* I should prefer the Homeric *ὑπόδρα β*
 where the Schol. explains *ὑπόδρα* by *δεινόν, ὀργίλον*.

⁵ How Eryxias could fancy he had been injuriously treated, I
 understand. Hence I suspect the author wrote *δακνόμενος*, not
μινος. See my note on Soph. Philoct. 377.

⁶ On the wealth of Callias see Schol. on Aristoph. *Barp.*, 4.
 Hemsterhuis on Lucian Timon, § 24.

⁷ Instead of *φείσοιτο*, which could not be thus used in the middl
 as shown by the subsequent *ἀντιφείρωσι*, the author wrote, *Ι*
φείσοι εὖ, as I have translated.

⁸ The description here given of the pebble-game, applies equal
 to chess, draughts, and backgammon.

⁹ In lieu of *ἡττᾶσθαι*, which seems somewhat too much here, I
 prefer *ιστάσθαι*, "to be at a stand-still—"

false, by detailing which, a person may get the better of his opponents, how that the wisest are likewise the wealthiest, ¹ and by saying these of such a kind of falsehood of persons saying true.¹ And perhaps there is nothing wonderful in this; just as if two persons should be speaking about letters, one asserting that sigma (σ) begins the word Socrates, but the other alpha (α), the argument of the party, who says that alpha (α) begins, should be superior to his, who says that sigma (σ) does.

[8.] And, looking round to the parties present, Eryxias observed, smiling at the same time, and blushing,² as if he had not been present³ during what had been said before, I did not imagine, Socrates, that there was any need of arguments of that kind, by which a person would be able to persuade not one of those, who are present,³ nor be benefited by them. For who is there with any intellect, who would be persuaded that the richest are the wisest? ⁴but would rather be informed with greater delight, if it is necessary⁴ to talk about being wealthy, from whence it is honourable to be wealthy, and from whence disgraceful, and what it is to be wealthy, whether a good or an evil. Be it so, said I. Henceforth then we will be on our guard; and you do right in admonishing me. But why do not you yourself, since you have introduced the subject, endeavour to state whether it seems to you to be a good or an evil to be wealthy? especially since the previous arguments do not appear to have been spoken with reference to this point.

[9.] To myself then for the present⁵ it seems that to be

¹ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. The author wrote, what might be got at, I think, by a bold conjecture.

² Why Eryxias should blush, in consequence of his being supposed to have been not present at the former part of the discourse, I cannot understand. I could have understood, had the author written, what I suspect he did write, *ὡς περ ἀπορῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λελεγμένοις*, "as if having been in a difficulty during the preceding conversation—" for that would have been a fair ground for blushing. And similarly one would prefer *ἀπορούντων* for *παρόντων*—just afterwards (³). The error has arisen from § 12.

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were originally, *ἰσχυροί, αἱ δὲ ἡδύον*—not as at present, *ἐπιδὲ δαῖν*—which I cannot understand. On the loss or confusion of *ἰσχυροί*, see my note on Legg. ix. p. 127, n. ⁵, while on *ἡδύον*, or *ἡδύον*, or *ἡδύονα*, united to verbs of hearing or understanding, see Ast's "Lexicon Platonicum," in "Ἠδύον."

⁵ In lieu of *τοῖνυν*, the sense requires *τὰ νῦν*, as I have translated.

wealthy is a good. But while he was still desirous to something, Critias suddenly interrupted him¹ (by saying Tell me, Eryxias, do you consider it a good to be wealthy? Yes, I do, by Zeus. For I should be mad (if I did not) I think there is not a single person, who would not say so. And yet, said the other,² I think too that there is not a person, whom I could not cause³ to say with myself that some men it is an evil to be wealthy. If then it were a it would not have appeared to some to be an evil. Her I said to them that—If ye happened to be at variance on this point, which of you two is speaking with the greater truth about horsemanship, how a person would ride the horse and had I myself happened to be skilled in horsemanship, I would have endeavoured to cause you to cease from your differences in opinion; for I should have been ashamed not, if present, prevented, as far as I could, your being at variance; or if you had been at variance upon any other point whatever, and were about to separate not at all, unless agreed upon⁴ this, rather as enemies instead of being friends. But now,⁴ since you happen to be at variance upon an point of this kind, of which there must needs be the use throughout the whole of life, and a great difference, whether we are to give to it, as being beneficial or not; and this too as being not of trifling questions, but of those that are thought to be the greatest by the Greeks, since fathers recommend the first point to their children, as soon as they arrive at age for reflecting upon⁵ what they ought;⁵ and⁶ the

¹ On this sense of *ὑπο κρούειν* see Aristoph. Ach. 38.

² Boeckh would read *ὁ ἱταῖρος*, "his friend," for he says that it scarcely found thus used elsewhere in Plato or his imitators.

³ The sense and syntax evidently require *ποιήσῃς*, the Attic optat., or *ποιήσας*, in lieu of *ποιήσαι*, which is without regimen.

⁴ The Greek is *τοῦτ' ἄλλοι—νῦν δὲ*. But first, there is to which *τοῦτ'* can be referred; and secondly, *ἄλλοι* could not be repeated after the preceding *ἄλλοι*; and lastly, the proposition down after *νῦν δὲ*, want their proper conclusion. I have therefore doubt but that the author wrote, *εἰ μὴ ὁμολογοῖτε, ἐχθρῶ δὲ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· νῦν δὲ τοῦτ' ἔτι ἄλλοι σπεύδουσιν δεῖ, ἐπειδὴ—* for *δεῖ* might easily have been lost through *ἐπειδὴ*—

⁵ In *τοῦ ἡδὴ φρονεῖν*, where *ἡδὴ* is perfectly unintelligible, lie hid *τοῦ*, & *δεῖ*, *φρονεῖν*—

⁶ I have translated as if *καὶ*, not *ὥς*, were written here. The two words are constantly confounded. See Markland Iph. A. 173.

to consider from whence they shall become wealthy; ¹so that should you possess anything you are worth something, but if not, nothing.¹ [10.] If then this object is made so violently a serious pursuit, and you, who agree on other matters, differ upon this one of such great moment, and still in addition you are at variance on the question of wealth, not whether it is of a ²black colour or white,² nor whether of a light weight or heavy, but whether it is an evil or a good, so as even to be arrayed to the extreme of enmity, should you be at variance about things evil and good, and this too, although you are friends as much as possible, and relations, I will not, as far as rests with myself, neglect you, while at variance with each other; but, if I were able myself, I would tell you how the case stands, and cause you to cease from your difference (in opinion). But now, since I happen to be not able, and each of you thinks himself able to cause the other to agree with him, I am prepared to take a part (in the discussion), as far as I can, in order that it may be agreed upon by you how the matter stands. Do you then, Critias, said I, endeavour to cause us to agree with you, as you have undertaken to do.

[11.] I would, said he, as I have begun, gladly ask Eryxias here, whether there seem to him to be men unjust and just. By Zeus, said he, and very much so. Well then, to act unjustly seems it to you to be an evil or a good? To me at least an evil. Would a man, who commits adultery with his neighbours' wives by means of money, seem to you to act unjustly? and this too when the state and the laws forbid it. To me at least he would seem to act unjustly. Consequently, said he, if the unjust man happens to be wealthy, and ³both able and willing to expend money,³ he would go astray; but if it were not his fortune to be rich, he would not have the means of expending, nor would he be able to accomplish what he wished, so that he would not even go astray. Hence it would be a greater benefit to the party to be not wealthy,

¹ Fischer quotes opportunely Horace Sat. i. 1, 62, "Nil satis est, inquit; quia tanti, quantum habeas, sis."

² Here is an allusion to the dark colour of iron, the coin of Sparta, and the white colour of silver, the coin of Athens.

³ I have translated, as if the author had originally written, what is required by the sense, *δυνατός και βουλόμενος ἀναλῶσαι ὁ ἀδίκος ἄνθρωπος*, not as at present, *δυνατός ἀναλῶσαι ὁ ἀδίκος τε ἄνθρωπος και ὁ βουλόμενος*, which I cannot understand.

since he would the less accomplish what he wished. Now he wished to do what was wrong. And again, would you say that to be ill is an evil or a good? I would say an evil. Well then, do there seem to you to be some men, who are without self-control? Yes, to me at least. If then it were better for a person of this kind for the sake of his health to abstain from food and drink, and the rest of things that are thought to be pleasant, while he is unable (to do so) through his want of self-control, it would be better for that person, that there should not be from whence he could procure those things for himself, rather than have a great superfluity in the necessaries (of life); for thus there would not be the power for him to go astray, not even if he vehemently wished it.

[12.] So well and beautifully was Critias thought to have spoken, that had not Eryxias felt a respect for those, who were present, nothing would have prevented him from getting up and striking Critias; of so great a thing did he deem himself to have been deprived; since it was evident to him, that he had previously formed not a correct opinion on the subject of wealth. Perceiving then that Eryxias was in this state, and careful that abuse and opposition should not proceed too far, I remarked, that Prodicus, the wise man of Ceos, had, when detailing this very argument, seemed to those, who were present, to be such a trifler as to be unable to persuade a single person present that he was speaking what was true; and thereupon a lad very young and a clever talker, who was sitting by, laughed at and jeered him, and put him up, desirous to get at the reasons for what he was saying; and in truth he became in much higher repute amongst the auditors than Prodicus himself. Might you have it in your power, said Erasistratus, to tell us his reasons? Completely so, if indeed I remember it. For it was, I think, something to this effect.

[13.] The lad asked him, in what way he conceived wealth to be an evil, and in what a good? when he taking up the discourse, observed—Just as you do likewise, that to persons beautiful in body and mind it is a good, and to such as know how to use it, to these likewise it is a good; but to the depraved and those who do not know, it is an evil. And all the rest of things, said he, are in this state. For of what kind are some of those, who make use of things, such to them

it is necessary for the things to be; and prettily, said he, appears to have been put into verse the sentiment of Archilochus—

As the actions are men meet with, so the thoughts are, which they frame. Now then, said the lad, if any one should make me wise in that very wisdom, by which the good become wise men, it is necessary for him to make at the same time the rest of things good for me, without his troubling himself at all about those very things, because he has made me wise instead of being untaught; as if a person should make me now a grammarian, it is necessary for him to make the rest of things grammatical for me; and if a musician, musical; just as when he makes me good, (it is necessary) to have made things good at the same time for me. To the latter assertion Prodicus however did not assent; although he acknowledged the former. [14.] Does it seem to you, said he, that as it is¹ the work of a man to make a dwelling, so it is to make things good? or is it necessary for things to continue to the end to be such, as they may have been at the commencement, whether evil or good? And Prodicus seemed to me to suspect to what point the argument was about to proceed in so² very clever a manner; (and),³ in order that he might not appear before all present to be confuted by the lad—for he thought it would be a thing of indifference for him to suffer this when alone—he said it was the work of a man. Does⁴ virtue, said (the lad), seem to you a thing to be taught,⁴ or is it innate? To be taught, he replied, at least by⁵ me. Would not then, said he, a person appear to be silly, if he thought that, by praying to the gods, he should become a grammarian or a musician, or obtain any other science, which it is necessary for a person to obtain by either learning from another or discovering himself? To

¹ I have with Stephens followed Cornarius, who suggested *ἐστιν* for *εἶναι*, which is without regimen.

² I have translated as if the Greek were *οὕτως σφόδρα πανούργως*, not *αὐτῶν σφόδρα πανούργως*: where Stephens, unable to understand *αὐτῶν*, tacitly changed it into *αὐτῷ*— On *οὕτω σφόδρα* united to another adverb see my Poppe's Prolegom. p. 178.

³ I have added *καί*, what might easily have dropt out after *πανούργως*, since *ὅς* and *καί* are, as I have observed on § 9, frequently confounded.

⁴—⁴ On this doctrine see the Meno.

⁵ I have translated “by” instead of “to—” For Prodicus was probably the promulgator of that doctrine.

this too he assented. Do not you then, Prodicus, said when you pray to the gods to do well, and for good to happen, pray at that time for nothing else but to be beautiful in body and mind; since to men beautiful and mind things likewise happen to be good, but be depraved. If then virtue happens to be able to be you would appear to be praying for nothing else than taught, what you do not know.

[15.] I said then to Prodicus, that he seemed to me suffered a thing of not a trifling kind, if he had happen fail in this; at least if he conceived that, what we learn from the gods, would take place ¹even at the same time should you go in haste on each occasion to a city,² and prayers ask of the gods to give good things, you never would not know whether they are able to give you what happen to ask for, as you would do, if you were to go doors of a grammar-master, and beg of him to impart knowledge of grammar, and to trouble himself about else but the science, which you can receive on the instruction (by which) you will be able to do the works of the grammar-master. On my saying this, Prodicus directed his countenance the lad, as about to defend himself, and to make a display of what you have done just now; and taking it to heart should appear to have prayed to the gods in vain. And thereupon ruler of the Gymnasium advancing, bade him take himself from the Gymnasium, as he was conversing upon subjects unsuited to young persons; and if not suited, evidently so.

[16.] This account have I detailed for the sake of that you may see how situated are the persons engaged in philosophy. For if Prodicus had been present, and spoke he would have appeared to those present to be so mad, be ejected even from the Gymnasium.³ But you should have now talked so extremely well, as not only to have persuaded those present,⁴ but to cause likewise the speaker

¹— I confess I scarcely understand *kai ἄμα*.

² This mention of a city seems very strange, where one would expect that of a temple.

³— As the present conversation is feigned to take place in the and not at the Gymnasium, I suspect the author wrote, *ὥστε καὶ θῆναι νῦν, ὡς τότε ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου*, "as to be ejected now, as then from the Gymnasium."

⁴ Here again I should prefer *ἀποροῦντας*— See § 8, n. ².

opposite side to agree with you; (and)¹ it is evident that, as in courts of law, if two persons happened to give the same evidence, one seeming to be correct in body and mind, but the other depraved (in both), the judges would, on account of the testimony of the depraved character, be not at all convinced; but, as it might happen, do even the reverse; but if the person, who seemed to be correct in body and mind, had so stated (alone),² the statement would have seemed to be vehemently true. Perhaps then the parties are situated in some such manner with respect to yourself and Prodicus; and one they consider a sophist and a vain talker, but yourself a statesman and a man of much worth; and then they imagine that they ought not to look to the speech itself, but to the speakers, of what kind they may be. But nevertheless, said Erasistratus, although you are speaking in ridicule, Socrates, it seems to myself at least, that Critias appears to say something (well). Nay, said I, by Zeus, nothing whatever. But why, since you have conversed upon these matters well and beautifully, do you not finish what remains of your discourse? For there seems to me something still remaining of the inquiry, especially since this appears to be acknowledged, that (wealth) is to some a good, but to others an evil. There remains then to inquire what is wealth in the abstract. For if we do not know this first, we shall not be able to agree as to what portion is an evil, and what a good; and I am prepared, as far as I can, to make the inquiry with you. Let then the person, who asserts that to be wealthy is a good, say on this point how the case happens to be.

[17.] Nay, said he, I do not, Socrates, define wealth in any way more cleverly than the rest of mankind. For this is to be wealthy, to possess much money. And I conceive that Critias here does not think that to be wealthy is any thing else. Even thus, said I, there will be something still left to consider, of what kind is the money, in order that you may not shortly afterwards appear to be at variance on this point again. For instance, you know³ that the Carthaginians make use of money of this kind. In a small skin there is bound up as much as is

¹ I have inserted *καί*, which seems to have dropt out after *οὐ*—

² The antithesis evidently requires *καὶ αὐτὸς*—where *αὐτὸς* might easily have been lost through *καὶ αὐτὸς*, which Orelli would change into *καὶ αὐτὸς*.

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὅτι οὐκ ὅτι*, not *οὐκ ὅτι*, which Horreus changed into *οὐκ ὅτι*, adopted by Boeckh.

the weight of a stater¹ at most. But what is so bound within, no one knows, except those who make it up. They deem it a legal tender,² when a seal has been put upon it; he, who possesses the greatest number of these skins, is thought to possess the most money, and to be the wealthiest. But any one amongst us were in possession of such things to the greatest amount, he would be not a whit more wealthy, if he possessed many pebbles from the mountain;³ but a Lacedæmonian they deem a weight of iron a legal tender, and when it is⁴ the useless part of iron; and he, who possesses a great weight of such kind of iron, is thought to be wealthy but elsewhere its possession is worth nothing; while in Laconia they make use of engraved stones, of which a man in Laconia would not have the power to make any use. But amongst the nomade Scythians, if a person possessed the assistance of Polytion, he would be thought to be not at all wealthy, than if a person amongst us were the owner of a mountain Lycabettus. [18.] It is plain then that these things cannot be property; since some of those who have possessed them, appear to have been not at all wealthy on this account. But each of these, said I, exerts reality⁵ as property to some persons, and they who possess them are wealthy; but to others they are not property, and to others persons on this account more wealthy; just as the things⁶ are neither honourable nor disgraceful to all, but referent to different persons. If then we are willing to inquire why amongst the Scythians houses are not property, but so with us; or why amongst the Carthaginians skins are property but not with us; or why amongst the Lacedæmonians iron is property, but not with us, should we not discover⁷ (th

¹ The Attic stater was a coin of the value of four drachms.

² This is the best translation of νομιζουσι.

³ In τοῦ ὄρους evidently lies hid the name of some mountain author wrote, I suspect, Πάρνηθος, a mountain near Athens.

⁴ Although καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι is found in § 10 and 11, yet here I prefer καὶ ταῦτά γ' ὄντι, as I have translated.

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were ὄντως, not ὄντα, which be united to ἔστιν—

⁶ Clericus was the first to suggest ταῦτά for τὰ τοιαῦτα, answered, "eadem," in the versions of Pirkheimer and Corradus.

⁷ In lieu of μέλιστα, the sense evidently requires κάλλιστον have translated; the words are perpetually confounded, as I have frequently remarked; while αἰρία has as evidently dropt out before οὐ

son) best in this way?¹ For example, should any one at Athens possess a thousand talents-weight of the stones in the Market-place, of which we make no use, is it that he would be deemed to be wealthier on that account? It appears not, at least to me. But if he possessed a thousand talents-weight of the stone called lychnite,¹ we should say that he was very wealthy. Very indeed. [19.] Is it, said I, on this account, because the latter is useful to us, but the former useless? Yes. Especially since amongst the Scythians houses are on this account not property to them, because they have no use for a house; nor would a Scythian put any value upon the most beautiful house for himself rather than a sheep-skin cloak; because the latter is useful to him, but the former useless.

² Again, on the other hand,² we do not consider the money of Carthage as property. For there is not an article of those we are in want of, which we can carry off by it,³ as we can by silver; so that it would be useless to us. It is likely. Whatever things then happen to be useful to us, these are property; but whatever are useless, are not property. How is this, Socrates? said Eryxias, taking up the discourse. Is there not what we make use of for conversing with each other, and ⁴for doing a hurt,⁴ and many other things? And would these be a property? And yet they appear to be useful. ⁵Not even thus then⁵ has it appeared to us what is a property. For that it is necessary that a property, if it is about to exist at all, should be useful, is acknowledged nearly by all. But what is the kind of property, since it is not of every kind. [20.] Come then (say), if we are to pursue the inquiry again in this way, ⁶would what we are in search of be discovered still

¹ The lychnite stone was, I suspect, something like crystal, in which, as being transparent, an oil-wick was placed, as is now done in glass tubes or globes.

² As αὐθις αὐ cannot begin a sentence, I suspect that πάλιν δ' have dropped out between ἰστίον and αὐθις— The three words αὐθις αὐ πάλιν are elsewhere united, as remarked by Porson in Supplem. Præf. Hec. p. 49.

³ I have with Boeckh adopted Fischer's αὐτῶν in lieu of αὐτοῦ—

⁴ Although nearly all the editors have justly found fault with βλάπτειν, yet none have suggested a satisfactory correction; nor can I.

⁵ I have translated as if the Greek were οὐκ αὖν οὐδ'—not οὐκ αὐ οὐδ', where αὐ has no meaning.

⁶ Baier suggests, what I have adopted, ἀρ' ἂν μάλλον— who might have supported this insertion of ἂν, by quoting § 21, εἰ—ἰποτρο—ἀρ' ἂν

better,⁶ (by asking)¹ what is that, for which we make property, and for what has the possession of property discovered, as drugs have² for causing diseases to grow for perhaps it would thus become more clear. Since it seems a thing of necessity, that, whatever happens to property, must be useful likewise, and that of this there is one kind, which we call property, it will be left to inquire,³ for what need are the things, which are to be called property, useful?⁴ For all things are useful, of which we make use for any⁴ operation, of which that have life are living things; of which living things of this kind we call man. If then a person were to ask what thing being removed out of the way shall we need of the physician's art, nor of its instruments? we shall be able to say—If diseases were removed from our bodies and did not exist at all, or if existing, were removed instantly. Of sciences then the medical is, as it seems, the most useful for this purpose, to cause the removal of [21.] And if a person should again ask us—By the removal of what thing are we in no need of property, shall we be able to tell? But if not, let us consider the matter. Come (say), if a man could live without food and drink and were neither hungry nor thirsty, is there a reason why he should want those very things, or silver, or any thing in order that he might obtain them? To myself it does not seem (he would). In the same manner the same of the rest of things. For if we did not want the things, we are at present in want, for the care of the body both of warmth and of cold sometimes, and of the other

ἐχοιμεν—and φέρε, εἰ,—ἴσθ' ὅτι ἀν—δίδιοιτο—and § 27, εἰ ἀν' αὐτῷ τι προσδίδιοιτο— He did not however perceive that that was not μάλλον τι, but κάλλιον εἶναι—as I have translated.

¹ I have translated as if ἐρόμενοι had dropt out after ζητοῦμαι.

²—³ This is a rare use of ἀπαλλάττειν.

⁴—⁵ The Greek is τὰ πρὸς τινὰ χρεῖαν χρήσιμα χρησθέντα ἵσθαι: which I cannot understand, nor could Gesner, who thus translates those words quoted by Stobæus, xcv. p. 525, "in quem us usurpentur, ut χρήματα ab utilitate dici mereantur." From this have been led to suggest that the author wrote εἶναι, πρὸς τὰ χρήσιμα, ἃ γ' ἐρῆσθαι χρή χρήματα, ἵσθιν; for thus εἶναι would belong to the preceding λοιπὸν.

⁶ I have translated, as if τιν', not τήν, had been written or fore ἰργασίαν.

of which the body¹ [being deficient]¹ is in want, that, which is called property, would be not used by us; at least if no one wanted at all any one of these things, for the sake of which we should wish to possess property, in order that² we may possess what is sufficient³ for our desires, and the wants of the body, of which we may on each occasion stand in need. If then the possession of property is useful for this purpose, namely, the attention to the wants of the body, should this be taken away from the midst of us, we should not be in want of property, and property would perhaps not exist at all. It appears so. [22.] It appears then, as is likely, that what are useful for this doing of things, are property. That such was property he acknowledged indeed; the reasoning nevertheless troubled him exceedingly. But what are these kind of things? (said he). Shall we say that the same thing can be useful for the same operation at one time, but useless at another? I would not say so; but if we have any want of the same thing³ for the same operation, it seems to me it would be useful; but if not, not. Hence, if we could work up a brazen image without fire, we should not be in want of fire for such an operation; and if we did not want it, it would not be useful to us. And the same reasoning applies to the rest of things. It appears so. Of such things then as it is possible for a thing to exist without them, not one of them would appear to be useful, at least for that thing. It would not. If then we should appear at any time able, without silver and gold, and the rest of such kind of things, which we do not use for the body, as we do food, and drink, and clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, to cause the wants of the body to cease, ⁴[so that there is no longer a need of them,]⁴ neither silver nor gold nor the rest of things would appear to be ⁵useful for it,⁵ if it were able to exist without them. They would not. Nor would those things appear to be property, unless they were

¹ The words between the numerals are evidently superfluous.

² The Greek is *ἐν ἱκανοίμεθα*—Stobæus offers *ἐκκοίμεθα*. From the two united it is easy to elicit, as I have translated, *ἐν, & ἱκανοί, σπόμεθα*—

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, not *τούτου*—

⁴ The words between the numerals are perfectly unnecessary.

⁵ I have adopted the reading furnished by Stobæus, xcv. p. 526. *χρήσιμα—πρός γε τούτου*—which Fischer was the first to approve of, in lieu of *χρήματα—πρός γε τούτου*—

useful. But those things would be (property), by which we are able to obtain what are useful.

[23.] I could never, Socrates, be able to be persuaded of this, that gold and silver and the rest of things of that kind are not property. For of this I am strongly persuaded, that, as things without use are not property, so of things the most useful ¹property is useful for it.¹ Nevertheless (I am not persuaded) of this, that these things happen to be not useful to us; since by them we obtain the necessities (of life). Come then (say), how shall we speak of these things? Are there not certain persons, who teach music or letters, or any other science, who in return for such instruction obtain for themselves the necessities (of life) by bargaining for a remuneration for such things? There are. Would not then these persons by such science obtain for themselves the necessities (of life), by making an exchange for it, as we now do for gold and silver? I confess it. If then they obtain by this act, what they make use of for living, this act would be useful for their living; for we have said that silver is useful on this account, that we are enabled by it to procure what is necessary for the body. It is so, said he.

[24.] If then the sciences of things useful for it are these, sciences would appear² to be property for the very same reason that gold and silver are. ³It is evident. It is evident too³ that those, who possess these sciences, are rather wealthy. But we admitted a little before with so much difficulty the reasoning, whether they were the wealthiest. But from what has been just now admitted, this would of necessity happen, that the rather intelligent are rather wealthy. For should a person ask us—Do we think that a horse is a useful thing for every man? ⁴Would you not say that,⁴ to those who know how to use a horse, it would be a useful thing, but to those

¹— I have followed Fischer, who suggested πρὸς τοῦτο χρήματα χρήσιμα. But as it is not easy to see to what τοῦτο applies, instead of πρὸς τοῦτων χρήματα τὰ χρήσιμα, I should prefer πρὸ πάντων χρήματα, ἢ ὄντα χρήσιμα, i. e. "before all things property, as being useful."

² Although φαίνονται might stand after εἰ—εἰσι, yet here I should prefer φαίνοντ' ἄν—

³— I have adopted Δῆλον. Δῆλον δέ—furnished by one MS., similar to φαίνεται. Φαίνεται ἄρα—in § 22.

⁴— I have translated, as if the Greek were ἀρ' οὐ φαίης ἂν εἶναι— not ἄρα φαίης ἦ—

who do not know, not? I should say so. Then said I, by the same rule a drug is not useful for every man, but only to him, who happens to know how to take it? I say so. Are not then all the rest of things in a similar condition? It is likely. Gold then and silver and the rest of things, which are thought to be property, would be useful to him alone, who happens to know how to use them. Just so. Did it not seem before to be the part of persons superior both in body and mind to know where and how to make use of each of these things? I admit it. [25.] To those men alone then, who are superior in body and mind, these things would be useful; since they (alone)¹ know how to use them. If then they are useful to these alone, to these alone they would appear to be property. ²Is it so? It is likely.³ Him too, who is unskilled in horsemanship, yet possesses horses that happen to be useless to him, should a person render skilful, would he not at the same time make him more wealthy, since he makes things to be useful to him which previously happened to be useless? For by imparting skill to the person he at the same time makes him wealthy likewise. It seems so. And yet I think I could swear on behalf of Critias, that he is persuaded by none of these arguments. (And truly so), by Zeus. For I should be mad if I were persuaded. But why have you not completed that part of the argument, how that gold and silver and the rest of things of that kind are not, although they seem to be, property? since I am very much delighted to hear those arguments, which you happen to be just now going through. Thereupon I observed that you appear to me, Critias, to be thus delighted at hearing me, as are such of the rhapsodists, as chaunt the verses of Homer; since not one of these arguments are thought by you to be true. [26.] Come then (and say) nevertheless, how shall we speak upon such matters? Would you not say that there are some³ things ever useful

¹ I have inserted "only," for *μόνοι* might easily have dropt out after *ἐκιστήμονες*—

² The Greek is at present *ἀρα ὡς τοις*, where *ἀρα* is perfectly unintelligible. It was formerly, as I have translated, *ἢ γὰρ; Ὡς τοις*. The Platonic *ἢ γὰρ* used interrogatively at the end of a sentence is found every where.

³ In lieu of *αὐτά*, found in all the MSS., Bekker has edited *ἄρα*—But I do not remember to have met with *ἄρα* thus placed before, and separated from, its adjective. He should have suggested *αἱ τὰ*—as I have translated.

to house-builders for making a dwelling? So it seems to me. Whether then shall we say that those things useful, which they ¹ make use of for house-building stones and bricks, and wood, and if there be any of this kind? or that there are tools, with which they dwell, and by which they obtain these things, i.e. wood and the stone, and again, the tools for them? at least it seems, said he, that all these (the tools) for those (the materials). Hence, said I, in the rest of operations, not only are those things ² (useful) make use of for each of the works, but those also we obtain them, and without which they would not be entirely so. Hence, both for those, who possess tools), and ³ if there be any thing further up, ³ and who possess these (the materials) ⁴ and what is fit so that at last they come to some infinite multitude necessary for all these to appear useful for their use. There is nothing, said he, to prevent such from being [27.] Well then, if food and drink, and clothing, and things which a person is about to make use of for himself were in his power, would he want in addition gold or any thing else, by which he could obtain what was in his power? It appears to me he would not. Would it appear to us, that sometimes a person does not want those things, which relate to the needs of the body? For he does not want them. Hence if they appear useless for this operation, they could not, on the other hand, be deemed to appear useful. For it has been laid down that it is not possible for things to be at one time useful, and at another useless, as regards the same operation. In the least, said he, the same reasoning would hold good to me. For if these were at any time useful for any purpose, it never would happen for them to be on the other hand useless. ⁵ But now to some operations of deprave

¹ In lieu of *οἷς αὐτῶν*, where the genitive has no meaning, prefer *οἷς αὐτοῖς*—similar to *οἷς αὐτοῖς* in the next clause, and in the next section. Opportunely then two MSS. offer *αὐτοῖς*.

² I have adopted, what Horreus suggested, *αὐτά* for *αὐτά*. Fischer calls an hyperbaton.

³—⁴, and ⁴—⁵ I confess I hardly understand the words *βῆμα* numerals, even if *δύο* be translated "further removed."

⁵— Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. The version has "Nunc vero dixeris aliquas operas esse rerum

but to others of good.⁵ I should say so. ¹Is it not possible then for a depraved act to be useful for the working out of some good?¹ It does not seem so to myself at least. But good acts we should say are those, which a man does through virtue. I admit it. Is it not possible for a person to learn some of the things, which are taught by conversation, although he were deprived of hearing,² or any thing else?² By Zeus, it does not seem so to me at least. Hence, of the things useful for virtue hearing would appear³ to be one,³ if at least virtue is to be taught by hearing, and we make use of it for instruction. It appears so. [28.] Hence, if medical art is able to cure⁴ a person diseased, even medical art would sometimes appear to be one⁵ of the things useful for virtue, if⁶ through it be furnished the power of hearing what relates to the thing to be taught.⁶ There is nothing to prevent it. If then again we obtain medical science in return for property, even property would appear to be useful for virtue. Yes, said he; for such it is. Hence, again, in like manner, that (would be useful), by which we could obtain property. Yes, all such by all means. Now does it not seem to you that a person could from acts depraved and disgraceful obtain for himself silver, in return for which he might obtain medical science, or be able to hear, after being unable? and to use that very (hearing) for virtue, or any other things of that kind? To me at least it does seem very much so. Would not then the depraved be useful for virtue? It would. It is not necessary then for those things, by which we can obtain what is useful for each, to be themselves useful for the same. For things depraved would sometimes seem to be useful for a thing that is good. And they

aliquas autem bonarum—" as if the translator wished to read, *Nūn δὲ γ' ἰσχύς τις τις—μοχθηρὸν εἶναι*—to answer to the following, *Ἐγὼ γὰρ φαίην*.

¹—¹ This was the doctrine of Rochefoucault, who said that "private vices are public benefits;" and of the Jesuits, who said that "the end sanctifies the means."

²—² I hardly understand the words between the numerals.

³—³ I have translated, as if *εἶναι* ἔν had dropt out after *ἀκούειν*—

⁴—⁴ Although *τὸν νοσοῦντα παύειν* might perhaps stand, yet *τὸν νοσοῦντα ἰατρῶν*, what I have translated, would be far preferable.

⁵—⁵ Here again ἔν has dropt out, I suspect, after *χρησίμων*—

⁶—⁶ The Greek is at present *διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς*— But *ἰατρικῆς* could not be thus repeated after *ἡ ἰατρικῆ*— Opportunely then does one MS. offer *διδασκῆς* in lieu of *διὰ τῆς*, which leads at once to *δι' αὐτῆς τὰ τῆς διδασκῆς*, without *ἰατρικῆς*: and so I have translated.

would be still more evident in this case. For if useful for each (of those), without which they would unless these had existed previously, come (say), how speak of things of this kind? Is it possible for ignorance to be useful for science, or disease for health, or vice for virtue? I should say, not. [29.] And yet we should agree that it is impossible for science to be produced in whom ignorance had not existed previously; or health in whom disease had not (existed); or virtue, in whom vice had not. The fact, said he, is so, as to me. Hence it would not be necessary for things to be useful, without which a thing is not able to be. For (otherwise)¹ ignorance would appear to be useful for science; and disease, for health; and vice, for virtue. In these arguments too he was very hard of belief, and all these things shall be property.² And I, knowing thoroughly, that it would be an equally hard task to convince him, as, according to the saying, to boil a stone. Let us bid a long³ farewell to these arguments; since we are unable to agree, whether the same things are useful, or not. But how shall we say on this? Whether shall we consider a person happier and better in want of the greatest number of things necessary for the body and living, or him, who (is in want) of the fewest? Now this question would perhaps be asked in the best manner,⁴ thus. Should one compare a person with himself, and consider which of his states is the better, whether, when he happens to be ill, or in health. At least, said he, does not require any great consideration. Perhaps, said I, it is easy for every simpleton to know the state of the person in health is better than that of the person ill. Well then, at what time do we happen to be better of things more in number and variety? when we are

¹ This "otherwise" is due to "alioquin," in the Latin version.

²⁻³ The words between the numerals I cannot understand, I think, the Latin translator, whose words are—"Vix etne vix sermonibus fidem habebat, quod non omnia hæc utilia essent: *μὴ* could hardly be rendered "quod non."

³ In lieu of ἀλλά, I have translated, as if the Greek were *καὶ*.

⁴ Here, as in § 18, I have translated, as if the Greek were *καὶ* in lieu of *μάλιστα*—

⁵ Here *ἀνεψ* is not the abbreviation of *ἀνθρώπων*, but the word means "senseless."

health? When we are ill. When therefore we happen to be lying in the worst condition for ourselves, we then are greatly in the desire, and the want of the greatest number of things that¹ relate to the pleasures of the body. It is so. [30.] According to the same rule then,² as a person is in the best condition for himself, when he is in want of the fewest of these things, so on the other hand, if there were two persons, one of whom happened to be greatly in the desire and want of many things, and the other of few things and moderately so, as for example things of this kind, such men as are dice-players, others wine-tiplers, and others of a voracious appetite, for all these happen to be nothing else than desires. Very much so.³ Now all desires are nothing else than the want of some things. (Nothing).³ The persons then, who have suffered the most of these, are in a more depraved state than those, who have suffered things of this kind either not at all, or to the least extent. I consider then persons of this kind to be very depraved; and the more they are of this kind, the more depraved. It seems then to us that it is not possible for these things to be useful for this purpose, unless we happen to be in the want of these things for this purpose. I admit it. It is necessary then, if these are about to be useful to us for the care of the wants of the body, that we too should want them for this purpose. So it seems at least to me. He then, to whom the greatest number of things useful for this purpose belongs, would appear to be in want of the greatest number for this purpose, since it is necessary for him to feel a want of all useful things. To me at least it seems to appear in this way. It is necessary therefore, according to this reasoning, for those, to whom there happens to be much property, to be in much want of the things necessary for the care of the body. For the things useful for this purpose have appeared to be property; so that of necessity they, who should appear to us to be the wealthiest, are in the most depraved state, since they are in want of the greatest number of things of this kind.

¹ In lieu of $\tau\alpha$ the syntax and sense require $\tau\omega$ —as I have translated.

² As the apodosis is wanting in this long-winded sentence, I doubt not there is some error here, which I could, perhaps, correct; but not without alterations which would be considered too violent. Suffice it to say for the present, that Stobæus omits $\epsilon\upsilon\tau\omega$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\upsilon$, in which a portion of the difficulty lies.

³ I have with Boeckh adopted the notion of Cornarius, that Οὐδὲν has dropt out before Οἱ οὖν —

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE DIALOGUE ON VIRTUE.

Of this dialogue, which contains little more than two portions of the *Meno*, the authorship is attributed to Æschines by Suidas, whom Fischer has followed; but by Boeckh to Simon, the shoemaker, in consequence of his remarking that the follower of Socrates had written two treatises respectively on Justice and Virtue, both of which are found amongst the titles of the spurious dialogues. It is however difficult to believe that any person, who was contemporary with Plato, would condescend to pilfer from a fellow-writer; unless it be said that Simon has given the dialogue as it really took place, with the view of showing that nearly all of what Plato put into the mouth of Socrates was the produce of the writer's own fertile imagination.

Be however the author who he may, it is a curious fact, that the dialogue contains allusions to circumstances not mentioned by Plato, but which could hardly have been known except to a contemporary, as I have remarked in § 7, n. '—'.

No less curious is another fact, that amongst the confessedly spurious dialogues of Plato, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in iii. 62, there is one under the title of *Μένων ἢ Ἱπποτρόφος*. But as the Vienna MS. reads there *Ἱπποτρόφος*, and the Vatican MS. of Plato, marked Ω by Bekker, gives the word *Ἱπποτρόφος*, as the name of the person conversing with Socrates, and as "Hippotrophus" is found as one of the Interlocutors in the Latin version of this dialogue made by Cincius Romanus, preserved amongst the additional MSS. No. 11,760, in the British Museum, it is fair to infer that the

real title was *Μίδων ἢ Ἱπποτρόπος*. For thus Midon the horse-breeder would be the origin of Menon of Thessaly, a country famous for its breed of horses. And it was from this coincidence in the name furnished by three different sources, that I have been led to examine more attentively than I should otherwise have done, the version of Cincius; where I have discovered, what I little expected, that the translator had, like Ficinus in other parts of Plato, met with a MS. more full than any subsequently collated, as may be seen in my notes.

With regard to the next dialogue "On Justice," I have only to remark, that it was in existence in the time of Thrasyllus, from whom Diogenes Laertius drew the greater part of his information relating to the Platonic and Pseudo-Platonic writings.

ON VIRTUE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND A FRIEND.

[1.] Is Virtue a thing to be taught, or to be not taught? but ¹ do men become good by nature, or by any other means? I cannot, Socrates, state at present. But let us consider the matter in this way. Come then, (say,) if a person wished to become good in the virtue,² in which clever cooks are good, from whence would he become so? It is evident, if he learnt from good cooks. Well then, if a person wished to become a good physician, by going to whom would he become a good physician? It is evident, by going to some one of the good physicians. But if he wished to become good in the art, in which clever carpenters (are good)? To (some one) of the (good) carpenters.

[2.] If then he wished to be good in the virtue, in which men are good and clever, whither must he go and learn? I conceive to (some one) of the (good) men (to learn) this, if it is to be learnt; for from whence else? Come then, (say,) who are the men that have become good? in order that we may see whether these are the persons, who make men good, Thucydides,³ and Themistocles, and Aristides, and Pericles.

¹ This ἀλλὰ is strangely introduced here. But as it is found in the Meno, § 1, although in a manner perfectly proper there, it would be uncritical perhaps to remove it. Cincius however has what is preferable, "Estne virtus o Hyppotrophe, res quæ doctrina percipi possit? an contra? Num viri boni natura efficiuntur, sive alio quodam modo?"

² By "virtue," was meant not merely a moral quality, as with us, but "excellence," generally.

³ This word should evidently follow καὶ Περικλῆς, to preserve the order in which they are taken subsequently, not only in this dialogue, but

Have we it in our power to say who was the teacher of these? We have not; for it is not told. Well then, we mention) any pupil, either amongst strangers or citizen any one else, either a free man or a slave, who assigns a cause of his having become wise and good his course with them? This too is not told. But they do surely grudge to share their virtue with other persons. haps so. Was it that there might not be rival artists, just cooks, and physicians, and carpenters feel a jealousy; ¹ sin is not to their advantage for many rival artists to exist for them to dwell amongst many similar persons. Is it in like manner not an advantage for good men to dwell amongst many similar persons? Perhaps so. [3.] Are not the and the just the same? Yes, they are. Is there the individual to whom it is an advantage to live not amongst good persons but amongst bad? I cannot tell. Can you not tell this whether it is the work of good men to do a hurt, and of men to do a benefit, or the reverse? The reverse. They then do a benefit, the bad do a hurt. Yes. Is there a person who wishes to be hurt rather than to be benefited? no means. No one therefore wishes to live amongst bad persons, rather than amongst good. It is so. Not one of the good is so jealous of another, as (not) ² to make him a person and similar to himself. From this ³ reasoning it see [4.] You have heard that Cleophantus was the son of Thucles. I have heard it. It is evident then that Themis was not jealous of his son becoming the best possible; why jealous of) ⁴ no one else, if indeed he was a good man (good) ⁵ they say he was. Yes. You know then that Thucles caused his son to be taught to be a clever and horseman. For instance he used to remain ⁶ standing up

in the *Meno*, § 33, 4, where Sydenham was the first to remark that Thucydides was not the historian, but a political opponent of Pericles.

¹ Fischer refers to Hesiod *Epy.* 25, *Καὶ κερამεύς κερამεὶ κορίττονι τίττων, Καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονίει καὶ δαιδὸς δαιδῷ*, or the homely English proverb, "Two of a trade can never agree."

² After *ὥστε* I have inserted, what has evidently dropt out, *μή*—however omits *ὥστε*, and has, "*sed bonum*—"

³ I have adopted *ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου*, found in MS. Aug. as to Fischer.

^{4, 5} I have inserted "envied," requisite to complete the series similarly "good," just afterwards.

⁶ I have adopted *ἐπίμνε*, the conjecture of Horreus, who

upon horses, and upright too hurled a javelin from (the backs of) the horses, and did many other wonderful feats,¹ and taught him, and made him wise in many other things,¹ such as are closely connected with a good education. Or have you not heard so from elderly persons? I have heard it. No one then could find fault with the son's nature as being bad.² Not justly so at least from what you have said. [5.] But what is this? that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, became a good and wise man in the matters where his father was wise, have you ever heard from any younger or older person? I have not heard it. Do we then conceive that he wished to instruct his own son in these matters; but in the wisdom, in which he was wise himself, not to make him better than any of his neighbours, if virtue were a thing to be taught? It is not likely at least. [6.] Of such a kind then is this your teacher of virtue, to whom you have alluded?³ Let us then look to another, by name Aristides, who brought up Lysimachus, and instructed him the best of the Athenians on such subjects as are connected with (good)⁴ teachers; and yet he made him a man no better than any body; for both you and I have seen and associated with him. It is true. [7.] You know too that Pericles brought up well⁵ his sons Paralus and Xanthippus,⁶ of the latter of whom you seem to me to have been the lover.⁶ These, as you know yourself, he taught to be horsemen inferior to none of the Athenians; and he instructed

reading from Meno, § 32, in lieu of *ἐπιβαίνει*, although in both places the author probably wrote something more fit to be read than what is found here at present.

¹ The Greek is here *καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἰδίδαξε καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν*—But *ἰδίδαξε* wants its subject, supplied in the Meno, § 32, *ὁ ἐκείνος αὐτὸν ἰδιδάξατο*. Hence one would read here *καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ, ὁ ἰδιδάξατο ἐκείνος, ἐποίησε σοφόν*—where *ἐποίησε* would be united as frequently with two accusatives.

² Cincius adds, “Quandoquidem eum ad percipiendas disciplinas adipiscendasque aptum idoneumque esse cognoscit—”

³ In lieu of *ὃν ὑπείπεις*, Cincius has—“quem majorum esse profitabaris,” as if his MS. had here something similar to what is found in Meno, § 33, *ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστον τῶν προτέρων*.

⁴ Both here and in Meno, § 33, I suspect that *καλῶν* has been lost after *διδασκάλων*—

⁵ In lieu of *αὖ* I have translated, as if the Greek were *εὖ*, similar to *μεγαλοπρεπῶς* in the Meno.

⁶ The words between the numerals have dropt out in Meno, § 33, after *Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον*.

them to be inferior to no one in the rest of contests, and all the other things that are learnt by art. But did he not wish to make them good men? But perhaps, Socrates, they would have become so, had they not died young. 'You reasonably come to the aid of your beloved.' But Pericles would have much rather made them clever in his own wisdom, than in music and contests, had virtue been a thing to be taught, and had he been able to make them good men. [8.] But (I fear) that it is a thing not to be taught; since Thucydides brought up well² his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, ³in behalf of whom you will not have it in your power to say, what you have done in behalf of the sons of Pericles; for one of these you surely know lived to old age, and the other much beyond,³ And yet their father taught them well other pursuits, and they wrestled the best of the Athenians. For he put one under Xanthias, and the other under Eudorus; and these were surely thought to wrestle the best of those of that period. Yes, they were. [9.] Is it not evident then, that he would not have taught his sons these things, where⁴ it was requisite to instruct them at an expense to himself, but those where⁵ without expending any thing it was requisite to make them good men. Now would he not have taught them this, if it were to be taught? It is likely at least. But perhaps Thucydides was a man of small means, and had not very many friends amongst the Athenians or their allies; and⁶ he was of a great family, and of great power in the state, and amongst the rest of the Greeks, so that if this had been a

¹—¹ Here again has been preserved another supplement of the Meno. For in § 30, Plato wrote, ΑΝ. δοκῶ μὲν, ἰβουλευτοῦ ἰσως δ' ἂν ἰγίνοντο, ὡ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ νῖοι ὄντες ἰτελεύτησαν. ΣΩ. σὺ μὲν εἰκότως βοηθεῖς τοῖς παιδικοῖς· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδάκτρων. For it seems unreasonable to suppose that the writer of this dialogue was cognizant of facts, which Plato either did not know, or was unwilling to mention.

² Here again I have substituted εὖ for αὖ —and so I would in Meno, § 33.

³—³ Here too is another supplement of the Meno; for all the words between the numerals ought to be inserted in § 33, after Στρίφανον, and γὰρ between καὶ and τοῦτους—

⁴, ⁵ I have adopted οὐ, "where," found in Meno, § 34, in lieu of οἶ, "whither;" and similarly in (⁶), to which ὅπου in 3 MSS. plainly leads.

⁶ Although καὶ is found both here and in the Meno, in neither place is it what the sense requires, as remarked there by Struve. Opportunely then has Cincius here, "Thucydidem abjectum et obcurum fuisse hominem. At longe secus erat; multitudine enim amicorum et civium et sociorum populi Atheniensis affuebat—"

thing to be taught, he would have discovered a person amongst those of the country, or foreigners, who would have made his son a good man, if he himself had, through his attention to state affairs, no leisure. But (I fear) that virtue is a thing not to be taught. Perhaps not. [10.] But if it is not to be taught, are the good naturally so from their birth? But this perhaps we shall discover by considering the matter in this way. Come then, (say,) do there exist the natures of good horses? They do exist. Are there not men, who possess an art, by which they know the natures of good horses, both as regards their body, with reference to running, and their feelings, which of them are full of spirit or devoid of it. Yes. What is this art, and what its name? Equestrian. Is there not in like manner an art relating to dogs, by which persons discriminate between the good and bad natures of dogs? There is. What is it? The hunter's art. There are too assayers amongst us of gold and silver, who, by looking, decide upon both the better and the worse (metal). There are. And what do you call them? Silver assayers. [11.] The boy-drillers¹ moreover know, by examining the natures of the bodies of men, which of them are useful and which not, for each of their labours, and which of the bodies of persons older and young, are about to be worthy of note, and in which there is much hope of their executing works connected with the body. It is so. [12.] Whether then are good horses and dogs, and other things of such a kind, of more importance in states, or good men? Good men. Well then, do you conceive that, if the natures of men were good for virtue, that mankind would not have planned in every way to discover those natures? It is likely at least. Can you then mention any art, which has been exhibited and applied to the natures of good men, so as to enable persons to decide upon them? I cannot. And yet the art would be worth much, and so too the parties possessing it. For they would have pointed out the young men, who, when they were still boys, were about to be good; and whom we should have taken and kept in the Acropolis for the public use, as if it were silver, and something more beautiful,² in order that they might not suffer any mischief, either in a fight or in any other danger, but be

¹ On the *παιδορρίβται*, see my remarks on Crito, § 7, n. 5.

² As in Meno. § 25, the expression in a similar passage is *ἐφελάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει—πολύ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον*—I have translated here, as

laid up as the saviours and benefactors of the state, since¹ they should have arrived at a proper age. But it seems almost that virtue does not exist to mankind either by nature or instruction. [13.] How then, Socrates, would persons seem to become (good),² if they do not become so by nature or instruction? By what other means could the good exist? This, I think, could not be shown easily; but I conjecture that the property (of goodness) is something especially divine, and that good men exist, as prophets do and oracle chaunters. For these exist neither by nature nor by art, but become such by the inspiration of the gods. And so too good men point out to states what is about on each occasion to happen, and what is about to be, from the inspiration³ of a god, much more, and more clearly, than oracle chaunters do: and even women⁴ somehow say that such a person is a divine man; and the Lacedæmonians too, when they praise in a very handsome manner, say that a man is divine,⁵ and often does Homer make use of the same expression, and the rest of poets likewise. When therefore a god wishes a state to do well, he causes some men in it to be good; but when a state is about to do ill, the god takes away the good men from it. Thus then it is likely that virtue is a thing not to be taught nor (derived) from nature, but exists by a divine allotment to those who possess it.

if the Greek were καλλιον, not μᾶλλον— The two words are constantly confounded. Cincius however has, "multo quoque hercle magis—"

¹ Instead of *ἰκεδὴ*, which is unintelligible, Cincius seems to have found in his MS. *ἴως δὲ*—for his version is "quousque—"

² I have translated, as if *ἀγαθοί*, absolutely requisite for the sense, had dropt out after *γίγνεσθαι*.

³ Cincius, here and just below, renders *ἐπιπνοια* by "providentia."

⁴ Cincius exhibits here a remarkable supplement in his version—"Atqui mulieres etiam, *qua maxime linguam antiquam observant*"—not found in Meno, § 41.

⁵ On the Laconian *θειός*, or rather *σιεός ἀνὴρ*, see Meno, § 41, n. 95.

ON JUSTICE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND A FRIEND.

[1.] CAN you tell us what is justice? or does it seem to you not worth entering into a discourse about it? To me at least (it seems) very much so. What is it then? What else than the things considered just. Do not (speak)¹ to me in this way; but, as if you had asked me—What is the eye? I should have said to you—It is that, by which we see; and if you should bid me to prove it, I would prove it. And if you should ask—To what is given the name of soul? I would say—To that, by which we know (something).² And if again—What is the voice? I would answer—That, by which we converse. In this way then do you tell me that justice is that, which we use for something, as are the things, of which I was just now asking. I have it not in my power to reply in this way at all. But, since such is the case, perhaps we shall discover it more easily in this way. Come then, (say,) by what do we, on consideration, distinguish the greater and the less? Is it not by a measure? Yes. And together with a measure by what art? Is it not by that of measurement? Yes. And how things light and heavy? Is it not by weight? Yes. And together with a weight by what art? Is it not that of weighing? Certainly.³ Well then, by what instrument do

¹ On the ellipse of *λίγε* after *μή μοι*, see my note on *Æsch.* Suppl. 284.

² I have translated, as if *τι* had dropt out before *γινώσκωμεν*, which can hardly dispense with its object.

³ After *πάνν γε*, Boeckh proposes to insert, *ΣΩ. τί δὲ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ*

we, on consideration, distinguish what is just and unjust? and together with the instrument, by what art previously? Is it not somehow manifest to you thus? No. [2.] But ¹(let us consider it)¹ again in this way. When we are disputing about things greater and less, who decides between us? Is it not the measurers? Yes. And when about things many and few, who are the persons to decide? Is it not the numberers? But what, when we are disputing with each other about things just and unjust, to whom do we come? and who are the persons to decide on each occasion between us? Say. Do you not, Socrates, mean the judges? You have correctly made the discovery. Come then and try to tell this likewise. By doing what do the measurers decide respecting things large and small? Is it not by measuring? Yes. And respecting things heavy and light? Is it not by weighing? Yes. And respecting things many and few? Is it not by numbering? Yes. But how, respecting things just and unjust? Answer me. I cannot say. Say, by speaking. Yes. By speaking then do judges decide between us, when they are forming a judgment respecting things just and unjust. Yes. And by measuring, those skilled in measuring things small and great? for a measure is that, by which these things are judged. It is so. And by weighing, those skilled in weighing things heavy and light? for a weight is that, by which these things are judged. Yes, it is. And again by numbering, those skilled in numbering things many and few? for number is that by which these things are judged. It is so. But by speaking, as we just now agreed, the judges decide respecting things just and unjust. You speak correctly, Socrates. [3.] It is true then; and speech is that, it seems, by which things just and unjust are judged. What then are things just and unjust? As if a person had asked us—Since a measure, and the measuring art, and the person skilled in measuring, decide which is the greater and the less, what is the greater and the less? Shall we say to him that the greater exceeds, and the

δλίγα; ἀρ' οὐκ ἀριθμῶ; 'ET. *Ναί. ΣΩ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τίτιν εἶχον;*
οὐ τῷ ἀριθμητικῷ; 'ET. *πάνν γε.* For not only might these words have
 been lost through τὸ ὁμοιοτάεινον, but they are requisite likewise for
 the train of thought; since the subject of number is touched upon in § 2,
 just as all the others are.

¹— I have introduced what is requisite for the sense.

less is exceeded? and since a weight and the weighing art and the person skilled in weighing decide the heavy and the light, shall we say to him, that the thing going downwards in the scales is heavy, but the thing (going) upwards is light? In like manner if he should ask us—Since speech and the art of judging and the judge is the party who decides what is just and unjust, what is the just and unjust? What answer shall we have to give him? ¹Or have we not a single word to say? ¹We have not. Whether willingly or unwillingly do men, think you, have this injustice? I mean in this way. Think you that they do injustice ²[and are unjust] ²willingly or unwillingly? Willingly, I imagine, Socrates; for they are wicked. [4.] You conceive then that men are willingly wicked and unjust. I do; and do not you? No; at least if we are to be persuaded by the poet.³ What kind of poet? He who said—

Not one is wicked willingly, nor blest
Unwillingly.

But still on the other hand,⁴ Socrates, well is the old proverb,⁵ that

Poets do many falsehoods sing.

But I should marvel, if this poet has told a falsehood. Come then,⁶ if you are at leisure, let us consider, whether he is saying what is false or true. Nay, I am at leisure. Come then, (say,) do you deem it just to tell a falsehood, or to tell the truth? To tell the truth. To tell a falsehood then is unjust? Yes. But whether to deceive or to not deceive? To not deceive, assuredly. To deceive then is unjust? Yes. But what, is it just to hurt, or to benefit? To benefit. To hurt then is unjust? Yes. [5.] It is just then to tell the truth, and to not deceive, and to benefit; but to tell a falsehood, and to hurt,

¹—¹ The Greek is at present, *ἡ οὐδὲ πω ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν*— But one MS. reads *ἡ οὐδὲ ποτε*— which evidently leads to *ἡ οὐδ' ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ*— as I have translated. On the loss of *ἱστορία* see myself on Prom. 766.

²—² The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation.

³ Who is the author of the Iambic verse, *Οὐδ' εἰς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάρτυρ*, is to be still discovered. It is quoted by Aristotle in *Nicomach. Eth. iii. 5*.

⁴ As *τοι* does not, I believe, elsewhere follow *τοι*, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀλλ' ἔρ' αὖ*—

⁵ The words *πολλὰ ψεύδονται δοῖδοι*, are the end of an hexameter of some unknown poet.

⁶ In lieu of *εἰπαι* I have translated, as if the Greek were *εἰπ' οὖν*—

and to deceive, unjust. Yes, by Zeus, and greatly so. What, to do so to enemies? By no means. But it is just to do a hurt to enemies, but to do a benefit, unjust. Yes. It is then just by deceiving enemies to do them a hurt? How not? Well then, to tell a falsehood in order that we may deceive and do a hurt to enemies, is it not just? It is. But what, do you not say that it is just to do a benefit to friends? I do. Whether by not deceiving or by deceiving for their benefit? By deceiving even, by Zeus. But is it just to do a benefit by deceiving, and yet not by telling a falsehood? or by telling a falsehood? It is just by telling even a falsehood. To tell a falsehood and to tell the truth is, as it seems, both just and unjust. Yes. And to not deceive and to deceive is both just and unjust. So it seems. And to do a hurt and to do a benefit is just and unjust. Yes. All things of this kind are it seems the same, both just and unjust. To me at least they appear so. [6.] Hear then. I have, like other men, a right eye and a left. Yes. And a right nostril and a left. Certainly. And a right hand and a left. Yes. Hence, since after giving the same name, you say that some of my (members) are on the right side, and others on the left, would you not be able to say, if I asked you, on which side they were, that some on one side are the right, and others on the other side the left? Yes. Come then, likewise, to that point,¹ since after giving the same name, you say that some acts are just, and some unjust, can you tell which are the just, and which the unjust? To me then it now appears that each of these acts, taking place at a proper time,² are just; but at not a proper one, unjust. And correctly does it appear to you. He then, who does each of these acts at a proper time, does what is just; but he, who does not at a proper time,³ (does) what is unjust. Yes. He then, who does what is just, is just; but he who does what is unjust, is unjust. It is so. [7.] Who then at a proper time⁴ is able to cut and burn and to make lean? The medical man. Because he knows, or for

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were, what the language requires, *ἐκείνη*, not *ἐκείν*—

^{2, 3, 4} I have here omitted *ἐν τῷ καιρῷ*, which is evidently an interpretation of *ἐν τῷ δέοντι*, as shown by (³) *ἐν τῷ δέοντι καιρῷ*, and similarly in (⁴). Boeckh in all the three places would read *ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ τῷ καιρῷ*.

some other reason? Because he knows. And who (is able) at a proper time to dig, and to plough, and to plant? The land-tiller. Because he knows, or because he does not? Because he knows. And in this way as regards other matters, he who knows, is able to do what is proper at a proper time;¹ but he who does not know, is not. Thus it is. And he who knows how to tell falsehoods, and to deceive, and to do a benefit, is able to do each of these things at a proper time;² but he who does not know, is not. You say what is true. And he who does these acts at a fitting time is just. Yes. He does them then through knowledge. How not? The just man then is just through knowledge. Yes. The unjust man then is unjust through what is opposite to what is just. It appears so. Now the just man is just through wisdom. Yes. And the unjust man is unjust through the want of instruction. It seems so. [8.] That, which our ancestors left us, as wisdom, seems near to being justice; but that, which (they left) as want of instruction, to be injustice. It is likely. Are men uninstructed willingly, or unwillingly? Unwillingly. Unwillingly then they are unjust. It appears so. But the unjust are wicked. Yes. Unwillingly then persons are wicked and unjust. By all means. But they act unjustly through there being the unjust. Yes. Through an act of unwillingness. Certainly. But that, which is willing, does not take place through what is unwilling. It does not. But the doing of injustice takes place through the existence of injustice. Yes. Now injustice is an involuntary act. Involuntary. Unwillingly then persons do an injustice, and are unjust and wicked. Unwillingly, as it appears. The poet then did not in this case tell a falsehood. It seems not.

^{1, 2} I have twice omitted *kai τῷ καιρῷ* after *ἐν τῷ διορί*. See just above.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SISYPHUS

AND

DEMODOCUS.

Of these dialogues, the former is said by Diogenes Laert., iii. 62, to be decidedly not written by Plato, and was one of those entitled *Ἀσίσφαλοι*, and attributed to Æschines, son of Charinus, the sausage-maker; of whom Socrates remarked, as we learn from Diog. L. ii. 60, that he was the only person who knew how to honour him properly. Now though no reason is there assigned for the remark, it is not difficult to conceive, by comparing what we know of the conduct of some other pupils of Socrates, such as Critias and Alcibiades, and even Plato, that Æschines not only put in practice the precepts of his master, but gave a true representation of his sentiments, without altering them to suit, as Plato did, his own peculiar notions.

With regard to the subject matter of the dialogue, it may be expressed in the words of Xenophon in *Cyrop.* i. 6, 46, that "the wisdom of man no more knows how to choose what is best, than if a person were to do whatever might arise from the throw of a die;" a passage quoted opportunely by Davies on Cicero de *Nat. Deor.* i. 35, "*Hoc est non considerare, sed quasi tortiri, quid loquare.*" And it was doubtless from the similarity of subject that Boeckh was led to attribute the Demodocus to the author of the Sisyphus; of which the only separate edition is to be found in my "*Plato's Four Dialogues, the Crito, Hippias, Alcibiades, and Sisyphus,*" published by Valpy in 1831; while the Demodocus is one of the small portions of the Platonic and Pseudo-Platonic writings, that have never appeared in a separate form.

SISYPHUS;

OR,

UPON TAKING COUNSEL.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND SISYPHUS.

[1.] Soc. And¹ we too waited a long time for you yesterday, Sisypheus, at the display made by Stratonicus, in order that you might, together with us, hear a clever man, who both by word and deed exhibited many and beautiful things;² and³ when we thought you would no longer be present, we were by ourselves the hearers of the man.

Sis. 'Truly by Zeus.⁴ For a want of leisure of rather a compulsory kind occurred to me, so that I neglected⁵ the display. For our rulers had a consultation yesterday, and they compelled me to consult with them. Now with us Pharsalians⁶ it is a law to obey the rulers, should they order any of us to consult with them.

Soc. And honourable it is to obey the law and to be reputed by fellow-citizens to be a good counsellor, as you are

¹ As this dialogue is one of those called "Ἀσιφαλοὶ, "headless," we need not wonder at the appearance of *δε* *kai*, here.

² With the mention of *πράγματα* here, may be compared that of *ἔργα*, in another Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, called Hipparchus, p. 228, B. *ἀλλὰ τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο*.

³ In lieu of *καὶ ἐπεὶ*, one would have expected *ἐπεὶ δὲ*—

⁴— Although *Ναὶ μὲν* are found thus united in Hom. *Il.* A. 235, *Ναὶ μὲν τόδε σκῆπτρον*, and elsewhere, yet here the sentence seems rather too abrupt.

⁵ I have omitted *μὴ* after *ᾧστε*, for it is hardly intelligible in this place.

⁶ Instead of *καὶ*, which has no meaning here, the author wrote *γὰρ*, for *γὰρ* is thus found after proper names, as I could show by numerous passages. And *γὰρ* and *καὶ* are frequently confounded, as I have remarked on Eurip. *Tro.* 520.

¹ [reputed to be a good counsellor as one of the Pharsalians].¹ But, Sisyphus, although I should not be able to enter upon a discussion against you on the subject of consulting correctly, conceiving it to be a work requiring much leisure, and a lengthy argument, still I would endeavour to converse with you first about consulting in the abstract, what it is. Can you then tell me what it is to consult in the abstract? Do not (tell)² me what it is to do so well or ill or in any manner,³ but what kind of thing it is alone by itself. For you could well and easily tell,⁴ being so good a counsellor. But (I fear) lest it is a superfluous work for me to make of you the inquiry.

Sis. Is it then unknown to you what it is to consult?

Soc. It is, Sisyphus, to myself at least, if it be any thing else than for a person, who does not know any thing of those matters respecting which it is requisite to do some act, to speak like a diviner and off-handed, whatever may present itself, and to make a guess⁵ according to the same things for himself:⁶ like persons playing at odd and even,⁶ who, knowing nothing about the even and odd, which they hold in their own⁷ hands, nevertheless happen by accident to say what is true about the same⁸ things. To consult then is oftentimes a thing

¹—¹ The words between the brackets are an evident interpolation. As regards the matter compare Hipp. Maj. § 2.

² On the ellipse of *λίγῃ* after *μή μοι* see myself on *Æsch. Suppl.* 284.

³ The Greek is at present *ἢ τὸ καλῶς πως*— It was originally *ἢ τὸ γ' ἄλλως πως*— For *καλῶς* would be superfluous after the preceding *εὖ*— On *ἄλλως πως* compare *Alcibiad.* II. § 13, n; *Phædr.* p. 272, B.; *Protag.* p. 333, B.; and on *γ' ἄλλως* and *καλῶς*, see *Crito.* § 13, n.⁴

⁴ The Greek is *ἢ καὶ πάνν ῥαδίως αὐτὸς*— But the sense requires, as I have translated, *εὖ γὰρ καὶ πάνν ῥαδίως εἰποῖς ἀν οὕτως γ'*— Compare *Euthyph.* p. 14, A. *ῥαδίως ἀν εἰποῖς.* Hipp. Maj. § 15, *καὶ σμικρὸν τί που τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη μάθημα, ὥν σὺ γ' οὕτως πολλῶν ἐπίστασαι.* With regard to *εὖ καὶ ῥαδίως*, see Schæfer on *Bos. v. Κινδύνος.*

⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτῷ*— out of which I am unable to make a particle of sense. I could have understood *εἰκάζοντα κατὰ πάντα εὖ πως*, "making a guess on all points somehow successfully," as I suggested twenty years ago.

⁶ On this game see the commentators on *Lysid.* p. 206, F., *Aristoph. Plut.* 817, and *Horace's* "Ludere par impar."

⁷ This *αὐτῶν* is very strange here, as if the party playing did not know the number in his own hand. Common sense evidently leads to *τῶν ἐναντίων*, "the opposite party," in lieu of *τῶν αὐτῶν*— and to *ἐνέωσιν* in lieu of *ἐχέωσιν*—

⁸ Here again I am at a loss in *περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν*. For the sense leads at once to *περὶ πάντων*—

of this kind, that a person, although knowing nothing of the matters, about which he is consulting, yet happens by accident to say what is the truth. If then it is a thing of this kind, I know what to consult is; if however it is not a thing of this kind, I should not know it at all.

Sis. It is not of such a kind as not to know in reality any thing at all, but to know partly something of the matter in hand, and partly not to know at all.¹

[2.] *Soc.* Do you mean that to consult is, by Zeus, a thing of this kind; that, as I seem to myself to divine somewhat your notions relating to the act of consulting well, it is the seeking to discover the best things for a person to employ himself in for his own benefit, but not to know them clearly,² but for this to be, as it were, in some form of a thought?³ Do you not mean somehow in this way.

Sis. I do.

Soc. Whether do men seek such things as they know, or such as they do not know?

Sis. Both.

Soc. Do you mean by this something of this kind, that men seek both what they know and what they do not know? just as if a person should know Callistratus, who he is;⁴ but not know to find where he is,⁴ not who is Callistratus.⁴ Do you mean that to seek both is after this manner.

Sis. I do.

Soc. He then, who knows Callistratus, would not seek that matter, namely, to know him.

Sis. He would not.

Soc. But he would, where he might be.

Sis. It seems so to myself at least.

Soc. Nor would he seek even this, namely, where it was possible to find him, if he knew already; but he would find him forthwith.

¹ On account of the antithesis in *εἰδέναι τι*, I have translated as if the Greek were *μηδὲ πᾶν*, not *μηδὲ πῶ*— Compare Xenoph. M. S. iv. 6, 7, 'Ἀρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἰστιάσθαι; Οὐδὲ μὰ Δι' ἔμοιγε πολλοστὸν μέρος αὐτῶν. Of course I am aware that *μηδίπῳ ἰστιάσθαι* is found just afterwards, but there is not, as here, any antithesis.

²⁻³ Such seems to be the meaning of the words, *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν νοήσει τι εἶναι τοῦτο*—

⁴ In the formula *Καλλίστρατον γινώσκει ὅς τις ἴσται*, the noun is not elsewhere, if I rightly remember, repeated. I have therefore omitted it.

⁴⁻⁴ The words between the numerals, I confess, I cannot understand.

Sis. Yes.

Soc. Men then do not seek the things, which they know, but, as it seems, what they do not know. But if this reasoning appears to you to be of a captious kind, and to have been spoken, not for the sake of a practical purpose, but for conversation merely, consider the matter in this way, if the case seems to be such as has been just now stated. Do you not know that this takes place in geometry? that by geometers the diameter is not unknown, whether it be a diameter or not,—for this I well know¹ is not sought to be discovered by them,—but how great it is in measurement in proportion to the sides of the space which it intersects? Is not this the very thing which is sought respecting it?

Sis. So it seems at least to me.

Soc. For it is that, which is unknown. Is it not so?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. Know you not that the doubling of the cube is sought to be discovered by geometers, how great it is by calculation? But the cube itself is not sought for by them, whether it is a cube, or not; for that at least they know well.² Is it not so?

Sis. Yes.

Soc. Respecting the air likewise, do you not know that Anaxagoras and Empedocles, and the rest of those,³ who talk about meteorology,³ are all seeking whether it is boundless or has a limit?

Sis. Yes I do.

Soc. But not the question, whether it is air. Is it not so?

Sis. It is.⁴

[3.] *Soc.* Will you then agree with me that such is the case with all other things⁵ now⁶ that to no person is there

¹ Although οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ is not an uncommon expression, yet here I should prefer—οὐδὲ γὰρ, οἷδ' εἶναι, and so I have translated; for the second οὐδὲ is omitted in some MSS.

² The Greek is τοῦτό γε. It was, I think, τοῦτό γ' εἶναι—

³⁻³ The word in Lucian's Icaromenipp. § 5, is Μετεωρολογίας; in Aristophanes *Nep.* 359, Μετεωροσοφιστῶν; and in 332, μετεωροφίνακας.

⁴ After ἢ γὰρ, the answer generally expresses an assertion, not a negation; which however is found again towards the end of this §, n. ⁴.

⁵ The Greek is καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων—which I cannot understand. I have translated as if it were originally καὶ τὰ τῶν—

⁶ Instead of ἤδη one MS. has ἂν δὴ, which leads to καὶ δεῖ—

any seeking¹ after the things he knows, but rather after those which he does not know?

Sis. I will.

Soc. Did not the consulting appear to us to be this very thing, namely, that a person is seeking after the best things relating to what he would require to employ himself in for his own benefit.

Sis. Yes.

Soc. And the seeking was, like the consulting, about things to be done. Is it not so?

Sis. Entirely.

Soc. Must we not consider then at present, what impediment is in the way of those, who are seeking, to the discovery of the things, about which they are making the search?

Sis. So it seems at least to me.

Soc. Could we say that any thing else was an impediment to them except a want of knowledge?

(*Sis.* Nothing else).²

Soc. Let us, by Zeus, consider the matter very much, letting out,³ as the saying is, every rope, and sending out every voice.⁴ And view thou this point with me. Think you that a man could consult about music, who knows nothing of music; or how he ought to play on the guitar, or to perform any thing according to the musician's art?

Sis. Not I indeed.

Soc. What then, as regards generalship, or piloting? Do you think that the person, who knows neither of those arts,

¹ The syntax requires instead of ζητεῖν, either ζήτημα or τὸ ζητεῖν.

² I have introduced, what the sense requires, οὐκ ἄλλο. Bekker indeed assigns Σκοπῶμεν νῆ Δία to Sisyphus, on the authority of four MSS. But such an answer could never be given to the question, Ἄρ' οὖν ἄλλο τι φαίμεν ἄν—

³ In lieu of ἰφύντες, Bekker would read ἀφύντες— But we meet in Protagor. p. 338, A., with ἰφύναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις; although a little afterwards one MS. reads οὐρία ἀφύντα; where the rest have ἰφύντα. Winckelmann prefers ἰξύντες, similar to ἰξιᾶσι πάντα δὴ κάλων, in Eurip. Med. 278, and πάντα δὴ κάλων ἰξύναι, in Aristoph. 'Ικκ. 753, to which he might have added ἰξίη κάλως in Tro. 94, and Herc. F. 837. But the play in the words requires here, κάλων ἰφύντες and φωνῶν ἀφύντες— where the latter expression is similar to φωνῶν ἀφῆεν, in Phœn. 1449, and φθογγὴν ἀφῆ in Hippol. 418.

⁴ On the formula πᾶσαν φωνὴν ἰέναι see Heindorf on Euthyd. p. 293, A.

would' have it in his power to consult about either of those matters, ¹as to what is to be done by him, and how,¹ who knows not to act the general or pilot?

Sis. I do not.

Soc. Do you think then that the case is so respecting all other matters, of which a person knows nothing; that it is not possible for him even to consult,² who knows nothing about them?

Sis. I do.

Soc. But it is (possible) for him to seek (to know).³ Is it not?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. To seek then would not be the same as to consult.

Sis. How could it?

Soc. Because to seek is surely applied to the matters, which a person does not know; but it seems to be not possible for a person to consult about those matters, of which he is ignorant. Or has not this been said correctly?⁴

Sis. Very much so.

Soc. Ye were then yesterday seeking to discover what was best for the state; but ye did not know it. For if ye had known, ye would not surely have been seeking it, just as we do not seek any thing amongst those which we know. Is it not so?

Sis. It is.⁵

Soc. Whether does it seem to you, Sisyphus, if a person does not know, that he ought to seek or to learn?

Sis. To myself at least it seems, by Zeus, to learn.

Soc. And correctly does it seem so. But does it seem to you that he ought to learn rather than seek on this account, because a person would discover more quickly and easily, if

¹— The Greek is $\delta, \tau\iota \kappa\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\omicron\nu \epsilon\iota\eta \alpha\upsilon\tau\omega \delta\omega\varsigma$ [$\eta \sigma\tau\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\eta\eta\tau\iota\omicron\nu \eta \kappa\upsilon\beta\epsilon\rho\eta\eta\tau\iota\omicron\nu \iota\kappa\iota\nu\omega \alpha\upsilon\tau\omega$], where the words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation of $\kappa\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\omicron\nu$, as I remarked twenty years ago; when I likewise suggested $\delta, \tau\iota \eta \delta\omega\varsigma$ — similar to $\delta, \tau\iota \kappa\alpha\iota \delta\pi\eta$ in Sympos. p. 212, B.

²— The Greek is $\mu\eta \epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota \mu\eta\delta\epsilon \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota \pi\omega \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ — where $\mu\eta \epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ is at variance with the train of thought; for the question is about the being able to consult, not about the being able to know. Hence I have omitted $\mu\eta \epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ here, and, after changing those words into $\eta\nu \epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, inserted them in (³), for there $\zeta\eta\tau\epsilon\iota\nu$ could hardly stand by itself.

⁴ I have translated, as if $\epsilon\upsilon$ had dropt out after $\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\chi\theta\eta$.

⁵ Here, as in (¹), the negative assertion is an answer to $\eta \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$.

he learnt from those, who know, than if he were to seek himself what he did not know? Or is it on some other account?

Sis. ¹ On no other than this.¹

[4.] Why did ye not then yesterday, disregarding the act of consulting about matters, of which ye knew nothing, and of seeking to do the best for the state,² learn from some one of those, who did know, how ye might do the best for the state? But ye seem to me to have been sitting the whole of yesterday and speaking off-hand, and prophesying about matters, of which ye were ignorant, and neglecting to learn, both the rulers of the state and you together with them. But perhaps you will say that this has been played off by myself against you for the sake of a conversation merely, and it has not been proved to you seriously. Consider then, by Zeus, this question at least for the present with seriousness. If it were conceded that to consult is something, and not, as now discovered, to be ³ nothing else than a knowledge according to conjecture, and a speaking off-hand,³ making use of merely a more solemn name,⁴ but nothing else,⁵ do you think, that as regards the act of consulting well and being good counsellors, persons differ one from another on that point,⁶ as persons ⁷[differ one from another]⁷ on all the other kinds of knowledge,

¹— I have translated, as if the Greek were, *Οὐκ ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ τοῦτο*, not *οὐκ ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο*, although a similar impropriety is found in another Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Hipparch. p. 227, B. *ἢ ἄλλο τι*; *οὐκ' ἀλλὰ*—

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *τῇ πόλει*, not *ἐν τῇ πόλει*, where the preposition is superfluous, as shown by the very next sentence.

³— The Greek is *οὐδὲν—ἀλλοῖον ἢ ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ εἰσαία καὶ σχεδιασμός*, literally “nothing strange than what is knowledge and guessing, and speaking off-hand.” But the idea of any thing strange is here quite out of place; while this union of knowledge and guessing would be a manifest absurdity. I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were, what I formerly suggested, *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὅν ἢ ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γι κατ' εἰσαίαν καὶ σχεδιασμόν*.

⁴ Compare Lucian in *Icaro-Menipp.* § 29, *ὄνομα σιμνόν τὴν ἀρετὴν περιθήμενοι*; and see Valckenaer in Eurip. *Diatrib.* p. 258, who might have quoted Eustath. *Il.* i. p. 762, 62, *Βασ. σιμνότητος περιπετάσματος τὸ τοῦ πράγματος δυσπρόσωπον συγκαλύπτεται*; and have corrected *παραπετάσματος* by the aid of *ταῖς τίχνας ταύταις παραπιτάσμασιν ἰχρήσαντο*, in Protagor. p. 317.

⁵ I confess I can scarcely understand *ἀλλῃ δ' οὐδενί*— The sense evidently requires *ἀλλθι δ' οὐδαμῇ*— “but true not at all.”

⁶ In lieu of *αὐτῶν* the sense and syntax require *ἐν αὐτῶν*, similar to *ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις*, just afterwards.

⁷— The words between the numerals are a manifest interpolation.

(such as) carpenters from carpenters, physicians from physicians, and hautboy-players from hautboy-players, and all the rest of handicraftsmen differ from each other?¹ As then those engaged in these arts (differ),² think you that in the act of consulting persons would differ at all in this manner, one from another?

Sis. Yes I do.

Soc. Now tell me, do not all, both those who consult well, and those who do so ill, consult about matters that are about to be?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. ³Is the future any thing else than what is not as yet?³

Sis. It is not.

Soc. For if it were, it would not surely be still about to be, but it would be already. Is it not so?

Sis. Yes.

Soc. ⁴Therefore that, which is not yet, in reality has not been produced.⁴

Sis. It has not.

Soc. ⁵Therefore that, which is not and has not been produced, has no existence in reality.⁵

Sis. It has not.

[5.] *Soc.* Do not all, then, who consult well or ill, consult about things which neither are, nor have been, and which have no existence, when they consult respecting things about to be?

Sis. At least they seem so.

Soc. Does it seem to you possible for a person to hit well or ill a thing, that does not exist?

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν*, not *αὐτοὶ τῶν αὐτῶν*, where *ἑαυτῶν* is *ἀλλήλων*, as elsewhere.

² I have neglected the unintelligible *ἢ* found between *τίχναϊς* and *οὕτω*—

³—³ The Greek is *ἄλλο τι οὖν ἢ τὰ μέλλοντα οὕτω ἔστιν*. But the sense requires, as I remarked long ago, *ἄλλο τι οὖν τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ ἂ οὕτω ἔστιν*, and so I have translated.

⁴—⁴ The Greek is *οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ πῶς ἔστιν οὕτως οὐδὲ γίγνεται τὰ μὴ ὄντα*—literally, "Therefore if it is not yet thus, that which is not has not been ever," which I must leave for others, if they can, to understand. The train of thought requires, *οὐκοῦν, ἂ μὴ πῶς ἔστιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ γίγνεται*.

⁵—⁵ Here again the chain of reasoning leads to *οὐκοῦν, ἂ μὴ πῶς ἔστιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ γίγνεται, οὕτω οὐδὲ φέσιν ἔχει οὐδεμίαν ὄντως*, as I have translated, not *οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ πῶς ἔστιν γίγνεται—αὐτῶν*—where *αὐτῶν* has nothing to which it can be referred.

Sis. How say you this?

Soc. I will explain, what I mean to say. Consider then. How would you distinguish out of many archers, which of them was the good and (which) the bad?

¹ *Sis.* Surely this is not difficult to know.¹

Soc. For perhaps you would bid them shoot at some mark. Is it not so?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. Would you not decide that he is the conqueror, who hits most often the mark in a direct way.²

Sis. Yes, I would.

Soc. But ³if there were no mark laid down³ for them to shoot at, but each shot where he⁴ liked, how could you distinguish between the good and bad archer?

Sis. Not at all.

Soc. Would you then not be at a loss to distinguish between

¹—¹ I have attributed all between the numerals to Sisyphus, not, as commonly, to Socrates; and altered η into $\eta\upsilon$ —

² I scarcely understand $\kappa\alpha\tau' \delta\rho\theta\acute{o}\nu$ — The sense evidently requires something like "in the bull's eye," which is in the centre of a target, and would be expressed probably in Greek by $\kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{o}\mu\phi\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\nu$ —

³—³ Here is evidently an allusion to an Æsopo-Socratic fable, first published in a latent metrical form by De Furia, from a Vatican MS., but recently in a more complete state from an Athos MS. by Boissonade; who however did not perceive some errors in the Greek, which I corrected in *Revue de Philologie*, vol. ii. p. 225, and I will therefore present the reader with an English version of it.

"To the gods Apollo, his long arrows holding,
Spoke thus—Who knows the arrow to let fly,
Than the far-darting farther? On the strife
With Phœbus enter'd Zeus, his weapons handling.
In Ares' helmet Hermes shook the lots,
Which Phœbus first obtaining, with his hands
The bent bow pushing from him, and the string
Letting go sharply, first his arrow fix'd
Within the distant gardens of the West.
When with his stride did Zeus the distance clear,
And cried—Where shall I shoot? no space have I.
And no bow drawing, bow-man's glory gained."

To the same fable an allusion is made by Lucretius in i. 968, "si quis procurrat ad oras Ultimus extremas jaciaturque volatile telum," quoted by Davies on Cicero de N. D. i. 20, "animus—ita late longeque peregrinatur, ut nullam tamen oram ultimam videat, in qua possit insistere."

⁴ Common sense requires "where," not "how," in Greek $\delta\pi\omicron\upsilon$, not $\delta\pi\omicron\varsigma$, and so I have translated.

those consulting well or ill, if they did not know what they were consulting about?

Sis. Yes, I should.

Soc. Do not those then, who consult respecting things about to be, consult respecting things not in existence?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. It is not therefore possible for any person to hit the thing not in existence. For how does any one seem to you to be able to hit, what is not in existence?

Sis. Not at all.

Soc. Since then it is not possible to hit, what is not in existence, no one would be able to hit any thing¹ of those not in existence by consulting. For things that are about to be, belong to those not in existence. Is it not so?

Sis. So it seems at least to me.

Soc. He then, who does not hit things about to be, would be amongst men neither a good counsellor, nor a bad counsellor.

Sis. It seems he would not.

Soc. Nor is a person (said)² to be either a better counsellor, or a worse counsellor, not even if he should be more successful or less successful in hitting, what is not in existence.

Sis. He is not.

Soc. Looking then to what circumstance men call certain persons by the name³ of good counsellors, or bad counsellors, is it not worthy, Sisyphus, to think again upon this matter?

Sis. (I say so).⁴

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀν γὰρ τι*, not *ἀν ἕκ*—

² As there is nothing on which *εἶναι* can depend, I suspect the author wrote *Οὐδὲ λέγεται*, not *Οὐδὲ γὰρ*—as I have translated.

³ To avoid the strange expression *ἀποκαλοῦσιν—εἶναι*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀποκαλοῦσιν—ὀνόματι*—

⁴ The dialogue is generally thought to be imperfect; but it will be complete, if we suppose that *φημί* has dropt out after *Σίσυφος*—and so I have translated.

DEMODOCUS.

[1.] You are, Demodocus, requesting¹ me to advise you on the matters, about which you are come together to deliberate. But it has come into my mind to consider, what avails this meeting of yours, and the eagerness of those, who think to advise with you, and the vote, which each of you thinks of giving. For, in the first place, unless it be possible to advise correctly and skilfully on the points, respecting which ye are come to deliberate, how is it not ridiculous for you to come together to deliberate on points, respecting which it is not possible to advise correctly? And in the second place, if it be possible to advise correctly and skilfully upon matters of this kind, still the knowledge, by which it is possible to advise correctly on them, is none. How then is it not out of place? But if there be any knowledge, by which it is possible to advise correctly on such matters, is it not necessary that there should be certain persons skilled to advise correctly on matters of this kind? And if there are certain persons, skilled to advise on those points, about which you are come together to deliberate, is it not necessary for you likewise to know how to advise on these matters, or not to know? Or that some persons should know, and some not? If then all of you know, what need is there for you to come together to deliberate? for each of you is competent to advise. But if, on the other hand, all of you do not know, how will you be able to deliberate? Or what advantage would there be to you in this meeting together, if you are not able to deliberate? But if some of you know, and others do not know, but these are in want of counsel, whether it is possible for an intellectual person to advise

¹ On this meaning of *καλεῖται* see Alcibiad. II. § n. 70.

the unskilled, even a single person is sufficient to advise with those of you, who do know. Or do not all, who know, advise the same thing? so that it is fitting, after you have heard that person, to separate. But now you do not this; but you wish to hear many giving their advice; for you do not take upon yourselves to know those, who are attempting to advise with you on points, on which they are advising. For if you had taken upon yourselves to know those, who were advising with you, it would have been sufficient for you to have heard one person alone. To come together then with the view of hearing those, who do not know, as if you were doing something of importance, how is it not a thing out of place? Respecting then this meeting of yours, I am in this way at a loss.

[2.] And that too is a thing of difficulty relating to the eagerness of those, who think they can advise with you. For if, while advising, they do not give the same advice upon the same points, how can they all advise correctly, when they do not advise what he, who advises correctly, would advise?¹ Or how can the eagerness of those, who are eager to advise on points, in which they are unskilled, not be out of place? for being skilled, they would not choose to advise incorrectly. But if, on the other hand, they advise the same, what need is there for them all to advise? for a single one of them would, if advising the same, be sufficient. To be eager then on such matters, as would be of no importance, how is it not ridiculous? Neither then would the eagerness of the unskilled be not out of place, when it is of such a kind; nor would men of sense feel an eagerness on such matters, knowing that even one of them would do the same thing by advising what was fitting; so that I am unable to discover how the eagerness of those, who fancy they are advising, is not ridiculous.

[3.] But as regards the vote which you are thinking to give, I am the most at a loss, what it can avail. For whether are you giving a judgment upon those, who know how to advise? ²But more persons will not advise at all any better

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἂν ἐν συμβουλευοίσι*—not *ἂν συμβουλευέιν*.

² The Greek is at present *ἀλλ' οὐ πλείονες ἐνὸς συμβουλευέουσιν, οὐδὲ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, which I cannot understand. I have therefore translated, as if it were originally *ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πλείονες πλείονες ἐνὸς συμβουλευέουσιν, οὐδ' εἰ ἄλλοι ἄλλως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*.

than one, nor some one way and others another correctly upon the same matter ;² so that respecting them there will be no need for you to give a vote. But are you giving a judgment ¹ upon some, who are unskilled and who ought not to advise any persons ?¹ Surely it is not fitting to intrust to such persons, as if they were madmen, to advise. But if you are to give a judgment upon neither the skilled nor the unskilled, upon whom are you to give it ? But what need is there for other persons to advise with you at all, if you are competent to give a judgment upon such matters ? But if on the other hand you are not competent, of what avail are your votes ? Or how is it not ridiculous for you to come together, as if about to consult, when you yourselves are in want of advice, and are incompetent, and yet fancy that you ought to come together and give a vote, as if competent to form a judgment ? For neither by being taken singly are you ignorant, and become sensible by being taken together ; nor, on the other hand, are you at a loss individually, but by coming together are no longer at a loss. But do you become competent to see together what things are to be done by you ? and this too, when you have neither learnt them from any one, nor discovered them yourselves ; which is the most shocking thing of all. For being unable to see together, what is to be done, you will not be competent to give a judgment upon the party, who is advising you correctly upon these matters ;³ nor, if a person, standing alone, as an adviser, should say this, that he himself will teach you what is to be done, is it in your power to form a correct judgment² upon those, who are advising you correctly or not. Now this would be a state not less shocking than that. If then neither the meeting nor the (single)³ adviser is able to make you competent to give a

¹—¹ In lieu of *καὶ ὥς μὴ δεῖ ξυμβουλευούοντας κρίνετε*, the sense seems to require, as I have translated, *καὶ, οὐς μὴ δεῖ ξυμβουλεύειν τισί, κρίνετε*—

²—² The Greek is at present *οὐδ' αὖ τοῦτό γ' ἱρεῖ εἰς ὧν ὁ ξυμβουλευῶν ὑμῖν ὅστος ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ἃ πρακτίον ὑμῖν ἴσθι καὶ κρίνειν*—where I can discover neither sense nor syntax. Opportunely then do three MSS. offer *διδάξει*, which has led me to *οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτό γ' ἱρεῖ εἰς ὧν ὁ ξυμβουλευῶν, ἅτι αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς διδάξει, ἃ πρακτία ἐν ὑμῖν ἴσθιν, εὖ κρίνειν*—what I have translated.

³ For the sake of the antithesis I have translated as if the Greek were originally *μηΘΕΙΣΟΣ*—not *μηΘΟΣ*—

judgment, what need is there to you for voting? Or how is this meeting of yours not opposed to your votes, and the vote to the eagerness of those advising you? For this meeting of yours is that of persons not competent, but in need of advisers; while the votes are given as of persons not wanting advisers, but able to form a judgment, and to advise; and the eagerness of those advising you, is as of persons who know; but the votes are given by you, as if the persons advising did not know. Now if any one were to ask you, who have voted, and the person advising you, respecting the matters on which you have voted—do you know what will that be, for the sake of which you think of doing what you have voted? you would not, I think, be able to say. And even if that should take place, for the sake of which you have it in your thoughts to do every thing,¹ do you know how it will benefit you? I think that neither you nor the party advising you would be able to tell this. But you conceive that some of those with intellect² know somehow this. But if a person should ask you who is the party,³ I do not think you would agree on this point. When therefore both the things, about which you are consulting,⁴ are such as not to be manifest, and the persons likewise, who vote and advise, are unskilled, reasonably will you say that it often falls out that persons have no faith in, and repent of, those things, for which they have taken counsel and voted. Now such events it is not becoming to fall out to the sensible. For they know the things, about which they give advice, both of what kind they are, and that they exist firmly to the parties persuaded, for the sake of whom they give the advice, and that neither to themselves nor to the parties persuaded will there be a repentance for any thing senseless.⁵ On matters

¹ In lieu of *ἀν*, omitted in two MSS., the author wrote, I suspect, *πᾶν*, as I have translated. On the phrase *πράττειν πᾶν* and its frequent corruption see my note on *Æsch. Eum.* 995.

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐννοῦν*, not *ἀνῶν*. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

³ The Greek is *εἰδέναι τι τούτων; εἰ τις*—which I cannot understand; to say nothing of the want of connexion in the sentences. To meet both objections, I suspect the author wrote *εἰδέναι τι ποῦ τίνα δ' εἰ τις*—what I have translated.

⁴ Correct Greek would require *ἐμβουλεύεσθε*, not *ἐμβουλεύετε*—

⁵ From *πισθεῖσιν αὐτοῖς* it is easy to elicit *πισθεῖσιν ἄνου τινος*—required by the sense, and to reject the repeated *αὐτοῖς*, which it is impossible to understand.

then of this kind I conceive that those, who possess any sense, should think it fit to give advice; but not about the matters on which you are requesting me to advise; for from their advice the result is good fortune, but from the trifling of these misfortune.

[4.] I was once present with a person while he was admonishing his friend, because the latter had trusted to an accuser, not having heard the other party making an apology for himself, but hearing only the accuser. He said that (the friend) had done a terrible thing, in deciding against the party without having been present himself, or having heard from the friends of the party, to whose statements it was reasonable for him to trust. For,¹ after having heard both, he would not have so hastily trusted to the accuser; but that it was just, before conferring praise or blame, to hear the party make his defence, as well as the accuser. For how could any one decide correctly a suit, or judge in a proper manner between persons, without hearing the opposite parties? for that it is better that assertions, like a purple colour and gold-money, should be judged of by being placed side by side. Or for what purpose has time been allowed to both the opposite parties in a suit? or the judges sworn to hear both sides equally? unless the lawgiver conceived that suits would be decided more justly and better by the judges. But you seem to me to have not even heard of what is said by the multitude. What is it? said (the other).

² Decide no suit, till both accounts you've heard.²

And yet this would not have been thus circulated, if it had not been well said, and as is fitting. I advise you therefore, said he, for the future not to blame or praise persons so hastily. The other then said that it appeared to him an absurd thing, if it were impossible to know, when one person was speaking, whether he was telling the truth or a falsehood, and yet possible to know, when two persons were speaking; and impossible to

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐ γὰρ δὲ*— not *οὐδ'* αὖ—

²—³ On this proverbial verse see my note on *Æsch. Eum.* 417. Winkelman refers to *Fachse* on *Muret. Var. Lect.* vii. 18, and *Stephan. Thes. L. Gr. T.* i. p. 190, ed. *Par.*

learn from a person, when telling the truth, but possible to be taught by that very person and another, when telling a falsehood; and if one by speaking straightforwardly and truly should be unable to show what he is saying clearly, but that two, one of whom should tell a falsehood, and not speak straightforwardly, should be able to show clearly that, which the party speaking straightforwardly was not able to show clearly. And I am at a loss, said he, on this point likewise, how they are to show it clearly; whether by being silent, or speaking. For if they are to show it clearly by being silent, there would be a need of hearing neither, much less both. But if by speaking both are to show it clearly, and both parties speak according to no regular manner and time¹—for both think they have a right to speak in turn—how is it possible for both to show the matter clearly? For if both are showing the matter clearly at the same time, both will be speaking together at the same time. ² But this they are not wont to do, nor do the laws permit it; ² so that if they are to show the matter clearly by speaking, each of them will do so by speaking; and when either party speaks, then either party will show the matter clearly; so that they will speak one before and the other after; and they will show the matter clearly, one before and the other after. Now if each party in turn shows the same matter clearly, what need is there to hear the latter? for the matter will have become clear by the party first speaking. But if both parties show clearly ³ that matter, said he,³ how will not either of them have done so? for how would both be able to show clearly that, which one of

¹ In lieu of *χρόνον* one MS. affords as a var. lect. *χρόνον*—and hence
 χ ν
 another has *ῥῥονον*— By the aid of both united I have been led to *ῥῥονον* *kai* *χρόνον*, what I have translated. For in a law-suit at Athens both the manner and the time were, in some cases, defined by law.

²—³ The Greek is at present, *τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἰσῶσι*— But as there is nothing to which *ἰσῶσι* can be united, opportunely does one MS. read *οὐκαθῶσιν*, where evidently lies hid *οὐκ εἰσῶσιν*— while from *ἰσῶσιν* it is easy to elicit *ἰσῶσι* *οἱ νόμοι*— what I have translated; for custom and law are thus perpetually united.

³— The Greek is at present *ἰσῶσι δ' ἴση*— But *ἰσῶσι* could hardly be used for *αὐτὸ*: and if it could, still less would *ἴση* be here introduced superfluously. Opportunely then do MSS. offer, one *δῆψ*, another *ἴση*, and a third *φῆ*: for the author wrote, I suspect, *ἰσῶσι δ', δ' ἀσαφὲς ἦν*— i. e. “that matter, which was not clear—”

them shall not have done so? But if either shall have shown it clearly, it is evident that the former will have spoken of it, and the former will have shown it clearly; so that how is it not possible for the person hearing him alone to know all correctly?¹ On hearing them I was at a loss, and unable to decide. For the others, who were present, said that the first reasoning was true. If then you can advise me² on this matter, whether it is possible,³ when one person is saying any thing, to know correctly what he is saying, say so;³ or whether there is need of a speaker on the opposite side, if a person would know which is speaking straightforwardly. Or whether it is not necessary to hear both parties? Or how do you think?

[5.] The day before yesterday a person was finding fault with another, because he was unwilling to lend money or to trust him; and the party, with whom he was finding fault, was defending himself; whereupon another person amongst those, who were present, inquired of the party finding fault—whether he, who had not trusted nor lent the money, had erred? and have not you too, said he, who did not persuade him to lend, erred? In what, said the other party, have I erred? Which of the two, said (the inquirer), seems to you to err? the person, who fails in what he wishes, or he, who does not (fail)? The person who fails, said he. Have you then not failed in wishing to borrow; while he, who did not wish to give up (his money), has not failed in that point. Truly so, said he; but in what have I erred, even if he has not given it me? Because, said (the inquirer), if you have begged the things which you ought not, how do you think that you have not erred? while he has acted correctly in not giving them up; but if, on the other hand, you have begged

¹ I have translated as if πάντ' εὖ had dropt out between ἀκούσαντα and γινῶναι.

² In lieu of συμβαλίσθαι, the sense evidently requires συμβουλεύεσθαι—For the party himself could make a conjecture, but could not give the advice he wanted.

³—³ Here again I suspect that something has dropt out. The Greek is at present ἐνός λίγοντος γινῶναι τί λέγει— It was originally ἐνός λίγοντός τι, γινῶναι εὖ, ὅ, τι λέγει, λέγει— what I have translated.

what you ought, and failed in this point, how have you not of necessity erred? Perhaps so, said he; but how has he not erred, who did not trust me? If you had treated with him, said (the inquirer), as was fitting, you would not have erred at all. Not at all. But now you have not treated with him, as was fitting. I appear so, said he. If then he was not persuaded, when you were treating with him, as was not fitting, how can you justly find fault with him? I am unable to say. Nor can you say that one must not pay attention to those, who conduct themselves ill? This (I can say) very much, said he. Do not then those persons seem to you to conduct themselves ill, who treat with a party in a manner that is not fitting? To me at least (they seem so), said he. In what then did he err, if he paid no attention to you, when conducting yourself ill? It appears, said he, in nothing. Why then, said (the inquirer), do persons find fault on such matters with each other, and blame those, who are not persuaded by them, because they are not persuaded, but do not find fault with themselves at all, because they have not persuaded them? Here-upon another party who was present, observed—When a person has conducted himself well towards any one, and has assisted him, and subsequently requests that party to conduct himself in a similar manner towards him, but does not meet with such conduct, how does he not reasonably find fault? Is not, said (the inquirer), the person whom the party requests to conduct himself in a similar manner, either able to conduct himself well, or unable? (Yes.)¹ And if he is unable, how can he properly make the request, who requests him (to perform)² what he cannot? but if he is able, how did he not persuade him (to do so)? or how do persons, who speak in this way, speak correctly? But, said (the other), it is requisite, by Zeus, to find fault with such a person,³ in order that both he may for the remainder of his life conduct himself better, and the other mean fellows,⁴ who hear the party finding fault. Think you, said (the inquirer), that any persons will conduct

¹ I have introduced the answer "Yes," which could hardly be dispensed with.

² The Greek is *ἵκω*— I have translated as if it were *ἀνύκω*—

³ The train of thought evidently leads to *ροῦόντω* instead of *ροῦτο*—

⁴ Instead of *ἄλλοι φίλοι*, the author wrote either *ἄλλοι οὐ φίλοι*, or *ἄλλοι φαῦλοι*, as I have translated.

themselves better when they hear a party speaking correctly,¹ or when in error? When speaking correctly, said he. ²Now the party, who was speaking not correctly, did not seem to you to make a request correctly?³ Truly so, said he. How then will those, who hear a person finding fault in this way, conduct themselves better. Not at all, said he. For what purpose, then,³ would a person find fault³ in this way? He confessed he could not discover

[6.] Some one was accusing a person of stupidity, because he had given credence quickly even to parties he happened to meet with,⁴ while they were speaking. To fellow-citizens and familiar friends, when speaking, it is reasonable to trust. But to persons of that kind, whom he had never seen nor heard of before, to give credence, and this too when he was not ignorant that the majority of men are braggarts and knaves, was no little proof of silliness. When one of those present observed—For my part I thought that you considered a person of greater value, who could quickly understand even any one he met with, rather than him, who did so slowly. And so I do consider, said the other. Why then, said (the former), do you find fault, if a person gives credence quickly, even to those he meets with, when they speak the truth? But, said (the other), I do not find fault with this, but because he gives credence to those, who tell falsehoods. But, if after a longer period even to those not accidentally met with he had given credence, and suffered annoyance,⁵ would you not have found fault with him still more? Yes; I should have done so, said he. Is it, because he gave credence slowly, even to those not acci-

¹ The words *καὶ ἀξιούντως*, commonly found here between *λέγοντος* and *ἡ*, were properly omitted originally in one MS.

²⁻³ To preserve the chain of reasoning the author evidently wrote, not 'Ο δὲ γὰρ οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἀξιούν ἰδόκει σοι— which I cannot understand, but 'Ο δὲ λέγων οὐκ ὁρθῶς οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἀξιούν ἰδόκει σοι— what I have translated.

³⁻³ Since all the MSS. but one read *ἐγκαλοῖ*, it is evident the author wrote *τοιαῦτ' ἂν*— not *τοιαῦτα*—

⁴ So I have translated *τοῖς τυχοῦσιν* all through this section, although *οἱ τυχόντες* generally means "ordinary persons." For *οἱ τυχόντες* are here opposed to *οἱ οἰκίοι*, and compared with *οἱ ἀγνώτες*.

⁵ In lieu of the unintelligible *ᾗτις*, I have substituted *ἡμᾶς*—

dentially met with? No, by Zeus, said he. For I suppose, said the other, you do not conceive that it is right to find fault with a person on this account, but because he gives credence to those, who state what is not credible. I do so, said he. Whether then, said (the other), do you think it is not right to find fault with him for giving credence slowly even to those not accidentally met with, but right (to do so) for giving credence quickly even to those accidentally met with? Not I indeed, said he. Why then do you find fault with him? said (the other). Because he errs in giving credence to persons accidentally met with, previous to making an inquiry. But if he had slowly given credence, previous to making an inquiry, he would not have erred. Not so, by Zeus, said he; but he would have erred even thus not the less; but I think one ought not to give credence to persons accidentally met with. But if, said (the other), you think one ought not to give credence to persons accidentally met with, how is it fitting to give credence quickly to persons unknown? and do you think that it is requisite to make an inquiry, whether they are speaking the truth? I think so,¹ said he. Say then, said (the other), is it not requisite to make inquiry about familiar friends and acquaintances, whether they are speaking the truth? I should say so, said he. For perhaps, said (the other), some of these state what is not credible. And very much so, said he. Why then, said (the other), is it more reasonable to give credence to familiar friends and acquaintances than to persons accidentally met with? I cannot tell, said he. What then, if it is requisite (not)² to give more credence to familiar friends than to persons accidentally met with, is it not requisite to consider them less trustworthy than persons accidentally met with? How not? said he. If then there are familiar friends to some persons, and persons unknown to others, how will it not be necessary to consider the same persons more trustworthy than the same? For it is requisite to consider familiar friends and persons unknown, as not

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *Εἰπέ, ἔπει*—not *ἔπει*—which I cannot understand.

² This negative, wanting in all the MSS., is found only in the Latin version of Corradus.

³ I have adopted *ῥῶν αὐτῶν*, suggested by Stephens, in lieu of *αὐτῶν*, which is unintelligible.

equally trustworthy, as you say yourself. This does not please me, said he. Equally, said (the former), do some believe what is stated by them, but others disbelieve? And this too is strange, said he. If then, said (the other), both familiar friends and persons accidentally met with state the same things, would not all things stated equally to all be credible or incredible (equally)? Necessarily so, said he. Must we not give credence then equally to those who state the same things?² It is probable, said he.

On their conversing in this way, I was at a loss to whom one ought to give credence and to whom not, and whether to the trust-worthy and those who know what they are speaking about, or to familiar friends and acquaintances. Upon these matters then how think you?

¹—¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἅπαντα—πᾶσι*, not *ἰπείρα—πῶς*, where *ἰπείρα* seems quite inadmissible.

² The Greek is at present *τοῖς λίγουσιν αὐτὰ—λίγουσιν αὐτὰ*— where Stephens was the first to suggest *λίγουσι—ταὐτὰ*, and to reject *λίγουσιν αὐτὰ*— But those words are not to be rejected entirely. They ought to be inserted after *γνωρίμοις* just below, and thus corrected, *λίγουσιν, ἀ οἶωνται εἰδέναι*, i. e. “say, what they think they know—” for thus the parties, who think they know, are properly opposed to those, who really know.

INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFINITIONS.

Or these Definitions, which are appended to all the complete editions of Plato, and found likewise in eleven MSS. collated by Bekker, the authorship is attributed in the Vienna MS. to Speusippus. (Φ.) But since the writing relied upon, as the authority for this statement, is more modern than the rest of the Manuscript, the remark is probably due to Sambucus, once the possessor of it; who, says Menage, on Diogen. L. iv. 5, asserted that the "Οροι, mentioned in the Life of Speusippus, had been falsely attributed to Plato; and he might have added, that although the Definitions are attributed to Plato by Casaubon, they are distinctly assigned to Speusippus by Ficinus; whose version of them is to be found towards the end of a volume in folio, containing his translation of "Iamblichus de Mysteriis," and other Greek treatises of a similar character, printed by Aldus in 1497. Stobæus, however, found the Definitions at the end of his MS. of Plato; to whom he says they were attributed, in iii. p. 49, 35. But instead of Speusippus being the author of these Definitions, internal evidence would rather lead to the supposition of their being the production of some more recent philosopher of Alexandria. For we find δόμα twice used in the sense of a "gift," a word first met with in Holy Writ, and subsequently in Plutarch, as remarked by H. Stephens; and while its compound πρόδομα is found in Hesych. Ἀρράβων, as duly noticed by Lobeck on Phrynichus, p. 249, the simple δόμα is reckoned amongst irregular formations by Herodian, Περὶ Μονηροῦς Δείξεως, p. 30, 5, where Lehr refers to Lobeck's Παραλειπόμενα, p. 424.

But granting even that from this fact no inference could be fairly drawn against the supposed authorship and antiquity of the Definitions, yet the matter of them is such as to disprove their being

written by a disciple of Plato, and suggests rather that they are the production of some philosopher, who concocted them from a faithless representation of the doctrines promulgated in the Socratic, Stoic, Academic, and Peripatetic schools; and this too with so little judgment, as frequently to give an unintelligible definition, when he might have found an intelligible one elsewhere, as I have shown on various occasions in the notes. Socrates, it is true, as remarked by Menage on Diogenes L. vii. 60, is said by Aristotle in *Metaphys.* i. 6, and xiii. 4, and Theopompus the rhetorician, quoted by Arrian on Epictetus ii. 17, to have paid considerable attention to Definitions; and this may be inferred from some instances furnished by Xenophon in *Memorab.* iv. 6. But it is to Zeno and his followers that we must refer the practice of laying down Definitions, as the basis of subsequent discussions. For they were accustomed to apply to moral philosophy the principle they had learnt from the Pythagoreans, as the groundwork of physical philosophy, developed by mathematics, as may be inferred from the *Life of Pythagoras* by Diogenes; who appeals to Phavorinus to prove that "Pythagoras made use of definitions through his 'Mathematical Wood;' and still more so did Socrates and his followers; and so did Aristotle and the Stoics." Menage too, on Diogen. L. vii. 60, remarks that a mass of such definitions are to be found in the *Life of Zeno* alone.

To the preceding proofs that the author of the Definitions was some philosopher of Alexandria, may be added those which Cousin has adduced. He remarks that *Ἀξιώσις*, in the sense of "dignity" or "majesty," does not belong to the period of Plato, nor even to any age of good Greek; and neither does *λογισμὸς συνόρατος*. So too *Ἀγάπησις* is not a word of Plato or his time; while on the unintelligible definition of the word *ὄνομα*, "a noun," he observes that "the language used there is altogether of the Alexandrine school, and is better suited to a treatise by Dionysius the Areopagite than to one attributed to Plato."

G. B.

DEFINITIONS.

¹ *Eternal*—that which has existed formerly through all time, and is now not destroyed.¹

God—an immortal living-being,² sufficient in itself for happiness; an eternal existence; the cause of the nature of the good.

Generation—a movement towards existence; ³ a sharing through a change³ in existence; a progression towards existence.

The sun—a fire in heaven, which can alone be seen from morning to evening by the same;⁴ ⁵ the greatest star, visible by day;⁵ a perpetually living being, possessing a soul.⁶

Time—⁷ a movement of the sun; a measure of progress.⁷

¹— As the idea of eternity necessarily includes the idea of continuance through the three periods of time, past, present, and future, this definition is evidently defective.

² I have translated ζῶν "a living being," to avoid the incongruity of considering god as an "animal," the ordinary meaning of ζῶν.

³— This is the proper version here of μάλαψις, not merely "a sharing."

⁴ Instead of "by the same," in Greek τοῖς αὐτοῖς, one would have expected "the same," in Greek ὁ αὐτός: for the question is not about the parties seeing, but the thing seen. Hence Corradus has "Sol—idem videri potest."

⁵— I have followed the reading of four MSS., ἄστρον ἡμεροφανὲς τὸ μέγιστον, and placed the words ζῶν διδίων ἐμψυχον after μέγιστον, not before them, as Bekker has done. Ficinus omits ἡμεροφανὲς. Corradus has correctly, "astrum maximum de die lucens."

⁶ On the sun possessing a soul, see Epinomis, p. 982, C. § 6.

⁷— Although this definition coincides in part with that of Eratosthenes, who, as we learn from Plutarch, ii. p. 884, B., described Time as "the journeying of the sun," yet it would be more correctly defined as "the measure of the motion of the sun, or of the progressive movement of

Day—a journeying of the sun from its rising (east) to its setting (west); a light, the opposite to Night.¹

Morning—the beginning of day; the first light from the sun.

Mid-day—the time when the shadows of substances have the least length.

Evening—the close of day.

Night—darkness, the opposite to Day;² a deprivation of the sun.

Chance—a proceeding from uncertainty to uncertainty, and from what is spontaneous;³ the⁴ cause⁵ of a fortuitous action.⁶

Old Age—the wasting away of a thing with life, the result of time.

*Wind*⁶—a movement in the air around the earth.

Air—an element, all of whose movements⁷ according to space are according to nature.⁷

Heaven—a substance, surrounding all things perceived by the senses, except the uppermost air.⁸

any thing," in Greek *Χρόνος ἡλίου κινήσεως μέτρον ἢ φορᾶς του*, not *Χρόνος ἡλίου κινήσεως, μέτρον φορᾶς*. The Stoics defined it as "the interval during (two) motions of the world." Corradus has, "mensura celestis conversionis."

¹ From this definition it would seem as if Night were a light, as well as Day. Hence one would have preferred *ῥῶς, τούναντιον νυκτὸς σκότῳ*, not simply *τούναντιον νυκτὶ*, and similarly in ², *Νύξ σκότος τούναντιον ἡμέρας φωτί*, not *ἡμέρᾳ* merely. Corradus makes this a new definition, "Lux, id, quod nocti est contrarium."

³ So Suidas, *Τύχη—ἡ φορὰ ἐξ ἀδῆλου εἰς ἀδῆλον καὶ αὐτόματον*. But Aristotle, according to Plutarch, ii. p. 885, C., made a distinction between *Τύχη* and *τὸ αὐτόματον*.

⁴ The *ἢ*, which is found before *ἐκ* in two MSS., and in its place in two, from whence *ἐκ* is placed over *ἢ* in two others, belongs in fact to *αἰρία*.

⁵ So I have translated *δαιμονίας πράξεως*. Stephens has, "causa felicitis successus;" but as "chance" is the cause of an unsuccessful as well as a successful action, the version in English should be as ambiguous as *δαιμονίας* is in Greek. Ficinus, too, "felicit actionis causa." Corradus, "et felicit actionis fortuita causa."

⁶ Why *πνεῦμα* is written here, where one would have expected *ἀνεμος*, I must leave for others to explain. Corradus renders *πνεῦμα* by "spiritus."

⁷ Here, again, I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot understand, the meaning of *κατὰ φύσιν*. Did the author write *κατὰ ρεῦσιν*? For the Stoics asserted, as we learn from Plutarch, ii. p. 895, A., that *πᾶν πνεῦμα αἰετος εἶναι ρεῦσιν*.

⁸ Here seems to be an allusion to what is called *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* in Phædr. p. 247, C. Ficinus omits *αἰσθητά*—

Soul—¹that which moves itself; ¹ the cause of vital motion in living beings.

²**Power**—that, which is able by itself to produce an effect.²

Vision—³the (bodily) habit³ of distinguishing substances.

Bone—marrow, consolidated by heat.

Element—⁴that, which combines and separates (particles) brought together.⁴

Virtue—⁵a (mental) constitution of the best kind; a habit of a mortal living being; ⁶the object of praise on account of itself; ⁶ a habit, according to which that, which possesses it, is said to be good; ⁷a just communion of laws; ⁷ a disposition, according to which ⁸that, which is constituted perfectly,⁸ is called steady; ⁹ a habit, effective of a good state of law.

¹—¹ On the self-moving power of the soul, see Phædrus, p. 246, D. § 51.

²—² There is another definition of power given in p. 144.

³—³ Although *ἔξις* and *διάθεσις* seem to be synonymous in p. 136, yet *ἔξις* appears to be applied to the body, and *διάθεσις* to the mind; and hence I have introduced between the lines "bodily" here, and shortly afterwards "mental" in ⁴.

⁴—⁴ A similar definition was given by the Stoics, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 136, *ἔστι δὲ στοιχείον, ἐξ οὗ πρῶτον γίνεται τι* (so Suidas correctly in *Στοιχείον* in lieu of *γινόμενα*) *καὶ εἰς ὃ ἴσχατον ἀναλύεται*. Ficinus has "ex quo componuntur, et in quod composita dissolvuntur."

⁵—⁵ See at ³.

⁶—⁶ So Cleanthes the Stoic, in Diogenes L. vii. 89, defined virtue as *διάθεσιν—δι' αὐτὴν—αἰρετὴν, οὐ διὰ τινὰ ῥόβον ἢ ἱλπίδα ἢ τι τῶν ἐξωθεν*: from whence one would prefer here *αἰρετὴ* to *ἱπαινετὴ*.

⁷—⁷ How virtue can be said to be "a just communion of laws" I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus; and hence he considered this as a fresh definition. But the two following sentences plainly prove that Virtue is still the subject of the definition. Did the author write *ἔξις ποιητικῆς εὐνομίας καὶ κοινωνίας νόμων δικαίας*? And so perhaps Stephens wished to read; for his version is—"Communio, legum est justa affectio, secundum quam id, quod habet perfecte affectum, honestum dicitur; aut habitus, qui æquitatis et concordie faciendæ vim habet:" which he got perhaps partly from Ficinus—"Communio, legum justa constitutio: qua quod præditum est, probum dicitur; habitus concordiam præstans." Corradus too considers this a new definition. His version is—"Communitas, legum justa dispositio, quam quicumque est adeptus, si modo sit optime affectus, honestus appellatur; habitus bonas legum lationem efficiens."

⁸—⁸ I have followed Bekker; who says, "*libri τὸ ἔχον*:" where he meant by "*libri*" printed books, not MSS., where those two words were, it seems, wanting.

⁹—⁹ I have translated *σπουδαῖος* "steady," i. e. a person who pursues an object in view without swerving and earnestly.

¹ *Discretion*—a power effective by itself of the good fortune of man ; a knowledge of things good and evil ; ² a knowledge effective of felicity ; ³ a (mental) constitution, by which we determine what is to be done and what is not to be done.¹

Justice—³ an agreement of the soul with itself, ³ and ⁴ a correct arrangement of the parts of the soul towards each other and about each other ; ⁴ ⁵ a habit, distributive to each person of that, which is according to worthiness ; ⁵ a habit, according to which he, who possesses it, can select what seems to him to be just ; a habit in life, ⁶ subservient to law ; ⁷ an equality that can share in common ; ⁷ a habit ministering to upright⁸ laws.

Temperance—a moderation of soul relating to the desires and pleasures, which exist in it according to nature ; a fitness in, and correct ordering of, the soul, as regards its natural pleasures and pains ; a harmony in the soul touching the states

¹—¹ The whole of this definition is found in Stobæus iii. p. 49, with a slight change in the position of the sentences.

²—² The words *πιστήμη ποιητική εὐδαιμονίας*, although acknowledged by Stobæus, have been cut out by Bekker from the text on the authority of a single MS.

³—³ How Justice can be said to be "an agreement of the soul with itself," I confess I cannot understand ; and still less how, in "⁴," it is a "correct arrangement of the parts of the soul towards each other and about each other ;" especially as a similar definition is given of Temperance in Stobæus v. p. 78, l. *Σωφροσύνη ἴσθιν ὁμολογία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλα*. Stephens too seems to have been at a loss ; for he renders *πρὸς ἀλλήλα καὶ περὶ ἀλλήλα* by merely "inter se," similar to "ad invicem cui mutuus" in Ficinus. Corradus has more closely "inter se et secum ordinis conservatio."

⁴—⁴ A similar definition is given from a not-mentioned author by Stobæus, ix. p. 125, 40. *Δικαιοσύνη δὲ ἴσθιν ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς διανεμητικὴ τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν*—where *ἐκάστω* seems to have dropt out between *διανεμητικὴ* and *τῶν*—

⁵ Since one MS. offers *βία* for *βίη*, perhaps the author wrote *ἐνευ βίας*, not *ἐν βίῃ*, and thus showed that Justice is subservient to law, not by force, but willingly.

⁶—⁶ How Justice can be "an equality sharing in common," I cannot understand ; nor could, I think, Stephens ; whose version is—"socialis equalitas." I could have understood *ισότητος κοινωνία*, or *ισότητος κοινωνικὴ ἕξις*—"a habit sharing in equality."

⁷ As four MSS. omit *ὁρθῶν*, one would suspect that *ἀγράφων* was written here originally, similar to the *ἀγράφους νόμους* mentioned by Xenophon in Memorab. iv. 4, 19, and by Demosthenes, p. 317 and 343, ed R., and the *ἀγραπτα—νόμιμα* in Soph. Antig. 453, and the "lex non scripta," on which Cicero is so eloquent, Pro Milone, § iii.

of ruling and being ruled ; a self-acting according to nature ;¹ [a well-ordering of the soul ;]¹ an² intercourse of the soul,² founded on reason, relating to things honourable and base ; a habit according to which he, who has it, can select and be cautious of what he ought.

Fortitude—a habit of the soul, not to be moved by fear ; a boldness in war ;³ a knowledge of the things relating to war ;³ a command over the soul relating to things of fear and dread ; a boldness subservient to discretion ; a bold bearing under the expectation of death ; a habit, preservative of right reasoning in dangers ;⁴ a strength (of mind) balancing (the apprehension) of danger ;⁴ a strength, bearing up on the side of virtue ; a tranquillity of soul with reference to things that appear, according to correct reasoning, to be full of dread and daring ; the safe preservation⁵ of uncertain determinations⁵ relating to things of dread ;⁶ a skill in war ;⁶ ⁷a habit, that can abide in law.⁷

Continence—a power enduring pain ;⁸ a following of correct reasoning ;³ ⁹a power not exceeded by that which is perceived by correct reasoning.⁹

¹—¹ The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolated repetition of the preceding *εὐταξία ψυχῆς*. They are omitted by Ficinus.

²—² I confess I do not understand how Temperance is *ὁμιλία τῆς ψυχῆς* ; nor could Corradus ; for his version is—"animi quasi sermo—"

³—³ Most assuredly Fortitude could never be correctly defined as "a knowledge of the things relating to war."

⁴—⁴ This, although paraphrastical, is still as close a version as can be well made of the terse original—*ῥώμη πρὸς κίνδυνον ἀντίρροπος*. On the word *ἀντίρροπος*, see Porson's translation of *ἀντίρροπον ἄχθος* in *Soph. El.* 119, as given by Monk in the *Museum Criticum*, No. 1. Ficinus, apparently unable to understand the clause, has omitted it. Corradus has—"robur periculo par."

⁵—⁵ Of the meaning of *δογμάτων ἀδήλων*, I confess myself quite in the dark. I could have understood *οὐ δειλῶν*—"not cowardly." Ficinus has—"observatio eorum, quæ ratio dictat, in rebus pavidis." Corradus, "incertarum opinionum de rebus adversis liberatio."

⁶—⁶ Here again Fortitude is said incorrectly to be "a skill in war."

⁷—⁷ Instead of *νόμον* one MS. has *λόγον* : which seems to lead to *φόβον*, "blame : " while in *ἐμμελητική*, found in two MSS. for *ἐμμενητική*, perhaps *ἀμελητική*, "neglectful," lies hid.

⁸—⁸ and ⁹—⁹ These definitions of *Ἐγκράτεια* are quite beyond my comprehension. How much more intelligible is the language of an unknown author, quoted by Stobæus, xvii. p. 157, who defines Continence as "the being able to restrain by reason the desire, that is rushing to the enjoyment of improper pleasures ; and the bearing up against and under the

Self-sufficiency—a completion in the possession of good things; ¹a habit, according to which they, who possess it, are the masters of themselves.¹

Reasonableness—a reduction in what is just and useful; a moderation in compacts; a well-ordering of the soul, founded on reason, as regards things honourable and base.

Endurance—the bearing-up against pain, for the sake of what is honourable; a bearing-up under labour for the sake of what is honourable.

²*Boldness*—the non-expectation of an ill; an imperturbability in the presence of an ill.²

Non-perception of pain—a habit, according to which we do not fall into sorrows.

The love of labour—a habit, that accomplishes what a person chooses (to do); a voluntary endurance; ³a habit not to be cavilled at on the subject of labour.³

Modesty—a voluntary shrinking from daring on just grounds towards what seems to be the best; a voluntary laying hold of the best; a cautious care of blame on just grounds.

✓ *Freedom*—the ruling power of life; a power ruling by itself on every occasion; ⁴a power over that, which relates to oneself in life; ⁵an unsparingness in the use and possession of property.⁵

Liberality—a habit in transacting money matters in a way

want of, and pain from, that, which is a natural desire:” where I have translated as if the Greek were τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐπίσεως ἰνδύας—to which I have been led by Gesner’s conjecture, κατὰ φύσας in lieu of κατὰ φύσιν—See too the definition in Diogen. L. vii. 93, τὴν δὲ ἐγκράτειαν, διαθέσιν ἀνυπερβατον τῶν κατ’ ὁρθὸν λόγον ἢ ἔξιν, ἀήττητον ἡδονῶν τὴν δὲ καρτερίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἔξιν ὧν ἐμμανητίον ἢ μὴ. Ficinus has here—“potestas, quæ nunquam dejicitur e rationis proposito,” which is intelligible indeed, but not to be got from the Greek.

¹—The words between the numerals are a definition rather of Continence than of Self-sufficiency. Corradus renders Ἐγκράτεια by “Beatitude” —

²—³ Ficinus has elegantly, but not closely—“Audacia securitas, qua quis malum neque futurum expectat, neque præsens horrescit.”

⁴—⁵ Ficinus—“adversus labores inconcussus habitus.” Corradus—“habitus laborem nunquam reprehendens.”

⁶—⁷ Such, I presume, is the meaning of Ἐξουσία τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐν βίῳ: Ficinus—“licentia propria vitæ.” Corradus—“in uno quoque sita potestas vivendi”—as if he wished to read ἐν ἑκάστῳ—

⁸—⁹ The words between the numerals are the definition rather of the following Ἐλευθεριότης, than of Ἐλευθερία.

that is fitting; the adding to, and possession of, property, as is meet.

Mildness—the settling down of an excitement arising from passion; a moderated temperament of soul.

Decorum—a voluntary yielding to what appears the best; a well-ordering respecting the movement of the body.

Felicity—a good composed of all good things; a power self-sufficient towards living well; a consummation as regards virtue; an utility self-sufficient for a living being.¹

Magnificence—the estimation according to correct reason² of that which is the most worthy of respect.³

Sagacity—a natural ability in the soul, according to which he, who possesses it, makes a conjecture³ in the quickest (time)³ relating to what is needful; an acuteness of intellect.

Honesty—a simplicity in moral conduct in union with fair speaking; a steadiness⁴ in moral conduct.

*Kalokagathia*⁵—a habit of selecting things that are the best.

High-mindedness—a gentlemanly⁶ use of accidental circumstances; a majesty of soul in union with reason.

¹ Stephens renders "vita," as if he wished to read ζωής in lieu of ζών, or else he got "vita" from Ficinus.

² Instead of τὸν σεμνότερον, which could not be applied to λογισμὸν, I have translated, as if the Greek were τοῦ σεμνότερου. One MS. has τὸ and another καί, which seem to lead to καὶ τὸ σεμνότερον. Ficinus too, "et honorandum." Corradus has, what to myself is unintelligible, "Magnificentia, amplitudo a gravissima mentis agitatione, et propositiones profecta."

³ Since one MS. offers ἐν ἑκάστῳ in lieu of ἐκάστῳ, it is easy to elicit from thence ἐν ἑκίστῳ. So the Stoics defined ἀγχινοῖαν by ἔξιν εὐπερικῆν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 93, where Casaubon refers to Aristotle, Ethic. vi. 9, who says that ἀγχινοῖα is κατὰ ταχὺ τι εὐστοχία. Ficinus however found in his MS. ἐν ἑκάστῳ: for his version is "in singulis"—

⁴ Here, as before, I have translated σπουδαΐτης by "steadiness."

⁵ As there is no single nor even compound word in English to answer to the Greek Καλοκαγαθία, by which was meant the union of bodily and mental accomplishments, I have put the Greek word into English letters, just as Philanthropy is in the next definition but one, where, for a similar reason, Ficinus has left in his Latin version the Greek word Φιλανθρωπία; but translated Καλοκαγαθία by "bonitas." The whole definition is omitted by Corradus.

⁶ By ἀστυῖος, literally, "living in a city," was meant also "a person of elegant manners," for such those in the city were, as opposed to those of inelegant manners, who lived in the country and were called ἀγροῖκοι. Ficinus has "moderatus"—

Philanthropy—a habit of moral conduct that easily leads to a friendship with man; a habit of acting kindly towards men; ¹the having thanks; a recollection with kind conduct.¹

Piety—justice relating to the gods; a power² paying attention to the gods willingly;³ a correct perception of the honour due to the gods; a knowledge of the honour due to the gods.

Good—⁴that on account of itself.⁴

Fearlessness—a habit, according to which we do not fall into fear.

Apathy—a habit, according to which we do not fall into sufferings.

Peace—a quietness as regards enmity in war.

Listlessness—an easiness of soul; apathy respecting the objects of anger.

*Skilfulness*⁵—a habit, according to which he, who pos-

¹—All the words between the numerals were first edited by Bekker from the text of five MSS., and the margin of two. But what is the meaning of *χάριτος σχίσις*, and how *φιλανθρωπία* can be defined as *μνήμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας*, I cannot understand. I could have understood *χάριτος ἔκχυσις γνῶμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας*, "a pouring out of favours designedly in combination with beneficence." The words were found in the MS. of Ficinus likewise; for his version is "gratiarum redditio; gratitudo benefica."

² Instead of *δύναμις* the sense evidently requires *διάθεσις*, similar to "affectio" in Ficinus.

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐκουσίως*, not *ἐκούσιος*. Ficinus has "voluntaria veneratio dei; recta honoris divini scientia"—Corradus, "voluntaria religionis deorum susceptio; recta cultus deorum scientia;" one or both of whom Stephens has followed in his version, "voluntaria de deorum cultu existimatio; recta cultus deorum scientia," as if he wished to unite *ἐκούσιος* with *ὑπόληψις*, and *ὁρθή* with *ἰπιστήμη*, not, as Bekker has done, *ἐκούσιος* with *δύναμις*, and *ὁρθή* with *ὑπόληψις*. The definition of piety given by the Stoics in Diogen. L. vii. 119, is shorter, if not better, *Εὐσίβεια, ἰπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείαις*.

⁴—The words between the numerals, in Greek, *Ἀγαθόν, τὸ αὐτοῦ ἵκεν*, are too few to make either syntax or sense. Stephens' version in English is, "Good is that, which exists for its own sake," a definition scarcely intelligible. Did the author write *Ἀγαθόν, ταῦτόν ἢ οὐχ ἔρεπον ὠφελίας*, which is the very definition given by the Stoics in Diogen. L. vii. 94; for *ὠφελίας* might easily have dropt out before *ἀφοβία*. Ficinus has supplied the word, requisite for the sense, in his version, "Bonum, quod sui ipsius gratia expetendum:" and so too has Corradus, "Bonum, quod sua ipsius causa appetitur."

⁵ There is no single word in English to answer to the Greek *δαιμόνης*,

sesses it, is able to form a conjecture about the peculiar termination (of a thing).

Friendship—a union of sentiment, relating to things honourable and just; the choice of the same kind of life; a union in opinion on questions of sect¹ and practice; a union in sentiment relating to a communion in life in combination with kind feelings; ²a communion in doing well and in suffering.²

³*Nobility of birth*—the virtue of a noble moral conduct; an easy leading of the soul to words and deeds.³

Selection—a correct approval after examination.

Kind feeling—⁴the selection of a person for the purpose of embracing by a person.⁴

Familiarity—a sharing in the same family.

by which was meant, as explained by Suidas, a power in speaking and a cleverness in acting.

¹ Such seems to be the meaning here of *προαίρεσις*, similar to the simple *αἵρεσις*. Stephens' version is, "consensio de proposito et actione." Ficinus has "in deliberando atque agendo." Corradus, "de eligendo et faciendo opinionum consensus."

^{2—3} Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Stephens' version is "societas beneficiorum mutuum." Ficinus has "communio in dandis accipiendisque beneficiis."

^{3—5} Orelli, unable to understand how *Εὐγένεια* is *ἀπὸ τῆς εὐγενούς ἡθους*, proposed to read *συγγενούς*, by which he probably meant "cognate." But what is gained by the alteration I confess I cannot discover. The author wrote, I suspect, *Εὐγένεια, ἀπὸ τῆς οὐ γίνουσι, ἡθους δὲ, εὐαγωγικῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς λόγους καὶ πράξεις*, "Nobility is an excellence, not from birth, but moral conduct, leading the soul to words and deeds;" where the definition is best explained by the sentiment of Juvenal in viii.,

Tota licet veteres exornent undique ceræ

Atria, nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus—

But even thus the definition is defective. For as words and deeds are of different kinds, it should be stated of what kind they are, to which nobility leads. Ficinus has, "Generositas, virtus ingenui moris; facilitas animi ad dicenda pariter atque agenda." Corradus, "Generositas, generosi moris virtus; animi ad rationes et actiones facilis inductio."

^{4—} Here again Orelli was, as I am, at a loss about the meaning of the definition; and hence he wished to cut out *αἵρεσις*. But to my mind the difficulty lies in *πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀσπασμός*, or as eight MSS. read, *ἀσπασμῷ*. Stephens' version is, "Benevolentia est electio hominis; hominis amplexus et salutatio," as if he wished to omit *πρὸς*—Ficinus has, "Benevolentia, electio hominis ad hominem grata atque accepta." Corradus, "Benevolentia, electio; complexus hominem cum homine copulans."

¹ *Agreement*—a sharing in all things existing; a concordance in thoughts and conceptions.¹

² *Lovingness*—a perfect exhibition.²

*Statesmanship*³—the knowledge of what is honourable and advantageous (for a state);⁴ a knowledge productive of justice in a state.

*Sociality*⁵—a friendship arising from an association amongst persons of the same age.⁶

⁷ *Good counsel*—the cognate virtue of reasoning.⁷

Belief—the correct conception⁸ of a thing being really as it seems to be;⁹ a firmness in moral conduct.⁹

¹— As it is difficult to perceive the difference between νοημάτων and ἐπολημμάτων, I suspect the words καὶ ἐπολημμάτων ought to follow τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων in the preceding clause, or be omitted altogether. Ficinus has "cogitationum suspicionumque concordia."

²— Of the words between the numerals I am quite content to express my perfect ignorance. Ficinus has "Charitas integra animi declaratio," as if he had found ψυχῆς in his MS.

³ So I have translated Πολιτικὴς in the dialogue of that name.

⁴ The words between the lunes have been added for the sense.

⁵ By *ἑταιρεία* was meant "a political club," as it would be called in England, not merely domestic sociality.

⁶ In lieu of γενημένους, which seems superfluous after καθ' ἡλικίαν, one would have expected συννημένους, "united." Ficinus has "ex diuturna æqualium consuetudine conflata."

⁷— With this unintelligible definition of Good Counsel, may be contrasted the very intelligible one given by the Stoics, as found in Diogenes Laertius, vii. 93, τὴν δὲ εὐβουλίαν, ἐπιστήμην τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι ποῖα καὶ πῶς πράττοντες πράττομεν συμφερόντως, i. e. "good counsel is the science of considering by doing what, and in what manner, we can act advantageously." Stephens' version is "Consilii præstantia est virtus rationi insita," as if he wished to read Εὐβουλίας ἀρετὴ ἀρετὴ λογισμῷ ἐμφυτος. Ficinus, however, translates Εὐβουλία by "Sagacitas," evidently for the sense. Corradus, "Consilium bonum, vis cogitationis insita:" as if he wished to read ἐμφυτος in lieu of συμφυτος.

⁸— Bekker's text is τοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς αὐτῷ φαίνεται, which I cannot understand. Opportunely then does one MS. offer αὐτῷ: for the author probably wrote, as I have translated, τοῦ ὅντως ἔχειν τι, ὡς αὐτῷ φαίνεται. Stephens' version is "Fides—persuasio, quæ res ita se habet, velut ipsi videtur," which, to myself, is quite as unintelligible as the Greek. Ficinus, "Fides, recta presumptio quod res sic se habet, ut sibi videtur." Corradus, "Fides, opinio recta rem ita, ut ipsi videtur, habere: certa veri comprehensio."

⁹— The author has evidently confounded πίστις, "belief," with πιστότης, "fidelity."

¹ *Truth*—a habit in affirming and denying; a knowledge of things true.¹

A wishing—a desire with right reason; a reasonable longing; a longing with reason, according to nature.

Counselling—an exhortation to another person, previous to acting, as to what manner it is meet to act.

Fit opportunity—the meeting with the time in which it is requisite to suffer or do something.

Caution—a guard against ill; the care of guarding (oneself).

Order—the working out a similarity in² all things existing with a relation to each other; a symmetry of communion; the cause of all things existing with a relation to each other; ³a symmetry towards learning.³

Application—a bracing up of the soul for learning.

Natural ability—a quickness in learning; a good production of nature; an excellence from nature.

Docility—a natural ability in the soul towards a quickness in learning.

Judgment—a peremptory decision⁴ respecting a disputed matter.

Law—⁵the (process of a) contest⁵ respecting the having done, an injury or not.

¹—¹ Here again is another definition, which not even the author of it could have understood. For to say that Truth is a knowledge of things true is to say nothing, without previously defining what true things are. Moreover Truth could never be called a *ἕξις*, "a habit or state of the mind." For it is the result of a discovery made by science from assertion and denial respecting what has been well said, in Greek, *Ἀλήθεια εὑρεσις ἐν καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει δι' ἐπιστήμην τῶν εὖ λεγθέντων*—which might have been corrupted into *Ἀλήθεια ἕξις ἐν καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν*—but that it was so corrupted, is more than I dare assert. Ficinus, however, renders *Ἀλήθεια* by "*Veracitas*," i. e. Truthfulness; which will get rid of a part of the difficulty, but not of all.

² I have adopted *ἐργασία ὁμοιότητος*, found in one MS., in lieu of *ἐργασίας ὁμοιότης*. Ficinus too has "*concentus operationum*." But Corradus—"actionis—similitudo."

³—³ I must leave for others to explain the meaning of the words with in the numerals as a definition of Order. Ficinus—"contemperatio ad percipiendum idonea."

⁴ I have translated as if the Greek were *κατάφασις*, "assertion," not *ἀπόφασις*, "denial." Stephens—"sententia rata"—what the sense requires; but such is not the meaning of *ἀπόφασις*. So too Ficinus—"rata pronuntiatio." Corradus—"Judicium, eventus rei, de qua ambigebatur, ratus."

⁵—⁵ So I have translated *ἀμφισβήτησις*, for the sake of the sense.

Good legal conduct—an obedience shown to proper laws.

Cheerfulness—a delight¹ at the acts of a temperate person.

Honour—a gift of good things presented on actions done through virtue; a mark of esteem in return² for virtue; ³ the outward bearing of what is an object of reverence; ⁴ the watching of a mark of esteem.⁴

Alacrity—⁵ the exhibition of a practical preference.⁵

Favour—a voluntary act of kindness; the return for a good act; a ministering at a fit time.

Concord—a similarity of opinion between rulers and ruled, how they ought to rule and be ruled.

A polity—the community of a multitude of persons, self-sufficient for a happy state; the community of a multitude according to law.

Forethought—a preparation with respect to things about to be.

Counsel—a consideration respecting future things how they may be advantageous.

Victory—a power having the superiority, as regards contention.

⁶ *A ready-way-finding*—a ready discrimination,⁶ that possesses a power over what is thought upon.⁷

Ficinus, with a similar view, has—"Lex, norma ad quam quæritur"—Corradus—"Lex, de rebus justis vel injustis disceptatio."

¹ Here χαρά, like ἀμφοσβήτης, has a pregnant sense; for it is not merely "delight," but "the result of delight."

² I have translated, as if the Greek were ἀντ', not ἀπ', which I can hardly understand. Corradus has—"dignitas ex virtute comparata."

³ Such seems to be the meaning of σχῆμα συμνόητος, which will be best understood by turning to the Menæxenus, § 2.

⁴ I hardly understand the words τήρησις ἀξιώματος as applied to τιμή. Stephens' version is "observatio dignitatum;" that of Ficinus—"conservatio dignitatis;" that of Corradus—"autoritatis conservatio."

⁵ Stephens has, what the sense requires, "declaratio voluntatis ad agendum:" but that can scarcely be got from the Greek. Ficinus, still more widely—"patens expeditio propositi ad res agendas." Corradus—"voluntatis ad agendum propter se significatio."

⁶ Instead of defining Εὐπορία by Εὐρίπνευα, one would have expected to see Εὐρίπνευα defined by Εὐπορία; and so Corradus—"Perspicientia, facultas ejus, quod cogitatur, assequendi." Cousin's version is—"Le succès dans la discussion vient du coup d'œil sur qui domine une question:" and his note—"Peut-être voudrait-il mieux entendre par εὐρίπνευα l'art de faire des distinctions; car c'est avec des distinctions qu'on triomphe dans la discussion."

⁷ Here λογίζομένου is used, contrary to custom, in a passive sense.

Bribe—the exchange for a favour.

Opportunity—the point of time suited to what is advantageous; a time that works for some good.

Memory—a disposition of the soul preservative of the truth that is in it.¹

The keeping in mind—the having thought on the stretch.

Thinking—the commencement of knowledge.

Holiness—a religious dread of sins against the gods; ²an attention to the honour due naturally to a deity.³

A prophecy—a knowledge, that points out beforehand an action, without a demonstrative proof.

The prophetic art—a science, that speculates upon what is now and will be to a mortal being.

Wisdom—a science not-hypothetical;⁴ a knowledge of things as they happen to exist;⁵ a science that speculates upon the cause of things existing.

Philosophy—a longing after the knowledge of things as they happen to exist;⁶ a habit of speculating upon the truth as to how it is true; a careful study in combination with correct reasoning.

Knowledge—a comprehension by the soul, ⁶not to be changed or cast down by reasoning;⁶ ⁷[the power of compre-

Ficinus—"Facundia, perspicacia et facultas obtinendi quod propositum est."

¹ As ἀλήθεια, the Greek word for truth, would mean literally "non-forgetfulness," and as memory is "non-forgetfulness," perhaps ἀλήθεια ought to be taken here in its literal sense; although such a meaning is not, I believe, given to ἀλήθεια elsewhere. The more correct definition of Μνήμη is in Suidas—ἡ τῶν πάλαι ἠγνωσμένων κατοχή, i. e. "the retention of what have been known of old."

^{2,3} Since six MSS. read θεραπείας, and one τε μνημης, perhaps the author wrote τῆς θεοῦ τημίαια ἢ κατὰ φύσιν θεραπείας—i. e. the natural care of the attention due to a deity.

³ By "not-hypothetical" is meant that which is founded on facts. Stephens' version is, "nullius certi argumenti," which would be strangely applied to a definition of wisdom. Ficinus more correctly—"scientia, quæ nihil penitus præsupponit." Corradus too—"scientia non supposita."

^{4,5} I have translated, as if the Greek were not τῶν ὄντων ἀπλ, but τῶν διὰ ὄντων, as in the preceding definition. In both places Corradus has—"rerum divinarum."

^{6,7} So I have translated ἀμετάπτωτος, to preserve the idea of change conveyed by μετά—

⁷ The words between the brackets are properly omitted in the three best MSS., for they are merely an explanation of the preceding sentence. They are, however, acknowledged by Ficinus and Corradus.

hending a thing or things, not to be changed or thrown down by reasoning;]⁷ a true reasoning not to be changed or cast down upon¹ reflection.

Opinion—a conception² to be changed by the persuasion of reason;² a rational³ impetus; a notion falling upon falsehood and truth by (not-)reason.⁴

Sensation—an impetus of the soul; a movement of mind; a heralding of the soul through the body to⁵ the seasons of man;⁵ from which there results a power of the soul devoid of reason,⁶ having a cognizance through the body.⁶

Habit—a disposition of the soul, according to which we are said to be with certain qualities.

¹ So I have translated *ἐν*, although I have some doubts about the reading. Stephens' version is—"in mente," similar to "in cogitatione," in Ficinus and Corradus.

²⁻³ As in the case of *ἀμετάπτωτος*, so here in that of *μεταπιστός*, I have introduced the idea of a change to answer to *μετα*—

³ How Opinion can be called "a rational impetus" I cannot understand. One would have expected *ὁ λογιστικῆς*, for *ου* might have been easily lost after *λόγους*. Ficinus has—"Opinio, cum fide per ratiocinationem rationis discursus," from which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS., except *μετὰ πίστεις* in lieu of *μεταπιστός*. Corradus avoids the difficulty by his version—"ratiocinandi impetus."

⁴ Here again *ὁ* seems to have dropped out after *ἐν*— On the similar loss of *ὁ*, I have written not a little in the Specimens of Notes, appended to my translation of the Midian Oration of Demosthenes; and to the passages of Sophocles emended there I could now add not a few more.

⁵⁻⁶ Such is the literal translation of *εἰς ὥρας ἀνθρώπων*, by which was meant perhaps what we call in English, "the periods of man's life." Stephens' version is—"ad opportunitates hominum;" that of Ficinus—"in formas hominum." Corradus—"ad extremas hominum partes." Cousin—"vers le monde exterieure;" and he adds in a note—"Il faut convenir que *ὥρας ἀνθρώπων* est une expression bien extraordinaire, et dont il est bien difficile de determiner le sens."

⁶— I confess my inability to understand the words between the brackets. For after *γνωριστικῆς* there is wanting something, to which that word may be referred. Hence as one MS. has *δι' ἀνθρώπων*, expressed by *δι' αὐτῶν*, in lieu of *διὰ σώματος*, perhaps the author wrote—*γνωριστικῆς τῶν διὰ σώματος ἰόντων*—"having a cognizance of what is passing through the body:" with which may be compared the expression in the Phædrus, p. 250, D., *τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων*: or else in *ἀνθρώπων* lies hid *αἰσθητήριον*. Compare Diogenes L. vii. 52, *αἰσθήσεις λίγεται—ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ' ἣν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται*: where one would have expected to find *πόροι*, Anglice "pores," as in Plutarch, quoted by Stephens in Thesaur. Gr., *τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια πόρων*. Corradus avoids the difficulty by translating *γνωριστικῆς* "cognitionis particeps."

¹ *Voice*—a flowing through the mouth from a thought.¹

² *Speech*—voice expressed by letters descriptive of each of things existing;² a form of language, compounded of nouns and verbs, without melody.³

Noun—a form of language uncompounded, the interpreter of that which is predicated 'against being, and of every thing which is not spoken of against itself.⁴

*Language*⁵—the voice of a man, expressed by letters, and some common symbol, acting as an interpreter, without melody.

Syllable—an articulation⁶ of the human voice, expressed by letters.

Definition—a sentence⁷ composed⁸ of difference and genus.⁹

¹—A similar definition is in The Sophist, § 106, p. 263, E., and in Diogenes L. vii. 55, *φωνή—ἀνθρώπου ἴστιν ἑναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη*.

²—Something similar is given as a definition in Diogenes L. vii. 56, *Δίξις—φωνή ἰγγραμματος—λόγος δὲ φωνῆ σημαντικῆ*.

³ Ficinus has "sine harmonia cantus," and so he renders shortly afterwards *ἀνευ μίλου*.

⁴—This is the literal translation of *κατὰ* with a genitive. What the sense requires is in the former sentence, *περὶ*: but what in the latter, I confess I do not know; for I cannot perceive what the author meant by *παντός τοῦ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγομένου*, unless it be something similar to what Aristotle says in Poetic, § 34, *Ὄνομα ἴστι φωνῆ συνθετῆ, σημαντικῆ ἀνευ χρόνου, ἧς μέρος οὐδὲν ἴστι καθ' αὐτὸ σημαντικόν*. Ficinus has "Nomen, dictio simplex, significativa ejus, quod secundum essentiam prædicatur, et omnis quod secundum ipsum minime dicitur:" from which it would seem that he found in his MS. *κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν* and *καθ' ἑαυτὸ*: which last is read in one MS. collated by Bekker. Corradus has "Nomen dictio simplex, quæ, cum id, quod de vi dicitur ea, quam οὐσίαν vocant, tum omne, quod non per se dicitur, significat."

⁵ Although I have just above translated *διάλεκτος* "a form of language," for the sake of the sense, yet here I have rendered it merely by "language," for a similar reason.

⁶ How a syllable can be said to be an articulation of the human voice I cannot understand. It ought to have been defined, "a combination of letters expressed or not by the human voice." But as Aristotle has defined it in Poetic, § 34, by *φωνῆ ἄσημος, συνθετῆ ἐξ ἀφώνου καὶ φωνῆν ἔχοντος*, one would have expected here, *Σύλλαβῃ ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς ἄσημος ἀρθμός ἰγγραμμάτων*, i. e. "a syllable is a combination without meaning of sounds of the human voice expressed by letters."

⁷ I have followed Twining on Aristotle's Poetics, § 34, in translating *λόγος* "a sentence."

⁸ To avoid the *ὑστερον πρότερον* in *διαφορὰς* and *γένους*—for the genus should be mentioned before that which differs from it—Stephens has, after Ficinus, rendered, "ex genere et differentia." There is a better definition in Diogenes L. vii. 60.

Proof—the showing forth of a thing not evident.

Demonstration—true reasoning ¹founded on syllogisms; ¹a reasoning, that makes a matter plain by what is previously known.

Element (of voice) ²—³a vocal sound uncompounded; the cause to the rest of vocal sounds of their being vocal sounds. ³

Useful—the cause of doing well; the cause of good.

Advantageous—that which conduces to good.

Honourable—that which is good. ⁴

Good—the cause of safety to things existing; the cause of all that relates to itself; from which it happens to choose what is meet. ⁵

Temperate—the orderly conduct of the soul.

Just—an ordonnance of law, productive of justice.

Voluntary—that which is drawn on by itself; ⁶ that which is selected with reference to itself, ⁷(and) completed according to design. ⁷

¹ Ficinus omits συλλογιστικός—

² Since στοιχείον by itself frequently means “a letter,” the word φωνή has been added to show what kind of element is here intended by the word, which generally means an “element” in physical philosophy. Corradus too, “Elementum vocis, vox simplex.”

³ Here, again, I am quite ignorant of the meaning of the words between the numerals; where I have designedly translated φωνή by “a vocal sound,” not merely “a voice.”

⁴ Instead of καλὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν, Stephens would seem to have wished to read Καλοκράθον, τὸ ἀγαθόν, for his version is “Honestum et pulchrum est bonum.”

⁵ Here too I am at a loss; and so too, I think, was Stephens; whose version is, “Bonum est causa salutis his, quæ sunt causa cuiusvis, quod ad ipsum refertur; a quo contingit electio eorum, quæ conveniunt.” Ficinus more closely, but not more intelligibly, “Bonum, quod in omnibus, quæ sunt, salutis est causa; causa omnis, quod ad ipsum tendit id, a quo veniunt quæcunque sunt eligenda.” Corradus, “Bonum, causa ut ea, quæ sunt, serventur; causa rei omnis quæ spectat ad ipsum, a quo proficiuntur omnia, quæ sunt eligenda.”

⁶ As Bekker has edited αὐτοῦ from one MS. in lieu of αὐτὸ, he should have inserted from conjecture, δι' before αὐτοῦ, for the sake of the syntax and sense. Stephens' version is, “Voluntarium idem est quod blandum et illectans:” where προσαγωγόν is taken in an active sense; and so it is in the version of Ficinus, “Voluntarium quod se ipsum ducit;” and of Corradus, “quod se ipsum insinuat.”

⁷ I have translated as if the Greek were not κατὰ, but καὶ τὸ κατὰ, to which τὸ καὶ in five MSS. and τὸ κατὰ in two manifestly lead. Ficinus has “quod cogitationem perficit,” as if his MS. read τὸ διάνοιαν διατελοῦν.

Free—that which rules itself.

Moderate—a mean between excess and deficiency ; and sufficient according to art.¹

Moderation—a mean between excess and deficiency.

Prize—the reward of excellence, that is chosen for its own sake.

Immortality—²an existence endowed with soul³ and a remaining for ever.

A holy thing—service paid to a god, acceptable to a god.

Festival—a holy time according to law.

³*Man*—an animal, wingless, biped, with wide nails ;³ the only one of beings that is a recipient of knowledge founded on reason.

Sacrifice—the gift⁴ of a victim⁵ to a god.

Prayer—an asking for good things, or that seem so, ⁶by man from gods.⁶

King—a ruler according to laws ; ⁷not subject to the audit-

¹ I must leave for others to explain this reference to art in a definition of Moderation.

² Corradus—"natura, quæ οὐσία dicitur, animata." But as four MSS. offer ἐμψύχον in lieu of ἐμψυχόν, perhaps the true reading is Ἀθανασία, οὐσίας ἐμψύχον ἢ αἰδίου μόνῃ, "Immortality, the remaining for ever of an existence endowed with soul : " where ἡ has been corrupted into καὶ by a very common confusion.

³ This is the celebrated definition of Plato ; who, after he had described man as a wingless and biped animal, was induced to add another word, πλατυώνυχον, "with wide nails," after Diogenes the Cynic had taken a cock, and stripping it of its feathers, cried out—"Behold Plato's Man." The story is told by Diogenes Laertius, vi. 40. In lieu, however, of πλατυώνυχος, which would be more applicable to an elephant or an aquatic bird, one would have expected to hear that Plato's word was πολυώνυχος, in allusion to the twenty nails found on the feet and hands of a man.

⁴ Here is the Alexandrine word δόμα, to which I have alluded in the Introduction, as furnishing internal evidence that these Definitions were written long after the time of Speusippus.

⁵ To avoid the absurdity of saying that a sacrifice is the gift of a sacrifice—for such is the ordinary meaning of θύμα—I have translated θύμα by "victim." Some would, however, prefer perhaps to read θυσία, θνητοῦ δόμα ἀθανάτου in lieu of θυσία, θεῷ δόμα θύματος. Corradus has—"Sacrificium, donum ad rem sacram deo dicatum."

⁶ I have translated as if the Greek were not αἰτήσεις ἀνθρώπων—παρὰ θεοῖς, where both the datives are without regimen, but αἰτήσεις ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων—παρὰ θεῶν—where θεῶν is due to one MS.

⁷ A similar definition in Diogenes L. vii. 122.

ing of his accounts ;⁷ the chief magistrate in a political constitution.

Government—the care of the whole.

¹ *Licence*—a superintendence of law.¹

Law-giver—a maker of laws according to which it is meet for a polity to exist.

Law—a decree, relating to the state, made by the multitude, not limited to any time.

Hypothesis—a principle not demonstrated ; the summary of a discourse.

A vote—a decree of the state limited to a certain time.

Statesman—a person skilled in the constitution of a state.

A state—the residence of a multitude of persons making use of decrees in common ; a multitude of persons existing under the same law.

The excellence of a state—a constitution of a correct polity.

The science of war—skill in war.

Alliance—a communion in war.

Safety—a protection from injury.²

Tyrant—a person ruling a state according to his own notion.

⁴ *Sophist*—a mercenary hunter after the young, rich, (and) in high repute.³

Wealth—a possession suited for happiness ; an abundance of means tending to happiness.

Deposit—a thing given⁴ with faith.⁵

Purgation—a separation of the worse from the better.

¹ This definition I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus has—“*Licentia, legis concessio*,” a meaning that *ἐπιτροπή* would hardly bear. Corradus—“*Potestas, legis procuratio*.” Perhaps the correct reading is *ἀποτροπή*, “a turning aside from law.”

² Such seems to be the meaning intended by *περιποίησις ἀβλαβής* : where, however, one would prefer *ἀβλαβείας* ; and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS. ; for his version is—“*Salus, munitio ab omni damno secura*.” Corradus—“*Salus, securi status comparatio*.”

³ This very definition of a Sophist is found in Sophist, § 17, p. 223, B., and § 36, p. 231, D. From the first passage I have introduced *καὶ* before *ἐνδόξων*. So too Ficinus—“*nobilium atque divitum* ;” and Corradus—“*et gloriosos*.”

⁴ Here again we meet with *δόμα*, where Attic Greek would require *δόσις*.

⁵ The expression—“a gift with faith,” is strangely applied as the definition of a deposit. One would have expected *διὰ πίστewος*—“through faith,” in the honesty of the party receiving the deposit.

To conquer—to possess the power, when having a difference.¹

A good man—such a one as is able to effect good for a person.

A temperate man—one who has moderate desires.

A continent man—one who has a power over the portions of the soul contending against right reason.

A steady² man—one who is perfectly good; one who preserves his virtue.

³ *Conscience*—a reflection with pain without reason.³

Indocility—a slowness in learning.

Lordship⁴—a just government, not subject to the auditing of accounts.

Dislike of wisdom—a habit, according to which he, who has it, dislikes reasoning.⁵

⁶ *Fear*—a consternation of the soul on the expectation of ill.⁶

Passion—a violent impetus without reason; ⁷ mind of regulation of soul without reason.⁷

⁸ *Consternation*—a fear on the expectation of ill.⁸

¹ Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. τὸν διαφερόμενον: for his version is "adversarium."

² Here, as before, I have translated σπουδαῖος by "steady."

³ Stephens, not perceiving that Σύννοια means here "Conscience," thus renders incorrectly the whole definition—"Meditatio est cogitatio cum dolore, absque ratione." Ficinus has—"Conscientia, cogitatio tristis absque ratiocinatione." But the sense evidently requires—"not without reason"—in Greek οὐκ ἄνευ λόγου, or else "without speaking;" for Conscience has a still voice; so Corradus—"Conscientia, tacita cum mœrore cogitatio."

⁴ This seems the exact rendering of δεσποτία, not "despotism."

⁵ Here again Stephens has missed the meaning of μισολόγος, as shown by his version—"eruditionis et doctrinæ osor est." Ficinus correctly—"rationes odit." Corradus, too, "rationem odit."

⁶ A similar definition in Aristotle's Rhetor. § 5, 1.

⁷ Such is the unintelligible English of the unintelligible Greek—νοῦς τῶν πάθους ψυχῆς ἀλογιστοῦ. Stephens's version is—"Animi concitatio est impetus violentus animæ irrationalis, absque ratione et ordine mentis," as if he wished to read the whole definition thus—θυμὸς, ὁρμὴ βίαιος ψυχῆς ἀλογιστοῦ ἄνευ λογισμοῦ νοῦ τε τῶν πάθους: at least Ficinus found this in this MS., as is evident from his version—"Animositas, impetus violentus irrationalis animæ absque ratione et ordine mentis." Corradus has—"Iracundia, appetitio sine cogitatione vehemens et violenta: significatio ordinis in animo perturbati."

⁸ By comparing the definitions of Fear and Consternation it would seem the two words were synonymous. The Stoics, however, made a distinction, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 112, by whom φόβος was

Flattery—a conversation to gratify¹ without the best;¹ a habit of conversing to gratify, exceeding moderation.

² *Anger*—an exhortation by passion to revenge.²

Insult—an injury leading to dishonour.

Intemperance—a habit forcing a person, contrary to right reason, towards what seem to be pleasant.

³ *Hesitation*—a flight from the commencement of labours.³

Cowardice—that which lays hold of (and detains)⁴ a rushing on; ⁵ the cause of a (mental) contraction.⁵

(*A beginning*)⁶—the first cause of existence.

⁷ *Calumny*—the setting friends apart by a word.⁷

Opportunity—that in which it is fitting to do and suffer each thing.

Injustice—a habit disregarding of laws.

Want—a diminution of good things.

defined προσδοκία κακοῦ: but Ἐκπληξίς, φόβος ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους πράγματος, i. e. "Consternation, a fear from the appearance of an unusual event."

¹—I am completely at a loss in the words between the numerals. I could have understood οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ, the very phrase used by Theophrastus, where he defines τὴν ἀρίσκειαν, "obsequiousness," by saying that ἔστιν, ὡς ὄρω περιλαβεῖν, ἐντευξίς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἡδονῆς παρὰ σκευαστική. But "without the best" is not the same as "for not the best." Ficinus fills out the sense by his "absque ratione boni"—Corradus evades the difficulty by his "colloquium—fallax et improbum."

²—A similar definition in Aristotle's Rhetor. § 2.

³—A similar definition in Diogenes L. vii. 112, Ὀκνος, φόβος μελλούσης ἐνέργειας.

⁴ I have introduced the words between the lunes to complete the sense. Stephens' version is—"Timiditas est affectio, quæ percipit impetum." But such a definition is applicable to Forethought as well as Cowardice. Ficinus has—"Pigritia, fuga laborum, qui ex gubernando proveniunt;" where he took ἀρχή in the sense of "government," not "commencement."

⁵—For this part of the definition we are indebted to a solitary MS. that offers αἰρία συστολῆς: where συστολή is used as in Diogenes L. vii. 111, λυπὴν εἶναι συστολὴν ἄλογον.

⁶ On the word ἀρχή, found, in none of the MSS. examined by Bekker, Stephens remarks that he has translated as if ἀρχή had dropt out. He got the idea from Ficinus, who has—"Timiditas, prima causa subcurrentis impetus," as if he had found in his MS., Δαλδία, ὁρμήν πρώτην τοῦ εἶναι αἰρία, without ἀντιληπτική. Corradus—"Ignavia, causa prima rei alicujus appetitionem faciendæ reprimens."

⁷ Corradus has rather strangely—"Disputatio, amicorum in sermone dissensio."

¹ *Shame*—a fear on the expectation of dishonour.¹

Vain-gloriousness—a habit of laying claim to a good or good things, not belonging to a person.

Sinning—acting contrary to right reason.

Envy—a pain at the good things of friends,² which either are or have been.

Shamelessness—a habit of the soul, that endures dishonour for the sake of gain.

Rashness—the excess of boldness in the case of dangers, which it ought not.³

A love of honour—a habit of the soul, lavish of every expense without consideration.

Natural depravity—a badness by nature, and a sinning in that, which is according to nature; ⁴a disease of that, which is according to nature.⁴

Hope—the expectation of a good.

Madness—a habit destructive of a correct perception.

Talkativeness—intemperance in speech, devoid of reason.

Contrariety—the greatest standing apart of things, that according to a certain difference fall under the same genus.

Involuntary—that which is brought to an end contrary to intention.

Instruction—a power that has the cure of the soul.

Instruction—the delivering of instruction.

Legislation—the science that renders a state ⁵firmly fixed (and without suffering).⁵

¹—A similar definition in Aristotle's Rhetor. § 6, and Diogenes L. vii. 112.

² Although φῶλον seems to be defended by Aristotle in Rhetor. ii. 10, yet one would have preferred ἄλλων, similar to the definition in Diogenes L. vii. 111, φθόνον, λυπήν ἐπ' ἄλλοτριούς αγαθοίς. Proclus, ii. p. 110, φθόνος ἰστίον ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοτριούσι αγαθοῖς λυπή. Corradus seems to have wished to read ποτε γενησομένοις in lieu of ποτε γεγενημένοις. For his version is, "vel olim futura sint."

³—Such is the literal version of οὐς μὴ δεῖ, which I cannot understand; nor could Stephens, whose version is "ubi non est opus," as if he wished to read οὐ—Ficinus has "quæ metuenda sunt," which seems to lead to οὐς ᾗ δεῖμα.

⁴—Such is the version of νόσος τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, which is equally unintelligible in Greek, and in English, and in the Latin of Ficinus and Stephens, "morbus ejus quod est secundum naturam," and of Corradus, "morbus in natura insitus."

⁵—In lieu of εὐπαγής three MSS. offer ἀπαθής, one ἀγαθοῦ, and one ἀγαθῆς. By selecting from all what seems to be the best suited to the

Admonition—a speech that finds fault from design; a speech for the sake of turning aside from error.

Assistance—the hindering an ill either existing or in the way of existing.

Punishment—a curing of the soul for an error committed.

¹*Power*—a superiority in doing or speaking; a habit according to which that, which possesses it, is powerful; a strength according to nature.

To preserve—to protect from hurt.¹

²(*Science*—is a knowledge without stumbling.)³

sense, I have elicited, *ἐπαιγὼς καὶ ἀπαθὼς*, what I have translated. Ficinus has "tumultu vacuam," answering to *ἐπαιγὼς*.

¹— These two definitions are thus separated in the version of Ficinus, "Potestas, excellentia in agendis seu dicendis; habitus, quo potentes efficimur. Robur, vis unum quidque in natura servans eo, quod detrimenta devitat;" but united in that of Corradus, "Potentia, in actione vel in sermone præstantia; habitus, quem qui habet, potens est; vis hominem naturaliter servans vel tutum efficiens."

²—³ This last definition, omitted by Bekker, is found in one MS. alone.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE TREATISE OF TIMÆUS.

OF this short treatise, relating to a Cosmogony according to the Pythagorean theory, the authorship used to be attributed to Timæus the Locrian, until Meiners adduced arguments to show that the work was the production of a more modern writer. The genuine writings of the Locrian philosopher had so completely disappeared before the time of Aristotle, that he seems to have known nothing about them, as may be inferred from what he says in *Metaphysic.* i. 6, p. 649, B.

In confirmation of this decision, which has been adopted by nearly all subsequent writers on the subject, De Gelder has been led to express his belief that the work was written by some philosopher, who lived in the second century of the Christian era, and amused himself with drawing up an abridgment of the Timæus of Plato, adopting what he conceived to be the Doric dialect, with the view of enabling him to palm it off as a genuine production of the Locrian philosopher. But though we know that similar deceptions have been practised at different times, yet even De Gelder himself confesses his inability to discover the motives that could lead the unknown author to commit the forgery. Hence we may fairly imagine that it was done at an earlier period, when the Ptolemies were collecting the works of older writers to adorn their library at Alexandria. And this deception the writer was enabled to carry on with the greater success, as he has been careful to introduce, doubtless from the work of a Pythagorean, some marked discrepancies, duly noticed by De Gelder in *Præf.* p. xi., from the Timæus of Plato, of whose treatise his own is in other respects little more than an abridgment.

At the present day the treatise is held in so little honour, that

De Gelder offered an apology for publishing it at Leyden in 1836. But the time has been, when it was highly esteemed as the genuine production of that very philosopher, whose ideas Plato was thought to have developed in his *Timæus*; and it was accordingly translated into Latin by Georgius Valla, Simon Passiensis, called likewise Bevilaqua, and Nogarola, whose versions were printed respectively at Venice in 1488, 1498, and 1555, and subsequently by Cornarius, fol. Bas. 1561. Of versions of it in modern languages, a French one appeared at Berlin, 1763, by the Marquis d'Argens, and another at Paris in 1768, by the Abbé Batteux, the former accompanied with an elaborate Preface and Commentary, and the latter with some sensible notes and a few various readings from three Paris MSS. There is likewise a German translation by Schulthes, first published at Zurich in 1779, and again in 1842. It is said by Fabricius to have been translated into English by T. Stanley, in his "History of Philosophy;" but such is not the fact; and equally incorrect is the Bipont editor of *Plato*, by whom De Gelder has been misled, in attributing a Latin translation of the treatise to Ficinus.

THE TREATISE
OF
TIMÆUS THE LOCRIAN

OR
THE SOUL OF THE WORLD AND NATURE.

[1.] TIMÆUS the Locrian asserted this—that of all the things in the Universe there are two causes, (one) ¹ Mind, (the cause) of things existing according to reason; (the other) Necessity,¹ (the cause) of things (existing) by (some) force, according to the powers of bodies; and that the former of these is of the nature of the good, and is called god, and the principle of things that are the best; but what come after this and are co-causes, are referred to Necessity; but that, as regards the things in the Universe, there are Form, Matter, and the Perceptible, which is, as it were, a production from the two (others); and that the former (namely, Form)² is unproduced, and unmoved, and stationary,³ and of the nature of the same, and perceptible by the mind, and a pattern of such things produced, as exist by a state of change; for that some such thing as this is Form spoken of and conceived to

¹—¹ What the author here, and Plato in Tim. p. 48, A., and 68, E., consider as the two distinct powers of Mind and Necessity, are said by Euripides in Tro. 890, to be singly another name for Ζεύς.

² As there are three things mentioned, Valck. wished, to prevent all uncertainty, to read τὸ μὲν εἶδος in lieu of τὸ μὲν εἶμεν, referring to Tim. p. 51, A. Had he lived to know that five MSS. offer τὰν for τὸ, and eight add δὲ after εἶμεν, he would perhaps have suggested τὰν μὲν εἶμεν ἰδίαν.

³ Since μόνον is the same as ἀκίνητον, Valck. suggested μόνον. But one would prefer μονάς, for the “monad” was of the nature of the same; while to avoid the repetition in μονάς τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ φύσιος, it is easy to read μονάς, ἢ τὰς ταύτῃ φύσιος ἰούσα—“proceeding from the nature of the same.”

be; but Matter is a mould,¹ and a mother and a nurse, and procreative of the third kind of being; for receiving the resemblances upon itself, and as it were remoulding them, it perfects these productions. He asserted moreover that Matter is eternal, not however unmoved; and although it is of itself without form and shapeless, yet it receives every kind of form, and that what is around bodies, is divisible and partakes of the nature² of the different; (and that) persons call moreover Matter by the name of Place and Space. These two principles, then, are opposite to each other; [of which]³ Form has a relation to a male (power) and a father; but Matter to a female and a mother; and being three they are recognisable by three marks; Form by mind, according to knowledge; Matter by a spurious kind of reasoning, through its not being perceived mentally by a direct course, but by analogy; and their productions by sensation and opinion.

[2.] Before, then, heaven existed, there were, through reason, Form and Matter, and the god, who is the worker-out⁴ of the better. But since what is older⁵ is superior to what is younger, and what is put in order before what is without order, the deity, being good, did, on seeing that Matter receives Form, and is altered in every way, but without order,⁶ feel the necessity⁶ of bringing it into order, and to establish a change from the undefined to the defined, in order that the differences between bodies might have a similar relation, and not receive various turns at hap-hazard. He made, therefore, this world out of the whole of Matter, laying it down as a limit to the nature of being, through its containing all the rest of things in itself, (and being) one, only-begotten, perfect, endued with

¹ By *λεπαινίον* was meant, 1. that which receives an impression, 2. the impression itself. See Tim. p. 50, B.

² Instead of *φύσιος*, Valck. would read *οὐσίας*. For the expression *τὰς περισσότερὰς οὐσίας* is found shortly afterwards, p. 96, A. § 3.

³ As *ἄν* could not precede here *τὸ μὲν εἶδος*, it is properly omitted in four MSS.; unless it be said that the author wrote *ἴνα*, "where," to which *ἄν* in one MS., and *ἐν* in another, seem to lead.

⁴ By *δημιουργός* is meant elsewhere the power that made something out of nothing; but here it is merely the worker-out.

⁵ By *πρεσβύτερον* De Gelder understands "the more intelligent," referring to Hesych., *Πρεσβύτερος* . . . *φρονιμώτερος*.

⁶ So we must render *ἐδήτε*—unless, what is preferable, we adopt *ἐδήλετο*, "wished," as suggested by Valckenaer on Theocrit. p. 259, A. Compare Tim. p. 29, E.

soul and with reason—for these (qualities) are superior to the soulless and the irrational—and of a sphere-like body; for this is more perfect than the rest of forms. Desirous, then, of making a very good production, he made it a deity, created, (and) never to be destroyed by any other cause than the god, who had put it into order, if indeed he should ever wish to dissolve it. But on the part of the good there is no rushing forward to the destruction of a very beautiful production. (The world) therefore, being such, continues without corruption and destruction and blessed. And it is the best of things created; since it has been produced by the best cause, that looks not to patterns made by hand, but to Form (in the abstract) and to Existence, perceived by the mind; to which the created thing, having been carefully adjusted, has become the most beautiful, and ¹to be not wrongly taken in hand.¹ And it is ever perfect according to the things perceived by sense; because the pattern perceived by mind² contains in itself³ all the living things perceived by mind, and has left nothing else out of itself, as being the limit of things perceived by mind, as this world is of those perceived by sense. And as being solid, and perceptible by touch and sight, it has a share of earth and fire, and of the things between them, air and water; and it is composed of bodies all perfect, which are in it as wholes, so that no part might ever be left out of it, in order that the body of the Universe might be altogether self-sufficient, uninjured by corruptions from without and within; ⁴for apart from these there is nothing else:⁴ for the things that are put together according to the best proportions, (and) with equal powers, neither rule over, nor are ruled by, each other in turn, so that some receive an increase, others a de-

¹—¹ Such would, I presume, be the literal meaning of ἀπαρχιότρον—a word that seems not be found elsewhere. Batteux's version, based on the Latin, "ut nova quadam opera emendari minime debeant," which is adopted likewise by De Gelder, is "qu'il n'aura jamais besoin d'être réparé"—a meaning evidently suggested rather by what the connexion of ideas appears to require, than by the actual derivation of the word.

² I have adopted νοητόν, found in the best MS. 1, in lieu of τῆνο: for τῆνο, in common Greek κείνο or ἐκείνο, could not thus follow τὸ παράδειγμα.

By comparing the expression ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχεν a little above, it is evident that we must read here ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχον instead of αὐτῷ περιέχον.

⁴—⁴ I have translated as if the reading were ἄλλο, not ἄλλὰ—

crease, but they remain in a bond of union indissoluble according to a proportion the very best.

[3.] For when there are three terms whatever, and their intervals are fixed according to the same proportion as regards each other, we then perceive that, after the manner of an extended string,¹ the middle term is to the first, what the third is to it; and (taking) also² inversely and by alternation³—according to the fitting of their places and order; and it is impossible for every one to arrange numerically⁴ these, so as not to have an equality of force. (The world too) is in a good state, as regards its shape and movement; as regards the former, in being a sphere, so that it is similar to itself on all sides, and is able to contain all the rest of shapes of the same kind as itself;⁴ as regards the latter, in exhibiting for ever the change dependent on a circle. Now the sphere alone is able in a state of quietness and of motion to preserve a fitness in the same place, so as neither to leave it, nor to receive another place, through its being on every side equally distant from the centre; and, being very smooth to exactness, as regards its external appearance, it has no need of mortal organs, which are fitted to, and carried through, the rest of animals for the sake of their wants. But the soul of the world has (the deity)⁵ united with the centre and led it outwards, investing the world wholly with it, and making it a mixture of Form undivided, and of Substance divided, so as to become one mixture from those two; for which (world) he mixed up two forces, the origin of motion, one connected with the

¹ So I have translated *ῥυσμῶ*, remembering the well-known story of the manner in which Pythagoras discovered harmonical proportions by stretching strings of different lengths; on which see more at length in the Supplementary Note.

² I have followed the reading suggested by De Gelder, *ἀνάπαλιν καὶ ἑναλλάξ*, and confirmed by *κατ' ἑναλλαγὴν—καὶ ἀνάπαλιν* in p. 99, B.

³ In lieu of *ἀριθμῶμεναι*, the best MS. has *ἀριθμῶμενα*: which evidently leads to *ἀριθμῶν θεμίνα*, as I have translated. De Gelder takes *ἀριθμῶμεναι* in the sense of *εἰς φιλίαν ἰλθεῖν*, as explained by Hesychius, while referring to Hom. *Il.* B. 124. But there the sense is "to number;" while, as Soping remarked, the words *εἰς φιλίαν ἰλθεῖν* are the explanation of *ἀριθμῶμεναι*.

⁴ By *ὁμογενία* De Gelder understands, with D'Argens, "regular-shaped bodies." Batteux renders more correctly—"les figures du même genre qu'elle."

⁵ I have translated, as if *ὁ θεός* had dropt out after *μεσότην*—

same, the other with the different; which (soul), 'being mixed with difficulty, was mixed not in the easiest way.'¹ Now all these proportions are combined harmonically according to numbers; which proportions he has divided according to a scale scientifically, so that a person is not ignorant of what things and by what means the soul is combined; which the deity has not ranked after the substance of the body,—²for, as we say, that which is before is in greater honour as regards both power and time,²—but he made it older by taking the first of unities, which is 384.³ Now of these, the

¹ To conceal the tautology in *δύσματος* and *οὐκ ἐκ τῷ ῥάστῳ συνεκρίνατο*, Batteux translates—"Le mélange de deux essences étoit difficile, et ne se fit pas sans beaucoup d'art et d'efforts." Perhaps, however, the author wrote, not *συνεκρίνατο*, but *συνεκρίναιτο*, to which *συνεκρίνατο* in one MS. seems to lead; or else there is some error in *ἐκ τῷ ῥάστῳ*, which are properly omitted in the similar passage of the Tim. p. 35, B., *καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδίαν, τὴν θαττον φύσιν δύσματος οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτόν ἐναρμόττων βίᾳ.*

² So I have translated, by placing *γάρ*, which is found at present after *πρότερον*, where it is however omitted by the best MS. I, between *ὥσπερ* and *λέγομεν*: for the author alludes to what he had said in p. 94, B. § 2, *τὸ πρεσβύτερον κάρρον ἐστὶ τῷ νεώτερω*. Vainly, then, does De Gelder produce this passage in proof of an imitation of Plato's language in Tim. p. 34, B. § 12, *τὴν δὲ δὴ ψυχὴν οὐχ, ὡς νῦν, ὁσπίαν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν*: for there the author probably wrote—*οὐχ, ὡς οἱ νῦν*—i. e. "like persons of the present day,"—and shortly afterwards—*ἀλλὰ παῖς ἄνους ὥς—ταύτῃ πῃ καὶ λέγομεν*—i. e. "but we too perhaps speak in this way, like a senseless child,"—in lieu of *ἀλλὰ πῶς ἡμεῖς—καὶ λέγομεν*. For *πῶς* could not thus follow *ἀλλὰ*—while the allusion to the child will be best understood by remembering that an Egyptian priest is feigned in Tim. p. 22, B., to have said even to Solon, one of the wise men of Greece, "Ἕλληνες αἰεὶ παῖδες ἐστέ.

³ Why this number should have been fixed upon as the first term, may perhaps be guessed at, from knowing, what is stated by Plutarch, De Anim. Procreat. p. 1020, C., that Plato's first term was 192, the half of 384, which last was adopted by Eudorus, a disciple of Crantor; and hence too we can obtain perhaps a clue, if not to the author of this treatise, at least to the time, when it was probably compiled. With regard to Plato's first term of 192, Plutarch must have learnt the fact from some other source than the Timæus itself, where there is not the most distant allusion to it; unless it be said that in his copy of that treatise there was found the identical number 192, in Greek letters ρ ζ β, written after *μῆαν ἀφ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῖραν* in p. 35, B. Be this, however, as it may—for Macrobius, in Somn. Scipion. ii. 2, has translated the passage as it is found at present, without any allusion to a specific number, while Stalbaum, after Boeckh, makes the first term of the series 384, without alluding even to Plutarch—we may perhaps arrive at the reason for the selection of this term, by bearing in mind that 192 is the product of

first being assumed, it is easy to reckon the double and triple; and all the terms, together with their complements and eighths,

16 into 12; where 12 would represent the twelve signs of the Zodiac, or the twelve months of the year, made up of 4 quarters, each consisting of 3 months; while 16 would represent the square of 4; which last number was, as I learn from the erudite treatise of Meursius, "De Denario Pythagorico," who, collecting, as usual, all that can be found in ancient authors on this subject, refers to Hierocles on "The Golden Verses," connected with the four elements of matter, and the four seasons of the year; and probably, I may add, with the four first digits, whose sum made up the Pythagorean Tetractys, or Tetras, according to Procopius Gazæus in Genesin—"Unitas, binarius, ternarius, et quaternarius, inter se additi, denarium constituunt." Nicomachus, however, in Harmonic., says that four represented harmony; and so too does Joannes Protopspath. on Hesiod, ἡ τετραὰς λίγυρας Ἀρμονίᾳ ἔχει γὰρ τὸν τετρίπυρον; where, from the mention of the musical term τὸν τετρίπυρον, there is an evident allusion to the story about the hammers, which will be discussed more at length in the Supplementary Note, or because it is the common difference between the odd numbers, 3, 7, 11, 15, taken in an arithmetical progression, whose sum makes 36, one $\frac{1}{12}$ of the 360 degrees into which the supposed orbit of the sun was divided, when the months were 10, not, as subsequently, 12. But why the square of 4 was taken instead of 4 itself, may perhaps be explained by supposing that, as the square would be the emblem of the surface of matter at rest, and the circle that of the surface of matter in motion, without which musical sounds cannot exist, the square may be considered as surrounding the circle of musical sounds, and the difference between the semidiagonal of the circumscribing square and the semidiameter of the circumscribed circle, may be taken as the first term of an harmonical scale. For other explanations of the reason, which led to the selection of 384, as the first term of the harmonical series, the reader is referred to Boeckh's "Philolaus," and to Schneider's "Dissertatio de Numero Platónico," quoted by Lindan on Tim. p. 45, who conceives with Plutarch that 384 was selected, as being the lowest number on which it was possible to operate for the eighths continually without the introduction of fractions; while, to understand the whole passage thoroughly, De Gelder says we must adopt, as already remarked by Batteux, λήμματα, found in a Par. MS., in lieu of συμπληρώματα; and that we must add likewise καὶ ταῖς ἀποτομαῖς after καὶ τοῖς ἐκγονδοῦς; for otherwise there would be two terms, namely, 2187 and 6561, wanting to complete the series of 36 terms. The proper word, however, was λείμμα, by which was meant the lesser of two unequal sections, into which a number was divided; as in the case of 7; which, divided into two unequal sections, gives 3 and 4, of which 3 would be called λείμμα. So too, if between any two notes, taken as extremes, two semitones are introduced, not having the same ratio to their contiguous notes, but represented, for example, respectively by $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{3}$, the semitone represented by the greater number ($\frac{1}{2}$) was called ἀποτομή, that by the less ($\frac{1}{3}$) διέσις.

To return, however, to the question about the τετραπύρες, I have said that it meant the number 10; which, as it is made up of the four odd numbers, taken in pairs, 1, 9; 3, 7; and of the four even numbers, taken

must amount to 114695; 'and the divisions likewise are 114695.¹

similarly, 2, 8; 4, 6, the former of which were the symbols of male powers, and the latter of female, contained in itself all the four powers of each sex to be found in the four quarters of the Universe. Plutarch, however, *De Isid. et Osirid.* ii. p. 381, F., and again, *De Anim. Procreat.* ii. p. 1027, E., says that the Tetractys was 36, as being the sum of the four first odd and the four first even numbers. But what could lead Pythagoras to select those numbers, or how, when selected, they would be called *τετρακτὺς*, Plutarch has not told us, nor probably could he have told. Much more reasonable then is the statement of Athenagoras in *Apolog.*, that the Tetractys meant 10; for he had perhaps found in some older writer that it was compounded of *τετράς* (4) and *ἑκτάς* (6), whose sum is 10, and not merely the sum of the first four digits, as stated by *Sext. Empiric.* iv. p. 332. Hence, since the names for 10 were *Κόσμος*, *Order*, *Οὐρανός*, *Heaven*, *Εἰμαρμίνη*, *Destiny*, *Αἰών*, *Eternity*, *Πίστις*, *Confident Belief*, *Κράτος*, *Power*, *Ἀνάγκη*, *Necessity*, and *Ἄγλας*, the *Supporter of Heaven and Earth*, as enumerated by one writer, quoted by *Meursius De Denario Pythagorico*, ch. 12, and by another *Θεός*, *God*, and *Σφαῖρα*, a *Sphere*, we can easily understand the oath of Pythagoras—

Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἡμίτερον ψυχῇ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν
Παγὰν, ἀνάου φεῦρος ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσαν—

By my Tetractys, which has given to Soul
The fount, that feeds of ever-flowing Nature
The roots—

And hence too we can understand that, when *Sextus Empiricus* says, *Advers. Mathemat.* iv. p. 333, ὥστε εἰκότως τὸν τίσσαρα ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς εἰρησθαι πηγὴν ἀνάου φύσεος ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσαν, he is drawing an inference, as regards a reason, not stating a simple matter of fact. So too *Hierocles* in *Aur. Carmin.*, where he identifies the *τετρακτὺς* with *τετράς* in the words—τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἡ τετράς ἀνείδησαντο στοιχείων—οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς τετρακτύος, ὡς ῥιζὸς καὶ ἀρχῆς ἡρηται: ἔστι γάρ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, δημιουργὸς τῶν πάντων καὶ αἰρία ἡ τετράς—they indulged merely in a conjecture as to the real meaning of *τετρακτὺς*, and in the closing words has improperly attributed to the number (4), what really belonged to the number (10); and so too has *Macrobius* in *Somn. Scipion.* i. 6. *Stalbaum*, however, on *Tim.* p. 35, B., says that "Tetractys est quatuor membrorum geometricorum complexio;" by which he means, I presume, the combination of the four terms of a geometrical progression. But as he thus loses sight of the letters -*κτς*, we may dismiss his interpretation without further notice; unless it be said that as *ῥιακτὸς* is derived from *ῥιζάω*, so *τετρακτὸς* might come from *τετραζέω*, while the verbal termination -*κς* is similarly found in *φρασ-κς* from *φράζω*.

¹—To meet the objection raised by D'Argens against the repetition of this clause, *De Gelder* says that the series of numerals, explanatory of the harmonical progressions alluded to, has been omitted by some MSS., although it was duly found in the one used by *Aldus*, and in that possessed by *Proclus*, as shown by his *Commentary on the Timæus*, iii. p. 197.

[4.] God the eternal, the chief ruler of the universe, and its creator, the mind alone beholds; but that which is produced we behold by the sight, both this world and its parts, how many soever they are in heaven; which, as being ethereal, must be divided into kinds; so that¹ some may be of the nature relating to the same, and some to the different. Of which the former lead from without all that are within them, along the general movement from the rising (east) to the setting (west). But the latter, relating to (the nature of) the different (lead) from within² the portions, that are carried along from west to east, and are self-moved, and they are whirled round and along, according as it may happen, by the movement of the same, which possesses in the world a superior power. Now the movement of the different, being divided according to an harmonical proportion, assumes the order of seven circles. The Moon, then, as being the nearest to the Earth, exhibits its monthly revolution; but the Sun after her completes his orbit in the period of a year. But there are two³ that run an equal course³ with the Sun; namely, (the stars) of Mercury and⁴ Juno, which the many call (the star of) Venus⁴ and Lucifer. For shepherds and the masses of

But this does not get rid of the objection, touching the word *διαίσεις*, "divisions." For though the sum of the series is 114695, the divisions or terms of the series are only 36, as will be seen by the Supplementary Note, taken for the most part from the annotations of Batteux.

¹ I have translated as if the Greek were *ὅσα τὰ*—not *ὅς τὰ*—

² To preserve the balance of the sentences, the author probably wrote *ἐντόςθεν τὰ ἀπὸ ἐκείρας*, to answer to *ἐξωθεν—τὰ ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς*—not *ἐντός ἀπὸ ἐκείρας τὰ*—

³ De Gelder says that Mercury and Venus are called *ισόδρομοι*, because the former was supposed to be distant from the Sun by only one sign of the Zodiac, equal to 30°, and the latter by not more than two; and he refers to Cicero N. D. ii. 20, "Mercurius—a Sole longius nunquam unius signi intervallo discedit—stella Veneris—nunquam a Sole duorum signorum intervallo longius discedit." But he should have referred to Pliny, H. N. ii. 8, who says that Venus performs her annual revolution in 348 days; and as the Earth, or, on the supposition that the Earth is at rest, the Sun completes its revolution in 365 days, Venus and the Sun might be said to be *ισόδρομοι*. It must, however, be confessed that a similar solution is not applicable to Mercury. Cicero, in Somn. Scipion, is content to translate *ισόδρομοι* by "comites."

⁴ On these two names, assigned to the same star, De Gelder refers to Pliny N. H. ii. 8, where, speaking of Venus, he says—"in magno nominum ambitu est; alii enim Junonis, alii Isidis, alii Matris Deum appellaverunt:" and to Pseud.-Aristotle, *περὶ Κόσμου*, § 2, δὲ οὐ φασφόρου,

mankind are not wise in sacred astronomy, nor skilled in the risings that take place in the west and east. For the same (star) becomes at one time (visible) in the west, when it follows the Sun so far, as not to be hidden by its light; and at another time in the east, when it leads on the Sun and rises before it, and is the herald of day. Hence the star of Venus becomes, through its running together with the Sun, frequently Lucifer, ¹ but not always; since ¹ there are many (that become so), both of those that are planets and are not; since every star of any magnitude that is seen above the horizon, before the Sun rises, heralds the day. But the three other stars, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, have their peculiar velocities, and ² unequal years; and they complete their course while making their periods of effulgence, ³ and of being visible, and of obscuration and eclipse, and giving birth to accurate risings and settings. Moreover, they complete their appearances conspicuously in the east or west according to their position as regards the Sun; who during the day exhibits its course from rising (in the east) to setting (in the west); but during the night it makes a movement in another direction from west to east, while it is carried on by the motion of the same; whereas, during the year (it is carried) according to its own inherent motion. From these two kinds of motion it rolls out a spiral, creeping, according to one portion, in the time of a day, but, whirled round under the sphere of the fixed stars, according to each revolution of darkness and day. Now these revolutions men call the portions of time,

ὃν Ἀφροδίτης, οἱ δὲ Ἡρας προσαγορεύουσιν, translated by Apuleius de Mund., "Quintus Phosphorus, Junonia, immo Veneris, stella censetur;" and to Augustine De Civitat. Dei vii. 15, "Luciferum quidam Veneris, quidam dicunt esse Junonis." Hence De Gelder proposes to read Ἐρμᾶ τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτας, τὸν Ἡρας—καλίουτι.

¹— So we must translate, or else adopt the conjecture of Stephens—ὅτε εἰς δὲ, of which De Gelder approves, in lieu of οὐκ εἰς δὲ—

² Instead of καὶ ἑναυτῶς—VI. would read κατ' ἑναυτῶς—

³ Here Bekker has edited περικαταλάμψιας with four MSS. But Batteux, Valck., and De Gelder prefer περικατάλαμψιας, furnished by a Paris one; by which they understand "over-takings"—referring to Tim. p. 38, D., καταλαμβάνουσι τε καὶ καταλαμβάνονται κατὰ ταῦτα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων Ἡλῖος τε καὶ ὁ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Ἑωσφόρος. But as περι would thus in composition seem scarcely intelligible, one would prefer—τὸν ὁρόμον περιῖ καταλάμψιας— and thus the sense would be—"they complete their course around, while making their overtakings."

which the deity has arranged together with the world. For the stars did not exist before in the world; and hence there was neither a year, nor periods of seasons, by which this generated time is measured, and which is the representation of the time not generated, which we call eternity. For as this heaven has been produced according to an eternal pattern, (namely,) the idea-like world, so,¹ according to a pattern, (namely,) eternity, has this time been made together with the world.

[5.] The Earth, fixed at the centre, becomes the hearth² of the gods, and the boundary³ of darkness and day,⁴ producing both settings and risings, according to the cuttings off (made by) the things that form the boundary,⁵ as we circumscribe by a cutting off the things of earth, sufficient for sight.⁵ And it is the oldest of bodies within (the circle of) heaven. And neither has Water at any time been produced without Earth, nor Air without moisture; nor could Fire continue without moisture and the materials which it burns; so that (the Earth) is fixed, as the root and base of all other substances,

¹ All the MSS. but one read *ὄντως ὥς*— But Bekker, on the authority of the best one, I, has omitted *ὄντως*— He should have read *ὄντως καί*— for *ὥς* never thus answers to *ὥς*, only to *οὕτως*; while *καί* is thus properly united to the repeated *παράδειγμα*, as I have shown by numerous examples in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 307, and to the passages there quoted I could now add as many more. Further, since we meet with *πρὸς παράδειγμα* in the latter clause, but *πρὸ διδίων παράδειγμα* in the former, it is evident that in both the author wrote *πρὸ*—

² De Gelder refers to Ovid, Fast. vi. 299, "Stat vi terra sua; vi stando Vesta vocatur."

³ In lieu of *ἄρος* VI. would read *ἄρος*, i. e. *ὁ οὐρανός*— referring to Tim. p. 40, C., *γῆ—φύλακα—νεκρός τῆ καὶ ἡμῶν* and to Hesych. *Οὐρανός—φύλαξ*.

⁴ Instead of *ἀμύρας*, four MSS. read *ἄρος*, and so does Simplicius de Caelo, quoted by Gaisford in Poet. Minor. Græc. I. ii. p. xlviii., which leads to *ἀγῆς*— and if this be the correct reading here, we must alter a little above *ἀμύρας* into *ἀγῆς*.

⁵ So I have translated, as if the Greek were—*ὥς γὰρ ὅστις λαμβάνει τὰ ἀπορομὰ τὰ τὰς γὰς περιγραφόμεθα*, where *περιγραφόμεθα* has been happily found in seven MSS. The author alludes to the custom of persons cutting off the rays of light by placing the fingers of the hand so as to form a kind of tube, when they want to examine a thing correctly. The common text is—*ὥς γὰρ ὅστις καὶ γὰρ ἀπορομὰ τὰς γὰς περιγραφόμενα*: which I must leave for those to understand, who can; amongst whom De Gelder is not one; for he proposes to read *περιγραφόμενα*; where I confess myself equally in the dark.

¹upon its own balance.¹ The principles of things produced are Matter, as the substratum, and Form (in the abstract), as the reason of (each) shape; and the result from these (two) are Earth and Water, and Air and Fire; the creation of which is of this kind. ²(Now) every body is composed of surfaces;² and this is (composed) of triangles; of which one is rectangular, the half of a square, with two equal sides; the other, whose sides are all unequal, ³having the greater angle thrice the size of the lesser; while the least angle in it is the third of a right angle, and the middle one is the double of the least; for it is two parts out of three; but the greatest is a right angle, being one and a half greater than the middle one and the triple of the least.³ Now this triangle (with all its sides unequal) is the half of an equilateral triangle, cut into two equal parts by a line let down from the apex to the base. Now in each of these triangles there is a right angle; but in one the two sides about the right angle are equal; in the other all the sides are unequal. Now let this be called a scalene (triangle); but the other, the half of a square, (be considered) the principle of the constitution of the Earth. For the square (produced) from this (scalene triangle) is composed of four half-squares; and from such a square is produced the cube, a body the most stationary and steady in every way, having six sides and eight angles; and on this account the Earth is a body the heaviest and most difficult to be moved, and its substance not to be changed into any thing else,⁴ through its not having a communion with a triangle of another kind. For the Earth alone has the half-square, as its peculiar element; and this is the element of the (three)⁵ other substances, Fire, Air, and Water. For on the half-triangle being put together six times, there is generated

¹ I have adopted *ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτᾷς ῥοπᾷ*, as suggested by Toussaint on Cornutus, p. 31, in lieu of *ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτᾷς ῥοπᾷς*, as I learn from De Gelder, who has supported the correction by Phædon, p. 189, A.

² Aristotle, *De Cælo*, iii. 1, p. 369, B., quoted by De Gelder, denies that bodies can be formed of plane surfaces merely; an observation that does not apply to Tim. p. 53, C., *τὸ δὲ τοῦ σώματος εἶδος πᾶν βάθος ἐχέει*.

³ The words between the numerals Batteux would reject as an interpolation; but they are defended by De Gelder.

⁴ I have adopted *ἄλλο*, furnished by three MSS., in lieu of *άλλα*.

⁵ Batteux, "trois autres elemens—" as if he wished to read *τῶν τριῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων*—in lieu of *τῶν ἄλλων*—

from it an equilateral (solid) triangle; of which is formed the pyramid, having four faces, and their angles¹ equal, the form of Fire, which is the most easy to be moved, and made up of the finest particles. After this is the octohedron, with eight faces and six angles, the element of Air; and the third is the eikosihedron, with twenty faces and twelve angles, the element of Water, made up of particles the most numerous and heaviest. These then, as being composed of the same element, are changed into each other. But (the deity) has made the dodecahedron, the image of the Universe, as being the nearest to the Sphere. Fire then, by the fineness of its particles, passes through all things; and Air through the rest of things, with the exception of Fire; and Water through Earth. All things are therefore full, and leave no vacuum.² But they are brought together by the revolving movement of the Universe, and are pressed against, and rubbed by, each other in turn, and produce the never-failing change from production to destruction.

[6.] By making use of these the deity put together this world, sensible to touch through (the particles of) Earth, and to sight through (those of) Fire; which two are the extremes; but through (the particles of) Air and Water he has bound (the world) together by the strongest chain, namely, proportion; which is able to hold together both itself, and the things kept in subjection through it. Now if the thing bound together is a plane surface, one middle (term) is sufficient; but if a solid, there will be need of two. With two middle terms then he combined two extremes, so that as Fire is to Air, Air might be to Water, and Water to Earth; and by alternation, as Fire is to Water, Air (might be) to Earth; and by inversion, as Earth is to Water, Water (might be) to Air, and Air to Fire; and by alternation, as Earth is to Air, so Water (might be) to Fire. Now since all are equal in power, their ratios are in a state of equality. This world then is one, through the bond of the deity, made according to proportion. Now each of these four substances possesses

¹ Since two MSS. read *τὰς τοῦτων γωνίας* in lieu of *τὰς ἰσὰς γωνίας*, the author probably wrote *τὰς τοῦτων γωνίας ἰσὰς*— for *ἰσὰς* might easily have dropped out after *γωνίας*—

² This was contrary to the doctrine of Epicurus; for Lucretius says, in i. 30, “est in rebus inane”—quoted by De Gelder.

many forms; Fire, those of Flame, and Burning, and Luminousness, through the inequality of the triangles in each of them. In the same manner, Air is partly clear and dry, and partly turbid¹ and foggy; and Water partly flowing and partly congealed, according as it is Snow, Hoar-frost, Hail, Ice: and that, which is Moist, is, in one respect, flowing, as honey, oil; but in another, is compact, as pitch, wax; and of the forms of what is compact there is a portion fusible, as gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, and purified iron;² and a portion friable, as sulphur, pitch, nitre, salt, alum, (and)³ stones of a similar kind.

[7.] After putting together the world, (the deity) planned the creation of living beings, subject to death, in order that, being perfect himself, he might work it out perfectly according to his image. He mixed up therefore the soul of man out of the same proportions and powers; and, after taking the particles and distributing them, he delivered them over to Nature the alterative. And she, succeeding him in working out living beings both mortal and ephemeral, the soul of whom she 'brought in flowingly,'⁴ some from the Moon, others from the Sun, and some too from the other bodies, that wander in the portion of the different, with the exception of one power belonging to the same, which she mixed up in the rational

¹ I have adopted *θολερὸν*, in lieu of *νοτερόν*, as suggested by VI., who refers to Tim. p. 58, D., *αἶρος—ὁ θολερώτατος ὁμίχλη*.

² Such is the meaning commonly assigned to *σταγών*, according to Hesych., *Σταγών ἢ τοῖς μεταλλικοῖς τὸ καθαρὸν σιδήριον*. But De Gelder says that by *σταγών* must be meant some metal in a natural state, not one purified artificially. He considers it therefore the same as what Aristotle, De Admirand. Narrat. p. 877, B., calls *κασσίτερος Κελτικὸς*, which the philosopher says is reported to melt quicker than lead. But as the metal, called by itself *κασσίτερος* in ancient times, is supposed to be the tin of Cornwall, in Aristotle's language *κασσίτερος Κελτικὸς*, there would be two words here descriptive of the same metal; unless indeed De Gelder intended, of which he says nothing, to reject *κασσίτερος* as the explanation of *σταγών*. I would rather understand by that word "quick-silver," which generally assumes the form of globular drops.

³ I have translated as if the Greek were *λίθοι τε*—not *λίθοι τοι*—

⁴ "Such is the literal version of *ἐπιρρύτως ἐνάγαγε*: which Cornarius, unable, as I confess I am myself, to understand, wished to alter into *ἐπιρρύτως ἐνίσταγε*. But, as *στάζω* and its compounds have no aor. 2, act., had he remembered the expression in Tim. p. 43, A., *τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνίδουν εἰς ἐπιρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον*, he would perhaps have suggested, *ὣν τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς ἐπιρρυτον σῶμ' ἀγαγε*, i. e. "whose souls she brought to a body flowed upon."

portion (of the soul), as the image of wisdom in those of a happy fate. ¹ Now of the soul of man a portion is rational and intellectual, and a portion irrational and unintellectual; but of the logical the better portion is from the nature of the same, but the worse is from that of the different; and each is seated around the head, so that the other portions of the soul and body may minister to it, as being the uppermost of the whole tabernacle.² But of the irrational portion, that which represents passion is around the heart, and that (which represents) desire is around the liver. But the principle of the body and the root of the marrow is the brain, in which is the leadership; and from this, like an effusion,³ flows through the back-bone⁴ what remains, from which are separated the particles for seed and reason:⁵ but of the marrow⁶ the surrounding defences are the bones; of which the flesh is the covering and concealment. And to the nerves he united joints by ligatures, suited for their movement. And of the internal (members there are) some for the sake of nourishment, and some for safety; and of the movements, some of those from without are conveyed to the intelligent place of perception; but others, not falling under the power of apprehension,⁷ are unperceived, either through the bodies affected being too earth-like, or through the movements being too feeble; and

¹ Since Tennemann confesses, as stated by De Gelder, that the origin of the human soul is more clearly explained in this treatise than in the *Timæus* of Plato, it is hard to understand how the former could be an abridgment of the latter.

² On the word *σκήνω*, as applied to the body, the tabernacle of the soul, see Axioch. p. 366, A. § 5.

³ Batteux, with the approbation of De Gelder, renders *ἀπόχυμα*, "une espèce de liqueur dense."

⁴ Instead of *νῆστιον*, four MSS. *νῆστιον*: which confirms *νῆστιον*, suggested by VI., who refers to *νῆστιον μυελόν* in *Tim.* p. 74, A.

⁵ In lieu of the unintelligible *λόγον*, Cornarius suggested *γόνον*, which seems to have been subsequently found in a solitary MS. Φ. To avoid however the tautology in *σπέρμα* and *γόνον*, De Gelder would read *σπερματίδα* (i. e. *φλίβα*) *καὶ γονήν*, referring *σπερματίδα* to the male, and *γονήν* to the female; and quoting Galen de *Uteri Dissect.* t. i. p. 210, ed. Bas., *γονήν δὲ λέγου—αὐτὴν τὴν μήτραν*.

⁶ As the marrow is always spoken of in the *Timæus* in the singular number, Valckenaer on *Phœniss.* 1085, corrected *μυελῶν* here into *μυελῶ*.

⁷ Such seems to be the meaning of *ἀντίλαψιν*: for which however De Gelder would read *ἀνάλαψιν*, forgetting that *ἀντιλαπτικόν* is used a little below as it is here.

as many, as cause nature to start from itself, are painful; but such as cause it to remain in itself, are called pleasures.

[8.] But amongst the senses the deity has lit up in us the sight for viewing objects in the¹ heavens, and for² the reception of knowledge; while as the recipient of speech and melody, he has implanted in us hearing,³ of which he who is deprived from his birth will become dumb, nor be³ able to give vent to any portion⁴ of speech; and hence persons say that this sense is related the nearest to speech. But as many of the affections of the body, as have a name, are so called with reference to the touch; and some too from their tendency to its seat. For the touch judges of the properties connected with life,⁵ (such as) warmth, coldness, dryness, moisture, smoothness, roughness, (and) of things, yielding, opposing, soft, hard. The touch too decides upon what is heavy and light. ⁶But reason defines them by their inclination to the middle (of the world) and from the middle.⁶ Now men mean the same thing by below and middle. For the centre of a sphere is the below; but that, which is above it to the circumference, is the up. Now what is warm appears to consist of fine particles, and such as cause bodies to separate; but what is cold (consists) of gross particles, and such as cause bodies to condense. The circumstances relating to taste are similar to those (relating) to touch. For by concretion and secretion, and further, by entering the pores and by (assuming) shapes, substances are either rough or smooth. For those that cause the tongue to

¹ With this expression may be compared Ovid's, "Oa homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri Jussit."

² Hence Milton, in allusion to his blindness, complains of "knowledge at one entrance quite shut out."

³ So I have translated, as if the Greek were, ἃς ὁ στερησκόμενος ἐκ γενέσεως ἐνὸς ἔσται, οὕτε—not ἃς στερησκόμενος ὁ ἀνὼς οὐδέ, where ὁ is omitted in one MS., and οὕτε, it would seem, read in all. And hence, not only might ἔσται have been easily lost before it, but ἐνὸς as easily corrupted into ἀνὼς, i. e. ἀνθρώπος. On the loss of ἐνὸς it will be sufficient to refer to Ruhnken's Epist. Crit. p. 212.

⁴ The sense evidently requires λόγον γὰρ τι, as I have translated, not λόγον ἔτι, where ἔτι is without any definite meaning.

⁵ Such is the natural translation of τὰς ζωτικὰς δυνάμεις. Batteux has, "qualités sensibles:" of which De Gelder approves, and refers to Hesych., Ζωτικός· ὁλος τηρεῖν. But there ζῶν has evidently dropt out after τηρεῖν.

⁶ In these words there is evidently an allusion to a centripetal and centrifugal force.

melt away or that scrape it, appear to be rough; but those that act moderately in scraping (appear) brackish; but those that inflame or separate the skin, acrid; but their opposites, the smooth and sweet, are reduced to a juicy state.¹ Of smelling the kinds have not been defined; for, from their percolating through narrow pores, that are too stiff to be either brought together or separated, things (seem) to be sweet-smelling or bad-smelling from the putrefaction or concoction² of the earth and substances like the earth. But a vocal sound is a percussion in the air, arriving at the soul through the ears; the pores of which proceed, until they reach the liver; and amongst them there is breath, by the movement of which hearing exists. Now of the voice and hearing that portion which is quick, is acute; but that which is slow, is grave; but the medium is the most in harmony. And that which is much and diffused, is great; but that which is little and compressed, is small; and that which is arranged according to musical proportions, is in tune; but that which is unarranged and out of those proportions, is out of tune, and not to be properly adjusted. The fourth kind of things relating to the senses is the most multi-form and various, and they are called objects of sight, in which are all kinds of colours, and an infinity of coloured substances; but the principal are four, white, black, brilliant,³ and red; for all the others are produced from a mix-

¹ Such is the literal meaning of *εγχύματα*: with which word however De Gelder is so dissatisfied as to propose its rejection. But by comparing Tim. p. 66, C., it would seem rather that something is wanting here.

² In lieu of *πίψεισι*, VI. proposes *ρήξεισι*. But that would be a mere tautology after *σάψισι*.

³ Batteux renders *λαμπρόν* "jaune." But such is not the meaning of *λαμπρός* elsewhere. That some specific colour is however intended, is evident from the whole tenor of the passage. By comparing then Tim. p. 68, B., *λαμπρόν τε ἱρυθρῷ λευκῷ τε μὲνύμενον ξανθὸν γίγνεται*, it would seem that by *λαμπρόν* was meant a light-blue; for that colour mixed with red and white would make what is now called gamboge, in Greek *ξανθός*. And hence we can understand *λαμπρός καὶ φοινικεύς* quoted from Plutarch by H. Steph. in Thes. *Λαμπρός*. Rudolph indeed on Ocellus Lucanus, p. 20, *πρός τε τὸ λαμπρόν καὶ ξανθὸν καὶ λευκόν*, explains *λαμπρόν* by *λευκόν*; and would reject therefore *λευκόν* as a gl. One would prefer, however *γλαυκόν*, if *λαμπρόν* means there "white;" but if light-blue, as here, *λευκόν* must be retained. With regard to the whole tenor of the passage, it is worth while quoting the words of Apuleius de Mundo, "Pictura ex discordibus pigmentorum coloribus, atris,

ture of these. Now what is white causes the vision to expand, but what is black to contract; just as what is warm is able to expand the touching, but what is cold to contract it; and what is rough naturally contracts the tasting, but what is sharp dilates it.

[9.] And (it is natural) for the covering of animals, that live in the air, to be nourished and kept together by the food being distributed by the veins through the whole mass, in the manner of a stream, conveyed as it were by channels, and moistened by the breath,¹ which diffuses it, and carries it to the extremities. And respiration is produced through there being no vacuum in nature, while the air, as it flows in, is inhaled in the place of that which is exhaled, through unseen mouths, through which the drops (of sweat) are visible on the surface; but a portion is got rid of by the natural warmth (of the body). It is necessary then for a portion, equal to what has been got rid of, to be introduced in its place; for, if not, there would be a vacuum; which is impossible: for the animal would no longer be flowing together² and one, when the covering had been separated by the vacuum. Now the same organization takes place in the case of lifeless substances, according to the analogy of respiration. For the gourd and amber are the likenesses of respiration. Now the breath flows through the body to an orifice outwards,³ and is introduced in turn through respiration by the mouth and nostrils, and again, after the manner of the Euripus, is carried

albis, luteis, et puniceis, confusione modica temperatis, imagines iis, quos imitatur, similes facit."

¹ The Greek is ἀπομέννας ὑπὸ τῷ πνεύματι: which appears a rather strange collocation of words; and the more so, as Plato in Tim. p. 77, C., has ὡς ὥσπερ ἐκ νάματος ἐπιπύοντος ἀρδου: by the aid of which passage we may read here νάματος for πνεύματος—

² De Gelder observes that σύρπον means here, that "which flows together and coheres," but, in p. 104, A., § 11, σύρπον, applied to πνεῦμα, means only that "which flows together," without any idea of coherence. But how τὸ ζῶον could be said to be σύρπον, I confess I cannot understand. Hence I suspect the author wrote—οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ εἷη καὶ κατὰ σύρπον γὰρ τὸ ζῶον, i. e. "for the animal would be no longer one, like something that has flowed together,"—instead of εἷη καὶ σύρπον καὶ τὸ ζῶον.

³ De Gelder proposes to omit θύραζε, as being superfluous after ἔξω. He should have rejected rather ἔξω, and suggested θύραζε, of which ἔξω would be the explanation.

in turn to the body, which is extended according to the flowing out. ¹The gourd (too), when the air within it is got rid of by fire, attracts to itself moisture: and amber, when the air is separated from it, receives an equal substance.¹ Now all nourishment is from the heart, as the root, and from the stomach, as a fountain, and is conveyed to the body, to which, if it be moistened by more² than what flows out, there is said to be an increase; but if by less, a decay; but the point of perfection is the boundary between those (two), and is considered (to exist) in an equality of efflux and influx; but when the joints of the system are broken, should there be no longer any passage for the breath, or the nourishment be not distributed, the animal dies.

[10.] Now there are many things hurtful to life and the causes of death. One kind is called disease. And of diseases the commencement is the want of harmony between the principal powers, when the simple powers, such as heat, or cold, or moisture, or dryness, are too much or deficient; and after these the turns and alterations of the blood from corruption, and the deterioration of the flesh, when wasting away, should the turns take place according to the changes to what is acid, or brackish, or bitter, in the blood, or wastings away of the flesh. For from hence arises the generation of bile and of phlegm, (and) diseased juices, and the rottenness of liquids, weak indeed, unless deeply seated,³ but difficult (to cure), when their commencement is generated from the bones, and painful, if in a state of inflammation from the marrow. The last of disorders is (those of) the breath, bile, and phlegm, when they increase and flow into situations foreign to them, or into places inappropriate;⁴ for then by laying hold of the situation, belonging to what are better, and by driving away what are congenial, they fix

¹ There is an allusion to the gourd and amber in Tim. p. 79, E. But in neither passage is it very easy to see what the allusion to either substance is intended to illustrate.

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *πλείονι*, to which *πλείον* in the best MS. I leads, in lieu of *πλείω*: and similarly, as if the Greek were not *μείω*, but *μείονι*, to which *μείων* in one MS., and *μείων* in another, seem to lead.

³ On the phrase *ἐν βάθει* De Gelder refers to Ælian, V. H. ii. 14, and Clemens Alexandr. Pædag. iii. p. 219, B.

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀποκαίσις*, not *ἐκκαίσις*: for which De Gelder would substitute *ἐκκησις*, i. e. "exposed to fatal disorders."

themselves there, injuring the bodies and resolving ¹(them) into those very things.¹ These then are the sufferings of the body; and from these are many diseases of the soul, some from one faculty, others from others; of the perceptive (soul the disease is) a difficulty of perception; of the recollecting, a forgetfulness; of the forward, a want of desire and of eagerness;² of that subject to affections, a violent suffering and excited madness; of the rational, an indisposition to learn and think. But of wickedness, the commencements are pleasures and pains, desires and fears, inflamed by the body and mixed up with the mind, and are called by various names. For there are loves, and regrets, and desires let loose, and passions on the stretch, and heavy resentments, and appetites of various kinds, and pleasures without measure. ³In all simplicity, to be unreasonably disposed towards affections and to be under their rule³ is the limit of virtue and vice; for to abound in them or to be superior to them places us in a good or bad position. Against such impulses the temperament of our bodies is able to co-operate greatly, whether quick or hot, or varied in various ways, by leading us to melancholy and violent lewdness; and certain parts, when affected by a flowing, produce itchings and forms of bodies more like a state of inflammation than of health; through which a sinking of the spirits,⁴ and a forgetfulness, and a silliness, and a fearfulness, are worked out.

[11.] Sufficient too are the habits, in which persons are brought up in the city or at home, and their daily food, enervating by luxury the soul or fortifying it for strength. For

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of *ἐς αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀναλύοντα*. But perspicuity would require rather *ἐς ἀνιάτα*, or something similar.

² In lieu of *ἀποπειρία* De Gelder would read *ἀποστρία*, referring to Galen's Exegese. Hippocrat., *ἀποστρίας καὶ ἀνορεξίας ποιητικὰ*, and rendering *ἀποστρία* "cibi fastidium." But that would be rather a bodily than mental affection.

³—³ Such is the literal translation of *ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀτόπως ἔχεν πρὸς τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀρχεσθαι*— But as it is no part of virtue "to be unreasonably disposed towards affections," it is evident that no sensible writer could have penned these words, although he might have written, and probably did write, something to this effect—*ἀπλῶς δὲ ἢ ἀτόπως ἔχεν πρὸς τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀρχεν ἢ ἀρχεσθαι*— for thus *ἀπλῶς ἔχεν* and *ἀρχεν* would belong to virtue, and *ἀτόπως ἔχεν* and *ἀρχεσθαι* to vice.

⁴ In lieu of *δυσθυμία* De Gelder would read *δυσμαθία*, referring to Tim. p. 87, A., *λήθης ἅμα καὶ δυσμαθίας*.

the living out of doors, and simple¹ fare, and gymnastic exercises, and the morals of companions, produce the greatest effect in the way of virtue and of vice. And these causes are derived from parents and the elements rather than from ourselves, provided there be no remissness on our part in keeping aloof from acts of duty. And for the animal to be in a good condition, it is requisite for the body to possess the better properties under its control, (namely,) health and correct perception, and strength and beauty. Now the principles of beauty are, a symmetry as regards its parts, and as regards the soul. For nature has arranged, like an instrument, the body to be subservient to, and in harmony with, the subjects of life. And it is requisite for the soul likewise to be brought into harmony with its analogous good qualities, (namely,) in the case of temperance, as the body is in the case of health; and in that of prudence, as in the case of correct perception; and in that of fortitude, as in the case of vigour and strength;² and in that of justice, as in the case of beauty.³ Of these the beginning is from nature; but their middle portions and end are from carefulness; those relating to the body, through the gymnastic and medical arts; those to the soul, through instruction and philosophy. For these are the powers that nourish, and give a tone to, the body and soul by means of labour and gymnastic exercise, and a pureness⁴ of diet; some through druggings (applied to the body),⁵ and others through discipline applied to the soul by means of punishments and reproaches; for by encouragement they give strength and excite to an onward movement, and exhort to advantageous works. The art of the gymnastic trainer,⁶ and its nearest

¹ Instead of ἀπλᾶι VI. has suggested ἀπελαῖς—If any change is requisite, I should prefer λῡραι—"slight"—which may be supported by the passages quoted by Jacobs in *Lectio. Stob.* p. 24, where λῡρη is united to διαίτα.

² To preserve the uniformity of the periods, and to prevent a tautology, we must omit either ῥώμην καὶ or καὶ ἰσχύον—

³ Here too the balance of the sentences requires the omission of ῥῶμα, as done in the translation.

⁴ Battenx has "purgations"—as if he wished to read καθαρῖσματος—

⁵ Here again the balance of the sentences shows that τῶν σωματίων is required to answer to τῶν ψυχῶν—

⁶ Respecting the business of the ἀλκιπτήρς, see my note on Plato Criton. p. 15.

relative, that of the medical man, do, on being ordered to attend upon bodies, bring their powers to the greatest symmetry, and cause the blood to be pure and the breath to flow equably,¹ in order that, if there be any diseased virulence there, the powers of the blood and breath may be in a state of strength; but music, and its leader, philosophy, that have been ordained by the gods² and laws for the regulation of the soul, ³accustom, and persuade, and partly compel,³ the irrational to obey reason, and the two irrational, passion and desire, to become, the one mild, the other quiet, so as not to be moved without reason, nor to be unmoved when the mind incites either to desire or enjoy something; for this is the definition of temperance, (namely,) docility⁴ and firmness. And intelligence and philosophy, the highest in honour, after cleansing (the soul) of false opinions, have introduced knowledge, recalling the mind from excessive ignorance, and setting it free for the contemplation of divine things; in which to occupy oneself with a self-sufficiency, as regards the affairs of man, and with an abundance, for the commensurate period of life, is a happy state.

[12.] Now he, to whom ⁵the deity has happened to assign something of a good fate,⁵ is led through opinion the most true to the happiest life. But if he be morose and indocile, let the punishment that comes from law and reason, follow him, bringing with it the fears ever on the stretch, both those that proceed from heaven and those from Hades, how that punishments, not to be begged off, are laid up for the unhappy below, and the rest

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *πνεῦμ' ἰσόρροον*, not *πνεῦμα σύρροον*.

² In lieu of *θεῶν* VI. has suggested *ἰθῶν*—

³ Such is the literal translation of the Greek—*ἰθίζονται καὶ πείθονται, ῥὰ δὲ καὶ ποταναγκάζονται*— But as one MS. offers *ἰπίζονται*, and another *ἰπειζονται*, and one omits *καὶ πείθονται*, and four omit *ῥὰ δὲ*, and two *πείθονται ῥὰ δὲ καὶ*, it is evident that the text has been terribly tampered with; and hence if it is not without some hesitation that I am led to believe the author wrote *εἰς ἔριν ζιόντ' ἵνα πείθονται, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ποταναγκάζονται*—i. e. "they persuade a person when boiling for a quarrel, or still further compel"—where *εἰς ἔριν ζιόντα* may be compared with *θυμὸν ζιόντι* in Eurip. Hec. 1046.

⁴ In lieu of *εὐπείθεια* VI. proposed to read *εὐπάθεια*— But that would differ only a little from *καρπεία*.

⁵ So I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὁ δαίμων εὐμοιρίας ἰσάτης ἔρυχε*, not *ὁ δαίμων μοιρας ῥᾶσ' ἔλαχε*: where the deity is said absurdly "to have a share of this fate."

of the things, which I praise the Ionic poet of old for making 'the crime-defiled (to suffer) for their wickedness.'¹ For as we sometimes render bodies sound by means of diseased substances, if they will not yield to the more healthy, so we restrain the soul by false reasoning, if it will not be led by true. And they would be called of necessity strange² punishments; since the souls of cowards enter by a change into the bodies of women,³ who are given to insulting conduct;³ and those of the blood-stained into the bodies of wild beasts for punishment; and of the lascivious into the forms of sows⁴ and boars; and of the light-minded and elated into the shapes of air-traversing birds; and of those who do nothing, learn nothing, and think of nothing, into that of aquatic animals who do nothing. But on all these matters has Nemesis given a judgment at a second period, together with the deities who preside over murderers, and those under the earth, the inspectors of human affairs, to whom god, the leader of all, has intrusted the administration of the world, filled with gods and men, and the rest of living beings, as many as have been made by the demiurgus according to the best image of a form not begotten, and eternal, and to be perceived by the mind.

¹— The Greek is at present *ἐκ παλαιᾶς ποιῦντα τὼς ἰναγίας*: where, since *ἐκ παλαιᾶς* is perfectly unintelligible, Wytttenbach suggested, what De Gelder has adopted, *ἐκλάσαι*— But that would be superfluous, thus united to *ποιῦντα*— I have therefore translated, as if the text were originally—*ἐν ἀπλᾶσι ποιῦντα τίσαι ἰναγίας*. The passage of Homer alluded to is in *Od. M.* 571—599.

² Wytttenbach, says De Gelder, understood by *ἕναι*, "new." But such a meaning that word could not bear. In *The Church of England Quarterly Review*, No. 1, p. 116, I proposed to read *Ἰξίωνιαι*—"after the manner of Ixion"—and hence I should have read likewise *κατὰ συνέλῳσιν*, in lieu of *πορὶ κέλασιν* shortly afterwards, and have inserted those words between *ὡς* and *μετενδουμέναν*: and instead of *οὐκ εἰκαίως*, I should have proposed *εἰσέως*. For the allusion is to the revolutions of the wheel, to which Ixion was feigned to be eternally bound; and with which are compared those which the soul in its transmigrations is destined to undergo.

³— The words between the numerals should be inserted after *λαγῶν* δὲ—for *ἔβρι* means here not "insolence," but "intemperance in lusts."

⁴ To avoid the tautology in *σὺν ἡ κάρων*, one would prefer *ἐνὶ ἡ κάρων*: to which δὲ ὕν in one MS. seems to lead; or else *σὺν ἡ γράων*. So in *Phileb.* p. 67, C. § 160. Porphyry seems to have found in his MS. not *βέες καὶ ἵπποι*, but *ὄνες καὶ γράων*, as Sydenham was the first to remark. We meet indeed with *σοὶ κάρποις* in *IA. E.* 783. But there one would prefer *σοὶ καρποῖσι*— Hesych. *Καρπός*—*ἐκτίων*.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.

As the Notes of Batteux, to which reference is made in p. 153, n. 1st, would scarcely furnish all the information requisite for the complete elucidation of this passage, I have introduced some preliminary matter, which, it is hoped, will afford clear notions on a rather difficult subject.

When Pythagoras was endeavouring to discover in respect to sounds a test for the ear, similar to that for the eye in respect to colours, as furnished by a lens, and to that for the hand, in respect to different substances, solid and liquid, by means of measures and weights, he happened to pass by the workshop of a coppersmith, where he heard a variety of sounds, produced by different hammers, as they came in contact with the metal; and after making various experiments, he discovered that the difference in the sounds was according to the weight of the hammers, and not according to the force with which the metal was struck. For the sounds were really the same, though differing in intensity, whether the hammers were wielded by hands more or less powerful; just as a key on the pianoforte gives the same note, but differing only in loudness, whether it be struck by a grown person or a child.

Perceiving thus that certain vibrations were produced in a bar of metal, when struck by different hammers, and suspecting probably that the sound was connected in some measure with such vibrations, he is reported to have noted down the weights of the different hammers, and on his return home to have suspended from a beam, stretched diagonally from two corners of a room, four strings of the same substance, length, and twist; to each of which he attached four weights of 12, 9, 8, and 6 pounds, respectively, which were fastened to the ground. He then struck the strings first singly, and found that the sounds were more or less acute, according as the strings were attached to the less or greater weight; he then struck the two extreme strings, and found that the sound proceeding from the string connected with the greatest weight, was, as compared with the sound proceeding from that connected with the least weight, in the proportion of 2 to 1: and by ringing the changes on the other strings, he found the sounds to be always in proportion to the weights attached to the strings.

His next step, it is said, was to transfer the strings, now called cat-gut, a corruption of cut-gut, to the bridge of a musical instrument, where the bridge answered the purpose of the beam previously used; while, in the place of the weights originally attached to the strings, he invented pegs, around which the strings were wound, and by which they were extended or contracted to the proper pitch, as they are at present in all stringed instruments; and the names assigned to the four strings were, ὑψίστη, the highest, μέση, the middle, κατωμέση, near to, but lower than, the middle, and βῆστη, the lowest; with which may be compared the four strings that produce the four notes, E, A, D, and G, on the modern violin.

According, however, to Boethius, *De Musica*, i. 20, this four-stringed lyre was invented even before the time of Orpheus. His words are—*"Simplicem principio fuisse musicam refert Nicomachus, adeo ut quatuor nervis tota constaret; idque usque ad Orpheum duravit, ut primus qui-*

dem et quartus diapason harmoniam (nervi) resonarent—ad imitationem mœnicæ mundanæ, quæ ex quatuor constat elementis.” While Manuel Bryennius in Harmonic. § i. p. 362, carries the invention still higher. For he says that “before the time of Mercury there was a four-stringed lyre, *κατὰ μίμνησιν τῆς τῶν στρογγύλων τετρακτῖδος*—where, be it remarked, *τετρακτῖδος* is used for *τετράδος*—but that Mercury, having joined two systems, formed a seven-stringed lyre;” where, as he says nothing of the other system, one may hazard a conjecture that he had heard of the tradition, mentioned by Diodorus Sic. i. 16, that the first lyre was with only three strings, to answer to the three seasons, called in Greece *ῥοαί*—

Be, however, the inventors of the four and seven-stringed lyres who they may, it is evident that the latter could not have been applied to any scientific purpose, until the three intermediate notes had been discovered requisite to make up the scale of seven notes; which were called respectively *ῥαποράτη*, near to, but under, the highest; *ὑπαρίστη*, near to, but above, the middle; and *ῥαπαράτη*, near to, but above, the lowest; thus making two semitones between the middle and highest. But instead of these semitones having the same ratio to their contiguous primary tones, Pythagoras discovered that they might be represented by a string divided into two unequal parts, bearing the ratio to each other of 243 to 256, (or of 3^5 to 4^4 .) And these seven names, invented originally for the seven strings of the lyre, were subsequently applied to the seven planets, when they were considered as giving what was called the music of the spheres.

By what means Pythagoras was enabled to arrive at the proportions, which two unequal semitones bear to each other, has not, as far as I know, been handed down. But he probably got at the fact by carrying out the experiments which led him to discover that, when a string is stretched so as to produce a certain sound, a string of the same thickness and twist, but of half that length, will give an octave higher; the third of that length, a fifth higher; and the eighth, the next note higher. So too if a string of a certain length gives a sound represented by a , the next note lower (b) will be represented by $a + \frac{1}{2}$, and (c) the next lower by $b + \frac{1}{2}$, and so on, except when the series is interrupted by one or more semitones, when instead of $\frac{1}{2}$ another quantity must be substituted, dependent on the ratio which 243 bears to 256.

With these preliminary observations we may turn to the Remarks of Batteux, who has drawn out the series of 36 terms and adjusted them to a musical scale—where the letters in Italics refer to the vocal gamut, and the Roman capitals to the instrumental—after prefacing the series with some observations, from which I will make such extracts as bear directly upon the matter in hand, and this with the greater willingness, as Batteux's little volume is not easily to be met with.

“By an harmonic proportion Timæus understands that of the numbers, which represent the concords in a musical scale. These were amongst the ancients only three. The octave, called diapason,¹ where the lowest note was to the highest as 4 to 2; the fifth, called diapente,² in the ratio of 3 to 2; and the fourth, called diatessaron,³ in the ratio of 4 to 3. To these were added, to complete the intervals of the concords, the single

^{1, 2, 3} The word *ῥαποράτη* is to be supplied after *διὰ πρῶτον*, and *διὰ πρῶτη*, and *διὰ τεσσαρῶν*.

notes, which are in the ratio of 9 to 8, and the semitones in that of 243 to 256.

"Now as the ancients identified the Soul of the world with its movement, the quantity of the movement became in their eyes the measure of the quantity of the Soul; and as the movement appeared to them to be the greatest at the circumference of the Universe, but nothing at the centre, the quantity of the Soul was considered to be the minimum at the centre, but the maximum at the circumference. Hence if the Soul were fixed, like a radius at one end, at the centre, it would, when turned along its whole length through all parts of the Universe, move with greater or less velocity, according as those were nearer to the circumference or centre.

"To understand then how the degrees of velocity were calculated, let us conceive this radius to be divided according to a musical scale; when such a division will represent the degrees, considered harmonically, of the Soul of the world.

"Let then 1 be assumed as the first term of the radius, fixed at the centre, or, to avoid fractions, that would otherwise occur in the calculations connected with the series following, let it be 384.¹ The second, which will be the distance of the next note, will be $384 + \frac{1}{2} = 432$. The third, $432 + \frac{1}{2} = 486$. The fourth, being a semitone, will be 512; for as 243 is to 256, so is 486 to 512. The eighth will be 768, the double of 384, or the first octave; and the 36th will be 114695, as shown by the table following:

<i>Mi</i>	...	E	...	384	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	432	
<i>Re</i>	...	D	...	432	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	486	
<i>Ut</i>	...	C	...	486	:	512	:	243	: 256
<i>Si</i>	...	B	...	512	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	576	
<i>La</i>	...	A	...	576	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	648	
<i>Sol</i>	...	G	...	648	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	729	
<i>Fa</i>	...	F	...	729	:	768	:	243	: 256
<i>Mi</i>	...	E	...	768	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	864	
<i>Re</i>	...	D	...	864	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	972	
<i>Ut</i>	...	C	...	972	:	1024	:	243	: 256
<i>Si</i>	...	B	...	1024	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	1152	
<i>La</i>	...	A	...	1152	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	1296	
<i>Sol</i>	...	G	...	1296	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	1458	
<i>Fa</i>	...	F	...	1458	:	1536	:	243	: 256
<i>Mi</i>	...	E	...	1536	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	1728	
<i>Re</i>	...	D	...	1728	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	1944	

¹ As this number is the product of $4 \times 8 \times 12$, which, taken by themselves, represent an arithmetical progression, whose common difference is 4, it was probably suggested by some circumstances connected with the properties of numbers, taken as the symbols of the phenomena of matter, which only a second Pythagoras would be able to unfold; and a similar observation is applicable to the fact that the ratio of 243 to 256 is that of 3^5 to 4^4 ; especially if we bear in mind what is stated by Plutarch, *De Anim. Procreat.* ii. p. 728, B., respecting Lucifer being represented by 243, and the Sun by 729.

<i>Ut</i>	...	C	...	1944	:	2048	::	243	:	256
<i>Si</i>	...	B	...	2048	+	139	=	2187 ¹		
<i>Si^b</i>	...	B ^b	...	2187	:	2304	::	243	:	256 ²
<i>La</i>	...	A	...	2304	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	2592		
<i>Sol</i>	...	G	...	2592	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	2916		
<i>Fa</i>	...	F	...	2916	:	3072	::	243	:	256
<i>Mi</i>	...	E	...	3072	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	3456		
<i>Re</i>	...	D	...	3456	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	3888		
<i>Ut</i>	...	C	...	3888	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	4374		
<i>Si^b</i>	...	B ^b	...	4374	:	4608	::	243	:	256
<i>La</i>	...	A	...	4608	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	5184		
<i>Sol</i>	...	G	...	5184	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	5832		
<i>Fa</i>	...	F	...	5832	:	6144	::	243	:	256
<i>Mi</i>	...	E	...	6144	+	417	=	6561		
<i>Mi^b</i>	...	E ^b	...	6561	:	6912 ³	::	243	:	256
<i>Re</i>	...	D	...	6912	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	7776		
<i>Ut</i>	...	C	...	7776	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	8748		
<i>Si^b</i>	...	B ^b	...	8748	:	9216	::	243	:	256
<i>La</i>	...	A	...	9216	+	$\frac{1}{2}$	=	10368		
<i>Sol</i>	...	G	...	10368	+	384	=	27		

Total' 114695

"That these 36 numbers are those which Timæus had in view, there can be but little doubt; since they fulfil all the conditions he has laid down. For we find there a progression of tones and semitones; of tones, which increase by adding to the number that precedes its eighth to make up the number that is to follow; and of semitones, by finding a number that is to follow, which shall bear to the preceding one the same ratio that 243 does to 256.

"It is requisite however to pay attention to the four numbers, 1944, 2048, 2187, and 2304, where the difference between the first and second is that of a semitone minor (104); and between the second and third of a semitone major (139); while these two semitones united make up 243, the difference between 2187 and 1944, or the equivalent of one tone. But between 2187 (*Si^b*) and 2304 (*La*) there is not more than a semitone minor, or the ratio of 243 to 256. And a similar arrangement in the four numbers, 5832, 6144, 6561, and 6912.

"But why were these terms fixed at 36? The reason is to be found in the mysteries of the school of Pythagoras, where it was thought proper

¹— On these two terms Batteux observes—"The difference between 1944 and 2187, is 243. Take away then 139, which the Greeks called an *apotomé*, from 243, there will remain 104, which they called a *lemme*. Now $1944 + 104 = 2048$; and $2048 + 139 = 2187$:" and why 243 is thus divided into 139 and 104, he has explained shortly afterwards.

²— Here again there is something arbitrary in this introduction of a semitone, marked by the same letters of the gamut as the tone itself.

³— Batteux's note is, " $5832 + (\text{the lemme}) 312 = 6144$, and $6144 + (\text{the } \textit{apotomé}) 417 = 6912$."

to multiply 384, the first assumed term, by 27. But why by 27? Because that number is the sum of the first numbers, which represent lines, surfaces, solids, squares, and cubes, added to unity. Thus, 1 is unity; 2 and 3, the first numbers representing lines; 4 and 9, the first surfaces, and both squares, the former of an even number (2), and the latter of an odd number (3); and lastly, 8 and 27, both representing solids and cubes, the former of an even number (2), and the latter of an odd number (3). Taking then the number 27 as the symbol of the world, and the numbers which it contains as the symbols of the elements and their combinations, it was only reasonable for the Soul of the world, which is the very basis of order and of the combinations, which constitute the world, to be composed of the same elements (of order) as the number 27 is itself."

THE
LIFE OF PLATO,
ACCORDING TO
DIOGENES LAERTIUS.

[1.] PLATO, an Athenian, was the son of Ariston and Perictioné, or Potoné,¹ who carried up her family to Solon. For Solon's brother was Dropides; whose son was Critias, the father of Calæschrus, whose children were Critias, one of the thirty,² and Glaucon, from whom were sprung Charmides and Perictioné, of whom and of Ariston Plato was the son, the sixth in descent from Solon, who carried up his genealogy to Neleus and Poseidon. They say that his father likewise carried his family up to Codrus, the son of Melanthus, who, according to Thrasyllus, were historically descended from Poseidon. [2.] But Speusippus, in his work entitled "Plato's Funeral Supper,"³ and Clearchus, in his "Praise of Plato," and Anaxilides, in the second book "About Philosophers,"

¹ Since the mother of Plato is not called elsewhere Potoné, it would seem, that the name of the daughter (in § 4) has been by some mistake attributed to the parent, contrary to the usual custom of Greece, where girls were never, I believe, called after their mothers, although they were, perhaps, after their grandmothers, just as boys were after their grandfathers. Hence for ἡ Πορώνης one might read *ἐκ* or *ἀπὸ* Πορώνης—

² By "the thirty" are meant "the thirty tyrants," as they were called, who were appointed by Lysander to be the Board of Directors at Athens, after the city had fallen into the power of the Lacedæmonians.

³ In lieu of *περὶ δειπνῶν*, I have adopted *περίδειπνον*, as recommended by Menage. For *περίδειπνον*, as we learn from Suidas, was a supper in honour of the dead, and one at which it was customary to speak an eulogy on the deceased. Now as Plato died at a marriage feast, according to the account given just afterwards, and alluded to in § 45, it is not difficult to see what was probably the subject of the *Περίδειπνον* written by Speusippus, the nephew of Plato.

state that there was a story at Athens, how that Ariston attempted to violate Perictioné, then in her prime, and not succeeding, beheld, on ceasing from his violence, a vision of Apollo, ¹ from which time he kept her undefiled by the rights of marriage until her delivery; ¹ when Plato, says Apollodorus, in his "Chronicles," was born in Ol. 88, on the seventh of Thargelion, (i. e. April,) the day on which the Delians say Apollo was born; and he died, as Hermippus states, while supping at a marriage feast, ² in the first year of Ol. 108, having lived 81 years. ³ [3.] But Neanthes says he died in his 84th year. He was therefore younger than Isocrates by 6 years; ⁴ who was born in the archonship of Lysimachus; but Plato in that of Ameinias, ⁵ during which Pericles died. He was of the ward of Colyttus, as Antileon states in the second book "On Chronology;" but according to some he was born at Ægina, in the house of Phidiades, the son of Thales, as Phavorinus says in his "Various History," through his father having been sent (thither), together with some others, as an allotment-holder, ⁶ but who returned to Athens, when those parties were driven out by the Lacedæmonians, who assisted the people of Ægina. He acted moreover as a Choregus, the means being furnished by Dion, ⁷ as Athenodorus

¹ The story, told here rather indistinctly by Diogenes, is given more clearly by Plutarch in Sympos. viii. 1, and the other authors quoted by Casaubon and Menage; from whom it appears, that Plato was said to have been the son of Apollo, and not of Aristo, who married Perictioné, not knowing that she was already pregnant by the god.

² But Cicero, de Senect. § 5, says that Plato died while in the act of writing. Here, instead of γάμος, Clinton in Fast. Hellenic. p. 139, = 149, ed. Krueger, would read γενεθλίου, "his birthday."

³ But Athenæus, in v. c. 18, says that Plato died in his 82nd year. The discrepancy in the account of Neanthes is owing, perhaps, to the error of Δ (4) for Α (1) found in the MS. of that author, which Diogenes made use of.

⁴ Meursius, De Archont. Athen. iii. 2, would read ζ (7) for ς (6), on the authority of Pseudo-Plutarch's Life of Isocrates.

⁵ Instead of "Ameinias," Salmasius proposed to read "Ameinon." The word in Diodorus is Epameinondas. But no Athenian, eligible for the Archonship, would have been called by a name with the Doric termination in "das," instead of the Attic in "des." Athenæus has Epameinon. In such a variety of readings, who, asks Menage, can detect the true one?

⁶ On the allotment-holders sent to Ægina, see Thucyd. ii. 27.

⁷ The same fact is mentioned by Plutarch likewise, in Dion. p. 964, F., quoted by Casaubon.

states in the eighth book of his "Peripatetics." [4.] He had two brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon, and a sister, Potoné, of whom Speusippus was the son. ¹ He received his boyhood's education¹ under Dionysius, of whom he makes mention in "The Rivals;" but became a gymnast under the wrestler Ariston of Argos; by whom he was called Plato on account of his fine habit of body, having borne previously the name of Aristocles after his grandfather,² as Alexander states in his "Successions;"³ but some (say) he was called so from the breadth of his interpretation,⁴ ⁵ or because he was of a broad face, as Neanthes asserts.⁵ There are also those who state that he wrestled at the Isthmus,⁶ as Dicaearchus does in his first book "On Lives;"⁷ [5.] and that he paid some attention to painting; and wrote poetry, at first dithyramba,⁸ and subsequently songs and tragedies; and they say⁹ he had a thin voice,¹⁰ as Timotheus of Athens states in his work "On Lives." It is said moreover that Socrates saw in a dream

¹ Such is the proper translation of *ἐκ παιδείης γράμματα*. For by *γράμματα*, literally "letters," was meant every thing that a boy was taught in his earliest years.

² As the name of Aristocles does not appear in the genealogy on the mother's side, the person alluded to was of course the father of Ariston.

³ By the word "Successions" are to be understood those that occurred in the different schools of philosophy.

⁴ Such is the literal version of *τὴν πλατύτητα τῆς ἑρμηνείας*, which Menage renders "orationis ubertatem." But such neither is, nor could be, the meaning of *ἑρμηνείας*. Diogenes probably wrote *εἰρωνείας*. For "irony" is the figure of speech constantly adopted by Socrates. Compare Sympos. p. 218, D. *μάλα εἰρωνικῶς*. Rep. i. p. 337, A., *ἡ εἰρωνία εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους*. And thus the expression *ἡ πλατύτης τῆς εἰρωνείας* may be compared with *πλατὺς γίλως*, which Herodian, at the end of Phrynichus, p. 471, ed. Lobeck, says is more elegant than *γίλως πολὺς*.

⁵ The words between the numerals ought to be placed after *μετανομάσθη* a little above—for thus the three different reasons, why Plato's name was changed from Aristocles, will be properly assigned to three different authorities.

⁶ Where the Isthmian games were celebrated.

⁷ Of these Lives by Dicaearchus, a fragment of one has come down to us, under the title of *Βίος Ἑλλάδος*—

⁸ Ælian, in V. H. ii. 30, says that Plato first wrote Heroic verses, not Dithyramba.

⁹ Instead of *φάσιν*, "they say," one would prefer *φύσιν*, "by nature." The two words are constantly confounded.

¹⁰ So Menage rightly understands *ισχνόφωνος*: although he did not see that in Hesych. *Ἰσχνόφωνος* *λεπτόφωνος*, *ἀπεχόμενος τὴν φωνήν*, the correct reading is *κατισχόμενος*—the explanation of *ισχνόφωνος*.

¹ that he was holding on his knees a cygnet, which became on the instant full-fledged and flew up, singing sweetly; ¹ and that the (next) day Plato ² was placed with him (as a pupil); ³ when he said, "This is the bird."³ He began his philosophical career in Academia; afterwards in the Garden near Colonus, as Alexander says in his "Successions," on the authority of Heracleitus. Subsequently, however, when about to engage in the contest with a tragedy, he did, after hearing Socrates, commit before the temple of Dionysus, ⁴ his poems to the flames, saying,

Come hither, Vulcan, Plato has need of thee.⁵

[6.] And from that period they say, being now twenty years old, he became a hearer of Socrates; and when the latter departed (from life),⁶ Plato attached himself to Cratylus, the follower of Heracleitus, and to Hermogenes, who adopted the philosophy of Parmenides. Afterwards, when he was 28 years old, as Hermodorus says, he retired to Megara with some other disciples of Socrates to Euclid. Subsequently he went to Cyréné to Theodorus the mathematician; and from thence to Italy to the Pythagoreans, Philolaus and Eurytus; and from thence to Egypt to the prophets;⁷ whither they say that Euripides⁸ also followed him, and falling sick there he was cured by the priests with the salt-water cure; from whence he said,⁹

The sea doth wash out all the ills of man.

[7.] And in truth, according to Homer,¹⁰ persons say that all

¹—¹ This story is told more fully by Apuleius, who says that the cygnet appeared to fly up from the altar of Love, that was in the Academia, before it settled in the bosom of Socrates.

²—² Such seems to be the meaning of αἰτῶ συσπῆναι.

³ The sense seems to require τὸν ἐν ὀνείρῳ ὄρνιν, "the bird in the dream;" where ἐν ὀνείρῳ might easily have dropped out between τὸν and ὄρνιν.

⁴ I have followed Menage in adopting Διονυσιακοῦ, found in MS. Par. and ed. Steph., in lieu of Ὀλυμπιακοῦ.

⁵ This is a parody of Hom. Il. E. 392, where Θέτις is the word in the place of Πάριον.

⁶ The Greek is merely ἀπελθόντος, by an euphemism, similar to that in Soph. Phil. 494, δίδου' ἐγὼ Μή μοι βεβήκοι, quoted by Casaubon.

⁷ These are called "priests" by Cicero, de Finib. v.

⁸ This, says Stanley, is an anachronism. For Euripides died before Socrates, after whose death Plato is here said to have visited Egypt.

⁹ In Iph. T. 1193.

¹⁰ Od. A. 230.

the Egyptians are physicians. Plato had determined moreover to mingle with the Magi; but on account of the wars then raging in Asia, he swerved from his purpose, and, returning to Athens, passed his time in Academia. Now this was a grove-like gymnasium in the suburbs, so called from a certain hero Academus, as Eupolis says in his "Non-campaigners,"

In the well-shaded courses¹ of the god,
(Call'd) Academus.

But Timon likewise, speaking against Plato, says—

The broadest² man led all; but with sweet voice
He talk'd, ³the picture of the tectix kind,³
That settling on the trees of Hecademus,
Their pleasant note pour forth—

for previously it was called, with an E, Hecademia. [8.] The philosopher was likewise a friend of Isocrates; and a disputation, that took place between them on the subject of poets, which occurred in the country, when Isocrates was a guest of Plato, Praxiphanes has put into writing. ⁴Aristoxenus moreover states that he served thrice in the army; once at Tanagra; a second time at Corinth; and the third time at Delium, where he obtained a prize for good conduct.⁴ In his discourses he has made a mixture of the doctrines of Heracleitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates. For as regards what are perceptible by a sense, he philosophized according to Heracleitus; in what are perceptible by the mind, according to Pythagoras; but in what relates to politics, according to Socrates. [9.] And some, amongst whom is Satyrus, assert

¹ In lieu of *δρόμοις*, Meursius in Exercitat. Critic. ii. 12, would read *δρόμοις*, answering to "silvas Academi" in Horace.

² Instead of *πλάτυστατος*, some MSS. read *πλατιστατος*, which seems to lead to *πλατύσκυτος*—where *κύτος* (body) would answer to *μῆκος* mentioned in § 4, or *τὸ στίγμα* in Hesych. Miles., similar to "latitudo pectoris" in Senec. Epist. 69.

³ Such seems to be the meaning of *τίρτιξιν ἰσόγραφος*—

⁴ In this account of Plato's serving in the army, it has been shown that either Aristoxenus has been guilty of anachronisms, or else that Diogenes has applied to Plato, what Aristoxenus had probably done to Socrates. For the first battle at Tanagra took place in Ol. 80, 4, seventeen years before Plato was born; that at Delium in Ol. 89, 1, when he was only four years old. He might indeed have been present at the battle near Corinth, if it be the one, to which there seems to be an allusion in Menexen. § 17, compared with Xenophon, Hell. iv. 2, and Demosth. in Leptin. § 41.

that he sent to Dion in Sicily to purchase¹ three Pythagorean treatises from Philolaus for 100 minæ. For they say he was in good circumstances, through having received from Dionysius above 80 talents, as Onestor states in his work entitled, "Whether shall the wise man engage in a money-making business?" To Epicharmus, the comic writer, he was much indebted, and had transcribed very many² things (from him), as Alcimus states in his treatises, which are four, addressed to Amyntas; where he says thus in the first—"Plato appears to have spoken³ much from the writings of Epicharmus. For let us look into the matter. Plato asserts⁴ that what is perceptible by a sense, is never permanent either as regards quality or quantity, but is ever in a state of flux and change."⁵ [10.]⁶ So that from which things should a person take away, these being neither equal, nor of a certain kind, nor possessing quantity nor quality:⁷ and these are they, of which there is a generation always, but never a substance; but that is perceptible by mind, from which nothing is taken away or added. Now this of things eternal the nature, which happens to be similar and the same for ever." And in fact Epicharmus has spoken very clearly about things perceptible by a sense and mind.

- A. Gods have ever present been, nor ever have they fail'd (to be);
 Similar too things present round us,⁸ and for ever through the same.
 B. Still before the gods 'tis said' that Chaos did exist the first.

¹ To this purchase Timon alludes in a tristich, preserved by A. Gellius, iii. 17, and thus translated partly by Stanley,

You Plato, with the love of learning caught,
 With a great sum a little treatise bought,
 Where all, that you have written, you were taught.

² So we may translate τὰ πλείονα, which generally means "the most;" unless it be said that the true reading is τὰ κάλλιστα—

³ In lieu of λέγων one would prefer λαβών, "to have taken—"

⁴ Compare Parmenid. § 13.

⁵ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which, I confess, I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Stanley, whose translation is, "as if we should subtract number from them, which are neither equal, nor certain, nor quantitative, nor qualitative."

⁶ By τὰδε is meant "the Universe." Compare Plato, Politic. p. 269, B., and Timæus, p. 41, A., τὸ πᾶν τόδε.

⁷ In Aristoph. Opv. 693, and Ovid Met. i. "Ante mare et tellus et, quod tegit omnia cœlum, Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe, Quem dixere Chaos."

A. How? It cannot be that aught should from what's nothing¹ come the first.

B. Nothing came by Zeus, the first; nor second (came) of things that here

We are talking of.

A. And, as they now are, they will aye remain.²

[11.]

A. Should a person³ to an even number⁴ wish to add an odd,
Or to take a sum in pebbles,⁵ that is ready to his hand,
Would the number wholly seem to you the same?⁶

B. To me not so.

A. Or if one to a cubit-measure⁷ wish'd another length to add,⁷
Or to cut off from the former, would the measure still remain?

B. Not so. A. Well then, cast your eyes thus on mankind; one shows increase;

And decrease one; all through all time are to changes subject found.

But that, which by nature changes never, in the same remains;
But will something different from its form⁸ already past become;
And both you and I now flourish different from yesterday;
And again, we by this reason different, not the same, (shall be).⁹

¹ By "nothing" is here meant "Chaos," in the language of Ovid, "rudis indigestaque moles."

² To get at the sense of this fragment, which has hitherto baffled preceding Scholars, it has been found requisite to change Πῶς δὲ ε' ἀμήχανόν γ' ἀπό τινος μηδὲν ὅττι πρᾶτον μόλοι into Πῶς; ἀμήχανόν γ' ἀπ' οὐδενός τι πρᾶτον ἦν μόλον: and Τῶν δὲ γ' ὧν ἄμμες νῦν ὧδε λέγομεν μίλλει τὰδ' εἶναι into Ὅν γε λέγομες ὥς δὲ νῦν, μίλλει τὰδ' αἰὲν ἱμῆναι. Hermann's reading, adopted by Huebner and Ahrens, De Dialect. p. 451, is, Πῶς δ'; ἀμάχανόν γ' ἀπό τινος εἰμεν, ὅτι πρᾶτον μόλοι, and Τῶν δὲ γ', ὧν ἄμμες νῦν ὧδε λέγομες, ἀλλὰ τὰδ' ἔχει, i. e. "How so? It is impossible for what has come first, to be from any thing;" and, "Of these, which we are now speaking of; but they are in this way."

³ The asterisks indicate the loss of something, as pointed out by the want of connexion in the ideas.

⁴ In the letters αὶ δὲ λῆς τὸν ἄρτιον, where λῆς is not only superfluous, but at variance with λῆ in the next verse, there seem to lie hid ὧδε γ' εἰς τιν' ἄρτιον: where τιν' is due to Hermann.

⁵ Such, I presume, is the meaning of ὑπάρχουσιν.

⁶ In the Greek letters, καὶ οὐ αὐτος, there seem to lie hid καὶ ποῦ αὐτος, as I have translated.

⁷ In lieu of καὶ τὸν, I have adopted Scaliger's splendid restoration παγεαίον, and rejected with Casaubon στερεὸν before ἔτερον: confirmed by MS. Monac. that omits στερεόν.

⁸ I have translated, as if the Greek were, not ε' αὐτὸ δὲ, in some MSS., nor ε' ἀπὸ δὲ, in others, but ε' ἀπ' εἶδους— Hermann's αὐτὸ δὲ, as, adopted by Huebner and Ahrens, I cannot understand.

⁹ Both the sense and metre prove that the author wrote something

[12.] Alcimus states likewise this too—The wise assert that the soul perceives some things through the body, when, as it were, ¹it hears (or) sees; ¹ but on other things it reflects through itself, and makes no use of the body. Hence of things existing, some are perceptible by sense, and some by mind. On which account Plato likewise has said that it is requisite for those, who are desirous of understanding the principles of the Universe, in the first place to preserve ideas separate by themselves, such as similitude, and unity, and multitude, and magnitude, and rest, and motion; and, secondly, beauty, and goodness, and justice, each taken abstractedly, and to lay down points like these, as the basis (of philosophy). [13.] Thirdly, to take a combined view of ideas, how they exist in relation to each other, such as ²science, or magnitude, or power, ³ while bearing in mind that ³what exist with us have, through sharing with them, the same name with them; ³ I mean, for instance, that things are just, inasmuch as they (share) in abstract justice; and things beautiful, inasmuch as they (share) in abstract beauty.⁴ Now one of every species is eternal, perceptible by the mind,⁵ and moreover insensible to suffering; and hence he asserts that ideas exist, like models in nature; and that the rest of things are assimilated to them, and exist as their resemblances.⁶ Now Epicharmus discourses about the good and ideas in this manner.

like Καὶ οὗτοι ἄλλοι, καὶ πολλοὶ αὐτοὶ μνείμεν καττὸν λόγον, where *μνείμεν* has been lost accidentally. Hermann and Meineke would insert *εὐλόγηται*. But a future is required.

¹— On the power of the soul to see, and hear, and speak, see my note on Hipp. Maj. § 38. With regard to the sense, *ἡ* has evidently dropt out between *ἀποφύγεσαν* and *βλέπουσαν*.

²— I confess I cannot understand what relation can be said to exist between each other in the case of science, magnitude, and dominion. Hence I suspect some words have been lost here; or else that Diogenes has carelessly made the extract from Alcimus; unless it be said that the relation intended is of one science, one magnitude, and one power with another science, magnitude, and power.

³— Here again I am at a loss in comprehending all between the numerals.

⁴ Had Alcimus read the Hippias Major, he would have seen that there is no such thing as beauty in the abstract, although Hippias pretended to prove the contrary.

⁵ I have adopted *νοητὸν*, the correction of Menage, in lieu of *νόημα*.

⁶ Stephens says he found some where *ομοιώματα*, instead of *ομοιώματα*, which is in three MSS., and *ομοιότητες* in MS. Cant.

[14.]

- A. Is piping then a thing? B. It is. A. Is man
A piping then? B. By no means. A. Come, then, say
What is a piper? What to you does he seem?
A man? or not? B. Assuredly a man.
- A. Seems not the case then to be thus about
The good? that of itself it is a thing;
And he, who learning knows it, good becomes;
Just as a piper, who has learnt to pipe,
Or to dance has a dancer learnt, or some
Weaver to weave, or what you will of trades
Like these, himself's the artist, not the art.

[15.] Now Plato, in the view he takes of ideas, says,¹ that "since there is recollection, ideas exist amongst the things that are, through the recollection being of something, that is in a quiet and permanent state. Now nothing is permanent but ideas. For in what manner, says he, would animals be preserved,² that have no connexion with ideas, and which, on this account, have received a mind from nature? and, moreover,³ they call to recollection their similitude and nourishment, of what kind it is for them, and they show why there is implanted in all animals the contemplation of similitude; from whence they perceive those of a similar kind. How then says Epicharmus?

[16.]

Wisdom, Eumæus,⁴ does not with one 'race
Alone exist.⁵ But all that live have mind.⁶
The female race of fowls,⁷ if to observe

¹ Since Plato, as remarked by Stanley, has no where stated, what Alcimus attributes to him, it is evident that he is merely giving here the substance of what he conceived to be the sentiments of Plato about ideas.

² Instead of "be preserved," the sequence of ideas seems to require "preserve any thing in memory;" in Greek, *διασώζω τὸ τι*, not *διασώζω*—

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were not *νῦν*, but *ἀμα*—

⁴ From this mention of the Homeric Eumæus Kruseman conceives the fragment to belong to some play, where Ulysses was the hero.

⁵—⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were *καθ' ἑν γένος Μόνον*, *ἀλλ' ὅσα πτερ*, not *καθ' ἑν μόνον* 'Αλλ' ὅσα πτερ—

⁷ As one MS. reads *πάντα γνῶμαν ἔχει*, it is evident that the author wrote *πάντα τὰν γνῶμαν ἔχει*, not *πάντα καὶ*— for the article cannot be dispensed with, and *καὶ* is unintelligible.

⁸ With this passage Scaliger aptly compares the fragment of the work of Ennius, called Epicharmus, preserved by Varro de Ling. Latin. iv., "Ova parere solet genu' pennis condecoratum Non animas;" and shortly afterwards, "Inde venit divinitu' pullis insinuans se Ipsa anima."

Attentively you are willing, brings not forth
Its young alive; but, sitting on its eggs,
Makes them a soul possess; and Nature knows
Alone how it gets wisdom, and is taught
'The best by her.'

And again—

It is no wonder that I speak these words,
And say that ²she to ³hee² are pleasing, and
Seem to be lovely born. For seems not² bitch
To dog most lovely? cow to bull? and ass
Female to male? and lovely sow to boar?⁴

[17.] And these or⁵ such like statement does Alcimus tack together through his four books, and ⁶stamp with the mark of spurious coin⁶ the assistance Plato had got from Epicharmus. Now that Epicharmus was not ignorant himself of his own wisdom, may be learnt from those verses in which he foretells the person, who would emulate him—

And I think—for clear to me this thought is⁷—that the memory
Still shall live of these my sayings; and that some one taking them
Shall the measures, which they now have, strip off all; and dressing give
Dyed with purple and hues many, and in language fine invest,
And, himself⁸ unconquered, show forth others conquered easily.

[18.] The book of Sophron likewise, the mime-writer, which had been neglected, Plato appears to have brought first to

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *παιδαίνουσι δ' ἀπὸς ἀνδρῶν ἑκαστὸν τὰς τέχνας*, not *παιδαίνουσι γὰρ αὐτὰς τὰς τέχνας*. Porson, in *Miscellan. Critic.* p. 277, suggests *αὐτὰς τὰς τέχνας*, i. e. *ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς*. But *παιδαίνουσι* is to be referred to *τὸ θῆλυ*, not to *φύσις*.

² From the following examples, where a female animal is said to be pleasing to a male one, it is evident that the author wrote here *ἀνδραῖσις ἀνδράς*—not *ἀνδραῖσιν αὐτοῦς*—which is perfectly unintelligible.

³ Since the article is omitted before *βοῦς*, *ὄνος*, and *ὄς*, so it ought to be before *κύων*. Hence I have translated, as if the word were *οὐ*—and the sentence taken interrogatively.

⁴ To complete the verse, we must insert *εἰμὲν* after *κάλλιστον*—

⁵ Instead of *ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα*, the correct phrase is *ταῦτα ἢ καὶ τοιαῦτα*—as I have shown in Porpo's *Prolegom.* p. 114.

⁶ Such is the exact meaning of *παρασημαίνων*.

⁷ I have translated, as if *δν*, required by the metre, had dropt out before *ἔμμι*. Hermann's suggestion, *δοξά γάρ δ' ὁ σαφὲς ἔμμι*, is adopted by Huebner. Clinton in *Fest. Hellen.* p. xxxvii. ed. 2, would read *δοξά γὰρ μὲν σάφ' ἔμμι τοῦθ', ὅτι*—

⁸ I have adopted *δ' αὐτὸς ἄλλους*, as suggested by Toup on Longin. § 34.

Athens, and to have modelled the manner ¹(of the speakers in his dialogues)¹ after them, which (were said) to have been found under his head. He thrice made a voyage to Sicily; the first time to see the island and the craters (of Ætna),² when the tyrant Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates, compelled him to form an acquaintance with himself. But he, after conversing on the subject of tyranny, and asserting that, what was advantageous to him (Dionysius) alone,³ was not the better thing, unless he excelled in virtue likewise, gave offence to Dionysius; who becoming enraged said (to Plato)—Thy language is that of an old (dotard); and Thine, replied the other, is that of a tyrant. [19.] From whence the tyrant, being much annoyed, was at first eager to destroy him; but, on being subsequently dissuaded by Dion and Aristomenes, he did no such thing; but handed him over to Pollis the Lacedæmonian—who had opportunely come upon an embassy—for the purpose of selling him; who, after carrying Plato to Ægina, was going to sell him; when Charmandrus, the son of Charmandrides, indicted Plato on a capital charge, according to a law laid down amongst the Æginetans,⁴ that the first Athenian, who should come upon the island, should perish without the form of a trial. Now it was Charmandrus himself who introduced the law, as Phavorinus states in his "Various History." But on some one saying, in mere joke, that the person, who had landed, was a philosopher, they let him go free; while some say that he was brought before the Ecclesia; and that, guarding himself against saying a word, he was ready to endure whatever might happen; and that they determined not to kill him, but to sell him⁵ after the manner of prisoners of war; [20.] when Anniceris of Cyrenæ, who was accidentally present, ransomed him for 20 minæ,—but some say for 30,—and sent him back to Athens to his friends; who immediately sent out the silver money, which Anniceris declined,

¹ The words between the numerals have been added for the sake of perspicuity.

² In *καὶ τῶν κρητῶν* lie hid either *καὶ τῶν καὶ κρητῶν*, or else *καὶ τῶν Αἰγναίων κρητῶν*—

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were *αὐτῷ μόνῳ*, not *αὐτῶ μόνον*—

⁴ As there is nothing to which *αὐτοῖς* can be directly referred, it is probable that Diogenes wrote *Αἰγινήταις*—

⁵ After *πᾶσι* I have omitted *ἀργύρας*, evidently unnecessary after *διγύσαν*.

remarking that "Not they alone were worthy to take care of Plato." But some say that Dion sent the money, which Plato did not accept, (for that purpose,) but to purchase a small garden for himself in Academia. And there is a story that Pollis was defeated by Chabrias, and subsequently¹ swallowed up by the sea at Helicé,¹ through the divine power being angry for his conduct towards the philosopher, as Phavorinus states in the first book of his "Memoirs." [21.] Dionysius did not however remain quiet; but, on learning (his escape), sent to Plato an order not to speak ill of him; who sent word in return, that his leisure was not such as to enable him to recollect even Dionysius. His second trip was to the younger Dionysius, to ask him for some land and persons, who were to live according to his notion of a polity. But Dionysius, although he made a promise to that effect, did not act up to it; and some say that Plato was imperilled, as having persuaded Dion and Theotas² to effect the freedom of the island; on which occasion the Pythagorean Archytas begged him off, by writing a letter to Dionysius, and sent him in safety to Athens. And this was the letter.

[22.] ARCHYTAS TO DIONYSIUS—HEALTH.

We all, the friends of Plato, have sent Lamescus and Photidas to receive the man, according to the agreement made by thyself; and³ thou wouldest do well³ in remembering that anxiety of thine, when thou didst entreat all of us touching the coming of Plato, and didst beg us to solicit him and to undertake all other matters, and those especially relating to his safety, while remaining and quitting again the port. Remember too how that thou didst set much store by his coming, and that thou didst from that time love him, as thou didst never any one of those near thee. But if any asperity has been produced, it is requisite to act with human feelings, and to restore to us the man unhurt. For by so acting thou wilt do what is just, and gratify us.

¹— This event took place probably when Helicé itself was swallowed up by the sea, as we learn from Strabo, and Steph. Byz. in 'Ελική.

² Instead of Θεώτας, Wesseling would read Θεόδοτον, referring to Epistol. 3, p. 318, C. and p. 348, and Plutarch in Dion. p. 963, A.

³— I have adopted αὐτοῖς, the suggestion of Emper, instead of αὐτοῖς: where, however, αὐτοῖς is due to Mange.

[23.] The third time he came, was to reconcile Dion to Dionysius; but not being successful, he returned to his country, having accomplished nothing. There he meddled not with state affairs, although he was, from what he wrote, a politician; and the reason was, that the people were already habituated to other forms of polity. And Pamphila states in the 25th book of her "Memoirs," that ¹the Arcadians and Thebans, when they were building Megalopolis, called upon him to be their law-giver; but on his learning that they were unwilling to have an equality, he did not go. [24.] (There is a report too) that he accompanied ¹Chabrias the general, when he was put on his trial on a capital charge, and not one of the citizens were willing to do so; and that when Crobylus, the informer, met him, as he was going up to the Acropolis in company with Chabrias, and said, "Are you come to act the pleader for another person, when you are not ignorant that the poison-cup of Socrates is waiting for you?"—he replied—"When I served in the army for my country's sake, I endured dangers; and now for duty's sake I will endure them for a friend."

He was the first who introduced reasoning by asking questions, as Phavorinus states in the eighth book of his "Various History;" and he expounded to Leodamas of Thasus the method of inquiry by analysis; and he first invented for the use of philosophy, the word "Antipodes,"² and "Element,"³ and "Dialectic," and "Poems,"⁴ and "the Oblong of Number,"⁵ and "the Superficial Plane of Boundaries,"⁶ and "the Provi-

¹—¹ Instead of *συνείπερο*, Valckenaer on Eurip. Diatrib. p. 289, suggests *συνίπει*, similar to the subsequent *συναγορεύων*— But see Clinton, Fast. Hellenic. p. 95, ed. 2.

² By this Plato meant, as we do now, the persons who live on the other side of the world, and whose feet are opposite to those who live on this.

³ The word *στοιχείον*, "element," says Stanley, "was confounded by all philosophers, since the time of Thales, with *ἀρχή*, "principle:" but Plato distinguishes *ἀρχή* from *στοιχεῖα*, by considering the former as that which has nothing, from which it might be generated; the latter, as that of things in the first state of being compounded.

⁴ In lieu of *ποίηματα*, Menage would read *ποιόγητα*. For he probably remembered the passage in Theætet. p. 182, A., τὸ δὲ ποιῶν ποῖόν τι δὲλλ' οὐ ποιόγητα.

⁵ Stanley says that by this expression Plato meant the product of a greater number multiplied by a less; and he refers to Theætet. p. 148, A.

⁶— So far was Plato from introducing the expression, *τὴν ἐπίπεδον*

dence of God." [25.] He was the first of the philosophers who opposed the reasoning of Lysias, the son of Cephalus, by exposing it in detail¹ in his Phædrus; and he first examined theoretically the power of the science of grammar. But, as he first spoke against nearly all before his time, it has been made a subject of inquiry, why he has never mentioned Democritus. On his going up to the Olympic games, Neanthes of Cyzicus says that all the Greeks turned their eyes towards him, when he had a meeting with Dion, then about to lead an army against Dionysius. And it is reported, in the first book of "The Memoirs" of Phavorinus, that Mithridates the Persian put up a statue of Plato in the Academy, with this inscription—

Mithridates, the son of Rhodobates, a Persian, has dedicated to the Muses an image of Plato, which Silanion executed.

[26.] Heracleides says, that when Plato was a young man he was so modest and orderly behaved, that he was never seen to laugh excessively; and though he was such a kind of person, he was scoffed at by the Comic writers. For instance, Theopompus in his "Autochares"² says thus—

³ For one is none,

And two, as Plato holds, is scarcely one;⁴

and Anaxandrides too in his "Theseus"—

When olives he devoured, 'that Plato loves';⁵

and Timon likewise, while thus playing on the letters (of his name)—

⁶ As Plato plait, in plaited⁷ wonders skill'd.

ἐπιφάνειαν, that, according to Proclus on Euclid ii., the word *ἐπιφάνεια* is not found in the sense of *ἐπιπιδον*, either in Plato or Aristotle. There is doubtless some error here, which I must leave for others to correct, by the aid of Suidas, *Ἐπιφάνεια ἰστί σῶματος πίρας ἢ τὸ μήκος καὶ πλάτος μόνον ἔχον, βάθος δὲ οὐ*, transcribed from Diogen. L. vii. 135.

¹ Such is the meaning of *κατὰ λέξιν*, literally, "word for word."

² Casaubon would read *Ἐδυχάρει* in lieu of *Ἀβρυχάρει*—

³ This is Stanley's version.

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἓς γ' ἐρᾷ Πλάτων*, not *ὅσπερ Πλάτων*, at variance with the metre; which Hermann supported by reading *ὅσπερ καὶ Πλάτων*.

⁵ The Greek is *ὣς ἀνέκλαττε Πλάτων, πεπλασμίνα θαύματα εἰδώς*: where however one would prefer *πλατύσημα τὰ θαύματα*— to preserve

[27.] Alexis in "Meropis"—

Thou'rt come in time ; since I, in doubtings tost,
Am walking up and down, and, Plato-like,
Find nought that's wise, but merely tire my feet ;

and in "Ancyliion"—

A. Thou speak'st of what 'thou knowest not one jot.

B. Mind has with Plato been a-running.

A. Know'st thou,¹
What is a pound, and 'onions what ?

B. Not I.²

Amphis in "Amphicrates"—

A. What is the good, which you are about to have
Through her, I know still less than does my master,
Of the good in Plato.

B. Ear then give.

[28.] And in Dexidemides—

Oh Plato ! how thou nothing know'st, except
To wear a scowling look, and eyebrows raise,
Like one who's bilious,³ with a solemn air.

Cratinus in "Pseud-Hypobolimaëus"—

A. Thou art a man, 'tis plain, and hast a soul.

B. By Plato's doctrine, I know not ; but⁴ I
Conceive, at least, I have.

the alliteration : and for the same reason I have translated *πλαττειν*, "to plait," instead of "to mould."

¹—¹ The Greek is, *ὅσθα συγγενὲς τρέχων Πλάτωνι καὶ γινώσκει*—out of which as it is impossible to extricate a particle of sense, I have translated, as if it were *ὅσθα σύ γ' ἐν Νοῦς ἰὸ ἔτρεχεν Πλάτωνι γ' ἢ γνοῖς εἰ*—where *ἰὸ ἔτρεχεν Πλάτωνι* may be compared with *ἰσα βαίνων Πυθολέει*, and the other passages quoted by Harpocration in *ἰσα βαίνων*, to which Meineke has referred. My *νοῦς* is partially supported by *συγγενοῦς* in Hesych. Miles. The slave, who was speaking, professed to be a Platonist.

²—² I have translated, as if the Greek were, not *κρόμμων*, but *κρόμμυ'*. *ὄς* for it seems hardly likely that onions would be spoken of in the singular number.

³ How a cockle or a periwinkle, for such is *κοχλίας*, could be said to raise its eyebrows, I must leave for others to understand. It is above my comprehension. Hence from these letters I have elicited *χολικὸς*—for a person suffering from the pain of a bilious attack would naturally lift up his eyebrows.

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὁδ', ἀλλ' ὑπονοῶ γ' ἔχειν*—not *ὁδ', ὑπονοῶ δ' ἔχειν*—contrary to the metre, where Hermann would read *ὁδ', ὑπονοῶ δ' ὥδ' ἔχειν*.

Alexis in "Olympiodorus"—

A. My mortal body has become quite dry;
The immortal portion has been lifted up¹
To the air.

B. This is not from the school of Plato.

And in "The Parasite"—

Or to hold idle talk with Plato staid'st thou?²

And Anaxilas likewise makes him his butt in "Botrylion," and "Circé," and "The wealthy women."

[29.] Aristippus too, in his fourth book "On Ancient Luxury," says that he became enamoured of a certain youth, Aster, while studying with him astronomy, and likewise of the before-mentioned Dion; and, some say, of Phædrus too; and that these epigrams, which are from his hands upon them, plainly prove his love.

³The stars, my Star, thou see'st. I heaven would be,
That I with many eyes might gaze on thee.³

And another—

⁴Like morning star, when living thou wast bright;
Now dead, thou art of eve's pale star the light.⁴

[30.] But on Dion in this manner—

For Hecuba and Troy's matrons tears has Fate
Woven, well suited to their hapless⁵ state;
But for thee, Dion, who hadst won the wreath
Of victory by brilliant deeds, the breath

¹ In lieu of ἔξωτε, the sense evidently requires ἔξωπρο, as I have translated. C. F. Hermann, as I learn from Huebner, would read ἔξωτε—

² For the sake of what seems to be the sense, I have translated, as if the Greek were not *καρμώνας*, but *καρίμνεας*.

³—³ This is Stanley's version, slightly altered.

⁴—⁴ Stanley's version is—

A Phosphor 'mongst the living late wert thou;
But shin'st among the dead a Hesper now—

which is rather closer to the original, literally—"Formerly thou didst shine amongst the living, the star in the east; but now, when dead, thou shinest an Hesperus amongst the dead."

It has been thus translated by Shelley;

Thou wert the morning star among the living,
Ere thy fair light had fled;
Now, having died, thou art as Hesperus, giving
New splendour to the dead.

⁵ I have adopted here the emendation *δύσφορμα* for *δύσφορα*, which I proposed in "The Greek Anthology, Prose and Verse," p. 443.

Of dæmons has blown down hopes built in air,¹

²And all that seem'd for Sicily good and fair;³

³Thou liest by people honour'd in the grave;³

For whom my heart did erst love-madden'd rave.

And this they say was inscribed on Dion's tomb at Syracuse.
[31.] They say moreover that, being enamoured of Alexis and Phædrus, as stated above, he acted the poet in this manner—

Alexis, now how great, was then⁴ how small!

I merely said—he's pretty; when by all

⁵The boy was stared at; all to him their feet

Turn'd. Why to dogs didst thou, Soul, show their meat?⁶

For this thou'lt sorrow feel.⁷ Bird-like⁸ e'en so

Did I not lose my Phædrus long ago?

He kept likewise Archæanassa, on whom he made these words—

From Colophon Archæanassa came;

She's mine; and on her wrinkles sits Love's power.

Unhappy ye had run through what a flame!

Who met her⁹ blooming in youth's bursting flower.⁹

¹ Here too I have translated my own ἀερίας ἐλπίδας, in lieu of εὐρείας ἐλπίδας.

²—³ This verse has been introduced, not so much for the rhyme, as to point out the native country of Dion.

³—⁴ The original is literally—"Thou liest in thy extensive country, honoured by citizens;" where the expression εὐρυχώρῳ is strangely applied to the country round Syracuse, which, as being hilly, is rather contracted than extensive.

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were Νῦν, τότε μὲν, Ἀλεξίς ὅσον μόνον—not Νῦν, ὅτε μὲν Ἀλεξίς ὅσον μόνον—which is perfectly unintelligible, although Apuleius has thus attempted to translate it—"Dixerit hic tantum, cum nil nisi pulcher Alexis Exstitit"—not aware that ἀφ' is the first person, εἶπα, not the third, εἶπε—

⁵ The Greek is at present ὅπται, καὶ πάντῃ πᾶς τις—It was originally ὅπται παῖς πάντῃ πᾶς τις—as I have translated. For though πάντῃ πᾶς would be perfectly correct, yet in that case τις would not be added; at least it is not so elsewhere.

⁶ Literally "bone."

⁷ I have adopted Stephens' ἀνήσει (2nd pers. fut. med.) in lieu of ἀνήσει (3rd pers. fut. act.).

⁸ In lieu of ὕστερον I have translated, as if the Greek were ὥς πτερόν—remembering the expression ὥσι πτερόν in Homer, descriptive of a rapid flight.

⁹—⁹ Such is the meaning given by Jacobs to πρωτοβόλου, which he has suggested in lieu of πρωτοπλόου. Stanley's version is—

To Archæ'nassa, on whose furrow'd brow
Love sits in triumph, I my service vow:

[32.] And these on Agathon—

While kissing Agathon, my soul
 I felt upon my lip;
 For there it hapless came, I ween,
 To take its final trip.¹

And another²—

I pelt thee with an apple; if a love
 Thou feel'st, accept the gift, my fair:
 And in return—³ that I the truth may prove—⁴
 Grant of thy virgin charms a share.
 But if thou think'st, what ne'er may be, (of wrong,)
 This counsel take (by lover told):
 Thy youthful years consider well; not long
 They'll last; and soon thou wilt be old.
 I am the apple, that a lover throws;
 'Consent, ere on us both age sends its snows.'⁵

[33.] They say too that the epigram on the Eretrians, who were caught in a net, is his—

'We are of the race of Eretria in Eubœa; but near Susa
 We are lying. Alas! how far from our own land.'⁶

If her declining graces shine so bright,
 What flames felt you, who saw her noon of light!

¹ This epigram has been thus translated by Shelley—

Kissing Helena, together
 With my kiss, my soul beside it
 Came to my lips, and there I kept it,—
 For the poor thing had wandered thither,
 To follow where the kiss should guide it:
 O, cruel I, to intercept it!

² Before *ἄλλο* has evidently dropt out *εἰς καλὴν*, or the name of some female; for to such only would the following epigram be addressed, as shown by Virgil's—"Malo me Galatœa petit, lasciva puella."

³— For the words between the numerals there is no warrant in the original.

⁴— Literally—"Nod kindly, Xanthippé; I and thou are decaying." Stanley's version is—

An apple I, Love's emblem, at thee throw;
 Thou in exchange thy virgin zone bestow.
 If thou refuse my suit, yet read in this,
 How short thy years; how frail thy beauty is.
 I cast the apple; loving, who loves thee,
 Xanthippé, yield. For soon both old will be.

⁵— Stanley's translation is—

We, in Eubœa born, Eretrians are
 Buried in Susa, from our country far.

And that one—

¹The Cyprian (goddess said) to the Muses, "Damsels, Venus Honour, or I will arm Love against you."

The Muses (replied) to Venus, "These mouthings are for Mars: That little boy flies not to us."¹

And another—

²A man, on finding gold, left a rope; but he the gold,
Who had left it, not finding, tied (to himself) the rope he found.²

[34.] But Molon,³ who had a feeling of enmity against Plato, observed, that "It was not a wonderful thing for Dionysius to be in Corinth, but for Plato to be in Sicily."⁴ Xenophon, too, appears to have been not kindly disposed towards him; for, as if through a love of contention, the two wrote a Symposium, an Apology for Socrates, and Memoirs relating to ethical subjects: further, one wrote a polity, and the other,

With regard to the fact of their being caught in a net, the story is told by Herodotus, vi. 101, and alluded to by Plato in Menex. § 10.

¹— Stanley's version is—

"Virgins," said Venus to the Muses, "pay
Homage to us, or Love shall wound your hearts."
The Muses answer'd—"Take those toys away;
Our breasts are proof against his childish darts."

Another translation will be found in the "Greek Anthology, Prose and Verse," p. 2.

²— Stanley's translation of this Epigram, where the terseness of the original defies a modern metrical version, is not the worst attempt that has been hitherto made—

One, finding gold, in change his halter quits;
Missing the gold, t'other the halter knits.

Shelley has translated it thus—

A man, who was about to hang himself,
Finding a purse, then threw away his rope;
The owner coming to reclaim his pelf,
The halter found and used it. So is Hope
Changed for Despair—one laid upon the shelf,
We take the other. Under heaven's high cope
Fortune is god. All you endure and do
Depend on circumstance as much as you.

³ Instead of ἀλλὰ τοι Μολων, MS. Cantab. offers ἀλλὰ Τιμολίων, correctly, it would seem; for τοι never, I believe, thus follows τοι.

⁴ To understand this remark, it should be borne in mind that Dionysius, after being the tyrant of Syracuse, turned schoolmaster at Corinth, where he could practise the virtues he had been taught by the philosophers, whom he had attracted to his court; whereas Plato would stand a chance of forgetting there all the lessons of virtue he had inculcated upon others.

the education of Cyrus; while Plato in the "Laws" asserts that the education of Cyrus was a fiction; for he was not such a kind of person; and though both make mention of Socrates, neither of them do so of each other, except Xenophon of Plato in the 3rd book of his "Memoirs." [35.] It is reported likewise that Antisthenes, being about to read something he had written, invited Plato to be present; and on Plato asking what he was about to read, he said—¹ On the being to not contradict; ¹ when on Plato saying—How then are you writing on this very subject?—and on his showing that Antisthenes was turning round on himself, ² the latter wrote a dialogue against Plato with the title of "Sathon;" from whence they continued through life estranged from each other. They say, too, that Socrates, on hearing Plato read his *Lysis*, remarked—How many falsehoods, by Hercules, has this young man told against me! For the man had written not a little that Socrates had never said. [36.] Against Aristippus likewise Plato had a feeling of hatred. At least in his dialogue "On the Soul," he slanders Aristippus, by saying that he was not present at the death of Socrates, but absent in Ægina, although it was close at hand. ³ He had likewise a feeling of rivalry towards Æschines; and they say that, ⁴ although he was himself in good repute with Dionysius, yet, that Æschines, who had come (to Syracuse) on account of his poverty, was looked down upon by Plato, ⁴ but was taken under his protection by Aristippus; and Idomeneus asserts that the reasons which Plato assigns to Crito, while consulting (with Socrates) in person about his flight, were those given by Æschines; but that Plato assigned them to Crito through his ill-feeling towards the other party.

[37.] Of himself Plato has no where in his writing made any mention, except in the dialogue "On the Soul," and in the "Apology." Of his dialogues Aristotle says that their

¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγων*: where we must read *περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἴσθαι ἀντιλέγειν*, "about not permitting a person to contradict," for *εἶναι* and *ἴσθαι* are elsewhere interchanged, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 120.

² Such, I presume, is the proper meaning here of *περιτρέψας*.

³ I have translated, as if *οὐσιν* had dropt out after *συνεγγός*—

⁴ I have adopted the emendation, suggested by Wyttenbach on Plutarch Moral. p. 504, ed Ox. = i. p. 407, Lips., who reads *καὶ τὸν* for *ὁν* before *ἰθακίαν*.

style¹ is between poetry and prose; while Phavorinus states some where, that Aristotle alone remained, when Plato was reading his dialogue "On the Soul;" whereas all the others rose up (and departed). And some affirm that Philip of Opuntium transcribed his "Laws," when still on the wax-tablet; and they say that to Philip belongs the *Epinomis*. Moreover, Euphorion and Panætius have stated that the commencement of "The Republic" was found to have been frequently turned about,² nearly the whole of which, says Aristoxenus, had been written in "The Opposite Reasonings"³ of Protagoras; [38.] and that the first dialogue he wrote was the *Phædrus*; for the question mooted there has something of a juvenile character; while Dicæarchus blames the whole manner of writing as being rather gross.⁴

Plato, when he saw a person playing at dice, is reported to have found fault with him; and on the party saying "It was for a trifle," he replied, "But the habit is not a trifle."

On being asked whether any thing of his would be, like those of former men, kept in recollection? he replied, "There is need of a name first; and then there will be many."

On Xenocrates once coming into his house, Plato told him to whip his slave; for he himself was not able, through being in a passion: and to one of his slaves he said, "You would have been flogged, had I not been in a passion."

[39.] After sitting upon horse-back, he got down immediately, observing that he was careful not to be convicted of horse-pride.⁵

To drunkards he recommended to look into a mirror; for they would abstain from conduct so unbecoming: and he said (in the *Laws*, vi. p. 775, B.) it was not proper to drink to

¹ So I have translated *ἰδίαν*, without any regard to the philosophical meaning attached to that word; which Hermogenes has used in a similar sense in his Criticisms on Demosthenes.

² The metaphor in *τορραμίνην* will be best understood by Horace's "*Sæpe stylum vertas*."

³ Of these "Opposite Reasonings" of Protagoras, some idea may be formed by a perusal of the Pseudo-Platonic Demodocus.

⁴ Such is the proper meaning of *φορτικός*. For Dicæarchus, doubtless, saw through the real meaning of that dialogue, of which the Neo-Platonists, judging from Hermias' Commentary, had not the most distant idea.

⁵ In the word *ἵππορασις* there is a play on *ἵππος*, which, in composition, means "great as a horse." So in English we say, "horse-radish," and "horse-mackerel."

intoxication, except during the festival of the god, who gave wine (to man).

To sleep much was displeasing to him. At least he observes in the "Laws," (vii. p. 808, B.,) that "a person sleeping is worth nothing."

[40.] On the subject of truth he speaks thus in the "Laws," (ii. p. 663, E.,) "A beautiful thing, and enduring, O stranger, is truth: but it seems to be not easy to persuade (persons of this)."

Moreover he thought himself worthy of some memorial being left of him either by his friends or in (his own) books.¹

He went from place to place for the most part by himself;² as some say.

He died in the manner we have mentioned above, in the thirteenth year of the reign of Philip (of Macedon), as Phavorinus states in the third book of his "Memoirs;" and from him (Philip), says Theopompus, he met with some reproof.³

Myronianus remarks in his "Similar," that Philo makes mention of the lice of Plato, as if he had died in that way.⁴

[41.] He was buried in⁵ Academia, where he had passed the greatest part of his life as a philosopher: from whence his sect was called "The Academiaick;" and his funeral was attended by the people there in a body, after he had made his will in this manner:—"Plato has left this property and (thus) disposed of it, (to wit,) the plot of ground in the ward of Hephæstia, on which the road, that leads from the temple in Cephisia, borders on the north side, and on the south the temple of Hercules in Hephæstia, and on the east is Archestratus, the Phrearrian, and on the west Philip, the Chollidean; and let it be lawful for no one to sell it, or to exchange it;

¹ I have inserted "his own." For the remark seems to have been an answer to some person, who probably found fault with Plato for making mention of himself in the "Phædo" and "Apology."

² I confess I cannot understand what αὐτὸς means here. Perhaps in καὶ αὐτὸς lies hid ἀελητος, "uninvited—"

³ It is to be regretted that Theopompus did not state, or that Diogenes did not transcribe more fully from Theopompus, what and for what was the reproof alluded to.

⁴ The subject of "The Similar" of Myronianus may be guessed at by knowing that Pherecydes and others mentioned by Plutarch and Heladius, quoted by Menage, died of the "morbus pediculosus."

⁵ Not "in," but "near," says Menage on the authority of Pausanias, Ἀκαδημίας οὐ πόρῳ Πλάτωνος μνημῆϊ ἴσιν.

but let it be, as far as is possible,¹ the property of the boy Adeimantus. [42.] Likewise the plot of ground in the parish of Eroiada², which I purchased from Callimachus, whose neighbour on the north side is Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian, and on the south side Demostratus of Xypeté,³ on the east Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian, on the west the (river) Cephus. (Likewise) 3 minæ; a silver phial weighing 165 drachms; a boat-(like vessel⁴) weighing 45 (drachms); a gold finger-ring, a gold ear-ring, both together weighing 4 drachms and 3 oboli. Euclides the stone-cutter owes me 3 minæ. I give Artemis⁵ her freedom. I leave behind me as domestics, Tycon, Bictas,⁶ Apolloniades, Dionysius; [43.] the utensils written down, of which Demetrius has the counterpart writings;⁷ and I am in debt to nobody. The executors are

¹ The same formula, to which Casaubon once objected, is found, he says, in the will of Epicurus, and answers to the Latin "quacunq; ratione" in Digest. de Legatis iii.

² I have adopted Ἐροιάδων and Ζυρτιάων, in lieu of Ἐροιάδων and Ζυρτιάων, as suggested by Casaubon: who refers to Steph. Byz. in Ἐροιάδων and Ζυρτίαν.

³ In lieu of κύβειον we must read κύβιον, as shown by Harpocration in Κύβιον, so called from its similarity in shape to a boat, just as we speak of a "butter-boat."

⁴ This seems a strange name for a female slave; and so is Dionysius for a male one.

⁵ In lieu of Βίτραν, Menage would read Βίτιαν, referring to Suidas, Βίτιας ὄνομα κύριον: or rather Βίριαν, remembering in Virgil, *Æn.* i. 742, "Tum Bitis dedit increpitans;" where Servius says that Bitias was a Carthaginian name, as shown by Livy, who mentions a Bitias as a commander of the Punic fleet. It was likewise a Trojan name, says Menage, as shown by *Æn.* ix. 672, "Pandarus et Bitias Idæo Alcanore creti." But Βίτρας, I suspect, is the Latin "Vict-as." For B in Greek supplies the place of V in Latin, as shown by Φαβρωπίτης and "Phavorinus." And if this be a correct notion, the will would be a forgery, as Stanley seems to have suspected. For he remarks that "if this will be not forged," the assertion of Apuleius is false; who states in his treatise *De Dogmat. Platon.*, "that the patrimony Plato left was a little orchard, adjoining the Academy, two servants, and a cup, wherein he supplicated to the gods, of gold no more than he wore, as an ear-ring, when he was a boy, the emblem of his nativity." The word in the early Latin translation by Ambrosius is "hycam." From which it is evident that he found in his MS. *visrav*—where *v* is an error for *u* (i. e. *β*). See my note on *Æsch. Eum.* 115, in Addend.

⁷ By ἀντιγραφα, Stanley understands "inventory." The word means rather "the counterpart copies" of a will, as shown by Casaubon and Salmasius, quoted by Menage on Diogen. L. v. 57.

Sosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Calimachus, Thrasippus." In this manner did he dispose of his property. And upon him these epigrams were written. The first is—

In temperance and morals just who shone
All men beyond, Aristocles here lies.
If Wisdom ever praise from all has won,
He has won most; and from him Envy flies.

[44.] And another—

Earth in her bosom Plato's body hides;
His soul to the ranks of blest immortals strays:
To Ariston's son the good man, who abides
Far off, for a godlike life¹ due honour pays.

And another of a more recent date—

Why, eagle, hast thou come over a tomb? and of whom is it, say?
And (why) art thou looking to the starry dwelling of the gods?
Of the soul of Plato, that has flown to Olympus,
I am the image; but his earth-born body the land² of Attica holds.³

[45.] And there is my own to this effect—

'Had not Apollo, to the Grecians kind,
To Plato's wit his godlike art resign'd,
Where had we found a cure for human souls?
For as Asclepius by his skill controls

¹ Literally, "on beholding a godlike life."

² Instead of δὲ τοῦ, Jacobs suggests δὲ γῆ— to which δὲ γῆ in MS. Cant. evidently leads.

³ Of this epigram there is a metrical translation by T. P. R. in the "Greek Anthology, Prose and Verse," p. 27, to which may be added my own—

A. Why, eagle, comest thou o'er this spot? Declare
Whose tomb is here? Why on the starry throne
Of the gods look'st thou? B. To the upper air
The soul of Plato, like a bird, has flown,
Of which I am the image; the remains
Of earth-born body Attic soil retains.

It has also been translated by Shelley—

Eagle! why soarest thou above that tomb?
To what sublime and starry-paved home
Floatest thou?
I am the image of swift Plato's spirit,
Ascending heaven—Athena doth inherit
His corpse below.

⁴— This translation has been slightly altered from the one by Smith in "The Lives and Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers, from Diogenes Laërtius."

The various pains the body's forced to feel,
So Plato's words the pains of mind can heal.⁴

And another, as to how he died—

Asclepius and Plato Phœbus gave
To man; that one the body's health might save,
The soul's the other. But when down, to grace
A marriage, came the god, and deign'd to trace
The city, that for him had Plato made,
¹ Him off he bore,¹ and in Jove's foot-path placed.

Such are the epigrams.

[46.] His disciples were, Speusippus of Athens, Xenocrates of Chalcedon, Aristotle of Stageira, Philip of Opuntium, Hestæus of Perinthus, Dion of Syracuse, Amyclus² of Heraclea, Erastus and Coriscus of Scepsus, ³Timolaus of Cyzicum, Euæon³ of Lampsacus, Bithon⁴ and Heracleides of Ænus, Hippothales and Callippus of Athens, Demetrius of Amphipolis, Heracleides of Pontus, and many others; together with whom were two women, Lasthenéa of Mantinéa and Axiothea the Phliasian, who, as Dicæarchus says, put on male attire.⁵ And some say that Theophrastus was one of his auditors, and Hyperides, the orator; and Lycurgus, too, says Chamæleon; and Demosthenes in like manner, as Polemon has handed down; ⁶what Sabinus too asserts, bringing forward as his authority⁶ Mnesistratus of Thasus, in the fourth book of his "Wood of Meditations;" and the thing is likely.

[47.] Now for thee,⁷ who art justly fond of Plato, and

¹—¹ The words between the numerals are not in the Greek.

² *Ælian*, in *Var. Hist.* iii. 19, has Ἀμύκλας, which *Menage* says is more correct. For -ας is the Doric termination, which would be adopted in Heraclea, a city said to have been colonized by the people of Megara and Tanagra.

³—³ Instead of Τιμόλαος, *Athenæus* has Τίμαιος, in xii. p. 509, A.; and in p. 508, F., Εὐάγων instead of Εὐαίων, as remarked by the critics here.

⁴ The name, says *Casaubon*, is Πύθων in *Demosthenes*, *Aristocrat* p. 659, 27, R., and *Plutarch* ii. p. 1126, C., to whom *Menage* adds, *Philostatus*, V. A. vii. 1; but in *Aristot. Polit.* v. 10, Πάρων, where *Victorius* would read Πύθων. The two brothers were crowned with golden crowns for the good service they had done Athens by destroying Cotys, the tyrant of Thrace.

⁵ Axiothea was therefore the strong-minded Bloomer of her day.

⁶—⁶ I have adopted *Casaubon's* correction, ὁ Σαβίνος λίγου κατὰ— in lieu of Σαβίνος λίγου καί—

⁷ *Reinesius*, in *Var. Lect.* ii. 12, with whom *Menage* agrees, conceives

seekest at the hands of any one soever very zealously the settled opinions of the philosopher, I deem it necessary to delineate both the nature of his reasonings and the order of his dialogues, and the road of his instruction,¹ in a manner, as far as is possible, elementary and reduced to heads, in order that the account of his life may not be without a share of that relating to his settled opinions; for it would be, as they say, ²bringing an owl to Athens,³ should it be required to narrate them to thee according to each species.

[48.] They say then that Zeno of Elea first wrote dialogues. But Aristotle, in the first book "About Poets," says it was Alexamenus a Styrian, or Teian, as Phavorinus asserts in his "Memoirs." But it appears to me that Plato would, by having bestowed great care on that kind of writing, justly carry off the first prize, as well for beauty as invention likewise.

Now a dialogue is a conversation, composed of question and answer, upon some of the subjects relating to philosophy or polity, with a becoming representation of the manners of the persons introduced, and ³the dressing of their diction.³ But the dialogue-art is that of a conversation, by which 'we arrange or re-arrange'⁴ a subject, according to the questions and answers of the parties conversing. [49.] Now of the Platonic dialogues⁵ there are two kinds marked of old;⁶ the expositive and the inquisitive: and these are divided, the expositive into two other marked kinds, the theoretical and practical; of which the theoretical belongs to the physical and logical;

that the female here alluded to was the Arria mentioned by Pseudo-Galen de Theriac. ad Pison, § 2.

¹ Casaubon, unable to understand *επαγωγῆς*, proposed to read *ἀγωγῆς*. I have translated, as if the Greek were *παυδαγωγίας*—

² As owls seem to have been plentiful at Athens, being sacred to the tutelary deity, the proverb may be compared with the corresponding one in English, "To carry coals to Newcastle."

³ This is perhaps the best translation of *τῆς κατὰ λῆξιν κατασκευῆς*: for the words *σκευῆ* and *κατασκευῆ* were technically used to express, what we mean by dressing a character for the stage.

⁴ The Greek is *ἀνασκευάζομιν τι ἢ κατασκευάζομεν*, with an *ὑπερ-ρον πρότερον*, which I have avoided in the version.

⁵ Since two MSS. read *τοῦ δὲ λόγου* in lieu of *τοῦ δὲ λόγου*, Huebner correctly suggested *τοῦ δὲ διαλόγου*— what I have adopted.

⁶ As *οὐ* is found before *πρῶτοι* just afterwards, so it should be here before *ἀνωτάτοι*— to preserve at once the syntax and sense.

but the practical to the ethical and political. And of the inquisitive there are likewise two principal marked kinds; one is 'after the manner of a fight (with gloves), and the other after that (with fists);¹ and to the former belongs that which is maieutic² and tentative; but to the latter that which is detective³ and eversive.

[50.] It does not however lie hid from us, that some assert that dialogues differ in another manner. For they say that some are dramatic, and some of a narrative, and others of a mixed kind. But such persons have designated the difference in dialogues by a name rather after the manner of tragic writers, than of philosophers.

Now of the physical kind there is the Timæus; of the logical, the Statesman, and Cratylus, and Parmenides, and the Sophist. But of the moral, the Apology, and Crito, and Phædo, and Phædrus, and the Banquet, and Menexenus, and Clitophon, and the Letters,⁴ and Philebus, Hipparchus, (and) the Rivals. But of the political, the Republic and Laws, and Minos and the Epinomis, and the Atlantic.⁵ [51.] Of the maieutic, the two Alcibiades, Theages, Lysis, (and) Laches; of the tentative, Euthyphron, Meno, Ion, Charmides, (and) Theætetus; of the detective one,⁶ the Protagoras; and of the eversive, the Euthydemus, the two Hippias, (and) Gorgias. Thus much then suffice it to say on the subject of the dialogue, as to what it is, and what are its different kinds.

But since there is much of factious contention, some asserting that Plato dogmatizes, and others not, come, let us take a part in these matters likewise. Now to dogmatize is to lay

¹—¹ By this version an English reader will have the best idea of what is meant in Greek by *γυμναστικός* and *ἀγωνιστικός*: the latter of which is applied to a real contest, the former to a sham one.

² The word *μαϊευτικός* is literally, "that which belongs to a midwife;" an expression introduced by Socrates, who, being the son of a midwife, said he treated the minds of men, as his mother did the bodies of women, by delivering them respectively of their thoughts and children.

³ By *ἐνδεδαιτικός* Casaubon understands "the accusatory." But as Plato never, if I rightly remember, brings an accusation against any of his opponents, but merely lays bare their fallacies, I have translated "detective."

⁴ It seems rather strange to rank the Letters amongst the moral dialogues. See § 61, and 62.

⁵ This is now called more commonly the Critias.

⁶ Instead of *εἰς*, I have translated as if the Greek were *εἰς*—

down an opinion, just as to legislate is to lay down laws: and the word dogma is applied in both ways, to the thing about which there is an opinion, and to the opinion itself. [52.] Now of these, the thing about which there is an opinion, is a proposition, but the opinion itself is a supposition. Plato then, on subjects which he comprehends, exhibits his opinions; but what is false, he refutes; while on such as are not clear, he holds back. Now on points, that seem to him (to be true), he shows himself through four characters, Socrates, Timæus, the stranger from Athens,¹ and the Eleatic stranger.² These strangers are not, however, as some imagine, Plato and Parmenides, but fictitious characters without a name; since, while Plato is detailing what is said by Socrates and Timæus, he is putting forth his own opinions. But he introduces by name,³ when convicted of false notions, Thrasymachus, and Callicles, and Polus and Gorgias, and Protagoras, and Hippias too, and Euthydemus, and those who are like them. [53.] And while he is putting together his proofs, he makes use of induction for the most part; not however in one form, but two-fold. Now induction is a reasoning that from certain truths (really existing)⁴ infers a truth peculiarly⁵ similar to itself. Of this induction there are two kinds; one, according to a contrariety, and the other from consequence. That according to contrariety is, when about⁶ the whole answer the contrary to what has been asked shall follow; for example—My father is either different from, or the same as, your father. If then your father is different from my father, he would not, as being different from a father, be a father. But if he is the same as my father, he would, as being the same as my father, be my father. [54.] And again—If man is not an animal, he would be stone or wood. Now he is not stone or wood. For he is a thing with life, and is moved by himself. He is

¹ This person is introduced in the Laws.

² This character is introduced in the Sophist.

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ονόματι*, not *οἶον*—For thus the persons without a name in some dialogues are opposed to those with a name in others.

⁴ The sense evidently requires *τινὸν ὄντως ἀληθῶν* in the Greek, not *τινὸν ἀληθῶν*—and so I have translated.

⁵ I confess I cannot understand *οἰκείως*—Perhaps the author wrote *αἰσῶς*, “reasonably—”

⁶ Instead of *περί*, “about,” one would have expected *παρὰ*, “along—”

then an animal. But if he is an animal, so also is a dog and a bull an animal. ¹A man then, as being an animal, would be a dog or bull.¹ Now this is the kind of induction according to a contrariety ²and a contest,² of which Plato makes use, not to dogmatize, but to confute. But the kind according to a consequence is likewise two-fold; one demonstrating what is sought for in part by means of that which exists in part; the other, rendered credible as a whole by means of that which is taken as a part. The former is suited for oratory; the latter, for logic. For example, in the former it is inquired, whether this man ³has murdered somebody, a proof being,³ that he was found at that very time, with blood upon him. [55.] Now this is the oratorical kind of induction, since the orator's art is occupied about particulars, not universals. For it does not make an inquiry about abstract justice, but about things that are just in a particular point of view; but the other is dialectical, through the universal being proved⁴ by the particulars. For example, it sought whether the soul is immortal, and whether the living proceed from the dead; which is shown in the dialogue "On the Soul," through something universal, (namely,) that opposites proceed from opposites; and that the Universal is itself composed of particulars; for example, that sleeping proceeds from being awake, and conversely; and that the greater proceeds from the less, and conversely. Now of this kind has Plato made use for building up his own notions.

[56.] And as of old in a tragedy at first the Chorus alone went through the drama, but afterwards Thespis invented one actor to enable the Chorus to be at rest, and Æschylus a second actor, and Sophocles a third, and they thus filled up the tragedy; so in the case of a philosophical discourse, it was formerly of one kind, relating to physics; but Socrates

¹ The Greek is εἴη ἂν καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν καὶ κύων καὶ ὁ βοῦς: where C. F. Hermann was the first to read εἴη ἂν ἄνθρωπος, ζῶν ὄν— but he failed to read likewise ἡ κύων ἡ βοῦς— similar to λιθος ἡ ξύλον just before. And so I have translated. Compare Euthydem. § 62, 63.

² The words καὶ μάχην are quite unnecessary here.

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were ἀπίκτεινν τινα, ἀπόδειξις οὐσα— not ἀπίκτεινν ἀπόδειξις—

⁴ In lieu of προαποδείχθιντος, C. F. Hermann would read προαποδείχθιντος— I should prefer the omission of προ— were it not difficult to account for its introduction.

added ethica, and Plato dialectica, and he thus worked out philosophy to an end. But Thrasyllus says that Plato put forth his dialogues after the manner of the tragic tetralogy; just as they¹ (the tragedians) contended with four dramas,² at the Dionysia, the Lenæa, the Panathenæa, and the Chytiri;³ of which the fourth was a satyric drama; and the four were called a tetralogy. [57.] Now there are, says he, in all fifty-six genuine dialogues of Plato—the Republic,⁴ nearly the whole of which, says Phavorinus in the 2nd book of his “Various History,” is found in the “Opposite Reasonings” of Protagoras,⁵ being divided into ten, and the Laws into twelve, forming nine tetralogies, the Republic occupying the place of one book,⁶ and of one book⁷ likewise the Laws. And he lays down as the first tetralogy, that which embraces a common argument. For he is desirous of showing of what kind would be the life of a philosopher. And he adopts for each book a double title; one derived from a name, and another from the matter. [58.] In the tetralogy, which is the first, the Euthyphron, or On Holiness, takes the lead; and the dialogue is tentative; the second is The Apology of Socrates, moral; the third, Crito, or About what is to be done, moral; the fourth, Phædon, or About the Soul, moral. The second tetralogy, in which the Cratylus, or On the Rectitude of Names, takes the lead, is logical; the Theætetus, or On Knowledge, tentative; the Sophist, or On the Being, logical; the Statesman, or On Kingly Power, logical. In the third (tetralogy), the Parmenides, or About Ideas, is logical; the Philebus, or On Pleasure, moral; the Banquet, or About Good,⁸ moral; the Phædrus, or About Love, moral. [59.] In the fourth (tetralogy), the (first) Alcibiades, or About the

¹ *ἄνθρωποι* is to be referred to *τραγῳδοί*, to be got out of *τραγικὴν*. See Porson on Hec. 22.

²⁻³ The words between the numerals are rejected by Wyttenbach in Biblioth. Crit. ii. 3, p. 56, for he knew that tragedies were not performed at the two Panathenæic festivals, nor at the *Χέρποι*, which was the last day of the *Ἀθροιστήρια*. Perhaps, however, in the time of Thrasyllus, or even earlier, when Athens ceased to be an independent state, plays were not confined, as formerly, to the Dionysia and Lenæa.

³⁻⁵ The same story told in § 37.

⁴⁻⁶ In lieu of *βιβλίον* one would have expected *διαλόγον*, to show that the thirty-six dialogues made nine tetralogies.

⁷ This title seems strangely mentioned, instead of “About Love—” for such is the subject of the Banquet.

Nature of Man, takes the lead, maieutic; the Second Alcibiades, or About Prayer, maieutic; the Hipparchus, or About the Love of Gain,¹ moral; the Rivals, or About Philosophy, moral. In the fifth (tetralogy), the Theages, or About Philosophy, takes the lead, maieutic; the Charmides, or About Temperance, tentative; the Laches, or About Fortitude, maieutic; the Lysis, or About Friendship, maieutic. In the sixth (tetralogy), the Euthydemus, or the Disputations, takes the lead, eversive; the Protagoras, or the Sophist, detective; the Gorgias, or On the Orator's Art, eversive; the Meno, or On Virtue, tentative. [60.] In the seventh (tetralogy), the two Hippias take the lead; the first, or About the Beautiful; the second, or About Falsehood, (both) eversive; the Ion, or About the Iliad,² tentative; the Menexenus, or The Funeral (Oration), moral. In the eighth (tetralogy), the Cleitophon, or the Exhortative, moral; the Republic, or About Justice, political; the Timæus, or About Nature, physical; the Critias, or the Atlantic, moral. In the ninth (tetralogy), the Minos, or About Law, political, takes the lead; the Laws, or About Legislation, political; the Epinomis, or the Night-meeting,³ or Philosopher, political. [61.] There are thirteen Epistles of a moral kind, on which he inscribed *Εὖ πράττειν*,⁴ but Epicurus *Εὖ διαίγειν*,⁵ and Cleon *Χαίρειν*⁶—one to Aristodemus; two to Archytas; four to Dionysius; one to Hermeias, (and) Erastus, and Coriscus; one to Leodamas; one to Perdiccas; and two to the family-friends of Dion. Such is the division that Thrasyllus makes, and some others. But some, amongst whom is Aristophanes the grammarian, distributed the dialogues into trilogies; and they put down as the first, the one in which the Republic, Timæus, (and) Critias take the lead; as the second, (where) the

¹ I have adopted *Περὶ φιλοκέρδους*, or, as it should be written, *Περὶ φιλοκέρδειας*, in lieu of *ἡ φιλοκέρδης*, to which Boeckh on Pseudo-Platon. Min. p. 36, objected, not aware that *Περὶ φιλοκέρδους* was found in ed. Steph. and MS. Vindob.

² The correct title would be, "About the Rhapsodist's Art."

³ The "night-meeting" alluded to is mentioned in Epinom. p. 992, D. § 13, but more fully in the Laws, x. p. 909, A. § 15; xii. p. 968, A. § 14.

⁴ i. e. "Be prosperous."

⁵ i. e. "Pass life happily."

⁶ i. e. "Rejoice," or "hail." The latter is the usual version; but the other is better suited to the event, which Cleon's letter announced, when he told his countrymen of the surrender of the Spartans at Sphacteria.

Sophist, Statesman, (and) Critias (do so); [62.] as the third, (where) ¹the Laws, Minos,¹ (and) Epinomis; as the fourth, (where) the Theætetus, Euthyphron, (and) Apology; as the fifth, (where) the Criton, Phædon, (and) Epistles;² but the rest singly, and in no order. But some, as before stated, begin with the Republic; others from the greater³ Alcibiades; and others from the Theages; and some, too, from the Euthyphron; others from the Cleitophon; some from the Timæus; some from the Phædrus; and others from the Theætetus; and many make a beginning with the Apology. Of the dialogues, which are rejected as confessedly spurious, there are ⁴Midon, the horse-breeder;⁴ Eryxias, or Erasistratus; Alcyon;⁵ and, the headless,⁶ Sisyphus, Axiochus, Phæaces,⁷ Demodocus, ⁸Chelidon, Hebdomé,⁸ Epimenides;⁹ of which the Alcyon appears to be Leon's,¹⁰ as Phavorinus says in the fifth book of his "Memoirs."

[63.] He has made use of words with various meanings, so that the business, which he has in hand, might not be easily seen at one view by the uneducated. He considers wisdom to be peculiarly the knowledge of things, perceptible by the mind and existing in reality; which knowledge he says (is conversant) about god, and soul apart from body; but individually he calls ¹¹philosophy wisdom, as being a longing after the divine wisdom;¹¹ but commonly all skill is by him

¹ Boeckh on Pseudo-Platon. Min. p. 32, would place Μῖνος before Νόμοι.

² How the Epistles could be classed with the Criton and Phædon, it is difficult to understand. See § 50.

³ The "greater" is used here, it would seem, for the "longer," like the "greater" Hippias.

⁴ Of this dialogue I have spoken sufficiently in the Introduction to it.

⁵, ⁷, ⁹ Of the Alcyon, and Phæaces, and Epimenides nothing is known but the titles.

⁶ The "headless" were so called, from their not having a regular beginning.

⁸ Whether the Χελιδών and Ἑβδομή were one or two dialogues it is impossible to ascertain. I suspect however that the title was Χελιδών εὐ δειμαμένη, i. e. "The well-building Swallow."

¹⁰ Menage asks whether to this Leon is to be attributed the dialogue, called Ἀλεῶν, found amongst the works of Lucian?

¹¹ This remark seems to be founded on Definit. p. 414, B., φιλοσοφία τῆς τῶν ὄντων δι' ἐπιστήμης ὁραεῖς.

designated wisdom; as when he calls the Demiurgus¹ wise. And he makes use of the same word in different senses. For instance, the word *φᾶλος* is taken by him in the sense of "simple," as it is applied by Euripides in his *Licymnius* to Hercules, thus—

Simple, not over-fine, greatly good, cutting off
In acts all sophistry,²
In the talkings of idlers unpractised.

And sometimes Plato uses it in respect to what is good,³ and sometimes likewise to what is little. [64.]⁴ And frequently he applies different nouns to signify the same thing. For example, Idea is both Species, and Genus, and Pattern, and Principle, and Cause. He adopts likewise contrary words to express the same thing. For he calls what is perceptible by the mind, both⁵ Entity and Non-entity; Entity, on account of its being generated; Non-entity, on account of its constant change; and likewise Idea, as being neither moved nor at rest; and the Same, and One, and Many.⁶ And he is accustomed to do the same in the case of more words.

[65.] The exposition of his reasoning is three-fold. First, it is requisite to show clearly what is each of the points spoken of; next, on what account they are spoken of, whether according to the leading notion, or in the portion of a similitude, and for the building up of the fixed opinion; and thirdly, whether they are spoken of correctly.

But, since some marks are placed in his books, come let us say something about them.

The X is adopted for (peculiar) words and figures of speech, and universally for what is the custom of Plato.

¹ Perhaps the writer alluded to *δημιουργός σοφός* in *Repub. i. p. 340, E.*

² Here *σοφίαν* is taken, like *σοφιστής*, in a bad sense. These verses, descriptive of the character of Hercules, might be applied with equal truth to England's great captain, recently departed; and not less so the language of an unknown author quoted by Suidas in *Εὔδεια*, to this effect—"The glory, which he had acquired by his victories over enemies, and by his strict justice in times of peace, made him a still more worthy object for all to look upon."

³ The antithesis requires, as Casaubon saw, *κακοῦ*, "bad," in lieu of *καλοῦ*.

⁴ This section begins in *Menage* with *χρηται δὲ*, just above.

⁵ See *Sophist*, § 63 and 91.

The double (line) > is used for the fixed opinions and favourite views of Plato.

The X with dots around, ✕, for extracts and 'pretty pieces of writing.'¹

The doubled (line) with dots around, ≡, for corrections of some kind.

The spit with dots around, ÷, ² for the rejections of what is silly.³

The antisigma⁴ with dots around, ∷, 'for the two uses and change in the position of the writings.'⁴

The thunderbolt ↓ for the leading to philosophy.

The asterisk * for the agreement in fixed opinions.

The spit — for the rejection (of matter).

Such are the marks, and so many the books, which, says Antigonos in his work "On Zeno," when recently published, if a person wished ⁵ to read and know thoroughly,⁵ he paid to their owners for the hire of them.

[67.] His favourite notions were these. He said that the soul was immortal, and invested itself with many bodies,⁶ and that its principle was in ⁷ arithmetic, but that of the body in geometry;⁷ and he defined it as the form of a spirit standing ⁸ altogether apart;⁸ and that it is self-moved;⁹ and is tripartite;¹⁰ for that its rational portion is seated about the head; its irascible about the heart; and its concupiscible about the

¹ Such, I presume, is the sense here of καλλιγραφίας: which elsewhere means the mechanical act of writing beautifully.

² Unable to understand πρὸς τὰς εἰκαιὺς ἀθερήσεις, I have translated, as if the Greek were πρὸς τὰς τοῦ εἰκαίου ἀθερήσεις.

³ The mark) is called anti-sigma, because it is the contrary to (; for so that letter was sometimes written of old.

⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek πρὸς τὰς διττὰς χρήσεις καὶ μεταβάσεις τῶν γραφῶν— which I must leave for others to understand, or correct, if they can.

⁵ Instead of διαγνῶναι, Casaubon proposed to read ἀναγνῶναι, found subsequently in a Paris MS., as Menage testifies. I have translated, as if the author had written ἀναγνῶναι καὶ διαγνῶναι.

⁶ This is stated in Phædon, p. 87, B.

⁷ I do not remember where Plato thus describes the soul and body.

⁸ In the words τοῦ πάντῃ διωστώτος— there is probably a lacuna to be thus supplied— τοῦ ἀπὸ παντὸς πάντῃ διωστώτος, i. e. "standing apart from every thing on every side."

⁹ This is the leading doctrine, on which the immortality of the soul is based in the Phædon.

¹⁰ See Rep. p. 580, D., which Cicero in Tuscul. i. had in mind.

navel and liver;¹⁰ [68.] and that (proceeding)¹ from the middle² it embraces entirely (as) in a circle the body; and that it is composed of the elements; and that, divided according to harmonic intervals, it forms two circles united together; of which the inner circle, being divided into six parts, makes seven circles in all; and that this lies along a diameter towards the left from within; but the outer along a side towards the right; on which account it rules, as being one; for the other is divided from within;³ and that one circle belongs to the same, and the others to the different; (and he asserts) that this⁴ movement is of the soul, but that of the Universe, and the carrying round of the planets; [69.] and that (the soul),⁴ after the division had thus taken place from the middle and was fitted to it at the extremes, knows the things that exist, and adjusts them, through its possessing in itself the elements according to harmony: and that opinion is produced, according to the circle of the different proceeding correctly,⁵ but knowledge, according to that of the same. And he showed that of all existing things there are two principles, god, which he calls likewise mind and cause, and matter;⁶ but that matter is without form and boundless,⁷ from which are produced coalitions; and that, being formerly moved in no order, it

¹ I have translated, as if *ἰούσαν* had dropt out after *μίσου*—

² Aldobrandinus has shown that all this is to be referred to the soul of the world, as delineated in the *Timæus*; and he might have added, that much of this abridgment, taken by itself, is a mass of unmeaning words; for the writer had evidently only a vague idea of what Plato himself has not expressed in the most intelligible manner.

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὴν*, not *τὸν*, which has nothing to which it can be referred; while *τὴν* belongs to *κίνησιν*—

⁴ I have introduced "the soul," conceiving that the author wrote *τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν. οὕτως ἰχθύσεως*—not *οὕτω δ' ἰχθύσεως*—for otherwise the subsequent *αὐτῇ* would want its substantive.

⁵ C. F. Hermann reads *ὀρθούμενον* instead of *ὀρθομένον*, doubtless remembering the expression *ὁ τοῦ θαλάσσης κύκλος ὀρθὸς ἰών* in *Tim.* p. 37, B.

⁶ Since the words *καὶ ἔλην* could not be interposed between *θεὸν* and *δὲν*, I have translated, as if they ended the sentence.

⁷ In lieu of *ἀπειρον*, Menage would read *ἀποιον*—referring to Cicero in *Academ.*, "Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate materiam—" and to Origen in *Philosophics*—*τὴν δὲ ἔλην δυνάμει μὲν σῶμα, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδὲ πω ἀσχημάτιστον γὰρ αὐτὴν οὖσαν καὶ ἀποιον, προσλαβούσαν σχήματα καὶ ποιότητας, γινίσθαι σῶμα*—a work, which Menage describes as being then unedited, but which has been given to the world by Miller at Oxford in 1851.

was brought to one spot by the deity, who considered order to be better than disorder.¹ [70.] And (he said) that this existence (of matter) is to be resolved into four elements, fire, water, air, earth; from which both the world and what is in it are generated; but that the earth alone is unchangeable, assigning as a reason, the difference in the forms, of which it is composed; for of all the others he says the forms are homogenous; for they are all composed from one ²triangle, whose sides are longer one than the other;³ but the form of the earth is peculiar to itself. For the element of fire is pyramidal; that of air, octohedral;⁴ and that of water, eikosi-hedral;⁵ but that of earth, cubical; from whence the earth neither changes into them, nor they into the earth. [71.] ⁶And that each is not separated into its own place; because the circular movement, by compressing and bringing things to the centre, causes the small particles to coalesce; but separates the large; from whence the species, as they change themselves, change likewise their places.⁷ And that the world is one, (and) generated; since it has been made by the deity, perceptible by mind; and that it is animated,⁸ in consequence of that, which is animated, being superior to that, which is not animated; and that this is laid down as the workmanship of the best cause; and that it was made one and not boundless; because one likewise was the model, by which he fabricated it. [72.] ⁹And that it is spherical; because he, who produced it, has that form; for that (the world) contains the rest of living beings;⁷ but this (the deity) the forms of all things; and that it (the world) is smooth,⁸ in a circle, and possesses no organs,⁹ on account of there being no use for them; moreover that the world will continue⁹ undestroyed,

¹ See Timæus, p. 30, A.

^{2,3} On this *πρόμαχος τρίγωνον* see Timæus, p. 54, A. Such a triangle is now called scalene.

^{3,4} i. e. one with eight, and the other with twenty sides. See Pseudo-Tim. Loc. p. 98, D., for this is not stated distinctly in the Tim. of Plato.

⁵ See Timæus, p. 58, A.

⁶ See Timæus, p. 32, B.

⁷ See Timæus, p. 32, B.

⁸ I have translated, as if the Greek were *λείον δὲ κύελην καὶ οὐδὲν ὄργανον ἔχοντα*—not *λείον δὲ καὶ οὐδὲν ὄργανον ἔχοντα κύελην*—For the passage in the Timæus, p. 32, C., is *λείον δὲ δὴ κύελην—διππεριβ-οῦτο—ὀμμάτων τε γὰρ ἐκτεῖντο οὐδὲν—οὐδὲ ἀκοῆς*—

⁹ I have adopted *διαμενῆν*, as suggested by Casaubon, in lieu of *διαμῆναι*.

on account of its being not resolved ¹into the deity.¹ Moreover that the deity is the cause of the whole of generation; because the good is naturally the doer of good; and that the best is the cause of the generation of heaven; for that the best of things perceived by the mind is the cause of the most beautiful of things generated; so that, since such is the deity, heaven is like the best, as being the most beautiful; and it would be like not one of things generated, but the deity (alone).² [73.] And that the world is composed of fire, water, air, (and) earth; of fire, that it might be visible; and of earth, that it might be solid; of water and air, that it might be according to a proportion—³for the powers of solid substances have a proportion by two middle terms—so that the whole might become one⁴—and that from all together it might be perfect and undestroyed. And that time is the image of eternity;⁴ and that this remains for ever; but that time is the movement of the heaven; for that night, and day, and month, and all such things, are parts of time; and hence ⁵time would not be without the natural movement of the world;⁵ for that as soon as ⁶a movement took place in it,⁶ time was; and that for the generation of time, the sun and moon and planets were generated. [74.]⁷ And that the number of the seasons might be very plain, and living things have a share in number, (he says) that the deity lit up the light of the sun;⁸ and that the moon is above the circle of the earth, and the sun in that, which is near to it; and the

¹—¹ The MS., which Ambrosius used, seems to have read *εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι*, not *εἰς τὸ θεῖον*, as remarked by Casaubon.

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀλλὰ μόνῃ τῇ θεῷ*—not *ἀλλ' ἢ τῇ θεῷ*.

³—³ See Timæus, p. 32, B.

⁴ In lieu of *τοῦ διδίου*, the syntax and sense require *τοῦ αἰῶνος*—the former, because the following *κἀκείνων* ought to be *κἀκεῖνο*, the latter, because Plato's expression in Timæus, p. 36, D. is *εἰκὼν-αἰῶνος-δὲν δὴ χρόνον ὀνομάκαμεν*.

⁵—⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀνευ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου φύσεως κινήσεως οὐκ ἂν εἶναι χρόνον*—not *ἀνευ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου φύσεως οὐκ εἶναι χρόνον*: for time is the measure of matter in motion, and has nothing to do with the nature of the world in a state of rest. Hence too in ⁶—⁶ I suspect that *κίνησιν* has been lost before *καί*—and if so, we need not alter *αὐτῷ* into *αὐτόν*, as suggested by Casaubon.

⁷ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *πρὸς δε*—

⁸ See Timæus, p. 39, B.

planets in the circles above; and that it (the world) is altogether animated, through its being bound to an animated motion; and, in order that the world might be rendered perfect, after being generated similar¹ to the living being perceptible by the mind, that the nature of the rest of living beings was generated;² and that since it possessed,³ it was requisite for heaven likewise to possess; and that it possessed therefore gods for the most part of fire;³ and that the other races are three, on wing, in the water, and on land. And that the earth is the oldest of the gods⁴ in heaven; and that it is a piece of workmanship for⁵ producing night and day; and that being at the centre it is moved about the centre. [75.]⁶ And since there are two causes, we must say, he asserts, that some things exist through mind,⁷ and some from a necessitous cause; and that these are air, fire, earth, water; and that they are not exactly elements, but recipients; and that these exist from triangles put together, and are resolved

¹ The Greek is at present *ὁμοίως*— It was originally, I suspect, *ἰσχυρῶς*—what I have translated.

²—³ Since there is nothing to serve as the object of *εἶχε*, we must probably read *εἶναι δὲ νοῦν ἰσχυρὸς εἶχε*— instead of *εἶναι οὖν ἰσχυρὸς εἶχε*— Opportunely then has the Latin version—"Quoniam igitur ille mentem habebat—"

⁴ This can be understood only by finding in the *Timæus*, p. 40, A. § 15, *τοῦ μὲν οὖν θείου τὴν πλείστην ἰδίαν ἐκ τοῦδ' ἀκωργάτερο*: while, instead of *ἔχων*, Ambrosius seems to have found *εἶναι*, as remarked by Casanbon.

⁵ From Cicero's version of the *Timæus*, p. 40, C. § 15, *γῆν δὲ—αἰθερμίνην καὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον φάλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νεκρὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμχανήσατο πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, ὅσαι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γέγοναι*.—"Terram—quam tracto axe sustinetur, diei noctisque electricam eandemque custodem antiquissimam corporum voluit esse eorum, quæ intra cælum gignerentur," it is evident that he found in his MS. *δημιουργὸν νεκρὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμχανήσατο καὶ φάλακα πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων*—and so did the author of *Tim. Loc.* p. 97, D., *πρεσβύτα δὲ ἐντὶ τῶν ἐντὸς ὠρανῶ σωμάτων*—Hence one would elicit *θεῶν σωμάτων* from the two readings, *θεῶν* and *σωμάτων*—

⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were *εἰς τὸ*, not *ὡς*—

⁷ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *γῆν δὲ*—a little above.

⁸ In lieu of *διαμνην*, Menage would read, what I have adopted, *δαὶ νοῦν*—confirmed by *διὰ νοῦ* in one MS. subsequently collated, and by Pseudo-Tim. Loc. § 1, *δύο αἰρίας εἶπεν τῶν συμπάντων. νόον μὲν, τῶν κατὰ λόγον γενομένων ἀνάγκαν δὲ, τῶν βίᾳ*, quoted by Menage; to which may be added, *Tim.* p. 48, A., *ἔξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως γεννήθη*: from whence one would substitute *ἀναγκαίαις συστάσεως* in the place of *ἀναγκαίαις αἰρίας*.

into them; and that their elements are ¹the triangle, whose sides are longer, one than the other, and that, whose two sides are equal¹ [76.] (He says) then that the principles and causes are the two mentioned, of which the pattern is god and matter; which (last) is of necessity without form, as is the case with the rest of recipients; and that the cause of this proceeds from necessity; for² (the mind) by receiving somehow ideas produces existences; and through an inequality of power it is moved; and being moved it moves in return the things moved by that power; and (he says) that these were moved formerly without reason and order; but, when they began to constitute the world out of what they received from the deity, they were moved³ symmetrically and orderly. [77.] For (he says) there were two causes even before the creation of heaven, and a third, generation; but not clear, and only vestiges,⁴ and without order; but, when the world had been created, they too received order; and that heaven was created out of all existing bodies. And it seems to him that the deity, like the soul, is incorporeal;⁵ for thus he is especially non-receptive of corruption and suffering. And he lays down, as before stated, ideas, as the causes and principles of things being constituted by nature such as they are.

[78.] On the subject of good and evil he said thus—that the aim should be⁶ to become like the deity; that virtue is self-sufficient for happiness; but that it wants, as instruments, the superfluities connected with the body, namely, strength, health, a good state of the senses, and the like; and of ex-

¹—¹ See Tim. p. 54, A.

² The Greek is *δεχόμενον γὰρ πως τὰς ἰδίας γεννᾶν τὰς οὐσίας*, where, since there is nothing to which *δεχόμενον* can be referred, I have translated as if *νοῦν* had dropt out after *γεννᾶν*— In Tim. p. 52, D., the expression is, *τὴν γεννήσεως τιθήνην—διὰ τὸ μήθ' ὁμοίως δυνάμειν μή' ἰσορροπῶν ἐμπέμπασθαι—σιεῖσθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἱερίων αὐτῇν, κινουμένην δὲ αὐτῷ πάλιν ἱερίῳ σιεῖν*.

³ I have adopted *κινεῖσθαι*, furnished by one MS., in lieu of *γενεῖσθαι*.

⁴ Compare Timæus, p. 53, B., *ἔχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὐτῶν ἅττα*—

⁵ Although Cicero, de Nat. Deor. i. 12, says, "sine corpore ullo Deum (Plato) vult esse, ut Græci dicunt *ἀσώματον*," yet I do not remember where the philosopher has so expressed himself.

⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τίλος μὲν δεῖν εἶναι*, not *τίλος μὲν εἶναι*— With regard to the sentiment, compare Theætet. p. 247, A. § 84, where Heindorf quotes from Themist. Or. xiv. p. 330, D., *μηδὲν ἄλλο φιλοσοφία ἢ ὁμοίωσις κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν θεῷ*.

ternals, such as wealth, good birth, and reputation; but that the wise would be, nevertheless, happy, even if those things were not present. And (he says) that a person should be a public man,¹ and marry,² and not transgress the laws laid down; and should legislate from events, as they arise, for his country, unless he sees that affairs are in the exceeding corruption³ of the people perfectly⁴ invincible to a person in a state of doubt.⁴

[79.] He thinks too that the gods look upon the affairs of men;⁵ and that there are demons.⁶

And he first showed that the⁷ idea of what is beautiful is close upon what is laudable, and rational, and useful, and becoming, and fitting;⁷ all of which are close upon what follows nature, and is confessed (to do so).

He has conversed likewise on the correct imposition of names,⁸ so that (he seems)⁹ to have been the first to put together the science of correctly¹⁰ answering and questioning¹⁰ by using it in an opportune¹¹ manner in his dialogues.¹²

He considered, moreover, justice to be a law of god,¹³ as being more powerful to turn persons¹⁴ to acting justly, lest, like¹⁵ evil-doers, they suffer punishments, even after death;¹⁶

¹ Aldobrandinus refers to Rep. vii. p. 519, C.

² This is laid down in the Laws, vi. p. 768, B.

³ I have adopted Casaubon's correction, *διαφθορά*, in lieu of *διαφορά*.

⁴ Casaubon was the first to see an error in *ἐν παραίτητα*, but failed to correct it by reading *ἀνταίτητα*. I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀνέκω ἀήτητα*—

⁵ Aldobrandinus refers to the Laws, x. p. 899, D., and the Banquet, p. 202, E.

⁶ This is the whole subject matter of the Hipp. Maj.

⁷ See the Cratylus.

⁸ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὥστε δοκίμ*, not *ὥστε καί*—Casaubon would elicit *δοκίμ* *σοφήσαι* from *διασοφήσαι*—

¹⁰ Instead of this absurd *ὅτι τὸν πρότερον*, the sense evidently requires *ἰσχυρὴν καὶ ἀσχεπνισθαι*—

¹¹ In lieu of *κατακρίτως*, which I cannot understand, I suspect the author wrote *κατακαρίως*, what I have translated.

¹² The words *ἐν δὲ* (or *γὰρ*) *τοῖς διαλόγοις* evidently belong, as I have translated, to the preceding, not the following, period.

¹³ This doctrine is not, as far as I remember, laid down distinctly in Plato; although it may be inferred from the first book of the Laws.

¹⁴ In lieu of *ἐπάρται ἵνα μὴ*, C. F. Hermann has suggested *ἐπάρται* *τυχεῖ, μὴ*—which has led myself to *τυχεῖς, μὴ*—

¹⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὡς κακοῦργοι*, not *οἱ κακοῦργοι*, where the article is without meaning.

from whence he was considered by some to be rather inclined to fables, by his mixing up accounts of this kind with his writings, in order that, through the uncertainty of the manner, in which matters stand after death, persons may thus be restrained from acts of injustice. These then were his favourite notions.

[80.]¹ And he divided, says Aristotle,² things in this manner. Of the good some relate to the soul, some to the body, and some are externals. For example, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, and things of this kind relate to the soul; but beauty, and a good habit, and health, to the body; but friends, and the happiness of one's country, and wealth, are amongst externals. [81.]³ Of good things then there are three kinds; some relating to the soul, some to the body, and some (are) external.³ Of friendship there are three kinds; one natural, another social, and another hospitable. Now by natural we mean that, which parents feel towards their offspring, and relations towards each other; and in this other animals likewise have a share; by social that, which is produced from habitual intercourse, and not at all connected by family-ties, such as that between Pylades and Orestes; but the friendship from hospitality is that from a meeting together, and carried on by means of writings⁴ to strangers. Of friendship then there is the natural, the social, and hospitable. But some add a fourth, the amorous.

[82.] Of a political state there are five kinds;⁵ one is democratical; another, aristocratical; a third, oligarchical; a fourth, regal; (and) a fifth, tyrannical. The democratical exists in states, when the people rule, and choose through

¹ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *θεν και*—a little above.

² This analysis of the doctrines of Plato is not, says Aldobrandinus, to be found in the extant writings of Aristotle; nor do I think it ever was. The author was, perhaps, the Plato mentioned in § 109, as *μαθητης Ἀριστοτέλους*, or some other Peripatetic. And hence I would read here *φῆσιν δὲ Ἀριστοτέλους*—or simply *φῆσιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης*—

³ A similar summary of the preceding account is found through the whole of the subsequent analysis; and as it generally follows the order of the subjects, wherever that order is not preserved, there is reason to believe that some error has crept into the text, as will be duly pointed out in the Notes.

⁴ By writings are meant such as were put upon the so-called *σύμβολον*, on which see my note on Philoct. 404.

⁵ See Rep. viii. p. 540, A.; ix. 580, B.

itself magistracies and laws. ¹The aristocratical is, when neither the rich, nor the poor, nor persons in repute, rule, but when the best possess power in the state.¹ Oligarchy is, when magistracies are elected from persons of property; for the rich are fewer than the poor. Of regal power there is one kind according to law, and another according to family; as at Carthage it is according to law; for that is a citizen-state; but at Lacedæmon and Macedonia² it is according to family; for they make a kingly power from a certain family. But a tyranny is, when persons, ³after being cheated or forced,³ are ruled over by some one. Of a political state then there is the form of a democracy, an aristocracy, an oligarchy, a kingly rule, and a tyranny.

[83.]⁴ Of justice there are three kinds; ⁵one relating to the gods, another to men, and another to the departed. For they, who sacrifice according to the laws, and have a regard for holy things, it is plain, act piously towards the gods; and they, who pay debts and restore deposits, act justly towards men; while they, who have a regard for monuments,⁵ it is plain, (act justly)⁶ towards the departed. Of justice then there is a kind relating to the gods, another to men, and another to the departed.

[84.] Of sciences there are three kinds; ⁷one relating to the power to do something, another to make something, and another to speculate on something.⁷ For house-building and ship-building are sciences that make something; for one can see the work done; but the sciences of statesmanship, and of playing on the pipe or harp, and such like, are those that do something; ⁸for it is not possible to see any thing that has been

¹— A similar definition of Aristocracy in the Menæxenus, § 8.

² Lacedæmon and Macedonia are similarly united in § 92.

³— Of a people being cheated or forced into the acceptance of regal power recent events in a neighbouring country afford a curious proof.

⁴ This section begins in Menæx's ed. a little before, at ἡ δὲ ἐν Ἀναξάμαν.

⁵— Of these three kinds the two first are mentioned in Euthyph. p. 12, E., and the last alluded to in the Laws, xii. p. 958, D., as remarked by Aldobrandinus.

⁶ I have supplied the ellipsis in the Greek.

⁷— Of these three kinds the first and third are mentioned in the Statesman, p. 259, C., and the second in Soph. p. 219, B., not in Themist., as stated by Aldobrandinus.

⁸— I have translated, as if θεαρόν, which is superfluous after ἰδόν,

done by them; but when they are doing something, it is to be seen.⁸ For one is playing the pipe, another the harp, and another the part of a statesman. But the sciences of geometry, harmony, and astrology¹ are speculative; for they neither do any thing, nor make any thing; but one speculates, as a geometrician, how lines are with respect to each other; another, as a harmonist, (speculates) on sounds; and the other, as an astrologer, on the stars and the world.² Of sciences then some are speculative, others relating to doing, and others to making.³

[85.] Of medical science there are five kinds;³ the pharmaceutic, the chirurgic,⁴ the dietetic, the nosognomic, and the boethetic. The pharmaceutic cures illness by drugs; the chirurgic restores health by cutting and burning; the dietetic produces a change in disorders by a change of diet; the nosognomic by knowing the characters of the disease; and the boethetic, by assisting on the instant, gives a relief from pain. Of the medical science then there is the pharmaceutic, the chirurgic, the dietetic, ⁵the boethetic, and the nosognomic.⁵

[86.] Of law there are two divisions; one written, the other unwritten. That, by which we act the statesman in cities, is the written; but that, which exists according to custom, is called the unwritten. For instance, there is no law to prevent our going naked to the public place of meeting, or putting on female attire; and yet we do not do such acts, through being prevented by an unwritten law. Of law then there is the written and the unwritten.

[87.]⁶ Speech is divided into five⁷ kinds; of which one is

were placed after ἀλλ', ὅτε πᾶρρουσι τι, for so we must read in lieu of ἀλλὰ πᾶρρουσι τι—

¹ By astrology is meant what is now called astronomy.

²⁻³ In this summary the order is inverted by the speculative being placed first instead of last.

³ Of these five kinds only the first four are alluded to in Rep. iii. p. 406, D., as remarked by Aldobrandinus.

⁴ The English "surgeon" is a corruption of the Greek χειρουργός.

⁵⁻⁶ Here again the order in the summary is neglected by placing the boethetic before the nosognomic.

⁶ This section begins in Menage's ed. with ἵρπα δὲ, just afterwards.

⁷ Of these five kinds three are spoken of in Phædr. p. 258, D., and p. 272, F., and the dialectic in Rep. vii. p. 533—537, as remarked by Aldobrandinus.

what statesmen speak in public assemblies, and is called political; and there is another division of speeches, such as orators write and bring forward as a display, for the purpose of praise, or blame, or accusation. Now this kind is the oratorical. And there is a third division, when private persons converse with each other. Now this is called the private kind. And there is another division, when persons, by putting questions and giving answers to the questioners, converse in a brief manner. Now this is called the dialectical. The fifth division is, when artists converse with each other about their own art. Now this is called artistical. Of speeches then there is the political, the oratorical, the private, the dialectical, and the artistical.

[88.] Musical science is divided into three kinds: one is by the mouth alone, such as singing; the second by means of the mouth and hands, such as playing on, and singing to, the harp; the third is by means of the hands alone, such as harp-playing. Of musical science then there is one kind by the mouth alone; another, by the mouth and hands; and another, by the hands.

[89.]¹ Nobility² of birth is divided into four kinds: one is, when the ancestors were ³persons of a beautiful (body) and of a fine (mind),³ ⁴and just⁴ persons say that their descendants are nobly born; another is, when the ancestors possessed power and were rulers, the descendants of these likewise persons call nobly born; and another, when the ancestors obtained a name, for instance, from generalship, (or)⁵ contests, ⁶crowned with garlands,⁶ the descendants of these likewise we call nobly born; and there is another kind, when a man is himself of a noble soul ⁷[and of a great soul].⁷ And this man persons say is nobly born; and indeed of nobility of

¹ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *ἅλλο εἶδος*—a little below.

² Plato no where, says Aldobrandinus, touches upon these different kinds of noble birth.

³ Such is the proper translation of *καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ*.

⁴ As there is no allusion to the *καὶ δίκαιοι* in the subsequent summary, those words ought to be omitted, unless it be said that they are included in the *ἐλευθεροί*.

⁵ I have introduced *ἢ*, required by the sense.

⁶ By these were meant the conquerors at any of the four public games in Greece.

⁷ The words *καὶ* (or *ἢ*) *μεγάλου ψυχῆς* are evidently an explanation of *γεννάδας*.

birth this is the best.¹ Of nobility of birth then there is one kind derived from ancestors of probity; another from those in power; another from those in great repute; and another from a person's own greatness of soul.²

[89.]³ Beauty is divided into three⁴ kinds; one is that, which is a subject of praise, as the beauty of form, (perceived) by the sight; another, as an object of utility, as any instrument or dwelling, and such like things, beautiful in respect to their use; and things, which, as regards laws and pursuits, and such like, are beautiful on the ground of a benefit. Of beauty then there is one kind on the score of praise; another, on that of utility; and another, on that of benefit.

[90.] The soul is divided into three⁵ parts; for one part is rational; another, concupiscible; and another, irascible. Of these the rational is the cause of consulting, and calculating, and reflecting, and of all such like acts; the concupiscible part of the soul is the cause of desiring to eat, and of having sexual intercourse, and of such like acts; and the irascible part is the cause of feeling boldness, and joy, and sorrow, and anger. Of the soul then there is one part, rational; another, concupiscible; and another, irascible.

[91.]⁶ Of perfect virtue there are four⁷ kinds; one, prudence; another, justice; the third, fortitude; the fourth, temperance. Of these, prudence is the cause of doing things correctly; justice, of acting justly in our intercourse and dealings with (each other); fortitude, of not being out of our wits⁸ in dangers and things of dread, but remaining (in them); and temperance, of mastering our desires, and of not being

¹ Menage aptly compares Juvenal's "Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus."

² As the *καλοκαγαθία* belongs to the first kind of nobly-born, while the last is described as *γεννάδας τὴν ψυχὴν*, it is evident the author wrote *μεγαλοψυχίας*— what I have translated: while *τῆς καλοκαγαθίας* should be inserted before *προγόνων ἐπιτεκῶν*—

³ This section is united in Menage's ed. to the preceding.

⁴ See § 79, n. 1—.

⁵ On these three parts see Rep. ix. p. 571, D., and 580, E.

⁶ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *τούτων ἡ φρόνησις*, a little below.

⁷ These four kinds are called the cardinal virtues. See at Menex. § 20, n. 31.

⁸ The Greek is *ἐξίστασθαι κοῦιν*: where Emper would omit *κοῦιν*. He should have suggested rather *ἀπογνοῖα*— "through despondency."

the slave of any pleasure, and of living orderly. Of virtue then there is one kind, prudence; another, justice; a third, fortitude; a fourth, temperance.

[92.]¹ Ruling power is divided into five kinds; one, according to law; one, according to nature; and one, according to custom; a fourth, according to family; and a fifth, according to violence. The rulers then in states, when they have been chosen by the citizens, rule according to law. They, who rule according to nature, not only amongst men, but animals likewise, are the males; for the males for the most part rule every where the females. The rule according to custom is of such a kind, as boy-leaders have over children, and teachers over their disciples.² The rule according to family is of such a kind, as the kings at Lacedæmon³ possess; 'for the kingly power comes from a certain family';⁴ and after the same manner persons bear sway in Macedonia; for there the kingly power is appointed from a family. But if persons rule over unwilling⁵ citizens by violence, or over willing by fraud,⁶ a rule of this kind is said to be according to violence. Of rule then there is one kind according to law; another, according to nature; another, according to family; and another, according to violence.

[93.] Of oratory there are six kinds. For when (speakers) bid (a state)⁶ to make war against, or alliance with, any one, such a kind is called a drawing-on; but when they require it not to make war or an alliance, but to keep quiet, such a kind is a drawing-off. The third kind of oratory is, when a person says he has been injured by some one, and shows such a one to have been the cause of many evils. Now this kind is called an accusation. The fourth kind of oratory is called a defence, when a person shows he has injured no one,⁷ nor

¹ This section begins in Menage's ed. a little below, with *οὐ μὴν οὐν*—

² In Greek *τῶν ποιῶντων*, literally, "those who go them." But Hesych. has *ποιητῆς μαθητής*.

³ See at § 82, n. ².

⁴ The words between the numerals are perfectly unnecessary.

⁵ Such is evidently what the balance of the sentence requires. Hence I have translated, as if *ἡ ἐκόντων* had dropt out after *ἀκόντων*. For thus *ἀκόντων* would refer to *βαστάμενοι*, and *ἐκόντων* to *παρὰ-προσάμενοι*.

⁶ I have introduced "a state," required by the sense and syntax, especially as *πόλιν* might easily have been lost before *πολεμῶν*.

⁷ I have translated, as if the Greek were *μηδὲν*—not *μηδὲν*—

done any thing out of the way. Now this kind persons call a defence. The fifth kind of oratory is, when one shows a person to be of a beautiful (body) and of fine (mind). Now this kind is called a praising. The sixth kind, is when one shows a person to be ill-favoured (in body and mind). Now this is called a blaming. There are then of oratory one kind, ¹a praising; another, a blaming; another, a drawing-on; another, a drawing-off; another, an accusation; and another, a defence.¹

[94.]² To speak correctly is divided into four kinds; one is, to speak what is requisite; and one, to speak how much is requisite; the third, to speak to whom it is requisite; and the fourth, to speak when it is requisite. ³As to what is requisite, it is meet³ to speak, what is about to benefit the speaker and hearer. As to how much is requisite, to speak neither more nor less than what is sufficient. As to whom it is requisite to speak, if (a person) addresses his elders in error,⁴ it is meet to address fitting language (to them) as (being) older; but if younger persons, it is meet to address fitting (language to them) as being younger. ⁵As to when it is requisite, it is meet⁵ to speak neither before nor after⁶ (it is fitting);⁶ or else ⁷that he will be in error and speak ill.⁷

[95.]⁸ Kindness is divided into four (forms). For (it is shown) either in purse, or person, or by science, or words. In purse, when a person, ⁹being in easy circumstances,⁹ assists

¹— In this summary the different kinds are strangely inverted.

² This section begins in Menage's ed. with *πικρατον εἶδος*, a little above.

³— I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἂ μὲν οὖν δεῖ, δεῖ λέγειν—* not *ἂ μὲν οὖν δεῖ λέγειν—*

⁴ Meric Casaubon, with whom Menage agrees, would expunge *ἀμαρτάνοντα*. But Menage says it is defended by Bochart, who refers to Chrysostom's Homily on Timotheus—*Πρεσβυτέρω μὴ ἐπιπλήξῃς—* ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πρὸς πατέρα προσειχθείης ἀμαρτόντα, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνον διαλέγῃς. At all events *τις* has been lost after *ἀμαρτάνοντα*—

⁵— The Greek is at present *πηνικά δὲ λέγειν ἴσθι*— It was originally *πηνικά δὲ δεῖ, λέγειν ἴσθι*— what I have translated.

⁶— I have translated, as if *οὐ δεῖ* had dropt out before *εἰ δεῖ*—

⁷— Such is the literal version of the Greek. But as Stephens makes mention of a various reading, *οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἰπεῖν* in lieu of *καὶ κακῶς ἰπεῖν*, perhaps the author wrote *διαμαρτήσασθαι ἵκων ὁρθῶς ἰπεῖς*—i. e. "you will correctly say that he will be in error."

⁸ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *τὸ δὲ πρὸς οὗς*, a little below.

⁹— I have adopted Casaubon's *εὐπορήσας* in lieu of *εὐπορήσαι*.

a party begging money; in person parties act kindly towards each other, when, being present, they assist those, who are being beaten; while they, who give instruction, and medicine, and teach any good thing, benefit by their science; but when one goes to a court of justice, and assists another, and makes a proper speech in his behalf, he does a kind act by words. Of kindness then there is one form in purse; another in person; another by science; and another by words.

[96.]¹ The end of things is divided (by him) into four kinds. Things have an end according to law, when a decree is proposed and a law ratifies it. Things have an end according to nature, (such as) a day, and a year, and the seasons. Things have an end according to art, as house-building; for a person puts the finish to a dwelling; and as ship-building, for ²(a person puts the finish to)³ vessels. There is an end to things according to accident; when they turn out in a different manner, and not as one fancies. There is then an end of things according to law, and nature, and art, and accident.

[97.]³ Power is divided into three kinds; one, when⁴ we are able, by the thinking faculty, to calculate and reflect; another, (when) by the body, for instance, to walk, and to give, and receive, and (to do) such like acts; a third, when⁵ we are able by the multitude of soldiers and wealth (to rule);⁶ from whence he, who has much power, is called a king; but the fourth is a division of power, ⁷in suffering and doing well and ill;⁷ for instance, we are able to be in bad health,⁸ and to be instructed, and to be in good health, and all such like things.⁸ Of power then there is one kind, in the thinking

¹ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *οὐ δὲ παιδεύοντες*, a little above.

² I have supplied the words requisite for the sense.

³ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *κατὰ φύσιν*, a little above.

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were *δυνάμει*, not *δυνάμει*.

⁵ Here again I have substituted *δυνάμει* for *δυνάμει*.

⁶ The train of ideas evidently shows that *βασιλεύειν*, or something similar, has dropt out after *χρημάτων*—

⁷ I have adopted the correction of Menage, *πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ κακῶς*.

⁸ The words between the numerals ought to be thus arranged and read in the Greek—*καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ παιδεύεσθαι εὖ καὶ κάκιστα, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*, instead of *καὶ παιδεύεσθαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*.

faculty ; another, in the body ; another, in an encampment¹ and wealth ; and another, in doing and suffering.

[98.] Of philanthropy there are three kinds ; one exists by being of an easy address,² as when some persons accost all they happen to meet,³ and, throwing out the right hand, give them a greeting ;³ another kind is, when a person affords assistance to every one in misfortune ; another kind⁴ [of philanthropy]⁴ is, when persons are liberal in feastings. Of philanthropy then there is one kind, in addressing ; another, in acting kindly ; and another, in feasting and being fond of society.

[99.]⁵ Felicity is divided into five parts. One is in well planning ; another, in a sound state of the senses, and in bodily health ; the third is in good fortune in one's doings ; the fourth in a good repute amongst men ; and the fifth in an abundance of means, and of things useful for life. (Of these) well-planning comes from instruction and from being skilled in many matters ; a sound state of the senses from the members of the body, as when a person sees with his eyes, and hears with his ears, and perceives with his nose and mouth, what he should perceive. Now a thing of this kind is a sound state of the senses. And good fortune is,⁶ when a person proceeds in the right road to what he is aiming at, and accomplishes,⁶ what it is meet for a man, who is in earnest, to do. And good repute is, when a person hears himself well spoken of. And abundance of means is, when a person is so situated with respect to the use of things in life, that he can benefit friends and indulge in expense on a large scale and in an easy manner. Now he, in whom all these circumstances meet, is completely happy. Of felicity then, well-planning is

¹ Such is the literal meaning of *στρατόπεδον*. But it is sometimes taken in the sense of *στράτευμα*, "an army."

² I have adopted Casaubon's correction, *εὐπροσηγορίας* in lieu of *προσηγορίας*—

³ Menage quotes from Plautus—"me benignius Omnes salutant—copulantur dexterās—" He might have added Aristoph. Plut. 784, *ἡσπάζοντο καὶ ἑδέξινοντο*.

⁴ The words between the brackets are quite superfluous.

⁵ This section in Menage's edition begins with *ἡ μὲν εὐβουλία*, a little lower.

⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὅταν ὡς ἐφ' ἃ σκοπεῖ κατ' ὁρθὴν, πράξῃ*—not *ὅταν ἐφ' ἃ σκοπεῖ πράξῃ κατ' ὁρθὴν*. But *ἐφ' ἃ* would require to be united to a verb of motion.

one part; a sound state of the senses and bodily health another; and another, good fortune; another, good repute; and another, an abundance of means.

[100.] Arts are divided into three (kinds), first, second, and third. The first is, that of mining for minerals, and of felling wood; for they are preparative: (the second)¹ is that of the smith and carpenter; for they are shape-giving; since from iron the smith forms arms, and from wood the carpenter pipes and lyres: and (the third)² is that of the party using materials, as the horseman makes use of reins; the warrior of arms; and the musician of pipes and a lyre. Of art then there are three kinds; that, which is the first; that, which is the second; and that, which is the third.

[101.] The good is divided into four kinds. One of which we say is in a person possessing virtue, peculiarly a good; another we speak of, as being a good in itself, namely, virtue and justice; (we speak) of the third, as, for example, food, and suitable exercise, and drugs; the fourth good we say is such a thing, as the art of the piper, and of the actor, and such like. Of the good then there are four kinds; one, to possess virtue; another is, virtue itself; a third is, food, and useful exercise; and a fourth good we say is, the art of the piper, and actor, and poet.³

[102.] Of existing things some are bad, some good, and some neither one or the other. Of these we say those are bad, which are able to do ever a mischief, such as intemperance, and thoughtlessness, and injustice, and such like things. But the opposites to these are good. ⁴But some things are able at one time to benefit, and at another to do a mischief, as to walk, and to sit down, and to eat; or wholly unable to either benefit or hurt; and these are neither good nor bad.⁴ Of existing things then, some are good, some bad, and some neither the one or the other.

[103.] A good state of law is divided into three kinds; one, when the laws are ⁵carefully made,⁵ we say is a good state of

¹ I have supplied here and in ² the words that seem necessary for the sense.

² Since the poet is not mentioned by name before, he must be considered as included in the general expression *kai ra poiata*.

³ Compare Gorgias, p. 467, D. § 52.

⁴ Such seems to be the meaning of *συνδαίον*, which is not elsewhere, if I rightly remember, applied to *νόμοι*.

law ; another, when the citizens abide by the laws laid down ; and this we say is a good state of law ; the third, when, although there are not laws, yet persons conduct themselves correctly as citizens, according to custom and (proper) pursuits ; and this we call a good state of law. Of a good state of law then, one kind is, that laws be carefully made ; another, that persons abide by existing laws ; and a third, when they conduct themselves as citizens according to custom and proper pursuits.

A bad state of law is divided into three kinds ; one of which is, when the laws are bad, as regards ¹strangers and citizens ; ¹another, when persons do not obey the existing (laws) ; and another, when there is no law at all. Of a bad state of law then, one kind is in there being bad laws ; another, in persons not obeying those that exist ; and a third, in there being no law.

[104.]² Opposites are divided into three kinds—as we say that good things are opposite to bad ; and ³justice to injustice, and prudence to imprudence, and such like ; and that bad things likewise are opposite to bad, (such as) prodigality to illiberality,⁴ and the being unjustly put on the rack to being treated so justly ; and such like ⁵[bad things are the opposite to bad] ; ⁵ ⁶and some, as being neither the one nor the other, are opposite to those, that are neither the one nor the other, as for instance, the being poor to the being rich ; for each by itself is neither good nor bad ; and similarly opposite is light to heavy, and quick to slow.⁶ Of opposites then, some things,

¹— The strangers are here strangely mentioned before the citizens.

² This section begins in Menage's ed. with *ἑτερον δὲ, ἰδὺν*—a little above.

³ In lieu of *ὥς*, the sense requires *καὶ*— On the confusion in those words, see Markland on Iph. A. 173.

⁴ The flow of ideas evidently leads to *τῇ ἀνελευθερίᾳ*, instead of *καὶ τὴν ἀνελευθερίαν*—

⁵— The words between the numerals, *κατὰ κακοῖς ἰαντία ἴσσι*, are clearly superfluous after the preceding *κατὰ δὲ κακοῖς ἰαντία εἶναι*.

⁶— The words between the numerals are made out of two readings ; one found in ed. Steph., *τὰ δὲ, ὥς οὐδετέρως οὐδέτερα, οἷον τὸ πίνεσθαι τῇ πλουτεῖν· ἐκάτερον γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὐτε κακόν· ἰαντία δὲ ὅμως· τὸ δὲ βαρὺ*— and the other in ed. Menag., where all those words are omitted, while the following period is closed with *ὥς οὐδέτερα οὐδετέρως ἰαντία ἴσσι*— and hence it is easy to see that the author wrote *τὰ*

as being good, are opposite to bad; and some, as being bad, (are opposite) to bad; and some, as being neither one nor the other, (are opposite) to those that are neither one nor the other.

[105.]¹ Of good things there are three kinds; some are to be had, some to be shared in, some (meet) to be in existence. Those to be had are, as many as it is possible to have, such as justice and health; those to be shared are, as many as it is not possible to have, but of which it is possible to have a share; for instance, it is not possible to have the good itself, but it is possible to have a share of it; and those (meet) to be in existence are as many as it is not possible either to have a share of them or to have, but as many as are meet to be in existence; for example, to be earnest in a matter and just: now these things it is possible neither to have nor to share in them, but they are meet to be in existence.² [to be earnest in a matter and just.]³ Of good things then some are to be had, some to be shared in, and some (meet) to be in existence.

[106.]³ Counselling is divided into three (kinds). One is taken from the past, one from the future, and one from the present. Things (taken) from the past are examples, as—“What did the Lacedæmonians suffer by trusting?”⁴ Things

ὅτι ὡς οὐδέντετρα οὐδέντετρος ἰσχυρία ἴσχυι, οἷον τὸ κίνεσθαι τῷ κλυεῖν οὐδέντετρον γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὐτ' κακὸν ἰσχυρία δ' ὁμοίως τὸ τε βαρὺ—The reading of ed. Steph. has been followed by E. Smith in his version—“Thirdly, where there is a contrariety between things neither good nor bad, as poverty and riches; for neither are good in themselves, yet contrary one to another. In like manner ponderosity and levity, swift and slow,” &c., p. 59.

¹ This section begins in Menage's ed. with τῶν ἰσχυρίων ἀπα—in the preceding period.

² The words between the numerals are evidently superfluous.

³ This section begins in Menage's ed. with τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπα—in the preceding period.

⁴ I confess I do not know to what circumstance the author is alluding, unless it be the one mentioned by Thucydides in v. 45, relating to the trick played upon the Spartan ambassadors by Alcibiades, in whose words they placed too implicit confidence. Still less do I know how the following words crept into the Latin translation—before τὴν ἔραστον—“quid pruden-ter egerit (gens) ut caveamus;” from which came the version of E. Smith, “The time past affords us examples, when we consider what the Lacedæmonians suffered through their over-confidence; what they bravely acted for our imitation.”

from the present; as for instance, ¹"to show that the walls are weak, the people cowards, (and) bread-corn¹ scarce." Things from the future, ²"Not to do wrong through suspicion to an embassy, lest Greece should be in bad repute."² In counselling then there are matters (taken) from the past, the present, and the future.

[107.] Voice is divided into two (kinds); one is with life, and one without life; that with life is of living beings, that without life is sounds and noises. Of voice with life one kind is expressed by letters, and one not expressed by letters. That expressed by letters is of men; that not expressed by letters is of animals. ³Of voice then there is one with life, and one without life.³

[108.]⁴ Of existing things, some are divisible and some indivisible. And of the divisible, some are with similar parts, some with dissimilar parts. Now the indivisible are as many as have no division, or are not composed of something; as for instance, unity, a point, and a sound; but the divisible are as many as are composed of something; as for instance, syllables, and concords, and animals, and water,⁵ and gold. Now those with similar parts are as many as are composed of similar things, and where the whole differs in nothing from the part, except in multitude; as for instance, water, and gold, and every thing that is fusible,⁶ and such like; but those with dissimilar parts are as many as are composed of dissimilar parts; as for instance, a dwelling and such like things. Of existing things then some are divisible and some indivisible;⁷ and of the divisible some are with similar parts and some with dissimilar parts.

¹ Here I am quite at a loss as to the event alluded to.

² Here again I must leave for others to discover what the author is alluding to.

³ To complete the summary one would have expected to find *ὑγρὰ μῆκος* after *ἐμψυχος*, and *ἀγρὰ μῆκος* after *ἀψυχος*.

⁴ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *καὶ ὁμοιομερῆ*—somewhat further on.

⁵ This introduction of water seems very strange here amongst the things that are composed of something. One would have expected rather *δένδρα* in lieu of *ὕδωρ*—

⁶ I have adopted Huebner's correction, *χυρὸν* for *ρυχόν*—

⁷ Instead of *ἀμερῆ* one would have preferred *ἀμίεστα*, given as a var. lect. by Stephens, as better opposed to *μερίστα*.

[109.]¹ Of things existing some are spoken of² with reference to themselves, and some with reference to another thing. Those that are spoken of with reference to themselves, are as many as do not need any thing in the way of explanation. Now these would be a man, a horse, and the rest of animals; for of these not one is currently understood by means of an interpretation; but of those that are spoken of with reference to another³ thing (there are) as many as need some explanation; as for instance, that which is greater than something, and that which is quicker than something, and that which is more beautiful (than something),⁴ and the like. For the greater is greater than the less, and the quicker (than the slower).⁵ Of things then existing some are spoken of with reference to themselves, and some with reference to another⁶ thing. And so too the first is divided according to Aristotle.⁷

There was likewise another Plato,⁸ a philosopher of Rhodes, a disciple of Panætius, as Seleucus the grammarian says in the first book "On Philosophy;" and another, a Peripatetic, a disciple of Aristotle; ⁹and another, (a son) of Praxiphanes, and a writer of the old comedy.⁹

¹ This section begins in Menage's ed. with *τῶν δὲ πρὸς τι*—a little lower.

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἄλλο λεγόμενα*, not *λίσσεται*.

³ Here, as in (²), *ἄλλο* seems to have dropt out.

⁴ After *εἰλλιον* I have inserted, what the balance of the sentence evidently requires.

⁵ Here too the train of ideas demands, not *τινος*, but *βραδύτερος*—what I have translated.

⁶ See at ² and ³.

⁷ In lieu of *Ἀριστοτέλην*, one would prefer *Ἀριστοτέλειον*— See at § 82, note.

⁸ Perhaps to this Plato is to be attributed some of the spurious dialogues.

⁹ The words between the numerals are thus rendered by E. Smith, "And one more, the son of Praxiphanes, a comic poet, that wrote after the ancient manner of freedom, without respect of persons, in imitation of Aristophanes." With regard to the comic writer being the son of Praxiphanes, Meineke appears to doubt it; at least he has not mentioned it in his *Histor. Critic. Comic. Græcor.*, nor has Fabricius in *Biblioth. Græc.*, nor Cobet in his *Observat. Crit. in Platonis Comici Reliquias*.

THE
LIFE OF PLATO,
BY
HESYCHIUS OF MILETUS.

PLATO the philosopher is said to have never undergone even once the marriage-state or sexual intercourse. And they say that his mother became pregnant from a divine vision when Apollo appeared to her; but when she had brought forth Plato, that then her husband cohabited with her, and that being with ¹broad shoulders or face he was called Plato;¹ but some assert that he was so called from being ²broad in his discourses.³ Hence Timon, while ridiculing him, says in his Farical verses—

The broadest man led all, but with sweet voice
He talk'd, the picture of the Tettix kind,
That settling on the trees of Hecademus,
Their pleasant note pour forth—

For the spot, which (is now) Academia, was formerly called Hecademia. He made for himself a mingling of the doctrines of Heracleitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates. For on things, perceptible by the senses, he philosophized according to Heracleitus; on those, perceptible by mind, according to Pythagoras; but on those, relating to politics, according to Socrates. He was likewise much indebted to Epicharmus. For Epicharmus³ says—"The wise assert that the soul perceives some things through the body; as, for example, by

¹ To understand this remark the reader should bear in mind that the Greek for "broad" is πλατ-υς, a word very similar to πλατ-ων.

²—³ If my emendation of *ειρωνειας* for *ειρωνειας*, in Diogen. L. § 4, be correct, we must read here γίλῳσι in lieu of λόγους.

³ In Diogen. L. § 12, this saying is attributed to Alcimus.

hearing and seeing; but on other things it reflects itself by itself, without making any use of the body: and hence, of the things that exist, some are perceptible by the senses, and some by the mind." On which account Plato has said that it is requisite for those, who desire to look into the principles of the Universe, to separate, in the first place, ideas, themselves by themselves, such as similitude, and unity, and number, and magnitude, and rest, and motion: secondly, to lay down itself by itself, beauty, and goodness, and justice, and such kind of things: and, thirdly, to look into such of the ideas as have a relation to each other, to wit, science, or magnitude, or arbitrary power, and to consider that what are with us have the same name as those, through their participating in them—I mean, that things are just, such as (participate in) the abstractedly just; and are beautiful, such as (participate in) the abstractedly beautiful; and that each of the species is eternal, and a notion,¹ and, moreover, not subject to circumstances. Hence he says likewise that ideas exist² in nature, as if they were patterns; and that the rest of things are like to them, as being their resemblances. Epicharmus too thus expresses himself touching the abstractedly good, and ideas—

Seems not the case then to be thus about
The good? that of itself it is a thing;
And he, who learning knows it, good becomes;
Just as a piper, who has learnt to pipe,
Or to dance has a dancer learnt, or some
Weaver to weave, or what you will of trades
Like these, himself's the artist, not the art.

Plato accompanied Chabrias, the general, on trial for a capital charge, when not one of the citizens was willing to do so; and when Crobylus the informer met him as he was going up, together with Chabrias, to the Acropolis, and said—"Art thou come to plead on the side of another, not knowing that the hemlock of Socrates awaits thee?" he replied—"When too I served in the army for the sake of fatherland, I endured dangers; and now for the sake of duty on account of a friend I will endure them." But though he was such a kind of

¹ Although *νόημα* is found both here and in Diogen. L. § 13, yet one would prefer in both places *νοητὸν*, as suggested there by Menage.

² I have followed Fischer, in changing *ἰστένας* into *ἰστένας*, as read in Diogen. L. § 13.

person, he was nevertheless scoffed at by the writers of comedy. At least Theopompus says—

For one is none,
And two, as Plato holds, is scarcely one;

and Anaxandrides too in his "Theseus"—

When olives he devoured, that Plato loves;

and Timon likewise, while thus playing on the letters (of his name)—

As Plato plaits, in plaited wonders skill'd.

Alexis in "Meropis"—

Thou'rt come in time; since I, in doubtings tost,
Am walking up and down, and, Plato-like,
Find nought that's wise, but merely tire my feet;

and in "Ancylicon"—

A. Thou speak'st of what thou knowest not one jot.

B. Mind has with Plato been a-running.

A. Know'st thou,

What is a pound, and onions what?

B. Not I.

Amphis in "Amphicrates"—

A. What is the good, which you are about to have
Through her, I know still less than does my master
Of the good in Plato.

On questions which he comprehended, Plato exhibits his opinions; and falsehoods he confutes; but on points that are uncertain he holds back. And what he has made up his mind upon, he exhibits by means of four characters, Socrates, Timæus ¹ the Athenian Guest, and the one from Elea; ¹ but amongst those confuted for falsehoods he introduces Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, (and) Gorgias. He asserted that the principle of the soul was arithmetical, but of the body, geometrical; and he defined it to be an idea of a breath standing apart on every side, and that it is self-moved ² and tripartite. ²

¹—¹ The words between the numerals have been properly supplied by Fischer, from Diogen. L. § 52, and so have those between (²—²) from § 67.

THE
LIFE OF PLATO,
BY
OLYMPIODORUS.

COME then, let us speak of the family of the philosopher, not for the sake of prolixity,¹ but of benefit rather and instruction to those, who betake themselves to him. For he was not "a Nobody,"² but rather—

¹ To many of mankind he was a care.³

For Plato is said to have been a son of his father Ariston, the son of Aristocles, from whom he carried up his family to Solon, the law-giver; and hence he wrote, in imitation of his ancestor, the Laws in twelve books, and a Political Constitution in eleven.⁴ He came into the world by his mother Perictioné, who was descended from Neleus, the son of Codrus.⁵ For they say that Apollo in a vision had an intercourse with his mother Perictioné, and, appearing in the night to Ariston, ordered him to have no connexion with Perictioné until the time of her bringing forth.⁶ And so he acted. And his pa-

¹ I have adopted *πολυηχοίας*, suggested by Windet, instead of *πολυροίας*.

² Here is an allusion to the name *Οὐτις*, assumed by Ulysses to enable him to deceive the Cyclops. It has been twice restored to Plato by myself; once in Hipp. Maj. § 24, and again in Alcibiad. II. § 23.

³ Here too is an allusion to *Od. A. 177*.

⁴ How this number is to be made up, it is difficult to state distinctly. Perhaps Olympiodorus meant to unite the Critias with the 10 books of the Republic.

⁵ According to Diogen. L. iii. 1, and Apuleius, the father, not the mother, was a descendant of Codrus.

⁶ I have adopted *ἀπορήσεις*; similar to *ἀπονήσεις* in Diogen. § 2, as suggested by Windet, for *ἀποράσεις*.

rents taking him after his birth, and when he was still an infant, placed him on Mount Hymettus, intending to make a sacrifice to the deities there, namely, Pan, and the Nymphs, and Apollo, who presides over shepherds. But while he was lying there, bees came and filled his mouth with honey from the comb, in order that it might be said¹ truly of him—

‘From his mouth flow’d a voice than honey far
More sweet.’²

And he calls himself³ on every side and⁴ a fellow-slave with the swans, as if he had proceeded⁴ from Apollo; for the bird belongs to Apollo. In early life he first went as a pupil to Dionysius the grammar-master, to learn the common course of instruction, of whom he has made mention in the Rivals, in order that Dionysius might not be without a share of remembrance on the part of Plato. After him he made use of Ariston the Argive, as his master in gymnastics, by whom, as they say, his name was changed into Plato, having been previously called Aristocles, after his grandfather; and he was called Plato, from his having two parts of his body very wide, namely, his breast and forehead, as his likeness proves, put up every where with such a representation. But others assert that it was not for this reason his name was changed, but on account of the breadth, and diffuseness, and openness of the style adopted⁵ by him; just as they say that Theophrastus, who was previously called Tyrtamus, had his name changed to⁶ Theophrastus on account of the divine nature of

¹ In lieu of γίνηται, the sense evidently requires λέγεται— what I have translated.

² This description is applied to Nestor in *Il. A.* 249.

³ Since Plato, in the person of Socrates, calls himself only once in *Phædon*, p. 85, B. § 78, ὁμόδουλος—τῶν κύκνων, there is probably some error in παντόθεν— from which it would be easy to elicit θεράποντα θεοῦ— and to confirm the correction by *Phædon*, § 77, οἱ κύκνοι—τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος θεράποντες μαντικοί τ' εἰσὶ— for so we must read in lieu of the unintelligible ὄντες, for Plato had a little before spoken of τῶν κύκνων—οἱ γεγηθότες, ὅτι μίλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀτίναί, οὐπὲρ εἰσι θεράποντες—

⁴ Instead of προσελθὼν, Windet has suggested, what I have adopted, προελθὼν—

⁵ So I have translated ἀνακτιμένον— although I know of no other passage where that verb has such a meaning.

⁶ To understand this, the reader should know that Θεόφραστος is compounded of Θεός, “god,” and φραστός, “spoken.”

his language.⁶ For his music-master he had Dracon, the pupil of Damon,¹ of whom he has made mention in the Republic. These were the three things the boys at Athens were taught, [I mean]² grammar, music, and wrestling, not simply for themselves; but grammar, to embellish the language, natural to them; music, to tame violent passions;³ and wrestling and gymnastics, to strengthen the relaxed state of desire.⁴ In these three points Alcibiades appears to have been instructed by him;⁵ and hence Socrates says to him, "But to play on the pipe you were not willing," and what follows.⁶ (Plato) went likewise to painters,⁷ from whom he derived some benefit in the mixing of colours, of which he has made mention in the Timæus. Subsequently he received instructions from the writers of tragedy likewise, who were considered⁸ to be the instructors of Greece; and he went to them for the sake of the moral and solemn style of tragedy, and the heroical nature of their subjects (selected by them); and he made an acquaintance with the dithyrambic poets, for the honour of Dionysus, who was said to be the superintendent of generation;⁹ for to that deity the Dithyramb is sacred, from whom likewise it had its name; for Dionysus is Dithy-

¹ Windet was the first to correct Δάμνος into Δάμωνος: of whom, as Fischer observes, Plato has made frequent mention.

² The words *φημι δὲ* appear to be interpolated. For after *τρία—ταῦτα*, the three things alluded to are elsewhere mentioned at once, without the intervention of *φημι δὲ*—answering to "scilicet" in Latin, and "to wit" in English.

³ Of the power of music to allay violent feelings the most facetious proof is given in the Epigram—

Music hath charms to soothe the savage beast;
And therefore fitted for a city feast.

⁴ In lieu of *ἐπιθυμίας* one would prefer *ἀποθυμίας*, "despondency," as better suited to *χαλαρόν*.

⁵ This *κατ' αὐτῷ* has nothing to which it can be referred. Olympiodorus wrote, I suspect, *παρ' αὐτῷ*, "straightway"—

⁶—The passage alluded to is in Alcib. I. § 7.

⁷ The same fact is told by Apuleius.

⁸ I have translated, as if the Greek were *νομιομένους* in lieu of *δοξαζομένους*—Compare Xenoph. K. II. i. 6, 12, *τοῖς στρατηγικοῖς ἀνδράσι νομιζομένοις εἶναι*.

⁹ How Dionysus could be said to be *ἐφορος τῆς γενέσεως*, I cannot understand, except with reference to the proverb—"Sine Baccho et Cerere friget Venus." Perhaps the author wrote *γυνέσεως*—so Virgil—"Lætitias Bacchus dator."

rambus, as having proceeded from ¹two doors, namely, Semele and the thigh of Jupiter.¹ For the ancients were wont to call things caused by the names of the causing; as they call Dionysus² likewise: and hence Proclus says on this subject—

Parents,³ from what they see (and know),⁴
Upon their children names bestow.

Now that Plato exercised himself in Dithyrambics is evident from the *Phædrus*, a dialogue that breathes very much⁵ of a dithyrambic style; inasmuch as Plato wrote, as reported, that dialogue the first. He took likewise great delight in Aristophanes, the comic writer, and in Sophron; from whom he benefited in his imitation of the characters in his dialogues. And he is reported to have been so delighted, that, when he was dead, (copies of) Aristophanes and Sophron were found on his couch; and he made himself this epigram upon Aristophanes—

'The Graces, when they wish'd to find
A shrine, that should for ever live,
Said, what they sought, alone the mind
Of Aristophanes could give.'

And he made fun of Aristophanes in his dialogue (called) the *Banquet*, as having derived some benefit in the style of comedy. For after making him hymn the god of Love, he introduces him as seized ⁷during (the conversation)⁷ with hiccups, and unable to finish the hymn. He composed likewise Tragic and Dithyrambic poetry, and some other things;

¹—¹ So the Etymol. M. in Διθύραμβος—ἀπὸ τοῦ (διὰ) δύο θύρας βαίνων, τὴν τε κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς Σεμέλης καὶ τὸν μηρὸν τοῦ Διὸς.

² This I confess I cannot understand. The sense seems to require καθάπερ τὸν οἶνον Διόνυσον καλοῦσι—"as they call wine Dionysus"—where wine would be the thing caused, and Dionysus the causer; as shown by Euripides, who says in *Bacch.* 278, ὁ Σεμέλης γόνος Βότρυος ὑγρὸν πᾶσι εὔρε—

³ I have adopted Windet's *τοκῆς*, required by the sense and syntax, in lieu of *τοκῶν*—

⁴ The words "and know" have been added for the rhyme.

⁵ As *πνέειν* requires an accusative, it is evident that *τι* has dropt out before *πνέειν*—

⁶—⁶ The literal translation of the original and another metrical version may be seen in the "Greek Anthology, Prose and Verse," p. 179.

⁷—⁷ I have translated, as if τοῦ λόγου had dropt out between μεταξὺ and λυγγί— See the *Banquet*, § 13.

all of which he burnt, after he had made a trial of an intercourse with Socrates, and pronouncing a verse of this kind—

¹ Come here, Hephaestus, Plato needs thy aid.¹

And a certain Anatolius, a grammarian, on speaking (again)² the verse, was in some repute with Hephaestus, who had been appointed governor of the city;³ for he said to him⁴—

Come here, Hephaestus, Pharus needs thy aid.

They say, moreover, that when Socrates was about to receive him (as a disciple), he saw, as a vision in a dream, that a swan without wings had settled on his knees; and, becoming fledged on the instant, flew up to the sky, and sung something so sweet, that he enchanted all who heard it; and this indicated the future fame of the man. But after the death of Socrates, he again⁵ made use of Cratylus, one of the sect of Heracleitus, as his teacher; on whom he composed the dialogue of that name, inscribing it "Cratylus, or On the Correctness of Names." Afterwards⁶ he sailed to Italy; and finding that Archytas had established there a school of Pythagoreans, he again⁷ had as a teacher the Pythagorean of the same name;⁸ there⁹ he has made mention of Archytas.

But since it is requisite for a philosopher to be fond of seeing the works of Nature, he sailed to Sicily likewise, to view the craters of fire that are in Ætna, and not for the sake of a Sicilian table,¹⁰ as thou, noble¹¹ Aristides,¹² sayest. And,

¹—¹ This is a parody of *Il. Σ. 392*.

² In lieu of *ἐνταῦθα*, the sense requires either *ἐνταῦθις*—what I have translated, or *ἐντεῦθεν*—"in consequence of this"—which would perhaps be preferable.

³ The city was Pharus, as shown by the quoted verse.

⁴ I have adopted Etwall's correction, *ὁ ἱς αὐτὸν*, in lieu of *ὁ αὐτὸν*—

⁵ For Plato, according to Apuleius, had been a disciple of Cratylus, previous to his attendance upon Socrates.

⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ταῦτα*, not *τούτων*—

^{7, 8, 9} I cannot understand either *πάλιν*, or *διέκρινον*, or *ἐνθα*—There is, no doubt, something wanting here, which may perhaps be supplied by the MSS. of this treatise hitherto uncollated; just as the Vienna MS. has filled up two gaps, as will be noticed in their proper places.

¹⁰ By "a Sicilian table" is meant a "luxurious one," as understood by Horace in his "Sicula dapes."

¹¹ This is a strange epithet applied to a person whose statement is called in question. Hence in lieu of *γενναῖς*, one would have expected *γελοία*, "ridiculous"—

¹² The passage of Aristides alluded to is in *Orat. Platon. ii. p. 376, Cant.*

when he was at Syracuse with Dionysius the Great, he endeavoured to change the tyranny there into an aristocracy; for which purpose he had gone to him (Dionysius); and on the latter inquiring of him—Whom do you think amongst men is happy? fancying forsooth that the philosopher would, out of flattery, say that he was, Plato answered that (he thought) Socrates was. (And when) Dionysius asked him again—What do you consider as the business of a statesman? Plato replied—To make the citizens better. (And when) he asked a third time—What then? Does it seem to you a little thing to act the judge correctly?—for Dionysius had a reputation for acting the judge correctly—Plato replied, ¹not lowering his sail ¹a jot—It is indeed a little thing, and of a statesman ²the farthest portion; for they, who act the judge correctly, are like the menders of cloth, who weave up again torn garments. (And when) he asked a fourth time—What is it, think you, ³to be a tyrant? Is it not a brave thing? Plato replied—Of all the most cowardly; since ⁴he fears even the razor ⁴of the barber, lest he should lose his life by it. Whereupon Dionysius, being greatly annoyed, ordered him, while the sun was still above the earth, ⁵to take himself off from Syracuse; and thus was Plato with dishonour ⁵driven out of Syracuse.

Of his second journey to Sicily the reason was this. After the death of Dionysius the Great, Dionysius, the son of Dionysius, succeeded to the kingdom, having Dion for his uncle, who had been a familiar acquaintance of Plato during his first journey. Dion therefore writes to him (saying) that —“If you were now present, there would be ⁶a hope of changing the tyranny into an aristocracy.” For this purpose then, when he had made a second journey, he was falsely accused by the spear-bearing attendants upon Dionysius, how that he was plotting to make over the government to Dion,

¹ Such is the exact meaning of *μηδὲν ὑποστυλάμενος*, similar to “*vail his bonnet*,” in Shakspeare.

² I have followed the suggestion of Hemsterhuis on Thom. Mag. p. 27, who would insert here *πολιτικοῦ*, preserved by Eusebius in Chronic. i. p. 56, ed. Scaliger.

³ I have translated, as if *οἷα* had dropt out before *εἶναι*—

⁴ From *μαχαίρια διαδίδου* Casaubon happily elicited *μαχαίριδια δίδου*. See Pierson on Mærid. p. 259.

⁵ The Vienna MS. has supplied all the words between the numerals.

⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐσται*, not *ἔσσι*—

and to depose Dionysius; when being overpowered, he was by Dionysius delivered over to Pollis of Ægina, who was then trading with Sicily, to be sold. And he carrying Plato to Ægina, found there Anniceris, the Libyan, who was about to sail to Elis for the purpose of entering the contest with a four-horsed car; and meeting with Pollis, he purchased Plato from him, having bought¹ this glory, superior to all the victory of a four-horsed car; respecting whom Aristides² says that no one would have known³ Anniceris, if he had not purchased Plato.

Of his third journey to Sicily this was the motive. Dion, after being proscribed by Dionysius and deprived of his property, was thrown into prison. He writes therefore to Plato, that Dionysius had promised to release him, if Plato would come to him again; when he readily undertook this third journey to assist his friend. And thus much on the travels of the philosopher to Sicily.

It should be known likewise that he went to Egypt to the men of the priesthood there, and learnt from them the science of a priest. Hence he says in the *Gorgias*—⁴“No, by the dog,”—which was a god in Egypt.⁴ For that, which statues mean amongst the Greek, animals do amongst the Egyptians, through being the symbols of each of the gods to whom they are dedicated. Being desirous, moreover, to meet with the Magi, but unable to reach them in consequence of a war raging at that time⁵ in Persia, he departed for Phœnicia; and meeting there with the Magi, he obtained the science of the Magi; and hence he appears in the *Timæus* to be skilled in the art of sacrificing, while speaking of the signs of the liver and entrails, and such like matters. But this ought to have been told⁶ previous to the statement of the causes of his journeys⁷ to Sicily.⁶

¹ In lieu of ἀγοράζοντος, which is perfectly unintelligible, I have translated, as if the Greek were ἀπορροφάοντος, what the sense evidently requires.

² In *Orat. Platon.* 2, t. iii. p. 385, Cant.

³ I have adopted ἐγίγνωσκον δὲ, as suggested by Etwell.

⁴—⁴ On this Socratic oath see my note on *Hipp. Maj.* § 18.

⁵ In lieu of *Θέου*, Casaubon would read *καὶ πόλεως*— He should have suggested *χρόνου*, what I have translated.

⁶—⁶ From this it would seem as if Plato travelled to Egypt and neighbouring countries before he went to Sicily.

⁷ Meric Casaubon would read *τῶν γῆναι* instead of *τῶν* simply.

On his return to Athens he established a school in the Academia, by separating a portion of the Gymnasium for a grove sacred to the Muses; and there Timon, the man-hater, associated with Plato alone. Very many persons did he attract to learning, both men and women in male attire, by preparing them to hear him, and showing them that his philosophy was superior to all love of business. For he freed himself from the irony¹ of Socrates, and from passing his time² in the place of public meeting, and at work-shops,³ and from composing discourses to catch young persons.⁴ He freed himself likewise from the Pythagorean oath,⁵ about keeping their doors closed, and the—"He said it,"⁶ and exhibited himself more like a citizen to all. ⁶After making many his admirers, and benefiting the most of them,⁶ when he was about to die, he had a dream, how that having become a swan,⁷ he went from tree to tree, and caused the greatest trouble to bird-limers. This Simmias, the Socratic philosopher, expounded (by saying) that he would be not caught by those, who after him wished to interpret him; for the interpreters who wanted to catch⁸ the meaning of the ancients were like bird-limers; and not caught he is; since one may take his words, like those of Homer, in a sense physical, moral, ethical, theological, and, (to speak) simply, in a variety of senses. For these two souls are said to be alto-

¹ This seems rather a strange assertion; for the Socratic irony is to be found in all the genuine dialogues, with the exception of the Laws.

²⁻³ This I suspect Plato never did at any time; although it was a frequent practice with Socrates, as we learn from Xenophon.

³ This was the practice of a sophist rather; and hence such a person is ridiculed on this very ground in the dialogue of that name.

⁴ I have adopted *ἄρκου*, suggested by Meric Casaubon, in lieu of *ὄγκου*. The oath alluded to was to not divulge their doctrines to persons who were not Pythagoreans.

⁵ This was the formula adopted by the disciples of Pythagoras, when they alluded to any of the doctrines of their teacher.

⁶⁻⁶ Of all the words between the numerals the original has been hitherto furnished by the Vienna MS. alone, with the exception of the letters *λήσας*, the termination of *ώφελήσας*.

⁷ To this dream of Plato fancying that he had become a swan, is perhaps to be referred the origin of Horace's ode, where he describes a similar transformation of himself into that bird.

⁸ In lieu of *πυρᾶσθαι*, the sense evidently requires *θηρᾶσθαι*, what I have translated. The two verbs are confounded elsewhere, as I have shown at Eurip. Tro. 982.

gether in harmony; and hence 'one may take them both in various senses.'¹

After his decease the Athenians buried him in an expensive manner, and they inscribed upon his tomb—

² These two, Æsculapius and Plato, did Apollo beget;
One, that he might save the soul; the other, the body.³

And thus much respecting the family of the philosopher.

¹ Such is the literal version of the original. But, unless I am mistaken, *δ αἰσῶν* have dropt out after *πατρόθεν*: which could hardly be applied to writers, although it might to what they wrote.

² Of this distich there is a metrical version in p. 199

THE
INTRODUCTION OF ALCINOUS,

TO
THE DOCTRINES OF PLATO.

[1.] *What Philosophy is, and what the person ought to be naturally, who is about to be a Philosopher.*

The teaching of the peculiar opinions of Plato would be something of this kind.

Philosophy is a longing after wisdom, or a release or withdrawal of the soul from the body, while we are turning ourselves to what is perceived by mind, and to things that exist truly. Now Wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human; and the person called a philosopher is so named from it,¹ as a musician is from music. Now it is necessary for such a person to be naturally disposed, in the first place, towards those kinds of learning, that possess the power to fit him for, and lead him to, the knowledge of the existence, perceived by mind, and not of that, ²which wanders about, and is in a state of flowing.³ Next, he must have a love for truth, and by no means admit a falsehood. Moreover, he must be naturally temperate, and, as regards the portion of the soul, ³subject to being affected by circumstances,³ naturally sub-

¹ The Greek is ἀπὸ ταύτης, with the ellipse of φιλοσοφίας, to be got out of φιλόσοφος: a fact not unknown to Ficinus, who has filled up the ellipse, "a philosophia cognomen accipit."

²⁻³ The Heracleitean doctrine, that all things are in a perpetual state of flowing, is here applied to knowledge, according to the sentiment of Solon—

Ever as I grow old, still much I learn.

³⁻³ Such is the periphrase required to understand the full meaning of τὸ παθητικόν in Greek.

duced. For he, who is 'eager after instruction' relating to things existing, and who turns to these his longing, will look upon pleasures² with little admiration. It is requisite too for him, who is about to be a philosopher, to be mentally free. For all little considerations are opposed to the soul, that is about to contemplate³ subjects pertaining to god and man.³ And towards justice likewise it is requisite for him to be naturally disposed, as it is⁴ towards truth and freedom (in thought)⁵ and temperance; and there ought to be in addition an aptitude to learn, and a (good) memory. For these things form the species of a philosopher. Since these naturally good qualities, when they meet with a proper education and fitting aliment, render a person perfect for virtue; but when they are neglected, they become the cause of great mischief. And these Plato was accustomed to call by names similar⁶ to the virtues, temperance, and fortitude, and justice.

[2.] *That as Contemplation takes the lead, Action is necessary and follows.*

Since life is twofold, Contemplative and Active, of the former the chief point lies in the knowledge of truth; but of the latter, in doing what is suggested by reason. The Contemplative life then is the one held in honour, but the Active that which follows and is necessary.⁷ That such is the case will be clear from hence. Contemplation is an operation of the mind, while it is thinking upon⁸ what is perceptible by mind;⁸ but Action is an operation of the rational soul, perfected by means of the body. The soul then, when contemplating the deity and the thoughts of the deity, is said to be in a good state;

¹—¹ Ficinus has "veritatis avidus," as if his MS. read ἀληθεινμάτων in lieu of μαθημάτων.

² Ficinus has "voluptates corporis," what the sense requires; and hence perhaps he found in his MS. οὐ θαυμάζου διὰ σωματικὰς τὰς ἡδονάς.

³—³ Ficinus has "veritatem rerum—"

⁴ I have translated, as if the Greek were ὡς γὰρ, not εἰς γὰρ, which I cannot understand.

⁵ The words, "in thought," are added, to answer to the preceding ἀνυπόθετον—τῇ γνώμῃ.

⁶ Ficinus has "communiori quodam nomine," as if his MS. read κοινωτέρῳ ὀνόματι in lieu of ὁμωνύμως—

⁷ Ficinus has, in lieu of ἀναγκαῖος, the Supplement, "necessariorum—que rerum ministra."

⁸—⁸ Instead of τὰ νοητά, the MS. of Ficinus seems to have read τὰ θεῖα— for his version is "divina—"

and this state goes by the name of intelligence; which a person would say is nothing else than an assimilation with the deity; and hence such would take the lead, and be held in honour, and be prayed for the most,¹ and be the most appropriate (for man);¹ nor is it to be hindered, and is placed in our power;² and it is the cause of the end laid down for us. But Action and the Active, performed through the body, can be hindered³ or may be carried on,³ when the things, which are seen during a contemplative life, require a person to apply them to the moral conduct of man. For he, who is intent upon his duty,⁴ will come to public affairs, when he sees them improperly administered by some persons, through his considering that to act as a general, and a judge, and an ambassador, are⁵ things of circumstances,⁵ but that the best in action, and as taking the lead in it, is that relating to legislation, and statesmanship, and⁶ the regulation and instruction of young persons. It is proper then, from what has been said, for the philosopher to be never deficient in Contemplation,⁷ but to feed it ever and to increase⁸ it,⁹ as being near to his proceeding on⁹ to a life of Action.

[3.] *That the study of the philosopher rests, according to Plato, on three points; on viewing things that exist; on doing what is correct; and on the art of reasoning.*

¹—¹ I have adopted the Supplement found in Ficinus—"necnon hominis quam maxime propria—"

²—² Such is the literal and unintelligible version of ἀκώλυτόν τε καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κείμενον—Ficinus has—"cui nulla obsistunt impedimenta, quominus in nostra potestate consistat—" adopted by Stanley.

³—³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

⁴ Such seems to be the meaning of σπουδαῖος, which embraces the two ideas of haste and earnestness in the Greek word σπουδή. Ficinus has "studiosus disciplinae—"

⁵—⁵ So I have translated περιστατικά— but Ficinus has "admicula quædam quasi externa existimans—" Stanley—"things necessary—"

⁶ I have translated, as if καὶ had dropt out before κατὰστασιν—Ficinus—"præscribere ordinem—" Stanley—"the compression of sedition," thus following in part the reading of ed. pr., κατὰ στάσιν—

⁷ Ficinus has "veritatis indagacionem," which would be in Greek τῆς ἀληθείας ἐρευνήσεως in lieu of τῆς θεωρίας—

⁸ Ficinus has "agere," evidently a typographical error for "augere—"

⁹—⁹ I have translated, as if the Greek were ὡς ἐχόμενον γε τοῦ—χωρεῖν—not ὡς ἐπόμενον δὲ καὶ—χωρεῖν—which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is—"humanas autem actiones tanquam inferiora quædam non nunquam attingere—" in which there is not a single word like the original. On the confusion between ἐπόμενον and ἐχόμενον, see the Statesman, p. 213, n. 63.

The study of the philosopher seems to rest, according to Plato, on three points; on the view and perception of things that exist; on doing what is correct; and on the theory¹ itself of reasoning.

The perception of things that exist is Contemplative; but Practical (science) is concerned about things to be done; and Dialectical about reasoning. Now this last is subdivided into the Distributive, and the Definitive, and the Inductive, and the Syllogistic; and this last into the Demonstrative, which is concerned about the syllogism, which exists of necessity;² and into the Tentative, which is seen in the case of a syllogism, resting on opinion;³ and into the third, Rhetorical, which is concerned about the enthymeme,³ which is called an imperfect syllogism; and still further into Sophisms; ⁴ which would not be that, which takes the lead in the eye of the philosopher, but what is necessary.⁴

Of Practical science one part is seen to be concerned about the care of morals, and another about the regulation of a household, and another relating to the state, and its safety. Of these, the first is called Moral; the second, Economical; the third, Political. Of the Contemplative one portion, relating to what is unmoved and the first cause, and such things as are divine, is called Theological; another portion, relating to the movement of the stars, and their periodical revolutions, and their return to the spot from whence they started, and to the constitution of this world, is Physical; but another portion, viewed by means of geometry and the rest of learning,⁵ is Mathematical.

¹ The Greek word *θεωρία*, which elsewhere means "contemplation," is taken here in the sense of the English "theory" derived from it. Ficinus, however, has "in sermonis considerations"—understanding by *λόγους* not "reason," but "discourse."

² In lieu of the words between the numerals, Ficinus has "et in ostensionem, quæ ratiocinatio probabilis appellatur."

³ After *ἐνθύμημα* Ficinus inserts "id est, sententiam cautam—"

⁴ So I have translated *ὅπερ προηγούμενον οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, ἀναγκαῖον δέ*. The version of Ficinus is—"quibus legitimus philosophus operam dabit non quod ea, ut præcipua, probet, verum quod interdum necessaria fore censeat—" which is far more intelligible than the Greek. Stanley has, "This the philosopher must look upon not as the chiefest, but a necessary part;" which is evidently a guess at the meaning.

⁵ Ficinus has, what is more explicit, "Sequitur Mathematica, quæ Geometricam et Arithmeticam continet."

Such then being the subdivision and portioning out of the kinds of philosophy, we must first speak of the Dialectical, as it is agreeable to the doctrines of Plato; and first of all about the Judicatory.

[4.] *Respecting the faculty of Judging, and the Judicatory powers of the soul.*

Since there is that, which judges, and likewise that, which is judged, there will be also that, which is effected by them, what a person would call judging. Properly one would call the act of judging the judging faculty, but more commonly that which judges. Now this is twofold; one, by which a thing is judged; the other, through which it is. Of which the former would be the intellect that is in us; ¹ the latter, the organ,¹ that is naturally judicatory, ² acting like a leader to what is true; but like a follower after what is false.² Now this organ is nothing else than natural reason. And, as regards things that exist, the philosopher would be called more clearly a judge, by whom things are judged. But reason likewise is a judge, through which the truth is judged, and which we have said is an organ. Now reason is twofold. One is altogether ³ to be not made captive³ and is accurate; the other is not⁴ to be deceived by falsehoods as regards the knowledge of things. The former of these can be attained by god, but not by man; but the latter can be attained by man likewise. Now this is also twofold; one is conversant about things perceptible by mind; the other about things perceptible by a sense; ⁴ of which the one, conversant about things perceptible by mind, is Science and Scientific Reason; but the other, conversant about things perceptible by a sense, is Opinionative and Opinion.⁴ From whence the Scientific possesses ⁵ a firmness and stability, as being conversant with

¹—¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὸ δὲ ἴσθιν ὄργανον*—instead of *τὸ δὲ δὴ' οὐ ὄργανον*—where *δὴ' οὐ* has been interpolated from the preceding *τὸ δὲ δὴ' οὐ*—

²—² Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has “*idque primo vera, secundo loco falsa dijudicat.*”

³—³ Such is the well-defined meaning of *ἀληπτος*. Ficinus has “*incomprehensibilis*”—which is ambiguous; and the same remark is applicable to “*infallibilis*,” his version of *ἀδιάψευστος*.

⁴—⁴ Ficinus has thus abridged all between the numerals—“*prima quidem, scientia est; secunda vero, opinio.*”

⁵—⁵ Here again Ficinus has more briefly—“*illa stabilitatem habet, quippe cum circa stabilia versetur.*”

principles firm and stable;⁵ but ¹the Credible and Opinionative (possess) probability, as being conversant about things not stable.¹

Now of Science, conversant about things perceptible by mind, and of Opinion, conversant about things perceptible by a sense, the principles are Intelligence and Perception. Now Perception is an affection of the soul, that gives, like a leader, by means of the body a previous intimation of a power that has been affected. But when there has been produced in the soul by means of the organs of sense an impression according to its sensation,²[which is a sensation,]² then, in order that (the impression) may not be evanescent, but permanent,³[and preserved]³ the preservation of it is called Memory.⁴ But Opinion is the complication of memory and sensation. For when we meet for the first time with a thing perceptible by a sense, and a sensation is produced in us by it, and from this sensation Memory, and we subsequently meet again with the same thing perceived by a sense, we combine the memory previously brought into action with the sensation produced a second time; and we say within ourselves,⁵⁶ as, for instance, say,⁶ Socrates, (or) a horse, (or) fire, or whatever thing there may be of such a kind. Now this is called Opinion through our combining the recollection brought previously into action with the sensation recently produced. And when these, placed⁷ along each other, agree, a true opinion is produced; but when they ⁸swerve from each other,⁸ a false one. For if a person, having a recollection of Socrates, and meeting with Plato, imagines, through some similarity, that

¹— Here too the Latin of Ficinus differs from the Greek—"hæc verisimilitudinem et imaginationem, utpote quæ ad mutabilia tendat."

²— The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation, and properly omitted by Ficinus.

³— Here again is an interpolation. Ficinus has "ut firma indelebilibus permaneat—" adopted by Stanley. This, however, is an abridgment rather of μή—διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἐξίτηλος γίνηται, ἀλλ' ἱμνοῦς καὶ σωζόμενος—

⁴ Compare Plato, Phileb. p. 34, A., σωτηρίαν—αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὁρθῶς ἀν' τὰς λέγους.

⁵ Ficinus has "in iis dicimus"—for his MS. read αὐτοῖς, not ἑαυτοῖς—

⁶— I have translated, as if *οἶον* had dropped out between *λέγομαι* and *φίρε*— Compare p. 253, lin. 2, *οἶον Εὐθύδημον φέρε*—

⁷ Ficinus has "colligantur," by an error of the press for "collocantur," which leads to *ρωθίμενα* in lieu of *γενόμενα*—

⁸— Such seems to be the proper version of *παρὰλλάξ*.

he is meeting again with Socrates, and afterwards combines the sensation, which he has received from Plato, as if he had received it from Socrates, with the recollection, which he has of Socrates, the opinion would be a false one. Now that, in which memory and sensation are produced (conjointly),¹ Plato² likens to an impression on wax; but when the soul, after remoulding by an exercise of thought the things, which have been imagined out of sensation and memory, looks upon them, as upon those, out of which they have been produced, Plato calls this a painting to the life;³ and sometimes too a phantasy. But he calls the exercise of thought a talking⁴ of the soul to itself;⁵ and talking (he says) is a flowing⁶ from it, proceeding with a vocal sound through the mouth. Now Cogitation is an operation of the mind, while contemplating the first things perceptible by mind. And this seems to be twofold; one, while it was contemplating things perceptible by mind, previous to the soul⁷ existing in the body;⁷ another, after⁸ it had been compelled to come⁸ into this body. Of these, one⁹ [that contemplated previous to the soul existing in the body]⁹ was called Cogitation;¹⁰ but¹¹ after it existed in the body,¹¹ that, which was then called Cogitation, was now called Physical Thinking, as being a cogitation in a subjective soul. When therefore we say that Cogitation is the beginning of Scientific Reasoning, we do not mean that, which is so called now, but that, which, as we have said, was then,

¹ I have translated, as if *ψυχή* had dropt out after *γίνηται*—

² In *Theætet.* p. 191, C.

³ The word in Plato is *ζωγράφημα*, not *ἀναζωγράφησιν*, as shown by Ast's Index.

⁴ Ficinus has—"discursum ac ratiocinium"—

⁵ Compare *Phileb.* § 81, where I should have remarked that the connexion between speaking to another and speaking to oneself, that is, thinking, is shown by the difference between *φράζειν* in the active voice and *φράζεσθαι* in the middle.

⁶ Hence we can perceive the connexion between *ῥέω* and *ῥίω*.

⁷ Ficinus has "descendat in corpus"—

⁸ Ficinus has "in corpus hoc mersa est," as if his MS. read *ἔμβεβύσθαι* in lieu of *ἔμβυβασθῆναι*—

⁹ The words between the brackets are an interpolation, and properly omitted by Ficinus.

¹⁰ Although *αὐτὸ τοῦτο νόησις ἐκαλεῖτο* might perhaps stand by supplying *ὄνομα* after *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, yet one would prefer to omit *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, or to read *αὕτη νόησις*, answering to "*ipsa intellectio*" in Ficinus.

¹¹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

when the soul existed apart from the body, called Cogitation, but is now Physical Thinking. Now Physical Thinking is called by him (Plato) both a simple science, and a fledging¹ of the soul; and sometimes, recollection. From these sciences that are simple, Physical and Scientific Reason, which exists in Nature, is composed. Since then there is Reason existing, both Scientific and Opinionative, and there is a Cogitation existing and Sensation, there are also things, that are subjective to them; as for instance, those, that are perceptible by mind, and those likewise, by a sense.

Now, since of things perceptible by mind some are primary, as ideas, and some secondary, as species, which, being (impressed) on Matter, are inseparable from it, Cogitation is twofold, one of the primary, and another of the secondary. And again, since of things perceptible by a sense, some are primary, as qualities—for instance, colour, whiteness,—but some according to accident—as white mixed with another colour,—and, moreover, ²a congregated mass,³ as fire, honey,—so there is sensation, one part of which is of primaries, and called itself primary; and another of secondaries, (and called) secondary. Of the primaries, perceptible by mind, Cogitation judges, not without Scientific Reason, ³by means of a certain apprehension, and not by a discourse in detail;³ but of the secondary, a sense judges not without Opinionative Reason; but of the congregated mass, Opinionative Reason (judges) not without a sense. Now since the world, perceptible by mind, is a primary perceptible, but that, perceptible by a sense, is a congregated mass, of the world, perceptible by mind, Cogitation judges, ⁴together with Reason that is not without reason;⁴ but of that perceptible by a sense Opinionative Reason (judges) not without a sense.

Since then there is Contemplation and Action, right reason does not judge in a similar manner of things, which fall under Contemplation, and of what are to be done; but in the case of Contemplation it looks to the truth, and to what is not in that

¹ Here is an allusion to Phædr. p. 249, C. D.

² ³ This in modern metaphysics would be called "a concrete substance."

³ Ficinus has "per comprehensionem quandam atque discursum—"

⁴ Since *παρά λόγον* differs not an atom from *ὅτι ἀνε λόγον*, it is probable that *παρά λόγον* is from an interpretation, especially as *ὅτι ἀνε λόγον* is properly balanced by *ὅτι ἀνε αἰσθήσεως*.

condition; but in the case of things to be done, to what is appropriate, and what is strange, and ¹ what is being done.¹ For by having a natural notion of what is beautiful and good we make use of reason; and referring to these natural notions, as to some determinate standards, we decide, ² whether any of these things are in this state or in a different one.²

[5.] *About the Dialectic element and its aim.*

The most elementary part of Dialectic Science he deems to be, first, the looking upon the essence of every thing whatsoever, and then, upon what relates to its accidents. It looks upon each thing, as it is in itself, either from above, in the way of Division or Definition, or from below,³ in that of Analysis; but on the accidents of, and that which exist in, essences, (it looks) either from the things contained, through Induction, or from the things containing, through a Syllogism; so that, according to this account, in Dialectical Science there is a dividing, and a defining, and an analyzing, and, moreover, that which is inductive and syllogistic. Now the dividing is the separating a genus into its species, or a whole into its parts; as when we separate the soul into the rational, and ⁴ that affected by circumstances;⁴ and again the (so) affected into the irascible and the concupiscible. The division too of the voice (is) into the things signified; as⁵ when one and the same word is referred to many things; and the division of accidents into things subjective; as when we say of good things, that some are so, as regards the soul, some, as regards the body, and some are external; and that of things subjective into accidents; as when we say of men, that some are good, some bad, and some between (both).⁶ It is necessary then to make use of the separation of the genus into its species for the purpose of knowing thoroughly each thing by itself, and what it is according to its essence. But this cannot take place without

¹—¹ Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "quid agendum, quid non," which plainly leads to *τὶ πρακτικόν καὶ μὴ*, in lieu of *τὶ τὸ πραττόμενον*.

²—² Ficinus has more briefly, "bonane an mala sint singula, dijudicamus."

³ Ficinus has "vel ordine converso," as if his MS. read *ἢ ἀνὰ πάλιν* instead of *ἐκ τῶθεν*.

⁴—⁴ Ficinus has "irrationalem—"

⁵ I have adopted *ὥς* from ed. pr. in lieu of *καὶ*— The two words are constantly confounded, as shown by Markland on Iph. A. 153.

⁶ Compare Martial's "Carmina sunt bona, sunt mediocritia, sunt mala plura."

a Definition. Now a Definition is produced from a division after this manner. Of the thing, that is about to fall under a Definition, it is requisite to take (in the first place)¹ the genus; ²as in the case of man (the genus) is an animal; ³and then to separate it, according to its proximate differences, descending to the species; as, for instance, to rational and irrational, mortal and immortal; so that if the proximate differences are combined³ with the genus, ⁴that proceeds from them,⁴ there exists a definition of man.

But of Analysis there are three kinds; one is an ascent from things perceptible by a sense to the primary perceptible by mind; another is an ascent through things (fully) shown⁵ and obscurely shown to propositions not to be demonstrated and without a middle;⁶ and another is that, which ascends from an hypothesis to principles not hypothetical. Now the first is something of this kind; as if we should proceed from the beauty relating to the body to the beauty relating to the soul; and from this to that in pursuits; and from this to that in laws; and then to the wide sea⁷ of beauty; and then, after having proceeded thus,⁸ we should discover ⁹what remains, namely, beauty itself.⁹ The second kind of Analysis is something like this. It is requisite to suppose what is to be sought, and to see what things are before it, and to show these from what

¹ I have followed Ficinus, whose version, "in primis capere," shows that *πρῶτον* has dropt out after *πράγματος*.

² Here again I have followed in part the version of Ficinus, "genus hominis animal;" for the Greek *ὡς ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον* I cannot understand.

³ Ficinus has "adjiciantur," as if his MS. read *προστίθεται*, not *συντίθεται*—

⁴ I cannot understand *τῷ ἐξ αὐτῶν*, nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted those words. I could have understood *τὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅρον*—"the definition arising from them"—

⁵ The antithesis evidently demands *ἢ δὲ διὰ τῶν διαδευκνυμένων*, not *δεικνυμένων* simply.

⁶ On the word *ἀμεσος*, applied to a proposition, see H. Stephens in Index to Thea. Græc. Ling., who remarks at the same time that the interpretation put upon that word by A. Gellius is at variance with its derivation,—a proposition without a middle.

⁷ Ficinus has a different metaphor, "ad ipsum—fontem." See p. 268, n. 2.

⁸ Ficinus has "per hunc modum—gradatim," as if his MS. read *ὁὕτως κατὰ πόδα*—

⁹ Such is evidently what is required by the train of thought. Ficinus too has "ipsum per se pulchrum—" as if his MS. read *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*, not *λοιπὸν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καλόν*: where however, the author wrote *τὸ λοιπὸν ὃν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*.

come after, by ascending up to those before, until we arrive at the first and what is acknowledged; and beginning (again),¹ from this we shall descend to what is sought by the Synthetical manner. For instance,² I am seeking, whether the soul is immortal; and after supposing this very thing, I inquire whether it is always moved; and after showing this, whether what is always moved is self-moved; and again, after showing this, I consider whether what is self-moved is a beginning of motion; and then, whether a beginning is unbegotten; ³ which is laid down as being acknowledged,³ inasmuch as the unbegotten is likewise the indestructible; from which, as from a thing quite clear, making a beginning I will put together a demonstration of this kind—If a beginning be a thing unbegotten and indestructible, that, which is self-moved, is a beginning of motion. Now the soul is a thing self-moved; it is therefore indestructible, and unbegotten, and immortal. But the Analysis from an hypothesis is of this kind—A person, inquiring into a matter, lays down that very thing hypothetically; and he then considers what will follow upon the assertion so laid down; and after this, whether it is requisite to give a reason for the hypothesis; and, laying down another hypothesis, he inquires whether what had been previously laid down, follows again⁴ the other hypothesis; and so he continues to do, until he arrives at some principle not hypothetical.

Induction is wholly a method by reasoning, which proceeds from the like to the like, or from particulars to generals. Induction is particularly useful for exciting notions connected with physics.

[6.] *On the kinds of the (so-called) Propositions, and on Syllogism.*

Of that portion of reasoning, which we call a Proposition, there are two kinds; one is Affirmation, the other Negation. Affirmation is a thing of this kind—Socrates is walking about;

¹ Since Ficinus has "rursus incipientes," he, doubtless, found in his MS. δ' αὖ ἀρχόμενοι, not δι' ἀρχόμενοι—

² This example contains the leading arguments put forth in the Phædo, to prove the immortality of the soul on philosophical principles.

³ Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, "quod quidem, ut perspicuum, a cunctis admittitur."

⁴ This "again" seems very strange, where the sense requires rather "still," in Greek ἔτι, not πάλιν—

but Negation is a thing of this kind—Socrates is not walking about. Of Affirmation and Negation, there is one kind relating to what is Universal, another to what is Particular. An Affirmation relating to what is Particular is of this kind—“A certain¹ pleasure is a good:” a Negation is of this kind—“A certain² pleasure is not a good.” But an Affirmation relating to what is Universal is of this kind—“Every disgraceful thing is an evil:” a Negation is of this kind—“Not one of disgraceful things is a good.”

Of Propositions some are Categorical, some Hypothetical. The Categorical are simple; as “Every just thing is beautiful;” but the Hypothetical point out a Consequence or Repugnance.

Plato makes use likewise of the operation of Syllogisms, when he is disproving or proving; when disproving falsehoods by a searching inquiry; and when proving truths by a certain kind of teaching. Now a Syllogism is a reasoning, in which, on some things being laid down, something necessarily turns out different from what has been laid down. Of Syllogisms there are some Categorical; others Hypothetical; and others Mixed. Of these the Categorical are those, of which the assumptions and conclusions are simple propositions; the Hypothetical are those, that proceed from hypothetical propositions; and the Mixed are those, that combine the (other) two.

The man³ makes use likewise of Demonstrative (reasoning),⁴ in the dialogues⁵ that covertly lead (to truth),⁶ and of Detective,⁶ in those against the Sophists and young persons;

¹ ² Here *τις* is found in an indefinite sense at the commencement of a sentence, contrary to the genius of the older Greek language; and although that position has been defended by Hermann and others, yet no unexceptionable instance can be produced before the time of Demosthenes, when, as remarked by Elmsley, the language of Athens had already begun to lose something of its pristine purity.

³ Ficinus has “Plato—”

⁴ Ficinus inserts here “argumentationibus,” which I have adopted.

⁵ Such, I conceive, is the meaning of *ὑποκρινόμενοι*—Ficinus has “quid ad expositionem pertinent—” But that would be in Greek *ὑποκρινόμενοι*.

⁶ Ficinus, unable to understand satisfactorily *ὑποδεδειγμένους*, gives, as usual, a double version, “probabilibus vero et apparentibus—” Unless I am greatly mistaken, Alcinoüs wrote *ὑποδεδειγμένους*, which I have translated “Detective;” for such are the dialogues written against the Sophists, like those introduced in the Gorgias, and against young men, like Meno and Alcibiades.

but the Litigious, against those called peculiarly Litigious, as, say,¹ for instance, Euthydemus and Hippias. Of the Categorical, whose forms are three, the first is that, ²in which the common extreme is first the predicate, and then the subject; the second is, in which the common extreme is the predicate in both; the third is, in which the common extreme is the subject in both.³ Now the Extremes I call the parts of Propositions; as in the Proposition, "Man is an animal," we call "Man" an extreme, and so too "Animal." According to the first, second, and third forms, Plato frequently asks reasons.⁴ According to the first (he argues)⁵ thus in the Alcibiades⁶—"Just things are honourable. But honourable things are good. Therefore just things are good." According to the second, in the Parmenides,⁶ thus—"That which has no parts, is neither straight nor round. But that which partakes of figure, is either straight or round. Hence that, which has no parts, does not partake even of figure." According to the third in the same book thus—⁷"That, which partakes of figure, has some quality; and that, which partakes of figure, is bounded; therefore that, which has some quality,

¹ So I have translated *φίρε* after *Εὐθύδημον*: for *φίρε* is frequently used for *αἰτί*, especially in the *Meno*. See p. 246, n. *.

^{2,3} I have adopted the phraseology of Ficinus, when translating the Greek, *ἐν ᾧ ὁ κοινὸς ὅρος τοῦ μὲν κατηγορεῖται, τῷ δὲ ὑποκείται* τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου, *ἐν ᾧ ὁ κοινὸς ὅρος ἀμφοτέρων κατηγορεῖται* τοῦ δὲ τρίτου, *ἐν ᾧ ὁ κοινὸς ὅρος ἀμφοτέρων ὑποκείται*. And hence, perhaps, is to be understood what is meant by Olympiodorus on *Platon. Alcibiad.* p. 126, ed. Creuzer, where the words *ὑποκείμενον* and *κατηγορηται* are found in two antithetical sentences.

³ Such is the literal version of *ἰρωτᾷ λόγους*. But as Ficinus has "disputat," one would fancy he found something else in his MS., were it not that we meet with *τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς—ἰρωτωμένους* shortly afterwards. Since, however, no Proposition could be said to ask a question, it will be asserted perhaps that *ἰρωτᾷ λόγους* means, "he proposes reasons by means of questions;" a meaning, which Stephens, in *Theas. Gr.* i. p. 1903, D., says he was the first to point out; while *τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς—ἰρωτωμένους* would signify "hypothetical reasons given by means of questions."

⁴ After "sic," answering to *οὕτως*, Ficinus adds "argumentatur," what I have adopted.

⁵ In *Alcibiad.* I. § 23.

⁶ In *Parmenid.* § 23.

⁷— This is not a quotation from, but an argument founded upon, the *Parmenides*. With regard to the text, Ficinus has, "Quod figura participat, quale est quod figura participat, finitum est; quod ergo est quale, initum est:" which is, what the Greek is not, unintelligible.

is bounded."¹ And in many books we shall find hypothetical reasons asked by him; and especially in the *Parmenides* we shall find them such as these¹—"If the one has no parts, it has neither a beginning, a middle, nor an end,² nor has it a limit;³ and if it has not a limit, neither does it partake of figure. If then the one has no parts, neither does it partake of figure." According to the second hypothetical form, which the majority say is the third, according to which the common extreme follows both the ends, he asks³ in this manner—"If the one has no parts, it is neither straight nor round. (But) if it partakes of figure, it is either straight or round. If then it has no parts, it does not partake of figure." And yet according to the third form, but the second with some persons, according to which the common extreme leads both, he asks⁴ thus in the *Phædo*—"If, after we have received the knowledge of what is equal, we have not forgotten it, we know it; but, if we have forgotten it, we recall it to mind.⁵ And of the Mixed he makes mention, which thus build up (a reasoning) from a consequence—"If the one is a whole and limited, it has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and partakes of figure. ⁶Now, since the leading is so, so is the ending."⁶ Of those too, that pull down from a consequence, ⁷(it is most easy) to contemplate the differences in a similar manner.⁷

When therefore a person looks carefully into the powers of the soul, and into the difference of men, and the kinds of rea-

¹ Ficinus has, more briefly, "Argumentationes præterea, quæ per suppositiones contextæ sunt, crebras apud Platonem reperire licet, præcipue vero in *Parmenide* rationes hujusmodi."

² The words between the numerals are evidently superfluous, unless we read ἔστι, in lieu of ἔχει, answering to "habebit" in Ficinus.

³ Ficinus, "ratiocinatur," and in ⁴, "argumentatur." See at p. 253, n. ⁴.

⁵ The reasoning alluded to is in p. 75, C. D.

⁶ This formula is repeated in § 9. Ficinus has "Verum antecedens, verum igitur consequens—" Stanley, "But the Antecedent is true, therefore the Consequent." The formula, used by the Stoics, was, "Si primum, secundum; atqui primum, secundum igitur—" as we learn from Apuleius de *Dogm. Platon.* iii.

⁷ I have translated, as if *ωσαύτως* had been corrupted into *ὅτε* *πῶς* and *κατὰ πάντα* into *κατὰ τοῦτο*, and *ἀγνοῶν* had dropt out after *διαφορὰς*—Ficinus has "sic quodammodo differentie considerantur—" as if he had found in his MS., or wished to read, *αὶ διαφοραὶ θεωρεῖσθαι*, instead of *τὰς διαφορὰς κατὰ τοῦτο θεωρεῖσθαι*—for he doubtless saw that *κατὰ τοῦτο* was at variance with the sense, and *θεωρεῖσθαι* with the syntax. Stanley, more briefly, "Of those also, which overthrow by Consequence, the differences may be gathered out of Plato."

soning,¹ and acutely perceives which of them are suited to the soul in this way or that, and being what himself by what and what kind of reasonings he can be persuaded, such a person, if he lays hold of a fitting opportunity for the use (of his faculties),¹ will become a perfect orator; and his oratorical skill would be justly called the science of speaking well.

And of Sophisms too we shall find the method² delineated³ by Plato in the Euthydemus, if we carefully read⁴ the book; so that⁵ it is indicated covertly, what Sophisms are in words, and what in things, and what are the solutions of them.

Moreover he has pointed out secretly the ten⁶ Categories in the Parmenides and the other dialogues; and he goes through the whole question of etymology in the Cratylus; and, to speak simply, the man is the most sufficient and wonderful in the business relating to Definitions and Divisions; all of which⁷ show forth especially the power of the Dialectic art.

The matter of the Cratylus has a meaning of this kind. Plato inquires there whether names are from nature or imposition; and he is satisfied that the correctness of names is referable to imposition; not however simply⁸ so, nor accidentally, but so that the imposition follows upon the nature of the thing; for the correctness of the name is nothing else than the imposition, which agrees with the nature of the thing; nor is yet the imposition, whatever it may be, of the name, sufficient by itself⁹ for correctness; nor is nature, nor the first

¹—¹ The whole of the matter between the numerals is thus represented by Ficinus in a form partly abridged, and transposed partly—"deinde temporis occasione considerata, certis affectibus hominum proprias, quibus moveri possint, ratiocinationes adcommodarit." With regard to the syntax, it is evident we must read αἰσθάνηται and δύνηται, instead of αἰσθάνεται and δύναται: for αἰσθάνηται would thus be coupled with κείνῃ by τε, and δύνηται follow ὅποιος with the usual ellipse of αὐ—

² In lieu of μέθοδον, Ficinus found something different in his MS., as shown by his "captionumque laqueos—"

³ Ficinus has "subinsinuatos—"

⁴ The oldest example of this sense of ἐντυγχάνειν is to be found, I believe, in Plutarch.

⁵ This ὥστε seems very strange here; and so, doubtless, thought Ficinus, whose version is "Illic enim—reperiuntur." Perhaps the author wrote ὥστε γὰρ—not ὥστε καί—

⁶ On the ten Categories, see Aristotle's treatise under that title.

⁷ Ficinus, "quæ duo," in Greek αἱ δύο, which is preferable to αἱ πᾶσαι—

⁸ Ficinus, "non temere—" as if his MS. read ἄλλως, not ἀπλῶς—

⁹ I have omitted, with Ficinus, καὶ ἀποκρῶσαν after αὐταρεπή—

utterance of the voice; but that which is (compounded)¹ of both, so that the peculiarity² of every name is laid down according to its affinity with the nature of the thing; for assuredly, should what is accidental be imposed upon an accidental thing, it would not signify what is correct; as if, for instance, we should give to a man the name of a horse; since to speak is some one of actions; so that a person would not speak correctly by speaking in any manner soever, but if he should speak in such a way, as things exist naturally. Now since to give a name to a thing is a part of speaking, so is a name a part of speech; (and) to name a thing correctly or not would take place, not according to any imposition whatsoever, but according to a natural affinity with the thing. Hence he would be the best name-imposer, who should mark out by the name the nature of the thing. For the name is an instrument of a thing, not such as occurs accidentally, but³ has a mutual relation by nature;³ and through it we teach each other the things, and we judge of them;⁴ so that⁵ the name is something with a teaching, and the instrument, that judges of the existence of each thing,⁵ as the shuttle is of weaving.

With regard to the Dialectic art, this too will take place, (to wit,) to make use of names correctly. For as a man skilled in weaving would make use of a shuttle, through knowing its work, after a workman had manufactured it, so the Dialectician would, after the name-imposer had imposed the name, make use of it in a proper and advantageous manner. For it is the part of an artificer to make a rudder, but of the steersman to make use of it properly. So too the name-imposer himself would make a proper use of the imposition, if he were to make the imposition in the presence of the Dialectician, who knows

¹ I have adopted the Supplement in Ficinus of "compositum," answering to *συναφθῆναι*, which has dropt out, I suspect, after *ἀμφοῖν*—

² I have translated, as if *τὸ* had been lost before *παντὸς*— Ficinus has "omnis nominis rectitudo—"

³ Ficinus has, more intelligibly, "quod naturæ congruum—" as if his MS. read something else than *κατάλληλον*.

⁴ Ficinus has "naturamque discernimus—" as if his MS. read *αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν*, not *αὐτὰ* simply. Compare, however, Cratyl. § 12, *διδάσκομεν τι ἄλλῃλους καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακρίνομεν, ἃ ἔχει*.

⁵ So in Cratyl. l. c., "Ὄνομα διδασκαλικόν τι ἴσθιν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας." Hence Ficinus has improperly, "atque distribuens uniuscujusque substantiam."

the nature of the things that are the subject (of the names.)¹ And let so much be written down on the Dialectical question.

[7.] *On the Contemplative kind and its division.*

Now let us speak in order of the Contemplative kind.

Of this we have said that one portion is Theological; another Physical; and another Mathematical: and that of the Theological the end is ²the knowledge relating to the first causes, and to what is the most above, and to principles; ³but of the Physical to learn what is the nature of the Universe; and what kind of animal is man; and what place he occupies in the world; and whether god has any forethought respecting the Universe; and whether there are other gods ⁴under his orders; and what is the condition of man with respect to the gods; but of the Mathematical, to consider ⁵the superficial and triply-separated nature, relating both to motion and an onward carrying on,⁶ and how it exists.

Let then the Contemplation of the Mathematical portion be laid down summarily. Now this was received by Plato for the acuteness of thought, as sharpening⁷ the intellect, and as furnishing an accuracy towards the consideration of things existing.⁸ That too, which relates to Numbers, being a portion of the Mathematical, ⁹introduces an affinity, not such as is accidental, to an upward approach to things existing; ⁷and it almost relieves us from the error and ignorance relating to things perceptible by a sense; and it co-operates towards the knowledge of existence, and ⁸becomes well-constituted, as

¹ I have supplied "of the names" from the version of Ficinus, "quæ sub nominibus latent:" who probably found in his MS. τῶν ὀνόματι ὑποκειμένων, not τῶν ὑποκειμένων simply.

^{2,3} Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has, more briefly, "supernarum causarum cognitio—"

³ Ficinus has "ministri—"

⁴ Ficinus, more briefly and intelligibly, "planam et in tres porrectam dimensiones naturam—" Perhaps the author wrote τὴν ἐκτετακτοῦ τε καὶ στερεοῦ μέτρησιν, καὶ τὴν τριχῇ διαστηκυσίαν φύσιν περὶ τε στάσεως καὶ κινήσεως καὶ φορᾶς— for otherwise there would be nothing to answer to the τριχῇ διαστηκυσίαν—

⁵ Ficinus has "attingens"—for his MS. probably read θίγουσα, by a literal error, for θήγουσα.

⁶ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "rerum divinarum."

⁷ Such is the literal version of the words between the numerals. Ficinus has "non mediocrem ad divina percipienda vim præstat—" Stanley,—"conferreth not a little to the understanding of things that are."

⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "promp-

so that,¹ unless we pursue in this way these subjects of learning, our contemplation on these matters will be incomplete, and unprofitable, and nothing worth. For it is meet to turn quickly from things to be seen and heard to those, which it is possible to see² by the reasoning faculty alone of the soul. For the looking into Mathematical learning is a kind of prelude to the contemplation of things existing. For Geometry, and Arithmetic, and the sciences that follow upon them, although desirous to lay hold of the Being, yet are they in a dream³ respecting the Being, and unable to see it, as a day-dream,⁴ through being ignorant both of the principles (of things) and of what are formed from those principles. They happen, nevertheless, to be very useful, according to what has been stated. From whence Plato said that such subjects of learning were not sciences at all. The Dialectic art is then a progression, that naturally ascends from Geometrical Hypotheses to the first principles of things and non-hypothetical. From whence he called the Dialectic art a science. But the subjects of (such) learning (he said) were neither opinion, through their being more clear than things perceptible by a sense; nor a science, through their being more obscure than the primaries perceptible by mind; but of bodies he says (there is)⁴ an opinion; of the primaries a science; but of (such) subjects of learning a mental notion. He lays down too, that Faith and Fancy are something; and that of these Faith is of things perceptible by a sense; but Fancy of resemblances and kinds.

eye of mind, so we are led from things audible by the ear of sense to try things of rhythm inaudible except by the ear of mind;" where the concluding words would be expressed in Greek,—ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουστῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνῆκτα εἰ μὴ ὡς τοῦ νοῦ, ρυθμούμενα, instead of ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουστῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῷ θεωρούμενα. For thus an ear would be attributed to the mind, as the eye is to it, in the verse of Epicharmus—Νοῦς ὅρη καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τὰλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά—while in ρυθμούμενα there would be an allusion to the well-regulated harmony of the spheres.

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were ὥσ' , not ὡς—

² Here again the balance of the sentences requires the mention of hearing as well as seeing. Hence, as Plato has λογισμοῦ-μετρίχουσα καὶ ἀρμονίας, one would prefer here, ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀκούειν μόνοις τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμῷ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ.

³ On the difference between *ἔναρ* and *ἔπαρ* see Blomf. on Prom. 495.

⁴ I have translated, as if *εἶναι* had dropt out after *φῆσιν*—

Since then the Dialectic art ¹ is the most powerful of the subjects of learning,¹ inasmuch as it is conversant about things divine, and stable, on this account it is ranked ² above the other subjects of learning,² and is, as it were, the coping-stone and guard.

[c.] *Respecting the Primary Matter.*

After this let us speak consecutively about Principles and Theological Contemplations, commencing from on high from the primaries, and descending from them, and looking into the creation of the world, and ending with the creation and nature of man.

And let us speak first of Matter.

This then he calls a mould, that receives ³ every impression, and a nurse, and a mother, and a space, and a thing subjective and tangible, (and) without sensation, and to be apprehended by spurious reasoning; and that it possesses a peculiarity of such a kind, that it receives all creations, and has the reputation of a nurse by nourishing ⁴ them, and admits all forms, being itself without Figure, and Quality, and Species, but moulded into such, and fashioned, as if it were a mould, and put into a form by them, possessing no peculiar figure or quality. For there would not be any thing properly prepared for various configurations and forms, unless it were itself without Quality, and not partaking of these species, which it must receive. For ⁵ we see that those, who prepare sweet-smelling ointments from oil, make use of the most sweet-scented; ⁶ and those, who are desirous of fabricating figures from wax or clay, smooth down those substances, and render

¹ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "efficacior quam mathematica," as if his MS. read *λεχυρότερον τῶν μαθηματικῶν* in lieu of *λεχυρότατον τῶν μαθημάτων*.

² Ficinus has "mathematicis universalis," as if his MS. read *τῶν μαθηματικῶν*—*τῶν ὅλων* instead of *τῶν μαθημάτων*—*τῶν λοιπῶν*. Stanley, "it is put before all Mathematics, as a wall and fortification of the rest."

³ I have, with Ficinus, omitted *καὶ* before *πανόχρηστος*—

⁴ In lieu of *τρέφειν* I have been led to *τρέφουσιν*, from "fovere" in Ficinus, followed by Stanley.

⁵ I have adopted *γὰρ* for *ὅτι*, answering to "enim" in Ficinus.

⁶ In lieu of *ἀνυσμωράτω*, the sense evidently requires *ἀνυσμωρότατω*, "the most without scent;" for if the oil had any scent, it would interfere with the scent of the substance, of which the ointment is made.

them shapeless in order that they may receive (new shapes).¹ It is fitting then for Matter which receives every thing, if it is about to receive forms universally, to be subject to the possessing not one of their natures, but to be without Quality, and without form for the purpose of receiving forms; and being such, it would be neither a body nor without a body, but a body *in posse*,² as we understand of copper, that it is a statue *in posse*,³ because, after having received the form, it will become a statue.

[9.] *Respecting Ideas and the Efficient Cause.*

While matter retains the character of a Principle, (Plato) admits still other principles likewise, both the pattern-like, that is, relating to Ideas, and that of god, the father and the cause of all things. Now Idea is, as regards god, a mental operation by him; as regards us, the first thing perceptible by mind; as regards Matter, a standard; but as regards the world, perceptible by a sense, a pattern; but as considered⁴ with reference to itself, an existence. For universally all that is generated according to a design ought to be generated for something. For⁵ if any thing be produced from any thing, as my own resemblance is from myself, there must be a pattern previously laid down; ⁶and whether the pattern be within or without, each of the artificers, having the pattern in himself, on every side and in every manner, invests its form with Matter.⁶

Now persons define Idea as the eternal pattern of things existing according to Nature. For it does not please the majority of Platonists (to admit) that there are Ideas of works of art, such as of a shield, or lyre; nor yet of things, that are contrary to Nature, such as of fever, and cholera; nor of what exists according to a part,⁷ as of Socrates and Plato; nor of

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὡς νέα διχῆται σχήματα, ἀσχημάτιστα παρίχοντα*, not *ὡς ἰνδιχῆται, ἀσχημάτιστα παρίχοντα*: which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is, "donec figuræ pristinae deleantur."

^{2, 3} So I have translated *δυνάμει*, as being more intelligible than "potential," the word adopted by Stanley. See p. 263, n. ⁴

⁵ Ficinus omits *ἰσχυρομένην*, probably as being superfluous.

⁶ I have adopted *γὰρ* found in ed. pr.

⁷ Ficinus has, more briefly, "Et, si exemplar haud omnino sit ab agente seorsum, ut quisque artifex in se ipso artificiorum exempla concipiens—horum deinde formas in materiam explicat."

⁸ Ficinus renders *κατὰ μέρος* by "particularium—"

things of no value, such as of filth and rotten thatch; nor of that, which exists with reference to something, as of a greater and superior; for Ideas are the notions of god eternal and perfect in themselves.

Now that there are Ideas, ¹in this way too they exhort (us).¹ For whether the deity be mind or something mental, it has thoughts, and these too both eternal and not to be turned aside. And if this be so, there are Ideas. For if Matter is on its own account without (a standard of) measure,² it must meet with a standard from something else, that is superior and without matter; hence ³if the antecedent (is true), so is the consequent;³ and if this be so, Ideas are certain (standards of) measures without Matter. Moreover, if the world is not such, as it is, from chance, not only has it been produced out of something, but by something; and not only so, but for something likewise. Now what could that, for which it has been produced, have been else than Idea? so that thus there would have been Ideas. Moreover, if mind differs from true⁴ opinion, what is perceived by mind differs also from what is held as an opinion; and if this be so, ⁵[things perceived by the mind are different from those held as opinions; so that]⁵ there will have been the primaries perceived by mind, and the primaries perceived by a sense; and if this be so, there are Ideas. Now mind does differ from a true opinion; so that there will have been Ideas.

[10.] *How it is meet to delineate the deity, and respecting his mental operation.*

We must now render an account, next in order, of the third principle, which Plato considers to be almost impossible to be told. We may however be led to it after this manner. If things are perceptible by mind, and these too not perceptible by a sense, nor with a participation in the things perceptible

¹ Ficinus renders *παραινέουσιν* by "probat—" Perhaps the author wrote *πέποινα* *ρίθυνα*, "make it passible," as we should say.

² Such, I presume, is the meaning of *ἀμετρος*.

³ See p. 254, n. ².

⁴ The chain of reasoning evidently requires the omission of *ἀληθεύς*, both here and shortly afterwards, where it is omitted by Ficinus. Perhaps the author wrote in both places *ἀσταθεύς*, "unsteady," for such is the character of opinion.

⁵ The words between the numerals, with the exception of *ὅτι*, are evidently an interpretation of *εἰς*—

by a sense, but belonging to some primaries perceptible by mind, there are simple primaries perceptible by mind, as there are primaries likewise perceptible by a sense. ¹If then the antecedent (is true), so is the consequent.¹ Now men—as being infected² with the suffering from sensation, so that, when they determine to think upon something perceptible by mind, they keep in their fancy that, which is perceptible by a sense, so as to think at the same time of magnitude, and form, and colour—do frequently think not clearly upon things perceptible by mind; whereas the gods, being freed from things perceptible by a sense, (do think) clearly and without a mixture (of fancies).³ Now since Mind is superior to the living principle,⁴ and as the Mind, which is, according to its working,⁵ thinking upon all things simultaneously and for ever, is superior to a mind *in posse*;⁶ and as ⁷the cause of that is better than this,⁷ ⁸and what exists is still above these,⁸ this would be the primary god, as being the cause⁹ of perpetually operating for the mind of the whole heaven.⁹ Now he is operating, although unmoved himself, for that (mind), ¹⁰as the sun does for vision, when it looks for him,¹⁰ and as that, ¹¹which has the faculty of desire, excites desire,¹¹ itself being

¹—¹ See p. 254, n. ².

² On this sense of *κίμπλασθαι* and its compounds, see Ruhnken on *Timæus* in *Ἀνάπτυξ*, and myself on Philoct. 522. Ficinus renders “*perturbatione sensuum occupati*.”

³ I have added “of fancies,” for the sake of perspicuity.

⁴ Such is frequently the meaning of *ψυχή*, not “soul.”

⁵ Ficinus renders *κατ’ ἐνέργειαν* by “*actu*—”

⁶ See at p. 261, n. ².

⁷—⁷ In *τούτου καλλίων ὁ αἰτίος τούτου* there is an ambiguity arising from the repetition of *τούτου*. To avoid it, Stanley follows the version of Ficinus, “*intellectus ille hoc denique pulchrius, quod ejus est causa*—”

⁸—⁸ Here too is another ambiguity, proceeding from the union of *ἀντίρω* and *ὑφίστηκεν*. Ficinus has “*quodque omnibus superextat*—” as if his MS. read *καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀντίρω πάντων ὑφίστηκεν*— without *ἐν*—

⁹—⁹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “*isque causa est ut mundi mens semper agat*—” as if he had found in his MS. *αἰτίος ἀπάρχων τοῦ αἰὲ ἐνεργεῖν τὸν νοῦν*— without *τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ*.

¹⁰—¹⁰ I cannot understand *ὅταν αὐτῷ προσβλέπῃ*, nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted those words in his version, “*haud secus quam in oculum subjectum sol agit*.” Stanley, “*as the sun upon the eye, when it turneth towards him*.”

¹¹—¹¹ Ficinus has “*quod appetitur, immobile ipsum, appetentem agi-*

unmoved. At least in this way will this Mind likewise excite the mind of the whole heaven. Now, since the primary Mind is the most beautiful, there must needs be the most beautiful thing placed under it. But nothing is more beautiful than itself. It would therefore be thinking for ever upon itself and its own cogitations; and this its mental energy is Idea. Moreover the primary god is eternal, ineffable, perfect in itself, ¹that is, not wanting in any thing, ²ever-perfect, that is, for ever perfect, all-perfect, that is, perfect in every way, ³a divinity, holiness, truth, symmetry, good. ⁴And I say not this, as if giving a definition, but ⁵as of one had in mind according to all. ⁶He is a good, ⁷because, being the cause of all good, ⁸he bestows kindness on all things according to his power; ⁹and a beautiful thing, ¹⁰because he is (so) by himself more than that by nature and symmetrical; ¹¹and truth, because he is the beginning of all truth, as the Sun is of all light; and he is the father, by being the cause of all things, and by putting into order the heavenly mind, and the soul of the world, with reference to himself and his own cogitations. For according to his own will he has filled all things with himself, after

ta—" where "appetentem" is probably a press error for "appetitum," answering to τὴν ὁρεῖν.

¹ As one can hardly believe that the author himself explained αὐτο-τελής by τούτοις ἀπροσδεής, it is probable that those two words, or at any rate one, τούτοις, is an interpolation, as shown by its omission in Ficinus.

² The Greek is αὐτελής, τούτοις δὲ τέλειος, παντελής, τούτοις πάντῃ τέλειος. But the version of Ficinus more correctly "semperque et undique absolute perfectus." For he, doubtless, found in his MS. αὐτελής καὶ πάντῃ τέλειος.

³ We must read either τὸ ἀγαθόν, or, what would be preferable, ἀγαθότης, "goodness."

⁴ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of ὥς κατὰ πάντα ἐνὸς νοουμένων. Ficinus has "ut unum potius cuncta contemplet."

⁵ Here ἀγαθόν is to be referred to ἀγαθότης, as καλὸν in the next clause is to συμμετρία.

⁶ Such is the literal version of πάντα εἰς δόξαν. Ficinus has more intelligibly, "omnia pro capacitate cujusque beneficiis replet—" i. e. "he fills all things with kindness according to the capacity of each."

⁷ Such, I presume, is the meaning of αὐτὸς τοῦ φύσις πλέον ἴσκι καὶ σύμμετρον, thus translated by Stanley, "Fair, because he is in his essence both more and equal;" and thus by Ficinus, "Pulchrum vero ex eo, quod ipsum natura plenitudo ipsa et harmonia omnia omnis existit."

having raised up the soul of the world and turned it to himself, being the cause of that¹ mind, which, being put into order by the father, puts into order the whole of nature in this world. He is moreover ineffable, and to be comprehended by mind alone, as has been stated; since he is neither genus nor species,² nor difference;³ nor has there happened to him any thing either evil—for it is not lawful to state this; or good—for he would be such³ according to the participation of something, especially goodness; nor difference—for this (cannot be)⁴ according to the notion of him; nor being with equality—for he has not been made a quality, nor perfected by quality; nor without quality⁵—for he has not been deprived of any quality, coming upon him; nor a part of any thing; nor as a whole, possessing any parts;⁶ nor so as to be any thing the same⁶ or different—for nothing has happened to him, according to which he is able to be separated from the rest of things; nor does he move, nor is he moved.

Now (the) first notion of him will be that, which is according to the abstraction from (all)⁷ these things; as we have had a notion of a point⁸ according to an abstraction⁹ from what is perceptible by a sense,⁹ by thinking upon a superficies, then a line, and lastly a point.¹⁰ The second notion will be that, which is according to analogy somehow in this way. For the

¹ In lieu of *ἀνρῆς*, which is without regimen, the sense and syntax require *αὐτοῦ*—

² The introduction of this clause seems out of place here: for the same point is touched upon just afterwards. One would have expected rather reasons to be given why god is neither genus nor species.

³ Ficinus has "*talis*—" He therefore found in his MS. *τοιούτος* in lieu of *οὗτος*—

⁴ I have adopted the Supplement that Ficinus offers in his version, "*feri potest*—" answering to *οἶόν τε*— which might easily have dropt out between *αὐτοῦ* and *οὗτε*—

⁵ Ficinus has "*informis*," through mistaking the meaning of *ἄκρου*.

⁶ Such is the literal version of the Greek, *οὐτε ὥστε ταῦτόν τι εἶναι*— where it is difficult to account for the introduction of *ὥστε εἶναι*— for the flow of ideas would require rather *οὐτε ἵστι ταῦτόν τι*— without *εἶναι*— similar to "*neque idem est cuiquam*—" in Ficinus.

⁷ Ficinus has "*horum omnium*—" as if his MS. read *τούτων πάντων*— what I have adopted.

⁸ Ficinus translates, here and in ¹⁰, *σημεῖον* by "*punctum*," which is in good Greek *σημεῖον*.

⁹ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

¹ analogy which the sun has to the seeing faculty and to things seen, without being himself vision, but enabling it to see and them to be seen, this analogy¹ has the primary mind to the thinking faculty, and to the things thought of. For not being what the thinking faculty is, it enables it to think, and for things perceptible by mind² to be thought of, by throwing around them the light of truth. But the third notion would be something of this kind. A person, after contemplating the beauty in bodies, will then proceed to the beauty of the soul; and afterwards to that, which is in pursuits and laws; and then to the wide sea³ of the beautiful; after which he will think of the good itself, and the lovely, and desirable, ⁴as it were a light that has appeared, and is shining out upon the thus ascending soul.⁴ ⁵In this way he thinks too upon god, on account of his excellence in a state of honour,⁵ and that he is without parts, through there being nothing prior to him; for a part, and that, from which ⁶(any thing is composed),⁶ is prior to that, of which it is a part; for the plane is prior to the bulk in a body, and the line is prior to a plane. By not having parts then he would be unmoved, as regards space and change. For if he were changed, it would be either by himself or by another. Now if it were by another, that other would be more powerful than he; but if by himself, he would be changed either for the worse or the better. Now both of these (suppositions) are absurd. From all which it appears that he⁷ is without body; which may be shown from these

¹—¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀναλογον*, not *λόγον*—

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *δι*, not *γὰρ*—

³ Here, as in p. 250, n. ¹, Ficinus substitutes “fontem” for “mare,” the proper version of *πλάγος*.

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has “velut splendorem in animam, quæ illuc evolavit, subito refulgentem—” whose MS., if faithfully represented, must have offered a remarkable variation.

⁵—⁵ Here too the version of Ficinus differs not a little, “Hujusmodi vero lumen deum ipsum esse ob excellentiam recognoscit; eumque in primis sine magnitudine quantitatis agnoscit—” where the last clause is required to fill up the chain of reasoning. Not less at variance with the Greek is the version of Stanley, “By this he comprehendeth god himself through reason of that excellence, which consisteth in adoration of him.”

⁶—⁶ The Supplement between the numerals has been adopted from “aliquid constituitur—” in Ficinus.

⁷ I have translated, as if the Greek were *αὐτός*, not *αὐτό*—

proofs likewise. For if god were body, he would be Material and with a Form, through every body being a dual substance, composed of Matter and of Form united to it; which are assimilated to Ideas and partake of them in some kind of manner hard to be explained. Now it is absurd for god to be composed of Matter and Form. For he will not be simple, nor capable of being a beginning; so that the deity would be a thing without body; and from another point,¹ if he is body, he would be Material, and would be either fire or water, or earth or air, or something (produced) from them. Now each of these at least is not capable of being a beginning; and he would be really² produced posterior to Matter, if he were Material; which suppositions being absurd, we must understand him to be without body. For if he were body, he would be³ destroyed, and produced, and changed.³ But each of these events is absurd in his case.

[11.] *That Qualities are incorporeal.*

Qualities moreover can be shown in this manner to be incorporeal. Every body is in a subjective state. But a Quality is not in a subjective state, but accidental. Body is therefore not a Quality. Every Quality is in a subjective state; but no body is in a subjective state. Quality therefore is not body. Further, one quality is the opposite to another quality. But one body is not so to another body; and body differs, as far as it is body, in nothing from body; but it does differ in Quality, ⁴and not, by Zeus, in bodies.⁴ Qualities are therefore not bodies. And it is most reasonable, that, as Matter is devoid of Quality, so Quality should be devoid of Matter; and if Quality be immaterial, Quality will be incorporeal. ⁵For if Qualities were bodies,⁵ two and three bodies would be in the same place—a thing the most absurd. But if Qualities are incorporeal, that which fabricates them (would be)⁶ incor-

¹ The Greek is at present αὐτόθεν, which is unintelligible. I have translated, as if it were originally ἀλλοθεν—Ficinus has "præterea—"

² Such is the meaning of ἄλλως here; unless we read αὐτῆς—τῆς ἑλῆς—similar to "materia ipsa—" in Ficinus.

³ The natural order of events would be rather—"produced, and changed, and destroyed."

⁴ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were, not εἰ γε μὴν—but εἰ γὰρ ἦν—where γὰρ ἦν is due to "enimvero si—sunt—" in Ficinus.

⁶ I have translated, as if ἂν εἴη had dropt out after ἀσώματον—Compare ἀσώματος ἂν εἴη just before.

poreal. Now there can be no other things that fabricate but incorporeals. For bodies are subject to suffering and to flowing, and to being not always in the same state and similar, and not permanent ¹and firmly fixed;¹ and even in cases, where they seem to be active in something, they are found to be previously passive in much. As then there is something clearly passive, so there must be something truly active. Now we should not find any thing else to be this, but what is incorporeal.

The discourse then respecting the Principles of things would be of some such kind as this, when called Theological. Let us then proceed next in order to what is called Physical, beginning from some point here.

[12.] *On the Causes of the World, and further on its Generation, Elements, and Arrangement.*

²Since of the things, which are perceptible by a sense according to nature and individually,² there must be some patterns defined, (namely) Ideas, from which Sciences and Definitions are produced—for ³besides all men a certain man is thought of, and besides all horses a certain horse³—and generally, besides living beings a living being not generated and indestructible, in the same manner as from one seal there are many impressions, and of one man ten thousand likenesses upon ten thousand, the Idea (itself)⁴ being originally⁵ the cause of each being such as it is itself—it is a thing of necessity that the World should have been fabricated by the deity, as the most beautiful composition, while he was looking to some Idea of a World, as being the pattern of this World, made, as it were, after the resemblance of that Idea, according to which it was, after being assimilated, worked out; while the deity came by a most wonderful forethought and mode of life⁶ to fabricate the World, because he was good. He fabricated it therefore

¹—¹ Ficinus correctly omits *καὶ ἰμωδα*, as superfluous after *μόνιμα*—

²—² The version of Ficinus presents a remarkable variation, "Corporaliū omnium, quæ secundum naturam distincta, invicem efficiuntur."

³—³ Ficinus has, more intelligibly, "præter singulos homines, hominem ipsum intelligere decet; et præter equos singulos, ipsum equum—"

⁴ I have introduced "itself" from "ipse" in Ficinus, adopted by Stanley.

⁵ Ficinus omits *ἀρχή*—

⁶ I cannot understand *διαίτασιν* here, nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is "optima norma—"

from the whole of matter ; which moved about in no order and superfluously, previous to the generation of heaven ; and taking it away from its disordered state he led it to the best¹ order, and he adorned its parts with becoming numbers and forms,² so as to discriminate³ how fire and earth exist at present with reference to air and water—things that exhibited previously merely³ foot-marks,⁴ and (were) the receptacle of the powers of the Elements, and were without reason and without measure shaking Matter and were shaken by it. ⁵ For from each of the four elements, as a whole, he generated the World ;⁵ and from all fire and earth and water and air leaving out neither any part or power, through having reflected,⁶ in the first place, that it was requisite to be a body and a production, and altogether tangible and visible ; since without fire and without earth it was not possible for any thing to be either visible or tangible. According then to a fair reason he formed it of earth and fire. But since it was requisite for some chain to be in the midst of both of these ; and since the divine chain is that of proportion, which has by nature the power to make itself and what are united with it one ; and since the World was not a plane—for one middle power would have been sufficient—but spherical—and required two middle powers for the fitting together—on this account, in the midst of fire and of earth, both air and water were arranged according to the manner of a proportion ; ⁷ so that, as fire is to air, so air should be to water, and this last to earth, and conversely ;⁷ and ⁸ by nothing being left from without, he

¹ Since Ficinus has “pulchrum ordinem—” perhaps his MS. read *καλὴν*—which would lead to *ἀρίστην καὶ καλλίστην*—“the best and most beautiful—”

² Ficinus has “ut ea mundus sit proportione contextus.”

³ I have supplied “merely” from “solum” in Ficinus.

⁴ On *ἵχνη* see at § 13, p. 271.

⁵ Ficinus has “ex integris enim quatuor elementis, eum compexit.”

⁶ Ficinus has “præcidebat,” by a press error for “prævidebat—”

⁷ Ficinus has, more fully, “ut quemadmodum se habet ignis ad aerem, sic aer ad aquam ; utque aer ad aquam, sic et aqua ad terram ; ac rursus, ut terra ad aquam, sic aqua ad aerem ; utque aqua ad aerem, sic aer ad ignem.” For he probably did not follow so much the MS. before him, as the passage in the *Timæus*, p. 32, A., to which there is an allusion. See too *Tim. Loc. iii. § 6*.

⁸ Ficinus has “ex eo insuper, quod nihil extra mundum reliquit, unicum illum fecit.”

made the World his only begotten,⁵ and assimilated it, according to number, to the Idea, that was one O.¹ He made it, moreover, without disease and without old age—inasmuch as nothing could come to it, naturally able to corrupt it—and self-sufficient, and in need of nothing from without; and he put round it a spherical form, the most regular kind of figure, and the most capacious, and the most easy to be moved. But, since it requires neither vision nor hearing, nor any thing else of that kind, he did not attach to it organs of such a kind for ministering (to the senses);² and after taking away the other kinds of motion, he gave it only the circularly-progressive, which has an affinity with that of Mind and Thought.

[13.] *Respecting the Configuration of the World; and that each of its forms is analogous to the World and its Elements.*

As the things, of which the World consists, are two, (namely,) body and soul, of which the former is visible and tangible,³ but the latter invisible and intangible, the power and constitution of each happens to be different. For its body⁴ is generated from fire and earth and water and air. These four substances did the fabricator of the World take together, while they were not, by Zeus,⁵ preserving the order of the elements; and he gave to them the form of a Pyramid, and a Cube, and an Octohedron, and Eikosihedron, but, above all, a Dodecahedron. And as far as Matter assumed the form of a Pyramid, it became Fire, ⁶that form being the most piercing,⁸ and made up of the fewest triangles, and in this manner the most attenuated; but as far as (it assumed the form) of an Octohedron, it took the quality of air; and as far as that of an Eikosihedron, it had the quality of water; and the form of a Cube he assigned to earth, as being the most solid

¹ Ficinus has, more clearly, "et ideæ suæ, quæ unica est numero, parem."

² I have supplied "to the senses" from "obsequium sentiendi" in Ficinus.

³ In lieu of *δαρὸν*, Ficinus found probably *θαλαρὸν*, answering to his "corruptioni obnoxium—" adopted by Stanley.

⁴ I have adopted, from ed. pr., *σῶμα αὐτοῦ* in lieu of *αὐτοῦ* simply. Ficinus too, "corpus—mundi."

⁵ Ficinus omits *μὲν Δία* here, as he frequently does in his version of Plato, through his dislike of the oath.

⁶ Ficinus has "ea quippe figura tenuis—" But there is nothing in the Greek answering to "tenuis."

and stable; but he made use of the form of the Dodecahedron for the Universe. But more than all these was the Plane of the nature of a Principle. For Planes are prior to Solids. And of the nature of a Plane there are, as it were, some two progenitors, ¹the most beautiful,¹ in the form of right-angled triangles; one, the Skalene; the other, the Isoskeles; the Skalene having one angle a right angle, and another two-thirds (of a right angle), and the remainder the third (of a right angle). Now the former,² [I mean the Skalene triangle,]² is the element of the Pyramid, and Octohedron, and Eikosi-hedron; the Pyramid consisting of four equilateral triangles, each of which is divided into six Skalene triangles, as described already; but the Octohedron in like manner of eight, each of which is divided into six Skalene; and the Eikosi-hedron (in like manner)³ of twenty. But the other,⁴ [I mean the Isoskeles,]⁴ becomes the constituent form of the Cube; for when four Isoskeles triangles come together, they make a Square; from six squares of which kind is formed a Cube. But for the Universe the deity made use of the Dodecahedron. Wherefore there are seen ⁵[in heaven]⁵ the forms of twelve animals in the circle of the Zodiac, and each of them is divided into thirty parts. And nearly so in the case of the Dodecahedron; which consists of twelve pentagons, (each)⁶ divided into five triangles, so that, as each consists of six triangles, there are found in the whole Dodecahedron three hundred and sixty triangles, being as many as there are parts in the Zodiac. Matter then, being fashioned into these forms by the deity, was moved at first with (indistinct)⁷ footsteps, and without order, but was subsequently reduced into order by the deity, while all things were fitted together according to a pro-

¹—¹ Ficinus omits τὰ κάλλιστα— words that ought to follow rather πρόγονα just before.

²—² After τὸ μὲν πρότερον one would omit λίγω δὴ τὸ σκαληνὸν τρίγωνον here, just as Ficinus omits a little below (⁴—⁴) after τὸ δὲ ἕτερον the words λίγω δὴ τὸ ἰσοσκελές—

³ I have adopted the Supplement in Ficinus, "similiter," to which there is nothing answering in the Greek.

⁴—⁴ The words ἐν οὐρανῷ are omitted by Ficinus.

⁶ I have introduced, what Ficinus has supplied, "unusquisque," wanting in the Greek, where ἐκάστων might easily have dropt out before ὥστε ἑκάστων—

⁷ This word seems absolutely requisite for the sense; although ἵχνη is found by itself in § 12, p. 268.

portion with each other. These things, however, when separated, do not remain at rest, but have a ceaseless shaking and communicate it to Matter. Wherefore being bound to the circumference of the World, they are driven on with it; and, while so driven on, they are carried against each other, the thinner particles into the places of the grosser; and by this means there is left no vacuum, destitute of some body; and as this inequality continues, it gives rise to a shaking; for by these particles Matter is shaken and they by it.

[14.] *Respecting the Soul of the World, and the Spheres, and the Stars.*

¹Bodies then has (Plato) introduced for the instruction of the Soul, touching the powers that are exhibited in it.¹ For since we judge of each of things existing by the Soul, he has fairly placed in it the Principles of all existing things, in order that, while contemplating each of the things that fall under it, according to their affinity and proximity, we should represent to ourselves its being in harmony with its acts. By saying then that there is a certain existence perceptible by the mind, which is indivisible, he has represented to himself another existence likewise, relating to bodies, which is divisible, by showing that he is able to lay hold by intellect of each of these existences; and by seeing that, as regards things perceptible by mind, there is an identity and a difference, and (so too) as regards things perceptible by a sense, from all these he has made the Soul a contribution.² For either the like is known by the like, which is the favourite doctrine of the Pythagorean, or the unlike by the unlike, which is that of Heracleitus, the Physical philosopher. But when (Plato) says that the World has been generated, we must not understand him, as if there were once a time, when the World was not; but because³ it is ever in generation,³ and shows forth something as a cause more ancient than its own constitution. And even the deity does not make the Soul ever existing of the World, but puts it in order. And

¹ Ficinus has, more briefly, "Ex corporibus itaque animæ vires investigare concessit." For he could not understand clearly, nor do I, the Greek—*εἰς τὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ δυνάμειν*—where the noun is wanting, required by *εἰς*—for the article cannot be taken here in a partitive sense.

² On the word *ἵστανος*, taken in its natural or metaphorical sense, see Casaubon on Theophrasti Character., p. 281.

³ Instead of *ἵστανος*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ἵστανος*: for his version is "perdurat—"

in this way he might be said to make it, by arousing up, as if from a drowsiness ¹ or heavy sleep,¹ and ² turning to himself both its mind and itself,² so that, by looking to what is perceptible by his mind, it may, while eagerly seeking his notions, assume species and forms. It is plain then that the World is a thing of life and intellectual. For the deity being desirous of making it the best (work),³ made it consequently both with life and intellect. For that, which is with life, is, ⁴ taken as a whole, a completed work superior to that, which, taken as a whole,⁴ is without life; and the intellectual than the non-intellectual; although perhaps by the mind not being able to subsist without a thing of life, but by the life being extended from the centre to the extremities, ⁵ it has happened, that it surrounds the body of the World in a circle and entirely conceals it, so that it stretches along the whole of the World, and in this manner binds and keeps it together;⁵ ⁶ and that the particles without have a power over those within.⁶ For that, which is without, remains uncut; but that, which is within, is cut into seven circles, divided from the commencement into double and triple intervals. Now that, which is comprehended by the (portion) of the sphere remaining uncut, is very like to the same; but the cut (like to) the different. For the movement of the heaven, which embraces all things, ⁷ is

¹— The words between the numerals are, perhaps, an interpolation. At least Ficinus has "*ex profundo quodam somno*," as if he did not find *καρπον* in his MS., or did not understand the word, explained by Suidas, "the aberration of mind arising from drinking wine."

²— Ficinus, more briefly, "*ad se ipsum ejus mentem—convertit—*"

³ Ficinus supplies, what is requisite for the sense, although wanting in the Greek, "*opus—*" as if *ἔργον* was found in his MS. between *γὰρ* and *αὐτόν*—

⁴— I have translated *ὅλον ὅλον*, "taken as a whole," words not found in the MS. of Ficinus, or omitted by him, as being obscure.

⁵— Ficinus more briefly, and with a change in the position of the words and sentences, "*mundi corpus totum circulo complexa est, universum quippe circumtegens, singulis ejus communicata particulis eoque pacto insolubili connectit vinculo, incolumenque conservat.*" I have, however, been content to change *διὰ παντός περιέχειν* *καὶ διὰ παντός* into *περιέχειν*

⁶— Ficinus has "atque ea vis animæ, quæ extra restitit, partes ejus intimas antecedit."

⁷— Such is the literal version of the Greek. Stanley's is, "being not uncertain, is one and ordinate—" that of Ficinus, "*cum minime pervagetur, unus est, ordinemque præcipuum servat.*"

not-wandering,⁷ as being one and in order; but that, ¹which is within, is various, and changed by risings and settings; and hence it is called wandering.¹ But that, which is without, is carried along to the right, by being moved from east to west; but that, which is within, conversely to the left, from west to east, ²meeting the world.² The deity made, moreover, the constellations and stars; and of these some not wandering, the ornament of heaven and of night, being very many in number; and ³(the planets), being seven,³ for the generation of number and time, and the exhibition of things existing. For an interval in the movement of the World has produced Time, ⁴the image, as it were, of eternity,⁴ which is a measure of the staying⁵ of the eternal World. But the non-wandering stars are not similar in power. The Sun is the leader of all, showing and illuminating all things. But the Moon is seen in the second rank, on account of her power; and the other planets proportionally, each according to its own share. Now the Moon makes the measure of a month,⁶ after it has completely gone through its own revolution, and overtaken the Sun in such (a time);⁷ but the Sun in that of a year. For

¹—¹ Ficinus, "At vero subjectorum progressus varius orbitibusque et occasibus permutatur; unde pervagatio quædam et oberratio nuncupatur."

²—² Ficinus has "superiori resistens." I confess I cannot understand either the Greek or the Latin; and the less so, as in a passage, similar in other respects, nothing similar is found in Tim. Loc. p. 97, C. § 4, where, however, from the words τὰ δὲ τὰς (ανάστω) τῷ ἰρίῳ—ἀπὸ ἱστρίας—ποθ' ἴω—ἱπαναφερόμενα—συμπεριδιναίται—τῇ ταύτῃ φορῇ, κράτος ἔχουσα ἐν κόσμῳ κάρρον—one ought perhaps to elicit here, εὖ πάντα ἱσχυοῦσα τὸν τοῦ κόσμου δρόμον—where δρόμον might have been easily lost before ἰδημοῦργησι. By comparing however the reading of Ficinus with the words of Cicero in Somn. Scipion. 4, "Huic (extimo orbi) subjecti sunt septem, qui versantur contrario motu atque cælum"—quoted by Ast on Epinom. § 9, τρεῖς δ' ἐπὶ φορὰς λίσσμεν (τῶν) ἐπὶ δεξιά κορευομένων—ἵνα δὲ—δὴν κάλλιστ' ἂν τις (τὸν) ἀνὰ κόσμον προσαγορεύοι, δὲ ἱναντίος ἱερίνοις ἐμπτασι κορεύεται—another reading might perhaps be elicited.

³—³ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "Quæ vero vagantur numero septem," as if his MS. read ἐπὶ πλανῆται ὄντα, not ἐπὶ πλανῆται—

⁴—⁴ Compare Tim. p. 37, D. § 14.

⁵ In lieu of μονῆς, Ficinus perhaps found something else in his MS., for his version is "status mensura," adopted by Stanley in his "the measure of the state—"

⁶ So Horne Tooke said that "month" comes from "it mooneth."

⁷ Ficinus, unable to understand ἐν τοσούτῳ, has omitted those words.

after it has gone round the circle of the Zodiac, it completes the seasons of the year; while the rest make use singly of their own periodical revolutions, which are beheld, not by ordinary persons, but by the properly instructed. Now from all these revolutions the perfect number and time is completed,¹ when all the planets, after arriving at the same point,² obtain such an arrangement, that a straight line being conceived to be let fall³ from the non-wandering sphere³ to the earth in the manner of a perpendicular, the centres of all⁴ are seen upon that line. There being then seven spheres⁵ in the wandering sphere,⁵ the deity made seven visible bodies out of a substance, for the most part fire-like, and fitted them to the spheres, formed out of the circle of the different and the wandering. And he placed the Moon in the first circle⁶ after the Earth;⁶ and the Sun he arranged for the second circle, and Lucifer and the so-called sacred⁷ star of Hermes into the circle, which moves with a velocity equal to the Sun, but at a distance from it; and above the rest,⁸ (each) in its own sphere,⁹ ¹⁰the slowest of them lying under the sphere of the non-wandering, which some call by the name of the star of Saturn;¹⁰ and that, which is the next after it in slowness, by the name of Jupiter, under which is that of Mars. But in the eighth the power, which is above, is thrown around them

and so too has Stanley; for they are wanting in Tim. p. 39, C. I have retained them, conceiving that χρόνῳ had dropt out, written $\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\psi$ in MSS.

¹ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "complebitur," as if his MS. read *συμπλήρης ἵσται, not συμπεραιούται*, "is passed through." Compare Tim. p. 39, C., *τὸν τίλιον ἰνιαυτὸν πληροῖ*—

² So Ficinus renders *σημεῖον*. See at § 10, p. 265, n. ³.

³—Ficinus has "a supremo circulo—"

⁴ In lieu of *αὐτῶν* Ficinus found in his MS. *πάντων*, as shown by his version—"omnium," adopted by Stanley.

⁵—Ficinus has "in orbe circumvago—"

⁶—I cannot understand *μετ' αὐτήν*, nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is, "circulo supra terram—" or else his MS. read *ὑπὲρ τὴν γῆν*— Stanley has, "in that circle, which is next the Earth—"

⁷ I do not remember to have read elsewhere of the star of Mercury being called "sacred."

⁸ I have, with Stanley, introduced "each," requisite for the sense.

⁹ Ficinus has "gradatim disposita," as if his MS. read something answering to "gradatim—"

¹⁰—¹⁰ Ficinus, more briefly, "tardiorē sane omnibus Saturni stellam in proxima sub non errante circulo sede locavit," as if he found in his MS. *πάντων*, adopted by Stanley, in lieu of *αὐτῶν*— See above, n. ⁴.

all. And all these are living intellectual beings, and gods, and of a spherical form.

[15.] *On Dæmons and the Elements*, 'with which they are combined.'

There are other Dæmons likewise, which a person might call created gods, according to each of the Elements. Some are visible, others invisible, in Æther (hot air)² and Fire, and in Air (cold air)³ and Water; so that no part of the World is without a share of life, nor of a living being superior to the nature of man. To these are committed all under the Moon, and upon the Earth. For the deity is himself the maker of the Universe, and of the gods and dæmons. Now³ the Universe will not have,³ according to his will, a dissolution; but the rest his children lead according to his command, and 'doing what they do'⁴ in imitation of him; and from whom are rumours, and⁵ voices (from heaven),⁵ and dreams, and oracles, and whatever is made an art of by mortals in the way of prophecy. 'Now the Earth lies in the midst of the whole (circles),'⁷ and is twisted round the pole, which is stretched through all,⁸ the guardian of day and night, and⁹ is the oldest of the gods

¹ Ficinus omits *συννόμων*, probably as being scarcely intelligible.

² On the difference between *αἰθήρ* and *ἀήρ*, see my note on Prometh. 88.

³ I have, with Stanley, translated, as if the Greek were *τὸ δὴ πᾶν λύσειν οὐκ ἔξει*—not *τὸ δὴ πᾶν λύσειν οὐκ ἔχει*—where *ἔξει* has been obtained from "habebit" in Ficinus, who adds too "in posterum," as if his MS. read *ἔτι τὸ λοιπὸν* after *πᾶν*—

⁴ Ficinus has merely "singula transigentes," not understanding perhaps the formula, *πράττοντες, ὅσα πράττουσι*, of which many examples are given by Abresch and Blomfield on Agam. 67. I have translated, as if *κατὰ* had dropt out between *καὶ* and *μύμνησιν*—

⁵ On *ἐλπίδες* and *ὄρεται* see Wytttenbach in Julian Orat. i. p. 62.

⁶ All between the numerals would more correctly close the preceding section.

⁷ The sense requires "circles," in Greek *κύκλων*, which might have dropt out easily after *δλων*—

⁸ Ficinus has "circa discordiam agitationemve, quæ per totum porrigitur coarctata," supplying the words "circa (where however there is a press-error, probably for 'extra') discordiam agitationemve," as if his MS. read *ἀστασίαστος οὐσα*, or something similar: and while from "porrigitur" it is evident that, in lieu of *τραγμῖνον*, it read *τραμῖνον*, what I have adopted, it is no less evident that his MS. omitted *πόλον*. At all events *τραμῖνον* is confirmed by Tim. p. 40, C., where three MSS. read *τραγμῖνον*—

⁹ On this notion see Tim. p. 40, C., and Tim. Loc. p. 97, D. § 5.

in heaven,³ and, after the soul of the World, furnishing us abundant food; about whom the World revolves, she being herself a star, but who, through her being a thing equally balanced, remains lying in the middle, and similar to those surrounding her. But the Æther is separated towards the most outward parts, and to the sphere of the non-wandering, and to that of the wandering; and after those spheres is that of the Air; and in the middle is the Earth with its own moisture.⁶

[16.] *About the gods, who are offsprings; and that the deity enjoined upon them the making of man.*

When all had been put into order by him, he left three remaining kinds of living beings, the winged, the aquatic, and the foot-walking. These the deity enjoined upon his offsprings to make, in order that the things moulded by him might not be immortal.¹ They then, after they had borrowed from the primary matter certain portions for definite periods, as if they were to be paid back again, fabricated mortal things of life. But when there was respecting the race of Man, as being the nearest related to gods, again a care both to the father of all, and to the gods, his offspring, the artificer of the Universe sent down upon earth the souls of this race, equal in number to the stars; and after he had placed² each soul in a star, as in a vehicle connected with it,² he did, in order that he might be without blame, lay down laws, fixed by Fate, after the manner of a Law-giver; that from the body should arise mortal affections, first, sensations, then pleasure and pain, and fear and anger, and that the souls, which obtained a mastery over these (feelings), and were not controlled by them, should live justly, and arrive at the star, connected with them; while they, who were overcome by (their own) injustice, should come in their second birth to the life of a woman; and, if they did not cease then, at last to the nature of wild beasts; and that the

¹ The sense evidently requires "mortal," or else we must read ὅπως μόνα τὰ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ πλασθῆναι, "in order that only the things moulded by him might be immortal." To avoid therefore the difficulty, Ficinus has altered the literal meaning of the words by translating "Nam si ipse hæc etiam genuisset, immortalia nata fuissent—" what Stanley has adopted.

² The Greek is ὡς εἰς ὄχημα ἄστρον τὸ σύννομον ἀπάσας: but the Latin of Ficinus, adopted by Stanley, "quamlibet antea cognato astro, tamquam vehiculo—" From both united it is easy to elicit εἰς ἄστρον, ὡς ὄχημα, τὸ σύννομον, ἐκάστας—

end of their labour should be to overcome what had grown upon them, and to return to¹ their proper state.

[17.] *Respecting the body and the members of man, and the powers of his soul.*

The gods then, in a leading manner,² moulded man from Earth and Fire and Air and Water, after borrowing certain portions with the view of repaying them. And, after putting them together with invisible bolts, they worked out some one body, and bound the master portion of the soul, sent down to the head, after placing as a substratum the brain in the manner of a ploughed field; and they put around the face the organs of the senses, to fulfil their fitting office. And they formed the marrow³ out of the smooth and straight triangles,⁴ of which the elements were composed, for it to be the generation of semen; but the bone from earth and marrow wetted,⁵ and frequently dipped in water and fire, and the nerves from bone and flesh; but the flesh itself was created out of a saline and acrid substance, like something fermented. And they placed around the marrow, bone; and around the bones, nerves; and through the means of the nerves were produced the bendings and bindings of the joints; and coverings for them by means of the flesh applied over them, here white, and there tawny,⁶ for the great utility itself of the body.⁶ From these were the internal viscera likewise put into folds, both the belly and the entrails rolled around⁷ it, and higher up from the mouth (came)⁸ the arteries and the opening of the larynx,⁸

¹ In lieu of *ἔξω λαθεῖν*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἔξω ἀναλαθεῖν*—similar to "habitum jam redierint" in Ficinus.

² I scarcely understand *προηγούμενος*, nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is "in primis—" from whence came Stanley's "first—"

³ Compare Tim. p. 73, B. § 49.

⁴ Ficinus has "co-coegerunt," as if his MS. read *συναχθῆναι* in lieu of *δευθῆναι*.

⁵ Ficinus, "alba tum plurima," as if his MS. read *πᾶσι* in lieu of *πᾶσι*.

⁶ Ficinus, "ad decorem et usum viventis—" the original of "for beauty and use" in Stanley. He found, therefore, in his MS., something different from *πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ εὐχρηστον τὸ σῶμα*.

⁷ One would have expected rather *παρὰ ταύτην*, "along it," in allusion to the folds of the colon.

⁸ I have adopted the version of Ficinus, "arteria et fistula faucium—" and so in part has Stanley, "the *aspera Arteria* and the *Œsophagus*—" The Greek is *ἀρτήρια καὶ φάρυγξ*—

one of which goes to the stomach, and the other to the lungs. The food too is arranged along the gut, comminuted and macerated by the breath and heat, and thus passes on to the whole body, according to its peculiar changes; while the two veins, that proceed along the spine, from opposite sides, infold the head and meet each other, and divide themselves 'hither and thither' into many parts. The gods then having made man, and bound² to his body the soul to be its mistress, located that, which rules according to reason, about the head, where is the commencement of the marrow, and nerves, and mental aberrations, according as they are affected; while the senses likewise lie around the head, as if they were the leading power of spear-bearing guards. In this spot is also that, which reasons, and contemplates, and judges. But that portion of the soul, which is affected by circumstances, they placed lower down, namely, the irascible about the heart, and the concupiscible about the lower belly and the parts about the navel; of which mention will be made hereafter.

[18.] *On the sense of Sight, and on light, and the formation of images in mirrors.*

After placing in the face the light-enduring³ eyes, they enclosed⁴ in them the light-like portion of fire; which being smooth and dense, they conceived to be the brother⁵ of the light of day.⁶ Now this⁷ runs through the whole of the eye, and especially the middle of it, in the most easy manner, (as

¹—¹ The Greek *σχιζονται τε γοῦν ἔνθεν*—where, in lieu of the unintelligible *γοῦν*, I have translated, as if the Greek were, *τ' ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν*, a formula found in Tim. p. 46, C., and restored by myself on Æsch. Eum. 95, to Eurip. Iph. T. 941; and to the passages there quoted I could add not a few more.

² Ficinus, "conjuxerunt—" as if his MS. had read *συνδῶσαντες*, not *ἐνδύσαντες*—A similar var. lect. in Tim. p. 45, B., where one MS. offers *ἐνδύσαντες* for *ἐνδῶσαντες*.

³ So I have translated *φωσφόρα*, literally "light-bringing;" for the eyes do not bring light, but bear it." Stanley, "the eyes, conduits of light—"

⁴ Ficinus, "accendere," as if his MS. read *καθῆψαν*, not *καθιέρξαν*—

⁵ On the metaphorical sense of *ἀδελφός*, found in Tim. p. 45, B., see Blomf. on Æsch. S. Th. 490.

⁶ Ficinus, "divini," probably a press error for "diurni—"

⁷—⁷ Ficinus, "passim per oculos manat, verum per pupillas purius ubi-risque transcurrit," thus avoiding the tautology in *καθάρωταρον* and *ἐλκενίστατον*. Both these words are, however, found in Tim. p. 45, B. in contiguous sentences, but not, as here, in juxta-position.

being) the most pure and clear;⁷ ¹ and having a sympathy with the light without, as like has with like,¹ it furnishes the sense of sight. Hence when light has departed at night or become obscured, that,² which flows from us,² adheres no longer to the air that is near; ³ but, being kept within, it smooths down and disperses³ the emotions within us, and becomes the bringer-on of sleep, by which the eyelids are closed; and when there is a great quietness,⁴ slumbers fall upon (us)⁴ with short dreams;⁵ but when some emotions are still left, frequent⁶ phantoms are produced around us; and in this way are formed visions, that become, according to a direct road,⁷ some, day-dreams, and some,⁸ night-dreams; and after these the image-makings, existing in mirrors, and other things, that are transparent and smooth, are perfected, not otherwise than by refraction, according as the mirrors have a convexity, concavity, or length; for the appearances will be different, through the lights being reflected to different parts, and slipping-off⁹ from the convexity, but coming together to the convexity. For thus in some cases ¹⁰ the left and the right are seen on opposite quar-

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἄντι*, not *τὸ*,—*ἐλκεριστότατον*— similar to *ἀδελφὸν ὃν τοῦτου πῦρ ἐλκερινός* in Tim. p. 45, B.

² Ficinus, "quod quidem externo fulgori simile contextum simili ac corroboratum—" which seems to have been obtained from Tim. p. 45, C., *ἐκπίπτον, ὁμοιον πρὸς ὁμοιον, ἐμπκαγίς γενόμενον*.

³ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "Quo fit ut, sese ad interiora recipiens, demulceat atque resolvat—"

⁴ I have translated, as if *ἡμῖν* had dropt out after *ἐκπίπτουσιν*. For though the pronoun is omitted in Tim. p. 45, E., *γενομένης δὲ πολλῆς μὲν ἡσυχίας βραχυόνευρος ὕπνος ἐκπίπτει*— yet as *μὲν* is there perfectly useless, and omitted in one MS., the author probably wrote *ἡμῖν*—

⁵ Ficinus, "somnia ferme sine insomniis surrepit."

⁶ Ficinus, "frequentia confestim—" thus rendering *συχνά* by two words.

⁷ Although *ἐνθουσιαν* is found in Tim. p. 45, D., I confess I do not understand its meaning in either place.

⁸ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὰς μὲν ὕπας, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὕπας*— not *ὕπας τε καὶ ὕπας*— Ficinus, "seu veræ seu falsæ." See at § 7, p. 259, n. ³.

⁹ I confess I cannot understand *ἀπολισθαίνωντων* here. Had a MS. offered *ἀπολισθύνων*, I would have suggested *ἀπελασθύνων*, "driven off," to balance *συνθύνων*— And so probably found Ficinus in his MS. At least his version is, "a convexo quidem repulsa atque dispersa—"

¹⁰ Alcinoüs, by his brevity, has obscured what is sufficiently clear in Tim. p. 46, B., where nothing is to be found answering to *ἐφ' ὧν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον*, which I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus has "in aliis pari modo;" what Stanley has adopted, "in others alike—"

ters; in others, according to equality;¹⁰ and in others, what is at the bottom is changed to what is at the top, and contrariwise.

[19.] *Of the other senses, and for what purposes they are created.*

Hearing has been created for distinguishing sound. It commences from a movement about the head and ends at the seat of the liver. And sound is that, which passes through the ears and brain and blood¹ in succession, until the soul is struck. An acute sound is that, which is moved quickly; a grave, slowly; a great one (is what is moved) with much (force); a small one (that which is moved) with little (force).

Following upon these there has been put together the power of the nostrils for the perception of smells. Now Smell is an affection, descending from the veins in the nostrils to the places² about the navel. But it does not happen that the kinds of it have received a name, except two,³ the most belonging to a genus,³ (namely) the sweet-smelling, and the bad-smelling, which have the appellation⁴ of painful and pleasant;⁴ but (it does happen) that all smell is denser than air, and thinner than water;⁵ and properly the things, in which the genus of Smell is reasonably said,⁵ that have not obtained a perfect change, but have a participation in air and water;⁶ and these are according to smoke and fog;⁶ for

¹ This mention of blood, found likewise in Tim. p. 67, B., is to be attributed, perhaps, to the knowledge of the fact, that sound is conveyed easily along a liquid.

² In lieu of *τόπων*, one would prefer *πόρων*, "pores—"

³ Such is, perhaps, the proper version of *γενικωτάτοιον*— which Ficinus, unable, I suspect, to understand, renders "præter duas communiores—" "Ficinus, "suavitatis et nauseæ—"

⁴ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the Greek, where ed. pr. reads *ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν αἵς*— instead of *κυρίως δὲ ἐν οἷς*— Ficinus, "proprie autem in iis odoribus genus accidit—" Stanley, "for odour is properly said to be of those things—"

⁵ Ficinus, more intelligibly, "cujusmodi sunt, quæ ex fumo et caligine conficiuntur." Plato, in Tim. p. 66, D., has *μεταβάλλοντος γὰρ ὕδατος εἰς αἶρα, αἶρος τε εἰς ὕδωρ, ἐν τῷ μεταξύ τούτων γεγόνασιν ὀσμαι ἐμπασαι ἀνῆασι τε, κάπνος ὡς ἡ ὀμίχλη*— for so that passage should be read, in lieu of *γεγόνασιν εἰσι τε ὀσμαι ἐμπασαι κάπνος ἡ ὀμίχλη*— for the sense is, "all scents are produced and rise up, like smoke and a fog." To meet, however, the difficulty in the Greek, that passage has been thus translated, "for odours are generated by the change of water into air, or of air into water; and all these are either smoke or vapour."

through these changing into each other the sense of smelling is completed.

And Taste too have the gods made the judge of juices the most varied, by extending to the heart the veins from it,¹ that are to be the provers and judges of the juices; for these,² when brought together and separated,³ according as the juices fall upon them, define the change in them. Now there are seven varieties in juices; sweet, vinegar-like, rough, salt-like, sour, bitter. And of these it happens that the sweet is of an opposite nature to all the rest, diffusing familiarly³ its moisture about the tongue; ⁴but those, that stir about and tear its skin,⁴ are acrid; those, that inflame and ⁵run upwards,⁵ are pungent; those, that have a detersive power so great as to cause it to waste,⁶ are sour; those, that are quietly cleansing and detersive, are salt-like; but of those, that contract the pores and unite (their parts), the more rough, are harsh; while those, that produce a less effect, are bitter.

But the power of the Touch has been prepared by the gods to lay hold of things warm and cold, and soft and hard, and

¹ How the veins could be extended from γῦσις, which is not the organ of tasting but the act, I cannot understand. By comparing, however, Tim. p. 65, D., ὅσα μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν ἄνθρωποι περὶ τὰ φλέβια, οἷόν περ δοκιμία, τῆς γλώττης τταμμένα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, it is easy to see that Alcinoüs wrote ἀπὸ γλώττης— not ἀπ' αὐτῆς— On the other hand, some persons seems to have wished to read γέσσις for γλώσσης in the Timæus; for the version is, "whenever any thing falls on the small veins around the tongue, which are the arbiters, as it were, of the taste, stretching to the heart—"

² Ficinüs, followed by Stanley, has more intelligibly, "dum dilatantur varie atque contrahuntur—"

³ I cannot understand οἰκίσας, nor could, I think, Ficinüs; whose version, adopted by Stanley, is "etenim humorem linguae imbibitum perfundit atque delinit—"

⁴ In lieu of τοὺς δὲ λακρούς, τοὺς μὲν κεκῶντάς τε καὶ σπαράττοντας, δέξας, Ficinüs has merely "acer turbat atque dispergit." For doubtless he could not understand, nor can I, τοὺς δὲ λακρούς— And hence I have translated, as if the Greek were τοὺς δὲ λόφους αὐτῆς—

⁵ I confess I do not know what is meant by εἰς τὰ ἀνω θύοντας in the Greek, or by the Latin of Ficinüs, "ad suprema evolat—" Stanley has "some heat and fly upwards, as the hot." Perhaps the author wrote εἰς τὰ ἀνω ὀνόου (i. e. ὀφρανοῦ)— "to the upper parts of the palate—" On this meaning of ὀφρανοῦ, see Schaffer on Dionys. de Composit. Verbor. § 14, p. 164.

⁶ The sense requires, not συνήκειν, but ῥήκειν, as translated. Ficinüs has merely "qui vehementer abstergit et liquefacit—" Stanley, "others being absterge, dissolve it."

light and heavy, and smooth and rough, so as to judge of the differences in them; and we call things, that receive a touch, yielding; but those, that do not yield, resisting. Now this happens according¹ to the bases of the bodies themselves. For those, that have a larger base, are ²stable, and fixed to their seat;² but those, that stand³ upon a small one, are yielding easily, and are soft and change their place easily. Now that, which is rough, would be with an unequal surface combined with hardness; but that, which is smooth, (would be) what is with an equal surface combined with thickness. Moreover as the properties of cold and heat are the most opposite, they are combined from opposite causes. For that, which by the sharpness and roughness of its particles cuts through (a thing),⁴ produces the property of heat; but the thicker particles⁵ (produce) cold; while by their ingress they drive out the lesser, and compel the small ones to enter on the other hand⁶ into their vacant place.⁶ For a shaking and trembling takes place then; and upon this occurring the property of cold arises in bodies.

[20.] *On the Heavy and Light.*

It is by no means proper to define the Heavy and Light by the up and down; for there is neither the up nor the down. For since the whole of heaven is like a sphere, and ⁷formed

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *κατά*, not *παρά*—

² Ficinus, "stabilia ac solida—" as if his MS. read *στέρεα*, not *ἰσπατα*—

³ Ficinus, evidently dissatisfied with *βιβῶρα*, has adopted a less specific term, "utuntur—" I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἰσῶρα*— But *βιβῶρα* is defended by *ὑπεῖκει δὲ ὅσον ἐπὶ σμικροῦ βαινει*— in *Tim.* p. 62, B.

⁴ I have translated, as if *τι* had dropt out before *τὸ*— for *διατίμνον* requires its object.

⁵ Unable to understand *ἀδρομερίστερον—ἰξωθούτων—βιαζομένων* δὲ— I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀδρομερίστερα—ἰξωθούντα—βιαζόμενα*— remembering the words in *Tim.* p. 62, B., *τὰ—μεγαλομερίστερα εἰσόντα, τὰ σμικρότερα ἰξωθούντα*— Ficinus, "frigida vero, quod ingressu pigrius, dum tenuia quidem expelluntur, et in illorum sedes crassiora penetrare coguntur—" which is evidently a bold attempt to make something like sense out of words, which, taken literally, are unintelligible.

⁶ Although *ἰκύνων* seems to be defended by *εἰς τὰς ἰκύνων—ἔδρας* in *Tim.* p. 62, B., yet I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὴν γε κινήν*—

⁷ Ficinus, "in convexa superficie æqualiter lævigatum—" as if his MS. read *εὐπρόσῳτος* in lieu of *ἱσῳτός*—

accurately even on its outward surface,⁷ some persons do not justly call one part up, and another down. For that is heavy, which is drawn with difficulty to a place contrary to nature; but (that which is drawn) easily, is light; and still further, heavy is that, which is composed of rather many particles; light, of very few.

[21.] *On Respiration.*

We respire in this manner. There is around us from without a great quantity of air. Now this passes to within through the mouth, and nostrils, and the rest of the pores of the body, ¹seen (only) by reason; ¹ and, after being warmed, ²it proceeds with haste to what is cognate in the external portions; ² and according to the road, by which it goes out, it drives back again the air to the parts within; and in this manner unceasingly, the circle being completed, are inspiration and expiration produced.³

[22.] *Respecting the Causes of Diseases.*

The causes of diseases (Plato says)⁴ are many. In the first place, the deficiency or the excess, in the elements, and their change into other places not their own; secondly, ⁵the inverse generation of homogeneous substances; ⁵ as if from flesh were produced blood, or bile, or phlegm; for all these things are nothing else than a wasting away.⁶ For phlegm is the wasting away of flesh; but sweat and a tear are, as it were, the serous portions of phlegm. Now phlegm, when left without,⁷ produces ⁸leprosy and scurvy; ⁸ but, when it is within and mingled with black bile, it induces what is called ⁹the

¹ Ficinus, "latentes—" Stanley, "invisible—"

² Ficinus, "ad externum cognatumque aerem refluxere nititur—" Stanley, "it floweth back again to the external air—"

³ Ficinus, "sequitur—" as if his MS. read *ἔπειτα* in lieu of *συνιστάνται*.

⁴ I have adopted the words between the lunes from "Plato—docuit" in Ficinus; the origin of "Plato allegeth" in Stanley.

⁵ I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals, although something similar is found in Tim. p. 83, B., *ὅταν ἀνάσταλιν ἡ γένεσις τοῦτων πορεύεται*— Ficinus, "mutuam cognatorum regenerationem—" which to myself is quite as unintelligible as the Greek. Stanley, "a preposterous generation of homogeneal parts—"

⁶ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, renders *σύντηξιν* by "colligationem et putrefactionem—" as if his MS. read *σύντηξιν ἢ σήψιν*—

⁷ Ficinus, "extra—missa—" as if his MS. read, not *ἀπολεσθῆναι*, but *ἀπορροεσθῆναι*— Stanley, "intercepted—"

⁸ Ficinus merely "albas infectiones—"

⁹ On the "holy disease," see the learned on Herodot. iii. 33.

holy disease.⁹ Now the phlegm, that is acrid and salt-like, is the cause of the affections, that exist ¹with a cold.¹ And ²all the parts, that are in a state of inflammation from bile, suffer this.³ For bile³ and phlegm work out very many and very various sufferings; the continued fever is produced from fire being in excess; the quotidian, from the excess of water being so; the tertian, from that of air; and the quartan, from that of earth.

Let us speak next in order of the Soul, taking up the discourse from some point here, even though we shall appear to repeat some things.

[23.] *On the three principal powers of the Soul.*

The gods, who formed the race of mortals, after they had received, as we have shown,⁴ the Soul of man, that is immortal, added to it two mortal portions. But that the divine and immortal portion of it might not be infected by the trifles⁵ of mortals, ⁶they placed over the body, as if they were appointing a ruler and a king over a citadel⁶ and assigning to him a residence, the head, which possesses a form, imitating that of the Universe; and they placed under it the rest of the body to minister to it; and attached that portion to it, as it were a vehicle, while they assigned to its mortal parts a dwelling-place, one to one part and another to another. For they placed that, which feels anger, in the heart; but that, which is affected by desire, in the intermediate place between the boundary on the side of the navel and that of the diaphragm, after binding it down, as if it were a mad⁷ and wild beast.

¹—¹ The Greek is *ἐν ρίψει*, an error, I suspect, for *ἐν ρίψει*— Ficinus, “per fluxum—” who therefore found in his MS. *ἐν ρεύσει*—

²—² Ficinus, “omnes enim, qui pituita simul et bili gravantur, id pati necesse est,” as if his MS. read *πάντας δὲ τοὺς φλεγμαίνοντας—πιπονθῆναι δέ*— (of which Stanley has adopted *πιπονθῆναι δέ*, as shown by his “must suffer—”) not *πάντα δὲ τὰ φλεγμαίνοντα—πιπονθε*.

³ In lieu of *χολήν*, ed. pr. *χολή*, and so Ficinus, “bilis cum pituita—” what I have adopted.

⁴ Instead of *δείξομεν*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ἰδίξαμεν*, as shown by his “diximus—” what I have adopted.

⁵ Ficinus, “deliramentis—” as if his MS. read *ἀφροσύνας*, not *φλυαρίας*.

⁶—⁶ Ficinus, “in ipsa corporis arce sedem ejus, utpote principis omnium, statuerunt—” as if his MS. read *ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀκροπόλεως πάνταρχον ἀποφθάντες*.

⁷ By the aid of this passage we may perhaps read in Tim. p. 70, E.,

But the lungs they planned, for the sake of the heart, to be soft and ¹without blood, and with cavities,¹ and sponge-like, in order that the heart, while leaping, according as anger was boiling, might have a softening down; but the liver for exciting the feeling of desire in the soul, and for rendering it gentle, ²by having a sweetness and bitterness;² and moreover for making manifest the prophetic power in dreams; for there is shown in it ³the power carried on from the mind through what is smooth and thick and brilliant;³ but the spleen for the sake of the liver, in order that the former may cleanse the latter, and render it brilliant, ⁴and at least receive to the same the differences, generated by certain diseases around the liver.⁴

[24.] *On the division of the parts of the Soul.*

That the Soul is tripartite according to its powers, and that its parts are distributed to their own place according to reason, we may learn from hence. In the first place, the things, separated by nature, are different. ⁵Now that, which has the property of suffering, is naturally separated from that, which has the property of reasoning;⁵ since the latter is conversant about things, perceived by the mind; but the former about things painful and pleasant, ⁶and still further what has the property of suffering, being about things with life.⁶ Secondly,

καὶ κατέδρασαν δὴ αὐτὸ ἐν ταῦθα, ἅτε οἰστροῦν καὶ ἀγριῶν θρίμμα in lieu of —δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν ταῦθα ὡς ἀγριῶν θρίμμα.

— In lieu of ἀναιμον, σπαραγγώδη, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἀνεμόεντα σπαραγγώδη— for his version is “ventosae et instar fistulae cavae—”

— and — To understand these two passages, the reader must turn to the Timæus, p. 71, B.—D. § 46.

— Ficinus, “utque putredines corroderentes, quæ quibusdam morbis circa jecur affluunt, in splenem continuo delabantur—” as if he had found in his MS. διαφθορὰς εἰς αὐτὸν— where διαφθορὰς would answer to ἀκαθάρσιαι in Tim. p. 72, C., ὅταν τινες ἀκαθάρσιαι γίγνωνται διὰ νόσους σώματος περὶ τὸ ἥπαρ— while, instead of ταῦτῶν, which I cannot understand, one would prefer ταυτὸν— For though ταῦτῶν seems to be defended by Tim. p. 72, D., ταπεινόμενος εἰς ταῦτῶν ἐννιζῶ, it only seems; since the antithesis in μέγας καὶ ὑπουλός ἀξάνεται plainly leads to ταπεινόμενος εἰς τὸ ὑγυινὸν ἐννιζῶ. Stanley’s version is—what is no version—“so that those corruptions, which by some diseases are contracted about the liver, retire thither.”

— Ficinus, “natura vero segregatur, quod rationem habet, et quod rationi subjicitur.” Stanley, “passionate and reasonable are separated by nature.”

— Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, more fully,

since the part, that has the property of suffering, and that, which has the property of reasoning, are different by nature, it is meet for them to be in separate places. For they are found to be at war with each other. Now nothing is able to be at war with itself; nor can the things opposed to each other stand together ¹at the same time about the same object.¹ At least in the case of Medea, anger is seen to be at war with reason; for she says—²

I know how great the ills I'm about to do;
But rage has a pow'r greater than ³my counsels.³

And in the case of Laius, when carrying off Chrysippus, desire is at war with reason; for he says—

'Alas! this thing from god ⁴to man's an ill,
When, what is good, one knows, but uses not.

Still further ⁵is it presented to the mind,⁵ that the property of suffering is different from that of reasoning, from the care of the property of reasoning being one thing, but that of suffering another; for the former is effected by the discipline of teaching; the latter by the practice of morality.⁶

[25.] *That the Soul is immortal.*

That the soul is immortal (Plato) proves by proceeding in this manner. The soul brings life to whatsoever she is attached, as being a thing born with herself. Now that, which brings life to any thing, is itself non-recipient of death; and a thing of this kind is immortal. If then the soul is immortal, it would be indestructible likewise. For it is an incorporeal

"*quinetiam ratio hominibus duntaxat, pars autem perturbationibus obsequens, cæteris quoque viventibus competit.*"

¹—Ficinus, more fully, "*circa idem secundum idem eodem tempore.*"

² In vs. 1075, 6.

³—Although τῶν ἰμῶν βουλευμάτων is found in the MSS. of Euripides, and in those of the different authors, who have quoted this passage, yet the very balance of the sentence requires something like θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσειν ἢ καλῶν βουλευμάτων— i. e. "But rage has greater power than good thoughts—" or τῶν γε νοῦ βουλευμάτων: which is nearer to the common reading, τῶν ἰμῶν βουλευμάτων.

⁴—Since Plutarch, ii. p. 33, E., offers τόδ' ἤδη θεῖον— perhaps Euripides wrote either τόδ' ἤλαθε θεῖον— or τόδ' ἤκει θεῖον—

⁵—Such is the proper version of παρίσταται. Ficinus renders "plane patebit—" what Stanley has adopted.

⁶ Ficinus, in lieu of ἡθους, seems to have found in his MS. ἔθους: for his version is "consuetudine et exercitatione—" adopted by Stanley.

existence, (and) not to be changed in its substance, and perceptible by mind, and invisible, and of one form; ¹(and) therefore not to be put together; ¹ not to be dissolved; ² not to be scattered about. ³ But the body is altogether the contrary; it is perceptible by sense; visible; to be scattered about; to be put together; of many forms. ³ The soul too, being by means of the body close upon what is perceived by a sense, ⁴ becomes giddy and is troubled, and, as it were, drunk; ⁴ but being close upon what is perceived by mind, she becomes itself of itself composed and tranquil; ⁵ nor is she like to that, by which, when she is close to it, she is troubled; so that she is rather like to what is perceived by mind. Now what is perceived by mind, is naturally ⁶ not to be scattered about, and indestructible. ⁶

Moreover the soul naturally ⁷ takes the lead. ⁷ Now that, which naturally takes the lead, is like to what is divine; ⁸ so that the soul, ⁸ by being like to what is divine, would be indestructible, and incorruptible. ⁹ (Again,) the contraries, that have no middle term, and exist, not according to themselves, but by some accident, ¹⁰ are constituted by nature to be pro-

¹ Ficinus renders *οὐκ οὖν ἀδιόνυκτος* by "nonne igitur et simplex?" But an interrogation here would be out of place. Stanley's version is, "Hence it must be simple; neither can it be at any time dissolved and corrupted."

² Ficinus omits *ἀσπίδατος*.

³ Ficinus has "Præterea animus, cum per corporis sensus ad illa, quæ sensibilia sunt, descendit—" while Stanley omits all between "The soul" and "drunk."

⁴ Ficinus renders *ἀγγιγῆ* by "angitus—" and omits *ὅλον μεθύει, ὥσπερ μεθύουσα (ἢ ψυχῇ)*—

⁵ All between the numerals is wanting in Ficinus; while Stanley renders, most strangely, "When the Soul adhereth to those things, which are perceptible by intellect, it acquiesceth."

⁶ Ficinus, "semper incorruptibile."

⁷ Ficinus, "corpori dominatur—" the origin of "doth naturally preside over the body" in Stanley; who adds, "not the body over the soul."

⁸ Ficinus has "Quod autem natura sua regit et imperat, divinitati cognatum—" translated by Stanley, "But that, which, by nature, ruleth and commandeth, is of kin to divinity."

⁹ Ficinus, "deo proxima immortalis erit—" Hence Stanley, "being next to god must be immortal."

¹⁰ Ficinus, "ut se invicem mutuo fieri valeant—" as if his MS. read *ἡ ἀλλήλων γίνεσθαι δύνασθαι*— not simply *γίνεσθαι* without *δύνασθαι*.

duced from each other; ¹⁰ for instance, ¹ that, which men call life, is the contrary to death. As then death is the separation of the soul from the body, so likewise is life the meeting of the soul, which existed, it is plain, previously, with the body. ² If then the soul will be after death, and was, before it fell in with the body, ² it is reasonable to believe that it is eternal. For it is not possible to conceive what will destroy ³ it.

Moreover if learning is (but) recollection, the soul would be immortal. Now that learning is (but) recollection, we may be led (to believe) ⁴ in this manner; for learning could not be based otherwise than on the recollection of what has been known of old. For if we have an idea of universals ⁵ from things taken in parts, how shall we find a way through things that are infinite, as regards their parts? ⁶ or how from a few: ⁶ for ⁷ we should have been deceived by a falsehood, ⁷ as say for example, by having decided that, what makes use of respiration, is alone a living being; ⁸ or how would thoughts have the property of a principle? ⁸ By an act of recollection then we have an idea from small cogitations, that secretly fall ⁹ from some things taken in parts, while we are remembering what was known of old, but of which we met with the oblivion, when we were invested with a body.

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ολον ιναντιον ιστι τουτο*—not *ιναντιον δι τουτο*—

²⁻³ Ficinus, more correctly, "quod si et fuit ante, et post mortem erit—" although he omits *πρὸ τοῦ περιπεσεῖν σώματι*: and so Stanley after him. One would prefer merely *ὡς ἦν*, "as it was—" with the usual change of *καὶ* and *ὡς*. See on Tim. Loc. p. 156, n. 1.

³ I have adopted *φθεροῦν* from ed. pr. in lieu of *φθίρον*— Ficinus too, "quod perdat illum, excogitare—" and so Stanley.

⁴ Ficinus renders *ἵαχθῆσιν* by "adstruimus—" from whence Stanley, "we prove—"

⁵ I have adopted "universals" from "universalia" in Ficinus, as the version of *κοινότηας*—

⁶⁻⁸ Ficinus, more fully, "at quomodo ex paucis individuis communia ipsa percipimus?" Hence Stanley, "or how from a few perceive universals?"

⁷ Ficinus, as usual, when in doubt, renders one word, *διεψέσθην*, by two, "deciperemur atque mentiremur."

⁸⁻⁹ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, "vel quomodo ipsae intelligentiae in nobis principales essent?" Stanley, "or how could the Notions themselves have the reason of Principles?"

⁹ Ficinus, "incidentibus—" as if his MS. read *ἱκπιδόντων* in lieu of *ὑποκιστόντων*—

Further, ¹the soul is not corrupted¹ by its own wickedness; neither will it be corrupted by that of another person, nor by any thing else at all. And being in this state, it would be a thing incorruptible. Moreover that, which is self-moved, is ever-moved in the manner of a principle. Now a thing of this kind is immortal. The soul too is self-moved. Now the self-moved is the principle of all motion and generation. But a principle is not generated, and is not to be destroyed; so that ²the soul of the Universe would be such, and that of man likewise;² since both have a share in the same mixture. Now he says that the soul is self-moved, because it possesses a life born with it, (and) ever in action by itself.

That rational souls then are immortal, a person might, according to this man, firmly assert; but whether the irrational are so likewise, is a doubtful point. For it is probable that irrational souls, driven about by a mere phantasy, and making no use of either reasoning or judgment, or contemplation³ and their combination, or 'intellectual apprehension,'⁴ but, being altogether without thought, belong neither to a nature perceptible by mind, nor to an existence the same as the rational, and are mortal and corruptible.

And it follows upon the reasoning that souls are immortal, that they are introduced into bodies by their being innate in the natures, that form the fœtus; and, by passing into many bodies, both human and not human, ⁵they ever remain the same in number,⁵ either by the will of the gods or through incontinence⁶ or a love for the body; for body and soul possess somehow an affinity with each other, like fire and brimstone.

¹—¹ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "si anima—nequaquam corrumpitur—" as if his MS. read ἡ ψυχὴ εἰ φθείραται οὐχ ὑπὸ— in lieu of οὐ φθείραται ὑπὸ—

²—² Ficinus, "et hominum et reliquorum animantium animæ—" as if he had found in his MS. not τῶν ἄλλων, but τῶν ἄλλων ζώων—

³ Ficinus renders θεωρήμασι by "intelligentiis—" See § 29, p. 302, n. ³.

⁴—⁴ Ficinus, "aut boni malive discretionē—" as if his MS. read something similar to κακωρίαις in ed. pr., in lieu of which D. Heinsius suggested, in ed. 2, νοητικαῖς. Stanley, "nor can they discern ill—"

⁵—⁵ Ficinus, "eundem semper servantes numerum;" who found perhaps in his MS., not ἡ ἀριθμὸς μενούσας, but αἱ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν μενούσας— Stanley, "either according to certain numbers they expect—"

⁶ Ficinus adds "vitæ" after "incontinentia."

The soul of the gods too possesses the judging faculty, which may be called Gnostic, and the impelling, which a person would name the Parastatic,¹ and the appropriating;² which powers, existing in human souls likewise, after being invested with body, receive, as it were, a change, the appropriating into the feeling of desire, and the impelling into that of anger.

[26.]³ *On Fate and Self-power.*⁴

On the question of Fate something of this kind is the doctrine of this man. All things he says are in Fate, but all things are not however fated. For Fate, while holding the rank of a law, does not, as it were, say that one person shall do this, and another suffer that; for⁵ it would proceed to infinity;⁵ since the things produced are infinite, and infinite too the accidents around them; moreover⁶ that, which is in our power, would depart,⁶ and praise too and blame, and every thing (else)⁷ that borders on them; but (it says)⁷ that if a soul selects a life of this kind, and does some such⁸ acts,⁹ some

¹ By *παραστατικόν*, says Salmasius on Epictetus, p. 132, quoted by Fischer, is meant "the power by which a person moves himself from place to place." But how a derivative from *ιστημι* can convey the idea of motion, I confess I cannot understand. Equally unintelligible is the version of Ficinus, "*præterea et aggrediendi naturam, quem assistendi vigorem possumus nuncupare*;" for the idea of attacking is the opposite to that of assisting. Perhaps Alcinoüs wrote *περιστατικόν*—

² So I have translated *τὸ οἰκειωτικόν*—The version of Ficinus is "*vim —qua conciliant et gubernant—*" where two different words are given for one, of whose meaning he was uncertain. Stanley omits here *τὸ οἰκειωτικόν*, and translates just afterwards *ἡ οἰκειωτική*, "the assistant."

³ The order of the sections from here to 32 differs in the version of Ficinus from that in the Greek text. This in Ficinus is 29.

⁴ The word *αὐτεξούσιον* is elsewhere translated "free-will."

⁵ Ficinus, "*in infinitum namque progressio foret—*" who perhaps found in his MS., not *εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ τοῦτο*—but *εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ πορεύοιρ' ἂν τοῦτο*—what I have translated.

⁶ Ficinus, "*libertas quoque nulla restaret—*" as if his MS. read *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτεξούσιον οὐκ ἔσται*—Hence Stanley, "besides this would take away our free-will—"

⁷ I have translated, as if *ἄλλο* had dropt out before *ἄλλως*. Ficinus, however, after omitting *καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοῦτοις παραπλήσιον*, adds "*verum sic Fatum pronunciat—*" as if his MS. read *ἀλλὰ λέγει οὕτως*—not *ἀλλὰ ὅτι*, nor *ἀλλὰ διότι*, found in ed. pr.

⁸ Since *τάδε τινα* is incorrect Greek, opportunely has Ficinus, "*hujusmodi quædam—*" which leads at once to *τοιαῦτα τινα*, both here and in the next sentence, where Ficinus has "*talia—*"

⁹ Ficinus, "*consequenter—patietur,*" which leads to something else than *αὐτῇ ἔσται*.

such things will follow it.⁹ The soul then is without a master, and it rests with itself to do or not an act; nor is it forced to do this (or that).¹ But that, which follows upon the doing, will be accomplished according to Fate. For instance,² should a Paris carry off a Helen, it being in his power to do so,³ there will follow, that the Greeks will make war upon the Trojans³ for the sake of Helen. So too⁴ did Apollo foretell to Laius⁵—

If thou child gettest, thee that child shall kill.

Now in the oracle⁶ is comprehended both Laius and his child-getting; but the consequence is fixed by Fate.

Now the nature of a possibility falls somehow in the middle between the true and the false; but⁷ that, which rests on ourselves, is borne, as it were, on a vehicle, upon that (possibility) which is naturally indefinite.⁷ Now that, which happens with our own choice, will be either⁸ true or false;⁸ but it differs from what is in possibility, that is (to say), what exists according to a habit and an active operation.⁹ For

¹ In lieu of *τοῦτο*, the sense requires *τὸ ἢ τό*—as I have translated. The formula is found frequently in Thucydides and Demosthenes, and is still to be restored to numerous corrupt passages. Stanley, “without any compulsion or necessity.”

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὅλον εἰ τις Πάρις ἀρπάσειεν τὴν Ἑλένην, ἐκ’ αὐτῇ δὲ τοῦτο*—not *ὅλον τῇ Πάρις ἀρπάσειεν τὴν Ἑλένην ἐκ’ αὐτῇ ὄντι*—where it is impossible to discover a particle of syntax. What Ficinus found in his MS. it is difficult to discover from his version, “veluti ex eo, quod Paris Helenam rapiet, quod quidem in ejus erit arbitrio.” We might read *ὅλον τῇ Πάριδι ἀρπάσαντι τὴν Ἑλένην, ἐκ’ αὐτῇ δὲ τοῦτο, ἡκολούθησεν ὅτι*—in lieu of *ἡκολούθησεν τό*—for in this allusion to a past event there could be no place for the idea of a future; although there might be, if the historical fact were put hypothetically. Stanley, “As from Paris’s ravishing Helené, which it is within his power to do or not to do, it shall follow that the Grecians contend with the Trojans about Helené.”

³ Ficinus omits *ἴσως*.

⁴ Ficinus correctly omits *γὰρ* between *οὐρ* and *καὶ*—

⁵ In Eurip. *Phœn.* 19.

⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were, not *θεσμός*, but *χρησμός*—

⁷ Such I conceive to be the meaning of the words *ἀόριστον δὲ ὄντι αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει ὥσπερ ἐποχῆται τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν*. Ficinus was equally at a loss, as shown by his version, “eique suapte natura indefinito libera animæ rationalis potestas undique superfertur.” Hence Stanley, “and being so indefinite by Nature, that, which is in our power, is carried on, as it were, to it.”

⁸ Ficinus, “confestim aut verum est—” as if his MS. read *τοῦτ’ αὐτίκ’ ἔσται*—not *τοῦτο ἔσται*—Hence Stanley, “is presently either true—”

⁹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τοῦ δὲ, δ ἢ ἐν δυνάμει, τοῦτ’*

that, which is in possibility, indicates a certain fitness, as regards some things, which have not, as yet, the habit;¹ as for example, a boy will be said to be in possibility a grammarian, or a flute-player, or a carpenter; but he will be such in the habit of some one or two of these (trades), when he shall have learned them, or possessed some of these habits: but as regards active operation, when he operates from the habits, which he possesses. But possibility is neither of these;² while that, which rests on ourselves, being indefinite, receives, according to the balance either way, the truth or not.³

[27.]³ *On the Good, and on what is the most to be honoured in the things of the Good, and on Virtues.*

We must next speak in order and summarily of what has been said by the man on points of Morality. The good to be most honoured and the greatest, he conceived it was not easy to discover, nor safe for those, who discovered it, to expose before all. To a very few then of his well-known friends, and those⁴ previously tried,⁴ did he give a share of his lectures on the good. If any one however takes up his writings carefully,⁵ (he will say that)⁵ he has laid down our good in the knowledge and contemplation of the primary good, which a person would call god and the primary mind. For all the things, that in any way are held by man to be good, he conceived to have obtained that appellation from their participating somehow in the primary and most honoured (good), in the manner that things sweet and hot obtain their appellations according to their participation in their primaries; but of the

ἔστι, τοῦ-γενομένου— not ὁ δὲ δύναμι, τοῦτ' ἔστι—τοῦ-λεγομένου: where τοῦ δὲ is due to ed. pr., which D. Heinsius incorrectly altered into ὁ δὲ—

¹ Ficinus, "ordinem suum," as if his MS. read *τάξιν* instead of *ἔξιν*—

² Such is the literal version of the Greek. That of Ficinus is fuller, "Indeterminatum enim atque indifferens natura sua, libertate nostra, in utram placuerit statem lencem, quodammodo declinante, mox verum aut falsum ex possibile fit—" But whether he found the corresponding Greek words in his MS. is another question.

³ This in Ficinus is § 30.

⁴ Ficinus, "probe electis—" Hence Stanley, "of whom his judgment made choice—"

⁵ Since Ficinus inserts "reperiet," adopted by Stanley, I have translated, as if the text were *λίγοι δὲ ὄντι*— words that might easily have fallen out between *ἀναλάβοι* and *ἐπιθετο*.

things, that are with us, only mind and reason reached to a similitude with the very (good).¹ Hence our good is a thing honourable and venerable and divine and lovely and symmetrical, and called somehow² happiness; but of the things, that are said by the many to be good, such as health, and beauty, and strength, and wealth, and³ what are near to these,³ there is not one altogether⁴ a good, unless⁵ it meets with⁵ the use of it arising from virtue; for when these are separated,⁶ they hold merely the rank of matter, existing as an evil to those, who use them evilly. And sometimes he has called even mortal things good. And happiness he conceived to exist not in human things, but in divine and blessed.⁷ From whence he said that the souls of philosophers in reality were filled with things great and wonderful, and, that after the dissolution of the body they became⁸ hearth-fellows⁸ with the gods, and go round with them, while surveying⁹ the level plane of truth;⁹ since even during the period of life they had a desire for his¹⁰ knowledge, and¹¹ honoured his pursuit above (all);¹¹ by which

¹ I have adopted, what Ficinus probably found in his MS., *αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, not *αὐτοῦ* merely, as shown by his "ipsius boni—" Stanley, "with the first good."

² Ficinus, "apud illum," as if his MS. read *ἐπ' αὐτοῦ* (i. e. Plato) instead of *πῶς*— Stanley, "he calleth—"

³ The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus and Stanley.

⁴ Ficinus, "prorsus:" who found therefore in his MS. *καθ' ἑαυτὸν*, not *καθ' ἑαυτὸν*—

⁵ In lieu of *νόχοι* I should prefer *τι ἔχοι*—

⁶ Ficinus, "separata enim hæc ab ipsa virtute—" He therefore found in his MS. *χωρισθῆντα γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀπ' ἀρετῆς αὐτῆς*, to which *χωρισθῆντα γὰρ ταύτης* in ed. pr. seem to lead, not *χωρισθῆντα γὰρ ταῦτα*— Stanley, "For being separated from virtue—"

⁷ Ficinus, "sanctis," as if his MS. read *ὁσίοις*, not *μακαρίους*. Stanley, "immortal."

⁸ Ficinus, "divinis epulis vesci—" remembering perhaps Horace's "cœnas deorum—"

⁹ On the expression *τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας πεδίον*, see the learned on Phædr. p. 248, B.

¹⁰ The Greek is *τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτοῦ*— But as Ficinus has "scientiæ divini," he found, no doubt, in his MS. *τοῦ θεοῦ*. And if so, one would prefer *θεῷ* to *θεοῖς* just above.

¹¹ Ficinus, more fully, "eam præ cæteris omnibus veluti pretiosissimum quiddam coluerunt—" as if he found something to this effect in his MS., *πρὸ πάντων ἄλλων ἄτε τιμωτάτον τι δὲ ἐτίμουντο*.

after (they)¹ are purified and revived, ²as it were, some eye of the soul,³ that, having been previously³ lost and blinded, is ⁴better to be saved than ten thousand eyes,⁴ becomes able to reach the nature of all that is rational. ⁵But on the other hand,⁵ ⁶men without minds are likened to those, who live under the earth,⁶ and who have never seen the brilliant light (of the sun),⁷ but look upon some dim⁸ shadows⁹ of the substances, that are with us,⁹ and conceive that they are clearly laying hold of what (really)¹⁰ exist. For as these, when they meet with a return from darkness, and arrive at a clear light, reasonably condemn what appeared then, and themselves likewise, for having been greatly deceived before; so they, who pass from the darkness, in which they have lived, ¹¹to things

¹ I have inserted "they," i. e. philosophers; for otherwise the masculine *ἰκαθαρμένους—ἀναζωπυρῆσαντας* would be without regimen; for *αὐτοῖς* might easily have dropt out before *ὥσπερ*— as may be inferred from the version of Ficinus, adopted by Stanley, "Cujus munere mentis illorum expergefactus oculus atque reviviscens, antea obcæcatus—"

² I have transposed, for the sake of perspicuity, *ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα ψυχῆς*— although the common order seems at first sight to be supported by Rep. vii. p. 527, D. § 9, which Alcinoüs had in mind, *ὄργανόν τὴ ψυχῆς ἰκαθαίρεται τὴ καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται, ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον*. But there both members of the sentence belong to one subject, not, as here, to two.

³ I have altered *τὴ* into *τίως*, to answer to "antea" in Ficinus, although the word is not found in the passage of the Republic just quoted.

⁴ On this expression see Wyttenbach on Plutarch de S. N. V. p. 91. Here Ficinus, followed by Stanley, supplies "corporeis" before "oculis"— and hence his MS. read, perhaps, *μυρίων σαρκίων ὀμμάτων*— what Iamblichus has in Vit. Pythagor. § 16, p. 58, quoted by Ast.

⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were *δ' αὐ*, not *γὰρ*—

⁶ Ficinus, "in subterranea quadam spelunca—" Hence he probably found in his MS. *τοῖς ὑπὸ γῆν ἐν κρύπτροις*, what Stanley has adopted, not *τοῖς ὑπὸ γῆν ἀνθρώποις*— Compare Phædon. p. 109, C. § 134.

⁷ Ficinus, "fulgidum solis lumen—" adopted by Stanley; for his MS. read, I suspect, *φῶς—λαμπρόν θ' ἰωρακόσιν*— where *θ* (i. e. *ἡλίου*, as shown in the Banquet, p. 555, n. 72,) might easily have dropt out before *ε*—

⁸ Ficinus, "exiguas et inanes—" as if he did not quite understand *ἀμυδράς*— Hence Stanley, "empty, thin shadows—"

⁹ Ficinus, more explicitly, "corporum, quæ nos supra terram inspicimus—" Hence Stanley, "of such bodies, as are with us upon the earth—"

¹⁰ I have translated, as if *ὄντως* had fallen out before *ὄντων*— and thus *ὄντως ὄντων* will answer to "vera" in Ficinus, the origin of "true" in Stanley.

¹¹ Ficinus, more briefly, and with a change in the order of the sentences, "ad divina se conferunt, rationabile est, quæ quondam maximi

that are truly divine and beautiful, will despise what was previously viewed by them with wonder, and they will have a more violent desire for the contemplation of the last mentioned.¹¹ And for them it is all in harmony to say that ¹the honourable is the (only) good; ¹ ²and that virtue is self-sufficient for happiness.² ³ But why the good consists in the knowledge of the first (being) and is honourable, has been made manifest through the whole of his compositions.³ But in what relates to (the good)⁴ by participation (he explains)⁵ somehow in this manner, in the first book of the Laws⁶—"Good things are two-fold; some relating to man, others to the gods," and so on. Now if there is any thing separated (from virtue),⁷ it is without a share in the existence of the First; and yet this is called by the senseless a good; and to him who has this, Plato says in the Euthydemus,⁸ there is a greater⁹ evil. And that he considered virtues to be chosen for their own sakes, we must take as a thing that follows, through his considering what is honourable as the only good. Now this very thing is shown in very many (dialogues),¹⁰ and especially in the whole of the Republic. For (he thinks)¹¹ that the person, who possesses ¹²the before-mentioned knowledge,¹² is the most fortunate and most happy; not on ac-

fecerant, aspernari, divinorumque beatam speculationem duntaxat amare—"

¹—¹ Ficinus, "ipsum solum bonum—" from whence I have introduced "only—"

²—² The words between the numerals are wanting in Ficinus.

³—³ Ficinus, "in scientia primi, quod et pulchrum est, consistere, quod per omnes Platonis libros ostensum est—" thus moulding into one the imperfect sentences found in his MS.

⁴—⁴ I have inserted "the good" for the sake of perspicuity. Ficinus, "semper tamen secundum ipsam participationem, id assertum," from whence I have introduced "he explains." Stanley, "As concerning these, which are good by participation—"

⁵ Legg. i. p. 631, B. § 6.

⁶ Ficinus, more explicitly, "si quid autem absque virtute possidetur—" Hence I have inserted "from virtue—" Stanley, "If any thing be disjoined from the first good—"

⁷ Alcinoüs seems to allude to Euthyd. p. 280, E. § 24.

⁸ Ficinus, "ingens—"

⁹ Ficinus supplies "dialogia," what Stanley and myself have adopted.

¹⁰ Here too Stanley and myself have adopted, what Ficinus furnishes, "existimat—"

¹¹—¹² Ficinus, "dei scientiam—"

count of the honours, which, by being such, he will receive, nor on account ¹of (other) rewards,¹ but that, even ²if he lives in obscurity² amongst all men, and there happen to him what are said to be evils, such as disfranchisement,³ and exile, and death, ⁴(he will nevertheless be happy);⁴ but on the other hand,⁵ that he, who possesses, with the exception of this knowledge, every thing considered a good, such as wealth, and great kingly power, and health, and strength, and beauty of body, will not be⁶ at all more happy. To all which he placed ⁷as an end, that was to follow,⁷ a similarity to god,⁸ as far as is possible.⁸ Now he takes this in hand in various ways. At one time he says, as in the *Theætetus*, that to be prudent, and just, and holy, is a similarity with god;⁹ and hence it is meet to endeavour to fly as quickly as possible thither from hence; for that flight is a similarity to god, as far as is possible; and that it is a similarity likewise to become just and holy with prudence. At another time he says, as in the last book of the *Republic*, that to be just alone (is so); ¹⁰for never is that person at least neglected by the gods, who shall be willing to be ready to become just, and, by making

¹ Ficinns, "alicujus alterius præmii—" who found perhaps in his MS. *ἄλλων* before *ἀλλά*— Hence Stanley, "any other reward—"

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *λανθάνη*—*βίω*ς, remembering the Horatian, "vixit moriensque sefellit." For *βίω*ς might have been easily lost after *ἀνθρώπων*. At all events, something is required to show the cause or nature of the concealment.

³ Such is the meaning of *ἀτιμία*. Taylor, on Libanius' Argument to Demosth. F. L., would identify *ἀτιμία* with "outlawry" in England.

⁴ Ficinns supplies, what Stanley has adopted, "nihilominus beatum fore—" requisite to balance the antithesis. But whether the supplement came from a MS. or his own brain, time will perhaps discover.

⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὸν δ' αὖ*—not *τὸν δὲ*—

⁶ The sense and syntax require *ἂν εἶναι*, not *εἶναι* simply.

⁷ Ficinns, "consequentem atque consonum finem—" where "atque consonum—" were perhaps added to explain the otherwise unintelligible *ἀελοῦσθον τέλος*, for which, however, it is easy to read *Κολοφῶνα*, and to reject *τέλος* as an explanation. For examples of the use of *Κολοφῶν* see Ast's Index; and on its corruption see Heusde in Specim. Crit. p. 33.

⁸ Ficinns, followed by Stanley, "quoad humanum genus assequi potest—" as if his MS. read *κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀνψ*, i. e. *ἀνθρώπων*, as shortly afterwards.

⁹ In p. 176, B. § 84.

¹⁰ In p. 613, A., from whence Fischer corrected here *ὡς ἂν—θίλει* into *ὅς ἂν—θίλῃ*, and might have altered likewise *ἐπιτηδεύων* into *ἐπιτηδεύων*—

virtue his pursuit,¹⁰ to be assimilated to god, as far as it is possible for a man to be. But in the *Phædon* he says that to be prudent and just is to have a similarity with a god, in these words—"Are not," says he,¹ "those the most fortunate and blessed,² and proceeding to the best place, who make the virtue relating to the people and the state their pursuit, which persons call temperance and justice?" At another time he says that the end (of life)³ is assimilated with god; and another, (it is) to follow (god),⁴ as when he states,⁵ "Now god, as the old saw (says, contains) the beginning and end," and so on. At another time both; as when he says,⁶—"But the soul, that follows god, and is likened to him," and so on. For the beginning of utility is the good, and this is said (to be) from god. The end therefore would follow⁷ upon the beginning, or⁸ on the being assimilated to god; ⁹that god, to wit, who is in heaven, or, by Zeus, above heaven, and who does not possess virtue, but is better than it.⁹ From whence one would correctly say that misery is the evil-doing of a

¹ In p. 82, A.

² Ficinus, "sancti—"

³ Ficinus, "vita finem—" as if his MS. read τὸ τέλος βίου— where βίου might easily have dropt out before ὁμοιωθῆναι— which I have adopted with Stanley. One would, however, have expected τὸ τέλος βίου εἶναι τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ, i. e. "the object of life is to be assimilated with god—"

⁴ Here again Ficinus supplies the word, adopted by Stanley, wanting at present for the sense, in his version, "sequi deum—" as if his MS. read ἑπείθεαι θεῷ— where θεῷ (i. e. θεῷ) might have been easily lost after ἑπείθεαι.

⁵ In the *Laws*, iv. p. 715, E. § 7, ὁ μὲν δὲ θεός, ὡς περ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μίσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων, εὐδαιμονία περαινὶ κατὰ φύσιν περιπορεύμενος τῷ δ' αἰεὶ ἐκτείνεται διὰ τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός ἥς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσων μάλιστα ἰχόμενος ἐκτείνεται ταπεινός καὶ κεκοσμημένος: from whence Ficinus obtained his "Deus profecto, ut antiquus sermo testatur, principium medium finemque rerum omnium continens, rectitudine perficit singula secundum naturam undique circumcurrens; hunc semper iudicium sequitur, iudex eorum, qui a divina lege discesserint; cui, qui beatus futurus est, se sponte subiciens, mitis et modestus obtemperat:—" where from his "singula" one would fancy that he found in his MS. ἱεστέρα before εἰσα, were it not that in the *Laws* his version is "recta peragit."

⁶ In *Phædr.* p. 248, A. § 59.

⁷ Ficinus renders ἀκολουθεῖν by "consonus—" Hence Stanley, "conformable—"

⁸ Ficinus omits ἢ—

⁹ All between the numerals is not a Platonic, but rather a Neo-Platonic notion.

presiding genius, but happiness the good-doing; ¹ and that we shall arrive at the being assimilated to god by making use of a fitting nature, and morals, and ² of conduct according to law, and perception, (according to nature,) ³ and, what is the chief (of all), of reason and instruction, ³ and the handing down of contemplation, so that we may for the most part stand aside from human affairs, and be ever busied in those perceived by mind. ³ Now the previous sacrifice to, ⁴ and previous cleansing for, the deity within us, ⁵ if we are about to be initiated into the greater subjects of learning, ⁵ would be through Music, and Arithmetic, and Astronomy, and Geometry, while we are taking care at the same time of the body by means of the Gymnastic art, which puts bodies into a state well prepared for war and peace.

[28.] ⁶ *What is Virtue, and how Virtues are divided by Plato.*

⁷ While Virtue is a thing divine, ⁷ it is itself a constitution of the soul perfect and the best, by causing a man to be with a good habit, and firm, and consistent, in speaking and acting, as regards both himself and others. But of its forms some are under reason, some are not. For as the irascible, the rational, and the concupiscible are different, so different too would be the complete state of each. Now the perfection of the rational part is Prudence; of the irascible, Fortitude; but of the concupiscible, Temperance. Now Prudence is a knowledge of things good and bad, and ⁸ of what are neither

¹ I have omitted τοῦ δαίμονος repeated here unnecessarily, and translated ἐνέειπεν "good-doing," for the sake of the antithesis, instead of "a good habit."

²⁻³ Ficinus, "morbisque et victu ac sensu secundum legem." But as "victu" is not the meaning of ἀγωγή, perhaps he found some other word in his MS. Moreover, as I cannot understand αἰσθῆσαι τῇ κατὰ νόμον, I have translated, as if the Greek were ἀγωγή τῇ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ αἰσθῆσαι τῇ κατὰ φύσιν: for thus νόμον and φύσιν would be properly opposed to each other.

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of the Greek; in lieu of which Ficinus has "ut ab humanis negotiis longe admodum alieni divinisque contemplationibus dediti semper vivamus."

⁴ On the proper and metaphorical meaning of προτίλεια see Ruhnken on Tim. p. 224.

⁵⁻⁶ Ficinus, "si majoribus expiationibus opus fuerit—"

⁶ In Ficinus, § 31.

⁷ Ficinus, "cum vero virtus divinus quidam thesaurus sit—"

⁸⁻⁹ Ficinus, "indifferentium," as if his MS. read ἀδιαφόρων instead of οὐδερῶν. Stanley, "and betwixt both—"

the one nor the other.⁴ But Temperance is a 'well-ordering (of the soul)¹ relating to 'desires and longings,² and 'their obedience to the leading power.³ But when we say that Temperance is a well-ordering and obedience, we suggest⁴ something of this kind, that there is a power, 'according to which the longings are in a well-regulated and obedient state, as regards that, which is naturally the master, namely, the rational power.⁵ But Fortitude is 'a power preservative of a lawful dogma dreadful or not dreadful, [that is, a power preservative of a lawful dogma].⁶ But Justice is a certain agreement 'on the part of these with each other,⁷ being a certain power, according to which the three parts of the soul agree and harmonize with each other, and 'each performs its own office according to its worthiness,⁸ 'that there may be a completion of three combined virtues,⁹ Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance, while reason is the ruler, and the rest of the parts of the soul are kept down, according to their own peculiarities, by reason, and by their being obedient to its

¹ I have translated, as if *ψυχῆς* had dropt out after *τάξις*—

² Ficinus, "voluptates atque libidines"—

³ Ficinus, "eas obediētes rationi efficiētes—" By uniting the two one might fancy the true reading to be *πρὸς τὸ τοῦ λόγου ἡγεμονικόν*—where *τοῦ λόγου* might easily have been lost between *τὸ* and *ἡγεμονικόν*. Stanley omits all between the numerals.

⁴ Ficinus translates *παρίσταμεν* by "intelligi volumus"—

⁵ Ficinus more briefly, "qua cupidines pedissequae naturalis domini sunt"—

⁶ Ficinus, "legitimae institutionis, seu arduae sive faciliae, servatio; id est conservatrix et executrix facultas legitimi rationis propositi—" But how Fortitude can be defined as *δόγματος ἐννόμου σωτηρία*, I must leave for others to explain, even if we take with Stanley *δόγμα* in the sense of "a precept." I could have understood *λήματος ἐμόνου σωτηρία*, "the preservation of an enduring spirit," as in § 30, *δογμῶν ἐμόνων*: and so I would read, where *δόγματος ἐννόμου σωτηρία* are repeated shortly afterwards. Moreover, the words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation.

⁷ Ficinus, "omnium animae partium—"

⁸ So I have put into English the Latin of Ficinus, "unaquaeque secundum dignitatem proprio munere fungitur;" for I cannot understand the Greek, *καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τῇ εἰσὶν γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσι κατ' ἑαυτὸν*—nor could, I think, Stanley; whose version is, "and that each be worthily conversant in those things, which are proper and belong to it."

⁹ I have translated, as if the Greek were, *ὥς δὲ παντὶ μὲν τις ὁ συντηρῶν ἀπερὶν*—not *ὥς δὲ—ὅσα τῶν*—for *ῥ* could hardly be omitted here after *ὥς δὲ*—

rein; from whence we must conceive that ¹these virtues follow (each other) in turn.¹ For as Fortitude is preservative of a lawful dogma, so it is of right reason.² [For a lawful dogma is a kind of right reason.]³ But right reason comes from Prudence. Moreover, Prudence stands as an ally⁴ with Fortitude. For it is the knowledge of good things. Now no one is able to see what is good, while it is rendered obscure by cowardice, and the feelings that follow upon cowardice. And nearly in the same manner a person is unable to act with prudence in union with intemperance,⁵ or generally through being subdued by any feeling. And if he does any thing contrary to right reason,⁶ Plato says that he suffers thus through ignorance and folly;⁶ so that he would not be able to possess Prudence, while he is intemperate and a coward. The perfect virtues therefore are thus inseparable from each other.⁶

[29.] *On Virtues and Vices; and, further, how each of them are distinguished.*

In another way likewise there are what are called Virtues,⁷ such as good natural qualities, and a progress towards them,⁷ that have an appellation, similar to their perfections, through a similarity with them. ⁸Thus, for instance, we call certain

¹ The Greek is merely ἀντακολουθεῖν. Ficinus has "conjugatione quadam se invicem consequi—" what I have with Stanley adopted partially.

² The words between the brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus and Stanley.

³ Such is the correct meaning of ἐπίσταται.

⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "ac generatim quisquis perturbatione concitus quicquam præter rationem efficit; propter incitiam semper aberrat."

⁵ After "aberrat," Ficinus inserts here some matter, which ought to be placed at the end of § 33, where see my note.

⁶ With the words between the numerals Ficinus commences § 26, where he has more fully, "Quoniam vero secundum vires rationales et irrationales anima trifariam divisa est, id homini contingere Plato existimat, ut nunquam prudens esse queat, dum aut timidus aut intemperatus existit. Id eoque absolutæ virtutes invicem inseparabiles sunt." And he then goes on with the translation of the remainder of this section.

⁷ Ficinus, "naturæ dotes et inclinationes bonæ—"

⁸ Ficinus, more intelligibly, "Quamobrem milites fortes quandoque dicimus, necnon imprudentes ac temerarios quosdam fortes aliquando prædicamus, haud sane de perfectis virtutibus, sed de dotibus naturæ loquentes."

soldiers brave; and sometimes we say that certain persons are brave, although they are thoughtless, while we are taking into account virtues that are not perfect.³ Now the perfect virtues have neither an extension nor remission. Vices however admit both of extension and remission; for one person is more thoughtless and more unjust than another. And yet vices do not follow each other. For some are opposites; which cannot exist around the same person.¹ For such is the state of boldness as compared with cowardice, and extravagance, with a love of money; since it is really impossible for a man to exist,² who is laid hold of by every kind of vice; for neither can the body possess in itself all the evils of the body.³ We must therefore admit a certain intermediate state, neither bad nor good. For all men are not either (entirely)³ good or bad; since such are those,⁴ who are making a progress to a sufficient good;⁴ for it is not easy to pass immediately from vice to virtue; since there is a great interval between extremes from each other,⁵ [and an opposition].⁵ And we must consider that some Virtues lead and others follow; and that the leaders are those, which are⁶ in the (portion), influenced by reason,⁶ from whom the rest obtain their perfection; but the followers are those in the portion affected by suffering; for these work out what is right, not according to the reason that is in them—for they have it not—but according to that, which is bestowed upon them by Prudence, (and) generated⁷ by custom and practice. And since neither sci-

¹ Ficinus, "in idem—" as if his MS. read *περί τὸ αὐτό*, not *περί τὸν αὐτόν*. Hence Stanley, "which are not competent to the same."

² Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "omnium vitiorum maculis inquinatus; quemadmodum nec corpus cunctis morborum corruptionibus simul afflictum."

³ I have translated, as if *ὅπως* had dropt out after *φάουλους*—

⁴ The Greek is *τοὺς ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν προκόπτοντας*, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, I think; for his version is, "qui jam ad integrum provenerunt—" I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were *ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν καλὸν προκόπτοντας*—where *καλὸν* might have been easily lost after *ἑαυτὸν*—

⁵ Ficinus omits *καὶ ἐναντίωσιν*, words quite superfluous here. Stanley, "interval and distance—" But *ἐναντίωσις* is not "distance." And if it were, the two words would be synonymous.

⁶ Ficinus, "in parte animæ rationali—" who therefore found in his MS. *λογιστικῆς*, the reading of ed. pr., not *λογισμῆς*, or rather *ἐν τῇ λογιστικῇ μέρει*.

⁷ Ficinus omits *ὑπογινόμενοι*—

ences nor arts exist in any other part of the body, except the rational alone, the virtues connected with that, which is affected by suffering, are not to be taught, because there are neither arts nor sciences; for they do not possess a peculiar contemplation.¹ Prudence however, as being a science, imparts to each (subordinate virtue)² its own peculiarity, just as the pilot gives to the sailors certain orders, not contemplated³ by them, and they obey him. And the same reasoning applies to a soldier and a general.

Since then vices admit of extension and remission, the sins⁴ (arising from them)⁴ would be not equal, but some greater and others less; and consequently some are punished more, and others less, by lawgivers. But though Virtues are extremes, through their being perfect, and similar to what is straight,⁵ they would be in another way means, through there being seen about all or the most of them two vices, one on each side, in excess and deficiency; as in the case of liberality,⁶ there is on one side parsimony, on the other extravagance. For in such circumstances there is a want of moderation, according as what is becoming is either in excess or deficiency. ⁷For neither would a person be apathetic, who, when his parents are assaulted, is not angry; nor would he be moderately affected, who (is angry) at every thing even of a common kind; but quite the contrary.⁷ Again, in like manner, he, who is not pained, when his parents die, is apathetic;

¹ Ficinus renders *θεώρημα* by "intelligentiam," as if he had found something else in his MS. But see § 25, p. 290, n. ².

³ I have inserted the words between the lunes to complete the sense, and translated, as if the Greek were *ἐκάσταις*, answering to "unicuique" in Ficinus, in lieu of *ἐκάστης*—

⁴ Since Ficinus renders *ἀγνοούμενα* by "minime inspecta," I have translated "contemplated—" to make the sense more clear.

⁵ Here again I have inserted words necessary for the sense.

⁶ Ficinus strangely translates *τοκίνας τῷ εὐθεῖ* by "recto comparantur—" Stanley, "And though Virtues are certain heights, as being perfect, and like unto that, which is right—"

⁷ The word *ἐλευθερίως*, which is elsewhere applied to "birth" or "education," is here taken in the English sense of "liberality," applied to money matters.

⁸ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "neque vero, qui parentibus suis furentibus nihil movetur, neque etiam, qui ex quibuscunque minimis effertur, moderatus est—" For the sake, however, of the antithesis, I have introduced "is angry" in the second clause.

while he, ¹who is affected excessively,¹ so as to waste away by grief, is immoderately affected; but he, who suffers this pain in moderation, is moderately affected.² Moreover he, who dreads every thing and beyond moderation, is a coward; but he, who fears nothing, is bold; while he, who is moderate in things of fear and boldness, is brave. And the same reasoning applies to other cases. Since then moderation in all affections is the best, and nothing else is moderate, but what is a mean between excess and deficiency,³ on this account Virtues (are) of this kind, through a mediocrity, because they cause us to be in a medium state in affections.³

[30.]⁴ *How Virtue is a voluntary thing, but Vice an involuntary one.*

⁵Since there is, if any thing else, what is in our power and without a master, Virtue is likewise a thing of this kind.⁶ For what is honourable would not be an object of praise, if it were from nature or a divine lot. ⁶Virtue therefore will be likewise a voluntary thing, existing, according to some impulse, fiery, and noble, and permanent. From Virtue then being voluntary, it follows that Vice is involuntary.⁶ For who would willingly choose to have in the best part of himself and in the most worthy of honour the greatest of ills. But if any one rushes on to Vice, in the first place he will rush on not as to Vice itself, but as to a good thing. And if a person ⁷improperly stretches himself onward⁷ altogether to viciousness, such a person has been deceived,⁸ as having been

¹— I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὑπερπαθὴς ἴσσι*, not *ὑπερπαθὴς τε*— Ficinus has "qui vero maiore se ipsum perdit, effrenis—" who found, therefore, a different reading in his MS.

² Ficinus, "moderatus dicitur—" what seems to be preferable.

³ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, more intelligibly, "ob id virtutes huiusmodi mediocritates dicte sunt, quod nos medicriter affectos circa perturbationes humanas reddunt." And so Stanley.

⁴ In Ficinus § 27.

⁵— I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals. I could have understood words to this effect—"If there be any thing in our power and without a master, Virtue is a thing of this kind." Stanley's version is "Virtue being chiefly of those things, which are in our power, not compulsive, it followeth that Virtue is voluntary."

⁶ This doctrine is laid down in the Gorgias.

⁷ By aid of "inclinatur" in Ficinus, I have translated, as if the Greek were *παραινιναί*, not *παραινιναί*— Stanley, "is carried onward—"

⁸— In lieu of the unintelligible *ἀποικονομησόμενον*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀποικον ἀμησόμενον*— To avoid the difficulty Fici-

about to reap a greater good at a distance from home⁴ by means of some lesser ill; and in this way he will arrive at it unwillingly. For it is impossible that a person should wish to rush on to what are ills in themselves, with neither ¹the hope of (some) good¹ nor the fear of a greater ill. Whatever wrongs then a bad man does are involuntary. Since then a wrong is involuntary, the doing an injustice is still more an involuntary act, by how much the greater ill it would be for that person to be active in doing an injustice, than for injustice to keep itself quiet. And yet, although acts of injustice are involuntary, we must punish the doers of injustice differently. For different are the mischiefs done; and the involuntariness lies either in ²ignorance or some suffering.² Now all of these it is permissible to turn aside by reasoning, and ³urbanity in conduct,³ and care. ⁴So great an ill (then) is injustice, that ⁵to act unjustly is a thing more to be avoided than to suffer unjustly.⁵ For the former is the work of a bad man; but the latter is the suffering of a weak one. And both is a base thing. But to act unjustly is so much the greater ill, as it is the baser thing. And it is an advantage to him, who acts unjustly, to undergo punishment,⁶ as it is to a person diseased to give up⁷ his body to a physician to cure. For all punishment is a cure for a soul that has sinned.

[31.]⁸ *What are Affections; and on their distinctions.*

nus has "ut per minus malum majus quoddam malum devitet—" Stanley, "that by a lesser ill he may arrive at a greater good—"

¹ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "spe aliqua boni," as if his MS. read οὔτε τι νιν ἐλπίδι ἀγαθοῦ— I have translated, as if the author had written οὔτε τινός ἐλπίδι ἀγαθοῦ.

² Ficinus, "in ignorance quadam vel perturbatione." But as ἀγνοια can hardly be described by τις merely, I have translated, as if νιν followed πάθει.

³ So I have translated ἥθεισιν ἀστέροις— Ficinus, "consuetudine civili," as if his MS. read ἔθεισιν—

⁴ Here begins § 28, in Ficinus, with the heading, "On Injustice and the distinction in Affections;" but § 32 in Heins.

⁵ This doctrine is promulgated in the Crito and Gorgias.

⁶ Ficinus, "se judici ultro subjicere—" as if his MS. read ὑποσχέιν δικαστῇ ἐκουσίως, ὡς— in lieu of ὑποσχέιν δίκην ὡς— For thus δικαστῇ would be properly opposed to ἰατρῷ.

⁷ In lieu of ὑποσχέιν the sense evidently requires παρασχέιν, similar to "committere" in Ficinus.

⁸ This § is 32 in ed. pr. and Heins., but united to § 28 in Ficinus.

But since most Virtues are conversant with Affections, let us define what kind of a thing is an Affection.

Now an Affection is an irrational movement of the soul, as regards either an ill or a good. And a movement has been called irrational, because Affections are neither decisions nor opinions, but movements of the irrational portions of the soul. For in the part of the soul, subject to Affections, there exist¹ things, which, although they are our works, are nevertheless not in our power.¹ They are however frequently produced in us, when not willing and resisting. Sometimes too, while knowing that, what have fallen on us, are² neither painful, nor pleasant, nor fearful,² we are not the less led by them; ³ what we should not have suffered, had these Affections been the same as decisions.³ For the latter we reject, ⁴ when we condemn them, whether fittingly or not fittingly.⁴ ⁵ For a good or for an ill:⁵ since on the appearance of an indifferent thing an Affection is not put into motion. For all Affections exist, according to the appearance of a good or an ill. For if we imagine that a good is present, we are pleased; and if it is about to be, we desire it; but if we imagine that an ill is present, we are pained; and what is about to be, we fear. For⁶ there are two Affections, simple and elementary, (namely,) Pleasure and Pain, and from these the rest are formed. For

¹— I have, with Stanley, followed the Latin of Ficinus, "quæ etsi nostra sunt opera, nihilo tamen magis in nostra potestate consistunt—" who probably found in his MS. *συμφοραται, δ, εἰ καὶ ἡμῖν τετα ἔργα, οὐδὲ ἴσ' ἡμῖν*— not *συμφοραται, κατὰ ἡμῖν τετα*— nor, as in ed. pr., *συμφοραται δὲ τὰ*—

²— Ficinus, "neque dulcia, nec expetenda, nec etiam metuenda—" Stanley has, more fully, "neither pleasing nor displeasing, expetible nor avoidable—"

³— I have translated, as if the Greek were *δ οὐκ ἂν ἡμῖν παθόντες, ταῦτα εἰ ἐπιστοῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἡμῖν*— similar to the Latin of Ficinus, "quod sane nunquam pateremur, si perturbationes idem essent atque iudicia—" The common reading, *οὐκ ἂν παθόντες ταῦτα, εἰ*— seems however to be defended by *οὐκ ἂν συνίσταται δὲ τοῦτο, εἰ*— but only seems; for there *δὲ* is added, what is wanting here. Stanley, "which could never be—"

⁴— Ficinus, "cum ipsa per consilium confutamus, sive, ut decet, seu non, id agamus." Stanley, "when we disapprove it, whether it ought to be so, or otherwise."

⁵— Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has, more fully and intelligibly, "Adjectum præterea in definitione est, boni cujusdam aut mali gratia."

⁶ The sense requires γὰρ for δὲ, or else we must omit, with Ficinus, both particles.

we must not number with these Fear and Desire, as being of the nature of principles and simple. For he, who fears, is not entirely deprived of pleasure: ¹ since if a person has existed through a time, that may have happened, while despairing of a release from, or an alleviation of, the ill; he abounds however in being pained and troubled; and on this account he is united to pain; ¹ and he, who desires, while remaining in the expectation of obtaining (his wish), is pleased; but as he is not completely confident, nor has a firm hope, he is weighed down. Since then Desire and Fear are not of the nature of principles, it will be conceded without a doubt that not one of the other Affections is simple, ² such, I mean, as Anger, and Regret, and Jealousy, and such like. For in these Pleasure and Pain are seen, ³ mixed up, as it were, in a manner with them. ³ But of Affections some are of a wild kind, others of a tame. Now the tame are such as exist in man according to nature; (being) ⁴ both necessary and proper; and they are in this state, while they preserve some measure; but when there is found in them ⁵ a want of measure, they then become deviations from right. Of such a kind are Pleasure, Pain, Anger, Pity, Shame. For it is proper to be pleased at things that happen according to nature, but to be pained at their contraries. And Anger is necessary ⁶ for self-defence and to avenge oneself upon foes; ⁶ and Pity is proper

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I cannot understand, nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is, “quippe, si malorum repulsionem vel levationem penitus desperarit, haud ultra metueret; immo acriori inde passione afflicto deleret jam potius quam timeret.” Equally at a loss seems to have been Stanley, whose translation is, “nor can a man live the least moment, who despaireth to be freed or eased of some evil; but it is more conversant in grief and sorrow; and therefore he, who feareth, sorroweth.”

² Ficinus, “minime simplices sunt—”

³—³ Although Ficinus by his “tanquam ex iis compositis—” seems to defend *μειγμένους*, yet as ed. pr. has *μειγμένας*, the author wrote, I conceive, *μειγμένως*, as I have translated.

⁴ I have translated, as if *ὅντα* had dropt out between *τε* and *καὶ*—Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has “atque hæ sane, dum modum tenent, necessariae ac propriae sunt—” as if his MS. read *καὶ ταῦτα, ὥς ἂν σύμμετρα ὑπάρχῃ, ἀναγκαῖά ἐστι καὶ οἰκτῖα*—not *ἀναγκαῖα τε καὶ οἰκτῖα* οὕτω δὲ ἔχει, ὥς ἂν σύμμετρα ὑπάρχῃ.

⁵ The sense and syntax evidently require *αὐτοῖς*, as I have translated, not *αὐτῆς*—

⁶—⁶ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, “ad repellendam ulciscendamque injuriam—”

¹for a love of mankind ;¹ and Shame is requisite for a retreat from things that are base.² But other Affections, which are contrary to Nature, are of a wild kind, and arise from a perversion (of mind),³ and improper habits. Of such a kind⁴ is (excessive)⁵ laughter, and a rejoicing over calamities, and a hatred of mankind ; which, by being stretched out and relaxed, and existing in any state whatsoever, are deviations from right,⁶ through not receiving any moderation.

And on the subject of Pleasure and Pain Plato says, that these Affections, existing somehow naturally in us from the beginning, are put into motion and carried onward ; since Pain⁷ and Sorrow⁷ are generated for those, who are excited contrary to nature ; but Pleasure for those, who return to their former state according to nature. Now he conceives that the state according to nature is a mean between Pain and Pleasure—⁸while it is the same with neither of them⁸—in which (mean) we exist for the greater portion of time. He teaches moreover that there are many kinds of Pleasures, some (felt) through the body, and others through the soul ; and that of Pleasures some are mixed with their opposites ;⁹ but others remain pure and undefiled ; and that some are the result of memory,¹⁰ and others united to hope ;¹⁰ and that some are disgraceful, such as are unrestrained, and combined with injustice, but others moderate, and participating somehow otherwise in the good,

¹—¹ Ficinus, "humanitatis atque caritatis—" Stanley, "Mercy agreeth with humanity."

² Ficinus, "ab adversis—" who therefore found in his MS. the reading of the ed. pr. *ἐχθρῶν*, altered by Heinsius in ed. 2, to *αἰσχροῶν*. The two words are frequently confounded elsewhere.

³ Ficinus, "ex perversione vitæ—" as if his MS. read *βίον* before *καί*—I have translated, as if *ψυχῆς* had dropt out after *διαστροφῆς*—

⁴ Ficinus, "hujusmodi—" for his MS. read not *ταῦτα*, but *τοιαῦτα*, what I have adopted.

⁵ Ficinus, followed by Stanley and myself, has "risus effusio—" as if his MS. read *γίλας πολλὰς* or *γίλας πλατὰς*, not simply *γίλας*—

⁶ Ficinus, whom Stanley follows, has "semper aberrant," as if his MS. read *ἅτι ἡμαρτημένα*, not *Διημαρτημένα*—

⁷—⁷ Ficinus omits *καὶ ἀληθδονος*—

⁸—⁸ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "dum neutro movetur—" as if his MS. read *οὐδενίῳ κινούμενον τὸ αὐτὸ*— not *οὐδενίῳ ἰσχύονεν ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ*—

⁹ This doctrine is promulgated in the Philebus. Here, however, Ficinus, whom Stanley follows, has "dolori," the explanation of *τοῖς ἐναντίοις*.

¹⁰—¹⁰ Ficinus, "secundum spem—"

such as the good-will felt towards the good, and the pleasure received from 'acts of virtue.'¹ But since many pleasures are naturally in no repute,² we must not inquire, whether they can belong to 'the simple good.'³ For that seems (to be) evanescent⁴ and of no value, which 'is an after-production, not by nature,⁵ and 'has nothing essence-like, or that takes the lead,⁶ but is co-existing with its opposite; for Pleasure and Pain are mingled. Now this would not have happened, if one (namely, Pleasure) were a simple good, and the other (namely, Pain) an ill.

[32.]⁷ *On Friendship.*

That, which is called especially and properly Friendship, is 'nothing else⁸ than what exists according to a reciprocal kind feeling. Now this takes place, when each party wishes equally that his neighbour and himself should do well. And this equality is not otherwise preserved than through a similarity in manners. For like is friendly to like,⁹ when they are in moderation;⁹ but when they are immoderate, they can suit neither each other, nor what are moderate. There are likewise some other friendships so considered, but not however really being so, that receive a colour, as it were, from Virtue; such as the natural friendship of parents towards their offspring, and of relations towards each other, and that which is called political and sociable.¹⁰ But these do not always have a reciprocity of kind feelings. There is likewise an amatory kind of friend-

¹ Ficinus, whom I have followed, renders *ἐν ἡδοναῖς* by "ex virtutum operatione—"

² Ficinus strangely renders *ἀδοκίμων* by "obscena—"

³ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, more fully, "simpliciter et absolute bonum—"

⁴ Ficinus, "exilis—" Stanley, "poor—"

⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἡ ἐπιγεννημά τι μὴ τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχουσα*— not *ἐπιγεννηματικὴ τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχουσα*— Ficinus has "cujus natura pedissequa est alterique succedens—"

⁶ Ficinus, "neque substantiæ propriæ principalis particeps—" Hence Stanley, "and hath not a principal primary essence—"

⁷ This § is in ed. pr., Heins., and Stanley, 31.

⁸ Ficinus, "nihil aliud est—" who found therefore in his MS., not *οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ*, but *οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ*— what I have translated.

⁹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *μερίω ὄντι*— an absolute sentence, not *μερίω ὄντι*— For both the likes ought to be in moderation.

¹⁰ So Stanley translates *ῥητορικὴ*. But Ficinus has "rhetorica—" for his MS. doubtless read *ῥητορικὴ*, instead of *ῥαιρικὴ*.

ship. Now of the amatory one kind is well-behaved,¹ as being that for a virtuous soul; but another ill-conducted,² as being for a vicious (soul); and there is an intermediate (kind) for that, which is of a medium disposition. For³ as there are three states of the soul in a rational living being, one good, another bad, and a third between those two, so there will be three amatory states, differing from each other in kind. Now that they are three, their aims point out especially by differing from each other. For the bad is the love of the body alone, through its being overcome by what is pleasant; and this is after the manner of beasts; but the well-behaved is for the sake of the naked soul, ⁴in which there is seen a fitness for virtue;⁴ but the intermediate has a longing for the body, and a longing likewise for the beauty of the soul. He too, ⁵who is worthy to be loved,⁵ is himself a mean, as being neither ill-conducted nor well-behaved; from whence we must call the love, ⁶that lays claim to the body,⁶ some dæmon rather than a god, who has never ⁷been generated in an earthly body,⁷ (and) is ⁸the conveyer of what is sent by the gods to man, and conversely.⁸ The amatory then, being thus commonly divided into the three kinds before mentioned, ⁹the one, which relates to the love of the good,⁹ being freed from an affection, ¹⁰becomes a thing of art;¹⁰ from whence it is placed in the rational (portion) of the soul; and its contemplations are to know ¹¹the person worthy to be loved, and to possess and make use of him;¹¹ and further to judge¹² of him from his propensities and im-

^{1, 2} Ficinus renders *dorota* by "honestus," and *φαύλα* by "turpis."

³ Ficinus, followed by Stanley and myself, "enimvero quemadmodum—" in Greek *ὡςπερ γὰρ*— not *ὡςπερ οὖν*—

⁴ Ficinus, more briefly, "ad virtutis officia promptum—"

⁵ Ficinus strangely translates *ἀξιόπαιρος* by "qui sumatur—"

⁶ Ficinus renders *συναρπαστικόν*, "ad corpus ex parte aliqua declinans—"

⁷ Ficinus, "in terrena corpora mersum—" as if his MS. read something else than *γῆσθενήσιν*— perhaps *ἀσθενήσιν*— Stanley, "which never descendeth into a human body—"

⁸ Compare Sympos. p. 202, E. § 28.

⁹ Ficinus, "boni quidem viri amor—"

¹⁰ Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "artificiosus quodammodo est—"

¹¹ Ficinus, "qui ob animi dotes sit benevolentia dignus, atque eum sibi conciliare—"

¹² I have translated, as if the Greek were, what the syntax requires, *ἰσχυρίζομαι*, to answer to the preceding *γινώσκει*, not *ἰσχυρίζομαι*—

pulses, whether they are noble, and ¹tending to what is honourable, and whether they are violent and fervid.¹ ²And he, who strives to possess it, shall possess it, not by rendering delicate or praising the object of his love, but by repressing it rather, and showing that by a person, being in the state he is now, life is not to be lived.² ³And when he gets the party loved into his power, he will make use of him, after having en-joined the things, through which he will, after being practised in them, become perfect; and the end to them (will be), that, instead of a lover and a beloved, they will become friends.³

[33.] *On the Forms of Polity.*

Of Politics (Plato) says that some ⁴(exist in reality, but some)⁴ are supposed to exist, such as⁵ he has detailed in the Republic. For in that (treatise), he has depicted ⁶the former as unwarlike; but the latter as being in a feverish state and warlike,⁶ while seeking which of these would be the best, and how they should be constituted. And it is there that, nearly alike to the division of the soul, is a Polity divided into three parts, relating to the guardians and aiders and operatives; to the first of which he assigns the counselling and ruling power; to the second, that of fighting for (the state), if need be; ⁷who are to be put into order according to the principle of anger,⁷ as if they were the allies of the rational principle;

¹ Ficinus, "ad bonum fervore quodam animi perferantur—" who therefore probably found in his MS. *ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν τινόμεναι, σφοδραὶ τε καὶ διάκρυποι*—not γινόμεναι, εἰ σφοδραὶ τε—

² Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, after "perferantur," has "laudat et approbat; sin contra se habeant, nec assentabitur illi, neque suavis verbis obsequisque deleniet, sed absterrebit potius, atque docebit nequaquam illi, donec talis sit, esse vivendum."

³ Here again Ficinus has strangely represented the original, "Promittat autem semper ac porriget ea, quibus exercitatus is, quem amat, ad optimam frugem evadat. Finis tandem iis etiam, ut ex amore amicitia fiat."

⁴ The Greek is *τὰς μὲν ἐνυποθίτους εἶναι*— But as the apodosis is wanting for *τὰς μὲν*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὰς μὲν εἶναι ὄντως, τὰς δὲ ὑποθίτους*— Stanley has "some are supposed only and conceived by abstract from the rest."

⁵ The sense evidently leads to *οἷας* in lieu of *ἀς*— as I have translated.

⁶ Ficinus, more briefly, "priorem quidem concordem, secundam vero dissidentem—"

⁷ Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus strangely renders "quos iracundie comparat—" For he did not understand, nor can I, what the writer meant here. Stanley, "to defend—by arms, which answereth to the irascible power."

but to the last (he assigns) arts, and the rest of handicrafts. And he conceives it right for the rulers to be philosophers, and contemplative of the primary good; for they alone¹ will administer all things properly; ²for never will human affairs cease from ill, unless philosophers become kings, or those, who are called kings, become, from some divine allotment, truly philosophers.³ For states will act³ the best and with justice at that time, when each portion of it ⁴is under its own law;⁴ so that the rulers may consult for the people, and the co-fighters be their servants and fight in their behalf, while the rest follow them obediently. And he says there are five kinds of Politics; (the first),⁵ an aristocracy, when the best are in power; the second, a timocracy, where ⁶those fond of honours⁶ are the rulers; the third, a democracy; and after this an oligarchy; and the last, a tyranny, which is the worst. He depicts likewise other Politics, hypothetically; of which there is that in the Laws, and that too, ⁷after correction, in the Epistles;⁷ of which he makes use for the states, that are labouring, as mentioned in the Laws, under a disease, and ⁸possessing a region bounded off,⁸ and persons selected from every age, so that, according to the differences in their nature, and places, there may be a need of peculiar instruction⁹ and of bringing up and of using arms. For they, who are near the sea, would apply themselves to navigation and to naval battles: while those, dwelling inland, would be fitted for fighting on foot, and the use of

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were *μόρους*, not *μόνος*.

² On this celebrated doctrine of Plato, see at Epist. 7, p. 502, n. "4."

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were *πράξειν*, not *ἐπράξειν*—Ficinus, "administrari—"

⁴ So I have translated *αὐτονομῆν*. Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "suo munere fungitur."

⁵ I have translated, as if the Greek were *τῇν τε ἀδρισταρῆσιν*—where *ἀ* means *πρώτην*, as shown by "primam" in Ficinus. On the loss of a letter, indicative of a number, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 223.

⁶ Ficinus renders *φιλοτιμῶν* by "fastu inflati homines."

⁷ Such is the meaning of *ἡ ἐκ διορθώσεως*, rendered literally by Ficinus "ex emendatione—" instead of which Stanley, apparently unable to understand it, has given "that, which reformeth others." With regard to the Epistles, Alcinoüs seems to allude to the 8th and 11th, for only in them is there a reference to any forms of Polity.

⁸ See the commencement of book 4.

⁹ Ficinus, "importatione et exportatione—" as if his MS. read *εἰσαγωγῆς καὶ ἐξαγωγῆς*, not *ἀγωγῆς* simply.

arms, either the lighter, like mountaineers, or the heavier, like persons living¹ on hilly plains; and some would practise cavalry exercise. But in this state he does not lay down by laws that women are to be in common.

Political virtue is therefore contemplative and practical,² and that which chooses³ to make a state good and happy, and⁴ of one mind and of one voice;⁵ (and) it enjoins commands, and has under it the science of war, and generalship, and law-judgments. For Political science considers ten thousand other matters, and especially this very one, whether we must engage in war or not.⁶

[34.] *On the Sophist.*

It has been stated before what kind of person is the philosopher. From him the Sophist differs, first in manner, in that he is⁷ the seeker of pay from young persons,⁸ and is willing to be considered⁹ a person with bodily and mental accomplishments,¹⁰ rather than to be so; and (secondly) in matter, in that the philosopher is conversant with things existing for ever and in the same state; while the Sophist busies himself about that which is not, and¹¹ retires to a spot, difficult to be seen on account of its darkness.¹² For to that,

¹ Such is the literal version of γεωλόφοις—πεδίοις. But as such a combination of words is unintelligible, opportunely has Ficinus "littora," which has led me to believe that the author wrote ἐν αἰγιαλοῖς ἢ ἀφελίσιν—πεδίοις—where ἀφελίσιν—πεδίοις may be compared with ἀφελῶν πεδίων in Aristoph. 'Ικκ. 524. Stanley avoids all the difficulty by putting into English the Latin of Ficinus, "et armaturam leviozem, qui montes colant; graviorem, qui littora."

² Ficinus, "quæ eligit atque proponit—"

³ Ficinus, "secum maxime consentientem—" Stanley, "and convenient to itself."

⁴ Ficinus omits here καὶ δικαστικὴν, but adds at the end of his § 31, = 28 here, the Supplement following, which evidently belongs to this place, "Et ut rempublicam gubernat, civilis scientia nuncupatur; cujus sunt officia duo, leges condere et conditas exsequi; prima νομοθετικὴ, id est legum positiva; secunda δικαστικὴ, id est judiciaria nominatur; considerat denique civilis peritia ea, quæ ad pacem, et quæ ad bellum pertinent, et in eo cum alia plurima, tum hoc præcipue, bellumne ineundum sit an potius renuendum."

⁵ See Sophist, p. 231, D. § 36, νῶν καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμοθος θηρεν-της— from whence one would read here ἔμμοστον θήραμα in lieu οἱ μωθαρνία—

⁶ Such is the proper rendering of καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.

⁷ Compare Sophist, p. 254, A. § 84, 'Ο μὲν (σοφιστής) ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα—διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κα-

which is, that, which is not, is not opposed. For the latter is unsubstantial and unintelligible, nor has it any basis; and which, if a person were compelled to speak of, or to think upon, he would be overthrown,¹ through his bringing a battle around himself.² Now that which is not, as far as it is understood,³ is not a naked negation of what is,⁴ but (it is) with a joint-meaning as regards another thing, which follows upon the primary being;⁵ so that, unless these too had participated in that, which is not, they would not have been separated from the others.⁶ But now, as many soever as are the beings that are, so many times is the being, which is not. For that, which is a not-being, is not a being.

So much it suffices to be said for an Introduction to the doctrine-making of Plato; of which a part has been stated in an orderly manner; but a part dispersedly and in no order; so that it is in the power of any one,⁶ from what has been said, to become contemplative and detective of the rest of his doctrines by following out these.⁷

ρανεῖσθαι χαλεπός. From whence I have, with Ficinus, omitted *καὶ* between *σκοτεινόν* and *δυσδιόφανον*.

¹ Ficinus, "oberrabit atque tergiversabitur—" as if his MS. read something else than *ἀναρπαγήσεται*. Stanley, "he is deceived, because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant—" which is not even a paraphrase, much less a translation.

² I have translated, as if the Greek were *αὐτὸν ἐν ταύτῃ*—not *αὐτὸ ἐν ταύτῃ*—for Ficinus has "secum ipse pugnet atque dissideat—"

³ Ficinus renders *ἡξακούεσθαι*, "pronuntiatum auditur—"

⁴ Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "sed cum suspitione quadam et subinsinuatione alterius, quod quidem modo aliquo ipsum, quod est, comitatur;" where "modo aliquo" would lead to *τῷ ῥήματι*, in lieu of *τῷ ῥήματι*, which Heinsius corrected into *τῷ ῥήματι*. Stanley, "Yet that, which is not, as far as it is spoken, is not a pure negation of that which is, but implieth a relation to another, which in some measure is joined to Ens."

⁵ Stanley, "so that, unless we assume something from that, which is, to that, which is not, it cannot be distinguished from other things."

⁶ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐνὶν τινας*, not *μὲντοι*, which could not follow *ὅτι*—

⁷ I have translated, as if *τούτων* had dropt out before *καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν*—And so probably read the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is "ut horum vestigiis reliqua etiam—"

THE

INTRODUCTION OF ALBINUS

TO
THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO.

[1.] THAT¹ for a person about to enter upon² the Dialogues of Plato, it is fitting that he should know previously what a Dialogue is. For neither without some art and power³ have dialogues been written, nor is it easy for a person, unskilled in contemplation, to know them artistically. It is agreeable then for a philosopher, who is making for himself an insight into every matter of whatever kind, to examine, (first,)⁴ the essence of the thing, and afterwards, what power it has, and not with reference to what is naturally useful and what is not. Now (Plato) says thus—⁵ “On every matter, O boy, there is one commencement to those about to consult properly. It is needful to know, about what is the consultation; or else there must needs be an erring in this matter. Now it lies hid from the majority, that they do not know the essence of each thing; (but), as if they did know, they do not, at the commencement

¹ From the word “Or”, here and elsewhere, it is evident that the whole of this Introduction is merely an extract from a longer treatise.

² I have translated, here and elsewhere, *εἰσέλθαι*, “to enter upon,” or “to meet with,” as being a meaning more nearly allied to the derivation of the word than “to read,” the sense given by others.

³ Perhaps “meaning” would be the proper rendering.

⁴ I have translated, as if *μὴν* had dropt out after *τῆν*, to answer to *ἔπειτα*—

⁵ In Phædr. p. 237, C. § 29, from whence Fischer reads here *πρὸ τοῦτο* instead of *παρὰ τοῦτο*—

of the inquiry, agree (amongst themselves),¹ but as they proceed, ²they pay the reasonable (penalty);³ for they agree neither with themselves nor with others." In order then that we may not suffer this,³ while entering upon the Dialogues of Plato, let us consider this very thing, which I have spoken of, what is a dialogue. ⁴[For neither without some art and power have dialogues been written.]⁴ ⁵It is then nothing else than a discourse composed of question and answer upon some political or philosophical matter, combined with a becoming delineation of the manners of the characters introduced, and the arrangement as regards their diction.⁵

[2.] Now a dialogue is called a discourse, as a man (is called) an animal. But since of a discourse there is one kind arranged (in the mind)⁶ and another pronounced (by the mouth),⁷ let us hear about the one pronounced (by the mouth). And since of the latter there is one kind spoken, as a continued narration, and another by question and answer, questions and answers are the peculiar mark of a dialogue; ⁸from whence it is said to be a discourse⁸ by interrogation; and moreover⁹ it is applied to some political and philosophical matter; because it is meet for the subject matter to be related to the dialogue.¹⁰ Now the matter is that relating to politics and philosophy.¹¹ For as the matter of fables is laid down as adapted to tragedy and poetry in general, so is to dialogue philosophy, that is (to say), what relates to philosophy. But as regards that, which is combined with a becoming deline-

¹ So Heindorf explains *διωμολογοῦνται*, which Fischer has restored here, in lieu of *οὐδὲ ὁμολογοῦντες*, from the passage referred to. For the active *ὁμολογοῦντες* would require *ἑαυτοῖς*, as shown by Alcibiad. I. p. 111, E., quoted by Heindorf, *οἱ πολλοὶ δοκεῖσι σοὶ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς*.

² So Heindorf understands *τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδιδοῦσαι*.

³ One would prefer *τὸ αὐτὸ*, "in the same way."

⁴ The words between the brackets are evidently a needless repetition.

⁵ The same definition of a dialogue is found in Diogen. L. iii. 48.

⁶ I have added the words between the lunas for the sake of perspicuity.

⁷ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ᾄδεν λόγος*, not *ᾄδεν ὁ λόγος*—where the article is improperly introduced.

⁸ I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐν δὲ*, not *τὸ δὲ*—

⁹ One would expect here *λόγῳ*, "the discourse," not *διαλόγῳ*.

¹⁰ To complete the definition, one would have expected to find something added to this effect, "which is discussed the best during a dialogue."

ation of the manners of the characters introduced, (and) their being different in their discourses through life, some as philosophers, and others as sophists, it is requisite to assign to each their peculiar manners; to the philosopher that, which is noble, and simple, and truth-loving; but to the sophist that, which is of many hues, and tricky, and reputation-loving; but to an individual what is peculiar to him. Added to this, ¹(the definition) speaks likewise of the arrangement, ¹as regards their diction; and reasonably so. For as ²the measure ought to be ²adapted to tragedy and comedy, and the fiction (of the subject) to the bruited story, so ought the diction and composition, adapted to the dialogue, possess what belongs ³to the grace of an Attic style, ³and is neither superfluous nor deficient.

[3.] But if a so-called discourse, not being made in the form, as I have laid down, but deficient on these points, is said to be a dialogue, it will not be said so correctly. ⁴Thus that, which is said in the case of Thucydides to belong to the power to represent the peculiarity of dialogues, but rather two public speeches composed on set purpose against each other. ⁴—Since then we have ascertained what is a dialogue, let us look into the different kinds of the Platonic dialogue, that is, into their characteristics, how many are the topmost, ⁵and how many of them ⁶exist subdivided into the uncut. ⁶

[4.] As regards their characteristics, which are two, one explanatory and the other exploratory, the explanatory is suited to the teaching and practice of truth, but the explora-

¹—¹ I have translated, as if ὁ ὅρος had dropt out before φησι— and *περί* after *κατασκευῆς*— Fabricius too perceived that *περί* was wanting here.

²—² Here too I have translated, as if the Greek were *οἰκίον εἶναι τὸ μέτρον*— not *τὸ οἰκίον μέτρον*—

³—³ The Greek is *τὸ Ἀττικόν, τὸ εὐχαραί*— as if two things were mentioned; whereas, since *τὸ Ἀττικόν* is *τὸ εὐχαραί*, the author probably wrote, what I have translated, *τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ τὸ εὐχαραί*—

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of the unintelligible original; where it is to be hoped that some of the MSS., not hitherto collated, either exhibit what the author wrote, or furnish a clue to it.

⁵ On the uncertainty in the meaning of *οἱ ἀνωτάτω*, see in the Life of Plato by Diogenes, § 49.

⁶—⁶ I confess I cannot understand the words between the numerals, and especially how the middle aor., *ἱετήσαντο*, could be found here.

tory to an exercise and conflict,¹ and the confutation of falsehood; and while the explanatory directs its aim to things, the exploratory does so to persons.

[5.] Of the dialogues of Plato there are drawn out in the class of *Physics*, the *Timæus*; in that of *Morals*, the *Apology*; in that of *Logic*, the *Theages*, *Cratylus*, *Lysis*, *Sophist*, *Laches*, (and) *Statesman*; in that of confutation, the *Parmenides* (and) *Protagoras*; in that of statesmanship, the *Crito*, *Phædon*, *Minos*, *Banquet*, *Laws*, *Epistles*, *Epinomis*, *Menexenus*, *Cleitophon*, (and) *Philebus*; in the tentative (class are) the *Euthyphron*, *Meno*, *Ion*, (and) *Charmides*; in the obstetrical,² the *Alcibiades*; and in the overthrowing, the *Hippias*, *Euthydemus*, (and) *Gorgias*.

[6.] Since then we have seen their differences, how they exist naturally, and their characteristics, let us state, in addition, from what dialogues persons must begin their entrance upon a discourse of Plato. For opinions are different. For some begin with the *Epistles*; and some with the *Theages*. And there are those, who divide the dialogues into tetralogies;³ and rank as the first tetralogy that, which contains the *Euthyphron*, *Apology*, *Criton*, and *Phædon*; the *Euthyphron*, as in it the charge against Socrates is brought forward; the *Apology*, since it was necessary for him to defend himself; the *Crito*, on account of his staying in prison; and afterwards the *Phædon*, since in it Socrates meets with the end of life. And of this⁴ opinion are *Derkylides* and *Thrasyllus*. But they seem to me to have wished to assign an order to the persons (of the dialogues) and the circumstances of their lives—a matter which is perhaps useful for something else, but not however for that, which we are wishing now; for we wish to discover the commencement and arrangement of instruction that is according to wisdom. We say then that the commencement of a discourse of Plato is not one and de-

¹ On the difference between *γυμνασία* and *ἀγών*, as applied to a mental conflict, see at *Diogenes' Life of Plato*, § 49.

² On the expression "obstetrical," applied to a dialogue, see at *Diogenes' Life of Plato*, § 49.

³ On the so-called Platonic Tetralogies, see *Diogenes' Life of Plato*, § 56.

⁴ I have adopted, what Fischer suggests, *ταύτης* before *τῆς*—

fined; for that, being perfect, it is similar to the perfect figure of a circle. For as the commencement of a circle is not one and defined, so neither is it of a discourse.¹

[7.] We will not however on this account enter upon it in any manner soever, nor accidentally. For if it is requisite to describe a circle, a person does not describe it, beginning from any point, but:² * * * * in whatever state each of us may be with regard to the discourse, beginning from that he will enter upon the dialogues of Plato. For there is a state according to nature, for instance, good or bad; and that according to age, where a person, for instance, is in the season for philosophizing or has passed it; and that, according to a predilection, as, for instance, in favour of philosophy or³ history; and 'that, according to a habit,'⁴ as in being, for example, previously initiated (in instruction),⁵ or without instruction, and that, according to the matter, as being engaged, for example, in philosophy, or dragged around by (political)⁶ circumstances.

[8.] He then, who is, according to nature, well born, and according to age is in the season for philosophizing, and according to a predilection, for the sake of exercising himself, is proceeding to reasoning, and he, who, according to a habit, has been previously initiated in instruction, and has been drawn aside from political circumstances, will begin from the Alcibiades⁷ to be well-turned by the inclination of intellect,⁷ and to know of what thing it is needful to make for himself a

¹ The Greek is διὰ τοῦ λόγου: where evidently lies hid a var. lect. διὰ

τοῦ λόγου— For other instances of one reading made up out of two, see my Poppo's Prolegomena, p. 175, to which I could now add many more.

² Fabricius thus supplies the missing matter, "but from that which is nearest at hand; in like manner—"

³ I have translated, as if the Greek were ἡ, not καί— On the confusion in those particles, see Porson on Eurip. Orest. 821.

⁴ I have adopted the suggestion of Fischer, who conceives that ἡ δὲ καὶ have dropt out between ἐνικα and ἔξιν—

⁵ I have translated, for the sake of the antithesis, as if μαθήσει had dropt out, similar to προτετελεσμένος τοῖς μαθήμασι in the next §.

⁶ I have followed Fischer, who has inserted πολιτικῶν before περιστάσεων, similar to πολιτικῶν περιστάσεων in the next §.

⁷ I have translated, as if the Greek were πρὸς τὸ τῇ ῥοπῇ τοῦ εὐπιστραφῆναι, to avoid the unmeaning tautology in πρὸς τὸ τραπῆναι καὶ ἐπιστραφῆναι—

care, and, as it were by a beautiful pattern, to see who is the philosopher and what is his pursuit, and upon what suppositions his discourse is carried on. ¹(Such a person)¹ must enter upon the *Phædo* next in order; for in it (Plato) states who is the philosopher, and what is his pursuit; and upon the supposition of the soul being immortal he goes through the discourse relating to it. After this it would be requisite to enter upon the *Republic*. For, commencing with the earliest instruction, he delineates the whole of education, by making use of which a person would arrive at the possession of virtue. But since it is requisite for us to be versed in the knowledge of things divine, so as to be able, by possessing² virtue, to be assimilated to them, we shall enter upon the *Timæus*; for by entering upon this² account relating to Nature, and on the so-called theology, and the arrangement of the Universe, we shall clearly have a recollection⁴ of things divine.

[9.] But if any one, to speak summarily, is able to survey correctly⁵ the arrangement of the dialogues, suited to the teaching according to Plato, to him who chooses the doctrines of Plato * *⁶ For as it is necessary to become a spectator⁷ of his own soul and of things divine,⁸ and of the gods themselves, and to obtain the most beautiful mind,⁸ he must cleanse

¹—¹ I have translated, as if *οὗτος* had dropt out between *δείσει* and *τῷ*—

² The syntax requires *κτησάμενοι*, to answer to the plural *ἐντευξόμεθα*, in lieu of *κτησάμενον*—

³ In lieu of *αὐτῷ*, the sense requires *ταύτῃ*—

⁴ Fabricius was the first to read *ἀναμνήσομεν* for *δν*.

⁵ To avoid the incorrect syntax in *εἰ—δύναται—δν*— we may read, as translated, *εἰ—δύναται—εὖ*—

⁶ Fabricius has supplied, what he imagined to be the missing matter, in his Latin version, “Platonis disciplina futurus sectator ex Platonis ipsius doctrina hoc faciet quam optime—” But he has neglected to state on what the dative *τῷ-αἰρουμένῳ* is to depend, unless perhaps he conceived that the author wrote *τῷ ῥᾷ Πλάτωνος αἰρουμένῳ ἐντὶν τοῦτο βῆσθαι δρᾶν*, or something similar.

⁷ I have adopted, what Fischer has suggested, *θεατῆν*, required by the subsequent *ἐαυτοῦ*, in lieu of *θεαράς*—

⁸—⁸ The words between the numerals present a very strange sense, as if it were possible for a person to be a spectator of the gods themselves and to obtain the most beautiful mind. Unless I am greatly mistaken the author wrote “*δὲδ ῥᾷ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλλίστου νοῦ τι ἴχεν*—” “through having a portion of the most beautiful mind itself of the gods—” not *καὶ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ καλλίστου νοῦ τυχέιν*.

out the false opinions of his conceptions. For not even have physicians deemed the body capable of enjoying the food brought to it, unless a person shall have previously cast out what was in it in the way of an obstacle. But after the cleansing out, it is requisite to excite and call forth the sentiments, imparted by nature, and to cleanse out these too, and to exhibit them pure, as principles. In addition to this, through the soul being thus¹ previously prepared, it is necessary to introduce into it its peculiar doctrines, according to which it may be perfected; now these relate to physics, and theology, and morality, and statesmanship. And² that the doctrines may remain in the soul and not be³ chased away, it will be necessary for it to be delivered to the reasoning relating to causation,⁴ in order that a person may lay hold firmly of the proposed aim. In addition to these it is meet that, what is not contrary to reason, should be furnished, in order that we may not be carried aside by some sophist, and turn our thoughts into a worse direction. That we may therefore cast out false opinions, it will be necessary to enter upon the dialogues of the tentative character, and which possess the confuting and the so-called cleansing power. And that a person may call forth into light the notions relating to physics, it will be necessary to enter upon the dialogues of the obstetrical character, for this is peculiar to them; since in those there are doctrines relating to physics, and to morals, and to statesmanship, and to the regulation of a household; of which some have a reference to contemplation and a contemplative life; but others to action and an active life; but both of them⁵ relate to the being assimilated to god.⁵ And that these, after being imparted, may be not escaping from us, it will be necessary to enter upon the dialogues of a logical character,

¹ I have translated, as if the Greek were not *ὥς*, but *οὕτως*—

² I have adopted *δι*, inserted by Fabricius, after *ἵνα*—

³ The syntax requires either the insertion of *ἢ* after *ἀναπόδραστα*, or else the omission of *καί* before it.

⁴ Such seems to be the meaning of *αἰτίας* here. Unless it be said that the author wrote *τῆς ἀ αἰτίας*, i. e. *τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας*, "the first cause." On this sense of *ἀ* and its loss before *αι*—see here, p. 312, n. ⁴.

⁵ Such some will perhaps consider a proper version of *ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ*. But *ἐπὶ* could hardly, I think, bear that meaning. Hence I suspect the author wrote *ἐποίει τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι*—where, since the imperfect indicates a custom, *ἐποίει* would mean "is wont to make—"

which is also of the exploratory kind. For they possess both the distinguishing and defining methods, and, moreover, the analytical and syllogistical, through which truths are shown and falsehoods confuted. Moreover, since it is requisite for us to be not led aside contrary to reason by sophists, we shall enter upon the dialogues of a demonstrative character; in which it is in our power to learn thoroughly how it is meet to listen to sophists, and¹ in what manner to carry ourselves towards those, who act wrongly in matters relating to reason.

¹ I have omitted *kai* *ὅτι*, which are quite superfluous before *kai* *ὁτινα* *ῥητόρων*.

Lucius

APULEIUS

ON

THE DOCTRINES¹ OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

[1.]² THE conformation of his body gave to Plato his name;³ for he was previously called Aristocles. His father was said to have been Ariston; while his mother was Perictioné, the daughter of Glaucus;⁴ and on both sides the nobility of his birth was sufficiently remarkable. For his father Ariston derived through Codrus his origin from Neptune; while the blood on his mother's side flowed from Solon, the very wise, who was the founder of the laws of Athens. There are however those, who assert that Plato sprang from a more exalted origin, at the time when a certain vision in the form of Apollo had a connexion with Perictioné. He was born in the month called Thargelion⁵ at Athens, on the day⁶ in which Latona is reported to have brought forth Apollo and Diana at Delos, (and) on the day before that, in which we have heard that Socrates was born. Mention is likewise made of the pretty dream that

¹ The more correct title would perhaps be that found in some MSS. and Ald., "Vita, Instituta, Dogmata Platonis per Apuleium."

² The sections are adopted from Hildebrand's edition.

³ For the word Πλατ-ων was formed from πλατ-ω, as shown in the Life of Plato by Hesychius, p. 229, n. ¹.

⁴ Diogenes, more correctly, Glaucon, as remarked by Casaubon.

⁵ This month marks a period from the middle of May to the middle of June.

⁶ This was the 7th.

Socrates had ; for he thought he saw a cygnet flying from an altar, which was in the Academia, sacred to Cupid, and settling on his lap ; and that afterwards, a full-fledged swan, it directed its flight to heaven, entrancing the ears of men and gods with the music of its song. And after Socrates had mentioned the dream to some persons when they had come together, Ariston very opportunely¹ attended upon Socrates, with the view of offering Plato to him as (the youth's) instructor ; on whom when Socrates had cast his eyes and ²saw from his external appearance his internal disposition,³ he said, "This, friends, is the swan (from the altar) of Cupid in the Academy."

[2.] Such and (sprung) from such did Plato not only excel heroes in virtue, but he equalled likewise the gods in power. For Speusippus,³ who was furnished with family documents,³ praises the acuteness of the boy's talent in perception, and his disposition as regards his wonderful modesty ; and he makes mention of the first-fruits of his youth as being imbued with the proofs of labour and his love of study ; and testifies that in the man there met together the growth of these and of other virtues.

From the same parents were his brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus. For his instructors he had in 'the rudiments of education,'⁴ Dionysius ; and in the palaestra, Ariston, a native of Argos ; and such a progress did practice bring with it, that he contended for the wrestler's prize at the Pythian and Isthmian games. Nor did he disdain the painter's art. For Tragic and Dithyrambic compositions likewise he fitted himself ; and, carried away by a confidence in his poetical powers, he was already desirous of professing himself a competitor, had not Socrates driven from his mind the lowness of the desire, and taken care to implant in his soul the glory that arises from true praise. And even previously⁵ he had

¹ Such seems to be the meaning of "commodum ;" for which two MSS. read "commodo."

² Compare Shakspeare's—"To read the mind's construction in the face"—which answers almost literally to the words of Apuleius, "ingenium internum de exteriore conspicatus facie."

³ For he was the nephew of Plato.

⁴ Such is the correct translation of "prima literatura—" For "literæ" in Latin, like *γράμματα* in Greek, meant something more extensive than "letters" do in English. See at Diogenes' Life of Plato, § 4, n. 1.

⁵ According to Diogenes, § 6, Plato attached himself to the sect of

been imbued with the (doctrines of the) sect of Heracleitus. But when he had given himself up to Socrates, he was superior to the rest of the disciples of Socrates not only in genius and learning; but by labour likewise and elegance he shed a lustre on the wisdom imparted to him by Socrates; by the labour, through which he endeavoured to make that wisdom his own; and by the elegance, through which he contributed to it a considerable dignity from the beauty and majesty of his language.

[3.] But after Socrates had left the world,¹ he sought out from whence he might make a further progress; and he betook himself to the discipline of Pythagoras; and though he saw it possessed a method of diligence and splendour combined, he was still more desirous of imitating its continence and chastity. And, as he perceived that the talents of the Pythagoreans were aided by other kinds of learning, he went to Cyrené to learn Geometry under Theodorus, and travelled even to Egypt to obtain a knowledge of astrology, and that he might learn from thence the rites of the prophets there. And ²a second time he went ³to Italy, and became a follower of the Pythagoreans, Eurytus of Tarentum, and Archytas, who was rather advanced in years; and he would have directed his thoughts to the Indians and Magi, had not the wars in Asia ⁴at that time prevented him ⁵“(from proceeding thither).” ⁶On which account, ⁷by following out with more than usual study the discoveries of Parmenides and Zeno, he so filled his treatises with things, ⁸taken unitedly, which singly ⁹had been an ob-

Heracleitus after the death of Socrates. But Aristotle, in *Metaphys.* i. 6, agrees with Apuleius.

¹ Literally “men—”

²⁻³ For the first time is alluded to in the expression “ad Pythagoræ disciplinam se contulit—” Perhaps, however, in lieu of “iterum venit,” Apuleius wrote “iter convertit,” i. e. “he turned his road—”

³ So the earlier edd. But as all the MSS. read “caletica,” Ouden-dorp has suggested “Chaldaica;” Hildebrand, “Halytica,” i. e. Lydian, in allusion to the war carried on by the younger Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes, that forms the subject of the early part of Xenophon’s “Anabasis.”

⁴⁻⁵ The words between the lunes are due to Joann. Sarisbur. in *Nug. Curial.* vii. 5, who has “procedere vetuissent—” not “vetuissent” simply.

⁵ The introduction of “quapropter” here seems very strange.

⁶⁻⁸ So we must translate “omnibus, quæ—singula,” to preserve the antithesis.

ject of admiration, that he was the first to unite philosophy, previously tripartite, and to show that its parts, each necessary in its turn, were not only not at variance with each other, but that they afforded a mutual aid. For although the members of philosophy had been obtained from different factories, (such as) natural philosophy from the Heracliteans, mental from the Pythagoreans, and moral from the very fountain of Socrates, yet from them all he formed one body, and, as it were, of his own begetting. But as the chiefs of these families (of Philosophy) had delivered to their auditors their sentiments in unpolished (language) and a rudimental (form), Plato rendered them perfect and even to be admired by polishing them up with reasonings, and investing them with the honourable dress of lofty diction. [4.] Many of his hearers, belonging to either sex, flourished as philosophers. He left behind him his patrimony, consisting of a small garden, adjoining the Academy, and ¹two slaves, and a goblet,¹ with which he made supplications to the gods; and of gold so much, as he had worn, when a boy, in his ear,² to mark his (noble birth). Some evil-disposed persons carp indeed at his three journeys to Sicily, and discuss them with opinions at variance with each other. But he went thither³ the first time for the sake of information, that he might understand the nature of *Ætna*, and the burning of ⁴the hollow mountain;⁴ the second, at the request of Dionysius, to assist the people of Syracuse, and to learn the municipal laws of that province. His third arrival took place ⁵in the wish to restore⁵ Dion, then an exile, to his country, after Plato had obtained a pardon for him from Dionysius.

Of his tenets, that might be called by the Greek word *δόγμα*, which he promulgated for the beneficial use of man, and

¹ On Diogen. L. § 44, n. 2, Stanley has remarked the discrepancy in the statements of the two writers.

² This was the right ear, as we learn from Isidorus, in Origin. xix. 31, "In aures—in Græcia puellas utraque aure, pueri tantum dextra gerebant."

³ I have translated, as if the Latin word were "illic," not "ille—"

⁴ Unless I am greatly mistaken the words "concavi montis" are an explanation of "crateris—" which was the technical expression applied to that natural phenomenon. See at Diogenes' Life of Plato, § 18, p. 165, n. 2.

⁵ So Oudendorp renders "reddidit—" for Plato, he says, failed in the attempt; although he confesses that *Ælian*, in V. H. iii. 17, asserts he did not fail.

for a rational method of living, and understanding, and speaking, we will commence from hence. For since he first held that the three parts of philosophy have an agreement with each other, we too will speak of each separately, beginning with Natural Philosophy.

[5.] Plato considers the principles of (all) things to be three—God, Matter, and the Forms of Things, which he calls *ἰδέαι*, (Ideas,) that are incomplete, shapeless, (and) distinguished by no mark of species and quality. But of God his sentiments are that he is incorporeal.¹ He alone, says (Plato), is *ἄπεριμετρος*, (without a circumference,)² the father and adorer³ of all things, blessed (himself) and the cause of blessings (to others), the very best, in want of nothing himself, (and) conferring all things (upon all); whom he calls the heavenly, the ineffable, the not-to-be-named, or, as he says himself, *ἄρρητον ἀκατωνόμαστον*;⁴ whose nature it is difficult to discover; and, if discovered, it cannot be proclaimed to the many. ⁵[The words of Plato are these, *θεὸν εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον, εὐρόντα δὲ εἰς πολλοὺς ἐκφέρειν ἀδύνατον.*]⁵ But of Matter he makes mention as unable to create, and to be destroyed, and that it is neither Fire, nor Water, nor any other of the principles and positive elements; but that of all things it is the first recipient of forms, and subjective to the act of making; (and) being as yet shapeless and devoid of the quality of configuration,⁶ God, as the artificer, gives to it a form Uni-

¹ Compare Alcinous, § 10, and Diogen. L. iii. 77.

² The word *ἄπεριμετρος* is not found, I believe, in Plato. The idea however may be compared with the well-known representation of God, who has been considered as a circle, whose centre is every where, and circumference no where.

³ So Oudendorp adopts "exornator," the conjecture of Lennep, in lieu of "extortor;" from which, as he could extort no meaning, he would elicit "extractor," i. e. "the builder up—" remembering the expression *τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ τὸν πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός* in Tim. p. 28, C. Hildebrand suggests "exorator," "the beginner;" for though, as he confesses, the word is not found elsewhere in Latin, yet it might have been coined by Apuleius, like many others from his mint.

⁴ Neither of these words are applied, if I rightly remember, to God by Plato.

⁵ The words between the numerals Scaliger was the first to reject, as being evidently introduced by some person, who had an incorrect recollection of the passage in Tim. p. 28, C., *εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.*

⁶ Compare Alcinous, § 8, p. 260.

versal, which is infinite on that account, because it is a magnitude without a limit. For that which is infinite has the limit of magnitude undefined; and hence, when (Matter) is deprived of limit, it can properly be seen¹ as infinite. Nor yet does he concede that it is with a body nor without a body. On that account he thinks it is not a body, because no body is free from some kind of form; nor yet can he say that it is without a body, because nothing, which is without a body, can exhibit a body; but that it seems to be with a body² by the force of reasoning;² and it is therefore to be comprehended³ not by acting alone, nor yet by the opinion alone of thought—⁴ for bodies, through the remarkable evidence of themselves, are known by⁴ similar judgment—⁴ but that those things, which do not possess a bodily substance, are seen by cogitation; from whence, ⁵ opinion being adulterated, the ambiguous quality of this matter is to be comprehended.⁵ [6.] The *ἰδέαι*, namely, the simple forms of all things, (he says,) are eternal, nor yet with a body; but they exist from such, as God has taken as the patterns of things, which are or will be; and (he says) it is not possible for any thing⁶ to be found beyond the individual images in the patterns of each species; and that of all existing⁷ things the forms and configurations are marked out from the impression of those patterns, in the manner of wax (impressions).

¹ In lieu of "videri," one would have expected rather "vocari," i. e. "to be called." For how a thing that is without limit, can be seen even with the eye of the mind, much less with that of the body, it is hard to understand.

² So I have translated "vi et ratione;" for otherwise there would be nothing to which "vi" could be applied. The Delphin editor indeed explains "vi" by "virtute—" to which he was perhaps led by knowing that ed. Junt. has "ut" instead of "vi—" and fancying that vi ut was an error for "virtute." But we are yet to learn to what is "virtute" to be referred. Moreover, as one MS. offers "secunda" for "sibi eam," it is evident there is some corruption here, which I must leave for others to correct, if they can.

³ Here again I must confess myself quite at a loss.

⁴ That is, says the Delphin editor, by an evident judgment. But "evident judgment" is an union of words perfectly without meaning.

⁵ Here too I confess my inability to understand what Apuleius intended by the words between the numerals.

⁶ I have translated, as if "quid" had dropt out-before "quam—"

⁷ Here "gignentium" is taken in an intransitive sense, as it is in Apuleius de Mundo, n. 736, and Sallust, B. J. § 79, quoted by Ouden-dorp; who would otherwise have read "entium—"

Obstata, which we call "essentia," (existences,) he says are two-fold, through which all things are produced, and even the world itself; one of which is perceived by reflection alone; the other can be subjective to the senses. Now that, which is perceived by the eyes of the mind, is found (to exist) for ever, and in the same manner, and equal and similar to itself, and what truly is. But the other is to be estimated by opinion, affected by a sense and a want of reason, and which he says is produced and perishes. And as the former is said to exist truly, so the latter we may say does not exist truly. And ¹of the first substance or existence is the first God,¹ and Matter, and the Forms of Things, and the living principle; of the second substance are all the things, which receive a form, and are generated, and derive their origin from a pattern of the former substance; (and) which are able to be changed and turned about, gliding away and escaping in the manner of flowing water. Moreover, since that substance of perception, which I have mentioned, rests upon a power that is consistent, the points, that are made the subject of dispute relating to it, are full of firm reasoning and belief; but of the latter, which is the shadow, as it were, and the image of the former, the reasonings and the words, which are used in disputes relating to it, are expressed by a method of teaching which is not consistent.

[7.] The beginning of all bodies he has stated to be Matter; and that it is marked by the impress of Forms; and that from hence have been produced the elements, Fire and Water, Earth and Air; which ought, if they are elements, to be simple,² nor to be united by a mutual connexion, after the manner of syllables;³ what takes place in the case of those (things),³ whose substance is made up by the coming together of powers in many ways; which, when they had been in no order and mixed together, were brought by the deity, who is the builder of the world, into order ⁴by means of numbers and measures in a circuit.⁴ These (he says) were reduced

¹ In the words "*primæ-substantiæ vel essentiæ primum Deum*—" there is an evident error of "*primum*" for "*primæ*—" For the question here is not about the first God, but the first existence.

² This comparison is from Tim. p. 48, B. § 21.

³ Floridus understands "*rebus*," as the antecedent of "*quarum*—" but Hildebrand, "*formis*—" Others read "*quorum*—".

⁴ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text. But

from very many elements into one; and that Fire, and Air, and Water, have their origin and beginning in a triangle, which is right-angled but with unequal angles; ¹ but that the Earth is formed of direct angles, triangles, and of equal footsteps; ¹ and that of the former form three kinds exist, the pyramidal, the ² octangular, and twenty-angular; ² but that ³ the sphere and pyramid ⁴ have in themselves the figure of Fire; and that the octangular sphere is dedicated to Air; and the twenty-angular to Water; but that the triangle with equal feet ⁴ forms out of itself a square, and the square ⁵ a cube, which is peculiar to the Earth. ⁵ On which account he gave to Fire the movable form of the pyramid, because ⁶ the quickness of one seemed to be very similar to the rapid movement of the other. ⁶ But of secondary velocity is the octangular sphere. This he assigned to the Air, which in lightness and quickness is the second after Fire. The sphere with twenty angles ⁷ is in the third place, ⁸ of this the rolling form seemed to be rather like that of flowing water. ⁸ There remains the form of dice (a

Plato, in Tim. p. 53, B. § 27, has *δυσχηματίζατο εἶδεναι καὶ ἀριθμοῖς*—where, however, there is nothing similar to “in ambitum;” nor is there in Alcinoüs, § 13, p. 271, who has, what is far more intelligible, “Matter—moved at first—without order—was subsequently reduced into order by the deity, while all things were fitted together according to a proportion with each other.”

¹ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the words “*terram vero directis quidem angulis trigonis et vestigiis paribus esse*—” supplied by MS. Fulv. and Excerpt. Bat. But a right angle is not elsewhere, I believe, called in Latin “*directus angulus*,” nor does “*vestigium*” mean “the side” of a triangle. What Apuleius wrote and meant to say it is impossible to discover, even with the aid of Pseudo-Tim. Loc. p. 98, D. § 5.

² Floridus was the first to remark that Apuleius has mistranslated *δεδάσπον* and *εἰκοσιῶπον*, found in Pseudo-Tim. Loc. p. 98, D. § 5, by applying to the angles, what the Greek writer said of the sides, of triangles.

³ Here again Apuleius plainly proves that he was writing on subjects, of which he had very imperfect notions. For as the sphere is a circular figure, and the pyramid an angular one, they could not both be the figure of fire, which was pyramidal alone, as stated in Tim. p. 56, B. § 31.

⁴ i. e. with equal sides—

⁵ Compare Tim. p. 55, C. § 30.

⁶ Compare Pseudo-Tim. Loc. p. 98, D. § 5.

⁷ So the Delphin editor understands “*vigesimalis*,” the correction of Elmenhorst, similar to “*viginti angulam*—” just above.

⁸ So I have translated, as if the words were “*hujus forma volubilis*

cube);¹ which, since it is immovable, has not absurdly obtained by lot the steadiness of the Earth.¹ Other beginnings too (he says)² might be discovered, which are known to God,³ or to him who is a friend of the gods.³ [8.] But of the primary elements, Fire, and Water, and the rest, he asserts⁴ the slight bodies of things with life and without it, consist in the shape of particles; but that the World, taken as a whole, is made up of⁵ the whole of Water, and the whole of Fire, and the whole of Air, and the whole of Earth,⁵ and that not only no portion of these is left without the World, but that its power even is not⁶ found beyond it,⁶ and that these are fitted to and connected with each other within it; and consequently its seat is in Fire, Earth, Water, and Air; and as Fire is united to Air by a (certain) relationship, so Moisture is united⁷ by an affinity to Earth.

Hence (he says) that there is one World, and in it all things; ⁸ nor is there a place left, in which another World

fluidæ aquæ similior est visa—"not "hujus forma fluida et volubilis . . ." which I will leave for those to understand, who can.

— Such is the literal version of "*quæ cum sit immobilis, terræ constantiam non absurde sortita est*—" where the natural train of thought would lead to quite the reverse. For it was the Earth, that was said to have obtained its stability from the form of the cube, not the cube from the form of the Earth. Hence Apuleius probably wrote "*quam, cum sit immobilis Terræ substantia, constantem non absurde sortita est*—" and hence we can account for what would be otherwise inexplicable, the variation in MSS. between "*substantiam*" and "*constantiam*." Unless indeed it be said that he had a confused and imperfect recollection of the passage in Pseudo-Loctr. Tim. p. 98, C. § 5, *τὸν κύβον, ἐδραϊώτατον, καὶ σταδαίον παντὶ ὅμα*—*τοῦτο δὲ βαρύτατον τε καὶ δυσκίνητον ἂ γὰρ*.

³ I have adopted "*ait, quæ*," found in one MS., in lieu of "*quæ aut.*"

² I do not remember where Plato says this, even if he does say so, of which I have great doubts.

⁴ I have translated, as if the author wrote "*ait*," not "*et*," which is unintelligible; and I have elicited "*ex illa*—" furnished by one MS.

— By the aid of this passage may be restored Tim. p. 32, D., *ἐκ γὰρ πυρὸς παντὸς ὑδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς ξυνίστησι*—

— I have adopted, what Floridus suggested, "*sed ne vim quidem*—" (where "*ne*" is omitted in MSS.) and confirmed by Tim. p. 32, C., *μέρος οὐδὲν οὐδένος οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἔξωθεν ὑπολιπών*—

⁷ Colvius was the first to see that the syntax required the indicative "*jugatur*," instead of the subjunctive "*jungatur*—"

— Compare Tim. p. 33, A.

could be;¹ nor are there (other)¹ elements remaining from which there could be formed the body of another World. Moreover, there is attributed to it ²a perpetual youth and a never-injured health;² and further, there is nothing left out of it that can corrupt its ³natural condition;³ and if there remained any thing ⁴(out of the World),⁴ it would not injure it; since it is on every side so put together and arranged, that what is adverse and contrary cannot do an injury to its nature and discipline. On this account then it has been sought by the fabricating God, in behalf of the World, which, ⁵like a beautiful and perfect sphere, is the most perfect and most beautiful, that it should be in want of nothing, and contain all things by shutting in and restraining them,⁵ (and be)⁶ beautiful and wonderful, like to and answering to himself. Now since there are held to be these⁷ seven movements in space, the forward and backward, the right and the left; and of things, that strive (to move)⁸ upwards and downwards; and of those, that are twisted into a spiral⁹ and circuit, this one (way),¹⁰ peculiar to wisdom and prudence, was left for the World, after the six former had been laid aside, that it should revolve according to reason.

And this World, he says, is now with a beginning; but ¹¹otherwise it has an origin,¹¹ and was produced, for there is no beginning or commencement, because it existed always; but that it seems to have been produced, because its¹² substance

¹ I have inserted, what the sense evidently requires; especially as "alia" might easily have been lost before "elementa."

²⁻³ Compare Tim. p. 33, A., *ἵνα ἀγήρων καὶ ἀνοσον ᾖ*.

³⁻⁴ Such seems to be the meaning of "ingenium," applied to the World.

⁴⁻⁵ The words between the lunes have been added to complete the sense.

⁵⁻⁶ Compare Tim. p. 33, B.—D., § 11.

⁶ I have translated, as if "et" had dropt out before "pulcher," and "sit" after "admirabilis—"

⁷ By the aid of this passage we may supply Tim. p. 34, A. § 11.

⁸ This insertion has been made for the sake of perspicuity.

⁹ This seems to be the correct translation of "gyrum—" a word applied to the revolutions of a top, which is set in motion by a string, wound round it in the form and with the power of a spiral.

¹⁰ As there is nothing in the text to which "una" can be referred, I have translated, as if "via" had been lost after "una—"

¹¹⁻¹² I confess, I cannot understand "alias habere originem—"

¹³ I have omitted, with the majority of MSS., "totius" after "rebus."

and nature consist of those things which have obtained, by lot, the quality of being produced. Hence it ¹is tangible, and visible, and comes under the senses of the body.¹ But ²because God has afforded a cause for its being produced, it is on that account about to be for ever of an immortal endurance.²

[9.] But the soul of all living beings (he says) is incorporeal, nor will it perish, when it shall have been released from the body; and that ³it is older than all things produced, and that it therefore has a command over and rules³ those things, of which it has obtained by lot the diligent care;⁴ and that it is ever moved by itself and is the mover of other things, which are by their nature unmoved and sluggish; and he proclaims that the heavenly soul, which is the fountain of all souls and the best and wisest parent of virtues, is subservient to God the maker, and is at hand for all his inventions; but that the substance of this mind is made up of numbers and measures⁵ by means of increase doubled and multiplied, and of increments obtained from themselves and from without;⁶ and hence it happens that the World is moved⁶ according to a system of music, instrumental and vocal.⁶ (He says too) that the Natures of things are two-fold; and that one of them is that, which can be seen by the eyes and touched by the hand, which he calls *δοξαστήν*, the subject of opinion; and the other is that, which presents itself to the mind, (called) *διανοητική*, the subject of cogitation and intellect:—for let pardon be granted⁷ to a novelty in words, that minister to the obscurity of things,⁷—and that the former portion is mutable, and easy

¹— Compare Tim. p. 28, B. § 9.

²— I confess myself quite unable to understand the cogency of this reasoning. Diogenes, as remarked by the Delphin editor, has produced a more intelligible one in his Life of Plato, § 72, “the world will continue undestroyed, on account of its being not resolved into that which is not—” for so properly read the MS. used by Ambrosius.

³— Compare Tim. p. 34, E. § 12, *πρὸς βυτίραν ψυχῇν σώματος ὡς δισπότιν καὶ ἀρξουσιν*—

⁴ So I have translated “*curam—diligentiamque*—”

⁵— What Apuleius meant by the words between the numerals will be perhaps best understood by Batteux’s note at the end of the translation of the Pseudo-Timæus.

⁶— Such is the full meaning of “*musicæ—et canore*—”

⁷— This excuse was demanded by Apuleius for the use of the words “*opinabilem*” and “*cogitabilem*—”

¹for a person beholding it; ¹ but that the latter, which is seen by the eye of mind, and is perceived and conceived by reflection, that penetrates it, is incorruptible, immutable, enduring, and the same for ever. Hence two-fold too, he says, is reasoning and interpretation. For the latter, which is visible, is inferred by a suspicion accidental, and not so ²very enduring; but the former, which is intelligible, is proved to be true by ratiocination perpetual and constant.

[10.] But Time (he says) is ³an image of Eternity; ³ although Time is subject to motion, (while) the nature of Eternity is fixed and motionless; and that Time goes into it, and can be ended and resolved into its magnitude, if at any time God, the maker of the World, shall so determine: (and) that by the spaces of the same Time the measures of the revolution of the World are comprehended; since the globes of the Sun and Moon do this, and the rest of the Stars, which we do not correctly say are ⁴Wandering and Wandering; ⁴ for our opinions and disputations respecting their orbits ⁵may be led from the reality by an error of the understanding; ⁵ whereas the disposer of (all) things has so appointed their ⁶returnings, risings, settings, recessions, delays, and progressions, ⁶ that there is no place left for even a moderate error; since days with nights fill up the space of a month, and months in their turn roll on the circle of a year; nor was it possible for the numeration of time to be

¹ Such is the literal version of "contuenti," in lieu of which Colvius suggested, with the approbation of Brant, "converti—" One MS. has "continenti—" From the two one might perhaps elicit "facile alium locum tenentem," i. e. "easily having another place—" in opposition to the subsequent "constantem—"

² I have adopted "non ita," elicited by Scioppius from "inita—"

³ Compare Tim. p. 37, D. § 14, αἰώνος—εἰκόνα—ὅν δὴ χρόνον ἀνομάσαμεν: and Alcinous, § 14, p. 274.

⁴ Such is the literal version of "Erroneas et Vagas—" where it is evident that one word is a gl., but which is so, it is not easy to determine. For while Apuleius has in De Deo Socrat. "quæ vulgo vagæ nuncupantur ab imperitiis—" the other word "erroneas" coincides more closely with the Greek πλανήτης.

⁵ I have translated, as if the text were, not "in errorem intellectum inducere" or "incidere," but "per errorem intellectus induci e re," where "per" might have easily dropt out before "errorem—" Hildebrand has edited, he says from MSS., "in errorem intellectum incidere."

⁶ The words between the numerals are placed in a rather strange order; for the natural flow of ideas would be, "revolutions, risings, settings, returnings, progress, and delays—"

entered upon, before those signs began to burn in the starry light; and the keeping of this reckoning would have perished, if this antique¹ chorus had stood still of old. For that the measures and returns of time might be known, and the circuit of the World be seen, the light of the Sun was lit up; and in turn the darkness of night invented, that desired rest might come to living beings; and a month² was made up, when the Moon, after completing the course of her circle, returned to the same spot from which she had departed; whereas the space of a year is completed, when the Sun shall have reached the four changes of the seasons, and be carried (back)³ to the same sign. The enumeration of those, ⁴that return into themselves, and of those, that depart from themselves,⁴ he discovered ⁵by the contemplation of the understanding;⁵ and (he says) that there are nevertheless ⁶determinate revolutions of the stars, preserved for ever in their legitimate courses, which the skill of man can with difficulty comprehend.⁶ From whence it happens, that the so-called Great Year is known very easily; the time of which will be filled up, when the company of the wandering stars shall arrive at the same end, and recover for itself a new commencement, and a journey through the roads of the World.

[11.] But of the celestial orbs, united to each other by mutual changes, the highest of all is that, ⁷which is reckoned as the

¹ Lipsius, unable, as I am, to understand "antiquus," suggested "astricus—" for he probably remembered the words of Varro, quoted by Nonius vi. 16, "Cœli choreas astricas—" similar to ἀστρων αἰθίροις χοροί in Eurip. El. 467.

² I have adopted "mensem," in lieu of "menses," as suggested by Wower; who aptly refers to Tim. p. 39, C. § 14, and to Alcinous, § 14. For the question is about each month, taken individually, not about many months.

³ I have translated, as if the text were, not "fuerit invecus," but "fuerit retrorsum vecus."

⁴ As the act of departure must precede that of return, one would have expected to find the two members of this period inverted.

⁵ I have translated, as if the text were, not "intellectu cogitationis," but "intellectus cogitatione," similar to "cogitatione animi" in the interpretation of the Delphin editor.

⁶ Compare Tim. p. 39, C. § 14.

⁷ I have translated, as if the text were "qui inerrabilem meatus censetur; cujus—" not "qui inerrabili meatu censetur; ejus—" for it was not the "meatus," which was "inerrabilis," but the stars, that were placed there.

path of the non-wandering (stars), by whose¹ embrace the rest are restrained; and that to the non-wandering the first place was assigned; the second to Saturn; the third to Jupiter; that Mars holds the fourth; that the fifth is assigned to Mercury; that the sixth belongs to Venus; and that the seventh is burnt up by the passage of the Sun; (and) that the Moon measures the eighth.

Hence (he says that) all things are occupied by elements and principles; that Fire is above all; and next is the place of Air; that next is that of Water; and next that the orb of Earth, situated in the middle, ¹stands equal in place,¹ and immovable in figure. He says too that these fires, fixed to the spheres of the stars, glide on in their courses perpetual and untired, and that they are living gods; but that the nature of the Spheres is nourished by, and made out of, Fire.

Moreover, the races of living beings are divided into four species; one of which is of the nature of Fire of such a kind, as we see the Sun and Moon to be, and the rest ²of the stars in the constellations;² another is of the quality of Air; and this he says is that of Dæmons; the third is a coalescence of Water and Earth; and that ³the mortal race of bodies³ (is) from this, (and) divided into the terrene and terrestrial—for so he considered the *χοῖκα*⁴ should be called—

¹—¹ I confess I do not understand what Apuleius meant by "equalem loco—" Perhaps he wrote "in medio situm æquilibrium loco," i. e. "situated in the middle place of the equally balanced." Compare Alcinous, § 15.

²—² Such, I presume, is the meaning of "siderum stellas—" for such a combination of words is not, I suspect, to be met with elsewhere.

³—³ Such is the literal version of "mortale genus corporum—" words scarcely intelligible, except by a metaptosis, for "mortalium genus corporum—" But as three MSS. offer, instead of *χοῖκα*, "et pronenertaron," and two, "et pote enepteron—" Apuleius wrote, I suspect, "mortale genus in et pteroen et apteron—" where "pteroen" and "apteron" are the Greek words *πτερόεν* and *ἀπτερόεν*, written in Latin letters; and if this be a correct conjecture, we must read likewise "dividi; et exinde in terrenum atque terrestre—" in lieu of "ex eo dividi terrenum atque terrestre—" For thus Apuleius would be found to have drawn his facts, not from Plato himself, but from some writer, who had an imperfect recollection of Tim. p. 40, A., *εἰσι δὲ τέτταρες (ἰδῖαι), μία μὲν οὐράνιον θῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνὸν καὶ ἀερόπτερον τριτὴ δὲ ἰνυδρον [εἶδος]. πᾶσιν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τειράρη.*

⁴ Since the word *χοῖκα*, applied to "mud," is not found except in the Alexandrine Greek of the Septuagint and New Testament, it is evident

and that terrene belongs to trees and other productions, which drag out an existence, while they are fixed to the ground; but terrestrial to things, which the earth feeds and sustains.

Of gods he enumerates three kinds; of which the first is that one and alone the highest, who is beyond the World, and incorporeal; whom we have shown above to be the father and architect of this divine World; another is such as the stars possess, and the rest of the deities, whom we call the heaven-inhabiting; the third embraces¹ those, whom the old Romans² called "Medioxumi," because they are, with relation to themselves and place and power, inferior to the highest gods, but naturally superior to man.

[12.] But all things which are carried on naturally, and on that account correctly, are governed by the guardianship of Providence: ³nor can the cause of any evil be ascribed to God; ³on which account ⁴(Plato) conceives that not all things are to be referred to the lot of Fate.⁴ For he gives this definition, that Providence is a divine determination, the conservator of the prosperity of that, for the sake of which it has undertaken such an office; (and) that Fate is a divine law, by which the inevitable designs of, and the acts commenced by, the deity are fulfilled. And hence, if any thing is done by Providence, it is done likewise by Fate; and that, which is finished by Fate, should seem to have been commenced⁵ by Providence. Now the first Providence is that of the highest (power) and the most above all the gods; who has ordained not only the deities, that dwell in heaven, whom he has dispersed to be ⁶a guard and glory⁶ through all

that Apuleius obtained his knowledge of the doctrines of Plato from some follower of that sect at Alexandria, who had himself only a slight acquaintance with the tenets of the Athenian. This inference, however, Hildebrand would not admit, as he rejects *χοιρά*, and would read "*πρίζον* et *ἐνυδρον*—"

¹ I have translated, as if the word were "habet," not "habent," which has nothing to which it can be referred.

² By these Apuleius probably meant Plautus; who has in *Cistellar. ii. 1*, "At ita me Dii, Deoque, Superi atque Inferi et Medioxumi."

³ Compare Plato *Rep. ii. p. 379, C.*, τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἄττα δὲ ζῆτεῖν τὰ αἰρία, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

⁴ I do not remember where Plato has so expressed himself; nor where he has given the definitions alluded to.

⁵ I have translated, as if the word were, not "susceptum," but "inceptum," required by the very balance of the sentence.

⁶ Compare "præsidium et—decus," in Horace.

the members of the World, but has given birth, ¹for ages upon ages, ¹to the deities naturally mortal; ²who are superior in wisdom to the rest of beings that live upon earth; and, after laying down laws, he delivered over to the other deities the disposition and guardianship of the other matters, which were necessary to be done daily. From whence so strenuously did the deities of the second providence keep their hold of the providence undertaken by them, that all things, ³which are shown to mortals from heaven, ³preserve the state of the father's arrangement unchanged. But the Dæmons, whom we might call Genii and Lares, (Plato) decides are the servants of the gods, and the protectors of man, and their interpreters, ⁴should they wish for any thing from the gods. Nor does he think that all things are to be referred to the force of Fate; but that there is something in ourselves, and something too in Fortune. He confesses, however, that the unforeseen ⁵accidents of Fortune are not known to us; for that something unsteady and running against us is wont to come between the affairs, which may have been undertaken with design and meditation, so that it does not permit, what has been thought upon, to come to an end. And when that impediment arrives advantageously, the circumstance is called Good Fortune; but Misfortune, when those hinderances are of a noxious kind.

[13.] Of all earthly things, nothing more excellent has Providence given than Man. Well therefore does the same (Plato) proclaim that ⁶the Soul is the mistress of the body. ⁶But since he asserts ⁷that the parts of the Soul are three, ⁷the reasoning power, which is the best portion of the mind, he

¹ Such is perhaps the best translation of "ad ævitatē temporis—" similar to the Ecclesiastical formula "per secula seculorum."

² That some of the deities were begotten, or supposed to be so, is stated in Tim. p. 40, D. § 15. But I do not remember where they are said to be mortal.

³ Oudendorp proposed to elicit from "quæ cœlestibus mortalibus exhibeantur," the reading in two MSS., "quæ cœlestes mortalibus exhibant—" for "cœlitus," he says, is not found in Apuleius nor in preceding authors; only in succeeding, as Lactantius, Prudentius, and Ammianus.

⁴ See the Banquet, p. 202, D. § 28.

⁵ I have translated, as if the word were "improvisos," not "improvidos—" ⁶ In Tim. p. 34, C.

⁷ In Rep. ix. p. 571, D. and 580, E. See Diogen. L. in the Life of Plato, § 90.

says has possession of ¹the citadel of the head;¹ but that the feeling of anger, which is distant from the reasoning power, is carried down to the domicile of the heart, and follows it, and ²in place answers to wisdom;² and that lust and desire, the lowest portion of the mind, occupy the lowest seats of the belly, as if they were certain stews and hiding-places of jakes, the resorts of iniquity and luxury; and that this portion seems to have been removed at a greater distance from wisdom, lest, by an unseasonable vicinity, reason might, while consulting³ for the safety of all, be disturbed in the usefulness of its reflections. (He says too) that the whole of man is in the head and face; for prudence and all the senses are contained in no other⁴ part of the body but that; since the rest of the members act as handmaidens ⁵[and are subservient]⁵ to the head, (and) minister food and other things; while the crown (of the head) is placed on high, ⁶as a lord and ruler, and by its providence to be delivered from dangers.⁶ Moreover, that the organs, with which the senses are furnished for perceiving and judging of quantities and qualities, are placed in like

¹ On this expression, see Davies on Cicero, N. D. ii. 56, "in capite, tanquam in arce—"

² Such is the literal and unintelligible version of "in loco respondere sapientiæ;" which Oudendorp attempts to defend and explain by asserting that by "in loco" is meant, where the subject and place require; forgetting that, if anger is "procul a ratione," it will not be in a situation "respondere sapientiæ." Hence I suspect that Apuleius wrote "et illico respondere insipientiæ," i. e. "and straightway answers to a want of wisdom." Hildebrand says that "in loco" is the same as "illico," and refers to Hand on Tursellin. Particul. T. iii. p. 207.

³ I have adopted "ratio consultants," the conjecture of Oudendorp, in lieu of the unintelligible "et rationem consumptam—" for which Salmasius on Epictetus, p. 146, would read "rationem consulturam—" from whence Hildebrand has "ratio consultura—"

⁴ I have, with Oudendorp, adopted "alia," as suggested by Colvius, in lieu of "alias," which means "otherwise," not "in another place."

⁵ Of the words "et subservire," the latter is evidently an interpretation of "ancillari," while the former should follow "capiti."

⁶ Such is the literal translation of the words "ut dominum atque rectorem, providentiaque ejus a periculis vindicari—" which I cannot understand, nor could Wower; who has suggested "ut dominum—providentia ejus—vindicaret." Hildebrand has "vectare etiam sublimen positum dominum atque rectorem; providentia ejus a periculis vindicari—" i. e. "and that they carry their lord and ruler placed on high; (and) are delivered by his providence from perils:" where "vectare" or "vectari" is found in all the MSS.

manner near the palace of the head, within the view of reason, in order that the truth, of understanding (by the mind) and perceiving (by the body), may be assisted.

[14.] But the senses themselves, being fitly formed by nature, have a cognate intelligence as regards those things, which are the objects of sense.

In the first place, the twin pupils of the eyes are very clear, and, shining with a certain light of vision, they possess the office of knowing light; while hearing, by partaking of the nature of air, has a perception of sounds, through messengers in the air; whereas the taste, being a sense more relaxed, is on that account suited to things rather moist and watery; but the touch, as being of the earth and corporeal, perceives things, that are rather solid, and which can be handled and struck against. Of those things likewise, which are changed, when corrupted ¹there is a separate perception.¹ For in the middle of the region of the face Nature has placed the nostrils, by ²the double door-way² of which there passes an odour together with the breath; and that conversions and changes furnish the causes of smelling; and that they³ are perceived from substances, when corrupted or burnt, or in a mucous⁴ or moistened state; ⁵when those substances are sought out, they are exhaled in vapour and smoke, the judgment and sense of a smell come upon them.⁵ For if the substances are

¹—¹ So Oudendorp from MSS. in lieu of "separanda vis intelligenda." But he does not show how "vis" could have crept in here, nor how "intelligentia" could be applied to a bodily, not mental, perception. The disorder probably lies somewhat deeper.

²—² In lieu of "symphonia" in some MSS., Vulcanius was the first to edit from others "bifori via—" a variation for which it would be difficult to account, except on the supposition that "symphonia" conceals some Greek word written in Latin letters, which Fulvius Ursinus and others conceive to have been "syphonibus—" referring to τοὺς ὀχετοὺς τῆς πύλης in Tim. p. 78, C.

³ As there is nothing to which "eas" can be referred, it is probable that Apuleius wrote "odoratus causas esse, odoresque—" not "odoratus causas dare, easque—"

⁴ So Colvius, by reading "mucescentibus" instead of "mitescenscentibus," which the Delphin editor says might allude to ripe fruit; while Scaliger suggested "putrescentibus," answering to σπυρμιένων in Tim. p. 66, D.

⁵—⁵ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text, "cum quidem ea quæruntur, vapore vel fumo exhalantur, odoris in his iudicium sensusque succedunt—" from which one might perhaps elicit "cum quidem, quas pereunt, putrem vapore vel fumo exhalante per aera odorem,

sound and the air pure, ¹ they never vitiate the gales of that kind.¹

Now these very senses are common to us and the rest of animals. But by the divine blessing the skill of man in that way is better furnished and more advanced, since his hearing and sight are superior. For he measures with his eyes the heavens and the orbits of the stars, and the settings and risings of the constellations, and he understands their distances, together with ² the signs they give; ² from which has flowed ³ the most beautiful and plentiful fountain of philosophy.³ And what could happen to man more magnificent than the sense of hearing? by which he learns simultaneously prudence and wisdom, and measures and makes the numbers and modes of speech and melody, and becomes himself entirely attuned and musical. To this has been added the tongue, and the outwork of the teeth and the beauty of a little mouth, which has been furnished to other animals indeed for supplying the necessities of living, and bringing to the belly its resources; but to man this has been given as the storehouse of right reasoning and of sweetest discourse, in order that, what forethought has conceived in the heart, speech might bring forward to be understood.

nasi iis iudicium sensusque succedunt," i. e. "when the judgment and perception of the nose comes upon those substances, which are perishing, while vapour or smoke is exhaling the smell of rottenness through the air." Hildebrand has "cum quidem ea genuntur, vapore vel fumo exhalante; odori in his iudicium sensusque succedunt—" conceiving that "genuntur" might be written for "gignuntur;" and "exhalante" taken intransitively, as "vestes exhalant" in Statius, Theb. x. 108.

¹ Such is the literal and unintelligible meaning of "nunquam ejusmodi auras inficiunt—" But as nothing has been said of gales of any kind, it is evident there is some error here, which may be corrected by reading "nunquam ejusmodi odores nares afficiunt," i. e. "never do smells of this kind affect the nostrils." Opportunely then do some MSS. read "aures—"

² Such seems to be the meaning of "significatibus—" in which word there is an allusion to the signs of the seasons and of the weather given by different constellations at their rising and setting.

³ By this Apuleius probably meant Astronomy; which is called "holy" in Pseudo-Tim. Locr. p. 96, E. § 4. Compare likewise Tim. p. 47, B. *ἡ ὡν ἱπορισάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γίνος* (read *γάνος*, similar to "fons" in Apuleius) *Ὁ μῆλλον ἀγαθὸν [οὐτ'] ἤλθεν οὐδ' ἤξει ποτε [τῷ] θνητῷ γίνε* *δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν, λίγω [δὲ] Τοῦτ' ὁμμάτων μίγματος ἀγαθόν*—where, by omitting the words placed between brackets, we can recover a dramatic fragment, spoken either by Teiresias, or Phineus, or Œdipus.

[15.] Moreover the bearing of the whole body and the form of the limbs are under one condition the best, (but) under another, worse. The inferior are ruled by the superiority of the chiefs, and they perform the ministering suited for living. 'Finally, the feet as far as the shoulders obey the head.' But the hedge of the eyebrows² protects the eyes, lest any thing should rush down from above, to disturb vision, which is tender and soft.

The Lungs by their place and affinity look very much to the welfare of the heart; (for) when it burns with anger and is palpitating³ with rather quick movements, the top of the heart itself, wet with blood, is received by the softness and thirst⁴ and cold of the lungs.

But the Spleen is near, and not vainly so, to the Liver, that it may relieve its redundancy, by sharing in its absorptions,⁵ and by cleansing what is filthy render the liver pure and clear;⁶ which is very advantageous to its fibres.

(He says too) that the belly is furnished with the folds of the intestines; but that there is an impediment by ligatures, so that what is eaten and drank may not pass through⁶ the place of sitting quickly,⁶ but, by being retained for a little

¹— Such is the literal and unintelligible version of "Pedes denique humerorum tenuis capiti obediunt—" by which the Delphin editor understands "Denique a pedibus usque ad humeros omnia membra parent capiti—" He therefore fancied perhaps that "et omnia membra" had dropt out after "denique—"

² One would have expected rather "palpebrarum—" for it is the eyelashes, not eyebrows, that protect the eyes; Plato has therefore correctly in Tim. p. 45, D., σωτηρίαν—της ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀμνηστῆσαντο τὴν τῶν βλέφαρων φύσιν.

³ I have adopted "trepidat," suggested by Lipsius, in lieu of "trepidans—"

⁴ I confess I do not understand what is meant by "siti—" The Delphin editor explains it by "siccitate—" But such is not the meaning of "sitia." Wower refers the thirst of the lungs to their porosity. But what connexion there is between these two ideas, I must leave for others to discover. By comparing however Tim. p. 70, C., where the lungs are said to be bloodless and porous and refrigerating, I suspect something has been lost here, of which "situ" in one MS., and "siti" in others, is the remnant.

⁵ Compare Tim. p. 72, C.

⁶ I have translated, as if the words were, not "sese penetrarent," which I cannot understand, but "sessum penetrarent—" remembering the expression in Tim. p. 73, A., τὴν—κοιλίαν ἐποδοχὴν ἰδεῖσαν, εἰλεῖαν τε περίε τὴν τῶν ἐντρίων γίνεσιν, ὥπως μὴ ταχὺ διεκπερῶσα ἢ τροφή πάλιν τροφῆς ἱταρὰς δεῖσθαι τὸ σῶμα ἱπαναγκάζοι.

time, they may show their utility to animals by their approach; and that the necessity of desiring food may not be impending at every moment through those things being exhausted and passing off, which had been introduced; and that there may not be a need for us to be occupied night and day for this purpose alone.

[16.] (Moreover) the bones are covered with flesh,¹ and the same are bound to nerves; yet nevertheless the members, which are the intermediate messengers of feeling, are hidden by flesh,³ in order that the sensations may not be blunted by the thickness (of the flesh).³ Those, too, that are connected by joinings and couplings for a rapidity in moving⁴ themselves easily, are not impeded by much flesh.⁵

Lastly, look at the top of the head itself, and you will see it covered with a thin skin, and shaggy with hair, (a protection) against the violence of cold and heat. But those parts are plump, ⁶which labour wears down, as, for instance, the buttocks themselves, where is the region of sitting.⁶

What shall I say of the food? ⁷which the roads, that emanate from the womb,⁷ and are joined to the fibres of the liver, disperse, after being turned into the form of blood, so that Nature may skilfully cause it to ⁸flow, like a river,⁸ from that place through all the joints.

But from the region of the heart the meanderings of the veins take their rise, transferring through the coils of the lungs the liveliness, which they had received from the heart;

^{1, 2, 3} Although "entrails" is elsewhere the meaning of "viscera," yet in all the three passages the Delphin editor, led by what the sense requires, explains the word by "carnibus—" whom I have followed.

³ The words between the lunes are added for the sake of perspicuity.

⁴ Hildebrand has "ad celeritatem, facilius se movendo—" and takes "movendo" as a dative "for moving—"

⁵ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the words "quas labor subigit, ut femina ipsa, qua sessitandi regio est—" which it is evident Apuleius could not have written; for the parts, which labour wears down, would not be those, which, while a person is sitting, are worn down the least. What, however, he did write, might be recovered without much difficulty; but the subject must be passed by, "ne quid habeat injucunditatis oratio," as Cicero says on a similar occasion, in N. D. ii. 15.

⁷ Here again a literal version plainly proves the existence of some error in the text.

⁸ I have translated, as if the text were "fluere, rivi instar," not "derivari—"

and being again distributed from that place through ¹the whole limbs they assist the whole man¹ by his breathing. From hence the alternations in breathing are drawn and given back in turn, in order that they may not be impeded by their mutual meetings.

The qualities (too) of the veins are various, which it is well known flow for the purpose of procreation from the region of the neck through the marrow of the loins, and are received into the place of the male organ; and again, that ²Venus excites the productive receptacle of seed, so that his power departs from a man.³

[17.] But when he says that the substances of the whole body are various, he means that the first seem to consist of fire and water, and the other elements; the second, of similar particles of the intestines,³ small bones, blood, and the rest (of substances); the third, of members discordant and various, that is, of head, belly, and unequal joints. From whence the substance, which consists of simple elements,⁴ if that, which by the necessity of living is asked for, in what manner it agrees even with the genus of each,⁴ guards the quality and temperature of the body; and increases the strength for those particles, which (consist of) the like, and of those, which we have said above are unlike to each other, it nourishes the beauty; and at the same time that equality of dry, moist, hot, and cold, gives health, strength, and form; just as an intemperate and immoderate permixture, while particles are individually and universally corrupted, destroys a living being with a rapid dissolution.

[18.] The same (philosopher) says that the soul is tripartite; (for) that one part is rational, another hot (with anger) or irritable, the third we may call a longing, and (give to) the

¹—¹ I have translated, as if the text were “per membra tota omnem hominem juvant—” not “per membra totum hominem juvant—”

²—³ The present text is “*russum venarum genitale seminium humanitatis excire*—” which nobody has been able to understand. I have translated, as if it were originally “*russum Venerem genitale seminium, homine ut abest vis, excire*—” where “*excire*” is due to Colvius. Hildebrand conceives the error to lie in “*russum*,” for which he would read “*cursu*—”

³ Here, as before, the Delphin editor interprets “*viscerum*” by “*car-nium*—”

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal version of words, which I confess I cannot understand.

same (feeling the name of) lustfulness; but that healthiness, and strength, and beauty, are then present to a being with soul, when reason rules it wholly, and passion and pleasure, two inferior parts, are obedient to reason, and, agreeing amongst themselves, long for nothing and make no stir, that reason deems to be useless. Now when the parts of the soul are regulated to an equability of that kind, the body is broken down by no disturbance; otherwise it introduces a sickness, and unhealthiness, and foulness, when the parts are, with respect to each other, not well put together and unequal, as when desire subdues anger and good counsel, and brings them into subjection with itself; or when anger, more hot than usual, overcomes reason, the mistress and queen, while desire is obsequious and appeased. But 'the sickness of the mind, he says, is a folly, and he divides it into two parts. One of these he calls unskilfulness; the other, madness;¹ and (he says) that the disease of unskilfulness takes place from a vain-glorious boasting, when a person falsely lays claim to the learning and knowledge of those things, of which he is ignorant; but that madness is wont to arise from very depraved habits and a lustful life; and that this madness, which a vicious quality of body produces, is called so, when those things, which are prepared by reason in the top (of the head), become contracted by inopportune straits; but that a ²man is then perfect when soul and body are united together,² and agree with, and respond to, each other, so that the firmness of mind be not inferior to the very strong powers of the body. The body however is increased then by natural increments when the portion of good health, being attended to ³with skilful art,³ knows not to exceed the measure of necessary living; and when health is not worn down by the greatness of external labours, nor by the weight of food introduced too immoderately, or not digested and distributed through the body as it should be. For then the joints and limbs retain the measure and force of due vigour, when that, which is introduced for the preservation of the whole body, is distributed to all the parts, as it were in equal proportions for each; but when that takes place in the least degree, then ensues the destruction of the body.

¹—¹ Compare Tim. p. 86, B.

²—² Compare Tim. p. 88, B.

³—³ I have translated, as if Apuleius had written "*solerti arte*—" not "*salubriter*," which could hardly be united to "*procurata*."

BOOK II

ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

[1.] THE head¹ of Moral Philosophy is, son² Faustinus, that you may know, by what means it is possible to arrive at a happy life. But previous to the other matters, which³ are known to appertain³ to happiness, which is the end⁴ of good things, I will show what Plato thinks upon this point.

Of good things then he thought that some were pre-eminently so, and in themselves the first; but the rest he conceived were good through a participation.⁵ The first good things are God, the highest, and that mind, which he calls *Noûς*; secondly, the things, which flow from the fountain of the first,⁶ are the virtues of the mind, (namely,) Prudence, Justice, Modesty,⁷ (and) Fortitude, but that amongst all these Prudence is the superior; but as the second in number and power he laid down Continence; to these succeeds Justice; (while) Fortitude is the fourth.

¹ I have written "head" in the sense in which Shakspeare uses that word in Othello, "The very head and front of my offending."

² It has been thought that Faustinus was not a son, but a disciple of Apuleius.

^{3, 4} I have translated, as if, instead of "contingent," found in one MS., the reading were originally "contingere nota—" similar to "notum properare" in Horace, according to the correction of Bentley; while (⁴) in lieu of "fine," I have adopted "finem," the emendation of Boescha, who understood by that word what Cicero does in his treatise "De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum." Hildebrand, unable to find a better reading, retains the one in MS. Flor., "bonorum finem contingere—"

⁵ In lieu of "per perceptionem," in one MS., and per receptionem" in another, I have translated, as if the text were "per participationem," which it is strange that Floridus did not suggest, who aptly refers to the expression *κατὰ μίθεσιν* in Alcinous, § 27.

⁶ Instead of "priorum," one would have expected "primorum," as understood by the Delphin editor.

⁷ What Apuleius call here "Pudicitiam," and just afterwards "Continentiam," is in Greek *σωφροσύνη*, commonly rendered "Temperance;" and the four are called the Cardinal Virtues. With regard to the order of the words, Oudendorp observes that "Pudicitiam" should precede "Justitiam," as shown by the following enumeration. But Plato, in Legg. l. p. 630, B. § 5, has *δικαιοσύνη και σωφροσύνη και φρόνησις*.

In good things likewise he made this distinction;¹ that some are of God² and in themselves the first,³ and are called simple goods; others are of man; nor are the same good things thought to be so by all; on which account the virtues of the mind are of God and simple; but those of man, which are goods in the opinion of some, are such as agree with the conveniences of the body, and are what we call external; which to the wise³ and those, who live rationally and moderately, are really good, but must needs be evils to the unwise and to those who are ignorant of their use.

[2.] The first good is the true, and divine, and best, and worthy to be loved and desired; and for the beauty of which the minds, that are under the influence of reason, have a longing, under the guidance of Nature, and are by the same power lit up to an ardent love for it. But as not all are able to obtain it, nor can possess the faculty of acquiring the first good, they are carried on to that, which is of man. The second good is not common to many, nor is it in a similar manner a good to all. For the longing after, and the desire to do any thing is excited either by a true good, or by what seems to be a good; from whence under the guidance of Nature there is a certain affinity between good things and that portion of the soul, which agrees with reason. But he considers that to be a good by accident, which is united to the body and to things that come from without, and that he, who is imbued by Nature to follow what is good, thinks he has been 'born not only for himself,'⁴ but for all men likewise; and that each one has been conceived⁵ not 'in an equal or similar manner,'⁶ but for the state; and next for those nearest to him; and then for the rest, who are united to him by familiarity or acquaintance.

[3.] That a man is (he says too) born, neither absolutely good

¹ In the Laws, i. p. 631, B. § 6.

²⁻³ I have translated, as if the text were not "per se et prima," but "et per se prima," similar to "prima per se" a little before.

³ Compare the Laws, ii. p. 662, B. § 7.

⁴⁻⁶ So the editors have adopted Casaubon's "sibimet ipsi natum," elicited from "sibimet intinatum," and supported by Plato, Epist. 9, p. 358, A., and Cicero.

⁵ Wower reads "conceptum" in lieu of "acceptum," from which, however, Hildebrand would elicit "assertum," and "civitati" from "etiam," not, as Oudendorp suggested, "communi—"

⁶⁻⁶ I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals.

from his stock, nor bad, but that his disposition inclines to both; that he has indeed some seeds of both, which are united to the origin of his birth, but which, by the discipline of education, ought to burst out into another¹ part; and that the instructors of boys ought to have no greater care than to thoroughly imbue them with morals and instructions, so that they may wish to become lovers of virtues, and learn to rule and be ruled by Justice as their mistress. On which account the boys ought to be brought to this point,² beside all the rest, that they may know that the things which are to be followed and avoided, are honourable and dishonourable; that to the former belong³ pleasure and praise; to the latter disgrace and baseness;⁴ (and) that we ought with confidence to wish for the honourable things which are good.

Of dispositions three kinds are classed by him; of which he calls one the superior and pre-eminent; another, the most foul and the worst; the third, which is tempered moderately from both, he calls a mean. In this mean he desires to be partakers the docile boy and the man, who is making a progress to moderation, and who is 'mild in his manner' and elegant; since he asserted that a mean of the same kind, (called) a third something, occurs in the case of virtues and vices; through which some acts are to be praised and others blamed. ⁵(Thus) between knowledge, (of one kind) firm, of another false, there is an obstinacy (of mind) united to a vanity;⁵

¹ Here again I am at a loss about the meaning of "alteram—" The train of thought requires rather "melioratam," or "præstantiorem—"

² I have translated, as if the text were "præter cætera—ad hoc—" not "hoc," which I cannot understand. Hildebrand too has "ad hoc—"

³ Such is the literal version of the text of Oudendorp. But the balance of the sentences evidently requires not "illa voluptatis ac laudis, hæc vero dedecoris ac turpitudinis," but something like "illa vere voluptatis ac laudis; hæc dedecoris ac ægritudinis;" for thus "vere voluptatis" would be balanced by "ægritudinis—" and "the pleasure" arising from honourable acts be properly called "true," as being mentally opposed to the not-true pleasure of acts not honourable. Hildebrand conceives the whole passage to be so corrupt, as to defy correction, except by the aid of better MSS.

⁴ I have adopted "comem modo," which Colvius elicited from "commodum—"

⁵ The common text is "Inter scientiam validam, alteram falsam, perviciam vapitate jactatam; inter—" where, although all the editors have seen that something was wanting, not one has remarked that the idea of a stubborn thing is at variance with that of a thing to be about by

between ¹a chaste and a lustful life he interposed abstinence and intemperance; ¹(and) has made ²shame and sluggishness² as the means between fortitude and fear. Since of those persons, whom he wished to appear moderate, neither the virtues were sincere, nor the vices sheer and untempered, but mixed up on this side and on that.

[4.] But the wickedness of a person stained with all vices he said was the worst; which, he asserted, took place, when that portion, which is the best and reasonable, and ought to rule the rest, was the slave of others; (and) when those leaders into vices, namely, anger and lust, are the lords, while reason is sent under the yoke. From things likewise quite different, (such as) abundance and want,³ is wickedness made up. Nor by the fault of an inequality alone does he consider that wickedness goes halting, but that ⁴it falls upon a dissimilitude;⁴ for it could not agree with goodness, since it differs in so many ways from itself; and carries before it not an inequality, but an incongruity. On which account he says that the three portions of the soul are pressed by three vices. (Thus) against prudence fights indocility, which not only introduces the destruction of science, but is adverse to the discipline of learning. Of this indocility we

vanity. I have therefore translated, as if Apuleius had written "Ita inter scientiam validam alteram, alteram falsam, pervicaciam esse vanitatem junctam mentis; inter—" For thus one "alteram" might have been easily lost before another; and "junctam mentis inter" corrupted into "jactatam inter—" Hildebrand, objecting to "validam," would read "ruditum" in the sense of "ruditatem;" and conceives that "alteram" is a corruption of some word, that had the meaning of "collocavit—"

¹— How "abstinence" and "intemperance" can be a mean between "chastity" and "lustfulness," I cannot understand. Opportunely then do some MSS. read "abstinentiam et temperantiam;" for from both united it is easy to elicit "abstinentis mediam temperantiam," i. e. "the temperance of a person abstaining, as a mean."

²— Here again two terms could not be interposed, as the means between two extremes. Besides, as "pudorem" and "pudicitiam" just before are nearly synonymous, the former word could scarcely be found here united to "ignaviam." Hence Apuleius probably wrote "mediam ignaviam fecit."

³ Compare Rep. iv. p. 422, A. § 2.

⁴— In these words, says Oudendorp, "Latet quid." I confess I do not understand them; nor could Hildebrand, who calls them "obscura."

have received from him two kinds, (one)¹ unskilfulness and stupidity—of which it is found that unskilfulness is a foe to wisdom, (but) stupidity to prudence; (another)² anger³ (and) boldness.³ ⁴Its companionship indignation follows,⁴ and unmovableness, called in Greek ⁵*ἀπορροία τοῦ ῥις*,⁵ for so I would say, which not only extinguishes the excitements of anger, but fixes them down by a stupor not to be moved. To the feelings of desire he applies luxuriousness, that is, a longing after pleasures, and insatiable draughts of things desired,⁶ ⁷for enjoyment and possession.⁷ From this luxuriousness there flows avarice and wantonness; of which the former puts a restraint upon liberality; the latter,⁸ by living too immoderately, squanders the means of a patrimony.⁸

[5.] But of a mind the best,⁹ says Plato, virtue is the bearing, that presents a noble figure; and which makes the person, on whom it is faithfully impressed, to be in accordance with himself, and tranquil and consistent, not in words alone, but in deeds likewise, agreeing with himself and the rest (of mankind). And this is the more likely, should Reason, seated on

¹ I have translated, as if "unam" had dropt out before "imperitiam," and (²) "alteram" between "inimicis" and "iracundiam."

³ I have adopted "audaciam" found in some MSS., and inserted "et—" for thus "iracundia et audacia" would properly form the second kind, just as "imperitia" and "fatuitas" form the first.

⁴ As Apuleius is not talking of certain things, which follow others, but those, that are opposed to others, it is evident that he did not write "ejus comitatur sequuntur indignatio—" But what he did write it is not so easy to discover. And hence, says Oudendorp, "perhaps something is wanting here."

⁵ From the letters ΔΟΡΘΗΘΙΑΝΟΥΤΙΚ Floridus, by the aid of Sciopius, elicited ΔΟΡΘΗΘΙΑΝΟΥ— to which I have added ΤΙΚ— The word however has not been found in Plato; although it is in Aristotle, Ethic. ii. 7, and in Plutarch.

⁶ I have translated, as if the text were "desideratorium," not "desideriorum—"

⁷ One would have expected "ad potiendum fruendumque," as translated, rather than "ad fruendum potiendumque—" at least, if "potiendum" means "possession," as it must mean, to prevent an otherwise needless tautology.

⁸ The text at present is "fundendo patrimonia prodigit facultates." I have adopted "vivendo," suggested by Colvius, and "patrimonii," found in one MS.

⁹ I have adopted "optime" from some MSS., and rejected "et" after "optime" with a solitary one.

the throne of its kingdom, hold the appetites and passions ever in subjection and under the rein; and they¹ so obey it, as to do their ministering tranquilly. (He says), however, that virtue is of one form, because that, which is good by its own nature, has no need of assistance; but, that it may be perfect, it ought to be content with solitude. ²Nor is quality alone united to the natural disposition of virtue, but similitude likewise;³ for so does it agree with itself on every side, that it is fitted from itself and answers to itself. Hence he speaks of virtues as means, and the same too as extremes, not only because (the former)³ are from redundancy and want, but because they are placed in the middle-ground of virtues. For example, Fortitude is surrounded on this side by Boldness, on that by Timidity. Now Boldness comes from the abundance of confidence, but Fear from the fault of a deficient Boldness. * * *

[6.] Of Virtues, some are perfect, others imperfect. Now those are imperfect, which by the kindness of Nature alone come forth in all, or are furnished by discipline alone, or are taught by Reason, as a mistress. Those therefore, that are made up of all,⁴ we say are perfect. He denies, (however,) ⁵that imperfect virtues accompany themselves;⁵ but those, which are perfect, he conceives on that account especially to be inseparable and united to each other, because for the person, who has an uncommon natural disposition, if there be added industry, practice, and the discipline which Reason, the ruler of affairs, has laid down, there will be left nothing, that virtue cannot furnish.

¹ I have translated, as if the text were "*ipsique ea ita obediunt*—" not "*ipsique ita obediunt*—" for thus "*ea*," that is to be referred to "*appetitus et iracundia*," would be the subject to "*obediunt*—" which is at present without one.

² The words between the numerals I confess I do not understand.

³ I have introduced this expression for the sake of perspicuity. But there is still something wanting to show how the means of virtues are the same as extremes. And hence I have marked a supposed omission by asterisks.

⁴ It is not easy to understand to what "*all*" is to be referred, unless it be the combination of the gifts of Nature with what is furnished by discipline and taught by Reason. Hence one would prefer "*omnibus his*," found in some editions.

⁵ Here too I am at a loss to understand how imperfect virtues can be said to accompany, or not, themselves.

He divides all the virtues amongst the parts of the soul; and he calls that virtue, which relies upon Reason, and is the spectator and judge of all matters, Prudence, and Wisdom; of which he wishes for Wisdom to appear as the instruction of things divine and human; but Prudence as the knowledge of understanding good and evil things, and those which are between the two. In that part then, which is considered as given rather to anger, is the seat of Fortitude and the strength of the soul, and the nerves, required for fulfilling those things, which are imposed upon us rather hardly by the rule of laws to be done. The third part of the mind belongs to desires and regrets; of which Abstinence is necessarily the companion; whom he wishes to be the preserver of an agreement in those things, that are naturally right and wrong in man. ¹By this is lustfulness turned to mildness and moderation; ¹ and by the method and modesty of this, voluptuary doings, he says, are restrained.

[7.] Through these three parts of the soul (he places)² a fourth Virtue, namely, Justice, as dividing itself equally; and the cause of it, he says, is knowledge, in order that each ³portion may be obedient both³ to reason and moderation in performing its duty. This the demi-god⁴ at one time calls Justice; at another he includes it in the appellation of virtue in general, and addresses it likewise by the name of Faithfulness;⁵ ⁶but when it is useful to the person, by whom it is possessed, it is benevolence;⁶ but when it looks abroad, and is the trustworthy spectator of utility to another, it has the name of Justice. There is too that Justice, which obtains the fourth place in the ordinary division of virtues,

¹—¹ I have translated, as if the text were “Ad placiditatem ab hac et mediocritatem—” not “Ad placentiam ac (MSS. 2, ad) mediocritatem—” where I cannot understand “placentiam;” while “ab hac” is confirmed by “ratione hujus” in the very next sentence.

² I have translated, as if “sistit” had dropt out between “se” and “scientiam—”

³—³ From “potiore” in MSS. I have elicited “portio et—”

⁴ So I have translated “heros;” for such the “hero” of antiquity was deemed to be.

⁵ Apuleius alludes to the Laws, i. p. 630, D. § 5, as remarked by Boeckh. Compare likewise Rep. i. p. 331, D., where Justice is defined to be the saying what is true, and the restoring what a person has received; which is Faithfulness.

⁶—⁶ The words between the numerals I confess I cannot understand.

which is coupled with Religiousness, that is, (in Greek,) *δαιοτης*; of which (the latter), Religiousness, is a slave devoted to the honour of the gods, and to the supplications in a divine rite; while the former (Justice) is the remedy and medicine¹ of human society and concord.¹ Now for two equal reasons Justice rules over human utility; of which the first is the observance of equality² in numbers and divisions, and in those matters, which have been bargained for³ according to a contract;³ add to this, that it is the guardian of weights and measures, and of the common distribution⁴ of public property; the second (reason) is that⁵ relating to boundaries,⁵ and is a sharing, proceeding from equity, so that a becoming ownership in lands may be assigned to each person, and the better (portion)⁶ be preserved for the good, but the worse for the bad. Add to this, let every one, who is by nature and industry the best, be preferred for honours and offices; (but) let the worst be in want of the light⁷ of dignity. Now in assigning and preserving honour that is the just measure on the part of him, who is the aider of the good, and the overthrower of the bad, that those things may ever be pre-eminent in the state, which are about to be of service to all; (but) that vices, together with their authors, may lie low and be trodden down; [8.] which result will be the more

¹ As a remedy and medicine would not be required for a healthy state of society, it is evident that the author wrote "*hominum societatis discordiæ remedium*," i. e. "a remedy for discord in human society."

² I have translated, as if the text were, not "*æqualitas*," but "*æqualitatis*," dependent on "*observantia*—"

³ I have translated, as if "*ad*" had dropt out before "*symbolum*;" for otherwise one can discover neither syntax nor sense in "*eorum, quæ pacta sunt, symbolum*."

⁴ The text is at present "*communicatio*—" But if that word had been meant to apply to justice, it would have been "*communicatrix*," to answer to "*custos*." Hence I have translated, as if the author wrote "*communicationis*," dependent on "*custos*—"

⁵ So the Delphin editor understands "*finalis*—"

⁶ By the conjecture of Oudendorp, "*optio potior*," I have been led to "*portio potior*—" what I have translated. Others perhaps would elicit "*opima portio*," from "*optimis potior*" in MSS. But "*optimis*" here is evidently a corrupt var. lect. for "*bonus*" in the next sentence; where the antithetical "*pessimi*" points to "*optimus quisque*" in lieu of "*bonus quisque*—" So too Hildebrand suggests "*optima portio*," or "*optima optio*—"

⁷ Instead of "*luce*" one would prefer "*loco*—"

easily obtained, if we are supplied with two examples, one, of a person divine, tranquil, and happy; another, of a person irreligious, inhuman, and deservedly detestable,¹ so that he, who is a stranger to, and averse from, a correct manner of living, would wish his faculties to be more like to those of the worst man, (but)² the good person (his)³ to those of the divine and heavenly man.

Hence there are with him two portions of the Oratorical art; one of which is the discipline, that contemplates what is good, (and is) tenacious of what is just, (and) fitted to, and agreeing with, the sect of that (philosopher), who wishes to appear a statesman; but the other is the science of flattering,⁴ the catcher at what is like the truth, (and) an experience brought together without any reason—for so we express *ἄλογον τριβὴν*⁵ (irrational exercise)—which wishes that to be received by persuasion, which it is unable to teach. Now this Plato has defined as *δύναμιν τοῦ πείθειν ἄνευ τοῦ διδάσκειν*⁶ (a power to persuade without teaching); (and) to which he has given the name of ⁷the shadow, that is, the image,⁷ of a portion of the Statesman's art. But Statesmanship, which he calls *πολιτικὴν*, he wished to be so understood by us, that we should consider it in the number of virtues; and that not only the person, who is acting and ⁸(occupied) in the very administration of affairs, should be viewed by it, (but)⁸ that things universally should be discerned by it; and that not only forethought is profitable to state affairs, but that all the Statesman's feelings and design should be to render the situation of the state fortunate and happy.

¹ I have translated, as if the text were "detestabilis," not "intestabilis—" which means literally "unable to be a witness—" an idea ill-suited to the train of thought.

^{2, 3} I have translated, as if "sed" had dropt out between "suas" and "divino," and "suas" between "bonus" and "similior—"

⁴ See Gorg. p. 466, A. ⁵ In Gorg. p. 501, A.

⁶ This is the splendid restoration of some unknown scholar, who referred to Gorg. p. 455, A., *ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀρα—πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστι πειστυτικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς.*

⁷ Apuleius has thus expressed by two words, what Plato has by one—*εἰδωλον*, in Gorg. p. 463, D.

⁸ I have translated, as if "versatum," to which "verum" for "rerum," in some MSS. leads, had dropt out after "rerum" and "verum" before "universa—" and as if "atque," omitted in some MSS., were a corruption of "æque—"

[9.] Now this same (Statesman's) art has a care for the usefulness of the soul by two methods. One¹ relates to law-giving,² the other¹ to law-courts.² The former is similar to the exercise, by which is acquired the beauty and strength of the soul, just as by exercise the health and beauty of the body is preserved: but that relating to law-courts is on a par with medicine; for it cures the diseases of the soul, as medicine does those of the body. These he calls disciplines, and professes that an attention to them brings a very great advantage; while their imitators are the arts of cookery and perfumery; but that the sophist's art, and the bland profession of the law, and the allurements of flattery, are disgraceful to those, who profess them, useless to all; of which arts he unites that of the sophist to that of the cook. For as the art of the cook sometimes catches the (good) opinion of the imprudent by its professing medical science, as if the things, which it is doing, are suited to the cure of disorders; so the art of the sophist, by imitating the manner of law-courts, furnishes to fools a (good) opinion, as if that art were attending to justice, which it is clear is favouring iniquity; whereas the professors³ of law imitate the art of the perfumer; for while this wishes to be the remedy, through which beauty and health are preserved in bodies, it not only diminishes the usefulness of the body, but breaks down its strength and powers, and changes the true colour of the blood to slothfulness;⁴ so that, by imitating the

¹ How the feminine "altera" can be thus introduced with reference to the masculine "duobus modis," I confess I cannot understand. Perhaps Apuleius wrote "duabus methodis—" in allusion to the words of Plato, *Δύοις ὄντοις τοῖν πραγμάτων δύο λόγοι τέχνας*, in Gorg. p. 464, B. § 44.

² So I have translated "legalis" and "judicialis," remembering the expression just afterwards in Gorg., *τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἱατρικῇ τὴν δικαστικὴν*. See too the learned on Phædr. p. 261, D. § 97, and on Quintilian, ii. 21.

³ Oudendorp, objecting to this introduction of persons, where arts had been mentioned previously, and finding that MSS. offer "professiones," proposes to read "professio noxia" or "nociva juris imitatur;" while Boscha suggests "professio inanis—" But the whole train of thought would require the rejection of an epithet here, even if it were found in every MS.

⁴ Oudendorp attempts to explain "desidiā" by "torporem sanguinis, quo palleat homo—" but in my opinion very unsuccessfully. For "desidia" never has nor could have such a meaning. Opportunely then

science of law, pretends indeed to be able to increase virtue in souls, whereas it weakens whatever there is in them of natural industry.

He thinks (moreover) that those virtues can be taught and studied, which appertain to a rational soul, that is to say, Wisdom and Prudence; and that those, which in the place of a remedy offer a resistance to the portions (of the soul),¹ that are corrupt, namely, Fortitude and Continencc, are rational. Now the Virtues before mentioned are held to be in the place of discipline; the rest, if they are perfect, he calls virtues; (but) if only half-perfect,² he conceives they ought not indeed to be called disciplines, nor yet does he consider them to be entirely strangers to discipline. But Justice, in that ³it is scattered amongst three parts of the soul,³ he imagines to be the art of living and a discipline; and that is at one time teachable, and at another proceeds from use and experience.

[10.] Of good things some he asserts are to be sought for the sake of themselves, as for example, happiness, and a pleasure that is good; others, for not their own sake, as medicine; others, for the sake both of themselves and something else, as forethought, and the rest of virtues, which we seek after, both for their own sake, as being in themselves excellent and honourable; and for the sake of something else, that is to say, of happiness, which is the fruit of virtue the most to be wished for.⁴ On this ground some bad things are to be avoided for the sake of themselves; others, for the sake of other things; (but) the majority, (for the sake) of themselves and of other things, as for example, folly, and vices of that kind, which are to be avoided both for the sake of themselves, and (for the sake) of those things, namely, misery and unhappiness, which may arise from them.

Of those things, which are to be sought after, some we say are absolutely good, those, (to wit,) which, when they are present always and to all, bring with them advantages, as for example, the virtues, of which happiness is the fruit: others does one MS. offer "desideriam;" where probably lies hid "desidia luridum—" or something like it.

¹ The Delphin editor supplies correctly "animæ—"

² These have been called in ii. § 6, imperfect, and are such as proceed from the gift of Nature.

³ See ii. § 7.

⁴ On the three kinds of good things see Rep. ii. p. 357, § 1.

are a good to some persons, and not to all nor always, as for instance, strength, health, wealth, and whatever relate to the body and (depend on) fortune. In like manner, of those things too, which are to be declined, some appear always and to all to be evils, when they are a hurt or an obstacle, as for instance, vices and misfortunes; some are a hurt, and that too not always, to some,¹ as for instance, sickness, want, and ²other things of a similar kind.³

[11.] But that virtue is at liberty, and placed in ourselves, and is to be sought for with willingness; but that sins, although not less at liberty, and placed in ourselves, are not to be entered upon with willingness. For the beholder of virtue, when he shall have understood that it is thoroughly good and excels in kindness, ³will make for himself a road to it,³ and will think it ought to be pursued for its own sake; in like manner how can he, who shall have perceived that vices not only bring disgrace upon reputation, but do a hurt in another manner, and are guilty of a fraud, be able to unite himself of his own accord to their fellowship? But if he proceeds to evil things of that kind, and believes that the use of them is advantageous to himself, through his being deceived by an error, and tempted by some⁴ image of good, he is, ⁵while ignorant of the truth,⁵ thrown headlong into ills. For you would vary from common opinion, when you are indeed not ignorant, what difference there is between poverty and wealth, and, when these matters are placed easy to know, (namely,) that neither poverty brings honour, nor wealth baseness, you should prefer the want of things necessary for living to the abundance of means; (and)⁶ you would seem to

¹ From the Delphin editor's interpretation, "*aliqua quibusdam*—" which is the sense required by the train of ideas, it would seem that he wished to read "*quædam nonnullis*" instead of "*quædam aliis*—" for thus "*nonnullis*" would be properly opposed to "*omnibus*."

² As some MSS. read "*cætera*," and others "*similia*," I have united the two.

³ I have adopted the reading suggested by Oudendorp, "*ad eam affectabit viam*."

⁴ I have translated, as if the text were "*imagine—quædam*—" not "*imagine—quidem*—"

⁵ Floridus was the first to object to "*sciens vero*—" but he did not see that Apuleius wrote "*nesciens veri*—"

⁶ I have inserted the copulative conjunction required to unite "*discrepes*" and "*videaris*—"

be silly, and ¹to pursue a conduct still more absurd than does the person,¹ who despises the health of the body by choosing in preference disease.

[12.] But that is an act of extreme madness, when he, who shall have beheld with the eyes of the soul the beauty of virtue, and shall have discovered by use and reason its utility, shall still, while not ignorant how much of disgrace and disadvantage he shall obtain from a participation in vices, be willing to give himself up to them. (He says too) that the health of the body, (and) strength, and freedom from pain, and other things of that kind, are extraneous, and that wealth likewise, and the rest of things, which we consider the advantages of fortune, are not to be called simply good. For if any one, who possesses them, withdraws himself from their use, they will be useless to him; and if any converts their use to wicked purposes, they will be seen to be even hurtful to him. But if any one abuses them, he will be exposed to vices; ²while he, who possesses them, is unable to hold them, when he is dead.³ From hence it is inferred that these ought not to be called simply good things; nor ought those, which ⁴sow diseases or poverty,⁵ and other things, to be considered evils. For he, whose property is small, and who is moderate in his expenses, will perceive no mischief (coming) from it; while he, who makes a right use of his poverty, will not only find no disadvantage, but, on the contrary, will become superior in enduring ⁶the rest of evils with a better

¹ I have translated, as if the text were, "et adhuc illo id absurdius sequi," where "sequi" is found in all the MSS.

² Since all the words between the numerals are omitted in nearly all the MSS., they have been thought by the generality of editors to be an interpolation, formed out of an explanatory gloss. Hildebrand however has given from his own conjecture, "haberi hæc etiam oberit—" i. e. "it will be a hurt to him for them to be possessed."

³ I have translated, as if the text were "quæ serunt morbos aut pauperiem—" not "quæ sunt morboæ, ut pauperiem—" Hildebrand gives up the passage in despair, except that he would read "contraria" for "ea—"

⁴ Since Oudendorp and Hildebrand confess that they cannot see their way out of the difficulties of the reading found in MSS., "cetera melioratum præstantior—" I have translated, as if the author had written "cetera mala meliore ratione præstantior—" for thus "mala," which is absolutely requisite here, might easily have dropped out before "meliore," and "meliore ratione" be corrupted into "melioratum."

method.⁴ If then 'it is not contrary either to have poverty or to rule over it by reason,' poverty is not by itself an evil.

Pleasure, moreover, (he says,) is neither absolutely a good, nor simply an evil; nor is that to be fled from, which is honourable, and proceeds not from things to be ashamed of, but from glorious doings; but that, which Nature herself spurns, and is sought after with disgraceful delight, he considers ought to be avoided.

Anxiety and labour, if they are natural, and descend from virtue itself, and are undertaken² for the performance of some remarkable act, he considered to be an object of desire; but that they are bad³ and detestable, if they are produced contrary to Nature for the sake of things the most base.

Not only does he know⁴ that vices fall on the soul by an act of the will, and ⁵come to bodies,⁵ but that there is a certain middle state, such as, when sadness is absent, nor yet do we perceive that gladness is present.

[13.] Of the things, which are in ourselves, the first good and worthy of all praise is, to the person seeking a good, virtue. On that account⁶ it ought to be called honourable; since we say that, what is honourable, is alone good, and what is base, bad; and deservedly so; (for) what is base cannot be good.

Friendship he says is a fellowship,⁷ and consists in a fellow-feeling, and is reciprocal, and brings the alternation of de-

¹ I must leave for others to understand "contrarium" here. The Delphin editor explains it by "repugnat—" But we are not informed to what it is repugnant. I could have understood "neque habere pauperiem neque eam regere rationi contrarium est,"—"it is not contrary to reason to have poverty or to rule over it."

² How the feminine "susceptæ" and (?) "malas" can thus be applied to "sollicitudinem et laborem" I cannot understand. Hence I suspect Apuleius wrote "sollicitudines laborum—"

³ From "sed" found in two MSS. after "vitia" Oudendorp would elicit "ait" or "scilicet—" I have translated, as if the author had written "scit—"

⁴ The text is "venire corporibus," where the dative follows "venire" very strangely. Hence from "convenire" in ed. pr. one might elicit "convivere," i. e. "live together with," answering to συζῆν in Politic. p. 302, B.

⁵ I have translated the old reading "ideo," not "adeo—" which Oudendorp has adopted from two MSS., observing that the words are synonymous.

⁷ In lieu of "sociam" the sense evidently requires, as I have translated, "societatem—"

light, when ¹(two persons) love equally in turn.¹ This result takes place for the benefit of friendship, when a friend is desirous that he, whom he loves, should enjoy a prosperous state equally with himself. Now that equality does not take place otherwise, than when a similarity in equal affection meets in both. For as ²like are united to like by an indissoluble connexion,³ so those, who are at variance, are disunited amongst themselves, nor are they the friends of others. Now the corruptions of enmity are produced from malevolence through a dissimilarity in manners and a difference in life, and sects, and opposite dispositions. There are likewise, he says, other kinds of friendship; one part of which is produced for the sake of pleasure, and another for that of a close relationship. Now the love of a close relationship and of children is agreeable to Nature; but that other feeling, which, abhorrent to the kindness of humanity, is called love, is a burning desire, by the lighting up of which the lovers of the body, being caught through their lustfulness, imagine a person to exist wholly in that, which ³they see (and wish for).³ Such ⁴unhappy feelings in the case of the soul⁴ Plato forbids to be called by the name of friendship; because they are not mutual, nor can be reciprocated,⁵ so that what is loved,⁵ may be loved in return; nor is there a constancy in them; and a length of time is wanting to them; and loves of that kind are put an end to by satiety⁶ and repentance.

¹ I have translated, as if the text were "quando duo æqualiter redamant—" not "quando—redamat—" where "redamat" has nothing to which it can be referred.

² Compare Homer in Od. xvii. 218, and Plato in Lyrid. p. 214, B., τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη εἶναι φίλον εἶναι.

³ The sense evidently requires, as I have translated, "et voluerint," after "viderint—" For it is not enough for a lover to see the loved object; he cannot fail to wish for it. With this union of "viderint" and "voluerint" may be compared the antithesis in ὁρῶν and ἐρῶν in Legg. viii. p. 837, C., ὁρῶν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶν τῇ ψυχῇ.

⁴ So I have rendered "calamitates animarum—"

⁵ I cannot understand "ut ament, quæ redamantur," I have therefore translated, as if the text were "ut, quæ amantur, redamantur." The Delphin editor likewise saw that the train of thought required "ut quæ amantur—" although he has improperly added "redament."

⁶ Oudendorp prefers "sanitate," furnished by many MSS., in lieu of "societate" in some, and "satiæte" in others; and refers to Ovid. Amor. i. 10, "Cum bene pertæsum est, animique resanuit error—" But "satiæte" answers to "pertæsum," and "pœnitentia" to "resanuit."

[14.] Of Loves of this kind Plato numbers three; because there is one, divine, agreeing with a mind uncorrupted and the method of virtue, (and) not to be repented of; another, pertaining to a degenerate mind, and to pleasure the most corrupt; the third, mixed up with both, belonging to a mediocre disposition and of moderate desires; but souls of a darker hue (he says) are impelled by a longing for the body, and that their only aim is to enjoy the use of it and to soften down their heart, by a pleasure and gratification of that kind. ¹But these are the acts of an elegant and well-educated mind,¹ to love passionately the souls of the good, and to make them a study, and to wish it done, that they should indulge as much as possible in good pursuits and be rendered better and superior. The mean between the two (he says) is formed of both; so that they are not entirely void of bodily gratifications, and yet are able to be caught by an elegant disposition of soul. As then that Love is inferred to be the most filthy and the least human and base, not from the nature of things, but from a bodily sickness and disease, so it may be believed that the divine (Love) comes into the minds of men, when it is granted by the gift and kindness of the gods, and by the breath of a celestial Cupid. There is too a third kind of Love, which we have mentioned as a mean. It is brought together by the proximity of what is divine and earthly; and since it is united ²by the connexion of a joint state amongst like persons,² it is, as ³being near to reason, the divine one; but ⁴the earthly, as being united ⁵to baseness and the longing after pleasure.⁵

[15.] ⁶Of persons worthy of blame there are four kinds;

¹— The text at present is "*Illæ vero facietæ et urbanæ sunt.*" But as there is nothing to which "*illæ*" can be referred, and, if there were, one could not understand how souls can be called "*facietæ et urbanæ.*" I have translated, as if Apuleius had written "*Illa vero facietæ et urbanæ mentis sunt.*" where "*facietæ*" and "*urbanæ*" would be expressed in Greek by *κοιφῆς* and *δωριον*.

²— I have translated, as if the text were "*nexu utique consortii parilium.*" not "*nexuque et consortio parili.*" which I confess I cannot understand; for the mention of persons, who are like, can scarcely be dispensed with.

³ I have adopted "*ut.*" found in ed. Vulc.

⁴ In lieu of "*et.*" the balance of the sentence requires "*at.*"

⁵ Since some MSS. read "*turpitudini*" for "*cupidini.*" Apuleius probably united both, as I have translated.

⁶— A similar idea, but expressed in more correct language, is found towards the end of this book, in p. 379.

of which the first is of the seekers after honours; the next is ¹of the lovers of substance; ¹ the third, of (the lovers) of popular rule; and the last of tyrannical (power).⁶ On which account² that first vice³ comes upon the mind, when the vigour of reason has become languid, and that portion of the soul, in which anger has the dominion, becomes the superior and stronger. Now that, which is called 'Ὀλιγαρχία,⁴ (Oligarchy,) is produced in this way; when on account of the worst food being given to that part of the soul, which consists of desires, not only are the seats of what is reasonable and given to anger occupied, but ⁵of that likewise, which sharpen not necessary desires.⁵ Such a person as this Plato has designated a gain-seeker and ⁶a hawk after money.⁶ ⁷The popular quality exists,⁷ when passions, being let loose⁸ by indulgence, burn not only with just desires, ⁹but with those

¹—¹ For the sake, not only of the antithesis, but the syntax likewise, I have elicited "sequens, substantiæ amatorum" from "sequens abstemiorum—" For thus "substantiæ," applied to money, would be opposed to honours, and "popularis et tyrannicæ dominationis" recover the noun "amatorum," on which those words, at present without regimen, depend.

² I confess I cannot understand "quapropter" here. I suspect something has been lost, requisite to unite the broken chain of thought.

³ Namely, "the love of honours."

⁴ The word in Plato, as remarked by Floridus, is *τιμαρχία*, not *Ὀλιγαρχία*, as applicable to the honour-seekers.

⁵ Such is the literal version of the words "ejus etiam, quæ non necessarias cupidines acunt—" which I must leave for others to understand; for I cannot see how "quæ—acunt" can thus follow "ejus—" Hildebrand has given from his own conjecture, "quæ non necessariam cupidinem ciunt—" from which nothing seems to be gained.

⁶ Since this expression is not found at present in Plato, nor could, I think, be introduced there, it is probable that Apuleius was alluding to some Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, just as he does in "lucricupidinem" to the Pseudo-Platonic Hipparchus.

⁷ The expression "qualitas popularis existit—" is strangely used here, where the nature of popular rule is to be defined. Hence, since the earlier editions offer "qualis" for "qualitas," perhaps the author wrote "Qualis sit vis popularis, ex eo visitur," i. e. "Of what kind is the power of the people, is seen from that," or something similar.

⁸ Colvius was the first to object to "laboratæ," for which he suggested "sabburæ—" while Oudendorp has proposed "irritatæ—" but my "liberatæ" seems nearer the mark.

⁹ The text at present is "sed his etiam quæ obviæ atque occurrentes—" from which, as being perfectly unintelligible, I have elicited "sed his etiam, quæ obvarant ab æquo occurrentes—" where "obvarant" means "to pervert," as shown by Nonius Marcellus, "Obvarare, pervertere, depravare."

likewise, which pervert from right the parties meeting with them,⁹ and oppress with their own conditions both the soul, that is susceptible of good counsel, and the other too, that is given rather to anger. But Tyrannical power is a life of luxury and full of lust; which, welded together out of pleasures endless and various and unlawful, holds a dominion over the entire mind.

[16.] Now the person, who is the worst, (Plato) says is not only base, and pernicious, and a despiser of the gods, and lives a life without moderation, and inhuman, and unsociable, but agrees likewise with neither his neighbours nor himself, ¹[and thus is at variance not only with other persons, but himself likewise,]¹ and is an enemy not to others only, but likewise to himself; and hence such a person is friendly neither to the good, nor to any one at all, and not even to himself; but that he, whom no excess of wickedness can go beyond, appears to be the worst of all.² (He says too) that such a person can never find a way for himself in the conduct of affairs, not merely on account of his ignorance, but because he knows not himself, and because thorough wickedness produces an unsettling in the mind, by impeding that person's designs, when commenced and reflected on, and by not permitting any of those things (to be done)³ which he may wish. Hence against a person the worst and most reprobate not only do those vices, which are according to⁴ Nature, produce a feeling of execration, such as envy is, and a delight in the misfortunes of others, but those likewise, which Nature does not reject, I mean pleasure, and sickness of mind, regret, love, pity, fear, shame, (and) anger. Now this takes place on that account, because an ill-regulated disposition has no moderation in whatever matter to which it rushes forward; and thus there is for it ever something deficient or redundant. Hence too the love of a man of this kind is de-

¹—The words between the brackets are evidently a mere repetition of the sentence preceding. As regards the matter, compare Lysid. p. 214, C. § 25.

² I have translated, as if the text were "omnium," not "eum—"

³ I have translated, as if "feri" had dropt out after "eorum."

⁴ Such is the ordinary meaning of "secundum." But the antithesis requires "contrary to—" a sense that Oudendorp attempts, I conceive, vainly to defend; who once wished to read "quæ secus quam Natura sinit," in lieu of "quæ secundum Naturam sunt."

praved in its whole tenor; because it is not only eager from its unbridled lusts and insatiable thirst to swallow all kinds of pleasure, but because it is distracted in its judgment of beauty by an error without reason, through its being ignorant of true loveliness, and being a passionate admirer of the skin of the body, effete, enervated, and passing away; nor does it set a great value at least¹ upon limbs coloured by the sun,² or rendered firm by exercise, but³ (values rather)³ 'those darkened by shade, or soft by sloth,⁴ and moulded⁵ with too much care.

[17.] That wickedness does not stalk abroad willingly, is plain in many ways. For injuriousness Plato says⁶ is an ill-regulated suffering and sickness of the mind; from whence he holds it clear that men are not carried to it willingly. For who would with his own will take upon himself so much of evil, as to carry knowingly crime and flagitiousness in the best portion of the mind. When therefore the possession of

¹ I confess I do not understand "saltem" here.

² To improve the colour of the skin, and the firmness of the flesh, the ancients were accustomed after washing first and then oiling themselves, to dry their skin in the sun, as shown by Aristophanes in *Εκκλησι.* 63, where a woman says, while imitating the acts of a man, Ἀλεψαμένη γὰρ οὖμ' ἔλυν, δι' ἡμέρας Ἐχλαινόμην ἰστώσα πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον: while effeminate persons were more fond of the shade, as we learn from Plato in *Phædr.* p. 239, C. § 35, Ὁφθήσεται δὲ μαλθακὸν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεὸν διώκων, οὐδ' ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τετραμμένον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ συμμεγεί σκιά, πόνοι μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἰδρώτων ξηρῶν ἀπυρον, ἔμπυρον δὲ ἀπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης.

³ I have inserted the words between the lunes for the sake of perspicuity.

⁴ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of "sed opacos umbra vel molles desidias:" where Oudendorp would explain "opacos" by "pingues—" But as such neither is nor could be the meaning, there is evidently an error here, which may be thus corrected—"sed Epicurei suis, umbraticola molles desidias—" "but those of an Epicurean hog, flabby with sloth, that loves the shade:" where the author had in mind not only the Horatian "Epicuri de grege porcus," but the expression likewise in Plautus, *Trinumm.* ii. 7, 49, "malacum—umbraticolam."

⁵ I have retained "modulatos" with the ed. pr., in lieu of which Wower suggested "medicatos," elicited from "meditatos" in one MS.; while, since all the others offer "medullatos," Oudendorp would read "emedullatos," i. e. "without marrow." But then "cura nimia" would have been omitted; which could not be; for Apuleius had in mind the words of Horace,

"operata juvenus
In cute curanda nimio plus."

⁶ The whole of this doctrine is detailed at length in the *Gorgias*.

evil is taken by the unthinking, it is meet that its use and doings should be supported by the ignorant; and on that account it is a worse¹ thing to hurt than to be hurt; because the hurt is in those things, which are of less value, namely, in those of the body, and external, which can be either diminished or perish by fraud;² while the preferable are unhurt, that relate to the soul itself; while to hurt is a far worse act. From whence it can be understood that by this error a mischief is brought upon good souls; and that he hurts himself more, who desires the destruction of another, than he hurts him, against whom he plots things of such a kind.

Since then to hurt another is of all evils the greatest,³ it is still much more grievous for him, who does a hurt, to depart with impunity;⁴ and it is more grievous and bitter than every punishment, if impunity is granted to a noxious person, and he does not suffer in the mean time a punishment from men; just as it is more grievous for (a troop)⁴ of most acute disorders to be in want of medicine, (and) to deceive medical men, and for those parts to be neither burnt nor cut off, by the pain of which the safety of the rest of the parts can be provided for.

[18.] Hence as the best physicians do not apply healing hands to bodies⁵ despaired of and cried over (as lost),³ in order that the attendance, which would do no good, may not prolong⁶ the period of pain; so it is better for those to die, whose souls are stained by vices, and cannot be cured by the medicine of wisdom. For⁷ Plato thinks that the man ought to be driven

¹ As the MSS. vary between "pejus" and "prius," Hildebrand would read "pravius—"

² Scioppius would read "funditus" in lieu of "fraudibus—" I should prefer "imminui possunt fraudibus vel vi interire—"

³ See Gorg. p. 509, B. § 138.

⁴ I have translated, as if "cohorem" had dropt out before "carere—" remembering the expression in Horace, "morborum—cohors—"

⁵ The text is "conclamatis desperatisque—" I have in the translation avoided the *ὑπερπον πρότερον*.

⁶ In lieu of "promulget" two MSS. read "promulcet." Both words are equally unintelligible. Hence Wasse on Sallust, B. J. 29, suggested "promicet—" referring to Nonius, "Promicare, extendere et porro jacere;—Nevius, Siquidem loqui vis non perdocere, multa longe promicanda oratio est—" But there "promicare" means to "flash before," as a person is wont to do a drawn sword. I have therefore translated, as if the text were "prolonget—"

⁷ Oudendorp's text is "vita existimat Plato esse pellendum." But most of the MSS. read "vita existimate populo—" ; one, "Plato noster"

from life,⁷ by whom the study of living properly cannot be obtained from Nature or his own exertions; or, if the love of life holds him fast, that he ought to be delivered over to the wise, by whose art at some time¹ he may be turned to better things. And truly it is better for such a person to be ruled over, and not to have the power of ruling over others, and to be not a lord, but a slave himself, as being impotent² over his own vices,³ and to be assigned to the power of others, after obtaining as his lot the office of obeying rather than of commanding. He said, likewise, that the worse man is the greater reprobate⁴ not on the sole ground,⁵ that he is ever distracted by a choice⁶ of vices, and torn in pieces by the wave swell of desires; but because⁶ the more he is desirous of more things, the more he seems to himself to be in want, and on that account to others likewise. For the things, that are hoped and wished for, arrive scarcely a few in number, and by the greatest trouble; and to these succeeds the still more burning madness⁶ of desires; nor by future evils only he is pained, but tortured likewise by the past⁷ and those in transit.⁷ All of which persons it is manifest can be drawn from evils of that kind by death alone.

[19.] But the pre-eminently good, and the immoderately bad, are very few and rather scarce, and, as he says,⁸ may be counted;

instead of "populo—" Perhaps Apuleius wrote "vita existimat Plato noster populove pellendum."

¹ I have translated, as if the word were "quondam," not "quadam—" which is scarcely intelligible.

²⁻³ As one MS. reads "servitio uni," and another "servorum," it is easy to elicit from both "suorum vitiorum—" where "vitiiorum" is due to Colvins; while to Modius is due "aliorumque," in lieu of "aliorum—"

²⁻³ I have translated, as if the text were "non ob solum id—" where "id" might easily have been lost before "deteriorem—"

⁴ In "editione" evidently lies hid "electione—" what I have translated.

⁵ The text is "qui—" I have translated, as if it were "sed quia—" for "sed" or "rerum" could not be omitted after "non solum—" Hildebrand would read "sed desiderium—" in lieu of "et desiderium—" in two MSS.

⁶ I have, with Oudendorp, adopted "furores," the conjecture of Florinus, in lieu of "fluores" in MSS. Hildebrand suggests "fervores—"

⁷ To avoid the tautology in "præteritis transactisque," I have translated, as if the text were "præteritis et in transitu," without "que," omitted in ed. Flor.

⁸ Apuleius had perhaps in mind Phædon, p. 99, A. § 89, ἡγήσατο τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

but the majority are those, who are neither clearly the best nor really the worst, but with, as it were, a medium in morals. And yet neither do the more excellent of them lay hold of all right things, nor do those, who are to be blamed, stumble in all. Of these the vices are not heavy nor out of season, nor with too much of crime, whose basis¹ is in a redundancy or deficiency; to whom there is of approbation both an entirety and measure; and who, while² they are taking a middle road between praise and blame, are constantly excited by the desire of undertaking matters of that kind, ³that at one time persons good and honourable invite them by reason; at another, dishonourable gains and base pleasures attract them.³ With such men fidelity in friendship does not endure; and loves not always incorrect, nor yet honourable, come into their minds.

[20.] A man therefore, Plato says, cannot be perfectly wise, unless he excels the rest (of men) in disposition, and is complete in the arts, and in the parts of prudence, and has been imbued with them even from boyhood, and accustomed to deeds and words in accordance, ⁴while his soul has been cleansed and strained from the lees of pleasure,⁴ ⁵and abstinence and patience⁵ have been chosen with his (whole) soul, and learning and eloquence have proceeded from the knowledge of things. He, however, who has gone through these matters, and walked with a confident and secure step in the road of virtue, and has acquired a solid method of living, becomes on a sudden perfect, that is, he reaches on a sudden the extreme portions of time, past and future, and is in a

¹ Such is perhaps the best version of "substantia—"

² I have translated, as if "quum" had dropt out after "qui—" Hildebrand would read "qui, quia—"

³ Such is the literal version of the text. But one would have expected rather to find the sentences more accurately balanced to this effect—"that at one time things good and honourable invite them to what is rational; at another, dishonourable gains attract them to disreputable pleasures:" in Latin, "ut nunc bona atque honesta eos ad rationalia invitent; nunc inhonesta lucra ad turpes alliciant voluptates."

⁴ So I have translated, as if the text were "purgata et effacata anima e voluptate—" not "purgata et effacata animi voluptate—" for as in the pleasures of the mind there are no lees, the lees cannot be said to be strained off.

⁵ Here is evidently an allusion to the doctrine of Pythagoras—*ἀνίχου καὶ ἀνίχου*.

certain manner intemporal.¹ After this, when vices are shut out and all things implanted and introduced, which conduce to a happy life, the wise man thinks correctly that he² does not depend upon others, nor can (any thing)³ be brought upon himself from others, but that (all things)⁴ are in his own hand. On which account he is neither elated in prosperity nor does he become contracted by adversity, when he knows that he is so furnished with adornments,⁵ that he can be separated from them by no violence. Such a person it behoves not only to inflict no injury, but even not to return it. For he does not consider that to be an act of contumely, which a wicked man commits; but he considers that (to be so), which patience cannot⁶ firmly endure. By which law of Nature⁷ let it be engraven on his mind, that not one of those things, which the rest of mankind conceive to be evils, can do a hurt to a wise man. Indeed,⁸ (Plato) asserts⁹ that the wise man, relying on his conscience, will be secure and confident in the whole of life, both because he considers, by drawing himself¹⁰ to better

¹ Others may, but I will never, believe that Apuleius wrote "intemporal—" which Oudendorp explains indeed "freed from time;" but since the ed. pr. has "in tempora lætum," it is evident that we must read "in tempora aëria elatum—" where "tempora aëria" may be compared with "O magna templa cœlitum Commixta stellis splendidis," quoted by Varro de Ling. Lat. vi. For thus such a person, carried up to the temples of the air, would be equal to the gods; as shown by Horace, "Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules Innisus arces attingit igneas."

^{2, 3, 4} I have translated, as if "se" had dropt out after "alii," and "quid" before "deferri," and "omnia" between "sua" and "manu." Compare Plato, Menexen. p. 247, E. § 20, ὅτι γὰρ ἀνδρὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνηρηται πάντα τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φέροντα—καὶ μὴ ἐν ἄλλοις αἰσπεῖται—translated by Cicero in Tuscul. v. 12, and imitated in Paradox. 2, "nemo potest esse non beatissimus, qui est totus aptus ex sese, quique in se uno ponit omnia:" and in Epistol. ad Famil. v. 13, "Laudem sapientie statuo esse maximam, non aliunde pendere, nec extrinsecus bene aut male vivendi suspensas habere rationes."

⁵ In lieu of "ornamentis" one would have expected "armamentis—"

⁶ I have adopted the reading of Oudendorp, who places "non," found before "putat," after "patientia—"

⁷ This mention of the law of Nature seems very strange, where one would have expected rather "of instruction," in Latin "doctrina—"

⁸ In lieu of "equidem," which can hardly be united to "dicit—" one would prefer "Et quidem—"

⁹ I have adopted "dicit" found in one MS. in lieu of "dici et—" unless it be said that in "vita dici et" he hid "vita die dicit—"

¹⁰ I have translated, as if "se" had dropt out after "rationes—"

reasons, that all things are accidents, and because he receives nothing with moroseness or difficulty, and persuades himself that his affairs belong to the immortal gods. The same person ¹ beholds the day of his death creeping on, neither unwillingly nor without hope,¹ because he trusts in the immortality of the soul. For the soul of the wise man, when liberated from the bonds of the body, migrates back to the gods, and for the merits of a life passed rather purely and chastely, he does by this very endeavour² ³ conciliate himself to the condition of the gods.³

[21.] To the same wise man he gives the name ⁴ of the best; and he rightly considers him both good⁴ and prudent, whose sound⁵ plans agree with acts the most correct, and whose principles proceed from a reason for what is just. This wise man he further says is the most brave; since by the vigour of his mind he is prepared to endure all things. Hence it is⁶ he says that fortitude is the nerve and very neck⁶ of the soul,⁷ just as cowardice he says borders upon weakness. Him too he correctly considers⁸ the only wealthy man; since he

¹ I have translated, as if the text were "*diem mortis sue prorepentis, nec invitus exspesve spectat*—" not "*d. m. s. propitius nec invitus expectat*—" where Oudendorp vainly endeavours to defend "*propitius*," not remembering the expression "*obrepit non intellecta senectus*," in Juvenal ix. 129, and not perceiving that the allusion to a hope could hardly be dispensed with. Or we may read "*mortis sue prope euntis*."

² I have translated, as if the text were "*nisu*," not "*usu*," which Oudendorp endeavours to explain by referring it to the use of a well-spent life. But "*nisu*" suits better with "*hac arte—inissus*" in Horace.

³ Such is the literal version of "*deorum se conditioni conciliat*—" words quite unintelligible, unless we suppose there is a change of cases for "*deorum sibi conditionem conciliat*." But, unless I am greatly mistaken, Apuleius wrote "*deorum se conditioni ac concilio levat*—" "*lifts himself up to the condition and the council of the gods*."

⁴ To find "*bonum*" thus following "*optimum*" seems rather strange. Perhaps the author wrote "*Plato τῖμον*—"

⁵ The balance of the sentence plainly requires "*sana*" instead of "*sane*—"

⁶ I do not remember where Plato says so of fortitude; although he has in Rep. iii. p. 411, B., ὡς ἀν' ἐκρίψυ (τὸν θυμὸν), ὥσπερ νῆρα, ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς.

⁷ I have adopted Oudendorp's "*animæ*" in lieu of "*animi*—" who aptly refers to "*fortitudinis sedem esse et vires animæ*," in ii. § 6.

⁸ In Phædr. p. 279, C. § 147, where Ast refers to Cicero, Paradox. 6, "That the wise man alone is rich."

alone appears to possess the riches of virtue, which are more precious than all treasures. Moreover the wise man ought to appear the most wealthy indeed, since he alone is able to rule over (wealth)¹ for necessary uses. For the rest of men, although they are flowing over with riches, seem nevertheless to be poor; because they either know not their use, or apply them to the worst purposes. For it is not the absence of money, that gives birth to want, but the presence of immoderate desires. It behoves (then)² the philosopher, if he will be in want of nothing, and the despiser of, and superior to, all those things, which men consider bitter to be borne, to do nothing otherwise,³ than to endeavour constantly to separate the soul from its fellowship with the body. And hence Philosophy is to be deemed a desire for death and a habit of dying.

[22.] It is meet for all good men to be friends amongst themselves, even if they are little known (to each other); and they are to be considered friends by that power, through which their manners and tenets agree; since like is not abhorrent from like. From hence it is clear that the fidelity of friendship can exist amongst the good alone. (Now) wisdom makes that young man a sedulous⁴ lover of good, who by the goodness of his disposition is rather ready (to learn) good arts. Nor will a deformity of body be able to drive away such a desire. For when the soul itself is pleasing, the whole man is loved; but when the body is desired, a man's⁵ worse part becomes agreeable to the heart. Justly then it is to be deemed that he, who is acquainted with good persons, will be desirous⁶ likewise of things of that kind. For he alone burns with good desires, who sees what is good with the eyes

¹ I have translated, as if "eas" had dropt out after "necessariis—"

² I have translated, as if "ergo" had been lost before "oportet—"

³ In "sic," which is quite unintelligible, evidently lies hid "secius," as I have translated.

⁴ I have translated, as if the text were "sedulum," not "sed eum—" where Oudendorp has suggested "scilicet eum—" although he says that "sed" may be defended; but how that can be, I cannot understand.

⁵ I have adopted "hominis," found in one MS., in lieu of "ejus."

⁶ I have adopted "cupitum," furnished by some MSS., in lieu of "cupidum—" for the train of thought evidently requires the mention of a future time.

of the mind. ¹[This is to be wise.]¹ ²But because he who is ignorant of that,² must needs be a hater also, and not a friend to virtue. Nor vainly is such a person a lover of disgraceful pleasures. (But) the wise man will not come, in the manner of a wild beast,³ to do something⁴ for the sake of some pleasure, unless there shall be at hand the honourable emoluments of virtue. The same person it behoves to live a life in this kind of pleasure, honourable, and admirable, and full of praise and glory; and to be preferred to all the rest of men, not only for the sake of these things, but to enjoy likewise alone and always its pleasantness and security. ⁵Nor will he be pained, when deprived of the dearest objects of affection, either because all things, which tend to happiness, depend on himself,⁵ or because the infliction of such pain is forbidden by the decree and law of right reason; or⁶ because, if he tortures himself on such a ground, or takes upon himself that sickness of mind for the sake of him, who is dead,⁷ as if the person were in a worse part,⁷ for his own sake, because he grieves that he has been deprived of such an acquaintance.

¹—The words between the brackets Wower acutely saw were superfluous. But as it is not easy to discover how they came here, they probably conceal some error.

²—Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the words "*istud vero quoniam qui est ignarus*—" where Oudendorp would read "*istius vero boni ignarus*—" But he does not tell us from whence "*quoniam*" came, nor how it could be corrupted from "*boni*." Apuleius wrote, I suspect, "*At studium veri quo animam agat—hoc enim est sapientiæ nosse—qui est ignarus, osor quoque ejus*—" i. e. But he who knows not whither the study of truth leads the soul—for to know this is the part of wisdom—must needs be a hater of it (the study)—

³ I have translated, as if the text were, not "*meræ*," but "*feræ*—" By a similar metaphor a flatterer is called "*a terrible wild beast*," in *Phædr.* p. 240, B. § 37.

⁴ Instead of "*voluptatis quidem alicujus gratia*," the sense and syntax evidently require "*voluptatis alicujus gratia quiddam*—" for thus "*agen-*" recovers, what it had lost, its object.

⁵ Compare Plato in *Menexen.* § 20.

⁶ The train of thought evidently requires "*aut*," not "*et*—"

⁷ Such is the literal version of "*quasi sit in pejore parte*—" But "*parte*" has no meaning here by itself. Besides, the apodosis of the sentence is clearly wanting; which may be supplied by reading "*quasi in pejore statu sit, partes aget fatui, aut*—" i. e. "*as if the deceased were in a worse position, he will act the part of a simpleton*;" for "*statu*" might easily have been lost before "*sit*," and "*partes aget fatui aut*" be corrupted into "*parte aut*—" ↗

But neither for the sake of the dead ought lamentations to be indulged in, since we know that the party has suffered no evil; and, if he had been with good feelings, that he is added to the number of the better; nor for the sake of himself; inasmuch as he places every thing upon himself, nor by the absence of anything can he be in want of virtue, of which he claims for himself the perpetual possession. The wise man, therefore, will not be sad.

[23.] The aim (then) of wisdom is that the wise man may by his merits¹ be carried up to god;² and this is about to be all his study, says (Plato),³ that he may by the emulation of his life approach to the doings of the gods. Now this will be able to happen to him, if he shows himself a man perfectly just, pious, (and) prudent. From whence, not only in the knowledge of looking forward, but in the labour of acting, it is fitting for him to follow those things, which are approved of by gods and men; since the highest of the gods not only thinks upon all this Universe through the reasoning of his reflections, but undertakes the first, the middle, and the last, and regulates what has been discovered thoroughly, by the universality and constancy of a provident arrangement.

Moreover, (he says) that the person⁴ appears to be happy to all, to whom good is supplied, and who knows in what manner he ought to be free from vices. Now one kind of happiness is, when we protect by the presence of our talents, what we are doing; another, when nothing is wanting to the perfection of life, and we are content with the mere contemplation of it. Now of each kind of happiness the source flows from virtue. But for the adornment⁵ of the genial place,⁵ or

^{1, 2} I have adopted "meritis," found in ed. pr., and changed "dei" into "deum" from conjecture, remembering the expression "everhat ad deos" in Horace. Hildebrand suggests "ad dei imaginem" in lieu of "ad dei meritum—"

³— I have translated, as if the text were "hancque omnem futuram ejus operam, ut—" not "hanc namque futuram ejus operam, ut—" where, since "namque" is found in a place not its own, it is probably a corruption of "que omnem;" at least "que" follows "hanc" in one MS. and ed. pr.; while "ait" might easily have been lost before "aut."

⁴ As I cannot discover to what thing "illud" can be referred, and, if I could, how such a thing could be said to know, I have translated, as if the text were "illum" to be referred to a person.

⁵— As no scholar has yet been able to explain or correct satisfactorily "genialis loci," I must leave the passage, as I find it, inexplicable; unless

virtue, we need none of these aids from without, which we deem to be good. But for the uses of ordinary life there is a need of the care of the body, and of the protection of these things, which come from without; yet however in suchwise, that they may become better by virtue, and by its assistance be united to the advantages of happiness, without which they are least of all to be held in the place of good things. Nor is it in vain, that virtue alone can make persons most happy; since without it happiness cannot be found from other prosperous affairs. Since we say that the wise man is a foot-follower and imitator of god, and we fancy that he does follow the deity. For this does the saying¹ mean, "Ἐπὶ θεῷ," "Follow god." Now not only does it behove him, while he inhabits (this) life, to speak words worthy of the gods,² and not to do those acts, which are displeasing to their majesty; but at that time likewise, when he is leaving the body, which he will not do, against the will of god.³ For though the power over death is in his hand, (and) though he knows that, by leaving the things of earth, he shall obtain what are better, still he ought not to bring death upon himself, unless the divine law shall decree that he must of necessity suffer it; and, if the adornments of his previously-passed life do him honour, still it behoves him to be more honourable, ⁴and the lover⁴ of a favourable report, when, careless of the life of his posterity, he permits his soul to pass to immortality, and anticipates, because he has lived piously, that it will inhabit the places of the blest, and mingle with the choirs of the gods and demi-gods.

[24.] Respecting the constitution of states, and the preservation of commonwealths to be ruled over, Plato thus ordains.

it be said that Apuleius wrote "ingenii, aliisque dotis," i. e. "of disposition, or any other talent," to which I have been led by Lipsius's "ingenialis—"

¹ This saying has been attributed to Sosiades. It is not, I think, to be found in Plato; who speaks, however, in Phædr. § 59, 60, and 62, of "a soul following a god;" and in Legg. iv. p. 716, C., of an action being *φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ*. But in i. p. 639, D., the Cretans are said in somewhat a different sense to be *ἐπόμενοι τῷ θεῷ*.

² I have adopted, with others, "dis dicere," the emendation of Stewechius, in lieu of "discere—"

³ Compare Phædon, p. 62, C. § 16.

⁴—I have translated, as if "et amantem" had dropt out after "tamen—" for the genitive "secundi rumoris—" would be otherwise without a word to govern it.

At the very commencement he defines the form of a state after this fashion. A state is the union of very many persons amongst themselves; where (some)¹ are rulers, others inferiors, bringing, when united, ²aid and assistance² to each other in turn, and regulating their duties by the same and correct laws; and a state would be one, ³like a villa,³ under the same walls, if⁴ the minds of the inhabitants are accustomed ⁵to like and dislike the same things.⁵ On which account we must persuade the founders of commonwealths, that they increase ⁶their own people to that point of places in such a way that⁶ all may be known to the same ruler, and not unknown to each other;⁷ for thus it will happen that all will be of one mind, and be willing for justice to be done to them.

(But) a great and healthy⁸ state it does not behove to depend on the multitude of its inhabitants, and on their great strength. For (Plato) thinks that not the power of the body nor of money, collected for the dominion of the many, is to be valued, ⁹with a bad heart and impotence, but when men, adorned with all virtues, and all the inhabitants, founded on laws, obey a common decree.⁹ But the rest of states, which

¹ I have adopted the correction of Stewechius, who would repeat "alii—"

²⁻³ To avoid the tautology in "opem atque auxilium" one would prefer "operam—"

⁴⁻⁵ I have translated, as if the text were, not "illam—" which I cannot understand, but "uti villam—" For a state is thus compared to a single residence in Plato, Rep. ii. p. 369, C., πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἰκῶσιν—

⁶ I have rejected "et" before "si," as perfectly at variance with the syntax and sense.

⁷⁻⁸ In the words "eadem velle atque eadem nolle" there is an allusion to Sallust's well-known definition of friendship, which he puts into the mouth of Catiline.

⁹ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text, "ut usque ad id locorum plebes suas taliter—augeant, ut—" first edited by Vulcanius, and found subsequently in two MSS.: with which Oudendorp is however not satisfied, nor am I. For Apuleius wrote, I suspect, "ut usque ad id plebes suas et taliter augeant, ut, vicorum instar—" i. e. "that they increase their people to such a point and in such a way, that, like villages—"

⁷ Compare Legg. v. p. 738, D. § 9.

⁸ I have translated, as if the text were, not "sane," but "et sanam—" similar to "sanas civitates" just afterwards.

⁹ Here a literal version best shows, how unintelligible is the text—"cum vecordia impotentiaque, sed cum decreto communi virtutibus omnibus ornati viri et omnes incolæ fundati legibus obsequuntur." And yet it is easy to see first, that "fundati legibus" could not be applied to

are not constituted after this model, he did not deem to be healthy, but were commonwealths filthy and swelling with disorders. Those, however, he said, were founded on reason, which were arranged after the manner of the soul, so that the best portion, which excels in wisdom and prudence, may rule over the multitude; and, as that has the care of the whole body, so ¹the beloved of prudence¹ may defend the things advantageous to the state in general. And let Fortitude likewise, the second portion of Virtue, as it chastises and restrains ²the feeling of desire by its rod,² be vigilant in the state. (And) in the place of watchers by day, let the youth become soldiers for the benefit of all; but let the discipline of a superior counsel bridle, restrain, and, if requisite, break down the restless and untamed, and on that account the worst of citizens. But that third part ³(of the soul, the seat)³ of desires, he considers on a par with the common people and land-tillers, which he thinks is to be supported for its moderate usefulness. ⁴He denies, however, that a commonwealth can stand, unless he, who rules, possesses a desire for wisdom, or unless he is chosen as the ruler, who, it is agreed amongst all, is the most wise.⁴

"incolæ;" and secondly, that something is required to balance "virtutibus omnibus ornati." Hence I suspect Apuleius wrote "sed cum decreto communi, virtutibus omnibus viri ornati, omnes incolæ sine vecordia imprudentiaque, fundatis legibus obsequuntur," i. e. "but when all the inhabitants, adorned with all the virtues of a man, obey without a bad heart and thoughtlessness the laws founded on a general decree." Perhaps however the words "cum vecordia impotentiaque" may be retained in their present place, at least, if we read after "putat," "junctas cum vecordia imprudentiaque," so that "vecordia" may be referred to "vires pecuniæ," and "imprudentia" to "vires corporis—"

¹ Such, I presume, is the meaning of "prudentiæ dilectus—" But whether such an expression is to be found elsewhere, is more than I know. Oudendorp indeed refers to Metam. viii. p. 554, A.; and, as regards the sense of the whole passage, Hildebrand refers to Plato, Rep. iv. p. 427—430.

² So Oudendorp. But since, in lieu of "via sua," one MS. reads "vi sua," and another "in sua," I suspect that Apuleius wrote "vi insanam appetentiam—"

³ The words between the lunes have been supplied for the sake of the sense; and, unless I am greatly mistaken, Apuleius actually wrote "Illam vero, sedem desideriorum, tertiam animæ partem—" For "sedem" might easily have dropt out before "desideriorem," and "animæ" after "tertiam—"

⁴ In Plato, Rep. v. p. 473. See Ruhnken on Rutil. Lup. i. 6.

[25.] He says, moreover, that all the citizens should be imbued with morality,¹ so that there may be no desire of possessing gold and silver in those, to whose guardianship and good faith the commonwealth is intrusted; and that they may not seek private wealth under the guise of its being public; and that hospitality may not take place of such a kind, that, while the door is not opened to others, they may so take care of food and living for themselves, as to waste on common feasts the money they may receive from those whom they protect. Marriages too (he says)² are not to be entered into individually, but are to be common,³ through the wise men of the states and magistrates, appointed⁴ to that business by lot, arranging in a public manner the betrothals for marriages of that kind, and taking especial care that persons be not united unequal to, or unlike each other. With these is connected a useful and necessary confusion,⁴ so that through⁵ the bringing up of children, unknown as yet, being mixed together, there is produced a difficulty of recognition by parents; for, while they do not know their own, they believe all, whom they may see of that age, to be their own, and all become, as it were, the parents of all the children in common. Of these marriages there is sought at a proper time the union; of which he believes⁶ the fidelity will be firm, if the number of the days accords with the harmony of music; while they, who are born of such marriages, will be imbued with fitting studies, and taught by the best instructions in the common master-hall of the preceptors, (and this too) not merely those of the male sex, but of the female likewise; whom Plato⁷ wishes to be united in all arts, that are thought to be peculiar to men, and even in those of war; since to both there is the same power, as their nature is one. (He says too) that a state of this kind has no need of laws, laid down from without; for being

¹ One MS. adds "et disciplinis—" of which Oudendorp approves.

²⁻³ On this celebrated doctrine of Plato, see Rep. v. p. 459, E. and foll.

³ I have translated, as if the text were "traditis," not "præditis," omitting with two MSS. "et" before "sorte—"

⁴ Compare Tim. p. 18, D.

⁵ I have translated, as if the text were originally, as Oudendorp saw, "per mixta—afferat—" not "permixta—afferant—"

⁶ In Rep. viii. p. 546, and foll.

⁷ In Rep. v. p. 451, and Laws vi. p. 780, C. and foll.

founded on ¹the rules of prudence,¹ and on that kind of institutions and manners, (of)² which mention has been made, it does not require other laws. And this commonwealth he intends to have been formed by himself, as a feigned representation of the truth, for the sake of an example.

[26.] There is likewise another commonwealth built up (by him) sufficiently just, and ³the best indeed³ in a certain appearance and by way of an example, and not, as the former is, without proofs,⁴ but with some ground-work. In this, after seeking the principles of the origin of a state and its foundations, he discusses, not in his own name,⁵ its situation⁶ and advantages, and he proceeds to the point, as to how a civil governor, after obtaining a place of that kind, and an assembly of many persons, ought, according to the nature of things present and of persons coming together, to build up a state full of good laws and of good morals. In this too⁷ he wishes the same bringing up of children and the same discipline in arts to be adopted. But in the case of marriages, and births, and patrimonies, he swerves from the rules laid down for the former commonwealth,⁸ by making marriages an affair of individuals, and the business of the suitors themselves private.⁸ But though the parties in contracting a marriage ought to take counsel from

¹ I have translated, as if the text were "*regula prudentiæ*," not "*regia prudentia*," where Lipsius proposed to read "*egregia prudentia*—"; Hildebrand adopts "*regi eam per prudentiam*—" suggested by Oudendorp.

² I have inserted the preposition requisite for the syntax, in Latin "*de*—"

³ I have transposed the words "*optima quidem*," which could not precede "*satis justa*—" but might be found before "*ipsa quidem*," at least if we alter "*quidem*" into "*quadam*" and refer it to "*specie*," as translated.

⁴ I have adopted Oudendorp's "*evidentiis*," in lieu of "*evidentia*—"

⁵ But in that of an Athenian stranger.

⁶ I have translated, as if Apuleius had written, not "*statu*—" but "*situ*," remembering the passage in the *Laws*, iv. p. 704, where Plato discusses the advantages and disadvantages arising from the choice in the site of a city.

⁷ Here, as before, "*equidem*" is found united improperly to a third person.

⁸ I have translated, as if the text were "*matrimonia singularia faciens, procorumque ipsorum rem privatam*—" (where "*rem*" might easily have dropped out after "*ipsorum*—") not "*matrimonia privata et singularia faciens, procorumque ipsorum*—" where there is nothing on which "*procorum*" can depend.

their own wishes, yet he decrees that the matter, as belonging to public good, ought to be looked into by the chiefs of the state in general. ¹ Wherefore let not the rich refuse a marriage with their inferiors, and let those in poverty obtain an union with the rich; ¹ and should there be an agreement in the strength of property, still different dispositions are to be mixed together, so that a quiet woman may be joined to a passionate man; and to a mild man may be united a rather excitable woman, in order that ² by such remedies and the fruits of living together ³ the offspring, formed out of differing natures, may coalesce by a better produce of manners, and so the state be increased by the means of families put together. ³ Children, too, conceived in the seed-bed of dissimilar manners, ⁴ when drawing in the fashion of a likeness of both, ⁴ there will be wanting in them neither vigour in carrying on affairs, nor counsel in surveying them; but they are to be instructed ⁵ according as the parents may determine. ⁵ Individuals too may have houses and private property, as they may be able; which, however, he does not permit to be increased by avarice, or wasted by luxury, or deserted through negligence. And for this state he orders laws to be promulgated; and he exhorts the framer of laws, when he has an idea of doing such a thing, to direct his contemplation to virtue.

[27.] As regards the mode of government, he considers that to be useful, which is formed by the mixture of three (kinds); for he does not think that the mere form of government, either by the upper orders or of the mob, is by itself useful; nor does he leave the faults of rulers unpunished; but he de-

¹—¹ Compare the Laws, vi. p. 773, B. § 16.

²—² I have translated, as if the text were "*talibus remediis et conversationum proventibus*," not "*talibus observationum remediis et proventibus*," which, I confess, I cannot understand.

³ One MS. has "*consitarum*," which better suits with the metaphor in "*proventu*," than "*compositarum*."

⁴—⁴ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text, "*cum utriusque instar similitudinis traxerint*—" Opportunely then does one MS. read "*ab utrisque*—" which lead to "*cum ab utrisque insita formam similitudinis traxerint*," i. e. "when, after being planted by both, they draw out the form of a likeness—"

⁵—⁵ I have followed the reading of Elmenhorst, "*utcunque parentes censuerint*;" but since some MSS. offer "*utcunque parentes nec ita sexus esse stratus censuerint civitatis*—" various attempts, all equally unsuccessful, have been made to elicit what Apuleius wrote.

termines that ¹a reason for ruling¹ exists rather with those, who are the superior in power. And other conditions of public affairs are thought to be defined by him, which have a leaning towards correct morals; and to the ruler over the commonwealth, which he wishes to stand fast by the correction (of errors), he gives an order, that he first fill up the laws, remaining (incomplete); and² that he desire the laws to be corrected, that are wrong; and then that he turn³ the teachings, which are corrupting the good of the state, to a better account; from which, if the depraved masses cannot be turned aside by advice and persuasion, they must be drawn from the course, they have commenced, by force and ⁴without a show of favour to any one.⁴ He describes too how in an active state the whole mass conducts itself when led by goodness and justice. For such persons will take to their arms their nearest relations; will guard their honours; drive off intemperance; restrain injustice, (and) give to modesty and the other ornaments of life the greatest honours. ⁵Nor let a multitude rashly fly together to the constitutions of commonwealths of that kind, except those who⁶ have been brought up under the best laws and superior institutions, (and are) moderate towards others, (and) agreeing amongst themselves.

[28.] ⁶Of citizens, worthy to be blamed, there are four kinds; one is of those, who are the chiefs in honour; another is of the few, with whom the power over affairs rests; the third is

¹ Instead of "rationem," Wower would read "gubernationem—". Perhaps Apuleius wrote "constare imperii rationem—" as I have translated.

² To fill up the sense this word is added, and "aut" altered into "et—"

³ I have translated, as if the text were, what the syntax demands, "convertat," not "convertit."

⁴ Such, I presume, is the meaning of "ingratis" here.

⁵ In the words between the numerals there is evidently something to be supplied. For Apuleius is here alluding to what Plato has laid down in the *Laws*, v. p. 740, that when by any event the prescribed number of 5040 of families shall become reduced, their place is to be supplied not from any source, but only from a select one. Hence he probably wrote "ad ejusmodi rerum publicarum status restituendos, si desit quid, sed qui—" where "restituendos" might easily have been lost after the letters "-rum status," and "si desit quid, sed qui," corrupted into "nisi qui—" and thus the sense will be, "to restore, if any thing be wanting, the constitution of commonwealths of this kind—"

⁶ The same idea, expressed in less perfect language, has been repeated in p. 361.

of the rule of all; the last of that of a tyrant.⁶ Now the first kind, ¹he says, is produced then, ¹when the more prudent persons are driven from the state by seditious² magistrates, and the power is transferred to these, who are strong in hand merely; and when not those, who could conduct affairs with milder counsels, obtain the means of ruling, but those, who are turbulent and violent. But the state of the few³ is obtained, ⁴when many persons poor, (and) criminal, and at the same time lying under the impotence of the wealthy few, give themselves up and permit,⁴ and when all the power of government not good morals but riches have obtained. The popular faction is strengthened, when the mass without wealth does by its strength hold out against the means of the rich, ⁵and the law is at the bidding⁵ of the people promulgated, that it is lawful

¹ I have adopted the emendation of an unknown scholar, who, says Boascha, has elicited "conferi dicit tum" from "confunditur" in one MS., and "confit" in ed. pr.

² The word "seditiosos" seems strangely introduced here. Apuleius wrote, I suspect, "seditiosne usos—" i. e. "taking advantage of a sedition—" as the so-called thirty tyrants did at Athens.

³ Oligarchy.

⁴ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of "cum inopes criminosi multi simul paucorum divitum impotentis subiacentes dederint se atque permiserint—" But, unless I am greatly mistaken, Apuleius wrote "cum inopes, crimine usi multo, suum modo, paucorum divitum impudentis subiacentes dederint se atque permiserint omnia; omnemque—" For this comparison of persons, wallowing in crimes, to swine, is confirmed by the expression in Rep. ii. p. 373, εἰ—ὧν πόλιν—κατασπαζέας, and by ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕιον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνῃται in Rep. vii. p. 535, E., where one would prefer θρίμμα νοβοιωτῶν, in allusion to Pindar's Βοιωτῶν ὧν in Ol. vi. 152, on which see Porson in Supplement, Pref. ad Hec. 57, who might have remarked, and so too might Meineke in Cratin. Fragm. 153, that the words Οὔτοι δ' εἰσὶν νοβοιωτοὶ lie hid in οὔτοι δ' αὖ οὗς in Plutarch, Περὶ Σαρκοφάγ. ii. p. 995, E. See too Pseudo-Locr. Tim. p. 104, E. § 12, where the souls of the lascivious are feigned to be sent into swine; and Horace, "Epicuri de grege porcus," which I have quoted in p. 364, n. ⁴—, to support my restoration "Epicurei suis." Or we might read in Rep., ὥσπερ θρίμμα ἡμερὸν ὕιον— and compare ὥσων ἡμεροὶ εἰσὶν ἀγέλας in Legg. v. p. 713, D. Moreover, I cannot understand why Elmenhorst and Oudendorp should prefer "impotentis" to "potentis;" for assuredly the wealthy are not powerless, as shown by Rep. i. p. 336, A., μήνα ολιμύτου δύνασθαι πλουσίον ἀνδρός. Lastly, "omnia" might easily have been lost before "omnem—" Or we may read "—permiserint totum—" similar to "se totum dedit atque permisit," with which Apuleius closes his treatise De Mundo.

⁵ In the letters "ejus sub" lie hid "ea jussu," not "ejus jussu," as Oudendorp imagined, for "ejus" is scarcely intelligible.

for all to obtain honours equally. After this there arises then ¹the individual head of that tyranny,¹ when he, who shall have broken through the laws through his contempt for them, ²shall make an attack upon the government, after being fitted for it by a similar conspiracy amongst the lawless,² and ordain subsequently that the whole mass of citizens are to obey his desires and wishes, and to regulate their obsequiousness by such an aim.³

BOOK III.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF REASONING.⁴

[1.] THE study of wisdom, which we call philosophy, seems to most persons to contain three kinds or parts, relating to Nature, (and) Morals, and Reasoning, of which (last) I now propose to speak, and in which is comprehended the art of Discussion. But while we are discussing the subject of

¹—¹ Such is the literal version of the reading in MS. Flor., “*tyrannidis illius singulare caput*,” adopted by some editors; others have given “*tyrannis illa singulare dominationis caput*—” Oudendorp suggests “*tyrannis illa et singularis* (for so one MS.) *dominationis caput*—” Perhaps Apuleius wrote “*tyranni vis, bellæ similis, et singulare dominationis caput*—” i. e. “the force of a tyrant, like to a wild beast—and the individual head of lordly rule.”

²—² I have translated, as if the text were “*simili illegum conjuratione aptatus ad imperium invaserit*—” not “*simili legum conjuratione adoptatum imperium invaserit*—” which, as being unintelligible, various scholars have attempted to amend in various ways; of whom Lipsius alone has hit upon the truth by reading “*illegum*,” while, as regards “*adaptatus*,” since Oudendorp vainly assimilates it to “*cooptatus*,” I have altered it into “*aptatus ad*—”

³ How true is this description of a tyranny, is shown by the history of not only ancient-but modern times.

⁴ There is another title, “Or about Interpretation—” which I have omitted, as being scarcely intelligible in English; although it is the very word taken from Aristotle, whom Apuleius, through the whole of this book, had constantly in mind; for of the rules and forms of Logic scarcely a vestige is to be found directly in the writings of Plato; while of the treatise itself Colvius truly says, towards the close of it, that it contains passages in not a sufficiently sound state, and such as cannot be restored without the aid of MSS., although something may be done in that way by comparing the Latin of Apuleius with the Greek of Aristotle.

speaking—of which there are various kinds, such as of giving a command [or orders],¹ of narrating, [being angry,]² wishing, vowing,³ being angry,⁴ hating, envying, favouring, pitying, admiring, despising, reproaching, repenting, deploring, and as well of bringing pleasure, as of striking terror, in which it is the part of a superior speaker to be able to make statements, that are diffused, in a narrow compass, (and) what are narrowed, in a wide one; what is common-place, in a pretty manner; (and) what is new, in a customary one; ⁵to make, what is great, little, and matters very great out of little;⁵ and (to do) very many other things of that kind—there is amongst these one, relating for the most part to a Proposition. This is called enunciative, when it comprehends an absolute sentiment; and is the only one of all, ⁶that is exposed to truth or falsehood;⁶ which Sergius calls “Effatum” (an expression); ⁷Varro, “proloquium” (a fore-speaking); Cicero, “enuntiatio” (an enunciation);⁷ the Greeks, *πρότασις* (a fore-stretching); likewise *ἄξιωμα*, which I (render)⁸ word for word, as well by “protensionem,” as by “rogamentum,”⁹ (an asking,)⁹ but which may be called more familiarly a proposition.

[2.] Now of Propositions, as well as of their Conclusions, there are two kinds; one, the Predicative, which is simple too,¹⁰ as if we should say—“He, who rules, is happy;” another, Substitutive, or Conditional, which is compounded too,¹¹ as if you should say¹²—“He, who rules, if he is wise, is happy.”

¹ As in the whole of this list “vel” is never found elsewhere, it is pretty evident that either “imperandi” or “mandandi” is an interpolation.

² Either “succensendi” here, or “irascendi” in ⁶, is an interpolation.

³ I have adopted “vovendi,” suggested by Lipsius, in lieu of “fovendi.”

⁴ Compare Phædr. p. 267, A. § 113, where see Heindorf.

⁵ Aristotle, Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, § 4, defines in like manner *πρόφαντικὸν λόγον*, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει.

⁷ Compare Seneca, Epist. 117, § 13, Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. xvi. 8, who drew their information chiefly from Cicero, Academ. iv. 29, Tuscul. i. 7, and De Fato, 1, 1; 9, 19; 12, 28.

⁸ I have supplied the verb required by the sense.

⁹ Floridus correctly remarks, that “rogamentum” is not the meaning of *ἄξιωμα*—which is rather, “a settled opinion,” like “axiom” in Geometry. In English, however, the word “question” is used in the sense of an inquiry into any subject for discussion.

¹⁰ ¹¹ It is difficult to understand why “etiam” should be thus written before “simplex,” and “composita.”

¹² In lieu of the unintelligible “Ajax,” Nansius happily suggested “aisa.”

For you substitute a condition, through which a person, unless he is wise, is not happy. (But) we will now speak of the Predicative, which naturally precedes, and is, as it were, the element (i. e. the principle) of the Substitutive.

There are likewise other differences, (namely) of Quantity and Quality. Of Quantity, in that some are General; as "Every breathing thing is alive; others Particular, as "Some animals do not breathe;" others Undefined, as "Animal breathes;" for the assertion does not define, whether it is every one, or some one. ¹ Nevertheless it always avails in the place of a Particular; because it is more safe to admit from what is uncertain that, which is less.¹ But of Quality, in that some are Affirmative;² because they affirm something about something, as "Virtue is a good;" for it affirms that there is goodness in Virtue; others Negative,³ as "Virtue is not a good;" for it denies that there is goodness in Virtue. The Stoics consider this too an Affirmative, when they say "It happens to a certain pleasure to be not a good." It affirms therefore, what happens to it, that is, what it is. For that reason, they say, it is Affirmative, because it affirms there is in that thing, in which it has denied there is that, which does not seem to be in it; but they call that alone Negative, to which a negative particle is prefixed. Now these will be beaten⁴ as well in other points as in this, should a person make this inquiry, ⁵ "That, which has not substance, does not exist." For they will be compelled, according to

¹ Such is the literal version of words, which, I confess, I do not understand. Martianus Capella, who evidently drew from the same source as Apuleius did, or rather Pseud.-Apuleius, according to Hildebrand, has in iv. § 396, more intelligibly—"Quod igitur indefinite dicimus, necessario particulariter accipimus; non necessario universaliter; et quoniam id potissimum enumerandum, quod securum habet intellectum, indefinitum pro particulari accipitur."

² The word in Apuleius is "dedicativæ," derived from "dedico," which Nonius identifies with "dico—" The modern expression is "Affirmative;" which I have adopted throughout.

³ The word in Apuleius is "Abdicativæ," answering to the modern "Negative."

⁴ I have translated, as if the text were, not "vincuntur," but "vincuntur," as required by the subsequent "rogaverit—"

⁵ Floridus, after making an attempt to unravel the meaning of the words between the numerals, ends his note by saying, that "he would be glad, if any person could produce a better explanation of a difficult passage."

what they assert, to confess that, what has no substance, is that, which does not exist.¹

[3.] A proposition, says Plato in the *Theætetus*,¹ consists of two parts of speech, a noun and verb, in the fewest words, as "Apuleius discusses;" which is either true or false; and is therefore a proposition. From whence some² have laid it down, that there are only those two parts of speech; because from those alone can be formed a perfect speech, that is, one which includes a sentence entirely; and that adverbs and pronouns and participles and conjunctions, and the rest of things of that kind, which Grammarians enumerate, are no more the parts of speech than are the (parts) of ships their ornaments, or of men their hairs; but³ that in the whole framework of a speech they are certainly to be reckoned in the place of bolts and pitch and glue. Moreover, of the two parts before-mentioned one is called the Subjective,⁴ as if it were placed under, as "Apuleius;" the other the Declarative,⁵ as "discusses," or "discusses not;" for it declares what Apuleius is doing. It is permissible, however, while the meaning remains the same, to extend each part to more words; as if, instead of "Apuleius," you should say, "the Platonic philosopher of Madaura;" and in like manner, instead of "discussing," you should say that "he is making use of a speech." For the most part the Subject is the minor

¹ The passage alluded to is not, I think, in the *Theætetus*, but in the *Sophist*, p. 262, C. § 103, where the Stranger, while conversing with *Theætetus*, says that "words cannot express an act, or the existence of any thing, unless a person mixes up verbs with nouns; and then, if they have been fitted properly, their combination becomes a speech, nearly of all speeches the first and shortest. . . . When, therefore, a person says, 'Man learns,' you assert that this is the shortest speech and the first—" for so that passage should have been translated, where Plato evidently wrote *τὸν δὲ, εἰ ἥρμοστο εὖ ἐκείνα, λόγος ἱγίαιτο εὐθὺς ἢ συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν πάντων τῶν λόγων πρῶτος καὶ μικρότατος— οὐκ ὅτι δὲ ἥρμοστο καὶ λόγος ἱγίαιτο εὐθὺς ἢ πρώτῃ συμπλοκῇ, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων πρῶτος—* where *ἥρμοστο* and *σχεδὸν* are equally at variance with syntax and sense.

² Of the modern Philologists, who have adopted this notion, the principal are Hemsterhuis and Horne Tooke.

³ I have translated, as if the text were "at," not "aut—" which is here unintelligible.

⁴ Instead of "Subjective" and "Declarative," the expressions in modern Logic are "Subject" and "Predicate;" which I have adopted generally elsewhere.

(in a proposition), and the Predicate the major, inasmuch as it embraces not only this Subject, but others likewise. For not only does Apuleius discuss, but many others who can be comprehended under the same Predicate; unless perchance a peculiarity belonging to something is predicated of it; as if you should say, "That, which is a horse, is able to neigh;" now "to neigh" is peculiar to a horse. Hence in these peculiarities equal is the Predicate, and equal too the Subject; but not, as in other cases, (the former,) ¹ is the major; since, when ² the same proposition might conversely become the Subject, and have as the Predicate of itself that, which it had previously as the Subject; as if, by changing the order, ³ you should say, "That, which is able to neigh, is a horse." But you would not be able to convert in like manner the terms, when they are unequal. For, not because it is true that "Every man is an animal," will it on that account be true, if you convert the terms, that "Every animal is a man." For it is not as peculiar to a man to be an animal, as it is to a horse to neigh; since there are other animals without number. Hence the Predicate is known in many ways; although the question be proposed in a converse order. First, because the Predicate can embrace more things than the Subject; next, because it is never ended by a Noun, but always by a Verb; by which especially it is distinguished even in the peculiarities alluded to from an equal Subject. This likewise is to be considered in the way of a comparison, that as propositions ⁴ (taken as a whole) ⁴ are both definite and indefinite, so it is agreed that portions of them, Subjective as well as Declarative, are partly defined, as "man" (and) "animal," and partly undefined, as "not a man" (and) "not an animal." For they do not define what a thing is, when (they say) it is not, but merely show that there is something else besides it.

¹ I have added "the former" for the sake of perspicuity.

² If "cum" be retained, the apodosis of the sentence will be wanting; and if it be rejected, it is difficult to say, from whence it came.


³ Such is the proper meaning here and elsewhere of "*mutata vice*—"

⁴—"I have added the words between the numerals for the sake of the antithesis in "*particulas*—" The Delphin editor explains, however, "*particulas*" by "*vocabula*—" with a view of making something like sense out of what would be otherwise nonsense.

[4.] We must now state in what manner these four¹ propositions are affected towards each other; which it will not be foreign to the purpose to view in the figure of a square. Let there be then on the upper line, as expressed below,² an Affirmative and a Negative, (both) Universal, as "All pleasure is a good," (and) "No pleasure is a good;" and let these be called Disagreeing.³ And in like manner on the lower line under each (Universal) let a Particular be noted, "Some pleasure is a good," (and) "Some pleasure is not a good;" and let these be called "Sub-equals"⁴ to each other. Then let oblique lines be drawn from the angles (of the square), one extending from the Universal Affirmative to the Particular Negative; another from the Particular Affirmative to the Universal Negative; and let them, as they are the contrary to each other in Quantity and Quality, be called "One or the other,"⁵ because it is necessary for one or the other to be true; which is called a perfect and whole contest; but between the Sub-equals and the Disagreeing the contest is divided; because the

¹ Namely, 1. an Universal Affirmative; 2. an Universal Negative; 3. a Particular Affirmative; 4. a Particular Negative.

² Although "infra scriptum est" is found here, and further on "ostendunt infra scripta—" yet in both places one would prefer "in figura—"



³ In modern Logic, the expressions are "Contrary" and "Subcontrary." See the figure in Aldrich's Logic.

⁵ Such is the literal meaning of "alterutra." The expression in Aristotle is *ἀντιπαρισταὶ ἀντισταναί*, or simply *ἀντιπαρῆς*, as remarked by others. Hence in modern Logic the expression is "Opposites," "Contradictory."

Disagreeing never become at the same time true, although they are occasionally at the same time false; while conversely the Sub-equals are never indeed false at the same time, although occasionally they are at the same time true; and on this account the refutation of either of these confirms the other; whereas the confirmation of either does not refute the other. But of the Disagreeing he, who has laid down¹ either one, takes off² the other, whereas conversely he, who takes off either one, does not lay down the other. For in truth he, who confirms either of (the so-called One or the other)³ never refutes the other; while⁴ he, who refutes the other confirms either of the (so-called)⁵ One or the other.⁶ But when either of the Universals is proved, it confirms its own Particular; but when it is refuted, it does not weaken it; and conversely, when either of the Particulars is refuted, it weakens its own Universal; but, when it is proved, it does not confirm it. Now that all this is so, as we assert, that, which is delineated below,⁶ easily shows from the propositions themselves. For it is ascertained what a person concedes, who shall have made any proposition.

[5.] Now either of the Universals is destroyed in three ways; when its Particular is shown to be false, or either one of the two others, whether the Disagreeing or the Sub-neutral.⁷ But it is supported in one way, if the Sub-neutral⁸ belonging

^{1, 2} Such is the literal version of "posuit" and "tollit;" which the Delphin editor interprets by "probavit" and "negat."

³ I have added these words to show that they refer to the definition mentioned a little above.

⁴ The antithesis evidently requires "at," not "et—"

⁵ As the MSS. vary between "alteram" and "quamvis," I have translated, as if the text were "alterutrarum quamvis," for the sake of the antithesis.

⁶ Here too, for the balance of the sentence, I have translated, as if "utramvis" had dropt out after "autem—"

⁷ See p. 386, n. 2, where the figure alluded to is given.

⁸ The strange word, "sub-neutra," which Oudendorp has adopted from three MSS., seems to have been coined, like "sub-par," and is taken by that editor in the sense of "alterutra—" found here in the text of some MSS., and written as a gloss over "sub-neutra" in others. But though, as Oudendorp remarks, "sub-neutra" could hardly proceed from the brain of a transcriber, yet as it has not been used before, it seems scarcely probable that it would be used here without some explanation. Hence I once suspected, that Apuleius wrote "subneutra, velut alterutra—" just as he has on a former occasion, "altera subjectiva nominatur, velut sub-

to it is shown to be false. On the other hand, either of the Particulars¹² is destroyed,³ if its Sub-neuter.⁴ But it is supported in three ways; if its Universal is true, or either of the two others is false, whether its Sub-equal or Sub-neuter.

The same facts we shall observe in the case of Equivalent propositions. Now those are said to be "Equivalent," which under another enunciation have an equal power, and are at the same time true, or at the same time false, one on account of the other, as the Undefined⁵ and the Particular. Moreover every proposition, if it assumes at its commencement a Negative particle, becomes (as)⁶ its Sub-alternate Equivalent; as when there is an Universal Affirmative, "All pleasure is a good," if a negation be prefixed to it, it will be "Not all pleasure is a good," having the same meaning as its Sub-alternate had, "Some pleasure is not a good." And in the three other propositions the same thing is to be understood.

[6.] Then with respect to Conversion, an Universal Negative and its Sub-alternate, a Particular Affirmative, are said to be Convertible propositions, on that account, because their portions, Subjective and Declarative, are able to preserve always their mutual changes, the condition of truth or falsehood still remaining. For as this proposition is true—"No prudent man is impious—" so, if you make a change in its parts, it will be true (to say), "No impious man is prudent." In like manner, as it is false (to say), "No man is an animal," so, if you make a change, it will be false (to say), "No animal is man." By parity of reasoning a Particular Affirmative becomes Convertible, "A certain grammarian is man," and

dita." By referring, however, to the diagram, it would seem that both "alterutra" and "subneutra," would be best understood by "the diagonal" or "cross" proposition. But I have preferred the word "Sub-alternate," adopted in modern Logic, as the translation of "alterutra."

¹ Since "subneutra" has been used just above in the sense of "alterutra," so, I think, it was written originally, both here and in the next sentence (⁴), instead of "alterutra—" as I have translated.

² I have translated, as if "utravis" had been lost before "Particularis—" for it is absolutely requisite to balance the preceding "utravis Universalis."

³ I have adopted "destruitur" from one MS., similar to "destruitur" just before; for the future would have no meaning here.

⁴ What is here called "Undefined," answers to the "Universal" mentioned above.

⁵ I have translated, as if "uti" had been lost after "fit—"

"A certain man is a grammarian." This result the two other propositions cannot always effect; although they sometimes undergo a Conversion; nor yet are they on that account said to be Convertible; for that which sometimes 'deceives, is rejected as uncertain.¹ Each proposition must therefore be laid open² through all its significations, as to whether it agrees, when it is taken Conversely. ³ Nor are those universally true;³ but only five. For either the peculiarity of something is declared, or its genus, or difference, or ⁴defined limit,⁴ or accident; nor beyond these (predicates) can any thing be found in any proposition. For instance, should you lay down "man" as the subject, you would say something of him, or mark out a peculiarity of his, as "being able to laugh;"⁵ or his genus, as "an animal;" or his difference, as "being rational;" or defined limit, as "a mortal animal endowed with reason;" or accident, as "being an orator." Since every thing, which is Declarative of any thing, either can, or cannot, be in turn its Subjective. And if it can, it either marks out what it is, and is (thus) a defined limit; or it does not mark out, and is (thus) a peculiarity. But if it cannot, there is either that, which ought to be placed in the definition, and (thus) there is a genus or difference; or what ought not (to be placed), and is (thus) an accident. Through these means then it will be known that the Particular Negative is not convertible. Now the Universal Affirmative is not by itself convertible; but it can be nevertheless made convertible,

¹—¹ So Oudendorp from conjecture. The MSS. vary between "fallitur certum," and "fallitur certo," and "fallitur certi—" Perhaps Apuleius wrote "fallit, pro incerto—" as I have translated.

² Instead of "reperienda," Wower suggested "repetenda—" I have translated, as if Apuleius had written "aperienda—"

³—³ So Oudendorp from MS. Petav.; another reads "nec universæ vere sunt;" a third, "nec innumeræ revera sunt istæ—" which seems far preferable, as regards the antithesis in "quinque solæ—" I confess, however, I do not see what the writer meant by the words between the numerals. I could have understood, "Nor are Universal propositions in reality numberless, but only these five—" in Latin, "nec universæ sunt innumeræ revera; sed istæ quinque solæ."

⁴—⁴ By "finis," some understand "definition," others "limit." I have united both.

⁵ On laughter, as a peculiarity of man, Kopp, on Martian. Capell. iv. 348, refers to Pollux, vi. 200, Lucian, Vit. Auct. § 26, and Porphyry. Isagog. i. 4, and 6.

as a Particular. For example, when the proposition is, "Every man is an animal," it cannot be converted, so as to be, "Every animal is a man;" but it may be, as a Particular, "A certain animal is man." But this (is) in a simple 'conversion, which is called in the inferences of conclusions a Reflex.¹ There is likewise another Conversion of propositions, which draws not only the order, but likewise the parts themselves to the contrary; so that, what is defined, becomes undefined; and, on the other hand, what is undefined (becomes) defined. This conversion the two remaining, (namely,) the Universal Affirmative and the Particular Negative, admit in turn; as, "Every man is an animal;" (and) "Every thing, that is not an animal, is not a man;" in like manner, "A certain animal is not rational;" (and) "A certain thing, which is not rational, is (not)² an animal." Now that this is so constantly, as we have said, you will discover by exploring all the five species before-mentioned.

[7.] The combination of propositions is said to be their connexion through another common part,³ by which they are united; for they can thus agree towards one conclusion. Now that common part must needs be in both propositions the Subject, or in both the Predicate; or in one the Subject, (and) in the other the Predicate. The forms therefore become three; of which let that be called the first, when that common part is in one the Subject, in the other the Predicate; which order 'is content not with an enumeration only, but with the worthiness of the conclusions;⁴ since the third form

¹— This is now called "a conversion by contraposition," which takes place, says Floridus, when a proposition is inverted, although its quantity is preserved, so that defined terms become undefined by the addition of the negative particle; and in this manner alone is a Particular Negative inverted. With regard, however, to the words, there seems to be a want of precision here; for elsewhere "conversio" and "reflexio" are synonymous, and so too are "conclusio" and "illatio."

² I have inserted, what Floridus has suggested, the negative particle, required by the sense.

³ This is now called in Logic "a middle term," as remarked by Floridus.

⁴— Such is the literal version of the text, and this the Delphin editor's interpretation, "which arrangement depends not merely upon an accidental enumeration, but on the excellence of the inferences." But as there is nothing in the text to answer to "fortuita," that word has been evidently introduced to make something like sense out of what seemed to

is the last ; because from it nothing is inferred, except a Particular ; (but) superior to this is the second, which contains Universal inferences, but only of a Negative kind : and the first is thus the powerful one, because in it¹ every kind of inferences is contained. Now I call that an inference or inferential question² which is collected and inferred from admissions. Moreover an admission is the proposition, which is conceded by the respondent ; for instance, should a person propose (this question)—Is every honourable thing good ?—it is a proposition ; and if (the respondent)³ says that he assents, there is, on the question being removed, an admission ; which is itself in common parlance the proposition—“ Every honourable thing is good.” To this you may unite⁴ another admission proposed and conceded in a similar manner—“ Every good thing is useful.” From this combination arises, as we shall presently show, the inferential (kind) of the first mode ; Universal, if (stated) Directly—“ Therefore every honourable thing is useful ;” (but) Particular, if (stated) Inversely,⁵—“ Therefore a useful thing is honourable ;” because a Universal Affirmative can be converted in the manner of a Particular only in the case of Inverted Propositions. Now an inference I say is made Directly⁶ when the same part is the Subject, as well in the combination as in the inference itself ;⁶ and likewise the Predicate is the same, when it exists in both ways ; but it is made Inversely,⁷ when the same thing takes place in an inverse order.⁷

be otherwise nonsense. One MS. has “*numeri ratione*,” from which however nothing seems to be gained.

¹ I have translated, as if the text were not “*in omne genus—concluditur*—” but “*in ea omne*—”

² On the meaning of “*rogamentum*,” see iii. § 1, p. 382, n. ².

³ I have inserted the respondent, for the sake of perspicuity.

⁴ I have translated, as if the text were “*jungere est*,” not “*junge*.”

⁵ So I have translated here and elsewhere “*reflexim*.”

⁶ Such is the literal version of the text ; and this the Delphin editor's interpretation, “*as well in one of the combined propositions, as in the conclusion itself* ;” while he says in the note, “*that this takes place when the Subject of one Conclusion is the Subject in one of the Premises, but the Predicate of the same Conclusion is the Predicate in another of the Premises. But how “conjugatio,” literally “a combination of propositions,” can be applied to one of the propositions so combined, I cannot understand.*”

⁷ That is, says Floridus, when the Predicate of the Conclusion is the Subject in one of the Premises, but the Subject is the Predicate in another.

[8.] Now let the whole of the reasoning, which is made up of admissions and inferences, be called by the name of a gathering-together of a conclusion; (and) it may be most conveniently defined, according to Aristotle,¹ as "a discourse, in which some things being conceded, something else beside what have been conceded, necessarily turns out, but yet through what have been conceded." In which definition no other kind of a discourse is to be understood than what is enunciable; which, as we have stated above,² is alone either true or false. And the expression, "some things being conceded," is put in the plural on that account, because a gathering together cannot take place from one admission; although it appears to Antipater the Stoic,³ contrary to the opinion of all, that (this)⁴ conclusion is complete—"Thou seest; therefore thou art alive;" whereas it would be complete in this way—"If thou seest, thou art alive; but thou dost see, therefore thou art alive." Moreover, because we want to draw a Conclusion not in what is conceded, but in what is denied, on that account (it is stated)⁵ in the definition that "something else necessarily turns out, beside what has been conceded." On which account the forms adopted by the Stoics are superfluous, that go through not the same thing in a different manner. For example—"It is day or night. Now it is day."⁶ Moreover, they double the same—"If day is, day is; therefore day is." Vainly then do they draw an inference, where a

¹ In Analytic. i. 1, Συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἴστί—λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν, ἑκέρων τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. There is a less perfect definition of a syllogism in Alcinous, § 6.

² See iii. § 1, p. 382, n. ⁶.

³ This Antipater, the Stoic of Tyre, was the preceptor of Cato the younger, as we learn from the Life of the Roman by Plutarch.

⁴ I have translated, as if "hæc" had dropt out between "plena" and "conclusio—"

⁵ I have added these words for the sake of perspicuity.

⁶ To complete the Syllogism, there is evidently wanting the Conclusion, "Therefore it is not night—" as in Isidorus Origin. ii. 28, "Quartus modus est ita—Aut dies est aut nox. Utique dies est. Nox ergo non est:" unless it be said that Apuleius designedly omitted the Conclusion, to show how illogically the Stoics reasoned; as Cicero does in Academ. Quæst. ii. 24, "Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet. Lucet autem. Lucet igitur.' Crederet scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere:" a passage the most apt for enabling us to understand here the pseudo-syllogism immediately following.

concession is made willingly and without a controversy. This is more like the truth, when I assert—"If day is, there is light. Now day is. Therefore it is light," that I am not wrongly drawing a conclusion beyond what I have admitted. For "it is light," which is in the Conclusion, has been also in the (major) proposition. But this we will refute in this manner, (by saying) that, "therefore it is light," is said in a different manner in the Conclusion, so that it may be shown it is now light; but it is taken in a different manner in the (minor) proposition, in which it is not said, that it is now light, but merely that it follows, that, if there be day, there will be likewise light. Now there is a great difference, whether you affirm that something exists in this way now, or merely that it is wont to be, when something else goes before. That too has taken place—namely, that in the same definition the idea of necessity has been included—in order that the force of the Conclusion may be distinguished from the likeness to an Induction. For in an Induction some things are conceded; for instance—"A man moves the lower jaw; a horse moves the lower jaw; and so does the ox and dog." From these admissions something else is inferred in the Conclusion—"Therefore every animal likewise moves the lower jaw." But as this is not true in the case of the crocodile, you cannot, although the preceding are conceded, admit the inference, which it would not have been lawful for you to refuse in the Conclusion; since the inference is comprehended in the admission itself; and on this account there has been added the expression—"turn out necessarily." Nor is even the last part of the definition superfluous; but it shows from the very things, which it has conceded, that the inference ought to turn out, but not that it would be established.

[9.] But on these points enough has been said. And we must now lay down, by what modes and combinations true conclusions take place within a determinate number of the Predicative kind (of propositions). ¹In the first form there are found nine modes, taken by themselves, but six combinations; in the second, four modes, (but) three combinations; in the third, six modes, (but) five combinations; ¹respecting which

¹ On these forms, modes, and combinations, the inquisitive reader must turn to Martian. Capell. iv. 411, and to the treatises on Logic by Aldrich and others.

(taken) in their order I will here put down the proofs, premising that a conclusion cannot be established from Particular propositions alone, or from Negative alone, because they can often lead even to what is false; moreover, that although, if either Negative¹ is united to many Affirmatives, an inference is produced, not Affirmative, but Negative, (still) only one (Negative), mixed with the rest, has any power. Similar too is the force of Particular propositions. For either of them,² if mixed with Universals, produces a particular inference.

Hence in the first form the first mode is that, which deduces³ from Universal Affirmatives an Universal Affirmative directly, as,—“Every just thing is honourable. (Now) every honourable thing is good. Therefore every just thing is good.” But if you draw the inference by a bend,⁴ (for instance,) “Therefore a certain good thing is just,” there is produced by the same combination the fifth mode; for in this manner alone I have shown above can an Universal Affirmative undergo a bend.⁵

The second mode is that, which deduces from Universals, Affirmative and Negative, an Universal Negative directly, as,—“Every just thing is honourable. (But) no honourable thing is base. Therefore no just thing is base.” Now if you draw the inference by a bend, as, “Therefore no just thing is base,” you will produce the sixth mode; for, as it has been stated, an Universal Negative is bent back on itself. We ought however to remember only that the Subject is to be drawn from the Affirmative to the inference in the second mode, and on that account it (the Affirmative) is to be considered the prior, although the Negative is enunciated previously. In like manner in the case of the rest that, which

¹ General or Particular.

² Affirmative or Negative.

³ I have translated here and elsewhere, as if the text were “deducit,” not “conducit—” which Oudendorp says, after Isidorus in Origin. ii. 28, has the same meaning as “colligere—” which is found in the same sense towards the end of this book, “illationes colligit,” and “colligunt—illationem.”

⁴ In the terms of the Syllogism, by substituting a Particular in the place of an Universal assertion.

⁵ So I have translated literally “reflectitur:” for which there is no corresponding expression in modern logic, that preserves the metaphor, which is scarcely seen in the word “inverted,” generally adopted as the proper version.

is the prior in power,¹ is to be undestroyed as the prior (in order). But in the sixth mode the Subjective is drawn from the Negative; (and) this is their only difference.

Further, the third mode (is that), which deduces from Affirmatives, Particular and Universal, a Particular Affirmative, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (But) every honourable thing is useful. Therefore a certain just thing is useful." But if you draw an inference with a bend—Therefore a certain useful thing is just—you will produce the seventh mode; for, as it has been stated, a Particular Affirmative is turned back on itself.

The fourth mode is that, which deduces from a Particular Affirmative and an Universal Negative a Particular Negative directly, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (But) no honourable thing is base. Therefore a certain just thing is not base." From this mode are discovered the changes contrary to the preceding; ²since the eighth and ninth preserve the inference of that (proposition), not as it is bent by it; (and) the (two) merely bend the combination itself² by propositions (called)³ Equivalent, and in an inverted order, so that the Negative becomes the prior; and thus (the mode)⁴ is said to deduce both by an inversion of the combinations. For if you insert the Universal Negative of the fourth (mode) and subjoin to it the Universal Affirmative, which the Particular Affirmative shall have inverted, there will be produced the eighth mode,⁵ which deduces from Universals, Negative

¹ i. e. which contains the Subject.

²⁻³ Such is the literal version of the text of Oudendorp, who has adopted, with Floridus, the readings of the Carnot MSS. in lieu of the corruptions to be found in other documents. I confess, however, I do not understand "non ut illi reflexam—" and the less so, as I do not know why "illi" should thus follow "ejus—" I suspect there is an omission here of some matter, which Apuleius drew from another source than Aristotle; who, as remarked by Floridus, rejects the five indirect modes of the first form as useless.

³ I have inserted "called," remembering the passage in iii. § 5, where Apuleius defines the expression "propositiones æquipollentes."

⁴ Oudendorp thus supplies "modus" as the nominative to "dicitur." Floridus adopts "dicuntur" from the Carnot MSS. But he is then compelled to take "conducere" in the sense of "concludere," a meaning which seems scarcely admissible.

⁵ Since three modes, namely, the fifth, sixth, and seventh, here omitted, are found in the abridgment made of this book of Apuleius by Isidorus in Origin. ii. 28, Colvius conceives that something has been lost here,

and Affirmative, a Particular Negative, in a bent manner, as, "No base thing is honourable. (But) every honourable thing is just. Therefore a certain just thing is not base."

But why the fourth mode alone should generate two (others), (while) the rest (generate) only one each, the reason is, that if we invert both propositions of the second mode, there will be produced a vain combination of two Particular (propositions); but if only one or the other,¹ there will be produced either the second form or the third.

[10.] Of these nine modes in the first form the four first are called "Non-Demonstrable;" not because they cannot be demonstrated, as ²the swelling of the tides of the whole sea, which has not been demonstrated as yet by a person, who knows the things of Nature, and ³the squaring of the circle; but because they are so simple and so manifest, as not to require demonstration; so that they produce themselves the rest, and impart from themselves a belief in them.

Of the second form we will now lay down the modes.

The first mode in the second form is that, which deduces

which Isidorus met with in a more perfect MS. of Apuleius. But Hildebrand says that "the three modes, which Colvius asserts are wanting, have been explained already," and he refers to Martianus Capella iv. 411, but without remarking that there, as here, "Octavus modus—" follows the mention of "Quartus modus—" from which the just inference would be, that the MS. of this treatise, used by Martian. Capell., was less perfect than the one, which Isidorus possessed.

¹ I have adopted "alterutram," found in the Delphin interpretation, in lieu of "alteram," in the text at present; which cannot be opposed to "utramque—"

² So I have translated, as if the text were "universi maris aestuum tumentia, quod nondum demonstratum naturæ res scienti, et—" which I have elicited by uniting the readings of MS. Carnot, "universi maris aestimat quod non demonstrantur sicut," with that of MS. Petav., "universi maris aestum quod nondum demonstratum ei sit ut—" where "aestum tumentia" might easily have been corrupted into "aestimat," and "naturæ res scienti" into "entur sicut;" while "tumentia" might be used for a substantive, as "faventia" is. But though no demonstration had been given of the cause of the tides by any Natural philosopher, still it had been remarked that "menstruis cursibus Lunæ decremēta et accessus fretorum atque aestum deprehenduntur," to use the language of Apuleius, *de Mundo*, p. 731 = 332, where Elmenhorst refers to Strabo, iii. p. 173 = 262, and other writers, who have alluded to the subject. Oudendorp, however, proposes to read "ut universim Aristoteles aestimat, aut quod nondum demonstratum ei sit, ut—" conceiving that Apuleius alluded to Aristotle, the Peripatetic philosopher of Alexandria, mentioned a little below, and by Diogenes Laert. in Zeno, § 164.

from Universals, Affirmative and Negative, an Universal Negative directly, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (But) no base thing is honourable. Therefore that, which is not just, is dishonourable." This¹ (mode) is reduced to the second not-demonstrable by its second terms being inverted.

The second mode is that, which deduces from the Universals, Negative and Affirmative, an Universal Negative directly, as, "No base thing is honourable. (But) every just thing is honourable. Therefore no base thing is just." This mode does not differ from the former combination, except that it draws the Subjective portion from the Negative to the inference; because the order of the enunciation is varied in this way, a circumstance that could not take place in the first form.

The third mode is that, which deduces from a Particular Affirmative and an Universal Negative a Particular Negative directly, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (But) no base thing is honourable. Therefore a certain just thing is not base." In this proposition if we invert the Universal Negative, there will arise² the fourth not-demonstrable; ³from which this is produced.³

The fourth mode is that, which deduces from a Particular Negative and an Universal Affirmative a Particular Negative directly, as, "A certain just thing is not base. (But) every bad thing is base. Therefore a certain just thing is not bad." Now this mode alone is proved through the impossible alone; about which kind of proposition we will speak, while explaining the modes of the third form.

[11.] In the third form the first mode is that, which deduces from Universal Affirmatives a Particular Affirmative as well directly as inversely, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (And) every just thing is good. Therefore a certain honourable thing is good," or thus, "Therefore a certain good thing is honourable." Since it matters not, what part from each proposition you make the Subject, as it does not matter, which you first enunciate. Hence Theophrastus does not

¹ I have adopted, with the Delphin interpreter, "hic" from MS. Petav. in lieu of "hæc—" which is without regimen. Compare, just below, "Hic—non differt—"

² I have translated, as if the text were "fiat," not "fit—"

³ I confess I do not see any necessity for the words between the numerals.

rightly decide that on this account there is not one mode, but two.

The second mode is that, which deduces from Affirmatives, Particular and Universal, an Affirmative Particular directly, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (And) every just thing is good. Therefore a certain honourable thing is good."

The third mode is that, which deduces from Affirmatives, Universal and Particular, an Affirmative Particular directly, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (And) a certain just thing is good. Therefore a certain good thing is honourable."

The fourth mode is that, which deduces from Universals, Affirmative and Negative, a Negative Particular directly, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (But) no just thing is bad. Therefore a certain honourable thing is not bad."

The fifth mode is that, which deduces from an Affirmative Particular and a Negative Universal an Affirmative Particular directly, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (But) no just thing is bad. Therefore a certain honourable thing is not bad."

The sixth mode is that, which deduces from an Affirmative Universal and a Negative Particular, a Negative Particular directly, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (And) a certain just thing is not bad. Therefore¹ a certain honourable thing is not bad."

[12.] Of these six modes, the three first are reduced to the third not-demonstrable, by the first proposition of the first and second (mode) being inverted; while the third has the same combination with the second, (but) differing in this alone, that it takes from an Universal its Subjective portion, inasmuch as it is reduced to the third by the inversion not only of the proposition but of the inference. In like manner the fourth and fifth are produced from the fourth not-demonstrable by their first propositions being inverted. But the sixth mode cannot be reduced to any not-demonstrable mode by either both propositions, or one, or the other,² being inverted; but it is proved merely by what is impossible; just as the fourth mode in the second form; and on that account both are numbered the last. But of the rest the arrangement is made

¹ I have adopted "igitur" from MS. Petav.

² Here, as in iii. § 9, p. 396, n. 1, I have translated, as if the text were "alterutra," not "altera," which cannot mean "one of two."

in all the forms according to the difference of the combinations and inferences. For since to make an assertion is prior to giving a denial, and an Universal has a greater power than a Particular, Universals are prior to Particulars; and to both are similar an Affirmation and an Inference; and that mode is placed before, which is reduced more quickly to the not-demonstrable mode, that is to say, by one inversion; which is one method of proving that those modes are fixed for a conclusion. There is likewise another method, which is common to all, even the not-demonstrable, and which is said to be through what is impossible, and is called by the Stoics the first laying down or the first exposition; which they define thus, "If from two (assertions) a third is deduced, one of them, 'when it collects inferences (from) a contrary, leaves the contrary.' But the old (logicians) have thus defined, "When one or the other of (two) propositions is assumed, if the ²inference of every conclusion is done away,³ the remaining (proposition) is done away." Now this was invented in opposition to those, who, after admissions have been made, impudently refuse (to receive) what is deduced from them; while from that, which they deny, something may be discovered contrary to that, which they had previously conceded. Moreover, (since)³ it is impossible for contraries to be at one and the same time true, they are consequently driven by what is impossible to the conclusion. Nor have logicians vainly laid down that that mode is true, in which the contrary to an inference, together with an admission, of one or the other⁴ (proposition), does away the remaining one. But the Stoics conceive that an inference is rejected, by merely prefixing a

¹ Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text, where Oudendorp confesses he sticks fast; and so too did Floridus; who would elicit "*Si ex duobus tertium quid colligitur, alterum eorum cum contrario illationis colligit contrarium relictum*—" from the reading of MSS. Carnot, "*si colligitur, alterum eorum cum contrarium illationis colligit, contrarium relinquit*." Oudendorp has proposed "*tollit*" in lieu of "*colligit*," referring to "*cujus adversum illationis — tollit reliquam*."

² I confess I cannot understand "*conclusionis illatio*," for the two words are elsewhere synonymous. With regard to "*tollo*," the Delphin interpreter considers it here, and every where else, as synonymous with "*nego*." See iii. § 4, p. 387, n. ¹ ²

³ I have translated, as if "*cum*" had dropt out before "*contraria*—"

⁴ I have adopted "*alterutra*," found in MS. Petav., in lieu of "*altera*—" See iii. § 9, p. 396, n. ¹

negative particle, or that one of the propositions is done away, as, for example, "All," (and) "Not all;" (or) "Some one," (and) "Not some one."¹

[13.] There are then produced against each Conclusion eight of a contrary kind, which may be opposed to it; since each admission may be done away by two methods; and there are produced twice four conclusions by a negative particle being at one time prefixed to the inference, and at another, by one or the other² of the inferences being accepted. Let there be, as an example, the first not-demonstrable (mode)—"Every just thing is honourable. (And) every honourable thing is good. Therefore every just thing is good." Now he who, after admitting the propositions, denies the inference, must necessarily say—"Some one just thing is not good." To this if you prefix³ the former of the two conceded—"Every just thing is honourable," an inference is produced, according to the second mode in the third form,— "Therefore some one honourable thing is not good;" which is repugnant to the second proposition, that had conceded that "Every honourable thing is good." In like manner this conclusion is altogether an opposite one, if, while things remain the same, you introduce its equivalent, as for instance,— "Therefore not every thing honourable is good." In a similar manner two other conclusions would be produced, if, as we have just now laid down the former proposition, so we assume the latter—"Some one just thing is not good. (But) every honourable thing is good," there will be produced⁴ a double inference belonging to the fourth mode of the second form, (namely)— "Therefore not every just thing is honourable," or—"Therefore some one just thing is not honourable;" both of which are equally repugnant to the former proposition, which had conceded that—"Every just thing is honourable." While these four conclusions remain, the proposition alone being changed, if, in lieu of that, which was—"Some one just thing is not good,"

¹ Hildebrand has introduced here from MS. Petav. "*Veteres vero et per alterutram. Igitur bifariam omnis non omnis, quidam*—"

² Here, as elsewhere, the Delphin interpreter explains "*alterutra*" by "contradictory." See p. 386, n. ².

³ I have adopted "*præponas*," found in MS. Petav., in lieu of "*proponas*."

⁴ Instead of "fit," the sense requires "fiet," what I have translated. See p. 397, n. ².

you make the proposition—"Not every just thing is good," so that the inference may be done away in two methods, there will be through the same changes four conclusions of the second form. In like manner, if in lieu of the same proposition, you make it—"No just thing is good," so that the inference may be done away by three methods, there will be four conclusions of the third form, but only in the case of those which have an Universal inference. For that alone can be done away by three methods; but in the others there are only eight; which, if a person wishes, he will be able to arrange¹ singly under each mode through all the forms, after the example we have laid down, so that, ²in the manner of persons arguing hypothetically by means of letters,² the order of the propositions being changed, while their power remains, the first not-demonstrable mode may be—"A (is affirmed) of every B. And B of every C. Therefore A is of every C." ³They begin from the Declaring, and consequently from the second proposition. This mode then, made perfect according to these, becomes backwardly of this kind³—"Every C (is) B. (And) every B (is) A. Therefore every C (is) A."⁴ The Stoics however instead of letters adopt numbers,⁵ as—"If there is a first, there is a second. But there is a first. Therefore there is a second." But Aristotle puts forth in the first form only four modes not-demonstrable; while Theophrastus and the

¹ Such seems to be what the train of thought requires. The MSS. vary between "suggere" and "suggerere." Lipsius would read "fingerere—" Perhaps Apuleius wrote "subregere—"

² This is the manner adopted by Aristotle in his Analytics.

³ Such is the literal version of the whole passage, as it is read in MSS. Carnot. But since in MS. Petav. the readings are "inferunt a declarata," in lieu of "incipiunt a declarante," and "modus secundus hos si pretexas" in lieu of "modus secundum hos perfectus—" I must leave for others to discover what Apuleius wrote, and to explain it, when discovered, with the aid of Floridus; who says that, "by the word 'Declarans' is meant that proposition, in which is found the Attribute of the Conclusion; which proposition Apuleius considers as the second, and holds that as the first, in which is found the Subject of the Conclusion—a point in which he is at variance with Aristotle; while by 'retro' is meant 'in an inverse order,' so that the second proposition may become the first, and in each proposition the Subject may be enunciated the first, and the Attribute the last."

⁴ I have adopted the interpretation of the Delphin editor.

⁵ So too does Cicero in Topic. § 4, quoted by Kopp on Martian. Capell. iv. 420.

rest enumerate five; for¹ by uniting an Indefinite proposition,¹ they deduce likewise an Indefinite inference. But this it is needless to bring forward; since an Indefinite (proposition) is done away in the place of a Particular (one); and the modes become the same as those in the case of a Particular proposition.

[14.] So too we have shown there are four in the first form; which if a person wishes to double, by accepting an Indefinite in the place of a Particular, and subjoining an Indefinite inference, there will be in all twenty-nine.² But Aristo of Alexandria and some younger Peripatetics suggest moreover five other modes of an Universal inference, (namely,) three in the first form and two in the second; in the place of which they deduce³ something of a Particular one; for it is very silly³ for him, 'to whom more has been conceded, to infer less.'⁴ Now it is proved that all the determinate modes in the three forms are only the nineteen, which we have shown above. (For) there are four propositions, (namely,) two Particulars (and) two Universals. Each of these, says Aristotle, is combined in four ways, so that it may be subjoined to itself,⁵ and be put before three others; and thus there will be sixteen combinations in each form. Of these there are six that possess a power equally in all; two, when of Negatives either one precedes the other; but four, when of Particulars any one precedes itself, or is subjoined to another. For nothing can be concluded, whenever there are either two Particulars

¹ Here is evidently something defective. For it should be stated to what the indefinite proposition is united.

² MSS. Carnot. "octo et viginti" in lieu of "novem et viginti—" on which Floridus remarks that, as he cannot make out the number intended by Apuleius, he is in doubt as to the true reading; and so too is Ouden-dorp.

³ I have translated, as if the text were "particularis inferant quid: perquam enim ineptum est—" not "particulares inferant; quod per quam ineptum est—" For "particulares" in the plural could not be opposed to the preceding singular "universalis illationis:" nor could the infinitive "concludere" thus depend upon the parenthetical sentence, "quod perquam ineptum est—"

⁴ Compare the expression of Cicero, quoted in p. 392, n. 2, "cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere."

⁵ How a proposition can be said "to be subjoined to itself," as here, or "to precede itself," as just afterwards, I cannot understand; and the less so, as I do not know to what passage of Aristotle Apuleius is alluding.

or two Negatives. There remain then for each form ten combinations. Moreover out of these, as well in the first as second form, two possess no power, when an Universal Affirmative is placed before a Particular one. Similarly in both the first and second form two may be cut out, in which a Particular Negative precedes either of the Universals. From whence it arises that there remain of the first form six combinations, in nine modes; (and) still eight for the two remaining forms; of which there is one, that is proved in neither of them, when an Universal Negative precedes a Particular Affirmative. Of those seven, which remain, there are four in the second form peculiar (and) false, when an Universal Affirmative is united either to itself or to its Particular in any place, or when the other precedes. In like manner two in the third form are peculiar (and) possess no power, when either of the Negatives precedes an Universal Affirmative; but the remaining three in the second form, and five in the third, we have shown to be determinate, when we reduced them to six combinations of the first form. Hence out of forty-eight combinations fourteen alone are proved. The remaining thirty-four, which I have reckoned up, are rejected, because they are able to exhibit false conclusions from true premises; of which it is easy for any one to make a trial by means of the five significations mentioned above, of kind, peculiarity, &c. But of those fourteen, which we have proved, the inferences themselves show that there are not more modes than have been stated above, so that they may be received as well directly as inversely, as far as the very truth permits; and on that account their number cannot be increased.

SOME ACCOUNT
OF
THE DIALOGUES AND OF THE EPISTLES
OF
PLATO.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE edition of Plato to which the following remarks are constantly referred, is that printed by Henry Stephens in 1578, in three volumes folio. But almost every other edition may be used with equal convenience, as the pagination of Stephens is given in the margin.

PREFACE

BY MATTHIAS.

BEFORE the reader enters on the perusal of this section, it is proper that he should be informed of what he is to expect. When the editor first heard that the works of Plato had been the subject of Mr. Gray's serious and critical attention, and that he had illustrated them by an analysis and by ample annotations, his curiosity was raised to no ordinary height. When the names of Plato and of Gray, of the philosopher and of the poet, were thus united, it was difficult to set bounds to his, or indeed to any, expectation. But when the volume, containing these important remarks, was first delivered into his hands, his sensation at the time reminded him of that which was experienced by an eminent scholar, at his discovery of the darker and more sublime hymns which antiquity has ascribed to Orpheus. His words on that occasion are as pleasing and as interesting as the enthusiasm was noble which inspired them: "In abyssum quandam mysteriorum descendere videbar, quum silente mundo, solis vigilantibus astris et luna, *μελανήφαρος* istos hymnos in manus sumpsi."¹ Many a learned man will acknowledge, as his own, the feelings of this animated scholar.

It might, indeed, be conceived that, from the intense contemplation on the subjects offered to him by Plato, so full of dignity and so pregnant with the materials of thought, Mr. Gray might have indulged himself in a continuation of the discussions, by expanding still wider the exalted and diversified ideas of his sublime original. He had a spirit equal and adapted to such an exertion, and congenial with that of the philosopher; but it seems as if he had, on purpose, restrained his own powers and tempered their ardour. What he chiefly sought and aimed at, and what he indeed effected, was to exhibit the sobriety of truth, the importance of the doctrines, and the great practical effects of true philosophy on life, on manners, and on policy;

Ψυχῆς ὄμμα φαινέν ἐκείν βίβροιο τινάμεν.

He never for a moment deviated from his original; as he was desirous only to lay before himself and his reader the sum and substance of the

¹ See the Preface of Eschenbach to the *Argonautica*, the *Hymns*, &c. of Orpheus, edit. 1699.

dialogues as they are, when divested of the peculiar attractions which so powerfully recommend these conversations on the banks of the Ilyssus. As a scholar, and as a reflecting man, he sat down to give an account to himself of what he had read and studied; and he gave it in words of his own, without addition, without amplification, and without the admixture of any ideas with those of Plato. He made large and valuable remarks and annotations, drawn from the stores of his own unbounded erudition, with a felicity and an elegance which never lost sight of utility and of solid information, without the display of reading, or the encumbrance of pedantic research. He never pretended to have consulted manuscripts, but, whenever he thought that an alteration of the text was necessary, or when a passage appeared to him to be obscure or corrupted, he proposed his own conjectural emendation. Yet it is pleasing to know, that Mr. Gray neither despised nor depreciated the advantages which may be derived from minuter and more subtle verbal criticism, and from the rectifying, or from the restoration, of the text of any author by that steady light which shone full on Bentley, and which, in after times, descended upon Porson. What he proposed to himself, that he effected; and through the whole of these writings there is such a perspicuity of expression, an eloquence so temperate, a philosophic energy so calm and unaffected, and the train of the specific arguments in each composition is presented so entire and unbroken, that his spirit may be said to shine through them; and, in this point of view, the words of Alcinous to Ulysses have a peculiar force, when applied to Mr. Gray;

Σοὶ ἐν μὲν μορφῇ ἐπίων, ἐν δὲ φρήνες ἰσθλαί,
Μῦθον δ', ὡς ὁ τ' αἰοῖδος, πισταμένως κατέλεξας.¹

His illustrations from antiquity, and from history, are as accurate as they are various and extensive. When, for instance, we peruse many of his notes drawn from those sources, we have often, as it were, the memoirs of the time and the politics of Syracuse; and scarcely could a modern writer feel himself more at home in the reign of Charles the Second, than Mr. Gray in the court of Dionysius. Or, if we turn to subjects of a different nature, where shall we find a nobler specimen of judicious analysis, and of manly, eloquent, interesting, and animated composition, than in his account of the *Protagoras*? But it would be useless, or invidious, to specify particulars where all is excellent. It is a proud consideration for Englishmen, that Mr. Gray composed all his remarks in his own native tongue, and with words of power *unsphered the spirit of Plato*.

In an age like this, it would be superfluous to speak of the merits and the character of the great philosopher, who has found *such* a commentator. We all know, that when Cicero looked for the master and for the example of eloquence and of finished composition, he found that master and that example in Plato; and all succeeding times have confirmed his judgment.

Plato has certainly ever been, and ever will be, the favourite philosopher of great orators and of great poets. He was himself familiar with the father of all poetry. The language of Plato, his spirit, his animated

¹ *Odyss.* xi. 365.

reasoning, his copiousness, his invention, the rhythm and the cadence of his style, the hallowed dignity and the amplitude of his conceptions, and that splendour of imagination with which he illuminated every subject, and threw into the gloom of futurity the rays of hope and the expectations of a better life, have always endeared and recommended him to the good and to the wise of every age and of every nation. From the legitimate study of his works, from that liberal delight which they afford, and from the expanded views which they present, surely it cannot be apprehended that any reader should be "spoiled through philosophy and vain deceit."

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE WORKS OF PLATO

BY FLOYER SYDENHAM.

THE dialogues¹ of Plato are of various kinds, not only with regard to those different matters, which are the subjects of them, but in respect also of the manner in which they are composed or framed, and of the form under which they make their appearance to the reader. It will not therefore be improper to distinguish the several kinds; by dividing them, first, into the most general, and then, subdividing them into the subordinate kinds; till we come to those lower species, which particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective denominations.

The most general division of the writings of Plato is, into those of the sceptical, and into those of the dogmatical, kind. In the former, nothing is expressly either proved or asserted; as some

¹ Socrates, the hero of these dramatic dialogues, lived a private life at Athens; quiet and studious, yet in the highest degree social, deigning his converse and communicating his knowledge, in proper measure, to all sorts of people: in this city therefore must of course lie the ordinary scene of those conversations, in which Socrates presides, or hath a share. As however that wise man used much exercise, and died before his days of exercise were past, probability admits the scene to be now and then diversified, by being changed to the adjacent country. Nor is it in these cases either confined to one spot of ground, or in general only, and at large, rural; sometimes it opens into the walks round the city-walls, and, at other times, is lengthened along the way to some appendant sea-port or village: now it is widened into the fields and groves; and now winds along the banks of the Illyssus. Of those conversations which pass within the city, the particular spot is no less varied; here it is the open street; there the private house of one of the company; but oftenest one or other public place of general resort; the place of exchange, or some court of judicature; the place where the gymnastic exercises were used, or some school where they were taught: neither is the banquet-room nor the prison wanting, to complete the variety. But in every dialogue the exactest care is taken to adapt the scene as much as possible to the subject, and even in the same dialogue the scene is shifted, if the economy of the drama require the different parts of it to be disposed in different places. By all this diversification propriety is preserved, the fancy, which is fond of change, is entertained, and the speculative mind is presented with a true, that is, with a variegated picture of human life.

philosophical question only is considered and examined, and the reader is left to himself to draw such conclusions, and to discover such truths, as the philosopher means to insinuate. This is done either in the way of inquiry, or in that of controversy and of dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such dialogues, as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that is done, either indirectly, by involving them in difficulties and embarrassing the maintainers of them; or directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those dialogues, whose tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; which is effected, either by exciting to the pursuit of some part of wisdom and by showing in what manner to investigate it, or by leading the way and helping the mind forward in the search.

The dialogues of the other kind, namely, the dogmatical or didactic, teach explicitly some point of doctrine: and this they do, either by laying it down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the way of reason and of argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered sometimes by the speaker himself magisterially, and at other times as derived to him by tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of teaching, used by Plato, proceeds either through analytical reasoning, resolving things into their principles, and from known or allowed truths tracing out the unknown; or through induction, from a multitude of particulars inferring some general thing in which they all agree.

According to this division is framed the following scheme, or table:

DIALOGUES	SCEPTICAL	DISPUTATIVE	EMBARRASSING
		INQUISITIVE	CONFUTING
	DOGMATICAL	DEMONSTRATIVE	EXCITING
			ASSISTING
		AUTHORITATIVE	ANALYTICAL
			INDUCTUAL
			MAGISTERIAL
			TRADITIONAL

The philosopher, in thus varying his manner and diversifying his writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain the reader with their variety, nor to teach him, on different occasions, with more or less plainness and perspicuity, nor yet to insinuate different degrees of certainty in the doctrines themselves: but he takes this method as a consummate master of the art of composition in the dialogue-way of writing; and from the different characters of the speakers, as from different elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or from different ingredients in their mixture, he produces some peculiar genius and turn of temper, as it were, in each.

Socrates, indeed, is in almost all of them the principal speaker, but when he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist, when the modest wisdom and clear science of the one are contrasted with the confident ignorance and the blind opinionativeness of the other, dispute and controversy must of course arise; where the false pretender cannot fail of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient, if there be no other persons present, because such a man can never be confuted in his own opinion; but when there is an audience round them, in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist must be convicted and exposed.

In some dialogues, Plato represents his great master mixing in conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. When these persons happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is occasion given to the philosopher to call forth the latent seeds of wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the inquisitive genius of such dialogues; in which, by a seeming equality in the conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited, and that of the disciple is encouraged, and, by proper questions, the mind also is aided and forwarded in the search of truth.

At other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved understandings and of more enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering the reasons of things: for to such an audience truth, with all the demonstration possible in the teaching it, is due. Hence, in the dialogues composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or demonstrative genius: it is of the analytical kind, when the principles of mind or of science, the leading truths, are to be unfolded; and of the inductive kind, when any subsequent truth of the same rank with others, or any part of science, is meant to be displayed.

But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which kind is the doctrine of outward nature, being only hypothetical and a matter of opinion; the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional and a matter of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctive and the matter of obedience; the air of authority is then assumed: in the former cases, the doctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of ancient sages; but in the latter, it is magisterially pronounced with the authority of a legislator. That this turn may be given to such dialogues with propriety, and with justice to the character of the speakers, the reasoning Socrates is laid aside, or he only sustains some lower and obscure part; while that which is the principal, or the shining, part is allotted to some other philosopher, to whom

may properly be attributed a more authoritative manner; or to such an antiquary, as may be credited or may be deemed to have received the best information; or finally, to such a statesman or politician, as may fairly be presumed best qualified for making laws.

Thus much for the manner in which the dialogues of Plato are severally composed, and for the turn of genius which is given to them in their composition. The form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, is of three sorts: 1. Either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy or comedy; or, 2. Purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed to be committed to writing and communicated to some absent friend; or, 3. It is of the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where the story of things past is recited to some person present.

Having thus divided the dialogues of Plato, with respect to that inward form or composition, which creates their genius; and again with reference to that outward form, which marks them, like flowers and other vegetables, with a certain character; we are to make a further division of them, with regard to their subject and to their design, beginning with their design or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects chosen. The end of all the writings of Plato is that, which is the end of all true philosophy or wisdom, I mean, the perfection and the happiness of man. Man therefore is the general subject; and the first business of philosophy must be to inquire, what is that being, called man, who is to be made happy; and what is his nature, in the perfection of which is placed his happiness.

The philosopher considers man as a compound being, consisting of body and of soul, the superior part of which soul is mind, by which he is intimately connected with the divine nature, and of near kindred to it; while the inferior part is made up of passions and of affections, reducible all to two kinds, having all of them either pain or pleasure for their object: by means of which, and also of his body, he is outwardly related to the fellows of his own species, and is connected with them and with all outward nature. He is moved by some commanding power within him, the principle of action, commonly called Will; and when the motion, given by it, is right, and in a right direction, it moves him for his real good. The motion and the direction are both right, when the one is measured and the other dictated by right reason. The motion is thus measured, and the direction is thus dictated; or, in other words, the measure and the rule of a man's actions are agreeable to right reason, when the governing power within him (i. e. the reason of his own mind) harmonizes with reason universal: and this it does, when his mind sees things as they are, and partakes of truth; because truth is the standard of right reason, is the same in

every and in all mind, and is the perfection and the end of mind itself. By means of truth therefore, or by the knowledge of it, (for the mind is in possession of truth by knowing it,) is a man's reason empowered to govern him, and his will is enabled to move him, for his good. Now the power of so governing and of so moving him is man's virtue; the virtue of every thing being its power to produce, or to procure, some certain good. Thus the two great objects of the Platonic philosophy are truth and virtue; truth, which is the good of all mind; and virtue, which is the good of the whole man.

Every truth, in every particular science, is the relation of any two or more things, that is, of such things as are the subjects of that science; and in the knowledge of all of which that science consists. The subjects of every science are things in their real essences, or ideas; and truth universal comprehends all the relations of all the real essences of all things. These relations being eternal, absolute, and independent on any particular mind, the real essences of things themselves not only must always *be*, but must always have the same manner also of *being*; that is, they must be always uniform and invariable, not subject to the differences or to the changes of any thoughts concerning them, and must indeed be seated above the comprehension or the reach of any particular minds. Our ideas, when true, are the exact copies or perfect images of these essences; and when we know them to be such, and can resolve them into their principles, then have we true science, properly so called. It is the nature of the human soul to have these ideas generated in her, and to partake of mind eternal and immutable. Hence she is the offspring, and the image, of the divine nature; and hence, by a participation of that nature which is eternal, and whose principle is unity, she is herself indissoluble and immortal.

The resemblances of those real essences are also in outward things, serving first to excite in the soul those true ideas: but, because of the ever-changing and transient nature of such things, (those resemblances being uncertain,) they are no less apt to raise false fancies, and to give birth to erroneous opinions.

But besides these natural representations of things, there are others which are arbitrary; invented by men, in order to express, or to signify to each other, whatever they perceive, or fancy, or know, or think. These are words framed into propositions and discourses; in which we give an account of what we think, or would have others think. They are delivered in three ways: either, 1. In the way of reason, applying themselves to the understanding with pretensions to prove; or, 2. In the way of oratory, addressing the passions in order to persuade; or, 3. In the way of poetry, engaging the imagination with a view to please. The mind therefore is in danger of being seduced into error by words, in four

different ways: either, 1. By wrong names attributed to things, disguising thus their real nature; or, 2. By sophistical arts of reasoning, thus exhibiting falsehood in a dress like that of truth; or, 3. By the adulterated colours of rhetoric, deluding us; or, 4. By the fantastic figuring of poetry, enchanting us. In this manner does Plato warn his readers against the ways which lead aside into error; while he conducts his followers along the road of truth.

As to the other object of Platonic wisdom, namely, virtue, or the settled power in the soul of governing man rightly; when it is considered as adhering to its divine principle, truth, it takes the form of sanctity; when considered as presiding over every word and action, it has the nature of prudence; when it is employed in controlling and ordering the concupiscible part of the soul, or the affections and passions which regard pleasure, it is called temperance; and when it is engaged in composing and directing the irascible part of the soul, or the affections and passions relative to pain, it assumes the name of fortitude. And thus far it respects private good immediately, yet it also extends its influence to the good of others through the connexions of kindred nature and of social life.

But since every man is a member of some civil community, since he is linked with the fellows of his own species, and is related to every nature superior and divine, and is also a part of universal nature; he must always of necessity participate of the good and evil of every whole, greater as well as less, to which he belongs; and he has an interest in the well-being of every species with which he is connected. Virtue therefore, with immediate reference to the good of others, to the public good, to the general good of mankind, and to universal good, (yet remotely, and by way of consequence, affecting private good,) virtue, we say, as she regulates the conduct of man, in order to these ends, has the title given her of justice, (universal, or particular in all its various branches,) friendship, patriotism, humanity, equity, and piety, with every subordinate duty springing out of these.

But since, in order to effect thoroughly, and fully to accomplish, the good of any vital whole, there must be a conspiration and a co-operation of all the parts; there ought in every public body to be one mind or law presiding over, disposing, and directing all; that through all may run one spirit, and that in all one virtue may operate. To illustrate this, the idea is presented of a perfect commonwealth, and a just model is framed of public laws: and in this the nature of virtue is seen most godlike, that is, of herself most diffusive and productive of the most good in her making all happy, as she is political and legislative.

Thus all virtue is order and proportion, whether in the soul of man, or in a civil state; and by putting measure into all the manners, and into every action, whether of private or of public life, it

produces in them symmetry and beauty; for of these proportioned measure is the principle. Virtue can do this, because the rule, according to which the virtuous mind or the will governs, is beauty itself; and the science, through which she governs, is the science of that beauty: for truth and beauty concur in one; and wherever they are, there also is good found. The love of beauty then is nothing different from that first and leading motive in all minds to the pursuit of every thing, namely, that motive whence the philosopher sets out in his inquiry after wisdom, the desire of good. Thus the perfection of man consists in his similitude to this supreme beauty; and in his union with it is found his supreme good.

The dialogues of Plato, with respect to their subjects, may be divided, conformably to this sketch of their design, into the speculative and the practical, and into such as are of a mixed nature. The subjects of these last are either general, which comprehend both the others; or differential, which distinguish them. The general subjects are either fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy, and human nature, and the soul of man: those of the final kind are love, and beauty, and good. The differential subjects regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice, in which are considered two questions; one of which is, whether virtue is to be taught; the other is, whether error in the will depend on error in the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to words or to things: of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric, and poetry: of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of mind, and outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private conduct and to the government of the mind over the whole man, or to his duty towards others in his several relations, or to the government of a civil state and to the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three heads the particular subjects practical rank in order; namely, virtue in general, sanctity, temperance, and fortitude; justice, friendship, patriotism, and piety; the ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state, and law in general; and lastly, those rules of government and of public conduct which constitute the civil laws.

Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is, a comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct, view of Plato's writings, it has been attempted to exhibit to him their just and natural distinctions; whether he choose to consider them with regard to their inward form or essence, or to their outward form or appearance, or to their matter or their end, that is, with regard to their genius, to their character, to their subject, and to their design.

ON THE WRITINGS OF PLATO.

BRIEF NOTICES

OF SOCRATES AND OF HIS FRIENDS.

SOCRATES.

ALL which Socrates possessed was not worth three minæ, in which he reckons a house he had in the city.¹ Critobulus often prevailed upon him to accompany him to the comedy.² Xantippe, his wife, the most ill-tempered of women: he made use of her to exercise his philosophy.³ He amused himself by dancing when he was fifty years old: his face remarkably ugly, and resembling that of the Sileni or satyrs, with large prominent eyes, a short flat nose turned up, wide nostrils, great mouth, &c., nick-named *ὁ Φορτιστής*.⁴ He rarely went out of the walls of Athens;⁵ was never out of Attica, but when he served in time of war, and once to the Isthmian games.⁶ He was seventy years old when he died.⁷ He left three sons, the eldest a youth, the two youngest children. His intrepid and cheerful behaviour at his trial and death.⁸ Compared to a torpedo.⁹ Called Prodicus, the sophist, his master.¹⁰ Learns, at near fifty years of age, to play on the lyre of Connus, son of Metrobius.¹¹ His mother, Phænarete, married Chæredemus, and had by him a son named Patrocles.¹² Seldom used to bathe, and commonly went barefooted.¹³ He could bear great quantities of wine without being overpowered by it, but did not choose to drink voluntarily.¹⁴

¹ Xenophon, *Oeconomic.* ² *Id.* *Eod.* ³ *Id.* *Sympos.* ⁴ *Eod.*
⁵ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 230. ⁶ *Id.* *Crito.* ⁷ *Ibid.* ⁸ Plato, *Apolog.*
and *Phædo*; Xenophon, *Memorabil.* ⁹ Plato, *Menon*, p. 80. ¹⁰ Plato,
Menon, p. 98. ¹¹ *Id.* *Euthydem.* p. 272. ¹² *Id.* *Euthydem.* p. 297.
¹³ *Plat.* *Sympos.* ¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 214, 220.

THE COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES.

CRITOULUS.

A MAN of fortune; his estate was worth above eight talents, which in Athens was very considerable. Had served the offices of gymnasiarch, choregus, &c., the most expensive of the city. Of an amorous disposition; negligent of economy; a lover of dramatic spectacles; he married a very young, inexperienced woman, with whom he conversed very little:¹⁴ he was present at the entertainment given by Callias to Autolycus, Socrates, and others, and at that time was newly married. OL. 89, 4. He was remarkable for his beauty; his fine panegyric on it: was passionately fond of Clinias. Crito, the father of the latter, introduced him to the acquaintance of Socrates, that he might cure him of this passion.¹⁵

ISCHOMACHUS.

HE was called in Athens, by way of pre-eminence, ὁ καλὸς ἀγαθός; he married a young maid under fifteen years of age, whom he educated and instructed himself. His first serious conversation with her, related by him to Socrates, on the duties of a mistress of a family. The order and arrangement of his house described: his morning exercises, walk to his villa, and ride from thence. He was a remarkably good horseman, of a vigorous constitution, and lasting health; was one of the richest men in Athens. His instruction and treatment of his slaves; his knowledge in agriculture. His father before him was a great lover of that art.¹⁷ He meddled not much in public affairs:¹⁸ was believed, while he lived, to be worth above seventy talents: but at his death he left not twenty, to be divided between his two sons.¹⁹

CALLIAS.

His genealogy: . . . Phænippus

Callias²⁰ ὁ Δαδοῦχος.

Hipponicus²¹

Callias²²

Hipponicus²³

Callias — Hipparete — Alcibiades.

¹⁴ Xenophon, *Æconomic*. ¹⁵ Id. *Sympos*. ¹⁷ Xenophon, *Æconomicus*.
¹⁸ Id. *Eod*. ¹⁹ Lysias, *Orat. de bonis Aristophanis*, 348. ²⁰ Dictus
 ὁ Δακκόπλουτος. Herod. v. Plutarch in Aristide. Scol. in Demosthen. p.
 393. Victor Celeste Ol. 54. ²¹ Dictus Ammon. Athenæus, l. xii. Plut.
 de Malign. Herodoti. ²² ὁ Δακκόπλουτος, uti et avus. Plut. in Aristide.
 Herodot. vii. Demosth. de Fals. Legat. ²³ Qui ad Delium occubuit, Ol.
 89, 1. Thucyd.—Plut. Alcib. Andocides in Alcibiadem.

Callias was in love with Autolycus, the son of Lyco, who gained the victory (while yet a boy) in the Pancratiun during the greater Panathenæa, OL. 89, 4, upon which occasion Callias gave an entertainment to his friends²¹ at his house in the Piræus. He had been scholar to the sophists Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus; was very wealthy; and had learned the art of memory from Hippias of Elis, at the recommendation of Antisthenes. He was Ἰσοκράτης of the Lacedæmonians who came to Athens; was hereditary priest of the Eleusinian deities, ὁ Ἀεθούης; was remarkable for his nobility and the gracefulness of his person;²² he had two sons, who were instructed by Evenus, the Parian sophist;²³ he entertained Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, and other sophists, their companions, in his house, OL. 90, 1.²⁴

NICERATUS.

He was son to the famous Nicias; was present at the symposium of Callias, OL. 89, 4, and then newly married. He could repeat by heart the whole Iliad and Odyssey, and had been scholar to Stesimbrotus and Anaximander. He was very wealthy and somewhat covetous; was fond of his wife, and beloved by her;²⁵ was scholar to Damon, the famous musician, who had been recommended to his father by Socrates;²⁶ and finally, he was put to death by order of the Thirty, with his uncle Eucrates.²⁷

ANTISTHENES.

He was extremely poor, but with a contempt of wealth; was present in the symposium of Callias, where he proved that riches and poverty are in the mind alone, and not in externals. His way of life was easy and contented: he passed whole days in the company of Socrates, who taught him (he says) to be mentally rich. He was much beloved in the city, and his scholars were esteemed by the public. He recommended Prodicus and Hippias the Elean to Callias;²⁸ bore great affection to Socrates, and was present at his death.²⁹

CHÆREPHON.

A man of warmth and eagerness of temper;³⁰ he was a friend to the liberties of the people; he fled to and returned with Thrasybulus; he died before Socrates's trial, for he is mentioned in Socrates's Apology, as then dead, and in the Gorgias, as then living:

²¹ Xenophon, Symposium; Athenæus, v. p. 216.

²² Ibid.

²³ Plato, Apolog.

²⁴ Plato, Protagoras.

²⁵ Xenophon, Sympos.

²⁶ Plato in Lachetæ.

²⁷ Xenophon, Gr. Hist. ii. Andocides de Mysterior.

²⁸ Xenophon, Sympos.

²⁹ Plato, Phæd.

³⁰ Vid. Charmidem, p. 153.

his death must therefore have happened between Ol. 93, 4, and Ol. 95, 1. He consulted the Delphian oracle to know if any man were wiser than Socrates. His brother, Chærecrates, survived him.³⁴

EPIGENES.

He was the son of Antipho of Cephisia:³⁵ and was present at the death of Socrates.³⁶

APOLLODORUS.

He was brother to Aiantodorus:³⁷ was a man of small abilities, but of an excellent heart, and remarkable for the affection he bore to Socrates;³⁸ he was present in the prison at the time of his death.³⁹ He lived at Phalerus, of which *Δῆμος* he was;⁴⁰ was but a boy when Socrates was fifty-three years old, and must therefore have been under thirty-seven at the time of Socrates's death. He was called *Μαυρός* from the warmth of his temper.

PHÆDO.

He was an Elean. See his account of Socrates's last moments.⁴¹

SIMMIAS.

He was a Theban, and a young man at the time of Socrates's death (as was Cebes), at which they were both present. He had received some tincture of the Pythagorean doctrines from Philolaus of Crotona; and was inquisitive and curious in the search of truth, far above all prejudice and credulity.⁴²

CEBES.

He was a Theban. (Vid. Simmiam.)

HERMOGENES.

He was a man of piety, and believed in divination. He was present in Callias's symposium; was a person of great honesty, mild, affable, and soberly cheerful:⁴³ not rich, and a man of few words;⁴⁴ was son to Hipponicus and brother to Callias.⁴⁵ He was present at the death of Socrates.⁴⁶

³⁴ Apol. Socrat. ³⁵ Plato, Apol. ³⁶ Phædo. ³⁷ Apol. Socrat.
³⁸ Phædo. ³⁹ Id. ⁴⁰ Plato, Sympos. ⁴¹ Plato, Phædo. ⁴² Plato,
Phædo. ⁴³ Xenoph. Sympos. ⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 391 and 408. ⁴⁵ Plato,
Cratylus. ⁴⁶ Plato, Phædo.

CHARMIDES.

He had a considerable estate in lands before the Peloponnesian war, which he thence entirely lost, and was reduced to great poverty. He was present at the symposium of Callias, where he discoursed on the advantages and pleasures of being poor. He ran at the stadium, at Nemea, contrary to Socrates's advice.* He was of extreme beauty when a youth.^a

ÆSCHYLUS.

He was of Phlius, and was introduced by Antisthenes to Socrates.

CRITO.

He was father to Critobulus; was of Alopecæ, and about the same age with Socrates.* He made the proposal to contrive the escape of Socrates out of prison, and to send him into Thessaly;^a he attended him daily in his confinement, and at the time of his death; he received his last orders; he closed his eyes, and took care of his funeral.^a

* Plato, Theages.

^a Id. Crito.

* Plato, Charmid.

^a Id. Phædo.

* Plato, Apolog.

PHÆDRUS.

THIS is supposed to be the first dialogue which Plato wrote, according to Diogen. Laert. iii. 38. Dionysius Halicarnassus (ii. 270, ed. Hudson) calls it one of his most celebrated discourses; and from it he produces examples both of the beauty and of the blemishes of Plato's style, which is all purity, all grace, and perspicuity; and he remarks that he sometimes rises to a true sublimity, and sometimes falls into an ungraceful redundancy of words and of ill-suited figures, ungraceful and obscure.

There is a good analysis of the Phædrus by the Abbé Sallier, wherein he shows its true subject and intention. It is upon eloquence, and is designed to demonstrate, that no writer, whether legislator, orator, historian, or poet, can do any thing excellent without a foundation of philosophy. The title prefixed to it, "On the Beautiful," cannot be genuine. It has no other relation to it, than that beauty is accidentally the theme of Socrates's second little oration, which is contained in this dialogue; not that it is, directly, even the subject of that, for the tendency of it is to prove, that a person ought to gratify rather the party who loves, than the one who does not, as the two preceding orations were to show the contrary. These are what Diogenes Laertius calls questions of a juvenile kind, though he may mean it of the whole dialogue, which is something juvenile and full of vanity, and such, Dionysius very justly says, was the character of Plato.

The Socratic dialogues are a kind of drama, wherein the time, the place, and the characters are almost as exactly marked as in a true theatrical representation. Phædrus here is a young man particularly sensible to eloquence and to fine writing, and thence a follower and an admirer of the famous Lysias, whose reputation was then at its height in Athens. He had been sitting the greatest part of the morning at the house of Epicrates, near the Olympium, to hear Lysias recite a discourse; and, having procured a copy of it, is meditating upon it with pleasure, as he walks without the city walls, where Socrates meets him. To avoid the heat of the day they retire to the shade of an ancient plane-tree, that over-shadows a fane of Achelœus and the Nymphs on the banks of a rivulet, which discharges itself at a little distance into the Ilyssus. The spot lay less than a quarter of a mile above the bridge, which led over the river to the temple of Diana Agræa. Here they

pursue their conversation during the hours of noon, till the sun grows lower and the heat becomes more mild.

We may nearly fix the year when this conversation is supposed to have happened. Lysias was now at Athens; he arrived there from Thurii in Italy in the forty-seventh year of his age, OL 92, 1. Euripides is also mentioned as still in the city; he left it to go into Macedonia, OL 92, 4, and, consequently, it must have happened in some year of that Olympiad, probably the 2nd or 3rd, and Plato must have written it in less than ten years afterwards, for his Lysis was written before the death of Socrates, which was OL 95, 1, but the Phædrus was still earlier, being his first composition; so he was between twenty and twenty-nine years of age.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 231, § 12. In my request.] What he desired, will appear but too plainly in the course of these little orations, and must appear a most strange subject of conversation for Socrates, to all who are unacquainted with the manners of Greece. The President de Montesquieu has observed, but too justly, on the nature of their love and gallantry. *Esprit des Loix*, v. 1. See also Xenoph. *CEconomic* and *Symposium*; and the *Symposium* of Plato; see also de *Legib.* i. 636.

P. 231, § 13. The law.] There were, indeed, laws of great severity in Athens against this vice; but who should put them in force in such general and shocking depravity?

P. 235. Nothing from myself. Παρά γὰρ ἑμαυτοῦ οὐδέν.] It is observable, that Socrates, whenever he would discourse affirmatively on any subject, or when he thought proper to raise and adorn his style, does it not in his own person, but assumes the character of another. Thus, for instance, he relates the beautiful fable between Virtue and Pleasure after Prodicus; he treats of the miseries of human life in the words of the same sophist; he describes the state of souls after death from the information of Gobryas, one of the Magi; he makes a panegyric on wine in the style of Gorgias; and here he does not venture to display his eloquence, till the Nymphs and the Muses have inspired him. This is consistent with that character of simplicity and of humility which he assumed.

P. 241. Ὀσπράκου μεταπρόβντος.] A proverb, taken from a game in use among children, called Ὀσπράκινδα, described by Jul. Pollux, ix. 154, and by Eustathius. They were divided into two parties, which fled or pursued each other alternately, as the chance of a piece of broken potsherd, thrown up into the air, determined it: the boy who threw it cried out Νεῖξ ἢ Ἡμίπα; if the black (or pitched) side came uppermost, his party ran away, and the other gave them chase; if the white one, the others ran, and they pursued them. Hence Ὀσπράκου Περιπροπή was used to describe a total reverse of fortune. Erasmus, in his *Adagia*, has not explained it well.

P. 257. A pleasant bend.] Erasmus explains it in his *Adagia*,

Εὐφημία φέρεται, as though in a part of a river, where there was a long and dangerous winding, the sailors used this piece of flattery by way of propitiating the Nile; but this does not fully clear up the passage here. That this proverb was so used may appear from the words of Athenæus, xii. 516, Τὸν τόπον καλοῦσι Γυναικῶν ἀγῶνα, γλυκὺν ἀγκῶνα: "they call the place of the women's contest 'pleasant bend;'" which last may mean, a specious term to cover their ignominy. Casaubon does not explain it: here it seems applied to such as speak one thing and mean another.

P. 259, § 90. Falling asleep.] The Greeks usually slept at noon in summer, as it is still the custom in Italy and Spain, and in other hot countries.

P. 259, § 91. τερρίγων.] The tettix, in Latin "cicada," is an animal with wings, the size of a man's thumb, of a dark brown colour, which sits on the trees and sings, that is, makes a noise like a cricket; but much more shrill, and without any intervals, which grows louder as the sun grows hotter. Some supposed it to live on the air, others, on dew only. It does in reality live on the exudations of plants, having a proboscis, like flies, to feed with; but is capable of living a long time, like many of the insect race, without any nourishment at all. The tettigometra, which is this creature in its intermediate state between a worm and a fly, was esteemed a delicacy to eat by the Greeks.

P. 261. The Eleatic Palamedes.] Quintilian, iii. 1—10, informs us, that the person here meant is Alcidamas of Elea. Diogen. Laert. ix. 25, takes it to be meant of Zeno Eleates, who is looked upon as the inventor of disputation and of logic, and who was at Athens when Socrates was not above eight years old, that is, above fifty years earlier than the time of this dialogue; but his contemporary Empedocles was the first who cultivated rhetoric as an art, and taught it to Gorgias, who published a book on that subject.

P. 270. Νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας.] He (i. e. Anaxagoras) attributed the disposition of the universe to an intelligent cause, or mind, whence he himself was called Νοῦς. He was nearly of the same age with Pericles, and came to Athens Ol. 75, 1, where he passed about thirty years.

P. 275. This discourse of Thamus (or Jupiter Ammon) on the uses and inconveniences of letters is excellent; and he gives a lively image of a great scholar, that is, of one who searches for wisdom in books alone.

LYSIS.

THERE is no circumstance in this dialogue to inform us when it happened; but it is certain that Plato wrote it when he was yet a young man, before OL. 95, 1, for Socrates heard it read. The scene of it is in a Palæstra, then newly built, a little without the walls of Athens, near the fountain of Panops, between the Academia and the Lycæum. The interlocutors are, Socrates; Hippothales and Ctesippus, two young men of Athens; Lysis, a boy of noble birth and fortune, beloved by Hippothales; and Menexenus, also a boy, and cousin to Ctesippus, and friend to Lysis. The characters are, as usual, elegantly drawn; but what is the end or meaning of the whole dialogue, I do not pretend to say. It turns upon the nature and definition of friendship. Socrates starts a hundred notions about it, and confutes them all himself; nothing is determined, the dialogue is interrupted and there is an end. Perhaps a second dialogue was designed on the same subject and never executed. As to all the mysteries which Serranus has discovered in it, they are mere dreams of his own.

The first part of this dialogue is of that kind called *Μαυριώδης*, "Obstetrical," and the second part, *Παρασκευώδης*, "Tentative."

N. B. The discourse with Menexenus is intended to correct a boy of a bolder and more forward nature than Lysis, by showing him that he knows nothing; and leaves him in the opinion of his own ignorance. The second title of the dialogue is a false or an incorrect one, for friendship is only by accident a part of it. The intent of the whole seems to be, to show in what manner we should converse with young people according to their different dispositions.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 204—211. Thus far the dialogue is very easy and elegant, particularly the short conversation with Lysis, which is an example how children of fortune and family ought to be treated, in order to correct that arrogance which those advantages are apt to inspire, and to win them gradually to reflection and good sense.

P. 206. The *Hermæa*.] A festival celebrated in all the places of education for boys. We see here how little the severe laws of Solon on this head were observed, which particularly forbade grown persons to be admitted on that occasion, as we learn from *Æschin.* in *Timarch.*

P. 211. "Ορνυα.] The passion of the Athenians for fighting quails and game-cocks is well known. See Plutarch in Alcibiade.

P. 214. The wisest.] Empedocles, perhaps, who ascribed the first formation of things to this friendship, "Ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότῳ συνίρχομεν αὖ ἐν παντί, &c. as stated in Diogen. Laert. viii. 76, or Anaxagoras, who taught that the Universe was made up of small bodies consisting of similar particles, as we learn from Diogen. Laert. ii. 8.

P. 219. After drinking hemlock.] A quantity of wine, drunk after the cicuta, "hemlock," was believed to prevent its mortal effects.

P. 223. It was late.] It was a law of Solon, that school-rooms were to be closed before sunset.

ALCIBIADES I.

THE title expressing the subject of this dialogue (like that of Lysis) is wrong. Dacier rightly observes, that the titles are commonly nothing to the purpose; but he is strangely mistaken in saying, they are of modern invention, and that Diogenes Laertius makes no mention of them. That author actually mentions them all, and from his account they appear to be more ancient than Thrasyllus, who lived probably under Augustus and Tiberius, and who seemingly took them to be all of Plato's own hand.

The true subject certainly is, to demonstrate the necessity of knowing one's self, and that, without this foundation, all other acquisitions in science are not only useless, but pernicious.

The time of this dialogue is towards the end of Alcibiades' nineteenth year, which (as Dodwell reckons) is Ol. 87, 1. Socrates was then about thirty-nine years old.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 106. To mount the platform.] Boys when they had undergone the *δοκιμασία*, "Scrutiny," before the Thesmothetæ, who presided in the court of Heliaæ, see Lysias in Diogeiton. p. 508 and 515; Aristoph. Vesp. 576; and Antiphont. de cæde Choreutæ, p. 143, ed. Steph.; and were enrolled among the men, though they were for a year excused from undertaking all *ἀστροπύια*, "Public Duties," seem to have been at liberty, at this time of the republic, to vote and speak in the assembly of the people. Therefore, Potter (Archæolog. i. 17) is not correct when he affirms that they could not speak there, who were under thirty years of age. They could not indeed be chosen into the senate, &c. till that age.

P. 106. *Γράμματα καὶ καθάριζαν.*] The usual education of the Athenian children from seven years old to fifteen. See *Æschines de Axioco*, p. 94, ed. Le Clerc, and *Aristoph.* in *Nubibus*, vs. 961.

P. 122, § 37. There is a care to not one of the Athenians.] Of old the court of Areopagus were inspectors of the education of youth. The members of it divided that care among them, and each of them in his province took note of such fathers as gave not their children an education suitable to their fortune and way of life, as *Isocrates* shows at large in his beautiful Areopagitic oration. At what time their vigilance on this head began to decline, I cannot fix; but it was probably towards the beginning of the administration of *Pericles*, when the authority of that venerable body was lessened and restrained by *Ephialtes*, that is, before Ol. 80, 1; yet I find the form of the thing still continued, though not the force of it: for *Æschines*, in *Axioch.* p. 367, § 8, speaking of the discipline young men were subject to, from about the age of eighteen to twenty, says that "The whole period of youth is under Moderators, and the selection of those who are placed over youths by the council of the Areopagus. The "Sophronists" here mentioned, are distinct from the Areopagites; being the name of a magistracy described in *Etymolog. Magn.* in *Σοφρονιστῆραι*, as certain officers, chosen by votes, ten in number, one for each ward, who have the care over the temperate conduct of youths.

P. 122, § 39. Already for many generations.] We are not told, I believe, by any other writer, that the use of money was so early introduced into Lacedæmon; but there is a passage of *Posidonius* in *Athenæus*, vi. 233, that throws light on the subject. *Plutarch* says, that money was not even allowed for the uses of the state, till after the siege of Athens and its surrender to *Lysander*, when that point was carried after a great struggle; although, at the same time, it was made capital to apply it to private occasions. This happened twenty-seven years after the date of this dialogue.

ALCIBIADES II.

THIS is a continuation of the same subject; for what is said on prayer is rather accidental, and only introductory to the main purpose of the dialogue. It is nothing inferior in elegance to the former. Some have attributed it to Xenophon, but it is undoubtedly Plato's, and designed as a second part to the former.

I could be glad if it were as easy to fix the time of it, as Dacier would persuade us, who boldly fixes it Ol. 93, 1, but there are facts alluded to in it, that will neither be reconciled to that date, nor indeed to one another; and besides, it is better to allow Plato to be guilty of these inaccuracies in chronology, than of those improprieties of character which must be the consequences of Dacier's supposition. It is plain that Socrates continues, as in the preceding discourse, to treat Alcibiades with a certain gentle superiority of understanding, and that he prescribes to, and instructs him in, a manner extremely proper to form the mind of a youth just entering into the world, but ill-bred and impertinent to a man of forty years of age, who had passed through the highest dignities of the state and through the most extraordinary reverses of fortune. Plato himself may convince us of this, by what he makes Socrates say in the first Alcibiades, p. 127, § 48: "But now you ought to take courage. For if you had perceived that you were suffering so at the age of fifty, it would have been difficult to take care of yourself. But now you are at the very time of life, when it is meet for you to perceive it."

The principal difficulties are that he speaks of Pericles as yet living, who died Ol. 87, 4, and of the murder of Archelaus king of Macedon as a fact then recent, which did not happen till Ol. 95, 1, the same year with Socrates's death, and near five years after that of Alcibiades.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 141. Τα παιδία.] Craterus conspired with Hellenocrates and Decannichus to murder that prince, (Archelaus of Macedonia,) as he was hunting. Aristotle calls him Cratæus, and gives a fuller account of this conspiracy than any other author. Aristot. Politic. v. 10. Archelaus had promised him one of his daughters in marriage, for he had two, but gave one to the king of Elimeia and the other to his own son Amyntas.

Hellenocrates was a Lariſſean who had likewise been ſubſervient to the king's pleaſures.

P. 148. Sacrifices the moſt numerous.] The Athenians were remarkably ſumptuous in their temples and public worſhip, beyond any other people. Two months in the year were taken up entirely in theſe ſolemnities. See Schol. on Ariſtoph. in Vesp. vs. 655, and Xenoph. Rep. Athen. p. 699.

P. 150. It is he of whoſe care you are the object.] Socrates may either mean the Divinity here, as in the former dialogue, Alcibiad. I. p. 122, § 37; for it was the character of Socrates to aſſume nothing to himſelf, but all to the demon, who directed him, whom he calls his, *ἑρμηνεύς*, "Guardian;" or Socrates may here mean himſelf, as I rather think. Some Chriſtian writers indeed would give a very extraordinary turn to this part of the dialogue, as though Plato meant to prove the neceſſity of a Revelation. But I can ſee no ſuch mysteries in it. Socrates has proved that we are neither fit to deal with mankind, till we know them by knowing ourſelves; nor to addreſs ourſelves to the Divine power, till we know enough of his nature to know what we owe him: what that nature is, he defers examining till another opportunity, which is done to raiſe the curioſity and impatience of the young Alcibiades, and to avoid that prolixity, into which a diſquiſition ſo important would have naturally led him.

THEAGES.

DEMODOCUS of Anagyrus, an old Athenian who had paſſed with reputation through the higheſt offices of the ſtate, and now, after the manner of his anceſtors, lived chiefly on his lands in the country, employed in agriculture and ruſtic amuſements, brings with him to Athens his ſon Theages, a youth impatient to improve himſelf in the arts then in vogue, and to ſhine among his companions who ſtudied eloquence,¹ and practiſed politics, as ſoon as ever their age would permit them to appear in the popular aſſemblies.

Socrates, at the father's deſire, enters into converſation with the young man, and decoys him by little and little into a confeſſion that he wanted to be a great man, and to govern his fellow citizens.

¹ Ariſtophanes ridicules in many places this turn of the age in which he lived. Reading, and the knowledge of the Belles Lettres, having more generally diffuſed itſelf through the body of the people, than it had done hitherto, had an ill effect on the manners of a nation naturally vain and lively. Every one had a ſmattering of eloquence and of reaſoning, and every one would make a figure and govern; but no one would be governed: the authority of age and of virtue was loſt and overborne, and wit and a fluency of words ſupplied the place of experience and of common ſenſe.

After diverting himself with the *naïveté* of Theages, he proposes ironically several sophists of reputation, and several famous statesmen, who were fit to instruct him in this grand art: but as it does not appear that the disciples of those sophists, or even the sons of those statesmen, have been much the better for their lessons, both Demodocus and Theages entreat and insist that Socrates himself would admit him to his company and favour him with his instructions. The philosopher very gravely tells them stories of his demon, without whose permission he undertakes nothing, and upon whom it entirely depends, whether his conversation shall be of any use, or not, to his friends; but at last he acquiesces, if Theages cares to make the experiment.

The scene of the dialogue is in the portico, described by Pausanias, i. 3, of Jupiter the Deliverer, in the Ceramicus, the principal street of Athens; and the time Ol. 92, 3-4, during the expedition of Thrasyllus, in which he was defeated at Ephesus by the Persians and other allies of Sparta. Socrates was then sixty years old.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 125. Callicreté.] The poem of Anacreon on Callicreté the daughter of Cyane, is now lost. Dacier seriously imagines that she was a female politician, like Aspasia. But it is more agreeable to Anacreon's gallantry, that we should suppose the seat of tyranny was only in her face.

P. 129. Κλειτόμαχον ἰπίσθαι.] This assassination of Nicias, the son of Heroscamander, by Philemon and Timarchus, and the condemnation of the latter with Euathlus, who had given him shelter, is not recounted in any other author.

EUTHYPHRO.

SOCRATES,¹ about the time that an accusation had been preferred against him for impiety in the court of the Βασιλεὺς,² second Archon,

¹ Ol. 95, 1.

² Impeachments for murder were laid in the court of the Βασιλεὺς, but not tried till four months after in the court of Areopagus, where the Βασιλεὺς had himself a vote. The cause was judged in the open air, for all such as were (ὁμορόφιοι) under the same roof with the defendant were thought to partake of his guilt. The accuser gave him immediate notice not to approach the forum, the assembly, the temples, or the public games, and in that state he continued, till he was acquitted of the crime. See

called "king," meets while he is walking in the portico, where that magistrate used to sit in judgment, with Euthyphro, a person deeply versed in the knowledge of religious affairs, as sacrifices, oracles, divinations, and such matters, and full of that grave kind of arrogance which these mysterious sciences use to inspire. His father, having an estate in the isle of Naxos, had employed among his own slaves a poor Athenian who worked for hire. This man, having drunk too much, had quarrelled with and actually murdered one of the slaves. Upon which, the father of Euthyphro apprehended and threw him into a jail, till the *Ἐξηγῆται*,¹ Interpreters, had been consulted, in order to know what should be done. The man, not having been taken much care of, died in his confinement: upon which Euthyphro determines to lodge an indictment against his own father for murder. Socrates, surprised at the novelty of such an accusation, inquires into the sentiments of Euthyphro with regard to piety and the service of the gods, by way of informing himself on that subject against the time of his trial, and by frequent questions, entangling him in his own concessions, and forcing him to shift from one principle and definition to another, soon lays open his ignorance, and shows that all his ideas of religion were founded on childish fables and on arbitrary forms and institutions.

The intention of the dialogue seems to be, to expose the vulgar notions of piety, founded on traditions unworthy of the Divinity, and employed in propitiating him by puerile inventions and by the vain ceremonies of external worship, without regard to justice and to those plain duties of society, which alone can render us truly worthy of the Deity.

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

PLATO was himself present at the trial of Socrates, being then about twenty-nine years of age; and he was one of those who offered to speak in his defence, though the court would not suffer him to proceed, and to be bound as a surety for the payment of his fine: yet we are not to imagine, that this oration was the real de-

Antipho Orat. de cæde Herodis, and de cæde Chæreutæ. Informations might also (as it seems) be laid in the court of Helisia before the Theomothetæ.

¹ The *Ἐξηγῆται* at Athens, like the Pontifices at Rome, were applied to, when any prodigy had happened, or any violent death, to settle the rites of expiation, or to propitiate the manes of the dead.

fence which Socrates made. Dionysius Halicarnassus says, that it "never saw even the door of the Judgment-Hall, nor of the Agora, but was written with some other design;" and what that design was, he explains himself by saying, that, under the cover of an apology, it is a delicate satire on the Athenians, a panegyric on Socrates, and a pattern and character of the true philosopher. Nevertheless, it is founded on truth; it represents the true spirit and disposition of Socrates, and many of the topics used in it are agreeable to those which we find in Xenophon, and which were doubtless used by Socrates himself; as where he mentions his demon, and the reasons he had for preferring death to life, his account of the oracle given to Chærepho, and the remarkable allusion to Palamedes, &c., the ground-work is manifestly the same though the expressions are different. In one thing only they seem directly to contradict each other: Xenophon says, he neither offered himself any thing in mitigation of his punishment, nor would suffer his friends to do so, looking upon this as an acknowledgment of some guilt. If the word in the text, *ἰπομιᾶσθαι*, means that he would not submit to ask for a change of his sentence into banishment, or perpetual imprisonment, so far it is agreeable to Plato, p. 37; but if it means, that he would not suffer any mulct himself, nor permit his friends to mention it, we see the contrary, p. 38, where he fines himself one mina, all he was worth, and where his friends Crito, Critobulus, Plato, and Apollodorus, offer thirty minæ, (£96 17s. 6d.,) which was, I suppose, all they could raise, to save him. Now this being a fact, at that time easily proved or disproved, I am of opinion that Plato never would have inserted into his discourse a manifest falsity, and, therefore, we are to take Xenophon's words in that restrained sense which I have mentioned.

Potter says, that from the nature of the crime *Ἀσέβεια*, "Impiety," it is evident that the trial was before the court of Areopagus. But I take the contrary to be evident from the style both here and in Xenophon. He always addresses his judges by the name of *Ἄνδρες*, "Men," or *Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*, "Men of Athens;" whereas the form of speaking either to the Areopagites or to the senate of Five Hundred was constantly *ὦ Βουλῇ*, "Oh! thou the Council:" and in the courts of justice, *Ἄνδρες Δικασταί*, "Jurymen," or sometimes *Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*, "Men of Athens," or *Ἄνδρες*, "Men," alone: he therefore was judged in some of these courts.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 32. *Ἐβουλευσα δέ.*] Socrates was in the senate of Five Hundred, Ol. 93, 3, being then sixty-five years of age. The Prytanes presided in the assemblies of the people, were seated in the place of honour,

The reasoning part is far inferior, sometimes weak, sometimes false, too obscure, too abstracted, to convince us of any thing; yet with a mixture of good sense and with many fine observations. The fabulous account of a future state is too particular and too fantastic an invention for Socrates to dwell upon at such a time, and has less decorum and propriety in it than the other parts of the dialogue.

Socrates attempts in this dialogue to prove that true philosophy is but a continual preparation for death; its daily study and practice being to wean and separate the body from the soul, whose pursuit of truth is perpetually stopped and impeded by the numerous avocations, the little pleasures, pains, and necessities of its companion. That, as death is but a transition from its opposite, life, (in the same manner as heat is from cold, weakness from strength, and all things, both in the natural and in the moral world, from their contraries,) so life is only a transition from death; whence he would infer the probability of a metempsychosis. That, such propositions, as every one assents to at first, being self-evident, and no one giving any account how such parts of knowledge, on which the rest are founded, were originally conveyed to our mind, there must have been a pre-existent state, in which the soul was acquainted with these truths, which she recollects and assents to on their recurring to her in this life. That, as truth is eternal and immutable, and not visible to our senses, but to the soul alone; and as the empire, which she exercises over the body, bears a resemblance to the power of the Divinity, it is probable that she, like her object, is everlasting and unchangeable, and, like the office she bears, something divine. That, it cannot be, as some have thought, merely a harmony resulting from a disposition of parts in the body, since it directs, commands, and restrains the functions of that very body. That, the soul, being the cause of life to the body, can never itself be susceptible of death; and that, there will be a state of rewards and punishments, the scene of which he takes pains in describing, though he concludes, that no man can tell exactly where or what it shall be.

Dacier's superstition and folly are so great in his notes on the Phædo, that they are not worth dwelling upon.

THE RIVALS.

THE scene lies in the school of Dionysius the grammarian, who was Plato's own master. The design is to show, that philosophy consists not in ostentation, nor in that insight (which the sophists affected) into a variety of the inferior parts of science, but in the knowledge of one's self, and in a sagacity in discovering the characters and dispositions of mankind, and of correcting and of modelling their minds to their own advantage.

The dialogue is excellent, but too short for such a subject. The interlocutors are not named, nor is there any mark of the time when it happened.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 135. The price of a slave skilled in carpenter's work, was five or six minæ, about £19 7s. 6d.; of an architect, 10,000 drachmæ, i. e. above £322 17s.

LACHES.

THE persons in this dialogue are men of distinguished rank and figure in the state of Athens.

1. Lysimachus, son to the famous Aristides, surnamed The Just.
2. Melesias, son to that Thucydides who was the great rival of Pericles in the administration.

3. Nicias, so often the general in the Peloponnesian war, celebrated for his goodness, for his conduct, and for his success, till the fatal expedition to Syracuse, in which he perished.

4. Laches, son of Melanopus of the district Æxone, and tribe Cæcropia, commander of the fleet sent to the assistance of the Leontines in Sicily, Ol. 88, 2, in which expedition he defeated the Locrians, reduced Messene, Mylæ, and other places, and after his recall seems to have been prosecuted by Cleon for corruption in

this very year; whence it appears, that he was in the battle of Delium.

5. Thucydides, son to Melesias. } Two youths under twenty years of age.
6. Aristides, son to Lysimachus. }
7. Socrates, then in his forty-seventh year.

The two first of these persons, being then very ancient, and probably about seventy years of age, and sensible of that defect in their own education, which had caused them to lead their lives in an obscurity unworthy the sons of such renowned fathers, were the more solicitous on account of their own sons, who were now almost of an age to enter into the world. They therefore invite Nicias and Laches, men of distinguished abilities and bravery, but some years younger than themselves, to a conference on that subject; and after having been spectators together of the feats of arms exhibited by Stesilaus, a professed master in the exercise of all weapons, they enter into conversation. Socrates, who happened to be present, is introduced by Laches to Lysimachus, as a person worthy to bear a part in their consultation. The first question is occasioned by the spectacle which they had just beheld, namely, "whether the management of arms be an exercise fit to be learned by young men of quality?" Nicias is desired first to deliver his opinion, which is, that it may give grace and agility to their persons, and courage and confidence to their minds; that it may make them more terrible to their enemies in battle, and more useful to their friends; and at the same time may inspire them with a laudable ambition to attain the higher and more noble parts of military knowledge. Laches has a direct contrary opinion of it: he argues from his own experience, that he never knew a man, who valued himself upon this art, that had distinguished himself in the war; that the Lacedæmonians, who valued and cultivated military discipline beyond all others, gave no encouragement to these masters of defence; that, to excel in it, only served to make a coward more assuming and impudent, and to expose a brave man to envy and calumny, by making any little failing or oversight more conspicuous in him.

Socrates is then prevailed upon to decide the difference, who artfully turns the question of much greater importance for a young man of spirit to know, namely, "what is valour, and how it is distinguished from a brutal and unmeaning fierceness." By interrogating Laches and Nicias, he shows, that such as had the highest reputation for courage in practice, were often very deficient in the theory; and yet none can communicate a virtue he possesses, without he has himself a clear idea of it. He proves, that valour must have good sense for its basis; that it consists in the knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared; and that, consequently, we must first distinguish between real good and evil, and that it is closely connected with the other virtues, namely,

justice, temperance, and piety, nor can it ever subsist without them. The scope of this fine dialogue is to show, that philosophy is the school of true bravery.

The time of this dialogue is not long after the defeat of the Athenians at Delium, OL 89, 1, in which action Socrates had behaved with great spirit, and thence recommended himself to the friendship of Laches.

HIPPARCHUS.

THE intention of the dialogue is to show, that all mankind in their actions equally tend to some imagined good, but are commonly mistaken in the nature of it; and that nothing can properly be called gain which, when attained, is not a real good.

The time of the dialogue is no where marked.

PHILEBUS.

THIS dialogue is too remarkable to be passed over slightly: we shall therefore annex the principal heads of it. The question is, "What is the supreme good of mankind?" and, "whether pleasure or wisdom have the better pretension to it?"

The persons are, Protarchus, the son of Callias, who supports the cause of pleasure, and Socrates, who opposes it: Philebus, who had begun the dispute, but was grown weary of it, and many others of the Athenian youth, are present at the conversation. The time of it is no where marked. The end of the dialogue is supposed to be lost.

P. 12. The name of pleasure, variously applied, to the joys of intemperance and folly, and to the satisfaction arising from wisdom, and from the command of our passions.

Though of unlike, and even of opposite natures, they agree so far, as they are all pleasures alike; as black and white, though contrary the one to the other, are comprehended under the general head of colours.

Though included under one name, if some are contrary and of opposite natures to others, they cannot both be good alike.

P. 14. Vulgar inquiry, how it is possible for many to be one, and one many, laid aside by consent as childish. Obscure question on our abstracted idea of unity.

P. 15. The vanity and disputatious humours of a young man, who has newly tasted of philosophy and has got hold of a puzzling question, are well described.

Every subject of our conversation has in it a mixture of the infinite and of the finite.

P. 16. The true logician will, as the ancients prescribed, first discover some single and general idea, and then proceed to two or three subordinate to it, which he will again subdivide into their several classes, which will form, as it were, a medium beneath finite and infinite.

Example in the alphabet. The human voice is one idea, but susceptible of a variety of modulations, and to be diversified even to infinity: to know that it is one, and to know that it is infinite, are neither of them knowledge; but there can be no knowledge without them.

When we first attain to the unity of things, we must descend from number to infinity, if we would know any thing: and when we first perceive their infinity, we must ascend through number to unity. Thus the first inventor of letters remarking the endless variety of sounds, discovered a certain number of vowels, distinguished others of a different power, called consonants, some of which were mutes, and others liquids, and to the whole combination of elements he gave the form and name of an alphabet.

P. 20. The good, which constitutes happiness, must be in itself sufficient and perfect, the aim and end of all human creatures.

A life of mere pleasure considered by itself, which, if pleasure only be that good, must need no mixture nor addition.

If we had no memory nor reflection, we could have no enjoyment of past pleasure, nor hope of future, and scarcely any perception of the present, which would be much like the life of an oyster: on the other hand, a life of thought and reflection, without any sense of pleasure or of pain, seems no desirable state. Neither contemplation therefore nor pleasure are the good we seek after, but probably a life composed of both.

P. 22. Whether the happiness of this mixed state is the result of pleasure, or rather of wisdom, and which contributes most to it?

P. 23. Division of all existence into the infinite, the limited¹

¹ Or rather, that which limits and gives bounds, such as figure, which gives bounds to extension; as time, which limits duration, &c.

the mixed, which is composed of the two former, and the supreme cause of all.

Example of the first; all that admits of increase or decrease, greater or less, hotter or colder, &c., i. e. all undetermined quantity.

Of the second; all that determines quantity, as equality, duplicity, and whatever relation number bears to number, and measure to measure.

Of the third, or mixed; all created things, in which the infinity of matter is, by number and measure, reduced to proportion.

P. 27. Pleasure and pain, having no bounds¹ in themselves, are of the nature of the infinite.

P. 28, § 49. The supreme power and wisdom of the Deity asserted.

P. 28, § 53. But a small portion of the several elements is visible in our frame. Our soul is a small portion of the spirit of the universe, or fourth kind mentioned above.

P. 31. Pain is a consequence of a² dissolution of that symmetry and harmony in our fabric, which is the cause of health, strength, &c.; as pleasure results from the return and restoration of the parts to their just proportions.

Thus hunger and thirst are uneasinesses proceeding from emptiness; eating and drinking produce pleasure by restoring a proper degree of repletion. Excess of cold is attended with a sensation of pain, and warmth brings with it an equal pleasure.

Pleasures and pains of the soul alone arise from the³ expectation of pleasure or pain of the body: these are hopes and fears, and depend upon the memory.

A state of indifference is without pleasure or pain, which is consistent with a life of thought and contemplation.

P. 33. Sensation is conveyed to the soul through the organs of the body; the body may receive many motions and alterations unperceived by the mind.

P. 34. Memory is the preserver of our sensations.

Recollection, an act of the mind alone, restores to us ideas imprinted in the memory, after an intermission.

¹ Happiness and misery, says Mr. Locke, are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not: but of some degrees of them we have very lively ideas. (Chapt. of Power, i. 41.)

² This is an idea of Timæus, the Locrian, p. 100, C. § 7. And Mr. Locke makes much the same observation. Excess of cold, (says he,) as well as heat, pains us; because it is equally destructive of that temper, which is necessary to the preservation and the exercise of the several functions of the body, and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth, or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds. Essay on H. U. ch. vii. § 4.

³ "Hope is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him. Fear is an uneasiness upon the thought of future evil, likely to befall us." Locke, ib. ch. xx.

Desire, in the mind alone, by which it supplies the wants of the body: it depends on memory.

In the appetites, pleasure and pain go together, a proportionable satisfaction succeeding, as the uneasiness abates.

Memory¹ of a past pleasing sensation inspires hope of a future one, and thereby abates an uneasiness actually present; as the absence of hope doubles a present pain.

P. 36. Whether truth and falsehood belong to pleasures and pains?

They do: as these are founded on our opinions² of things preconceived, which may, undoubtedly, be either true or false.

P. 38. Our opinions are founded on our sensations, and the memory of them. Thus we see a figure at a distance beyond a certain rock, or under a certain tree, and we say to ourselves, it is a man; but on advancing up to it, we find a rude image of wood carved by a shepherd.

P. 39. The senses, the memory, and the passions, which attend on them, write on our souls, or rather delineate, a variety of conceptions and representations, of which, when justly drawn, we form true opinions and propositions; but when falsely, we form false ones.

On these our hopes and fears are built, and consequently are capable of truth and falsehood, as well as the opinions on which they are founded.

P. 40. The good abound in just and true hopes, fears, and desires; the bad, in false and delusive ones.

P. 41. As pleasures³ and pains are infinite, we can only measure them by comparison, one with the other.

P. 42, § 89. Our hopes and fears are no less liable to be deceived by the prospect of distant objects, than our eyes. As we are always comparing those which are far off, with others less remote or very near, it is no wonder that we are often mistaken; especially as a pleasure, when set next a pain, does naturally appear greater than its true magnitude, and a pain less.

P. 42, § 90. So much then of pains and pleasures as exceeds or falls short of its archetype, is false.

P. 42, § 92. A state of indolence, or of apathy, is supposed by the school of Heraclitus to be impossible, on account of the perpetual motion of all things.

¹ What Plato calls by the name of *Μνήμη*, "Memory," and *Ἀνάμνησις*, "Recollection," are by Locke distinguished under the names of Contemplation and Memory, (l. i. ch. 10,) being the different powers of retention.

² All this head is finely explained by Locke in ch. on Power, § 61 and foll., which is the best comment on this part of Plato.

³ "If we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison." Locke, ch. on Power, § 42.

Motions and alterations¹ proved to happen continually in our body, of which the soul has no perception.

P. 43. Therefore, (though we should allow the perpetual motion of things,) there are times when the soul feels neither pleasure nor pain; so that this is a possible state.

Pleasure, and its contrary, are not the consequences of any changes in our constituent parts, but of such changes as are considerable and violent.

P. 44. The sect of philosophers, who affirm² that there is no pleasure but the absence of pain, is in the wrong, but from a noble principle.

P. 45. To know the nature of pleasure, we should consider such as are strongest: bodily pleasures are such.

Pleasure is in proportion to our desires. The desires and longings of sick persons are the most violent: the mad and thoughtless feel the strongest³ degree of pleasure and of pain; so that both the one and the other increase with the disorder and depravity of our body and mind.

P. 46. Pleasures of lust have a mixture of pain, as the pain of the itch⁴ has a mixture of pleasure, and both subsist at the same instant.

Anger, grief, love, envy, are pains of the soul, but with a mixture⁵ of pleasure. Exemplified in the exercise of our compassion and terror at a tragic spectacle, and of our envy at a comic one. The pleasure of ridicule arises from vanity and from the ignorance of ourselves. We laugh at the follies of the weak, and hate those of the powerful.

P. 47. Pure and unmixed pleasures⁶ proved to exist: those of the senses resulting from regularity of figure, beautiful colours, melodious sounds, odours of fragrance, &c., and all whose absence is not necessarily accompanied with any uneasiness. Again: satisfactions of the mind resulting from knowledge, the absence or loss of which is not naturally attended with any pain.

P. 53, § 121. A small portion of pure and uncorrupted pleasure is preferable to a larger one of that which is mixed and impure.

P. 53, § 122. The opinion of some philosophers, that pleasure is continually generating, but is never produced, i. e. it has no real existence, seems true with regard to mere bodily pleasures.

P. 55, § 130. Inquiry into knowledge. The nature of the arts:

¹ Whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind, whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. Locke, ch. ix.

² "Pleasure," says Mr. Selden, "is nothing but the intermission of pain, the enjoyment of something I am in great trouble for, till I have it."

³ Vid. Plat. in Republ. iii. p. 403.

⁴ Vid. Gorgiam, p. 494.

⁵ Vid. Aristot. Rhetor. ii. c. 2.

⁶ Vid. de Republ. ix. p. 584.

such of them as approach the nearest to real knowledge, are the most¹ considerable, being founded on number, weight, and² measure, and capable of demonstration.

P. 55, § 131. Secondly, those attainable only by use and frequent trial, being founded on conjecture and experiment, such as music, medicine, agriculture, natural philosophy, &c.

P. 60. Recapitulation.

P. 61. Happiness resides in³ the just mixture of wisdom and pleasure; particularly when we join the purest pleasures with the clearer and more certain sciences.

P. 63. *Prosopopœia* of the pleasures and sciences, consulted on the proposal made for uniting them.

P. 64. No mixture is either useful or durable, without proportion. The supreme good of man consists in beauty, in symmetry, and in truth, which are the causes of all the happiness to be found in the above-mentioned union.

MENO.

THE subject of the dialogue is this: That virtue is knowledge, and that true philosophy alone can give us that knowledge.

I see nothing in this dialogue to make one think that Plato intended to raise the character of Meno. He is introduced as a young man who seems to value himself on his parts, and on the proficiency he has made under Gorgias the Leontine, whose notions are here exposed, and the compliments Socrates makes him on his beauty, wealth, family, and other distinctions, are only little politenesses ordinarily used by that philosopher to put persons into good humour, and draw them into conversation with him.

The time of the dialogue seems to be not long before the expedition of the ten thousand into Asia, for Meno was even then a very young man, and still beardless, as he is represented here; and the menaces of Anytus (p. 94) show, that it was not long before the accusation of Socrates; so that we may place it Ol. 94, 4, if Plato may be trusted in these small matters of chronology, which, we know, he sometimes neglected. Gorgias was yet at Athens, Ol. 93, 4, and it is probable, that the approaching siege of that city might

¹ Vid. de Republ. x. p. 602.

² And above all, logic, to which we owe all the evidence and certainty we find in the rest. De Republ. vii. p. 534.

³ Vid. de Republ. ix. p. 582, and de Leg. v. p. 733.

drive him thence into Thessaly, and he returned not till after Socrates's death.

Socrates here distinguishes (p. 75) the true method of disputation from the false.

P. 77. Meno's first definition of virtue is, that it consists in desiring good, and in being able to attain it. Socrates proves that all men desire good, and consequently all men are so far equally virtuous, which is an absurdity; it must therefore consist in the ability to attain it: which is true in Socrates's sense of the word good. (which makes him say, *ἵσως ἂν εὖ λέγοις*): but it is necessary to know if men's ideas of it are the same. Upon inquiry, Meno's meaning appears to be, health, honour, riches, power, &c.; but, being pressed by Socrates, he is forced to own, that the attainment of these is so far from virtue, that it is vice, unless accompanied with temperance, with justice, and with piety; as then the virtue of such an attainment consists in such adjuncts, and not in the thing attained; and as these are confessedly parts of virtue only, subordinate to some more general idea, they are no nearer discovering what virtue in the abstract is, than they were at first.

Though the doctrine of reminiscence, repeated by Plato in several places, be chimerical enough; yet this, which follows it, (p. 84,) is worth attending to, where Socrates shows how useful it is to be sensible of our own ignorance. While we know nothing, we doubt of nothing; this is a state of great confidence and security. From the first distrust we entertain of our own understanding springs an uneasiness and a curiosity, which will not be satisfied till it attains to knowledge.

Whoever reads the dialogue, "On Virtue, whether it is to be taught," attributed to Æschines the Socratic, will see so great a resemblance to this of Plato, and at the same time find so great a difference in several respects, that he will believe both one and the other to be sketches of a real conversation, which passed between Socrates and some other person, noted down both by Æschines and by Plato at the time: the former left his notes in that unfinished condition, but the latter supplied them as he thought fit, and worked them up at his leisure into this dialogue.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 70. *Ἐφ' ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλοῦτι.*] The breed of Thessalian horses was the most celebrated in Greece; and when the cities of Thessaly were united among themselves, they could raise a body of six thousand, equal to any cavalry in the world. (Xenophon, *Hellenic*. vi. p. 339. Pausan. x. p. 799. Plato in *Hipp. Maj.* p. 284.) They were of great service to Alexander in his expeditions. The country was very rich in pasture and in corn, and, as their government was generally remiss and ill-regulated, their wealth naturally introduced a corruption (Athe-

næus, xiv. p. 663) of manners, which made them first slaves themselves, and then the instruments of slavery to other people. It was they who invited the Persian (Herod. vii. and ix.) into Greece; and afterwards gave rise to the power of the Macedonians. Isocrates (Orat. de Pace, p. 183) produces them as an example of a strong and wealthy people, reduced by their own bad management to a low and distressed condition.

P. 70. *Ἀριστίππου τοῦ Λαρίσσαιου.*] Aristippus of Larissa, one of the potent house of the Aleuadæ, descendants of Hercules, from which the Thessalians had so often elected their *Tayoi*, or captains-general. There had been a friendship kept up between them and the royal family of Persia, ever since the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, in which they were of great use to him. This Aristippus had particular connexions with the younger Cyrus, (Xenoph. Anab. i. 145, and ii. 173,) who lent him a body of four thousand mercenaries, which he made use of to subdue the faction which opposed him in Thessaly, and seems to have established a sort of tyranny there. Meno (also of Larissa) son of Alexidemus, led a body of fifteen hundred men to the assistance of Cyrus in his expedition against his brother, Artaxerxes, Ol. 94, 4, and (after the death of Cyrus) betrayed the Greek commanders into the hands of the Persian, who cut off their heads. He himself survived not above a year, but was destroyed by the Persians. His character is admirably drawn by Xenophon, (Anab. ii. p. 173,) and many have looked on this as a mark of the enmity between Plato and Xenophon. See Athenæus, xi. p. 505 and 506; Diog. Laert. ii. sect. 57, and iii. sect. 34; and Aul. Gellius, xiv. sect. 3.

P. 76. The definition of colour, in the manner of Gorgias, (perhaps we should read *σμάρων*, in lieu of *σχημάτων*,) is that there is from that efflux, or those effluvia, of figured bodies, an efflux which is proportioned to our sense of seeing. This is true, if understood of the particles of light reflected from bodies; but not otherwise. Empedocles, however, and after him Epicurus, in Diogen. Laert. x. 49, thought, that the immediate objects of vision were certain particles detached from the surface of the bodies which we behold.

P. 80. The torpedo.] This fish, called by the French on the coast of the Mediterranean, "la torpille," is of the skate or ray kind. As all of that species have a wide mouth and prominent eyes, the face of Socrates, who had these two remarkable features, reminds Meno of this fish. Its figure and extraordinary property of benumbing any creature which touches it are described by Mr. Reaumur, in the *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences*, pour l'Année 1714, where there is a print of it.

P. 89. In the citadel.] Where the sacred treasure was kept. It consisted of one thousand talents, never to be touched, unless the city were to be attacked by a naval force; in any other case it was made capital to propose it.

GORGIAS.

P. 451. Σκολιον.] These Scolia were a kind of lyric compositions, sung either in concert, or successively, by all the guests after a banquet: the subjects of them were either the praises of some divinity, or moral precepts, or reflections on life, or gay exhortations to mirth, to wine, or to love. There were some Scolia of great antiquity; the most esteemed were those of Alcæus, of Praxilla, and of Anacreon.

P. 453. The election of physicians.] There were public physicians elected in most of the Greek cities, who received a salary from the commonwealth, and seem to have taken no fees of particular people. Those physicians who exercised this office, were said δημοσύνειν. See Aristoph. Birds, vs. 585, and Acharn. 1029; Plut. 508; but the custom seems to have been laid aside before OL. 97, 4, in Athens. See Aristoph. Plut. 407; Gorg. p. 514; and the Statesman, p. 259.

P. 563. There is much good sense in this part of the dialogue: he distinguishes the arts, which form and improve the body, into the gymnastic, which regulates its motions and maintains its proper habit, and the medical, which corrects its ill habits and cures its distempers: those of the soul, which answer to the former, are the legislative, which prescribes rules for its conduct and preserves its uprightness, and the judicative, which amends and redresses its deviation from those rules. Flattery, ever applying herself to the passions of men, without regarding any principle or proposing any rational end, has watched her opportunity, and assuming the form of these several arts, has introduced four counterfeits in their room, viz. 1. Cookery, which, while it tickles the palate, pretends to maintain the body in health and vigour; 2. Cosmetics, which conceal our defects and diseases under a borrowed beauty; 3. Sophistry, which, by the false lights it throws upon every thing, misleads our reason and palliates our vices; and, 4. Rhetoric, which saves us from the chastisement we deserve and eludes the salutary rigour of justice.

P. 467. If a person is doing something, &c.] He is here proving that fundamental principle of his doctrine, namely, that the wicked man is doing he knows not what, and sins only through ignorance: and that the end of his actions, like that of all other men, is good, but he mistakes the nature of it, and uses wrong means to attain it.

P. 470. Yesterday and the day before.] As the time of this

dialogue plainly appears (from that passage in p. 473, "Last year becoming by lot one of the council," which is taken notice of by Athenæus, in v. p. 217) to be Ol. 93, 4, the year after the sea-fight at Arginusæ, these words must be taken in a larger sense, as we say of a thing long since past, "It happened but the other day," when we would compare it with more ancient times; for Archelaus had now reigned at least nine years, and continued on the throne about six years longer. So in p. 503, by the words, "Pericles recently dead," we must understand *recenti*, "recently," in the same manner, for Pericles had been dead twenty-three years. But the time is there compared with that of Cimon, Themistocles, and Miltiades, who died many years before. Socrates indeed might have seen and remembered Cimon, the other two he could not. These particulars of Archelaus's history are curious and not to be met with elsewhere: viz. That he was the bastard son of Perdiccas by a female slave belonging to his brother Alcetas; that he caused his uncle and master Alcetas, together with Alexander his son, to be murdered after a banquet, to which he had invited them; that he caused his own brother, a child of seven years old, (the true heir to the crown and the son of Perdiccas by his wife Cleopatra,) to be drowned in a well. Athenæus (in xi. p. 506) is absurd enough to question the truth of these particulars, or, supposing them true, he says, that they are instances of Plato's ingratitude, who was much in favour with Archelaus. The passage, which he cites immediately after from Carystius of Pergamus, disproves all this, for it shows Plato's connexion to have been with Perdiccas *the Third*, who began to reign thirty-five years after Archelaus's death, and was elder brother to the famous Philip of Macedon. We have an epistle of Plato to that prince still remaining. At the time of Archelaus's death, Plato was under thirty years of age.

P. 481. Demus, the son of Pyrilampes, was much in the friendship of Pericles, and remarkable for being the first man who brought peacocks to Athens, and bred them in his volaries. (Plutarch in Pericle, and Athenæus, ix. p. 397.) Plato often put much truth and good sense into the mouth of characters which he did not approve. The Protagoras is a remarkable instance of this, where Socrates is introduced in the beginning, arguing against the very doctrine, which naturally follows from those principles, which he himself lays down in the end, and of which he obliges the sophist to confess the truth.

P. 488. First proof against Callicles, who had advanced that, by the law of nature, the stronger had a right to govern the weaker, that the many are stronger than the few, and consequently ought to govern them: so that the positive law of the commonwealth is the result of the law of nature.

P. 501. Cinesias, the son of Meles, was a dithyrambic poet

in some sort of vogue among the people at this time. He was still a worse man than a writer, and the depravity of his character made even his misfortunes ridiculous; so that his poverty, his deformities, and his distempers, were not only produced on the stage, but frequently alluded to by the orators, and exposed to the scorn of the multitude. The comic poet, Strattis, who lived at this time, made Cinesias the subject of an entire drama.

P. 503. The bold attack made in this place on some of the greatest characters of antiquity, has drawn much censure on Plato; but we are to consider that he is here proving his favourite point, which seems to me the grand aim and intention of this dialogue, that philosophy alone is the parent of virtue, the discoverer of those fixed and unerring principles, on which the truly great and good man builds his whole scheme of life, and by which he directs all his actions; and that he, who practises this noblest art, and makes it his whole endeavour to inspire his fellow-citizens with a love for true knowledge, and this was the constant view and the employment of Socrates, has infinitely the superiority not only over the masters of those arts which the public most admires, as music, poetry, and eloquence, but over the most celebrated names in history, as heroes and statesmen; as the first have generally applied their talents to flatter the ear, to humour the prejudices, and to inflame the passions of mankind; and the latter, to soothe their vanity, to irritate their ambition, and to cheat them with an apparent, not a real, greatness.

P. 511. The price of a pilot from Ægina to Attica was two oboli (about two-pence halfpenny); from Attica to Pontus, or to Egypt, two drachmæ (fifteen-pence halfpenny).

P. 514. To learn the potter's art in a pitcher.] Proverb. To begin with a jar before we have made a gallipot.

Amphora cœpit

Institui, currente rotâ cur uroeus exit?

P. 515. To giving pay.] The administration of Pericles was the ruin of the Athenian constitution. By abridging the power of the Areopagus, and by impairing their authority, who were the superintendents of education and the censors of public manners, he sapped the foundations of virtue among them; by distributing the public revenue among the courts of justice, he made them mercenary and avaricious, negligent of their private affairs, and ever meddling in those of their neighbours; by the frequency and magnificence of the public spectacles, he inured them to luxury and to idleness; and by engaging them in the Peloponnesian war, he exposed them to be deserted by all their allies, and left to the mercy of the braver and more virtuous Lacedæmonians. Isocrates, although he had no prejudice against Pericles, and does justice to his disinterestedness and honesty in the

management of the public money, still he looked upon the first of these alterations as the ruin of his country, in *Orat. Areopag.* p. 147, &c.

The *Μισθὸς Δικαστηνῶν*, "the pay of the jurymen," here spoken of by Socrates, was three oboli a day, paid to 6000 citizens, for so many sat in the courts of justice, which was to the state a yearly expense of one hundred and fifty talents; i. e. reckoning ten months to the year, for two months were spent in holidays, when the courts did not meet. A payment, appointed by Agyrrius about Ol. 96, 4, was made by every Athenian citizen who came to the assembly of the people. The ill effect which this had upon their manners is painted by Aristophanes with much humour in several of his dramas, and particularly in the *Vespæ*.

P. 517. Neither the true nor the flattering.] This shows that Plato meant only to distinguish between the use of eloquence and its abuse; nor is he in earnest when he says just above, that we have not known a single good man, who has been good for state affairs—for he afterwards himself names Aristides, as a man of uncommon probity, but only to show that he had puzzled Callicles, who could not produce one example of a statesman, who had abilities, or art, sufficient to preserve him from the fury of the people.

1b. Nor do I blame.] Hence it appears that he only means to show how much superior the character of a real philosopher is to that of a statesman.

MINOS.

THIS dialogue takes its name, as also does the *Hipparchus*, not from either of the persons introduced in it, but from the Cretan Minos, whose character and laws are mentioned pretty much at large. Socrates, and another Athenian nearly of the same age, who is not named, are considering the nature of laws in it; and the intention of Plato is to show, that there is a law of nature and of truth, common to all men, to which all truly legal institutions must be conformable, and which is the real foundation of them all.

Unfortunately the dialogue remains imperfect: it is indeed probable that it was never finished.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 315. Human sacrifice, and particularly of their children, to Saturn was in use among the Carthaginians: the sacrifices of the Lycians and of the descendants of Athamas, though people of Greek origin, were barbarous; the ancient Attic custom is mentioned of sacrificing victims near the bodies of dead persons, before they were carried out to burial, and hiring *ἔγχεσθαι*, and the still more ancient one of interring them in the houses where they died: both long since disused.

P. 318. Lycurgus.] The time of this dialogue is no where marked; but we see from p. 321, that Socrates was now advanced in years; supposing him then to be only sixty, it is 367 years from the first Olympiad of Coræbus; but most critics agree that Lycurgus lived one hundred and eight years before that time, and Eratosthenes, with the most accurate chronologers, affirms, that he was still more ancient. Plato therefore places him half a century later than any one else has done. The computation of Thucydides, who reckons it something more than 400 years to the end of the Peloponnesian war, from the time of the institution of Lycurgus's laws, comes nearest to that of Plato. For as the war ended Ol. 94, 1, Lycurgus settled the constitution about 27 years before the first Olympiad of Coræbus.

CHARMIDES.

OL. 87, 2 OR 3.

THE subject of this dialogue is ἡ Σοφροσύνη, "Temperance;" and what was Plato's real opinion of that virtue, may be seen in Rep. iv. p. 430, and Laws, iii. p. 696.

The dramatic part of it is very elegant.

P. 153. That a battle had taken place.] I take the particular action here mentioned to be the attack made on the city, soon after the arrival of Hagno and Cleopompus with fresh troops. See Thucyd. ii. 58. If we consider the purport of the narration there we shall find that Thucydides meant to say that Phormio and his 1600 soldiers, among whom were Socrates and Alcibiades, had returned from their expedition into Chalcidice, mentioned in i. 63, and had joined the army newly arrived from Potidea.

Ib. Critias.] It is extraordinary that Plato, from a partiality to his own family, should so often introduce into his writings the character of Critias, his cousin, whose very name, one should imagine, must be held in detestation at Athens even to remotest

times, he being a monster of injustice and cruelty. Plato seems to have been not a little proud of his family. See Rep. ii. p. 368.

P. 156. Zamolxis.] This person, said by some to have been a slave of Pythagoras, but by Herodotus, in iv. 94, to have been of much greater antiquity, was the king and prophet of the Getae, who were at first only a clan of the Thracians, but afterwards, having passed the Danube, became a great and powerful nation. It is very remarkable, that they had a succession of these high priests, who lived sequestered from mankind in a grotto, and had communication only with the king, in whose power they had a great share from Zamolxis down to the time of Augustus, and possibly long after. See Strabo vii. p. 297.

P. 167: The third to the Saviour.] A proverbial expression frequent with Plato, as in Philebus, p. 66, D., and in Epist. viii. p. 340, A. I imagine it alludes to the Athenian custom detailed by Athenæus from Philochorus in ii. p. 38, which was to serve round after supper a little pure wine, with these words, Ἀγαθὴ Δαίμωνι, "To the good Genius," and afterwards as much wine and water as every one called for, with the form of Διὶ Σωτῆρι, "To Zeus the Saviour."

CRATYLUS.

THIS long dialogue on the origin of words was probably a performance of Plato when he was very young, and is the least considerable of all his works.

Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, is said to have been the master of Plato after Socrates's death; but the latter part of the dialogue is plainly written against the opinions of that sect, and of Cratylus in particular.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 398. Ancient Attic words, δαίμων, εἶπεν: and p. 401, ἰσία; 410, Ὀραί; 418, Ἱμερα, vel Ἐμερα. He remarks that the ancient Attic abounded in the Ι and Δ, which in his time had been often changed to the Η or Ε and the Ζ, and that the women preserved much of the old language among them.

P. 409. Much of the Greek language derived from the Barbarians: Ὑψ, Πῦρ, Κῦων, borrowed from the Phrygians.

P. 425. The Barbarians acknowledged to be more ancient than the Greeks.

P. 427. The powers of the several Greek letters, and the manner of their formation: viz. the P expressive of motion, being formed by a tremulous motion of the tongue; the I of smallness and tenuity; the Φ, Ψ, Σ, Ζ, of all noises made by the air; the Δ and Τ of a cessation of motion; the Α of slipperiness and gliding; the same with a Γ prefixed, of the adherence and tenacity of fluids; the Ν of any thing internal; the Α of largeness; the Ο of roundness; and the Η expressive of length.

SYMPOSIUM.

As to the time of this dialogue, Athenæus, in v. p. 217, tells us, that Agatho first gained the prize when Euphemus was Archon, which was Ol. 90, 4. What he adds, namely, that Plato was then only fourteen years old, and consequently could not be at this entertainment, is very true, but nothing to the purpose; for it is not Plato who uses those words which he cites, but Apollodorus, who recounts the particulars of this banquet, as he had them from Aristodemus, who was present at it ten or twelve years before.

Among the ancients, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Hermogenes, Athenæus, Gellius, and Ausonius, and among the moderns, Jos. Scaliger, Petavius, Ger. Vossius, Fraguier, Freret, and La Mothe le Vayer, believed the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon to be a romance: on the other side, are Usher, Marsham, Le Clerc, Prideaux, Bossuet, Tourne mine, Banier, Lenglet, Rollin, Guyon.

P. 177. ἄλλους μὲν ῥίσι τῶν θεῶν.] No hymns, nor temples, nor religious rites were offered to Love in Greece. See *Sympos.* p. 189.

P. 215. The figures of the Sileni in the shops of the sculptors were made hollow, which opened and discovered within the statues of the gods.

P. 219. An army.] They went thither with the supplies under the command of Phormio, Ol. 87, 1. (See *Thucyd.* i. 64.) Alcibiades being then twenty years of age, and Socrates thirty-nine. The folly of Athenæus, in v. c. 15, who would prove, against the authority of Plato and of Antisthenes, that Socrates was not in any of these actions, is justly exposed by Casaubon. We may add, that if the silence of Thucydides could prove any thing with regard to Socrates, it would prove, at least as strongly, that Alcibiades was not at Potidæa neither; but the contrary is certain from that very oration of Isocrates, to which Athenæus refers,

Περὶ Ζεύρους, p. 352, where he is said to have gained the *'Aporia*, namely, a crown and a complete suit of armour, before that city; and if the orator had not totally suppressed the name of Socrates, it would have been highly injudicious in a discourse pronounced by the son of Alcibiades, where he was to exalt the character of his father, and by no means to lessen the merit of any of his actions. He left that to his enemies, who, it is likely, did not forget the generosity of Socrates on this occasion. It is clear from the many oversights of Athenæus here, that he either trusted to his memory, or only quoted from his own extracts, and not from the originals. Plato mentions no second *'Aporia* gained at Delium, and only speaks of the coolness and presence of mind shown by Socrates in his retreat; as he has done also in the Laches. Athenæus affirms, that Alcibiades was not in the battle of Delium, but he assigns no reasons. If he concludes it from the silence of Thucydides, as before, this is nothing; since that historian mentions none but the commanders-in-chief on any of these occasions, and often only one or two of the principal of these: but probably Alcibiades and Laches might then only serve as private men.

This dialogue, particularly the end of it, the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Euthydemus, &c., are strong instances of Plato's genius for dramatic poetry in the comic kind, noticed by Athenæus, in v. p. 187. See also Olympiodor. in the Life of Plato. The Phædo is an instance of Plato's power in the tragic kind.

EUTHYDEMUS.

THERE is a good deal of humour, and even of the "*vis comica*," in this dialogue. Its end is to expose the vanity and weakness of two famous sophists, and to show, by way of contrast, the art of Socrates in leading youth into the paths of virtue and of right reason.

P. 287. Are you so Saturn-like,] i. e. "simple and old-fashioned." It is scarcely possible to see with patience Plato seriously confuting these childish subtleties, as low as any logical quibbles, used by our scholastic divines in the days of monkery and of deep ignorance. But he best knew the manners of his own age, and doubtless saw these things in a graver light than they of themselves deserve, by reflecting on the bad effects which they had on the understandings and on the morals of his countrymen, who not only spent their wit and their time in playing with words,

when they might have employed them in inquiring into things; but, by rendering every principle doubtful and dark alike, must necessarily induce men to leave themselves to the guidance of chance and of the passions, unassisted by reason. Whereas if, in reality, there be no certain truth attainable by human knowledge, both the means and the end of disputation are absolutely taken away, and it becomes the most absurd and the most childish of all occupations.

HIPPIAS MAJOR.

We learn from this dialogue in how poor a condition the art of reasoning on moral and abstracted subjects was, before the time of Socrates; for it is impossible that Plato should introduce a sophist of the first reputation for eloquence and knowledge in several kinds, talking in a manner below the absurdity and weakness of a child, unless he had really drawn after the life. No less than twenty-four pages are here spent in vain, only to force it into the head of Hippias, that there is such a thing as a general idea; and that, before we can dispute on any subject, we should give a definition of it.

The time of the conversation seems to be after Ol. 89, 2, for the war had permitted no intercourse between Athens and Elis before that year, and we see in the Protagoras that Hippias was actually at Athens Ol. 90, 1, so that it seems to fall naturally between these two years.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 289. Passages of Heraclitus: Πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρός ἄλλω γίνεσθαι συμβαλεῖν.—Ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πιθήκος φάνεσθαι. This latter passage is undoubtedly the original of that famous thought in Pope's Essay on Man, b. ii.;

“And showed a Newton, as we show an ape;”

which some persons have imagined that he borrowed from one Palingenius,* an obscure author, who wrote a poem called “Zodiacus Vitæ.”

[* Pope, who was versed in the modern Latin poets, might have taken it from Palingenius, and Palingenius from Plato. EDITOR.]

HIPPIAS MINOR.

THE time of this dialogue is after the Hippias Major, with which it may be ranked.

P. 368. Hippias appeared at Olympia in a dress of his own weaving, buskins of his own cutting out and sewing, with a ring on his finger, and a seal engraved by himself, and a beautiful zone of his own embroidery. He brought with him epic poems, dithyrambics, tragedies, and orations, all of his own composition.

P. 368, § 10. Belt.] The Greeks therefore girt their under-garment with a cincture.

PROTAGORAS.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE DATE OF THIS DIALOGUE.

PLATO, in this dialogue, one of the noblest he ever wrote, has fallen, through negligence, into some anachronisms, as Athenæus has remarked, (in v. p. 218,) though some things in reality are only mistakes of his own, and others he has omitted, which are real faults. Dacier undertakes wholly to justify Plato. We shall show that neither of them are quite in the right.

There are two marks, which fix the time of this conversation, as it is generally thought, and as Athenæus has shown. One, that Callias is mentioned in p. 315, as then master of himself, and in possession of the estate of his father, Hipponicus, who was slain in the battle of Delium, Ol. 89, 1, so that it must be after that year; the other, that the *Ἄγριοι*, "The Savages," a comedy of Pherecrates, alluded to, is said to have been played the year before. Now that play was brought upon the stage in the magistracy of Aristion, Ol. 89, 4; consequently this must have happened Ol. 90, 1.

There is yet a third circumstance which may ascertain the date of the dialogue. Athenæus produces it as an instance of Plato's negligence; but he has only discovered his own by it. Hippias the Elean, he says, and others of his countrymen are introduced, in p. 315, as then present at Athens, whereas it is impossible they could be there during the Peloponnesian war, while the Eleans were confederates with Sparta against the Athenians; for though a truce was agreed upon for one year, under Isarchus, Ol. 89, 1, yet it was broken through presently, and no cessation of arms ensued. But in reality Hippias might be at Athens any year after Isarchus's magistracy; since though the war broke out afresh afterwards with Sparta, yet the allies of Sparta entered not into it, as at first, but either continued neuter, or joined the Athenians, and Elis particularly entered into a defensive league with them this very year, as shown by Thucyd. v. 47; so that when Athenæus speaks of the truce as not remaining, it is plain that he did not know but that Sparta entered the war again with all the confederates which she had at first, and consequently he had read Thucydides very negligently. This very thing then may fix it to Ol. 90, 1, at least it will prove that it could not be earlier than Ol. 89, 1.

Athenæus further remarks, that Eupolis in his *Κόλασις*, "The Flatterers," which was played Ol. 89, 3, speaks of Protagoras as then present at Athens, and that Ameipsias in his *Κόρυς*, "Conus," acted two years before, has not introduced him into his chorus of *Φρονιμοὶ*, "The Men of Thought;" so that it is probable that he arrived at Athens in the interval between the representation of these two dramas, which is three or four years earlier than the dialogue, in which Plato nevertheless says that he had not been three days come; and that after many years' absence. Dacier attempts to answer this, but makes little of it; and indeed it was impossible to do better, since both the comedies are lost, and we do not know to what parts of them Athenæus alludes, as he cites nothing.

But in truth there are other circumstances inconsistent with the date of the dialogue, of which neither Athenæus nor Dacier have taken any notice. 1st, Alcibiades is represented as just on the confines of youth and manhood, whereas in Ol. 90, 1, he was turned of thirty. 2ndly, Criso of Himera, celebrated for gaining three victories successively in the course at Olympia, the first of which was Ol. 83, is spoken of in p. 335, as in the height of his vigour. Now it is scarcely possible, that one, who was a man grown at the time I have mentioned, should continue in full strength and agility twenty-nine years afterwards: but this I do not much insist upon. 3rdly, Pericles is spoken of in p. 320, as yet living, although he died nine years before; and what is worse, his two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, are both represented

as present at this conversation, though they certainly died during the plague some time before their father.

ANALYSIS OF THE DIALOGUE.

Socrates is wakened before day-break with a hasty knocking at his door: it is Hippocrates, a young man, who comes eagerly to acquaint him with the arrival of Protagoras, the celebrated sophist, at Athens, and to entreat him to go immediately and present him to that great man; for he is determined to spare no pains nor expense, so he may be but admitted to his conversation. Socrates moderates his impatience a little, and while they take a turn about the hall together, waiting for sun-rise, inquires into his notions of a sophist, and what he expected from him; and finding his ideas not very clear upon that head, shows him the folly of putting his soul into the hands of he knew not whom, to do with it he knew not what. If his body had been indisposed, and he had needed a physician, he would certainly have taken the advice and recommendation of his family and friends; but here, where his mind, a thing of much greater importance, was concerned, he was on the point of trusting it, unadvisedly and at random, to the care of a person, whom he had never seen nor spoken to. That a sophist was a kind of merchant, or rather a retailer of food for the soul, and, like other shop-keepers, would exert his eloquence to recommend his own goods. The misfortune was, we could not carry them off, like corporeal viands, set them by a while, and consider them at leisure, whether they were wholesome or not, before we tasted them; that in this case we have no vessel, but the soul, to receive them in, which will necessarily retain a tincture, and perhaps much to its prejudice, of all which is instilled into it. However, by way of trial only, they agree to wait upon Protagoras, and accordingly they go to the house of Callias, where both he and two other principal sophists, Prodicus and Hippias, with all their train of followers, were lodged and entertained.

The porter, an eunuch, wearied and pestered with the crowd of sophists who resorted to the house, mistaking them for such, gives them a short answer, and shuts the door in their face. At last they are admitted, and find Protagoras with Callias, and more company, walking in the porticos. The motions of Protagoras's followers are described with much humour; how at every turn they divided and cast off, as in a dance, still falling in, and moving in due subordination behind the principal performer. Hippias is sitting in a great chair, on the opposite side of the court, discoursing on points of natural philosophy to a circle, who are seated on forms round him; while Prodicus, in a large inner

apartment, in bed and wrapped up in abundance of warm clothes, lies discoursing with another company of admirers. Socrates approaches Protagoras, and presents the young Hippocrates to him. The sophist, having premised something to give an idea of his own profession, its use and dignity, the rest of the company, being summoned together from all quarters, seat themselves about him; and Socrates begins by entreating Protagoras to inform him, what was the tendency and usual effect of his lessons, that Hippocrates might know what he was to expect from him. His answers show, that he professed to accomplish men for public and private life, to make them good and useful members of the state, and of a family. Socrates admires the beauty of his art, if indeed there be such an art, which, he confesses, he has often doubted; for if virtue is a thing which may be taught, what can his countrymen the Athenians mean, who in their public assemblies, if the question turn on repairing the public edifices, consult the architect, and if on their fleet, the ship-builder, and laughed at such as, on pretence of their wit, of their wealth, or of their nobility, should interfere in debates which concern a kind of knowledge, in which they have neither skill nor experience; but if the point to be considered relate to the laws, to the magistracy, to the administration of peace and war, and to such subjects, every merchant, every little tradesman and mechanic, the poor as well as the rich, the mean as well as the noble, deliver their opinion with confidence, and are heard with attention. Besides, those greatest statesmen, who have been esteemed the brightest examples of political virtue, though they have given their children every accomplishment of the body which education could bestow, do not at all appear to have improved their minds with those qualities for which they themselves were so eminent, and in which consequently they were best able to instruct them, if instruction could convey these virtues to the soul at all.

Protagoras answers by reciting a fable delivered in very beautiful language. The substance of it is this. Prometheus and Epimetheus, when the gods had formed all kinds of animals within the bowels of the earth, and the destined day approached for producing them into light, were commissioned to distribute among them the powers and qualifications which were allotted to them. The younger brother prevailed upon the elder to let him perform this work; and Prometheus consented to review afterwards and correct his disposition of things. Epimetheus then began, and directed his care to the preservation of the several species, that none might ever be totally lost. To some he gave extreme swiftness, but they were deficient in strength; and the strong he made not equally swift: the little found their security in the lightness of their bodies, in their airy wings, and in their subterraneous retreats; while those of vast magnitude had the superiority of their

bulk for a defence. Such as were formed to prey on others, he made to produce but few young ones; while those, who were to serve as their prey, brought forth a numerous progeny. He armed them against the seasons with hoofs of horn and callous feet, with hides of proof and soft warm furs, their native bed and clothing all in one. But when Prometheus came to review his brother's work, he found that he had lavished all his art and all his materials upon the brute creation, while mankind, whose turn it was next to be produced to light, was left a naked, helpless animal, exposed to the rigour of the seasons and to the violence of every other creature round him. In compassion therefore to his wants, Prometheus purloined the arts of Pallas and of Vulcan, and with them fire, without which they were impracticable and useless, and bestowed them on this new race, to compensate their natural defects. Men then, as allied to the divinity and endowed with reason, were the only part of the creation which acknowledged the being and the providence of the gods. They began to erect altars and statues; they formed articulate sounds, and invented language; they built habitations, covered themselves with clothing, and cultivated the ground. But still they were lonely creatures, scattered here and there; for Prometheus did not dare to enter the citadel of Jove, where Policy, the mother and queen of social life, was kept near the throne of the god himself; otherwise he would have bestowed her too on his favourite mankind. The arts which they possessed, just supported them, but could not defend them against the multitude and fierceness of the wild beasts: they tried to assemble and live together, but soon found that they were more dangerous and mischievous to one another than the savage creatures had been. In pity then to their condition, Jove, lest the whole race should perish, sent Mercury to earth, with Shame and Justice; and when he doubted how he should bestow them, and whether they should be distributed, as the arts had been, this to one, and that to another, or equally divided among the whole kind; Jove approved of the latter, and he commanded that if any did not receive his share of that bounty he should be extirpated from the face of the earth, as the pest and destruction of his fellow-creatures.

This then, continues Protagoras, is the reason, why the Athenians, and other nations, in debates, which turn on the several arts, attend only to the advice of the skilful; but give ear in matters of government, which are founded on ideas of common justice and probity, to every citizen indifferently among them: and that this is the common opinion of all men, may hence appear. If a person totally ignorant of music should fancy himself an admirable performer, the world would either laugh or be angry, and his friends would reprimand or treat him as a madman: but if a man should have candour and plain-dealing enough to profess himself a vil-

lain and ignorant of common justice, what in the other case would have been counted modesty, the simple confession of truth and of his own ignorance, would here be called impudence and madness. He that will not dissemble here, will be by all regarded as an idiot; for to own that one knows not what justice is, is to own that one ought not to live among mankind.

He proceeds to show, that no one thought our idea of justice to be the gift of nature; but that it is acquired by instruction and by experience: for with the weak, the deformed, or the blind man, no one is angry; no reprimands, no punishments attend the unfortunate, nor are employed to correct our natural defects; but they are the proper consequences of our voluntary neglects or offences. Nor is the punishment, which follows even these, intended to redress an evil already past, for that is impossible, but to prevent a future, or at least to deter others from like offences; which proves, that wickedness is by all regarded as a voluntary ignorance.

Next he shows, how this knowledge is acquired. It is by education. Every one is interested in teaching another the proper virtue of a man, on which alone all his other acquisitions must be founded, and without which he cannot exist among his fellow-creatures. His parents, as soon as understanding begins to dawn in him, are employed in prescribing what he ought to do and what he ought not to do; his masters, in filling his mind with the precepts, and forming it to the example, of the greatest men, or in fashioning his body to perform with ease and patience whatever his reason commands; and lastly, the laws of the state lay down a rule, by which he is necessitated to direct his actions. If then the sons of the greatest men do not appear to be greater proficient in virtue than the ordinary sort, it must not be ascribed to the parent's neglect; much less must it be concluded, that virtue is not to be acquired by instruction: it is the fault perhaps of genius and of nature. Let us suppose, that to perform on a certain instrument were a qualification required in every man, and necessary to the existence of a city, ought we to wonder, that the son of an admirable performer fell infinitely short of his father in skill? Should we attribute this to want of care, or say, that music were not attainable by any art? or should we not rather ascribe it to defect of genius and to natural inability? Yet every member of such a state would doubtless far surpass all persons rude and unpractised in music. In like manner, the most worthless member of a society, civilized by some sort of education and brought up under the influence of laws and of policy, will be an amiable man, if compared with a wild and uncultivated savage.

It is hard indeed to say, who is our particular instructor in the social virtues; as, for the same reason, it is hard to say, who taught us our native tongue; yet no one will therefore deny that

we learned it. The public is in these cases our master; and all the world has a share in our instruction. Suffice it, continues the sophist, to know, that some there are among us, elevated a little above the ordinary sort, in the art of leading mankind to honour and to virtue; and among these I have the advantage to be distinguished.

Socrates continues astonished for a time and speechless, as though dazzled with the beauty of Protagoras's discourse. At last, recovering himself, he ventures to propound a little doubt which has arisen in his mind, though perfectly satisfied, he says, with the main question, whether temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest, which Protagoras has so often mentioned, and seemed to comprehend under the general name of virtue, are different things, and can subsist separately in the same person; or whether they are all the same quality of mind, only exerted on different occasions. Protagoras readily agrees to the first of these; but is insensibly betrayed by Socrates into the toils of his logic, and makes such concessions, that he finds himself forced to conclude the direct contrary of what he had first advanced. He is sensible of his disgrace, and tries to evade this closer kind of reasoning by taking refuge in that more diffuse eloquence, which used to gain him such applause. But when he finds himself cut short by Socrates, who pleads the weakness of his own memory, unable to attend to long-continued discourses, and who entreats him to bring down the greatness of his talents to the level of a mind so much inferior, he is forced to pick a frivolous quarrel with Socrates, and break off the conversation in the middle. Here Callias interposes, and Alcibiades, in his insolent way, by supporting the request of Socrates and by piquing the vanity of Protagoras, obliges him to accommodate himself to the interrogatory method of disputation, and renews the dialogue.¹

To save the dignity of Protagoras, and to put him in humour again, Socrates proposes that he shall conduct the debate, and state the questions, while he himself will only answer them; provided Protagoras will in his turn afterwards condescend to do the same for him. The sophist begins by proposing a famous ode of Simonides, which seems to carry in it an absolute contradiction, which he desires Socrates to reconcile. Socrates appears at first puzzled, and after he has played awhile with Protagoras and with the other sophists, that he may have time to recollect himself, he gives an explanation of that poem, and of its pretended inconsistency, in a manner so new and so just as to gain the applause of

¹ The episodical characters of Prodicus and Hippias, introduced as mediating a reconciliation, are great ornaments to the dialogue; the affectation of eloquence and of an accurate choice of words in the former, and the stately figurative diction of the latter, being undoubtedly drawn from the life.

the whole company. He then brings back Protagoras, in spite of his reluctance, to his former subject, but without taking advantage of his former concessions, and desires again his opinion on the unity, or on the similitude, of the virtues. Protagoras now owns, that there is a near¹ affinity between them all, except valour, which he affirms that a man may possess, who is entirely destitute of all the rest. Socrates proves to him, that this virtue also, like the others, is founded on knowledge and is reducible to it; that it is but to know what is really to be feared, and what is not; that good and evil, or in other words, pleasure and pain,² being the great and the only movers of the human mind, no one can reject pleasure, but where it seems productive of a superior degree of pain, or prefer pain, unless the consequence of it be a superior pleasure. That to balance these one against the other with accuracy, to judge rightly of them at a distance, to calculate the overplus of each, is that science on which our happiness depends, and which is the basis of every virtue. That, if our whole life's welfare and the interests of it were as closely connected with the judgment, which we should make on the real magnitude of objects and on their true figure, or with our not being deceived by the appearance which they exhibit at a distance, who doubts but that geometry and optics would then be the means of happiness to us, and would become the rule of virtue? That there is a kind of knowledge no less necessary to us in our present state, and no less a science; and that, when we pretend to be misled by our passions, we ought to blame our ignorance, which is the true source of all our follies and vices. And now, continues Socrates, who would not laugh at our inconsistency? You set out with affirming that virtue might be taught, yet in the course of our debate you have treated it as a thing entirely distinct³ from knowledge, and not reducible to it: I, who advanced the contrary position, have shown that it is a science, and consequently that it may be learned.

Protagoras, who has had no other share in the dispute than to make, without perceiving the consequence, such concessions as absolutely destroy what he set out with affirming, tries to support the dignity of his own age and reputation, by making an arrogant compliment to Socrates, commending his parts, very considerable, he says, and very promising for so young a man, and doing him

¹ See Gorgias, p. 507.

² Plato reasons on the principles of the most rational Epicurean in this place, and indeed on the only principles which can be defended. As our sense of pleasure and of pain is our earliest sentiment, and is the great instrument of self-preservation, some philosophers have called these affections, *The first according to nature*. See Aul. Gell. xii. 6.

³ It was the opinion of Socrates, that all the virtues were only prudence, or wisdom, exerted on different occasions. An opinion in which, says Aristotle, in *Ethic. Nicom.* vi. 13, he was partly right and partly wrong.

the justice to say to all his acquaintance, that he knows no one more likely, some time or other, to make an extraordinary person; and he adds that this is not a time to enter deeper into this subject; but on any other day he shall be at his service.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 320. At liberty.] Every divinity had some such animals, which fed at liberty within the sacred enclosures and pastures. Such were the oxen of the Sun, in Homer, *Od. M.*; the owls of Minerva in the Acropolis at Athens, (*Aristoph. Lysist.*) the peacocks of Juno at Samos, (*Athenæus*, xiv. p. 655,) the tame serpents of Æsculapius, at Epidaurus, (*Pausan.* iii. 28, and at Athens, *Aristoph. Plut.* 733,) the fishes of the Syrian goddess, &c. (*Xenoph. Anab.* i. p. 254.)

P. 328. Worthy of the money I make.] It is remarkable in what general esteem and admiration Protagoras was held throughout all Greece. If any scholar of his thought the price he exacted was too high, he only obliged him to say upon his oath, what he thought the precepts he had given were worth, and Protagoras was satisfied with that sum. Yet he got more wealth by his profession than Phidias the statuary, and any other ten the most celebrated artists of Greece, as we learn from *Meno*, p. 91, and *Hipp. Maj.* p. 282. *Quintilian* says, in iii. 1, that *Euathlus* gave him 10,000 drachmæ (about £300 sterling) for his art of rhetoric in writing. He was the first sophist in Greece who professed himself a teacher of education and virtue, and such an one as could make men better and better every time he conversed with them. See p. 318, and 349.

P. 357. The want of instruction.] The true key and great moral of the dialogue is, that knowledge alone is the source of virtue, and ignorance the source of vice. It was Plato's own principle, as shown in *Epist.* vii. p. 336, and elsewhere. The consequence of it is, that virtue may be taught, and may be acquired; and that philosophy alone can point us out the way to it.

As Serranus, and, I think, every commentator after him, has read this dialogue with a grave countenance, and understood it in a literal sense, though it is throughout a very apparent and continued irony; it is no wonder if such persons, as trust to their accounts of it, find it a very silly and frivolous thing. Yet under that irony, doubtless, there is concealed a serious meaning, which makes a part of Plato's great design, a design which runs through all his writings. He was persuaded that virtue must be built on knowledge, not on that counterfeit knowledge, which dwells only on the surface of things, and is guided by the imagination rather than by the judgment, (for this was the peculiar foible of his countrymen, a light and desultory people, easily seduced by their fancy wherever it led them,) but on the knowledge which is fixed and settled on certain great and general truths, and on principles as ancient and as unshaken as nature itself, or rather as the author of nature. To this knowledge, and consequently to virtue, he thought that philosophy was our only guide: and as to all those arts, which are usually made merely subservient to the passions of mankind, as politics, eloquence, and poetry, he thought that they were no otherwise to be esteemed than as they are grounded on philosophy, and are directed to the ends of virtue. They, who had best succeeded in them before his time, owed, as he thought, their success rather to a lucky hit, to some gleam of truth, as it were providentially breaking in upon their minds, than to those fixed and unerring principles which are not to be erased from a soul, which has once been thoroughly convinced of them. Their conduct therefore in their actions, and in their productions, has been wavering between good and evil, and unable to reach perfection. The inferior tribe have caught something of their fire, merely by imitation, and form their judgments, not from any real skill they have in these arts, but merely from (what La Bruyere calls) a *gout de comparaison*. The general applause of men has pointed out to them what is finest; and to that, as to a principle, they refer their taste, without knowing or inquiring in what its excellence consists. Each Muse (says Plato in this dialogue) inspires and holds suspended her favourite poet in immediate contact, as the magnet does a link of iron, and from him, through whom the attractive virtue passes and is continued to the rest, hangs a long chain of actors, and singers, and critics, and interpreters of interpreters.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 533. *Dædalus* was the son of *Palamaon*, of that branch of the royal family called *Metionidæ*, being sprung from *Metion*, the son of *Erectheus*. (See *Pausan.* vii. p. 531, and i. p. 13.) There were statues of his workmanship still preserved in several cities of Greece, at Thebes, Lebadea, Delos, *Olus*, and *Gnossus*, even in the time of *Pausanias*, above six hundred years after this. See *Pausan.* ix. p. 793, and *Plato*, *Hippias Maj.* p. 282. *Epeus*, the son of *Panopeus*, was the inventor of the Trojan horse; in the temple of the Lycian *Apollo* at *Argos*, was preserved a wooden figure of *Mercury* made by him. *Theodorus*, the Samian, son of *Tecleles*, first discovered the method of casting iron, and of forming it into figures: he also (with his countryman *Rhæcus* the son of *Phileus*) was the first who cast statues in bronze; he worked likewise in gold, and graved precious stones.

P. 533. *Ὀλύμπιον.*] *Olympus*, the Phrygian, lived in the time of *Midas*, before the Trojan war, yet his compositions, as well the music as the verses, were extant even in *Plutarch's* days. *Aristotel.* *Politic.* viii. c. 5, and *Plato*, *Sympos.* p. 215. Hence also it seems that they had the music of *Orpheus*, of *Thamyris*, and of *Pheuius*, then in being. (See *Hom. Odys.* A. 325, and X. 330.)

P. 533. The *Magnesian.*] *Euripides* gave it this name, probably from the city of *Magnesia* near the hill of *Sipylius*, where it was found. *Mr. Chishull* tells us, that as they were ascending the castle-hill of this city, a compass, which they carried with them, pointed to different quarters, as it happened to be placed on different stones, and that at last it entirely lost its virtue; which shows that hill to be a mine of loadstone. Its power of attracting iron and of communicating its virtue to that iron, we see, was a thing well known at that time, yet they suspected nothing of its polar qualities.

P. 534. *ὑπορχήματα.*] *Pindar* was famous for this kind of compositions, though we have lost them, as well as his dithyrambics. *Xenodemos* also, *Bacchylides*, and *Pratinas* the *Phliasian*, excelled in them. *Athenæus* has preserved a fine fragment of this last poet, xiv. p. 617. These compositions were full of description, and were sung by a chorus who danced at the same time, and represented the words by their movements and gestures. *Tynnichus* of *Chalcis*, whose pæan was famous, and indeed the only good thing he ever wrote.

P. 535. *Ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος.*] The *Rhapsodi*, we find, were mounted on a sort of suggestum, with a crown of gold (see p. 530 and 541 of this dialogue) on their heads, and dressed in robes of various colours, and after their performance was finished, a collection seems to have been made for them among the audience.

P. 536. The *Corybantes.*] This alludes to a peculiar phrensy, supposed to be inspired by some divinity, especially *Cybele*, and attended with violent motions and efforts of the body. Persons so affected believed they heard the sound of loud music continually in their ears, and were peculiarly sensible to certain airs, when really played, as it is reported of those who are bitten by the tarantula.

THEÆTETUS.

TERPSION meeting Euclides at Megara, and inquiring where he has been, is informed that he has been accompanying Theætetus, who is lately come on shore from Corinth, in a weak and almost dying condition, upon his return to Athens. This reminds them of the high opinion which Socrates had entertained of that young man, who was presented to him (not long before his death) by Theodorus of Cyrene, the geometrician. The conversation, which then passed between them, was taken down in writing by Euclides, who, at the request of Terpsion, orders his servant to read it to them.

The Abbé Sallier, in *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, vol. xiii. p. 317, has given an elegant translation of the most shining part of this dialogue; and also in vol. xvi. p. 70, has translated all that part of the dialogue, in which Plato has explained the system of Protagoras. The description of a true philosopher in p. 172, though a little exaggerated, and more in the character of Plato than of Socrates, has yet an elevation in it which is admirable. The Abbé Sallier has also given a sketch of the dialogue, which is a very long one, and, as he rightly judges, would not be much approved in a translation. It is of that kind called *Παραρτήσις*, "Tentative," in order to make trial of the capacity of Theætetus, while Socrates, as he says, only plays the midwife, and brings the conceptions of his mind to light. The question is, What is knowledge? and the purpose of the dialogue is rather to refute the false definitions of it, as established by¹ Protagoras in his writings, and resulting from the tenets of Heraclitus,² of Empedocles, and of other philosophers, than to produce a better definition of his own. Yet there are many fine and remarkable passages in it, such as the observations of Theodorus on the faults of temper, which usually attend on brighter parts, and on the defects of genius often found in minds of a more sedate and solid turn; Socrates's illustration of his own art by the whimsical comparison between that and midwifery; his opinion, adopted by Aristotle in *Metaphys.* i. p. 335, ed. Sylb., that admiration is the parent of

¹ His fundamental tenet was, that every man's own perceptions of things were (to him) the measure and the test of truth and of falsehood.

² Viz. that motion was the principle of being, and the only cause of all its qualities.

philosophy; the explanation of active and passive powers of matter, arising from the perpetual flux and motion of all things, which was the doctrine of Heraclitus and others; the reflections on philosophical leisure, and on a liberal turn of mind, opposed to the little cunning and narrow thoughts of mere men of business; the description of Heraclitus's followers, then very numerous in Ionia, particularly at Ephesus; the account of the tenets of Parmenides and of Melissus, directly contrary to those of the former; the distinction between our senses, the instruments through which the mind perceives external objects, and the mind itself, which judges of their existence, their likeness, and their difference, and founds its knowledge on the ideas which it abstracts from them; to which we may add, the comparison of ideas fixed in the memory to impressions made in wax, and the dwelling on this similitude in order to show the several imperfections of this faculty in different constitutions.

THE SOPHIST.

I AM convinced that this is a continuation of the *Theætetus*, which ends with these words, "To-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again," as this begins with "According to our agreement, Socrates, yesterday, we are come ourselves in due order." The persons are the same, except the philosopher of the Eleatic school, who is here introduced, and who carries on the disputation with *Theætetus*, while both Theodorus and Socrates continue silent. The apparent subject of it is the character of a sophist, which is here at large displayed in opposition to that of a philosopher; but here too he occasionally attacks the opinions of Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and others, on the incertitude of all existence and on the perpetual flux of matter.

This dialogue, in a translation, would suit the taste of the present age still less even than the *Theætetus*; particularly that part, which is intended to explain the nature of existence and of non-existence, which to me is obscure beyond all comprehension, partly perhaps from our ignorance of the opinions of those philosophers, which are here refuted; and partly from the abstracted nature of the subject; and not a little, I doubt, from Plato's manner of treating it.

The most remarkable things in this dialogue appear to be, his

description of that disorder and want of symmetry in the soul, produced by ignorance, which puts it off its bias on its way to happiness, the great end of human actions: the distinction he makes between *Ἀγνοια*, "the want of knowledge," and *Ἀμαθία*, "the want of learning;" of which the former is simply our ignorance of a thing, the latter, an ignorance which mistakes itself for knowledge, and which, as long as this sentiment attends it, is without hope of remedy: the explanation of the Socratic mode of instruction, adapted to this peculiar kind of ignorance, by drawing a person's errors gradually from his own mouth, ranging them together, and exposing to his own eyes their inconsistency and weakness: the comparison of that representation of things, given us by the sophists, and pieces of painting, which, placed at a certain distance, deceive the young and inexperienced into an opinion of their reality: and the total change of ideas in young men when they come into the world, and begin to be acquainted with it by their own sensations, and not by description. All these passages are extremely good.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 252. Eurycles.] He was a ventriloquist, and set up for a prophet. Such as are possessed of this faculty, can manage their voice in so wonderful a manner, that it shall seem to come from what part they please, not of themselves only, but of any other person in the company, or even from the bottom of a well, down a chimney, from below stairs, &c., of which I myself have been witness.

P. 265. We see here that it was the common opinion, that the creation of things was the work of blind, unintelligent nature; whereas the contrary was the result of philosophical reflection and disquisition, believed by a few people only.

THE STATESMAN.

THIS dialogue is a continuation of the Sophist, as the Sophist is a continuation of the Theætetus; and they were accordingly ranged together by Thrasyllus in that order, as stated by Diog. Laert. iii. 58, though Serranus in his edition has separated them. The persons are the same, only that here the younger Socrates is introduced, instead of Theætetus, carrying on the conversation with the stranger from Elea. The principal heads of it are the following:

P. 258. The division of the sciences into speculative and practical.

P. 259. The master, the economist, the politician, the king; which are taken as different names for men of the same profession.

The private man, who can give lessons of government to such as publicly exercise this art, deserves the name of royal no less than they.

No difference between a great family and a small commonwealth.

The politician must command on his own judgment, and not by the suggestion of others.

P. 262. The absurdity of the Greeks, who divided all mankind into Greeks and barbarians. The folly of all distinction and division without a difference.

P. 269. The fable of the contrary revolutions in the universe at periodical times, with the alternate destruction and reproduction of all creatures.

P. 273. The disorder and the evil in the natural world, accounted for from the nature of¹ matter, while it was yet a chaos.

The former revolution, in which the Divinity himself immediately conducted every thing, is called the Saturnian age; the present revolution, when the world goes the contrary way, being left to its own² conduct. Mankind are now guided by their own free-will, and are preserved by their own inventions.

P. 275. The nature of the monarch in this age is no other

¹ Plato, with the Pythagoreans, looked upon matter as co-eternal with the Deity, but receiving its order and design entirely from him.

² Here too, as in the *Timæus*, p. 63, A., he considers the universe as one vast, animated, and intelligent body.

than that of the people which he commands. His government must be with the consent of the people.

P. 276. Clear and certain knowledge is rare and in few instances; we are forced to supply this defect by comparison and by analogy. Necessity of tracing things up to their first principles. Examples of logical division.

Greater, or less, with respect to our actions, are not to be considered as mere relations only depending on one another, but are to be referred to a certain middle term, which forms the standard of morality.

P. 284. All the arts consist in measurement, and are divided into two classes: 1st, Those arts which compare dimensions, numbers, or motions, each with its contrary, as greater with smaller, more with less, swifter with slower; and 2dly, Those, which compare them by their distances from some middle point, seated between two extremes, in which consists what is right, fit, and becoming.

The design of these distinctions, and of the manner used before in tracing out the idea of a sophist and a politician, is to form the mind to a habit of logical division.

The necessity of illustrating our contemplations, on abstract and spiritual subjects, by sensible and material images, is stated.

P. 286. An apology for his prolixity.

Principal, and concurrent, or instrumental causes, are named; the division of the latter, with their several productions, is into seven classes of arts which are necessary to society: viz.

1. *Tò πρωτογενὲς εἶδος*. That class which furnishes materials for all the rest; it includes the arts of mining, hewing, felling, &c.

2. *Ὀργάνον*. The instruments employed, in all manufactures, with the arts which make them.

3. *Ἀγγεῖον*. The vessels to contain and preserve our nutriment, and other movables, furnished by the potter, joiner, brazier, &c.

4. *Ὀχήμα*. Carriages, seats, vehicles for the land and water, &c., by the coach-maker, ship and boat-builder, &c.

5. *Πρόσθαμα*. Shelter, covering, and defence, as houses, clothing, tents, arms, &c., by the architect, weaver, armourer, &c.

6. *Παίγμων*. Pleasure and amusement, as painting, music, sculpture, &c.

7. *Θρέμμα*. Nourishment, supplied by agriculture, hunting, cookery, &c., and regulated by the gymnastic and medical arts.

P. 289. None of these arts have any pretence to, or competition with, the art of governing; no more than the class which voluntarily exercise the employment of slaves, such as merchants, bankers, and tradesmen: the priesthood too are included under this head, as interpreters between the gods and men, not from their own judgment, but either by inspiration, or by a certain prescribed ceremonial.

P. 291. There are three kinds of government: monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy: the two first are distinguished into four, royalty, tyranny, aristocracy, and oligarchy-proper.

P. 294. The imperfection of all laws arises from the impossibility of adapting them to the continual change of circumstances, and to particular cases.

P. 296. Force may be employed by the wise and just legislator to good ends.

P. 298. The supposition of a set of rules in physic, in agriculture, or in navigation, drawn up by a majority of the citizens, and not to be transgressed under pain of death, applied to the case of laws made by the people.

P. 307. Some nations are destroyed by an excess of spirit; others by their own inoffensiveness and love of quiet.

P. 308. The office of true policy is to temper courage with moderation, and moderation with courage. Policy presides over education.

This dialogue seems to be a very natural introduction to the books *De Republicâ*, and was doubtless so intended. See particularly iii. p. 410, &c., and iv. p. 442.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 290. The Egyptian kings were all of them priests, and if any of another class usurped the throne, they too were obliged to admit themselves of that order.

THE REPUBLIC.

THE scene of this dialogue lies at the house of Cephalus, a rich old Syracusan, father to Lysias the orator, then residing in the Piræus, on the day of the Bendidea, a festival, then first celebrated on the 19th day of the month Thargelion, answering to the middle of June, with processions, races, and illuminations in honour of the Thracian Diana. The persons engaged in the conversation, or present at it, are Cephalus himself, Polemarchus, Lysias, and Euthydemus, his three sons; Glauco and Adimantus, sons of Aristo and brothers to Plato; Niceratus, son of Nicias; Thras-

machus the sophist of Chalcedon; Clitophon, son of Aristonymus, and Charmantides of Pæania, and Socrates.

As to the time of these dialogues, it is certain that Cephalus died about Ol. 84, 1, and that his son Lysias was born fifteen years before Ol. 80, 2, consequently they must fall between these two years, and probably not long before Cephalus's death, when he was seventy years old or more; and Lysias was a boy of ten or twelve and upwards. Therefore I should place it in the 83rd Ol. See *Fastos Atticos*, Corsini, vol. ii. Dissert. 13, p. 312. But I must observe that this is not easily reconcilable with the age of Adimantus and Glauco, who are here introduced as men grown up, and consequently must be at least thirty-six years older than their brother Plato. If this can be allowed, the action at Megara there mentioned must be that which happened Ol. 83, 2, under Pericles; and the institution of the Bendidea must have been Ol. 83, 3 or 4. It is observable also that Theages is mentioned in vi. p. 496 of this dialogue, as advanced in the study of philosophy. He was very young, when his father Demodocus put him under the care of Socrates, which was in Ol. 92, 3, and consequently thirty-five years after the time which Corsini would assign to this conversation.

BOOK I.

HEADS OF THE FIRST DIALOGUE.

The pleasures of old age and the advantages of wealth.

P. 335. The just man hurts no one, not even his enemies.

P. 338. The sophist's definition of justice, namely, that it is the advantage of our superiors, to which the laws of every government oblige the subject to conform, is refuted.

P. 341. The proof, that the proper office of every art is to act for the good of its inferiors.

P. 343. The sophist's attempt to show, that justice is not the good of those who possess it, but of those who do not; and that injustice is only blamed in such as have not the art to carry it to its perfection, refuted.

P. 347. In a state composed all of good men, no one would be ambitious of governing.

P. 349. The perfection of the arts consists in attaining a certain rule of proportion. The musician does not attempt to excel his fellows by straining or stopping his chords higher or lower than they; for that would produce dissonance and not harmony; the physician does not try to exceed his fellows by prescribing a larger or less quantity of nourishment, or of medicines, than conduces to health; and so of the rest. The unjust man therefore, who would surpass all the rest of his fellow-creatures in the

quantity of his pleasures and powers, acts like one ignorant in the art of life, in which only the just are skilled.

P. 351. The greatest and most signal injustices, which one state and society can commit against another, cannot be perpetrated without a strict adherence to justice among the particular members of such a state and society : so that there is no force nor strength without a degree of justice.

P. 352. Injustice even in one single mind must set it at perpetual variance with itself, as well as with all others.

P. 353. Virtue is the proper office, the wisdom, the strength, and the happiness of the human soul.

BOOK II.

HEADS OF THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

P. 357. Good is of three kinds : the First we embrace for itself, without regard to its consequences ; such are all innocent delights and amusements. The Second, both for itself and for its consequences, as health, strength, sense, &c. The Third, for its consequences only, as labour, medicine, &c. The second of these is the most perfect : the justice of this class. Objection—To consider it rightly we must separate it from honour and from reward, and view it simply as it is in itself.

P. 358. Injustice is a real good to its possessor, and justice is an evil : but as men feel more pain in suffering than inflicting injury, and as the greater part are more exposed to suffer it than capable of inflicting it, they have by compact agreed neither to do nor to suffer injustice ; which is a medium calculated for the general benefit, between that which is best of all, namely, to do injustice without fear of punishment, and that which is worst, to suffer it without a possibility of revenge. This is the origin of what we call justice.

Such as practise the rules of justice do it from their inability to do otherwise, and consequently against their will. Story of Gyges's¹ ring, by which he could make himself invisible at pleasure. No person, who possessed such a ring, but would do wrong.

P. 360. Life of the perfectly unjust man, who conceals his true character from the world, and that of the perfectly just man, who seems the contrary in the eye of the world, are compared : the happiness of the former is contrasted with the misery of the latter.

P. 362. The advantages of probity are not therefore, according to this representation, in itself, but in things exterior to it, in

¹ See Cic. de Offic. iii. c. 9, where he attributes to Gyges himself what Plato relates of one of his ancestors.

honours and rewards, and they attend not on being, but on seeming honest.

P. 363. Accordingly the praises bestowed on justice, and the reproaches on injustice, by our parents and governors, are employed not on the thing itself, but on its consequences. The Elysian fields and the punishments of Tartarus are painted in the strongest colours by the poets; while they represent the practice of virtue as difficult and laborious, and that of vice, as easy and delightful. They add, that the gods often bestow misery on the former, and prosperity and success on the latter; and, at the same time, they teach us how to expiate our crimes, and even how to hurt our enemies, by prayers, by sacrifices, and by incantations.

P. 366. The consequence is, by this mode of argument, that to dissemble well with the world is the way to happiness in *this* life; and for what is to come, we may buy the favour of the gods at a trifling expense.

P. 369. The nature of political justice. The image of a society in its first formation: it is founded on our natural imbecility, and on the mutual occasion we have for each other's assistance. Our first and most pressing necessity, is that of food; the second, of habitation; the third, of clothing. The first and most necessary society must therefore consist of a ploughman, a builder, a shoemaker, and a weaver: but, as they will want instruments, a carpenter and a smith will be requisite; and as cattle will be wanted, as well for their skins and wool, as for tillage and carriage, they must take in shepherds and the herdsmen. As one country produces not every thing, they will have occasion for some imported commodities, which cannot be procured without exportations in return, so that a commerce must be carried on by merchants; and if it be performed by sea, there will be an occasion for mariners and pilots. Further; as the employment of the shepherds, agricultors, mechanics, merchants, and such persons will not permit them to attend the markets, there must be retailers, and tradesmen, and money to purchase with; and there must be servants to assist all these, that is, persons who let out their strength for hire. Such an establishment will not be long without a degree of luxury, which will increase the city with a vast variety of artificers, and require a greater extent of territory to support them: they will then encroach on their neighbours. Hence the origin of war. A militia will be required; but as this is an art, which will engross the whole man, and take up all his time, to acquire and exercise it, a distinct body will be formed of chosen men for the defence of the state.

P. 374. The nature of a soldier: he must have quickness of sense, agility, and strength, invincible spirit tempered with gentleness and goodness of heart, and an understanding apprehensive and desirous of knowledge.

P. 376. The education of such a person. Errors and dangerous prejudices are instilled into young minds by the Greek poets. The scandalous fables of Homer and of Hesiod, who attribute injustice, enmity, anger, and deceit to the gods, are reprobated; and the immutable goodness, truth, justice, mercy, and other attributes of the Divinity are nobly asserted.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 363. *Ἐργαὶ καὶ καράδες τοὶ τῶν Θεῶν.*] Incantations and magical rites, to hurt one's enemies, were practised in Greece and taught by vagabond priests and prophets: a number of books ascribed to Musæus and Orpheus were carried about by such people, prescribing various expiatory ceremonies and mysterious rites: so the chorus of Satyrs in the Cyclops of Euripides, vs. 642.

P. 372. Chick-peas and beans.] This was a common dessert among the Greeks, both eaten raw, when green and tender, or when dry, parched in the fire. See Athenæus, ii. p. 54; Theocritus, Id. vii. 65. Crobylus (quoted by Athenæus, p. 54) calls this kind of entables, "the monkeys' dessert."

BOOK III.

HEADS OF THE THIRD DIALOGUE.

P. 386. Wrong notions of a future state are instilled into youth by the poets, whence arises an unmanly fear of death.

P. 388. Excessive sorrow and excessive laughter are equally unbecoming a man of worth.

P. 389. Falsehood and fiction are not permitted, but where they are for the good of mankind; and consequently they are not to be trusted but in skilful hands.

P. 390. Examples of impiety and of bad morality in the poets, and in other ancient writers.

P. 392. Poetic eloquence is divided into narration, in the writer's own person, and imitation, in some assumed character. Dithyrambs usually consist wholly of the former; dramatic poesy, of the latter; the epic, &c., of both mixed.

P. 395. Early imitation becomes a second nature. The soldier is not permitted to imitate any thing misbecoming his own character, and consequently he is neither permitted to write, nor to play, any part which he himself would not act in life.

P. 396. Imitative expression in oratory, or in gesture, is restrained by the same principle.

P. 398. Music must be regulated. The Lydian, Syntono-Lydian, and Ionian harmonies are banished, as accommodated to the soft, enervate passions; but the Dorian and the Phrygian

harmonies are permitted, as manly, decent, and persuasive. All instruments of great compass and of luxuriant harmony, the lyra, the cythara, and the fistula, are allowed; and the various rhythms or movements are in like manner restrained.

P. 401. The same principle is extended to painting, sculpture, architecture, and to the other arts.

P. 403. Love is permitted, but abstracted from bodily enjoyment. Diet and exercises, plain and simple meats, are prescribed.

P. 405. Many judges and physicians are a sure sign of a society ill-regulated both in mind and in body. Ancient physicians knew no medicines but for wounds, fractures, epidemical distempers, and other acute complaints. The diætic and gymnastic method of cure, or rather of protracting diseases, was not known before Herodicus introduced it.

P. 409. The temper and disposition of an old man of probity, fit to judge of the crimes of others, is described.

P. 410. The temper of men, practised in the exercises of the body, but unacquainted with music and with letters, is apt to run into an obstinate and brutal fierceness; and that of the contrary sort, into indolence and effeminacy. The gradual neglect of this, in both cases, is here finely painted.

P. 412. Choice of such of the soldiery, as are to rise to the magistracy; namely, of those who, through their life, have been proof to pleasure and to pain.

P. 414. An example of a beneficial fiction. It is difficult to fix in the minds of men a belief in fables, originally; but it is very easy to deliver it down to posterity, when once established.

P. 416. The habitation of the soldiery: all luxury in building to be absolutely forbidden them: they are to have no patrimony, nor possessions, but to be supported and furnished with necessaries from year to year by the citizens; they are to live and eat in common, and to use no plate, nor jewels, nor money.

BOOK IV.

HEADS OF THE FOURTH DIALOGUE.

P. 419. Objection—That the *Φύλακες*, or “soldiers,” in whose hands the government is placed, will have less happiness and enjoyment of life than any of the meanest citizens.

Answer—That it is not the intention of the legislature to bestow superior happiness on any one class of men in the state; but that each shall enjoy such a measure of it, as is consistent with the preservation of the whole.

P. 421. Opulence and poverty are equally destructive of a state; the one producing luxury, indolence, and a spirit of inno-

vation ; the other producing meanness, cunning, and a like spirit of innovation.

The task of the magistracy is to keep both the one and the other out of the republic.

P. 422. Can such a state, without a superfluity of treasure, defend itself, when attacked by a rich and powerful neighbour ?

As easily as a champion, exercised for the Olympic games, could defeat one or more rich fat men unused to fatigue, who should fall upon him in a hot day.

The advantage of such a state, which neither needs riches nor desires them, in forming alliances.

Every republic formed on another plan, though it bear the name of a state, is in reality several states included under one name ; the rich making one state, the poor another, and so on ; always at war among themselves.

P. 423. A body of a thousand men bred to war, and united by such an education and government as this, is superior even in number to any thing that almost any state in Greece could produce.

P. 424. No innovation is to be ever admitted in the original plan of education. A change of music in a country betokens a change in their morals.

P. 425. Fine satire on the Athenians, and on their demagogues.

P. 428. The political wisdom of the new-formed state is seated in the magistracy.

P. 429. Its bravery is seated in the soldiery : in what it consists.

P. 430. The nature of temperance : the expression of *subduing one's self*, is explained ; when reason, the superior part of the mind, preserves its empire over the inferior, that is, over our passions and desires. The temperance of the new republic, whose wisdom and valour, in the hands of the soldiery, exercise a just power over the inferior people by their own consent, is described.

P. 433. Political justice distributes to every one his proper province of action, and prevents each from encroaching on the other.

P. 435. Justice in a private man : its similitude to the former is stated. The three distinct faculties of the soul, namely, appetite, or desire, reason, and indignation, or the concupiscible, the rational, and the irascible, are described.

P. 441. The first made to obey the second, and the third to assist and to strengthen it. Fortitude is the proper virtue of the irascible, wisdom of the rational, and temperance of the concupiscible, preserving a sort of harmony and consent between the three.

P. 443. Justice is the result of this union, maintaining each faculty in its proper office.

P. 444. The description of injustice.

P. 445. The uniformity of virtue, and the infinite variety of vice. Four more distinguished kinds of it are enumerated, whence arise four different kinds of bad government.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 420. 'Ανδρίαç.] This word seems to be used here for a painting, not a statue, as elsewhere.

Ib. Fine garments.] The *ἔσθρις* was a long variegated mantle, which swept the ground, worn by the principal characters in tragedy, and on great solemnities by the Greek women. See Theocrit. Id. ii. 73.

P. 435. The Scythians, the Thracians, and other northern nations were distinguished by their ferocity, the Greeks by their curiosity and love of knowledge, and the Phœnicians and Egyptians by their desire of gain. Plato marks the threefold distinction.

BOOK V.¹

HEADS OF THE FIFTH DIALOGUE.

P. 451. On the education of the women. There is no natural difference between the sexes, but in point of strength; their exercises, therefore, both of body and mind, are to be alike, as are their employments in the state.

P. 452. Custom is forced in time to submit to reason. The sight of men exercising² naked was once held indecent in Greece, till the Cretans first, and then the Lacedæmonians, introduced it: it is still held scandalous by the Persians, and by other barbarians.

P. 454. When the entire sexes are compared with each other, the female is doubtless the inferior; but, in individuals, the woman has often the advantage of the man.

P. 456. Choice of the female soldiery.

P. 457. Wives in common to all men of the same class. Their times of meeting to be regulated on solemn days, accompanied with solemn ceremonies and sacrifices, by the magistracy, who are to contrive by lots, the secret management of which is known to them alone, that the best and bravest of the men may be paired with women of like qualities, and that those, who are less fit to breed, may come together very seldom.

¹ It is probable that this 5th book, and perhaps the 3rd, were written when Plato was about thirty-five years old, for he says in his 7th Epistle, p. 328, when speaking of himself before his first voyage to Sicily—And I was compelled to say while praising true philosophy, &c.; and Aulus Gellius asserts in xiv. 3, that Xenophon, after reading the two books of Plato's Republic which were first published, wrote in opposition to them his Cyropædia. I know not how ancient the division of this work into ten books may be; but there is no reason at all for it, the whole being one continued conversation.

² The Lacedæmonians, says Thucydides in i. 6, were the first to undress themselves and to appear naked in public; whereas formerly the Athletes in the Olympic contests wore a girdle round their middle; and not many years have passed since the custom was left off. This change is said to have been made about the 32nd Olymp.

P. 460. Neither fathers nor mothers are to know their own children, which, when born, are to be conveyed to a separate part of the city, and there, so many of them as the magistrate shall choose, to be brought up by nurses appointed for that purpose.

The time of propagation to be limited, in the men from thirty years of age to fifty-five, in the women from twenty to forty. No children born of parents under or above this term to be brought up, but exposed, and the parents severely censured; as are all who meet without the usual solemnities, and without the licence of the magistrate.

P. 461. All children, born within seven or ten months from the time any person was permitted to propagate, are to be considered as their own children: all that are born within the time, in which their parents are suffered to breed, are to regard each other as brethren. Marriage is to be prohibited between persons in these circumstances.

P. 462. Partiality and dissension among the soldiery are prevented by these appointments. A fellow-feeling of pleasures and of pains is the strongest band of union which can connect mankind.

P. 466. Children are to be carried out to war very early, to see and to learn their intended profession, and wait on their parents in the field.

P. 468. A soldier who deserts his rank, or throws away his arms, is to be reduced to the rank of a mechanic: he who is taken prisoner alive is never to be ransomed.—The reward of the bravest.

P. 469. It is not permitted to reduce a Greek to captivity, nor to strip the dead of any thing but of their arms, which are forbidden to be dedicated in the temples; it is not permitted to ravage the country further than to destroy the year's crop, or to burn the buildings.

P. 472. The reason why a state, thus instituted, seems an impossibility. No people will ever be rightly governed, till kings shall be philosophers, or philosophers be kings.

P. 474. The description of a genius truly philosophic.

▷ 476. The distinction of knowledge and opinion.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 460. This was actually the practice of Sparta, as we learn from Plutarch in *Lycurg.*, where the old men of each tribe sat in judgment on the new-born infants, and, if they were weakly or deformed, ordered them to be cast into a deep cavern, near Mount Taygetus. Thence also are borrowed the prohibition of gold and silver, the *ἕσθια*, "the eating together" in public, the naked exercises of the women, the community of goods, the general authority of the old men over the young, the simplicity of music and of diet, the exemption of the soldiery from all other business, and most of the fundamental institutions in Plato's republic, as Plutarch observes in his *Lycurgus*.

BOOK VI.

HEADS OF THE SIXTH DIALOGUE.

Plato is no where more admirable than in this book: the thoughts are as just as they are new, and the elocution is as beautiful as it is expressive; it can never be read too often: but towards the end it is excessively obscure.

P. 485. The love of truth is the natural consequence of a genius truly inclined to philosophy. Such a mind will be little inclined to sensual pleasures, and consequently will be temperate, and a stranger to avarice and to illiberality.

P. 486. Such a mind, being accustomed to the most extensive views of things and to the sublimest contemplations, will contract an habitual greatness, and look down, as it were, with disregard on human life and on death, the end of it; and consequently will possess the truest fortitude. Justice is the result of these virtues.

Apprehension and memory are two fundamental qualities of a philosophic mind.

P. 487. Such a genius is made by nature to govern mankind.

Objection from experience—That such as have devoted themselves to the study of philosophy, and have made it the employment of their maturer age, have turned out either very bad men, or entirely useless to society.

P. 488. Their inutility, with regard to government, is allowed and accounted for. The comparison of a bad government to a ship, where the mariners have agreed to let their pilot have no hand in the steerage, but to take that task upon themselves.

P. 491. Those very endowments, before described as necessary to the philosophic mind, are often the ruin of it, especially when joined to the external advantages of strength, beauty, nobility, and wealth, when they light in a bad soil, and do not meet with their proper nurture, which an excellent education only can bestow.

Extraordinary virtues and extraordinary vices are equally the produce of a vigorous mind: little souls are alike incapable of one or of the other.

The corruption of young minds is falsely attributed to the sophists, who style themselves philosophers: it is the public example which depraves them; the assemblies of the people, the courts of justice, the camp, and the theatres inspire them with false opinions, elevate them with false applause, and fright them with false infamy. The sophists do no more than confirm the opinions of the public, and teach how to humour its passions and to flatter its vanities.

P. 495. As few great geniuses have strength to resist the general contagion, but leave philosophy abandoned and forlorn, though it

is their own peculiar province, the sophists step into their vacant place, assume their name and air, and cheat the people into an opinion of them. They are compared to a little old slave, worth money, dressed out like a bridegroom to marry the beautiful, but poor, orphan daughter of his deceased lord.

P. 495, § 10. A description of the few of true genius who escape depravation, and devote themselves really to philosophy; which happens commonly either from some ill fortune, or from weakness of constitution. The reason why they must necessarily be excluded from public affairs, unless in this imaginary republic.

P. 500. The application of these arguments to the proof of his former proposition, namely, that until princes shall be philosophers or philosophers shall be princes, no state can be completely happy.

P. 503. The φύλακες, "Guardians," therefore, are to be real philosophers. The great difficulty is to find the requisite qualifications of mind united in one person. Quickness of apprehension and a retentive memory, vivacity and application, gentleness and magnanimity, rarely go together.

P. 508. The idea of the supreme good is the foundation of philosophy, without which all acquisitions are useless. The cause of knowledge and of truth is compared to light; truth, to the power which bodies have of reflecting light, or of becoming visible; and the sovereign good itself is compared to the sun, the lord and father of light.

P. 509. The author of being is superior to all being.

P. 510. There are different degrees of certainty in the objects of our understanding.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 485. The existence that is for ever.] Our general abstracted ideas, as they exist in the mind independent of matter, which is subject to continual changes, were regarded by Plato as the sole foundations of knowledge, and emanations, as it were, from the divinity himself.

P. 497. Those who engage in it, &c.] This is a remarkable passage, as it shows the manner in which the Athenians usually studied philosophy, and Plato's judgment about it, which was directly opposite to the common practice.

BOOK VII.

HEADS OF THE SEVENTH DIALOGUE.

P. 514. The state of mankind is compared to that of persons confined in a vast cavern from their birth, with their legs fettered, and with their heads so placed in a machine that they cannot

turn them to the light, which shines full in at the entrance of the cave; nor can they see such bodies as are continually in motion, passing and repassing behind them, but only the shadows of them, as they fall on the sides of the grotto directly before their eyes.

If any one should set them free from this confinement, oblige them to walk, and drag them from their cavern into open day, they would hang back or move with unwillingness or pain; their eyes would be dazzled with the brightness of each new object, and comprehend nothing distinctly; they would long for their shadows and darkness again, till, being more habituated to light, they would first be brought to gaze on the images of things reflected in the water, or elsewhere; then on the bodies themselves; then on the skies, on the stars, and the moon, and gradually on the sun himself, whom they would learn to be the source and the author of all these beautiful appearances.

If any thing should induce one of these persons to descend again into his native cavern, his eyes would not for a long time be reconciled to darkness, his old fellow-prisoners would treat him as stupid and blind, would say that he had spoiled his eyes in those upper regions, and grow angry with him, if he proposed to set them at liberty.

P. 518. An early good education is the only thing which can turn the eyes of our mind from the darkness and uncertainty of popular opinion to the clear light of truth. It is the interest of the public neither to suffer unlettered and unphilosophic minds to meddle with government, nor to allow men of knowledge to give themselves up for their whole life to contemplation, as the first will have no principle to act upon, and the others no practice nor inclination to business.

P. 526. The use of the mathematics, in education, is principally to abstract the mind from sensible and material objects, and to turn it to contemplate certain general and immutable truths, whence it may aspire to the knowledge of the supreme good, who is immutable, and is the object only of the understanding.

The great improvement of a mind versed in these sciences, which quicken and enlarge the apprehension, and inure us to intense application, and what are their practical uses, particularly in military knowledge, is eloquently described.

P. 537. The *Φύλακες*, "Guards," to be initiated in mathematical knowledge and studies before seventeen, and for three years more are to be confined to their continual and necessary exercises of the body, that is, till about twenty years of age; they are not to enter upon logic till after thirty, in which they are to continue five years.

Knowledge is not to be implanted in a free-born mind by force and violence, but by gentleness accompanied with art, and by every kind of invitation.

The dangerous situation of the mind, when it is quitting the first prejudices of education and has not yet discovered the true principles of action, is here admirably described. It is compared to a youth brought up in affluence, and surrounded by flatterers, by persons who have passed hitherto for his parents, but are not really so; when he has found out the imposition, he will neglect those whom he has hitherto obeyed and honoured, and will naturally incline to the advice of his flatterers, till he can discover those persons to whom he owes his duty and his birth.

The levity, the heat, and the vanity of our *first* youth make it an improper time to be trusted with reasoning and disputation, which is only fit for a mind grown cooler and more settled by years; as old age on the other hand weakens the apprehension, and renders us incapable of application.

From thirty-five to fifty years of age the *Φύλακες*, "Guards," are to be obliged to administer the public affairs, and to act in the inferior offices of the magistracy; after fifty they are to be admitted into the highest philosophy, the doctrine of the supreme good, and are in their turn to submit to bear the superior offices of the state.

BOOK VIII.

HEADS OF THE EIGHTH DIALOGUE.

Plato here resumes the subject which he had dropped at the end of the fourth book.

P. 544. Four distinct kinds of government are enumerated, which deviate from the true form, and gradually grow worse and worse: namely, 1. The timocracy, so he calls the Lacedæmonian or Cretan constitution; 2. The oligarchy; 3. The democracy; and 4. Tyranny: they are produced by as many different corruptions of the mind and manners of the inhabitants.

P. 545. The change from the true aristocracy (or constitution of Plato's republic) to a timocracy is described. Every thing, which has had a beginning, is subject to corruption. The introduction of property, and the division of land among the *Φύλακες*. The encroachment on the liberty of the inferior part of the commonwealth. Secret avarice and love of pleasure are the consequence of private property. The neglect of music and of letters. The preference given to the exercises of the body. The prevalence of the irascible over the rational part of the soul.

The character of a citizen in such a state and the origin of such a character are described.

P. 550. The change from a timocracy into an oligarchy, where none are admitted to the honours and offices of the commonwealth,

who do not possess a certain proportion of property. The progress of avarice is the cause of this alteration. Such a state is always divided into two, always at enmity among themselves, the rich and the poor, which is the cause of its weakness. The alienation of property, which is freely permitted by the wealthy for their own interest, will still increase the disproportion of fortune among the citizens. The ill consequences of prodigality, and of its attendant extreme poverty, in a state. The poor are compared to drones in a bee-hive, some with stings and some without.

P. 552. The gradual transition of the mind from the love of honour to the love of money.

When a young man has seen the misfortunes which ambition has brought upon his own family, as fines, banishment, confiscation, and even death itself, adversity and fear will break his spirit and humble his parts, which he will now apply to raise a fortune by securer methods, by the slow and secret arts of gain: his rational faculties and nobler passions will be subjected to his desire of acquisition, and he will admire and emulate others only in proportion as they possess the great object of his wishes: his passion for wealth will keep down and suppress in him the love of pleasure and of extravagance, which yet, for want of philosophy and of a right education, will continue alive in his heart and exert itself, when he can find an opportunity to satisfy it by some secret injustice at the expense of others.

P. 555. The source of a democracy: namely, when the meaner sort, increasing with a number of men of spirit and abilities, reduced to poverty by extravagance and by the love of pleasure, begin to feel their own strength, and compare themselves to the few wealthy persons who compose the government, whose body and mind are weakened by their application to nothing but to the sordid arts of lucre. The change of the constitution. The way to the magistracy laid open to all, and decided by balloting. A lively picture of the Athenian commonwealth.

P. 558. The distinction between our necessary and unnecessary desires, is stated; when the latter prevail over the former by indulgence, and by keeping bad company, they form a democratic mind. The description of such a soul, when years have somewhat allayed the tumult and violence of its passions; it is the sport of humour and of caprice, inconstant in any pursuit, and incapable of any resolution.

P. 562. When liberty degenerates into extreme licence and anarchy, the democracy begins to tend towards tyranny. The picture of the Athenian government and manners is continued with great force and severity: where youth assumes the authority and decisiveness of age, and age mimics the gaiety and pleasures of youth; where women and slaves are upon the same footing with their husbands and masters; and where even the dogs and horses

march directly onwards, and refuse to give way to a citizen. The common mutation of things from one extreme to another.

P. 564. The division of those who bear sway in a democracy into three kinds: 1. The busy, bold, and active poor, who are ready to undertake and execute any thing; 2. The idle and insignificant poor, who follow the former, and serve to make a number and a noise in the popular assemblies; and 3. The middling sort, who earn their bread by their labour, and have naturally little inclination to public affairs, nor are easily brought together, but when allured by the hopes of some gain, yet, when collected, are the strongest party of all. The conversion of a demagogue into a tyrant, from necessity and from fear, the steps which he takes to attain the supreme power, the policy of tyrants, and the misery of their condition, are excellently described.

P. 568. The accusation of the tragic poets, as inspiring a love of tyranny, and patronized by tyrants; they are encouraged also in democracies, and are little esteemed in better governments.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 544. The Cretan.] Lycurgus borrowed his constitution from that of the Cretans, as Herodotus, Strabo, Plutarch, and other writers, allow; and it is plain, that Plato thought it the best form of government that any where existed, which seems indeed to have been the general opinion of the greatest men in Greece.

P. 547. Dwellers around and domestics.] The Lacedæmonians gave the name of *Περίοικοι*, "Dwellers around," to their subjects, the inhabitants of Laconia, who were not Spartans. As they were used, I imagine, hardly enough by their superiors, and had no share in the government, many authors do not distinguish them from the Heliotæ, who were absolutely slaves; yet, in reality, they seem to have been on a distinct footing, being reckoned free men, and employed by the Spartan government to command such troops as they often send abroad, consisting of Heliotæ, to whom they had given their liberty. The *Περίοικοι* likewise seem to have had the property of lands, for when Lycurgus divided the country into thirty thousand portions, and gave nine thousand of them to the Spartans, to whom did the other twenty-one thousand portions belong, unless to the *Περίοικοι*? who else should people the hundred cities, besides villages, which were once in Laconia? It is plain also, that the *Περίοικοι* served in war, as *ὀπλίται*, "heavy-armed foot," which the Heliotæ never did, as we learn from Thucydides, iv. p. 238, and as in the battle of Platææ, according to Herodotus in ix. 29, there were ten thousand Lacedæmonians, of which five thousand were Spartans; it follows, that the other five thousand were *Περίοικοι*; for he mentions the Heliotæ by themselves, as light-armed troops in number thirty-five thousand, that is, seven to each Spartan; and Xenophon, in Lacedæmon. Republ. p. 289, and Græc. Hist. i. p. 256, plainly distinguishes the *Ἱππομεινέες*, who were Spartans, but excluded from the magistracy, the *Νεοδαμῶνεις*, who were Heliotæ

made free, the Heliotes, and the *Πελοποννησιοί*. See also Isocrates in Panegy. p. 11, and in Panathen. p. 270. The Cretans called their slaves, who cultivated the lands, *Πελοποννησιοί*. See Aristot. Polit. ii. c. 10

BOOK IX.

HEADS OF THE NINTH DIALOGUE.

P. 571. The worst and most lawless of our unnecessary desires are described, which are particularly active in sleep, when we go to our repose after drinking freely, or eating a full meal.

P. 572. The transition of the mind from a democratic to a tyrannical constitution. Debauchery, and what is called love, are the great instruments of this change. Lust and drunkenness, names for two different sorts of madness, between them produce a tyrant.

P. 573. Our desires from indulgence grow stronger and more numerous. Extravagance naturally leads to want, which will be supplied either by fraud or by violence.

P. 575. In states in which there are but a few persons of this turn, and the body of the people are uncorrupted, they usually leave their own country, and enter into the guards of some foreign prince, or serve him in his wars: or, if they have not this opportunity, they stay at home and turn informers, false evidences, highwaymen, and housebreakers, cut-purses, and such characters; but, if they are numerous and strong, they form a party against the laws and liberties of the people, set at their head commonly the worst among them, and erect a despotic government.

The behaviour of a tyrannical nature in private life; unacquainted with friendship, always domineering over, or servilely flattering, his companions.

P. 577. The comparison between a state enslaved, and the mind of a tyrant. The servitude, the poverty, the fears, and the anguish of such a mind are described; and it is proved to be the most miserable of human creatures.

P. 578. The condition of any private man of fortune, who has fifty or more slaves. Such a man with his effects, wife and family, supposed to be separated from the state and his fellow-citizens, in which his security consists, and placed in a desert country at some distance, surrounded with a people, who look upon it as a crime to enslave one's fellow-creatures, and are ready to favour any conspiracy of his servants against him: how anxious and how intolerable would be his condition! Such, and still worse, is that of a tyrant.

P. 581. The pleasures of knowledge and of philosophy are

proved to be superior to those which result from honour or from gain, and from the satisfaction of our appetites. The wise man, the ambitious man, the man of wealth and pleasure, will each of them give the preference to his favourite pursuit, and will undervalue that of the others, but experience is the only proper judge which can decide the question, and the wise man alone possesses that experience; the necessity of his nature must have acquainted him with the pleasure which arises from satisfying our appetites. Honour and the public esteem will be the consequence of his life and studies, as well as of the opulent or of the ambitious man; so that he is equally qualified with them to judge of their pleasures, but not they of his, which they have never experienced.

P. 584. Most of our sensual joys are only a cessation from uneasiness and pain, as are the eager hopes and expectations which attend them. A fine image is drawn of the ordinary life of mankind, of their sordid pursuits, and of their contemptible passions.

P. 588. The recapitulation, and conclusion, that the height of injustice and of wickedness is the height of misery.

P. 590. The intention of all education and laws is to subject the brutal part of our nature to the rational. A scheme of life, worthy of a philosophic mind, is laid down.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 578. Fifty slaves.] The more wealthy Greeks had very large families of slaves. In Athens the number of slaves was to that of citizens as 20 to 1: the latter being about 21,000; the former, 400,000. Mnaso of Phocis, a friend of Aristotle, had 1000 slaves or more, as had likewise Nicias, the famous Athenian. In Corinth, there were reckoned 460,000 slaves; at Ægina, above 470,000; and many a Roman had in his own service above 20,000: this was a computation made Ol. 110, by Demetrius Phalereus.

BOOK X.

HEADS OF THE TENTH DIALOGUE.

P. 595. Plato's apology for himself. His reasons for banishing all imitative poetry from his republic: 1. Because it represents things not as they really are, but as they appear; 2. The wisdom of the poets is not equal to their reputation; 3. There is no example of a state having been better regulated, or of a war better conducted, or of an art improved, by any poet's instructions; and 4. There is no plan of education laid down, no sect nor school found-

ed, even by Homer and the most considerable of the poets, as by the philosophers.

P. 602. Their art concurs with the senses to deceive us and to draw off the mind from right reason, it excites and increases the empire of the passions, enervates our resolution, and seduces us by the power of ill example.

P. 604. The passions and vices are easy to imitate by reason of their variety; but the cool, uniform, and simple character of virtue is very difficult to draw, so as to touch or delight a theatre, or any other mixed assembly of men.

P. 607. The power of numbers and of expression over the soul is great, which renders poetry more particularly dangerous.

P. 608. Having shown that virtue is most eligible on its own account, even when destitute of all external rewards, he now comes to explain the happiness which waits upon it in another life, as well as in the present. The immortality of the soul and a state of future rewards and of future punishments are asserted.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 595. Plato professes a great admiration, even from a child, for Homer, but yet is forced to exclude him from his commonwealth, for a man is not to be held in honour before truth. The Greeks had carried their admiration for Homer to a high pitch of enthusiasm in Plato's time: it was he, they said, who first had formed Greece to knowledge and humanity; and in him were contained all the arts, all morality, politics, and divinity.

P. 600. Εἰς τίχνας.] Thales is said to have discovered the annual course of the sun in the ecliptic, and to have made several improvements in astronomy and geometry. To Anacharsis is ascribed the invention of anchors, and of the potter's wheel. See Diog. Laertius.

P. 608. By Zeus, not I.] Is it possible that the immortality of the soul should be a doctrine so unusual, and so little known at Athens, as to cause this surprise in Glauco?—Yet in the Phædo likewise, p. 70, Cebes treats this point in the same manner.

P. 611. Like those who see Glaucus.] He speaks as if this divinity were sometimes actually visible to seafaring men, all covered with seaweed and shells.

P. 614. The story of Er, the Pamphylian, who, when he had lain twelve days dead in appearance on the field of battle, and was placed on the funeral pile, came to life again, and related all he had seen in the other world. The judgment of souls, their progress of a thousand years through the regions of bliss or of misery, the eternal punishment of tyrants, and of others guilty of enormous crimes, in Tartarus, the spindle of Necessity, which turns the eight spheres, and the employment of her three daughters, the Fates, are all described, with the allotment and choice of lives (either in human bodies, or in those of brute animals) permitted to those spirits who are again to appear on earth; as of Orpheus.

who chooses that of a swan, Ajax, of a lion, Thersites, of a monkey, Ulysses, that of an obscure private man, &c. : their passage over the river Lethe is also mentioned. The whole fable is finely written.

Milton alludes to the spindle of Necessity in his entertainment called the *Arcades*. Virgil has also imitated many parts of the fable in his sixth *Æneid*, and Tully in the *Somnium Scipionis*. See Macrobian. i. c. 1.

THE LAWS.

THE persons of the dialogue are Clinias, a Cretan of Gnosus, and two strangers, who are his guests, the one a Lacedæmonian, called Megillus, the other an Athenian, who is not named, but who appears by the character and sentiments to be Plato himself. See Diog. Laert. iii. 52. They are, all three, men far advanced in years, and as they walk or repose themselves in the fields under the shade of ancient cypress trees, which grew to a great bulk and beauty, in the way that led from the city of Gnosus to the temple and grotto of Jupiter, (where Minos was believed to have received his laws from the god himself,) they enter into conversation on the policy and constitution of the Cretans.

There is no præmium nor introduction to the dialogue, as there is to most of Plato's writings. I speak of that kind of præmium usual with Plato, which informs us often of the occasion and of the time of the dialogue, and of the characters of the persons introduced in it. In reality the entire four first books of "the Laws" are but introductory to the main subject, as he tells us himself in the end of the fourth book, p. 722.

BOOK I.

HEADS OF THE FIRST DIALOGUE.

P. 625. The institutions of Minos were principally directed to form the citizens to war. The great advantages of a people superior in military skill over the rest of mankind are stated. Every people is naturally in a state of war with its neighbours; even particular cities, nay, private families, are in a like situation within themselves, where the better and more rational part are always contending for that superiority which is their due, over the lower

and the less reasonable. An internal war is maintained in the breast of each particular man, who labours to subdue himself by establishing the empire of reason over his passions and his desires.

P. 628. A legislator, who makes it the great end of his constitution to form the nation to war, is shown to be inferior to him who reconciles the members of it among themselves, and prevents intestine tumults and divisions.

P. 631. The view of the true lawgiver is to train the mind and manners of his people to the virtues in their order, that is, to wisdom, to temperance, and to justice, and, in the fourth place, to valour. The method he ought to lay down in the disposition of his laws is stated.

P. 634. The fault of the Cretan and of the Lacedæmonian laws is, that they do not fortify the soul as well against pleasure as against pain. Youth is not permitted to examine into the rectitude of those laws by which they are governed, nor to dispute about them; this is the privilege of age, and only to be practised in private.

P. 636, § 8. The division of the citizens into companies, called *Zeuxaria*, which daily assembled to eat together in public, was apt to create seditions and conspiracies. The regular naked exercises of the youth were often the cause of an unnatural passion among them. Crete and Lacedæmon are blamed particularly on this account.

P. 636, § 9. Pleasure and pain are the two great sources of all human actions: the skill of a legislator consists in managing and opposing one of them to the other.

P. 639. The use of wine, when under a proper direction, in the education of youth.

P. 642. An apology for his own garrulity and diffuseness, which is the characteristic of an Athenian.

P. 643. The nature and intent of education.

P. 644. Mankind are compared to puppets: but whether they are formed by the gods for their diversion, or for some more serious purpose, (he says,) is uncertain. Their pleasures and pains, their hopes and fears, are the springs which move them, and often draw contrary ways at once. Reason is the master-spring which ought to determine their motions; but as this draws gently and never uses violence, some of the passions must be called to its aid, which may give it strength to resist the force of the others.

P. 645. The effects of wine upon the soul: it heightens all our passions and diminishes our understanding, that is, in reality, it reduces us again to childhood. As physicians, for the sake of our body, give us certain potions, which for a time create sickness and pain in us, and put our whole frame into disorder; so possibly might the legislator, by a singular experiment, make wine subservient to a good purpose in education, and, without either pain

or danger, put the prudence, the modesty, and the temper of youth to the trial, and see how far they could resist the disorder of the mind which is naturally produced by this liquor.

P. 647, § 14. The fear of dishonour is opposed to the fear of pain; the first is a great instrument in the hands of a wise legislator to suppress and to conquer the latter.

P. 647, § 15. If there were any drug or composition known that would inspire us with fear and with dejection of spirits, for the time its influence lasted, what need would there be of fatiguing our youth with long laborious exercises, or of exposing them in battle to real danger, in order to fortify the soul against the attacks of fear and of pain? This draught alone, properly applied, would be a sufficient trial of our valour under the eye of the magistrate, who might confer honour and disgrace on a youth, according to his behaviour during the operation. Unluckily, there is no such drug discovered; but there is a potion which exalts our spirits, and kindles in the mind insolence, and imprudence, and lust, and every fiercer passion, while it lays open to view our ignorance, our avarice, and our cowardice. Why should we wait till these vices exert themselves into real action, and produce their several mischiefs in society; when, by a well-regulated use of this liquor, we might, without danger, discover them lurking in the disposition of youth, and suppress them even in their infancy?

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 629. *Διαβάντες δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν*.] The Spartans, when they passed the frontier of their own state to enter into the territory of an enemy, always performed sacrifice; and if the victims proved inauspicious, they retired, and gave over their enterprise.

P. 630. Of the mercenaries.] In Plato's time, about Ol. 106, and soon after, the intestine tumults in the Greek cities, joined to a sort of fashion, which prevailed, of going to seek their fortune in a foreign service, had so depopulated Greece, that Isocrates tells Philip of Macedon, that he might form a better and stronger army out of these mercenaries, than he could out of the citizens themselves, who continued in their own country. The strength of the Persian king's armies was entirely composed of these Greeks, as was that of his enemies also, the kings of Egypt and of Cyprus, and the revolted viceroys in Asia Minor. They were also employed by Athens, and by other states of Greece, to save their own troops; so that the Athenian heavy-armed infantry now consisted of mercenaries, though the citizens themselves served as rowers on board the fleet; just contrary to what had been the ancient practice, when the ships were manned by foreigners and slaves, and the Athenians themselves were the heavy-armed.

P. 636. *Ἐκτερόδυμα*.] This seems to me to be the nominative, and *Νόμῳ* the accusative; and the sense will thus be, "This practice (of exercising constantly naked) appears to me to have weakened greatly

that ancient and natural law, by which the pleasures of love, not only among human creatures, but even in the brute creation (mutually belong to the two sexes)." This is a remarkable passage: and Tully judges in the same manner of these exercises. How far the Cretans indulged their passions in the way here mentioned, may be seen in Ephorus, quoted by Strabo x. The purity of manners at Sparta is strongly asserted by Xenophon, *De Lacedæmon. Republ.* p. 395, and by Plutarch in *Lycurgus*; but here is a testimony on the other side at least of equal authority.

P. 637. *Ὀρχὴν ἐν ἀμαξίαις.*] A sort of drunken farces performed in the villages of Attica, during the Dionysia, which seem to be the origin of the ancient comedy and tragedy. Hence the proverb, *Ἐξ ἀμαξίας λέγειν*: and hence, too, Aristophanes gives the name of *Τραγωδία* to comedy. *Acharnenses*, vs. 498, 499, and 627. They seem to have still continued in use in the country.

P. 642. The hearth of our city.] As each private family had its Vesta, to whom the hearth was particularly sacred, so that of the public was seated in the Prytaneum, as we learn from Pindar, *Nem. Od.* 11; where in most cities a perpetual lamp was kept burning in honour of this goddess: and as every private family of rank had their *Πρόξενoi*, "public hosts," in several cities of Greece, with whom they were connected by the ties of hospitality, and in whose houses they were lodged and entertained, so cities themselves had a like connexion with each other; and there were public *Πρόξενoi* nominated to receive and to defray the expenses of such as came on business from other cities in alliance with them.

P. 647. *Αἰδῶ.*] This is, what we call honour, that is, the fear of shame; and which is left to supply, as well as it can, the place of all the virtues among us. Plato calls this sentiment, in p. 674, *θεῖος φόβος*, "a divine fear." Montesquieu makes it the grand principle of monarchical governments, in *L'Esprit des Loix*, i. 6, and in France its effects are most conspicuous.

BOOK II.

HEADS OF THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

P. 653. The great purpose of a right education is, to fix in the mind an early habit of associating its ideas of pleasure and of desire with its ideas of virtue, and those of pain and aversion with that of vice: so that reason, when it comes to maturity, and happy are they with whom, even in their old age, it does come to maturity! may look back with satisfaction, and may approve the useful prejudices instilled into the soul in its infancy.

The early inclination of children to noise and motion is noticed, which, when reduced to order and symmetry, produce harmony and grace, which are two pleasures known only to humankind. The origin of music and of the dance.

P. 655. In what kind of imitation their true beauty consists. Every sound, or movement, or attitude, which naturally accom-

panies and expresses any virtue, or any laudable endowment of mind and of body, is beautiful, as the contrary is deformed and unpleasing. The error of such as make pleasure the sole end of these arts.

Reasons for the diversity of men's taste and judgment in them are assigned. Some from having been early depraved, and little accustomed to what is lovely, come to approve and take delight in deformity: others applaud what is noble and graceful, but feel no pleasure from it, either because their mind has a natural depravity in it, though their education has been good, or because their principles are right, but their habits and practice have not been conformable to them. The danger of this last defect is stated, when men delight in what their judgment disapproves.

P. 657. The restraint, which ought to be laid on poets in all well-disciplined states, is named. Musicians in Egypt¹ were confined by law, even from the remotest antiquity, to certain simple species of melody, and the painters and sculptors to some peculiar standards for their measures and attitudes, from which they were not to deviate.

P. 658. A reflection on the usual wrong determinations of the persons appointed to judge of their musical and poetical entertainments at Athens, who, though they took an oath to decide impartially, were biased, either through fear or from the affectation of popularity, by the opinion of the crowd; whereas they ought to have considered themselves as masters and directors of the public taste. From this weakness arose the corruption of their theatrical entertainments. In Italy and in Sicily the victory was adjudged by the whole audience to that poet who had the greatest number of hands held up for him.

P. 659. The manners, exhibited in a drama to the people, ought always to be better than their own.

P. 662. The morality inculcated by the poets, even in Sparta and in Crete, where all innovations were by law forbidden, was defective enough. What sentiments they ought to inspire. Plato's² great principles are explained, namely, that happiness is inseparable from virtue and misery from wickedness, and that the latter is rather an error of the judgment than of the will.

P. 663. If these opinions were actually as false, as they are immutably founded on truth, yet a wise lawgiver would think

¹ This will account for the little improvement the Egyptians ever made in the fine arts, though they were perhaps the inventors of them: for undoubtedly the advancement and perfection of these things, as well as their corruption, are entirely owing to liberty and innovation.

² Aristotle looked upon this as the distinguishing part of Plato's doctrine; as we see from a fragment of his elegy to Eudemus, preserved in Olympiodorus's commentary on the Gorgias.

himself obliged to inculcate them as true, by every method possible.

It is easy to persuade men, even of the most absurd fiction; how much more of an undoubted truth!

P. 664. The institution of the three choruses, which are to repeat in verse, accompanied with music and with dances, these great principles of society, and to fix them in the belief of the public: the first chorus is composed of boys under eighteen, and sacred to the Muses; the second, from that age to thirty, and sacred to Apollo; the third, to Bacchus, consisting of all from thirty to sixty years of age.

P. 666. The use of wine is forbidden to boys: it is allowed, but very moderately, to men under thirty; after that age, with less restraint: the good effects of it in old age are mentioned.

P. 667. The principles and qualifications which are required in such as are fit to judge of poetry, and of the other imitative arts.

P. 669. Instrumental music by itself, which serves not to accompany the voice, is condemned, as uncertain and indefinite in its expression. The three arts of poetry, of music, and of the dance, (or action,) were not made to be separated.

P. 671. The regulation of entertainments, with the manner of presiding at them, is enforced; without which the drinking of wine ought not to be permitted at all, or in a very small degree.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 658. It is here said, that puppet-shows and jugglers' tricks are best accommodated to the taste of young children; as comedy is to that of bigger boys, tragedy to that of young men, and of the women of the better sort, and of the bulk of the people in general, and the rhapsodi to that of the older and wiser sort.

P. 665. After practising their voices.] The singers in these choruses were subjected to a course of abstinence and of physic, for a considerable time before they put their voices to the trial. See Antipho. Orat. de Cæde Choreut.

BOOK III.

HEADS OF THE THIRD DIALOGUE.

P. 676. The immense antiquity of the earth, and the innumerable changes it has undergone in the course of ages. Mankind are generally believed to have been often destroyed, a very small remnant excepted, by inundation and by pestilence.

The supposition of a handful of men, probably shepherds, who

were feeding their cattle on the mountains, and were there preserved with their families from a general deluge, which had overwhelmed all the cities and inhabitants of the country below.

P. 677. The destruction of arts and sciences, with their slow and gradual revival among this infant society, is nobly described.

P. 680. The beginnings of government: the paternal way first in use, which he calls the justest of all monarchies. Assemblies of different families agree to descend from the mountain-tops, and to settle in the hill-country below them; and as each of them has a head or a prince of its own, and customs in which it has been brought up, it will be necessary to describe certain laws in common, and to settle a kind of senate, or of aristocracy.

P. 683. The causes of the increase and declension of states, are exemplified in the history of Sparta, Messene, and Argos. The original league between the three kingdoms founded by the Heraclidæ, and the mutual engagements entered into by the several kings and by their people, are stated.

P. 684. The easiness of establishing an equality of property in a new conquest, which is so difficult for a legislator to accomplish, who would give a better form to a government already established.

P. 688. States are destroyed, not so much for the want of valour and of conduct, as for the want of virtue, which only is true wisdom. The greatest and the most pernicious of all ignorance is, when we do not love what we approve.

P. 691. Absolute power, unaccountable to any and uncontrolled, is not to be supported by any mortal man. The aiming at this was the destruction of the Argive and Messenian monarchs. That which probably preserved the Lacedæmonian state, was the originally lodging the regal power in the hands of two; then the institution of the senate by Lycurgus; and lastly, that of the Ephori by Theopompus. Had the three kingdoms been united and governed in the Spartan manner, the Persian king would never have dared to invade Greece: his repulse was entirely due to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and not to the common efforts of the Greeks.

P. 693. The two great forms of government, from which all the rest are derived, are monarchy and democracy: Persia is an example of the first carried to its height, and Athens an example of the latter. The best constitution is formed out of both.

P. 694. The reason of the variations observable in the Persian power is given; the different administration of different princes, who succeeded one another, and the cause of it, is accounted for from their education. The care of Cyrus's children, while he was abroad in the field, was trusted entirely to the women, who bred them up in high notions of that grandeur to which they were to succeed, and in the effeminate and luxurious manners of the Medes.

Darius, who succeeded them, had been bred as a private soldier, and he restored the declining empire to its former greatness. Xerxes, his son, brought up as great princes usually are, by his folly weakened it again, and ever since it has been growing worse and worse.

P. 696. Honour is the proper reward of virtue only; in what manner it ought to be distributed in a well-regulated state.

P. 697. The impossibility is stated of any government's subsisting long, where the people are enemies to the administration, which, where despotism in its full extent prevails, must always be the case.

P. 698. A picture of the reverse of this, a complete democracy, as at Athens. The constitution of that state was different before the Persian invasion. The reasons for their distinguished bravery on that occasion. An account of the change introduced in their music, and the progress of liberty, or rather of licence, among them.

P. 701. The great aim of a legislator is to inspire liberty, wisdom, and concord. Clinias, being appointed with nine other citizens to superintend and to form a body of laws for a new colony they are going to settle, asks advice of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian strangers on that head.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 677. 'Ο, τι μὲν γὰρ μυριάκις.] I imagine he means to say, "For, without supposing some such destruction as this, how can we account for all the useful arts among mankind, invented, as it were but yesterday, or, at farthest, not above two thousand years old? It is impossible that men in those times should have been utterly ignorant of all which had passed so many thousand ages, unless all records, and monuments, and remains of their improvements and discoveries had perished." Compare Lucret. v. 329.

BOOK IV.

HEADS OF THE FOURTH DIALOGUE.

P. 704. The advantages and disadvantages arising from the situation of a city, and the great difficulty of preserving the constitution and the morals of a maritime and trading state, are described.

P. 706. The manner of carrying on a war by sea is unworthy of a brave and free people; it impairs their valour, depends too much on the lower and more mechanic arts, and is hardly ever decisive. The battles of Artemisium and of Salamis could not have pre-

served Greece, as it has been commonly thought, from the Persians, had they not been defeated in the action at Plataeæ.

P. 708. The difficulties which attend new colonies, if sent out by a single city, are stated: they will more hardly submit to a new discipline, and to laws different from those of their native country: but then they concur more readily in one design, and act with more strength and uniformity among themselves. If they are collected from various states, they are weak and disjointed, but more apt to receive such forms and impressions as a legislator would give them.

The constitution of states and of their laws is owing more to nature, or to chance, or to the concurrence of various accidents, than to human foresight: yet the wise lawgiver will not therefore despair, but will accommodate his art to the various circumstances and opportunities of things. The mariner cannot command the winds and the waves, yet he can watch his advantages, and make the best use possible of both, for the expedition and security of his voyage.

P. 709. The greatest advantage which a lawgiver can ever meet with is, when he is supported by an arbitrary prince, young, sober, and of good understanding, generous and brave; the second lucky opportunity is, when he can find a limited monarch of like disposition to concur in his designs; the third is, when he can unite himself to the leading men in some popular government; and the fourth and most difficult is, in an oligarchy.

P. 711. The character and manners of a whole people, in a despotic government, are easily changed by the encouragement and by the example of their prince.

P. 712. The best governments are of a mixed kind, and are not reducible to any of the common forms. Thus those of Crete and of Sparta were neither tyrannical, nor monarchical, nor aristocratical, nor democratical, but had something of all these.

P. 713. The fable of the Saturnian age is introduced, when the gods or dæmons in person reigned over mankind. No mortal nature is fit to be trusted with an absolute power of commanding its fellow-creatures: and therefore the law, that is, pure reason, divested of all human passions and appetites, the part of man which most resembles the divinity, ought alone to be implicitly obeyed in a well-governed state.

P. 715. The first address to the citizens of the new colony, is to inculcate the belief of providence and of divine justice, humility, moderation, obedience to the laws, and piety to the gods and to parents: this should be by way of procemium to the laws; for freemen are not to be treated like slaves; they are to be taught and to be persuaded, before they are threatened and punished.

P. 721. The laws of marriage, and the reasons and inducements to observe them, are stated.

P. 722. The necessity and the nature of general and of particular introductions are stated.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 704. The great advantage of a maritime power with respect to its influence, its commerce and riches, its politeness of manners and language, and the enjoyment of every pleasure and convenience of life, are admirably explained by Xenophon in *Athen. Republ.* p. 201, who considers it in every light, in which Montesquieu and the best modern political writers would do. But Plato extended his views farther. He never regarded statesmanship as the art of preserving mankind in a certain form of society, or of securing their property or their pleasures, or of enlarging their power, unless so far as all these were consistent with the preservation of their virtue, and of that happiness which is the natural result of it. Isocrates, in *Panathen.* p. 256, is constrained to own, that when Athens became a great naval power, she was forced to sacrifice her good order and morals to her ambition; although he justifies her for doing so from necessity; but in the *Orat. on Peace*, p. 174, he speaks his mind more freely, and shows that the dominion of the sea was every way the ruin of the Athenians, and afterwards of the Lacedæmonians.

P. 714. Conducive to the continuance of its own power.] This was the doctrine of Thrasymachus, and it is in appearance that of Montesquieu in his *Esprit des Loix*; but this great man did not dare to speak his mind, in a country almost despotically governed, without disguise. Let any one see the amiable picture which Montesquieu draws of freer governments, and, in contrast to it, his idea of a court, and they will not be at a loss to know his real sentiments. That constitution and policy which is founded, as he says himself, on every virtue, must be the only one worthy of human nature.

BOOK V.

HEADS OF THE FIFTH DIALOGUE.

P. 726. After showing the reason of that duty, which men owe to the gods and to their parents, he comes to that, which we owe to ourselves; and first, of the reverence due to our own soul; that it consists not in flattering its vanity, nor indulging its pleasures, nor in soothing its indolence, nor in satisfying its avarice.

P. 729. The second honours are due to our body, whose perfection is not placed in excess of strength, of bulk, of swiftness, of beauty, nor even of health, but in a mediocrity of all these qualities; for a redundancy, or a deficiency, in any one of them is always prejudicial to the mind.

The same holds with regard to fortune. The folly of heaping

up riches for our children is exposed, as the only valuable inheritance which we can leave them is a respect for virtue. The reverence due to youth is inculcated. True education consists not in precept, but in example.

The duty to relations and to friends: strict justice, hospitality, and compassion, are due to strangers and foreigners, but above all to suppliants.

What is that habit of the mind which best becomes a man of honour and a good citizen. Veracity is the prime virtue. Justice consists in this; not only to do no injury, but to prevent others from doing any, and to assist the magistrate in punishing those who commit them. Temperance and wisdom: the persons who possess these or any other virtues deserve our praise; those who impart them to others, and multiply their influence, are worthy of double honours. The use of emulation in a state: the hatefulness of envy and detraction.

P. 731. Spirit and indignation are virtues, when employed against crimes and vices, which admit of no other cure than extreme severity: yet they are not inconsistent with lenity and tender compassion, when we consider that no man is voluntarily wicked, and that the fault is in his understanding, and not in his intention. The blindness of what is called self-love. Excessive joy and sorrow are equally condemned.

P. 733. A life of virtue is preferable to any other, even with respect to its pleasures. This passage is admirable.

P. 736. The method of purgation requisite in forming a society, in order to clear it of its noxious parts, either by punishments, or by sending out colonies.

P. 737. The number of citizens limited. Equal divisions of lands among them. The institution of temples and sacred rites, in which nothing of novelty is to be permitted nor the slightest alteration made; but ancient opinions and traditions are to be religiously followed. Festivals and general assemblies serve to familiarize the citizens to one another, and to bring the whole people acquainted with the temper and character of each particular man.

P. 739. The recommendation of his first scheme of government laid down in his *Republica*, v., p. 462, in which all things are in common; and the whole state, their possessions, their families, their passions, are so united as that they may all act together, like the faculties of a single person. The present scheme comes next to it in perfection.

The number of the shares allotted to the citizens is never to be diminished nor increased. Each man is to choose one among his sons who is to succeed to his portion; the rest to be given in adoption to those who have none of their own. The supreme magistrate

is to preside over this equality, and to preserve it. If the number of children exceed the number of shares, he may send out a colony; if it fall short, he may, in cases of great necessity, introduce the sons of foreigners. No alienation of lands to be permitted.

P. 741. The increase of fortune by commerce is to be prohibited, and the use of gold or silver small money, of a species not valued, nor in request with other people, only permitted for the ordinary uses of life. The common coin of Greece is to be in the hands of the public, or employed only on occasion of an embassy, or of an expedition into foreign states. No private person may go abroad without leave of the government; and if he bring back with him any foreign money, he must deposit it in the hands of the magistrate, or he, and all who are privy to the concealment, shall forfeit twice the value and incur disgrace.

P. 742. No securities shall be given among citizens in any case; no fortune paid on a marriage; no money lent on interest.

The folly of a legislator who thinks of making a great, a flourishing, a rich, and a happy state, without regard to the virtue of the inhabitants.

P. 743. The inconsistency of great wealth and of great virtue. The good men will never acquire any thing by unjust means, nor ever refuse to be at any expense on decent and honest occasions. He, therefore, who scruples not to acquire by fair and by unfair means, and will be at no expense on any occasion, must naturally be thrice as rich as the former. A good man will not lavish all he has in idle pleasures and prodigality; he will not therefore be very poor. Business and acquisition ought to employ no more of our time than may be spared from the improvement of our mind and of our body.

P. 744. A colony cannot be formed of men perfectly equal in point of fortune: it will be therefore necessary to divide the citizens into classes according to their circumstances, that they may pay impositions to the public service in proportion to them. The wealthier members are also, *cæteris paribus*, to be preferred before others to offices and dignities of expense; which will bring every one's fortune gradually to a level.

Four such classes to be instituted: the first worth the value of his land; the fourth, four times as much. Above or below this proportion no one is to go, on pain of forfeiture and disgrace: therefore, the substance of every man is to be publicly enrolled, under the inspection of a magistracy.

P. 745. The division of the country. Every man's lot is to consist of two half-shares, the one near the city, the other near the frontier: every one also is to have two houses, likewise within the city, the one near the midst of it, the other near the walls. The country is to be divided into twelve tribes, and the city into as

many regions; and each of them to be dedicated to its several divinity.

P. 746. An apology for this scheme, which to some will seem impracticable.

P. 747. The great difference of climates and of situations, and the sensible effects which they produce, not on the bodies alone, but on the souls of men, are stated.

[It is matter of just but unavailing regret that Mr. Gray proceeded no further in his analysis and annotations on the books of Plato *De Legibus*. The editor had once intended to endeavour to analyse the remaining five books; but, on the maturest consideration, a respect for the reader and for the memory of Mr. Gray prevented his attempting to offer any writing of his own, as a continuation of the work of so great and so consummate a master.

Perhaps, indeed, the reader may be inclined to consider this fragment in that point of view in which the elder Pliny, in language of refined eloquence, speaks of some productions of ancient art, as peculiarly interesting from the very circumstance of their being left unfinished; "*In lenocinio commendationis dolor est manūs, dum id ageret, extinctæ.*"—EDITOR.]

THE EPISTLES.

DIODEGENES Laertius, who lived probably about the time of Septimius Severus, in the catalogue he gives us of Plato's works, counts thirteen epistles, and enumerates their titles, by which they appear to be the same as those which we now have. Yet we are not thence to conclude them to be all genuine alike. Fictions of this kind are far more ancient than that author's time; and his judgment and accuracy were not sufficient to distinguish the true from the false, as plainly appears from those palpable forgeries, the letters of the seven sages, which yet easily passed upon him as genuine.

EPISTLE I. OL. 103, 2.

This letter is not from Plato, but from his favourite scholar, the famous Dion; nor is it possible that the philosopher himself could have any hand in it, he being with Dionysius at Syracuse, as he tells us himself, when Dion was forced away, and continuing there some time after. It is sent by Baccheus, who had conducted Dion on his way, together with a sum of money, which Dionysius had ordered to be given to him for his expenses, which he returns to the tyrant with much contempt. The spirit of it and the sentiments are not amiss; and yet it is not very consistent with the indignation which Dion must have felt, and with the suddenness of the occasion, to end his letter with three scraps of poetry, though never so well applied. To say the truth, I much doubt of this epistle, and the more so as it contradicts a fact in Plutarch, who assures us that at the very time when Dion was hurried away, his friends were permitted to load two ships with his wealth and furniture, and to transport them to him in Peloponnesus; besides which, his revenues were regularly remitted to him, till Plato went into Sicily for the last time, which was at least six years after.

EPISTLE II. OL. 105, 1.

This epistle appears to have been written soon after Plato's return from his third voyage to Syracuse, and the interview which he had with Dion at the Olympic games, which he himself mentions, *Epist. vii. p. 350*, and in this place also. Archedemus, who brought the letter from Dionysius, and returned with this answer, was a friend and follower of Archytas, the Pythagorean of Tarentum, as stated in *Epist. vii. p. 339, p. 521*, but was himself probably a Syracusan; at least he had a house in that city where Plato was lodged, after he had been turned out of the citadel, as shown in *p. 349*. He was sent on board a ship of war, with Dionysius's letters of invitation to Plato, wherein he pressed him to come the third time into Sicily, as a person well known and much esteemed by the philosopher, and he is mentioned as present in the gardens of the palace at an interview which Plato had with Dionysius, about three weeks before he returned home again. See *Epist. iii. p. 319*.

EPISTLE III. OL. 105, 4.

This epistle, like those to the friends of Dion afterwards, was apparently written to be made public, and is a justification of Plato's conduct, as well as an invective against the cruelty and falsehood of Dionysius. The beginning of the letter is a reproach, the more keen for being somewhat disguised; and in the rest of it he observes no longer any measures with the tyrant: whence I conclude that it was written after Dion's expedition against him was professedly begun, and perhaps after his entry into Syracuse, particularly from p. 315. But now that I have taught Dion to do these very things, &c.

EPISTLE IV. OL. 105, 4.

This was written probably the same year with the former, or the beginning of the next, on account of those differences which Dion had with Heraclides and his uncle Theodotes, who at last drove him out of Syracuse: their history may be seen in the 7th Epistle, and in Plutarch.

EPISTLE V. OL. 103, 4.

Perdiccas, the second son of Amyntas, succeeded to the crown of Macedon, after the death of his brother-in-law, Ptolemy of Alorus, OL 103, 4. There seem to have been ancient ties of hospitality and of friendship between the royal family of Macedon, from Archelaus's time, and the principal literati of Athens. Plato here recommends his friend and scholar, Euphræus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa, to be of Perdiccas's council, and his secretary. He grew into the highest favour with Perdiccas, and was trusted with the entire management of all his affairs. He used his power arbitrarily enough. Caristius, of Pergamus, quoted by Athenæus, xi. p. 506, and 508, gives the following instance of it, that he would not suffer any one to sit at the king's table who was ignorant of geometry or of philosophy. And yet to Plato and to Euphræus did the great Philip of Macedon owe his succession to the kingdom, as Speusippus writes in a letter to Philip reproaching him with his ingratitude, for by them was his brother Perdiccas persuaded to bestow on him some districts as an *appanage*, where, after his death, Philip was enabled to raise troops and to recover the kingdom. Euphræus, upon the death of his master, having

rendered himself hateful to the principal Macedonians, was obliged, as it seems, to retire into his own country; where, soon after Philip was settled on the throne, Parmenio was ordered to murder him.

Ficinus and H. Stephanus, finding in the margin of some manuscripts this fifth epistle ascribed to Dion and not to Plato, seem inclined to admit that correction, but without reason. Plato has in his other undoubted epistles spoken of himself, as he has done in this, in the third person. He is here apologizing for his recommendation of a man who was to have a share in the administration of a kingdom. Some may object, says he, "How should Plato be a competent judge, he who has never meddled in the government of his own country, nor thought himself fit to advise his own citizens?" He answers this by showing his reasons for such a conduct; but the last sentence is not at all clear. The thought is the very same with that in the 7th Epistle, p. 330, but some principal word seems to be omitted; perhaps after *δράσας δὲ* should be inserted *ἰατρικὸν ἀνδρα*, or *ἰατρὸν ἀγαθόν*.

EPISTLE VI.

This letter, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus in Strom. v., and by Origen contra Celsum vi., Menage, in Diog. Laert. iii., tells us is no longer extant among the epistles of Plato, and is supposed to be a fiction of the Christians. Bentley, in Phileluther. Lips., had reason to wonder at the negligence of that critic, who did not know that the epistle was still preserved: and he adds, that there is no cause to believe the letter not to be genuine, as there are passages in the Dialogues themselves as favourable to the Christian opinions as any thing in this epistle. The passage which those Fathers cite is at the end of the letter, and has indeed much the air of a forgery. I do not know any passages in the Dialogues equally suspicious; nor do I see why it might not be tacked to the end of an undoubtedly original letter: there is nothing else here but what seems genuine.

Erastus and Coriscus¹ were followers of Plato, and born at Scepsis, a city of Troas, seated on Mount Ida, not far from the sources of the Scamander and of the Æsepus; they seem to have

¹ See Strabo, xiii. p. 602, and 607. The Coriscus here mentioned has a son called Neleus, a follower of Aristotle and a particular friend of Theophrastus, who left his library, in which was contained all that Aristotle had ever written, in the original manuscript, to him when he died. It continued in the possession of his family at Scepsis, about one hundred and fifty years, when Apellicon of Teos purchased and transferred it to Athens, whence, soon after, Sylla carried it to Rome.

attained a principal authority in their little state, and Plato recommends to them here to cultivate the friendship of Hermias their neighbour, and sovereign of Assus and Atarneus, two strong towns on the coast of the Sinus Adramyttenus near the foot of Ida. Coriscus had also been scholar to Plato, though an eunuch, and slave to Eubulus, a Bithynian and a banker. His master, having found means to erect a little principality in the places before mentioned, made Hermias his heir. He gave his niece Pythias in marriage to Aristotle, who lived with him near three years, till Ol. 107, 4, about which time Memnon, the Rhodian general to the Persian king, by a base treachery got him into his hands, and sending him to court he was there hanged. See Strabo xiii. p. 610, and Suidas. Aristotle wrote his epitaph, and a beautiful ode or hymn in honour to his memory, which are still extant.

EPISTLE VII. OL. 105, 4.

Callippus, after the treacherous murder of Dion, was attacked in Syracuse by the friends of that great man, but they were worsted by him and his party; and being driven out they fled to the Leontini, and he maintained his power in the city for thirteen months, as we learn from Diodor. Sic. xvi. 36; until Hipparinus, nephew to Dion, and half-brother to Dionysius, found means to assemble troops; and while Callippus was engaged in the siege of Catana, he, at the head of Dion's party, re-entered Syracuse, and kept possession of it for two years. At the end of which time, Hipparinus in a drunken debauch was assassinated, but by whom I do not find; and his younger brother, Nysæus, succeeded to his power, and made the most arbitrary use of it for near five years; when Dionysius, returning from Locri, as stated by Plutarch in the Life of Timoleon, became once more master of Syracuse, and, as it seems, put Nysæus to death.

Who were the friends of Dion to whom Plato writes, it is hard to enumerate. The principal were his son Hipparinus, and his sister's son, likewise called Hipparinus, and his brother, Megacles, if living, though I rather imagine he had been killed in the course of the war before the death of Dion; and Nicetas, who afterwards was tyrant of the Leontines.

Plato was about forty years of age when first he came to Syracuse. His fortieth year was Ol. 97, 4.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 324. Relations and acquaintances.] Critias, a man as remarkable for the brightness of his parts as for the depravity of his manners and for the hardness of his heart, was Plato's second cousin by the mother's side; and Charmides, the son of Glauco, was his uncle, brother to his mother Perictione. The first was one of the Thirty, the latter one of the Ten, and both were slain in the same action. Plato's family were deeply engaged in the oligarchy; for Calleschrus, as we learn from Lysias in Eratosthen. p. 215, his great-uncle, had been a principal man in the Council of Four Hundred. (Ol. 92, l.) It is a strong proof of Plato's honesty and resolution, that his nearest relations could not seduce him to share in their power or in their crimes at that age. His uncle, though a great friend of Socrates and of a very amiable character, had not the same strength of mind.

Ib. Against one of the citizens.] The Thirty, during the short time of their magistracy, which was less than a year, put fifteen hundred persons to death, as we learn from Isocrates in Areopag. p. 153, most of whom were innocent, and they obliged about five thousand more to fly. The prisoner here meant was Leo, the Salaminian. See Apolog. p. 32.

P. 328. And not as some imagined.] Plato had been most severely reflected upon for passing his time at the court of Dionysius. Athenæus, whose book is highly valuable for the numberless fragments of excellent authors, now lost, of which it is composed, has preserved abundance of scandal on this head, in xi. p. 507. This and the third Epistle are Plato's justification of himself, and are written with a design to clear his character.

P. 342.] I know not what to say to this very uncommon opinion of Plato, that no philosopher should put either his system, or the method of attaining to a knowledge of it, into writing. The arguments he brings in support of it are obscure beyond my comprehension. All I conceive is, that he means to show how inadequate words are to express our ideas, and how poor a representation even our ideas are of the essence of things. What he says on the bad effects which a half-strained and superficial knowledge produces in ordinary minds, is certainly very just and very fine. See the Phædrus, p. 274—276, where he compares all written arts to the gardens of Adonis, which look gay and verdant, but, having no depth of earth, soon wither away. Lord Bacon, in Nov. Organ. i. 43 and 59, expresses himself strongly on this head. See Book i. App. 43 and 50, Bohn's Edition.

EPISTLE VIII. Ol. 105, 4.

From this Epistle, p. 364, it appears that Plato and Herodotus make Lycurgus the author of the institution of the Ephori, and not Theopompus, as later writers do. See Aristot. Politic. v. c. 11.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 353. Opici.] The ancient inhabitants of Campania, particularly that country which lies round the Bay of Naples. See Aristot. Politic. viii. 10. In a passage cited from Aristotle by Dionys. Halic. i. p. 57, he seems to extend the name to all the inhabitants of that coast to the south of the Tuscan. Aristotle mentions the Opici as the same people with the Ausones. But Polybius judged them to be a distinct people. See Strabo, v. p. 242. The Siculi probably might speak the same tongue, having been driven out of Italy, as we learn from Thucyd. vi., by these Opici some years after the Trojan war, and settling in a part of this island. This name grew into a term of reproach, which the more polished Greeks bestowed upon the Romans, as Cato the censor complains in Pliny, xxix. 1, "*Nos quoque dictant barbaros, et spurcius nos quam alios Opicos appellatione ferdant;*" and in time it became a Latin word to signify barbarous and illiterate.

P. 355. My own son.] This directly contradicts both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos, who particularly describe the tragical end of Hipparinus, Dion's son, when just arrived at man's estate. All that story, and the apparition which preceded it, must be false, if this epistle be genuine, which I see no reason, but this, for doubting. The only way to reconcile the matter is, by supposing that Plato might here mean the infant son of Dion, who was born after his father's death; and who was not yet destroyed by Hicetas, for Plutarch intimates, that he continued to treat both the child and its mother well for a considerable time after the expulsion of Callippus. What makes against this supposition is, that in the end of this letter, p. 357, he speaks of Dion's son, as of a person fit to judge of, and to approve, the scheme of government which he has proposed to all parties.

EPISTLE IX.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 358. Each of us is born not for himself alone, &c.] This fine sentiment is quoted by Cicero De Officiis, i. 7, and again, De Finibus, ii. 14, so that the 7th, the 4th, and this epistle, are of an authority not to be called in question.

EPISTLE XII.

This epistle is marked in the first editions of Plato as spurious: and so it is in a Vatican MS. Serranus sees mysteries here, where there are none. The same is said also of the 13th Epistle: but there seems no reason for it.

EPISTLE XIII. OL. 303, 3 or 4.

In order of time this is the second epistle in the collection. It is marked in the MSS. as spurious, and, I must own, it does little honour to Plato's memory; yet it is sure that Plutarch esteemed it genuine. He cites T. i. p. 966, E., a passage from it relating to Areté, the wife of Dion; and in T. ii. p. 474, D., he mentions the character of Helico the Cyzicenean, which is to be found here. I know not what to determine; unless we suppose some parts of it to be inserted afterwards by some idle sophist who was an enemy to Plato's character. It is observable, that Plutarch, in the place last mentioned, says it was written at the end of the epistle, whereas the words alluded to are here not far from the beginning. Possibly some fragments of the true epistle might remain, which were patched together and supplied by some trifler.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 362. The expensive linen of Amorgus.] The fine linen of Amorgos, of which they made tunics for women, was transparent. See Aristoph. Lysist. vss. 46, 150, and 736, where the Scholia call the plant of which the thread was made, ἡ λινωκαλάμη, and say, that it was in fineness *ὡς τὴν βύσσον, ἢ τὴν κάτρασον*: they were dyed of a bright red colour.

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